

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister, Republic of South Africa  
 Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Amb. Bernadus Gerhardus Fourie, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs  
 Amb. Roelof Frederik Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN  
 General Hendrik Johannes Van den Bergh, Director, Bureau for State Security; Security Adviser to the Prime Minister  
 Amb. Donald Sole, Ambassador to FRG  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
 William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs  
 Amb. William Bowdler, Ambassador to South Africa  
 Robert Funseth, Special Assistant to Secretary for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department  
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff Member **DWR**

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, June 23, 1976  
7:10 - 9:05 p.m. (Dinner)

PLACE: Hotel Bodenmais,  
Bodenmais,  
FRG

[The Prime Minister and Secretary conferred alone from approximately 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. The principals then joined their delegations for cocktails. At about 7:10 the dinner began. The Prime Minister began the meal by saying grace. The conversation then began. ]

Kissinger: I asked the Prime Minister whether he could give us his assessment of the Rhodesian situation -- the military situation and the prospects. We will give you our assessment but you, being closer, I'm sure study it more closely.



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BY [signature] NARA, DATE 4/2/04

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
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I can say I learned from the Prime Minister that there is a tribe in that is called Bastards.

Schaufele: We can give you new recruits!

Vorster: I said this to Waldheim and he nearly went through the roof. They call themselves Bastards and are insulted if you don't say, "Hello, Bastard." [Laughter]

Van den Bergh: It is literally true.

Kissinger: Do any speak German there?

Van den Bergh: Some older ones do.

Kissinger: What is the situation in Rhodesia?

Vorster: The situation in Rhodesia, Mr. Secretary, is, in a nutshell: Some people are inclined to think it's a fight between whites and blacks. But it's a fight between certain blacks and a group of whites and blacks. Two-thirds of the Rhodesian Army are blacks; volunteers, not conscripted. They're good fighters, as good as the others.

Kissinger: By "as good as the others" do you mean as good as the whites? Or as the other blacks?

Vorster: The other blacks. If the Cubans and Soviets stay out, the fight between 15,000 on the Rhodesian side and a few thousand terrorists can go on for 15 years.

Van den Bergh: Right. It could be forever and ever.


Kissinger: At what point -- since this is a psychological problem -- will the whites move out of the outlying farms into the cities, because their homes are insecure?

Vorster: Some will do it. But the morale of the people is very high. It's do or die for them. This is all they have.

Kissinger: But this doesn't preclude its becoming untenable. It happened in Angola.

Vorster: Don't equate the Portuguese settler with the Rhodesian farmer. That is a different kettle of fish.

Kissinger: Our estimate is they have 11,500 -- in training.



Schaufele: We estimate 3,500 already trained.

Vorster: But they're not even as well-trained as those who came in five years ago.

Kissinger: But in the history of guerrilla wars, the government always begins by trying to recruit the local population to fight the guerrillas.

Vorster: Here they hurt themselves by killing and maiming black women and children. The number of whites killed is very small. But hundreds of blacks have been killed and maimed.

Van den Bergh: And kidnapped.

Kissinger: But leaving aside the moral question, the example of Algeria -- where they were there longer -- guerrillas started by attacking the local population. At first they're outraged, then they're intimidated. The Government has to intensify measures. If they make reprisals, they lose their international position; if they don't, they lose the war.

So, with all respect, it seems to me to be the first phase of the war. At some point they reach a phase where, according to Mao, they swim in the sea of the population.

Vorster: But it's not at that phase. They can liquidate the terrorists, and they're doing quite well.

And the populace in Mozambique comes over to us for food. If they don't get it from us, they're starving.

Muller: They buy corn.

Vorster: Wheat and corn.

[Botha and Funseth arrive after giving a press briefing. See Tab A.]

Kissinger: Will the casualties begin to increase?

Vorster: They have increased already, on both sides, but more so on the terrorist side than on the Rhodesian side. We'll give you the figures.

Kissinger: But our estimate is that the ratio is declining. About three to one.

Van den Bergh: That is so.

Vorster: That's the civilian population; not just fighting men.

Schaufele: But they're aiming at the populace.

Van den Bergh: Most of the casualties are from the mines. They killed four black kids yesterday.

