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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs


Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to  
Israel  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday - March 14, 1975  
1:10 - 3:45 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



Rabin: Well, we have heard a lot through radio and television; we hope we will hear a lot in this discussion.

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *9/17/03*  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT GUIDELINES  
BY *HR*, DATE *9/29/03*

Kissinger: If Motta (Gur) and Simcha (Dinitz), who are only two people with influence with my travelling press, would tell them not to ask Sadat substantive questions whenever they are let in to take pictures, there wouldn't be so many stories in the press.

Rabin: Whenever you are ready, we are ready.

Kissinger: Here is a Howard K. Smith commentary on television yesterday, on the impact of the Cambodian situation. (He gives Rabin a page from the News Summary. See Tab A.) I'm not raising this because Jewish influence would affect it; it is just a human tragedy. In fact I think it is beyond... It would be a great mistake for you to get involved in the Cambodian thing. (Rabin reads it.)

(To Sisco:) Do we have that cable from Damascus? (He reads from Damascus 924, Tab B) We got a cable this morning from our Ambassador in Damascus who had talked with the Yugoslavian Ambassador who had talked with Khaddam, to whom Khaddam said substantially what was in the other cable I read to you: that we give them no prospects, no participation of the PLO, no movement on the Golan. We give them only vague prospects. And Khaddam said: What is taken by force can only be regained by force. He couldn't have invented the phrase because it is the same as Asad told us.

Rabin: What follows?

Kissinger: That we have to consider the consequences.

Rabin: Should there be a link?

Kissinger: No, but that we should make a strategic decision this weekend to have an agreement and if so, to move rapidly to minimize the period for mischiefmaking. That is the only tactical conclusion. The strategic decision is to consider the consequences if Syria goes to war.

Rabin: You might consider if there is not an interim settlement, the war will be postponed.

Kissinger: But the political crisis will be intensified.



Rabin: There is not a political crisis.

Kissinger: There is no question that if there is a war, we will be accused domestically of having made it inevitable. But that's...

Peres: Do you judge that the Syrians will go it alone?

Kissinger: Before I came into the area I thought it impossible. Now I consider it less than 50-50, but considerable. Joe?

Sisco: It's the old story of drawing in the other Arabs. So I don't preclude it either.

Peres: It will be affected by how strong a coalition in the Middle East they can form.

Sisco: Yes.

Kissinger: When I am alone with Asad, he didn't talk so threateningly as he does with his colleagues there. He asked me, how could he just renew the UNDOF?

First, let me talk about the letter. The first evening I was there -- Wednesday -- the first evening I was there I went over your paper without reading it but making every point in it. And I'll give you the answers, which extended over two days.

Rabin: Do you want wine?

Peres: It is a delicious wine, which I recommend.

Rabin: This is the idea of the Minister of Defense.

Peres: The first constructive idea!

(A dry white wine is served -- Carmel-Avdat.)

Rabin: As we say, l'chayim. (Everyone toasts.)

Kissinger: So we went through that paper, and there were some preliminary comments, and we said we would go over it the next day. It was Fahmy and Gamasy and Sadat; Joe Sisco and I and our Ambassador. At the end I saw Sadat alone and I said I had a letter for him



from you. I said I knew it might be embarrassing for him to read it. He said, "I can read it and give it back." He read it. (At Tab C is Dr. Kissinger's copy of the letter, with his notes of Sadat's comments.) He said: "It is very important for me to know who thought this up." I said, "The Israelis thought it up." He said, "Did they write it? That is even more important." I said they wrote it. He folded it up and said it is the most important communique he has received from Israel that really shows understanding. He kept the letter and still has it. He was very moved.

The next day he took it out again. He had marked it up and said he wanted to discuss it. He said, first, "If it was not for Henry Kissinger, I would not have touched this letter, but I have received it and I will keep it and not forget it and this is an important fact."

Then he went through it paragraph by paragraph. This was not of vital significance. In the first paragraph, about "the long conflict between our two countries" and "both our nations have been victims of tragic historical circumstances," he said "I agree completely."

The second paragraph -- he said, "I agree completely."

The third paragraph, the last sentence: "I know that no agreement is possible without difficult decisions but I am ready to grapple with them for the sake of the cause of peace" -- he said "I quite agree. We shall be doing it on a reciprocal basis. Maybe I have a freer hand than you. I will try to make it easier for Rabin. I'll handle the Arab people if he will handle the Israeli people."

The paragraph on the step-by-step approach -- he agrees with everything you said. He says he understands what you are facing. He says he is surprised you didn't mention the Knesset. You said you have to "convince both people and Government in Israel." He said, "You forgot to mention the Knesset."

Rabin: He has no sense of humor.

Dinitz: In our country, the Government represents the people.

Kissinger: There were other points.



As to the particular "suggestions and ideas" mentioned in the last paragraph, he said, "he has given me his suggestions and we will discuss it." He said, "He has given me the letter. I shall keep the letter. But I can't answer it at this stage for the simple reason that if it becomes known the whole process will be damaged."

He agreed on the step-by-step approach.

Rabin: You said it twice.

Kissinger: He said it twice. "Withdrawal to an agreed line will open up a period in which disagreements will be settled by peaceful means. It must be a turning point." He wants it to be a step toward a peaceful direction. He repeats he will use peaceful means only, as he said in Le Monde.

The main thing he wants Yitzhak Rabin to know is that he never will use power again.

"Tell him that at Geneva I will not touch this agreement. You can tell him I will not try to change anything between us at Geneva. Assure him from my side that I am not dreaming of solving this at Geneva. We will not use force whatever the problems."

He was very moved. I wrote it down as he was talking, so it's almost verbatim.

All right. Now, on the points. I need not say that anything that became public on this exchange would have rather disastrous consequences.


Rabin: I must say that at the last Cabinet meeting relatively little...

Kissinger: True. I haven't complained yet on this trip. On Sunday, I'm sure it will change.

Rabin: We have cut the number of leaks by the Cabinet.

Kissinger: So far. We now come to a particularly sensitive phase.

On the letter, I must say it is the single most positive reaction I have heard from an Arab leader.



On the Red Crescent, he agrees to this proposition, for the flood victims and for release of the prisoners except murderers, for the bodies. He says he has 39 bodies. I'd advise you not to announce it. But you can consider it settled. He'll even permit some joint visitations.

Dinitz: They know about 39, or do they have them?

Kissinger: They have them.

Rabin, Peres: It was 57.

Kissinger: I think we can do that on the next trip.

Rabin: I want to be sure: Red Crescent facilities in El Arish for flood victims, and what else?

Peres: Prisoners.

Kissinger: Excluding those charged with capital crimes. I told them it was about 5 or 6. Again, this was a gesture. I didn't make it a quid pro quo. I told him the Israelis are willing to do it. I asked separately for the bodies, so it became a quid pro quo.

