

The Republic of Plato, With an introd., notes and the argument of the dialogue by G.H. Wells.

Plato.

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


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THE REPUBLIC

OF

PLATO

BOOKS I. AND II.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND THE
ARGUMENT OF THE DIALOGUE

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THE present text is that of C. F. HERMANN, with the exception of STALLBAUM's conjecture, ἐμποίῃσας for ἐμποίῃσαι, p. 333 E.



THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. 'The finest of human intellects, exercising boundless control over the finest of human language.' If these words, in which Plato's genius has been described, are to be taken, not as the language of misguided enthusiasm, but as the verdict of competent criticism, we may well pause, in approaching the *Republic*, in order to attempt to grasp the situation, philosophical and political, that produced the masterpiece of Greek literary effort which lies before us.

After the storm comes the calm. The Peloponnesian War was over; Athens had passed through the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred, and through the tyranny of the Thirty; Socrates and Plato, amongst their fellow-citizens of Athens, had looked upon the destruction of their city's walls, the walls which had made Athens what she was; public irritation and private resentment had cut short Socrates' few remaining years of life—he was more than seventy years of age at the time of his impeachment—when Plato relinquished that promiscuous intercourse with all classes of citizens, which he had practised as Socrates' companion, for the private study of philosophy. He made the *Academeia*, a gymnasium lying on the north-east side of Athens, his

B

home; whence, without passing through the city,¹ he could reach the Lyceum, another gymnasium on the north-west, which had been Socrates' favourite haunt (τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ διατριβάς, *Euthyphro, init.*); and in the Academia he delivered the results of his philosophical inquiries to all those who came to hear him.

In the intervals of his systematic studies, his mind continually reverting to the friend and master whom he had made the companion of his life, he poured forth a continuous series of biographical sketches, in which he treated all those ethical questions which engaged attention at the time, in relation to Socrates' life and Socrates' opinions with regard to them. It was a labour of love, demanding systematic work and careful elaboration, and could never have been carried out without an absorbing interest in the character of the man who is the hero of these Dialogues.

In the *Republic* of Plato, the completest and most elaborate of all his Dialogues, we find ourselves at a new point of departure in Greek philosophical thought.

The first philosophers were the Ionian physicists, such as Thales and Anaximenes, with whose systems Socrates had little or no sympathy. Next came Pythagoras, who thought that number was the essence of all things, a belief which must have swayed Plato's dictum in *Republic*, Book VI., page 546 C, viz. that disregard of a certain 'perfect number' (ἀριθμὸς τέλειος) is fatal to the existence of a good city. Reference to Pythagoras' teaching is also found on pages 600 B and 530 D.

But although this philosopher exerted no small influence over Plato's fancies, we must pass to the Eleatic

¹ See *Lysis, init.* ἔπορευόμεν μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας εὐθὺς Λυκείου τὴν ἕξω τείχους ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τείχος.

school to trace the origin both of Socrates' method and of Plato's philosophical system.

Socrates' method was that of the Eleatic Zeno, who is styled by Aristotle the father and founder of dialectic; it was principally a negative method, i.e. it tended towards the destruction of error and the testing of facts. This method Socrates' shared with the Sophists, a number of men professing to teach ethic, some of whom had applied this Eleatic method of criticism to all relations of life with a corrupting and subversive effect that had roused the indignation of orthodox and constitutional Athenians.

Passing on from the method to the system, we find that the Eleatic school held the belief that the world of sense, that is, tangible objects, did not really exist. This is in direct agreement with the system of philosophy which Plato constructs in Books VI. and VII. of the *Republic*¹; where objects of sight and touch (*φαινόμενα*) are stated to be three times removed from their Real Originals, of which they are emanations.

Independently of this negative, or Eleatic belief, Plato's philosophy also had its positive side; it recognised as the origin of all being certain forms (*εἶδη*) cognisable only by pure reason (*Νοῦς*). *Λόγος τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη*, page 511 C. In this belief we see the influence of Anaxagoras, a philosopher who was driven from Athens, B.C. 432, who spoke of *νοῦς*, or Intelligence, as the designing and arranging principle of the universe.² Since the expulsion of Anaxagoras, positive philosophy had held no place in Athens. As a substitute for it the lectures of Sophists had engaged public attention and

¹ See abstract of the Dialogue, *libb. cilt.*

² See Aristotle, *Metaph.* i. 3.

had fostered private inquiry. The Sophists' lectures, like their method, were rather critical than positive: the Sophists did not contribute to general knowledge; they proved the fallacy of this question or that, and those of them who were inclined to rhetoric, taught the art of persuasion. But Plato, following upon hints dropped by Socrates, and not merely reproducing the words of his teacher, struck out again into the path of constructive philosophy. Whilst he shows us in his Dialogues that no one appreciated the Socratic and Sophistic method, or ἔλεγχος, better than himself, it is in the *Republic*, beyond the other Dialogues, that he demands, under the characters of the sons of Ariston, a positive and coherent account of Justice, of Being, and of God. Whilst therefore sharing in the general tendency of Eleatic thought, Plato must be regarded as having developed and elaborated the main tenet of Anaxagoras' philosophy.

With this brief account of the conditions which furnished the occasion and the speculative direction of the *Republic*, we proceed to inquire into what divisions the Dialogue naturally falls.

§ 2. Setting aside the division into books, at once arbitrary, and, as in the case of Books II. and III., incorrect, we find that, speaking very generally, there are three main divisions of the Dialogue.

I. There is the preface, or, as Socrates calls it (page 357 C), the προοίμιον, which lasts from the beginning of the work to the end of the first book, and is carried on to page 367 E, that is, rather less than half Book II. This first part is occupied with a refutation of popular and Sophistical definitions of, and opinions concerning, justice, and with an elaborate statement of

Socrates
teacher
of
Plato

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the advantages of injustice, given as a challenge to Socrates by the two sons of Ariston.

II. In the second division of the Dialogue we have a defence of Justice given at length by Socrates, who finds it necessary to put the growth of an imaginary city before the minds of his hearers (*εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ*, page 369 A), in order to discover the growth of Justice in that city, and to transfer it analogically to the mind of individual man. The description of the origin, the life, the requirements of this State, and the education of its members, together with sundry *ἀπορίαι*, *i.e.* difficulties, put forward and discussed, occupy the remainder of Book II. and the whole of Books III.—V. inclusive. But in Book V. the Dialogue is beginning to assume a more analytical and esoteric phase. Socrates has already thrown out a hint of this: he has already admitted that his State and his Justice hitherto described are accommodated to popular comprehension: *καὶ εὖ γ' ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων, οἷσιν νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα.* page 435 D.

III. Now, however, as the last *ἀπορία*, *viz.* 'The ruler of the State must be a philosopher,' is proposed, and to some extent settled, Socrates suggests that the thorough and complete solution of the whole of this point would be quite sufficient to set the main inquiry at rest, without entering upon other points connected with it: *ἔμοι γ' οὖν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι, εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ρηθῆναι καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατψέσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου* (Book VI. *init.*). And this, on the whole, is the purport of the rest of the Dialogue, *i.e.* Book VI. to X. *fin.* This part starts with a study of the philosophic nature, gives the education

necessary for its development, propounds and accommodates to the philosophic nature the theory of 'Ιδέαι, and with a digression upon the various degenerated forms of the perfect State, comes to an end in an account of the rewards that follow upon a life lived according to philosophy and justice.

To sum up, then, there are three parts into which the *Republic* may be divided. First, the prelude; secondly, the discovery of Justice through the creation of an Ideal State; thirdly, the elaboration and idealization of this State through a carefully worked out system of philosophy.

This division has been called a rough one; we proceed to give a more detailed view of the structure of the work.

I. The first part, or preface, may conveniently be kept, viz. Book I. *init.*—Book II. page 367 E.

II. Next we have the creation of a State, and the nature of Justice as found in it, pages 367 E—435 A.

III. Transference of Political Justice to man by analogy, pages 435 A—449 B.

IV. Three ἀπορίαι, or τρικυμῖαι, arising out of the question, 'How is the State to be managed?' pages 449 B—505 A.

V. Philosophical system of 'Ιδέαι, or Real Existence, pages 505 A—541 B.

VI. Different forms of degeneration from the Ideal State, and the types of man corresponding to them, pages 543 B—579 C.

VII. Comparison between the just and unjust man; and their respective rewards, 579 C—*fin.*

§ 3. Following upon the first division of the Dialogue, the question demands attention—How far is the Republic a constructive dialogue? With a few exceptions, such as the *Apology*, and perhaps the *Cratylus*, which Professor Jowett looks upon as of a neutral stamp, Plato's Dialogues may be divided into two kinds: positive and constructive, and negative and destructive; *i.e.* those which try to prove, and those which try to disprove, some position or positions. Of the former the *Phaedo*, *Crito*, *Symposium*, and *Phaedrus* may be taken as examples; of the latter the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, and *Meno*. The Dialogue before us is compound, *i.e.* it partakes of both kinds. In the first division of the book, viz. *init.*—367 E, Socrates is avowedly trying to disprove, and not to prove. He first destroys that definition of justice which is attributed to Simonides or Homer, or some other wise man; see 335 E, *Μαχούμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, κοινῇ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ* (sc. this definition of justice) *φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέαι.* He next combats at length a definition given by the inferior Sophist of the day, and shows that it is incorrect, see 352, *seqq.*; and, when he has twice shown the falsity of existing opinions on the question, 'What is Justice?' he openly confesses that he himself knows nothing at all of its true nature; see 354 B: *πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὔρειν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφέμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμησαί ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία, εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ . . . ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι.*

So far in the Dialogue we have nothing of constructive import, with the exception of a few points by means of which Socrates overcomes Thrasymachus' position, which will be noticed in the text. And in the beginning of

Book II. we merely encounter a re-statement of Thrasymachus' position and an elaboration of his arguments; with which re-statement the first part of the *Republic* is held to conclude.

The earnest challenge of the sons of Ariston, *πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκον* (Book II. *init.*), has roused Socrates to an unusual effort, which he veils, as always, under the pretence of incapacity. He begins, not to tell them what Justice is, but to ask them to try with him if they cannot find a larger organism than the human soul wherein Justice dwells, and so to overcome the difficulty. 'Let us,' he says, 'construct a State, and find where Justice dwells in the State' (page 369 A). The word *γυγνομένην* here shows that we now have something to look for from Socrates himself,—that he has for the time renounced the destruction of error, and is entering upon the construction of a truth.

This constructive character the Dialogue maintains to its end. For the construction of a State is found to involve the construction of a complete system of education for all classes, and out of this system, again, there arises the necessity for constructing another and a more esoteric system of education for the upper class, and this involves the complete elaboration of a philosophical system. And besides these two systems of education and this system of philosophy which are contained in the *Republic*, we have a great deal of information and suggestion upon various other subjects conveyed to us by the way; for the Dialogue, although it has its unity, is far-reaching and discursive.

It must therefore be apparent to any one at all

familiar with the negative character of Platonic writing, what a valuable link in the chain of Greek thought lies before us in the *Republic*. ~~Two complete systems of education and one of philosophy, a treatise upon the interdependence of classes in a State, trade, medicine, poetry, political economy, religion, the position of woman, death, slavery, the relation between mind and body, music, courage, temperance, science, immortality, all different systems of government, love, war, the stage, revolution, such, and many more questions of minor interest, do we find treated, in many cases with great care and elaboration, in this unique and universal Dialogue.~~

§ 4. We next come to inquire if it is possible from internal evidence to discover the motives that induced Plato to compose this Dialogue?

There can be little doubt that, amongst other motives, Plato approached the composition of the *Republic* with the intention of vindicating Socrates' life and opinions. It is an *Apologia pro vita ejus*. It may be replied to this that nearly all Plato's Dialogues partake, more or less, of this intention; and the reply would be true. Plato, we can see, had an unbounded veneration for the protagonist of his Dialogues as a man, as a philosopher, and as a dialectician. He must have experienced the bitterest grief at Socrates' death, and must have devoted a great part of his life to storing up, in these vivid dialectical portraits, reminiscences of his guide, philosopher, and friend. Now the Dialogue before us is at once the longest, with the exception of the *Laws*, and by far the most wide-reaching in the subjects of which it treats. (These subjects have been briefly summarized above.) It is, in fact, Plato's greatest effort. We expect, then, in

Plato's greatest effort to find the completest and the best account of Socrates' life and opinions. Those who look in Plato for anecdotes about Socrates will be disappointed, and must turn to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. Plato does not deal in anecdotes. He never fell into what the author of *Vivian Grey* called his anecdotage. He is too much of an artist to endeavour to depict a man solely by what he did; he gives us the true account of his character by showing what he would have said and done under certain circumstances.

If we view Plato and Xenophon in their respective ways of treating the character of Socrates, we find that Plato's manner is romantic or poetic, whilst Xenophon's is matter-of-fact; that there is, in fact, the same distinction between them which Aristotle draws between poetry and history. He says, 'There is this difference between the historian and the poet: the former tells us what has happened, the latter what would happen. For poetry is concerned with the general, and history with the particular.'¹ Plato has clearly laid down for us the general lines of Socrates' character, as well as Xenophon; but he has done so by means of giving us a broad and a coherent account of the principles which formed his character.

Plato himself would have been loth to hear himself termed a poet; he condemns most poets and their poetry, and drives them from his Ideal State²; he even depreciates Homer,³ although his endless quotations show

¹ See *Poetic*. ix. 1451 b, τούτω διαφέρει τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποιήσις ἱστορίας ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

² See p. 398.

³ See Book X. *in*i. 602, C.

how he read and admired him ; but he was a poet in this, the real, sense, of which Aristotle speaks. He tells us what were and also what would have been Socrates' opinions.

Plato, then, was a poet in this respect ; but it does not follow, as a writer supposes in his preface to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (Oxford Ed.), that Plato's portrait of Socrates given us in the Dialogues is an idealization. To us the otherwise marvellous consistency of the character renders this an impossibility, especially in regard of Socrates' religious professions, his method of dialectic, his humour, and, a point difficult of illustration, but of the greatest weight, his manner.

To place before his readers a complete account of Socrates, his beliefs, his method, and his character, is the general object of Plato's *Republic*. But there is another object which Plato had in view, bearing no direct reference to Socrates, viz. the presentation of an Ideal State ; and this object is to be explained by the absorbing interest felt by every Greek in the politics of a free city, the love of a Republic and the hatred of a Despotism. Each citizen of a Greek city had his political opinions, and no doubt each citizen had his political hobby. Putting together this philo-political feeling, and a further one, viz., the love of one's own creations, upon which Plato himself insists,¹ we may feel certain that the work grew under his hands, and that the gratification of watching his city's growth urged the maker of the city to further efforts than he at first intended.

¹ οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτὰ. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἐγαπῶσι...
p. 330, C.

Again: Plato's *Republic* is evidently a work of art, the work of a mind bent on a complete and beautiful creation. The definition of such a work is laid down by Aristotle in his *Poetic* (1450 *fn.*) in these terms, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν. And he also states that the magnitude of the work must be in proportion to its importance: μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν. If we allow that the principles of artistic construction are correct, and if we grant that Plato considered justice to be a subject demanding the most lengthy and detailed treatment, and the most elaborate development from popular to scientific definition, we may at the same time gather that he looked upon it as a theme specially susceptible of artistic treatment, from various points of beauty which distinguish the Dialogue. We do not here speak of such points of beauty as the simplicity of the style and the lucidity of the argument: they are natural to the writer, and inseparable from his style.¹ We speak rather of conscious and exceptional efforts to adorn his work. Such an effort results in the elaborate sketching of character which presents to us the admirable portraits, among others, of the violent Thrasymachus and the sincere yet sceptical Glaucon. Another such effort relieves the monotony of constructive dialogue, whilst it illustrates the text of the speaker, by the introduction of short romances, fables, and allegories. Such are the story of Gyges and his ring in Book II., the allegories of the cave in Book VII.,

¹ To the simplicity and lucidity of Plato's writing John Sterling bears witness. See Carlyle's *Life of John Sterling*, Library Edition, p. 139, 1870: 'For philosophic inquiry and truths of awful preciousness, I would select as my personages and interlocutors beings with whose language and "whereabouts" my readers would be familiar. Thus did Plato in his Dialogues.'

and of the ship's captain in Book VI., and the narrative of Er concerning the after life in Book X.

Theognis wrote—

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ἰγυαίνειν
Ἦδιστον δὲ τυχεῖν ὧν τις ἕκαστος ἐρᾷ,

where it is noticeable that Justice (the theme of the *Republic*) is placed first amongst human blessings, and described as 'the fairest'; and Plato in his Dialogue concerning Justice felt with Theognis that it was a subject which called for the decoration of the artist as well as the research of the philosopher.

Another and a more special motive makes itself apparent here and there in the Dialogue, viz., the desire to rebut specific charges against Socrates, and especially to answer those brought against him in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes¹ and the indictment of Anytus. We know that the latter was expressed in the words: Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἱερα δὲ καὶ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεοὺς διαφθείρων.

To take the latter charge first: we find a distinct statement as to the corruption of young men, in Book VI. 492 A. ἧ καὶ σὺ ἡγᾷ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νεοὺς, . . . ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους εἶναι σοφιστάς; Here he denies that corruption of a class can be effected by individuals, and asserts that society and its depraved

¹ In *Rep.* p. 583, B, we meet this expression, after two proofs have been given of the superiority of justice to injustice, *δὲς γε νικηκῶς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον*. This expression cannot fail to recall at once the episode of the word-battle between the *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος λόγος* in the *Clouds*; and if we add the other points of coincidence between the two works, we shall not fail to conclude that Plato wrote with distinct reference to that comedy of Aristophanes.

taste is the real corrupter. Thus he answers the latter count of Anytus' indictment and the whole plot of Aristophanes' play. Of the charge of impiety we must speak more in detail, because we have to gather, not from a single passage, but from many scattered up and down in the Dialogue, Plato's opinion as to this charge against Socrates. In the *Clouds* Socrates is represented as repudiating the existence of the gods—

Ποῖος Ζεὺς ; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις· οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεὺς.

l. 367—

just as he is charged in Anytus' indictment ; and he is also represented, *καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων* (in Anytus' words), by Aristophanes in the same play.

ΣΤ. ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτὰς οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥστε φέρεσθαι ;

ΣΩ. ἤκιστ' ἀλλ' αἰθέριος Δῖνος.

ll. 379, 80.

How does Plato answer these charges? In the first place he represents the Socrates of the *Republic* as eminently orthodox in religious belief and religious observance. When Socrates comes to these subjects in the course of founding his city, he remarks that to Apollo of Delphi must be left the greatest, the best, and the first legislation, τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα καὶ πρῶτα τῶν νομοθετημάτων . . . ἱερῶν τε ἰδρύσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἥρώων θεραπείαι, p. 427 B. This is the teacher who was accused of disregarding the gods of his country ! For, be it noted, it is to Apollo,¹ Θεὸς πατρῶος of Attica, and not to Zeus, that Socrates refers questions of religion, a course that should satisfy the most fasti-

¹ v. *Euthydemus*, 302, C fin. Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνος γένεσιν.

dious of Athenian ritualists. And this is not a solitary instance of his orthodoxy.¹ We find on page 461 E, that the family regulations of the State are to depend upon a system of lots subject to the consent of the Pythia, *ἐὰν ὁ κλήρος ταύτη ξυμπίπτῃ καὶ ἡ Πυθία προσαναιρῇ*.²

In the next place Socrates in the *Republic* is represented as removing from the gods all those charges of cruelty and lust which legend had attached to them³; thus on page 377 E *σεqq.* *ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐπέυσαστο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἃ φησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὐτὸν Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν. τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὦμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι.* And in the same passage he states his disbelief in quarrels between the gods, the stories of Hera being bound by her son,⁴ of Hephæstus being thrown out of heaven by his father, and so forth.⁵

¹ Xenophon bears strong and direct testimony to the falsity of the charge of heresy against Socrates in *Mem.* 1, 2, *fin.* *Πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ; δεῖ ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ γέγραπτο, φανερός ἦν θεραπέων τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.* And *v.* also on this point, chap. iii. 1-4, and iv. *ad fin.*

² Cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 3, *init.* *τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φανερός ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἥπερ ἡ Πυθία ὑποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ περὶ θυσίας ἢ περὶ προγόνων θεραπέας ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τοιοῦτων· ἢ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμφ πόλεως ἀναγεῖ ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, Σωκράτης τε οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρῆνει.*

³ The rejection of popular legend about the gods caused the cry to be raised that Socrates did not believe in the gods themselves.

⁴ A confirmation of this hypothesis, that Plato is writing with the express purpose of vindicating Socrates' teaching from accusations brought against it, is afforded by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*, 1, 2, 49; where he expressly mentions that Socrates was accused of inciting youths to 'bind,' *i.e.* imprison their fathers, an accusation which this present passage of the *Republic* would answer: *'Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πάτερας προηπλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε ... Φάσκων κατὰ νόμον ἐξεῖναι παρανομίας ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πάτερα δῆσαι.*

⁵ For an explanation of this inconsistency, *viz.* the belief in

Thirdly, Socrates lays down in plain language the terms of his religious belief, his creed. The God in whom he believes is one, and eternal, and true¹; and knows the just from the unjust.²

God cannot harm any being, because he is good himself, and therefore cannot make anything bad: on the contrary, he is the author of all good to mankind, page 379 D. τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλοι αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅπτα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἷτια, ἄλλο οὐ τὸν θεόν. All his works are for the best, page 530, A. νομιεῖν μὲν, ὡς οἰόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ξυνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. And one more point in support of Socrates' orthodoxy may be added: that the occasion itself of this Dialogue arises on the return of Socrates from a religious observance, προσευξόμενος τῷ θεῷ, whither he had been, like any other good citizen.

It would be a great mistake to suppose that Socrates was an irreligious man or an atheist. On the contrary, and in accordance with what has been said above, Xenophon bears witness that Socrates' belief in divine supervision of earthly life amounted almost to superstition. His words are (*Mem.* 1, 3, 4), 'And if Socrates thought that he had any intimation from the gods, he would have been less likely to disobey it than to take a blind guide in a journey instead of one who could see. And he used to speak in severe terms of those who prefer the blind counsel of men

good and beneficent gods existing side by side with a number of immoral and revolting tales concerning them, see Sir G. W. Cox, *Aryan Mythology*, Book I. chap. vi. ed. 1870; also chap. iv. p. 66.

¹ 382, E.

² 612, E. θεοῦ γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶδός ἐστιν.

to warnings from the gods.'¹ With this religious feeling is associated the *δαιμόνιον*, or actual supernatural check, which, so he devoutly believed, prevented him from entering upon a wrong course of action. *ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει, πρότρέπει δὲ οὐποτε.*² And this belief no doubt partly accounted for that clause in the indictment of Anytus, *καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων.*³ But we cannot help asking, if Socrates' religious teaching was as pure as it is represented by Plato, and it is hard to believe otherwise, how are we to account for the charge, *οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων*, in the face of such testimony as we possess to Socrates' regular observance of religious forms? We can only say that the original worship of Zeus, the mighty king who dispenses justice to gods and men, had become totally corrupted, that legend had come to be regarded as the essence instead of the accidents or accretions of religion, and that belief in legend was jealously demanded by ultra-orthodox Athenians from any one who practised as a teacher.

At the same time it must be remembered that the anti-Socratic agitation took its rise in political animosity; the indictment, like the scorpion, bore the sting in its tail: *διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους.* Alcibiades and Critias were no doubt the *νέοι*, who had attracted the special attention of the accuser: they were more or less responsible for their country's ruin, and in their excesses we see the more immediate cause of Socrates' indictment. The first count, viz. that of heresy, arose from an

¹ See also Socrates' remonstrances with Aristodemus the Little, a man who habitually disregarded sacrifice, consultation with oracles, and other religious duties.—*Mem.* 1, 4.

² See however *Xen. Mem.* 4, 3, 12, where it is hinted that the *δαιμόνιον* initiated action. *εἴ γε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι* (sc. θεοὶ) *ὀπίσσω προσημαίνουσί σοι ἄ τε χρῆ ποιεῖν ἄ τε μή.*

³ For the *δαιμόνιον*, v. *Euthydemus*, 272 E.

ignorance of facts, the second from a confusion of causes.

§ 5. Another interesting question meets us as we follow Socrates' creation of his State, viz. How far Plato thought it possible to realize such a State and such a life? That this question had engaged Plato's own attention we can be sure. Not once nor twice do the hearers interpose with the question, 'But, Socrates, is such a state of things possible?' See page 471 C. 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέποτε μνηθῆσεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρωσάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἶρηκας, τὸ ὡς δυνατὴ αὐτῇ ἢ πολιτεία γείεσθαι καὶ τίνα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατῇ' *et infra* E, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἤδη περὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατόν καὶ ἢ δυνατόν. Socrates' reply to this challenge is characteristic. 'You swoop down upon me and my argument just as I was coming to the most difficult part of it. Now we are inquiring what Justice and the just man are: very good: we are, in other words, trying to find the model, or pattern, or canon, to which we can apply individual cases, judge of their merits, and so build up our own definition of Justice.' We never started with the idea of proving that such things can be. No! a painter may be able to paint a most beautiful figure, and yet it will not follow that such a figure has ever existed, or does, or will exist. But such a figure is none the less beautiful, it is none the less useful; for it serves as an ideal towards which painters may direct their efforts.' In this answer Socrates parries the question: he has not sufficiently unfolded his scheme, nor sufficiently prepared the minds of his hearers to approach such a question.

But in the third *τρικνημία* (473 D), that is, the statement that evil and trouble will never cease till kings

are philosophers and philosophers kings, Socrates has delivered his mind, and he adds, 'Until this is so, our State will never come to be a possibility (*φύη εἰς τὸ δυνατόν*) and see the light of the sun.' The further question at once arises, 'What does Socrates mean by kings being philosophers, and philosophers kings?' The answer to it is found in the conclusion of Book V. and in Book VI. Briefly, he means by philosophers those men who are gifted with a strong will, that can master the desires of the body (*λογιστικοί*), and a clear head that can discriminate real from false (*φιλοσοφίας ἐρωτικοί*).¹ Even in this place he does not distinctly commit himself to the statement that such a city is actually to be realized; he only mentions here a necessary condition for its realization, which he repeats in slightly different terms in 499 B., *οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλειος πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλλῃ πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοοι γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων νίεσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τινος θείας ἐπινοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρωσ ἐμπέσῃ.* 'Until philosophers are compelled to govern the State, or kings receive, through some divine afflatus, a real love of real philosophy, our city can never exist.' And he adds, as before, 'And whether either or both of these conditions can be realized, I maintain is a question wide of the mark.' But let us see what follows;—'Now if in some bygone age, or at the present time in some foreign country far from our ken, or in the future, it happens that men of a truly philosophic nature be

¹ A succinct definition of 'philosopher' is given in 484, B. *φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι.*

found managing the State, I am ready to maintain in argument that the city we speak of has, or is, or will be realized. We confess the difficulty of the thing, but we deny that it is an impossibility. Χαλεπὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ καλά.' Here then we have at least Plato's, and probably Socrates' opinion, clearly laid down, that the State he speaks of is not merely Utopian. By the side of this passage such a remark as 'I forgot that we were not in earnest' (page 536 C, ἐπελαθόμεν ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν¹) may be dismissed as not affecting the question, as being a *façon de parler* on the part of Socrates. And if further confirmation be needed, we may turn to the end of Book VI., where Socrates appeals to Glaucon to allow that his State is not all cloudland, μὴ παντάπασις ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, that it is difficult to realize, but not impossible. Glaucon however is not convinced; on the contrary, he expresses farther on in the Dialogue (Book IX. *fin.* 592 B) his opinion that the State only exists in the Dialogue, and not in the world, πόλει τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. To which Socrates repeats his original answer, 'Whether such a city exist or not, it matters little; but we have it in heaven as an ideal towards which we can strive.'

Such is the internal evidence of the *Republic* with regard to Plato's belief in the possibility of his State. This evidence we leave to the reader, first adding a few remarks upon the different conditions of political existence at the time this Dialogue was written, conditions which materially affect the question as to the possibility of the existence of such a State. These conditions may be gathered into two heads:—

(First, the great pliability at that period of a mass

¹ It is perfectly true that Socrates 'was in jest,' but he was also in earnest. Ἐπαιξεν ἕμα σπουδάζων, *v. infr.*

of people or material from which the State was organized.

(Secondly, the small extent of the material.)

The second point may be dismissed in a few words. Aristotle in his *Ethics* (9, 10, 3) lays down that the limits of a State must be more than ten citizens and less than 100,000: οὔτε ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων. Plato, it is true, mentions four or five as the least possible number that could compose a State, but he is speaking only of its origin, not of its complete form: see page 369 E. Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἀναγκασιότατη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. According to Ctesicles, at a census of the population of Attica taken under Demetrius Phalareus, the number of free burghers was 20,000, 10,000 μέτοικοι, and 400,000 slaves. And the frequency with which whole communities migrated or were transplanted in Greek history will serve to show that Aristotle's 100,000 is an extreme limit towards which the average πόλις did not nearly approach. To take a few examples of this fact, and omitting mention of the numerous parties of κληροῦχοι or colonists continually leaving Hellas, as being rather off-shoots than transplantations, we may call to mind the several movements of the Thereans under Battus, of which Herodotus speaks (see Book IV. 155, *seqq.*); or the exodus *en masse* of the Phocaeans, who are said to have sunk a stone in their harbour as a pledge of eternal exile; or the sudden transplantation of citizens from forty districts to the newly-founded town of Megalopolis in Arcadia by Epaminondas.¹ And this ease of manipulation could only be afforded by comparatively small numbers.

¹ Similar instances in ancient history are afforded by the removal of the Jewish nation to Babylon, and the deportation of the Cilician pirates to Soli by Pompey.

With regard to the former point, viz., the g^{ra}pliability of these bodies of men, it must be remembered that the range of human thought at the period the Athenian empire was much less extensive than the present day, and that the general tone of a State was depreciated, in the case of democracies, by the admission of the mass of the lower classes to a share in the management of public business. Hence the whole πόλις was easily influenced by a powerful, or ambitious or unscrupulous mind. At Athens, Peisistratus, Pericles,¹ and Cleon, men of very different stamp all exercised at different times an undisputed empire over the Athenian mind; and, in the case of the two latter, the people followed their leader obediently, and ratified with constitutional voting whatever measure that leader might put forward. Even in matters requiring the gravest and the longest deliberation, a burst of rhetoric would carry a majority on the side of the speaker; as in the case of the condemnation of the Mytilenæans, where the audacity of Cleon was sufficient to blind the whole Athenian assembly to the atrocious nature of his proposal. 'The most violent man in the whole city, and at the same time the most influential.' (ὦν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαίωτατος τῶν πολιτῶν, τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, Thuc. III. 36.) Such is Thucydides' description of Cleon, and although it is evidently pointed by oligarchical feeling, it is generally borne out by the story of Cleon's career. And if the most violent man in a city is also the most influential, we can see that the mental and moral standard of the whole city must be low, and the city itself easily swayed. Cleon's history is an example of the power

¹ In Xen. *Mem.* 2, 6, 13, Pericles is said to have charmed the city into following him. ἐπάδων τῇ πόλει ἐποιεῖ αὐτὴν φιλεῖν αὐτόν.

wielded by a violent or unscrupulous mind. When Pericles' influence was in the ascendant, the city followed his guidance to the bitter end, even to enduring the worst hardships of a siege and a blockade; thereby illustrating the truth of Plato's belief, that the people are usually traduced, and only need proper guidance to bring them up to better things. (See 499, E.) But Cleon's case is the reverse of Pericles', and his influence depreciated the public tone, whilst it also shows how blindly the average citizen was led by the man whom he believed, rightly or wrongly, to be working for his interest. Now, as such a man could lead the populace when champion (*προστάτης*, see 565 D, and also C, *ὅταν περ φύηται τύραννος ἐκ προστατικῆς ρίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν*), so he could impress them when he had constituted himself permanent despot, as Peisistratus (*τύραννος*); or when he availed himself of his influence only for a time, as Lycurgus and Solon and Pericles are said to have done (*νομοθετής*). Such men, in fact, stamped their individuality on the peoples with whom they had to deal.

Let us see how Plato himself bears out this fact. In page 502 B, Socrates states that one single man, supposing he have the city in obedience to his will, can bring everything to pass that seems to his hearers so difficult of accomplishment. *Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰς ἱκανὸς γεγόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελεῖσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα.* The constitution of the Spartan community is a striking instance of a whole people voluntarily submitting themselves to an irksome military *régime* (said to have been inaugurated by one man), lasting far on into middle life, against which they are known to have secretly, and in some cases openly,¹

¹ *E.g.* in the case of Pausanias and Lysander.

rebelled. To this opinion of Socrates, that a single man could impress himself upon an entire community, we must add one of his reasons already mentioned, viz., his above-mentioned belief that the common people were usually traduced, and really merited a much better reputation for capacity of improvement. See 499 E. ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ· ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσι . . . κ.τ.λ.

Such are the considerations which help to explain Plato's belief in the possibility of his State—a possibility, however, not to be realised, as he thought, till the existing generation with their traditions and prejudices had given place to the next, on which the legislator might work. See page 415 D. ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων νιέῃς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἷ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

§ 6. The first step towards the constitution of a defending and protecting body in the State is education (Book II. page 376 E). And the first part of education is music, i.e. all learning which demands a direct effort of the mind, and is opposed to gymnastic. Again, the earliest step in musical education is fiction (*ψευδεῖς λόγοι*). But to the usual tales of fiction which relate to gods and heroes, Socrates takes great exception, because of their lightness, their impiety, and their immorality. A great deal is said in this Second Book, and a great deal more in Book III. upon the same subject, a subject which has been formulated in the expression, 'the conflict between religion and mythology.'

It is well known to all what cruel and immoral deeds are attributed to the members of the Greek theogony. Socrates mentions several of them in this Second Book

of the *Republic*, e.g. the binding of Hera by her son Ares, the mutilation of Ouranos by Kronos, how Ouranos devoured his own offspring, and so forth. But it is not equally well known that by the side of this variety of legends there existed a clear and well-defined belief in the existence of one Supreme Power, almighty and just, from the earliest time of which we have records in Greek writing. The object of this belief was not well defined, nor can we expect it to have been so; there was no attempt to define in strict terms the nature of God.

But the co-existence of this belief and this mythology challenged criticism in the mind of the people, conscious or unconscious. Sometimes the criticism broke out in the writings of the poets in the form of a declaration of faith in the Supreme Being and his purity; sometimes it appeared as a direct protest against the wickedness of the celestials or the impiety of attributing wickedness to them. At another time both declarations of faith and protests were combined with an attempt to grasp with the mind that which must be by its nature transcendent.

The necessity under which the human mind lies of believing in God is put forward in the *Odyssey* in simple and beautiful language,

πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.—*Od.* iii. 48.

'All men yearn after gods'; and the recurrence of the expression *θεουδής* in that poem points to a God who is to be feared by those who violate the laws of hospitality (see *Od.* vi. 121, where the expression is joined with *φιλόξενος*), and who upholds justice (*Od.* xix. 109, in connection with *εὐδικίας*). Justice is also said by Hesiod to originate in its purest form from Zeus, *ἰθείησι δίκαις*,

αἶ τ' ἐκ Διὸς εἰσιν ἄρισται; and the same poet bears witness to the omniscience of Zeus,

οὕτως οὔτε πη ἐστὶ Διὸς νόον ἐξαλέασθαι,

and speaks of the race of heroes who succeeded to the gold, silver, and bronze ages, as juster and nobler than their predecessors—

δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον,

ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος.

Where it is noticeable that they seem to be termed *θεῖον* or godlike, inasmuch as they are just and noble. In the same way, and in the same poem, men who fail to honour parents in old age are described as *οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπιν εἰδότες*: and *Αἰδώς* (Reverence) and *Νέμεσις* (Just Anger) leave the earth and return to Olympus in the iron age of cruelty and strife. And the reward of prosperity is said distinctly to follow upon righteous dealing—

*οἱ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμονσι διδοῦσιν
 ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δίκαιοι,
 τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεῦσιν ἐν αὐτῇ,
 εἰρήνη δ' ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδὲ ποτ' αὐτοῖς
 ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς.*

From these passages it will be seen that Hesiod believed the relation of God to man to be one of justice and active supervision:—

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας,

are his words later on in the same poem; and although he speaks of Zeus' hatred of particular individuals and the harsh punishment which mortals incur at his hands, his general and his final conception of the Deity is of a pure and monotheistic character.

Pindar's religious belief finds its expression in a

strong protest against the credibility of mythological tales; thus in *Olymp.* 1, 82,

ἔμοι δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαρ-
γον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν· ἀφίσταμαι.

And another of the early lyrists claims Virtue as the peculiar gift of Heaven—

οὔτις ἄνευ θεῶν ἀρέτην λάβεν
οὐ πόλις οὐ βροτός· Θεὸς ὁ παμμῆτις.

Whilst another says the same of what is noble—

ὅτι καλὸν φίλον ἐστί· τὸ δ' οὐ καλὸν οὐ φίλον ἐστί·
τοῦτ' ἔπος ἀθανάτων ἦλθε διὰ στομάτων;

and Sotades speaks of Temperance as their especial gift:—

ἂν δὲ σωφρονῆς, τοῦτο θεῶν δῶρον ὑπάρχει.

Empedocles (*Fr.* 437-9) expressly states that the same law of right (*θέμις*) is invariable for all—

οὐ πέλεται τοῖς μὲν θεμιτὸν τόδε τοῖς δ' ἀθέμιστον·
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νομίμων διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

Here the language is vague, and the principle of justice is not referred to one Being as its originator, but the principle itself is none the less distinctly laid down. And a similar thought occurs in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, line 863—

εἴ μοι ξυνεῖη φέροντι
μοῖρα τὰν εὔσεπτον ἀγνεῖαν λόγων
ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι πρόκεινται
ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν
δι' αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες, ὧν Ὀλυμπος

πατήρ μόνος, οὐδέ νιν
 θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρων
 ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ μάν ποτε λάθα κατακοιμάσει.

Here, as Professor Campbell says, we have Olympus used to express 'a sort of unseen heaven,' a holy place. And all words and deeds are said to be fixed and defined by heavenly laws as pure or the reverse. A vagueness of expression pervades the poet's words, but there is no vagueness in the principle; just as in the same place (line 903 *infr.*), we have an invocation to Zeus, qualified by the condition 'if so thou art rightly called'—

ἀλλ' ὦ κρατύνων, εἴπερ ὄρθ' ἀκούεις,
 Ζεῦ, πάντ' ἀνάσσων,

a sentiment to be closely paralleled by a similar expression in the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus, line 162 'Zeus, whoe'er he be,'

Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστὶν εἰ τόδ' αὐ—
 τῷ φίλον κεκλημένῳ,
 τοῦτό νιν προσεννέπω.

Here the use of the indicative ἐστὶ shows that there is no doubt in the mind of the supplicant as to Zeus' existence, which the context confirms; but there is the same confession of ignorance as to the form of his manifestation. And so in *Choëphoroe* 951, when speaking of Justice, the poet first speaks of her as Διὸς κόρα, adding that her name among mortals is called by a happy chance Δίκη, implying that her divinity and her being are alike derived from Zeus:—

Διὸς κόρα· Δίκαν δέ νιν
 προσαγορεύομεν
 βροτοὶ, τυχόντες καλῶς.

These passages show that in the minds of the best thinkers there was no doubt as to the existence and the preeminence, and the justice and purity of Zeus and the gods. They may have believed to a small extent in mythological tales; they cannot have accepted them entirely; in Pindar's opinion, in fact, they are to be unconditionally rejected—*ἀφίσταμαι*. And no doubt all those poets and thinkers who approached to Pindar's intellectual standpoint thought with Pindar and with Socrates that tales of the sort should have no place in a man's serious belief.¹

§ 7. We have now seen what the *Republic* is, how it is divided, why it was written, what kind of information or addition to philosophy it contains, and how far Plato believed in the possibility of his State. We have also seen that in the first two books of the Dialogue we must only expect critical and negative results with the beginning of the creation of a State. It remains to say a few words upon the light in which Socrates is brought before us in the first two books of the *Republic*, which form the proem or prosodus of the dialectical drama.

We have spoken above of Socrates' religion, his belief in God, and the terms of that belief; we have

¹ In this apparent inconsistency, viz. the coexistence of a pure morality with a debased mythology, some have seen the traces of an old cult of personified natural forces, the growth of which cult is thus described by Buckle: 'The aspects of nature when very threatening stimulate the imagination. . . . Among an ignorant people there is a direct tendency to ascribe all serious dangers to supernatural intervention; and a strong religious sentiment being thus aroused, it constantly happens not only that the danger is submitted to, but that it is actually worshipped.'—*History of Civilization*, vol. i. page 113, 2nd Edition.

seen that, so far from being an atheist, Socrates was a man of lively belief in the gods of his country. We cannot speak here of his moral earnestness, his deep conviction of the seriousness of life, and the tenacity with which he applied himself to the preaching of that conviction. That, in spite of a superficial lightness and a gay humour, he was earnest and serious, the perusal of a single Dialogue of Plato will satisfy us. We have to speak rather of this gaiety and humour, characteristics which stand out in the brightest light in this prelude to the more serious business of the Dialogue.

*Ἐπαιζεν ἄμα σπουδάζων, 'he used to jest in earnest.' This epigram of Xenophon's expresses in the happiest terms Socrates' power of mingling the grave with the gay, the lively with the severe; it shows how he could joke and quibble apparently in the lightest strain, and yet bring out of his jokes and quibbles the solid grain of truth. And who shall quarrel with Socrates for this habit? The first principle of teaching, of preaching, of imparting knowledge of any kind, is not to instruct, but to interest. *Μαθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει* are the words of Aristotle¹; and induction, the marshalling of facts in detail, must precede deduction, if we are to interest our hearers. This is Socrates' manner of argument. He presents in their humblest guise the humblest facts, garnishes them with his humour, and links them effectively but not obtrusively into a more or less perfect chain of argument; until the hearer is struck with amazement and conviction to find what power and what knowledge the barest facts can yield if they are manipulated with a skilful hand.

✱ Let us, then, see how this humour is employed with

¹ *Post. Analyt.* 1, 18, p. 81, α 40.

effect in the scenes of dialectic which the first two books of the *Republic* present. Socrates is quietly walking home from Piraeus; in reply to the jocular threat of forcible detention he suggests the possibility of gaining his release by persuasion; he falls with pleasure into a conversation with Cephalus, who is approaching the evening of life, and begins an apparently short discussion with Cephalus' son and heir Polemarchus. Thus far Socrates has shown only in his quiet and speculative mood; but, as the discussion with Polemarchus advances, he begins to apply his *ἄλεγχος* or critical method with such effect that it rouses the envy of Thrasymachus, a Sophist present among the audience, described by Socrates in the *Phaedrus*¹ as the mighty Chalcedonian, who trusts, as the sequel will show, rather to his lungs than his logic for dialectical success. It is to Socrates' treatment of this braggart and to Socrates' bearing under the infliction of his declamations that we invite attention; for by his treatment of others the best insight is gained into a man's character.

The first result of the dialectical collision between the mighty Chalcedonian and Socrates is that the former is made ridiculous (see page 338 C); the next that he becomes furious; and this again is naturally followed by his discomfiture in the argument. But all these results are attained by Socrates without the slightest violation of those rules of good feeling and good breeding to which Thrasymachus is an entire stranger. In his account of the discussion Socrates compares Thrasymachus to a wild beast and a bath-man, and very well are the similes deserved; but in the actual

¹ 267 D.

conversation his politeness stands out in marked contrast to Thrasymachus' overbearing conduct. We know that there is nothing so provocative of anger to a violent person as a calm and cool demeanour under his attacks. Of this demeanour Socrates was a perfect example. His humour led him also to take a positive relish in exasperating men who showed any violent intentions—we see traces of this in his treatment of Thrasymachus, and we have another case of it in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, which deserves, for the illustration it affords of Socrates' manner in this respect, to be quoted *in extenso*.

'Critias and Charicles (two of the Thirty) called Socrates and showed him the law which forbid him to converse with the young Then he said, "I desire to obey the law; but I wish to know if you think dialectic is on the side of that which is spoken rightly, or against it, that you bid me discontinue it. For if it belongs to the former class, it is the same thing as if you ordered me not to speak rightly, and if it belong to the latter, it is evident that we should try to learn to speak rightly." At this Charicles was angry, and said, "As you cannot understand us, Socrates, we tell you clearly not to converse with the young at all." Socrates replied, "To prevent any misunderstanding, will you define what you mean by the young?" And Charicles answered, "All those below thirty years of age." "But supposing that I am making a purchase," said Socrates, "and the seller is under thirty years of age, may I not ask him what he charges?" "Of course," replied Charicles; "but you are always asking questions with a purpose: these questions you must not ask." "Nor answer, I suppose," replied Socrates, "if


a youth were to ask me, for instance, 'Where does Charicles live?' or, 'Where is Critias?'" "Such questions as those you might answer," said Charicles. And Critias said, "But your cobblers, and your carpenters and your coppersmiths, those illustrations that you are always dinning into our ears and working to death, you must have done with." "Then," said Socrates, "I must also have done with all my inductions from those illustrations, about justice and piety and the rest?" "By Zeus, you must!" said Charicles.¹

In this interesting and characteristic scene, we have Socrates treating in his humorous way a command that must have been of the greatest seriousness to him. *ἐπαίξεν ἄμα σπουδάζων*. He is trying to show his enemies the mistake into which they are falling, by exhibiting their command in a ridiculous light. But Critias and his companions were not men who could be influenced by words; and it is only when Socrates has fair play accorded to him that his *reductio ad absurdum* is of avail. Then, however, it is of the highest efficiency; and nowhere is it employed with greater effect than in the First Book of the *Republic*. And if it be asked, 'Why is it that Socrates was so given up to his humour that we find it glancing on every page of these biographical sketches?' we must answer that its very value and force lay in the fact that it was spontaneous, redeeming Socrates' teaching from the charge of dullness, and investing it with an interest for all. So far was Socrates even from lying under the imputation of flippancy that the Athenians who condemned him must have felt that in him they had to deal with one who

¹ Xen. *Mem.* 1, 2, 33, *seqq.*

exerted a real power and a real influence over citizens. Earnest he was in every action, inasmuch as he did nothing without a definite object; and so he was he from wasting his energies in mere logomachy that his teaching may be fairly summed up in Platon's noble words, 'Ἀθληταὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος' 'Men are athletes in the greatest of all contests—the arena of life.'

THE
ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.



THE
ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK I.

I WENT down to Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, Ariston's son, to see the festival of Artemis; and, as we were coming back, Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, overtook us, with Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, and others with them. And Polemarchus constrained us to go home with him; where we found amongst others Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, and the old man Cephalus, just finishing a sacrificial rite. He gently upbraided me for, not coming oftener to see him, adding that at his time of life the pleasure of conversation with friends was very great. I replied that nothing gave me also greater pleasure than communing with those who have gone before on the road of life; for they could describe whether it were hard or easy, rough or smooth. 'Why,' he said, 'many of my friends, Socrates, when they come to see me, are always lamenting their old age and longing after the pleasures of youth; whilst I tell them that to be quit of the desires of youth is to be freed not from one but from a host of hard and
rec age masters.' 'Yes,' I said, 'but you must recollect
r easy circumstances, Cephalus.' 'No doubt,' he

replied, 'my circumstances make life easier; but though I might be discontented if I were poor, I am sure some of those friends of mine would never be contented even if they were rich; as Themistocles said to the Seriphian. And I have worked hard to repair my grandfather's fortune, which my father left me in a dilapidated state. But when you come to my age, Socrates, you begin to think over your past life, of the good you have done, and then you are comforted: and of the evil, and the more it be, the unhappier a man is. 'And what is this "doing good" or justice?' I said. 'Oh!' he said, 'I must bequeath the disquisition to Polemarchus.' 'Who is your heir?' I said. At this he smiled, and then left us. 'Come now, Polemarchus, I said, 'with your legacy of argument, what is that definition of justice "Tell the truth and pay your debts," given by Simonides, which you support? You don't say that you ought to give back to a friend everything that you have borrowed? You might, at that rate, have to give a sword to a madman.' 'I suppose Simonides meant,' he said, 'that we ought to give that which befits each to each.' 'In other words,' I said, 'to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies; as a good steersman is capable of carrying his friends safely and drowning his foes. But in what circumstances is justice useful to our friends?' 'To help our friends,' he answered, 'when they need help, and give back money when they lend it us.' 'So that,' I said, 'if they have no attacks made upon them and never lend money, there is no place for this justice of ours. And on the principle that a good keeper makes a good poacher, our just man will be good at thieving, be good at keeping. So that Simonides' and I saw, definition of justice has assumed a strange aspect you

again, often those who are apparently our enemies are really our friends; so that from our definition it would in some cases, turn out that doing harm to friends is justice—the very reverse of Simonides' meaning.' 'Let us change the definition then,' he said, 'and substitute "our real friends" for "our friends."' 'But,' I said, 'the function of justice is to make men just and good, as the function of each art and trade is to make the objects of their work better in respect of that art or trade. How then can it be the function of justice to harm any one, that is, to depreciate his powers? For all harm is depreciation. We must therefore remove that part of the definition.' 'We must,' he said.

Now Thrasymachus before this had tried to interrupt the conversation a good many times, but the rest prevented him; so that when we stopped he gathered himself together like a wild beast and hurled himself upon us. 'You fools!' he said, 'why, if you really want to know what justice is, do you exhibit all these pretty tricks of dialectic? Now answer me in a straightforward manner, what you really think it to be. And don't say that it is the beneficial or the advantageous or the profitable or that which is to a man's interest.' 'Nay! pity us, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'and give us your help, for we do not profess to know what it is.' 'Ah!' said he, 'Socrates' usual self-depreciation!'¹ 'By no means,' said I; 'but if you ask a man to define twelve, and say, you must not answer twice six, or three times four, or four times three, what is he to say?' 'Nonsense!' he said; 'but supposing I tell you what justice is, what will you say?' 'I shall receive the information and be thankful for it,' I said.

¹ εἰπαρέια.