Kissinger: But I'm trying to be analytical. At what point will the settlers begin to abandon the outlying districts?

Vorster: The point has not yet been reached. But I'd mislead you if I said it wouldn't be.

Muller: But you have to realize the determination of the settlers.

Kissinger: But I'm just trying to understand. Don't you think at some point the people will start to leave?

Vorster: They're leaving now, and in increasing numbers. But they're not the people who count. They're the hangers-on. The Portuguese fought office hours -- 9 to 5. Not these.

Van den Bergh: There are no boats in the harbors.

Vorster: The Portuguese had boats in the harbors. Ready to go. These people aren't looking over their shoulders.

Lord: Are there blacks fighting with the whites?

Vorster: There are, and they're well-trained. The black man is no fool. He knows Machel promised a paradise and now it's going to hell. He says: "We've got jobs, so if that's the kind of paradise they have, we'll stay here."

Lord: Do you think Smith's strategy will be to give concessions?

Vorster: He has gotten jobs for them and made concessions. He created a commission to combat discrimination and accepted all the recommendations that count. He appointed seven black Ministers. That makes a difference.

Kissinger: Do they (the blacks) really know what's going on in Mozambique?

Vorster: There is a story about Mozambique -- there are no telegraph lines. A man shot a lion, and ten minutes later it was known fifty miles away.

Kissinger: How?

Botha: By bush telegraph.

Vorster: That's Africa.

Van den Bergh: It's the same tribe living on both sides of the border. One brother might be in Rhodesia and the other in Mozambique.

Vorster: I grew up on a farm. I spoke Xhosa before I spoke Afrikaans. They know exactly what goes on in Mozambique -- or Tanzania -- or Ethiopia. That's Africa.

Kissinger: Let's go back to Rhodesia. We get extremely different opinions. Some say the situation will begin to unravel by this time next year.

Vorster: Next year?

Kissinger: The cities won't be insecure, but the roads will be unsafe at night, etc. Some say two years. But all say it will happen at some point.

Vorster: We can't disprove that. We can't say it will happen, and we can't say it won't. Unless there is outside intervention I'll go along with you to some extent. I'll agree it's going to happen in X years, but I can't say two years.

Kissinger: By outside intervention do you mean officers, or actual troops?

Van den Bergh: Actual troops.

Kissinger: Why won't white officers make a difference?

Vorster: Because they'll be new and they will have a communications gap. And they won't know the psychology of the troops they're commanding. That makes a difference in Africa.

Van den Bergh: The blacks in Rhodesia know their white masters; they grew up with them on farms. They fought together as kids.

Kissinger: That was true in Algeria, too.

Schaufele: And Kenya.

Vorster: But the whites didn't fight in Kenya.

Schaufele: If the blacks can't fight, won't this encourage outside intervention?

Vorster: That is the million dollar question. Kaunda, for one, will be very wary of it because he's genuinely as afraid of Russian communists as you and I are.

Kissinger: But he may be equally afraid of not letting them in.

Vorster: I can tell you a story. I won't mention names, but it was a Southern African President. He said he didn't fear the Chinese but he did fear the Russians. I said my mother said "if you sup with the Devil, use a long spoon, and they're both devils." He said, "You're wrong. If you make a deal with the Chinese to build a machine, they'll come on the appointed day and ask our experts to come and they'll train our people. So if anything goes wrong with the machine, our people can handle it. That's the Chinese. The Russians will arrive on the appointed day and ask our people to clear off. They don't teach us a thing. They say that if we need help we should call them. And once they aid you they enslave you."

Kissinger: It just shows the Chinese are shrewder.

Botha: Yes.

Vorster: But the Chinese aren't a factor. It doesn't mean they won't be a factor in future.

Muller: Will they stay out of Rhodesia as they did in Angola?

Kissinger: I'm not sure. One could make a case for the proposition that having been humiliated indirectly in Angola, they might become more active in Rhodesia -- to ensure that what happens in Rhodesia doesn't happen under Russian tutelage.

Vorster: Not yet. There is no evidence at the moment. That doesn't mean it won't happen in future.

Muller: Isn't it clear that they (the Chinese) want to remain on good terms with the U.S.?