Regarding the military disposition, I raised that one division. Gamasy says it's there for training, temporarily -- that, of course, wouldn't be conclusive -- and he said there was absolutely no intention to use it for a surprise attack. Of course, they would say that if they were planning a surprise attack.

I must say that I don't think there is a chance of Egypt's starting a surprise attack. Unless these negotiations fail, and there is extended political preparation. But I could be wrong.

On other military dispositions, perhaps we can talk in a smaller group for a few minutes afterwards.

On the political side, let me run through what in my view is achievable -- without having drafted anything.

I think Egypt is willing to include that "it is not a final settlement, but a significant step in the process leading to peace in accordance with





Resolution 338." Second, in this process of peace, all disputes will be resolved by peaceful means. Third, Egypt will not resort to force for the duration of the agreement. And I think -- but it is not yet conceded -- that this can all be stated publicly and be part of the agreement. Fourth, the agreement will be valid until superseded by another agreement -- as long as it is clear it is part of the process. The concept he said he would accept as long as... The thing he cannot live with is something that looks like this is a final agreement.

He agrees to some joint Egyptian-Israeli participation in the buffer zone. First he proposed a Mixed Armistice Commission. I said no, and then he suggested something related to UNEF.

Rabin: He said publicly he doesn't exclude joint patrols.

Kissinger: I'm telling you what he meant.

Rabin: But he said it.

Kissinger: He doesn't think so fast on his feet, and he suffers from the illusion that it is impolite to refuse to answer questions. He doesn't know what to do with Marilyn Berger and Barry Schweid attacking him. He said afterward, "I gave the Israelis a lot." I said, "The Israelis will have a plan ready when I get there."

Your papers say I'm representing the Egyptians.


Peres: I wish it were true.

Rabin: I see you read the Israeli papers more than me. More than I.

Kissinger: I think he will agree to a committee, associated with UNEF. And he agreed to the automatic annual renewal of UNEF. He will give us a letter, in addition to the agreement, committing him to an annual automatic renewal.

Rabin: It will be part of the agreement?

Kissinger: We tried to work out the phrasing but I gave it up because I didn't want to agree on language with Fahmy and then try to extract it from you. Maybe Gazit can work out something. What Fahmy says is, in the agreement it will say, "it will be renewed annually," and this means they will renew it.



On the specific list, your various points.

On your point 2, for example, he will agree to open bridges, or whatever the phrase is -- circulation of Egyptians and people in Gaza and the Sinai, that is, family visits, statements etcetera, but not of foreign tourists.

With respect to non-restrictions on the air travel or other travel, they will agree that foreigners need not have dual passports. The same passports can be used for both Egypt and Israel.

Allon: A foreign vessel will be able to...

Kissinger: No.

Rabin: Only tourists, not vessels.

Allon: The same vessel to unload in Port Said and Haifa.

Kissinger: That is a different problem. I didn't go into it.

Allon: That is also very important.

Rabin: A ship from France or England, going all over the area.

Kissinger: We didn't go into that. I didn't raise it; I did raise the question of airliners and they refused.

Rabin: I assume the same would apply to ships too.

Oakley: No, not necessarily.

Peres: If they are cargo ships.

Kissinger: I have the impression, incidentally, that some of these points, if we were approaching an agreement... I want to say two things: Fahmy and Gamasy are more forces to be reckoned with in this negotiation than the previous one. In the previous one, he (Sadat) did everything alone.

Rabin: Even though he is President and has no Parliamentary system.



Kissinger: I'm just giving you my impression.

Rabin: I remember many briefings a senior American official has given in the last few months.

Kissinger: About what?

Rabin: About a coalition system. We get information about the briefings whenever you give one.

Kissinger: I have no illusion. I think if you put together a mosaic of my briefings, you would see it as very helpful to you.

Rabin: I can't say it.

Kissinger: That is your problem. I have to conduct our foreign policy.

If the notion gets around that you can move with great alacrity, you will be under more pressure.

Rabin: You should read the interview of the Minister of Defense in the Washington Post speaking in the same terms.

Kissinger: Which?

Rabin: The same terms as the rest of us, as the Government.

Allon: Peres is giving up too much!

Kissinger: I wish I could say it for our government!

Rabin: You said it.

Kissinger: What interview in the Washington Post?

Dinitz: Shimon gave an interview some time ago and yesterday they published it.

Kissinger: What is your complaint? That I didn't criticize it?

Peres: Please do something!



Kissinger: Did you say you want to go to Geneva? (Laughter)

Even Gromyko doesn't want to go to Geneva. He proposed either Tehran or Vienna. So even he doesn't want it.

Only Eban does.

As I pointed out, Gamasy and Fahmy have played a much more assertive role. It is the judgment of our Ambassador that if both were to resign simultaneous, it would be an insuperable problem for him. Gamasy said to you, Joe, that if he doesn't like the military provisions, he can stop it. Fahmy didn't go so far.

Foreigners need not have dual passports for Egypt and Israel.

He is prepared to reduce hostile propaganda on Egyptian-controlled media. He will not do anything on the PLO radio in Cairo, because it would be an enormous problem for him because they even broadcast attacks on him.

On the boycott, he is prepared to change the boycott. He's changed his representative on the Boycott Committee. The old man was caught up in the theology; the new one has political understanding. But he will let American firms in.

Gazit: On a selective basis.

Sisco: Correct.

Gazit: That is not so good. Not so very good.

Kissinger: Why?

Gazit: Because out of 20, he could admit only two. The blacklist remains.

Allon: We can take it up again. It's not the last word.

Kissinger: International pressures and third parties: Fahmy in the room said it couldn't be stopped because it would be too visible. The most they could do is tone it down. Sadat, when he was alone with me, said he could go further than that. They did not have to be so active.



Bab el-Mandeb, and air routes, he agrees. It will be no problem.

On mixed crews going through the Canal, he says what you will do is hire a Panamanian ship with an Israel captain and a few blacks, and call it mixed, and the Egyptian manager has to let it through. Predominantly Israeli crews will be a problem.

These are the things he is willing to do. And I have told you what he said about Geneva. I think it covers all your points.

He does not agree to aerial reconnaissance.

He does not agree to alert systems for each side.

Allon: Hmmm?

Rabin: What are the consequences?

Kissinger: He said we can do it.


Rabin: You do it every ten days. Ten days is a lot of time to prepare something in the Middle East.

Sisco: He says your own reconnaissance is enough.

Rabin: Then the line has to be changed.

Kissinger: Wait a minute. We have a massive Gamasy problem here. Gamasy is a professional soldier and extremely disciplined. He is very passionate on the issue. He thinks the present Egyptian line is an insult and makes no military sense whatever. On the line, he, supported by Fahmy, says it is not enough for a UN zone -- the Egyptian line must be seen to move forward, and the balance must be more-even. The Egyptian line must be at the western end of the passes, and Israel can have the eastern end, with the UN in between. Rather than have the UN have the whole passes. Sadat now says that without an advance of Egyptian forces, the agreement has no value; it is not enough to just have UN forces.

