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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

September 30, 1976

TO: Dick Cheney
Bob Teeter

FROM: Doug Bailey

SUBJECT: Foreign & Defense Policy Debate.

The President's major opportunity to win the election is in this debate. Accordingly, while the "presidential" character of the first debate should be maintained, it will be important (and appropriate) for the President to be aggressive from the opening bell.

1. Basic Strategy. There is peace. And Carter has no experience. Those two points, repeated over and over, can generally destroy any Carter argument.
 - e.g.: "This debate is between a man without two minutes experience in formulating or executing foreign and defense policy and the first President since Eisenhower to be able to say this country is at peace."
 - e.g.: "Mr. Carter's call for U. S. troop reductions in Europe and Korea shows his inexperience. Those steps must be the result of negotiations with our allies in which their commitments are sought to match our troop cutback. Mr. Carter has naively played all his chips before even getting to the table."
 - e.g.: "I will keep Secretary Kissinger. The people know my team. Because Mr. Carter has had no experience at all, I hope he will tell the people in this debate who his Secretary of State will be, who his Secretary of Defense will be. The people have the right to know who will be running the country's foreign policy."

(This is my nominee for the lead statement, putting Carter on the defensive from the outset. The President must be prepared to comment on his choices if he names them: Brzezinski -- no government experience; George Ball -- of the Rusk, Bundy, Rostow group; Henry Jackson -- does he want a \$7 billion defense cut?)

- e.g. "Mr. Carter last July proudly said he had never met an American President. Now he has. But has he ever met a Secretary of State? Or a Secretary of Defense? Or, more important, a foreign Secretary of an ally -- or a head of State, friend or foe?"

e.g.: "Mr. Carter in our first debate said he couldn't think of anything I've done. Well, quite aside from 4,000,000 jobs and cutting inflation in half and restoring trust to the White House, I would hope Mr. Carter has noticed that this country is at peace. To suggest that that is not an accomplishment simply underscores his lack of experience in this area."

2. Other points to hit hard on.

- a. | 5-7 billion budget cut. "It's misleading to promise to re-organize government but not say how. It's irresponsible to promise to reform taxes but not say how. But it's truly dangerous for an inexperienced man to promise to cut \$7 billion from the defense budget but not say how."
- b. | B-1 bomber. "Mr. Carter's indecision on the B-1 bomber reflects either his inexperience or evasion or both. I think it's important for Mr. Carter to make up his mind and tell the people where he stands. There's no button in the Oval Office marked 'maybe'."
- c. | Radio Free Europe. "Mr. Carter is quite proud of having written the Democratic Party Platform. Why did he omit any mention of Radio Free Europe? I assume it isn't indifference to the people of Eastern Europe? Or is it lack of experience again?"
- d. | Grain Sale Embargo. "The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, which Mr. Carter supports, would restrict the right of the American farmer to sell abroad. I oppose any such restriction. Because I insisted on a U.S./Soviet agreement I now cannot foresee any circumstance in which an embargo on trade would be justified."

3. Some strategy reminders.

- a. | Avoid the Republican vs. Democrat language. Even the fact that each of the last 4 wars began under Democratic Presidents is better said by naming the Presidents rather than their Party.
- b. | Avoid citing "Congressional experience." Rather: "It's been my responsibility for 25 years to know the details of the nation's defense budget."
- c. | Henry Kissinger is unpopular only on the far extremes. And a heavy attack on him can always be thwarted by asking Carter who he would appoint, given his own inexperience.

- d. "Open diplomacy" does not have a broad constituency. "It shows Mr. Carter's naivete and inexperience to think that national security treaties can be negotiated publicly."
 - e. Peace is the answer to any criticism. "Mr. Carter's criticism makes it sound as if this country is at war rather than at peace. As far as I am concerned, peace with freedom is the only valid test of a nation's policy. That's exactly what we have."
 - f. Even in the foreign area, it is unwise to claim credit for the last 8 years -- only the last two. If we claim credit in one area, we may have to accept blame in other areas.
4. A Clincher Point. At any point in the debate, when Mr. Carter mis-states facts or policy or seems vague, an effective comment might be: "Mr. Carter may wish to revise what he just said. I think it's important that both of us realize that in addition to the 100,000,000 Americans watching tonight, 200,000,000 more people are watching throughout the world, including many foreign leaders. I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish the Kremlin to think that he is uncertain whether America needs the B-1 bomber." (Or: "I'm sure Mr. Carter would not wish our allies to think we would withdraw troops without discussing the subject with them carefully.")