Kissinger: They do; in fact they were ready to help in Angola if we could have kept up a front.

Muller: If they intervened, wouldn't it interfere with good relations with the U.S.?

Kissinger: With advisers -- I'll be honest -- I'm not sure it would interfere with good relations. Troops, yes.

Vorster: The Russians might say to the terrorists: "If you get involved with the Chinese, count us out."

Kissinger: Really?

Van den Bergh: The Chinese have no say in Rhodesia now.

Vorster: I think the Russians laid down the law. All their weapons are Russian.

Van den Bergh: Except the Chinese train terrorists in Tanzania. You shouldn't get the impression we think white Rhodesia will find it easy.

Vorster: No, I made that point to the Secretary in our talk. And it will get harder for them.

Van den Bergh: And it depends on whether Botswana needs the railway line.

Schaufele: I thought Botswana allowed the terrorists to leave Rhodesia through Botswana.

Vorster: That they allow. They look the otherway.

Muller: They don't have the police force to control it.

Schaufele: Will you help them?

Vorster: We help Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho. It's really a closer union than the European Common Market.

Fourie: There is an understanding that if the line is interrupted -- it's a Rhodesian line -- we will help them.

Kissinger: "Help" means?

Fourie: It means if the line is cut in Botswana without cooperation with Botswana and they have no communications, South Africa will help. But if that situation is brought about only without Botswana's cooperation. The line is operated through Botswana to the Republic and Botswana can't operate it itself.

Vorster: It would be worthwhile to give Dr. Kissinger the Mozambique situation in a nutshell.

Fourie: Mozambique for us is essential, but the railway if not used by us is inoperative.

From the Mozambique side, there is every desire to encourage the use of the port up to the maximum. There is a similar desire on our side, and there is cooperation on the technical level and other levels.

Kissinger: For South African goods?

Fourie: Everything.

Vorster: It's operative to the extent of 70% at the moment.

Fourie: Compared to the situation before independence.

Vorster: And there is the Mozambique Labor Agreement.

Fourie: Two weeks ago we had a discussion with the Mozambique people. There were various difficulties, and they agreed to have our people come there to put things right. If they couldn't fix it themselves we could send our people there to do it. And the South African Railway Association is prepared even to fly people in.

Schaufele: They lost the harbor pilots.

Fourie: They've got qualified people coming in, and some Portuguese have decided to stay. So the situation will not throttle the harbor.

They've got three sources of income: the harbor and port, the mines, and the Cabora Bassa situation.

Muller: The hydroelectric power.

Fourie: In the gold mines alone, we employ 90,000.

Kissinger: Where are the mines?

Fourie: Near Johannesburg.

Vorster: Tell him how they're paid.



Fourie: By an arrangement we made with the Portuguese, they're paid by us in gold. We keep part of it for them when they return, at the market price, and sell it for them -- at the world price. Your set price.

Kissinger: You blame us for everything. [Laughter].

Fourie: Our reserve bank sells it on their behalf -- Mozambique's behalf.

Muller: They trust us to sell it on their behalf.

Funseth: You sell it for the individual worker?

Fourie: The workers get their shares -- at \$42 a share--and we sell it at the world price, and the Government of Mozambique gets the difference.

Kissinger: Not a bad arbitrage.

Muller: Tell the Secretary what the Cabora Bassa is.

Fourie: Cabora Bassa is a hydroelectric dam. It has a 80-90,000 milliwatt capacity, and a surplus of 1800 milliwatts. If they don't sell it to us, it's a white elephant. The moment we cutt off the power, Mozambique is out of power to the tune of 80-90 per cent, because we supply most of it to them.

Muller: And they don't worry about it. They trust us.

Kissinger: Nevertheless, Mozambique will become the main base against Rhodesia.

Vorster: It is now. It already is. It's the main base.

Kissinger: Zambia won't?

Vorster: Zambia is preparing bases. They are very wary but they will submit to pressure. But it will be difficult because they will have to cross the Cariba Dam.

Kissinger: Can't they go across the river where we were?

Vorster: The Zambezi? At some times of the year it's possible; at some times it's not possible.

Schaufele: Can they go through Botswana?

Vorster: They can, but it's a long way around.

