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**Gandhi ON
WORLD AFFAIRS**

Gandhi ON WORLD AFFAIRS

By Paul F. Power

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PREFACE

Among the leading names of modern history that of Mohandas K. Gandhi is respected by many men for its association with principle, nationalism and pacifism. Although much has been written about the man, his ideas and conduct, more remains to be known and understood. Especially there is a need to examine his thinking about issues with international significance. It is here that this book finds its purpose—to bring together his main views on world affairs and to evaluate their relevance for today.

The book begins with a review of basic influences on Gandhi's thought and of his public career that extended from Victorian times to the atomic age. There follows a summary of his more important beliefs which make up his political philosophy. His ideas about international relations are then presented under topical headings and traced chronologically before they are assessed.

The scope of international relations in this book includes the traditional subjects of war, peace and foreign policy. Also, the book covers Gandhi's ideas about the movement of science and technology into the underdeveloped nations, and the encounters of great religions and races. These are included in the belief that intercultural relations deserve increased recognition by those who write about international problems.

I have tried to benefit by a number of studies of Gandhi's thought and comments on its significance. Anyone who attempts to write in this field is indebted to many others to whom acknowledgment through footnotes is a meager tribute. With certain interpretations of Gandhi's ideas and their application I have found reason to differ and now offer my reappraisals.

The original material for this book was examined in a variety of sources. Among these is *Indian Opinion*, the South African newspaper Gandhi founded in 1903 and published until 1914, a source rarely investigated for the light it throws on a critical period of his life before he earned his place in world affairs. Observation of the Indian scene in 1944-1946 gave me a brief yet helpful introduction to Gandhi's nation then emerging out of colonial status into freedom with its rights and problems. My first research efforts began in 1954 under Professor Morley Ayearst of New York University when I became aware of the

need for analysis of Gandhi's ideas, but especially of his treatment of problems with ramifications beyond his locale.

A number of persons who knew Gandhi well—Mr. Louis Fischer, Dr. John Haynes Holmes and Dr. William Stuart Nelson—provided much insight in the course of my discussions with them. I am indebted to Dr. Ralph J. Bunche and the late Dr. Taraknath Das for answering questions about their interpretations of Gandhi's importance, and to the following for information concerning their views of Gandhi's thought or for help in finding basic source material: Dr. Joan V. Bondurant, Mr. Johan Galtung, Miss Ela Gandhi, Professor George Hendrick and Mr. Ian LeMaistre. Mr. Pyarelal Nair, Gandhi's associate and last secretary, clarified some points which had puzzled me. Information about sources came from the Indian Embassy in Washington, the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Historical Division of the Department of State, the Chinese Embassy in Washington, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and the United Nations Archives.

The John Day Company has kindly granted me permission to quote from Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After*. A quotation from G. D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma* is used with the permission of Longmans, Green and Company. The Navajivan Trust has kindly allowed me to quote from books which it has published: two works by Mahadev Desai, *Anasaktiyoga: The Gospel of Selfless Action or the Gita According to Gandhi*, and *The Diary of Mahadev Desai*, Vol. I; the following books by Mohandas K. Gandhi or compilations of his writings: *Delhi Diary*, *From Yeravda Mandir*, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*, *Non-Violence in Peace and War*, *Ruskin's Unto This Last*, and *Towards Non-Violent Socialism*; also Pyarelal Nair, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, Vol. I.

I want to thank those members of the Government Department of New York University who read and commented on the manuscript which eventually went into this book: Professors Marshall E. Dimock, Thomas Hovet, Albert Somit and Richard N. Swift. Others made very helpful suggestions. A grant from the Samuel S. Fels Fund greatly expedited my research efforts. It is only necessary to add that responsibility for fact and interpretation is mine alone.

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Essex Junction, Vermont

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CHAPTER I

EARLY INFLUENCES

The assassination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in 1948 ended a momentous life spanning three continents and three quarters of a century.¹

Although his life began and ended in India, he knew well two other lands, travelling to England for his legal education and serving his public apprenticeship in South Africa. By the time of his death he had engaged in great undertakings and had received world recognition as a proponent of nonviolence and Indian freedom. Nonetheless his origins and first prospects were relatively modest.

Gandhi was born in 1869, at Porbandar, a coastal city northwest of Bombay in the Kathiawar peninsula. Because of this city's location by the Arabian Sea, it has been a place of international contacts, but the roots of Gandhi's Hindu family were essentially regional. In caste he belonged to the Bania division of the third ranking Vaisyas who are traditionally traders and farmers. His father and grandfather had risen to become first ministers of minute princely states indirectly controlled by British imperialism, thereby giving him a political inheritance favorable to small-scale government which persisted in his later thought.

Within his family circle Gandhi was the youngest of his father's six children by four marriages. As a boy he admired the practicality of his father and his mother's piety. Religious influences made a deep imprint on him. His parents adhered to north Indian Vaishnavism, a sect enriched by the traditions of Ramananda who in the fourteenth century emphasized humility and the transient nature of caste. Generally speaking, Vaishnavites believe in a personal and merciful God; revere Vishnu, the second member of the Hindu triad; strive for salvation through devotion and good works; and insist on periodic fasts and strict vegetarianism. Gandhi absorbed many of these ideas, though not in a doctrinal or institutional sense, as shown by his early turning from Vaishnavite temple worship.

Other religious philosophies touched him during his childhood, but especially Jainism. This is a reform group external to orthodox Hinduism and composed mainly of urban trading classes. Jains search for ultimate truth beyond the senses and take a vow of non-injury to avoid harm to all living things, including micro-organisms. This pledge of personal nonviolence is ahimsa, found also in Buddhism and in Hinduism as a virtue of the holy man who renounces the world. Under different influences Gandhi later reinterpreted and expanded this principle to include temporal and collective as well as spiritual and individual matters.

In keeping with Hindu custom Gandhi married early, in his case when he was thirteen and still in school. This experience was an unsettling one for him and may have contributed to his later endorsement of sexual abstinence and his efforts to improve the welfare of Indian women. His wife, Kasturbai, a near illiterate, remained patient and dutiful throughout her life. He was shy at home and in school where he took no part in sports or other competitive activities. However, he was not passive in all areas; he objected to the use of English in secondary grades, broke Vaishnavite rules against eating meat, and questioned the existence of God.

For a brief period Gandhi attended a unit of the University of Bombay, but found the college difficult and returned home. He considered becoming a doctor until relatives urged him to study law in England because they were shocked about a Vaishnavite touching the dead and ambitious for his future. Although Gandhi accepted their advice, his decision to go abroad led to difficulties with the council of his subcaste which believed foreign contact would subvert his faith. When he persisted in his decision, he was excommunicated. To allay his mother's fears he took a vow from a Jain monk to shun meat, women and alcohol. Supported by the ambitions of others and by timely financial aid, Gandhi, then seventeen, sailed for the West in September 1888. He stayed there two and a half years.

For a short time after arrival in England, where he went immediately to London, Gandhi tried to become an accomplished British gentleman; much to his own later amusement he dressed fashionably and took lessons in French, elocution, dancing and the violin. Despite a few temptations, he kept his vow of abstinence. To keep his dietary pledge he sought and found a vegetarian restaurant; in its wider ramifications this discovery was probably his most important London

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experience.³ At first he was interested in vegetarianism for economic and health reasons; but then he became convinced of its ethical message and rededicated himself to the regimen of his childhood faith in the belief that thereby he upheld the principle of noninjury.

Gandhi's interest in vegetarianism led him to join the London Vegetarian Society during the second half of his stay. He became a member of its executive committee and designed an emblem with an appropriate motto. A fellow practitioner was Sir Edwin Arnold, editor of the *Daily Telegraph* and popular translator of Asian classics, whom he invited to serve on the board of a shortlived branch of the Society. Early in 1891 he began to contribute articles to the London group's newspaper in which he described the healthful effects of meatless customs in India.⁴ Furthermore he travelled beyond London and spoke to small gatherings about the need to adopt a proper diet.⁴ Vegetarianism supplied Gandhi with his initial public mission to the world.

In this period Gandhi encountered several facets of Western civilization, some for the first time and others in forms different from those he had known in India. A new and important experience was reading the Bible. Urged by a Christian roommate, he read it thoroughly; the Old Testament he found tedious, but the New Testament inspired him, especially the Sermon on the Mount. Partly because of this exposure he later invoked lessons of active pacifism and suffering which he drew from the teachings of Jesus.

Indicative of his modest social and intellectual beginnings, before Gandhi went to London he had never read a newspaper.⁵ Once there he soon became a regular reader of the *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily News* and *Pall Mall Gazette*, giving him information about British and world affairs. The *Daily Telegraph* was "cockney" and more concerned with popular features than with politics. Editorially it supported Gladstone's Liberalism, except in foreign policy where it tended to be Conservative. The fact that Sir Edwin Arnold was then editor may account for Gandhi's reading this newspaper. The Liberal *Daily News* favored free trade, civil rights, parliamentary reform and Gladstone's foreign policy of "masterly inactivity." The *Pall Mall Gazette* was independent; under the editorship of William T. Stead and then Edward T. Cook during Gandhi's London phase, its policy adhered to J. R. Seeley's conception of the civilizing role of British imperialism throughout the world. For the following score of years Gandhi, too, was attached to this view of the British Empire. Also, Cook was an enthusiast of John Ruskin's artistic and social

ideas which were introduced into the newspaper at the time of Gandhi's London education, thereby making available to him Ruskin's reformist thought which significantly affected him later in South Africa.⁶

Gandhi's early introduction to nationalism, in the main a Western ideology, was evident during his stay in London. He attended lectures given by Dadabhai Naoroji, economic critic of British imperialism and "Grand Old Man" of India's upsurge in the nineteenth century, who then taught in London. When Charles Bradlaugh died, he and other Indians attended the funeral of this advocate of Indian reform and freethinking member of Parliament. Gandhi's political nationalism, however, did not become pronounced until he went to South Africa.

The legal education for which Gandhi went to England consisted of "keeping terms" in the Inner Temple of the Inns of Court. In the only written examinations, Roman and Common Law, he succeeded easily. He took time off from his studies to go to Paris to see the 1889 Exhibition which he found materialistic, and incidental to the purpose of his trip, visited local churches which inspired him. To achieve some mark of academic recognition not provided by his law studies, he prepared for the University of London matriculation examination that he passed after an initial failure in Latin.

Gandhi's professional education in London does not appear to have significantly shaped the major bases of his thought. More important was the Eastern direction which his ideas, many of them newly conceptualized, began to take under the stimuli of first experiences and the challenge of a foreign environment. His intellectual discovery of vegetarianism represents a fresh awareness of his Indian origins. Another illustration is found in his encounter with Theosophy. Through a friend he met Helena Blavatsky, co-founder of the Theosophical Society, and Annie Besant, a social reformer converted to Theosophy from atheism, whom he knew subsequently in her role of Indian nationalist. Contrary to Gandhi's own account, he was an associate member of the Blavatsky Theosophical Lodge in London for six months, but for unknown reasons he did not renew this connection.⁷ The membership requirements outlined in Blavatsky's *The Key to Theosophy* which Gandhi read, asked members to believe in humanity without distinctions of race or creed and to remain politically neutral. Other major objects of the Society were optional, to promote the study of ancient Indian philosophy through Brahmanical, Buddhist and Zoroastrian texts, and to investigate the oc-

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cult through an inner circle of votaries.⁸ Gandhi later testified how Theosophy helped him to appreciate that Hinduism is not superstitious as Christian missionaries have claimed.⁹ Theosophy's influence can be seen also on his views of the major religions and on his humanism.

Significant for the development of Gandhi's premises was his reading of two books based on Indian traditions. The first is Sir Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia*, a romanticized version of sayings attributed to Buddha.¹⁰ Certainly Gandhi broadly considered Buddha as a welcome reformer of Hinduism and respected Buddhist ideas of nonviolence and compassion. The second is Arnold's popular translation of the Bhagavad Gita,¹¹ the Hindu epic of about the second century which recounts a struggle between good and evil and suggests that men pursue a way of responsible action to reach the ultimate truth. Surprisingly Gandhi said that this was his first reading of the Bhagavad Gita,¹² a work esteemed by his own Vaishnavite sect, and from which he gained ideas of selfless duty and dynamic pacifism.

Gandhi's English education closed when he was admitted to the bar in June 1891 and sailed that month for India. Superficially he had assumed the poise and speech of a Western Oriental gentleman. Shortly before leaving England he told an interviewer that he had come to the West to prepare for a materially gainful life and "to see England; the land of the philosophers and poets, the very center of civilization."¹³ But beneath such sentiments ground had been broken for quite a different outlook which emerged in due course.

When Gandhi arrived at home he was beset with trouble; first of all he discovered that his mother had died in his absence and his family had kept the news from him. Determined to win back his caste status he made public expiation for disobeying his elders in going abroad. To an extent a new friendship with a Jain poet and jeweler, Raychandbhai Ravjibhai, brought him solace. But when he went to Bombay to practice law he failed at the outset; in his first case he stood up to cross-examine the plaintiff's witness and could not speak, consequently another barrister had to assume the responsibility. Gandhi then attempted to find a teaching position, but his lack of a university degree blocked the way. After six months in Bombay he returned to his native Kathiawar and subsisted on legal drafting for impoverished clients.

A critical social and political setback occurred in Kathiawar. Gandhi's brother, charged with giving impolitic advice to a local prince,

lost political standing and asked Gandhi to intercede with the local British agent whom he had met in England. Reluctantly he agreed and then so persisted in arguing his brother's cause before the agent that the latter called a guard and expelled the young barrister from the room. His British education, his family ties to local authority, and his prior meeting of the agent availed him nothing. Gandhi considered legal action against the sahib, but bitterly accepted advice from a distinguished Indian lawyer to "pocket the insult." The incident left a lasting impression on him and hindered his law practice. Fortunately he received a timely offer from Moslem traders to go to South Africa for a year of legal work. He accepted the proposal and sailed for South Africa in April 1893, leaving in India his wife and two children.

Except for occasional trips to England and India, Gandhi remained in South Africa for two decades, from 1893 to 1914. There he found his life's philosophy and began his political career. The Transvaal and Natal were the scenes of most of his activities. Shortly after his arrival he experienced racial discrimination in a variety of incidents. Contrary to Indian custom, a magistrate told him to remove his turban in court; railway officials refused to honor his first-class ticket; and a hotel clerk denied him a room because he was a non-white.

By reason of these indignities Gandhi began to represent Indians in their dealings with white colonists and in 1894 turned a corner of his life. Yielding to the requests of Indian friends to stay and lead them in opposing a Natal bill depriving resident Indians of voting rights, he did not return home at the end of his one year's commitment. When the bill became law, he helped to form the Natal Indian Congress to press the grievances of local Indians. To gain political advice he began to correspond with Naoroji.¹⁴ Combining private law practice and public work, Gandhi opposed a suggested head tax on indentured Indians whose term of service had expired. For in addition to racialism, the inferior status of South African Indians originated in an indentured labor system dating from 1860 and operative in his time. Though a lesser tax was adopted, he worked for the next twenty years until all head taxes were ended.

In 1894 Gandhi began to read the pacifist and anarchist writings of Leo Tolstoy. The most important of these for his thought was *The Kingdom of God is Within You*.¹⁵ In this work Tolstoy asks men to resist military service and the payment of taxes, rejects the

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use of the state to bring about social and political reform, and calls for a revival of non-institutional, pacifist Christianity. Gandhi incorporated aspects of these ideas into his growing anti-Western and pacifist outlook. Later, in 1909, he began corresponding with Tolstoy. The tenor of Gandhi's letters suggests that he wished to associate himself with the Russian in order to publicize his South African Indian movement.¹⁶

Gandhi's deep interest in vegetarianism continued. He invested in a meatless restaurant which subsequently failed. In 1894 he wrote an open letter to Indians in England urging them to join vegetarian groups and to practice Hindu customs about meatless diets to gain sympathy for Indian nationalism,¹⁷ and thereby added a political note to his dietary convictions. Moreover he went forward with his study of religion, at first Mohammedanism, and then Nonconformist Protestantism. Members of these faiths befriended him and tried to convert him. A visit to a German Trappist monastery near Durban in 1895 showed him the principles of renunciation, humility and racial respect in practice. However, none of these non-Hindu religious experiences had a pervasive effect. Indeed he turned and enriched his knowledge of Hindu religious traditions, in particular by studying the classical Upanishads, devotional literature, and the Bhagavad Gita. In part influenced by correspondence with his friend, Raychandbhai, Gandhi quietly but irrevocably committed himself to non-orthodox Hinduism about 1896.

Furthermore he began to enlarge his political horizon when in mid-1896 he made a five months visit to India where he met leaders of the Young India¹⁸ and Indian National Congress¹⁹ movements. To promote his cause he wrote the "Green Pamphlet," a popular account of the British Indian situation in South Africa.²⁰ Also, he made speeches criticizing Europeans of Natal, and on his return voyage attacked the West as a civilization based predominantly on force. South African whites, who had heard of his speeches and believed he was undermining their supremacy, nearly lynched him when his boat docked in December. He escaped serious injury through the aid of sympathetic colonials; characteristically, he refused to cooperate with local authorities and have his assailants prosecuted, though the London Government had urged punishment of the guilty.

When the Boer War began in 1899, Gandhi promptly supported the British cause and organized a group of Indians for stretcher duties. Although he and his men served only six weeks, their spirit and performance did much to prove the loyalty of the local Indian

community to colonial and imperial officials. During the war he again went to India to carry the story of overseas Indians to nationalist circles. Following a brief visit to Burma, he returned to South Africa. After the Boer War ended in 1902, he discovered that the British began to mollify their former enemies by being conciliatory about racial questions. Responding to this development, he concentrated his anti-discrimination activities in the Boer stronghold of the Transvaal to prevent the spread there of anti-Indian legislation.

In 1903 Gandhi launched a moderate newspaper, *Indian Opinion*, to represent the interests of South African Indians and to enlighten colonists about their obligation toward Asians. Slowly less cautious ideas began to take shape; he translated Plato's *Apology* into his native Gujarati and published this account of Socrates' resistance to injustice in the Indian language edition of his newspaper and as a separate pamphlet. The British Government considered the pamphlet to be dangerous and so they confiscated it.²³

About this time Gandhi first read John Ruskin's *Unto This Last*²⁴ which Henry S. L. Polak, a British associate, called to his attention. He wrote his own version of it and used as a title, *sarvodaya*, "the welfare of all."²⁵ In his tract he agreed with Ruskin about the debilitating effects of industrialism and economic liberalism, the value of handcraft industry, the importance of motivating men by love, and the equal service rendered to society by all occupations. Gandhi's paraphrase did not include Ruskin's suggestion to use government as a tool of social reform; and he omitted Ruskin's idea that an enlightened state has an international purpose to spread peace and goodwill, though he later believed that free India has such a mission. Under the influence of Ruskin and of Indian communalist ideas, he established a cooperative farm at Phoenix in Natal where relatives and followers might live a self-sufficient life. He transferred his newspaper there, but not yet a literal believer himself, he remained in Johannesburg as a successful lawyer, enjoying a middle-class home, European clothes and an income of three thousand pounds.

Within two years significant interior changes surfaced into his thought and practice. In 1906 after serving briefly as a stretcher sergeant in the Zulu rebellion, he renounced economic gain and marital relations and pledged himself to live at a subsistence level and to abstain from sexual intercourse in order to pursue the truth more effectively. Nevertheless the Indian ascetic influences which had much to do with these steps did not cause him to withdraw from the world; instead he continued to live with his family and intensi-

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fied his efforts on behalf of social and political reform. At the time he was thirty-seven and the father of four children.

A further evidence of important developments in Gandhi's life was his first public appeal for nonviolent direct action against the state, expressed in September 1906. During a meeting of Indians in Johannesburg he spontaneously recommended that they offer peaceful mass disobedience to a new Transvaal registration law. Although the Law of Manu and other traditional Indian writings permit resistance to injustice, and although there had been civil strikes and boycotts against British rule in India, Gandhi tended to credit many sources for his idea of nonviolent disobedience. Among these are Henry David Thoreau,²⁴ Jesus,²⁵ Daniel, Socrates, Tolstoy²⁶ and the Bhagavad Gita.²⁷ In fact he encountered Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience* after his first call for a boycott, making this influence one of confirmation.²⁸ Whatever the origins of his resistance idea, it was Gandhi who developed the notion into a system of direct action for purposes of individual and collective reform.

Before actually undertaking mass resistance, Gandhi went to England to oppose Royal Assent to the registration law. He succeeded only in delaying the impact of the legislation; for although the Assent was technically withheld, the Transvaal was given responsible government on January 1, 1907, and with it the power to determine racial policy adverse to local Asians. When he returned to South Africa, he led Indians in disobedience to the law, and as a consequence he and several followers were jailed. From prison he negotiated through an intermediary with Jan Christiaan Smuts, Transvaal Government representative and former Boer leader, and soon reached a compromise settlement which made possible his release from jail. Different interpretations of the settlement arose, and he resumed the struggle in September 1908 against the registration law and a new enactment forbidding Indians to enter the Transvaal. Subsequent jailings and deportations soon reduced the Indian resisters to a hard core, among them Gandhi.

Hoping to revitalize the local struggle, he went again to England to seek imperial authority against the Transvaal regime. As in earlier visits to England and India, he sought aid from government officials and others who realized the disruptive effect of the South African Indian problem on imperial relations with nationalist India. However division within Gandhi's community weakened his position, and in the face of determined colonial and imperial opposition, he achieved no practical results.

On the return voyage to South Africa in November 1909, Gandhi wrote his anti-modernist and pacifist manifesto, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule*.²⁹ Partly the consequence of his empty mission, this is one of Gandhi's more important writings. Intended in its immediate effect to combat terrorist methods of some Indian nationalists at home, the tract was banned by the British Indian Government when Gandhi tried to have it distributed in his native Gujarat; for though his viewpoint was pacific, his condemnation of British rule was severe. He then proceeded to publish it for use in South Africa where the Indian problem had more to do with social than political unrest.

The work shows the particular influence on Gandhi of Leo Tolstoy, Dadabhai Naoroji, John Ruskin and Edward Carpenter, an English socialist and critic of Victorian materialism,³⁰ as well as Indian traditions of nonviolence, ruralism and piety. The contents reveal how Gandhi had seriously reexamined or rejected his earlier acceptance of modernism, constitutionalism and progress, and that his beliefs had completed their movement into broad currents of cultural nationalism, active pacifism and personal asceticism. Henceforth his thought flowed through these channels, and the essential Gandhi appeared.

Not long after his return to South Africa, Gandhi established the Tolstoy Farm near Johannesburg as a refuge for the families of jailed Indian resisters and as a symbol of his idealism. Subsequently he devoted his life exclusively to public service and to developing his leadership abilities. Partly at Gandhi's request, Gopal K. Gokhale, a leader of moderate Indian nationalism and a member of the Legislative Council of India, came to South Africa to study local Indian grievances. Although Gandhi claimed Gokhale as his political teacher until his death in 1915, it is evident that there were many differences between the two men. Unlike Gandhi, Gokhale was convinced of the superiority of Western constitutionalism; he even considered Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* the work of a "fool,"³¹ and told Gandhi and his Tolstoy Farm followers that their life of self-denial was an extremism based on pride.³²

The Union Government gave Gokhale assurances about some issues; but later misunderstanding led to a new disobedience struggle. The zenith of the movement which Gandhi had organized and led came in November 1913, when more than two thousand Indian men, women, and children marched illegally but peacefully into the Transvaal to protest civic and social restrictions. Many were arrested

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and jailed. Lord Hardinge, Viceroy of India, intervened with a statement favoring the protesting Indians. After protracted negotiations with Smuts who had now progressed to represent the Union Government, Gandhi secured relief from the major tribulations of resident Indians, gaining for them more freedom of movement and legal recognition of marriages according to Hindu or Moslem custom. Satisfied that he had attained minimum social demands, he immediately made plans to leave the continent and to enter the mainstream of Indian politics. Explaining that his relatives had need for him in India, he sailed for home by way of England in July 1914.

The first World War had begun when Gandhi arrived in London. Consistent with his previous record when the Empire was in difficulty, he offered his services to the British Government. At its suggestion he began to organize a medical relief corps and for this purpose recruited Indians living in the United Kingdom. Sickness prevented him from continuing the project, and he returned to India in December 1914. There his South African activities had earned him considerable public respect, and in the Congress his previous visits and correspondence had prepared the way for a political career. At Gokhale's request he refrained from public activity for one year in order to become acquainted with national issues. After touring the country he established a colony near Ahmedabad in Gujarat, which became a center for his activities.

Gandhi began his public political career in the Indian subcontinent at Benares University in February 1916 when he denounced the English language, waste in British rule, terrorism as a means for securing freedom and Indian apathy. He then carried out a successful, agrarian disobedience movement at Champaran in Bihar. But true to his pledge in 1914 to aid the British war effort, he recruited Indian soldiers.

In August 1917 Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, announced Britain's policy of preparing India for self-government within the Empire. At first Gandhi favored the ensuing Montagu-Chelmsford constitutional reforms; but he soon turned against them in the belief that mass education in nonviolent resistance, rather than constitutional gradualism, would bring about self-rule.

When the war ended Gandhi united with other nationalists in opposing restrictive, civil rights legislation aimed at Indian terrorism. To this issue he joined anti-British feeling among Moslem Indians on the Caliphate question, i.e., the pan-Islamic fear that the Allied

powers, having defeated the Turks, would terminate the religious office of the Caliph in Constantinople. Violence resulted from a public strike which Gandhi called on April 6, 1919. British reprisals followed, including a massacre of unarmed Indians at Amritsar. Looking for a vehicle for his social and political ideas, in October Gandhi undertook the editorship of *Young India* and its Indian language equivalents.

Following the deaths of the leading nationalists Gopal K. Gokhale and Bal Gangadhar Tilak,²⁸ Gandhi became the central figure in Indian nationalism. A charismatic personality to the Indian peasants, he seemed to them a saintly "Mahatma" or "great soul" who epitomized spiritual fulfillment. Usually he preferred to be called "Gandhiji," a term of respect and not a diminutive, rather than "Mahatma," maintaining that he was not a saint. In September 1920 he permanently adopted the loin cloth of the peasant and so enhanced his power by means of this and other symbols. Thereafter his personality and ideas had much to do with expanding the base of the Congress party beyond that of a middle-class debating club. However, he had to compete for party control with Western-oriented constitutionalists and also with extremists of the left and right who sometimes condoned violence as a political technique.

Disappointments shadowed the Mahatma's rise to importance. When he initiated a comprehensive disobedience struggle and promised independence by the end of 1921,²⁹ freedom did not come, and Indian violence in the United Provinces in February 1922 caused him to suspend direct action, to the displeasure of such nationalists as Jawaharlal Nehru,³⁰ a popular Brahmin intellectual and son of Congress leader Motilal Nehru. In March the British arrested Gandhi and tried him for sedition; he willingly pleaded guilty and was imprisoned until 1924. After his release the Congress ended its boycott of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and as a result of this shift toward constitutionalism, he temporarily gave up his program of non-cooperation.

Because the political scene remained relatively quiet between 1925 and 1928, Gandhi concentrated on social reforms. In particular he worked to revive village production of homespun cloth that he hoped would displace the foreign product, and to eliminate untouchability. He visited Ceylon briefly and urged his pacific ideas. In the field of active politics he agreed with other nationalists that the Parliament's Simon Commission on Indian problems was certain to fail. Early in 1929 the Congress demanded complete independence

from Great Britain by the end of the year. In May a British Labor cabinet under Ramsay MacDonald took office and announced through the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, that it would hold a Round Table Conference on India to consider new political solutions. Gandhi wished to be conciliatory, but opposition in Parliament prevented the British Government from giving any assurances about dominion status to Indian nationalists prior to the meeting. Consequently at the end of the year the Congress, with Gandhi's approval, secured the withdrawal of its members from provincial legislatures and began another wave of civil disobedience.