'Well, pay your money,' he said. 'I have none,' I replied. 'We will all contribute for Socrates,' said Glaucon. So Thrasymachus, after beating about the bush for a time, and pretending that he was not anxious to be the speaker himself, defined justice as the Interest of the Stronger. 'Do you mean,' said I, 'that if it is to the interest of Polydamas, who is stronger than we, to eat beef, that we ought to eat beef too, and that that would be justice?' 'You are a brute, Socrates,' he said. 'You know that, in every city, whether the government be tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy, the laws are always made by those in power in their own interest; and justice is acting according to law, therefore justice is the Interest of the Stronger, or the Governing Portion.' 'But stay, Thrasymachus,' I said, 'you told me not to use *interest* in my definition, and you have done so yourself. But, passing over that objection, I ask you if the Governing Portion does not sometimes make laws which turn out badly for themselves; and if so, whether justice, *i.e.* acting according to law, may not therefore sometimes turn out in the exactly opposite way, *viz.* against the Interest of the Stronger?'

'I did not mean that at all,' said Thrasymachus, 'I do not call the man who makes a mistake in legislation the Stronger, *when* he makes his mistake. For a man is not a scribe, a doctor, or a calculator, when he makes a mistake in transcribing, doctoring, or calculating.' 'Well, that may be,' I said; 'but all the arts have some definite object, *as arts* (I do not mean as remunerative, because in that respect they are all phases of the art of money-making); and these arts need no external assistance as long as they are correctly and wholly practised, but are free from defect and mistake,

as arts. And these arts are superior to and command those subjects on whom they practise. And their object is merely and solely the interest of the subject, which is inferior to and weaker than themselves; and in the case of the arts, therefore, the interest of the weaker is their object and not the interest of the stronger. And in a ship the steersman governs the ship, and directs all his efforts to the safety of the crew, who are his inferiors in steering. And in every kind of government, in short, you will find that it is the interest of the weaker that is sought after by the stronger, and not that of himself.

At this point Thrasymachus suddenly asked me: 'Have you a nurse, Socrates?' 'Why do you ask foolish questions,' I said, 'instead of going on with the argument?' 'Because you drivel,' he said, 'and don't understand the difference between sheep and shepherd. For the shepherd takes care of the sheep, just as your steersman or captain takes care of his crew, but it is for his own ultimate profit and interest. You can prove it by what you know of public office. When a strong, unscrupulous man takes a public position, he farms it, he uses it to help his friends and spite his foes, he comes out of it with full hands, even if he went in with empty ones; but a just and upright man lets his own household go to rack and ruin, whilst he is transacting the public business of such a post, and offends his friends, and spends much of his private fortune, and comes out of his position much poorer than he was when he accepted it. And in a contract between a bad man and a good one, which do you suppose will come off the better? And I do not speak of thieves, and sacrilegious persons, kidnappers, and so forth, but of those specious rogues who compass the

ideal of injustice, and are highly respectable members of the State.'

After this burst of rhetoric Thrasymachus would have made off, but the others detained him, and compelled him to stay and defend his words. 'Well,' says I, 'in plain words, I do not believe all that. For you will not keep to your strict definition with which you began, when you said that the ruler, or the Stronger never erred *as* a ruler; but now when you say that the shepherd takes care of the sheep only for his own ultimate interest, I answer that, respecting his own ultimate interest, he is a money-maker and not a shepherd. Therefore, *as* shepherd he has regard for the interest of the weaker.¹ And this is proved Thrasymachus, by the attachment of salaries and honours to official posts, to induce men to come forward, or even fines, if they will not offer themselves because it is not for their own interest that men hold office, but for the interest of those whom they govern. And therefore in a perfectly fair and prosperous community there would be exactly the same struggle to avoid office as there is now to enjoy it. On these grounds, among others, I repudiate Thrasymachus' definition of justice. But I consider that a much graver position which he upholds, viz. that an unjust life is better and more profitable than a just one. Come, Thrasymachus, let us enter on this question. You call injustice profitable, so I suppose you call justice vice.'

¹ This refutation of Thrasymachus is substantially a reply to Adeimantus also, in Book IV. *init.*, when he maintains that Socrates has not made the rulers of the State, the *φύλακες*, comfortable; for the answer there is, although not distinctly expressed, the same as this, viz. that the rulers are for the people and not the people for the rulers, and that this principle is evident, consistent, and universal, at any rate in a free State.


‘No,’ he said, ‘but great folly.’ ‘You grant,’ I said, ‘that the just man does not try to overreach the just, but the unjust?’ ‘He might try,’ he said, ‘but he would not succeed.’ ‘Whilst the unjust,’ I continued, ‘tries to overreach both.’ ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘and the ideally unjust man succeeds completely.’ ‘But,’ I continued, ‘in any art whatsoever, it is the unskilful and ignorant man who tries to take advantage both of the ignorant and the skilful; whilst the skilful man would take advantage not of the skilful, but of the unskilful only. So that according to the analogy of all the arts, if we call the skilful man wise and good, and the ignorant useless and bad, your unjust man resembles the latter, and your just man the former.’

Thrasymachus was obliged to confess the justice of my proof, but he fought hard against it, and got very hot (for it was a summer day) and actually blushed, for the first time, I should say, in his life. ‘Well,’ I said, ‘with this conclusion, that other position of yours is turned, viz. that injustice is strong and justice weak. For which city is more likely to hold her own amongst other cities, the skilful or the unskilful, i.e. the just or the unjust? You must remember that, where there is injustice, there is sedition, and the house divided against itself. (So that the more injustice there is in a State the less efficient it will be. And your unjust man will incur Heaven’s hatred, for he is opposed to the just, and I suppose you call the gods just; whilst the just man will be the friend of the gods. And hence we may conclude that, when we see an unjust man prospering, or a number of unjust men carrying out a project to a successful issue, that, in so far as they succeed, they are not entirely unjust, but have a certain consistency and

coherence, by virtue of which they succeed, whereas they were perfectly unjust they would fail altogether. And if you grant that we live in virtue of our soul and that the soul has a function, or mode of action, the eyes' function is seeing, and the ears' function hearing; and if you further grant that these functions have an excellence proper to each, viz. their highest state of efficiency; we must conclude that the excellence of the soul is justice; for by it the soul best performs its part of originating right action. And so the just man will live a good life, and the unjust man a bad one.

is by your consideration, Thrasymachus, that we have arrived at this happy conclusion: since you began to take a calm view of the question. But for all this we know no more of what justice really is than when we began; for we have been considering whether it is wisdom or folly, virtue or vice, profitable or unprofitable before we have even obtained its definition.'

¹ κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι.



BOOK II.

WHEN we had gone so far in our discourse I thought that there was an end of it, but as it turned out, this was merely the preface. For Glaucon would not accept the conclusion, but said, 'Are you content to suppose that you have set the question at rest in our minds by this mode of arriving at a conclusion, or will you thoroughly prove the truth of the position that justice is better than injustice? Is justice one of those things that we pursue for its own sake, or for the sake of its results, or for the sake of both?' 'Of both,' I answered. 'Well,' he said, 'I should like to have it satisfactorily proved. Thrasyachus gave up long before he ought to have done (for I will revive his argument), and did not bring half the objections against the just life which he might have brought. And all the apologists of justice, whom I have ever heard speak, confine themselves to the advantages which follow from a virtuous life, and do not support justice for its own intrinsic worth. So I am going to bring various counts against justice with all my powers. First, then, in its origin ~~justice is described as a compromise, effected by the weaker, who find themselves habitually ill-treated, and make an arrangement that there shall be no ill-doing by themselves or against themselves.~~ It is a compromise between the height of success, viz., doing evil with

impunity, and the depth of misfortune, which is both ill-treated without hope of redress.

There is no principle in doing good and being just. If a just man had a ring like that of Gyges the Lydian he would be as bad as the unjust. For Gyges' ring had the power of making its wearer invisible, and he committed adultery with the king's wife, and by her help slew the king, and reigned in his stead. Now strip off from the unjust man all things that make him unlovely to the world's eyes, and let him stand forth completely and efficiently equipped with his injustice. If he ever fail, imagine him as one capable of restoring his fortunes; let him be considered a just man; let him be master of persuasion, and, if need be, of force. On the other side place the perfectly just man, and, to complete the antithesis, subtract from him even his appearance of justice, for otherwise he will be rewarded according to his appearance, and let him go on unaltered until he die, so that he may be consistently and continuously just. How then will these two fare? The good man will be scourged, fined, tortured, imprisoned, and deserted by every one, will end his days in solitude and misery; whilst the unjust man will be called to rule over his fellow citizens, receive crowns and rewards, will attain to the summit of earthly prosperity, and will have all the means of helping on his poorer friends and of paying duteous sacrifice to the gods. This is the completest indictment against the just life that I know.'

I was about to begin a reply to Glaucon, when his brother Adeimantus chimed in: 'He has not said half enough, Socrates. The apologists of justice tell us that in the after life the good enjoy different securities, e.g. a never-ending intoxication, and that the unjust are sentenced to pour water for ever through a sieve.'

and the rewards and punishments by which the minds of the young are incited to virtue. The poets again are helplessly at sea on the question of justice and morality, for they sing of the beauty of holiness, but they tell us that spells and sacrifices and prayers of all kinds can easily sway the judgments of heaven. And when young men see how injustice prevails, and learn from professors of rhetoric and persuasion how to move the hearts of men, what wonder is it if they turn altogether away from justice, saying to themselves that they can always get rid of their sins by 'a few sacrifices, when they are coming towards their end. And all this is due to that custom of praising justice for its rewards, and dissuading people from injustice because of its penalties. In your apology, then, for justice, remove the reputation and the accessories that attach to each. Bring both bare before us, and prove to those who will hear you with eager ears that justice is right and good, and injustice wicked and bad.'

I had always felt a regard for Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on this occasion I was especially struck with them, so cleverly had they stated their case, and so earnest were they in their desire to have the question settled. I replied that I feared I was unable to make such a defence of justice as would satisfy them, but I was ready to try. To discover justice in the human soul, let us see if we cannot find justice first in some larger organism, just as if we were unable to read something written in small letters, and were to seek for the same thing written large in another place. Justice perhaps may be 'writ large' in a State, and could then be transferred by analogical argument to the Soul of man. Let us then picture to ourselves the actual birth and growth of a State.

Now the origin of a State lies, I take it, in the inefficiency of a man's resources. For man needs much, but cannot always satisfy his needs by himself. Therefore this man joins that man to himself in a society to profit by his powers, and an interchange of benefits is made between them. What, then, is man's first need? Food. And the next is that of lodging, and the third that of clothing. We shall require for our city, then, a tiller of the soil, a house-builder, and a weaver, and perhaps, too, a cobbler. Hence four or five at least is the original number of our citizens. The next question is this: Is the husbandman to produce enough corn for himself and no more, or is he to supply the others with corn on the condition that they supply him with the produce of their labour? Is he to make his own clothes and build his own house, besides raising food enough for his consumption? No; we must lay down this principle at once, that each man must share the results of his toil amongst all the citizens, because every man has one art and only one, generally speaking, in which he excels; therefore let him confine himself to this art, and not waste his time and his art by attempting other arts. So there must be a smith to make the husbandman his plough, and a carpenter, and various other mechanics. And we cannot help feeling the necessity of importing commodities from other places; for each place, like each man, is not self-sufficient, but needs supplementing from the resources of other places. And so we shall have merchants in our State. And, seeing that a seller cannot sit down and waste his time till a buyer may happen to come by who wants his commodity, we must have middle-men, *i.e.* tradesmen, to form a convenient link between the producer and the consumer. Those of our citizens whose body is more efficient

than their mind will become hired servants, and so the different inhabitants of our city will grow and multiply.

'This is our city. Now comes the question, What manner of life will they live? They will till the ground, build them houses, make them garments; in summer working lightly clad, in winter well protected; they will make them fine loaves and cakes of the wheat and barley which they grow; they will lie on leaf-couches and will live pleasantly, drinking their wine and praising their gods, training their children carefully to avoid poverty and contention. And, if you please, we will give them a relish, olives, cheese, figs, and nuts. And living moderately they will spend a long life, and bequeath the same happy existence to their children.' 'Tis a city of swine, Socrates, and nothing more nor less,' said Glaucon. 'You must give them the usual amenities of life, tables and chairs, and a few delicacies.' 'Ah!' I said, 'you want me to create a luxurious city, with all its accompaniment of cooks, sweetmeats, sauces, dancing girls, and doctors. And to keep all this mob of accessory populace we shall want to cut off a little piece of our neighbours' land, and they will feel the same necessity regarding ours, so that at once war is generated, with its horses, and soldiers, and weapons. And if war is an art or trade (and I do not see how it can fail to be so) we must confine our soldiers to their trade of war, and keep a standing army. Nay, of all other trades in the city, it will be the most important, because the duty of the warriors will be to keep intact the whole Body Politic. Hence the most time and the greatest care must be spent on our warriors or guardians as we may call them. They must be keen, quick, strong, courageous, and withal gentle; so that their great

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strength and spirit may not be turned against their own fellow citizens; like dogs of a noble nature—very savage when they see a stranger, who may have done them no harm, but gentle to any one whom they know, although he may never have done them any kindness. In other words they must be philosophic, *i.e.* quick to apprehend what is to the interest of their fellow countrymen and what is against it. How then are we to produce such a type of man?

‘Education is divided into music and gymnastics. In the music¹ the first step is fiction.’ ‘I do not understand you,’ he said. ‘I mean,’ said I, ‘that as we teach our children by telling them stories, so we must begin the education of our guardians, but with this difference: the tales that our children hear, told by Homer and Hesiod, contain a great deal of noxious fiction, which must be expunged with the greatest care from our system of education. The foul and ridiculous stories about many of the gods are not true, to begin with, and, if they were true, I would not have children’s ears defiled with them. What, then, are we to use in their place? you say. And I reply that we are no poets; but in our city there will be poets, and we shall instruct them as to the poetry they are to write, we shall lay down the lines on which they are to work, and if they transgress them, we shall punish the irregularity. God is good, and he must always be represented so: he cannot be the author of evil to any living being; he cannot lie or deceive; he cannot even change, for if he were to change it would be for the better or for the worse. Now he cannot change for the better, because he is the Best; and he would not desire to change for

¹ *i.e.* every subject which has an intellectual element, *e.g.* music, poetry, ethics.

the worse. Therefore he is true and unchangeable. We will, then, strive with all our might and main against those writers who attempt to traduce the nature of God, and drive them from our city. And we shall have great fault to find with Homer and Æschylus, and many other poets who have failed to give a consistent account of the goodness of the gods.'

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BOOK III.

‘Our poets must be careful when they speak of the after life, not to malign it, and when they are singing of gods and heroes they must not attribute anything unseemly to them, either in grief or in joy, for example, excessive laughter. And the rulers of the State are to be the only persons who have control over the songs and myths of the State.’

‘Again, sobriety and temperance are necessary for our young men ; and therefore all things intemperate, either in word or in action, must be struck out of our poetry, especially in mentioning gods and heroes. The matter of our poetry having been considered, and rules for its guidance having been laid down, we come next to speak of its manner, or style.¹

‘All poetry is either imitative, or narrative, or compounded of both. For instance, the poet of the *Iliad* begins with invoking the Muse : and then he narrates to us how Chryses came, and besought all the Greeks to give him back his daughter ; and then the poet speaks as if he were Chryses himself. And in this latter mode of speaking I call a poet imitative. For he might have gone on with his narrative style, and told us about Chryses’ invocation himself, instead of making Chryses speak, as he does. The epic then is of the

¹ λέξις.

compound order; whilst tragedy leaves out, "and he replied," or "so the goddess spoke," and gives the dialogue as it actually comes from the speakers. This kind is purely imitative. Whilst in dithyrambs it is the poet speaking all the time; and in them we have the narrative pure.

'Now one man is seldom or never a good imitator in more than one subject. A writer of tragedy does not succeed in comedy, nor *vice versa*. Man's nature is of so small a capacity that, as in craftsmanship, so in art, we must be specialists if we wish to succeed. And the manner of imitation must correspond to the matter. We shall not allow our artists to give us presentations of anything foul or dishonourable. For as a good man will never lose control over his actions, so he should never imitate in word or action those who have lost control of themselves. As he will not imitate everything he sees indiscriminately, but only those things which are worthy of imitation, so he will not even read such imitations from the poets, or allow them to give such imitations. In fact, our citizens must be men of single, not double or multiple¹ mind; and in their words, actions, and writings, they will follow the ideal of the upright and single-hearted man.

'Next, the music of the poetry. This must be adapted as far as possible to the poetry itself; and if we observe this rule we shall not go wrong. Remove at once then those melodies of a pitiful and wailing character like the mixolydian and syntonolydian; the soft, effeminate,

¹ In the *Laelius* of Cicero, the single-minded man is held up for our admiration as a friend. 'Simplicem præterea et communem et consentientem, qui rebus iisdem moveatur, eligi par est; quæ omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem. Neque enim fidum potest esse *multiplex ingenium* et tortuosum.'—Ch. xviii. sec. 65.

and revelling strains.' 'At this rate,' he said, 'you will leave none but the Dorian and Phrygian.' 'I dare say not,' said I, 'for the first-named have many strings and many chords, and are altogether of too complex a nature for our simple and unaffected songs. And then the rhythm, or flow of the verses, must be fixed; for instance, dactylic, epic, iambic, or trochaic. But we will consult Damon on this point; for it is a difficult one. Only we may be sure of this, that, if we have a good style to begin with, our metre and rhythm will more easily flow well with it; and the whole composition will ultimately depend for its style and music and rhythm on the character of the composer. If we take pains with our teaching of temperance, courage, and magnanimity, we shall find our music and poetry falling naturally into a good groove; and thus we shall avoid all intemperance and vulgarity.

'Now we come to the gymnastic training of our youths. And let me remind you that men are athletes in the greatest arena, that of life.¹ Their bodily training must be of the highest efficiency; excluding Syracusan luxuries, Sicilian cookery, Attic sweetmeats, Corinthian courtezans; for by the presence of luxury in the State the door is opened to intemperance and a whole horde of diseases, which will come trooping in; and our city will be full of doctors, cooperating up wrecked constitutions. Nay, our men will have no leisure to be ill; but if a man is unsound we will have none of him, for it is neither to his own interest nor to that of his fellow citizens that he live in our State or anywhere else.'

'But,' said Glaucon, 'the best doctor is he who has had most experience of bad constitutions and bad illnesses, even perhaps in his own body.' 'That may be,' I said,

¹ ἀθληται μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος.

' but you might as well say that the best judge, and the most honourable man, is he who has had most-experience of crime. Whereas, on the contrary, the fact is that the fresher the mind and the purer, which approaches the administration of justice, the better able is it to discern between good and evil. For a wicked man would be always suspecting others to be as bad as himself, and would attribute the worst motives to every man. And no doubt the good man, on the contrary, would now and then lay himself open to the charge of too great a simplicity. But it is a fault on the right side.¹

' And we must take care in gymnastic that we do not forget its real object; which is, not to bring the body to its highest development, but to increase the efficiency of the mind.² In this way. Men who spend all their time in gymnastic become subject to roughness and harshness of manner, whilst those who neglect it entirely grow too soft, and milder than is fitting. But a due admixture of the gymnastic element will strengthen the mind for its intellectual labour, and is of the same importance as music, because without it we cannot attain to that intermediate condition between the excess of roughness and the excess of mildness which is the proper frame of mind for our citizens to possess.'

' And who are to be the guardians and rulers?' 'The

¹ Socrates does not really answer Glaucon's objection by this analogy. It is quite true, as Glaucon maintains, that in such a State a physician would not have the opportunity or the experience to perfect himself in his art. The true answer would be that in Socrates' state there is no requirement and no place for a skilled physician; but Socrates does not state this clearly, he leaves it to be inferred, and breaks away into the moral sphere with an illustration which is not sufficiently parallel to be to the point.

² See Book vi. 498 B. τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδρουταί, εὖ μάλ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτώμενους.

elder of course, and the best of the elders. And the best of the elders I should define as those who can best withstand the temptation and the bewitchment of pleasure and fear, who can keep their mental and moral balance and live a harmonious and consistent life.

‘To keep our youth firmly imbued with their responsibility and their duty, I would invent a fiction of this sort; that all those citizens who are found worthy to rule are golden in their nature, and the defenders are silver, and the common people iron: and that there is a prophecy that, when a silver or an iron nature shall be found at the head of the state, then it shall fall and come to nought.’ ‘Well,’ said he, ‘you might imbue a second generation with this fable perhaps, but not the present.’

‘And so our community will live, well governed by its guardians, and well defended by its protectors, who will not turn against the sheep they defend like wolves; and all will live in common, not calling this mine and that yours,¹ but, like a great army will be happy and powerful in the loyalty of each individual to the colours. Gold and silver, except the gold and silver of their own natures, they will never touch; for it is avarice that breeds disunion in a city, and it is disunion which is political ruin.

¹ Sir Thomas More following this principle of Plato in his *Utopia*, finds one result of proprietorship and inequality of possessions in the great number of laws required to regulate conflicting rights. Thus: ‘. . . where euerye man calleth that he hath gotten his owne private and proper goodes, where so many newe lawes daylye made be not sufficiente for euerye man to enjoye, defende, and knowe from another man’s that whych he calleth his owne.’ A few pages further on we have his description of the Utopian life in common: ‘Whoso will may go in (to the houses), for there is nothing within the houses that is priuate or anye man’s owne.’—Pp. 67 and 79, ed. Arber, London, 1869.

BOOK IV.

'BUT supposing some one objected to all this, Socrates,' said Adeimantus, 'that you have made your State and appointed your guardians, and that they turn out to be by no means the happiest and most comfortable people in it, what would you say?' 'I should answer,' I said, 'that the people are not for the guardians, but the guardians for the people, or rather "each man for himself and God for us all." In other words, we do not make the happiness of a particular class our object, but the general welfare. It would be absurd, would it not, to dress up our farmers and potters and shoemakers in fine clothes, and tell them to do as much work as they pleased, and how they pleased? Every man then must do his quantum of due labour, and thus we shall avoid the two extremes of riches and poverty, which are the mainsprings of discontent and sedition.'

'But are we to have no resources, no wealth, Socrates?' 'Certainly not; for if we have no wealth we shall have no enemy coming to despoil us, and like a trained athlete, who can encounter any number of rich fat burghers, provided that he take them one or two at a time, so shall we be. For our soldiers and guardians will be able to fight twice their number of opponents; and other nations will prefer to fight with us, the strong and hard-bitten dogs, against the fat and helpless sheep. And us they will leave alone.'

‘Each of us then having our proper duty and performing it, we shall allow our State to grow and extend as far as is consistent with its unity. And our guardians will attend to many points of detail, such as of preserving the orthodox rules of music and gymnastic, of enforcing proper respect towards elders; but many more must be left to the good sense of our people, and the correct development of our principles of education. And our religious observances of all kinds will of course be settled by the word of the Delphian God.

‘Our city is now grown, and furnished with all its appliances, and is a living organism. Where, now, are we to look for justice? Let us approach the problem as a mathematical equation in which there are one or more unknown quantities. Every city that is rightly and justly managed, in other words, a good city, must be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. In our equation then, these four are the unknown quantities; and if we can ascertain the first three and eliminate them, the remaining one, justice, will be clear.

‘First then our city must be wise. And wherein? In the smallest and yet the most important section of itself, viz. in the body of guardians. For if these be truly wise, seeing that on them depends the weal or woe of the State, the rest of the people will be wise also, in so far as they can attain to wisdom. Again, what part of the State must without fail be brave?’ ‘The part which defends the rest,’ he said. ‘So,’ said I, ‘it is of the greatest importance that our guardians and defenders be the bravest men in the State.

‘Shall we take temperance next,’ I said, ‘or do you prefer to leave it out, and go straight on to find justice?’ ‘We had better keep to your method,’ he said, ‘and go on to consider temperance.’ ‘Well,’

said I, 'when all the citizens are in agreement as to who should be the rulers, and when they all live in harmony, then I should call them temperate. Just as in the soul of a man there is a better impulse and a worse, and sometimes the better has complete control of the worse; so that concord throughout the State is the temperance of the State.¹ And now, Glaucon, for justice. Follow close behind me, and breathe a prayer for success, and peep warily through this dark and tangled thicket. But courage! we must go forward.' 'We must,' said he. And I,—'Holloa, holloa, Glaucon, what fools we are! Here is the very thing we have been gaping about for, tumbling at our feet.' 'Why, what do you mean?' he said. 'I mean that when we said every man was to do his own business in the State, and not to be a busybody or a Jack-of-all-trades, that was justice; and that is the unknown quantity, as I was calling it, which we have been speaking of all along. And to meddle with other people's business is injustice.'

'Now let us transfer this to the individual. In the mind of man there is a three-fold division which corresponds to the division above, of the three virtues necessary to a good guardian. There is the faculty of acquiring knowledge, of feeling spirited with the second, and of feeling sensual desire with the third. And let

¹ It will be seen that in the application of the justice of the State to the human soul, this description of *σωφροσύνη* is very nearly identical with that of *δικαιοσύνη* there. Only the different parts of the human soul, here described as *βέλτιον* and *χειρόν* (131 B.), are there further elaborated into three, viz. *λογιστικόν*, *θυμοειδές*, and *ἐπιθυμητικόν*. Aristotle's division in the *Politics*, book i. chap. v. *ωὐ μέν* is similar to the present one,—*ἐν ταύτῃ τῷ (sc. ψυχῇ) ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον, τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον· ὧν ἑτέραν ἀμείν εἶναι ἀρετὴν. οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου.*

me premise that a thing can neither do nor be the contrary of itself, in the same part of it, and with regard to the same thing. We have thirst and we have thirst of a particular kind, but we have also sometimes, and together with the thirst, another feeling which holds us back from satisfying that thirst. This other feeling is the contrary of the first and cannot therefore be a manifestation of the same faculty. ~~The faculty which often opposes itself to the sensual desire is the rational or intellectual~~; and we shall find upon inspection that the spirited or third kind of faculty either ranges itself upon the side of the intellectual or is quenched by the sensual. Then if our individual is to be just, ~~the intellectual faculty must always predominate~~ and govern the other two inferior faculties. For the sensual occupies the greatest extent of the soul and is of an insatiable nature; and the three must be in accord and harmony. It was then a shadow of the real justice which made us lay it down that a mechanic should work at that art with the whole and the best of his powers, and at that art alone for which he is fitted. So a man, generally, must see that each of his three faculties are working according to their proper nature and to their proper end, and if he adjust them harmoniously and combine them into one efficient whole, he will be a just man, and will be practising justice.

‘We have now to fix ~~what is~~ injustice—not a difficult task. It is the predominance of the wrong faculty in man’s soul, which cannot fail to bring with it disturbance and sedition and trouble. And it follows naturally upon this that justice is profitable and injustice unprofitable.’



BOOK V.

I WAS then going on to speak of the degenerate forms of the Body Politic, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted me. They refused to allow me to go on until I had set their minds at rest on the troublesome question of the wives and the children of our guardians. 'Well, then,' I said, 'I cannot help believing that we ought to go on the same principle with respect to our women as we did in the case of our men, in other words, (that the women should undergo exactly the same training mental and physical, however much you may laugh at the idea of the wrinkled old women in the gymnasia. And I maintain this because there is in my opinion¹ no intrinsic difference between the two natures; only one is weaker than the other, implying a difference of quantity, not of kind. So we must select, as before, those with a prudent mind for our guardian-women, and their chastity² will be a protection for those who have to

¹ Aristotle's opinion was less liberal than Plato's upon this point. He thought, with the general mind of Greece, that the woman and the slave were naturally and originally inferior to man, and did not contemplate the possibility of their having been gradually deteriorated. See *Pol.* 1, 2. *ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρβρον πρὸς τὸ θήλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. Et infra, οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δούλοι.* And again of women, chap. v. *init.* *τί τε γὰρ ἄρβρον φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον.*
² *ἡ δὲ εἰπερ ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἱματίων ἀμφιέσσονται.* Tennyson has the same *can* thought in his *Lady Godiva*, 'Then she rode for h, clothed on with' *ity.*

mingle with the men in daily life. This is the first of those great difficulties which stand in the way of my theory, and made me hesitate to expound it. And the next is a more serious one, viz., that all the wives and all the children should be common, and none should say, "This is my wife," "These are my children." My reason is one which should appeal to you, Glaucon, who are a bird fancier, and take great pains in the selection of your brood-birds and their pairing: you choose, of course, the staunchest and best-conditioned in your yard. Ought not therefore man, who is the noblest animal, to have the greatest care taken of his sexual relations? And the manner in which I should wish it to be managed would be as follows. At certain periods of the year solemn rites and sacrifices should be performed, and marriages should be effected then and there between the finest and strongest men and women. The festival should be looked upon as most holy, and any one disobeying the injunctions of the directing priest should be subject to the severest penalties. And for the ages between which marriages should be effected I place twenty to forty for the women, and thirty to fifty-five for the men. And no illegitimate offspring, or children born at a wrong time, should be brought up, so that all irregularity may be avoided in the matter. These children must be considered as the children of all the fathers, they must call all men who were married before they were born, father, and in the same manner they will speak of all the women as mother, and the children as brother and sister. And I wish to see this community of relationship, because, in such a state of things, each individual will feel, and enjoy or resent, everything affects the state for good or for ill; just as in a body, which is healthy and sound, there is

sympathy and harmony of all feelings. Minor disputes, too, will be prevented by the fear and regard which relationship inspires in a well educated mind. Such a view of relationship dissipates, I think, your former objections about the hard life we were giving our guardians. For this view shows that a man's proper part in life is to be first well regulated, and afterwards comfortable; and the latter will follow upon the former.

'Now these children, so born, and brought up in large State nurseries, will be trained to war from their youth, besides their other studies, and ought by all analogy to go to view battles at an early age, mounted upon swift and docile horses to bring them out of possible harm. And in the battles the warrior who acquits himself best shall receive all the usual rewards of a victor, and shall receive the best wife, whomsoever he chooses, so that he may beget others like himself.

'In war our soldiers must recollect that they are not barbarians nor brutes; and in fighting against a Greek city they should treat their opponents as belonging to the same family as themselves, and not destroy houses nor burn fruit-trees, but only ravage the crop of the year; whilst against barbarians they will proceed as Greeks now, unhappily, treat Greeks.'

'You are avoiding all this time, Socrates,' said Glaucon, 'the real pith of the matter, viz., the question, Can such a condition of relationship exist in reality?' 'Well,' I said, 'I was avoiding it, I confess, and I answer, since you press me to a conclusion, Does the unattainability of anything make the representation of it any the worse, if it is the best representation that human skill can effect?' 'No,' he said, 'certainly not.' 'Well, then,' I replied, 'I do not say that such a thing has, or can, or will be brought about, but I do say that if we

can, as we have done, picture it to ourselves, we may place it before the eyes of our mind, and work towards our ideal in hope and faith.

3 | 'A third difficulty I have to put before you, and the greatest of all. Until kings are philosophers, and philosophers kings, there is no end to the troubles of state.¹ Stand by me, Glaucon, or I shall never weather this storm-wave.' 'That will I,' he answered. 'Do you know, then,' said I, 'what it is to be devoted to one subject, such as wine, when a man has a word to say about, and in favour of, all kinds of wine? Or to be very emulous, e.g. when a man will be sub-lieutenant if he cannot be general, rather than not be a commander of some sort; the opposite of the character 'aut Caesar aut nullus.' I mean, then, by philosopher, the man who is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, real knowledge, and not merely inquisitive. The more our citizens approach this temperament, the better the state will be. True knowledge in its perfection and entirety man cannot attain. But he can attain to a kind of knowledge of realities if he has any knowledge at all because he cannot know nonentities. Hence his knowledge is half way between real knowledge and ignorance and we must call it opinion.² When, then, his opinion about a thing is correct: as far as it goes he is a philosopher and a useful and valuable member of our state.

¹ Sir Thomas More proposes a middle course which he judges would be of more value. 'For where as your Plato judgeth that weale publiques shall by thys meanes attayne perfect felicitie, eyther if philosophers be kynges, or elles yf kynges gene themselues to the studie of Philosophie, how farre I praye you shall commend wealthes then be frome thys felicitie, yf Philosophers wyll vouchesafte to enstruct kynges with their good counsell?'

² Compare the definition of courage in Book IV. 429 B. : *δύναμις τῆς αἰσῆς, ἢ διὰ πάντος σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν.*

BOOK VI.

'We must next spend some time, not as much as I should wish, upon a study of the philosophic nature. I call a philosopher one who can grasp the continuity and coherent existence of things.'¹ So in our selection and education of philosophic natures, we must first be sure that they desire to know things which have a real and continuous existence, not those which are subject to flux and decay. Next, their nature must be truth-loving, lie-abhorring. Again, they would be devoted to the pleasures of the mind, and have little taste for sensual pleasures; from which it follows that they will not be ardent seekers of money: for they will despise the pleasures which money buys. They must also be magnanimous, with a disregard of death, gentle and just, fond of learning, with good memories.'

'I can say nothing against the method of your conclusion, Socrates,' said Adeimantus; 'but like a good chess-player you lead your man away little by little until these little diversions mount up to an overwhelming total. In this game of words I cannot beat you; but what I have to say is this, that those men whom we see round us studying philosophy continuously, so far from being the best citizens, turn out the most

¹ 'The eternal and unchangeable.'—JOWETT.

inferior, I will not say the worst. How then can these things be which you maintain?’

‘I will try and explain myself in a parable, Adeimantus,’ I said. ‘Picture to yourself a ship, steered by a helmsman, who in size and strength is vastly superior to the rest of the crew, but short-sighted and deaf and not well acquainted with navigation. And suppose that his crew are always struggling and fighting amongst themselves, and trying to get the helm of the ship into their own hands, either by force or fraud. And that they try to drug the helmsman, and gauge the characters of their fellow-sailors entirely by the consideration, whether they are quick at getting the helm out of the helmsman’s hands, or not. Such a position I imagine does the philosopher occupy in an ordinary state as the helmsman in such a ship as I describe. And the persons you describe as utterly worthless, who nevertheless affect philosophy, are like those sailors who without any knowledge or practice of navigation try to gain possession of the helm.

‘You recollect the different excellences requisite for a nature which is to become truly philosophic : these requisites are very rarely combined in the same person. And we must further inquire into the depreciation and degeneration of these natures. For the principle, *corruptio optimi pessima*, is unfortunately too true, and the more abilities a man has the worse he will be without training and principle.¹

‘It is not individual sophists who first corrupt noble

¹ We find the same sentiment insisted upon in the *Euthydemus*, page 281, D, through a number of instances:—‘Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ’, ἔφη, ὃ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι . . . ἔὰν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅσῳ δυνατότερα ὑπηρετεῖν ἡγουμένῳ κικῶ ὄντι.

natures, but the applause and the noise and the struggling of the world. In fact, if any young mind were to resist all these influences by its own strength we should be inclined to call it a miracle. For these paid professors are like men who might study the passions and desires of some great brute and know how to humour him, and were to call this study wisdom; having no regard for real wisdom and virtue, but judging everything by the likes and dislikes of the monster. In the same way do these sophists study the tastes and opinions of the vulgar and the many, who from their nature, are incapable of ever knowing realities and unities. So that a young man is sorely let and hindered if he have any tastes for philosophy by the tyrannical action of the world and the sophists; seeing that even if he persist in his natural bent, they will be up in arms against him, straining every nerve to keep out the truth. The result is that those of a noble and philosophic nature are prevented from studying philosophy, whilst inferior and vulgar minds leave their workshops and their trades and go philosophizing; just as if a little baldheaded journeyman were to come into a fortune, get washed and dressed up in fine clothes, and marry his master's daughter. What kind of offspring could be expected from such a union but bastards? and what sort of philosophy can be expected from those vulgar minds we speak of but inferior sophistry and false systems? So those men who would be philosophers, if they could stand against the overwhelming attacks of the world, give up the contest, and content themselves with looking calmly at the worry and bustle, taking care to do their own duty, like a man who stoops down under a wall to let a storm of dust and hail pass over him.

'Now in what sort of a state can a philosopher

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have fair play? Not in any that we know of. But we must have a training and an atmosphere for our youths the very reverse of that at present existing. Boys approach philosophy in its most difficult aspect in the intervals of other studies, and soon throw it aside for the rest of their lives; with the exception of a few who continue it quite by the way,¹ and think a good deal of themselves for continuing it at all. But we should have the rudiments of philosophy taught at an earlier age, and we should amplify the training of the mind whilst it is approaching its greatest development. And when bodily strength begins to fail, our citizens should devote all their mental activity to philosophy, treating everything else as of secondary importance. And whether our plan succeed or not, is not the question, as long as we are persuaded that our principle is good; in fact, I do not look for very great opposition from the majority, who, I believe, are usually traduced, and after all are only misled by ranters and pseudo-philosophers. This then is the way towards realising our perfect state; and we must try to make it clear to the majority that men must be philosophic, and the philosophers must rule in the State. Nor will it be impossible for even a single man to bring a whole city into a condition of obedience to this maxim.

‘Now we said that the philosopher must be fond of learning and of a keen nature withal, that he must be physically as well as intellectually able; two requisites hard to find united in the same person. What then is he to make his study and his object? The Ideal Good; which is above and greater than even Justice itself. Most men are ignorant as to what is really good: they pursue that which appears to them to be

¹ πᾶρεργον.

good. Let us try to seek out the nature of this Ideal Good. The sense of seeing requires a medium through which the object of sight is seen, I mean light. And light is generated from the sun. The sight is not the sun, nor is the sun sight, but the one exists by means of the other, and beholds it. Conceive then the Ideal Good as standing in the same relation to the mind and the objects of thought, as the sun stands to the sight and the objects of sight. And as the shining of the sun enables our eyes to see things clearly before us, so that which brings truth and reality illumines the mind and gives rise to actual thought, and perception of the Truth and Reality themselves. They are not the Ideal Good, but partake of its form and its nature.¹ And as the sun is the author of life and growth, although not itself life and growth, so the Ideal Good is the author of real knowledge and real existence, yet superior even to existence itself.

‘And to make quite clear the relation between the different grades of knowledge and reality, imagine a line divided into two parts, and again another line divided into two parts, in the same ratio as the other. Let the first line represent the mental sphere, and the second line the sensual. The first section of the first line represents pure thought and its objects, viz. real existences²; and the second part represents thought which does not contemplate real existences, but copies of them as nearly as possible like the originals. Take, for instance, those squares and Circles and triangles about which mathematicians reason, which are not

¹ Cf. ‘He was not that light, but was sent to bear witness of that light.’—St. John i., where this same illustration of light is carried out at length.

² *Ideai.*

BOOK VII.

U 'Now picture to yourself,' I said, 'an underground cavern with a long exit to the upper air; and imagine that you see a number of people who ever since they were born have been chained neck and foot, so that they have always sat in the same position with their faces towards the inner wall of the cavern. Behind them, a long way off and above, a large bright fire is kindled, and between the fire and the prisoners runs a road, along which pass continually men carrying different objects; and between the road and the prisoners is a low wall, over which the fire casts their shadows on to the wall of the cavern facing which the prisoners sit. Will not these prisoners, if they can talk to each other, give names to the objects they see in the reflection on the wall? And will they not attribute the voices, if the men speak, to the different shadows?' 'Certainly,' he said. 'So that,' I continued, 'these shadows and echoes of the realities will be taken by the prisoners for realities themselves.'

'Next suppose that one of these prisoners is released from his chains and dragged up to the light of day by a rough and difficult path. Surely he will find everything hard to perceive, and will believe the shadows, with which he is better acquainted, to be the realities, and will be blinded by the light, and will hate the man

who dragged him up into it; and, if he is gradually educated and taught to understand and behold realities, he will first and most easily behold images in the water, reflections, and other things not far removed in their nature from his shadows: he will see better by night than by day.

‘If he ever become completely enlightened he will think himself fortunate in having escaped his dungeon, and he will pity his former fellow-prisoners, and will despise any good things he may have enjoyed there as worth nothing in comparison with what he now enjoys. Again, were he to revisit the cave, he would find his eyes unaccustomed to its darkness, and would be looked upon as good for nothing, even if, before, he had been the quickest and the cleverest at perceiving the various shadows. Nay, if he tried to persuade the captives to come up and be enlightened, they would ill-treat him and perhaps kill him.

‘Transferring all this image to the actual world, I liken men who have gone into the upper air and contemplated the realities, of which the captives only see the shadows, I liken them to men who have made an approach to the Ideal Good. Thus, following out the parable, when such men are called back to the world from that contemplation, it is small wonder if they fail, and are jeered, and worsted, in the petti-fogging affairs of ordinary life. A wise man, then, will recollect that there are two ways of making a mistake; as we might say according to our parable, either from having too much light in the eye or too little. And, in accordance with this view of thought and life, I do not agree with those who talk about “putting” knowledge into people; as if it were not there already, and only needed a proper training and a

proper atmosphere to draw it out. Other powers of the soul may have been acquired and may seem to have their nature akin to the bodily powers, but the power of comprehension seems to have something of a divine and original nature which it never loses, however much it may be dulled.

'Therefore our education must make our chosen citizens move towards the contemplation of the Ideal Good and the Really Existing; and, remembering that they are for the people and not the people for them, they must be content to go amongst them and lead them towards that light and knowledge which they themselves have acquired.

'And for this education, or drawing round of the mind towards light and knowledge, our former methods of gymnastic and music will not suffice. Let us take some general science, such as arithmetic or calculation, and see if they must be experts in it. First let me premise that all objects of perception and thought are either excitative or non-excitative, i.e. either they suggest something else, or they do not. For instance, finger. That does not suggest any other fact. But first finger, or long finger, suggest respectively second finger, short finger, and so on. The perception therefore of length, or priority, is the same as that of shortness, or duality; and is, as we might say, a double sense. But the actual vision only sees one object, and may therefore be called a single sense. Now the science of number is essentially excitative: we are continually seeing objects which the sight takes in as one and the same, whilst the mind teaches us to look upon them as one and

¹ v. s. Book IV. *init.* οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἕσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα ὄλη ἡ πόλις.

as many at the same time. Therefore the science of number, being excitative of thought, appears to be necessary for our further developed education. And they will not treat the science in a trafficking way, but will investigate the properties of pure number.

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 'Our citizens will find this science of great use also in warfare; geometry too will be good for the same purpose, which they must study, if we find that it also conduces to the knowledge of the Ideal Good and real existence. Now the objection that geometry is only useful when applied practically is absurd; for then it is knowledge applied to things that come and go, that are made and perish. Whilst our study of geometry will be primarily directed to the knowledge of that which is eternal and not perishable. Therefore let us teach our citizens geometry. After geometry shall we take astronomy, i.e. solids in motion? Or ought we not rather to pass to solids first, i.e. bodies of cubic content? The fact is that the science of three dimensions is so little understood and practised that we must say we will have it taught if our city will; and so we pass on to astronomy. By astronomy I do not mean lying on your back and staring upwards to the heavens, or lying on your face and staring downwards. I understand that science which teaches us about real existence in the study of the heavenly bodies, and draws the intelligence upwards in an intellectual, not a physical, sense. The student of philosophy will study the motions of stars, sun, and moon, the flight of seasons and years, as they point to a unity and a coherent design of a perfect Creator.

X
 'Should we not seek for some science which stands to our hearing in the same relation as astronomy to seeing? I mean the science of harmony; not the practice of

worrying and torturing musical instruments, twisting the head on one side, dragging unwilling notes from more unwilling strings, and disputing about demi-semi-tones. But that there is a science of harmony worth studying for our citizens I am sure.

'All these sciences form but the preface and prelude to the business of life for our citizens. And this is a law, viz. that they shall be able to comprehend an account, and give an account of all that they ought to know. And Dialectic is the master science which effects this, and gives the mind the power to free itself from every-thing sensual, and move straight on through argument to the actual nature of things and to the Ideal Good.

All the other studies and arts we have mentioned before merely correspond to the process of accustoming the released prisoner's eyes to the sight of shadows and reflections. Even those sciences we have just now mentioned as indispensable to the education of our citizens have been treated in an inadequate manner, and not so as to conduce towards the knowledge of real existence. For men have been unable to give a rational account of them and have ignored their first principles. Dialectic, on the contrary, moves upwards towards first principles of science, directing the eye of the soul to the source of true knowledge; and uses these arts, which we have called sciences in deference to custom, as props and helps in its progress. It is in fact the coping stone and perfection of all studies.

'Now we must be very careful in the choice of those who are to enter upon this highest course of study. We must be sure that they have a congenial nature and will take pains and pleasure in the subject. For intellectual labour which is found only compulsory, and brings no pleasure to the student, is worth nothing.

They must begin from boyhood to study arithmetic and geometry, but compulsion must be avoided; rather let each mind develop itself in its congenial channel; for in this way we can best judge in what direction we are to employ them. And the quickest in work of all kinds and on critical occasions are to be selected for the higher education; when the gymnastic period, of two or three years, is over. And then we shall distinguish these above their fellows, and begin to teach them the general connection between the different lines of study, and their general bearing upon real knowledge and real existence. At thirty years of age we shall again make a selection from these students, and advance the best to further honours. But we must beware of the free-thinking which dialectic brings with it, and try to prevent the former landmarks from being swept away. Put the case in a parable thus: A child is brought up from his infancy with parents whom he is taught to love and respect, as being his own, when they are not really so; and he is also surrounded with flatterers. If he discover his true relationship, or rather non-relationship, he will lose his respect and love for his supposed parents and pay more attention to his flatterers. So are we brought up to believe this and that honourable and just, until the age of scepticism, i.e. inquiry, comes and asks "What is the just?" "What is honourable?" And then, with the exception of strong and noble minds, men fall back upon the pleasures which have played the part of the flatterer, and fail in their allegiance to justice and honour. To prevent this from being the case in our city, the study of dialectic and the inquiry into the real nature of things will be consummated only late in life; in fact the youths will not be allowed to approach it at all,

except by the study of the preliminary sciences. Let us therefore place five years, or about twice the number of those given up to gymnastic, as the proper time to be allotted for the study of dialectic. After this period they must return to the cave and take their place as instructors in war and other business for, say, fifteen years.

‘And when they have earned their discharge from the duty of assisting their fellow-citizens in the routine of life, they may at last be admitted to the end and aim of their training, the contemplation of absolute existence, and the pure study of actual knowledge; allowing a short time, turn by turn, for the performance of political duties. And when they die they will go to the islands of the Blest, and will leave an honourable memory of their life and services in the city. All this is not impossible, but it is hard to compass; and our means of facing the difficulty will be to ignore the present generation, and apply ourselves to those who are young enough to receive new ethical impressions.

BOOK VIII.

and
translating
Oligarchy
democracy
tyranny

'We have now composed our State, and its different grades of citizens have been discussed, and we have agreed that everything in it which relates to men applies equally to women. But we have been diverging from the original question in these last discussions.' 'Yes,' said Glaucon, 'you were going to speak of the different modes in which the actual city of the present day is a degeneration from our ideal city. And you said that there were four kinds. What are these?' 'First,' I said, 'there is the Cretan or Laconian, which has the highest reputation, then oligarchy, a state full of evils, next democracy, and lastly that fine *régime* they call a despotism.¹ Let us then, with these five kinds of States before us, investigate the characters which severally correspond to them.

'We can omit the just and noble man, who corresponds to our Ideal State, for he has been fully discussed already. Next to him comes the ambitious and emulous man, corresponding to the Cretan State. And then we might pass in review the other characters, corresponding to the other three States, so that when we have studied injustice in its fullest development we may compare it with justice, and make up our minds whether to believe Thrasymachus or not. And following our former method

¹ τυραννίς.

we had better first study the several States which correspond to these men, so gaining a clearer understanding of the men themselves.

'Change in a State arises from dissension in the governing part: where the governing part is unanimous no disturbance is possible.¹ But the origin of the disturbance will lie in a disregard of the proper season of reproduction. This season should properly depend upon a fixed number calculated to an exact result; and if this number be calculated wrongly there will be irregularity in the birth of our children. And this irregularity will show itself as the children grow up and are appointed by selection to posts of difficulty and danger. For they will fail to retain the proper opinion about musical study, about crises, and about moderation, and, according to our fiction, the gold will have become alloyed with silver, bronze, and iron. The inferior part will draw their minds to base gain, while the superior continues to draw them upward towards the proper object of life. Hence they will begin to strive with each other, to appropriate land and houses to their private use, and to enslave those whom they ought to protect against slavery. And such a State lies midway between aristocracy and oligarchy. But there will still be respect for government, the defending portion will

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.* v. 10, objects to this statement, on the ground that time changes all things. He also objects that this disregard of proper seasons is not peculiar to the dissolution of the *'Αριστη πολιτεία*. And thirdly, he states that the progress of degeneration does not pass regularly through these five stages, but that often a monarchy will change at once to a democracy, or an oligarchy to a despotism. And another objection is that Plato does not tell us what happens after the despotism. And lastly, that although the forms of oligarchy and democracy are diverse, Socrates treats them as one.

still abstain from other business, and there will be medals in common. Yet there will be a reluctance to appoint the cleverest to govern, because the clever will now have become unprincipled, and men will lean towards the spirited and pugnacious to be their leaders. Greed of gain and of private fortune will spring up, concealment, and eluding of the law, and greater honour will be paid to gymnastic than to music. Next, the man who corresponds to such a state as this.' 'He will be something like Glaucon,' said Adeimantus, 'if he is emulous.' 'Perhaps he will,' I said; 'he will also sink a little below the intellectual standard, but will be fond of study, obedient, no orator, rough to slaves, gentle to his peers, and very fond of rule, of praise, of gymnastic, and of hunting; and as he grew up a love of money, would develop in him. Such is our timocratic youth. And such men as he is arise in the following way: when a man, nobly born, retires into private life disgusted with the bad state of politics, and pays no attention to the pomps and vanities of the world. Then his wife, finding that she is nobody, as her husband holds no public office, and pays little attention to her for good or for ill, grows discontented. And the servants say to the sons of the family, "When you grow up you can pay off this man, or you can do all that your father neglects to do." Such a youth, and one born of such a father, will find himself dragged in different directions by the two inclinations—the philosophical, inherited from his father, prompting him to peace and retirement, and the concupiscent, on the other hand, and the spirited, leading him into politics and a life of action; from which conflicting motives he will finally become ambitious, emulous, and high-minded.