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 5, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: DICK CHENEY
FROM: JIM CAVANAUGH
SUBJECT: Memorandum to Commerce Implementing
Certain Procedures Relating to Arab
Boycott of U.S. Firms

Attached is a memorandum for your signature. It has been reviewed and approved by Ed Schmults, Jim Cannon, Jim Lynn and Bill Gorog. Bill Hyland has okayed it subject to Brent Scowcroft's review in San Francisco.

The memorandum has been cleared with Commerce. An accompanying fact sheet indicating previous actions the President has taken in the matter has been supplied to Ron Nessen with the recommendation that it be released at the time that the President's memorandum is released.

We urge that this be signed and released tonight so that we can make a midnight deadline in some important papers.

Attachment



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Would you please assure that the Department of Commerce takes steps to permit the public inspection and copying of boycott-related reports to be filed in the future with the Department of Commerce. Only business proprietary information regarding such things as quantity and type of goods exported, the release of which could place reporting firms at a competitive disadvantage, should not be made available to the public.

During the past year, there has been a growing interest in and awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American business. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies.

I have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The action I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation of our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against nations friendly to us.

To provide adequate notice to American exporters of this new policy, these inspection procedures should be placed in effect for reports filed after December, 1976.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Attached for your consideration is a
draft concluding statement for the
debate.


Brent

~~MR. PRESIDENT~~

For the past two years I have been charged with responsibility for the foreign policy and national security of the United States. This period has marked a major turning point for our country and for the world. Today, America is strong, secure from threats or attacks. Today, for the first time since President Eisenhower, a President running for election can say we are at peace. I consider that my finest achievement and, as we conclude this debate, I want to leave you with a clear statement of my goals, and priorities to keep it that way over the next four years.

First, I will assure that the strength of our Armed Forces remains unsurpassed. It is the only sure way to preserve peace. It is the necessary foundation of our diplomacy. No one will respect a weak America.

Second, I will give the fullest attention to the strength of our alliances. Our NATO and Asian allies share the total burden of our security, strengthen our deterrent and reinforce our diplomacy.

Third, I will continue efforts to reduce tension with adversaries. Always mindful of our deep and abiding differences I believe it is nonetheless essential in the nuclear age to keep differences from erupting into military confrontation. In this context I will continue our dialogue with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China, always dealing from strength and, as a result, always able to insist on terms which serve U.S. interests.

Fourth, in this spirit I will apply the enormous talent and technology of America to consolidating peace in such troubled areas as the Middle East and in Africa. Beyond this, we must eliminate the root causes of turmoil and conflict around the world: hunger, disease, food and energy shortages, the environment, and nuclear proliferation. We can solve these problems.

Finally, and most important, peace will be empty if we cannot make progress in the defense of our principles. I will insure that the American ideals of freedom for all peoples and races, the dignity and security of every man and woman, and the sanctity of law, are reflected in our international as well as our national policies. In the United Nations and in other forums we will speak out for the principle of fairness that is the heritage of America. This nation cannot be pressured or blackmailed. My message to the world is that there is much to be accomplished with us through cooperation; nothing through coercion. We face a compelling mandate from mankind. Let's get on with it.



→ MIKE DUVAL
FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1976

JF
10/2/76

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVE GERGEN

FROM: AGNES WALDRON

SUBJECT: Max Frankel and Henry Trewitt

I talked to Bob McCloskey about both of these men. He said Max Frankel is first rate, one of the finest persons he has ever worked with. He is a superb analyst and is held in high regard by Secretaries Rusk, Rogers and Kissinger.

Frankel was born in Germany in 1930. His parents were refugees from Nazi Germany and came to the U.S. in 1940. Frankel became a naturalized citizen in 1948. He received an A.B. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1952. In 1953 he received an M.A. from the same University, also in Political Science.

Frankel has been a member of the staff of the New York Times since 1952. He has covered the White House and the State Department. In 1968, he became chief of the Washington bureau and later was promoted to associate editor where he has responsibility for the Sunday edition.