To dramatize the struggle Gandhi decided early in 1930 upon a march to the sea to obtain salt—forbidden to Indians as a government monopoly. The two hundred-mile journey began at his colony near Ahmedabad and ended at Dandi on the coast. The publicity about the salt march, which took twenty-four days, stirred public opinion in many nations. By obtaining salt from the sea, Gandhi opened the way for mass disobedience to the salt laws. The police arrested many, including the leader.

Although several principals of Indian nationalism were in jail, the first session of the London Round Table Conference met in November. Two months later the authorities released Gandhi, Nehru and other Congress chiefs. Gandhi then began to negotiate with the British Indian Government to determine under what conditions his civil disobedience could terminate and he might attend the London meeting. Winston Churchill's comment about the negotiations with the Viceroy became world famous: "It is alarming and nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half-naked up the Viceregal Palace . . . to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor." Resulting from the negotiations was the Irwin-Gandhi agreement, which to Nehru's dismay, Gandhi entered without consulting other nationalists.²⁰ The terms called for the British to release political prisoners and to end the government salt monopoly; for Congress-led Indians to suspend civil disobedience and to be represented in the London conference. The pact gave no assurances to Indian nationalists about early independence or dominion status.

Thereafter the Congress sent Gandhi to London as its sole representative, though it restricted his latitude to bargain. He took the opportunity to show his concern for the underprivileged by staying in an East End settlement house. To allay anti-Indian sentiments

of unemployed workers, he visited Lancashire factories then economically depressed because of the Indian boycott against foreign cloth. Among others, he met Lloyd George, Harold Laski, Charlie Chaplin and George Bernard Shaw. He tried to see Winston Churchill, but the leader of the opposition to Indian nationalism was unwilling to see him. He talked to a variety of academic audiences and reluctantly gave a radio speech for American listeners. At the suggestion of the British Cabinet he had an audience with King George V. The Mahatma wore loin cloth and sandals to Buckingham Palace. The prospect and the fact of meeting the scantily clad and supposedly seditious Indian disquieted the monarch.⁷⁷

Although the trip was a publicity triumph for Gandhi who had been widely misunderstood in the West as a Machiavellian ascetic, the Round Table Conference which he had come to attend failed to reconcile the British Government's view of its responsibilities to Indian minorities not fully represented in the predominantly Hindu Congress. Disagreements developed from his claim to represent all of his countrymen through the Congress, and his belief and that of his party that the British Government had specially chosen the other Indians at the meeting so as to divide Indian nationalism. On the other hand, the British argued that Moslems, "untouchables," Anglo-Indians and Princes required protection from Hindus of the Congress in any new constitutional plan. When the impasse was clear to all, Gandhi decided to return home.

Some friends in America urged him to go first to the United States to explain his cause to the American people, but others, especially John Haynes Holmes, a major American interpreter, cautioned against such a visit as unprepared and untimely in relation to American public opinion. Gandhi declined the invitation and returned to India through Western Europe. In Switzerland he visited Romain Rolland and made a few public statements on war and peace. He went to Rome where he had a brief interview with Mussolini, purportedly to convince the dictator of the efficacy of peace, though political implications were noted in London. To complicate matters a Fascist newspaper wrote that in a gathering of Indians and Italians Gandhi had promised an Indian market for Italian goods if Italy aided Indian nationalism, though he denied the truth of the account. To improve his position with Indian Roman Catholics, Gandhi attempted to see Pius XI, but the Pope was not available, according to one source because the Vatican was dismayed at Gandhi's simple dress and had had insufficient time to arrange an audience.⁷⁸

EARLY INFLUENCES

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When he arrived in India early in 1932,³⁹ he found deep unrest in the wake of the breakdown of the London conference. Subsequent incidents of violence led British authorities to arrest numerous Indians, including Gandhi. While imprisoned, he learned of the British Government's decision to permit separate elections for "untouchables" in a new constitutional proposal. Protesting against what he considered the perpetuation of discrimination, Gandhi began a fast unto death to support his belief in integrating those with no caste standing into Hindu society. Nehru later called the fast a "severe blow" to the civil disobedience movement since it diverted attention from strictly political issues.⁴⁰ When Gandhi was nearly dead, he and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the "untouchable" leader who approved separate elections, began to negotiate. And when both sides compromised the fast ended. The question of untouchability lived on in India's social and political life.

Released from prison after his fast, Gandhi tended to concentrate on social reforms because nationalist activity was at a low ebb. Through an intermediary, Churchill agreed in 1935 to go to India and while there to visit Gandhi. The Mahatma, acting the role Churchill had played in London in 1931 when he tried to see the British leader, declined to agree to such a plan.⁴¹ In 1937 he founded his newspaper *Harijan*, a name he used for "untouchables" which means the children of God.

In 1937 the Congress accepted certain features of the limited self-rule authorized by the India Act of 1935 which developed from the London Round Table Conference; however it denounced the Act's federal scheme and the reservation to the Viceroy of powers over defense and foreign affairs. Gandhi gave his reluctant approval to Congress participation in provincial elections which took place under the new law, and the party emerged as the strongest political force in India with forty-five percent of the vote. This enabled it to form ministries in most of the provinces, thereby gaining parliamentary experience so important for future independence. Gandhi remained in the background, preferring nonviolent direct action to constitutionalism. Indeed, in his long career he never served in any government.

At the outbreak of the second World War in September 1939, the British Government unilaterally committed India to the conflict. In protest the Congress withdrew from office, a move which Gandhi endorsed. Seemingly he did not wish to embarrass the British in their war efforts; but intermittently he upheld Indian propaganda

against the Western democracies, approved sporadic civil disobedience, and took a rigid pacifist position about settling international disputes by force.

In February 1942, Gandhi met Chiang Kai-shek in Calcutta when the Chinese leader, a friend of Indian self-determination, paid a visit to consult with military heads and to enlist nationalist Indian support for the war threatening China through Burma. Thereafter Gandhi avowed his personal sympathy with China's cause, but he did not suggest that Indian nationalists ought to place the struggle against Japan ahead of gaining independence from the British Empire.

Because of internal unrest and the advance of Japanese armies to India's borders, in March 1942 the British War Cabinet sent the Cripps Mission to India. The nucleus of the Mission's plan was to offer India dominion status, including the right to leave the Commonwealth, effective after the war. The Congress accepted this part of the proposal; difficulties developed out of apparent British efforts to safeguard the power of the Indian princes in the post-war constituent assembly and about the extent of nationalist participation in wartime defense policy. There was also the Moslem League, active since 1906 in representing those Moslems who believe that Islamic India requires separate political power in the subcontinent. The League's demand for a distinct state threatened to undermine any agreement the British Government might make with the Congress. Because Gandhi sought an immediate transfer of power without discussing specifics, he early separated himself from the Cripps-Congress talks and from any possible compromise with the Moslem League whose ideas he had long assailed. When the Congress representatives, Nehru and Maulana Azad, a leader of Congress Moslems, rejected the British proposals, the Mission ended. The crucial issue had been that of nationalist participation in defense of the country during the war.

Following the Cripps Mission, the Congress reached a crisis in its efforts to secure wartime independence. To bargain with the British Government the Congress leaders had few means left. Gandhi responded by limiting pacifism to himself and approving the armed defense of India against Japan by those Indians who believed in violence, provided India obtained immediate freedom. Nehru and other nationalists had been willing to do this earlier, but Gandhi's position was a new factor in Anglo-Congress negotiations. Happlessly for the Congress and Gandhi, the British did not alter their position. He appealed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to help

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Indian nationalism, again with the promise that national India would take active part in the war if it were granted immediate freedom.⁴² Roosevelt's non-committal reply indicates that he hoped national India would aid the war effort.

The crisis came to an end with the August 8, 1942, resolution of the All-India Congress Committee. Inspired by Gandhi, this declaration called for the British to grant immediate sovereignty to national India and threatened nonviolent resistance if the British refused. A few hours after the announcement of the "Quit India" demand, the British authorities arrested Gandhi and other party leaders, and suppressed the Congress throughout India. Ironically, Manuel L. Quezon, the Philippine leader then in exile in America, cabled Gandhi the day of his arrest asking him to join the United Nations in resisting Japanese aggression. Contrary to his wishes and instructions numerous acts of violence against British control took place, but subsequently order was restored and the war effort went forward without serious domestic strife. Gandhi's wife, who went to prison with her husband, died there in February 1944. In May he was released for reasons of health.

At the end of the war Gandhi and the Congress renewed their demands for national independence. They also continued their opposition to intense Moslem League pressure for Pakistan under the leadership of Mohamed Ali Jinnah, a brilliant lawyer who had worked with Gandhi twenty-odd years before to promote national Moslem-Hindu cooperation, but who from 1940 was chiefly responsible for the League's demand for a separate state. The defeat of Churchill's government helped to expedite events, though at great costs. The incoming Labor party appointed a Cabinet Mission to construct a plan granting India full independence and to adjust the views of the major nationalist parties.⁴³ Arriving in March 1946, the Mission recommended a constituent assembly to create a federal India and suggested a provisional government in the interim. The Congress formed a temporary regime and the Moslem League later entered it. The constituent body began its work in December despite the absence of the League and the Indian states ruled by the princes.

The gravity of the Congress-League impasse and its accompanying strife obliged Prime Minister Clement Attlee to announce in February 1947 that Great Britain would extinguish its political power in India no later than June 1948. Under the coordination of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, a partition scheme was devised which the Congress accepted. Gandhi submitted to the decision as the only

way to achieve independence without civil war. In the spring of 1947, Gandhi visited the princely state of Kashmir and lent his influence there to Congress interests at a time when the local government had not yet decided whether to join Pakistan or India under the terms of the partition plan. Pakistan later charged that by his visit to Kashmir he had conspired to bring Kashmir into the Indian Union."

Gandhi did not celebrate on August 15, 1947 when the dominions of India and Pakistan entered the family of nations, because the partition had momentarily stimulated mass migrations and widespread violence between Hindus and Moslems. That autumn the Kashmir issue added to the cataclysm arising from partition, and he toured disturbed sections of India proper to help pacify unrest. In January 1948, he undertook a special fast in New Delhi to end Hindu-Moslem killings. But the tradition of violence that India has long known and against which Gandhi had pitted his mind and energy soon confronted him for the last time. On January 30, a Hindu extremist who thought Gandhi was an enemy of Hinduism killed him on his way to a prayer meeting.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Gandhi's general political philosophy supplies insights into his ideas about world affairs. This philosophy depends on his premises about absolute truth, duty and nonviolence, and his fundamental conceptions about man, society and the state.

In his book, *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Thought*, Arnold Brecht affirms that belief in the existence of a supreme being who created and plans the universe is a distinctly relevant factor for the study of the state, independent of the fact that such a deity's existence or nonexistence is not demonstrable by modern science. The relevance of such theism is found in its influence on political ideas, institutions and motivations.¹ In Gandhi's case certainly metaphysics and political notions are intertwined.

At the apex of his beliefs is the Hindu concept of *satya*, absolute truth, essential being, the supreme good.² Of these meanings Gandhi preferred "truth." For a time he held that "God equals truth," but later he reversed the order and said that "truth equals God." He adopted the new formula because its appeal is more universal, maintaining that it is as acceptable to non-theists as to theists.³

Before and after the change Gandhi considered absolute truth the same as divinity.⁴ This interpretation of *satya* as divinity has been explained by the lack of distinction in Hinduism between the partial ability of man and the full ability of God to know ultimate reality.⁵ In any event he believed in the purposeful, moral government of the universe by an omnipotent and omniscient first cause which he could explain in terms of pantheism or transcendentalism.⁶ Furthermore, his first cause is both merciful and just,⁷ attributes which are reflected in his stress on pacific means and political reform.

Allied to *satya* in Gandhi's system of beliefs is his conception of law or duty, i.e., his interpretation of dharma, Hinduism's "higher law" and one of its three aims of life.⁸ The other two are *artha*,⁹ power or wealth, and *kama*, pleasure or aspiration. These three aims are progressive steps toward *moksa*, final release from the world. Shunning the specialized Indian traditions devoted to domination

and sensuality, Gandhi postulated that any legitimate power and pleasure are included in the higher moral law.¹⁰

Dharma is the basic concept of Hindu political thought, broad in its implications and open to several definitions.¹¹ Two major meanings of dharma are that it is a source of political, social and religious duties which is capable of changing them; and that it is an agency of absolute truth executing these duties in the world of men.¹² Gandhi made use of both meanings, but generally tended to understand dharma as a universal morality to which the affairs of men and states should correspond, much as the first view suggests. He rejected any of Brahmanical Hinduism's attempts to give authoritative interpretations of ancient Indian dharmic literature in the form of literally binding codes traceable to a divine source.¹³ Since he did not accept these orthodox versions of dharma, he made no attempt to cast it into fixed, institutional forms as sometimes done with analogous higher laws in the East and West. But whatever his differences with orthodox Hinduism, Gandhi stood well within the confines of the broad dharmic tradition.

Together with absolute truth and the higher law in Gandhi's cluster of basic ideas is his special understanding of the Vaishnavite, Jainist and Buddhist idea of ahimsa—love or nonviolence. His particular interpretation of this notion provided him with a first principle for his amplified theory of pacific action.¹⁴ Of the possible English translations of ahimsa, Gandhi preferred "nonviolence." He agreed that St. Paul's "charity" is an approximation but felt that it does not sufficiently imply respect for the non-human.¹⁵ As an ascetic he disliked the term "love" because in English it often suggests a physical manifestation.¹⁶

Gandhi pointed out a difference between passive and dynamic nonviolence, and he repudiated passive interpretations found in such nonresistance traditions as those of the Jains and Mennonites. He insisted that ahimsa is dynamic, not passive.¹⁷ Albert Schweitzer believes that Gandhi's activist understanding of ahimsa is a major refinement of the Indian idea, traditionally one of quietism and negation.¹⁸ Clearly his view of ahimsa is not a denial of power as influence, pressure or force, but rather of power in its violent forms. Though Gandhi held that ahimsa is the perfect means to reach ultimate truth, the supreme good is higher in his scale of values than dynamic nonviolence.¹⁹ For this reason his pacifism tends to be non-absolute.

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tiny exercises considerable influence upon the theorist's political ideas. For his part Gandhi looked at man in relation to absolute truth, the higher law of duty and the ethic of nonviolence. Absolute truth certifies man's being, consequently, "devotion to this truth is the sole justification for our existence."²⁰ In the light of this truth man is responsible for his conduct and is capable of improving his nature in this world or the next. In keeping with Hindu tradition, Gandhi held that man passes through many stages of becoming until he earns his release from a cycle of rebirths, the inexorable law of karma. Man's will is free to the extent that he can discharge his obligation to erase his faults and to find the supreme good and spiritual liberty. In effect, Gandhi's understanding of man stands between one of rigid imperfectibility and one of full perfectibility, between the outlook of a Calvin and that of a Condorcet. "No one," Gandhi declared, "should dogmatize about the capacity of human nature for degradation or exaltation."²¹

Man can approach the ultimate good through a variety of truths. Truth as man knows it at his own level, Gandhi freely admitted, may appear differently to man from that of absolute truth, and differently among men. Despite this plurality of truths, in Gandhi's view the world as man knows it is not maya, illusion, as Vedantic Hinduism claims.²² The gap between what is really true and man's relative understanding of that truth only proved to Gandhi the obligation for man to seek ultimate reality; "there is nothing wrong in every man following truth according to his lights. Indeed it is his duty to do so."²³ This is precisely what Gandhi did himself. *The Story of My Experiments With Truth* is the revealing, original title of his autobiography. "I have grown from truth to truth,"²⁴ he once said, and he expected others to do the same.

This does not mean that Gandhi was a relativist; he had no taste for uncertainty. Rather his view of man leaves considerable room for changes in preferences and policies whenever fundamentals are confronted by the immediate problems of life. Criticized for his own inconsistencies, he explained: "but one's life is not a straight line; it is a bundle of duties very often conflicting. And one is called upon continually to make one's choice between one duty and another."²⁵

Man's first duty, Gandhi was convinced, stems from his relation to the higher law of dharma. But he also believed that no political, social or religious institution is needed to interpret dharma. Man best performs his duty by working from subjective, personal reform

outward to objective, inter-personal and institutional reform in society, the state and the world. As a result of these conceptions, Gandhi's method of discovering the specifics of the higher law is highly intuitive, which gave him the reputation of being a mystic comparable to St. Francis of Assisi.²⁶ To his mind the unseen code is clouded from exact rational interpretations that can be communicated to most men. But this is in the nature of things and no defect of man who should consider dharma as a perfect order that guides him to paths of duty.

Gandhi had no doubts, at least for himself, about the superior way to absolute truth: *anasaktiyoga* or *karmayoga*, selfless action. Drawing this idea from the Bhagavad Gita, he interpreted the epic to mean that living requires right action; and because the true self is immortal, release from the bonds of responsibility comes from dutiful activity performed without attachment to reward. Gandhi wanted men to follow the path of ethical action as a middle ground between inactive asceticism, and activity for the sake of benefits, either from the world or for the self. For "mere knowledge of right or wrong," he believed, "will not make one fit for salvation." Nor will passive virtue suffice. "He who gives up action fails. He who gives up only the rewards rises." Faith in a personal God helps man to find eternal happiness, but this belief is secondary to "that matchless remedy . . . the renunciation of the fruits of action."²⁷

In the quest for ultimate truth Gandhi singled out courage as the crucial virtue which men must show. This fearlessness is "freedom from all eternal fear—fear of disease, bodily injury and death, of dispossession, of losing one's nearest and dearest, of losing reputation or giving offense."²⁸ Such courage produces a state of mental equipoise man needs to achieve his final ends.²⁹ It is a call to develop psychic strength to withstand assaults upon his integrity by passivity, cowardice and doubt. This is a prescription for mental health and it is a formula for the effective political man.

Gandhi marshalled numerous ideas about man's relation to non-violence. He considered cowardly nonviolence as the least satisfactory type of pacifism and the highest kind that of the individual capable of violent action but who through self-discipline behaves peacefully. Citing Jesus and Buddha, and Hindu and Islamic holy men as practitioners of the ideal variety of non-violence, he further held that violence is preferable to cowardice or passivity, and that some violence is unavoidable in the process of living.³⁰ All of these qualifications contribute significantly to the non-absolute character of his pacifism.

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Can men understand and practice the ideal type of nonviolence? To this Gandhi replied that all men are qualified to know and employ the highest kind, regardless of class or of such aids as celibacy.²⁴ With the use of reason and faith,²⁵ men can live a nearly pacific life thereby fulfilling the duty to search fearlessly for truth. It is the duty of the quest, however, rather than the perfectibility of man,²⁶ which Gandhi stressed as the hope for the living of nonviolence.

His ethic of non-injury is included in vows which he observed and recommended to his closest followers. These pledges, which are similar to the five principles of righteous living found in Buddhism, consist of faith in absolute truth or God; physical and psychical courage; non-violence; swadeshi, loyalty to one's native institutions; dietary self-control; honesty; chastity; belief in religious equality; manual labor; and the removal of untouchability. The practice of humility integrates these observances.²⁷ Recognizing that only some men can practice all of these vows, to ordinary men he expounded the way of nonviolence, the means to truth, rather than insisting on all of the disciplines which he imposed upon himself. But in his explication of nonviolence, he required one basic condition for its true manifestation, namely, suffering in body or soul as a substitute for injury to others.²⁸ One explanation for the appeal of Gandhi lies in his approval of self-abnegation, which is especially welcomed by those receptive to ideas of martyrdom and penance. Others appreciate his thought because it speaks to their convictions about non-retaliation as a desirable social and political method.

The emphasis which Gandhi placed on nonviolence led several Western pacifists to view his notions as confirmation for their own unconditionally irenic ideas, giving him a reputation as an absolute pacifist that his thought does not warrant.²⁹ Although Gandhi distinguished his own dynamic pacifism from doctrines of passive resistance and nonresistance, he did not disown many ideas about himself which evolved into Gandhism. Admittedly, he rejected sectarian Gandhism,³⁰ but he did this mainly to curtail the growth of literalists among his Indian followers, though he was unsuccessful in the attempt. Conscious of the tides of world opinion, he let Western Gandhism influence pacifist circles in Europe and North America, and this aided Indian nationalism by generating criticism of British imperialism.

Gandhi's conceptions about society and the nation form a necessary background to his ideas about how men should be governed. Through

his use of the idea of swadeshi, meaning to belong to or made in one's country, he extended his concern with truth, duty and nonviolence to social and political life. It should be pointed out that before he became a national figure, swadeshi denoted anti-British economic activity, for example, a boycott of British goods; subsequently he gave the concept a broad interpretation, and incorporated many religious, economic and political ideas under its heading.³³

The religious division stresses adherence to one's ancestral faith, not in the spirit of exclusiveness, but with respect for all religions as varied facets of one final truth. Yet Gandhi had other ideas declaring Hinduism superior to other faiths because it is a plastic, master-creed that makes India an inappropriate culture for alien missionaries. Swadeshi in economics suggests that India should bar foreign goods and rebuild the native economy to make India as self-sufficient as is possible in the modern world, a qualification that permitted his economic thinking to evolve from endorsement of autarchy to positions of less drastic economic nationalism. In the political order, his notion of swadeshi calls for a state based on native forms of government, but especially the Indian village panchayats or councils.

The social implications of Gandhian swadeshi are found in his view of the commune, classes and work. He contended that India's village society expressed the pacific ideal before the West introduced centralizing and depersonalizing forces.³⁴ His social thought drew from Hindu cosmogony ideas analogous to the Golden Age in Greek mythology and to the Judeo-Christian concept about man's innocence before the Fall. He proudly recalled the Krita Yuga, or Golden Age of dharma, when self-reliance and peace ruled the cooperative society of Indian villages, only to be succeeded by less righteous times, especially the Kali Yuga or Black Age of coercion and immorality.³⁵ Apart from myths, Gandhi found a basis for his communal ideas in the history of the autonomous, village-based republics during the Indian Buddhist age, 557-477 B.C.³⁶

Despite Western encrustations, Gandhi claimed that the Indian village had retained its ancient characteristics of social cohesion, economic simplicity and political autonomy. But it is especially significant that his interpretation of traditional Indian village life did not mean that he advocated its literal revival.³⁷ The spirit, not the historic form of an institution was vital to him.

In the field of social classes Gandhi recognized values of orderly functionalism in the caste system. He rejected the orthodox Hindu idea that caste status is the result of divine reward and punishment.³⁸

And he considered invalid any more castes than the four great divisions symbolized by the priest, warrior, merchant and worker. He endorsed the fourfold structure because he supposed that it is based on hereditary differences in aptitude and personality. Consequently he thought that the system allocates men to the basic tasks of society without producing class conflict of the kind Marxism assumes as natural. On the one hand his understanding of caste bars a theocratic society and excessive class rigidity; and on the other, it excludes inter-class strife and disruptive social mobility.

Gandhi's appreciation of the utility of caste is shown in his activity for the benefit of "untouchables" to whom he wished to give Hindu status by returning them to the caste structure at the lowest level. He strove to give this group improved rights in such matters as access to wells and temples, but he also looked to ending their pariahship by restoring their Hindu sense of belonging."

Of all the Indian classes Gandhi preferred the peasants who not only represent the greater part of the population, but who symbolized to him a desirable theory of labor. Furthermore the simple ways of rustic life attracted him, and he felt ethically committed to bring about the alleviation of rural poverty. As part of his identification with the Indian agrarian, Gandhi dressed like one and urged all classes to practice "bread labor," the universal performance each day of useful, manual work." Much as did the Physiocrats and Jefferson, he held that rural values remedy the depersonalization and materialism of life by placing social existence close to the mainsprings of human endeavor. He did not turn his agrarianism into a mystical nationalism as Barres and Maurras had done in late nineteenth century France, nor did he contend that the peasantry has a monopoly of social virtue. For example, he expected the wealthy voluntarily to become trustees of their property and to function as stewards in the public interest." In part it is from Gandhi's stewardship idea that Vinoba Bhave, a leading Gandhian, has drawn inspiration for his program of voluntary land gifts to Indian peasants." Gandhi's motto for his philosophy of social classes was *sarvodaya*, the welfare of all.

Work, the earth and the female component of life, it has been said, are the three basic symbols of Gandhi's social thought." If the feminine aspect is understood as social harmony and compassion, these are excellent keys to his understanding of society.

Sometimes Gandhi used the term "nation" when speaking of the social structure of society. He also employed the word in a more technical sense to mean an entity composed of a people with a common

history and destiny. Most frequently he spoke of the Indian "nation" despite the plurality of Indian languages, peoples and creeds. Though a traditional Western nationalist such as Winston Churchill has seen many nations in India, Gandhi saw all Indians as partners in one nationality and considered them as equal heirs to a rich civilization which was destined to achieve modern statehood. His idea of the Indian nation is as much a geocultural expression as it is a political one.

Gandhi's ideology about the nation falls between the stools of liberal and integral nationalism. In contrast to the thinking of liberals, his ideas embody little of the natural rights and cosmopolitan traditions derived from the French Revolution. He agreed with Joseph Mazzini's insistence on responsibility as the basis of nationalism rather than French libertarianism, but he did not adopt the Italian's internationalism.⁴⁹ And unlike integral nationalists, deeply attached to cultural homogeneity as in Irish or Japanese patriotism, Gandhi took a hopeful stand on cultural differences. He believed that such divisions should not prevent the creation of a state. As an illustration of his conviction his South African newspaper disagreed with the argument that India was too plural to become a state, citing the United States as evidence of successful pluralism.⁵⁰ Later, in answer to the contention of Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, that India could not be a nation because it had nine major religions and one hundred and thirty languages, Gandhi wrote: "We contend that for all practical purposes . . . we are one nation."⁵¹ Furthermore, as a pluralist, he held that no one aspect of a heterogeneous nation, in particular, religious faith, requires a separate political expression.

The pattern of Gandhi's thought about the state and its management can be understood from a summary of his general political beliefs, his nonviolent system of change, and his thinking about Western democratic theory and practice.