'Next after the timocratic or ambitious city will come

the oligarchy. The cause of degeneration here is the "auri sacra fames" in the citizens and their wives. For riches and virtue are like the opposite pans of a balance: as one goes up the other goes down. So our citizens, instead of being praise-loving or virtue-loving, will become money-loving. The rich will monopolise all government and honours, of whatever character they themselves may be, poor men will be ill-treated, and there will be two cities in one, a sure sign of dissolution. In war, for instance, this disunion will appear in the reluctance of the rich to put arms in the hands of the poor, for fear the poor should turn upon them. And tradesmen and farmers will sell their plant, which others will acquire who have no business with it, and thus a useless rabble will be turned loose upon the city, with nothing to do except raise sedition. If you see drones in a hive, you know that there are some bees with stings as well as those without; and in the same way in a city where you see beggars, there are sure to be thieves and cut-purses, sacrilegious and abandoned people. Now in an oligarchical city the beggars are numberless, and by analogy we should expect to find thieves and robbers there also. Next, to speak of the man corresponding to this State. His father has met with the worst misfortune of all kinds in public life; he has been general in a war, has failed, been impeached, fined, imprisoned, banished, or what not. And these misfortunes have quite driven all love of honour and all spirit out of the son's head, who applies himself sedulously to scrape money together. In his soul the concupiscent and covetous element is the honoured and unquestioned lord. He will satisfy those desires which we call necessary, but will not spend his money on the others, for them he will keep in subjection. He has no

culture, and therefore all those drone-like vices are incipient in him, even if repressed; he would defraud a ward, for instance, and take any other opportunity of doing evil with impunity. He would have two natures, therefore, within him, and on the whole the better powers would be masters of the inferior, although not through any virtuous principle, but merely because such a man shuns indulgence as expensive.

After this comes Democracy. And the change from Oligarchy arises through an excess of present advantage, I mean the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. For we have those stinged creatures, the men burdened with debts, and smarting under disgrace and political disabilities, ready to fall upon the rich class, and anxious for revolution. And the rich money-making, money-lending class increase the liabilities of their victims, stinging with their usury and filling the city with drones, i.e. beggars. There is no check on this malady, no law to prevent a man from converting his goods and his means into ready money; whilst the rulers make all they can out of the ruled, and bring up their own families in luxury. When these two classes meet, on the road, in war, at public games, on board ship, the poor man learns that it is not an unmixed advantage after all to be rich; he sees the rich man fat and unwieldy, whilst he himself is wiry and agile; and he consequently despises him as good for nothing. And a very slight occasion will serve to bring these two opposing elements into actual war. Then ~~the poor conquer, and make a re-distribution of property, and a democracy is formed~~. How, then, will such a State fare? First there will be free license for every man to acquire what he likes and to live as he likes; and the State will be a wonderfully variegated production, such as some

people, women and children, for instance, especially admire. It is the city of all men, for every one can suit his own taste if he come here; a man can do just what he pleases. If you wish to go to war, your neighbour is not bound to agree with you; if you are prevented from this or that by law, you can set the law aside. Democracy, in fact, means anarchy.

The democratic man is the son of the oligarchic man, whom we have already described as money-making. The son will follow his father in keeping down those desires which are not imperative. By imperative or necessary desires I mean those of which we cannot be rid, which benefit us by being satisfied, such as the desire of eating, whilst those which do us no good and can be repressed by means of training I call unnecessary, of which we may mention a fondness of delicate food for an example. The change from the oligarchic to the democratic nature is as follows: the son was brought up in a frugal manner on the honey which the father accumulated, and afterwards makes the acquaintance of gay and brilliant sparks who have carried the science of pleasure to a wonderful perfection. Then there arises in him a sedition, between the careful oligarchic temper and the pleasure-seeking and prodigal; and sometimes the former is in the ascendant, sometimes the latter. And if certain desires are driven out their place is soon filled up by others, perhaps worse, because in such a man there is nothing, such as intellectual tastes, to fill the void. So the citadel of his soul is won by base pleasures and wrong opinions. These base pursuits drive away honour, and temperance, and propriety, and flaunt anarchy, incontinency, and pride, in their stead. And the man who has thus lost the right opinion treats

¹ αἰθρῶσι θεηρῶσι καὶ δεινῶσι, carrying on the metaphor.

all pleasures alike, and indulges them indiscriminately. First he spends his time in drinking and playing, then he veers round and drinks nothing but water; sometimes he practises gymnastics and next does nothing at all; again he becomes a politician and jumps up to say the first thing that comes into his head; he is

‘Everything by starts, and nothing long.’

X If he sees another engaged in making money, he will make money; if another is going to the war, he will go too. In short his life and his tastes are universal.

X The finest State of all and the finest man now remain I mean the despotism and the despot. As excess of wealth turned oligarchy into democracy, so excess of liberty turns democracy into despotism. For men, such as we have described in a democratic city, intimidate the rulers and make them do as they wish, and not follow the law strictly: they uphold servile rulers and decry just ones. All relations are disturbed and reversed, sons usurp their father's prerogatives, and fathers are afraid of their sons.¹ Strangers usurp the place of the citizens, masters fawn upon their pupils, and pupils have no regard for their masters. Elders throw aside their grave and serious bearing, and ape the lightness and flippancy of youth, and slaves are as free as their purchasers: whilst the very animals are imbued with this spirit of ultra-freedom and strut about pushing people off the pathways. So free must every one be that they disregard all law, and will call no one master. On the principle, then, of reaction, this ultra-freedom

¹ Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1331, 1332:—

ΣΤ. τὸν πατέρα τύπτεις;

ΦΕ.

κάποφανῶ γε νῆ Δία

ὡς ἐν δίκῃ σ' ἔτυπτον.

will result in an ultra-slavery, somewhat in the same way that we establish the principle *corruptio optimi pessima*; although it must be remembered that this surfeit of freedom is not "the best," for it is possible to have too much of a good thing.¹ The change will begin in the persons of those men whom we likened to the drones of the hives, some of them having stings and others stingless, in the oligarchic State; but in the democratic this class will be much stronger. So the strongest of these drones will do all the speaking and working in politics, and the inferior drones will buzz about the tribune and prevent any one from being heard in opposition, except a very few. Then there are the rich on which the drones subsist, and a third class, viz. the mechanics and journeymen, who are always ready to combine if they see an opportunity of plunder. And if the rich try to defend themselves they are called bad citizens and oligarchical, a false accusation which makes them really become so. And the people set up a champion in opposition to them, who is the germ of the despot. And such a man is like to him who once tastes human blood, as in the story of Zeus Lycaeus in Arcadia, and must become a wolf. For if he once become involved in prosecutions and judicial murder, he will go on from bad to worse, banishing, killing, proclaiming abolition of debt and redistribution of land. Then he is perhaps expelled and re-installed by force, and his hand is against all who helped to drive him out. The next step is that he is obliged to ask the people to give him a body-guard, and when he has obtained this,

¹ Cf. *Euthydemus*, xxv. where the sophist is trying to make Ctesippus advance the contrary proposition; *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέη, πίνειν ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πλείστον δεῖ πίνειν, εἰ σεργ.*

the despotism stands forth complete. And the people do not say of their champion, "How are the mighty fallen!" but the champion is now a full-blown despot.

X ' At first he is mild and gentle, and his measures are all in the direction of lightening the people's burdens, but as he goes on he finds it necessary to stir up war so that he may keep up his character of champion, and impoverish the people by war-taxes to prevent their rising against him. And if any of his friends speak out his mind against these practices he will have to remove him, and so he will become the enemy of any magnanimous, prudent, or wealthy man. And as physicians remove all the evils of the body and encourage the development of what is good, the tyrant will remove all the good and leave the evil. He will defend himself with foreign mercenaries and with freed men. Hence we may see the mistake of Euripides and of poets in general who commend despotisms and democracies, and encourage people towards them, although they naturally are well rewarded for their encomiums by those whom they panegyrised. The despot will plunder sacred treasure, confiscate the property of those whom he has exiled, and spend his own inheritance in riotous living with male and female companions. And the people that has begotten the despot will have to keep him, and it will be of no use to them to say that it is not right for a child when he grows up to be a burden to his father, and that they did not help him forward as their champion that he might collect a pack of idle knaves about him, who devour the citizen's substance. Nay, he will strike his father and treat him as a son should not; and the people trying to escape out of the frying-pan of slavery will fall into the fire

of despotism, which is after all the worst kind of slavery. This, then, is the change from democracy to tyranny.¹

¹ With this simile of the son illtreating the father, may be compared a considerable part of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, v. ll. 1321, *seqq.* In Xenophon, *Mem.* 1, 2, 49, the charge is noticed against Socrates, as in the passage referred to in the *Clouds*, that he encouraged the very vices which he condemns here and in Book II. page 378 B.

BOOK IX.

X 'WE now come to speak of the despot himself and how he arises. But first I should wish to define more exactly the differences of pleasure. Some of those pleasures which I called unnecessary appear to be distinctly criminal; the desire of them arises very frequently in sleep, when the rational faculty is dormant, and we imagine ourselves doing the worst actions without compunction. Now the more temperate a man's actions are when waking, the more rational will be his dreams. The democratic man, if you remember, was he who had deserted the parsimony of his oligarchic father, and on making acquaintance with dissipated men, and lived a life midway between luxury and miserliness. The son of this democratic man will be brought up between two opposing forces; viz. the advice of his father and of a part of the household, to live a moderate life, and the incitements of others of the household who draw him on to all kinds of pleasures and expenses. If these triumph in the city of his soul, they are like the drone's sting, they kill any honourable and temperate inclinations that may yet survive, and they fill the soul with madness and license. Thence come feasting, revellings, and dissipations of all sorts, which drain his income; and to supply funds for their continuance there

must be loans and embezzlement, and defrauding of his family, perhaps with violence, and his old and dear parents will perhaps be thrown aside and ill treated and disregarded, in the interest of some acquaintance of an hour. And from such crimes it is but a short step to robbery and sacrilege. If there are but a few of such men in a city, they commit crimes of various gravity, and perhaps they become informers, and take and give bribes; but they are a mere trifle compared with the *régime* of a despot. For he is generated by an excessive number of such men in a city; who put forward the most despotically-minded of them all, and he grinds down his father-city, or, as the Cretan phrase goes, his mother-city under, and by means of his young companions. Such a man is never on terms of friendship and equality with any one, he either flatters and fawns, or else he bullies: he has no honour or magnanimity, he is full of injustice, he is unreliable, and the longer he lives the worse he becomes. So the despot will become a most unhappy man, and will be exactly opposed to the monarch, and the monarchical state will be the best. Therefore let us glance also at the rest of the despotical State, to gain a clear and true notion of the whole growth of a despotism, and specially at the inner and unvarnished life of the despot himself.

To speak of the State first: all that is best in it will lie in the most abject slavery, and similarly in the man's soul, his noblest nature will be in slavery to his worst. And as the despot is a spendthrift and a lustful man, the soul of the despotical man will be continually poverty-stricken and continually craving. Is he not then the most wretched of all men? No. It is the despot himself, (the despotical man who comes forward

and lives a public life, who is the most wretched.¹ Let us consider the life of those private individuals who have the greatest external resemblance to the tyrant, viz. those who possess many slaves. Now of these slaves they have no fear, why? Because the whole city is full of free men like themselves, and the union of them all is strength. But imagine a single free man with his whole family and household suddenly transported to a desert place,—where would his safety be? Would he not be obliged to fawn upon his slaves, to free them, to give them all they asked for? Or put a case of this sort. Imagine a man surrounded on all sides by neighbours who would not brook the slightest injury to any of their number, but would inflict the greatest penalties on him if he attempted to harm them. Such a life does the despotical man lead, and in such intimidation does he live, fearing even to show himself outside his house, and living more like a woman than a free man. But his worst lot is to come forward in public, for then he is like a man with an unsound body, which is compelled to fight and strive with other bodies, although most unfit for the task. The despot will be of all men most hateful, wicked, odious, friendless, impious, and will make others as bad as himself. And the different kinds of men will follow in this order of descent, beginning from the monarchical; the timocratic, oligarchic, the democratic and despotical.

‘Let us try and gain the same result by a different method; and let us recollect the triple division of the

¹ Socrates is careful to insist upon the difference between the despot and the despotical man. Glaucon is deceived by Socrates' proposal in 557 B. *κελεύοιμεν εξαγγέλλειν, πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος*. But, to discover the condition of the *τύραννος*, Socrates will pass first through a description of the condition of the *τυραννικός ιδιώτης*.

soul, into rational, spirited and concupiscent. The last
 may be retained and called the money-loving element,
 because money is the means by which the sensual
 pleasures are gratified, and the second we may call the
praise-loving or strife-loving element, and the first the
knowledge-loving. Now each man in whom one of
these elements predominates will praise the pleasures
proper to that element, and despise those of the other
two. Which then are we to believe? Surely the man
who has the most experience, good sense, and logic. And
the knowledge-loving man will have more experience
than the other two, for he has, or may have, tried the
pleasures which they commend, and found them wanting,
before he went on to the pleasure of studying truth and
real existence. He will also be a more sensible man,
and have greater command of logic, for logic is the
science of gaining knowledge. On all points, then, the
knowledge-loving man is the best judge of what pleasure
really is: next, he who loves praise, and lastly he who
loves money.

'The just man has thus thrown the unjust man twice.'¹
 Let us try a third method. You know that people when
 they are in pain look back upon their past condition of
 painlessness with a feeling that it was pleasure compared
 with their present condition of pain. And when, after
 pleasure, there comes a cessation from pleasure, people
 imagine the absence of pleasure to be pain.² In fact
there is a middle state, neither pleasure nor pain, and
the pleasure or pain of this middle state is only apparent.

¹ See again, Ar. *Clouds*, ll. 889, *seqq.* where the Just and Unjust cause contend, the latter being victorious.

² Imitated by Sir Thomas More, *Utopia*, p. 114, ed. Arber. 'For thys (viz. the quiete and upryghte state of the body), yf it be not letted nor assaulted with no greif, is delectable of itself, thoughe it be moued with no externall or outwarde pleasure.'

not real. But there are real pleasures, which arise out of no cessation from pain, e.g. the pleasures of smell, which leave no feeling of pain upon their removal. Real pleasure and real pain are not the absence of pain and pleasure respectively, which form most of those states called bodily pleasures, pleasures of anticipation, and so forth. We may parallel this fact by picturing to ourselves something below and something above a fixed point midway between the two. The mid-point seems to be the upper point to the lowest, and the lower point to the upper: whereas it is really midway. And if you put gray beside white it looks black, or if you put it beside black it looks white. Now hunger, thirst, and feelings of this sort, are a sort of emptiness of the body, which their satisfaction fills up, and if you grant that the satisfaction of a void in knowledge and right opinion is more true and real than the satisfaction of a void in man's stomach (inasmuch as knowledge and right opinion partake more of the nature of real existence than the life of the body) it will follow that the pleasure experienced in the satisfaction or filling up of ignorance with knowledge will be a more real thing than that experienced in gratifying bodily desires and emptinesses. Those men, therefore, who know neither virtue nor good sense, wander all their lives about this middle or colourless region, experiencing no true pleasure, and they live the life of brutes, in endless gorging, indulgence, and strife. And their loves, and hates, and wars will all be concerned with shadows, as Stesichorus sings of the image of Helen, about which the Greeks fought at Troy.

'Passing on to analyse the praise-loving or ambitious nature can we not account for it on the same principle? Is there not a void in the soul which is filled and

satisfied, according to the man's nature, by honours and victory and the exercise of spirit? Now in so far as any of the money-loving or praise-loving desires follow science and reason, they obtain true pleasure: what then shall we say of the knowledge-loving part, which makes science and reason its only pursuits? Therefore in man's soul, as long as each part pursues its own pleasures, and as long as the proper relation is preserved between the three parts, and we do not have one interfering with another, the man's life will be harmonious and happy. So the despot, since the worst and most unreal form of pleasure is master within his soul, will live most unhappily, and the kingly man, who gives the pursuit of true pleasure the first place, will live the happiest life possible. Let us try to estimate the gulf between them. The despot is three times removed from the oligarchical man, and the oligarchic man also three times from the kingly man. Hence the despot is thrice three times removed from the kingly or aristocratic man, and from true pleasure and happiness. So, to put it arithmetically, and taking six powers of three, we find that the kingly man is seven hundred and twenty-nine times as happy as the despot.

'Let me ask you now to exercise your imagination once more, thus: A being is composed of three parts, the first, of a sort of hydra, having the heads of all kinds of beasts, wild and tame; the second, a lion; the third, a man. All these different parts are grown together, so that they make one creature. But around them all and including them all there is the external appearance of a man. Now, suppose that this man allows the brutal and bestial natures within him to have the upper hand of the human nature, and to quarrel, and to do exactly as the passing mood bids them, whilst the

human part is starved and reduced. Surely one who praises injustice would say that such would be the proper life for this creature to lead: whilst a man who loves justice would advise that the tame parts of the hydra be developed and the wild ones suppressed; that the leonine nature be won over to ally itself with the human, and harmony be attained in the whole body of the creature. In such an image as this we might express the history of man's composite nature. When a man commits a crime for the sake of money or does any evil act voluntarily, he is letting loose the bestial nature within him, and when he is cruel and desperate he gives the leonine part of his soul undue prominence. Or again, when he turns fawner and flatterer, he is trying to turn the noble lion within him to an ape. Therefore rule is salutary—the rule of the better; for the better rules for the good of the whole polity. That is the reason of our governing children, and not permitting them to think for themselves, till they by careful training come to years of discretion, because they do not when young understand the superiority of the rational or the inferiority of the sensual. He then that forgets not to keep his inferior nature in subordination to his superior, will gain temperance and justice and sense: he will give honour to study as the means of acquiring this temperament, he will not even make good health and strength his object, if it be incompatible with temperance; nor honours, unless he think that he will be the better for them.' 'Tis an ideal,' said Glaucon. 'Ah!' I said, 'it is an ideal, but one to which he would be always looking.'¹

¹ v.s. 472 and 473, e.g. εἰν οἱοί τε γενώμεθα εὐρεῖν ὡς ἐν ἐγγ'τατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλις οἰκήσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γενέσθαι, ἀ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις.

BOOK X.

'I SHOULD wish to say a few more words on the subject of poetry and imitation,—in short, to reject that poetry which partakes of the imitative. When a man makes a bed, or a table, he makes it with regard to a pattern or example.¹ He does not make the pattern, he uses the pattern to guide him. And any man can, in a sense, make everything; for instance if you reflect anything in a mirror, you make it, so to speak, and a painter, when he paints, makes objects in another sense. Now in the case of a bed the pattern is really the original and most really existent bed; for that which the carpenter makes is only this bed or that, and not the universal bed. Hence there are three beds; first, the pattern and original of all, second, the physical specimen, made by the craftsman, thirdly, the copy of this latter, made by the painter. And notice that God, who is the maker of the original, has made it one and universal, whilst the others are indefinite in number.

It is just so with poetry and poetry writers; they are imitators three times removed from the original maker. And consider the question thus also. When you look at a bed from different points, it seems different, but it is really the same. Now painting, and imitative art generally, represent things as they appear, not as they

¹ ἰδέα.

are. Now the question arises, are we justified in giving Homer the reputation he enjoys at present in our State, the reputation of knowing all those things about which he sings? for if he and the other poets do not, they are deceivers of those whom they instruct. Surely, if they were well acquainted with those works and objects about which they sing, they would apply their energies to those works themselves and to those objects themselves, in order to leave behind them a substantial and enduring record of their labours.¹ So when the poet speaks about medicine we shall inquire if he ever healed any sick persons, or else ask what right he has to speak on the subject. Has he made any laws, as Lycurgus, given any city a constitution, as Solon, invented anything, as Thales and Anacharsis? No! Then perhaps he was useful during his lifetime in private life; laid down ethical rules, as Pythagoras did, which have formed the law of a sect. Not even this! Both Homer and Hesiod then could hardly have been able to teach men how to be virtuous, or they would never have been allowed to travel about singing their songs with a scanty remuneration. They would have been treated, on the contrary, like Protagoras of Abdera² and Prodicus of Ceos, who gained such a hold over those whom they taught, that their pupils never thought of doing the smallest thing without consulting them. Homer therefore, and all the poets, are the imitators not of virtue but of the shadows of virtue. And the painters are the same; for they do

¹ It is curious that Plato should have been so carried away by the favourite antithesis of λόγοι and ἔργα, as not to recognise in writings a more enduring work than the results of physical labour; especially with the writings of Homer and their influence before his eyes.

² For these two sophists v. the dialogue which bears Protagoras' name, 310 A.—316.

not consult with the maker of the things which they imitate, as they ought to do, if they wish to gain a good idea of it, before putting it on the canvas. Now it is granted that this sort of imitation is concerned with things three times removed from reality: things like shadows and reflections which seem different from what they really are, and are perceived by the most superficial of the senses; whilst the rational faculty discovers the true nature of things. Imitation then in painting is far removed from truth and reason, and consequently can be the originator of nothing sound and useful in us.

‘Next the imitation of poetry. Poetry represents action, intentional or unintentional, and the consequences of action: it represents men under the influence of complex and distracting thought. Now we know that when a man gives way to violent excitement, he does so under the influence of his sensual nature;¹ when he resists it, he is moved by the law of reason.² And the more a man resists the effects of excitement the more temperate and the better he becomes. What good and temperate man then will care to imitate, especially in the publicity of a theatre, the abandonment of self-restraint, as expressed in the writings of the poets? Will not any wise man think that it is hard enough to keep a check upon his own passions without imitating other people’s passions as well, and thereby bringing the mind into a relaxed and excitable condition?³

¹ Πάθος.

² λόγος καὶ νόμος.

³ With this view of theatrical and poetical works should be compared Aristotle’s view in *Poetic* 5. He justifies the exciting properties of tragedy as being a purgative: δι’ ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Notably in the case of pity and fear the wise man will refrain from exciting himself by studying or representing the excitement of others. And he will shun excessive indulgence in laughter for fear of becoming flippant; and generally avoid the fiercer lusts of the flesh. Homer then as a hymn-writer and panegyrist shall be welcome in our State, but otherwise we will have nothing to say to him, although we may allow him to be the best poet and the first tragedian. And before any poet can be admitted he must make a defence of poetry in prose, to prove that it is salutary.'

'After all we have not yet spoken of all the rewards of virtue. It would be an endless task,' he said. 'And why should not our task be endless,' I said, 'in the case of an immortal being?' 'What do you mean?' he said. 'I mean,' said I, 'that our soul is immortal, and I will try to prove it. Every existing thing is liable to corruption, the body has its sicknesses and diseases, plants have their blight, metals rust, and all things go from better to worse. It is some evil which destroys, not a good, nor even a neutral; whilst the good preserves each thing of which it is a good. Injustice, ignorance, intemperance are the corrupters of the soul, just as disease corrupts the body. Bad food and poison do not directly destroy the body; but they produce in it a corruption, which corruption directly destroys it. According to this analogy, then, unless the corruption of the body implant a corruption of soul in the soul, we can never imagine that the soul is destroyed by a foreign evil without any evil of its own. But it does not appear that a bad condition of body can exert any influence of the sort upon the soul. A man is not the more wicked because he dies of a malignant fever. Nor does a life of wickedness make a man mentally

incapable; but rather sharpens his wits. Hence the soul is not destroyed by its own corruption, as the body is; neither is it, of course, destroyed by the corruption of other existences. Therefore it exists for ever; or is immortal. Neither can it grow less if nothing of it is destroyed; nor greater, for that would imply the addition of something mortal. To look at the soul as it exists in the world and human life, is to look at it with all its accretions and disfigurements, like the representations of the sea-god Glaucos, beaten, and bruised, and broken by the waves, with shells, and seaweed, and stones, sticking to his body; and more like a beast than a god. Such is the soul, beset with its thousand ills. We should, on the contrary, try to look to the philosophical history of the soul, its real, its immortal, and its divine nature, raising it out of this sea of troubles and removing all the accretions of the world, and the forms and feelings of human life which cloud and dim its clearness.

‘We have not yet spoken of the advantages and rewards of justice. I beg you to give me back the loan you received from me on that point, I mean, my admission, for the sake of the better stating of your case,¹ that a just man may be, and often is, considered to be unjust, and *vice versa*. Now I think it has been shown that in the first place the gods have no doubt about the just and the unjust. And if so, the gods must give him good fortune whom they know to be just, however much it may appear to be the reverse at the moment. And, in regard of his fellow-man, although the unjust may for the time appear to be carrying everything before him, like those who in a race rush off with the lead, yet, as those runners often run them-

¹ v. s. Book II. *mit.*—367 E.

selves out and come in far behind at the end, so the unjust will be found wanting at the end of his career, and the truth of the proverb 'Honesty is the best policy,' will be established. One point yet remains to be settled. What are the rewards of justice and injustice after death? I will try and tell you briefly; no long story of Alcinous, but of a man named Er, a Pamphylian. This man died on the field of battle, and was taken up on the twelfth day to be burnt on the pyre, when he suddenly revived, and told how he had gone in company with many other souls, to a strange place, where there were two rifts in the earth, close together, and other two over against them in the heaven. Between these sat judges, who bade the just take the right-hand path upwards, and the unjust the left-hand and downward path. But him they told to observe carefully; for he was to return to earth, and tell men what things he had seen done there. So he saw the souls departing as I have said through these two rifts, one in earth and the other in heaven; and he saw them rising from the other rift in the earth covered with dirt and dust, and coming down from the rift in the heaven pure and clean. Here in a meadow there was a great meeting;—those from the earthly rift told how they had been wandering for a thousand years in pain, whilst those from the heavenly rift spoke of the transcendent pleasure they had enjoyed. In short, for each offence the penalty was tenfold, and for each good work a tenfold reward likewise. And greater penalties even than these for impiety and murder, and greater rewards in proportion for piety. He heard a question asked about Ardiæus, despot of a Pamphylian city, who had committed foul crimes during his rule. And a soul answered that when Ardiæus, together with other despots and certain private men,

who had committed great crimes, arrived at the entrance of the upper rift, after their thousand years' suffering, there was a bellowing noise from the entrance, signifying that they were still too guilty to be received, and certain savage-looking, fiery-hot figures advanced, seized and bound them, flayed them, and carded them with thorns, proclaiming to all the crimes which had merited such punishment. But those for whom the entrance had no noise, went on in peace and joy, and, after staying for seven days in the meadow, on the eighth they went on their way; and on the fourth day after this they came to a pillar of light, stretching straight along earth and heaven, like a rainbow, very bright and very clear. This they reached after a day's journey; and there they saw the ends of it lashed with cords, forming as it were an undergirder to the circuit of the heaven. At these ends was the spindle of Necessity, the centre of all revolutions, whose shafts and hook are of adamant, and its whorl of composite construction. For it was as if hollow and of great size, with a smaller and similar one fitting in it, and another within this, making eight in all. Their rims are of different breadths, and their lights of different intensity and colour, and their revolutions of different speed. On each of them sits a siren singing in monotone, and the eight sounds produce a harmony. And the three daughters of Necessity sit singing to the music of the sirens; Lachesis sings what has been, Clotho what is, and Atropos what is to come. And they turn the spindle one after the other. Now these souls were obliged to proceed towards Lachesis; and a certain one took different lives and lots from Lachesis' lap and stood up and proclaimed aloud, "Thus says Lachesis, daughter of Necessity—choose ye what life ye will; ye are responsible; God is free." Then he

threw all the lots down and they chose, with the exception of Er, who was not allowed to choose. And there were lives of all kinds of men and animals. This then was the crisis, this was the difficult moment; and herein was the man fortunate who had studied the philosophy of life, and knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good; avoiding excess in both directions. And all, even the last, if he chose with discretion, might secure a happy and a peaceful life. Now the very first who chose, through his own folly and greed, selected the life of a great despot; and when he discovered what sort of a life he had chosen, he beat his breast, and bewailed not his own folly but the cruelty of fortune and of fate; whereas if he had gone about his choice in a quiet and philosophic spirit, he might not only have lived his earthly life in happiness, but afterwards have gone through the heavenly journey with comfort and pleasure. It was pitiful and sometimes ludicrous to see how the different choices were made, generally in some regard to the former life of each chooser. Orpheus, for instance, would be a swan, not wishing to be born of woman; Thamyrus, a nightingale; Telamonian Ajax, a lion; Agamemnon an eagle; Epeios, son of Panopeus, a workwoman; Thersites, a monkey. And last of all there came the soul of Odysseus; and he, for his toils and wanderings that he had undergone, chose rather to live the life of an obscure and humble man than any other. Many souls of animals, too, passed into men, and interchanged with each other. Then they were all led before Lachesis, and a spirit took each of them, and led them to drink of the water of Lethe, after Clotho had assigned their future to each, and Atropos had rendered it inevitable. And the wise drank less than the foolish, who forgot everything. Then they lay down to rest

and at midnight there were thunderings and an earthquake, and they were all shot up different ways to their birth, like shooting stars. But Er was prevented from drinking, and remembered nothing more, till he revived.

‘Such, Glaucon, is the story, which if we believe we shall do well, practise justice, believing the soul to be immortal, and at last arrive at that happy road which leads up to heaven, and spend our thousand years of wandering in happiness.’

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ,
ΘΡΑΣΤΜΑΧΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ.

CAP. I.

Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιᾶ / μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ 327
'Αρίστωνος, / προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ / καὶ ἅμα τὴν

CH. I.—*Socrates, walking home from Piræus, is induced to tarry at Polemarchus' house.*

τῇ θεῷ, sc. the Thracian Artemis, known as Bendis. So we have this festival termed τὰ Βενδιδεῖα: v. *infra* 354 A. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰσιτίσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδεῖοις. The temple of this goddess stood on the promontory Munychia. See Xen. Hell. 2, 4, 11, where Thrasybulus is described as posting himself on Munychia. From this passage it appears that there were two temples, one of the Munychian Artemis and one of Bendis. *ἔπειτα ἐχώρουν κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἄμαξιτον ἀναφέρουσαν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Φυλλῆς... συνεσπειράθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνυ-*

χίαν. οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἕστεως εἰς τὴν Ἴπποδάμειον ἀγορὰν ἐλθόντες πρῶτον μὲν συνετάξαντο, ὥστε ἐμπλήσαι τὴν ὁδὸν ἣ φέρει πρὸς τε τὸ ἱερόν τῆς Μουνυχίας Ἄρτεμιδος καὶ τὸ Βενδιδεῖον. The question suggests itself, Why do we find a Thracian goddess located in the heart of Athens' seaport? Traces of a connexion between Athens and Thrace appear in an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians, made in the time of Pericles, B.C. 431; the strength of which may be gauged by the fact that a Lacedæmonian embassy who tried to separate Sitalces from Athens were delivered up to the Athenians by him. Sitalces' son Sadocus also became at that time an Athenian

ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι | τίνα τρόπον ποιήσου-
 σιν | ἄτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες. | καλὴ μὲν οὖν μοι καὶ
 ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπὴ ἔδοξεν εἶναι, ἢ μέντοι ἦττον
 ἐφαίνεταιο πρέπειν ἦν οἱ Θυράκες ἔπεμπον | προσευξά-
 Βμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρήσαντες | ἀπῆμεν πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ.
 κατιδὼν οὖν πόρρωθεν | ἡμᾶς οἴκαδε ὠρμημένους |
 Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλου ἐκέλευσε δραμόντα τὸν

citizen. Thuc. 2, 29. Thucydides gives as the reason for this alliance the desire of the Athenians to gain a post in Thrace from which they could support their efforts in Chalcidonia and conquer Perdiccas; and although he is careful to point out that Teres, father of Sitalces, had nothing to do with Tereus of the legend, who was a Thracian and married an Athenian wife, it is probable that this myth was made use of by the Athenians in consummating their alliance with Sitalces.

τὴν ἑορτὴν..., τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν. The object of the dependent sentence is here drawn back from its proper grammatical position, because it is the most prominent thought in the mind of the speaker. So Ar. Nub. 1148—

καὶ μοι τὸν υἱόν, εἰ μεμάρηκε
 τὸν λόγον
 ἐκείνον εἴφ', ὃν ἀρτίως εἰσή-
 γαγες.

et infra ibid. 1186—

οὐ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τὸν νόμον

ἴσασιν ὀρθῶς, ὅ τι νοεῖ,

where the subject of the dependent sentence is treated similarly. The idiom is a very frequent one. See below, *δρᾶς οὖν ἡμᾶς, ὅσοι ἐσμέν*; and Chap. X. *εἰδέναί τὸ δίκαιον, ὅ τι ἐστίν*. For the sudden transition from

the past narrative tense to the simple future we may compare Herod. 2, 121, 9, *ὡς, ἐκείνων προορέων, ὅπως βίον ἀφθονον ἔχωσι, τεχνάσαιτο...* Also see Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 2, *ἐκ τούτου δὲ Φαρνάβατος φοβούμενος τὸ στράτευμα μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν στρατεύηται, ... ἐδεῖτο*— where the primary tense *στρατεύηται* accompanies the narrative tense *ἐδεῖτο*. This example, it may be noticed, also illustrates the use of the subject drawn back from the dependent sentence. Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4, *ἔφη οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσειν, εἰ ἡντῶ 33, ἔς τε δ' ἂν μόλωσιν, εἰς ἀφθονίαν παρέξειν ἔφη καὶ σῖτα καὶ ποτά.*

πομπή, the technical term for a religious ceremony involving a procession. See Ar. Acharnians 247.

καὶ μὴν καλὸν γ' ἐστ', ὃ
 Διδύμω δέσποτα,

κεχαρισμένως σοι τῆνδε τὴν
 πομπὴν ἐμὲ

πέμψαντα καὶ θύσαντα...

where the verb *πέμπω* is joined as here with *πομπή*.

ἀπῆμεν πρὸς, 'we were going towards'... so below, *οἴκαδε*, homewards. It is to be noticed here that Socrates goes through the religious service and festival like any other orthodox citizen, v. *Introd.*



10 παῖδα περιμεῖναι ἔ κελεύσαι. καὶ μοι ὄπισθεν ὁ
 παῖς λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου, | Κελεύει ὄπισθεν ὁ
 Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖναι. | καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστράφην τε
 καὶ ἠρόμην | ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη. Οὗτος, ἔφη, | ὄπισθεν
 προσέρχεται | ἀλλὰ περιμένετε | Ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν,
 15 ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαῦκων. | καὶ ὀλίγω ὕστερον ὁ τε Πολέ- C
 μαρχος ἦκε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαῦκωνος ἀδελ-
 φὸς καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικίου | καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, | ὡς ἀπὸ
 τῆς πομπῆς | ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἄστυ ἄρμῆσθαι | ὡς ἀπίοντες. | Οὐ
 20 γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις, | ἦν δ' ἐγώ. | Ὅρας οὖν ἡμᾶς,
 ἔφη, ὅσοι ἐσμέν; | Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; | Ἡ τοίνυν τούτων,
 ἔφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μένετ' αὐτοῦ. | Οὐκοῦν, ἦν

μου...λαβ...ίμ., 'taking hold of me by the robe from behind' —*ηματίου* is added afterwards, defining more exactly the word *μου*. Verbs, such as *λαμβάνομαι*, *ἄπτομαι*, *ἄρπάζω*, *ἔχομαι*, *ψάω*, take genitive of the thing caught hold of, or of the part of the thing. Thus Eur. Cycl. 322—

τένοντος ἀρπάσας ἀκροῦ ποδός,
 et 390, *inf.*—
 κ' ἐγὼ λαβοίμην τοῦ τυφλοῦντος ὄμματα
 δαλοῦ,

and Herod. 2, 121, 11, *ἔργου ἔχεσθαι*. So *ἀντιλαμβάνομαι*, *inf.* Ch. X. *in it.*, *Θρασύμαχος ... ἔργα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου*.

μετεστράφην ... ἠρόμην, distinguish these tenses.

Πολέμαρχος, said by Muretus to have been brother of Lysias the orator. *v. inf.* Ch. II. *in it.*

Νικήρατος. Muretus states that this Niceratus was a general in the Peloponnesian war; but Thucydides, to whom he refers, is silent upon the question.

ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς, in the same way above *ἔτε νῦν πρῶτον ἔγοντες*. These particles, joined with a participle, introduce a circumstance which defines more fully, or explains, the principal statement. See below 329 A, *ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ὡς μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι*. It must be distinguished from *ὡς* in the next sentence, which introduces a supposition, not a fact.

οὐ γὰρ... Fully expressed, the answer would be, 'You guess rightly, *for* (γὰρ) we are going homewards.' See Soph. O. T. 432-3—

TE. οὐδ' ἰκάνην ἔγωγ' ἐν, εἰ σὺ μὴ κάλεις.

OI. οὐ γὰρ τί σ' ἦδη μῶρα φωνήσαντ'.

i.e. 'It was not my fault that I called you, *for* I knew not,' &c.

οὐκοῦν, &c. Socrates is ready at once with a characteristic reply to Polemarchus' dilemma. 'There is another alternative yet, if we can persuade you to let us go.' Polemarchus' threat

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247
25
328
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δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἠλλείπεται τὸ ἦν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς ὡς χρῆ) ἡμᾶς ἀφέξει; Ἡ καὶ δύναισθ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πείσαι μὴ ἀκούοντας; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων. Ὡς τοίνυν μὴ ἀκουσομένων, οὕτω διανοεῖσθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, Ἄρά γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἴστε ὅτι λαμπὰς ἔσται πρὸς ἑσπέραν ἀφ' ἵππων τῇ θεῷ; Ἀφ' ἵππων; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καινόν γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἀμιλλώμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Πολέμαρχος, καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν, ἦν ἀξίον θεάσασθαι. ἔξανασθησόμεθα γὰρ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ τὴν παννυχίδα

is of force, Socrates suggests persuasion.

μη ἀκ., 'if we refused to listen.' The participle here, as often, is equivalent to a conditional sentence. See *inf.* Ch. V. *init.* δ ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων, i.e. 'if I were to mention it.' Also Ch. VI. *med.* τὸ τινὸς παρακαταθεμένον τι δτάουν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι, i.e. 'if he were to ask for it when he was out of his mind.'

οὐδ' ἴστε. οὐδέ indicates surprise. 'Then you do not really (ἀρα) know?' This particle ἀρα, although differently accentuated and used at the beginning of the sentence, contains the same implication as ἀρα, 'after all,' or 'then'; for which see Eur. Med. 1029—

ἄλλως ἄρ' ὑμᾶς, ὦ τέκν', ἐξεθρεψάμην,
et ibid. 1262—

μάταν ἀρα γένος φίλιον ἔτεκες. λαμπὰς, i.g. λαμπαδηφορία, a contest in which two or more sets of competitors handed on a torch from man to man, the object being to bring the torch first to the goal alight. See Aesch.

Ag. 281 *seqq.*; where the beacon-signals that brought the news of the capture of Troy are compared in an elaborate simile to the λαμπὰς, ll. 312-4—

τοιοῦδε τοί μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι,

ἄλλος παρ' ἄλλου διαδοχαῖς πληρούμενοι·

νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.

The simpler form of the game was for individuals to run the whole course with the torch. Muretus tells us that Prometheus, Hephæstus, and Pallas were the first recipients of this sacred celebration; and suggests that it was paid to Artemis under her character of Selene, quoting the epithet 'noctiluca' from Horace, Od. 4, 6, 38, and accounting for the introduction of horses by a reference to Ovid's line, 'Altaque rotantes Luna regebat equos.' He also refers most aptly to Plato's own use of this custom in simile. Laws 776 B. ἐκτρέφοντας παιδας, καθάπερ λαμπάδα τὸν βίον παραδιδόντας ἄλλοις ἐξ ἄλλων.

πρὸς ἑσπέραν, sub noctem, towards night-fall.

θεασόμεθα / και ξυνεσόμεθά τε πολλοῖς τῶν νέων
 35 αὐτόθι και διαλεξόμεθα. ἀλλὰ μένετε και μὴ ἄλλως B
 ποιείτε. και ὁ Γλαῦκων, Ἔοικεν, ἔφη, μενετέον εἶναι.
 Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν.

CAP. II.

1 (Ἦμεν) οὖν οἴκαδε εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου, και Λυσίαν
 τε αὐτόθι κατελάβομεν και Εὐθύδημον, τοὺς τοῦ
 Πολεμάρχου ἀδελφούς, και δὴ και Θρασύμαχον τὸν

πολλοῖς τῶν νέων... Added by Polemarchus as an inducement to Socrates, whose conversations with the young were so notorious that he was distinctly forbidden to engage in them. Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 33, τοῖς νέοις ἀπειπέτην μὴ διαλέγεσθαι.

ἀλλὰ μένετε. ἀλλὰ is the favourite particle employed with an urgent imperative, and may be seen from the following passages to have the force, as it were, of anticipating a possible refusal. See above, 328, ἀλλὰ περιμένετε. Ar. Acharn. 408. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθητ'. ET. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. ΔΙ. ἀλλ' ὄμως. Eur. Med. 942—

σὺ δ' ἀλλὰ σὴν κέλευσον αἰτεῖσθαι πατρός
 γυναῖκα παῖδας τήνδε μὴ φεύγειν χθόνα.

Ch. II.—Where they find Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, with whom Socrates engages in conversation.

και δὴ και, i. q. et denique: this collocation of particles marks the final and principal point in a series, the particular case to which the others have

been the prelude. See Euthyphro *fin.* και τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι..., και οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω, και δὴ και τὸν ἕλλον βίον ἔμεινον βιωσοίμην. See also Rep. Book II. *in*it. Γλαῦκων δὲ ἀνδρείοτατος ὢν τυγχάνει, και δὴ και τότε, i. e. 'always hitherto, but especially on that occasion': an exact illustration of this force. See also Ch. III. B. και ἄλλοις, και δὴ και Σοφοκλεῖ. Other cases of the phrase, with slightly varied meaning, will be noticed below, 343 B, 361 E. δὴ itself is usually final or conclusive: see Soph. Antigone, 895, where Antigone, after enumerating the others of her family who have perished by violent deaths, speaks thus of herself—

ὦν λιοισθία γ' ὧν και κάκιστα δὴ μακροῦ
 κάτειμι.

See also Rep. Ch. XII. *fin.* and Ch. XIV. τοιοῦτον οὖν δὴ σοι και ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, the concluding statement and summing up of Thrasymachus' case.

Θρασύμαχον. The character of this person the Dialogue will unfold. He is mentioned as a rhetor in Phædrus 261 C, 269

Χαλκηδόνιον| καὶ Χαρμαντίδην τὸν Παιανιέα καὶ
 5 Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου| ἦν δ' ἔνδον καὶ ὁ
 πατὴρ ὁ τοῦ Πολεμάρχου| Κέφαλος| καὶ μάλα πρεσ-
 C βύτης| μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι| διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκη
 αὐτόν| καθῆστο δὲ| ἐστεφανωμένος| ἐπὶ τινος προσ-
 κεφαλαίου τε καὶ δίφρου| τεθυκῶς γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν| ἐν
 10 τῇ αὐλῇ| ἐκαθεζόμεθα οὖν παρ' αὐτόν| ἔκειντο γὰρ
 δίφροι τινὲς αὐτόθι κύκλω| εὐθύς οὖν με ἰδὼν| ὁ
 Κέφαλος ἠσπάζετό τε| καὶ εἶπε| ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ
 θαμίξεις ἡμῖν καταβαίνων εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ| χρῆν

E, and especially 271 A, whilst in 267 D he is termed 'the mighty Chalcedonian,' and specially commended for his able treatment of a pathetic theme; but we are tempted to think that Socrates is imposing upon Phædrus in this latter point, from what we learn of Thrasy-machus in the Republic.

διὰ χρόνου, see Herod. vi. 118. ἀλλά μὲν δι' ἑτέων εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐκομίσαντο.

καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος. In the same way the Socrates of the Clouds of Aristophanes causes the neophyte Strepsiades to sit down and wear a crown in approaching the Cloud-deities. ll. 255, 6—

ΣΤ. ἰδοὺ κάθημαι.

ΣΩ. τουτοὺ τοίνυν λαβὲ τὸν στέφανον.

προσκεφαλαίου καὶ δίφρου. So Cicero, Ep. Fam. 9, 18, *fin.* 'Sella tibi erit in ludo: eam pulvinus sequetur.'

παρ' αὐτόν. We find a verb with the meaning of sitting used with accusative in Euthydemus 273 B, ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον ἐκαθέζετο, and 271 B, ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος; and in Hom. Od. 4, 51—

ἐς ῥα θρόνους ἔζοντο παρ' Ἀτρεΐδην Μενέλαον.

The accusative implies that they 'went towards him and sat down.' So Herod. 3, 64, ὡς Σμέρδης ἰζόμενος εἰς τὸν βασιλῆιον θρόνον ψάυσειε τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

ἔκειντο γάρ... These seats were for those who shared in the sacrificial rites, and afterwards partook of the sacrificial banquet from small tables placed in front of them. The practice of combining a banquet with a sacrifice was most frequent; thus the one is spoken of as the usual accompaniment of the other in Xen. Mem. 2, 3, 11. εἴ τινα τῶν γνωρίμων βούλοιο κατεργάσασθαι, ὅποτε θύοι, καλεῖν σε ἐπὶ δαίπνον, τί ἂν ποιήης; also see Od. I, 144,

οἱ μὲν ἔπειτα ἐξεῖς ἔζοντο κατὰ κλισμούς τε θρόνους τε.

And so in 3, 389.

θαμίξεις, the general term expressing frequency combined with a participle which specializes the action; whilst φοίταω (πυκνῶς ἰέναι), used below to express the same meaning as θαμίξεις καταβαίνων, has the further meaning of 'going'

15 μέντοι, | εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔτι ἐν δυνάμει ἦν τοῦ ῥαδίως
 πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, | οὐδὲν ἂν σε ἔδει δεῦρο
 ἰέναι, | ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἂν παρὰ σέ ἦμεν | νῦν δέ | σε χρὴ
 πυκνότερον δεῦρο ἰέναι | ὥς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε | ὅσον I
 αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ | ἀπομαραίνονται, | τοσοῦτον
 αὔξονται | αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε | καὶ ἡδοναί. |
 20 μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, | ἀλλὰ τοῖσδε τε τοῖς νεανίαις
 ξύνισθι | καὶ δεῦρο | παρ' ἡμᾶς | φοίτα | ὥς παρὰ φίλους

besides that of frequency. Hence it is the regular term for going to school. Euthyd. 272 C. ἄλλους πέπεικα συμμαθητὰς μοι φοιτᾶν πρεσβύτας. Rep. 563 A, διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται. Hom. Od. 2, 182, uses it of the flitting of birds.

ὄρνιθες δέ τε πολλοὶ ὑπ' αὐγὰς
 ἡελίοιο
 φοιτῶσι.

χρῆν μέντοι, 'but you should.' It is always advisable to look for an adversative meaning in μέντοι; and this is its force in the great majority of cases: see Ch. I. *in it*. οὐ μέντοι ἦττον... But in others it is more emphatic than adversative: *E.g.* 331 D, καὶ μέντοι καὶ παραδίδωμι τὸν λόγον. 375 C, ἀλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὀπότερον ἂν στέρηται... See note *ad Cap.* XIII. *in it*.

εἰ μὲν... νῦν δέ. So in Od. 2, 76 and 79—

εἴ χ' ὑμεῖς γε φάγοιτε, τάχ' ἂν
 ποτε καὶ τίσις εἴη,
 νῦν δέ μοι ἀπρήκτους ὀδύνας
 ἐμβάλλετε θυμῷ.

Where εἴ κε, 'in that case,' is balanced by νῦν δέ, 'but as matters stand'; as here.

εἰ μὲν γάρ... If this statement represents an actual reminiscence, we must look upon it as of the greatest

importance, bearing witness as it does to the goodwill and confidence of an old man in Socrates. Notice that Cephalus uses ἡμεῖς, and τοῖσδε τοῖς νεανίαις below, his family as well as himself.

κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναί... Aristotle states the fact which is here implied, Eth. 7, 11, 4, ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί. Plato is careful to show (*infra* Book III.) that a good mind must exert a good influence over the body, and that the body must not be left to itself to work out its own efficiency. See 408 E, οὐ γὰρ σώματι σῶμα θεραπεύουσιν,—ἀλλὰ ψυχῇ σῶμα. and *supr.* 403 D, ψυχῇ ἀγαθῇ τῇ αὐτῆς ἀρετῇ σῶμα παρέχειν ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστον. And so also Xenophon in the Memorabilia represents Socrates as asserting that bodily efficiency can only be attained by making the body subservient to the mind. Book II. 1, 28. εἰ δέ καὶ σώματι βούλει δύνατος εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρετεῖν ἐπιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμναστέον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρωτί. Conversely, Tennyson in the Princess—

'Since to look on noble forms
 Makes noble through the
 sensuous organism
 That which is higher.'

τε καὶ πάνυ οἰκείους. Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ὦ Κέφαλε,
 χαίρω γε διαλεγόμενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις· δοκεῖ
 Ἐγάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινὰ
 25 ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύ-
 εσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστὶ τραχεία καὶ χαλεπή, ἢ ῥαδία
 καὶ εὐπορος· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην, ὃ
 τί σοι φαίνεται τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς
 ἡλικίας, ὃ δὴ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ φασὶν εἶναι οἱ

καὶ μὴν. μὴν is like μέντοι, and generally implies opposition. But like μέντοι it sometimes has no adversative force. e.g. *infra* Ch. VII. καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὃ ναυπηγός. Here καὶ μὴν simply introduces another case similar to that mentioned immediately before, and is accumulative, not adversative. We see this accumulative force again in Book II. 362 D, ἀλλὰ τί μὴν; εἶπον, 'Why what next?' or 'What besides?' For Adeimantus is going to supplement, and not oppose, his brother's case with a further statement. As a rule its function is to adduce an answer to an objection, or to state a further objection or a further instance that must be taken into account. See Book II. 370 E, καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἴη ὁ διάκονος...κενὸς ἄπεισιν, and in Book VI. 485 E, καὶ μὴν που καὶ τότε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, and in Soph. Ant. 1053, 4—

KP. οὐ βούλομαι τὸν μάντιν ἀντειπεῖν κακῶς.

TE. καὶ μὴν λέγεις, ψευδῆ με θεσπίσειν λέγων.

i.e. 'Ah! but you do insult me.' Also *ibid.* *supra*, 221, καὶ μὴν ὁ χρησμός γ' οὗτος, 'Well, if they do that at any rate is the penalty.'

χαίρω γε. Γε is here apolo-

getic or explanatory. 'I really do take pleasure.'

καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ, 'so that I would gladly hear in your case,' lit. 'learn from you.' Here σοῦ is distinguished by καὶ δὴ κοῖ from other cases in general as the special instance which engages the speaker's interest. See above, Ch. II. *in it.* and Herod. 3, 20, νόμοισι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοισι χρῆσθαι, καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὴν βασιλητῆν.

ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἡλικίας εἶ, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of life.' For this genitive of distance see Euthyphro 4 B. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἶναι ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος. Again Lysides 204 D, πόρρω ἤδη εἶ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. Euthydemus 294 E, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἤκει. And Xen. Anab. 7, 8, 20, ὅπως ὅτι μακροτάτην ἔλθοι τῆς Λυδίας.

ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ. II. 22, 60, Od. 15, 348, and Herod. 3, 14, 12, ἐς πτωχῆτην ἀπίκται ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ. The first of a long series of quotations from Homeric poems with which Plato has adorned his work, which make us ill-prepared for a condemnation of poets in general (Book II. 377 D, *seqq.*) and of Homer in particular. (Book X. *in it.*)

30 ποιηταί, | πότερον χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου | ἢ πῶς σὺ
αὐτὸ ἐξαγγέλλεις.

CAP. III.

Ἐγὼ σοί, ἔφη, νῆ τὸν Δία ἐρῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ρίον
γέ μοι φαίνεται | πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθ' αἱ τινες | 329
(εἰς ταῦτ' οὖν) παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες | διασώζοντες
τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν, | οἱ οὖν πλεῖστοι ἡμῶν
ὀλοφύρονται | ξυνιόντες, | τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδονὰς |
ποθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι περὶ τε τὰ φροδίσια
καὶ περὶ πότους καὶ εὐωχίας καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἃ τῶν

δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι, *scqq.* Cicero has translated thus in his Cato Major de Senectute: 'Volumus sane, nisi molestum est, Cato, tanquam longam aliquam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediendum sit, istuc quo pervenienti, videre, quale sit.' Ch. II. *fin.* In the next chapter Cicero translates from Plato almost literally this account of the old men who deplore their old age. He then states, in the mouth of Lælius, Socrates' suggestion that perhaps Cephalus' circumstances may be the reason of his happiness which we find in 329 D, together with the tale of Themistocles and the Seriphian. Hesiod uses the metaphor of the road in his description of the good and bad life. *Op. et Dies*, 285—

τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ
ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδὸς μάλα δ'
ἐγγύθι ναίει.

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προ-
πάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὕρθιος
ὁλμος ἐς αὐτήν,
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπήν
δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται

ῥηϊδίῃ δὲ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπῇ
περ' εὐδῶα.

τοῦ βίου, dependent on *τοῦτο*, 'this part of your life': *v. infr.* 367 D. *τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαίνεσον δικαιοσύνης ὃ αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι.* *Euthyd.* 304 A. *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος.* And *infra*, here, 329 C *fin.* τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. And somewhat similar is Virgil's expression, *Æn.* I.—

'Tu mihi quodeunque hoc
regni... Concilias.'

From these examples it is clear that we should gain a better idea of the idiom by translating 'your life at this time'; and 'justice in this respect,' 'the affair in this aspect,' in the examples respectively: *τοῦτο* being closely constructed with the substantive. Fortified by these instances, the above explanation may stand against Stallbaum's condemnation of it as 'valde contorta.'

CH. III.—*Cephalus' Apologia Senectutis.*

ἃ τῶν τοι. ἔχεται, 'which are connected with such things.'

τοιούτων ἔχεται, | καὶ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων
 τινῶν ἀπεστερημένοι | καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, | νῦν δὲ
 Β οὐδὲ ζῶντες | ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλα-
 κίσεις | τοῦ γήρως ὀδύρονται, | καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ | τὸ
 γήρας ὕμνοῦσιν ὄσων κακῶν σφίσι αἴτιον. | ἐμοὶ δὲ
 δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκратες, οὗτοι οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτιᾶσθαι.
 εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτ' αἴτιον | κἂν ἐγὼ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπε-
 πόνθη | ἕνεκά γε γήρως | καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὄσσοι ἐν-
 ταῦθα ἦλθον ἡλικίας. | νῦν δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἐντέτύχηκα
 οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσι | καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ
 ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμην ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τίνος
 C Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σοφόκλεις, ἔχεις πρὸς τὰ φροδίσια ; | ἔτι
 οἶός τε εἰ γυναικί συγγίγνεσθαι ; | καὶ ὅς, Εὐφήμει,

Lit. 'hang on to,' or 'depend upon'; so, in a physical sense, *μισσοὺς δρυὸς ἔχεται*.

τοῦ γήρως, 'about old age.' We find *ὀδύρομαι* constructed with genitive alone in *Od.* 4, 104—

τῶν πάντων οὐ τόσον ὀδύρομαι.

So *Od.* 2 *in*it.—

τοῦ δ' γε δακρυχέων ἀγορήσατο.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ, 'it is on this very point,' or 'for this very reason'; viz. *οἰκείων προπ.* δὴ here is more emphatic than conclusive—its usual force; and refers to what precedes. So in *Book II.* 368 B, Socrates, after congratulating the sons of Ariston on their able defence of injustice, remarks, *δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπίσθαι*. 'You certainly appear to have lacked real conviction.' So in 370 B, *ἐκ δὴ τούτων*.

ἐπεπόνθη, 'the very same thing would have happened to me.' *πάσχω*, thus used of something happening to a man,

by force of circumstances apart from his control, is common. See 368 B, *loc. supr. cit.* *πάνν* γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, 'some divine afflatus has come to you.' *Aristoph.* *Clouds*, 816, *τί χρῆμα πάσχεις, ὦ πάτερ*; 'what has come to you?' See *infr.* *Ch. XI.* *τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν*; 'What do you think should be done to you?' The idiom lies in the use of the subjective word instead of a neutral or objective one.

νῦν δέ, 'whereas the fact is...' *v. supra not.* *Ch. II.*

καὶ ἄλλοις, καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, 'Sophocles especially besides other.' For the idiom *καὶ ἄλλ.* *καί*, see *Theæt. in*it. *ἐθαύμασα Σοκράτους ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου*. For *καὶ δὴ καὶ v.s. not.* *Ch. II.* Sophocles was born B.C. 495, and died B.C. 405. Recollecting that Socrates' death took place 399 B.C. at the age of about seventy, we see that the philosopher must have had many opportunities of intercourse with the poet.

ἔφη, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ἄσμεναίτατα μέντοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὡσπερ λυτῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν ἐκείνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρα πολλή εἰρήνη γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐπειδὴν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι παύσονται κατατείνουσαι καὶ χαλᾶσῶσι, παντάπασι τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἔστι καὶ μαινομένων ἀπηλλάχθαι.

μέντοι, 'nay, on the other hand.'

ὡσπερ λυτῶντα, &c. See what was said above, Ch. II. D, of the opposition between sensual and intellectual enjoyment; and the passage quoted from Aristotle. Plato mentions this below, Book III. 403 A, as being most opposed of all to the intellectual exercises. Μείζω δέ τινα καὶ ὀξυτέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, &c., as Aristotle in the Ethics.

κατατείνουσαι. The physical notion of stretching (τείνω) begets a large family of transferred yet kindred expressions, when the verb is compounded with different prepositions, e.g. διατεταμένους, Book VI. 501 C, 'with might and main,' (Jowett); ξυντεταμένως, 'in earnest,' 499 A; ἐντεινάμενος, 'laying great stress upon,' 'seriously,' 536 C; and again πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείννας, 'concentrating himself entirely upon this point,' 591 B; and τείνω simple: ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τείνοντας πάντας, 'all striving towards the same object,' 464 D.

μαινομένων. So in 403 A, loc. cit. οὐδέ γε μανικωτέραν. (ἡδονὴν sc.)

ἀπηλλάχθαι. In Eur. Med. 967, the simple verb ἀλλάσσομαι means to 'get one thing in exchange for another':

τῶν δ' ἐμῶν παιδῶν φυγὰς ψυχῆς ἢν ἀλλαξαίμεθα' whilst the active verb, ἀλλάσσω, is used simply as 'to take instead of.' Thus Theognis,

οὐδέ τις ἀλλάξει κάκιον, τοῦ 'σθλοῦ παρεόντος,— ἀπαλλάσσω means 'to rid'; thus Eur. Cycl. 371—

κώμου μὲν αὐτὸν τοῦδ' ἀπαλλάξαι.

But it has also an intransitive meaning 'to turn out,' or 'come out from'; Rep. 491 D: τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν...κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης. Similarly παραλλάττειν, 'to change,' 530 B, γίγνεσθαι τὲ ταῦτα αἰεὶ ὡσάυτως καὶ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν. Hence we can understand the meaning of ἀπαλλάσσομαι, 'to get rid of,' or 'to free one's self from,' as here; it is found again in Book III. 406 D, τομῇ χρῆσάμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι (sc. νοσήματος) and 390 E, μὴ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τῆς μήνιος. Also 465 D, πάντων τε δὴ τούτων ἀπαλλάξονται. But καταλλάσσομαι, 'to make it up with,' τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῆ, 566 E; and διαλλάσσομαι, in the same sense, 471 A, καὶ ὡς διαλλαγῆσόμενοι ἄρα διοίονται;

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους
μία τις αἰτία ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ γῆρας, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλ'
ὁ τρόπος τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἂν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ
εὐκόλοι ὦσι, καὶ τὸ γῆρας μετρίως ἐστὶν ἐπίπονον·
εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ γῆρας, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ νεότης χαλεπὴ
τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυμβαίνει.

CAP. IV.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀγασθεὶς αὐτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, βουλό-
μενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον Ὁ Κέφαλε,

'Then they will dispute on the understanding that they are going to make it up again some day?' The sense of change is apparent throughout.

μετρίως, 'not very.' The word implies an absence of excess: see 372 C, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες; 396 C, μέτριος ἀνήρ; and 399 C; σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως πράττοντα. The idea which it conveys is the keynote of a great part of Greek thought: How to avoid excess and steer a middle course. So Theognis—

Μηδὲν ἄγαν ἄσχαλλε ταρασσο-
μένων πολιητέων
Κύρνε, μέσην δ' ἔρχευ τὴν
ὄδδν ὥσπερ ἐγώ.

So in Xenophon's Memorabilia, 2, 1, 11, Aristippus defends his life of self-indulgence by terming it a mean between command and slavery. εἶναι τίς μὲν δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδδς, ἣν πειρῶμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας. For another example see Antigone 67—

τὸ γὰρ
περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει
νοῦν οὐδένα.

It is interesting to trace how large a part the idea of excess and moderation plays in Greek legend and drama: prosperity in excess is a direct challenge to Nemesis; Polycrates must throw his ring away, but even that cannot save him; Œdipus is dashed from the height of success to a bitterness worse than that of death; and Agamemnon, flushed with victory, falls a victim to the jealousy which Heaven ever bears towards the over-fortunate.

καὶ γῆρας καὶ νεότης... See Cic. de Sen., Ch. II. 'Quibus enim nihil est in ipsis opis ad bene beateque vivendum, iis omnis ætas gravis est.'

CH. IV.—*Cephalus' Opinions about Age and Money.*

ἐκινούν. In this word we have an epitome of Socrates' method in its objective aspect. He tells us in another place that he does not agree with those who talk about putting knowledge into people, as though it were not there before. See

οἶμαι σου τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγῃς, οὐκ ἔ
 ἀποδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἠγείσθαι σε βραδίως τὸ γῆρας
 φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν
 κερκτῆσθαι· τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια
 φασιν εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέ-
 χονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τί, οὐ μέντοι γε ὅσον οἶον-
 ται, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους εὖ ἔχει, ὅς τῳ
 Σεριφίῳ λουδορουμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δι' αὐτὸν
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῖ, ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὐτ' 330

Book VII. 518 C, φασὶ δὲ πού
 οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης
 σφεῖς ἐντιθέναί. He believed
 that knowledge, or at least
 the capacity for knowledge, was
 in all men, and only needed
 κίνησις, or μαίευσις, to use his
 own metaphor, to bring it out.
 We shall see below, Ch. V. C,
 how Socrates tries to draw
 Cephalus into a discussion
 about justice by means of pro-
 poundng a dilemma; how
 again in Chaps. VI. and VII.
 he encourages Polemarchus to
 try and solve the difficulties
 in Simonides' definition of
 justice by placing them before
 him; how he is careful to say,
 after the detection of the flaw
 in the definition, 'We, then,
 shall dispute it,' μαχοῦμεθα ἀρα
 κοινῇ, ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ...; and, in
 fact, to impress the person with
 whom he is conversing that it
 is his duty to do all he can to
 help in the discussion. There-
 fore Xenophon's word for Socra-
 tes' teaching of virtue in the
 Memorabilia is προτρέπειν, not
 διδάσκειν. See I, 7, *in it.*
 ἐπισκεψόμεθα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀλαζο-
 νείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς ξύνοντας
 ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προτρέπειν,
 and again Book II. *in it.* ἔδοκεῖ
 δὲ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέ-

πειν τοὺς ξύνοντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκρά-
 τειαν. That is, to incite men
 to teach themselves how to
 practise virtue. Also see Book
 II. Ch. V. *in it.*

ἠγείσθαι σε βραδίως τὸ γῆρας
 φέρειν... Cicero's rendering:
 'Tibi propter opes et copias et
 dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorē
 senectutem videri.'

λέγουσι μὲν τί, 'there is
 something in what they say.'
 We have another meaning of
 λέγω, *in fr.* Ch. XII. ἔμαθον
 δὲ λέγεις, 'I understood what
 you mean,' and XIII. *in.* τὸ
 τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν
 δὲ ἤγοιτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμ-
 φέρειν. For the sense here, see
 Euthyd. 305 E. Δοκοῦσί σοι τι,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις; Aristotle,
 Eth. 7, 13, 3, οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζό-
 μενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλας
 περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκο-
 ντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, οὐδὲν
 λέγουσιν. Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12,
 εἰ μέντοι μηδὲ δι' ἀνθρώπων, ἴσως
 ἂν τι λέγοις.

τὸ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους, v. s. 329
 C, τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίνεταί.
 Herodotus tells the tale of a
 man named Timodemus of
 Aphidna, and places his birth-
 place in Belbina, a little island
 north-west of Seriphus.—8,
 12, 5.

ἂν αὐτὸς Σερίφιος ὦν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὐτ' ἐκεῖνος
 Ἀθηναῖος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ μὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ
 γῆρας φέρουσι, εὖ ἔχει ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ὁ
 ἐπιεικὴς πάνυ τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι,
 οὐθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιεικὴς πλουτήσας εὐκολὸς ποτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ
 γένοιτο. Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κέφαλε, ὦν κέ-
Β κτησαι τὰ πλέω | παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω; Ποῖ' ἐπε-
 κτησάμην, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; μέσος τις γέγονα
 χρηματιστῆς τοῦ τε πάππου καὶ τοῦ πατρός. ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος ἐμοὶ | σχεδόν τι ὅσην
 ἐγὼ νῦν οὐσίαν κέκτημαι | παραλαβὼν | πολλάκις
 τοσαύτην ἐποίησε, Λυσανίας δὲ ὁ πατήρ | ἐτι ἐλάττω
 αὐτὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νῦν οὐσης· ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, ἐὰν μὴ
 ἐλάττω καταλίπω τουτοισί, ἀλλὰ βραχέϊ γέ τι

οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιεικὴς πάνυ τι... In
 the same manner Aristotle
 claims for the good man a
 portion of the world's goods if
 he is to be really happy; Eth.
 1, 5, 6, ἐνδέχασθαι ἔχοντα τὴν
 ἀρετὴν... κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν
 τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα
 οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν: and in
 7, 13, 3 quoted above; and
 again προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν
 ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀγαθῶν.

ἐπεκτήσω, notice force of ἐπί.
 ποῖ' ἐπεκ..., 'Acquired! do
 you ask?' The usual way of
 expressing surprise or contempt,
 viz. to join the pronominal ποῖος
 to a word used by the last
 speaker. So Aristoph. Ach.
 61, 2—

ΚΗΡ. οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βα-
 σιλέως.

ΔΙ. ποίου βασιλέως;
 ἰ.γ. 'King indeed!'
 et *infr.* 109. Also see Euthyde-
 mus 291 A. ΣΩ. μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος
 ἦν ὁ τοιαύτ' εἰπῶν; ΚΡ. Ποῖος
 Κτήσιππος;

πάππος τε καὶ ὁμώνυμος. The
 usual practice was for grand-
 father and grandson to bear the
 same name. Thus we hear of a
 young Sophocles, B.C. 401, a
 tragic poet, who was son of
 Iophon, and grandson of Sopho-
 cles. Sometimes, however, this
 nomenclature missed a genera-
 tion: thus we have in Alcibiades'
 family—

Clinias
 |
 Alcibiades
 |
 Axiochus
 |
 Clinias.

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγαπῶ, not 'I love,'
 but 'I am content.' So in 435
 D, οὐκοῦν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη. 'Can
 we not rest content with these
 instances?' and again, 472 B,
 ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν, ἐὰν ὅ τι ἐγγύτατα
 αὐτῆς ᾖ; 'Or shall we be satis-
 fied if it be the nearest possible?'
 We find *amo* used similarly in
Juv. 7, 9,

πλείω ἢ παρέλαβον. Οὐ τοι ἔνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαθᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιούσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ διὰ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτησώνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσι, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάξουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, ἤπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσὶν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

'At si Pieria quadrans tibi nullus in arca

Ostendetur, ames nomen vic- tumque Machærae,'

'You would have to content yourself with...' The expression is an optimistic one, as though anything that has to be acquiesced in became not merely tolerable, but pleasant.

οἱ δὲ κτησ. διπλῆ... Sir Thomas More in his Utopia expresses this fact thus, 'And verily it is naturally given to all men to esteme their owne inventions best.' Aristotle, Eth. 4, 1, 20, πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Again 9, 7, 7, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων. Also sec. 4 gives the psychological reason for it, according to Aristotle's system. Ἐνεργεῖα δὴ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. This passage seems to be a reproduction of Plato's words. Lord Beaconsfield, in his psychological romance of Contarini Fleming, states the

same fact with regard to the acquisition of knowledge:—

'The idea that is gained with an effort affords far greater satisfaction than that which is acquired with dangerous facility. We dwell with more fondness on the perfume of the flower which we ourselves have tended, than on the odour of that which we cull with carelessness and cast away without remorse.' Pt. II. Ch. I.

καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, 'as well as in regard of its use.' See above, καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, 329 B, 'Sophocles in particular, as well as others.' Aristotle, in speaking of friendship, remarks that the friendships of the old are dictated by what is advantageous, which so entirely absorbs their attention that they are sometimes unpleasant. See Eth. 8, 3, 4, οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον... ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς' as here χαλεποί. And again Eth. 8, 6, 1, ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρσβυτικαῖς ἤττον γίνεταί ἡ φιλία, ὅσφ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἤττον τοῖς ὁμιλιαῖς χαίρουσιν.

CAP. V.

D Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλά μοι ἔτι τοσόνδε εἰπέ τί μέγιστον οἶει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσθαι; "Ο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἴσως οὐκ ἂν πολλοὺς πείσαιμι λέγων. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι τελευτήσῃ, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὧν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ εἰσήει. οἳ τὲ γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελῶμενοι τέως, τότε δὴ

CH. V. — *Wealth is a good thing, but a good conscience is better.*

λέγων, *v.s. ποτ. ἀδ μη ἀκούον-
τας.* Ch. I.

τελευτήσῃ, this word is at once elliptical (τελευτῶν βίον) and euphemistic. 'To finish life' avoids the use of an unlucky word, and is inspired by the same feeling which prompts the use of οἱ κάτω, or plures, to express the dead; see *Antigone* 75—

ἐπεὶ πλείων χρόνος
δὴν δεῖ μ' ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω
τῶν ἐνθάδε,

and, again, substitutes ἐκεῖ (see below) for Hades. Thus in B, *ἐπειτα ἐκέισε ἀπιέναι*: and so in Book VI. 498 C, *τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν*. In Book III. we find a remarkable acknowledgment of the use of euphemism, in the case of the word εὐήθεια. 400 E, *εὐηθεῖα, οὐχ ἦν ἀνοίαν οὐσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλά...* A similar use of εὐδαίμων is found in 422 E, *εὐδαίμων εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἶει...* 'You are much to be envied,

if you suppose...'; cf. *χρηστός*, 531 B, *τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχον-
τας*, 'those fine people.' In this last instance, as also in Plato's use of *χαρίεις, κομψός, γενναῖος*, euphemism becomes sarcasm.

καταγελῶμενοι τέως μῦθοι. We shall have more to say about the μῦθοι farther on: at present let it be remarked that Cephalus takes it for granted that national legend and belief incur ridicule amongst all but the old. Reference should also be made to Book III. *ἰνῖ.* where Socrates asks the question—'Can we expect a man to be brave and despise death who is afraid of Hades as of a place full of horrors?' *τῶν Ἄιδου ἠγούμενον εἶναι τε καὶ δεῖνὰ εἶναι οἶει τινὰ θανάτου ἀδεῖ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι πρὸ ἤττης τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον*; Socrates' answer to the difficulty is, to compel all who speak or write of the after life to sing the praises of Hades as of a place full of enjoyment and reunion with friends.

στρέφουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθεῖς ὧσι· καὶ αὐτὸς ἦτοι ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ γήρωσ ἀσθενείας ἢ καὶ ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον τι καθορᾶ αὐτά· ὑποψίας δ' οὖν καὶ δείματος μεστὸς γίγνεται καὶ ἀναλογίζεται ἤδη καὶ σκοπεῖ, εἴ τινά τι ἠδίκηκεν ὁ μὲν οὖν εὐρίσκων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, θαμὰ ἐγειρόμενος δειμαίνει καὶ ζῆ μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος· τῷ δὲ μηδὲν ἑαυτῷ ἄδικον ξυνειδότι, ἠδέϊα ἐλπίς αἰεὶ πάρεστι καὶ ἀγαθὴ γηροτρόφος, ὡς καὶ Πίνδαρος λέγει· χαριέντως γάρ τοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτ' ἐκείνος εἶπεν ὅτι ὁσ ἂν δικαίως καὶ ὀσίως τὸν βίον διαγάγῃ,

γλυκεῖα οἱ καρδίαν ἀτάλλοισα γηροτρόφος
συναορεῖ

ἐλπίς, ἃ μάλιστα θνατῶν
πολύστροφον γνώμαν κυβερνᾷ.

εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστώσ ὡς σφόδρα. πρὸς δὴ τοῦτ' ἔγωγε τίθημι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πλειστοῦ

Πίνδαρος. Socrates quotes Pindar in Book II. 365 B, and refers to him in Book III. 408 C. Plato, as it has been mentioned, conceived, at any rate in Socrates' person, a violent antipathy for poets; but their words are continually on his lips. In this dialogue alone he quotes Homer in more than twenty places, Hesiod in seven, Æschylus in six, Pindar in three, besides Orpheus, Musæus, Archilochus, Euripides, Sophocles, Phocylides, and Simonides. And this antipathy is rather a result of rigidly working out the principles of specialization than an expression of Plato's own feeling upon the subject. But poets are accused by him of traducing the

gods and the after life; in the philosophical system of the later books they are found to be imitators, and are therefore condemned, as being removed from treating of realities; and in Book X. Plato works himself up to such a pitch of indignation against their presuming to write about any subjects of which they have not a technical knowledge that he arraigns Homer and Hesiod at his dialectical bar, and bids them answer for themselves if they wish to be barely tolerated.

γλυκεῖα οἱ... Fr. 233.
πολύστροφον, 'full of expe-
dients.' The mind of man is
ever ready through hope to make
fresh endeavours. This word is

Βάξίαν εἶναι, οὐ τι παντὶ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατῆσαι ἢ ψεύσασθαι, μηδ' αὐτὸν ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῷ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ χρήματα, ἔπειτα ἐκεῖσε ἀπιέναι δεδιότα, μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρεῖας πολλὰς, ἀλλὰ γε (ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνός) οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

Παγκάλως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ Κέφαλε. τοῦτο δ' αὐτό, τὴν δικαιοσύνην, πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτὸ φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, καὶ τὸ ἀποδιδόναι, ἂν τίς τι παρά του λάβῃ, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ἐνίστε

in effect the same with that which is applied to Odysseus :

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μούσα, πολ-
ύτροπον.

ἔπειτα, inserted between participle and infinitive, shows that the action expressed by the infinitive must be preceded by that expressed by the participle : that they express, in fact, a compound but indivisible thought. Thus, 'For money contributes to a large extent in helping a man to depart to Hades without owing anything to heaven or his fellow-man.' See Xen. Anab. 7, 1, 4. ὁ δὲ Ἀναξίβιος ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν ξυνδιαβάντα ἔπειτα οὕτως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. (Where notice what precedes—'Xenophon told Anaxibius that he wished to depart.') 'But Anaxibius commanded him *not* to go away until he had crossed over,' or 'without crossing over.'

θαυμαστῶς ὡς. Similarly *infra* 350 C, μετὰ ἰδρώτος θαυμαστοῦ ἔσου. The participle *δεδιότα* here is loosely constructed, and added rather as an afterthought. It should properly be qualified

with a negative, and would fall thus into the sentence : 'Money makes it possible for a man to depart to Hades without fear, as not owing,' &c. In Greek it is very frequent to find that when once the sentence has taken a negative phase, as in the present case (*μηδὲ ἐξαπατῆσαι*), very little care is taken to separate strictly the rest of it into its affirmative and negative parts. In this sentence the second *μηδέ* belongs solely to the participle *ὀφείλοντα*, and has nothing to do with the main verb *ἀπιέναι*, whereas *μηδέ* in the former clause qualifies *ἐξαπατῆσαι*, the principal verb.

τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Cephalus has said that a life lived well and justly is the best passport to the other world. Socrates insists upon this point, viz. the difficulty of living a life justly, and, as is usual with him, demands a definition.

ἀποδιδόναι τι. This may seem too special a case to be included in a wide definition such as that of justice; but it is to be

μὲν δικάως, ἐνίστε δὲ ἀδίκως ποιεῖν; ὅιον τοιόνδε λέγω· πᾶς ἂν πον εἴποι, εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονούντος ὄπλα, εἰ μανεῖς ἀπαιτοῖ, ὅτι

remembered that deposits on trust with friends were of the most frequent occurrence and of the greatest necessity in ancient times, from the absence of public funds, scarcity of reliable banks (τραπέζαι), and the few opportunities of safe investment; and, in the case of Greece, from the precarious status of many commonwealths. We have many references in Greek and Roman literature to this practice. In Herodotus 6, 86, we have the tale of Glaucus of Sparta, which turns upon the religious obligation of good faith in deposits: τὰ ἡμίσεια πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἐξαργυρώσαντα θέσθαι παρὰ σε, εἰ ἐξεπισταμένῳ ὡς μοι κείμενα ἔσται παρὰ σοι σόα, &c. And the moral of the tale is thus expressed: οὕτω ἀγαθόν, μηδὲ διανοέεσθαι περὶ παραθήκης ἄλλο γε, ἢ ἀπαιτούντων ἀποδιδόναι. See also Juv. xiii. 174—

‘Nullane perjuri capitis, fraudisque nefandæ

Pœna erit?...’

Spartano cuidam respondit

Pythia vates;

Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret

Depositum retinere.’

Thus Pompey is made the custodian of one of the copies of Ptolemy's will when the treasury could not find room for them: ‘Quum propter publicas occupationes (in ærario) poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositæ.’ Cæs. B. C. 3, 10, 8. In Quintilian, Instit. Or. an accused man, it is suggested, may explain the presence of an

article seized in his house by asserting that it is ‘deposita res’; 5, 13, 49: ‘Cum res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit, dicat necesse est reus, aut se ignorantem illatam, aut depositam apud se...’ And again *ibid.* 7, 2, 50, the distinction is drawn between ‘credita’ and ‘deposita,’ from which the latter appear to have been the more important. ‘Crediti et depositi duæ sunt quæstiones, sed nonnunquam junctæ.’ In Thuc. 2, 72, Archidamus the Spartan uses the word παρακαταθήκην to describe the way in which the Platæans' city and property should be treated under the Spartans' care. ἐπειδὴν δὲ (πόλεμος) παρελθῆ, ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλάβωμεν, μεχρὶ δὲ τοῦδε ἔξομεν παρακαταθήκην. And in Xen. Hellen. 6, 1, 2, we read of Polydamas, a Thessalian, whose reputation for probity was so great that he was entrusted with the acropolis and the revenue of the Pharsalians in time of a political struggle. οὕτως ἐδοκεῖ καλὸς τε κἀγαθὸς εἶναι ὥστε καὶ στασιάζοντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν. See also the use of δυσξόμβολος in Xenophon, Mem. 2, 6, 3; and note ἀδ ζυμβόλαια, *infra* Ch. VII.

εἰ τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς ... Cicero has translated this passage in De Officiis 3, 25, 95. ‘Depositæ non semper reddenda; si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit...’

οὔτε χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποδιδόναι, οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη
 ὁ ἀποδιδούς, οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα πάντα
 Δέθελων τάληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔορθως, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκ
 ἄρα οὗτος ὄρος ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν
 καὶ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαβῶν ὁ Πολέμαρχος, εἴπερ γέ τι
 χρή Σιμωνίδῃ πείθεσθαι. Καὶ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Κέφαλος,
 καὶ παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον· δεῖ γάρ με ἤδη τῶν

οὔτε χρή is balanced by οὔτε δίκαιος ἂν εἴη, whilst οὐδ' αὖ, &c. is supplementary to ὁ ἀποδιδούς; 'nor again one who made a point of (ἐθέλων) telling him everything.'

καὶ μέντοι. See above note *ad* Cap. I. In this place there does not appear to be any adversative sense in μέντοι. Rather some phrase such as 'and now' or 'and really,' would express the bearing of Cephalus' remark. If we look below, 339 C, we find the question οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆσι εἶναι; 'Do you not maintain justice to be, in fact, obedience to governors?' In this passage the whole point of the question bears upon the obedience, which Thrasymachus calls justice; because the obedience of the ruled is found sometimes to be against the interest of the rulers. Hence the word πείθεσθαι is emphasized by καί (καί is often purely emphatic), and the whole sentence by μέντοι: and the latter is adversative only in so far as it qualifies the opening sentence of an argument. The word is also found subjoined to ἀλλά, which fact confirms this supposition, that it is not always purely adversative: *v. infr.* 614 B, ἀλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ,

Ἄλκινου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ. And below here, Ch. vi. *infr.* ἀλλά μέντοι. For καί emphatic see Hom. Od. II. 107, 8—

ἀλλ' ὅτε τέτρατον ἦλθεν ἔτος
 καὶ ἐπήλυθον ὄραι,
 καὶ τότε δὴ τις εἶπε γυναικῶν,
 ἦ σάφα ἦδη.
et infr. 244-5—

ἀργαλέον δέ
 ἀνδράσι καὶ πλεόνεσι μαχή-
 σασθαι περὶ δαιτί.
 And see below here, Ch. X.—
 καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν
 καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν ... and
 note.

With Cephalus' departure the first phase of the Dialogue comes to an end, which we may call the descriptive and uncritical. The lines of an argument have been indeed laid down, but Cephalus has declined to have anything to do with the argument: he is the representative of old Athens, orthodox in his religion and undisturbed by scepticism. He has to contemplate his own approaching dissolution, not a dissolution and reconstruction of social systems; and he leaves it to the younger men to justify beliefs by argument, while declining to enter upon the task himself.

ιερών ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέ-
μαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὄς
γελάσας· καὶ ἅμα ἦει πρὸς τὰ ιερά.

CAP. VI.

Λέγε δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου/κληρονόμος, τί εἶ
φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιο-
σύνης; "Ὅτι, ἦ δ' ὄς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀπο-
διδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· τοῦτο λέγων δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς
λέγειν. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδη γε οὐ

CH. VI.—*Simonides' definition means that we ought to give every man his deserts.*

τί φῆς τὸν Σιμ. The principal verb here is really λέγοντα. 'What do you maintain that Simonides said, when you say that he gave a true account of justice?' But through a desire to give a more lengthened and connected form to the sentence, the sense is, as it were, suspended in the participle λέγοντα, and only brought to a conclusion at λέγειν; whereas it should have stopped at λέγοντα, and ὀρθῶς λέγειν should have been cast into a fresh dependent clause. See Ch. VI. *init.* A similar construction, subordinating the principal verb into a participle, is found in 462 A. τί ποτε τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἔχομεν, οὐ δεῖ στοχαζόμενον τὸν νομοθέτην τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους; where the sense is, 'What is the best object at which our lawgiver ought to aim when he makes his laws?' But the aiming, although the important word is subordinated grammatically to the conclusive, yet really

weaker word, τιθέναι, already implied in νομοθέτην. See also Xen. Mem. I, 2, 34. Πότερον τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην σὺν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λεγομένοις εἶναι νομίζοντες, ἢ σὺν τοῖς μὴ ὀρθῶς, ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύετε αὐτῆς; i.e. 'Do you think dialectic is on the side of that which is rightly, or wrongly spoken, that you bid me renounce it?' Again, Xen. Anab. 7, 7, 8. καὶ οὐχ ὅπως δῶρα δούς καὶ εἰς ποίησας ἀνθ' ὧν εἰς ἔπαθες ἀξιοῖς ἡμᾶς ἀποπέμψασθαι, ἀλλ', &c. 'And so far from having the grace to make us presents and repay us for benefits received, when you send us away...' Plat. Euthyd. 289 C. ἀρὰ ἐστὶν αὕτη, ἦν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι; 'Was this the art which we ought to have learnt, if we wanted to be happy?' Eur. Cycl. 123, 4—

ὡς ἐκπιεῖν ἂν κύλικα βουλοίμην μίαν,
πάντων Κυκλώπων ἀντιδούς βοσκήματα.

i.e. 'I would give all the Cyclops' flocks, if I could drain a single cup.' And similarly *ibid.* ll. 431, 453, and Rep.

ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ· τοῦτο
 μέντοι ὃ τί ποτέ λέγει, σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ἴσως
 γιγνώσκεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο
 λέγει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τινος παρακαταθεμέ-
 332 νου τι ὁφρὸν μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῦντι ἀποδιδόναι·
 καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον πού ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ παρα-
 κατέθετο· ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Ἀποδοτέον δέ γε οὐδ'
 ὀπωστιοῦν τότε, ὅποτε τις μὴ σωφρόνως ἀπαιτοῖ;
 Ἀληθῆ, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλο δὴ τι ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἔοικε,
 λέγει Σιμωνίδης· τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα δίκαιον εἶναι ἀπο-
 δίδοναι. Ἄλλο μέντοι νῆ Δί, ἔφη· τοῖς γὰρ φίλοις

471 C. δοκεῖς οὐδέποτε μνηθῆ-
 σεσθαι ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παρω-
 σάμενος πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηκας.
 In the present passage Polemar-
 chus' answer shows what is the
 real sense of the question, for
 he tells us what Simonides
 said.

σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος. So Hero-
 dotus calls Solon a σοφιστής,
 I, 29. Solon, like Simonides,
 embodied his wise saying in
 verse: Stallb. quotes Cicero de
 Nat. Deor. I, 22. 'Simonides
 non solum poeta suavis, sed
 etiam cetero quin doctus sapiens-
 que traditur.' θεῖος, 'partaking
 of the divine nature.' The soul
 of man was regarded by Plato
 as being in some degree divine.
 See Book III. *fin.* (416 E),
 εἰπεῖν αὐτοῖς ὅτι θεῖον παρὰ θεῶν
 δεῖ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχουσι; as Cicero
 says in De Offic. iii. 2, 44:
 'Mentem suam, qua nihil homini
 dedit deus ipse divinius.' Plato
 again, in speaking of the tempta-
 tions of youth, attributes all
 good resolutions and resistance
 of evil to the same element;
 see Book VI. 492 E. οὔτε γὰρ
 γίγνεται . . . ἄλλοῖον ἢ θος πρὸς
 ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν

πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὃ
 ἔταιρε· θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν
 παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου· εὖ
 γὰρ χρῆ εἶδέναι, ὅ τι περ ἂν σωθῆ
 . . . θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σώσαι
 λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἔρεισι. See also
 500 D. θεῖος δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ
 γὰρ φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιος τε
 καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ
 γίγνεται. In legend we have a
 gradually descending scale of
 divinity from Zeus, through the
 Olympian deities, the inferior
 gods of heaven such as the
 Hours, Hebe, Ganymede; then
 gods of the earth, Dryads,
 Naiads, and of the sea, Nereids;
 and so on to demi-gods as
 Heracles, and Sarpedon; whilst
 finally such personages as Ἔσκυ-
 lapius, though mortal, obtain a
 partial divinity from their asso-
 ciation with gods. Such a system
 Plato would explain by the pre-
 sence to a greater or a less degree
 of that which he calls τὸ θεῖον.
 For this question see also 518
 E, 546 B, 589 D, 590 D, ἔχοντος
 ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, where it
 is equivalent to that part of the
 soul called λογιστικόν.

δίκαιον εἶναι, 'that justice
 consists in...'

οἶεται ὀφείλειν τοὺς φίλους ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν/
κακὸν δὲ μηδέν/ Μανθάνω, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ ὅτι οὐ τὰ ὀφει-
όμενα ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃς ἂν τῷ χρυσίῳ ἀποδῶ παρακα- Β
ταθεμένῳ, ἐάνπερ ἡ ἀπόδοσις καὶ ἡ λήψις βλαβερὰ
γίγνηται, φίλοι δὲ ὡσιν ὃ τε ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ὁ
ἀποδιδούς, οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην, Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. τί δέ; τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποδοτέον, ὃ τι ἂν τύχη
ὀφειλόμενον, Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὀφεί-
λεται αὐτοῖς, ὀφείλεται δέ γε, οἶμαι, παρά γε τοῦ
ἐχθροῦ τῷ ἐχθρῷ, ὅπερ καὶ προσήκει, κακὸν τι.

CAP. VII.

Ἦνίξαστο ἄρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης C
ποιητικῶς τὸ δίκαιον ὁ εἶη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς

τὰ ὀφειλόμενα. At present the difficulty of justifying this definition lies in the double meaning of ὀφείλω. ὀφειλόμενον means 'that which is owed.' Anything therefore which is 'owed' ought to be given back. But the word has also a moral signification, viz. 'that which is due' to any one. Hence in the present sentence τὰ ὀφειλόμενα is elevated to the meaning 'that which is due to a man,' not merely 'that which is owed him.'

τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Notice here Socrates' adroitness. By an apparently unimportant suggestion he starts the wide question, 'How should we act towards enemies?' Upon this slight suggestion hangs the greater part of the rest of this book. And Polemarchus is drawn into the discussion irresistibly; thinking, as he does, that he

has an answer ready for the difficulty.

CH. VII.—*We find that justice is doing good to friends and harm to foes. But apparently there are but few occasions on which justice can be employed.*

In this chapter Socrates draws on Polemarchus to give a certain definition of justice, and a further description of it; and then proceeds to demolish the definition and stultify the description by proofs which are drawn from physical facts, i.e. by analogy. These proofs are in themselves insufficient and unsatisfactory; it is not fair to condemn an ethical system because it does not fall in analogically with the system of doctoring, of cooking, and of cobbling. But Socrates' friends are too ignorant of the use of

φαίνεται, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, τοῦτο δὲ ὠνόμασεν ὀφειλόμενον. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει; ἔφη. Ὡς πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὡς Σιμωνίδη, ἢ (τίσιν) οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη, ἢ σώμασι φάρμακά τε καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτά. Ἡ δὲ τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικὴ καλεῖται; Ἡ τοῖς ὄψοις τὰ ἡδύσματα. **Δ**εῖν ἢ οὖν δὴ τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο; Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένους, ἢ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελείας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα.

words to doubt his proofs or impugn his method. And Socrates, in his conclusion, viz. that the definition of justice is unsound, is correct, although he arrives at the conclusion unfairly.

τίσιν οὖν τί... 'What then does the art of healing give which is due and right, and to whom, that it is called the art of healing?' Here, as above, Ch. VI. *init.*, we have the principal verb in the participle, and the unimportant word 'called' thrown into its place. The question is not 'What is the art of healing called?' but, 'What does it give, and to whom, to deserve the name?'

τί ἂν οἶει. ἄν stands at the beginning of the sentence to intimate at once that it is hypothetical; as in *Antigone*, 466—

ἀλλ' ἂν, εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς
μητρὸς θανόντ' ἄθαπτον ἦν-
σχόμην νέκυν,
κείνοισ ἂν ἤλυγον.

and so in *Book II.* 378 A. τὰ

δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη, ὑπὸ τοῦ νιέως, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὤμην δεῖν βραδύως οὕτω λέγεσθαι; and similarly in the expression οὐκ οἶδ' ἂν εἰ κείσομαι.

εἰ μὲν τι, δεῖ ἄκ... These words betray a consciousness that analogy may not be a sufficient guide to true inference. As τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένους stands here, we have in other places λόγος almost personified, as the chain of argument, which must be followed out implicitly unless bringing the reasoner to a palpable absurdity. See *Book II.* 365 C. ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονῆσειν ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν λόγων φέροι. *Book III.* 388 E, ὡς ἄρτι ὁ λόγος ἐσήμαινεν ὃ κειστέον, ἕως ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἄλλω καλλιῶνι κείσῃ. *inf.* 394 D, ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὡσπερ πνεῦμα φέρῃ ταύτη ἰτέον. 399 D, ὡς γοῦν ὃ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει. 503 B, παρεξίοντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

Τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς
 δικαιοσύνην λέγει ; | Δοκεῖ μοι. | Τίς οὖν δυνατώτατος
 κάμνοντας φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς πρὸς
 νόσον καὶ ὑγίειαν ; | Ἴατρος. | Τίς δὲ πλείοντα πρὸς Ε
 τὸν τῆς θαλάττης κίνδυνου ; Κυβερνήτης. | Τί δὲ ὁ
 δίκαιος ; | ἐν τίνι πράξει | καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατώ-
 τατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν ; | Ἐν
 τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ξυμμαχεῖν. | ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. |
 Εἶεν· μὴ κάμνουσί γε μήν, ὦ φίλε Πολέμαρχε, ἱατρὸς
 ἄχρηστος. | Ἀληθῆ. Καὶ μὴ πλεουσι δὴ κυβερνήτης.
 Ναί. Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν / ὁ δίκαιος ἄχρη-
 στος ; | Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. | Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ
 ἐν εἰρήνῃ δικαιοσύνη ; | Χρήσιμον. Καὶ γὰρ γεωργία· 333

τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα... The first definition, ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν καὶ ἂν λάβῃ τις ἀποδιδόναι, having been found insufficient, a second is stated in these words.

τί δὲ ὁ δίκαιος ; The fallacy is involved here of confusing a contract with an ethical question. The physician and pilot are men of business, and perform certain duties to the best of their abilities for money ; whilst a just man is one whose actions, as being just, are at once an object and end in themselves. The objective benefit of just conduct lies more in the example and encouragement it affords to others.

ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν... Polemarchus falls into the trap prepared for him, and tries to find some 'business' which a just man practises, some profession of which he makes a study ; thereby getting involved in the difficulty explained above.

Ἄρα καὶ τοῖς μὴ πολεμοῦσιν... This inference is perfectly lo-

gical if a just man be described in the terms of Polemarchus' definition. For if we state that a just man is one who benefits his friends, and then limit the benefits to acting as a champion and ally (προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν) ; it follows that if there are no disputes going on, the just man's province or profession does not enter into consideration at all.

χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ... Polemarchus, by agreeing to this, repudiates his former reading of his definition, ἐν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ξυμμαχεῖν. He is thus forced to find some 'produce' of justice, because Socrates continues to insist upon the analogy of the arts and manufactures, whose function is to produce some thing or some condition of things. Socrates, or Plato, was well aware of what we call the relation of things. In Book IV. 438 B we find the words ὅσα γε ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, 'All those things of such a

κ


ἡ οὐ; Ναί. | Προς γε καρποῦ κτήσιν. | Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυτοτομική; | Ναί. Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, οἶμαι, φαίης κτήσιν. | Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ δῆ; | τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρεῖαν ἢ κτήσιν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φαίης ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι; | Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὡς Σώκρατες. | Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ἢ τι Β ἄλλο; | Κοινωνήματα δῆτα. | Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνὸς εἰς πεττῶν θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεττευτικός; | Ὁ πεττευτικός. | Ἄλλ' εἰς πλύνθων καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερός τε καὶ ἀμείνων

nature as to have a relation to some thing.' These words are the introduction to a disquisition upon quality and relation. Now Socrates knew that justice is concerned not with things but with the relations between things; and from the passage in Book IV. it appears that he is using this form of *ἐλεγχος* or disproof here only because it suits the mind of his hearer and gets rid of the bad definition.

ξυμβόλαια. Here Polemarchus is nearer to the function of justice—the model and rule for covenants and transactions. For the word compare 486 C, *ὁ κόσμος... ἐστ' ὅπῃ ἂν δυσξέμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο*, where *δυσξέ...* is 'covenant-breaker'; and 424 D, *ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει*; and 554 C, *Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος... κατέχει ἐπιθυμίας*; So in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 3, *δυσξέμβολός ἐστι, καὶ λαμβάνων μὲν ἤδεται, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ οὐ βούλεται*; *εἰ ἰηφρ.* 5, *εὐρκόσ τε καὶ εὐξέμβολος ὦν τυγχάνει.*

πεττῶν. 'Πεσσοὶ sive πεττοὶ non sunt tali, sed calculi; ἀστράγαλοι tali sunt; at πεσσοὶ ψήφοι

times, ut constat ex Polluce libr. ix. Ludi sunt valde inter se dissimiles. Male itaque Marsilius, "in diferendis talis"; tali non diferuntur sed jaciuntur. At πεσσοὶ disponuntur in lineis, deinde moventur.'—MURETUS. The game is mentioned again in Book C, 487 B: *Ὅσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεῦν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ τι φέρουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς ἀποκλείεσθαι ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐτῆς τινὸς ἐτέρας οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις, ἰ.ε. the skilful dialectician 'checkmates' his opponent. The game is mentioned also in Euripides, Medea 68. Here again Polemarchus is taken through a number of special pursuits, each aiming at a direct result; and is naturally unable to discover any limited class of objects upon which justice exercises its functions. Generally speaking we might summarize the fallacy here by saying that justice regards the mode in which a thing is done, or, as above, the relation of those concerned in it, rather than the action itself and its results.*



ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ α'.

κοινωνός/του οικοδομικοῦ ;| Οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλ' αὐτῶν
δὴ κοινωνία| ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνός/του κιθαρι-
στικοῦ, ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δικαίου εἰς κρου-
μάτων ;| Εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως,
ὡ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι ἀργυρίῳ, ὅταν δέη
ἀργυρίου κοινῇ πρίασθαι ἢ ἀπβδύσθαι ἵππον| τότε
δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ ;| Φαίνεται. Καὶ
μὴν ὅταν γε πλοῖον, ὁ ναυπηγὸς ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης.
Ἔοικεν. | Ὅταν οὖν τί δέη ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ κοινῇ
χρῆσθαι,| ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμώτερος τῶν ἄλλων ;| Ὅταν
παρακαταθέσθαι καὶ σὼν εἶναι, ὡ Σώκρατες. | Οὐκοῦν
λέγεις, ὅταν μὴδὲν δέη αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι ;|
Πάνυ γε. | Ὅταν ἄρα ἄχρηστον ἢ ἀργύριον,| τότε

eis argyriou. Polemarchus thus driven into a corner falls back upon that case, mentioned above (see note ad Cap. V. αποιδόναι τι) where the services of another are required to guard a deposit, a case of very frequent occurrence, but entirely inadequate for purposes of definition.

καὶ μὴν. v. s. note ad Cap. II. τί δεῖ...χρῆσθαι. This verb takes accusative of the purpose or object, and dative of the means employed. See Ar. Acharnians 935, τί χρῆσεται ποτ' αὐτῷ ; and Nubes 22, τί ἐχρήσαμην ; Equit. 1183, καὶ τί τοῦτοις χρῆσομαι τοῖς ἐντέροις ; Plat. Euthyd. 287 C, οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρῆσομαι τοῖς λόγοις ; Xen. Anab. 7, 2, 31, Ξενοφῶν ἐπήρητο Σεύθην ὃ τι δέοιτο χρῆσθαι τῇ στρατίᾳ. And so here infra, ὅταν μὴδὲν δεῖ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι.

ἀλλὰ κείσθαι. Notice the instantaneous change of ἀργύριον here from object to subject. See Homer, II. I, 218—

ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπειθήται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ.

Here the subject, ὅς, never reaches its verb, but is changed into an object, αὐτοῦ, before its own construction is complete. Such abruptness is characteristic of the Greek language, and seldom finds a place in Latin ; for where it does occur we shall probably be right in attributing it to the influence of Greek literature ; e.g. Virg. Æn. 5, 773—

'Tres Eryci vitulos, et Tempestatibus agnam Cædere deinde jubet, solvique ex ordine funem.'

Again *ibid.* iii. 60—

'Omnibus idem animus, scele-rata excedere terra, Linqui pollutum hospitium, et dare classibus Austros.'

And vii. 468—

'Jubet arma parari Tutari Italiam, detrudere finibus hostem.'

But in these passages the change of subject lessens the abruptness of the change of construction.

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Ἐχρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ δικαιοσύνη ; Κινδυνεὺει. Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δέη φυλάττειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ; ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀμπελοργικῇ ; Φαίνεται. Φῆσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δέη φυλάττειν, καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσθαι, χρησίμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσθαι, τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ; Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ περὶ τὰλλα δὴ πάντα ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος, ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστία χρήσιμος ; Κινδυνεύει.

CAP. VIII.