I am unable to find much biographical information on Henry Trewitt. He is from Tennessee and worked on a Tennessee newspaper. He joined the Baltimore Sun and for a long time was their correspondent in Bonn. Later he left the Sun for Newsweek but he returned to the Sun. Ambassador McCloskey said Trewitt does not waste his time worrying about marginal stuff, he is a serious journalist and not a "personality." Trewitt is particularly interested in Western Europe, NATO and Strategic Arms and is most knowledgeable about all of these subjects.

Frankel is especially knowledgeable about the above subjects and because of his background is concerned about Israel and attendant Middle Eastern problems.

Attached is an article by Trewitt, appraising HAK. It is a balanced appraisal of HAK's African effort.

Attachment



The Rhodesia deal was more than luck

Baltimore Sun 10-3-76

By HENRY L. TREWHITT

Washington.

If it is Henry A. Kissinger's final grand piroquette on the global stage, no one can complain about the last act. It still is a bit early to bring down the curtain. There may be time for another arms control treaty with the Russians, even if the voters expel Mr. Ford. But for high drama, with thousands of lives and superpower strategy at stake, few performances can equal that of the Secretary of State in Southern Africa.

His fragile deal between Rhodesia's white minority government and its black neighbors may not hold. By its very nature, there will be moments of apparent collapse, and one of them may

Henry L. Trehwitt reports on diplomatic affairs for The Sun.

be real. But if it does hold, Rhodesia will make a peaceful transition to black majority government. The lessons there will be applied to Namibia—or South-West Africa—where South Africa rules in defiance of world opinion. Eventually, they inevitably will be applied against the white government in South Africa itself. And the Russians will have been maneuvered into impotence in a strategic area.

In human terms, the blood already running will stop. Given the vast preponderance of blacks over whites, and thus certainty of the eventual outcome, only racists of both sides could wish otherwise. Yet, Rhodesia, where 270,000 whites dictate to 6 million blacks, had held out through a generation of change in most of Africa. Why did Prime Minister Ian D. Smith yield now, and why through Mr. Kissinger? Some critics argue that the secretary this time merely happened to be in the right place in the right circumstances. Mr.

Kissinger himself says cheerfully that his "personal charm" tipped the balance. He meant the remark lightly, one assumes, but neither is a frivolous point. Being in the right place at the right time is a critical judgment of diplomacy. Personal charm, translated into persuasiveness and cold-eyed exploitation of interests, is one of its tools.

For what is happening in Southern Africa now is more than anything else a calculated, in some cases agonized, reappraisal of interests. The motives of some leaders are clear, of others obscure. The drama has few elements of romance. It is a tale of survival and power.

The historical setting is important. In the generation since World War II, the white colonial powers yielded gradually to black rule. For most of that generation, white Rhodesia survived as an anomaly, having declared its independence of Great Britain 11 years ago. South Africa, where 4 million whites

control 16 million blacks, is a different matter. Even most blacks concede the vested interests of the whites there, though not their assumed right to dictate.

From time to time, black Africa has become a public playground for the superpowers, as in the Congo in the mid-1960's. More often, their competition for influence has been quieter. The Soviet Union by no means has fared badly, despite its diplomatic ham-handedness. Its position in the horn of the Northeast is strong. It has established influence in some of the states now arrayed against Rhodesia.

Late last year and early this year Angola became the greatest Soviet trophy in Africa. Russian money and guns, and the proxy fighting of Cuban troops, installed the Socialist government of Agostinho Neto after Portugal abandoned the last important colonial

See RHODESIA, K2, Col. 1

A shaky but viable accord

RHODESIA, from K1

stronghold on the continent. The United States was surprised. Mr. Kissinger's belated support for Mr. Neto's rivals collapsed against congressional opposition and Communist power.

But Angola, to understate it, held Mr. Kissinger's attention on Africa. Above all else, he takes the long view, backward and forward. He could envision Southern Africa, with its vast resources, falling totally under Soviet influence as it made a bloody transition to black government.

Those resources are important in a world facing shortages. South Africa also overlooks crowded sea-lanes, historically a prime element in strategic position. Administration planners could sense domestic implications in the developing conflict as well. American blacks would sympathize with Southern Africa's blacks, creating turmoil at home—especially if the United States wound up in the familiar position of seeming to support elite capitalism over the masses. American interests were obvious, if how to serve them was not.