Gandhi's views of state power reflect his belief in a higher law holding government accountable to morality,⁵² much as the Western medieval prince was responsible to a divine source of temporal rule. To execute this accountability, he foresaw a decentralized Indian state established on village life where power is transformed into legitimate government. He illustrated his ideas about the devolution of power to the local polity when he led the struggle against imperialism in 1920-1922. At that time he called for Indians to withdraw from British-sponsored political, educational and legal institutions. In place of the existing order he expected to establish a parallel state

based on reconstituted village councils, a local system of native justice, and national schools using Indian languages.⁵³ He envisaged a radical shift, not one for mere change of personnel, but for change of the system and the methods.⁵⁴ Though these ideas underwent later reformulations, they are crucial to his outlook on the state. And shaping that was his general conviction that every modern state is open to objection because the positive law with which it governs may rest only on unilateral authority and is unjust if discerning men find conflicts with the higher law.⁵⁵

The tendency of Gandhi to endorse decentralized political power has led a number of commentators to suggest that the core of his political thought is philosophical anarchism.⁵⁶ On the other hand it would seem that his local government ideal, to which he clung throughout his life, has the rudiments of a state equipped with a central government, however limited in powers. Even in his extreme "back to the village" phase (1920-1922), belief in a minimum state is discoverable in his thought.⁵⁷ Moreover, though he deplored communist or social democratic arguments for collectivism as such, he came to accept the use of central authority for social and economic problems insolvable at the village level.⁵⁸

Because anarchism and sovereignty are incompatible, it is important to notice that Gandhi hoped for "sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority."⁵⁹ This implies that the people have within themselves resources which the state does not possess and indeed should respect at all times. It does not mean that "moral authority" is to take the place of state sovereignty. Gandhi did have a decided preference for self-reliance and voluntarism which has been noted in his concept of the trusteeship of the wealthy. However, though he preferred reform by self-disciplined individuals, he also accepted regulation enforced by the state; in the case of the trustees, he agreed to the state establishing fees for their stewardship after they had willingly turned over their property to the commonwealth.⁶⁰

It might be said that without being a philosophical anarchist, Gandhi resisted political sovereignty understood as dominion, i.e., absolute, non-responsible power. On this point his ideas agree with the criticisms of sovereignty offered from different premises by such Western students of politics as Harold L. Laski in his early writings, Robert M. MacIver and Jacques Maritain. Though he did not develop his thoughts in a systematic manner, Gandhi believed, as these theorists have argued,⁶¹ that individuals and autonomous groups deserve a social existence beyond state control; and that though the state

alone has a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, it is answerable to its subjects for the circumscribed power it administers. Furthermore, although Gandhi appealed to the Utopian anarchism in folk myths, e.g., the fable about the god Rama⁶⁶ who ruled on earth as an ideal prince and then retired to let his subjects govern themselves, he did not wish to see this myth transformed into reality any more than he did the one about the Golden Age of dharma. As far as his ideal state is concerned, he admitted that it would have criminals and police to deal with them.⁶⁷ For unlike Tolstoy, Gandhi did not endorse a stateless society for the temporal world. To do so would have precluded him from struggling for national India's own sovereignty and would have forced him to consider the foreign relations of India or of any state as deplorable undertakings of government.

When he discussed the best state, Gandhi often employed religious terminology, declaring, for example, that politics subserves religion.⁶⁸ But when he spoke of religion he usually meant ethics. He came closer to separating institutional and doctrinal beliefs from his own non-dogmatic ethics when he barred the discussion of religious faith in the same context as nationalism, contending that they involve different fields.⁶⁹ When he spoke of bringing religion to bear upon politics, he meant an ethical reorientation of government. This may well mean that he spiritualized political life as some commentators have observed,⁷⁰ but he did not intend to establish a doctrinal religion by political power. Certainly his plural nationalism runs counter to a nationalism based on one creed alone. Nevertheless Gandhi's outlook on church-state relations within a plural society is not a secular "wall" theory, because, to borrow from the insights of Barbara Ward, Asian minds have not been accustomed to a distinction between, much less a separation of, church and state.⁷¹

One writer regrets that, despite the tradition of Gandhi, free India's secular constitution does not provide religious instruction through public education.⁷² He opposed doctrinal religious instruction but approved the teaching of interfaith ethics in public schools.⁷³ As a pluralist he objected to a union of state power and religious institutions, to any form of establishment, and this brought him into agreement on the subject with Nehru, a secularist.⁷⁴ But since Gandhi depicted himself as a theist and frequently used religious ideas for political ends, his thinking about church-state relations is closer to that found in a democratic state where most citizens are theists than in a democratic state where most men are not.

The ethical interests of Gandhi have led one writer to conclude that

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his conception of the state resembles the neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian view of T. H. Green, particularly Green's emphasis on the responsibility and ethical nature of the state.⁷¹ It is true that when Gandhi came to accept a collectivist solution to social and economic problems unsolved by local government, he placed upon the state the responsibility to provide welfare services and to redress social wrongs. Still, his state is never innately good, but only by means of its never complete correspondence to the higher law of dharma. And his state does not have a moral character greater than the sum of the virtues of its citizens. His approach to the ethical nature of the state agrees with Max Weber's view, that the state is a technical tool rather than something of intrinsic worth.⁷²

Believing that the political formulation of nonviolence is an experiment still in the making, Gandhi declined to specify the constitutional structure of his ideal state.⁷³ What he did say about a basic law chiefly applies to the local level; there the village council of five members traditionally combines executive, legislative, and judicial powers and exercises wide social and economic functions in the commune.⁷⁴

Concerning a system of change in society and politics Gandhi was much more expressive. For this purpose he created "satyagraha," adherence to truth or "soul force," which is difficult to classify within traditional Western political thought.⁷⁵ The term originated in a slogan contest Gandhi conducted in South Africa in 1906 when he wanted an Indian word to describe his program of civil disobedience. The winning term was *sadagraha*, firmness in a good cause. Preferring "truth force," Gandhi personally changed *sadagraha* to "satyagraha."⁷⁶ Within society and the state satyagraha provides for peaceful resistance to social or political authority. Resistance can be on an individual or mass basis. The vital activity of satyagraha is a search for justice to which the ethic of nonviolence is united. "The first condition of nonviolence," he said, "is justice all round in every department of life."⁷⁷

Gandhi approved his system of change for many objectives. The main goals were to end British rule in India; to attain the repeal of unjust legislation; to extinguish violence and tensions between Moslem and Hindu Indians; to improve the conditions of "untouchables" and return them to Hindu society; to eliminate narcotic addiction and the consumption of alcoholic beverages; to upgrade Indian women; to restore Indian village industries; to solve industrial and agrarian disputes; and to substitute a moral force for war.

As methods of satyagraha, Gandhi proposed several devices long

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known to Eastern and Western traditions of protest. Among these methods are boycotts of foreign-made goods; non-participation in government schools, courts and parliamentary institutions; individual or mass disobedience of selected laws; picketing; fasting; the mass sacrifice of life to military force; the non-payment of taxes; voluntary exodus or exile; the renunciation of state honors and titles; and the time honored method of strike, in India the hartal. By his versatile use of this battery of techniques, Gandhi returned pacific pressure to its Eastern origins.⁷⁸

As an extension of ahimsa, satyagraha is legitimate if offered in the spirit of suffering and love, a characteristic much admired by Christian Democrat Maritain for its virtue of forbearance.⁷⁹ For Gandhi insisted that satyagraha neither coerces the opponent nor merely transfers the struggle to the psychological level.⁸⁰ Once undertaken, satyagraha proceeds ideally to the victory of its partisans who do not retreat from the possibility of death,⁸¹ though Nehru believes one's capacity to suffer is a built-in limitation.⁸² The resistance must be based on initial obedience to authority, for example, one must first obey police enforcing an unjust law, and after briefly submitting, begin resistance.

It is important to realize that Gandhi vouched for the effectiveness of satyagraha regardless of the nature of the opponent, claiming that it can reform anyone.⁸³ His denial that satyagraha presumes a moral adversary⁸⁴ is understandable in the light of the advantages a contrary statement would have given to the governments he opposed. For it does seem clear that the theory of satyagraha posits some humaneness in the antagonist.⁸⁵ That Gandhi's use of satyagraha received aid from an enlightened foe was suggested by Rajendra Prasad, President of India and a dedicated Gandhian, after the achievement of Indian freedom. Speaking about British imperialists in January 1953, Prasad said, "They had set a limit to their own action below which the British could not and did not go, and we must admit, we must confess, that Gandhiji's success was due very largely to himself and his people, but also to the British."⁸⁶

Gandhi himself indicated the predicate of the opponent's redeemability which underlies satyagraha when he told the British Government members of the Round Table Conference in 1931 how civil disobedience would affect them. "I do know that you will suffer," he said, "but I want you to suffer because I want to touch your hearts; and when your hearts have been touched will come the psychological moment for negotiation."⁸⁷ And he believed about other adversaries what he believed about the British. Moreover, the success of satya-

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graha may depend on the antagonist's realization that its user loves him and is not a disarmed enemy planning a ruse, and who should therefore be suppressed. The important point is that assumptions about the opponent's ability to be reformed and to perceive good will are essential to Gandhi's theory of resistance.

Since he had high expectations concerning the practitioner and the adversary of satyagraha, it is relevant to inquire if these expectations carried over into his ideas on democracy which presumes considerable faith in men. For example, did Gandhi think that his system of non-violent struggle is a contribution to democratic thought and practice? It is true that when he was leaving South Africa, he likened satyagraha's objectives to the rights attained by the Magna Carta.⁸⁰ But broadly speaking, he looked on satyagraha as an Eastern phenomenon seeking universal justice, and that neither its methods nor goals are specially related to modern democracy.⁸¹ One good reason for this is that Gandhi had little knowledge of Western constitutionalism outside of colonial manifestations, and his experiences with these left him disillusioned, hostile and eventually indifferent to Western democratic institutions. His disenchantment grew out of his experience with the British Empire's inability to safeguard unenfranchised minorities in its self-governing units.⁸² Subsequently his disappointment turned into sharp criticism of what he had once trusted. In 1909 he indicted the British Parliament as a "badge of slavery" and "a sterile woman and a prostitute," and he called its members "hypocritical and selfish" who served party rather than national interests.⁸³ Even British constitutional history had moved in the wrong direction: Gandhi believed that the British reforms of 1832 had been undesirable, charging that they had been based on violence and had emphasized men's rights rather than their duties.⁸⁴

As Gandhi's career progressed, he became critical of the fact that Western political parties act as brokers between interests competing for voters.⁸⁵ He expressed his basic theory of party when he recommended that the Congress party disband after his nation's freedom and become a social service organization.⁸⁶ From his viewpoint ordinary, democratic political parties are divisive and probably unprincipled and should dedicate themselves to the common good even at the cost of their dissolution.

In his later years Gandhi moderated his criticisms of Western constitutionalism because he realized that most of his Congress associates desired parliamentary government based on the British model,⁸⁷ and because he came to accept the idea that the welfare of the masses

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could be advanced through a Western-style democratic government. For these reasons he endorsed "nonviolent" democracy as his goal for free India." This meant that democracy, as he understood it, was not his ideal since he believed it is open to corruption, over-centralization, and excessive use of police power; but he would accept democracy as a possible way to bring the rule of dharma. Nonetheless he never became enthusiastic about democratic institutions.

Because of Gandhi's criticisms of and indifference to parliamentary democracy, his reliance on self-help and direct action in preference to evolutionary constitutionalism, and his stress on traditional Indian village life, there is no great difficulty in agreeing with Nehru that Gandhi was more of a dynamic peasant leader than a democratic theorist or politician in the Western manner."

This observation notwithstanding, Gandhi was aware of the fundamental beginnings for a democratic philosophy. He affirmed the primacy of the individual personality" and of civil liberties" in relation to the absolutism of state sovereignty. As ideologies and governments, totalitarian communism and fascism were objectionable to him. For no determinism about class or race can coexist with his ideas of personal freedom, social harmony and pluralism; and no regimes furthering subversion or aggression can accept his emphasis upon non-violent means. Without turning his religious concerns into a proposal for theocracy,¹⁰⁰ he pointed out the permanent need for a confluence of ethics and political action within the state, but also abroad in the world community.

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CHAPTER III

WAR AND THE WORLD

Gandhi saw a spiritual unity among all men transcending their temporal differences. He believed that his own principles are reflections of this unity and that they are universally applicable in the visible world. It is the application of principles, rather than any demand for political, economic or cultural integration, which characterizes his views on international relations. These views can be grouped under three general topics, the nature, causes and prevention of war, the relations between the East and the West, and free India's international role. An outline of his thinking about these subjects prepares the way for a detailed inquiry into his ideas on specific problems within each field.

The major unsolved problem of international relations, Gandhi maintained, is war, that is to say, interstate aggression in its widest sense. He opposed aggression whether or not it directly uses military force, receives legal recognition from the parties concerned or the international community. His ideas suggest, moreover, that he was not satisfied about men's periodic efforts to analyze the nature and causes of war and to undertake its prevention. Consistently Gandhi believed that the actual process of war is unrighteous because it contradicts ahimsa and the higher law of dharma. "The children of violence will commit suicide and perish unless they turn away from violence," he observed in a discussion of war.¹ However, his views differ on whether belligerents can be just and whether something of value is ever produced from the evil process of war. Some of the diversities on these points are resolved by the tendency of his pacifism to admit limitations, in particular that truth, not peace, is the ultimate good. The demands of his nationalism upon his idealism account for other inconsistencies. For these reasons his opinions about the character of war sometimes differ from those of Western pacifists who hold that in every respect war is the absence of justice.²

As causes of war Gandhi named Western imperialism and fascism. He also cited communism as a threat to world peace. His criticism of the three ideologies is qualified by an ability to forgive opponents and

his faith in their reformation. Behind these political forces he saw man's economic greed and recourse to violence as deeper sources of aggression. As remedies he called for economic justice, sovereign equality and peaceful cooperation among states as requisites for international harmony. The first solution received support from his economic grievances against Western colonialism and his own philosophy of non-materialism. His insistence upon the equality of all states as a precondition to peace gained strength from his backing of the self-determination of most peoples, though not Indian Moslems and Zionists. For many reasons he was an advocate of interstate fellowship and good will. The more important of these are his belief in the dharmic law which imposes a moral obligation on states⁴ as well as individuals; his desire to settle disputes at the level of the parties concerned; and his assent to the idea of "one world"—provided that it incorporates his "truth" and his "nonviolence."⁴

To eliminate war and to establish world peace, Gandhi looked to statesmen and nations to use or develop certain methods and institutions. The chief of these are third party settlement, world government, disarmament and an international police force. He argued that because the individual can be pacific, states possess an equal potential since they are equal to the sum of their citizens.⁵ In addition he recommended satyagraha as a substitute for military action. He denied that his technique of struggle is a method of war rather than of peace and said that it has a spiritual quality which is not found in ordinary warfare. As to its interstate employment he claimed: "Satyagraha is a law of universal application. Beginning with the family its use can be extended to every other circle."⁶

Overlapping his thinking about war and its solution are his evaluations of the political, scientific and cultural influences of the West on the East. By "West" he meant the modern civilization of the expansionist nations of the Occident, which are technically advanced, racially proud and Judeo-Christian in tradition. In Gandhi's view intercultural relations begin on the assumption of an aggressive, industrialized West and an ethical, non-materialist East.⁷ He tried to bar those Western influences which he believed might destroy the integrity of the East, but his ideas evolved to permit limited acculturation.

Free India's role in world affairs received attention from Gandhi the politician and the idealist. His personal involvement with such problems as overseas Indians, the Moslem state of Pakistan and India's membership in the British Commonwealth, generated ideas which form

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a bequest to sovereign India's foreign policy. The legacy shows how deeply the conception of responsible, national loyalty impressed itself on Gandhi's thought. Clearly he expected a sovereign India to carry out a pacifying function in the world which would be a projection of the country's irenic heritage and its nonviolent struggle against the British Empire. Here Gandhi's notions implicitly deny those ancient Hindu ideas emphasizing stratagem, guile and the balance of power as the basis for India's external relations, especially those associated with Kautilya and Kamandaka.⁸ Nonetheless Gandhi left to his country's foreign policy some practical advice as well as a moralistic approach to world affairs. Adroitness and idealism are also evident in his particular views about the character of war.

Rather vexingly, Gandhi's ideas about war cut across unqualified pacifism, conditional pacifism and patriotic realism. Divergent and sometimes conflicting positions can be traced throughout most of the years of his public career, although one may dominate the others during particular phases. As an unqualified pacifist, he believed that participants in war are not righteous and that nothing of value is produced from military conflict. This viewpoint can be found in his ideas during the period 1909-1914, in his comments about Western democracies immediately after World War I and during the early years of World War II. It is seen also in his condemnation of nuclear war. As an absolute pacifist he is more utopian than his general premises suggest.

When Gandhi was a conditional pacifist, he found that justice rests with one party to a conflict and that some good is possible from war despite its wrong means. Evidence of this position is seen in his support of the Japanese in their war with Russia in 1904-1905, in debates with Western pacifists, and in a number of his comments during the 1930's when he endorsed the cause of the victims of fascism. Gandhi's qualified pacifism is consistent with his system of belief in which dynamic nonviolence is his dialectical method to find the ultimate truth without being the end itself. When this position is understood, it is evident that Gandhi does not offer an ethic of love divorced from justice as Reinhold Niebuhr believes.⁹

The third approach of Gandhi to war represents the flexible adjustment of his idealism to the demands of his nationalism. Examples are found in comments during World War I, in subsequent explanations for aiding the British Empire, and in his suggestions for the defense of India during the 1920's. He was flexible when he permitted the

United Nations and non-pacifist Indians to defend India in 1942 if the country were freed. In Gandhi's third outlook on war there is something of "his intense and many sided realism" which a former associate couples with humaneness as the secrets of his appeal to men.¹⁰

The shifts in Gandhi's views of war can be demonstrated most helpfully within a chronological framework. His outlook on military conflict appears as early as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when his newspaper adopted an editorial policy clearly supporting "righteous" Japanese against "aggressor" Russia. The journal declared its admiration for the "sheer force of character" of "the Japanese who have brought themselves into the forefront of the nations of the world." In keeping with the publisher's emerging nationalism, the weekly considered Japan's victory as a beneficial symbol of a new Asia confronting the West. Having supported one party to the struggle, Gandhi's paper welcomed the war's end and hoped that in the future nations would use pacific means to settle their differences.¹¹

Indian Opinion took the position it did partly because Britain then supported Japan as a deterrent against Russian expansion in Asia, and partly because Indian nationalists were enthusiastic about Japan contesting a Western power. But on this and other matters of editorial policy the basic decisions were made by Gandhi, the publisher, who also gave close supervision to his paper. In effect, as policy-maker for the newspaper, he indicated his belief that in war one side can possess justice and that a positive good can emerge from war. He did so while maintaining that peace is superior to war.

Later, *Indian Opinion* championed the work of Indians, among them Gandhi, serving as medical corpsmen with British imperial troops who were suppressing the Zulu rebellion in 1906. The paper made a special appeal to white colonists to use "for purposes of war . . . Indians who are perfectly loyal and who are capable of training."¹² Gandhi's desire to earn respect for his countrymen through wartime service was implicit in his paper's policy. Again, he found that military conflict could produce a desired end.

As his disillusionment with British imperialism developed, anti-war sentiments emerged in his newspaper and writings. "The British government in India," he wrote late in 1909, "constitute a struggle between the Modern Civilization, which is the Kingdom of Satan, and the Ancient Civilization, which is the Kingdom of God. The one is the God of War, the other is the God of Love."¹³ Elsewhere he spoke out against war as a degrading and brutalizing method of change inferior to the way of suffering.

Despite these pacifist sentiments, when the First World War broke out Gandhi's stand changed and once again he supported one party to a war and found a potential good in armed victory. Upon arrival in London in 1914, Gandhi told the British Government that his war-time services and those of other Indians in England were "unconditionally at the disposal of the authorities" because he and the others wished to "share the responsibilities of membership in this great Empire, if we would share its privileges."¹⁴ Later in India he told his countrymen that fighting for the British Empire was to their advantage. They were not equals in the imperial family, he declared, but they could become so by earning the respect of the British through military service. To achieve recognition, he told potential recruits, they should learn how to use arms.

Soon after the war ended in 1918, Gandhi and other Indian nationalists who had supported the British became disillusioned and embittered. They had failed to secure political concessions from the British Government over and above the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, and the British had attempted to impose civil curbs through the Rowlatt Bills. Gandhi countered British imperialism with civil disobedience. But though his struggle was pacific, he limited the application of his pacifism to free India's military defense, apparently because he momentarily expected his country's independence. To illustrate, he cautioned against excessive pacifist criticism of defending a free India by arms and urged non-pacifists to demonstrate their beliefs if independent India were attacked. Going further, he declared non-violence to be a temporary ideal for securing Indian sovereignty and not pertinent in the event of an invasion of India.

On a different front Gandhi was on the defensive. Some Indian nationalists and pacifists criticized him for having participated in the Boer, Zulu and the First World War. His response brought out realistic and mixed views of war. Writing in a time of peace, he looked back to his South African phase and described to his critics the quandry in which he and his followers had found themselves. "All of us," he wrote "recognized the immorality of war . . . It was quite clear to me that participation in war could never be consistent with ahimsa. But it is not always given to one to be equally clear about one's duty. A votary of truth is often obliged to grope in the dark."¹⁵

Gandhi added that fundamentally he had been and he still was a pacifist. For man to exist, however, involves some violence. A believer in ahimsa should always try to end a war, though he himself had not

been able to do so because his pacifism had been underdeveloped. If the pacifist could not face the task of ending war, he "may take part in war, and yet wholeheartedly try to free himself, his nation and the world from war."

In trying to explain to others why he had supported the British in the Boer War and World War I, he said that he had wished to improve his status and that of his people through an empire which he had believed worthy of reform. He also gave a special reason for his aid. Because he had been in England in 1914, he enjoyed the protection of the British fleet; consequently, he had felt obligated to the process of violence and impelled to pay his debt by wartime service.

Seeking Gandhi's nerve center, one critic alleged that his conduct in World War I had violated his interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita that selfless action is the path of salvation. To this Gandhi replied that he drew two lessons from the Bhagavad Gita: to base action on unselfishness and to be detached from worldly benefits. He did not believe that seeking Indian freedom by wartime service had been selfish or to be detached means to ignore or shun the profits of action. Gandhi's moral was to avoid asking for something; it was not a refusal to accept something good from evil.

Gandhi's conditional pacifism is well illustrated in some of his answers to criticism of his wartime service and by general remarks. They also illumine the differences between him and those who believe that war has no relation to justice. Questioned about war by the Dutch pacifist Bart DeLigt, he held that as a member of a disarmed, subject nation which needed the spirit of resistance, he would vote for military training in a free India. Taking the initiative, he argued that Western pacifists aid war capacities by paying taxes for military purposes.¹⁶ Elsewhere in a dialogue with European war resisters, he pointed out that he opposed alien rule while they dealt with states to which they felt some loyalty.¹⁷ The important point that emerges is that Gandhi's qualified pacifism could not meet some of the rigorous standards of many Western peace workers of his day, nor could it match similar norms today. Compare, for example, the opinion of Philip Noel-Baker, the British pacifist and Nobel Prizeman, that war is a "filthy thing," with Gandhi's statement, "If war had no redeeming feature, no courage and heroism behind it, it would be a despicable thing, and would not need speeches to destroy it."¹⁸

He made it clear to the peace movement everywhere that intellectual neutrality is indefensible during wartime. No matter how much they detest violence, he told pacifists, they must decide which is the just

side in a military contest.¹⁹ Applying his conviction to particular events, he considered righteous the Spanish Republicans fighting Franco, the Chinese struggling against Japan, and the Poles resisting Germany, although he deplored the violent defense methods involved.²⁰ For as Gandhi identified the victims of aggression, he continued to pass moral judgments against the course of war. Speaking about Nazi Germany's oppression of Jews, he said: "If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity, a war against Germany, to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified. But I do not believe in any war."²¹

Paradoxically intertwined with Gandhi's conditional pacifism are views as absolute as those of any Western pacifist. For instance, after World War I, Gandhi alleged that the Allies had been as deceitful, cruel and selfish as Germany, and that they had been a menace to the world because of their secret treaties and military record. With the outbreak of World War II, he looked back and criticized the peace-makers at Versailles for having denied justice to Germany and took to task Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points for depending on arms rather than nonviolence for their ultimate sanction. Expressing his standpoint, in April 1939, when the British and French guaranteed Poland's security against German aggression, he wrote: "After all, what is the gain if the so-called democracies win? War certainly will not end. Democracy will have adopted all the tactics of the Fascists and the Nazis, including conscription and all other forceable methods to compel and exact obedience. All that may be gained at the end of the victory is the possibility of a comparative protection of individual liberty."²²

Gandhi's rigorous pacifism during World War II was intensified by national India's negotiations with the British Government for immediate freedom. From 1939 to the spring of 1942 he generally found no righteousness in the Allied cause. Sometimes he became indifferent to any issues that were not Indian. Privately, Gandhi wrote to a friend in May 1940, that though Europe was destroying itself, he would not permit his sympathies to be involved.²³

The "Royden affair" gives an excellent illustration of Gandhi's unconditional pacifism during World War II. Maude Royden, a British pacifist, decided late in 1941 that her capacity for nonviolence was not sufficient for the circumstances in which she found herself. Following her interpretation of Christ's idea that "he that loseth his life shall save it," she decided to support the war which she could not effectively diminish. When Gandhi learned of her decision, he criticized her new

position and asked her to repent and to return to her former unqualified nonviolence. It does not seem that Gandhi understood that her personal incapacity to observe strict pacifism was a condition to which he himself confessed in the 1920's as one of his explanations for supporting the British cause in World War I.

A red test of Gandhi's pacifism came during World II when he was confronted with the question of whether he would approve a war of a national liberation by which Japanese military intervention would help to achieve Indian statehood. Possibly he may have been willing for free India to negotiate with Japan. A *New York Times* correspondent writes that in 1942 Gandhi was prepared to negotiate with Japan and cites a copy of the draft of a Congress party resolution which he allegedly submitted to the party's Working Committee. The copy, apparently secured by British Intelligence, contains the statement that if India were freed, its first order of business would be to negotiate with Japan. Nehru changed the resolution and offered national Indian aid to the British war effort if India secured immediate independence.²⁴

But Gandhi did not permit his aspiration for Indian freedom to lead him to condone violent interference from outside his country, since this would have given India a more severe rule than it had under the British Empire. He hinted at this factor when he wrote: "I would not be guilty of inviting any power to invade India for the purpose of expelling the English. For one thing, it would be contrary to my creed of nonviolence. For another, I have too great a respect for English bravery and arms to think that an invasion of India can be successful without a strong combination of different powers. In any case, I have no desire to substitute British rule with any other foreign rule. I want unadulterated Home Rule, however inferior in quality it may be."²⁵

Despite such a declaration, rumors persisted in colonial circles about Gandhi's sympathy toward Japan. To clear up any doubts, in July 1942 he wrote a public letter to the Japanese. In it he recalled how he had admired Japan's victory over Russia in 1906 and how easily he had associated with Japanese monks in his ashrams. But he also described the attack on China as indefensible and criticized Japan's "efforts to dismember Asia" and to prevent a "world federation and brotherhood without which there can be no hope for humanity." Gandhi warned Japan not to misinterpret his opposition to British rule as an appeal to invade India; he urged Japan to end its aggression, though he doubted that it would heed his appeal.²⁶

The signal change in Gandhi's pacifism during World War II came when he gave his permission in mid-1942 for an immediately liberated India to become a defense theater for operations against Japan under the terms of a treaty with the democracies.⁷⁷ He saw himself as a witness for non-violence, allowing the Western powers and those Indians who were not pacifists to defend the India-Burma frontier, and thereby Mother India. Asked if India itself would declare war, Gandhi replied: "Free India need not do so. It simply becomes the ally of the Allied powers, simply out of gratefulness for the payment of a debt, however overdue. Human nature thanks the debtor when he discharges the debt."⁷⁸ The important point here is that during a time of crisis in Indian nationalist efforts to oust British power, the dictates of politics overcame his idealism. Nehru considers this development in Gandhi's ideas on the defense of India as a unique change involving suffering in Gandhi's mind and soul.⁷⁹ Apart from the difficulty of his decision, it is clear that a precedent existed in Gandhi's past for the shift in his outlook on war in 1942, namely, his support of British imperialism in World War I following earlier pacifist declarations.