He says his forces are totally vulnerable to an Israeli surprise attack.



Gur: Did he say anything on the balance of forces?

Kissinger: Yes, but he is willing to discuss it in terms of the Sinai. I would have thought it would include west of the Canal.

Gur: Right. We have always to mobilize our reserves; that takes always more time than any timetable for him to move.

Kissinger: Gamasy told me when we were alone: "for the self-respect of our armed forces, there must be a movement forward. If we have this, everything you are concerned about can be managed; if we do not have this, the whole agreement will be difficult."

Rabin: The purpose of this meeting -- let's make it clear -- is to listen to your report on what the Egyptians said and not to answer. We will answer later.

Kissinger: By April 1.


Rabin: March 27 is Passover and the Exodus. We don't have the intention of a big exodus this time. (Laughter)

Kissinger: That's a joke of your Ambassador.

Having seen Gamasy, this is a major point of principle. My impression is Gamasy believes the present line is a political line and not a military line. It leaves his forces totally defenseless. He says he has no capability to defend the Canal. Therefore, he says if the purpose of this agreement is to make the Canal more secure, then he wants -- well, he wants the far side -- at least the western mouth of the passes. He drew -- or Sadat drew -- a diagram. He would rather have the Israelis in the passes and the Egyptians in the other end, because this makes clear the defensive positions of both sides. Now he says he is vulnerable to the passes.

Sadat said "we made so many mistakes in the other one that it cannot be repeated." He says their strategic concept is no longer a surprise attack. I wouldn't count on that.

He told me if you had brought up tanks and used them as artillery at the time of his Canal crossing (on October 6, 1973), he would not have been able to do more than just hold on symbolically.



Gur: Anything he says about that is correct.

Kissinger: The artillery commander last night said he was astonished you didn't meet them with artillery fire.

Peres: He could come to the Agranat Commission.

Kissinger: Sadat said you shouldn't worry about a surprise attack any more. Sadat says, first of all, he warned about it for two years. And Gamasy says what he wants now is a strategic balance in the Sinai. He says you are totally defended, and there is no military purpose for his forces on the east side of the Canal.

Rabin: I don't deny it but this is something beyond given in return for withdrawal.

Kissinger: I'm just reporting. He doesn't feel that moving your line east of the passes is a significant change in your disposition. You have most of your forces east of the passes anyway. You can judge.

Gur: For us the main thing is the reduction of forces in Egypt.

Kissinger: Well, if the principle were accepted, my judgment is we could talk to Sadat about what the forces should be. I didn't want to get into it with him without having your judgment.

Rabin: The strategic balance can be achieved by forwarding one side or by reduction of forces on the other side.


Kissinger: Or both. I think if you offer to reduce some of your forces in the Sinai, they would discuss it. I didn't pursue it.

Allon: Within a few hours, in darkness, there will be violations.

Rabin: When there are violations, if there is a thinning out, it is very difficult to go to war.

Kissinger: No question. The question is what the actual strategic situation will be -- the generals can answer -- if you hold the passes on the east side.

Allon: I would like to clarify. The last time you told us your impression was that they wanted to move into the zone now held by the UN.



Kissinger: Sadat said to me he would settle for that as a last resort. But my impression is the Egyptian army won't stand for it. Because Gamasy's presentation was made with an intensity.

Gur: Maybe President Sadat will be so much impressed by Gamasy that he will give up much more in the political field.

Kissinger: That is a good point. I agree with you. Maybe if he gets enough for Gamasy, he can do more in the political field because the army will be quieted.

Allon: See what kind of generals we have. (Laughter)

Kissinger: I have the impression what they are thinking of now is the defense of the Canal; maybe the next year they will be thinking about a surprise attack. Gamasy is extremely unhappy about the LANCE missiles. He said you wanted a reopened Canal as a hostage; now you have it and you also can smash it with LANCE.

Dinitz: He wants to exchange some SCUDs for some LANCEs? (Laughter)

Gur: He means peacefully. (Laughter)

Kissinger: I'm just reporting. There is a tendency to attack the reporter.

Rabin: I am sure it is the same on the other side.

Kissinger: No.

Sisco: There is more of a tendency here.


Dinitz: Maybe you give him better reports.

Sisco: Also it reflects the greater intimacy here, quite honestly.

Kissinger: If we can present some strategic balance, around some conception of the balance, I have the impression the political points may move more easily.

These are the essential points.

They took a run at the Palestinian issue. I said it is absolutely out of the question. They said anything like the Vladivostok communique





would do -- not in the agreement but if I say it to them -- would be okay. They tried something about Syria but with no steam in it. For the record.

Let me sum it up. We have gone through a week of semi-philosophical discussions and we need a decision now. Both sides know enough about what the other side needs. I think I should bring concrete formulations to the Egyptians, rather than here. Once a fundamental decision is made, we should move with as much speed as the subject permits. Because I asked Sadat when I should go to Riyadh; he said Sunday, before your Cabinet meeting. It couldn't work out because they have the President of Mali visiting (in Saudi Arabia). I should go while I can still tell the old man in good conscience there is no agreement, or after there is an agreement. The worst time would be when it is apparent there will be; then to proceed would be offending him. So he (Sadat) is glad I am going to Syria and Riyadh.

He is sending someone to Riyadh tomorrow, to say he doesn't know what the Israelis will do so he can't see whether an agreement is possible.

Peres: Gamasy is not so interested in Abu Rudeis, only the passages?

Kissinger: No, he is interested in Abu Rudeis too but in a political sense.

What bothers him are Israeli naval ships in the Gulf, and the defense of the Canal.

Rabin: Fahmy is interested in Abu Rudeis. It's division of labor.

Kissinger: Except it is not true. I don't think they agree beforehand.

Gur: You said they are against a warning system.

Kissinger: In the buffer zone.

Gur: If they are so concerned about a balance, why?

Kissinger: I think that is a question of sovereignty.

Gur: What is so bad? If they agree to a mixed committee -- and I think they will agree to patrols.

Kissinger: I can't say.

Gur: What is wrong with patrols?

Rabin: Motta, the strategic balance can be kept by: a wide buffer zone, with UNEF, patrols, and a warning system, and second, by a limited buffer zone, where both sides will keep positions that deter the other from attack.

Kissinger: Exactly right.

Rabin: These are two different concepts. I think I would prefer a wider buffer zone, but to Gamasy... This is the point. As a result of Gamasy's concept, one can have a warning system. Instead of keeping the passes out of control of either, one can divide it in a way that each side keeps its own warning system.

Kissinger: Concretely, if you accepted the Gamasy proposal, where is that position of yours?

Rabin: There is no middle. It is not mathematical...

Allon: That position is very important.

Kissinger: When I raised your idea of reconnaissance, he said he would agree if we gave him our reconnaissance F-4's!