Kissinger: Nevertheless, in every international forum, these countries-- even Botswana - make an all-out plea for the black movement vis-a-vis Rhodesia.

Vorster: That is so. By all means.

Botha: That's the pattern.

Vorster: They all say they boycott South Africa, but they buy plenty from us. That's Africa, and we make allowances for it.

Kissinger: From the international point of view, their demands for a boycott are more important than what they do -- because it's what the press is aware of.

Vorster: Talk is cheap, but money buys the whiskey.

Kissinger: You told me upstairs that no Secretary of State has talked to a South African Prime Minister . . .

Vorster: In thirty years. Smuts did.

Botha: With Stettinius.

Kissinger: And no Secretary of State has ever been to South Africa.

Vorster: You'll set a record.

Kissinger: I'll do it before a primary in a northern state with a black population. [Laughter]

Vorster: I'll tell you a story about South Africa. Much troubled water ran under Kaunda's bridge and mine. When I traveled over the bridge and got into his Mercedes 600 -- and it's the only time I've been in one, when I go to Africa. When we got into the car, he said: "I hear you tell a good story about Amin." So I said "When Amin became Field Marshal, he decided to change the name of Uganda to Idi. When the notice came out, a wise man -- one of the few left -- said to him: 'You can't change it to Idi. There is nothing wrong with the name of Idi, but there is a country in the world called Cyprus, and they call them Cypriots.'" [Laughter] He asked me at the end of the day to tell the story again. We were talking about Africa.

Kissinger: After my Lusaka speech, he attacked Amin.

Schaufele: He said he was the only racist in Africa.

Kissinger: In black Africa. [Laughter]

I have to say that all of them said I should talk to you. They all said you were a reasonable man.

Vorster: Because we discuss with them openly and honorably. We say exactly where we stand.

Kissinger: Why didn't your talks with Kaunda succeed?

Vorster: Because Ian and I thought Nkomo and the ANC would find a solution.

Kissinger: On what issue did the Smith Government fail to cooperate?

Vorster: On the common rolls. That was the only outstanding point. You have to realize it was South Africa that brought them together and South Africa that created the climate. Kaunda asked us to get Nkomo and Sithole out of detention. We did it. We arranged the meeting at the bridge and we provided the amenities at the bridge.

I brought Smith and Kaunda together for the first time since 1962. Everything they've asked us to do, we've done.

Kissinger: Except close the border.

Vorster: This is the one thing we said we couldn't do. We didn't promise it.

Muller: We aren't being blamed for the breakdown.

Kissinger: That is right.

Muller: Kaunda, whatever he says in public, can't break off relations with us.

Vorster: He knows it's not our fault.

Muller: They know it.

Vorster: We brought them together in the train. I asked him to start the talks and he said, no. He said, "Age before beauty." So I did. He was right: age before beauty.

Fourie: And it was the Prime Minister who first introduced Nkomo and Sithole.

Vorster: Nkomo, Sithole, Muzorewa, and \_\_\_\_\_ were there. Nkomo stood out. If you went in there not knowing who was the leader, you would have picked out Nkomo. If I had to ride the river with one of them, I'd pick Nkomo.

Muller: And the Rhodesians do too.

Kissinger: But how long will he be in the game? It's between him and the men with the guns.

Vorster: That's right. Even if there is an agreement tomorrow with Nkomo, the men with the guns wouldn't recognize him as their leader.

Kissinger: But it would be an entirely different situation internationally. If there is a legitimate government in Salisbury, if Nkomo was in office under international guarantees, and then terrorism started. . .

Vorster: Of course.

Kissinger: I've said publicly -- so it's no secret -- that if the Cubans and the Soviets did something, we would act. But with fifty percent of our combat troops being black because of our All-Volunteer Army -- and we could do it against Cuba because of Western Hemisphere grounds. But if Vietnam came in, or the North Koreans . . . Ironically, the easiest one for us to tackle is Cuba. But if there were a legitimate government, and then the terrorists started, we could do something.

Muller: They won't have support in the world.

Kissinger: We'd be in a much better position. We'd give arms to Nkomo.


Muller: The Rhodesian Party is the equivalent of our Progressive party, which we're fighting.