When the second world conflict ended, Gandhi resumed an unconditionally irenic attitude. Speaking about free India's defense, he said military forces would be incompatible with the ideal Hindu state and with democracy. The mention of war criminals brought forth the response that they "are not confined to the Axis Powers alone. Roosevelt and Churchill are no less war criminals than Hitler and Mussolini."⁸⁰ In fact at the time of Roosevelt's death, Gandhi said that World War II had no positive achievement and that the future outlook for peace was dim. He sent a cable to Mrs. Roosevelt expressing "condolence and congratulation" on the death of the American president and concluded: "The latter [sentiment of congratulation] because your illustrious husband died in harness and after war had reached a point where Allied victory had become certain. He was spared the humiliating spectacle of being party to a peace which threatens to be prelude to war bloodier still if possible."⁸¹

Atomic warfare gave Gandhi a fresh opportunity to claim that war has no relation to justice. "So far as I can see," he wrote, "the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be the so-called laws of war which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth. War knows no law except that of might. The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the Allied arms but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is

yet too early to see. Forces of nature act in a mysterious manner.”²³

Gandhi's abhorrence of an atomic war intensified his faith in non-violence: “There have been cataclysmic changes in the world. Do I still adhere to my faith of truth and nonviolence? Has not the atomic bomb exploded that faith? Not only has it not done so, but it has clearly demonstrated to me that the twins constitute the mightiest force in the world. Before it the atom bomb is of no effect. The two opposing forces are wholly different in kind, the one moral and spiritual, the other physical and material. The one is infinitely superior to the other which by its very nature has an end. The force of the spirit is ever progressive and endless. Its full expression makes it unconquerable in the world. In saying this I know that I have said nothing new. I merely bear witness to the fact.”²⁴

Nor did Gandhi believe that nuclear discoveries had created a “balance of terror” forestalling a third world war by fear of mutual destruction. He conceded that there might be a temporary revulsion to atomic war, but the world would return to violence when the feeling had passed.²⁵ From Gandhi's viewpoint, states using nuclear weapons can never be “just,” and nothing of value results from an atomic war.

It would be inaccurate to conclude that in Gandhi's last years his pacifism was consistently of the rigorous type. For instance, when considering Indo-Pakistani disputes relating to partition and religious disturbances, he declared that it would be more beneficial for the two states to go to war than for justice to suffer.²⁶ Criticized by pacifist Indians for this comment, he explained that he had not advised or condoned war; rather he had wished only to underscore how the two states were responsible for adjusting disputes, not aggrieved individuals conducting private warfare. The Indian and Pakistani governments, he added, should first use peaceful means to settle their differences.²⁷ Nevertheless Gandhi did not retract his statement that India might have to find justice through war, placing the right cause ahead of peace for its own sake. This illustration shows how in the last years of his public career, as in the first, Gandhi sometimes treated war as having a connection with justice which relegates peace as such to a subordinate level.

The patterns that emerge from Gandhi's views of the nature of war are those of unqualified pacifism, conditional pacifism, and patriotic realism. The first is a viewpoint familiar to international relations: war is unjust as to its methods, participants and results. On the other hand his qualified pacifism is exceptional in that it stresses the responsibility of nonviolent men—and of states since he drew

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no distinction between individual and collective nonviolence—to decide who is the aggressor and to do so without abdicating the quest for peace. It is because of Gandhi's assertive, conditional pacifism that Reginald Reynolds, a British Friend, credited Gandhi with rescuing Christian pacifism from overemphasis on passive resistance and nonresistance.⁷⁷ As to his realistic position on war, this points up the difficulty of combining demands for self-determination with pacifism. Those men or nations wishing to be free and to be pacific are likely to discover some utility in violence.

Unlike political beliefs and aspirations within states, international ideologies are propelled by diplomacy, propaganda or subversion into the affairs of other nations. Gandhi condemned certain international ideologies and their related economic, political and military practices, because they lead to interstate conflict or threaten world peace. These ideologies are imperialism, communism and fascism.

To Gandhi "imperialism" meant the overseas control of non-Western areas and peoples by Western powers. Except that he eventually gave the term a pejorative interpretation, this is essentially a definition from the Victorian Age of J. R. Seeley and Cecil Rhodes when much of his thought was formed. He infrequently employed "colonialism" as a substitute, and he seldom used the term "imperialism" to describe the forceful control, East or West, of a nation by any foreign state. His thinking about imperialism, for the most part of the British type, evolved from belief in its progressive character to criticism of its motives and rejection of its results.

In the first decade and a half of his South African phase, Gandhi was generally loyal to the British Empire. "The policy of the paper," the first editorial of Gandhi's *Indian Opinion* advised its readers, "would be to advocate the cause of the British Indians in this sub-continent. But while it would insist upon the rights of the community, it would not be slow to point out to it its responsibilities also as members of a mighty empire. It would persistently endeavor to bring about a proper understanding between the two communities which providence has brought together under one flag."⁷⁸

But soon his faith in the civilizing mission of the British Empire collapsed under the strain of racial discrimination and the evolution of his thought into channels of pacifism, nationalism and non-materialism. Owing principally to his ethic of non-attachment, he interpreted colonialism and war in economic terms. "Let us pray," he wrote in the conclusion to his retelling of a Ruskin tract, "India

is saved from the fate that has overtaken Europe, where the nations are poised for an attack on one another, and are silent only because of the stockpiling of armaments. Someday there will be an explosion, and then Europe will be a veritable hell on earth. Non-white races are looked upon as legitimate prey by every European state. What else can we expect where covetousness is the ruling passion in the breasts of men.”³³

It followed for Gandhi that the entire history of the European penetration of the East had a basic fault, nowhere better illustrated than in the record of imperialism in his own country. About the British East India Company, he wrote in 1909: “That corporation was versed alike in commerce and war. It was unhampered by questions of morality. Its object was to increase its commerce and to make money.” He declared further that once British imperialism was established, it maintained arms chiefly to protect its commerce.³⁴

During World War I Gandhi had placed a moratorium on his criticisms of imperialism and militarism. Subsequently he was no longer willing to serve his masters in order to bargain with them since he had become a leader of his people in his own right. Thereafter he revived and refined his pre-1914 charges against imperialism, in one instance broadly indicting exploitive colonialism as the first cause of war.³⁵ He claimed especially that the European powers had fought to redistribute colonial spoils. However, Gandhi distinguished between the imperialism which he judged adversely and the men who practiced it. In a speech at Madras in 1920, he insisted: “I am not anti-English; I am not anti-British; I am not anti-Government; but I am anti-untruth, anti-humbug and anti-injustice. So long as the Government spells injustice, it may regard me as its implacable enemy.”³⁶

How timely, then, are Gandhi's views linking traditional Western imperialism and war? It is true, of course, that imperialism has contributed to the causes of war and that colonial territories were significant prizes from the seventeenth century to the close of World War II. Nevertheless, with the breaking up of the great Western colonial empires after 1945, and with the effective spread of anti-colonialism and self-determination throughout the non-communist sectors of the world, it seems very doubtful that any wish of the traditional Western powers to secure or retain overseas colonies will ever again propel states into war. For the kind of imperialism against which Gandhi struggled has largely disappeared from international politics.

As to Gandhi's economic interpretation of imperialism emphasizing

the greed of men, such an analysis overlooks the motivating factors of prestige and adventure which have been significant in the history of Western colonialism. It should be noted also that Gandhi's economic critique of imperialism is non-Marxist in origins, tracing back to the influences of Naoroji, Ruskin, Gokhale and Tolstoy. He seldom indicted capitalism as such for sustaining imperialism as have Marxists drawing from Lenin's *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.

Gandhi brought several charges against communism as a threat to peace. He did so even though he did not read basic Marxist and communist literature until late in life. Not until his detention during the second World War did he read *Das Kapital* and "some of the other writings of Marx and also of Engels, Lenin, Stalin and some books about the Reds in China," according to Gandhi's last secretary.⁴⁸ However, Gandhi was exposed to general information about Marxism, beginning at least with the Russian Revolution in 1917, and subsequently to more detailed information through dealings with Marxist-influenced nationalists such as Nehru. He learned something, too, from his contact with international communism and the Communist party of India, both of which oscillated between criticism of him as a peasant reactionary and appreciation of him as a national leader.⁴⁹

Distinctions between social democracy and Marxism in Leninist or Stalinist formulations were not clear to Gandhi. This was owing to the fluid circumstances during India's colonial period which blurred non-communist and communist Marxism;⁵⁰ to a basic unity he perceived in Marxism of any type; and to his tendency to identify himself with some ideals of socialism and communism while criticizing most of their methods. To the extent that he could and did make distinctions, he saw international significance in communism which he did not in non-communist socialism, probably because he had no appreciable information about or interest in the Second International and socialist parties beyond India. But he did take up the issues of world social revolution, the Soviet Union's control of international communism, and the nature of the Communist party of India.

Gandhi seldom separated national and social revolution since to his mind both shared the error of violence. In 1925, however, he distinguished them and contended that violence sustains the exploitation of the masses by elites in India and Europe, even though the European masses have access to and share in political power. Social revolution by the masses in Europe, and social or national revolution by the masses in India, cannot remedy exploitation. For to employ

violence only increases the very thing from which the masses seek liberation." Gandhi made absolute his ban on world social revolution as he did on Indian national revolution.

To apply his broad objection to violent revolution to communism itself was another matter. For about the first decade and a half following the Soviet capture of power in Russia, his views of communism assumed three forms. First, there was a belief that communism did not constitute a threat to India; second, an admission that he knew little about Soviet communism; and third, an opposition to communist violence, atheism and dedication to class war. Illustrative of an early understanding that communism has world ambitions, in 1924 he turned aside Soviet efforts to invite him to Russia and to subvert his movement: "Any attempt to use me for violent purposes," he wrote in *Young India*, "is bound to fail." Nonetheless he tended to combine a variety of viewpoints.

"I must confess," Gandhi said in 1928, "that I have not been able to fully understand the meaning of Bolshevism. All that I know is that it aims at the abolition of the institution of private property. This is only an application of the ethical ideal of non-possession in the realm of economics, and if the people adopted this ideal of their own accord or could be made to accept it by means of peaceful persuasion, there would be nothing like it. But from what I know of Bolshevism, it not only does not preclude the use of force, but freely sanctions it for the expropriation of private property and maintaining the collective ownership of the same. And if that is so, I have no hesitation in saying that the Bolshevik regime in its present form cannot last for long. It is my firm conviction that nothing enduring can be built on violence. But be that as it may, there is no questioning the fact that the Bolshevik ideal has behind it the purest sacrifice of countless men and women who have given up their all for its sake; an ideal that is sanctified by the sacrifices of such master spirits as Lenin cannot go in vain, a noble example of their renunciation will be emblazoned forever and quicken and purify the ideal as time passes."⁴⁰

A year later Gandhi was charged with appeasing the British by the communist-directed League Against Imperialism. Such figures as Romain Roland, George Lansbury, Albert Einstein and Mme. Sun Yat-sen, who had been drawn into the League's circle, were among those who criticized Gandhi. There is no evidence he was aware of the League's basic orientation to Moscow and was skeptical of its propaganda. Interestingly, Jawaharlal Nehru was a League member until 1930 when it expelled him.⁴¹ Sometime in the 1930's Gandhi ceased to pro-

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ness ignorance of communism, but themes of criticism and appreciation or toleration continued in his outlook. This pattern is illustrated by his comment that he objected to the imposition of communism on the Russian people and called himself a nonviolent communist.

On the threshold of World War II communist diplomacy received Gandhi's attention. Writing at the time of the 1938 Munich agreement between Hitler and the Western democracies, he absolved the Soviet Union of appeasement, but frankly added: "Russia has a dictator who dreams of peace and thinks he will wade to it through a sea of blood."⁸⁰ When the war began a year later, Gandhi described the German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, and the resulting aggression of the two states against Poland as "painful." Wistfully, he hoped that "the unnatural combination of Germany and the Soviet Union will result in a happy though unintended fusion whose shape no one can foretell."⁸¹

Unlike many people in the Western democracies, Gandhi found international communism more objectionable, not less, after the Soviet-German peace ended in June 1941, when Germany invaded Russia. For thereafter Comintern policy stressed the single issue of anti-fascism, and ended or curtailed communist support to anti-colonial movements aimed at Russia's new allies, such as Great Britain. Never before had communism affected Gandhi so directly. His response to these events is clearly shown in his correspondence in 1944 with Puran Chandra Joshi of the Indian Communist party (CPI).⁸² On behalf of the CPI, Joshi tried to convince Gandhi that communist support after June 1941 of a United Nations victory did not compromise the colonial question. Joshi argued that the Soviet Union was still the premier anti-imperialist power, momentarily fighting the greater enemy of fascism. Dissatisfied with such opportunism, Gandhi asked how Indian communists could justify their "people's war" when so many colonial peoples lacked freedom. To this he added that Indian communists had attempted to infiltrate the Congress party, had aided the British suppression of Indian labor and had received foreign instruction and financial support. Joshi answered that fascism represented imperialism in its last form and that colonial peoples were involved in a "new context." He denied that the CPI received directions from abroad and vaguely explained the origin of CPI funds. Gandhi could not accept the idea that an alliance between the Allies and the Soviet Union against fascism changed an imperialist war into a popular war. Accepting Joshi's assurances about CPI finances, he

continued to believe that communists wished to subvert the Congress party and that they adhered to violence and atheism.

Despite these criticisms, Gandhi told Joshi that he would not judge the CPI by derogatory evidence within India, for "I do not want to pass judgment against a political party." Moreover, outside of the Joshi affair, Gandhi said that there was no reason why Indian communists as such should be kept out of the Congress party. He also continued his efforts to convince individual communists of his beliefs.²⁸

Gandhi's objections to communism—mixed with his belief that all men and all ideas can be redeemed—continued to the end of his life. Thus in 1946 he charged that Indian communists receive instructions from the Soviet Union and do not "make any distinction between fair and foul, truth and falsehood."²⁹ Repeating earlier ideas, he claimed to be a "nonviolent communist," hoping to remedy what he felt was communism's main fault.

For world affairs Gandhi's ideas about communism offer well-known but still welcome insights, in particular that communism has international direction and employs violence and subversion. Wisely he did not endorse political reaction as an answer to communism. However, there are weaknesses in his views, such as his willingness to consider communist parties as traditional political groups and to accept communists into them. His technique of identifying himself with communism may have been an appreciation of the need in an underdeveloped country to solve social problems from which communism draws strength. Yet his statements that he was a "nonviolent communist" foreshadowed the propaganda value which Indian communism has extracted from the Gandhian tradition after his death, for example, by bringing together Gandhians and communists to work under artful slogans for world peace.³⁰

The critical and redemptive ideas in Gandhi's views about communist Marxism are also apparent in his objections to Italian Fascism and German National Socialism as disrupting forces in world affairs. Evidence of his wish to redeem Italian Fascism is found in the reason he gave for seeking an interview with Mussolini in 1932: to convince the Italian dictator about the superiority of nonviolence.

Three years after the event Gandhi confided to an associate a graphic description of Mussolini: "His personal life is extremely simple. But he has the eyes of a cat. A person gets dazed in his presence. I was not to be dazed like that, but I noticed that he had so arranged things about him that a visitor would easily get stricken with terror. The walls of the passage, through which one has to pass

to reach him, are all studded with various types of swords and other weapons. In his own room, too, there is not a single picture or anything of that kind on the walls, but they are covered with weapons. He keeps no arms on his person. But his eyes move about in every direction as if in constant rotation. The visitor would totally succumb before the awe of his gaze like a rat running directly into the mouth of a cat out of mere fright.”⁶⁸

Gandhi considered the violence of Mussolini and Hitler, like all violence, as a transitory phenomenon corrected by nonviolent resistance. Two letters especially indicate his redemptive outlook on German National Socialism. “Hitler is not a bad man,” he wrote about May 1940 to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, concerning the war. “If you call it off today, he will follow suit. If you want to send me to Germany or anywhere else, I am at your disposal. You can also inform the Cabinet about this.”⁶⁹ And in a public letter to Hitler on July 23, 1939, Gandhi indicated his belief that powerful dictators are not beyond reformation. “It is quite clear,” he wrote Hitler, “that you are today the one person in the world who can prevent a war which may reduce humanity to the savage state. Must you pay that price for an object, however worthy it may appear to you to be? Will you listen to the appeal of one who has deliberately shunned the method of war not without considerable success? Anyway, I anticipate your forgiveness if I have erred in writing to you.”⁷⁰

Gandhi’s faith in satyagraha influenced his understanding of Nazism; thus he advised Jews in Hitler’s Germany to use nonviolent, direct action against Nazi persecutions in place of the passive resistance which he said they were employing.⁷¹ With the benefit of hindsight it has been well said that German Jews might have attracted world attention sooner than they did had they been trained in and used Gandhi’s satyagraha.⁷²

At times Gandhi’s view of fascism was a paradoxical mixture of appreciation and criticism. “It is not that people would necessarily be unhappy under fascism,” he said in 1934. “We may leave aside Hitler, but under Mussolini Italy is certainly better off than before. Some of the public utility works undertaken there are commendable. The standard of living has improved. But what does it all avail? There is no freedom there. Whoever dares to oppose Mussolini’s policy invites death. And now even killing has become unnecessary. People have adapted themselves to the new condition and are content with it. He has done the work more cleverly than Hitler.”⁷³ Another mixed comment is Gandhi’s prediction in 1940 that the German people would

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admire Hitler "as a genius, as a brave man, as a matchless organizer, and much more. But I should hope that the Germans of the future will have learned the art of discrimination even about their heroes." Gandhi added that the Nazi empire would fall because it had over-expanded and was based on the erroneous ideology of "ruthless force reduced to an exact science and worked with scientific precision."⁶⁸ These were prophetic words.

Privately Gandhi sent a brief, frank second letter to Hitler in December 1941, though British Intelligence did not permit delivery, assuring the Nazi chief that he was a patriot and not a "monster," even if his deeds were brutish. Indian nationalists, Gandhi wrote, opposed Nazism as they did British imperialism and sought no German aid in their cause. He asked Hitler to suspend German military activities as a contribution to peace.⁶⁹ Gandhi's more critical views of fascism include a call before the rise of Nazism for an end to German racialism and militarism,⁷⁰ his statement to Mussolini in 1931 that Italian Fascism is "a house of cards,"⁷¹ and his indictment of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism as aggressive.⁷² He censured fascism within his anti-colonialism when he observed in 1934 that there are "fascists* in Parliament, and that Winston Churchill is a great admirer of Mussolini's."⁷³

Although Gandhi thought fascism redeemable, he did not use the identification technique he employed with communism. He seemed to realize the risks of saying he was a "nonviolent communist" were not so great as talking about the compatibility of nonviolence and fascism. Thereby he correctly realized the limited intellectual appeal of fascism in contrast to that which communism has enjoyed in the world.

How instructive, then, are Gandhi's ideas about the causes of war? He cited as threats to peace three significant ideologies which in material forms have committed aggression and dominated various nations. Imperialism he naturally identified with the British Empire he knew so well, but which is now no threat to the world, however much its former evils are remembered or artificially perpetuated. By naming man's acquisitiveness as one source of imperialism, he focused on a problem not restricted to imperialism and that may be an irreducible fact of international affairs. Understandably for his time and place, he did not expand the term "imperialism" to include international communism, although he recognized the latter's indirect aggression

* This refers to Sir Oswald Mosley, British fascist leader.

and its exploitation of unrelated national and social upheavals. He knew fascism only from afar; what he did observe undoubtedly repelled him. Yet his ideas provide few insights into the origins of fascism and its relationship to other totalitarian or authoritarian dictatorships, and he did not suggest ways to prevent its return to world politics.

Gandhi the non-materialist did not understand how differences in economic and geographical "givens" contribute to military capabilities and supply incentives for war. Significantly, he did not directly assess the war potential of nationalism. As he commented upon specific menaces to world peace, his governing conviction was that "human nature in its essence is one and therefore unfailingly responds to the advances of love."⁶⁸ If one accepts the limitations noted, his thought offers hope for men as such as the greater number of them discern and attempt to regulate threats to peace.

Is belief in man's rehabilitation enough to lessen the chances of and perhaps to end war? What did Gandhi think of various devices to bring or maintain peace? In this area Gandhi considered the pacific settlement of disputes, world government, international organization, disarmament and a world police force. He also looked beyond traditional ideas of preventing aggression and advised several peoples to adopt satyagraha for defensive warfare.

Of the many ways of pacific settlement, Gandhi singled out what he called "arbitration" as his preferred method of resolving interstate questions, meaning any informal effort by a third party to mediate, conciliate or use good offices. In particular he appreciated the attempt of President Roosevelt, in April 1939, to settle differences between the West European democracies and Germany. "How I wish Herr Hitler," Gandhi wrote shortly before the war began, "would respond to the appeal of the President of the United States and allow his claims to be investigated by arbitrators in whose choice he will have as effective a voice as the disputants!"⁶⁹ Roosevelt did not mention "arbitration," nor did he suggest a disinterested panel selected by the disputants. He said that his message came from a "friendly intermediary," not even a "mediator," asking Hitler to promise not to attack specified European nations for a minimum of ten years, and called himself a "post office" that would secure guarantees from other powers.⁷⁰

After the invasion of Poland, Gandhi expressed disappointment that Hitler had been unwilling to "arbitrate" German claims to Danzig and the Polish Corridor. Once more he was under the mistaken im-

pression that Roosevelt had called for an independent tribunal to settle these issues. Hitler's refusal to heed third party intercession later supplied Gandhi with a reason to sympathize with the Allied cause. Technically a call for arbitration or not, Roosevelt's action appealed to Gandhi.

On Indian questions he expressed some reservations about third-party settlement. He opposed the use of a foreign commission to reconcile disputes over the boundaries of the internal linguistic states proposed by some Indians for free India.⁷¹ Nevertheless he supported the arbitration of debt questions between free India and the United Kingdom.⁷² And, what is more important, he agreed to the use of an arbitrator for the Kashmir question.⁷³

There is little evidence available about what Gandhi thought of legalistic methods of pacific settlement, though there is reason to believe his opinion was unfavorable. A successful barrister in South Africa by 1909, he came to consider the legal profession as self-seeking and an instigator of discord, not an agency for justice and harmony. Behind such a view were his convictions about the decadence of modern civilization and the benefits of poverty and self-reliance; also, the Inns of Court disbarred him because of his prison record, and this may have influenced him. The net result was that after about 1906-1909 he was no friend of legal positivism. When this attitude is fused with his anti-colonialism, it is not too unrealistic to suggest that he was not well disposed toward international law. Specifically, during the time when his basic ideas were emerging, his newspaper expressed lack of sympathy with the Tsar's appeal to international law when Japan suddenly attacked Russia early in 1904. Over two decades later he judged the 1928 Pact of Paris—which "condemned and renounced" war but preserved the right of Western nations to defend "vital" regional and colonial areas—as proof that the European powers wanted to carry on a joint exploitation of the non-West by peaceful means.⁷⁴

On the other hand, within Gandhi's belief in the higher law of dharma, applicable to states as well as to men, there are ideas of justice and order comparable to those of the natural law tradition which does so much to encourage positive international law. Man's moral responsibility is Gandhi's avenue for enforcing the higher code in the world, especially since he drew no distinction between interpersonal and interstate duty. "I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother," Gandhi told Julian Huxley when he was director-general of UNESCO, "that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from

duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world.”⁷⁸

Additional indications of how Gandhi believed the world should be organized to maintain a just peace appear in his ideas about world government. His views on this topic must be understood in connection with his efforts to grope beyond notions about the British Commonwealth and to envisage a larger association of states. For instance, Gandhi told a Congress party audience in December 1924, when he assumed the party's chief office: “The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent states warring one against another, but a federation of friendly interdependent states. The consummation of that event may be far off. I want to make no grand claim for our country. But I see nothing grand or impossible about our expressing our readiness for universal interdependence rather than independence.”⁷⁹

He developed these ideas fifteen years later within his broader political philosophy. “I have often said,” he wrote in *Young India*, “that, if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself. Nonviolence is the means; the end for every nation is complete independence. There will be an international league only when all the nations, big or small, composing it are fully independent. The nature of that independence will correspond to ours to the extent of nonviolence assimilated by the nations concerned. One thing is certain. In a society based on nonviolence, the smallest nation will feel as tall as the tallest.”⁸⁰ Here Gandhi's “league” of “fully independent” states suggests less cohesion and more attention to sovereign equality than the “federation of friendly interdependent states” suggested in his 1924 statement. In addition to equality, he made it clear he foresaw a universal membership in any new world organization, and not limited to those states in the British Commonwealth or those who were victorious in World War II.⁸¹

Gandhi's search for a world confederation drew no inspiration from such Western declarations of principles and aspirations as the Atlantic Charter. After his opposite number in British imperialism, Winston Churchill, said in Parliament in September 1941, that the self-determination aspect of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India, Gandhi said that the declaration had sunk into the sea as soon as Roosevelt and Churchill signed it.⁸²

His first approval of the term “world government” came sometime between 1938 and 1942. It was a new idea to him, he admitted, but he approved of it.⁸³ Subsequently he endorsed inspirational resolutions

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of the Congress party which suggested a federal world state based on self-determination of all peoples and economic justice. Still he did not entirely agree with practical efforts by others to establish an immediate world organization, but he offered to compromise on details if respect was shown his ethic of nonviolence.

Gandhi's sympathies with world government did not flow out of any positive convictions about historical international organizations, but were often jumps beyond his outlook on the League of Nations and the United Nations. For his ideas about these bodies show the influence of his dedication to self-help and to anti-colonialism, and of weak internationalist tendencies in his composite world-view. Also, the critical attitude of Tolstoy toward international peace efforts may have influenced Gandhi. Through his appreciative reading of Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, he knew of Tolstoy's review and forceful criticism of the London Peace Congress of 1890 (held while Gandhi was in London but which he did not attend) to the effect that the power-ridden state system is beyond reform by either public or private initiative.

Revealing his underlying attitude, Gandhi refused to petition the League of Nations about French military activities in the League mandate of Syria when Indians returning from the Middle East in 1925 asked him as Congress president to help remedy the situation. He contended that such a protest would not have moral force behind it. Legitimate appeals, he said, require suffering by the aggrieved. He indicated that, in any event, nationalist India could not help the Syrians because Western colonialism held a mortgage on the League of Nations.⁸¹

Visiting the League's home city of Geneva in 1931, Gandhi criticized the organization for its lack of an effective force to keep the peace, and recommended that it adopt his satyagraha.⁸² But when the Italian-Ethiopian War came four years later, he had no suggestions to offer the League, other than to imply that it should employ no sanctions against Italy. And Ethiopia, in Gandhi's opinion, should not appeal to the League or to any foreign power for armed intervention. Throughout the Ethiopian crisis he failed to appreciate that the League's economic penalties against Italy were nonviolent and similar to his own economic boycotts against British imperialism.

At the time of the United Nations creation, Gandhi commented about the need for a new general international organization. Identifying the freedom of India as a major issue, he urged statesmen at San Francisco to achieve a host of objectives. He specifically asked

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them to end colonialism and war, to impose generous peace treaties, to create a world police force, and to establish economic justice and a world federation. The tenor of his statement indicated pessimism about the realization of these goals. "I very much fear that behind the structure of world security sought to be raised lurk mistrust and fear which breed war."⁸⁸ About functional and structural problems of international government he had nothing to say.

Once it was established, Gandhi was not sanguine about the United Nations.* The absence of national India from the founding conference affected his views. He thought that the United Nations could not maintain world peace, but he did not suggest any particular changes.⁸⁹

Yet Gandhi did not detract from the reputation of the United Nations. He rejected a contention that his fast in January 1948, which he directed equally at religious strife in India and in Pakistan, prejudiced India's Kashmir case in the world organization. For it was his belief that his fast would help the United Nations to come to a right decision.