Of course, if the buffer zone shrinks, that will not be that decisive.

Rabin: I think we have all the points.

Peres: Where do we stand on nonbelligerency? How far -- because it is for us a vital position -- can we go on this issue? Is it just an opening position?

Kissinger: I think we can agree it is "a significant step towards peace," not just "a step."

Rabin: Between the two countries?

Kissinger: Oh, between the two countries?

Rabin: Otherwise, there is nothing new since '67.



Kissinger: Secondly, I imagine it is possible to say -- and I'm piecing together -- that as a result of the agreement, the two sides agree that the conflicts between them cannot be settled by force and henceforth will be settled...

Allon: By political means.

Kissinger: Peaceful means. As long as it is clear it is part of the process.

Third, I think it is possible to have a clause of non-resort to force, that two sides agree in -- whatever -- conducting these negotiations, they will not resort to force. In addition to the clause about peaceful settlement.

Peres: Between the two countries?

Kissinger: All of this will be in the basic document signed by the two countries.

Dinitz: Yitzhak said also the reference to peace will be "a significant step."

Allon: "Between the signatory countries."

Kissinger: The things I'm saying, while I'm not 100% sure, I think have a probability of success. This one -- about "between the signatory countries" -- I'm not sure about. They are concerned about seeming to make a final agreement or a peace settlement. They are tricking Faisal by this.

Allon: They are treating it as another disengagement agreement?

Kissinger: There is no point in my mind they are selling it to the public as a second disengagement agreement. But what's important is what the clauses say.

Rabin: Will it be public?

Kissinger: All of what I've said will be public.

"Egypt will not resort to the use of force for the duration of the agreement, and the agreement remains valid until it is superseded by another agreement." So you've got four related clauses.



Rabin: Duration -- it can be exploded in a year.

Kissinger: How?

Rabin: They can claim Israel doesn't make progress.

Kissinger: This was your idea -- "until superseded by another agreement."

Rabin: We wanted it in two ways -- that it will be valid until superseded, and by unlimited duration. The Egyptians could say to the Russians, "You do the job. You put the veto!" Then everything is fine but the agreement will go down. This is what Yigal stressed all the time.

Kissinger: The agreement wouldn't go down. The UN force will be renewed from the buffer.

Allon: But without the UN, what guarantee is there of the agreement?

Rabin: When the UN is removed, it is a sign they have something in mind. Let's face it.

Peres: Can he say that within 10 years there will be a final settlement of all the differences?

Kissinger: No. From what I've seen of the Syrian and the Saudi position.

Peres: Open bridges?

Kissinger: That he agrees.

Peres: Tourists?

Kissinger: Israelis neither.

Peres: Pity. He doesn't know what he misses!

The third point, the people in the Sinai with relatives -- they can visit their people in the Sinai or Gaza?

Kissinger: No.



Rabin: It's called "summer visits." It is a practical arrangement, not a principle. This is what we do with Jordan; they can visit to the West Bank. Where they go, we don't care.

Kissinger: That he might do.

Peres: Close to a million Arabs visit Israel -- I think it has an effect. There is a Palestinian community in Egypt of a size -- I don't know how large it is. They can have visits. It is not in the agreement, but it can be arranged on a practical level. But we are looking all the time for how to normalize life. I wouldn't want to attach a disproportionate importance. And here it is based on a precedent. I believe it helped a great deal to keep the frontier quiet and open and normal.

They came here; they work; they make some money. It eases the sense of seige, the claustrophobia in the Arab world.

Kissinger: I've never explored it.

Peres: How about the shipments of goods? We have this precedent with Jordan.

Kissinger: They don't see themselves as in the same category as Jordan.

Peres: But they feel towards Gaza as the Jordanians feel towards the West Bank.


Kissinger: Egyptians going to Gaza? It is conceptually possible. Arabs moving around.

Peres: They feel the same moral responsibility to Gaza as Jordanians do to the West Bank.

Kissinger: I have the impression they want to get rid of Gaza, frankly.

Peres: We are not pushing to give it back.

Kissinger: Marwan told the Shah he's getting "sick and tired of Arabs."



Peres: I'd like to pursue these ideas. Without mentioning the Jordanians. How about a desalinization plant between El Arish and supplying water to both sides? By a foreign company -- American, Japanese.

Kissinger: I think Sadat feels passionately about Egyptian territory, and about non-Egyptian territory he feels not passionately at all. But anything that looks like enabling Israel to stay...

Peres: The plant could serve both sides, regardless of the sovereignty of the territory in the future.

Kissinger: It might be interesting to him. If he can participate.

Peres: An international company. If there is such a station, suddenly the whole area looks different to both sides. If the Sinai is empty and there are only armies -- it's a barometer.

Dinitz: If it's a barometer and empty, it's freezing. (Laughter)

Rabin: Let's go back. We put seven points. (See the Israeli memorandum of March 11, Tab D.) I understand when it comes to the first -- the agreement stands on its own feet -- the agreement will deal only with Egypt and Israel and will be only an interim agreement.

Kissinger: Without using that word.

Rabin: There is no linkage to other Arab countries.

Kissinger: Yes. With one proviso.


Rabin: Let's go point by point.

Kissinger: As an agreement, there is no organic link -- or no link of any kind -- with any other agreement. In other words, no other agreement will be mentioned.

Rabin: There is a distinction. Progress towards peace and non-use of force.

Kissinger: They are both in there.

Rabin: But you confused the two. What we want is an advanced formula than when it comes to the disengagement agreement.



Kissinger: I agree.

Rabin: Here, more than just another step of disengagement.

Kissinger: I understand.

Rabin: Second -- progress towards peace -- what we want is practical arrangements to implement it. You gave us certain answers.

When it comes to the third point, you said as long as it is in the context of an effort to achieve peace, they are ready to use nonresort to force and everything should be solved by peaceful means.

Kissinger: Let me separate the two, because they came up in a different way. That the solution is only by peaceful means should logically precede the nonuse of force, and in nonuse of force they want the process. I've told them the nonuse clause could be the escape clause, which is probably what your concern is. But we weren't drafting. They say it is not their intention.

Rabin: What is their intention?

Kissinger: They say they have to show the other Arabs that it is not a separate peace and not a final line and they are going to continue to negotiate for the remainder. Maybe with some ingenuity... if this is true, we could find some language.

Peres: There is a difference between nonbelligerency and nonuse of force. Our problem is how to replace the state of belligerency with a new state which allows people to live openly, etc. Nonuse of force refers to one incident; a state of belligerency means a whole state.


Rabin: They say nonbelligerency is not possible.

Kissinger: That's clear.

Peres: "A process for peace," etc., maybe would be helpful.

Rabin: Fourth, arrangements on the ground. It seems the Egyptians want to move forward.

Kissinger: Yes.



Rabin: I'm not arguing. I'm just summing up what you reported.