Schaufele: But Smith is ruining Nkomo.

Vorster: It's only a question of Standard 6 or Standard 7 or Standard 8. It's not one-man-one-vote -- which would mean dictatorship.

Kissinger: Standard 7 means? Education?

Vorster: Standard 7 is primary plus one. Standard 8 is primary plus 2.



Kissinger: For how long is this still open?

Van den Bergh: For as long as the whites see guarantees.

Vorster: They're worried about their pensions, their property.

Kissinger: Guarantees -- who can give it?

Vorster: I think the affluent West can do it. Britain, claiming she is the legal power and there are 80,000 British citizens . . . Interestingly, the most anti-British leader in Rhodesia is Lord Graham. I think Britain has a real moral responsibility.

Lord: But is a guarantee credible to the whites?

Vorster: Sure.

Kissinger: As the Prime Minister said to me in the private talks, there are two kinds of guarantees: One is while they stay in Rhodesia -- such as a guarantee of property. The second is compensation if they leave.

Muller: Right. The fact is that time is seen to be running out rapidly.

Kissinger: By you too.

Muller: Yes. But not yet so rapidly that it will lead to the evacuation of all whites.

Kissinger: That has not yet happened.

But it depends on how it happens. Whether it happens as in Kenya. If they're given assurances against expropriation.

Muller: And if they are, the likelihood is that the amount involved will be smaller. Because the whites are the most productive.

Vorster: The problem is if the whites will send their wives and mothers to South Africa to "uncle," and the whites stay and fight, they will be a tremendous fighting force.



Fourie: It's 160,000 including 80,000 Britons.

Kissinger: But if it's like Mozambique and it's a big force, no guarantees will work.

Vorster: That's right.

Van den Bergh: And you'll have a Marxist government in Rhodesia.

Vorster: And the entire country will be a shambles, and the beautiful cities, Salisbury and Bulawayo, will be in rack and ruin.

Muller: But if there is a solution where the whites don't feel threatened, if they could be encouraged to stay behind regardless of the color of the government, then it could be a great asset to the West, because Communism could be held back.

Kissinger: I'm a newcomer to Africa. But my understanding is, if there is finite time -- maybe a year -- when one can settle with men like Nkomo, then afterwards one has to settle with the guerrilla high command. Then it's an unwinnable situation, no matter how long it takes, whether five or ten years.

Vorster: Maybe not. Unless the Russians and Chinese intervene.

Kissinger: Given the evolution of world politics . . .

Muller: But the whites will leave.

Kissinger: But there is no domestic situation in which we could support Smith. We could even support Nkomo.

Vorster: Nkomo enforced by specific guarantees can save the situation.

Kissinger: For us, we can support Nkomo, but we can't support Smith. This is the reality, whatever any American tells you.

Vorster: Nkomo, bolstered up with sufficient guarantees, can save the present situation.

Kissinger: Bill, do you think there is still time to establish Nkomo?

Schaufele: Barely.

Muller: With the support of the four Presidents.

Schaufele: Six to eight months.

Kissinger: Kaunda saw our President when he was new and said, "Install Machel in Mozambique." The President said, "What about free elections?" Kaunda said, "Install him and we'll take care of the elections." [Laughter]

Nyerere said the same thing to me. But it has to be rapid.

Botha: Time is running out.

Kissinger: Do you want them to stay there?

Lord: He [Muller] just said to me that even if Smith accepted, the others wouldn't.

Muller: It might not mean evacuation.

Kissinger: I understand. You believe the whites can keep the standard of the economy and keep it going, so it will be something like Kenya, not like Tanzania.

From my impression of Nkomo, he wants the whites to stay. His analysis is the same as yours.

Vorster: Oh, yes. But he wants the whites to work for him. There is no better slave than a white slave if you need one.

Muller: He's a level-headed person.

Kissinger: You have to think about what guarantees can be given.

Botha: That's the crux.

Kissinger: And then about what we do with Smith.

Vorster: But we're disposing of the skin of a buck that doesn't belong to us; it belongs to the British.

Kissinger: The British have to be brought in.

Give us part of the Mozambique gold business and we'll make it a fund. [Laughter]

Muller: We have a public opinion.