The Kashmir dispute provided a significant test of Gandhi's position on international organization. A source close to Lord Louis Mountbatten, free India's first Governor-General, implies that the Mahatma gave prior approval to the Indian government's decision of December 1947 to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations.⁹⁰ Pyarelal Nair, Gandhi's secretary and confidant, informs the writer that Gandhi warned the Indian leaders not to send the Kashmir question to the United Nations.⁹¹ After the referral he suggested publicly that his country withdraw its complaint from the world body and start bilateral negotiations with Pakistan, a move everyone would welcome.⁹² In view of Pyarelal Nair's testimony and Gandhi's general lack of optimism or enthusiasm about the United Nations, it is probable that he had no desire to internationalize the Kashmir issue.

Just as Gandhi was not disposed to avail himself of international organization, so he did not profit from the lessons of the Western disarmament movement. For to solve the problem of state armaments, he unequivocally recommended total disarmament, passing in silence over progressive limitation upon arms. Instead, he advised "dis-

* Dr. Ralph Bunche has jocularly commented that the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council is Gandhian since it prevents the use of force. *Gandhian Outlook*, p. 291.

armament" by theism, and in a temporal sense, immediate disarmament by unilateral or multilateral state action.

Gandhi thought that the first condition of peace is trust in an active, interposing deity, a prerequisite the West had failed to realize. Without this trust man would feel God's punishment, a view which helps to explain his description of Hitler as a divine scourge to punish the world for its faults.²⁰ Also Gandhi suggested prayer in the event of nuclear war. Potential victims of atomic attack, he explained to Margaret Bourke-White, should go into the open and pray for the pilot of the airplane bringing atomic weapons so that he might realize through extra-human intervention that those below intended no evil toward him.²¹

Though Gandhi believed that ultimate peace is in a divine plan which has not been fully revealed to men, they have an obligation to apply what they know in order to establish temporal peace. In particular, he held that disarmament can and should be introduced by one or several states. He doubted that a great power would actually introduce universal disarmament, and he put his faith in India to show the way toward that goal. Still he hoped for some armed state, an apostolate of one, to be a witness for the truth of nonviolence and to dare to disarm itself, whatever the risks, and thereby to serve the world. As Western pacifists have often done, he looked to small, neutral Switzerland to give up traditional defense methods.

But he expected much from great powers, too. Only the United States' use of atomic weapons to end the Asiatic phase of the Second World War dimmed Gandhi's earlier hope that America might lead the world to total disarmament by emulating the nonviolence of the Congress party. The larger states could also disarm as a group and earn the gratitude of history. The renunciation of materialism and faith in a divinity would enable great powers to give up their arms. And if nations do not renounce weapons completely, he argued, they will deteriorate into intellectual and spiritual decadence and into militarism and dictatorship. "One step at a time is enough for me," Gandhi frequently remarked, but this applied to other fields, not to military weapons.

As a substitute for national defense forces, he first had critical ideas but eventually expressed affirmative views about an international police agency using weapons to maintain peace and repel aggression. As late as 1938 he denied that a world police force would be an advance over historical warfare. During the Second World War Gandhi's views evolved to approve with reservations an international police force.

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Because modern aerial bombing is so indiscriminate, he ruled out an international air force. In 1946 Gandhi had an important discussion about violence and justice with George Catlin, a British political scientist; in the talk Gandhi first expressed unwillingness to define aggression and optimism about training all men to be nonviolent in the same time that a few can learn how to be impartial in the use of force against aggressors. But he went on to say that if an objective body could be found he would welcome it as a basis for a world police force." Significantly, late in life he approved the use under unbiased auspices of armed justice in an imperfect world.

Apart from what Gandhi thought about conventional notions and devices to eliminate warfare, he believed that his technique of non-violent, direct action can be employed for defensive, interstate struggles which customarily involve military violence. Illustrations of this belief are especially evident in the last decade of his life and show the confidence with which he would substitute for war a method he had developed and found effective in the colonial circumstances of India.

Gandhi conceded in 1931 that by reason of education, military history, economic materialism, and disbelief in non-retaliation, it was difficult to introduce satyagraha to the West.²¹ His call for interstate satyagraha came essentially with the Second World War, partly because he had to justify his pacifism within India when few peoples abroad were nonviolent, but principally because of the universal character of his ideas about ethical resistance. Thus, after the Munich agreement of 1938, Gandhi's standpoint was one which released Britain and France from any responsibility toward Czechoslovakia and called for the Czechs to conduct unconditional, nonviolent resistance against Germany so that Czech "honor" might be secured. He had no doubts that the Czechs could respond to the challenge and die without using violence against the German aggressors. He held much the same view of the war in China and expressed the hope that the Chinese would rise above the morality of Japan, otherwise their victory by arms would mean only one more militarist nation.

The French surrender in June 1940, which shocked the democratic world, caused a different impact on Gandhi's mind. "I think French statesmen," he said, "have shown rare courage in bowing to the inevitable and refusing to be party to senseless, mutual slaughter. There can be no sense in France coming out victorious if the stake is in truth lost. The cause of liberty becomes a mockery, if the price to be paid is wholesale destruction of those who are to enjoy liberty. It then becomes an inglorious satiation of ambition. The bravery

of the French soldier is world-known. But let the world know also the greater bravery of the French statesmen in suing for peace."⁹²

With a similar unconcern for opinion in the West, Gandhi wrote five months after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor that the United States could have remained out of the war to offer a nonviolent contribution to the world.⁹³

Closer to his own problems, Gandhi insisted that he did not wish the defeat of Great Britain, only that it stop fighting, become a nation of "little Englanders," i.e., give up India and permit Hitler and Mussolini to take what they wanted while combating fascism with non-cooperation. He spoke, too, of employing satyagraha against a Japanese invasion of India. The idea of a pacific Indian force was not a new one. For internal order after freedom he had often spoken of "peace brigades" manned by Gandhians; and in the 1930's he spoke of using the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, Servants of God, a group of militant Pathans sworn to nonviolence, to meet raids across the Afghan-Indian border, though in fact, their activities never extended beyond problems of Indian nationalism. In the event of any invasion by Japan, he advised his people to refuse to build bridges, to use Japanese money or to sell to the intruders.⁹⁴ Mindful of the country's already low level of wealth, he disapproved a scorched earth policy. Because the Japanese Army did not penetrate more than a few miles into India at one point, no practical opportunity came for Gandhi to decide whether to implement his ideas.

Despite his faith in the international use of satyagraha, Gandhi did not organize and coordinate its employment. During World War II a Western pacifist asked him to cooperate in forming a nonviolent police force to wage a peaceful struggle against political and economic aggression. Perhaps retreating from the implied offensive use of satyagraha, Gandhi answered that he did not expect to lead a pacific army; "so far as I can see at present," he added, "every country will have to work out its own program. Simultaneous action is possible."⁹⁵

Assessing Gandhi's ideas about methods to control or replace war, one can see that he approved informal, third party intervention in disputes, but he did not appreciate how positive, legal machinery can give structure and stability to the world order. He undervalued historic diplomacy because he was a colonial subject for most of his life and had relied on direct action, not representation. As to his ideas about world government and international organization, they tend to vault from nationalism to universalism, avoiding the more difficult but more likely international route leading states from war.

On disarmament, Gandhi missed the possibility of the graduated use of force as an alternative method to universal disarming for keeping a just peace. He failed also to take into account the self-interest that motivates any serious efforts to limit arms and which underlies mutual inspection and effective control of war systems. Furthermore, Gandhi's "risk-taking" path toward disarmament contributes either to a pacifism of nonresistance or to propaganda covering aggressive interests. In the one case, a totally disarmed state has no recourse other than appeasement or capitulation should armed nations take advantage of its status. In the other, the idea of unconditional disarmament provides a cloak for the ambitions of those states which do not intend to honor their word.

Gandhi's ideas do point toward the establishment of an impartial world police force, such as provided for under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter making available on a permanent, stand-by basis, armed units of member states for use by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. For creating a United Nations army after the fact of aggression, as in the 1950 Korean and 1956 Suez crises, his ideas are less suggestive. It is clear that his qualified support of an international police force can not be reasonably construed to mean his views aid the deterrent military power of a single nation, or collective security arrangements such as NATO or SEATO.

Because of its uniqueness, the international use of satyagraha as a substitute for war requires an extended comment. In the first place, the victims of aggression to whom Gandhi recommended his pacific resistance method needed more time than he allowed them to understand and develop the satyagraha spirit and technique. If, as he claimed, active, fearless nonviolence is the highest type of courage, he advised his weapon prematurely to Westerners who had little knowledge or experience with it. Certainly time had been needed for him to teach his Indian followers the prerequisites of self-suffering and non-retaliation on which satyagraha depends; some never fully understood these prerequisites.

Some analysts of Gandhi's thought conclude that satyagraha is a valid, effective substitute for war, comparable to William James' "moral equivalent of war," a term Gandhi seldom used.⁶⁰ There is a common sacrificial theme in James' "equivalent" and in satyagraha. Yet Gandhi's satyagraha is considerably less devoted to military virtues than is James' developed notion of hardihood which is not pacific in its outlook.

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satyagraha is neither coercive nor redemptive. He argues that it is a middle force of ethical compulsion which can be substituted for war because it satisfies many of the qualities of war, among them mass appeal, aggressiveness, suffering and romance.⁹⁸ Like the militant character of James' "equivalent," the militant bent of satyagraha in this interpretation seems out of place with Gandhi's presuppositions about mercy and love. To be sure, satyagraha was an ethical method of change in the internal colonial situation of India. But there Gandhi's device was faced with an opponent who did not automatically suppress dissent. Imperial British rule in India was either too ethical or too clever to create many martyrs. The nature of the opponent is vitally important for the effectiveness of satyagraha. And in an interstate situation, the opponents of satyagraha are likely to be less forbearing, or at least less astute, than British imperialists were when they dealt internally with Gandhi's civil disobedience. Beyond the shelter of its own sovereignty, military power counts few costs and is unlikely to be enlightened or thwarted by unarmed, noncooperating adversaries. The values and the expectations of the opponent, and the place of the conflict, determine the relevancy of Gandhi's weapon.

Claims that satyagraha is a nonviolent force are in keeping with Gandhi's idea that ahimsa, the headwater of satyagraha, is dynamic and not pietistic reverence for life or nonresistance. Nonetheless force, even Gandhi's "soul-force," is a form of power like violence itself. Consequently, as Professor Clyde Eagleton keenly saw two decades ago, Gandhi's nonviolent direct action must, like any other force, answer to the international community if it is used in world affairs.⁹⁹

Although there are basic questions still to be answered before it is feasible as a nonviolent device to replace war, Gandhi's satyagraha may offer assistance to civil defense in a nuclear age. Citizen apathy, the relative uselessness of traditional home guards and militia, the need to build cores of resistance to invaders who can not possibly be stopped at the border or who invade everywhere by air, these and other critical problems face Western defense officials of atomic and non-atomic powers alike. Already analysts of the social, ethical and international implications of satyagraha's theory and practice have done enough work¹⁰⁰ by which planners on domestic defense might profit

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CHAPTER IV

THE WEST AND THE NON-WEST

Among civilizations as among states there are relations which markedly affect world politics. One of the more important of these is the penetration of Western ideas and institutions into the non-West during the twentieth century. This process has set into motion counter forces which combine political and cultural features. The response from the non-West has created international difficulties not generally found in contemporary relations among Occidental powers. The "positive neutrality" adopted by an African or Asian state is to a significant degree explainable by the cultural turmoil which that country is experiencing. For the way in which a developing nation adjusts to Western influences is a potent source of misunderstanding and conflict in international affairs.

With other discerning Indians,¹ Gandhi was vitally concerned with the politico-cultural relations of the East and the West. In several respects influenced by both civilizations, he was well qualified to distinguish between politics and culture. But he postulated their interdependency, as he did of all branches of life, and this prevented him from treating them as related although not necessarily interdependent. Thus he was certain that the West employed its cultural ideas and techniques to keep the East in colonial subjection; and in turn he used cultural means to achieve his political ends.

Gandhi's main position was one of resisting most Western influences and reasserting the values of traditional India. Yet he did not ask for a literal revival of ancient forms of social and political life; he thought that they had a viable spirit worthy of preservation but also that their outer-shell alone could serve no useful purpose in the modern world. Indeed, he came to accept some aspects of Westernization, not as desirable in themselves, but as inevitable forces which might be transformed in their new setting. The result is something of a paradox, expressed in a reply of Gandhi's to Rabindranath Tagore, Nobel Prize poet, reformer and prominent advocate of an Indian renaissance, during their debate over the meaning of Gandhi's attachment to peasant India and noncooperation. To quote Gandhi, "I do not want my house

to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the culture of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.”³

Gandhi's ideas about contacts between the West and the non-West suggest five categories—the political and the ideological, science and its applications, communication, race relations, and the great religions.

Accepting politics as an aspect of cultural relations, as Gandhi did, one can see that during the greater part of his career he considered imperialism to be the main political contact between the East and the West. He censured this intrusion severely, blaming it as one of the major sources of war and international unrest. Although he had in mind chiefly British colonialism, his anti-imperialism is not entirely Anglocentric. Japan, France, and the United States—as well as the United Kingdom—wished to keep India in a subject condition to provide a market for their cloth production.⁴ Deploring any recourse to violence, he approved a number of anti-imperialist struggles outside of India. He admired Riff tribesmen who in 1925 combatted French and Spanish forces in Morocco.⁴ On his way to London in 1931, he told Egyptian Wafdists that he sympathized with their national aspirations. Without considering Sudanese wishes for their own state, he urged one government for Egypt and Sudan after the withdrawal of British power.⁵

Nevertheless, Gandhi usually did not support an anti-Western political bloc of former colonial peoples. To him such a front implied inferiority. “How can we have Asia for the Asiatics,” he asked, “unless we are content to let Asia remain a frog in the well? But Asia can not afford to remain a frog in the well. It has a message for the whole world if it will only live up to it.”⁶ After World War II he advised West African soldiers that any Indo-African movement against Western colonialism should be ethical, not “mechanical.”⁷

Instead of militant, political anti-colonialism, Gandhi urged the nations of the non-West to adopt a cultural ideology with which to counter the West. This ideology presupposes Occidental expansion and Oriental response, and an eventual cultural balance. But the fundamental predicate is the East's primacy of knowledge about the good life. Illustrative of Gandhi's viewpoint, half a century ago he told an audience in the Johannesburg YMCA that the West has unfortunately seized upon the idea that it alone should dominate the world. Consequently the West is centrifugal and destructive, since it lacks valid, inner goals. In contrast, the East remains centripetal

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and constructive, possessing legitimate ends. Gandhi admitted that the East needs the West for stimulation to rediscover its own values. Thereafter the East will predominate since its ideals are superior. He concluded his talk with the idea that "the two forces of East and West are undoubtedly opposing forces, but perhaps in the economy of nature both are necessary."⁹

The themes of this speech reecho in 1947 when he addressed the first, post-war conference of Asian states, many of them newly sovereign. "All the Asian representatives have come together," Gandhi said. "Is it in order to wage a war against Europe, against America or against non-Asiatics? I say most emphatically 'No'."⁹ He reminded his listeners how wisdom flowed to the West from the Eastern home of the world's holy men—Krishna, Rama, Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Jesus and Mohammed. In the West, however, Christianity became corrupt and with its atomic weapons needs Asia's message of love. "You will complete the conquest of the West," Gandhi told the delegates, "not through vengeance because you have been exploited, but with real understanding."¹⁰

When appraised, Gandhi's political advice to the non-West in its dealings with the West is a call for freedom and justice through self-determination. He was indifferent to the type of government a new state selected. His own experience with the British Empire had led him to turn from liberal constitutionalism toward Indian institutions and traditions, such as the local council and the "village republics." Consequently, his outlook implies that the new Afro-Asian states should choose native political formulas without feeling an indebtedness to Western ideas. Little encouragement can be found in his thought for non-Western experiments in Euramerican democracy.

It is clear from his cultural ideology how Gandhi wished former colonial peoples to reassert themselves in the world with methods different from those the West employed against them. He particularly wanted the non-West to shun military alliances and the use or threat of violence as the basis for relations with the West. At the same time Gandhi's Afro-Asianism has a theme of superiority which serves political ends. It is not unreasonable to imagine him addressing the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, using much the same language he had employed at the New Delhi Asian meeting in 1947 and which provided cultural overtones for the political objectives of newly liberated nations.

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tant contacts between the West and the East are the entrance and spread of science and technology in the non-Western world. Commenting on science in general, Gandhi told Vincent Sheean that man should not investigate facts, since scientific measurements do not reveal "truth."¹¹ Also, he believed that science is limited by its dependency on reason which can be upset by logic, though he made it clear that both reason and faith are needed in life.¹²

The absence of any full-scale criticism of scientific method by Gandhi cautions against any conclusion that he was anti-scientific. He opposed scientism, the ideology of science, and he fully expected modern science to answer to his values.

Gandhi emphasized Eastern self-reliance as his answer to progress in Western science, but especially in its medical applications. It upset him, for instance, that Indians went abroad for medical treatment.¹³ Despite his own youthful ambition to be a doctor, he soon turned aside from modern medicine. Like George Bernard Shaw, he particularly objected to the "force" used in vivisection and vaccination. Beginning in South Africa he himself used and advised others to use hydrotherapy, earth treatment, herbs and dietetics as medical cures. *Indian Opinion* mirrored Gandhi's views, reprinting a criticism by Tolstoy of modern science and medicine,¹⁴ and opposing compulsory vaccination.¹⁵ A high tide of his ideas came in 1909 when he called modern doctors parasitical agents of the West who sinned through vivisection and the prescription of remedies contrary to Hindu or Moslem beliefs.¹⁶ At this time Gandhi also opposed hospitals, and not until the Nineteen Twenties did he come to consider them as necessary evils.¹⁷

Western contributions to personal hygiene and municipal sanitation were acceptable to Gandhi. Within his social program he gave high priority to the building and maintenance of latrines. Although he condemned the West for giving India the cities that require special sanitation measures, he paid tribute to Western advances in public medicine.

On balance probably Gandhi believed that medical science undermines man's self-reliance; sometimes it is part of the unavoidable violence of remaining alive, but not desirable in itself. And though many of his thoughts offer little encouragement for countries needing increased medical personnel and equipment, conceivably his ideas help to advance the public hygiene programs of the World Health Organization.

A significant illustration of Gandhi's objections to what he consider-

ed a misuse of science is his disapproval of artificial birth control. His views reflect his philosophy of non-materialism, sexual abstinence which he adopted in 1906, and underlying that vow, *brahmacharya*, comprehensive control over mind, body and speech. Broadly speaking, he argued that sexual relations bind men to the temporal world; satisfaction of the sexual appetite at will or without the intent of having children is sinful; and artificial birth control is a spiritual error.²⁸ Gandhi and birth control advocate Margaret Sanger debated the merits of the issue in 1936. He began by arguing for total abstinence and ended by giving his reluctant approval to continence and the "rhythm" method of birth regulation.²⁹ Elsewhere he suggested late marriages as a beneficial custom.

Gandhi was aware of the relation between the birth control question and population problems. Taking up the issue of famines and birth rates in 1946, he contended that a nation's government, not the pressure of peoples upon resources, is responsible for food shortages. He said artificial birth control, not a rise in population, is a "calamity." Gandhi added, "Without, however, encroaching upon the moral domain, let me say that the propagation of the race rabbit-wise must undoubtedly be stopped, but not so as to bring greater evils in its train." ³⁰

Overall, Gandhi's ideas about birth control run counter to the conclusions of most demographers and neo-Malthusians that the underdeveloped world is overpopulated in relation to those resources needed for improving its standards of living. His thinking implicitly opposes the current efforts of such Asian states as Japan and India to check the growth of their large populations through birth control, abortion or sterilization. His stand on the issue is close to that of Roman Catholicism, and, for different reasons, of historical Marxism which teaches that "overpopulation" is a bourgeois, Malthusian illusion.

Additional evidence of Gandhi's basic ideas about applied science and its role in international relations appears in his views of industrialization. Influenced by Indian rural and ascetic traditions, and by Ruskin and Tolstoy, before 1914 he believed that industrialization represents a "great sin." He blamed the industrial revolution for exploiting men and driving them into a competitive, urban life where the values of simplicity, autonomy and nonviolence can not survive. Gandhi carefully described industrialization as an error of "modern" civilizations, East and West, but he held the West responsible for

bringing industry and applied technology into India as adjuncts of colonial control.²⁴

Believing that "good travels at a snail's pace," Gandhi made railroads a prime object of his criticism, though he did not reject them outright and even made efforts to bring about reforms in third-class Indian railroad travel. Shortly after 1919, he restated his criticism of industry and applied technology, conceding that machinery and railroads could remain in free India to serve the nation rather than foreign imperialists.²⁵ He did not retract any of his earlier criticisms, explaining that although he had come to accept railroads, they added nothing to the stature of a nation.²⁶ Subsequently, Gandhi's ideas evolved enough to accept some other important aspects of applied science. After an earlier refusal,²⁷ he said in 1935 that the electrification of the Indian village was permissible, provided it did not cause unemployment.²⁸ He specifically approved the domestic manufacture of the Singer sewing machine because it fitted his village industry program.

Gandhi employed the symbol of the spinning wheel to represent his social philosophy, but cautioned against interpretations that he was a revivalist critic of modernism. For "the message of the spinning wheel," he expounded, "is much wider than its circumference. Its message is one of simplicity, service of mankind, living so as not to hurt others, creating an indissoluble bond between the rich and the poor, capital and labour, the prince and the peasant. That larger message is naturally for all."²⁹ His fear of technological unemployment among India's seasonally occupied agrarians stands out in his social message. He admitted that "machinery has its place, it has come to stay. But it must not be allowed to displace necessary human labor."³⁰ To this idea Gandhi coupled his belief that all classes should perform some useful "bread labor" each day, a rule he thought industrial work does not satisfy. At times Gandhi used his reputation as an opponent of the machine to bargain for his political and social ideas. He would not despise machines, he told Charlie Chaplin in 1931, if India secured its freedom and redistributed its wealth.³¹

Concomitant to the introduction of science and industry into the the non-West is the rendering of technical assistance or surplus products to less developed lands by advanced nations. Would Gandhi with his ideas of self-help and his distrust of Western technology permit such assistance?

Sometimes his devotion to his own social ideals impinged upon his attitude about Western technical aid. To illustrate, in 1925 a Rockefeller Foundation health officer told Charles Freer Andrews, an

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Anglican clergyman and associate of Gandhi's, that ninety-two percent of the peasants in a district near Madras suffered from hook worm, typhoid or dysentery. The officer recommended an immediate sanitation program for the region. When Gandhi learned of the report, he commented how he had long been an advocate of remedial measures although he had no comprehensive health scheme of his own, "for the simple reason that it cannot solve the problem of the daily, growing poverty, immediately and directly." He suggested his cottage industry plan as a "direct" cure.²⁰

On another occasion subsequent to Gandhi's more extreme criticisms of Western science and industry, he told Danish missionaries who wished a message from him that if the people of Denmark wanted to help, they should teach Indians about their dairy and cattle breeding industries.²¹ In effect Gandhi suggested a departure from Hindu customs which severely restrict the economic development of the large and generally unproductive Indian cattle population. Here Gandhi welcomed technical aid from the West. He did again when he told a visitor going to the United States after World War II to return with a boat of food grains.²² However, in the same period he spurned "foreign charity" in the form of Russian wheat during India's food crisis in 1946 because it would undermine his ideal of self-reliance,²³ though there may have been political reasons. The day before his death he objected to applying Western scientific methods to Indian agriculture,²⁴ perhaps fearing that greater productivity would create unemployment.

Gandhi died before the marked rise after the Second World War in aid from Western private and governmental sources to less developed nations. Given his conflicting views on technical aid, no final estimate can be made about his stand. At the very least he would have wanted the non-West to accept help only if it did not jeopardize Eastern autonomy in a world of rapid change.

An assessment of his ideas on science and its applications suggests that Gandhi neglected the long-run potential of science and technology to create employment and reduce misery. Both of these objectives were his goals, and generally they are those of the world today. Perhaps he feared the imperialist West so much in politics that he became wary about non-political aspects of Western science and technology. Though Gandhi's later ideas became less critical of science and technology than C. Delisle Burns realized when he commented on Gandhi's thought in 1938, Burns ably pointed out that there is a danger that the teaching of Gandhi confuses methods and morals,

and mistakes the far with evil and the near with good." Certainly Gandhi was not prescient about what now appears true, that the determination of the future is more likely to come from the movement of science and technology throughout the world than from any of the forces which he endorsed.

These comments apart, Gandhi realized that many problems flow from cultural change. His views, evolving from antipathy to conditional acceptance of science and technology, represent an effort to slow down acculturation while retaining and restating native values. Because of this, his legacy is helpful when it moderates demands for material progress in the non-West if they are greater than basic resources or the ability to adjust peacefully to new ways and ideas.

To establish peaceful change as an accepted method of international relations, communication among the peoples concerned is necessary. In this field Gandhi's ideas deal with the functions of language and education in the world community. Since he knew several languages and had travelled and studied abroad, he might have considered foreign languages and higher education as desirable mediums of intercultural communication. Instead he stressed non-Western languages and "basic education" as ways to combat modernism and to reassert the traditional. As he did so he clearly understood how language and education are effective political tools.

Early in his career—by 1897—Gandhi staunchly defended Indian language training and home education rather than what he disparagingly called Western "literary education." He had his own children educated at home in preference to the public or private South African schools in which he believed European education and language were corrupting influences on the students. And he used Indian languages to build the morale of South African countrymen. Consequently, *Indian Opinion*, though conducted from its start in an English edition, favored colonial government recognition of four Indian languages as equal in rank with Dutch or English and argued that skill in one of the latter should not be a test for immigration into Natal.*

Writing in 1909 about Indian cultural nationalism, Gandhi focused his attention on the English language and claimed that it had helped to enslave India based on the educational efforts of Thomas Babington Macaulay. To dislodge English, he recommended a formula to revive Indian languages that required his fellow countrymen to learn Hindustani, written either in the script of North Indian Moslems or North Indian Hindus who have traditionally prevailed in India's po-

litical and economic life. Beneath the master language covering the luxuriant growth of Indian languages, he encouraged cross-communication between subcultures; members of each major language group were to learn the language of their classical literature, and some members of the prevailing groups were to learn the languages, e.g., Tamil, of Dravidian South India.³⁸ As his thought on Indian languages developed, he emphasized the master language in two scripts and warned against the possible destruction of India's cultural unity through excessive stress of provincial tongues.

The salient point here is that Gandhi's formula about adopting the language or languages of the major social groups is comparable to what takes place in world-wide communication, where one or two languages dominate intercultural exchange. Indeed, rejecting English for Indian domestic usage, he accepted English for what he considered to be the distant worlds of interstate diplomacy and trade.³⁹ Usually he paid little attention to French which he had learned as a student in London.

Though Gandhi's views on Indian languages offer a parallel to intercultural communication, he himself drew nationalist conclusions from his beliefs. It is disloyal, he held, for Indian parents to teach their children to talk and think in English. He argued that knowing English had impeded the careers of B. G. Tilak and R. M. Roy,⁴⁰ suggesting that these leaders of India's modern history might have contributed more to the awakening of Indian masses by using their own languages exclusively.