Kissinger: I think, maybe if they are pushed against the wall, they might settle for just a UN zone. But that could create a monumental crisis with Gamasy, and with Fahmy for that matter. I think it may be more realistic to think in terms of each side holding one mouth of the passes. Joe, is that your impression?

Sisco: Exactly right.

Kissinger: He didn't get to be Under Secretary for nothing!

Sisco: What are the distances?

Rabin: 10 to 20 kilometers. In the north, there are no passes.

Kissinger: There the buffer zone can be much wider.

Allon: One of the basic conceptions I thought the three of us were sharing -- the US, Egypt and Israel -- was that the greater part of the Sinai would be demilitarized. Now, it seems Gamasy -- and I can see as a soldier why -- wants to create a precedent for always moving Egyptian forces, and have always a limited narrow buffer zone. And Sadat said it.

Kissinger: Not necessarily. You have the map that he has drawn. The first line is east of the passes. The second line is...

Dinitz: Half of the Sinai.


Rabin: To tell the truth, it is nonsense what he drew.

Allon: The blue line is all right.

Rabin: It is acceptable. In the context of peace.

Allon: But it is always a narrow zone.

Rabin: Always narrow. Never demilitarized. Therefore, I understand he prefers the kind of division of the area that will forward his forces to the eastern side of the UN zone. I'm just summing up.





Kissinger: Correct.

Rabin: Then, possibly committees to supervise the buffer zone, and no mixed patrols.

Kissinger: Mixed patrols I didn't raise.

Rabin: And no overflights.

Kissinger: He is willing to have liaison officers with the UNEF.

Peres: A group of three, or what? Liaisons we have today.

Kissinger: Whatever it was, he meant it as an advance over what it is today.

Allon: In addition to small joint committees, would he mean some joint committee to observe the whole agreement? A super one.

Rabin: Just the buffer zone.

Kissinger: I never raised it.

Gazit: There is under 4(d) (of the Israeli memorandum at Tab D) something very much like it.

Kissinger: (reads) "By Joint Committee and supervision teams." Joe thinks, and I tend to agree with him...


Rabin: (interrupts) Duration -- it will continue until it is superseded, and will there be a one-year extension and automatic renewal.

Kissinger: Yes, but all of us suffered from the misapprehension that this phrase about being valid until superseded was important. We spent a lot of time on this.

Rabin: No, it is important.

Kissinger: Except he wants to add "in the process of peace."

Allon: "Peace efforts!"



Kissinger: Which strengthens it.

Rabin: Implementation.

Kissinger: I said six-nine months; he didn't like it. I didn't bargain.

Rabin: Now, as to procedure. We will consider what you say; we have a problem on Sunday. The President (Katzir) is coming back from the United States and we have to meet him, and we have to leave at 3 o'clock. We have to meet him. It may not make sense to meet for one hour.

Peres: We could meet in Tel Aviv.

Rabin: No.

Peres: There are precedents. We have met in Midrasha.

Kissinger: Should I try to go to Riyadh? I have no problem. I can arrive at 4:00 and pretend the President came to meet me!

I can come either earlier or later.

Rabin: 6:00 is the safest. It might be even earlier.

Peres: If he comes at 4:00...

Rabin: Let's be on the safe side and meet at 6:00.


Kissinger: It makes no difference to us. We will look again at the idea of Riyadh.

Sisco: We'll call from the hotel. (Laughter)

Allon: The duration point is important.

Kissinger: It is really important to keep all these nonuse of force things, progress towards peace, as quiet as possible. The Syrians really are making a vicious effort to destroy it.

Second, contrary to your usual negotiating tactic of tenacious hanging on to every point, I would consider -- if you really want an agreement, which is a decision you have to make.



Rabin: We want an agreement.

Kissinger: I think if you go back to him with the basic concept, he will be flexible on the other points. I would be willing to delay my going back there if we could get into drafting.

Rabin: I see you talk psychology with us, to get concessions. Do you do the same with him? (Laughter)

Kissinger: Yes. I build you all up.

Allon: It is not so hard to build up a great man!

Kissinger: I'm not asking you to do anything you won't already do. I want you to think in terms of the basic concept. Not to fight over whether students and teachers can go. Once he knows the basic direction...

Peres: I recognize that for the passes, this isn't necessarily a precedent for the future.

Kissinger: That is, a wider buffer zone?

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: Yes. Here is something Sadat mentioned to me at the end of the meeting. One trouble is that once Fahmy gets a look at it, he goes up in smoke. I said to him once, "why can't you say something as you said in Le Monde? So he says both sides consider the conflict will not be solved by power or war but instead they will solve it by peaceful means only. It was your idea.

Allon: I must be the nudnik of today: It is an important achievement that he accepted that the agreement remains valid until it is superseded. What will worry us is the short interval between one renewal and another. Because this could undermine the duration of the agreement. We should use our imagination.

Kissinger: Let me say, the agreement has to be judged in terms of its intrinsic merit, among which is the fact of the agreement. Second, the fact that such a document is signed between a leading Arab state and Israel will have its own novelty. Even if it is broken a year from now, breaking it will be all the more significant. And since one motive



for it is to be in the best position if that happens. Third, the fact that there is no linkage in the agreement is a fact. And fourth, if there is a Geneva -- about which I am no longer so sure -- others will know that if they want any progress, they have to do it in terms of progress towards peace.

The military terms you have to assess.

You have to weigh the consequences of no agreement.

Peres: The alternative is a better agreement. You shouldn't think we are thinking of... What we are thinking of is a departure -- not yet a state of peace but the end of the state of belligerency. The question is the weight of it.

Kissinger: That is what they won't give.

Peres: We give more weight to belligerency than to nonbelligerency. On the morrow of the agreement, he will give a speech. He will return exactly to the point of departure.

Kissinger: With all due respect, by the middle of next week, you won't face the question of an agreement and a better one. We are talking about the best possible agreement. By the middle of next week, you will face a choice between the best possible agreement and no agreement. We have to get the movement going. Once there is a breakthrough, we will need a week to 10 days to conclude it. But the basic framework must exist by the middle of next week. And if it's better than 10 days, it would help in the Arab world.

My impression is if we get the basic framework settled, he will break his back on the other issues.

I think he can overrule Fahmy more easily than Gamasy.

One other point: You remember the paper I gave you... it had nonuse of force linked to Syria. I said it was not acceptable. So they said nonuse of force is only between Israel and Egypt. But they said if Israel can undertake not to attack Syria -- if Syria is mentioned once --

Rabin: We are obligated by the disengagement as long as it is kept by the other side.



Kissinger: Let me finish. I said, the problem isn't a preemptive attack, but if there is a war of attrition, Israel needs the right of sharp retaliation. You will be pleased to know Gamasy said "That's true." They pointed out that in their draft they didn't say what they would do. To have them as an ally, I must say...

Dinitz: Mutual observance of the disengagement...

Kissinger: That may be a way into it. There is a difference between them.