Ε Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, πανυ γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἄχρηστα χρήσιμον ὄν τυγχάνει. τόδε δὲ σκεψώμεθα. ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ πατάξαι δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἴτε πυκτικῇ εἴτε τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῃ, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον

περὶ τὰλλα δὴ πάντα. δὴ ἰσ here conclusive, as it is in combination with καὶ δὴ καὶ, see above Ch. II. *ἰνὶ*. but with καὶ alone, καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι, 'Well then they are dead?' i.e. suppose them dead, Eur. Med. 386, καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι, Soph. Ant. 245, δὴ assents. See 361 E, note.

CH. VIII.—*But we may make a mistake between friend and foe. Therefore justice would be better defined as benefiting our real friends and harming our real enemies.*

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ νόσον, &c. The original reading here of most of the MSS. is φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαθεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐμποιῆσαι. Muretus was for removing καὶ λαθεῖν altogether, as

'absurdum planeque obscurum, although the latter epithet hardly implies a reason for removing the words. Bekker, from a MS., substituted καὶ μὴ παθεῖν, in which he was followed by Stallbaum; a substitution which cuts the knot rather than unties it. Faesi's defence of the vulgate is mainly agreed to by Boeckh, Wiegand, and apparently at one time by C. F. Hermann, from whose recension the text is taken; it is as follows, 'cavere sibi a morbo morbumque fallere (aut devitare, aut latere ne te capiat).' Stallbaum, from whose note the above facts are taken, points out with justice that the notion of λαθεῖν, secrecy, is required in the latter part of the sentence, for we have below the good

ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποίησας ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου 334 γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὅσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλευματα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις. Πάνυ γε. Ὅτου τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτου καὶ φῶρ δεινός. Ἔοικεν. Εἰ ἄρα ὁ δίκαιος ἀργύριον δεινὸς φυλάττειν, καὶ κλεπτειν δεινός. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Κλέπτῃς ἄρα τις ὁ δίκαιος, ὡς ἔοικεν, (ἀναπεφανταὶ) καὶ κινδυνεύεις παρ' Ὀμήρου μεμαθηκέναι αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τὸν τοῦ Ὀδυσ-

custodian of the camp represented as δεινὸς κλέψαι, and again in the conclusion of the whole matter the just man, i.e. the good custodian, turns out to be a good thief. λαθεῖν then must be transferred to the latter part of the sentence. And the best codices remove καὶ altogether from between δεινότατος and ἐμποίησαι. Thus far for destructive criticism. But it is evident that the construction of the words καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποίησαι conveys no meaning at all. And the fault in the sentence is also evident; viz. the want of a participle to combine with λαθεῖν. If we are right in our destruction of the vulgate, there can be no doubt about the meaning which this latter clause should convey; viz. ('The man who is clever at protecting himself from disease) is the very man who is cleverest at secretly inflicting it upon others.' Stallbaum whilst acknowledging this requirement of the text, retains the reading which involves this want of construction; although he has satisfied himself, 'sine ullâ dubitatione,' that we should write

ἐμποίησας for ἐμποίησαι. The conjecture is very happy, involves the smallest possible alteration of the text, and may very fitly stand until challenged by a better.

ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, v. s. note ad Cap. VII. εἴ τι δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος... See Od. 19, 395. (Αὐτόλυκος)—

Μητρὸς ἧς πάτερ' ἐσθλὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο

Κλεπτοσύνη θ' ἔρκω τε.

It is but fair to the poet to quote the lines which follow—

θεὸς δέ οἱ αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν

'Ερμείας' τῷ γὰρ κεχαρισμένα
μήρια καίεν

'Ἀρνῶν ἧδ' ἐρίφων.

In this conclusion of Socrates we have an expression of that hostility which Plato felt towards poets who represented the gods as immoral. We cannot palliate the fact that fraud and deception commanded admiration in the Homeric age, provided success followed their employment. But we must couple with this fact another, viz. that this deception was directed against foes, and that a semi-barbarous age compelled recourse

Β σεως πρὸς μητρὸς πάππον Αὐτόλυκον ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ φησιν αὐτὸν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κεκάσθαι κλεπτοσύνη θ' ὄρκω τε. ἔοικεν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ κατὰ σέ καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον καὶ κατὰ Σιμωνίδην κλεπτικῆς εἶναι, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ μεντοὶ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅ τι ἔλεγον· τοῦτο μεντοὶ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς. Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἐκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, (κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι) καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως; Εἰκὸς μὲν, ἔφη, οὓς ἂν τις ἠγγῆται χρηστούς, φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς, μισεῖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε

to many shameful acts, the prime object of which was self-preservation on the part of the perpetrator.

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί ἔφη, &c. Socrates' method, here exhibited at length, is described lower down by Thrasymachus thus: 'He will take care not to answer himself, but make the other person answer, then seize his words, and so confute them.' 337 E. This charge is true, for Socrates' method as above described was eliminative, viz. to discover the true by getting rid of the false or the vague. In this part of the Dialogue he is destroying popular ideas of justice, which are vague and insufficient: hence he draws Polemarchus on to give his ideas full expression and convince him of their insufficiency. In 348 B Socrates gives a reason for his method. He says, 'It is no use for us to make orations and each sum up the points in

his favour, because, in such a case, we shall need a jury to decide; whereas if we pursue the system of question and answer, we shall be barristers and jurymen at one and the same time.' In Book VI. Adeimantus, as it has been mentioned above, compares Socrates' method to that of a good chess-player, whose opponent does not understand the gist of his moves, but suddenly finds himself, at the end of the game, in a predicament.

πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας... The same distinction is drawn lower down, Ch. XIII., in the argument with Thrasymachus, between that which is, and that which is thought to be, to the advantage of the stronger. So Madame de Sévigné calls attention to this distinction, beginning one of her letters 'Comment-vous portez-vous? Comment croyez-vous vous porter?' &c.

οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν... See Ch.

δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τούναντίον; Ἀμαρτάνουσιν. Τούτοις ἄρα οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἐχθροί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ φίλοι; Πάνυ γε. Ἄλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηροὺς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν. Φαίνεται. D Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ δίκαιοί τε καὶ οἱοὶ μὴ ἀδικοῦν. Ἀληθῆ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον τοὺς μὴδὲν ἀδικούντας δίκαιον κακῶς ποιεῖν. Μηδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· πονηρὸς γὰρ ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ λόγος. Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν. Οὗτος ἐκείνου καλλίων φαίνεται. Πολλοῖς ἄρα, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ξυμβήσεται, ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάπτειν· πονηροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ· τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς E ὠφελεῖν· ἀγαθοὶ γάρ· καὶ οὕτως ἐροῦμεν αὐτὸ τούναντιον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἔφαμεν λέγειν. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτω ξυμβαίνει. ἀλλὰ μεταθώμεθα κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐχθρὸν θέσθαι. Πῶς θέμενοι, ὦ Πολέμαρχε; Ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντα χρηστὸν, τοῦτον φίλον εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταθώμεθα; Τὸν δοκοῦντά τε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν

XIII. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἱσὶ τι καὶ ἄμαρτεῖν;

τότε, 'in that case,' as we had above, Ch. III., νῦν δέ, 'whilst as facts are'; and in Ch. II. εἰ μὲν...νῦν δέ.

πονηρὸς...ὁ λόγος, v. s. note αὐτὸ εἰ μὲν τι δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν... Ch. VII. The use of πονηρὸς implies a sort of maliciousness or perversity in the argument, just as Euthyphro complains to Socrates that the words will keep coming round again to the same point from which they started. Euthyphro, 11 B. Ἄλλ',

ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἐγωγε ὅπως σοι εἶπω ὃ νοῶ· περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν δεῖ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.

ὅσοι διημαρτήκασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Stallb. compares Phædr. 257 D, τοῦ ἐταίρου συχνὸν διημαρτάνεις, which sets any doubt about this passage at rest. Heindorf, on the Phædrus, had already compared this passage of the Republic.

τὸν δοκοῦντα τε, &c. 'By distinguishing the apparently and the really good friend.'

335 φίλον τὸν δὲ δοκοῦντα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ μὴ, δοκεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι φίλον· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ θέσις· Φίλος μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρὸς. Ναί. (Κελεύεις δὴ ἡμᾶς προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς· νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστι δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὖ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, Β οὕτως ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

CAP. IX.

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δικαίου ἀνδρὸς βλάπτειν καὶ ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων; Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη, τοὺς γε πονηροὺς τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς δεῖ βλάπτειν. Βλαπτόμενοι δ' ἵπποι βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίγνονται; Χείρους. Ἄρα εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν ἀρετὴν, ἢ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων; Εἰς τὴν τῶν ἵππων. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ κύνες βλαπτόμενοι χείρους γίγνονται εἰς τὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς

Φίλος μὲν δὴ... κελεύεις δὴ... 'You conclude then that the good man,' &c., and 'Finally you would have us add...'

προσθεῖναι τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ... A curious ellipse. We must supply πλέον, not ἄλλο, for at first the statement was unqualified. The notion of comparison, or greater extent, is implied in the preposition πρὸς. So μᾶλλον is omitted, II. I, 117—

βούλομαι

ἐγὼ λαὸν σὸν ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι.

Lysias 171, 5, ζητοῦσι κερδαίνειν ἢ ἡμᾶς κείθειν.

νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὧδε λέγειν... Xenophon, Mem. 2, 3, 14, so

far depreciates the character of Socrates as to make him lay down this rule of retaliation himself. καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἄξιος εἶναι, ὅς ἂν φθάνη τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν, showing thereby how far below Plato's was his knowledge of Socrates.

CH. IX.—But good men do no harm to any one.

ἄρα εἰς τὴν... This qualification restricts the injury to the proper nature of the sufferer; and shows that it is the most telling and deleterious possible.

τὴν τῶν ἵππων ἀρετὴν; Ἀνάγκη. Ἀνθρώπου δέ, C
 ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν
 ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χεῖρους γίνεσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν
 οὖν. Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή;
 Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη. Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ
 φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίνεσθαι.
 Ἔοικεν. Ἄρ' οὖν τῇ μουσικῇ οἱ μουσικοὶ ἀμούσους

ἀνθρώπου δέ... In the time of the cruelties of the Thirty, Socrates spoke out against ill-treatment of our fellow man thus: *ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον* (sc. than the herdsman ill-treating his flock with impunity) *εἴ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ χεῖρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται.*

ἄλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη. It must be noticed above that the question is not 'Is it right that any one should harm another?' but 'Is it right that a just man should harm any one?' Then *δικαιοσύνη* is adroitly introduced as that human *ἀρετή* upon which any harm done will take effect; thus bringing about the telling conclusion that for a just man to harm another is an unnatural action, and, in fact, a moral impossibility. Looking back upon this piece of reasoning, it must be impugned, upon logical grounds, as again merely resting on analogy. But to consider the argument broadly: first let us grant that Socrates by *βλάπτω* means the physical equivalent of *ἀδικῶ*. Then we must translate *βλάπτω* by 'hurt wantonly,' not merely 'hurt'; because if we strike a horse or a dog it may be for his good, and instead of depreciating his 'powers' (*ἀρετή*) improve them. Then, if by *βλάπτω* he means 'to treat

wantonly,' we shall thoroughly agree with Socrates that all creatures treated thus have their powers diverted towards resentment and retaliation, instead of keeping them concentrated upon useful and healthy action. So we speak of 'vice' in horses (to carry out Socrates' illustration), which is often the result of wanton ill-treatment. And so in the moral sphere. If a person is wantonly injured (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*), the injury not only breeds in him a desire to be revenged upon the perpetrator, but lowers his general sense of justice, by making him think worse of his fellow-man.

ἀμούσους. This word means here 'unmusical' or 'uneducated,' devoid of *μουσική*. In Book III. 411 D, the result of practising gymnastic to the exclusion of music is said to render a man *μισόλογος καὶ ἀμούσος*, i.e. 'opposed to intellectual exercise,' and *ἀμούσος* is 'unintellectual.' A third sense arises from this meaning, the positive sense of 'vulgar,' or 'wanting taste,' which appears in the word *ἀμουσία*; v. *infra*. 403 C. *ψόγον ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφείζονται.* So Ausonius ad Symmachum: 'Dein cogitans necum non illud Catullianum, "Cui dono lepidum et novum libellum!" sed *ἀμούσότερον*

δύνανται ποιεῖν; Ἄδύνατον. Ἄλλὰ τῇ ἵππικῇ οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἀφίππους; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἄλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς; Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον. Οὐ γὰρ θερμότητος, οἶμαι, ἔργον ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Ναί. Οὐδὲ ξηρότητας ὑγραίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Πάνυ γε. Οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον, ὡς Πολέμαρχε, οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τοῦ αἰδίου. Παντάπασί μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι φησὶ τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ

et verius; "Cui dono illepidum, rudem libellum?"

ἔργον, 'function,' or, more objectively, 'use.' We have three divisions of things possessing ἔργα in the Republic.

i. Abstractions, as in the present passage. 'The function or property of heat.'

ii. The arts, v. *infra*. 346 D. καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι (τέχναι) οὕτω τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκείνο ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται...

iii. Individuals, *infra*. 352 E. καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον.

The definition of ἔργον is to be found in the context of the last passage quoted: 'Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄπου οὖν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνῃ ἐκείνῳ ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα; This principle forms the groundwork of the State which is to be created; thus Book V. 453 B. αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς κατοικήσεως, ἦν ὀκίσετε πόλιν, ὠμολο-

γεῖτε δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἕνα ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν. The expression κατὰ φύσιν must be noticed; it covers the case of individuals; because to do uncongenial work, however well, is not strictly an ἔργον. Aristotle describes the ἔργον of man as that, in the exercise of which lies a man's well-being physical and moral: αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαλατοποιῶ καὶ πάντι τεχνίτη, καὶ ὄλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εἶδ. He then defines it more distinctly as, ζωὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, or finally, ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖα κατὰ λόγον.—Nic. Eth. I, 7, 10—14. Ἔργον in short is exercise of faculties.

ὁ δέ γε δίκαιος ἀγαθός. 'And the just man I suppose comes under the head of "good"!'

νοεῖ, 'means,' 'signifies,' see Euthydemus, 287 D, where an eristic quibble is set up on the expression νοεῖ τὸ ῥῆμα, 'the word means.'

δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὠφέλειαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφός· ὁ ταῦτα εἰπὼν οὐ γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγεν οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἔφανη ὃν βλάπτειν.) Συγχωρῶ, ἢ δ' ὅς. Μαχόμεθα ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῆ ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ἔάν τις αὐτὸ φῆ ἢ Σιμωνίδην ἢ Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν εἰρηκέναι ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. Ἐγωγ' οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτοιμός εἰμι κοινωνεῖν τῆς μάχης. Ἄλλ' οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ μοι 336 δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ φάναι δίκαιον εἶναι τοὺς μὲν φίλους ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν; Τίνος; ἔφη. Οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου εἶναι ἢ Περδίκκου ἢ Ξέρξου ἢ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦ Θηβαίου ἢ τίνος ἄλλου μέγα οἰομένου δύνασθαι πλουσίου ἀνδρός. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἢ δικαιοσύνη ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φαίη εἶναι;

οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ... δίκαιον... ὄν, predicate; οὐδένα, object. οὐδαμοῦ, 'in the case of no man.' ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ. Perhaps the best example of this identification of his companion with himself in the discovery of truth is found in Book IV. 432, where Socrates has started with the discovery of temperance, wisdom and courage, and proceeds to find justice by eliminating the other three. 'Now, Glaucon, like hunters, we must surround the thicket, and beware lest the object of our search escape us. Be zealous then and look carefully, and tell me if you see it first,' &c. For this expression of uncompromising hostility against false morals, see his opinion, not less uncompromising, on religious beliefs, Book II. 380 B. κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεὸν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα,

διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινα λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, μήτε τινα ἀκούειν. οἶμαι αὐτὸ Περιάνδρου... Plato's contempt for this maxim may be gauged by the fact that he attributes it to tyrants: for whom he had the liveliest detestation. See Argument of the Dialogue, Books IX., X. For Periander, tyrant of Corinth, see Herod. 3, 48, seqq.; and 8, 137, seqq. for Perdiccas, tyrant of Macedonia. For Ismenius of Thebes, see Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 1. οὐδὲ... ἢ δικαιοσύνη... οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον. Similarly Plato distinguishes between ὁ τυραννικός and τύραννος in Book IX. See Argument, and note, p. 90. δικαιοσύνη is the General or Ἰδέα, under which τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. individual cases of justice, are included.

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CAP. X.

B Καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ διαλεγόμενων ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου, ἔπειτα ὑπὸ τῶν παρακαθημένων διεκωλύετο βουλομένων διακοῦσαι τὸν λόγον· ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦτ' εἶπον, οὐκέτι ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἀλλὰ συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίου ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς

CH. X.—*Thrasymachus interrupts violently; and asks why they do not discuss the question seriously.*

καὶ διαλεγ. καὶ emphatic, 'even whilst we had been talking,' as in 582 B. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ βῆδιον (γενέσθαι). 'On the contrary, it is a hard matter even for one who is zealous.' The particle is employed in a similar way above, Ch. III. καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ; but it is more emphatic here, the coordinate clause being introduced merely by δέ (ὡς δὲ διεπαυσάμεθα), much weaker than καὶ δὴ καὶ which introduces the second clause of the example above. See Ch. V. *not. ad καὶ μέντοι.*

ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. See *not. c. i. ad μου... λαβόμενος τοῦ ἱματίου.* Ἄντι here, as in similar verbs, ἀντέχομαι, e.g. implies that the object caught hold of is entirely distinct and separate from the person who catches hold of it: and communicates the idea of aggression in the present passage. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 618, Obs. 1, 3rd ed. 'As a general rule the compounds of ἀντί take a dative, as conveying a notion of hostility.'

ἔπειτα, the middle point of the sequence, introduced by μὲν and concluding with δέ.

διακοῦσαι. Note force of διὰ, 'hear it out.'

θηρίον. We see here a reference to a hunt, from which Socrates draws many similes and metaphors; v. *infra*. Book IV. 432, quoted above: κυνηγέτας θάμνον περιστάσθαι. Euthyphro 13A, *et passim*. Socrates arrives at the conclusion how to combine courage and gentleness in the warriors of his city, by a reference to the fact that those traits coexist in hounds. Book II. 375 C. For συστρέψας we may compare the metaphor *ξυρεῖν τὸν λέοντα*, *infra*. Ch. XV., where Thrasymachus is the lion. Another word involving a metaphor from the sphere of hunting is ἀγριαίνω, 'to behave like a wild beast.' See *infra*. ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι; and Book VI. 501 E. *ἔτι οὖν ἀγριαίνουσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν...* From this metaphor another is drawn, viz. the process of 'taming' a person, as in Book II. Ch. II. *in it.* Thrasymachus is said to have been 'tamed' by Socrates: this metaphor is of the most frequent occurrence, as will be noticed there.

διαρπασόμενος. καὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὁ Πολέμαρχος δει-
σαντες διεπτοήθημεν· ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον φθεγξάμενος
Τίς, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς πάλαι φλυαρία ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες; C
καὶ τί εὐηθίζεσθε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑποκατακλινο-
μενοι ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλ' εἶπερ ὡς ἀληθῶς βούλει
εἰδέναι τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τι ἐστί, μὴ μόνον ἐρώτα μηδὲ
φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων, ἐπειδάν τις τι ἀποκρίνηται,
ἐγνωκῶς τοῦτο, ὅτι ῥᾶον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ ἀποκρίνεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόκριναί καὶ εἰπέ, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ

εἰς μέσον φθεγξ. So Herod.
3, 62, προηγόρευε στὰς ἐς μέσον
τὰ ἐντεταλμένα. And v. s. not.
ad Cap. II. ἐκαθεζόμεθα...παρ'
αὐτόν.

ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, reflexive for reci-
procal 'each other.' For see
below ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλή-
λοις. The word ὑποκατακλ.
means 'retiring in turn,' and
expresses the motions of a pair
of dancers, to whom Thrasyma-
chus derisively likens Socrates
and Polemarchus. Such dancers
were ordinarily employed to
amuse guests at a banquet from
Homeric times. See Hom. II.
18, 605; Od. 4, 15. In Od.
8, 378, we have the equivalent
of ὑποκατακλ.—

ἄρχεῖσθην δὴ ἔπειτα ποτὶ
χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ταρφέ' ἀμειβομένω

where ἀμειβομένω exactly ex-
presses the alternate advance
and retirement of the two per-
formers. Although Thrasyma-
chus compares Socrates to a
public juggler, it will be seen
in the course of his conversation
that he is very anxious to ex-
hibit his own rhetorical powers.
Thus *infra*. 338 A. ὁ Θρασύ-
μαχος φανερὸς ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν,
ἵν' εὐδοκίμησειεν.

μηδὲ φιλο. ἐλέγχ. &c. 'And

do not be anxious to distinguish
yourself in disproving every-
thing that a person says.' ἐπειδάν
&c. must be taken closely with
ἐλέγχων.

ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποκρ. This
is exactly what Socrates could
not be brought to do; he dis-
claimed all knowledge, which
relieved him from the onus of
construction, and persisted in
showing the incorrectness of po-
pular beliefs, theories, language,
and morality. In many cases
we may believe that he had
actually no settled account to
give at once of the large ques-
tions which he used to discuss,
and that he really derived in-
struction and assistance from
demolishing the mistaken no-
tions of other people. It has
been pointed out in the Intro-
duction that, as this Dialogue
proceeds, Socrates is induced to
launch out into construction;
but it is at the urgent request
of Glaucon and Adeimantus,
who in Book II. *init.* evince a
feeling of perplexity at the pro-
sperity of the wicked, and a sin-
cere desire to hear of a solution
to the troublesome paradox, that
the gods are good and the wicked
are prosperous. But Thrasyma-
chus asks, and asks in vain.

D δίκαιον· καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶ μῆδ' ἔτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μῆδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μῆδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μῆδ' ὅτι τὸ ξυμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι, εἰ μὴ ὑθλοὺς τοιούτους λέγῃς. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐξεπλήγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβούμην, καὶ μοι δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐωράκη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμέ, ἄφρονος ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἡνίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου

E ἤρχετο ἐξαγριαίνεσθαι, προσέβλεψα αὐτὸν πρότερος, ὥστε αὐτῷ οἶός τ' ἐγενόμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων Ὡ Θρασύμαχε, μὴ χαλεπὸς ἡμῖν ἴσθι· εἰ γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγώ τε καὶ ὄδε, εὐ ἴσθι ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνομεν. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἡμᾶς

ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς, omission of *δρα*, or a similar word. See Eur. Cycl. 487—

ἄγε νῦν· ὅπως ἀψεσθε τοῦ δαλοῦ χερσῶν.

So 469, *supr.* ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀνήρ ἔσει. Meno. 77 A.: ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἶός τε ἔσομαι πολλὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν. Aristoph. Nub. 489—

ἄγε νῦν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβά-
λωμαι σοφὸν
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων εὐθέως
ὑφαρπάσει.

εἰ *infr.* 882—

ὅπως δ' ἐκείνω τῷ λόγῳ μαθή-
σεται.

This sentence indicates Thrasymachus' temperament, condemning as he does five possible definitions as ὑθλοὶ τοιούτοι, nonsense of this sort.

εἰ μὴ πρότερος.. See Virg. Ecl. 9, 53—

'Vox quoque Mœrim
Jam fugit ipsa; lupi Mœrim
videre priores.'

So Pliny, Hist. Nat. 8, 34.

'Sed in Italia quoque creditus
Iuporum visus esse noxius,
vocemque homini, quem priores
contempnentur, adimere ad præ-
sens.'

ὑποτρέμων. Socrates here almost descends into the burlesque; and prepares the effect which is afterwards produced by the discomfiture of the overbearing Thrasymachus.

μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου... 'For pray do not think that in a search for gold we should not have deferred to each other, but that in the search for justice we should do so.' This *à fortiori* reasoning from the physical to the moral sphere is employed very frequently by the Xenophontic Socrates; see Memorabilia, Book I, 2, 32. θαύμαστόν οἱ δοκεῖν εἶναι, εἰ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομῆς, καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν, μὴ ὁμολογήη κακὸς βούκολος εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως, καὶ

έκόντας είναι ύποκατακλίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ
ζητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εὐρεσιν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύ-
νην δὲ ζητοῦντας, πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυσίῳ τιμιώτε-
ρον, ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοήτως ὑπέικειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐ
σπουδάζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτό. οἴου γε σύ,
ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἐλεεῖσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς
πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστί που ὑπὸ ὑμῶν τῶν δεινῶν ἢ 337
χαλεπαίνεσθαι.

ποιῶν τοὺς πολίτας ἐλάττους καὶ
χείρους, μὴ αἰσχύνεται, μὴδ'
οἴεται κακὸς εἶναι προστάτης τῆς
πίλεως. And *infra*. Ch. VII. *fin*.
ἀπατεῶνα δ' ἐκάλει οὐ μικρὸν μὲν,
εἴ τις ἀργύριον ἢ σκεῦος παρά του
πειθοῖ λαβῶν ἀποστεροῖη, πολὺ
δὲ μεγίστον, ὅστις μηδενὸς ἀξίος
ὦν ἐξηπατῆκει, πείθων ὡς ἱκανὸς
εἴη τῆς πόλεως ἡγείσθαι. And
again, Book 2, 4, 2, καὶ γὰρ
οἰκίας καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ ἀνδράποδα
καὶ βοσκήματα καὶ σκεύη κτωμέ-
νους τε ἐπιμελῶς δρᾶν ἔφη, καὶ
τὰ δρᾶ σώζειν πειρωμένους· φίλον
δὲ, ὃ μεγίστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φασιν
δρᾶν ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐτε ὕπως
κτῆσονται φροντίζοντας, οὐτε ὕπως
οἱ δντες ἑαυτοῖς σώζονται.

ἔπειθ', 'in that case,' 'in
such a case as that.' This
particle generally emphasizes
the connexion of one sentence
with another in a *sequence*, see
above this Ch. *init.* ἔπειτα ὑπὸ
τῶν... But, as here, it some-
times stands more as a powerful
demonstrative, although still
retaining the sequential force
in part. This sequential force
is logical rather than temporal,

as Conington points out when
he compares the use of *præterea*
with ἔπειτα. Virg. *Æn.* 1, 49—

'Et quisquam numen Junonis
adorat
Præterea?'

And cf. *Od.* 2, 275—

εἰ δ' οὐ κείνου γ' ἐσσι νόθος καὶ
Πηνελοπείης,
οὐ σέγ' ἔπειτα ἔολπα τελευ-
τήσειν ἄμενοιῶς.

δεινῶν. *δεινός* by itself bears
the secondary sense of 'clever,'
which it gains through the no-
tion that great cleverness strikes
awe into those who witness it.
Thus 'wonderfully clever' would
more nearly express the exact
meaning. In his description of
a chariot race in the *Electra*,
Sophocles, with the complacency
of one who praises his audience,
speaks thus:—

γνοῦς δ' οὐξ Ἀθηνῶν δεινὸς
ἠνιοστρόφος
ἔξω παρασπᾶ κἀνακωχεύει...

CAP. XI.

Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν Ὡ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, αὕτη κείνη ἢ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προὔλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐβελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ. Σοφὴς γὰρ εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε' εὖ οὖν ἤδησθα ὅτι, εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὅποσα **Β** ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῶ ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς, ὅτι ἔστι τὰ δώδεκα δις ἕξ μῆδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μῆδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μῆδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία' ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι σου, ἐὰν τοιαῦτα

CH. XI.—*Thrasymachus knows what justice is, but wishes to be paid before he will share his knowledge.*

ἀνεκάγχ. σαρδάν. Cf. Virg. Eclogue 7, 41—

'Immo ego Sardoniis videar tibi amarior herbis,'

and Horace, A. P. 375; from which passages it is evident that Sardinia produced certain acrid herbs; but the connexion of the 'Sardonic smile' with the grimace produced by eating these herbs seems not to be warranted. For the construction of this adverbial accusative, see Eur. Alc. 772—

τί σεμνὸν οὕτω καὶ πεφροντικὸς βλέπει;

And Aristoph. Vesp. 900—

ὡς δὲ καὶ κλέπτων βλέπει.

εἰρωνεία, 'pretending to know less than one does,' 'self-depreciation.' ὁ εἰρων in Aristotle is described as the converse of the braggart. Thus Nic. Eth.

4, 7, 2. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ ἀλαζῶν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζύων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δ' εἰρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν. And so in 2, 7, 12. ἢ δὲ προσποίησις ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζῶν, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττω εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων.

σόφος γὰρ εἶ, '(of course you knew this) for you are adroit,' &c. Socrates implies that Thrasymachus put his question in such a manner as to preclude an answer, so that he might charge Socrates with εἰρωνεία. For the expression v. *infr.* ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ.

ὅπως μοι, v.s. Thrasymachus' own words, which are repeated exactly, to point the ludicrous comparison.

ὡς οὐκ ἀποδ. v.s. Ch. IV. *inil.* Ὡ Κέφαλε, οἶμαί σου τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι' *et infr.* Ch. XIII. *fin.* οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχάμεθα.

φλωαρήσ· δῆλον, οἶμαι, σοὶ ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτω πυνθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι εἶπεν· ὦ Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὧν προεῖπες μηδέν; πότερον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι τυγχάνει ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶπω τι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τί ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα; Εἶπεν, C ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. Οὐδέν γε κωλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὅμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἡττόν τι αὐτὸν οἶει ἀποκρινεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον ἑαυτῷ, εἴαν τε ἡμεῖς ἀπαγορεύωμεν εἴαν τε μή; *Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω

δῆλον ἦν. We should expect *ἔν*, but Socrates perhaps wishes to put the case as if it had really passed through Thrasy-machus' mind.

μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι. 'Am I not to answer?' Deliberative subjunctive. See Eur. Ion. 758—*εἶπωμεν ἢ σιγῶμεν*; and Med. 1271—

οἶμοι τι δράσω; ποῖ φύγω
μήτρος χέρας;

εἰ ἰηστ. here οὕτω σε φῶμεν
λέγειν; Ch. XIV. *ἰνίτ*

ὡς δὴ ὅμοιον. δὴ here is purely emphatic, as below 338 A.: σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναι. And similarly in Od. 2, 271.

*εἰ δὴ τοι σοῦ πατρὸς ἐνέστακται
μένος ἡύ.*

'If you really have inherited your father's spirit.' See Book VIII. 544 C.: *ἢ γενναία δὴ τυραννίς.*

ἔλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὕτω ποιήσεις; 'Are you positively going to do so?' A common colloquialism in which the particle *ἢ* is omitted. Constructed fully the phrase would stand *ἔλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ οὕτω, ὅτι...κ.τ.λ.* We can see the first stage of the ellipse in such an expression as this:

τί τόνδ' ἂν εἶποις ἄλλο πλὴν
αὐτῷ πόνους

φύσαι;

Soph. Ant. 646. Also see Euthydemus 276 A.: *ἔλλο τι οὖν οὐπω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα. εἰ ἰηστ.* here Ch. XV. 342 D. Thrasy-machus is evidently dismayed at Socrates refusing to bind himself to the restrictions laid upon him. This kind of sophist required that the conversation should be conducted not merely on certain lines, but even in certain terms, if he were to prove his points. See Euthydemus, Ch. XVI., where a sophist, bearing a certain resemblance to Thrasy-machus, although gifted with greater powers of argument, positively refuses to proceed unless Socrates answer precisely in the terms he wishes. Thrasy-machus here intends to produce an effect, when he prohibits the use of certain words in the definition, by forcing Socrates to confess that he cannot define justice without them: Socrates parries the assault by calmly hinting that the true definition would require one of them.

L

ποιήσεις ; ὦν ἐγὼ ἀπεῖπον, τούτων τι ἀποκριεῖ ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μοι σκεψαμένῳ οὕτω δόξειεν. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταυτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίω τούτων ; τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν ; Τί ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ ὅπερ προσήκει πάσχειν τῷ μὴ εἰδῶτι ; προσήκει δέ που μαθεῖν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδοτος· καὶ ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο ἀξιώ παθεῖν. Ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ μαθεῖν καὶ ἀπότισον ἀργύριον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδάν

τί ἀξιοῖς παθεῖν, 'how ought you to be treated?' i.e. 'what ought you to have done to you?' For this use of παθεῖν *v.s. not. ad Cap. III. ἐπεπόνθη.*

ἦδὺς γὰρ εἶ, 'you are a cool fellow.' ἦδὺς in this relation means 'simple' or 'ingenuous,' and is thus euphemistic, and sarcastically used for its opposite e.g. δεινός or ὑβριστικός: i.e. 'it is a cool request to ask, without payment.' Somewhat similarly in Book VII. 527 D. Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἕλικας δεδίωτι τοὺς πολλοὺς, μὴ δοκῆς ἀχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. And so χαρίεις Book IX. 602 B. χαρίεις ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικός. Where the opposite notion is intended, *v.s. Ch. V. not. ad τελευτήσειν.*

ἀποτίσον ἀργύριον. With this practice of Thrasymachus compare Xenophon's testimony to Socrates' disinterested teaching. ἐκείνος γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητάς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβῶν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς ξυνοουσίας ἐπόρατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθονῶς ἐπήρκει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. Mem. I, 2, 60, whilst *infra*, he seems to describe Thrasymachus himself: τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσι χρήματα δίδοναι οὐκ ἠθελον διαλέγεσθαι. Plato's opinion of such sophists

may be gathered from Book VI. 493 A: ἐκαστος τῶν μισθαρούντων ἰδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσιν...κ.τ.λ. where the word μισθαρούντων bears a bad sense. Other passages in the Memorabilia corroborating Socrates' refusal to take money for teaching are I, 6, 11. οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνοουσίας ἀργύριον πράττη. And *supr.* § 3. καὶ μὴ χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβόνεις. Socrates speaks thus of those who took money for imparting knowledge: καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυριοὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὡσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν. And he speaks of the advantage which he enjoys from his practice of taking none, viz. that he can choose whom he will to instruct, and is not at the beck and call of every one; § 5. ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντι οὐκ ἀνάγκη διαλέγεσθαι ᾧ ἂν μὴ βούλωμαι. In the Apology Socrates mentions that his accusers could not bring the charge of money-making against him; 31 C. οὐχ οἰοί τε ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. And so 19 D: οὐκ ἔστιν...ὡς ἐγὼ χρήματα πράττομαι.

ἐπειδάν μοι γένηται. In the Apology 23 B, Socrates explains his poverty thus: περιτῶν ζητῶ

μοι γένηται, εἶπον. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· ἄλλ' ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· παντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. Πάνυ γε, οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς, **Ε** ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται, αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ ἀποκρίνηται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνη λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὶς ἀποκρίναιτο πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς μηδὲ φασκων εἰδέναί, ἔπειτα, εἴ τι καὶ οἶεται περὶ τούτων, ἀπειρη- μένον αὐτῷ εἶη, ὅπως μηδὲν ἐρεῖ ὧν ἠγέεται, ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου; ἀλλὰ σὲ δὴ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς λέγειν· 338 σὺ γὰρ δὴ φῆς εἰδέναί καὶ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης καὶ Γλαύκωνα τόνδε διδάξαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀσπῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἂν τινα οἶμαι σοφόν εἶναι· καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας... ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. *v. s.* also the mention of his charity in the passage from Xen. Mem. I, 2, 60: πᾶσιν ἀφθονῶς ἐπήρκει; which would help to account for it.

ἔνεκα ἀργυρίου, 'as far as money is concerned.' Cf. Euthyphr. II D: ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ζέμενεν ἂν ταῦτα οὕτως, *i. e.* 'for anything I did to the contrary.' And see Eur. Cycl. 512 — κελουμάτων δ' ἔκατι τυφέσθω Κύκλωψ.

And so Rep. 582 C. ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἔνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρινεῖ οὗτος.

πάντες γὰρ Σωκράτει. Of this popularity which Socrates evidently enjoys, the Charmides supplies another instance; see *in l.* καὶ με ὡς εἶδον ἐσίοντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκίτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν.

αὐτὸς μὲν, &c. A very fair description of Socrates' ordinary method. See Introd. p. 7.

ἀπειρημένον... εἶη. Stallbaum proposes to omit εἶη, a course which the run of the sentence recommends; for, as the text stands, εἰ must qualify both οἶεται and εἶη, which it cannot do without awkwardness. Then εἰρημένον will be a case of the neuter absolute participle in the accusative case. For which construction see *in fr.* Book V. 449 C: ὡς ἄρα περὶ γυναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πάντι δῆλον. Protag. 323 B: ὡς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα μετέχειν αὐτῆς. Also Herod. I, 129: εἰ, παρεὼν αὐτῷ βασιλεῖα γενέσθαι... ἄλλω περιέβηκε τὸ κράτος.

ὅπ' ἀνδρὸς οὐ φαύλου. *v. s.* σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ.

ἐμοὶ τε χαρ. So below, 351 C, where Thrasymachus repeats Socrates' words. Σοὶ γὰρ, ἔφη χαρίζομαι. *ei iud.* τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε. And in

CAP. XII.

Εἰπόντος δέ μου ταῦτα ὁ τε Γλαυκῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν· καὶ ὁ Θρασύμαχος φανερός μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἕν' εὐδοκιμήσειεν, ἡγούμενος ἔχειν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλην· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονεικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

Β τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησε, κάπειτα Αὐτῆ δὴ, ἔφη, ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιουτα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. "Ὅτι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἶπες, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· ὅτι δὲ οὐ με φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, ψεύδει. ἐκτίνω γὰρ ὄσση δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ ἐπαινεῖν μόνον· χρήματα

Euthydemus 274 D. πάνν μὲν οὖν τούτοις χαρίσασθον καλ... ἐπιδείξατον.

CH. XII.—*Thrasymachus' definition of Justice, the Interest of the Stronger.*

φανερός ἦν ... εὐδοκιμήσειεν. These expressions prove Thrasymachus to have belonged rather to the rhetorical than the ethical division of sophists. See below, Ch. XVI., where Thrasymachus having stated his views at length wishes to make off without further argument. Protagoras of Abdera, the most famous of all the sophists, was not often in the habit of conversing; he, too, rather employed rhetoric than dialectic. See Prot. 335 A. where he refuses to go upon the principle of short questions and answers, which Socrates avers to be the only kind of discussion he can follow. It is true that

earlier in the dialogue Protagoras offers to discuss a question μῦθον λέγων, ἢ λόγῳ διεξελεθῶν. But we can see from the later passage quoted that λόγος with Protagoras and Socrates meant different things. And Socrates believed in the case of Protagoras, as in that of Thrasymachus here, that he had a distinct desire to produce a rhetorical effect. *id.* 317 C. ὑπώπτεισα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προδίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἴππία ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι (as εὐδοκιμήσειε, here).

ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία, *v.s.* above ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους. The article indicates that Socrates had a public reputation for wisdom.

χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω, *v.s. nob. ad. ἀποτίσον ἀργύριον*, Ch. XI. In Xen. Mem. i, 6, 2, Antiphon asks how it is that philosophy only brings poverty: ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὤμην τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας

γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω. ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, ἐάν τις μοι δοκῆ εὐ λέγειν, εὐ εἴσει αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὴν ἀποκρίνη· οἶμαι γὰρ σε εὐ ἐρεῖν. Ἄκουε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς. φημί γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐβελήσεις. Ἐὰν μάθω γε πρῶτον, ἔφη, τί λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὐπω οἶδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος

εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίνεσθαι, σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τάναντια τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολεπανκέναι· ἢς γοῦν οὕτως, ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς δούλος ὑπὸ δεσπότη διατρώμενος μείνειε. Aristotle in the Politics, 1, 4, shows that the philosopher can be wealthy, if he chooses, by the story of Thales in Miletus, who discovered from astronomical researches that the olive-yield would be excessive in the ensuing year, and, by a small deposit of earnest-money, secured a large profit upon it at the harvest: ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦκε πολλῶν ζητούμενων ἄμα, καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐκμισθοῦντα ἢν τρόπον ἠβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντος ἐπίδειξαι, ὅτι βῆδιδόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἢν βούλωνται.

ὡς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ... This adroit piece of flattery is evidently swallowed by Thrasymachus, for he proceeds without more ado to give his definition. Socrates' words exhibit a phase of his εἰρωνεία, for he incites Thrasymachus to speak by an assumed admiration for the wisdom of what he is going to say. We must suppose that Socrates veils the sarcasm of his words beneath an appearance of innocence: otherwise Thrasymachus would hardly fail to see their true drift.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. We have now left behind popu-

lar, and have to treat with sophistic definition; briefly the principle is, 'Might is Right.' Thrasymachus' line of argument is as follows. The stronger make regulations for their own benefit, and these regulations are dignified by the term 'laws,' and justice is obedience to them. Now the description of that form of government called τυραννίς in Aristotle's Politics, 3, 55, corresponds exactly to Thrasymachus' account of a state of justice here: ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος. And Aristotle calls such a state a degenerated form or abnormal growth from a monarchy, which is described, in contrast to the τυραννίς, as having regard to the common interest, not to that of the ruler; καλεῖν δ' εἰθάμεν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν; where it should be noticed that ἀποβλέπουσαν means having regard only, or chiefly, to the public weal. Here Thrasymachus puts forward the κρείττων, i.e. the man who is superior in bodily strength or force of will, but disregards the claims of the commonwealth upon him, as the ruler of the state. Socrates, on the contrary, gradually unfolds the principle that all arts and sciences, and therefore all governments, ought to be

φῆς ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τό γε τοιόνδε φῆς· εἰ Πουλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων ὁ παγκρατιαστής καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ **Δ**σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἅμα καὶ δίκαιον. Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτη ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἧ

directed, if they are true arts and governments, towards the amelioration of some objects less strong and less capable than themselves. And therefore he will be found to claim the right to govern for that man who is himself governed by his best nature, arguing from the analogy of such a man's own psychical polity. For when the θείον, λογιστικόν, or rational part of man's nature is in the ascendant, and keeps under the spirited and sensual, then such a man's body and mind as a whole will be most healthy and most efficient. See Book IX. 590 D. δούλον αὐτόν (sc. τὸν τυχόντα) φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλαβῇ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ὤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔμεινον ἔν παντί ὑπὸ θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος. That Thrasymachus' position is not entirely out of date, the following passages from a modern writer will show. 'All fighting is the dusty conflict of Strengths, each thinking itself the strongest, or in other words the justest: of Might which do in the long run and for ever will in this just universe in the long run mean Rights.'

Carlyle, Past and Present, Book III. Ch. X; and again in his Life of John Sterling, Pt. III. Ch. I. 'Might and Right, the identity of these two, if a man will understand this God's-universe, and that only he who conforms to the law of it can in the long run have any "Might."'

Πουλυδάμας. οὗτος ὁ Πουλυδάμας ἀπὸ Σκοτούσης ἦν, πόλεως Θεσσαλίας, διασημύτατος παγκρατιαστής, ὑπερμεγεθῆς, ὃς ἐν Πέρσαις παρ' Ὀχῶ γενόμενος τῷ βασιλεὶ λέοντας ἀνείλε καὶ ἄπλισμένους γυμνὸς κατηγωνίσατο. Schol.

βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ. So above ἡδὺς γὰρ εἶ, σόφως γὰρ εἶ.

ταύτη ὑπολ. This answer it must be observed, is a confession that the definition is assailable, i.e. is imperfect. ὑπό implies stealth on Socrates' part, in an underhand way, as we say; so ἱποκάθημαι, to lie in ambush, ὑποστέλλομαι, to prevaricate. But the word is also used merely 'to interrupt,' without any further notion; see below, Ch. XIII. *ad med.* ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ἱπολαβών. In the present passage we may translate ὑπ. ταύτ. 'twist into that sense,' with the additional notion of stealth. In Euthyd. 295 B, the word means simply 'to understand.' ἱπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι ὁ λέγω;

ἀν κακουρησῆσαι μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον εἶπέ, τί λέγεις. Εἴτ' οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν τυραννῶνται, αἱ δὲ δημοκρατοῦνται, αἱ δὲ ἀριστοκρατοῦνται; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο κρατεῖ ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει, τὸ ἄρχον; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεται δέ γε τοὺς νόμους ἐκάστη ἢ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτῇ συμφέρον, δημοκρατία μὲν δημοκρατικούς, τυραννὶς δὲ τυραννικούς, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω θέμεναι

τῶν πόλεων αἱ μὲν... Plato is fond of this triple division, which occurs again in his analysis of μέλος (λόγος, ἁρμονία, ῥυθμός); of justice itself (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σοφία); of the city (χρηματιστικόν, ἐπικουρικόν, φυλακικόν); of the soul (θυμοειδές, φιλομαθές, φιλοχρήματον); and of the main difficulties to be encountered in founding the ideal State, Book V.; and of things desirable, Book II. *in it*. But in Book VIII. (*conf.* Book IV. *fin.*) we have four varieties of the State, degenerations from the Ideal, viz. the Timocratic, Oligarchic, Democratic, and Despotic; the first of which Socrates limits to such constitutions as those of Crete and Sparta. In his accusation of Ctesiphon Æschines divides all states into three kinds. εἰ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τυραννὶς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ δημοκρατία. And he goes on to say that the former two are managed merely according to the fancies of the rulers, but the democracy by established law. διοικῶνται δ' αἱ μὲν τυραννίδες καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις. Æsch. in Ctes. *ad in it*.

τίθεται δέ γε... Thrasymachus is correct in this statement as long as the selfish and unjust have the reins of government. But in Book IX. 590 D (*v. s. not. ad τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον*) Socrates shows that the best men, *i. e.* those in whose souls the λογιστικόν or rational element is master, ought to be masters of all the rest; because as the λογιστικόν, by restraining the lusts and passions produces the best possible condition of the body, when it is master, so the good man will not indulge himself when he is master in the state, but will set himself to make the whole body politic as healthy and efficient as possible. Therefore it is that he says in Book V. 473 D, that, until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the best state cannot be; for by philosopher he means λογιστικός, *i. e.* one in whom the intellectual dominates the sensual, *v. Introd.* p. 19. In short, the good man or philosopher is unselfish, and has regard for the well-being of the whole state, rather than for his own. Such is Socrates' answer in effect to this position of Thrasymachus.

δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, τὸ σφίσι ξυμφέρον, καὶ τὸν τούτου ἐκβαίνοντα κολάζουσιν ὡς παρανομοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικοῦντα. τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστίν, ὦ Βέλτιστε, ὃ λέγω ἐν ἀπάσαις
339 ταῖς πόλεσι ταυτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρον· αὕτη δέ που κρατεῖ, ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τῷ ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ πανταχοῦ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον. Νῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔμαθον ὃ λεγεις· εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἡ μῆ, πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι· καίτοι ἔμοιγε ἀπηγόρευες ὅπως μὴ τοῦτο ἀποκρινοίμην· πρόσσεστι δὲ
B δὴ αὐτόθι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Σμικρά γε ἴσως, ἔφη,

τοῦτο δίκαιον εἶναι, &c. So Sir Thomas More in his Utopia, Book II. of the religions in Utopia. 'Besides this the riche men not only by private fraud but also by commen lawes, do every day pluck and snatche away from the poore some parte of their daily living. So where as it semed before unjustice to recompense with unkindnesse their paynes that have been beneficiall to the publique weale, now they have to this their wrong and unjustice dealinge given the name of justice, yea and that by force of a law.' See Xen. Mem. I, 2, 41, where the question is asked, τί ἐστὶ νόμος; and the conclusion is: πάντα, ὅσα ἂν τὸ κράτος τῆς πόλεως βουλευσάμενον ἂ χρῆ ποιεῖν γράψῃ, νόμος καλεῖται. And it is there shown that spoliation and oppression is often dignified by the term law. See also Arist. Pol. 3, 6. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν

οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι, καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιον;

πειράσομαι μαθεῖν. Socrates is really anxious to arrive at a refutation of Thrasymachus' account of justice; therefore he passes over, with a bare mention, the objection that Thrasymachus has employed a word in his definition which he had forbidden Socrates to use; *v. s.* 336, D. And he likewise passes over Thrasymachus' reply, that he added to this word the qualification τοῦ κρείττονος. His desire is expressed in 346 A in the words ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν, 'let us get to some conclusion or other'; and so below here he uses the imperative verbal, ὅτι τοῦτο σκεπτέον, εἰ δληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον.

αὐτόθι, 'in this (latter) place,' 'in your later definition.'

σμικρά γε ἴσως, 'a slight qualification, I suppose.' ἴσως sarcastically.

προσθήκη. Οὕτω δῆλον οὐδ' εἰ μεγάλη· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν τοῦτο σκεπτόν εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, δῆλον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ξυμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττουτος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτόν δῆ. Σκόπει, ἔφη.

CAP. XIII.

Ταῦτ' ἔσται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι μέντοι τοῖς ἄρχουσι δίκαιον φῆς εἶναι; Ἔγωγε. Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; Πάντως που, ἔφη, οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ἐπιχειροῦντες νόμους τιθέναι τοὺς μὲν ὀρθῶς τιθέασι, τοὺς δὲ τινας οὐκ ὀρθῶς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Τὸ δὲ

ὅπω δῆλον... 'It may be an important one for all I know.' οὐδέ, 'not even,' implying that it may very well be an important addition.

ξυμφέρον γέ τι... ὁμολογῶ. The first piece of positive statement which Socrates has admitted in this argument. He allows justice to be 'advantageous.' ξυμφέρον τι is not more than a quality of justice. It is no definition, but merely one of the aspects of justice.

σκεπτόν δῆ. We have had three statements to which this is the conclusion; δῆ being the particle which marks the final stage of an argument. *v.s. not. ad. περι. τάλλα*, Ch. VII. and Ch. II. *init. καὶ δῆ καί*.