An incident late in life tellingly illustrates Gandhi's consistent understanding about the close relation of language and politics. To celebrate India's first independence day, the BBC asked him to deliver a world-wide message on August 15, 1947. He declined the invitation, remarking that he had to resist temptation and that the world must forget that he knew English.⁴¹ Elsewhere he noted the progress achieved by Japan⁴² and Soviet Russia using their own languages. Reluctantly he approved English instruction at the university level but not below.⁴³

Often indistinguishable from Gandhi's ideas about language are his mature educational ideas, best revealed in the Wardha Scheme which he inspired and approved.⁴⁴ This plan, formulated in 1937, calls for free, compulsory and public co-education between the ages of seven and fourteen, with Hindustani rather than English as the language of instruction. Based on the belief that a school is a workshop of "hand, head and heart," the basic curriculum stresses manual training. The

products made are sold to the state and private markets in order for the student to support himself. The curriculum includes instruction in personal and public hygiene, a literacy program, and training to respect the dignity of labor. Education above this level is both private and public, implying a state monopoly of education during the early years. Especially visible in the Wardha Scheme are the influences of Gandhi's experience in educating his children at home in South Africa, Ruskin's ideas on public workshops as a remedy for unemployment, and the ideas of the pediatric educator Maria Montessori whom Gandhi visited in Europe in 1931.

Dr. Alva Myrdal of UNESCO suggests that Gandhi's basic educational ideas are in the tradition leading to UNESCO's "fundamental education" program, which, in the less developed nations, trains teachers, produces local training materials, and teaches reading, writing and occupational skills.⁴ This comparison places the Gandhian Wardha Scheme into the proper perspective, international in scope and significance.

Gandhi's opinions on the language question suggest that he was more interested in advancing nationalism than communication. In particular, he wished autochthonous tongues and scripts to safeguard non-Western values. He did not ban intellectual communication completely, since he permitted translations to admit Western thought into the East. After native ways had molded students, he allowed them to learn the Western languages of world diplomacy and commerce. Belief in India's autonomy and the superiority of its life predominate in Gandhi's ideas about education, though they also have a wider importance. In effect, his thought points to a correction of the excessively intellectual elements in Western education, and to the extension of integral training to the many.

Political and social problems arising from the meeting of the colored and white races confronted Gandhi throughout most of his public career. His experience with European racialism in South Africa did much to set his future course as an active opponent of Western customs and governments and as a leading proponent of Indian nationalism. Symptomatic of his thoughts, his paper contended that the bias of whites drew its strength from color prejudice and fear of economic competition, and it condemned deliberate racial segregation as an un-Christian practice for a Western people.⁴ Extending its criticisms of white prejudice, his weekly cited British dominions other

than South Africa, in particular Canada and Australia, as countries which did not deal fairly with men of color.⁴⁵

As Gandhi called for an end to Caucasian racialism, he also lent support to racial separatism, not to the coalescing of races. He distinguished the South African Indian problem from that of Negro and racially mixed Africans who have grievances against the governing white minority in South Africa. Though he sympathized with the complaints of the colored communities against their European rulers, he declined to assume their cause.⁴⁶ He included local Chinese in his reform movement because, like Indians, they were subject to restrictive legislation covering Asians. But he reasoned that he had enough problems with the anti-Asian laws without taking up the banner of the indigenous African population and the "coloreds." Another indication of his belief in autonomy is found in the comment of *Indian Opinion* on interracial marriage: "Such marriages are unquestionably to be regretted as not only do they often result in misery to the parties immediately concerned, but the offspring of such unions are born to an undesirable inheritance."⁴⁷ Three decades later he directly expressed his sentiments when he criticized Indian socialist efforts in 1939 to merge Indian and Negro reform movements in South Africa. Humanitarianism separated from experience, he warned, may destroy the cause espoused.⁴⁸

Moreover Gandhi showed moderation within the struggle to improve the status of South African Indians. Thus the movement he led confined itself to the removal of public, social disabilities. Hoping to allay the fears of whites about a political upsurge by Asians, his paper stressed that the South African Indians wished racial equality with Europeans only in such matters as economic treatment and movement of residence, and that they did not demand the franchise. Even in social relations, his newspaper said that local Indians did not wish to have private, social contacts with Europeans nor ask that such intercourse should take place generally among the races.⁴⁹ When he left South Africa in 1914, Gandhi wrote a public letter stating that political rights were not part of the unfinished business of South African Indians. He implied that he was not demanding such rights in the hope that Europeans would appreciate his temperate comments and thus feel more inclined to grant full social liberties to Asians.⁵⁰

Gandhi's limits on his South African struggle against racialism may have been dictated by political discretion. They are also explainable by an approach to racialism that seems moderate by today's standards of colored peoples searching for political rights and social respect. In

this connection it is significant that one of Gandhi's editors, Henry S. L. Polak, told the Universal Races Congress in London, July 1911, that the racial stand of the South African Indians led by Gandhi was an "intermediate position."⁵⁴

It is true that as the years passed, Gandhi became less moderate about racial issues. Although he continued to take an interest in the South African Indian situation throughout his life, he reserved his more vigorous attacks on racialism for the distant United States and its social scene. Without ever having visited America, he learned about racial problems in the United States from correspondents, and from interviews with American Negro leaders who visited him, among them Benjamin Mays, William Stuart Nelson, Howard Thurman and Channing Tobias.

"America is the house of the interracial conflict on a vast scale."⁵⁵ So Gandhi wrote in 1926 after receiving reports of discrimination against Asian students in the United States. Later he charged that the United States was no more prepared to respect Negroes of the caliber of the scientist Booker T. Washington than it had been when some Americans protested President Theodore Roosevelt's dining with Washington in the White House.⁵⁶

The theme of cultural autonomy reappears in Gandhi's comments on racialism in the United States. Although American Negroes have accepted Christianity and Western civilization, he observed, discrimination continues against them,⁵⁷ implying that Christian association and Western acculturation serve no useful purpose for American Negroes. To solve their social problems, he advised Negroes in America to practice nonviolence and courage.⁵⁸ But when asked in 1947 by William Stuart Nelson for suggestions as to how American Negroes might remedy their situation, he was extremely cautious and declined to offer any.

What, then, are the lessons of Gandhi's views for race relations in the world today? In the first place, his ideas opposing Caucasian racialism continue to exercise a beneficial influence on a problem that infects the relations of the West and the non-West. Gandhi's name will be held in esteem for many years to come by all critics of white racial conceit. This is so even though some of his ideas appear moderate by today's liberal standards. But this moderation has its relevance, too; for it calls attention to the absence in Gandhi's thought of reverse racialism against whites, and consequently suggests that non-whites, as well as whites, can benefit from his views. Moreover his moderation and his pluralism contribute to the maintenance of personal and collec-

tive self-respect by colored peoples. This in turn prepares a basis for a world which E. Franklin Frazier of Howard describes as one where racialism has ended and racial differences are matters for mutual respect among several "federated cultures."⁵⁶

Gandhi considered the major faiths of the world from two viewpoints, one critical and one tolerant. He was often critical when he believed religions aid state power, either in the West or when he treated them as instruments of Western political influence in the East. This outlook led him to censure Christianity, Judaism and Zionism. By attacking them he supposed that he scored Western imperialism. Sometimes his ideas were more subtle. He once commented that Christian leaders of African nationalists were at a disadvantage since their faith was that of their masters, implying that they would do better politically to be non-Christians.⁵⁷ Gandhi even opposed any association with Moral Rearmament, a world-wide, non-doctrinaire group dedicated to Gandhian-like principles of honesty, purity, selflessness and love. He recognized Moral Rearmament's good intentions but observed that the organization came from the exploitive, colonial West.⁵⁸

Gandhi made less stringent and somewhat different criticisms of non-Western religions. He did this because he was convinced that Eastern faiths had escaped much of the corrupting violence and materialism which he found in the West and had kept closer to the Asian cradle of all creeds. Zoroastrianism, the traditional religion of the influential Parsis of West India, Gandhi treated with circumspection. About the ethical philosophies of Taoism and Confucianism and the state religion of Shintoism, he had little to say, because by his own admission he was not an authority on comparative religion.

When Gandhi looked upon the great faiths as ethical founts rather than as institutions allied with temporal power, he was tolerant. Believing that men can personally discover "truth" apart from "error," he considered the living religions as sources of ethical lessons which individual conscience might separate from orthodox doctrine and incorporate into an eclectic philosophy of life. Closely examined, Gandhi's tolerance of the major faiths is part of syncretic Hinduism or neo-Hinduism, a non-orthodox interpretation dominant in modern Hindu thought. For owing principally to the antiquity of Hinduism and to the interaction of various cultures and their religions in the Indian sub-continent, Hinduism is remarkable among the world faiths for

its ability to absorb or to admit the validity of truths in other creeds without testifying against itself."⁶⁴

The greater number of Gandhi's criticisms of religion have to do with his observations on Christianity. Fundamentally, he believed that much of Western Christianity denies the Sermon on the Mount and that its history is one of demeaning association with state power from Constantine down into the atomic age.⁶⁵ He felt that the link between Christianity and force represents a decline of Christianity from its pure, Eastern origins.⁶⁶ Furthermore he was convinced that once the West adopted Christianity it made the crucial mistake of treating Christ's dynamic pacifism as a static, utopian idealism, and hence, out of despair about realizing an absolute ethic of nonviolence, strayed into violent paths. "Has not the West paid heavily in regarding Jesus as a Passive Resister? Christendom has been responsible for the wars which put to shame even those described in the Old Testament"⁶⁷

Gandhi took special exception to Christian missionary work in India. There are several explanations for his outlook. As an ancient, socio-religious culture, Hinduism itself does not proselytize in the usual sense. Also, Gandhi had an adverse childhood picture of Christian preachers. Later one of them, active in Rajkot at the time Gandhi recalled a Christian insulting Hinduism, denied having done so; Gandhi replied that his own memory was accurate.⁶⁸ Furthermore, because the British required Western missionaries to abstain from doing anything harmful to imperial rule in India, this caused nationalists such as Gandhi to suspect that Christian missions contributed to the political status quo.

Generally, Gandhi identified Christian mission efforts with aggressive Western expansion.⁶⁹ "Physician, heal thyself," he said of such proselytizing, and he called Albert Schweitzer the greatest of Christians for not preaching any more.⁷⁰ Christian work among "untouchables" particularly disturbed Gandhi, in part because of his own efforts to return them to Hindu society.⁷¹ He did not make similar vigorous criticisms of Islam and Buddhism for trying to convert "untouchables" since these faiths are non-Western.

In addition to Christianity, Judaism received Gandhi's critical attention. Indirect evidence of his views dates back to his South African days when his paper claimed that the South African Jewish community, composed principally of refugees from East European pogroms, did not aid another persecuted minority, the South African Indians.⁷² His newspaper editorialized that Jews in South Africa

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should appreciate the parallel between their former status in anti-Semitic areas of Europe and the position of Indians in South Africa.⁶⁸

Years later Gandhi personally offered criticisms of Judaism. He said that Jews believe in retributive justice, alleging they sought revenge against German National Socialists.⁶⁹ Challenged by Western Jews, he withdrew his charge.⁷⁰ At another time he frankly told Louis Fischer, subsequently one of his biographers, that though Christianity is guilty of creating the atomic bomb, Judaism is "obstinate and unenlightened" in comparison to Christianity. In the same discussion Gandhi conceded that he knew little about Judaism.⁷¹

This lack of information about Judaism, and special political ideas and conditions affected Gandhi's opinions of Zionism. In South Africa *Indian Opinion* raised the issue of the Jewish National Home in the course of criticizing local Jews, but declined to comment directly on its merits.⁷² Later, in the 1930's, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise tried through John Haynes Holmes to secure a favorable comment on Zionism from Gandhi, but without success.⁷³ Four factors influenced his stand on the subject. First, he was sensitive about the ideas of Moslem Indians who were anti-Zionist because of their sympathy for Middle Eastern Arabs opposed to the Jewish National Home; second, he objected to any Zionist methods inconsistent with his way of nonviolence; third, he found Zionism contrary to his pluralistic nationalism which excludes the establishment of any state based solely or mainly on one religion; and fourth, he apparently believed it imprudent to complicate his relations with the British, who held the mandate in Palestine, by approving Zionism.

There is no question that Gandhi sympathized with the Jews who suffered Nazi depredations, but he said that this "does not blind me to the requirements of justice."⁷⁴ Jews are nationals of the country where they live to the same extent as non-Jews, he argued, and Zionists have no need for Israel which is a spiritual ideal, not a geographical entity. Palestine belongs to the Arabs and any Jewish immigration there should not result in a National Jewish Home; Zionist or Arab violence is wrong and Zionism, if persisted in, will cause the world-wide expulsion of Jews to their National Home or at least raise the problem of dual political allegiance.⁷⁵ The Jewish philosopher Martin Buber wrote Gandhi and attempted to convince him to alter these ideas, but Gandhi was not basically influenced and for unknown reasons gave no reply.⁷⁶

Perhaps because Gandhi momentarily realized how Zionism, too, had to contend with British imperialism and generally endorsed Indian

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nationalism, he approved of Zionism in 1946. He told Sidney Silverman, Labor member of Parliament, and Louis Fischer, that the Jews have a prior claim to Palestine.⁷⁷ But subsequently Gandhi returned to his earlier, and more representative, anti-Zionist position, for example, when he criticized any settlement of the Palestine question based on Zionist money from the United States or arms from Europe.⁷⁸

Since Gandhi deferred to Indian Moslems in his consideration of Zionism, it is not surprising to discover that he tempered his criticism of Mohammedanism because it is non-Western and because of the tense Hindu-Moslem situation in India.⁷⁹ In the Koran he saw a message of peace incorrectly carried out by Islamic war. No doubt exists that he admired the asceticism of Moslem fakirs⁸⁰ and the mystical elements of Sufism. He directly condemned any interpretation of the Koran which would justify primitive civil punishment, such as stoning to death.⁸¹ The Moslem contention that Islam is a spiritual democracy did not impress him.⁸² But despite some criticisms, Gandhi genuinely devoted himself to improving Hindu-Moslem relations and earned considerable respect for himself in Islamic India.

Because Buddhism originated in India and early helped to direct him toward a philosophy grounded on ideals of compassion and non-violence, Gandhi treated this faith with life-long respect. With his comprehensive understanding of Indian thought and civilization, however, he tended to patronize Buddhism by including it in Hinduism and claiming that modern Buddhism has deteriorated from its original inspiration.⁸³

Despite his criticisms of the great faiths, Gandhi considered himself a tolerant man. "Religions are different roads converging to the same point," he said. "What does it matter that we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal?"⁸⁴ He contended that all religions are based on ahimsa, love or nonviolence,⁸⁵ all are equally perfect and imperfect, thus eliminating claims of comparative merit, and all worship the same God.⁸⁶ For the many faiths composed a mosaic: "Looking at society all the world over there is nothing but duality or plurality. Unity is conspicuous by its absence. This man is high, that one is low, that is a Hindu, that a Moslem, third a Christian, fourth a Parsi, fifth a Sikh, sixth a Jew. Even among these there are subdivisions. In the unity of my conception there is perfect unity in the plurality of the designs."⁸⁷

Gandhi believed that every creed contains some aspect of final truth and advised men to pursue truth, as they personally understand it, in the faith of their birth. Nevertheless, since no religion has a mono-

poly of truth, one should borrow from other faiths what is deficient in one's own. "Looking at all religions with an equal eye, we would not only not hesitate, but would think it our duty, to blend into our faith every acceptable feature of other faiths."⁸⁸ This borrowing is syncretism, a special characteristic of the non-orthodox Hinduism to which Gandhi adhered. Therefore he felt entitled to claim much for Hinduism of the dominant, plastic type. "Not being an exclusive religion," he explained, "it enables followers of that faith not merely to respect all other religions, but it also enables them to admire and assimilate whatever may be good in the other faiths. Nonviolence is common to all religions, but it has found the highest expression and application in Hinduism."⁸⁹

Behind Gandhi's attachment to his native faith were several convictions, variously expressed. Hinduism is the most tolerant of all faiths because it has outlived its militant history to become the premier religion of peace.⁹⁰ The absence of a body of doctrine to which all Hindus must conform is an asset and a matter of pride.⁹¹ He often said that the wisdom of all religious teachers can be found in Hinduism. Even when Gandhi criticized his faith, for instance, about castelessness, it remained for him the master-creed. Divine providence protected Hinduism from the penetration of Western materialism, and in turn Hinduism will emerge to bring world peace.⁹² "Hinduism will burst forth upon the world with a brilliance perhaps unknown before," he predicted, simultaneously admitting that this was a claim for its superiority.⁹³

When Gandhi's ideas about the living religions are critically viewed, his judgments against the association of religion and power, particularly by those faiths which have grown strong in the West, are inconsistent with the use he made of religious terminology and symbols to channel the emotions of the Indian masses into anti-imperialist nationalism. For millions of Indians, to see the dhoti-clad Mahatma, who had undertaken a life of personal asceticism as his path to perfection, was to receive *darshana*, grace bestowed by a holy man. Although he disclaimed mahatmahood and vigorously opposed state aid to religious orthodoxy, his invoking of spirituality, his ideas of renunciation and penance, and his appeals to pious Indian traditions stimulated religio-political forces which did much to advance his career and Indian nationalism. Gandhi's use of religion in politics so disturbs Reinhold Niebuhr that he has been led to say it may have been plausible in India but it is ultimately unsound anywhere.⁹⁴ This

opinion is too severe, though it does indicate the difficulties raised by Gandhi's fusion of religious notions with practical politics.

As to Gandhi's syncretic treatment of the great faiths, conceivably it is a brief for a fundamental religion of the world as Vincent Sheean is convinced,⁶⁶ comparable with a basic synthetic system drawn from the competing great religions such as Arnold Toynbee and Aldous Huxley propose.⁶⁷ No doubt Gandhi has challenged the right of orthodoxy, especially in Christianity⁶⁸ and in Islam, to make universalist claims for their tenets. Manifestly his viewpoint is welcome to the modernist or the liberal who believes that God seeks out men in many ways and that no religion is false.⁶⁹ For international politics what is most important is that Gandhi employed neo-Hinduism as part of his politico-cultural efforts to offset Western influences in India and to advance the interests of his country.

CHAPTER V

INDIA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

An architect of Indian freedom, Gandhi left a legacy to his nation for its conduct as a sovereign state in international relations. This bequest has inspired the new India to credit Gandhi for his contribution. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nehru has declared that Gandhi taught his country to interpret its interests in terms of the world's interests.¹ In the same line of thought the Information Service of India states that "India's foreign policy is based on the Gandhian ideal of peace and universal goodwill."²

To find the implications of Gandhi's views about Indian foreign policy it is necessary to study their specifics. Whether free India has followed Gandhi's ideas in keeping with his intentions is another matter. His bequest contains, first, his ideas about policy questions which are important today for India's external affairs, and second, his expectations about the general function of India on the world stage.

During the course of Gandhi's public career he dealt with several subjects on which free India has formulated concrete policies—overseas Indians, membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, Pakistan, foreign economic relations, and French and Portuguese India.

Scattered around the world, overseas or emigrant Indians are native born nationals or their descendants, living mainly in countries with past or present association with Great Britain.³ Among these are Tibet, Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia, the Fiji Islands, British Guiana, Trinidad, Canada, the Union of South Africa, Kenya, and Mauritius. These people have perplexed several governments, principally because of their social and political grievances about conditions in their new lands. Gandhi recognized the plight of overseas Indians throughout the world and considered their diverse problems as essentially one, namely, how to overcome the color bar in social, economic, and eventually in political matters. His particular suggestions for coping with the problems of Indians abroad were to encourage local self-help and nonviolent resistance; to persuade colonial governments to improve conditions; to end degrading channels of

Indian emigration; to hold Indians responsible for their personal conduct in host nations; and, late in life, to ask for protection of overseas Indians by international organization and diplomacy.

Gandhi favored extending the right of South African Indians to organize for protection of their social liberties to all overseas Indians.⁴ In 1906 his direct action method of satyagraha emerged out of his own efforts to improve the lot of fellow nationals, and he used this weapon with relative success from then until 1914. After he had left South Africa, he advised his countrymen living abroad to learn and practice his kind of civil disobedience.⁵

Despite Gandhi's own difficulties in securing relief from colonial and imperial regimes, he had confidence that white governments could resolve local Indian problems. In the temperate language of the dutiful and faithful subject anticipating a boon from the advanced nations of the world, a resolution he drafted in 1915 for the Congress party requested the imperial British statesmen and self-governing countries—but especially Canada and South Africa—to do honor to their ideals and to treat European and Indian immigrants equally; this would grant rights which the world had come to expect of Western peoples and remedy a source of unrest and discontent. The resolutions shows trust in white stewardship.⁶

In addition to satyagraha and his faith in the reformation of Western governments, he tried to moderate the problem by curtailing, and in some circumstances prohibiting, emigration. It is true that when he first went to South Africa, he briefly approved of the outward movement of his countrymen. But faced in South Africa with an indentured labor system and the racial hostility of whites, he subsequently opposed further large-scale immigration and worked to end admission of contract laborers, a practice finally stopped in 1917. He did seek and win right of entry for educated Indians, but he prudently agreed to discrimination by South African governments against the admission of non-indentured, uneducated Indians.⁷ In his own way Gandhi contributed to the closing of a world frontier.

Cognizant of excuses for discrimination, Gandhi cautioned Indians to show traits which the host nation would respect in their personal conduct. He did not recommend cultural assimilation; rather he gave paternal advice about honesty, courtesy and cleanliness, not only in South Africa but wherever the occasion arose. On a visit to Ceylon in 1927 he told his countrymen that their adopted nation would judge all Indians by their behavior, and consequently told them to live exemplary lives.⁸ Although Gandhi seldom censured the economic conduct

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When India became free, he supported his nation's efforts to help overseas kinsmen through international organization and diplomacy. After India had complained to the United Nations Assembly in 1946 about discrimination against Indians by the Union of South Africa, in a rare kind word for international organization he said he hoped the United Nations would deal with the problem effectively.⁹ He also asked that sovereign India use diplomacy to assist Indians in British East Africa.¹⁰

From Gandhi's solutions for the complaints of overseas Indians, what is pertinent today? Clearly the same conditions for using satyagraha are no longer present in the world. Earlier he could bring influence to bear on the self-governing units of the British family, not only through local Indian agitation, but also by the imperial London government anxious about nationalist Indian sympathy with compatriots abroad. Now there is a loosely joined Commonwealth without a strong imperial center to pressure members, and a sovereign India not prone to call for civil disobedience by Indians abroad when it has its own problems of domestic unrest. About Gandhi's urging of Western enlightenment much has already been done, South Africa excepted, and the problem now includes enlightening free, non-Western countries with Indian minorities. Contract immigration ended in Gandhi's day, and the question of personal conduct seems incidental. In the field of international opinion, Gandhi did support a method by which India continues to publicize the complaints of overseas Indians, and it is through this medium that progress can be made.

Even though Gandhi had become a confirmed Indian nationalist by 1909, his ideas about free India's remaining within the Commonwealth of Nations lagged behind the evolution of his anti-colonialism. For one thing, indefiniteness and changes in British public law during his lifetime made it difficult for him and other Indian nationalists to understand clearly the relations between "self-governing" entities and the United Kingdom. The term "dominion," referring to the older colonized units of the British Empire, did not find sanction until the Imperial Conference of 1907. Not until 1926 did "dominion" come to mean certain self-governing entities which are united by a common allegiance to the Crown and associated as equal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Furthermore, Gandhi had his own reasons of sentiment and realism for treating as distinct problems Indian statehood, and imperial or Commonwealth association.

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In the first place, Gandhi's acceptance of the British imperial idea, symbolized by the Crown, is discoverable later than the emergence of his mature nationalism. Believing that the British Empire would provide India with self-government, if prompted by mass civil disobedience, he declared his faith in the Empire.¹¹ Gandhi's profession of imperial loyalty was especially noticeable during the First World War.¹² Soon after the Paris Peace Conference, Gandhi expressed concern about the compatibility of the imperial concept and Indian nationalism; from about 1925 he doubted that the idea of the Crown, styled from the time of Victoria and Disraeli as "Empress" or "Emperor" of India, could ever coexist with the Indian view of self-government.

Apart from Gandhi's thoughts about the imperial and crown concepts, he began to criticize dominion status as such when the Union of South Africa was being formed. He and his associates feared that the establishment of the Union might substitute uniform and perhaps more stringent regulations against Asians for existing patchwork discrimination.¹³ When the South African National Convention of 1909 produced the final draft of the law with which to form the Union, *Indian Opinion* pointed out that the measure would offer virtually no political or social advantages to men of color, for it "unites against the colored people the hitherto scattered forces of the white men in South Africa. The timid Imperial Government, which of late has listened to might rather than right, will become paralyzed before the so-called united voice of South Africa."¹⁴ While in London at the end of 1909, Gandhi lobbied against the South African Act. Forces stronger than the Transvaal Indians whom he represented overcame his efforts, and the Act went into effect the following year.

Gandhi's objections to dominion status because of white racialism continued after his South African years. Dominion status, he said, is meaningful only within a family of ethnically similar nations.¹⁵ When India became free, he observed that the Commonwealth should not admit non-white members unless it believed that racialism was fundamentally wrong.¹⁶ However, his major consideration of free India's Commonwealth membership came in the decade after 1919 when he began to shed his earlier loyalties to the British Empire. Mainly because of internal politics in the Congress party, he did not immediately ask for Indian self-government outside of the British family. When he did demand sovereignty without Commonwealth ties, he placed negotiations with the British Government ahead of precision about free India's exact standing in international law.

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From 1920 to 1929, Gandhi tended to oppose demands in the Congress party to end all ties to the United Kingdom. During this time he interpreted the goal of *swaraj*, self-government, to mean "that status of India which her people desire at a given moment."¹⁷ Then in late 1929 Gandhi supported a majority in the Congress which passed a resolution declaring that the party sought *purna swaraj*, complete independence outside of the Commonwealth. Like *swaraj*, "partnership" supplied Gandhi with another tactical idea about India's dominion status. Asked if he would accept Indian Commonwealth membership similar to that enjoyed by the Union of South Africa, he responded that because India accounts for one-fifth of humanity, he would find such a role inadequate for "partnership."¹⁸

The historic Statute of Westminster, passed by the British Parliament, December 11, 1931, did not alter Gandhi's tactical approach. In substance, the Statute leaves a common sovereign, the right of appeal to the Privy Council, military defense, and loyalty, as the ties of Commonwealth. The Statute did not arouse the interest of Gandhi who sought a way out of the dependent role in which nationalist India considered itself. At the London Round Table Conference immediately before the Statute was passed by Parliament, he realized that it treats the problem of defining "dominion" by specifying certain entities and not by a broad formula into which India could be placed. This lack of a general definition did not concern him, and he kept to his position of insistence on "partnership."

Throughout the years of the 1930's and 1940's Gandhi insisted publicly that the proper goal for national India was complete independence. In a letter to Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, in early 1940, he wrote that the Congress party would not accept dominion status in terms of the Statute of Westminster.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Gandhi did not overlook the propaganda value of his position. Privately he admitted that the Irish Free State, a dominion since 1922 and a prime mover with the Union of South Africa in weakening imperial ties, illustrated that the spirit, rather than the letter, of independence was vital. Gandhi, however, thought it improper to make such an admission in public.²⁰

From the second World War until his death in 1948, Gandhi continued to question the wisdom of free India staying in the Commonwealth. Asked in 1942 if India would accept dominion status, he replied: "No good. We will have no half measures, no tinkering with independence."²¹ And when India became free and remained in the Commonwealth, he was displeased about the fact.²² In his later years

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perhaps some of his own tactical criticisms of dominion status—which may have helped national India to bargain with the United Kingdom—convinced him of the undesirability of Commonwealth association for free India. Racialism in Commonwealth nations was another important influence on his mind in his final phase.