Mr. Kissinger's reaction was historic. He moved to pre-empt the Soviet role, approaching Africans under the maxim: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. As it turned out, the response was happier than he might have expected. The reason, apparently, was that reassessments were under way in other capitals at the same time.

For South Africa, the message of Angola—now reflected in the rioting of South Africa's own blacks—foretold the future: White rule had been left naked by Portugal's departure. Prime Minister John Vorster did not have the ultimate answers for his own racial transition. But one thing he needed was time. Orderly transition in Rhodesia might buy time for South Africa. As principal supplier and supporter for Rhodesia, South Africa in effect could decide Rhodesia's future if not its own.

In the so-called frontline black states—Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola—leaders were certain of their goals, the extent of execution and consequences. In outlook, they range from the militance of Mr. Neto and Mozambique's Samora Machel to the moderation of Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda. Tanzania's exquisitely intellectual Julius Nyerere exemplifies the Socialist third world leader,

more nationalist than ideologue, willing to take help from anyone as long as no strings are attached.

Obviously, all wanted Rhodesia's white government to yield quickly and bloodlessly. It was by no means certain, however, that they could agree among themselves on Rhodesia's future or on the allotment of power among Rhodesia's fragmented revolutionary movements.

In that light, the threatened blood-bath in Rhodesia also contained risks for other leaders, white and black, throughout the area. Confusion and division in black Africa. Chaos in South Africa, as militant white volunteers surged across the border to help their neighbors. Increasing manipulation by the great powers, with the danger of confrontation.

Enter Mr. Kissinger, talking of a peaceful solution. For once he was on the side of the angels at home and he was prepared to exploit all of the changes in the area. The domestic judgment of his effort still is by no means final. But he went with the blessing of white liberals and most American blacks. Even conservative criticism has been muted. Apparently, he persuaded many conservatives that support for Africa's whites was politically impossible, and that orderly transition in fact was the only way to protect American interest.

What followed was, in most respects, vintage Kissinger. First, he appealed to Mr. Vorster's need for time. Mr. Vorster, in turn, threatened to shut off vital economic channels to Rhodesia. Left with nowhere to turn, Mr. Smith made the critical decision he had avoided before—to begin concrete steps toward majority rule.

The tactical details available so far suggest Mr. Kissinger took many short cuts, not a rarity in diplomacy. Mr. Smith for example, said in his address of capitulation that Mr. Kissinger had promised an end to economic sanctions and terrorism with the first steps toward transition. He set out the black-white division of power in detail.

"Who? Us?" the black leaders answered in effect. They wanted negotiations, but without preconditions. Somehow the principals appeared to be saddled with promises they were not aware they had made.

As a practical matter, the black leaders of government were unable to

guarantee some of the things Mr. Smith specified. Nor could Mr. Kissinger guarantee absolutely an end to United Nations sanctions—especially if the Russians object—or congressional approval of several hundred million dollars in United States aid and indemnity funds for Rhodesia. All are elements of the complex settlement package.

Actually, U.S. officials said, they had received general approval of the approach from the black leaders, not detailed acceptance as Mr. Smith seemed to believe. Taken all together, the evidence suggested that Mr. Kissinger allowed some impressions to develop unwarranted momentum to get it charitably. In turn, the white Rhodesians and their black neighbors put their own interpretation, each according to his political needs, on each element of the package.

Those who advocate higher morality and less secrecy in foreign affairs may not approve. But it is not an unfamiliar pattern in negotiations. The end result often, as in this case, is that the negotiators find themselves further down a long road than they might otherwise.

For the Russians, the development is a severe political embarrassment. Their assault on Mr. Kissinger's diplomacy has been unusually strident. For one thing, they see it as an effort to preserve American interests and the security of white Africans, which it is. For another, they have labeled it as a disguised campaign to preserve white rule, which it is not.

The whole delicate structure could break down at any time on any of several issues. No doubt, there will be crises in negotiations, including interruptions. But the dynamics of change are now running, as Mr. Kissinger recognized, ready for further exploitation. In that regard, he has achieved a breakthrough. He was, indeed, in the right place at the right time. But it is more complicated than that.

A shaky but viable accord

RHODESIA, from K I

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