CH. XIII.—*But often, Thrasymachus, the Stronger make laws, in their ignorance, to their own disadvantage; and is that Justice?*

οὐ καὶ πείθεσθαι... 'Was it not this very obedience?...' καὶ emphatic as above, Ch. X. *init. μέντοι* marks the opening of an objection; as we might say, 'Now was it not this very obedience'; but its adversative sense is not concentrated here upon the particular sentence, and is therefore not so clearly marked as usual. *v.s. not. ad. Cap. V. καὶ μέντοι*.

ἢ οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. The latter alternative is generally that intended to be accepted. *v. infr. Ch. XV. 342 B. ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης, &c.* And Ch. XXII. *fin. πότερον ἢ κρείττων πόλις... τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐξεῖ ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης;*

τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα... 'And by rightly we are to understand enactments to their own advantage, are we not?' ἄρα, 'as it seems'; ἄρα, 'as it seems,' with the addition of an emphasized interrogation. *v.s. note,*

ὀρθῶς ἄρα τὸ τὰ ξυμφέροντά ἐστι τίθεσθαι ἑαυτοῖς, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἀξύμφορα ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ; Οὕτως. Ἄ δ' ἂν θῶνται, ποιητέον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸνναντίον τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Τί λέγεις σύ ; ἔφη. Ἄ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ σκοπῶμεν δὲ βέλτιον. οὐχ ὠμολόγηται τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοῖς ἀρχομένοις προστάττοντας ποιεῖν ἅττα ἐνίοτε διαμαρτάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῖς βελτίστου, ἃ δ' ἂν προστάττωσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, δίκαιον εἶναι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ποιεῖν ; ταυτ' οὐχ ὠμολόγηται ; Εὐοῖμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀξύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὠμολογήσθαι σοι, ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες ἄκοντες κακὰ αὐτοῖς προστάττωσι, τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς ταυτὰ ποιεῖν, ἃ ἐκείνοι προσέ-

page 108. It is noticeable how very careful Socrates is to define all his terms with strictness: the reason being that he has to deal with a sophist who would think nothing of obstructing the argument by a mere logomachy, whilst Socrates is anxious to get to a conclusion.

ἃ δ' ἂν θῶνται. The subjunctive is used to express the indefinite nature of the law-making, which depends merely upon the will and present feeling of the legislators; as Æschines expresses it, τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων. *v.s. not. ad τῶν πολέων αἰ μὲν.*

τί λέγεις σύ ; Thrasymachus is taken by surprise; he does not see to the end of Socrates' argument at present. This argument has been employed

before in Polemarchus' case. See *supr.* Ch. VIII. *ad med.* where Socrates points out that a person may injure a friend through believing him to be an enemy, just as here he is about to show that legislators may harm themselves through legislation intended for their own benefit.

τοῖς δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι φῆς. If we punctuate as in the text it would seem better to read φῆς, and look upon this clause as not dependent upon ὅταν in the preceding one, but added as an after thought, repeating one of the premisses. Stallb. places only a comma at προσέταξαν, but the question ἄρα τότε, &c., cannot follow in the same sentence as the imperative οἴου.

ταξαν' ἄρα τότε, ὦ σοφώτατε Θρασύμαχε, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν αὐτὸ οὕτως, δίκαιον εἶναι ποιεῖν, τὸνναντίον ἢ ὃ σὺ λέγεις; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀξύμφορον δήπου προστάττεται τοῖς ἥττοσι ποιεῖν. Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ 340 Πολέμαρχος, σαφέστατά γε. Ἐὰν σύ γ', ἔφη, αὐτῷ μαρτυρήσης, ὁ Κλειτοφῶν ὑπολαβῶν. Καὶ τί, ἔφη, δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἐνίοτε ἑαυτοῖς κακὰ προστάττειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ὦ Κλειτοφῶν, ξυμφέρον δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο. ταῦτα δὲ Β ἀμφότερα θέμενος ὠμολόγησεν αὐ ἐνίοτε τοὺς κρείττους τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀξύμφορα κελεύειν τοὺς ἥττους τε καὶ ἀρχομένους ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων τῶν ὁμολογιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δίκαιον ἂν εἴη ἢ τὸ μὴ ξυμφέρον. Ἄλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κλειτοφῶν, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὃ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὐτῷ ξυμφέρειν τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο. Ἄλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Πολέμαρχος,

ὑπολαβῶν. *v.s. not. ad ταύτη ὑπολ. Cap. XII. med.* This is a piece of raillery on Cleitophon's part; Polemarchus chiming in as though there were an end of the discussion to which he himself has contributed nothing.

τὸ τοῦ κρείττ. ἔλεγεν... ἔλεγεν here is 'meant,' not 'said'; for if it were the latter, the sense would require εἶναι before ἔ. And Polemarchus is quite right in the point of fact, viz. that Thrasymachus did not say so.

And, thirdly, λέγειν is used in the same sense, XIV. *init.*; and in Ch. XV. *ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἀρχοντά τε, &c.* For another sense of λέγω see Ch. IV. note, with which compare Cicero, Cato Major, vi. 16. 'Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant,' i.e. 'they say nothing to the point.' τούτο ποιητέον, &c. 'This he meant was to be done by the inferior, and he meant to define (ἐτίθετο) justice thus.'

Ἐλέγετο. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν οὕτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὕτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχόμεθα.

CAP. XIV.

Καὶ μοι εἶπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν δ' ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάν τε ξυμφέρῃ ἐάν τε μῆ; οὕτω σε φῶμεν λέγειν; "Ἡκιστά γ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἶει καλεῖν τον ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ; "Ἐγωγε, εἶπον, ᾤμην σε τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὠμολόγεις οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ **Ἦ** τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συκοφάντης γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ

ἀποδεχόμεθα αὐτοῦ, *v.s. not. ad Cap. XI. ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι σου.* And see Parmenides, 128 E. ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι...καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. We can render here 'Let us take him so,' *i.e.* 'So let us understand him.' During this discussion Thrasymachus has been at a loss for an answer, and is elaborating a reply, when Cleitophon, who seems to lean rather to Thrasymachus' side, saves him from immediate confusion by the different reading of his definition.

CH. XIV.—*Thrasymachus shows that one who legislates against his advantage cannot be termed the Stronger when he does so.*

φῶμεν. For this subjunctive *v.s. not. ad μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι, 337 B.*

κρείττω με οἶει... 'Do you think I call a man who makes

a mistake the Stronger when he makes a mistake?' This delicate distinction can be upheld in theory; but in practical legislation the result does not arise from the intention of the legislator, but from the actual legislation. It is to no purpose to uphold, as Thrasymachus does, that cases of bad legislation are to be left out of the question; because it is the sum total of all upon which the estimate of a man's powers is founded. It has been said, 'the best general is he who makes fewest mistakes'; as Thrasymachus would phrase it, 'who is oftenest a general'; but we can see in such a case that, regarding the total result, the office and the man are inseparable.

Συκοφάντης. Below, Ch. XV. *init.* we have Socrates' reading of this expression. οἶει με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακοῦρ-

Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρον καλεῖς
 σὺ τὸν ἑξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ'
 αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἑξαμαρτάνει; ἢ λογιστικόν, ὃς ἂν ἐν
 λογισμῷ ἁμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἁμαρτάνῃ, κατὰ ταύ-
 την τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; ἄλλ', οἶμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι
 οὕτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὁ λογιστὴς ἐξή-
 μαρτε καὶ ὁ γραμματιστὴς· τὸ δ', οἶμαι, ἕκαστος
 τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ προσαγορεύομεν **Ε**
 αὐτόν, οὐδέποτε ἁμαρτάνει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ
 λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δη-
 μιουργῶν ἁμαρτάνει. ἐπιλιπούσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης
 ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός·
 ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτάνει
 τότε ὅταν ἄρχων ᾖ, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, ὅτι ὁ
 ἰατρὸς ἤμαρτε καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ἤμαρτε. τοιοῦτον οὖν
 δὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπόλαβε νῦν δὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· τὸ
 δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκείνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν ἄρχοντα,
 καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστὶ, μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἁμαρτά- **341**
 νοντα δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ

γούνητά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμην; ἐξ ἐπιβούλης is the point wherein lies the *συκοφαντία*: 'making a false representation on purpose.' So Demosthenes accuses Æschines of *συκοφαντία*, in that Æschines accused him of receiving commendation from Ctesiphon when in office and for the mere discharge of the duties of his office, whilst, Demosthenes implies, Æschines knew very well that the commendation was elicited by the gift of certain moneys, separate and distinct from the official accounts. See Dem. de Cor. 264, Reiske. οὗτος συκοφαντῶν, ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ τότε ὡν ἐπέδωκα τὰ χρήματα, ἐπήνεσεν αὐτόν, φησιν, ὑπεύθυνον ὄντα. Οὐ περὶ

τούτων γε οὐδενός, ὡν ὑπεύθυνος ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐπέδωκα, ᾧ συκοφάντα.

αὐτίκα. 'Ne longe abeam ut statim exemplum afferam'; Stallb. 'Do you call a physician, now,...

λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι. Cf. Euthydemus, 304 E. οὕτωςι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπε τοῖς ὀνόμασι. λέγω here is 'to say,' not 'to mean.' ῥήματι is added to make this clear; but should be omitted in translation, and λέγομεν emphasized. 'We say the physician has made a mistake, whereas he cannot make a mistake as a physician.' ἀλλά here may be translated as 'yet'; and so below, ἀλλὰ πᾶς γ' ἂν εἴποι, 'yet it would be commonly said.'

τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.

CAP. XV.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε' δοκῶ σοι συκοφαντεῖν ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶει γάρ με ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κακουργούντά σε ἐρέσθαι ὡς ἠρόμην ; Εὐ μὲν οὖν οἶδα, ἔφη· καὶ οὐδέν γέ σοι **Β** πλεόν ἔσται· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, οὔτε μὴ λαθὼν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναιο. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσοιμι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ αὐθ' ἰς ἡμῖν τοιοῦτον ἐγγένηται, διόρισαι, ποτέρως λέγεις τὸν ἄρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν κρείττονα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὗ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν. Τὸν τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ, ἔφη, λόγῳ

CH. XV.—*But, Thrasymachus, all the arts and sciences have regard to the interest of those to whom they minister, to the interest, that is, of the Weaker.*

SOCRATES shifts his line of confutation here: he does not prove the fallacy of Thrasymachus' point, that the legislator, as a legislator, cannot err. And he refrains for this reason. He is about to employ Thrasymachus' own words on this point to confute him farther on. See Ch. XVII. 345 C, where Thrasymachus is shown to have first demanded that the shepherd, or ruler, be considered only and entirely as a shepherd, or ruler; and afterwards to have employed the term shepherd, or ruler, as one who keeps sheep, or rules a people, for his own profit.

οὐδεν γέ σοι πλεόν ἔσται. 'It will be no advantage to you.' See Euthydemus, 288 E: οὐδέν πλεόν, οὐδ' εἰ ἀνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶρ ἡμῖν χρυσίον γένοιτο. And see below here, Ch. XXI.; also in Ch. XVI we have the converse phrase: δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει.

οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν, &c. 'Nor, if you are detected [lit. fail to escape notice], will you be able to force me in the argument.' There is an alternative between the employment of fraud and force, as in Book II. 3. λέγειν τε ἰκανῶ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν... καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίαι δέηται.

ὄν. Keeping the same meaning of ἔλεγες as above in λέγεις, ὄν must refer to τόν, not to λόγῳ.

ἄρχοντα ὄντα· πρὸς ταῦτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει, εἴ τι δύνασαι· οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἶός τ' ἦς. Οἶει γὰρ ἄν με, εἶπον, οὕτω ὁμῆσαι, ὥστε ξυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον; Νῦν γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπεχείρησας, οὐδέν ὦν καὶ ταῦτα. "Αδην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλ' εἰπέ μοι ὁ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ ἰατρός, ὃν ἄρτι ἔλεγες, πότερον χρηματιστής ἐστιν ἢ τῶν καμνόντων θεραπευτής; καὶ λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. Τῶν καμνόντων, ἔφη, θεραπευτής. Τί δὲ κυβερνή-

οὐδέν σου παρίεμαι, 'I do not try to get anything conceded by you.' Prof. Campbell supplies two instances of this use from the Laws, 742 B, ἰδιώτη δὲ ἂν ἔρα ποτὲ ἀνάγκη τις γίγνηται ἀποδημεῖν, παρέμενος μὲν τοὺς ἔρχοντας ἀποδημεῖται. And below 951 A.

ὥστε ξυρεῖν... ποροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτῶν τι ἢ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρούντων λεγομένη. Schol.

νῦν γοῦν, &c. 'At any rate you made the attempt just now, and failed for all that.' We find the expression καὶ ταῦτα thrown in without regard to the construction, with this meaning of 'besides' or 'and yet'; c.g. Xen. Anab. 2, 4, 15. Μένωννα δὲ οὐκ ἐξήτει, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' Ἀριαίῳ ὦν τοῦ Μένωνος ξένου. See also Rep. Book IV. *in it.* Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπιστίμι. Also Euthydemus, 288 A. καὶ ταῦτα οὐτωςὲ θανμαστῆς οὐσης (τέχνης) εἰς ἀκριβειαν λόγων. *in fr.* 299 D. Οὐκ οὖν καὶ χρυσοῦν ἀγαθόν; Πάνν, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ, ἔφη. Similarly καὶ τάδε; Soph. O. T. 819—

καὶ τάδ' οὐτίς ἄλλος ἦν

ἢ γὰρ 'π' ἐμαυτῷ τάσδ' ἔρας ὁ προστιθείς.

In this example τάδε has been explained as an accusativus pendens, in the others ταῦτα is rather an accusative of respect, or adverbial accusative.

πότερον χρηματιστής... At this point Socrates begins to introduce the consideration that a physician, as a physician, has no regard for money, i.e. for his own interests, and that, by analogy of the arts, a ruler must, as a ruler, have regard to the interests of the ruled. Hence the injunction, λέγε τὸν τῷ ὄντι ἰατρὸν ὄντα. His next point is that the arts, in so far as they require anything, require it in order to render them more efficient, that they may be perfect in themselves (τέλειαι), and self-sufficient (αὐταρκεῖς); whereas both that with which, and that upon which, they are exercised, require their assistance, and perhaps the assistance of much else besides. Governing, therefore, being an art, looks to the benefit of the governed, and in itself should be self-sufficient, and should not require recompense from the governed.

της ; ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβερνήτης ναυτῶν ἄρχων ἐστὶν ἢ
Δναύτης ; Ναυτῶν ἄρχων. Οὐδέν, οἶμαι, τοῦτο ὑπο-
 λογιστέον, ὅτι πλεῖ ἐν τῇ νηϊ, οὐδ' ἐστὶ κλητέος
 ναύτης· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖν κυβερνήτης καλεῖται,
 ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὴν τῶν ναυτῶν ἀρχήν.
 Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἔστι τι
 ξυμφέρον ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐ καὶ ἡ τέχνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἐπὶ τούτῳ πέφυκεν, ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἐκάστῳ
 ζητεῖν τε καὶ ἐκπορίζειν ; Ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη. Ἄρ'
 οὐν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρον ἄλλο
Εἢ ὃ τι μάλιστα τελείαν εἶναι ; Πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς ;
 Ὡσπερ, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἔροιο, εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι
 εἶναι σώματι ἢ προσδεῖται τινος, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι

ὁ ὀρθῶς κυβ. ... ἄρχων. A short digression upon the meaning of κυβερνήτης. His duties as captain (ναυτῶν ἄρχων) and as the person responsible for the safe conduct of the ship (κυβερνήτης) form his real business ; his duties as a sailor, and the fact of his sailing in the vessel are incidental. *v. infr. fin. ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων, ἀλλ' οὐ ναυτής.*

οὐκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτων... ἄρ' οὐν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν. These two questions must be connected in the argument : they form an antithesis ; and whilst the answer to the first is 'yes,' the answer to the second, if Thrasymachus understood the question, would be 'no.' See below, *οὕτως φαίνεται*, and the question answered in those words. Every person who exercises an art (ἐκάστῳ τούτων) receives a reward or payment (ξυμφέρον) in return, in order that he may be supported and kept in a state of efficiency to discharge the duties of his art.

But every art (ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν) is sufficient in itself, requires no external aid, and only aims at being as perfect as possible by enlarging its sphere of action.

πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς ; 'What do you refer to ?' or 'How am I to understand your question ?' The question is worded in such a manner that it does not convey a definite meaning to Thrasymachus.

εἴ με ἔροιο... Socrates' fondness for the dialectical method causes him to cast even his illustration in the form of question and answer.

ἐξαρκεῖ. The corresponding adjective is *αὐταρκής*, self-sufficient, that which has not to depend upon external resources and external aid. The origin of justice itself is said (Book II. 358 E) by Glaucon to lie in the fact that some men, being naturally unable to defend themselves, combine together to bring about an arrangement which shall insure their not being ill-

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρημένη, ὅτι σῶμά ἐστι πονηρὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι. τούτῳ οὖν ὅπως ἐκπορίζῃ τὰ ξυμφέροντα, ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρεσκευάσθη ἡ τέχνη. ἡ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκῶ, ἔφην, ἂν εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων, ἡ οὐ; Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη. Τί δὲ δὴ; 342 αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐστὶ πονηρά, ἢ ἄλλη τις τέχνη ἔσθ' ὃ τι προσδεῖται τινος ἀρετῆς, ὡς περ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὄψεως καὶ ὠτα ἀκοῆς καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ τινὸς

treated. In other words they are not *αὐτάρκεις*, they require external assistance. Aristotle follows in Plato's steps thus: . . . πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 4. Again in Book II. the origin of the city itself is said to lie in men being not *αὐτάρκεις*, but requiring each other's assistance in daily life. Γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής. Aristotle places happiness in the same category that Plato places the arts here, because whilst all things else in human life have regard to happiness as their aim, happiness itself is *αὐταρκής*, or self-sufficient. See Nic. Eth. 1, 7, 6: τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. Similarly in the Republic, Book III. 387 D, the noble man (*ἐπικτῆς ἀνὴρ*) who has no fear of death is *αὐταρκής*: ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐταρκής πρὸς τὸ εἶδ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἐτέρου προσδεῖται. But not entirely so; see Ch. IV. οὐτ' ἂν ὁ ἐπικτῆς πάνυ τι ραδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας ἐνέγκοι. Similarly Aristotle in the passage quoted allows that even his

perfect human character stands in need of a few relations and friends, and therefore in Books 10, 7, 4, he speaks of perfect *αὐτάρκεια* as having rather a mental than a social and physical import. "Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστα' ἂν εἴη; τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ σόφως καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται.

ἡ ὀρθῶς...εἰπεῖν οὕτω λέγων. v.s. Ch. VI. *ἐπιτ.* τί φῆς τὸν Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης;

αὐτὴ ἡ ἰατρικὴ... Here the original question is repeated, ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν... Thrasymachus having been enlightened.

ἔσθ' ὃ τι προσδεῖται. See *ἐπιτ.* 346 D: ἔσθ' ὅτι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; And Ch. XXIII. *ἐπιτ.* ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδους ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; This particle *ὅτι* combines very readily with such words as *ἐστί*, *οἶδα*, *δῆλον*, to emphasize either a statement or a question. So *ἔστιν ἴνα*, *ἔστιν οὐ*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως*, *οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως*.

ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, 'over and above them.' The force of *ἐπί* here must not be overlooked. The meaning is that on account of the sight and hearing (*διὰ ταῦτα*)

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τέχνης τῆς τὸ ξυμφέρον εἰς ταῦτα σκεψομένης τε καὶ ἐκποριζούσης; ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνι τις πονηρία, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστη τέχνη ἄλλης τέχνης, ἣτις αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπομένη ἐτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον; ἢ Β αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται; ἢ οὔτε αὐτῆς οὔτε ἄλλης προσδεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖν οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία οὔτε ἁμαρτία •

there is a further consideration, viz. the art which attends to the eye and ear. αὐτοῖς then refers to the eye and ear; whilst τῆς τὸ ξ. &c. below will mean 'an art which looks out and provides that which is to the advantage (of the eye and ear) for these purposes,' viz. sight and hearing (εἰς ταῦτα).

καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπέραντον, 'and does this go on for ever?' 'ad infinitum?'

ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ... The latter alternative, as usual in these longer dilemmas, is intended to be accepted. *v.s.* Ch. XIII. *inil.*: πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐκάσταις ἢ οἱ τοῖ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. And see Meno. 72 B. ἄρα τούτῳ φῆς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλω δὲ τῷ;

ὅσπε αὐτῆς... 'Not only is the art independent of other arts, but it is also independent of assistance from itself.' This proposition is not true in its latter clause. An art, as practised upon its objects, does not gain assistance from other arts *directly*; although indirectly many arts contribute to the improvement of one, *e.g.* microscopy to surgery. See Sir John Lubbock's address to the British

Association at York, 1881: 'One very marked feature in modern discovery was the manner in which distinct branches of science had thrown, and were throwing, light on one another.' But an art does gain assistance from itself, *i.e.* it improves by experience, the continual treatment of new cases suggests improvements,—*vires acquirit eundo*. And, to transfer this to Plato's instance, an old doctor is, broadly speaking, better than a young one. This loose point, although of no account here, will be found to create a difficulty later on, in Book III., where Socrates is speaking of the physicians in his State. In that passage (409 *fin.*) he slurs over the fact that experience of disease makes the best physician, with the barbarous conclusion that where a person is of a bad constitution, ἀποθήσκειν ἐδούσουσιν.

οὔτε γὰρ πονηρία... *i.e.* in the principles of science there is nothing of evil effect. They are immutable and beneficial; for by the knowledge of them we can work according, and not in opposition, to nature. But in the person who applies them, and in the recipient of their application, there is πονηρία, or fault. An art is the exercise of

οὐδεμία οὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει
 τέχνη ἄλλῃ τὸ ξυμφέρον ζητεῖν ἢ ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη
 ἐστίν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβῆς καὶ ἀκέραιός ἐστιν ὀρθή
 οὐσα, ἕωςπερ ἂν ἡ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὄλη ἤπερ ἐστὶ ;
 καὶ σκόπει ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ· οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως
 ἔχει; Οὕτως, ἔφη, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἰατρικὴ ἰατρικῇ τὸ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι.
 Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐδὲ ἵππικὴ ἵππικῇ ἀλλ' ἵπποις· οὐδὲ C
 ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται,
 ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν· Φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
 Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἄρχουσί γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ

human faculty according to system, and whilst exercised thus (*ὀρθῇ οὐσα*) an art is beneficial. In this passage it must be borne in mind that Socrates is speaking 'strictly,' *i.e.* when speaking of an art he speaks of those principles which in their nature are unerring; and does not regard the art in the slightest degree as remunerative to him who practises it.

οὕτως ἔφη, φαίνεται. Thrasymachus is beginning to see the gist of Socrates' argument, and uses the qualitative word *φαίνεται*.

ἄρχουσί γε... 'are in command of, and are stronger than...' On this analogy, cleverly brought home to the ears of his audience by the use of *ἄρχω* and *κρατέω*, rests Socrates' conclusion, that justice is the interest of the weaker, and not of the stronger. The analogy may be borne out thus: the principles of medicine and the ruler of a State alike dictate to the people what they are to do and what they are not to do as subjects, respectively, of medicine and law. The principles of medicine and of law

are alike intrusted to experts whose duty it is to legislate, for prevention and cure, against illness and crime. A citizen who is a good member of the commonwealth, and a person who has need of medicine, must, as a condition of benefit, accept the constitution and the principles of medicine. But it is easy to see that the analogy cannot be borne out entirely. If we put the case that a person disobeys his doctor, who is the worse? The patient. Whereas if a citizen be guilty of treason he may throw the State into confusion and ruin the ruler. The particle *μὴν* is used to introduce a fresh link in the chain of argument, and also indicates the point at which this argument begins to show in marked opposition to Thrasymachus' words, that rulers rule for their own benefit; just as in XXI. *fn.* in a similar stage of an argument we have *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν*, &c. For Socrates here brings the arts under the category of rulers. 'And yet, Thrasymachus [*i.e.* for all that you said before], the arts are rulers.' Γε is to save

κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου, οὐπὲρ εἰσι τέχλαι. Συνεχώρησεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόγις. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἥττονός τε καὶ ἀρχομένου ὑπὸ ἑαυτῆς. Ξυνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχασθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν, Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς οὐδεὶς, καθ' ὅσον ἰατρός, τὸ τῷ ἰατρῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ κάμνοντι; ὠμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἰατρὸς σωμαίων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής. ἦ οὐχ ὠμολόγηται; Ξυνέφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἔἰθ' οὐ ναύτης; ὠμολόγηται. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων τὸ τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ξυμφέρον σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάξει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ναύτῃ τε καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. Ξυνέφησε μόγις. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστὶ, τὸ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὃ ἂν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ξυμφέρον καὶ πρέπον καὶ λέγει ἅ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἅ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

CAP. XVI.

343 Ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι καταφανὲς ἦν, ὅτι ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοῦναντίον the directness of this attack upon Thrasymachus' position; it is apologetic. turns government to his own benefit, and a just man finds it his ruin.

ἄλλο τι οὖν, v.s. Ch. XI. C.

ᾧ, 'in whose interest,' for whose benefit.'

CH. XVI.—That is all nonsense, replied Thrasymachus; any one can tell you that an unjust man

ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου, v.s. Ch. II. fin. ἐνταῦθα εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας.

ὁ τοῦ δικ. λόγος, 'the account' or 'the definition' of that which is just.

περιεστήκει, ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τίτθῃ σοι ἔστιν ; Τί δέ ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτᾶν ; "Οτι τοί σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾶ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γιγνώσκεις. "Οτι δὴ τί μάλιστα ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. "Οτι οἶει τοὺς ποιμένας ἢ τοὺς βουκόλους

περιεστήκει. περιέρχουαι, used in Euthyphro, II, B, C, of an argument coming round to the same point, instead of to a conclusion, as here. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ δ' ἂν προθώμεθα. And so περιέναι, *ibid.* Here, as noticed above in Ch. VII., the argument is invested with a quasi-personality.

τιτῆ σοι ἔστιν ; Thrasymachus is evidently enraged at his discomfiture. The scene is very similar to that in Euthydemus, 287 B, where Socrates has got the better of two sophists ; whereupon the less discreet of the two remarks : εἶτ' ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε, &c. *i.e.* 'Are you such a dotard, &c.?' So below, ὦ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες.

αὐτῇ, 'for her,' *i.e.* 'because she neglects to tell you.' An example of the pure 'Ethic Dative.' This Ethic Dative is merely an extreme case of the ordinary use of the dative : which is to express reference to a person or thing other than the subject, but affected indirectly by, or having some relation to, the action of the main verb. Examples of this general sense of the dative are :—

αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖσιν ἀφείλετο νόστιμον ἡμᾶρ.—Hom. Od. I, 9.
'Oscula libavit natæ.'

Virg. Æn. I, 256.

κελσάσῃσι δὲ νησὶ καθειλομεν ἴστια πάντα.

Hom. Od. 9, 149.

'Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit.'

Hor. Od. I. 24, 9.

The above datives fall in grammars under different heads ; but they all agree in this fundamental character, that they express some person or thing more or less directly connected with the main action. In these examples the connection is close : often we can render by 'of,' as though the case were a genitive. Subjoined are some examples of the Ethic Dative, where it will be noticed that the connection between the person or thing in the dative, and the subject, is more remote, is rather mental than physical, as in the above examples :—

'Non Beroe vobis ! non hæc Rhœteia, matres, Est Dorycli conjux.'

Virg. Æn. 5, 646.

οὐκ ἄρβεν' ὑμῖν ἔστιν ;

Arist. Nub. 688.

κλιθῆτί νῦν μοι, πλεῦρα θεῖς ἐπὶ χθονός.

Eur. Cyc. 425.

ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ μυθολογοῦσθαι μαστὰ καὶ ἵπκον.—Rep. Book II. 359 D.

μάλιστα, 'particularly,' 'in what special point?'

Β τὸ τῶν προβάτων ἢ τὸ τῶν βοῶν ἀγαθὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ παχύνειν αὐτοὺς καὶ θεραπεύειν πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέποντας ἢ τὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντας, οἳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχουσιν, ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ διανοεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ ὥσπερ ἂν τις πρὸς πρόβατα διατεθείη, καὶ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖν αὐτοὺς διὰ νυκτὸς

Γ καὶ ἡμέρας ἢ τοῦτο ὅθεν αὐτοὶ ὠφελήσονται. καὶ οὕτω πόρρω εἰ περί τε τοῦ δικαίου καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδίκου τε καὶ ἀδικίας, ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι ἢ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι,

καὶ δὴ καί, *v.s. not. ad Cap. II. in it.* For other instances of this expression see Herod. 3, 61, κήρυκας τῆ τε ἄλλῃ διέπεμπε, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Αἴγυπτον. *Et infr.* 62, οἳ τε δὴ ὦν ἄλλοι κήρυκες προηγόρευον ταῦτα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον ταχθεῖς, &c.

ἄλλως πως ἡγεῖ... Thrasymachus here betrays his own debased notions of government, by giving no governor credit for a disinterested regard for the good of those whom he governs. Just as Socrates says in Book III. 409 A, a man who has been familiar with crime from his youth is no good judge; for he will attribute the worst motives to every person who comes before him. ἀπειρον αὐτὴν (ψυχὴν) δεῖ κακῶν ἡθῶν νέαν οὖσαν γεγονέναι, εἰ μέλλει καλὴ κάγαθὴ οὖσα κρίνειν ὑγιῶς τὰ δίκαια... δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν δικαστὴν... ὀψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἶόν ἐστιν. Thrasymachus shifts his ground here, and, discarding the ἀκριβῆς ἰατρός and ἀκριβῆς ποιμὴν (who is a shepherd and nothing but a shepherd), he advances the position that the Ruler, like the shepherd, has his own interest

always in view when taking all care of those committed to him.

οὕτω πόρρω εἰ, 'so far a-field,' 'so far off.' We find the expression used to convey an exactly opposite sense when the simple genitive is employed. οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἡκει, 'you are so far advanced upon the road of wisdom.'—Euthyd. 294 E.

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. See Arist. Eth. Nic. 5, 6, 6, διὰ τοῦτο (τὸ μὴ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν ἀγαθοῦ) ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην. And *ibid.* *supr.* Ch. I. 17. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ δικαιοσύνη μόνῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν. The phrase means, 'the benefit of some one else.' Thrasymachus here must be taken as meaning by δικαιοσύνη, 'justice as popularly understood'; otherwise ἀλλότριον has no meaning. But he is passing on now to consider the condition of the subjects, those who experience justice, *i.e.* the 'rule of the Stronger'; whilst, from the view of the rulers, justice is the 'advantage of the Stronger.' 'By justice,

τοῦ κρείττονος τε καὶ ἄρχοντος ξυμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετούντος βλάβη, ἢ δὲ ἀδικία τούναντιον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, οἱ δ' ἄρχόμενοι ποιοῦσι τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκείνον ποιοῦσιν ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. σκοπεῖσθαι δέ, ὧ εὐηθέστατε Σώκρατες, D οὕτωςι χρῆ, ὅτι δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους

he would say, 'in the mouths of the people, we must understand the profit of the rulers and the injury of the ruled.'

οἰκεία βλάβη. v.s. the passage quoted from Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* in Ch. XII. 338 E. The passage proceeds thus:— 'Therefore when I consider and way in my mind all these commen welthes, which now a dayes any where do flourish, so God helpe me, I can perceave nothing but a certain conspiracy of riche men procuring their owne commodities under the name of the commen wealth.'

ἢ δὲ ἀδικία τουναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει... Thrasymachus does not tell us who are the perpetrators of injustice; but, as injustice is stated to be the exercise of rule over the just (*ἄρχει τῶν δικαίων*), we are obliged to conclude that it is the rulers who are the ἀδικοὶ and exercise this ἀδικία. We are confirmed in this conclusion by a reference to Book III. 409, *loc. supr. cit.*, where the just man, it is allowed, is often the victim of the unjust; just as in the Gospel it is said that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light. *Ἰδὲ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις* (as *εὐηθικῶν*

here) *νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικῆς φαίνονται καὶ εὐεξαπατητοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων.* Therefore Thrasymachus' position comes to this: Rulers manage the people for their own profit: the law-abiding people consider obedience to the rulers to be justice. Still it remains that the rule of the Rulers is, in all cases, an unjust one. It is evident from this that Thrasymachus allows in the background the existence of a very different justice from the justice of his definition; otherwise, why does he acknowledge that the Rulers rule unjustly? We shall see what use Socrates makes of this inconsistency in the sequel. Aristotle treats of a similar case in *Eth. Nic.* 5, 6, where, describing *πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*, he also defines injustice: *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμει τῶν ἀπλῶς αγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. Διδὸν οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄνθρωπον ἀρχειν ἄλλα-τὸν λόγον.*

δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει, v.s. πολ. ad οὐδὲν γέ σοι πλέον ἔσται, Ch. XV. inil. In *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 5, 9, 9, the just man is described as denying himself, as permitting or conniving at the advantage of others, *ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆς ἔλαττωτικός ἐστίν.* And above,

ξυμβολαίοις, ὅπου ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ κοινω-
νίῃσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εὐροις ἐν τῇ διαλύσει τῆς κοινωνίης
πλέον ἔχοντα τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀλλ' ἔλαττον
ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὅταν τέ τινες εἰσφοραὶ
ᾧσιν, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ
Εἰ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅταν τε λήψεις, ὁ μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ πολλὰ
κερδαίνει. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα ἀρχῆ ἐκάτερος,

πλέον ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει. For this position see Book II. Chaps. I.-IX., where it is drawn out at much greater length, and illustrated with much greater force by Glaucon and Adeimantus. See also Aristophanes, Clouds, where the Δίκαιος Λόγος and the Ἄδικος Λόγος measure swords, ll. 889-1104. And with regard to the special question, ἔπειτα ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, of the just man and the unjust in office, see Socrates' conversation with Aristippus in Mem. Xenophontis, Book II. Ch. I. And also Antiphon's opinion of Socrates' refusal to take money for teaching; *ibid.* Book I. 6, 12. Δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴησιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷ ἐπὶ πλευνεξία, σόφος δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀξία ἐπιστάμενος. Here σόφος οὐκ... is the equivalent of εὐθηκῶν and εὐήθεις in the passages of the Republic. And see also the passage from Arist. Ethics quoted above, πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν.

ξυμβολαίοις. *v.s. not. ad* Cap. VII.

εἰσφοραί, an extraordinary tax, raised upon property, to meet urgent occasions. Thus when Mytilene was besieged, B.C. 428, by Paches, an εἰσφορά was imposed. προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσπενέγοντες τότε πρῶτον εἰσφορὰν διακύσια,

ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς συμμαχοῦς, &c. The term for the imperial requisition was φόρος, and afterwards σύνταξις, see Dem. de Cor. 305, Reiske.

ἀπὸ τῶν ἴσων, 'upon an equal assessment or amount of property.' ἀπό implies 'calculating from.'

λήψεις. An illustration of this practice, *i.e.* of gratis distribution to the citizens when any extraordinary revenue accrued, is found in Herod. VII. 144, where it is proposed that the produce of the Laurian silver should be applied thus: ἐμελλον λαβεσθαι ἀρχηδὸν ἑκαστός δέκα δραχμῶν. Themistocles however diverted the money to the building of a fleet. Similarly in Roman history, when Attalus Philometor, king of Pergamus, bequeathed his property to Rome, Tiberius Gracchus proposed to apply it to the stocking of those farms which poor farmers had obtained through his agrarian laws, instead of merely distributing it to all the citizens.

ὅταν ἀρχὴν τινα... For this third point compare Xen. Mem. II. 1, 8. καὶ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐναυτῶ τὰ δέοντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τούτου, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολιταῖς, ὧν δέοντα

τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ εἰ μηδεμίᾳ ἄλλῃ ζημία, τὰ γε οἰκεία δι' ἀμελειαν μοχθηρότερος ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελείσθαι διὰ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπέχθασθαι τοῖς τε οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθέλῃ αὐτοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον· τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ πάντα τούτων τάναντία ὑπάρχει. λέγω γὰρ ὄνπερ νῦν δη ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν. τούτου οὖν σκόπει, εἴπερ **344** βούλει κρίνειν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ξυμφέρει ἰδίᾳ αὐτῷ ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸ δίκαιον. πάντων δὲ ῥᾶστα μαθή-

πορίζειν. καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν πολλὰ ὦν βούλεται ἑλλείπειν τῆς δὲ πόλεως προεστῶτα, ἐὰν μὴ πάντα, ὅσα ἡ πόλις βούλεται καταπράττει, τούτου δίκην ὑπέχειν, τούτο πῶς οὐ πολλὰ ἀφορομένη ἐστίν; So in Herod. 1, 97, the just man Deioces, who is always appointed arbiter of disputes, finds that his own affairs go to ruin whilst he is rectifying others'. οὐ γὰρ οἱ λυσιτελέειν, τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐξημεληκότα, τοῖσι πέλας δι' ἡμέρης δικάζειν. Aristotle (Eth. 5, 66) gives the reason for the just man's poverty in office, by stating the principle on which he acts: οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. And he coincides with Plato in his opinion of their different behaviour in office when he says, ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει; 5, 1, 16. Thrasymachus adds that it is the fault of the judge's εὐθήθεια if he cannot make his livelihood and something to spare out of his dispensation of justice.

μοχθηρότερος ἔχειν. We should be inclined at first sight to make τὰ οἰκεία the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν, but when we come to the balancing clauses, ἐκ δὲ...

ὠφελείσθαι, and πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, we see that the sentence will be more perfect if 'the just man' be made the subject of μοχθ. ἔχειν as well as of ὠφελείσθαι. The use of μοχθηρῶς διακείσθαι in Gorgias, 504 E, may be noticed in support of this construction; and τὰ γε οἰκεία will then be accusativus respectus pendens. For the termination of μοχθ. Stallb. adduces a number of similar words, ἐνδεεστέρος, ἀγριότερος, μαθηκατώτερος, &c. And for this use of the absolute comparative, see Euthyphro *in il.*, τί νεώτερον; Herod. VI. 46. τεῖχος ισχυρότερον περιβαλλόμενοι.

ἀπέχθασθαι. Transl. 'to be an object of hatred to,' thus bringing out the force of the dative, the case of the person indirectly concerned; *v.s. not. ad autē*, and see *infr.* Ch. XXIII. ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. To render, 'by his relations and acquaintances,' is not accurate, although unavoidable in such a phrase as, ἐμοὶ πέπρακται τούργον.

ἢ τὸ δίκαιον, *sc. εἶναι ξυμφέρει* τῷ δίκαιῳ, Stallb. The expression is awkward and more abrupt

σει, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς, ἢ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἀδικηθέντας καὶ ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερά καὶ ὄσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ **Β** ξυλληβδην ὧν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ζημιούται τε καὶ ὀνειδίῃ ἔχει τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρύχοι καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικούντες τῶν τοιούτων κακουρημάτων καλοῦνται· ἐπει-

than we should expect to find. Bremius conjectured *τό* before *ἄδικον*, which would improve the reading; but some of the MSS. omit *τό* altogether.

τὴν τελεωτ. ἀδικίαν. v. i. 348 D: *ὅ γε τελέως οἳ τε ἀδικεῖν*. And *infr.* in this Ch. τὴν δλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα. 351 B: *τελεώτατα ὄσα ἄδικος*. 352 C: *κομιδῆ ὄντες ἄδικοι*. 360 E: *τέλεον ἐκότερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν*. *Et ibid. infr.* ἐσχάτη ἀδικία, τῷ τελέως ἀδικῶ. And so ἡμιμόχθηροι, 352 C, and οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικούντες, *infr.* here.

ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 5. Διδὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεταί τυραννος. *Loc. suppr. cit.*; *et infr.* § 7. Μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος... ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τυράννοι. For the genesis of the τυράννος, see Book VIII. *fin.* IX. *init.* Thrasymachus' account of the despot here agrees substantially with that of Socrates in Book VIII.

ἱερά καὶ ὄσια. ἱερά = Latin sacer; ὄσιον = fas. See Liddell

and Scott *ad* ὄσιος, 2. For ξυλληβδην v.s. Ch. IX.: ἢ καὶ ξυλληβδην ἀρετῆ ὀ αγαθοὶ κακοῦς; (sc. ποιούσι).

καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι, &c. Cf. the tale of Alexander and the robber, which has been related thus. 'A certain pirate who made great havoc among the shipping of the Mediterranean Sea was taken prisoner by the Macedonian soldiers and brought before Alexander, who asked by what right he committed his robberies. "I am a robber by the same right that you are a conqueror," was the reply; "the only difference between us is, that I have but a few men, and can do but little mischief, while you have a large army and can do a great deal."'

τῶν τοιούτων κακ. Causal genitive: it is used very frequently in Greek, and appears in many forms. *E.g.* with adjective alone, *ὃ δυστάλαινα τῶν ἐμῶν παθημάτων*. Or with verbs of wondering, see *infr.* 426 D. *τοὺς... προθυμονόμενους οὐκ ἄγασαι τῆς ἀνδρείας*. Also with such verbs as *εὐδαιμονίζω, μακαρίζω, ὀλβίζω*.

δὲν δέ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος δουλώσεται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὄλην ἀδικίαν C ἠδίκηκότα· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶσχειν φοβούμενοι ὄνειδιζουσιν οἱ ὄνειδιζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἰκανῶς γιγνομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον.

CAP. XVII.

Ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῷ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι, D ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὠτων

ἀνδραπ. δουλ. ἀνδραποδίζομαι is the more odious word of the two, and expresses the act of depriving a man of his liberty; hence it means sometimes to kidnap; δουλώω, to hold in subjection. So in Book V. 469 B, we find the former used when the question is discussed—Shall Greeks enslave Greeks in war? Πρῶτον μὲν ἀνδραποδισμοῦ πέρι, δοκεῖ δίκαιον Ἑλληνῶν Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι. Whilst farther on we find δούλος and δουλεία used to describe the state of slavery.

οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶσχειν. In his elaboration of Thrasymachus' case in Book II., Glaucon shows that what is called justice arises from this fact, that men give up wrong dealing, not from principle, but because they prefer to free themselves from the danger of being

ill-treated by others. ὥστ' ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύονται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμέοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυμθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μὴτ' ἀδικεῖν μὴτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

φοβούμενοι, 'because they are afraid of.'

ἰσχυρότερον...ἀδικία. Thrasymachus here no longer conceals his true position, but clearly states that what is justice to the ruled is injustice in the hands of the ruler; an inconsistency which cannot be supported by the terms of any definition.

CH. XVII.—Socrates entreats Thrasymachus to abide by his words.

ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς... Socrates, as it has been mentioned above, had the greatest objection to

ἄθροον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον. οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνάγκασαν ὑπομεῖναι τε καὶ παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον καὶ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς πάνυ ἐδεόμην τε καὶ εἶπον· ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει ;
Ε ἢ σμικρὸν οἶε ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ'

long speeches, and always stipulated for the method of question and answer in discussion. See Protag. 334 D. He justified this claim on the ground that he had a bad memory (a phase of the *ειρωνεία*), thus: *loc. cit.* ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ἐπιλήσμων τις ἂν ἀνθρώπος. In Ch. XXII. *init.* Thrasymachus, when defeated in argument, refuses to be convinced, and expresses his intention either of giving his opinion in a speech, or of saying 'yes' and 'no,' just as Socrates desires—in other words, of not attempting to argue the question. He there states that he knows Socrates will accuse him of making an harangue (*δημηγορεῖν*) if he deliver himself as he desires, and yet declines to argue point by point. For *καταντλέω*, see 536 B, *φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν*; where also the object is in the genitive.

πολὸν τὸν λόγον. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 272, 20, *πολλῶ βέοντι*, of an orator; and Hor. Sat. I, 7, 28—

'Salso multoque fluenti.'

The word *θρασσυνομένῳ* preceding *πολλῶ βέοντι* in the passage quoted from Demosthenes, encourages us to believe that the name Thrasymachus was appropriated by Plato to intimate the character of this sophist.

οὐ μὴν εἴασάν γε, 'but the rest by no means permitted him to escape.' γε implies the complete refusal of the others to let Thrasymachus off, being attached to *εἴασαν*, in order to negative the bare idea of their doing so.

οἷον ἐμβαλὼν...ἔχεις. Here, as noticed above, page 128, the principal verb is cast into the participle, for purposes of grammatical construction; as we had above, *οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδिका...φοβούμενοι ὄνειδίζουσιν*. 'They are not afraid of doing but of suffering harm, that they reproach,' &c. We may recal Virgil, *Æn. I, 141*—

'Clauso ventorum carcere regnet.'
i.e. 'Let him shut up his prison before he play the king.' For *ἐμβαλὼν v. infr.* ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον;

ἢ σμικρὸν οἶε...ἀλλ' οὐ... For the sentiment, *v.s. not. ad εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐζητοῦμεν*, Ch. X. And *infr.* 352 C, *οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ᾔη*. Similarly 358 E, *περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μάλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων;* (sc. *δικαιοσύνης*). Again 367 D, *σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἂν* (sc. bear to hear the ordinary talk about justice) *εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν*

οὐ βίου διαγωγὴν, ἢ ἂν διαγόμενος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
 λυσιτελεστάτην ζωὴν ζῶῃ; Ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ
 Θρασύμαχος, τουτὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν; Ἔοικας, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ,
 ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε οὐδὲν κήδεσθαι, οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε
 χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα ἀγνοοῦντες ὃ σὺ φῆς
 εἰδέναί. ἀλλ', ὦ ἴγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξα-
 σθαι· οὗτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται, ὃ τι ἂν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦσδε 345

βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελέ-
 λυθας ἢ τοῦτο. In the same
 strain he insists in Book V.
 452 C, seqq. on the folly of
 those who only make a joke
 out of well-intentioned legisla-
 tion, adding the telling remark,
 μάταιος δὲ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται
 ἢ τὸ κακόν. Again in Book VI.
 497 E he makes the just man
 disregard all else but living his
 life purely and uprightly; ἀγαθῶ,
 εἴ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε
 καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τὸν τε ἐνθάδε
 βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν
 αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἴλεως
 τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάξεται.
 These passages are very valuable,
 because they preserve the lead-
 ing point of Socrates' moral
 system—'Put everything after
 living your life uprightly,'—
 just as in Book X. *ipit.* he puts
 truth before persons, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ
 πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος
 ἀνὴρ, and they prove to us what
 we are liable to forget sometimes
 amid the raillery of the dialogue,
 that Socrates was always in
 earnest. See *Intro.* § 7. Ari-
 stotle speaks similarly in *Eth.*
Nic. 2, 21: Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα
 πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν
 (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ
 ἀρετὴ) σκοπεύομεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἀγαθὸν
 γενώμεθα, &c. The expression
 ἀλλ' οὐ is to be noticed, where
 in English we should say 'and
 not.' See Book II. 379 D:
 τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν

τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. So
 in Book VI. 500 A: ἐν ὀλίγοις
 τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγ-
 νεσθαι. Also *ibid.* 492 A: ἡ καὶ
 σὺ ἡγεῖ διαφθειρομένους τινας
 εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους...ἀλλ'
 οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας
 μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς.
 And also Book VII. 532 C, and
infra. here, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν
 ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα, and Ch. XVIII.
 ὠφέλειαν ἰδίαν παρέχεται, ἀλλ'
 οὐ κοινήν.

εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βίωσ.
 v. Euthyphro *fin.* καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν
 ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἀμεινον βιωσοίμην.

προθυμοῦ. A favourite term
 with Plato in a similar context.
 So Euthyphro II E, αὐτὸς σοὶ
 ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δεῖξαι, where
 ξύν implies that the learner will
 assist the teacher by readiness
 to receive information; as in
 Xen. *Anab.* 7, 2, 24: δεόμενός
 μου ξυμπροθυμηθῆναι διαβῆναι τὸ
 στρατεύμα. See also Laches
 186 A: προθυμούμενοι αὐτοῖν ὃ
 τι ἀρίστα γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχάς.
 And for the spirit in which the
 remark is proffered see *Meno.*
 71 D: εἶπον καὶ μὴ φρονήσης, τί
 φῆς ἀρετὴν εἶναι;

κείσεται. Something similar
 is Virgil's—

'Haud illi stabant Æneia parvo
 Hospitia.'

(*Æn.* 10, 494); the difference
 being that stare is used of the
 expense, κείμαι of the gain.

ὄντας εὐεργετήσης. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ σοι λέγω τό γ' ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδ' οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐὰν ἔᾳ τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύη πράττειν ἃ βούλεται· ἀλλ', ὧ ἡγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἀδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λαυθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτ' οὖν καὶ ἕτερος
Β ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπουθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ. πείσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἰκανῶς ἡμᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; Μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν, ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῆ, φανερώς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἔξαπάτα.
Κ νῦν δὲ ὀρᾷς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα, ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὀριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ῥου δεῖν

For this sense of *κείμαι*, to be stored up, see Ch. VII. *ad fin.* μηδὲν αὐτῷ (sc. ἀργυρίῳ) χρῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι.

τὸ γ' ἐμόν, *v.s.* τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, Ch. III.

ἢ τῷ λαυθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμ. *v. infr.* Book II. Ch. IV.: λέγειν τε ἰκανῶ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐάν τι μηνύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίαι δέηται. The unjust man is described as fully provided against all emergencies, by fraud or force, as in this passage.

πέπουθεν, 'has occurred to some one else,' *v.s. not.* *ad* page 114, ἐπεπόνθη.

ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα, &c. See the beginning of Ch. XVI. where Thrasymachus, in transferring his metaphor from a physician to a shepherd, forgot

or repudiated his former distinction between the physician speaking roughly, and the physician purely as a physician; and proceeded to assert that the shepherd has his own ultimate profit always in view rather than the good of the sheep. Socrates points out that if the shepherd is to be understood rigorously as a shepherd (*ἀκριβῶς*), he has regard only to the well-being of the sheep, and not of himself. See Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, p. 61, ed. Arber, in imitation of this passage: 'Therefore the kynge ought to take more care for the wealth of his people, then for his owne wealth, euen as the office and dewtie of a shephearde is, in that he is a shepherde, to feede his shepe rather then himselfe.'

ὑστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξει, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἶε αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ' ὅσον ποιμὴν ἔστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποδοῦσθαι, ὡσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ' οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου D ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ· ἐπεὶ τά γε αὐτῆς, ὡστ' εἶναι βελτίστη, ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γ' ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέη τοῦ ποιμενικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω δὲ ᾧμην ἔγωγε νῦν δὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν, πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἐν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς E ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τοὺς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἐκόντας οἶε ἄρχειν; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ, ἔφη, ἀλλ' εὐοῖδα.

τῇ δὲ ποιμεν. οὐ δήπου ἄλλου μέλει. We find this verb used personally in Hom. Od. 9, 20—

εἴμ' Ὀδυσσεὺς Λαερτιάδης δε πᾶσι δόλοισιν ἀνθρώποισι μέλω.

So *δοκέω* is found, and *ἔοικα* personally, as well as *δοκεῖ* and *ἔοικεν*. See Book II. 368 B: *δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι*. And Meno. 72 A: *πολλῇ γέ τιμι εὐτυχία ἔοικα κεχρησθαι*.

ἕως γ' ἂν μηδέν... See above, Ch. XV., the question at which Thrasymachus stumbled: *ἀρ' οὐν καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔστι τι ξυμφέρων ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα τελείαν εἶναι*;

οὕτω δὲ ᾧμην... νῦν δὴ, 'just now.' Socrates calls Thrasymachus' attention to the inconsistency of making the ruler,

as a ruler, have regard to his own interest. He then puts a question involving the word *ἀρχειν*, which he and Thrasymachus understand in different ways, thus; Thrasymachus' idea of *ἀρχή* is the discharge of certain duties as a necessary condition of obtaining money, power, and opportunity to further one's influence by judicious distribution of places; whilst Socrates looks upon it as an arduous and responsible labour, in which self must be ignored, and all the powers of the mind strained to their utmost, in providing for the welfare of the public. On these different acceptations of the term *ἀρχή* turns the next part of the discussion.

CAP. XVIII.

Τί δέ ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκόν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφέλειαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ; ἐπεὶ
 346 τὸσόνδε εἶπέ· οὐχὶ ἐκάστην μέντοι φημὲν ἐκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ; καὶ, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. Ἄλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστη ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερ-

CH. XVIII.—*To every art, if it be exercised not merely as an art, but as a means of livelihood, the art, so to speak, of making money is subsidiary.*

οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκόν, &c. See Arist. Eth. 5, 6, 6 : ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην· μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος. And so Aristotle in the Politics, when speaking of those to whom the supervision of criminals was intrusted : Χαλεπή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ (ἀρχή) διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν· ὥστε ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἐστὶ κερδαίνειν οὐτ' ἄρχειν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτήν... μέντοι, emphatic here, not adversative ; *v.s. not. ad Cap. II. page III.*

τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι... *i.e.* 'What is it that makes one art different from another ; is it not the work it performs ?' And see Meno. 72 B. Ἄρα τούτῳ φῆς (μελίττας)... εἶναι διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι.

παρὰ δόξαν, 'contrary to expectation' ; *i.e.* παρὰ προσδοκίαν, 'a jesting answer.' We shall

understand Socrates' hint better if we refer back to Thrasymachus' question, Ch. XVI., τίττη σοι ἔστιν ; and below, Ch. XX. *ad med.* where Socrates says, 'I think you are now really speaking your mind, Thrasymachus, and not jesting.' ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖς σὺ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπτειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκούντα λέγειν ὡς περ διανοεῖ. παρὰ δόξαν means contrary to the expectation of the listeners, and does not refer to the speaker, as in Ch. XXII. E. Μηδαμῶς παρὰ γε τὴν σαντοῦ δόξαν, 'against your own conviction.' Cf. also Æschines cont. Ctes. 18 (ed. Simcox) : διδάξω δ' ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῶν παραδόξων, *i.e.* 'in cases where you would least expect it.'

ἰδίαν.. ἀλλ' οὐ κοινήν. Each art may afford a recompense to the exercisers of it, but it may be exercised gratuitously, προίκα ἐργάζηται, *infra* D ; therefore it is not essential to the nature of an art that it bear profit ; but each art has a special function and a special sphere, in which its true nature consists.

νητική δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις· ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἑάνπερ βούλη ἄκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἂν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρευν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Οὐδέ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἢ ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρῶν. Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικὴν, ἢ ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῆ; Οὐκ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε C. ὠφέλειαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὠμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Ἦντινα ἄρα ὠφέλειαν κοινῇ ὠφελούνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ

ἢ ἑάνπερ. βούλη ἄκριβῶς διορίζειν. The latter alternative gives the proposition to be accepted, *v.s.* Ch. XV. note. The art of navigation exists for and is directed solely towards, the safe conduct of people and goods over the sea. A physician may say to a man 'take a sea voyage to recruit yourself'; but if a sailor is the better for his seafaring life, it is an accident in his art, not a constituent element, for he may be required to voyage in unhealthy as well as healthy climates.

οὐ δῆτα, 'of course not.' Prof. Paley terms δῆτα an adverbial expansion of δῆ. Δῆ, as has been noticed above, is culminative or final, and also emphatic; and often thus combined with οὐ. So *infra*. Ch. XXIII. *ἰνί. δοκεῖς...πρᾶξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν*; Οὐ δῆτα. See also Sophocles, *Ced. Tyr.* 754, 5—

Οἱ. ἢ κἄν δόμοισι τυγχάνει τανῦν παρών;

ΙΟ. Οὐ δῆτ'.

et infra. 94I, 2—

ΙΟ. τί, δ'; οὐχ ὁ πρέσβυς

Πόλυβος ἐγκρατῆς ἔτι;

ΑΓ. οὐ δῆτ', ἐπεὶ νιν θάνατος ἐν τάφοις ἔχει.

ὠφέλειαν... ὠφελούνται. So above, τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχειν; and *infra*. Book III. 405 C, πάσας μὲν ἀγρυπᾶς στρέφεισθαι. ἄρα calls attention to a discrepancy or a difference, its prevailing sense in Attic Greek being 'after all,' 'as it appears then,' and so is often used, as here, when a conclusion is reached conflicting with a former belief. See Book II. 362 A: τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου; and note. And so in *Æschylus'* *Agamemnon*, when the chorus asks what *παν* is to be the murderer, Cassandra replies, ἢ κάρτ' ἄρ' ἂν παρεσκόπεισ χρησμῶν ἐμών. And so οὐκ ἄρα, *infra*. here; and see note page 108, οὐδ' ἴστε.

τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρῶμενοι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Φαμέν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνημένους ὠφελείσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. **Ξυνέφη** **Δ** μόγις. Οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ αὕτη ἢ ὠφέλειά ἐστιν, ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἢ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἐπομένη μισθόν, καὶ α ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτω· τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκείνο, ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγηται, ἔσθ' ὅ τι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδ' **Ε** ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ', ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον

φαμέν δέ γε, &c. We have here a crude version of the fact that all human labour can be productive. The only way of justifying the use of the word *τέχνη* is to say that there is an art in knowing what article is demanded, in order that the labour may meet a want and be profitable to the labourer. But Socrates does not mean this, he is only arguing upon analogy; and he chooses to term the practice of getting paid for duties, professional or mechanical, an art, because it suits his disproof of Thrasymachus' statements.

ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς... We must not overlook the importance of this clause, although stated conditionally. 'But what if a

man gets no pay for his labour — what then? Does he get any benefit from the art itself?' 'No,' Socrates would go on, 'it is to the person for whom he works that all benefit accrues from the art itself and not to the labourer; for he may spend his labour on that which is not wanted at once, and then he gets no return.' In contrast to this Socrates then puts the converse, 'Does he *do* no good, then, if he work without pay?' And Socrates' answer is that he must benefit some one by productive labour; although he may not be necessarily remunerated for it. In brief, it is impossible to work without doing good, but it is possible to work without gaining money.

ἤττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Θρασύμαχε, καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλγειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθοῦντα, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλῶς τῇ τέχνῃ πράξειν οὐδέ- 347 ποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἔοικε, μισθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ ζημίαν, ἐὰν μὴ ἄρχῃ.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα. δὴ marks the conclusion.

τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ... See Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8: ἀφρονος ἀνθρώπου εἶναι τὸ, μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὰ δεόντα παρασκευάζειν, μὴ ἀρκεῖν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ προσαναθέσθαι τὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις.

ὁ μέλλων... 'the man who is to do his duty in his art.' When μέλλω is used thus in the participle or with εἰ, the principal verb in the sentence expresses a necessary condition without which the action expressed by the verb following μέλλων cannot be realized. We should therefore gain a clearer rendering if we put the statement negatively, 'A man cannot do his duty in his art, unless he loses sight of his own interests,' or 'if a man is to do his duty in his art, he must lose sight of his interests.' μέλλω then has the force of a certain future, 'to be sure to'... So in 520 D the phrase οἱ μέλλοντες ἀρξείν is applied to men who are said

to be unwilling to take office, but who, nevertheless do take it; where it may be construed 'those who must take office.' And in this Book, Ch. XXI.; πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... ἔοικέναι: 'How can he fail to be like...?' And here *inf.*: τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθελήσειν ἄρχειν, 'Those who are to be induced to take office.' And in Book II. Ch. I.: τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Also *id.* Ch. IV.: λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι. This meaning is in curious contrast to another use 'to be going to do a thing (and never do it)'; 'to linger,' 'hesitate.' See Soph. O. C. 1627, 8—

ὦ οὗτος οὐτος, Οἰδίπωνος, τί μέλλομεν χωρεῖν; πάλαι δὴ τ' ἀπὸ σοῦ βραδύνεται.

From which latter sense we have μελλητής (cunctator) in Ar. Eth. Nic. 4, 3, 27.

ζημίαν. See Ar. Eth. 5, 6, 6, *loc. sup. cit.*

CAP. XIX.

Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ἔφη ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς γιγνώσκω· τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ἤντινα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἴρηκας, οὐ βξυνηκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἄρα μισθόν, ἔφην, οὐ ξυνεις, δι' ὃν ἄρχουσιν οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἐθέλωσιν ἄρχειν. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε χρημάτων ἕνεκα ἐθέλουσιν ἄρχειν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερώς πραττόμενοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕνεκα μισθόν

CH. XIX.—Men who love money and fame are ready to take office: the best men only do so when pressed. But next I do not agree with Thrasymachus, that the just life is less profitable than the unjust.

οὐ ξυνηκα. Glaucon does not contemplate a repugnance to taking office; Socrates himself below confesses that the reverse is the case, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἀρχειν (περιμάχητον). Aristotle in Eth. Nic. draws out this character of a just man who is actuated by no self-interest, because he is in lack of nothing (οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται); he is βασιλεὺς, the true monarch, and stands in contrast to τύραννος.

τὸ φιλότ. καὶ τὸ φιλάργ. With this threefold division of the self-sufficient, the praise-loving, and the money-loving characters, compare Book IX. 581 A. Ἄρ' οὐν καί... τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς... καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδῆς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν;... Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς... εἰ φιλόνηικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγο-

ρευόμεν, ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; Ἄλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν... φιλομαθῆς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν; We have therefore before us here already an intimation of that threefold division into which the human mind is to be parted in Plato's ethical system; upon which he founds his political system as well. This statement, τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν, may have been true in so far as the latter (φιλάργυρον) was concerned, but not as regards τὸ φιλότιμον, in Athenian politics. Demosthenes acknowledges in a magnificent passage that Athens had spent more money and more lives ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας than the rest of Hellas had spent upon themselves; and the statement would apply with equal truth to those epochs of Athenian history which witnessed the decorations of the Acropolis and the Sicilian expedition.

μισθωτοὶ βούλονται κεκλήσθαι, οὔτε λάθρα αὐτοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται· οὐδ' αὖ τιμῆς ἕνεκα οὐ γὰρ εἰσι φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν· ὅθεν κινδυνεύει τὸ ἐκόντα ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάγκην περιμένειν αἰσχροὺς νενομίσθαι. τῆς δὲ ζημίας μεγίστη τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ αὐτὸς ἐθέλη ἄρχειν· ἦν δεισαντές μοι φαίνονται ἄρχειν, ὅταν ἄρχωσιν, οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, καὶ τότε ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ' ὡς εὐπαθήσουσες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίοσιν ἐπιτρέψαι οὐδὲ ὁμοίους. D ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει, πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμάχητον ἂν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὡσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἔλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν

ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον, &c. At the completion of his system of education for the philosopher-kings (Book VII. 520), Plato shows how unwillingly they will take office, preferring much the life of calm speculation to that of political business. ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἰσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοῦναντίον τῶν νῦν ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει ἀρχόντων.

περιμάχητον. See again *loc. cit.* οὐκ ἔναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλὰ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούντων τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος.

ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν. In the passage quoted, 520 D Book VII., Plato adds that that city is the best where men are least anxious

to govern. ἐν πόλει ἣ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρξειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι. ἐνταῦθα, 'there,' *i.e.* 'in that city.'

οὐ πέφυκε... σκοπεῖσθαι. So Soph. *Antigone* 79—

τὸ δὲ βία πολιτῶν δρᾶν ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.

And *infra*, here, Ch. XXIII; πάντα ποιήσει, ἕπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι.

ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν. The fondness for a continuous participial construction is allowed here to interfere with the exactness of the antithesis, which would have required ὠφελεῖν.

Ἐγώ γε οὐδαμῇ συγχωρῶ Θρασυμάχῳ, ὡς τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ κρείττουος ξυμφέρον· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαυθις σκευφόμεθα· πολὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖ μείζον εἶναι, ὃ νῦν λέγει Θρασύμαχος, τὸν τοῦ ἀδίκου βίον φάσκων εἶναι κρείττω ἢ τὸν τοῦ δικαίου. σὺ οὖν πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, αἰρεῖ καὶ ποτέρως ἀληθεστέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; Τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἐγώ γε, ἔφη, λυσιτελέστερον βίον εἶναι. *Ηκουσας, 348 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα ἄρτι Θρασύμαχος ἀγαθὰ διήλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου; *Ηκουσα, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐ πείθομαι. Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἂν δυνώμεθά πη ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἢ δ' ὅς *Ἄν μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντικατατείναντες λέγωμεν αὐτῷ λόγον παρὰ λόγον, ὅσα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ

τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαυθις σκ. Thrasymachus is here reduced to silence, but not convinced.

τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ἐγώ γε... Although Glaucón is ready to state his conviction to this effect, we find in Book II. that he is sorely troubled by the misfortunes of the just and the prosperity of the wicked. See Ch. V. 361 E: ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, &c. (τὸν δὲ ἀδικον) πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα γαμῆν ὀπόθεν ἂν βούληται, &c.

ἀληθεστέρως, v.s. μοχθηροτέρως, Ch. XVI. and *infr.* Book II. Ch. V. ἀγροικότερως.

ἤκουσα. In Book II. *in it.* Glaucón confesses that he has doubts about the question, for the superiority of injustice has been so dinned into his ears by Thrasymachus and others. ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὅσα ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων.

πέθειν, 'convince.' So Book

II. *in it.*: πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι;

ἂν μὲν τοίνυν... v.s. *not. ad* Cap. XII. *in it.* This arrangement is proposed by Socrates in the interest of his method. We know that he disliked long speeches, from the way in which he speaks of Thrasymachus' oration, *sup.* Ch. XVII., and from Protagoras 335; and, if he can induce Thrasymachus to argue the question, he is sure of the victory. For the word ἀντικατατ. Stallb. comp. Phædr. 257 C: ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον (λόγον) ἀντιπαρτείνειν.

αὐτῷ, Θρασυμάχῳ.

αὐ. This particle always has reference to a fresh case whether of like nature, or not, with that which precedes; v. *infr.* Ch. XXIV. *ad med.*: τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν; The statement then, of the advantages of justice is looked upon as a rejoinder to

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθις οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἡμεῖς, ἀριθμεῖν δεήσει τὰγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν, ὅσα ἐκάτεροι ἐν ἐκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τιῶν τῶν δια- **B** κρινούντων δεησόμεθα· ἂν δὲ ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἅμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει ; Οὕτως, ἔφη. ✓

CAP. XX.

*Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν τελέας οὔσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φῆς εἶναι ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἔφη, καὶ δι' ἃ, εἶρηκα. Φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε **C** περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις ; τὸ μὲν που ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ

Thrasymachus' statement already made, that injustice is the better.

ἐκατέρῳ, sc. λόγῳ.
ἀνομολογούμενοι, 'allowing,'
or 'making concessions.'

CH. XX.—Justice then with you, Thrasymachus, is wretched and evil, whilst injustice is noble and good. But your just man only tries to get the better of the unjust, whilst your unjust man tries to get the better of both unjust and just.

τὴν τελέαν ἀδικίαν... v.s. 344
A: ἐπὶ τὴν τελειωτάτην ἀδικίαν ἔλθῃς. 'The ideal of injustice,' in contrast to mere acts of felony, τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας, *infra*. Hence the definite article is used.

φέρε δὴ τὸ τοιόνδε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις ; 'Come then, what

would you say to such a question as this about them?' The drift of this part of the argument is clear, if we look to the middle of the chapter, where Socrates says that he believes Thrasymachus to be in earnest. He is merely taking Thrasymachus categorically over the ground of his assertion—on which it rests ; he wishes to have Thrasymachus' position well defined before he proceeds to attack it. It is with this intent that he couches his questions in such a form as to draw from Thrasymachus downright and emphatic answers. Thus he says, when he has elicited the statement that one is ἀρετὴ and the other κακία, 'I suppose justice is ἀρετὴ and injustice κακία ;' on purpose to draw from Thrasymachus an indignant disclaimer.

καλείς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν ; Εἰκὸς γ' ἔφη, ὦ ἦδιστε, ἐπειδὴ καὶ λέγω ἀδικίαν μὲν λυσιτελεῖν, δικαιοσύνην δ' οὐ. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν ; Τούναντίον, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κακίαν ; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν. Τὴν ἀδικίαν ἄρα κακοθήθειαν καλείς ; Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εὐβουλίαν, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ φρόνιμοί σοι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι ; Οἷ γε τελέως, ἔφη, οἷοί τε ἀδικεῖν, πολεῖς τε καὶ ἔθνη δυνάμενοι ἀνθρώπων ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι· σὺ δὲ οἶε με ἴσως τοὺς τὰ βαλάντια ἀποτέμνοντας λέγειν. λυσιτελεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐάνπερ λανθάνῃ ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἄξια Ἐλόγου, ἀλλ' ἂ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον. Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὅ τι βούλει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐθαύμασα, εἰ ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας τίθης μέρει τὴν ἀδικίαν, τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην ἐν τοῖς ἐναντιοῖς. Ἄλλὰ πάνυ οὕτω τίθημι. Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦδη στερεώτερον, ὦ ἑταῖρε,

ἦδιστε. Not merely colloquial, as Horace's 'quid agis, dulcissime rerum,' but with the sarcastic vein noticed on ἦδὺς γὰρ εἶ, Ch. XI. The words virtue and vice for ἀρετὴ and κακία are altogether inadequate; there is a further notion in ἀρετὴ of health and vigour.

τούναντίον...οὐκ, ἀλλὰ... It is evident that Thrasymachus is now talking very much at random; he states that his view is the converse (τούναντίον) of Socrates'; but has to qualify this statement considerably.

πάνυ γενν. εὐήθειαν, 'an admirable simplicity,' or 'most ingenuous folly.' So below, ἀστειὸς is coupled with εὐήθης.


κακοθήθειαν. A passing pun of Socrates'; εὐήθεια, goodness or mildness of disposition,

comes afterwards to mean foolishness euphemistically; see p. 120, note. Socrates pretends to conclude that, ἀδικία being the contrary of δικαιοσύνη, the former is κακοθήθεια. But εὐήθεια in its ordinary, that is, its derived sense of folly, is not the contrary or correlative of κακοθήθεια, which means viciousness. Hence Socrates is merely jesting for the moment.

ἐν ἀρετῆς ... μέρει, v.s. Ch. XIX.: ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει εἶρηκας.

ἀλλὰ πάνυ... v.s. Ch. I.: ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.

τοῦτο στερεώτερον. This is said to beguile Thrasymachus. Socrates has no difficulty in refuting such a suicidal position as that taken up here. It is a much more difficult task, and one which he has to meet in



καὶ οὐκέτι ῥάδιον ἔχειν ὅ τί τις εἴη
 σιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μὲντοι ἢ
 αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ ὠμολόγεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἄλλοι ποῖες
 εἶχομεν ἂν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες·
 νῦν δὲ δήλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ
 ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῷ πάντα προσθήσεις, ἃ
 ἡμεῖς τῷ δικαίῳ προσετίθεμεν, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν 349
 ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. Ἄληθέσ-
 τατα, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Ἄλλ' οὐ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 ἀποκνητέον γε τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν σκοπούμενον,
 ἕως ἂν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἄπερ διανοεῖ. ἐμοὶ
 γὰρ δοκεῖς σύ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἀτεχνῶς νῦν οὐ σκώπ-
 τειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν.
 Τί δέ σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτο διαφέρει, εἴτε μοι δοκεῖ εἴτε μή,
 ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν λόγον ἐλέγχεις; Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ B
 τὸδε μοι πειρῶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀποκρίνασθαι· ὁ
 δίκαιος τοῦ δικαίου δοκεῖ τί σοι ἂν ἐθέλειν πλέον

Book II., to prove that 'honesty is the best policy,' against the facts marshalled by Glaucon and Adeimantus. It will be seen that Socrates does not attempt the solution of that difficulty there; he begins to form his state, and only in Book IX., does he come back to settle finally the thorny question, of which the present position of Thrasymachus is but a shadow or a caricature, see Book IX. 588: Ἐλεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐν-
 ταῦθα λόγου γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβω-
 μεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ
 δεῦρο ἤκομεν. ἦν δὲ που λεγόμενον
 λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελείως μὲν
 ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ...
 Νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγόμεθα,
 ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν
 ἢν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.
 ἐν ἀρετῇ, i.e. ἐν ἀρετῆς μέ-

ρει.' See above, Chap. XIX. *init.*

διανοεῖ. *διανοία* is Plato's word for the faculty by which human knowledge is obtained; distinguished on the one side from *νοῦς*, that which grasps real existence, and on the other from *δόξα*, opinion, and *πίστις*, belief. But this strict sense is not to be attached here to *διανοεῖ*; for in the next sentence we find *τὰ δοκοῦντα* used to express that which *διανοεῖ* expresses here—'what you really think,' 'your real opinion.' And in Book II. Ch. III. *init.* *ποιεῖν διανοία* is simply to imagine, picture to oneself in the thoughts.

πλέον ἔχειν. This phrase is employed rather with the intention of confuting Thrasymachus' position, than in order to convey

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ἔχειν ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀστείος, ὥσπερ
 νῦν, καὶ εὐήθης. Τί δέ ; τῆς δικαίας πράξεως ;
 Οὐδὲ τῆς δικαίας, ἔφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξιοῖ

a consistent meaning in all the different cases where it is applied. We can understand the unjust man 'taking advantage' (compare οὐδέν γέ σοι πλεόν ἔσται, Ch. XV.) or 'getting the better of,' his own kind and the just also. But we do not understand Socrates' statement that the just man would try to take advantage of the unjust ; unless we admit that, for the sake of the present argument, Socrates sinks his own opinion about 'doing good to friends and harm to foes,' as Xenophon represents him in Mem. 2, 3, 14 : καὶ μὴν πλείστου γε δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ ἐπαίνου ἕξιός εἶναι, ὅς ἂν φθάσῃ τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιῶν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὐεργετῶν. Again, accepting this explanation, we come to a further difficulty ; viz. how to understand the phrase, when, in Ch. XXI., it is applied to the arts of music, doctoring, &c. It seems probable, as Messrs. Davies and Vaughan in their translation of the Republic suppose, that there is here a play upon words. πλεόν ἔχειν means (as noticed above) 'to get or take advantage of' ; but, in its application to the arts, this sense of the phrase must be passed over for another—such as 'to know more about,' 'to be more at home with.' Now this sense also implies that the man who 'knows more about' music or physic 'has the advantage over' one who knows less ; and it is in this sense that we must understand Socrates, if we are to follow him in his disproof. The analogy of the

arts cannot conduct us here to a conclusion in ethics any more than in Ch. XV., where see note on ἄρχουσι γε. The whole train of argument is forced, and the disproof must be held to depend entirely upon this *equivocum* inherent in the expression πλεόν ἔχειν. The translators above mentioned have been happy in their mode of conveying the sense of the Greek to English readers. Thus they render πλεόν ἔχειν, 'to go beyond,' in most places where it occurs ; but reserve to themselves the privilege of substituting 'have the advantage of,' 'do or say more,' (πλεῖα αἰρεῖσθαι ... ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν) in other places which seem to gain in clearness as they lose in consistency of translation.

ἀστείος ... καὶ εὐήθης. Hendiadys, conveying the same meaning as γενναία εὐήθεια. ἀστείος is used like ἡδὺς, χαρίεις, γενναῖος, χρηστὸς, sarcastically here. Its first meaning is 'fine,' comptus, or lautus ; it is found in Πράξ. τῶν Ἀποστ. Μωσῆς ἦν ἀστείος τῷ Θεῷ. E. V. 'exceeding fair.' See also Arist. Nub. where the explanation is being given that geometry measures out the whole earth, and Strep-siades, understanding it to mean allotments, replies—

ἀστείον λέγεις.

Τὸ γὰρ σόφισμα δημοτικὸν καὶ
 χρήσιμον.

We find it used again in this sarcastic sense in Book V. 452 C : ἐξῆν τοῖς τότε ἀστείους πάντα ταῦτα κωμωδεῖν. 'The wits of the day had the opportunity

ἂν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῖτο δίκαιον; 'Ηγοῖτ' ἂν', ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; Ἄλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ ἀδικος; ἄρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἀδικος πλεονεκτῆσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλείστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; Ἔστι ταῦτα.

CAP. XXI.

Ἔγωγε δὴ λέγωμεν, ἔφη, ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἀδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου. Ἄριστα, ἔφη, εἴρηκας. Ἔστι δέ γε, ἔφη, φρόνιμός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερος. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, εἶ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ

of turning this into burlesque.' And sarcastically again Arist. Nub. 1064—

Μάχαιραν' ἀστεῖόν γε κέρδος ἔλαβεν ὁ κακοδαίμων.

ἀμιλλήσεται. So διαμιλλᾶν in 516 E: τὰς δὲ δὴ σκίας ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματούοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, &c. And again ἐνάμιλλον 433 D: Ἐνάμιλλον ἔρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς ἀρετὴν πόλεως τῆ τε σοφία αὐτῆς καὶ τῆ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ τοῦ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν δύναμις.

CH. XXI.—But no man who exercises an art well, tries to have the advantage of his fellow-

workman, but only of the unpractised. And such an artificer is good and wise; therefore an unjust man is wicked and foolish.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔοικε. This chain in the argument is inserted with a definite object. It has been mentioned above that the argument is one of analogy; and the first conclusion comes out therefore in the establishment of a resemblance, — a resemblance between the just man and him who is wise and good; see *infra* 350 B. Socrates, foreseeing the nature of his conclusion, provides against its indefinite

ἄδικος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἔοικεν ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει, ἔφη, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὢν καὶ εἰκέναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἰκέναι ; Καλῶς. τοιοῦτος ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷσπερ ἔοικεν. Ἄλλὰ τί μέλλει ; ἔφη. Εἶεν, **Εὖ** Ἐθρασύμαχε' μουσικὸν δέ τινα λέγεις, ἕτερον δὲ ἄμουσον. Ἐγώ γε. Πότερον φρόνιμον καὶ πότερον ἄφρονα ; Τὸν μὲν μουσικὸν δήπου φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ ἄμουσον ἄφρονα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον, ἀγαθόν, ἂ δὲ ἄφρονα, κακόν ; Ναί. Τί δὲ ἰατρικόν ; οὐχ οὕτως ; Οὕτως. Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν τίς σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ ἀρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἀξιούν πλέον ἔχειν ; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δέ ; **350** ἀμούσου ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί δὲ ἰατρικὸς ; ἐν τῇ ἐδωδῇ ἢ πόσει ἐθέλειν ἂν τι ἰατρικοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ

character by gaining Thrasymachus' agreement to the proposition : 'A man is of the same kind as those whom he resembles' ; a position in itself neither correct nor definite, but necessary for confounding Thrasymachus.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει... εἰκέναι, 'how can he help being like?' *v.s. not. αὐτὸ δὲ μέλλων*, Ch. XVIII. μέλλω has here the sense of 'sure to be,' whilst in Thrasymachus' next remark we have an entirely different meaning, partaking of that sense of delay or hesitation which, it has been noticed, μέλλω also possesses. τί μέλλει, then, is like τί μὴν ; 'what further stay is there,' or, colloquially, 'Well, what then?'

πότερον φρόνιμον... Here there is a double deception. First the fallacy of two questions ; for, be it observed, Socrates asks which is wise and which foolish,

before he has asked if they are respectively wise and foolish. And secondly the word φρόνιμος is used in its broad sense, although there is no certainty that a man who is μουσικὸς is also φρόνιμος. This latter fallacy appears later on more than once, see 350 B : ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων σοφός ; ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός. But Thrasymachus, as it has been stated, is more of a declaimer than a dialectician, and has not the ability to find these flaws in Socrates' argument. In fact we can quite imagine that Socrates is caricaturing argument in the present passage. In his next suggestion Socrates seems to feel the necessity for qualifying these conclusions, and adds to the statement that 'the wise man is a good man' the limitation, 'in so far as he is wise' ; but it is a solitary piece of accuracy in an otherwise loose argument.

ἀνδρὸς ἢ πρῶιγματος ; Οὐ δῆτα. Μὴ ἰατρικοῦ δέ ;
 Ναί. Περὶ πάσης δὲ ὄρα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀνε-
 πιστημοσύνης, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὀστισοῦν
 πλείω ἂν ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα ἄλλος ἐπιστήμων
 ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, καὶ οὐ ταῦτ' αὐτῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ
 εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρᾶξιν. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη
 τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχειν. Τί δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμων ; οὐχὶ
 ὁμοίως μὲν ἐπιστήμονος πλεονεκτῆσειεν ἂν, ὁμοίως **B**
 δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονος ; Ἴσως. Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός ;
 Φημί. Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός ; Φημί. Ὁ ἄρα ἀγαθός
 τε καὶ σοφὸς τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐκ ἐθελήσει πλεονεκ-
 τεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ἐναντίου. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
 Ὁ δὲ κακός τε καὶ ἀμαθὴς τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ
 ἐναντίου. Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, ὁ ἄδικος ἡμῖν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὁμοίου πλεο-
 νεκτεῖ ; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες ; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ
 γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτῆσει, τοῦ δὲ **C**
 ἀνομοίου ; Ναί. Ἔοικεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν
 δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ
 καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. Κινδυνεύει. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὠμολογοῦμεν,

πλείω αἰρεῖσθαι... ἢ πράττειν ἢ
 λέγειν, *v.s. not. ad πλέον ἔχειν.*
 These infinitives are appositive,
 not expegetical.

τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ. τῷ ὁμ.
 depends upon ταῦτ', and ἑαυτῷ
 upon ὁμοίῳ ; 'the same things
 with the man who is like
 him.'

ἀλλ' ἴσως... τοῦτο γε. Signs
 of hesitation begin to appear in
 Thrasymachus. Thus we find
 the word ἴσως in his reply to
 the next question, when, to a
 similar question with the mere
 substitution of δίκαιος and ἄδικος
 for ἐπιστήμων and ἀνεπιστήμων,
 he had readily assented. Ch.
 XX. *fin.*

ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός ; ὁ δὲ
 σοφὸς ἀγαθός. These generaliza-
 tions are not accurate, as it has
 been remarked ; they require
 the qualification ἄπερ ἐπιστήμων
 and ἄπερ σοφός. In Euthy-
 demus a sophist tries this
 dialectical trick upon Socrates
 himself, but Socrates exposes
 the fallacy, and then gratifies
 the sophist by appearing to be
 defeated in the argument. Thus
 293 C : Οὐκοῦν εἴ τι μὴ ἐπίσ-
 τασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ. Ἐκείνου
 γε, *i.e.* 'In respect of *that* I
 am not wise.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν. For the same
 particles in a similar context, see
 Ch. XV. and note on ἔρχοσιν γε.

ὦ γε ὁμοῖος ἑκάτερος εἶη, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἑκάτερον εἶναι. Ὁμολογοῦμεν γάρ· Ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται ὦν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός.

CAP. XXII.

Ὁ δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, Δοῦχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν βραδύως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις, μετὰ ἰδρώτους θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου, ἄτε καὶ θέρουσ ὄντος· τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγὼ, πρότερον δὲ οὐπω, Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὖν διωμολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀδικίαν κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτω κείσθω, ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐδὲ ἂ νῦν λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν. εἰ οὖν Ε λέγοιμι, εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἄν με φαίης· ἢ οὖν

ἄρα ἀναπέφανται. Ergo evasit. See Book V. 464 B: τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῖν πέφανται ἢ κοινωμία τοῖς ἐπικουροῖς τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

CH. XXII.—*There is yet another point, Thrasymachus; you said that the unjust was more efficient than the just. Shall we settle it? Just as you please, he said.*

θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου, v.s. Ch. V.: εὐ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα.

ἄτε καὶ θέρουσ. ἄτε it has been seen, Ch. I., introduces an accompanying fact; ἄτε νῦν

πρῶτον ἄγοντες, and ὡς in some cases, also *ibid.*: ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομπῆς. So οἶά τε, Od. 3, 73; οἶά τε ληϊστῆρες.

Θρασύμαχον ἐρυθριῶντα. See Euthydemus 297 B, where Dionysodorus, the less adroit of the two word-fencers, is overcome in an argument and blushes. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ἠρυθρίασεν.

ἔφαμεν δὲ δὴ. See 348 E: νῦν δὲ δῆλος εἶ ὅτι φήσεις αὐτὸ καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι.

ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, v.s. 347 D: οὐκ ἔχοντες ἑαυτῶν βελτίσιον ἐπιτρέψαι.

δημηγορεῖν, 'harangue,' v.s. *not. ad ὡσπερ βαλανέως*, Ch. XVII.

ἔα με εἰπεῖν ὅσα βούλομαι, ἢ, εἰ βούλει ἐρωτᾶν, ἐρώτα· ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥσπερ ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοῦς μύθους λεγούσαις, εἴεν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρά γε τὴν σαυτοῦ δόξαν. "Ὡστε σοι, ἔφη, ἀρέσκειν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἔαῖς λέγειν. καίτοι τί ἄλλο βούλει; Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ τοῦτο ποιήσεις, ποίει· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα δὴ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καὶ ἐξῆς διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, 351 ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὃν δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν. ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἶπερ σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνη, ῥαδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἀδικία. οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν. ἀλλ' οὔτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὡς Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδέ πη σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι **B** ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλωσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῆ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη· καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὕσα ἀδικος. Μανθάνω, ἔφην, ὅτι σὸς οὗτος ἦν ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ τότε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοπῶ· πότερον ἢ

ἐρώτα δὴ, 'ask then,' v.i. Book II. 361 E: καὶ δὴ κἂν, and note.

σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετὴ, predicate.

ἔτι, sc. after the proof that justice is wise and good, and injustice foolish and bad.

οὔτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, 'by no means in this sweeping manner.' ἀπλῶς means 'generally' or 'broadly.' τὸ ἀπλῶς καλόν, Arist. Eth. 5, 9, 9, is 'the absolute good.' So above here in Ch. VI. πότερα τὴν ἀλήθειαν δικαιοσύνην φήσομεν εἶναι ἀπλῶς;

i.e. 'without qualification.' Socrates does not wish here to employ the general conclusion that justice is good and wise and injustice wicked and foolish, in order to prove the strength of the former and the weakness of the latter; he is going back to prior considerations, expressed in the proverb, 'Union is Strength,' which he proceeds to develop.

τελεώτατα οὕσα ἀδικος, v.s. Ch. XVI. τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, and note.

κρείττων γιγνομένη πόλις πόλεως ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔξει, ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες ἔχει, ἢ **δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης· εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἀδικίας.** Πάνυ ἄγαμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ **Θρασύμαχε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπινεύεις μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνει πάνυ καλῶς.** Σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη; **χαρίζομαι.**

CAP. XXIII.

Εὐ γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε· δοκεῖς ἂν ἢ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ ληστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κοινῇ ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πρᾶξαι ἂν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῦεν ἀλλήλους; **οὐ δὴτα, ἢ δ' ὅς.** Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῦεν; οὐ μᾶλλον; **Πάνυ γε.** Στάσεις γάρ που, ὦ **Θρασύμαχε, ἢ γε**

ἢ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ, *v. s. not.* Ch. XIII.: ἢ οἰοί τι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν; χαρίζομαι. So above, ὥστε σοι ἀρέσκειν, and also *infr.* καὶ τότε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε. And in Ch. XI. *fin.*: ἐμοί τε χαρίζου ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ μὴ φθονήσης.

CH. XXIII.—*In every relation of life injustice, by breeding hatred and discord, brings weakness; but justice, concord and strength. Again, the just man will be happier than the unjust.*

In this chapter Thrasy-machus does not attempt to argue, but carries out his stated intention, *κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι.*

δοκεῖς. This use is not uncommon. We find also a construction intermediate between this and the ordinary impersonal sense. See Book II. 368 B, *δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι.*

οὐ δὴτα, *v. infr.* E: ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἴδοις ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς; οὐ δὴτα. And *supr.* Ch. XVIII.

στάσεις. Stasis was the *δύε* *noire* of Greek politicians; for the constitution was not often in such stable equilibrium that it could defy the attacks of a single determined and pertinacious citizen. The Republic, being a political dialogue (as well as an ethical), abounds in references to Stasis. Thus when describing the contest between the sensual and rational elements of the soul, we have the simile of a stasis: *ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμόν,* Book IV. 440 B; *et infr.* 442 B, of the sensual nature again, *ἀρχειν ἐπιχειρήσῃ ὧν οὐ προσήκον.* Again 459 E, *ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὅτι μάλιστα ἀστασιαστος ἔσται.* It is especially cou-

ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν ἢ γάρ; Ἔστω,

demned in Book V. 462 B: Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν (πόλιν) διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῆ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μιᾶς; The community of wives and children, and property, will remove all occasions of στάσις from the guardians of the Ideal State, 464 E: ὅσα γε διὰ χρημάτων ἢ παιδῶν ἢ ξυγγενῶν κτήσιν ἐνθροπιοι στασιαζουσιν. And if the guardians of the State are not subject to στάσις, the rest of the State will fall into στάσις neither with the guardians nor amongst themselves. τούτων μὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων οὐδέν δεινὸν μή ποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἄλλλους διχοστατήσῃ. In 470 B, we have στάσις defined and distinguished from war. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἐχθρᾶς στάσις κέκληται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου πόλεμος. Change in a State arises from στάσις in the governing body, Book VIII. 545 D: πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐργένηται. A city composed of very rich and very poor men is two cities, and must come to nought. Το μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις, 551 D. There is no στάσις in the philosopher's soul. Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἕρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης; 586 E. This point has been illustrated at length, not only because the passages quoted will be found to bear upon the present chapter, but because in

this principle, that concord is inherent in justice and discord in injustice, we have the keynote of the whole Dialogue of the Republic. In agreement with this fact we find the definition of justice, as finally discovered in Book IV. 433 A: ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς δ' αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη πεφυκνία εἴη. 'Each unit of the State should concentrate himself upon that for which nature has best fitted him.' Or, in a brief definition, *ibidem*, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, 'Justice is doing your own business and not meddling.' Therefore in the present passage, although Socrates does not pretend to arrive at definition (see the last words of this book, ἔστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι), he is still preparing his own and his audience's thoughts for the line he afterwards takes; viz. that justice must be found in the due discharge of one's proper duties. We have noticed above a similar presage of a theory to come, in the case of the three-fold division of rulers into those who love money, praise, and duty; Ch. XIX. *init.* And we shall perhaps view in their truest light these correspondences between the earlier and later books of the Republic, if we consider that Plato in the composition of his work first approached those questions only tentatively and incompletely which he afterwards bent his full powers to solve.

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ἢ δ' ὅς, ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι. Ἄλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μίσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει. **Ε** ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν ἐν δυοῖν ἐγγένηται, οὐ διοίσονται καὶ μισήσουσι· καὶ ἐχθροὶ ἔσονται ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις; Ἔσονται, ἔφη. Ἐὰν δὲ δῆ, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐν ἐνὶ ἐγγένηται ἀδικία, μὴ ἀπολεῖ τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔξει; Μηδὲν ἦττον ἐχέτω, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιάνδε τιὰ φαίνεται ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν, οἷαν, ὧ ἂν ἐγγένηται, εἴτε πόλει τινὶ εἴτε γένοι εἴτε στρατο-
352 πέδῳ εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὄφρουν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν πράττειν μεθ' αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, ἔτι δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ παντὶ καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ; οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ δῆ, οἶμαι, ἐνούσα ταῦτα πάντα τοιήσει, ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ νύχ ὁμοιοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ

ἔργον ἀδικίας, *v.s.* Ch. IX. θερμότητος ἔργον, *et in fr.* Ch. XXIV. ὀφθαλμῶν ἔργον.

καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. This is added with a distinct purpose; see below 352 A, Δίκαιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ θεοί;

ἐν ἐνὶ, *v.s.* passage quoted from 586 E; note on στάσεις.

μὴ...ἔξει. The nom. to ἀπολεῖ is ἀδικία, and also to ἔξει. οὐδὲν ἦττον is adverbial.

οἷαν, ὧ ἂν ἐγγένηται...ποιεῖν. οἷαν is attracted to the case of δύναμιν; we should expect οἷη ἂν ποιοῖ. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 823, Obs. 2, οἷος is for οἷός τε *cr* ὡστε. So *in fr.* 415 E: τοιαύτας

(εὐνάς) οἷας χειμῶνός τε στέγειν καὶ θέρουσ ἱκανὰς εἶναι.

μεθ' αὐτοῦ, 'with itself,' *i.e.* 'with harmony among its individuals'; for notice that the several examples are all collective—city, camp, nation; whilst in the next question we come to the individual, who is none the less susceptible of στάσις. καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ is again added with the intention of proving the schismatic to be θεοῖς ἐχθρός; see below.

ἐν ἐνὶ δῆ. δῆ final; the case of the individual being the important one, to which the other cases are introductory.

ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δίκαιοις. ἦ γάρ ; Ναί. Δίκαιοι δέ γ' εἰσίν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ οἱ θεοί ; Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη. Καὶ Β θεοὶς ἄρα ἐχθρὸς ἔσται ὁ ἄδικος, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος φίλος. Εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ἔφη, θαρρῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγέ σοι ἐναντιώσομαι, ἵνα μὴ τοῖσδε ἀπέχθωμαι. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μοι τῆς ἐστιάσεως ἀποπλήρωσον ἀποκρινόμενος ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ σοφώτεροι καὶ ἀμείνους καὶ δυνατώτεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι οὐδὲν πράττειν μετ' ἀλλήλων οἰοί τε, ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ οὖς φαμεν ἐρρωμένως πώποτε τι μετ' ἀλλήλων κοινῇ πρᾶξαι ἄδικους ὄντας, τούτο οὐ παντά- C πασιν ἀληθὲς λέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπείχοντο ἀλλήλων κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς

εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου. For this word *v.s.* Ch. III. *in il.*, περί τε τὰ φρυδίσια καὶ περί πότους καὶ εὐωχίας. And Ch. XVII. C: ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἐστιάσεσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν. And see a similar expression of Thrasymachus' below Ch. XXIV.: Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐιστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδαίοις, 'Let this be your banquet.' So we may translate here 'Feast yourself upon the argument.' And finally we have immediately below, τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς ἐιστιάσεως.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ, &c. This introduction of the sentence is taken up again after a long parenthesis (ἀλλὰ δὴ) ... ἀδύνατοι, in the words: ταῦτα μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

οὖς φαμεν, &c. The construction here is entirely changed. We should expect at least οὕτοι οὐκ οὕτως ἔχουσιν or περί τούτων οὐκ ἀληθεύομεν; but the personal pronoun is neglected altogether, and the whole clause dismissed

by a demonstrative, τούτο. Somewhat similar is Electra Sophocles, 1364—

τοὺς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ λόγους
πολλοὶ κυκλοῦνται νύκτες ἡ-
μέραι τ' ἴσαι
αἱ ταῦτά σοι δεῖξουσιν, Ἥλέκ-
τρα, σαφῆ.

Where the substitution of a neuter pronoun, to express the substance of that which has preceded, occurs; but the construction approaches nearer than the present to a regular one.

κομιδῇ ὄντες ἄδικοι, opposed to ἡμιμόχθηροι ὄντες. For this expression and τελῶς ἄδικοι, *v.s.* *not. ad τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν*, Ch. XVI.

δῆλον ὅτι ἐνῆν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη. See Xen. Mem. 3, 9, 5: τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδόμενος ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἀμαρτάνειν.

δικαιοσύνη, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἐποίει μήτοι καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἐφ' οὓς ἦσαν ἅμα ἀδικεῖν, δι' ἣν ἔπραξαν ἂ ἔπραξαν, ὠρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀδिका ἀδικία ἡμιμόχ-
D θηροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεὶ οἱ γε παμπόνηροὶ καὶ τελέως ἀδικοὶ τελέως εἰσὶ καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατοί· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, μανθάνω, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς σὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄμεινον ζῶσιν οἱ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὕστερον προϋθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν ὁμῶς δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ζῆν. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη. Σκοπῶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ μοι λέγε· δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; Ἐμοιγε. Ἄρ'
E οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν

φαίνονται μὲν οὖν νῦν... ὁμῶς δ' ἔτι βέλτιον σκεπτέον. So above, Ch. XXII.: ἀλλ' οὐτι οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ὡς Θρασύμαχε, ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῆδε πρ σκέψασθαι.

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος. ἐπιτυχάνω, to light upon, or happen. ὁ ἐπιτυχών, 'a chance comer'; τὸ ἐπιτυχόν, 'anything that happens,' 'this or that.' So in Book II., Socrates will not permit the children in his State to hear any kind of fiction from any kind of person. Ἄρ' οὖν βραδῶς παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας; (Ch. XVII). See also Book VII. 539 D: καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό. For the sentiment *v.s.* 344 E: ἡ σμικρὸν οἷε ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα διορίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ βίου διαγωγῆν... οὐδέ τι φροντίζειν εἴτε χεῖρον εἴτε βέλτιον βιωσόμεθα; and note.

Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης, &c. 'Would you not then call the function of a horse, or of anything else, that which we do only with horses or best with horses?' In Book III. 406 E, it is implied that without the ἔργον it is no use for a man to live: ἦν τι αὐτῷ ἔργον, ὃ εἰ μὴ πράττοι, οὐκ ἐλυσιτελεῖ ζῆν. And in Book V. 453 B, when the question has been asked, are not women different from men? and answered in the affirmative, the inference is that they should have a different ἔργον. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο καὶ ἔργον ἐκατέρῃ προσήκει προστάττειν τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. ἔργον then, as meant by Plato, is action of some kind, the agent or instrument being that which is naturally fitted to perform it; *v.s.* Ch. IX.: θερμότητος ἔργον, and note. And for the rest of the doctrine of τὸ ἔργον see Ch. XXIV. and note.

ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνω ἐκείνω ποιῆ τις ἢ ἄριστα ; Οὐ
 μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ὧδε ἔσθ' ὅτω ἂν ἄλλω ἴδοις
 ἢ ὀφθαλμοῖς ; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλω ἢ
 ὤσιν ; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων
 φαιμέν ἔργα εἶναι ; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ ; **μαχαίρα ἂν** 353
ἀμπέλου κλήμα ἀποτέμοις καὶ σμίλη καὶ ἄλλοις
πολλοῖς ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; Ἄλλ' οὐδενί γ' ἂν, οἶμαι,
οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνω τῷ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐργασθέντι.
Ἄληθῆ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο τούτου ἔργον θήσομεν ;
Θήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

CAP. XXIV.

Νῦν δῆ, οἶμαι, ἄμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων
 πυνθανόμενος, εἰ οὐ τοῦτο ἐκάστου εἴη ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ
 μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζεται. Ἄλλ',
 ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκάστου πράγ-
 ματος ἔργον εἶναι. **Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ' οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετῆ** B

ἔσθ' ὅτω, v.s. Ch. XV. ἔσθ'
 ὅτι προσδεῖται.

CH. XXIV.—*Finally, everything has a function which it is enabled to discharge by means of its own proper virtue. The virtue of the soul is justice; hence a just man lives the best, the most useful, and the happiest life.*

νῦν δῆ, 'by this time,' sc. 'after this explanation'; v. *infra*. ἔχε δῆ, ἴθι δῆ.

ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνον τι. τι, subject; ὃ, object; μόνον and κάλλιστα qualify ἀπεργ.