Neither Gandhi nor many others foresaw the adaptability of the crown symbol which now is the center of a diverse cluster of self-governing entities, including the Republic of India and the Constitutional Monarchy of Malaya. He did not live to see India's association with the Commonwealth radically changed by the declaration of its prime ministers in April 1949, which describes India as "a sovereign independent republic" that recognizes the Crown only as the head of a no longer "British" Commonwealth. Though he was not present, he had contributed to the liberalization and redefinition of a unique association of states.

For the creation of Pakistan, Mahatma Gandhi bears little responsibility. His lifelong attempt to establish a state sheltering all Indians regardless of their creed, language, or descent worked against the movement to form a distinct Moslem state. The traditions of the Mughal Empire, and the accomplishments of a philosopher and poet like Muhammad Iqbal, he believed, belong to one Indian nation. Moslems should be citizens of a state which treats all religions impartially; any alternative would destroy Indian unity. "If every component part of the nation," he wrote, "claims the right of self-determination for itself, there is no one nation and there is no independence. I have already said that Pakistan is such an untruth that it cannot stand."²²

Gandhi tried to convince Moslems about the correctness of his nationalism and nonviolence, particularly in the 1919-1924 period, when he identified himself with the Caliphate movement. Commending pan-Islamic solidarity, he made it clear that he did not endorse the use of the Mohammedan faith for violent political or religious purposes. The failure of his non-cooperation drive in 1922, and the subsequent abolition of the Caliphate by secular Turkish forces under Kemal Ataturk ended his major effort to associate Indian Moslems with his ideas.

The creation of Pakistan in 1947 distressed Gandhi, but he promised the Indian public not to encourage nonviolent resistance to partition. During the communal disturbances following the division of India, he opposed the voluntary or involuntary transfer of Moslems to Pakistan from the dominion of India, and Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to

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India. The migrations of people to states known to be sympathetic to particular creeds, he contended, vitiated the possibility of religious coexistence within and between the countries. What he saw and sensed troubled him deeply.

The Kashmir crisis of 1947-1948 challenged his national and ethical ideals. Kashmir and Jammu are predominantly Moslem areas in the extreme north of the Indian subcontinent, contiguous to Pakistan and India. Traditionally they have been ruled by the Dogras, a Hindu princely family. With the end of British power in 1947, the prevailing interpretation of the terms creating India and Pakistan was that each princely entity should join one dominion or the other. The factors to determine accession were the political will of the prince and his government, geographic logic and religious composition. Sir Hari Singh, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, felt his state could remain independent of India and Pakistan, but when Pathan tribesmen invaded his land in October 1947 and joined with local sympathizers of Pakistan to attack his followers, he asked for military help from India. The latter's government insisted on first receiving Kashmir's formal request for accession which was given and accepted, and then India flew its troops to Kashmir in late October and subsequently secured much of the disputed area, despite the introduction of regular Pakistani forces. India took the problem to the United Nations and agreed to a plebiscite to decide the future of the whole area. Numerous United Nations efforts to solve the problem, which has severely damaged relations between the two states, have remained unsuccessful.

De facto division of Kashmir now gives Pakistan control of one-third of the area and one-fourth of the population; India incorporated the balance into its realm in January 1957, but continues to claim Pakistan's share. For its part Pakistan claims that the Indian area is held in violation of international law.

Prime Minister Nehru has indicated that Gandhi approved of sending the Indian Army into Kashmir. "It has been and is a moral issue with us, apart from other aspects of the case," Nehru said publicly in March 1948 after Gandhi's death, "and because of this, at every stage and at every step, I consulted Mahatma Gandhi and had his approval."¹⁰ Certainly after the fact Gandhi sustained the Indian Army's help to the pro-Indian government of Kashmir. Speaking at the end of October 1947, he upheld the idea that India's retention of Kashmir with its majority of Moslems would certify Hindu-Moslem coexistence in India proper and disprove the argument that Moslem

Indians require their own state.²⁶ Soon thereafter he denied that he valued force as a solution to the Kashmir problem. In keeping with his high regard for courage, he said that what he admired was the bravery of the Indian Army and of Kashmiris defending the region against invaders.²⁷

Gandhi gave his full support to his government's endorsement of a plebiscite to determine the accession wishes of the Kashmir people.²⁸ As already noted, he also gave his assent to an arbitrator for the Kashmir issue. This did not mean that he wished the United Nations to take up the problem since he asked his country to remove its complaint against Pakistan from the jurisdiction of the international body. The net legacy of Gandhi's views of the problem is difficult to determine, all the more so because, about the likely outcome—"settlement" based on the de facto cease-fire lines—he unequivocally said he was opposed to the idea of partition.²⁹ But a weighing of the evidence available indicates that Gandhi contributed to his nation's hegemony in Kashmir.*

On a different subject Gandhi lent his influence to harmonious relations between India and Pakistan. In 1947, he convinced the Indian Government to pay Pakistan its share of assets due from public funds divided but not distributed at the time of partition.³⁰ And he did so against the wishes of the Congress party militant, Vallabhbhai Patel, who wanted to use the assets as a political lever with Pakistan. Gandhi's stand contributed directly to moderating bad feeling between the two states. In the last month of his life he took a broad, realistic view of Indian-Pakistan tensions about Kashmir and of religious strife within both countries. He feared that India's relations with the entire Islamic world might be jeopardized if differences with Pakistan remained unsettled.³¹ On January 26, 1948, four days before his death, he extended a fraternal recognition of Pakistan. "I wonder," he asked, "if we can remain free from the fever of power politics, of the bid for power which afflicts the political world, the East and the West."³² These words are still pondered by Indians.

Gandhi's attachment to a comprehensive nationalism was incompatible with the premises of Pakistan. His belief that Moslems in the subcontinent are Indians before they are Moslems led him to endorse realistic interests of Indian foreign policy about its Islamic neighbor.

* The same can be said of the states of Hyderabad and Junagadh which India absorbed against the wishes of their rulers but with the consent of most of their people.

Yet his ethical principles were active, as with the issue of public monies. Thus for India's relations with Pakistan, Gandhi handed down ideas reflecting self-interest, but, more importantly, goodwill.

The economic effects of the partition which created Pakistan and India were not readily visible to Gandhi during the few months remaining to him after the independence of the two states. He was well aware of India's economic relations with the world. Drawing from his anti-colonialism, his preference for a decentralized agricultural society, and his concept of swadeshi, he generally endorsed a policy of self-sufficiency for his country. There are some situations, however, where he agreed to external contacts. Thus the important questions are how much autarchy did Gandhi suggest for India, and where should openings be allowed for foreign economic intercourse?

Gandhi's faith in the Indian ability to provide internally needed goods and services led him throughout the 1920's to oppose Indian imports of cotton cloth and yarn from British sources. In the 1930's he extended the import ban to all foreign cotton textiles. Looking abroad for reasons to defend his boycott, Gandhi contended that unlike India, those nations exporting cloth could divert resources from cloth production to alternative profitable activities.²⁹

As a part of his swadeshi campaign, Gandhi advocated prohibitive duties on foreign cloth and the repeal of excise taxes on Indian mill cloth. He hoped for cloth spun in the cottage industry eventually to overtake cloth made in factories. But though favoring a village economy, he was willing to aid domestic manufacturing against foreign competition. For he was not adamant about the superiority of village industries as compared to factory industries when the factories were domestic. Nor did he always take a strict position about boycotting foreign cloth. When Gandhi visited the Lancashire textile mills in 1931, he told workers that the Indian boycott included all foreign cloth, not merely British cloth, and promised that India would give priority to British textiles if all political issues were settled.³⁰ Thus his "liberal" position on Indian imports served the art of negotiating. In less difficult political circumstances, he believed that India could be self-sufficient in food and cotton behind import walls against the world.³¹

Certainly his economic interpretation of imperialism affected his position on Indian foreign trade. Participation in international trade, he argued, tightens the bonds of foreign rule and depresses the colonial economy. Gandhi ignored mercantilism and held free trade responsible for India's exploitation. He claimed that the West's obtaining of

raw materials from colonial areas in return for finished goods was more responsible for India's subject condition than were political factors. To remedy this situation, the West, and certainly the United Kingdom, should regulate exports with concern for India's welfare, and subject India should control its imports by boycott.⁸⁸

There was some change in Gandhi's outlook on foreign trade. In 1929 he regarded a statistically favorable balance of trade as the sign of a "bleeding process."⁸⁹ Yet he did not let the influence of India's colonial history dominate his ideas of trade possibilities for free India. For he came to believe soon after his country's freedom that it could be "self-sufficient" by reducing "non-essential" imports until their value balanced that of exports.⁹⁰ Here Gandhi's conservative import policy departs somewhat from his earlier interpretation of swadeshi as near-isolation.⁹¹

Compared with Gandhi's ideas about foreign trade, his views on the entrance and treatment of foreign-owned industry and investment show less change. Throughout the 1920's he did not oppose foreign investment in India if such capital were not part of exploitive colonialism. This amounted to discouraging investors, chiefly British. At the London Round Table Conference he refused to guarantee the same commercial rights to British industries operating in India as to national firms. He would not promise that the commercial rights among Indians would be equal, since he looked forward to discrimination in behalf of India's less-favored classes. The only formula he would agree to was that, "No disqualification not suffered by Indian-born citizens of the free Indian state shall be imposed upon any persons lawfully residing in or entering India merely on the ground of race, color or religion."⁹²

Later, Gandhi described how a business, foreign in origin, could meet his swadeshi requirements. "An industry to be Indian must be demonstrably in the interest of the masses. It must be manned by Indians both skilled and unskilled. Its capital and machinery should be Indian and the labor employed should have a living wage and be comfortably housed, while the welfare of the children of the labourers should be guaranteed by the employers."⁹³ By this definition he hoped to end British industries operating in India under the guise of Indian corporations. He conceded that only his All-India Spinning Association and All-India Village Industries Association satisfied his terms. Consequently, having established his point, he became a degree more flexible. "I should have no objection," he wrote, "to the use of foreign capital, or to the employment of foreign talent, when such are not

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available in India, or when we need them—but only on condition that such capital and such talents are exclusively under the control, direction and management of Indians and are used in the interests of India.”⁴

If Gandhi remained essentially conservative about India's acceptance of foreign business and finance, he was similarly cautious about free India seeking overseas financial aid. If such assistance is needed, he observed, it should not be sought abjectly.⁴

In review, Gandhi's ideas about India's foreign economic relations suggest a policy of considerable economic nationalism. The quasi-autarchy would prevail in cloth and food production and whenever economic business enterprises, financial investment and aid originate abroad. In harmony with Gandhi's objectives, India has adopted restrictive economic devices. Quotas and licenses restrain the importation of foreign-made goods so as to husband scarce currencies which Indians might spend abroad on luxuries. But to meet Gandhi's preferences, India would go beyond and shelter itself from the unpredictable currents of international economic life and nurture its self-esteem and modest resources. Such a policy might seem unduly protectionist for a developing land.

Related to the problem of British colonialism in India is the question of French and Portuguese India. The French possessions, transferred to India between 1951-1954 after negotiations, contained approximately 200 square miles of territory with a population of about 362,000. The most noted French possession was Pondicherry on the east Indian coast in Madras. Portugal's possessions in the subcontinent of India comprise approximately 1,500 square miles of territory with a population of about 624,000. The main colony is Goa on the west coast. Though Indian nationalists agitated against French and Portuguese colonialism concurrently with their struggle against British power, until 1946 Gandhi showed no special concern about the matter. When it developed that France would prove tractable and give up its Indian possessions, Indian nationalism focused its criticism on Portugal, especially for its retention of Goa.

On this issue Gandhi marshalled several arguments.⁴ The Goan government is despotic and Goans should agitate for association with India; but as to priorities, they should place the protection of their internal civil rights ahead of integration with the motherland. Portugal ought not to depend on any treaty with the United Kingdom to maintain Portuguese India, and it would be responsible for any bloodshed arising from the controversy. Contentions that Portugal

has Vatican support based on Portuguese Roman Catholicism and the St. Ignatius Loyola burial shrine in Goa have no part in the controversy.*

Gandhi's criticism of non-British possessions in India is not unique. What is significant, however, is that he did not call for Indian satyagrahis to invade Portuguese possessions. For in August 1955, 3,000 unarmed Indians claiming to use Gandhi's methods crossed into Goa, and casualties were inflicted by Portuguese-led Goans who caused the satyagrahis to withdraw. It is a matter of speculation whether Gandhi would have sponsored or approved this offensive, international use of nonviolent direct action. Homer A. Jack, a Unitarian minister and dedicated Gandhian who witnessed and sympathized with the foray into Goa, interprets this invasion as "a specialized aspect of Gandhism" while admitting Nehru stopped its further use.⁴⁸ Gandhi's secretary believes that "there was no satyagraha in the Goan affair, but only a travesty of it."⁴⁹

The Mahatma viewed free India as a medium through which "international relations will be placed on a moral basis."⁴⁸ India, he predicted, "will be the voice of a powerful nation seeking to keep under restraint all violent forces of the world."⁴⁹ These beliefs depend on his pride in Indian civilization, "the nursery of the most ancient religions," which "has very little to learn from modern civilization, a civilization based on violence of the blackest type, largely a negation of the Divine in man, and which is rushing headlong to its ruin."⁴⁹

Gandhi further claimed for his country: "India has an unbroken tradition of nonviolence from times immemorial. But at no time in her ancient history, as far as I know it, has it had complete nonviolence in action pervading the whole land. Nevertheless, it is my unshakable belief that her destiny is to deliver the message of nonviolence to mankind. It may take ages to come to fruition. But so far as I can judge, no other will precede her in the fulfillment of that mission."⁴⁹ According to Nehru, Gandhi's pacifist interpretation of Indian history is not well-grounded.⁵⁰ Gandhi himself had few reservations about his nation's peaceful heritage.

Concretely, Gandhi pointed to India's nonviolent struggle for freedom as evidence of its ability to export peace. Before India's independence he said that since his country was not a state but a captive,

* In Rome, July, 1955, Nehru quoted Pius XII to the effect that the problem of Goa is not a religious issue.

exploited land, its liberation by pacific means would be "the largest contribution that any single nation will have made towards world peace."⁵¹ He held nationalist India responsible for honoring its non-violent reputation, all the more so because he expected free India to lead other colonial nations to independence. In his eyes British rule in India represented classical imperialism; consequently, the "freedom of India will demonstrate to all the exploited races of the earth that their freedom is very near and that in no case will they henceforth be exploited."⁵² Not only did Gandhi claim that India's liberation secured that of Burma and Ceylon, but he extolled India as the hope of the world, and in particular of Africa and Asia.⁵³

At times Gandhi was concerned that India's purposeful role in the world would suffer if it did not live up internally to the ideal of its nonviolent struggle against colonialism. He became especially discouraged after the outbreak of Hindu-Moslem violence in 1947. When he fasted in January 1948 to exert moral pressure on Hindu-Moslem strife, he clarified the broader goal of his action: "The reward will be the regaining of India's dwindling prestige and her fast fading sovereignty over the heart of Asia and, therethrough, the world. I flatter myself the belief that the loss of her soul by India will mean the loss of the hope of the aching, storm-tossed and hungry world."⁵⁴ Despite such thoughts, for the most part Gandhi had faith in India's ability to bring peace to the world.

Closely examined, Gandhi's idea of "peace" is not the destination of a state policy. "Peace is not and never can be the direct object of policy," E. H. Carr has taught diplomatists.⁵⁵ Instead, Gandhi's call for India's peaceful role is a philosophical notion which he bequeathed to his country for both internal and external affairs and which is traceable in his thought to his interpretation of ahimsa as dynamic nonviolence.

Although Gandhi's idea of India's pacific destiny is not an end of policy, this does not diminish its importance; rather, this fact helps to clarify his understanding of India's purpose in the world. For since his Indian peace mission has a cultural foundation and is free from overtly political ambitions, it stands within the *Panch Shila* tradition leading up to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed to by India and the People's Republic of China in April 1954, and subsequently by other Afro-Asian and communist states. The Five Principles are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In its own

way Gandhi's thought aids the *Panch Shila* theme which is not an interest in itself, but which has been employed by free India after his death to further the country's prestige.

In considering the overall implications of Gandhi's thought for India's function in international affairs, one notices how closely his ideas correspond to those of most nationalist Indian leaders about foreign relations before the country's independence: anti-imperialism, racial equality, anti-fascism, international cooperation, an "ethical" approach to world affairs, and an absence of fear about international communism.⁵⁶ Two exceptions stand out. Gandhi had few favorable opinions about existing international organizations. And his anti-communism—even when moderated by his ability to forgive those he disagreed with and by his contribution to the ideology of "peaceful coexistence"—contrasts with the generally benign outlook of Indian nationalists on communism before freedom and of the Indian government from independence up until the public emergence in 1959 of Communist China's pressure on Nehru's India.

Finally, without suggesting that Gandhi advocated India's self-interest as the determinant of its world role, his bequest is more realistic than has been usually realized. Because of his activist and non-absolute pacifism, his swadeshi loyalty to native institutions, and his ideology of peace, Gandhi's thought contributes to significant objectives of India's or any state's foreign policy: national security, domestic welfare, and world influence.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL

Out of unpromising beginnings Gandhi rose to fame in India and the world. He had a notable career dedicated to the advance of Indian nationalism, social justice and the integrity of man. The political philosophy he developed has elements traceable to a multitude of sources, Eastern and Western. Fundamentally shaped by 1909, this philosophy is more remarkable for its plastic character than for its consistency or sophistication; however, it served him well in his "experiments with truth" until his death in 1948, and it inspired others to follow him and his ideals.

To Gandhi the ultimate goal of life was absolute truth, knowable to man through partial truths. A higher law of duty requires man to seek the final truth fearlessly, actively and selflessly. Nonviolence is the superior ethic enabling man to live the good life but not the goal itself. "The way of peace," Gandhi said, "is the way of truth. Truthfulness is even more important than peacefulness."¹

Gandhi thought that man can affirm the higher values within the social and political order and, in the process, reshape society and the state. According to him, society should be organic and decentralized. For it is the commune which transforms state power into valid authority. His ideas evolved to accept the modern state if it is dedicated to localism, pluralism and service. Sensitive to the need for change, he developed a system of nonviolent direct action to reform society and the state. In general he was hostile or indifferent to Western democratic institutions; nonetheless, the foundations of democracy are strengthened by his concern for civil liberties and an ethical basis of political life.

Gandhi believed that his philosophical beliefs and domestic political ideas apply to world affairs. The dominant theme in his thinking about international relations is expressed by Albert Schweitzer's dictum that "world-view is a product of life-view, and not vice versa."² Most of Gandhi's attention to problems of world affairs dealt with the nature, causes and control of war, the relations between the West and the non-West, and India's role in the world.

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Owing to variety in Gandhi's pacifism and to the impingement of nationalism on his ideals, his views of war require careful study. He condemned the process of war as an evil flowing from its direct or indirect use of coercion and violence. But three patterns are found in his views about the justice of participants in war and about the just results of war. At times he took a rigorously pacifist stand and held that neither contestant in a conflict is just and nothing of value emerges from it. This was clearly his view of nuclear war. On other occasions he maintained that a particular side in a war is just and deserves the moral support of pacifists and non-pacifists alike. Sometimes Gandhi the patriot aided war efforts or restricted his pacifism to himself and to those who believed with him that the violent course of war is untenable; he did this to give secondary help to non-pacifist activities which furthered Indian nationalism.

Gandhi's three views of the nature of war offer, respectively, an absolute pacifism unfortunately devoid of the ideal of justice, a qualified pacifism which wisely retains the concept of justice, and an expedient justification of force for some greater good. Though students of Gandhi's thought can decide for themselves what lessons to draw from his varying views on the nature of war, it is no longer correct to conclude with Reinhold Niebuhr and other critics of absolute pacifism that Gandhi belongs solely in this category. Contrary to what has been said, Gandhi's ideas encompass Max Weber's ethic of responsibility, e.g., "peace—but not at any price," as well as Weber's ethic of intention, e.g., "peace at any price."⁸ For on the problem of war, Gandhi, as a practical nationalist and a thinker who admitted that he moved "from truth to truth," worked his way through a tangle of paradoxes.

As causes of war or threats to peace Gandhi named imperialism, communism and fascism. He specially objected to the economic exploitation, violence and coercion which these ideologies justify, though his analysis of them is not always thorough. It is a contribution to political philosophy that he was willing to forgive men as such since he assumed that they can be convinced of their errors and reclaimed for legitimate purposes.

To prevent war Gandhi esteemed third party intervention to settle disputes after the failure of negotiations by the contestants themselves. His dislike of the Western state system kept him from endorsing traditional customary and positive international law. Otherwise his thought lends welcome support to ideas of natural law holding states accountable to an unwritten code.

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Gandhi endorsed a "nonviolent" association of states as a type of world government for which men should strive. However, as a critic of absolute sovereignty and a dedicated worker for Indian independence, he was in no haste to relinquish his nation's power to a super-state. Gandhi essentially ignored international organization as a means to keep the peace. His few comments on the League of Nations and the United Nations reveal a modicum of support for these bodies, so that his views here are disappointing to proponents of interstate organizations. About disarmament as a way to peace, Gandhi had several suggestions, especially for the major powers. Excessively trustful, he recommended total disarmament without political and technical safeguards to prevent aggression.

Caution marked Gandhi's comments about a world police force. He feared that violence is the same in a righteous as in an unrighteous cause; and he felt that since men are capable of improvement, all men may soon become peaceable. But toward the end of his life he seemed to approve of an impartial world army, and this much is a contribution to world affairs.

As an alternative to military force, he suggested defensive satyagraha as a means to control war by mass sacrifice and noncooperation. He recommended his nonviolent resistance method for a number of interstate conflicts, especially during the Second World War. In the process he was so intent about universalizing his convictions that he failed to remember how much time had been required to train Indians in satyagraha, and even then there were lapses into violence. Also, he extended satyagraha outside of India where it had enlightened opponents to situations where it did not. Those Gandhians who are convinced satyagraha is a replacement for war do not acknowledge that its use between states requires assumptions about the locus of the struggle and the interstate behavior of men and states which are unduly optimistic today. For civil defense in a nuclear age, however, satyagraha may yet be relevant beyond its original time and place.

Gandhi found many uses for the differences between the West and the non-West. Politically, he worked to terminate Western imperialism. He also asked the newly liberated people of Afro-Asia to forgive their past masters. Expanding this idea into a non-Western ideology, he suggested that the East deal with the West on cultural terms rather than on consciously political interests, though the ideology can help to advance these interests.

The penetration of science and technology into the non-West Gandhi resisted for fear that the process would destroy older, desir-

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able values while altering the material conditions of life. Certain features he eventually accepted. In effect his legacy warns against Westernization at the expense of native mores. He worked to diminish the Western monopoly on communication between the Occident and the Orient. And in education he strove to put "bread labor" and primary skills on a par with books. Although he censured racial bias, he viewed the meeting of the colored and the white races with appreciation for the role of autonomy in preserving the cultural integrity of the non-West. His ideas help remove the blight of white racialism on world politics; they also aid moderation and mutual respect in contacts among the great peoples.

Inconsistent with his own mixing of religion and politics, Gandhi criticized the association of institutional religion and state power, particularly when faiths identifiable with the West penetrated the East. As an intellectual counter-move, he proposed the reassertion of his own civilization through neo-Hinduism, implying for international relations a continued confusion between politics and culture.

Gandhi's legacy to his country's foreign relations tends to support the following policies: Aware of its responsibilities to overseas nationals or their descendants, the Indian government would defend them and publicize their disabilities through international channels. Assuming that the redefinition of Commonwealth association in 1949 for India's benefit satisfied the spirit of Gandhi's demand for "partnership" among the United Kingdom and Commonwealth members, India would probably remain within the grouping. Because he opposed the creation of Pakistan and justified his state's retention of Kashmir, India would have firm relations with its Islamic neighbor. Nonetheless, these relations would be fair because of his efforts to foster mutual Hindu-Moslem respect and his deep fund of good faith. Indian foreign policy would reflect considerable economic nationalism as a result of Gandhi's attachment to ideas of self-sufficiency, and the country's economic health would suffer. Furthermore, his thinking lends support to the continuing efforts of his nation to end Portugese holdings in the Indian subcontinent as anachronisms of a former age.

Apart from these problems, on Gandhi's terms India would recognize the subversive means which international communism employs to win its objectives. To the extent that the Indian government heeded his criticism of communism, it would take a less uncommitted stand about the communist, free world split than it did in the first decade of freedom. Certainly India, borrowing from Gandhi's call for his nation's pacifist mission in the world, would have additional reason to ex-

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pound the *Panch Shila* formula of "peaceful coexistence." Generally the Indian government would be on firm ground in crediting Gandhi for his contribution to furthering Indian security, welfare and prestige.

If these, then, are the lessons of Gandhi's international thought, do his ideas have the potential for a theory of world affairs? To answer this it is helpful to compare them to some existing theories about international life.

First of all, Gandhi appreciated the dominant place of war among unsolved world problems and recognized the injustice of direct and indirect aggression. And his thought suggests a decentralized world as a remedy to Soviet-American bipolarity.⁴ Nevertheless he did not consider outstanding political, economic and legal forces operating in the international community. Because of his intellectual make-up and the political and social activities he stressed, he did not, perhaps could not, extend his ideas to master complex questions involving power, wealth and law that underlie both struggle and cooperation in world affairs. He came across these things as he considered other problems, but he did not reach out to comment on them and to develop his answers into a broad theory. This much said, Gandhi deserves a place among the great spokesmen for peace. The proposal by the *Christian Century* in 1934 to award him the Nobel Prize for Peace deserved considerably more serious attention that it received from world opinion.*

Gandhi believed that the world is a humanistic whole, regardless of the fact that it does not possess political, ideological or cultural unity. His humanistic ideas affirm that there is a fundamental bond between all men, and that the progress or devolution in one man's quest for truth affects humanity at large. This interaction stems from the morality of dharma to which all men are accountable, and which gives their life a unifying principle not provided in temporal life. These ideas favor a humanism much like William Ernest Hocking suggests to correct the tendency of men to depend upon dogmatic institutions of science, religion and politics.⁵ Thus Gandhi's legacy "speaks for man," though there is scarcely an ideology, be it secular, Hindu or Marxist, which does not purport to do so. To the Christian humanist, at least, Gandhi's ethic of love whereby most men can for-

* Gandhi commented about the Nobel Prize recommendation: "Do you know of a dreamer who won attention by 'adventitious' aid?" Quoted in *Christian Century*, LXII (Nov. 21, 1945), 1290.

give and forbear, is a welcome assent to St. Paul's fraternal charity.

Appreciative of Gandhi's humanism, the Orientalist Louis Massignon suggests that, as Ruskin's economic ideas were an advance over those of Ricardo, Gandhi's thought provides a remedy to the socio-psychological "tensions" theory of world affairs. Massignon points out, "Not every desire is functional in mankind; we must select the tension towards good, the desire of truth and justice, i.e., satyagraha." The socio-psychological school is probably as alert as Massignon to the need for constructive aspirations of men, the difference between the two being more apparent than real. It would seem that the "tensions" approach to international relations is benefited by Gandhi's emphasis on the interplay between the self-disciplined individual, and the purposefully directed, socially useful group. Here, too, the world can be helped by Gandhi's work for inter-class harmony and social stability. And his call for men to liberate themselves from all types of fear by means of inner resources, and to do so without relinquishing contact with social and political reality, is a gain for the mental climate of the individual engaged with the world.