Kissinger: You control your parliament better than we do. [Laughter]

Vorster: That's true!

Muller: But our people are very emotional about Rhodesia. In order to strengthen my Prime Minister -- who's very strong.

Vorster: My strength is my weakness. That's my problem.

Kissinger: My weakness is my strength. [Laughter] I've got nothing to lose!

Vorster: Once this issue gets into the emotional field and I play it wrongly, I'm out.

Muller: That's right.

Vorster: And after me, what? [To Amb. Bowdler] Not the United Party, Mr. Ambassador. They're a splinter force. You know it. You can for once enter in our domestic affairs! It's my friend Albert on my right.

Muller: If it's seen as a reasonable deal for our neighbors, then my Prime Minister is in a strong position.

Kissinger: It can't be painless, but it can be just.

Botha: That's very well put.

Kissinger: It will inevitably be painful.



Muller: But we should consider an anesthetic.

Schaufele: Can I ask a very blunt question, Mr. Prime Minister?

Vorster: Yes.

Schaufele: Can any deal be made with Smith?

Vorster: If it can be a reasonable deal that I can sell to my people, I can sell it to him, or if not, to the leaders. I'll sell it to David Smith, the second in command.

Kissinger: If you can sell it to your people . . .

Muller: We can sell it across the border.

Kissinger: And your definition of reasonable is something that gives reasonable incentives for the whites to stay and plausible assurance of compensation if they leave.

Vorster: If there is no mass exodus. We've had a mass exodus from Mozambique and from Angola; God knows we don't want another.

Muller: For many reasons.

Vorster: Plausible assurance of life and property.

Kissinger: That's something we will think about.

Vorster: There has to be assurance it will stick.

Kissinger: A government by Nkomo, or someone like him.

Vorster: Guaranteed by outside powers.

Kissinger: In what way?

Vorster: Financial and otherwise.

Kissinger: Financial we can do, but we can't guarantee Nkomo against an overthrow.

Vorster: No, that is not realistic.

Muller: Do you want to bring the British in?

Kissinger: Yes, definitely. We don't want to do it alone.

Muller: And the Europeans, who are very keen. And some Africans -- the Zambians and others.

Kissinger: We want that. But the only way we can sell it to the Africans is if we can say: If all these conditions are met, on a date certain something will happen. If we could go to the four Presidents within a measurable time and say: by February 1, Nkomo will be President -- or March 1.

Vorster: There must be a transition period.

Kissinger: Or conceivably -- I'm thinking out loud -- a transitional period with the British coming back.

Vorster: Amen.

Kissinger: In which Nkomo could come in.

Vorster: But not a black Parliament.

Kissinger: I think we can then sell it to the Africans.

Vorster: And then you can look to me.

I don't want to stick my neck out -- but you can look to me because it's my responsibility to sell it to my subcontinent.

Kissinger: Then my only responsibility is to keep my people quiet.

Botha: Absolutely.

Vorster: It would be dynamite.

Kissinger: You talk about a bush telegraph! [Laughter]



Schaufele: We don't even need a bush!

Botha: We've never revealed anything.

Kissinger: No, you've been good.

Muller: Unless this thing is kept absolutely secret, it's off completely.

Vorster: It's the most emotional issue in southern Africa.

Kissinger: Let's be realistic. I can handle Congress. I'll just not tell them very much. It's a very unusual position for me to be in.  
[Laughter]

Vorster: I saw you on television. You did very well. [Laughter]  
With Senator Byrd.

Kissinger: Don't rely on Senator Byrd.

Vorster: No, I rely on you.

Kissinger: We have to tell the black Africans something that we discussed.

Vorster: You can tell them it's our considered opinion that a settlement with Nkomo is not off.

Kissinger: Well, I think the best thing is to say you have to go back and think about it.

Muller: That's even better.

Kissinger: We should go back and put this package together.

Bill, you can go around Africa and brief them orally.

Once we have the package, we should move quickly. If we mention Nkomo, without being able to produce something, it'll kill him. We can make it a condition at the end -- "We can give you a date certain if . . ."

Vorster: The Presidents said to Nkomo that he was relevant if he could get a settlement, and irrelevant if he could not.

