

MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, May 26, 1975
 9:05 - 10:27 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
 The White House

Kissinger: The Holystone operation is a total disaster. [Substantial discussion].

I think maybe we should take it to the public.

The President: How do we get hold of this?

Kissinger: I think someone needs to be fired, whether it is justified or not.

I would get Schlesinger and Colby in and say you want a report and you want someone fired -- also Ingersoll.

The President: Get those three in here.

Kissinger: On your trip we didn't get to discuss CSCE.

On CBM's, the issue left is what territory should be included for notice of maneuvers. The Europeans wanted 500 kilometers inside the Soviet Union maneuvers involving 12,000 troops, and notice 96 days ahead. The Soviet Union proposes 30,000 troops, 18 days ahead, 150 kilometers. The Soviet proposals are inadequate.

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CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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On human contacts, it is a total fraud. Only Gromyko can understand the language. The language is very abstract, but even this the Soviet Union won't accept.

As for post-conference machinery, the Soviets previously wanted a permanent Secretariat. We wanted an assessment in two years. Now the Soviet Union is on our side; but they want to delay four to five years since they now are afraid Yugoslavia and Romania will use the machinery against them.

I think your position must be hard-line. No more concessions to the Soviet Union. If they want a conference, let them concede.

The President: Did you see the New York Times editorial?

Kissinger: It was unconscionable. You should see the editorials they had in '69 and '70. But the Jews are trying to get the maximum polarization with the Soviet Union.

But on CSCE, I would listen and not get engaged. Say if we can get a decent settlement, fine; if not, wait a few months.

The President: If the Soviets are so eager to get a CSCE, can we use that for SALT leverage?

Kissinger: It would be difficult; it could have been done a year ago maybe, but the Europeans would leave you. We should, three years ago, have link it with MBFR. But if it isn't finished by early June, there can't be a meeting in July. Our negotiation can drag just a bit behind the Europeans and slow it up as much as possible.

The President: I think we should hang back. Will the Europeans care?

Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev said he wouldn't come here before the CSCE. I told him that is OK; we are better off domestically on our anti-Soviet line.

On SALT, there is no bureaucratic dispute. The issues are SS-18, cruise missiles, Backfire. On SS-18, they want to have both MIRV and non-MIRV'd. They might agree to verification by complexes. This looks manageable. We couldn't allow this with 17's and 19's.

On cruise missiles, we may be cheating a little because they may honestly think Vladivostok settled it. They may agree to 2500 klm.



On Backfire, we are out of ideas. We may have to try not counting those in Southern USSR. Or we may have to count F-111's.

But there is no dispute within the Verification Panel on these issues.

The President: I notice the paper said there were disputes.

Kissinger: I don't know about Schlesinger, but not in the VP.

On the Mideast -- I am thinking we try for a separate agreement with Egypt, then go to Geneva later in the year with an overall agreement. Rabin may try to tie your hands on an overall agreement in conceding an Egyptian agreement.

On Spain, there is nothing to discuss with Franco. He is over the hill. Cortina looks like the end of the Inquisition. He proposes a defense treaty with us, which then would be the basis for an agreement with NATO. It is nuts.

The other big issue is Morocco. They will declare it independent. There are three claimants. Hassan claims he has a million refugees to send back in, as an excuse for annexation. Algeria wants it for access to the sea. Mauritania wants it. We should stay out. We got the parties to take it to the International Court of Justice. It could blow up any time Hassan needs a diversion. We are giving equipment to Hassan -- the Spanish may raise it.

Leone wants to see you alone. That is fine. The one snag is that we couldn't accept Communists in the government. Raise this also with the Pope.

The President: I did it before. Krol said we should indicate to the Pope to invite him to the US in '76.

Kissinger: I would tell the Pope of your concern with Spain, Portugal, and, above all, Italy. He is interested in the Mideast and Jerusalem and humanitarianism. Be careful what you tell the Italians, except Leone, because they will leak it -- and they'll leak some things which you haven't said. Be careful especially about the Mideast. Keep it general.

The President: Did you see Evans and Novak?

Kissinger: It is terrible. We are just a Latin American country.



Back to the Greeks and Turks. I could give Caramanlis a brief description of the Turkish domestic situation. You could say we do what we can but we can't run counter to the realities of the situation. Be careful of the Greeks. Caramanlis and Bitsios are superbly clever. Much more than the Turks. We could outline where it could go. Demirel wants to settle but he's afraid of Ecevit. Caramanlis will get uneasy at this.

The President: Can we get him to call off Brademas?

Kissinger: There would be too much danger of Brademas leaking it.

Start with Caramanlis with affection to Greece, and respect for him.

The President: How about our aid?

Kissinger: We are dragging our feet. How can we give the Greeks aid while there is a Turkish cutoff?

You can say the same thing to Demirel, but he isn't the man for the time. Tell him he has it won -- all he has to do is give up some territory he doesn't need.

[Scowcroft leaves to get a map.]

If we could get the Greeks and Turks to agree to a proposal, we could then float it as a US proposal. But that is premature. I wouldn't get into detail -- just listen.