Allon: The "paramilitary" in the Syrian one was done through America and not in the agreement.

Kissinger: That is an ingenious way. Maybe we can use the phrase.

Allon: What are we going to say to the press? You are the one to talk today. You came back.

Rabin: What did you say to the press in Aswan?

Kissinger: In Aswan I said we have now moved from general impressions to some concrete ideas. Incidentally, you always said you wanted "concrete ideas" so you could go to the Cabinet. I hear there are complaints now that I said "concrete ideas."


Dinitz: No.

Rabin: No problem. The problem is after the Cabinet meeting Sunday, everyone will say, "What is Israel's answer to the Egyptian position?" But this is a problem for Sunday. As long as we are not talking to the press, there is no problem.

Kissinger: We can handle it by backgrounding our press. I've told them every day -- they have not printed it -- that the Israeli discussion was constructive. My understanding is you couldn't go to the Cabinet without Egyptian ideas.

Rabin: Right. Let's distinguish between our role and your role. They will ask you, "what were the concrete ideas?"

Kissinger: We will say we can't discuss it. If your Cabinet could be restrained again...



Rabin: We will do our best.

Allon: They behaved very well so far.

Kissinger: I agree. But it will be extremely dangerous with the Syrians and the Saudis if these ideas -- nonuse of force, settling the dispute by peaceful means -- get into the press. Extremely damaging.

Can I see you for a minute? It concerns something on these missile sites.

(Rabin, Peres, Kissinger and Allon met in the Prime Minister's private office from 3:35 to 3:45 to report the Egyptian reaction to the U.S. reconnaissance photographs of the five SA-6 sites recently built east of the Canal. Gamasy had expressed surprise and promised to investigate.)



(A) 10

ABC COMMENTARY - HOWARD K. SMITH *Thursday, 13 March 1975*

THE VOTES BY THE HOUSE AND SENATE DEMOCRATS FOR NO MORE AID TO INDOCHINA PRETTY WELL CLOSE AN ERA -- THE ERA OF U.S. INTERVENTION BY FORCE ALMOST ANYWHERE.

TODAY, IN THE PRESS, SNIDE COMMENTS ON THAT ERA FILL THE AIR: ARROGANCE OF POWER, DELUSIONS OF OMNIPOTENCE, GENDARMING THE WORLD TO DESTRUCTION.

WELL, THERE ARE GOOD THINGS TO SAY ABOUT THAT ERA, ALSO. LOOK BACK AT THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE DEBATES THAT BEGAN IT ALL AND YOU WILL FIND NO ARROGANCE, NOT EVEN MUCH WILLINGNESS. WE ACTED BECAUSE THERE WAS NOBODY ELSE TO STOP SYSTEMATIC AGGRESSION FROM GREECE TO KOREA.

THE "DOMINO THEORY," WHICH WE WERE ACTING AGAINST, WAS NO MYTH. AFTER HITLER KNOCKED OVER THE AUSTRIAN DOMINO, THE OTHERS FOLLOWED, FROM HOLLAND ALL THE WAY TO CAUCASUS AND STALIN WOULD UNJUSTLY HAVE DONE THE SAME HAD WE NOT ACTED.

FAR FROM FAILURE, THE ERA OF U.S. ACTIVISM IN LEADERSHIP WAS A SUCCESS. THE ECONOMIST OF LONDON RECENTLY COMPARED THE THREE QUARTERS OF THIS CENTURY THAT HAVE NOW PASSED, THE FIRST AND SECOND QUARTERS IT ADJUDGED TO BE FAILURES, WITH DEPRES-

SIONS AND A WORLD WAR EACH.

BUT THE FINAL THIRD, WHEN THE U.S. TOOK OVER LEADERSHIP, IT JUDGES THE BEST QUARTER, NOT ONLY OF THE CENTURY, BUT PROBABLY OF HISTORY, GENERAL PROSPERITY, RISEN HUMAN VALUES, FROM WELFARE AT HOME TO LIBERATION OF ALL THE COLONIES ABROAD, AND NO WORLD WAR.

THE CURRENT IMAGE OF THE UNITED STATES AS A FOOLISH MEDDLER WILL FADE WITH TIME. INDEED THE ERA MAY BE LOOKED BACK ON WITH NOSTALGIA.

FOR WITH ALL THE MISTAKES RECKONED IN, HUMANITY MADE THE MOST GAINS AND AVOIDED THE WORST PERILS PROBABLY EVER.



(B) 10

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*Syria*

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: OVIP ~~KISSINGER~~, HENRY A)  
SUBJECT: SYRIAN PESSIMISM

REF: DAMASCUS 0924

QM THERE HAS BEEN NO CLEAR ECHO IN SYRIAN NEWS MEDIA OR, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ON LOCAL DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT OF THAT EDGIER MORE BELLICOSE SYRIAN TONE I NOTED IN YOUR MARCH 9 MEETING. THIS LEADERSHIP HAS APPARENTLY BEEN KEEPING ITS COUNSEL.

2. CALLED ON YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR PEKIC TODAY, WHO BY VIRTUE OF THE STRONG ITO-ASAD LINK, SYRIA'S RESPECT FOR THE YUGOSLAV MODEL AND HR

OWN PERSONAL QUALITIES IS ON UNUSUALLY CLOSE TERMS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS IN DAMASCUS. AFTER DESCRIBING HIS VIEWS OF THE PROPOSED JOINT PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN COMMAND, PEKIC SAID HE WANTED SHARE WITH ME COMMENTS KHADDAM HAD MADE TO HIM MARCH 10 ABOUT SYRIAN REACTION TO YOUR MEETING. (KHADDAM, HE SAID, HAD PREFACED HIS COMMENTS WITH THE STATEMENT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THEM WITH NO OTHER DIPLOMAT IN DAMASCUS.) THE FONMIN HAD CALMLY AND COLDLY STATED THAT SYRIA WAS ON VERGE OF LOSING "ALL CONFIDENCE" IN YOUR MISSION. KHADDAM ASKED, "WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO DO WHEN WE ARE TOLD AMERICA WILL HAVE NO CONTACTS WITH THE PLO; THAT WE MUST WAIT OUR TURN FOR SOME POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVEMENT ON GOLAN; AND WHEN NOTHING IS SAID ABOUT CONVENING GENEVA?" WAR, KHADDAM CONCLUDED, LOGICALLY WAS BECOMING SARG'S ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO PRESERVE ARAB UNITY AND SECURE ARAB RIGHTS. HE THEN PARROTED ASAD'S STATEMENT TO YOU THAT "WHAT IS LOST BY FORCE, FORCE MUST REGAIN."