Our intelligence says that Nkomo went to Moscow to ask them not to intervene. Your intelligence is better than ours.

Kissinger: For your sake I hope you're wrong. [Laughter]

Vorster: We don't know where he is now.

Kissinger: Our impression is he got a cool reception.

Schaufele: He asked for money.

Vorster: That they all do, so it's a general trend. [Laughter]

We think when he gets back he'll try to get Smith to lock him up. To get him back in the good grace of the terrorists.

Kissinger: If he's locked up, all hell will break loose in America. We have to keep an eye on the big picture.

We'll talk to Nkomo.

Bill will have to go to Africa.

Vorster: If you can keep Nkomo out of Rhodesia for some weeks . . . Take him for a vacation somewhere.

Muller: My own feeling is, at this stage we should rather concentrate on the Free World -- the Nine. The seeds are sown . . .

Kissinger: But we have to say something to the Africans.

Schaufele: You have a commitment.

Kissinger: I have a commitment.

Muller: Tell them you have something you're cooking up. Give him some encouragement.

Kissinger: What we have to do is put a package together. Quietly. But we have to let them know there is something going on. I don't

mind having this break up with us saying, "Interesting ideas were discussed but you have to go back and think about it."

Vorster: Not only me.

Kissinger: Both of us.

Muller: I'm afraid of Nkomo's reaction if we tell him.

Kissinger: We don't have to tell him anything.

Muller: Only that he doesn't do something rash.

Kissinger: He won't win prizes with his IQ.

Vorster: No, but he's the best. You know what the Duke of Wellington said?

Kissinger: No.

Vorster: About his troops. He said: I don't know if they frighten the enemy; they frighten me. [Laughter]

Muller: It's important we know what progress you make with your partners.

Kissinger: You can count on it.

Vorster: You get in touch with me through Pik [Botha]. He spends lots of government money talking to people.

Botha: It's absolutely essential this be kept quiet.

Vorster: Can my son come in and take a picture?

Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Muller: If this gets out . . .

Kissinger: Look, bits and pieces will get out. I guarantee they will get out as soon as we talk to the Europeans. But that's our idea, not

your proposal. The best is to let the British put it forward. Then we organize it quietly and operate behind the scenes. I'll see Crosland and Callaghan, and I'll see all of them at Puerto Rico. And I'll see Genscher tomorrow at the airport.

Tomorrow we'll agree who says what to whom.

Don't you raise the guarantee thing too explicitly with the Germans because they're in the middle of an election campaign.

[Vorster's son comes in and takes a picture. Rodman does too.]

Kissinger: We'll tell our press not to expect any big announcements tomorrow.

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SECSTATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR.  
 SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR. NESSEN; USIA FOR IOP/M;  
 IPS; IBS; IEU; FC/STRICKER, NEW YORK

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: GW, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT FUNSETH BRIEFING AT B ODENMAIS, JUNE 23, 1976

REF: USDEL GRAFENAU 0008

1. STATEMENT BY SPOKESMAN ROBERT FUNSETH REPORTED IN REFTEL  
 WAS BASED ON HIS PRESS POOL REPORT FROM BRIEFING FUNSETH GAVE  
 AT THE HOTEL SONNENHOF IN BODENMAIS, JUNE 23, 1976 WITH R.F.  
 BOTHA, SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, THE TEXT OF WHICH  
 FOLLOWS:

FUNSETH: THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY MET ALONE FOR  
 TWO HOURS. WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF OUR TALKS, SO IT IS NOT  
 POSSIBLE FOR US TO CHARACTERIZE THEM AT THIS POINT. THE AMBASS-  
 ADOR AND I WILL RETURN DOWNSTARIS TO JOIN THE OTHER DELEGATIONS  
 AT A WORKING DINNER WHEN THE TALKS WILL CONTINUE. WHILE THE  
 PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY MET, THE TWO DELEGATIONS -  
 THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS - MET SEPARATELY AND  
 TALKED ON ISSUES OF INTEREST. THE TALKS WILL CONTINUE TOMORROW  
 IN GRAFENAU. THAT IS ALL THE INFORMATION THAT MY DELEGATION  
 HAS AT THIS POINT.

BOTHA: AND THAT IS A JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.