In the field of intercultural relations Gandhi's thought contributes to a different approach to world affairs. In the first place, he predicted the dangers of rapid acculturation. But he understood that the non-West can be preferred without the need to endorse militant, anti-modern revivalism such as Tilak did in his early public career when he resisted public health efforts against contagion. Begrudgingly or not, Gandhi was wise enough to accept the eventual seepage into the East of the pervasive influences of modern science and technology. And though he did not offer any suggestions for the preservation of cultures other than his own, his concern for the integrity of the Indian civilization implies for the entire non-West the maintenance of differences culturally basic to man's political and social life. Even if Gandhi's objections to Westernization are taken literally, he was, as Martin Buber has said, a critic of good will whom the West should welcome.⁷

Taken together, Gandhi's ideas aid a theory of cultural regionalism dedicated to the peaceful adjustment, but not surrender, of underdeveloped nations to the modern forces of science, materialism and secularism. Such a regional theory is in contrast to one dealing with economic functionalism, political union or military security. His ideas resemble what Filmer S. C. Northrop has called "culturism," the organization of the world for peaceful purposes by admitting deep

differences among civilizations and also by acknowledging cultural complementarity.⁸

The limitations of Gandhi's intercultural ideas can not be escaped. He made cultural dissimilarities serve politics, as shown by his treatment of religion and the East-West language question. His diplomacy of the loin cloth further illustrates how he manipulated cultural symbols for political ends. This merger of politics and culture renders no service to international understanding since the political process takes on issues foreign to its primary function. Men are more likely to agree with one another on parallel lines of culture and politics than on lines which converge. Nor did Gandhi suggest how intracultural, political institutions can guide the non-West from a society of villages to one accommodating modern influences. Finally, as Arnold Toynbee reminds us, Gandhi himself worked against his cultural preferences by his adherence to the Western ideology of nationalism.⁹

Despite these deficiencies, Gandhi's regionalism is a step toward establishing intercultural equilibrium as the optimum relation between the East and the West, and, in the interim, represents a moderately timed acculturation which is about the best hope for the traditional non-West in today's world. In either case, his regional ideas help to remedy cultural domination and conflict.

Beyond established theoretical approaches to international relations Gandhi's thought does not reveal any original plan to explain and anticipate world events and perhaps control their effects. For in the field of world affairs he was not a speculative thinker or a systematic analyst. Consequently, his ideas are not a source of a "new dynamism in world affairs"¹⁰ which delivers international relations from the defects of power politics.¹¹ These appraisals are part of Gandhism that often accurately reflects the thinking of the historical Gandhi, but which at times misinterprets his lessons or overlooks the conditions on which they rested.

Gandhism is well-grounded when the satyagraha resistance method and its demanding ethical discipline are employed by men who do not have full constitutional liberties or social equality, provided these men are in a democratic state or live under Western colonial rule. Thus the bus boycott of 1955-1956 in Montgomery, Alabama, led by Martin Luther King, Jr.,¹² a perceptive student of Gandhi's thought, was in keeping with true Gandhism. So, too, are many of the activities of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), of Vinoba Bhave and his land-gift program, and of some of the pacifists who invoke his direct action ideas to protest nuclear war, e.g., by illegally entering atomic

testing grounds and by "walking for peace." Gandhism, however, sometimes overreaches the source of its inspiration. Though many ideologies expand beyond their seminal thinkers, believers have no indisputable right to claim that the accretions are always faithful to the ideas of the founders. Gandhians speak for themselves and not for Gandhi when they represent him as an unqualified pacifist. This man frequently valued duty, courage and Indian sovereignty more than the absolute purity of means for its own sake.

Gandhi contributed to international relations by giving a non-absolute, dynamic interpretation to nonviolence in which peace is the best, but not the only legitimate way, to reach the good; and by advocating responsible nationalism for India and other states. He did not grasp many crucial issues which must be faced in international politics, devise an effective method to end war, or construct a new theory of international affairs. Rather his ideas lend support to broad conceptions of ethical humanism, socio-psychological harmony, and cultural regionalism, which by different routes seek a just and peaceful world.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. The chief sources for biographical information used in this book are Joseph J. Doke, *Gandhi: An Indian Patriot in South Africa* (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1919); Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950); Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, trans. from the Gujarati by Mahader Desai (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948); Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, trans. from the Gujarati by Valji G. Desai (Stanford: Academic Reprints, 1954); Mohandas K. Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed. Government of India, Vols. I and II (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information, 1958-1959); *Indian Opinion*, 1903-1914; B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958); Henry S. L. Polak, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Man and His Mission* (9th ed. Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1931); Millie G. Polak, *Mr. Gandhi: The Man* (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931); Edmond Privat, *Vie De Gandhi* (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1949); Dinanath G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, 8 vols. (Bombay: Jhaveri & Tendulkar, 1951-1954).

2. In London a tract by Henry S. Salt influenced Gandhi about the benefits of a vegetable diet; Gandhi met Salt, a socialist friend of George Bernard Shaw. Henry S. Salt, *Company I Have Kept* (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930), p. 137.

3. *Collected Works*, I, 24-55.

4. Ian LeMaistre, "Gandhi in London," Part 2, *Envoy*, III (July-Aug. 1958), 15, 27.

5. *Autobiography*, p. 66.

6. For writings by or about Ruskin, or citations of such writings, published in the *Pall Mall Gazette* during Gandhi's London period, consult *The Works of John Ruskin*, eds. Edward T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (London: George Allen, 1905), XXXIV, 615, 617-620, 716; XXXVII, 155-156, 158-159.

7. Ian LeMaistre, "Gandhi in London," *Envoy*, III (Jan.-Feb. 1958), 21. Gandhi mistakenly recorded in his autobiography that he did not join the Theosophical Society; he said that he had not wished to become a member of a religious group because he knew too little about his own faith. *Autobiography*, p. 91. This and other lapses in memory will be challenges to the writer of a definitive biography of Gandhi.

8. Helena P. Blavatsky, *The Key to Theosophy* (London: Theosophical Society, 1889), pp. 3, 39, 305-308.

9. *Autobiography*, p. 91.

10. Sir Edwin Arnold, *The Light of Asia* (Boston: Roberts Bros., 1885).

11. Sir Edwin Arnold, *The Song Celestial* (Boston: Roberts Bros., 1885).

12. *Autobiography*, p. 90.

13. *Collected Works*, I, 53-54.

14. *Ibid.*, I, 105-106, 114-115, 129-130, 168, 301, 320.

15. Leo Tolstoy, *The Novels and Other Writings of Lyof N. Tolstoï*, Vol. XIX, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, trans. from the Russian by Aline Delano (New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), pp. 114-136.

16. The Gandhi-Tolstoy correspondence is found in Kalidas Nag, *Tolstoy and Gandhi* (Patna: Pustak Bhandar, 1950), pp. 59-75. The Gandhi-Tolstoy contact is the meeting of East and West according to Alexandre Kaplan, *Gandhi et Tolstoy* (Nancy: L. Stoquert, 1949). A study which does not appreciate that Gandhi developed a political program as Tolstoy did not is M. I. Markovic, *Tolstoy et Gandhi* (Paris: Libraire Ancienne, 1928).

17. *Collected Works*, I, 87-89.

18. Various currents of this awakening are described by one of its spokesmen in Lajpat Rai, *Young India* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1916).

19. The Indian National Congress dates from 1885. Its development to 1946 with some attention to Gandhi's role can be followed in Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, 2 vols. (Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd., 1946-1947).

20. *Collected Works*, II, 1-52.

21. Gandhi's newspaper cited Socrates as a model for passive resisters. *Indian Opinion*, Nov. 16, 1907. A study of Socrates and Gandhi as opponents of state injustice concludes that their differences are greater than their common ground. V. Larock, "Socrate, Gandhi," *Serta Lèodiensa*, Fasc. 41 (1930), pp. 247-260.

22. *The Works of John Ruskin*, XVII, 17-114.

23. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Ruskin's Unto This Last: A Paraphrase*, trans. from the Gujarati by Valji G. Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951).

24. *Indian Opinion*, Nov. 23, 1907.

25. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1907.

26. *Ibid.*, June 12, 1909.

27. *Young India*, May 7, 1925.

28. *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau*, IV (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), 356-387. On this subject see especially, George Hendrick, "The Influence of Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience' on Gandhi's Satyagraha," *New England Quarterly*, XXIX (Dec. 1956), 462-471. In early 1909 Gandhi also became familiar with some of Ralph Waldo Emerson's ideas about education and self-reliance. See Fischer, *Life*, pp. 91, 93, and George Hendrick, "Emerson and Gandhi," *The Emerson Society Quarterly*, No. 2 (First Quarter, 1956), 7-8.

29. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule* (rev. ed.; Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1939).

30. See Edward Carpenter, *Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure* (3rd ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), a later edition of Gandhi's main source of Carpenter's ideas.

31. *Hind Swaraj*, p. 12, from the *Aryan Path: Special Hind Swaraj Number*, Sept. 1938.

32. *South Africa*, p. 249.

33. Tilak predated Gandhi in urging direct action and revival of traditional Indian culture to oust British rule and Western civilization. Although Gandhi's ideas are closer to those of Tilak, he felt drawn to the moderate Gokhale. *Autobiography*, pp. 220-221.

34. A sympathetic account of the struggle is given in Taraknath Das, "The Progress of the Non-Violent Revolution in India," *Journal of International Relations*, XII (Oct. 1921), 204-214.

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35. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Toward Freedom* (New York: John Day Co., 1941), p. 79. Gandhi's ethical influence on Nehru is considered in Donald E. Smith, *Nehru and Democracy* (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1958), pp. 13-15, 154-157.
36. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 192.
37. Viscount Templewood, *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954), pp. 59-60. Personal and public aspects of Gandhi's London stay are recorded in Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Gandhiji in England*, ed. by the publisher, (Madras: B. C. Paul & Co., 1932); and Muriel Lester, *Entertaining Gandhi* (London: Ivor Nicholson, 1932).
38. *New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1931. On this question, see Glorney Bolton, *The Tragedy of Gandhi* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1934), pp. 259-285.
39. For an account of the sea voyage, consult Edmond Privat, *Aux Indes Avec Gandhi* (rev. ed.; Lausanne: Editions La Concorde, 1948).
40. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, p. 224.
41. Ghanshyam D. Birla, *In the Shadow of the Mahatma* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1953), pp. 223, 241, 272.
42. Gandhi's letter to Roosevelt, July 1, 1942, is reproduced in Fischer, *Life*, pp. 539-540.
43. For the passing of British rule in India, see V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
44. Pakistan's charge against Gandhi is denied in Lord Birdwood, *Two Nations and Kashmir* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1956), pp. 34, 43-45.

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CHAPTER II

1. Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 456-473.
2. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *From Yeravda Mandir: Ashram Observances*, trans. from the Gujarati by Valji G. Desai (3rd ed.; Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1945), pp. 1-4.
3. *Young India*, Dec. 31, 1931; and Romain Rolland, "A Visit from Gandhi," *The Nation*, CXXXIV (Feb. 10, 1932), 167-168.
4. *Hind Swaraj*, p. 71; *Harijan*, Feb. 24, 1946; and *ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1947.
5. John H. Muirhead, in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, ed., *Mahatma Gandhi: Essays and Reflections on His Life and Work* (2nd ed.; London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949), pp. 198-199.
6. Dharendra M. Datta, *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), pp. 9, 22-23, 27-28.
7. *Young India*, May 25, 1921; *ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1926; and *Harijan*, Sept. 16, 1931. A study of Gandhi's premises suggests that his deity is mainly forgiving. See Gopinath Dhawan, *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (2nd ed.; Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951), p. 46. For the view that Gandhi's God has no attributes, see Indra, *Ahimsa-Yoga or Shriman-Mohan-Gita: An Exposition of Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Non-Violence*, trans. from the Sanskrit by Surendra Devi (Lahore: Minerva Book Shop, 1945), p. 81.
8. For Gandhi's views on the subject, see *Hindu Dharma*, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950).
9. The political tradition of *artha* is best known from the amoral policy advice attributed to Kautilya, a prime minister of the Maurya dynasty in about the fourth

century B.C. See *Kautilya's Arthashastra*, trans. from the Sanskrit by R. Shamasastri (Mysore: Wesleyan Mission Press, 1923).

10. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War*, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa, I (3rd ed.; Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), 301, from *Harijan*, July 21, 1940.

11. D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 15.

12. Anant S. Altekar, *Sources of Hindu Dharma in its Socio-Religious Aspects* (Sholapur: Institute of Public Administration, 1953), pp. 56-83; and K. P. Mukerji, *The State* (Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1952), Appendix I, pp. 321-346.

13. For Gandhi's rejections of authoritative interpretation of dharmic literature, see *Young India*, May 21, 1925; and *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1925.

14. Although the Bhagavad Gita can be reasonably interpreted as approving violence in a good cause, Gandhi often credited that epic as a source of his nonviolence idea. See *Young India*, Mar. 12, 1925; and *Non-Violence*, I, 316, from *Harijan*, Aug. 18, 1940. For an analysis of the Bhagavad Gita, consult Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: Pantheon, 1951), pp. 378-409.

15. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *To Pacifists*, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1949), pp. 4-5, from *Harijan*, Mar. 14, 1936.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha*, ed. Bharatan Kumarappa (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951), pp. 132-135, from *Harijan*, Aug. 11, 1920.

18. Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and its Development*, trans. from the German by Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 229-232.

19. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 3, from *Harijan*, Mar. 28, 1946; and *Non-Violence*, II, 104, from *Harijan*, June 23, 1946.

20. *Yeravda Mandir*, p. 2.

21. *Harijan*, May 4, 1940.

22. On the Vedanta and its advaitist or non-dualist philosophy, see Zimmer, pp. 409-463. Gandhi spoke of himself as an advaitist. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 62, from *Young India*, Jan. 21, 1926. But his emphasis on good works to achieve release subordinates the way of intuitive knowledge essential to the advaitist. See Datta, p. 63, for the explanation that Gandhi was an advaitist only by his monistic-like belief in one ultimate reality, while viewing man and God as distinct beings.

23. *Yeravda Mandir*, p. 3.

24. *Harijan*, Sept. 30, 1939.

25. *Young India*, Nov. 5, 1925. For authoritative examples of agreement by students and admirers of Gandhi's thought that he was not a systematic thinker, see John Haynes Holmes, *My Gandhi* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 162; and J. B. Kripalani, *The Gandhian Way* (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1938), pp. 162-183.

26. Gandhi was likened to St. Francis of Assisi by a leading Friend, Rufus M. Jones. See Radhakrishnan, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 161.

27. Mahadev Desai, *Anasaktiyoga: The Gospel of Selfless Action or the Gita According to Gandhi*, trans. from the Gujarati with a commentary by Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), p. 125, 127-128. Gandhi's lesson of ethical action drawn from the Bhagavad Gita is independent of his discovery of non-violence in the same source; the Hindu revivalist Tilak discovered the first, but not the second. See D. Mackenzie Brown, "The Philosophy of Bal Gangadhar Tilak:

Karma vs. Jnana n the Gita Rahasya," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XVIII (Feb. 1958), 203.

28. *Yeravda Mandir*, p. 27.

29. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Christian Missions: Their Place in India*, ed. by the publisher (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1941), p. 272.

30. *Harijan*, Apr. 7, 1946; and *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1946. See also *Young India*, May 21, 1925; and *ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1928.

31. *Young India*, Nov. 27, 1924; *ibid.*, Apr. 24, 1930; *ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1925.

32. *Harijan*, May 5, 1946 and *ibid.*, June 18, 1938.

33. Gandhi's "optimism" about man is compared with Rousseau's romanticized view of humanity in Mariadas Ruthnaswamy, *The Political Philosophy of Mr. Gandhi*, (Madras: Tagore & Co., 1922), pp. 13-17.

34. *Yeravda Mandir*, pp. 1-48.

35. *Young India*, June 16, 1920; and *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1925. Gandhi probably drew his conception of non-masochistic suffering from the ancient Vedic tradition of propitiating sacrifice transformed in the Upanishads so that the ego is made the subject and object of suffering. *Yeravda Mandir*, pp. 53-60. See also Krishnalal Shridharani, *War Without Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939), pp. 171-172. Gandhi, too, was familiar with the life and death of Jesus.

36. In particular, see Camille Drevet, *Pour Connaître la Pensée de Gandhi* (Paris: Bordas, 1946); Romain Rolland, *Mahatma Gandhi*, trans. from the French by Catherine D. Groth, (New York: Century Co., 1924); Richard Gregg, *The Power of Non-Violence* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1934); and Muriel Lester, *My Host the Hindu* (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1931).

37. Tendulkar, IV, 88.

38. *Yeravda Mandir*, pp. 61, 66-67; and Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Economic and Industrial Life and Relations*, ed. V. B. Kher, II (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1957), 64-66, 68-69, from Gandhi's address to the Missionary Conference, Madras, Feb. 14, 1916.

39. *Hind Swaraj*, pp. 24-31, 44-45. See also *Non-Violence*, I, 35, from *Young India*, Sept. 17, 1925; *Harijan*, Aug. 29, 1936; and *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1940.

40. *Hind Swaraj*, p. 27; and Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Young India* (1924-1926) ed. S. Ganesan (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), p. 910, from *Young India*, Apr. 9, 1925; and *Harijan*, July 21, 1940. The Black Age, which began 3102 B.C., will last 432,000 years; it will be followed by the dissolution of the world and a new cycle. Though the chronology absolves the West of responsibility for its errors in India, Gandhi did not do so. For this Indian tradition, see Aurobindo Ghose, *The Spirit and Form of Indian Polity* (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1947), pp. 7-8, 30-32.

41. The village traditions of special interest to Gandhi are described in U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Hindu Political Theories* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1923), esp. pp. 118-120; and Benoy K. Sarkar, "Democratic Ideals and Republican Institutions in India," *The American Political Science Review*, XII (Nov. 1918).

42. Even the autonomy Gandhi valued in Indian village traditions may have been imperfect. In the ancient Indian polity the king could interfere in the communes if they failed to apply their own laws or if they armed without cause. Radhakumud Mookerji, *Local Government in Ancient India*, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1919), p. 229.

43. *Hindu Dharma*, pp. 362, 365, from *Young India*, Oct. 20, 1927, and Nov. 24, 1927.

44. See Mohandas K. Gandhi, *The Removal of Untouchability* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1954).

45. For introducing the idea of "bread labor" to him, Gandhi credited Ruskin, the Bhagavad Gita and through Tolstoy, the writer T. M. Bondaref. *Yeravda Mandir*, pp. 33-37.

46. Kishorlal G. Mashruwala, *Gandhi and Marx* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1951), Appendix II, pp. 106-107, from *Harijan*, Mar. 31, 1946. Indian Marxists so often criticized Gandhi's trusteeship idea that he occasionally defended himself by speaking of private property as a "concession." Nirmal K. Bose, "An Interview with Mahatma Gandhi," *The Modern Review*, LVIII (Oct. 1935), 410-413. Evidence of Gandhi's belief in the ability of the wealthy to act responsibly is found in Kaka Kalelkar, ed., *To A Gandhian Capitalist* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, Ltd., 1951).

47. According to some Gandhians, Bhava is St. Paul to Gandhi's Christ. "Vinoba Bhava Symposium," *Gandhi Marg*, II, (Jan. 1958), 31.

48. S. S. Nehru, "Die Sozialidee in Staate Gandhi's" *Archiv Fur Recht und Sozialphilosophie*, XLIII (Nov. 1, 1957), 9-20.

49. Compare *Hind Swaraj*, pp. 48-49, 77; and Joseph Mazzini, *The Duties of Man and Other Essays* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1936), pp. 7-122. Parallels between Gandhi and Mazzini are drawn in Anthony Elenjittam, "Guiseppe Mazzini and Mahatma Gandhi," *The Modern Review*, XCIV (Oct. 1953), 379-381.

50. *Indian Opinion*, June 27, 1908.

51. *Young India*, July 23, 1925.

52. A comparison of the political implications of dharma and other Indian concepts with Occidental theory is found in Norman D. Palmer, "Indian and Western Political Thought: Coalescence or Clash?" *The American Political Science Review*, XLIX, (Sept. 1955), 747-761.

53. *Young India* (1924-1926), pp. 225-228, from *Young India*, Apr. 17, 1924; and *ibid.*, p. 436, from *Young India*, Dec. 26, 1924.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 233, from *Young India*, May 8, 1924.

55. *South Africa*, p. 317; and *Young India* (1924-1926), p. 865, from *Young India*, Oct. 22, 1925.

56. For example, see Atindrananth Bose, "Gandhi: Man of the Past or Future?" *The Modern Review*, CI (Jan. 1957), 21-23; Dhawan, p. 317; M. P. Mangudkar, "Gandhiji's Contribution to Modern Political Thought," *The Radical Humanist*, XVII (Nov. 15 and 29, 1953), 545-548, and 575-576. An example of Gandhi's anarchism is found in *To Pacifists*, pp. 91-92, from *Harijan*, July 21, 1940. There he wrote that the most desirable state is a nonviolent one, a condition of anarchy, although he admitted humans cannot reach this objective.

57. See for example, Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Freedom's Battle*, ed. G. A. Ganesh (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1921), p. 217; and *Young India*, Nov. 10, 1921.

58. The movement of Gandhi's thought toward collectivist ideas, despite an ebb of decentralization that continued to his death, is demonstrated in Nirmal K. Bose, *Studies in Gandhism* (2nd ed.; Calcutta: Narendra Chatterjee, 1947), pp. 206 ff.

59. Dhawan, p. 331, from *Harijan*, Jan. 2, 1937. Probably Gandhi drew the idea of popular sovereignty from Western political theory. In traditional Indian political thought, sovereignty is attached to the ruler and never passes to the people. H. N. Sinha, *Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity* (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), p. iv.

60. *Economic Life*, I, 126, from *Harijan*, Oct. 25, 1952, based on a 1944 document.

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61. See Jacques Maritain, *The Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 28-53, which takes into account the objections of Laski and MacIver to absolute sovereignty.

62. For example, see *Young India* (1924-1926), p. 472 from *Young India*, Jan. 8, 1925.

63. *Harijan*, Mar. 10, 1940.

64. *Young India*, Apr. 3, 1924.

65. *Harijan*, Dec. 7, 1947.

66. See, for example, Iqbal Srivastava, "Mahatma's Political Ethics," *The Modern Review*, XCI (Feb. 1952), 127-129; and Hans Praeger, "Mahatma Gandhi," *Nord und Süd*, LIII (Apr. 1930), 357-369. One writer describes Gandhi as the most recent prophet the world has known. Madhuri Desai, *Begegnung Mit Gandhi* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1949), p. 135.

67. Barbara Ward, *The Interplay of East and West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1957), p. 72.

68. Bodh Raj Sharma, "Reflections on Parliamentary Government in India," *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, XV (Jan.-Mar. 1954), 16-18.

69. *Harijan*, Mar. 16, 1947.

70. Smith, pp. 154-157.

71. Bishan S. Sharma, *Gandhi as a Political Thinker* (Allahabad: Indian Press, Ltd., 1956), esp. pp. 147-152.

72. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, eds., *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), p. 46.

73. *Harijan*, Jan. 2, 1937.

74. Dhawan, pp. 335-336, 349. See also Shriman N. Agarwal, *Gandhian Constitution for Free India* (Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1946), a proposal for a village-based polity for free India which Gandhi endorsed.

75. See Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 146-188.

76. *South Africa*, p. 109.

77. *Harijan*, May 4, 1940.

78. Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-Violent Coercion* (New York: Century Co., 1923), p. 396.

79. Maritain, pp. 68-71.

80. *Indian Opinion*, May 21, 1910.

81. *To Pacifists*, p. 97, from *Harijan*, Mar. 31, 1946.

82. Government of India, *Gandhian Outlook and Techniques: Proceedings of the Seminar on the Contribution of Gandhian Outlook and Techniques to the Solution of Tensions Between and Within Nations* (New Delhi: Ministry of Education, 1953), p. 15.

83. *Satyagraha*, p. 178, from *Young India*, Apr. 24, 1924; and *ibid.*, p. 382, from *Harijan*, Mar. 31, 1946.

84. *Harijan*, Apr. 15, 1939.

85. Haridas T. Muzumdar, "Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Soul Force," *The Modern Review*, XCIX (Feb. 1956), 108.

86. *Gandhian Outlook*, p. 338.

87. Quoted in *Proceedings of the Second Session of the Round Table Conference on India*, Cmd. 3997, *House of Commons Sessional Papers, 1931-1932*, Vol. VIII, 393.

88. *Indian Opinion*, July 29, 1914.

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89. Satyagraha is not needed in an effective democracy, according to A. B. Shah, "Satyagraha and Democracy," *Quest II* (Oct.-Nov., 1956), 12-13. Sharma, *Political Thinker*, p. 88, argues that non-cooperation aims at ultimate cooperation with the state and presumably is self-liquidating in a true democracy. See also T. Andhyarujina, "Satyagraha and Democracy," *Quest II* (Dec. 1956-Jan. 1957), 39-43.
90. *Indian Opinion*, Oct. 24, 1906.
91. *Hind Swaraj*, pp. 122-123.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
93. *Young India: 1924-1926*, p. 345, from *Young India*, July 3, 1924.
94. *Non-Violence*, II, 393, from *Harijan*, Feb. 15, 1948.
95. *Harijan*, July 28, 1946.
96. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1940.
97. Nehru, *Toward Freedom*, pp. 189-191.
98. J. J. Suda, "The Gandhian Concept of Democracy and Freedom," *Gandhian Concept of State*, ed. Biman Bihari Majumdar (Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar & Sons Private, Ltd. for Bihar University, 1957), p. 111.
99. See Ernest Barker's comments in Radhakrishnan, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 61.
100. Compare George Orwell, "Reflections on Gandhi," *Partisan Review*, XVI (Jan. 1949).

CHAPTER III

1. Pyarelal Nair, *Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase*, I (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1956), 411.
2. For unconditional Western pacifism, see Guy F. Herschberger, *War, Peace and Nonresistance* (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 1944); and Abraham J. Muste, *Non-Violence in an Aggressive World* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1940).
3. The application of dharma to states is discussed in Sekharipurma V. Viswanatha, *International Law in Ancient India* (Bombay: Longman's Green & Co., 1925), pp. 9-11.
4. George Catlin, *In the Path of Mahatma Gandhi* (Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1950), p. 281.
5. *Young India*, Mar. 2, 1928; and *Harijan*, Nov. 5, 1938. A similar pacifist approach in the West is found in Louis Corman, *La Non-Violence* (Paris: Delamain & Bontelleau, 1949), p. 9.
6. *Satyagraha*, p. 382.
7. Tendulkar, I, 129-131. On Gandhi's preference for a rural, decentralized Eastern society, see S. Abid Husain, *The Way of Gandhi and Nehru* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959), esp. pp. 44 ff., 149-151.
8. See M. Yamunacharya, "The Hindu Theory of International Relations as Expounded in Kamandaka's Nitisara," *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, III (Apr.-June 1943), 127-128. For Kautilya's ideas, see in particular, Narendra Nath Law, *Inter-State Relations in Ancient India, Part I* (Calcutta: Luzac & Co., 1920); and Benoy K. Sarkar, "Hindu Theory of International Relations," *The American Political Science Review*, XIII (Aug. 1919), 400-414.
9. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," in C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall, eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Political Thought* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 450.

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Kautilya's ideas,
Political

, 1956), p.

10. Nair, *Last Phase*, I, 192.
11. *Indian Opinion*, Feb. 18, 1904; *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1905; *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1905; and *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1905.
12. *Ibid.*, May 12, 1906.
13. From the original, English preface to *Hind Swaraj*, published in *Indian Opinion*, Apr. 2, 1910.
14. *Indian Opinion*, Sept. 16, 1914.
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