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STATE DEPT. RECORDS  
BY *HR* DATE 9/29/03

~~SECRET~~



3. THE YUGOSLAV, WHO HAS FOLLOWED YOUR MISSION HERE IN THE AREA WITH THE CLOSEST ATTENTION AND SYMPATHY FROM ITS INCEPTION, COMMENTED THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN HIS MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS ABOUT YOUR EFFORTS THAT HE FELT THEY MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUSPENDING CONTACT WITH YOU. PEKIC THEOBSERVED THAT IF THE SYRIANS ARE, INDEED, ABOUT TO BOYCOTT YOUR MISSION, THEY MAY VISUALIZE THE PROPOSED JOINT COMMAND AS SYRIA'S CHANCE TO START TO PULL TOGETHER THE "NORTHERN FRONT." HE PREDICTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN SYRO-IRAQI RELATIONS, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE THOUGHT BOTH PTSNTRIES SHOULD FIND A DESIRABLE AND ATTAINABLE GOAL. I MADE NO COMMENT TO THE YUGOSLAV IN RESPONSE TO WHAT HE HAD VOLUNTEERED.

4. COMMENT: HOPE I AM NOT CRYING WOLF IN PREDICTING THAT YOUR SATURDAY MEETING HERE WILL BE A CRITICAL ONE IN TERMS OF KEEPING LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN WITH ASAD. YOU WILL HAVE VISITED ISRAEL TWICE SINCE YOUR LAST MEETING WITH HIM. HE WILL EXPECT YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PROSEPECTS FOR GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS AND, I AM CONVINCED, HOPES DEEPLY THAT YOU WILL BRING SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR HIM TO CONTINUE WITH YOUR HELP SEARCHING FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTIRBQ. THIS WILL BE IN ADDITION TO EXPECTING TO HEAR ABOUT THE STATUS OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ASAD SUGGESTED TO YOU THAT YOU FULLS PREPARE AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARRANGEMENT BUT DELAY ITS FINALI CA-TION UNTIL SOMETHINGUCAN BE WORKED OUT FOR SYRIA, INITIALLY THIS STR

CK ME AS OFF HANDED AND NAIVE. ON REFLECTION HIS IDEA LOOKS BETTER ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO WAY OF JUDGING WHAT ITS ACCEPTABILITY MIGHT BE IN THE OTHER CAPTEALS. IT WOULD OFFER A MINIMUM ACCOMMODATION TO SYRIA, IN THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO ENGAGE IN SIMULTANEOUS TALKS ON BOTH FRONTS.

MURPHY

~~SECRET~~



- ① If it was not the world I would not have touched it.
- ② Have received March 12, 1975 it + will keep it
- ③ Will not forget it

Your Excellency,

As I address this letter to you I am fully aware of the extraordinary nature of the act. However, the fact that I can entrust it to our mutual friend, Dr. Henry Kissinger, ensures its confidentiality.

Agree

The long conflict between our two countries has brought much suffering to our peoples. Both our nations have been victims of tragic historical circumstances and I now express the sincere hope that Providence will extricate us from the vortex of warfare and enmity.

Agree

It has always been my firm conviction that Egypt, by virtue of its cultural heritage, its strength, its size and its influence, carries a leading voice with respect to the peace-making effort in our region. From what Dr. Kissinger has conveyed to me, as well as from your public statements, I feel assured that you are determined to make strenuous efforts to achieve a settlement.

I, on my part, am determined to make all efforts to promote peace between us, and it is in this spirit that I express the aspiration that we shall yet succeed in reaching an agreement that will do honor to our two peoples. Please know that, though I am on the other side, I am endeavoring to understand your problems and to see things from your perspective. I know that no agreement

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


Main thing I want Rabin to know is the spirit behind these things  
My spirit is that we will never have use of power again.

Will make it easier for Rabin, he must make it easier for me.  
I will try to candle Arab people if he candles Israeli people.

... that I felt that ...  
... of the ...

Must have vision with me  
Any step from my side will  
assume 10 steps  
would have been ready to meet  
him - occupation of my house  
Came -



*With you  
shall be  
staying  
in respect  
basis  
may be  
I have  
send this  
you*

is possible without difficult decisions but I am ready to grapple with them for the sake of the cause of peace between our countries.

With this in mind, permit me, Mr. President, to bring to your attention a concern which we in Israel consider of crucial importance.

The step-by-step approach, as I understand it is intended to bring our countries closer to peace and thereby provide momentum towards peace for the region as a whole. Hence, my people have to know that through the process of withdrawal to a new agreed line we have reached a turning point and that we are now entering an era in which we will be able to settle all our differences by peaceful means only. As Prime Minister, I must be able to convince both people and Government in Israel that in surrendering physical strategic positions we shall not be exposing ourselves to increased hardships created by lengthier and inferior lines in a resumed conflict. This can be possible only if it is visibly shown that the act of withdrawal marks the real beginning of progress towards peace by deeds and words that demonstrate the intention of peace.

*Peace  
through  
re-accept  
by the  
applicable*

*Agreed  
to most  
of suggestions*

These, Mr. President, are some thoughts I thought worthy of bringing to your attention. They, together with the suggestions and ideas I have asked Dr. Kissinger to convey have the single purpose of contributing to an understanding of our respective problems. You will, no doubt, want to react and comment on the proposals received through Dr. Kissinger. This will enable the negotiations to develop further.

*Understand what you  
are saying. You forgot  
to mention Knesset*

*Diplomatic  
measure of all pts  
agreed.*



I conclude with the hope that we shall be able to advance understanding on the important matters that engage our two Governments.

*quite right*

With expressions of highest esteem,

*Y. Rabin*  
Yitzhak Rabin

*shall keep letter. But as I answer at this stage for simple reason at any moment if this is known whole process will be damaged.*

*Quite agree on pt. Hence withdrawal to agreed line by peaceful means only must be turning pt. confusion in track*  
*Peaceful means only*

*Will use peaceful means only*

*Both conflict parties consider that this conflict will not be solved by military force or power & therefore will solve it by peaceful means only*



Will not at Geneva touch this  
agreement. Will not change anything  
between us at Geneva.

Assure him from my side that I am not  
meaning of solving this at Geneva.

Will not use four related problems  
will not raise call at Geneva





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

March 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his first meeting with Prime Minister Rabin upon arrival back in Jerusalem:

"Immediately after arriving in Jerusalem from Aswan, I met for almost three hours with Prime Minister Rabin and his colleagues to give them a detailed report on the latest elements of the Egyptian position, which I described in some detail in my report to you yesterday from Aswan. The Israelis raised a number of questions for clarification, but withheld any reaction to the Egyptian ideas until they can consult among themselves and report to the Cabinet during its regular meeting this Sunday. This is contrary to some press reports that will be emanating from Israel, based on an obtuse backgrounder, by an Israeli spokesman indicating that Israel has rejected what I brought from Aswan.

"From the questions they raised, it is clear that they continue to attach great importance to getting from Sadat the maximum possible commitment to the non-use of force in the future, to specific evidences of movement toward non-belligerency, and to assurances that, once a new Sinai agreement is achieved, its duration will be open-ended and not linked to early movement toward further agreements on the Egyptian or other fronts.