QUESTION: MR. FUNSETH, MAY I ASK ONE OPERATIONAL QUESTION?  
 WE'VE HEARD RUMORS OF A PRESS CONFERENCE AT FUERSTENFELDBRUCK  
 TOMORROW AT 3 P.M.

FUNSETH: THAT'S NOT A RUMOR. THAT'S CORRECT. THE SECRETARY  
 AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, MR. GENSCHER,  
 WILL HAVE A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE AT 3P.M. FOLLOWING THEIR  
 MEETING AT FUERSTENFELDBRUCK AIRPORT.

QUESTION: WHAT TIME WILL GENSCHER (UNINTELLIGIBLE)?

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FUNSETH: NO PRESS CONFERENCE IN GRAFENAU.

QUESTION: (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

FUNSETH: NO, THIS IS A MEETING IN MUNICH BETWEEN MR. GENSCHER AND MR. KISSINGER.

QUESTION: WILL THERE BE A FINAL STATEMENT TOMORROW OF ANY KIND?

BOTHA: THAT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT IS DECIDED TOMORROW.

QUESTION: MAY I ASK ANOTHER OPERATIONAL QUESTION OF MR. BOTHA? WILL THAT BE A SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENT?

BOTHA: I CANNOT COMMENT ON THAT AT ALL. THAT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT MY PRIME MINISTER AND DR. KISSINGER MIGHT DECIDE ON THIS POINT.

QUESTION: HOW WAS THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE TALKS?

BOTHA: THERE IS NO CHARACTERIZATION AT THIS STAGE. WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TALKS.

QUESTION: WILL THE TALKS (UNINTELLIGIBLE)?

BOTHA: YES, SURE. BUT WE ARE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TALKS.

QUESTION: THE CONFERENCE ABOUT THE MEETINGS OF THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE). WILL IT BE RELEVANT TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN TALKS, OR WILL IT BE SEPARATE?

FUNSETH: IT WILL BE AN OPEN NEWS CONFERENCE.

QUESTION: WHEN WILL IT TAKE PLACE?

FUNSETH: 3P.M.

QUESTION: WHAT TIME? WHAT WILL THEY TALK ABOUT?

FUNSETH: MR. GENSCHER AND DR. KISSINGER WILL MEET AT TWO O'CLOCK. THEY ALWAYS HAVE PLENTY TO TALK ABOUT. IT'S AN OPEN AGENDA.

QUESTION: MR. BOTHA, ARE THERE STILL PLANS FOR A NEWS CONFERENCE BY MR. VORSTER IN BONN ON FRIDAY?

BOTHA: I CANNOT COMMENT ON THAT AT THIS TIME.

FUNSETH: THAT'S REALLY ALL WE HVE. THANKS A LOT.

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 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 002  
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 005  
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 001  
 BT  
 UNCLAS USDEL GRAFENAU 0008

SECSTATE FOR S/PRS AND EUR/CE; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR  
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: GW, OVIP (KISSENGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: FUNSETH STATEMENT FOLLOWING KISSINGER-VORSTER  
 MEETING

1. BEGIN QUOTE: THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY  
 HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING ALONE IN THE HOTEL IN BODENMAIS.  
 THE TALKS ARE CONTINUING AT A WORKING DINNER HOSTED  
 BY THE PRIME MINISTER. WE ARE NOT CHARACTERIZING  
 THEM. THE TALKS WILL CONTINUE AT 9 A.M. TOMORROW.  
 WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY WERE MEETING,  
 THE TWO DELEGATIONS MET SEPARATELY. THE DELEGATIONS  
 ARE: SOUTH AFRICA -- THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN  
 MINISTER HILGARD MULLER, B.G. FOURIE (SECRETARY OF THE  
 FOREIGN OFFICE), AMBASSADOR BOTHA, GENERAL HENDRIK VAN  
 DEN BERGH (SECRETARY FOR STATE SECURITY). ON THE  
 AMERICAN SIDE: THE SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
 STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, WILLIAM SCHAUFEL, AMBASSADOR  
 WILLIAM BOWDLER, WINSTON LORD, ROBERT  
 FUNSETH AND PETER RODMAN. END QUOTE.  
 BT

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