"I gave them my impression that, if agreement can be reached on a new line and balance of forces in the Sinai which meets Egypt's basic strategic requirements, Sadat would go very far in satisfying Israel's concerns about the political content of the agreement. Rabin summed up the key issue succinctly by saying that there are two basic concepts now under consideration: (a) the Israeli concept of creating a large and effective buffer in the area from which Israel withdraws, and (b) the Egyptian concept of advancing its forces to

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM. EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY

BY *HR* 9/29/03



the western entrance of the Sinai passes as Israel withdraws to the eastern entrance to the passes, with a small buffer zone in between and with each side relying for its strategic security on a balance of deterrent forces in the Sinai.

"It remains to be seen whether these concepts can be reconciled. We should have a better idea when we get the Israeli reaction following Sunday's Cabinet meeting, although I may get some indications when I see Rabin at a small private dinner tonight. I gave the Israelis my judgment that it is important to achieve agreement on a strategic framework by the middle of next week and to go to Sadat with concrete proposals for an agreement that will be sufficiently forthcoming to make it possible to move quickly to conclude the negotiations before counter-pressures can build up from Syria and probably from Saudi Arabia as well.

"While awaiting the Israeli Cabinet reaction, I will go to Damascus tomorrow and continue my efforts to persuade the Syrians to keep their options open. From Damascus, I will go to Amman tomorrow night to bring Hussein up to date and discuss a number of bilateral and regional security concerns that are on his mind. I will also seek to enlist Hussein's help with Syria, with whom the Jordanians have greatly improved their relations of late. Given King Faisal's key role and the importance of keeping him from lining up with Syria against a Sinai agreement, I have also asked whether Faisal could see me Sunday afternoon before I return that evening to Jerusalem."







3/15/75

TALKING POINTS


General Observations

1. Sadat wants the agreement.
2. He continues to express confidence he can handle the Syrian situation.
3. He is under strong pressure from Gamasy that the military aspects of the agreement be satisfactory to him. He is also under pressure from Fahmy not to give too much on the political aspects, though Fahmy was helpful on some points.
4. You believe Sadat understands Israeli desire that the agreement be evidence of practical progress to peace. In his own words, "I want this agreement to be a turning point in the relations between Israel and Egypt."
5. His reaction to the letter was very positive. (You will want to brief Rabin and Allon more concretely on Sadat's reaction, and his oral response to Rabin.)
6. Sadat was very pleased with Israeli reaction re Red Crescent, and he can be expected to move on the POW's and the bodies..
7. You were asked to indicate Egyptian reaction to Israeli concern regarding the Egyptian military disposition. Gamasy's response is they have only added a division to the third army, there is no real ~~Red~~ build-up, it is for temporary training purposes, and Sadat and Gamasy both said categorically that Egypt has no intention of attacking Israel.

On the political side, we have made progress.


- A. Willing to include in the agreement, a statement that this not a final peace settlement, but a step in the process

*significant*



leading to peace in accordance with 338.

- B. In the peace process, that all disputes will be resolved by peaceful means.
- C. That Egypt will not resort to ~~the use of~~ force for the duration on the agreement, and to make this be public since it would be in the agreement. *ctt*
- D. That the agreement remain valid until superseded by another agreement as long as it is made clear in some way that this is not the final agreement.
- E. Some joint Israeli-Egyptian participation, in the buffer zone, though we have to find a name (my suggestion is Israeli-Egyptian Liaison Representatives).
- F. Annual automatic renewal of UNEF.
- G. As to the Israeli list:
  - (1) Willing for Egyptian families, students to have freedom of movement in Sinai and from Gaza, but not Israelis.
  - (2) On air travel, foreigners need not have dual passports and willing to have travel from Cairo and relevant points to Israel, but not Israelis.
  - (3) Will reduce hostile propaganda on Egyptian controlled media; seems not willing to do anything regarding Palestinian media propaganda, even on Cairo radio.
  - (4) Willing informally, in first instance related to American <sup>Firms</sup> forces, to ease economic warfare and boycott practices; has already changed his representative on Boycott Committee, who will go with a "new spirit."



- (5) Negative on cessation of anti-Israeli diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (6) Agrees to freedom of navigation -- Bab el Mandab; agrees on cargoes; more reserved on question of crews.

No question regarding air flights on <sup>regular</sup> air routes.

8. On the Egyptian side they want:

- (a) Israeli withdrawal out of the passes and oil fields.
- (b) Want forces moved forward to Western end of the passes (Gamasy is pressing this hard.).
- (c) Want balanced forces between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai.

Explain strategic concept of Egyptians. Israelis will see this is the key problem: greater Egyptian military presence east of Canal.

9. Other points

Might wish to express the view that some Egyptian military movement forward will be required, though this should be put very gingerly.

Egyptian desire for some reference to Syria must be found, but again this may not be the right time to do anything more than mention this to the Israelis.

Handling of the Geneva Conference.

Handling of the Palestinian issue.

Finally, suggest procedure of putting together a proposal to take to Sadat.

Attached: A. Rabin's Seven Points  
B. Israeli Paper  
C. Egyptian Paper



2

2


2



Rabin's Seven Points

Dinner, Sunday, March 9

1. Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet. But Israel remains ready to negotiate with each of its neighbors without making conditions connecting one to the other. Nor do subsequent agreements have to be of the same pattern. But it is easiest to start with Egypt.
2. It has to be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording.
3. It has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force in the context of an interim agreement. Whatever the legal formula is -- nonaggression, non-belligerency, whatever -- it must be a declared public commitment towards Israel, between Egypt and Israel.
4. There must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack.
5. Duration: (a) How to solve the dilemma of indefiniteness versus a long specified period, and (b) the length of time between signature of the agreement and its complete implementation.
6. Relation between the interim agreement and what takes place at Geneva: What is it that commits Egypt to continued moderate behavior under the terms of the interim agreement?
7. The nature of the new line is related concretely to what is attainable on the six points above.





B



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10/1/73

PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.


(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.



- 3 -
- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committee and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
  - (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
  - (f) There will be serial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
  - (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration


- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USSR that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.

The first part of the letter will be devoted to a preliminary  
statement of the content and discussion of the six points  
mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75





Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement:

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:

a) The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;

b) The Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes;

c) The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;

d) The area between the new Israeli line and a line 10 kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces;

e) The area between the new Egyptian line and a line 10 kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.



4- Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria

5- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the Charter.

6- The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975.

7- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function as long as the efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement are proceeding and, towards that end, its mandate will be extended annually.

8- The two parties will cooperate with the UNEF Chief of Staff and agree that their military representatives meet with him if necessary in the zone of disengagement to discuss problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.

9- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations





or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

10- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

11- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

12- The parties agreed that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians.

13- This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.



ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH THREE

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH FOUR

4- Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.





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