ἀρετῆ. The word here has the widest signification of which it is capable; and, as noted

above, is not adequately translated by 'virtue'; 'excellence' expresses this general sense better. With Plato the physical aspect of ἀρετῆ is more pronounced; it expresses first an efficiency of bodily organs which is rather congenital than acquired; and, afterwards, moral excellence, which also Plato thought was inherent in man. It is true that according to the dialogue of the Meno, Plato thought that moral ἀρετῆ was a science (ἐπιστήμη), and admitted of being taught (διδασκῆ); but he also believed that the rudiments of it and the aptitude for it existed already in man. Similarly Socrates in Mem. Xen. 2, 6, 39, speaks of the

δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὥπερ καὶ ἔργον τι προστέ-
 τακται; ἴωμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῶν,
 φασί, ἔστιν ἔργον; Ἔστιν. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ
 ὀφθαλμῶν ἔστιν; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δέ; ὧτων ἦν τι
 ἔργον; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ; Καὶ ἀρετὴ. Τί δὲ
 πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οὕτω; Οὕτω. Ἐχε
 δὴ ἄρ' ἂν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπερ-
 γάσαιτο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ'
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς κακίαν; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη· τυφλό-
 τητα γὰρ ἴσως λέγεις ἀντὶ τῆς ὄψεως. Ἥτις, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετὴ· οὐ γὰρ πω τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ'
 εἰ τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον εὖ ἐργάσεται
 τὰ ἐργαζόμενα, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς. Ἀληθές, ἔφη,

moral excellences, not being formed, but *increased* by study and practice: ὅσαι δ' ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται, σκοπούμενος εὐρήσεις πάσας μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτη αὐξανομένης. And for Plato's belief in the existence of ἀρετὴ in man, see Rep. Book IV. 444 E: Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ζοικε, ὑγίειά τε τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς, (i.e. its normal and natural state) κακία δὲ νόσος τε καὶ αἰσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια. Aristotle (Eth. 2, 6, 2) follows partly in Plato's footsteps: πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. Ὅμοιος ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππου τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθόν... καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνομαι καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. The first part of this passage is taken directly from Plato; the latter part is

Aristotle's own. For he looks upon ἀρετὴ of man as something acquired by habit (ἕξις); see *ibid.* Ch. I. 2: ἐξ οὗ δήλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται, 'No ethical excellence is congenital'; the contrary of Plato's belief quoted above from Rep. Book IV.

ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτά, 'the same illustration.'

ἔχε δὴ, 'now mark.' δὴ emphatic; intimating an important step, and a new point of departure in the argument. So, ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε σκέψαι.

τυφλότητα γὰρ, &c. Thrasy-machus is too assentient here: in his willingness to agree to all that Socrates says, he says too much. Socrates is not concerned with the actual excellence or vice of this or that subject of illustration; he does not wish to stop over that, hence he disregards the suggestion and dismisses it with a mere acknowledgment.

τούτό γε λεγεις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧτα στερόμενα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς κακῶς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀπεργάσεται ; Πάνυ γε. Τίθεμεν οὖν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἴθι δὴ, μετὰ ταῦτα **D** τόδε σκέψαι· ψυχῆς ἔστι τι ἔργον, ὃ ἄλλω τῶν ὄντων οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ πράξαις, οἷον τὸ τοιούδε· τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδοίμεν καὶ φαίμεν ἴδια ἐκείνης εἶναι ; Οὐδενὶ ἄλλω. Τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν ; ψυχῆς φήσομεν ἔργον εἶναι ; Μάλιστά γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴν φαμέν τινα ψυχῆς εἶναι ; Φαμέν. Ἄρ' οὖν ποτέ, ὦ Θρασύ-**E** μαχε, ψυχῇ τὰ αὐτῆς ἔργα εὖ ἀπεργάσεται στερομένη τῆς οικείας ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀδύνατον ; Ἄδύνατον. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα κακῇ ψυχῇ κακῶς ἄρχειν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τῇ δὲ ἀγαθῇ πάντα ταῦτα εὖ πράττειν. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν ψυχῆς εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, κακίαν δὲ ἀδικίαν ; Συνεχωρήσαμεν γάρ. Ἡ μὲν ἄρα δικαία ψυχῇ καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἀνὴρ εὖ βιώσεται, κακῶς δὲ ὁ ἄδικος. Φαίνεται, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν **354** σὸν λόγον. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε εὖ ζῶν μακίριός τε καὶ

τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ... ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλω ἢ ψυχῇ δικαίως, &c. See Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 53 : τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελοῦσθαι ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίνεται φρόνησις.

τί δ' αὖ τὸ ζῆν. See Aristotle Eth. 1, 7, 12 : ἀνθρώπου θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι. τί οὖν δὴ τούτ' ἂν εἴη ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς. Aristotle thus demands a fuller definition of the ψυχῆς ἔργον than ζῆν alone ; and he finds it in ζωὴ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴν γε συνεχωρήσαμεν... Socrates refers to the conclusion (Ch. XXI. *fin.*) : ὁ

μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡοῦν ἀναπέφανται ὢν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὃ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός. But there is in this question a fallacy. The word ἀρετῇ, on which the whole discussion turns, has not been definitely employed in the former conclusions. It has only been employed in the present chapter in the general sense of excellence of any particular person or thing. Now it is suddenly introduced, with the limited sense of human virtue, to clinch the argument that a virtuous life is the best.

εὐδαίμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ τάναντία. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἄρα εὐδαίμων, ὁ δ' ἄδικος ἄθλιος. Ἔστωσαν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄθλιόν γε εἶναι οὐ λυσιτελεῖ, εὐδαίμονα δέ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐδέποτε ἄρα, ὦ μακάριε Θρασύμαχε, λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδέοις. Ὑπὸ σοῦ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, ἐπειδὴ μοι πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω. **Β**οῦ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίμαι δι' ἔμαντόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαῦσαι, καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ οὕτω, πρὶν ὃ τὸ πρῶ-

Βενδιδέοις, v.s. Ch. I. *in*it. note.

πρᾶος ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπ. This word is suggested by the simile of the wild beast, in which Thrasymachus was introduced, Ch. X.: *συστρέψας ἑαυτὸν ὥσπερ θηρίον ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς διαρπασόμενος; et inf'r. ibid.* ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἤρχετο ἀγριαίνεσθαι. Xenophon employs the verb with regard to a person in Mem. 2, 3, 16; ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν ἄνδρα καταπραῦνειν. See also Book VI. 501 C for a similar expression, *πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος, δι' ὃν ἐκείνοι ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῶ παραδίδομεν, καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραῦννται;* And in Book IV. when speaking of the γενναῖος, Socrates says: οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπρῆξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραῦνθη; Similarly the word ἡμερος is applied to that part of the soul called the λογιστικόν, whilst the sensual is described as τὸ θηριώδες τε καὶ ἄγριον, Book IX.

*in*it. The former also is said to soothe the third element of the soul, τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραῦνας. In Book II. Ch. II., the simile is further elaborated, q.v.

δι' ἔμαντόν... 'through my own fault, not through yours'; i.e. ὑπὸ σοῦ γε *supr.* Socrates hints that he has thoroughly enjoyed that part of the entertainment which Thrasymachus has supplied; that he has enjoyed a light meal and a quaint, not a hearty one.

τοῦ αἰεὶ παραφερομένου. V. i. Book II. Ch. III.: αὐτῷ αἰεὶ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, 'from time to time.'

ἀρπάζοντες. See Arist. Nub. where Socrates tells the neophyte to 'catch up' any scrap of wisdom he may throw him.

ἄγε νῦν, ὅπως, ὅταν τι προβά-
λωμαι σοφόν

περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, εὐθέως
ὑφαρπάσει.

πρὶν τοῦ προτ. μετρ. ἀπολαῦσαι, 'Before they have had a fair taste of the first.' For μετρίως v.s. p. 116.

τον ἐσκοποῦμεν εὐρεῖν, τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἀφόμενος ἐκείνου ὀρμήσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε κακία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀμαθία εἴτε σοφία καὶ ἀρετή, καὶ ἐμπесόντος αὐ ὕστερον λόγου, ὅτι λυσιτελέστερον ἢ ἀδικία τῆς δικαιοσύνης, οὐκ ἀπεσχόμεν τὸ μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐλθεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥστε μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὁπότε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὃ ἐστὶ, σχολῆ εἶσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὔσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

τὸ δίκαιον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, cf. *Æsch. Ag. 162*: Ζεὺς ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, implying ignorance of the real nature of Zeus, as here of justice.

σχολῆ εἶσομαι, 'it will be long before I know,' 'I shall

take a long time to find out'; v.l. *Book III. 394 E*: Σχολῆ ἔρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μὴήσεται, 'He will be very far from,' &c.

BOOK II.

CAP. I.

357 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον. ὁ γὰρ

CH. I.—*I thought we had here come to a conclusion, but it was only the prologue after all. For Glaucon would have me attempt an account of justice.*

The first book, as Socrates says here, is a preface or prelude; it intimates, as we have noticed in one or two passages, what is to be the matter of the whole dialogue; it shows how far astray even those men who profess to have a coherent system of ethics, wander from the real facts. It smooths the way for a fresh and a more satisfactory system in two ways, viz. by removing error, and by suggesting possible solutions to different ethical difficulties; and this last confession of Socrates that he knows nothing about justice, separates the inquiry from all prejudice. And, finally, Socrates is thus placed in the position of director of the discussion, as the man who can remove fallacy and

point the way, if he decline to lead it, towards truth and justice. The first five chapters are devoted to Glaucon's statement of the case for injustice and the unjust life; the next four to a like statement, or an elaboration of the same, by Adeimantus. Then at last Socrates takes up his parable and speaks his mind. He proceeds to the construction of a State, in which, so he expects, the counterpart of justice in man may be found. For the State is made 'not of stone or wood, but of men, of living flesh and blood.' And the construction of the State, and the education required in it, occupy the rest of this second book.

λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι, v.s. note page 115.

ἄρα, note p. 108.

προοίμιον. Cf. πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν. Ap. Trendelenb. Log. El.

Γλαύκων ἀεὶ τε ἀνδρείοτατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο, ἀλλ' ἔφη Ὁ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πείσαι, Β ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστι δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον ; Ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἶπον, ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην, εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ποιεῖς ὁ βούλει. λέγε γάρ μοι ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ τοιόνδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφίεμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι ; οἶον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἰ

Γλαύκων. For other traits in this character see Book I. Ch. XI. where he generously offers on behalf of all to contribute for Socrates: ἀλλ' ἕνεκα ἀργυρίου, ὃ Θρασύμαχε, λέγε· πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσίσσομεν. He is outspoken and confesses his ignorance with a laugh in Book III. 398 C: καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἐπιγελάσας, Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὃ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύω ἐκτὸς τῶν πάντων εἶναι. In the same Book 402 E, we are almost surprised to find him advancing the enlightened suggestion, that bodily defects do not obscure the loveliness of a fair mind: εἰ μέντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὑπομείνειν ἂν ᾧστ' ἐθέλειν ἀσπάζεσθαι. In Book VIII. 348 E his brother Adeimantus calls him combative: οἴμαι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτοῦτ' εἶναι ἕνεκά γε φιλονεικίας. He is ἐρωτικὸς, 474 D: ἄλλω, εἶπον, ἔπρεπεν, ὃ Γλαύκων, λέγειν ἢ λέγειν· ἀνδρὶ δ' ἐρωτικῷ, &c. He is very earnest over the dialogue. Book V. 450 C: μέτρον δὲ γ', ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. Yet we are disappointed in Book VI. 508 B, to

find that he supposes ἡδονὴ to be the source of knowledge and truth: οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονῆν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

ἀεὶ τε...καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε, v.s. Book I.: ἡδὴ ἐντετύχηκα καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ δὴ καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ, &c.; pp. 109 and 112.

ἀπεδέξατο. See Book I. Ch. IV. *in it.*: Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις· οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. And here *in fr.* 568 B: ἢ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ᾧμην ἀποφαίνειν, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου.

ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔγωγ' ἂν ἐλοίμην. This declaration follows with consistency upon his opinion, delivered in Book I. Ch. XXIII., about the importance of the question before them: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆ ξῆν. εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη is spoken in Socrates' usual tone of self-depreciation, just as *in fr.* Ch. X. he says of himself, ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί. See Book I. Ch. XI. *in it.*: αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἢ εἰωθῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους. So below here he says, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τις, ὡς ζοικε, δυσμαθής. And in Meno 71 C: οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὃ Μένων. Here also in 368 B: δοκῶ γὰρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι.

καὶ αἰ ἡδοναί, &c. The con-

ἡδοναὶ ὄσαι ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρό-
νον διὰ ταύτας γίνεταί ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.
C* Ἐμοιγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Τί δέ ;
δ' αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ
γιγνομένων ; οἷον αὐτὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ ὄρᾶν καὶ τὸ
ὕγιαίνειν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά που δι' ἀμφοτέρα ἀσπαζό-
μεθα. Ναί, εἶπον. Τρίτον δὲ ὄρᾶς τι, ἔφη, εἶδος
ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύ-
εσθαι καὶ ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός ;
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἂν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ
D αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἔνεκα οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν
δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίνεταί ἀπ'
αὐτῶν. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν, ἔφην, καὶ τοῦτο τρίτον.
ἀλλὰ τί δή ; Ἐν ποίῳ, ἔφη, τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην
358 τίθης ; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ,
δ' καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγα-
πητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τοίνυν
δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους,

struction in the middle of this sentence passes easily from a relative to a demonstrative : instead of διὰ ταύτας where it stands, the continuation of the regular construction would require δι' ἧς after καί ; see p. 195.

χαίρειν ἔχοντα. Here the personal accusative is thrown in, as frequently ; see below, καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι. And Book I. Ch. V. : μηδ' αὐτὸ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῶν θυσίας τιναὶς ἢ ἀνθρώπων χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκείσε ἀπείναι δεδιότα.

τρίτον δὲ. For this continually recurring division into three heads, v.s. Book I. Ch. XII., note τῶν πολέων αἱ μὲν. And below here Ch. II. *ad inii.*

ἐν ᾧ, 'under which fall' ; as in Book I. Ch. XX. : ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ αὐτὸ καὶ σοφία

ἐτόλμησας θεῖναι. The same meaning is expressed in Ch. XIX. *id.* by the phrase ἐν μέρει : ἐν μισθοῦ μέρει.

τί δή, 'what is your conclusion ?' v. *infr.* Book I. Ch. XXIIV. Νῦν δὴ, ἔχε δὴ, ἔθι δὴ, which mark off the salient points, or points of conclusion ; and *nott.* pp. 109, 114.

τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι, v.s. *not.* *ad* ὁ μέλλον, Book I. Ch. XVIII.; and the examples of this expression there mentioned.

τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους. This may be regarded either as a purely partitive genitive, or the speaker may have in his mind the expression ἐν μέρει, q. v. *supr.*

τοῖς πολλοῖς. Adeimantus further elaborates this statement of Glaucon's in Ch. IX. *infr.*,

ὁ μισθῶν θ' ἔνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ δὲ δι' αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὄν χαλεπὸν.

CAP. II.

Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάσαι ὑπὸ Θρασυμάχου ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄν ψέγεται· ἀλλ' ἐγώ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, δυσμαθής. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφη, ἄκουσον καὶ ἐμοῦ, Β εἴαν σοὶ ταῦτ' ἀδοκῆ. Θρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται πρωιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφεις κληθῆναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτω κατὰ νοῦν ἢ ἀπόδειξις γέγονε περὶ ἐκατέρου· ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκούσαι, τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν εἶσαι χαίρειν. οὕτωςι οὖν ποιήσω, εἴαν καὶ σοὶ δοκῆ· ἐπανανέωσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον,

where he says that no one has ever praised justice or blamed injustice for themselves, but only for the rewards and reputation that each brings. οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπήνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γινομένας.

CH. II.—*He would therefore first state a case in full for injustice, as it appears to thrive. Justice arises from a contract between the many weak and the few strong, that there be no ill-treatment at all.*

ὥσπερ ὄφεις κληθῆναι, *v. s. nol. ad πρώου ἐγένου καὶ χαλεπαίνων ἐπαύσω*, Book I. Ch. XXIV. The word expresses the effect of the Seirens' song in Xen. Mem. 2, 6, 31: ἀλλὰ πᾶσι

πρόρρωθεν ἐπῆδον, πάντας φασὶν ὑπομένειν, καὶ ἀκούοντας αὐτῶν κηλεῖσθαι. In Phædrus 267 C, Thrasymachus is represented as doing that which he here suffers himself: ὀργίσει τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονε, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν ὡς ἔφη. In Rep. X. 601 the word is used of the charm of poetry, which makes the poet seem to understand all the subjects on which he touches: οὕτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχει. Compare the expression ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, Book VIII. 554 D. τί τ' ἔστιν ἐκάτερον. Above, Book I. *fin.*, Socrates has confessed ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα δ' ἐστὶ...

ἐπανανέωσομαι ... λόγον. So ἐγκωμιαζόμενον, *infra.*; expressions used as if the Λόγος were an actually existent being;

Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὄθεν γεγονέναι· δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἄκοντες ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν· τρίτον δὲ ὅτι εἰκότως αὐτὸ δρῶσι πολὺ γὰρ ἀμεινῶν ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐτι δοκεῖ σὺτως· ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρλημένος τὰ ὄτα, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ **Δ**τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον, ὡς ἀμεινον ἀδικίας, οὐδενός πω ἀκήκοα ὡς βούλομαι· βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἀκούσαι. μάλιστα δ' οἶμαι ἂν σοῦ πυθέσθαι διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδικὸν βίον ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδείξομαί σοι, ὃν τρόπον αὐ βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ' ὄρα, εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἂ λέγω. Πάντων μάλιστα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ· περὶ **Ε**γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλακίς τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἔφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην ἐρεῖν, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὄθεν γεγоне δικαιοσύνη. πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ τὸ

hence the expressions, ἴχνη τοῦ λόγου, τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνη, Book V. 462 A. See also *nott.* pp. 108, 132, 135.

ἐρῶ δ.κ. οἷον εἶναι φασιν, *v.s. not.* p. 106.

πρῶτον...δευτέρον...τρίτον, *v.s. Ch. I. not. ad τρίτον.*

διατεθρ. τὰ ὄτα, *v.s. Book I. Ch. XVII. ἐπιλ.:* ἡμῶν καταπλήσας τῶν ὄτων ἄθροον καὶ πολὺν τὸν λόγον. And Book III. 411 A: ὅταν μὲν τις μουσικῇ παρέχη καταυλεῖν καὶ καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὄτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης, κ.τ.λ.

ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου...καὶ λόγον...οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα. Notice the accusative of the thing and genitive of the persons.

κατατείνας, *v.s. not.* p. 115.

αὐ, 'in return.'

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ. ὡς ἔρα τὰ Τρωεσσὶν ἐελδομένοισι φανήτην; Π. 7, 7. ἐμοὶ δέ κεν ἀσμένῳ εἴη; Π. 15, 108. ποθοῦντι προῦφάνης; Soph. O. C. 1505. Uti militibus exaquat cum imperatore labos volentibus esset; Sall. Jug. 4. Jelf, Gr. Gr. 599, 3.

περὶ γὰρ τίνος, &c., *v.s. not. ad* οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, Book I. Ch. XXIII.

τί οἷόν τε καὶ ὄθεν, 'what justice is, both in its nature and its source.'

πεφυκέναι γὰρ δὴ φασὶ, &c. 'They say that doing harm is naturally a good thing.'

μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν, πλεονί
 δὲ κακῶ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπειδὴν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ
 ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γένωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμέ-
 νοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν 359
 ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις μῆτ' ἀδικεῖν μῆτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.

πλέονι δὲ κακῶ, 'but that suffering harm is more of an evil than the doing it is a good.' The construction here is compound. By the omission of πλέονι...ἢ we should have the simple sense, 'but that suffering harm exceeds, as an evil, doing harm as a good.' Thus πλέονι is inserted pleonastically; and if it were to be kept, the comparative word ὑπερβάλλειν would have to be removed in favour of some neutral expression such as εἶναι:—πλέον δὲ κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, *i.e.* the origin of justice lies in a social contract. To this view, which Glaucon propounds, the view taken of justice by Hobbes, the English philosopher (1588-1679), has a certain resemblance. He considered that, naturally all men are equal, and all have an equal right to everything; but that, in virtue of their possessing reason, they recognise 'Laws of Nature' as he terms them. The first or fundamental Law of Nature according to Hobbes is this: 'That every man ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use, all helps and advantages of Warre.' The second 'Law of Nature' grows out of this one: 'That

a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre forth as for Peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.' 'Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.' This surrendering of right corresponds to the surrendering of the power of doing harm, which Glaucon speaks of here, and the object is the same, self-preservation and self-protection. Glaucon's justice is nothing more than this compromise; but Hobbes' justice is something more. This second Law of Nature makes it possible for the Contract to come into existence. 'Right is laid aside either by renouncing or transferring.' 'The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call Contract.' And a contract extending over a period of time Hobbes calls a Covenant. 'Before the names of Just and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some Punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant.' It will be seen that, in this description of the germs of justice, Hobbes' account agrees partly with Glaucon's.

καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τιθεσθαι καὶ ξυν-
θήκας αὐτῶν, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιταγ-
μα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ εἶναι δὴ ταύτην
γένεσιν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν
τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῶ δίκην.

He agrees with him that men will violate their covenants if they can do so without suffering. But he does not agree with him precisely as to the restraining power. Plato makes Glaucon here affirm that it is the fear of being treated themselves unjustly at another time, which restrains men from acting unjustly, and thereby gives rise to Justice; which, in effect, is the belief of Hobbes also; but Hobbes continues thus to explain what he means by that 'terror of Punishment.' 'Such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth . . . And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is where there is no Commonwealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things. Therefore, where there is no Commonwealth, there is nothing Unjust. So that the nature of Justice consisteth in keeping of valid Covenants; but the validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them.' Hobbes therefore thought with Socrates (Ch. X.) that Justice must be sought for in the State. It is not, as Glaucon here is urging, a crude bargain between men in a savage state; but it is the result of an attempt to gain security, which can only

exist in a civil polity. And thus Hobbes enunciates a Third Law of Nature: 'That men performe their Covenants made.' 'And in this Law of Nature consisteth the Fountain and Originall of Justice.' 'And the definition of Injustice is no other than *the not Performance of Covenant.*' Therefore, taking a general view of Hobbes' scheme of justice, we see that it is arrived at by three steps, these three Laws of Nature:—

- i. Man as a reasonable being makes peace his object.
- ii. To ensure peace he surrenders certain of his natural rights.
- iii. He must abide consistently by this surrender, *i.e.* by his Covenants.

Finally, to this description of the evolution of law from a state of barbarism may be added a similar account of the origin of chivalry; which is thus summarized: 'The exaltation of woman, and the extravagant homage paid to her sex, by the masters of the *gay saber*, were among the instinctive efforts of a semi-barbarous society to protect itself from its own ferocity.' See the *Nineteenth Century*, November 1881: A New Love Poet; by Lord Lytton.

ἀρίστου ὄντος ἐὰν ἀδικῶν...
In Book III. 405 C Socrates holds up such a person as the worst type of man possible in a state. Ἡ δοκεῖ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσφ' ὄν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ Β

ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον· ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα οὐδ' ἂν ἐνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μῆτε ἀδικεῖν μῆτε ἀδικεῖσθαι· μαίνεσθαι γὰρ ἄν.

δὴ μ
μ

τούτου ἀσχιον εἶναι τοῦτο δταν τις... ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ τούτῳ πεισθῆ καλλωπίεσθαι, ὡς δεινὸς ὢν περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἱκανὸς πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι, πάσας δὲ διεξόδους διεξελθὼν ἀποστραφῆναι λυγρίζομενος ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην. Also in Crito (49), injustice is harmful to the doer. τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀσχιρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ. So Gorg. 508: καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὀτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικούντι καὶ ἀσχιον καὶ κακίον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. In Aristophanes' Clouds the ἔδικος λόγος sums up the advantages of Injustice, ll. 1071 seqq.; and, as in the case of the character referred to in Rep. Book III., it is said that to practise injustice with impunity requires a ready tongue. See Arist. Nub. 1073: ἀπόλωλας· ἀδύνατος γὰρ εἰ λέγειν. The use made of rhetorical education to elude the law, brought a bad name upon those who learnt and those who taught. The sophists, we know, lay under a social stigma, for evidence of which see Protagoras, 311 C-E (καὶ ὅς εἶπεν ἐρυθρίδας). And the teachers of rhetoric were included under the σοφισταί. See note on πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι, Ch. VIII.

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσφ'. For this favourite image of a virtue or anything desirable lying as

a mean between two points, see note p. 116. Aristotle has followed it out completely in his account of the different virtues. Thus courage is the mean between rashness and cowardice, liberality between extravagance and parsimony; see Ethics 2, 7. And of justice itself, Book V. 5, 17: δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἕλαττόν ἐστιν. But not in the same way as the others; for injustice is at once excess and defect, justice being the mean.

ἀγαπᾶσθαι, see p. 118, note; 'to put up with,' or 'accept.' That which is put up with is often introduced by the conditional εἰ. Thus Demosthenes de Cor. 301 (Reiske): ἀλλ' ἀγαπητόν εἶναι, εἰ μὴδὲν παραλείπων τις ἀδεῖ πράξειεν. And so here Book VI. 496 E. ἀγαπᾶ εἰ πῶ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων τὸν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται, κ.τ.λ. Book V. 471 B: ἢ ἀγαπήσομεν, ἐὰν ὅτι ἐγγύτατα αὐτῆς ᾖ; Book IV. 435 C: οὐκ οὖν ἀγαπητόν; ἔφη. Similarly στέργω in Dem. de Cor. 249: εἰ δὲ φησιν οὗτος, δεῖξάτω, καὶ γὰρ στέργω καὶ σωπῆσομαι. Æschines cont. Ctes. 20 (ed. Simcox): ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαπῶσιν, ἐὰν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικῆ.

P

ἢ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὡς Σώκρατες, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε τοιαῦτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

CAP. III.

Ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἄκοντες αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσι, μάλιστ' ἂν αισθοίμεθα, εἰ τοιούδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατέρῳ ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν θεώμενοι, ποῖ ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάτερον ἄξει. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτον ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἦν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οἷαν ποτέ φασι δύναμιν τῷ [Γύγῃ] τοῦ Λυδοῦ

CH. III.—*If the just man had the power of doing evil without being detected, he would be as bad as the unjust, as in the tale of Gyges.*

αὐτό, *sc.* δικαιοσύνην.

εἰ τοιούδε ποιήσαιμεν διανοία. Similarly εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, *infra*. Ch. X. And τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν, Ch. XI. *infra*.

ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν ... βούληται ... ἄξει, *v. s. not.* p. 106.

νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν. See Aristotle *Eth.* 10, 9, 9: *περὶ ταῦτα δεῖ μὲθ' ἂν νόμων καὶ ὅλων δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ κειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Ἐἰ *infra*. 12: ὃ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν. And the majority of mankind, so Aris-*

totle thinks, do not pursue what is good unless they are compelled; see *supr.* § 4: οὐ γὰρ κεύθουσιν αἰδοῖ κειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ ἀισχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὸς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὸς ἀντικειμένους λυπᾶς, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδεῖς οὐδ' ἐννοιαὶ ἔχουσιν, ἀγευστοὶ οὖντες.

Γύγῃ. An older and a different version of the story is related in Herod. I. 8-15; whilst in Cicero *de Off.* we have a short summary of Plato's account, see 3, 9, 38: *Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, &c.* The account here is thrown into the infinitive narration, as in the story of Er in Book X. p. 614, *seqq.*

προγόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ποιμένα D
θητεύοντα παρὰ τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὄμβρου δὲ
πολλοῦ γενομένου καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναί τι τῆς γῆς
καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἧ ἔνεμεν ἰδόντα
δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλα τε δὴ
μυθολογοῦσι θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἵππον χαλκοῦν κοῖλον,
θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἃς ἐγκύψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα
νεκρὸν, ὡς φαίνεσθαι, μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, τοῦτον
δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν E
δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι. συλλόγου δὲ
γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰωθότος, ἴν' ἐξαγγέλλοιεν
κατὰ μῆνα τῷ βασιλεῖ τὰ περὶ τὰ ποιμνία, ἀφικέ-
σθαι καὶ ἐκείνον ἔχοντα τὸν δακτύλιον. καθήμενον
οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην τοῦ
δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τῆς
χειρός· τούτου δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι 360
τοῖς παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὡς περὶ οἴχο-
μένου. καὶ τὸν θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιψηλα-

ἄλλα τὲ δὴ...καί, v.s. note p.
114: καὶ ἄλλοις καὶ Σοφοκλεῖ,
'Sophocles besides others.' For
μυθολογοῦσι v.s. αὐτῇ, Book I.
Ch. XVI. *ἰνί.*

μείζω ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον. Cic.
loc. cit. 'corpus magnitudine
inuitata.'

δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον.
Rings play an important part
in Eastern legend; many tales
in the Arabian Nights turn
upon rings and their talismanic
properties. Compare the story
of Polyocrates and his ring,
Herod. 3, 39, *seqq.*

ἐξαγγέλλοιεν. Hermann notes
that the present tense retains
its force in the other moods
besides the indicative, referring
to 'res diutius durans vel sæpius
repetita.' Whilst Schneider

accounts for this present tense,
by supposing that the word
refers to the passing of accounts
at the meeting.

τυχεῖν τὴν σφενδόνην. Cicero
loc. cit.: Quem ut detraxit, ipse
induit: tum in pastorum se
concilium recepit: ibi quum
palam ejus annuli ad palmam
converterat, a nullo videbatur,
ipse autem omnia videbat; idem
rursus videbatur quum in locum
annulum inverterat.

καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, 'and they
began to converse about him
as though he had gone away.'
For the sudden change of subject
see p. 131 note; and add to the
examples quoted Virg. *Æn.* X. :—
liceat dimittere ab armis
Incolumem Ascanium, liceat
supersesse nepotem.

φῶντα τὸν δακτύλιον στρέψαι ἔξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέψαντα φανερόν γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαντα ἀποπειρᾶσθαι τοῦ δακτυλίου, εἰ ταύτην ἔχοι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἴσω τὴν σφενδόνην ἀδήλω γίνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλω. αἰσθόμενον δὲ εὐθύς διαπράξασθαι τῶν ἀγγέλων γενέσθαι τῶν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα· ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσαντα, μετ' ἐκείνης **Β** ἐπιθέμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ ἀποκτείνει καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατασχεῖν. εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτω δακτυλίῳ γενοίσθην, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος περιθείτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι, ἔξδν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀδεῶς ὃ τι βούλοιο λαμβάνειν, καὶ **Κ** εἰσιόντι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας συγγίγνεσθαι ὄτῳ βούλοιο, καὶ ἀποκτινύναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὐστυνας βούλοιο, καὶ τᾶλλα πράττειν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰσόθεου ὄντα. οὕτω δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἂν διάφορον τοῦ

διαπράξασθαι, 'to manage.' In Book IV. 440 C. the word means 'to carry out to the end.' οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπράξηται ἡ τελευτήση. In Xenophon Anab. 7, 3, 16, 'to effect': Παριανούς τινας, οἱ παρήσαν φιλίαν διαπραξόμενοι πρὸς Μήδοκον. In Od. ii. 213, 'to accomplish'—

οἴ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον.

And so in Herod. iii. 61, 4: ὡς οἱ αὐτὸς πάντα διαπρήξει.

ὡς δόξειεν. Ast inserted ἄν, but against MS. authority. Matthiæ held that the preceding ἄν qualifies this clause. For ἀδαμάντινος Stallb. compares Book X. 619 A: ἀδαμάντινως δὲ θεὸς ταύτην τὴν δόξαν ἔχοντα

εἰς Ἄιδου ἰέναι.

τολμήσειεν, 'bring himself to abstain.' τολμάω, like τλάω, is 'to have the heart to...' See Medea Euripid. 1325—

ἦτις τέκνοισι σοῖσιν ἐμβαλεῖν ξίφος

ἔτλης τεκοῦσα.

And so *infra*. *ibid.* 1339—

οὐκ ἔστιν ἦτις τοῦτ' ἂν Ἑλληνὶς γυνή

ἔτλη ποτέ.

For *τολμάω* see Book IX. 576 A: πάντα σχήματα τολμώντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκεῖοι.

ἔξδν αὐτῷ. For this absolute accusative *v.s.* note page 147; also Æschines cont. Ctes. 10, (ed. Simcox): εἰ φαήσεται ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει, τυχόν δι' καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνιαυτῷ.

ἑτέρου ποιοῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτων ἴσιεν ἀμφότεροι. καί-
τοι μέγα τούτο τεκμήριον ἂν φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς
ἐκῶν δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ
ἰδία ὄντος, ἐπεὶ ὅπου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἕκαστος οἶός τε
ἕσσεσθαι ἀδικεῖν; ἀδικεῖν. λυσιτελεῖν γὰρ δὴ οἴεται D
πᾶς ἀνὴρ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἰδία τὴν ἀδικίαν τῆς δικαιο-
σύνης, ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος, ὡς φήσει ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου
λόγου λέγων· ἐπεὶ εἴ τις τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας ἐπιλαβό-
μενος μηδὲν ποτε ἐθέλοι ἀδικῆσαι μηδὲ ἄψαιτο τῶν
ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τοῖς
αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητότατος, ἐπαινοῖεν δ' ἂν αὐτὸν
ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξαπατώντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸν τοῦ
ἀδικεῖσθαι φόβον. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως.

CAP. IV.

Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ βίου περὶ ὧν λέγομεν, ἔαν E
διαστησώμεθα τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτα-

ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδία ὄντος. It is not clear if ἰδία is to be taken as equivalent to καθ' ἑαυτήν; 'Justice is not a good in itself,' or 'with regard to the individual.' The latter seems preferable, if we take into account ἰδία in the following sentence.

ἀληθῆ οἰόμενος. This is spoken merely in the character of advocate for injustice which Glaucon has assumed. The question is this, 'Is injustice more profitable (λυσιτελεῖν)?' But Glaucon does not even believe that it is; v.s. Ch. II: πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὡς λέγουσιν· ἐπεὶ ἐμοίγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐτι δοκεῖ οὕτως.

ἐπιλαβόμενος. For verbs of this kind v.s. note p. 107.

ἀνοητότατος, v.s. Book I. ἀστειός καὶ εὐήθης, Ch. XX. and note.

διὰ τὸν τοῦ ἀδ. φόβον. So Horace Sat. I, 3, 111—

Jura inventa metu injusti fateare necesse est,

Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.

CH. IV.—*Let us now place before us the unjust man, fully equipped with injustice, even appearing by his cleverness, to be just; and on the other side the just man who, on his part, fails to seem just.*

ἔαν διαστ. τὸν τε δικ. καὶ τὸν ἀδ. See Arist. Nub. 889-1104. διαστ. means to discriminate, to set before oneself separately;

τον, οἷοί τ' ἐσόμεθα κρίναι ὀρθῶς· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. τίς οὖν δὴ ἢ διάστασις; ἤδε· μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδίκου ἀπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, μήτε τοῦ δικαίου ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τέλεον ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα τιθῶμεν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὁ ἄδικος ὡσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ δημιουργοὶ ποιεῖτω· οἶον κυβερνήτης ἄκρος ἢ ἰατρὸς τά τε ἀδύνατα ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ

361 τὰ δυνατὰ διαισθάνεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐπιχειρεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἔα, ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν ἄρα πη σφαλῆ, ἱκανὸς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι· οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄδικος ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀδικήμασι λανθανέτω, εἰ μέλλει σφόδρα ἄδικος εἶναι· τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἡγητέον· ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελείῳ ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην

B δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέσαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλῃται τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, ἐὰν τι μνηύηται τῶν ἀδικημάτων, καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται,

this is necessary because, as Glaucon shows below, the just is often mistaken for the unjust, and *vice versa*.

μηδὲν ἀφαιρῶμεν μήτε τοῦ ἀδ. As a rule this verb takes an accusative of the thing, and dative of the person, or a double accusative; but the present construction is found again in Xen. Hell. iii. 1, 7: φρεατῖαν τεμόμενος ὑπόνομον ἔρυττεν, ὡς ἀφαιρησόμενος τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτῶν.

τέλεον, v. i. τῷ τελείῳ ἀδίκῳ, and *supr.* τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, Ch. XVI. and note.

δεινοὶ δημ., 'adepts in their craft'; v. i. ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, Ch. X.

εἰ ἐέλλει, v. s. Book I. Ch. XVIII.: ὁ μέλλων, and note.

τὸν ἀλίσκόμενον. With this expression, and ἐὰν ἄρα πη σφαλῆ, compare Ar. Nub. loc. cit. 1079—

μοιχὸς γὰρ ἦν τύχης ἀλοῦς, τάδ' ἀντερεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἡδίκηκας.

λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι. This is the means employed by the Ἄδικος Λόγος of the Clouds to insure success in roguery; v. loc. cit. 1072—

ἡμαρτες, ἡράσθης, ἐμοίχευσάς τι, κἄτ' ἐλίφθης, ἀπόλωλας· ἀδύνατος γὰρ εἰ λέγειν· ἐμοὶ δ' ὀμιλῶν, &c.

βιάς, v. s. 341 B: οὔτε γὰρ ἔν με λάθοις κακούργων, οὔτε μὴ λαθῶν βιάσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ δύναο. And 345 A, of the unjust man, as here: ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, &c.

διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον παρ' αὐτὸν ἰστώμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν. εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι C τοιοῦτῳ εἶναι· ἄδηλον οὖν, εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἔνεκα τοιοῦτος εἶη. γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ποιητέος ἐναντίας διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν δόξαν

νάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λαθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι.

παρασκευὴν φίλων. See Æschines contra Ctes. I, 1: τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὁράτε, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν, ὅσα γεγένηται. And compare the use of the word *παράκλησις*, Dem. de Cor. 69 (Arnold): οἱ μὲν ἐκ παρακλήσεως συγκαθημένοι.

ἀπλοῦν, in the first sense, *i. g.* simplex, 'open' or 'single-hearted.' In Book III. this singleness of mind in the guardian of the city precludes him from imitation (*i. e.* description in art) of anything not entirely in accord with his own nature. See 395 C: τοὺς φύλακας...δεῖν εἶναι δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας πάντῃ ἀκριβεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν ὃ τι μὴ εἰς τοῦτο φέροι, οὐδὲν δὴ δεοῖ ἀν αὐτοὺς ἄλλο πράττειν οὐδὲ μιμῆσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμῆσθαι τὰ τοῦτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, δόσιους, ἐλευθεροῦς. Similarly Cicero speaks of the single heart which must be a first condition of friendship. 'Simplexem præterea...eligi par est... Neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuo-

sum.'—Lælius xviii. 65. And Juvenal Sat. iii. grounds his antipathy against the Greeks on the fact that they can assume any character and play any rôle. See ll. 74 seqq.—

Ede quid illum

Esse putes? quem vis hominem secum attulit ad nos: Grammaticus, rhetor, geometres, pictor, alyptes, Augur, schænobates, medicus, magus: omnia novit.

...Natio comœdia est. Rides: majore cachinno Concutitur; flet, si lacrimas conspexit amici. ...Non sumus ergo pares: melior, qui semper et omni Nocte dieque potest alienum sumere vultum.

κατ' Αἰσχύλον. See Sept. c. Theb. 592—

οὐ γὰρ δόκειν ἀριστος, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρονὸς κατ' οὐμένους, ἀφ' ἧς τὰ κερδὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα.

And *v. infra*. Ch. V. *ad med.* where the lines are quoted.

ἀδηλον οὖν, sc. ἂν εἶη.

ἐχέτω τὴν μεγίστην ἀδικίας, ἵνα ἡ βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην τῷ μὴ τέγγεσθαι ὑπὸ κακοδοξίας
Δ καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γυγνομένων ἀλλ' ἴτω ἀμετάστατος μέχρι θανάτου, δοκῶν μὲν εἶναι ἄδικος διὰ βίου, ὧν δὲ δίκαιος, ἵν' ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον ἐλληλυθότες, ὁ μὲν δικαιοσύνης, ὁ δὲ ἀδικίας, κρίνωνται ὁπότερος αὐτοῖν εὐδαιμονέστερος.

CAP. V.

Βαβαί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὡς ἐρρωμένως ἐκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις

βεβασανισμένος. 'Ut quasi ad Lydium lapidem exploratus sit illis erga justitiam amor, quod neque infamia molliatur atque inflectatur, neque iis quæ eam consequi solent.—Muretus.

εὐδαιμονέστερος. Aristotle speaks strongly against the theory that virtue made a man perfectly happy in spite of circumstances. Thus Eth. I, 5, 6: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν. And 7, 13, 3: οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαιμόνα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθὸς, ἢ ἔκοντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν.

CH. V.—*The purely just man will be fined, imprisoned, tortured; the perfectly unjust will live prosperous and die honoured.*

ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα. A favourite simile with Athenian writers; who had the works of Myron,

Polycleitus, Phidias, and many others before their eyes. See Book IV. 420 C: νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἴομεθα, τὴν εὐδαιμόνα (πόλιν) πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες, ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιοῦτους τινας τιθέντες, ἀλλ' ὄλην· αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσελθῶν τις ἔψεγε λέγων, κ.τ.λ. See also Book VI. 500 D: *Ἄν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὄρα μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἔθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, κ.τ.λ., where the metaphor of the painter accompanies it. Again, Book VII. 540 C: Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὧς Σώκρατες, ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιδοὺς, ἀπειργασαί. We find a reference again to the art in Xen. Mem 2, 6, 6: τοὺς μὲν ἀνδριαντοποιδοὺς, ἔφη, δοκιμάζομεν, οὐ τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν ὀρώμεν τοὺς πρόσθεν ἀνδριάντας καλῶς εἰργασμένον τούτῳ πιστεύομεν καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς εὐποιήσειν. Again, Demosthenes accuses Æschines of demanding

τοῖν ἀνδροῖν. Ὡς μάλιστ', ἔφη, δύναμαι. ὄντιον δὲ τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν ἔτι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, χαλεπὸν ἐπέξελθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷος ἐκάτερον βίος ἐπιμένει. λεκτέον οὖν· **E** καὶ δὴ κὰν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγεται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. ἐροῦσι δὲ τάδε, ὅτι οὕτω διακείμενος ὁ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τῶφθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν **362** ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται, καὶ γινώσεται, ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν· τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου

an arbitrary definition of δημοτικὸς: ὡσπερ ἀνδριαντα ἐκδεδικώς κατὰ ξυγγραφὴν, εἴτ' οὐκ ἔχοντα ἃ προσῆκεν ἐκ τῆς ξυγγραφῆς κομιζόμενος. — 268 Reiske. Again, in Ion. 533 A, Plato draws an instance from the art: τί δὲ; ἐν ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ, ἤδη τίν' εἶδες, ὅστις... ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ πέρα ἐνδὸς δεινὸς ἐστιν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἃ εὖ πεποίηκεν; ἐπέξελθεῖν, 'to go through next.' ἐξ here has the force of διὰ in διελθεῖν, 'to go through,' or 'describe fully.' See Meno. 71 E: εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν. Ἐπὶ with the same force occurs again in ἐπανελεῖν, ἐπανιέναι; see Dem. de Cor. 260: βούλομαι τοίνυν ἐπανελεῖν ἐφ' ἃ τούτων ἐξῆς ἐπολιτευόμεν, 'I wish next to refer back to...' And so 246: ἀλλ' ἐκέισε ἐπανερχομαι, 'But I am coming back to that point next.' See also Arist. Nub. 1058—

ἀνεμ' δῆτ' ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὴν γλῶτταν,
'From this point I pass back to the question of talking.' And *infra*. 1408—

ἐκέισε δ' ὄθεν ἀπέσχισάς με τοῦ λόγου μέτεμι.

καὶ δὴ κὰν. καὶ δὴ καὶ here is not culminative as noticed pp. 109, 112. We have rather to emphasise καὶ δὴ: 'Well then, granted that it be spoken.' Καὶ δὴ is expressive of assent, either to a thought—

καὶ δὴ τεθνᾶσι: τίς με δέξεται πόλις.—Eur. Med.
or to a command—

ΚΡ. οὐκοῦν ἐρείς ποτ', εἴτ' ἀπαλαχθεὶς ἄπει;

ΦΥ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σοι.—Soph. Ant. 244.

So here καὶ δὴ is assentient to the thought which Glaucon takes for granted will be in Socrates' mind: 'And if you say that my words are rather unpolished,' &c. The assentient force of δὴ is very noticeable in δῆτα; see Book I. Ch. IX.: ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις τὰ κοινωνήματα, ἢ τι ἕλλο; κοινωνήματα δῆτα, i.e. 'Certainly covenantants.' ἐκκαυθήσεται τῶφθαλμῷ. See Dem. de Cor. 246: τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, τὴν κλεῖν κατσαγῶτα, τὴν χεῖρα, τὸ σκέλος πεπηρωμένον.

πολὺ ἦν ἄρα, for ἄρα in this sense v.s. 346 C, and note on ὠφέλειαν: also Book I. 335 E, where it has been found

πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουςι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν,

B βαθείαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενον,
ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλευματα,

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι, ἔπειτα γαμῆν ὁπόθεν ἂν βούληται, ἐκδιδόναι εἰς οὓς ἂν βούληται, ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν οἷς ἂν ἐθέλῃ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ὠφελεῖσθαι κερδαίνοντα τῷ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τὸ ἀδικεῖν· εἰς ἀγῶνας τοίνυν ἰόντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πλεονεκτοῦντα δὲ πλουτεῖν καὶ τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, καὶ θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ ἀναθήματα ἱκανῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρε-

that a definition cannot be rightly ascribed to Simonides: *μαχόμεθα ἔρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ... ἐάν τις φῆ, κ.τ.λ.* For τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχ. see τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. 329 C; and τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, Book IV. 422 E. For the imperfect indicative we may recall Horace's—

‘Ornare pulvinar deorum
Tempus erat dapibus sodales.’
Od. I, 37, 2.

And Virg. Ecl. I, 80—

‘Hic tamen hanc mecum poterat requiescere noctem.’
where see Conington.

τῷ ὄντι γὰρ, *i.e.* the unjust man's conduct is consistently unjust, and, inasmuch as he realises good things from it, there is an element of consistency or reality in it.

ἐχόμενον, lit. ‘attaching itself to’; *v.s.* note p. 107, and *inf.* here *πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα*, Ch. VI. *ad med.*

ξυμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν, *v.s.* Book I. 333 A: *ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα*; And *inf.* Ch. XI. where money is described as νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκα.

τοὺς τε φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθρ. βλάπτειν, see Meno. 71 E, where the ἀρετὴ of a man includes this practice, when he is in office: *πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, ῥάδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς.*

ἀναθήματα. Any dedicated offering: see Herod. 5, 60, this inscription on a tripod, Σκαῖος πυγμαχέων με ἐκῆβόλφ' Ἀπόλλωνι νίκησας ἀνέθηκε τεῖν περικαλλῆς ἄγαλμα—in the temple of Ismenian Apollo at Thebes. Again, upon a chariot and four horses of bronze, on the left hand

πῶς θύειν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέναι, καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὓς ἂν βουλευῆαι, ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἢ τὸν δίκαιον. οὕτω φασίν, ὧ Σώκρατες, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τὸν βίον ἄμεινον ἢ τῷ δίκαιῳ.

CAP. VI.

Ταῦτ' εἰπόντος τοῦ Γλαύκωνος, ἐγὼ μὲν ἐν νῶ D εἶχόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἀδείμαντος, Οὐ τί που οἶει, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἰκανῶς

as one entered by the propylæa into the Acropolis at Athens:

Ἔθνεα Βοιωτῶν καὶ Χαλκιδίων
δαμάσαντες

Παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἔργμασιν ἐν
πολέμῳ,

Δεσμῶ ἐν ἀχλὺοεντι σιδηρέῳ
ἔσβεσαν ἕβριν,

Τῶν ἵππους δεκάτην Παλλάδι
τάσδ' ἔθεσαν..

See also the epigraph of Pausanias upon the tripod dedicated by the Greeks at Delphi, after the Persian war—

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν
ᾤλεσε Μήδων

Πausanias Φοῖβῳ μνήμ' ἀνέ-
θηκε τόδε.

θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου πολὺ ἄμεινον τοὺς θεοὺς. Socrates at the end of the dialogue comes back to this question, and shows, in direct reference to this passage (ἄρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετε μοι ἂ ἔδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, Book X. 612 C), that God knows well the character of each, *ibid.* E. οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε, ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκότερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν. It is worth noticing that Hesiod,

whose morality Adeimantus disparages, Ch. VI. *infra.* bears witness also to the omniscience of Heaven. See Op. et Dies. 247:

ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν
ζόντες

ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκο-
λιῆσι δίκησιν

ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι θεῶν ὅπιν
οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ
πουλυβοτείρῃ

ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν
ἀνθρώπων.

θεοφιλέστερον, in opposition to Socrates' position that the unjust is θεοῖς ἐχθρός. Book I. Ch. XXIII. 352 B.

CH. VI.—*Herewith Adeimantus struck in: 'Neither should we leave out the case for justice: fathers commend justice to their children, not for its own sake, but for its rewards; and poets likewise.'*

ταῦτ' εἶπ. With these opening words compare Book I. Ch. XVII. *inib.* Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ὁ Θρασύμαχος ἐν νῶ εἶχεν ἀπιέναι.

εἰρησθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου ; Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν ; εἶπον-
 Αυτό, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐκ εἴρηται ὁ μάλιστα ἔδει ρηθῆναι.
 Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λεγόμενον, ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ
 παρείη' ὥστε καὶ σύ, εἴ τι ὅδε ἐλλείπει, ἐπάμνυε.
 καίτοι ἐμέ γε ἱκανὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτου ρηθέντα κατα-
 παλαιῖσαι καὶ ἀδύνατον ποιῆσαι βοηθεῖν δικαιοσύνη.
Ε καὶ ὅς, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τάδε ἄκουε·
 δεῖ γὰρ διελθεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους λόγους ὧν
 ὅδε εἶπεν, οὐ δικαιοσύνην μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἀδικίαν δὲ
 ψέγουσιν, ἔν' ἢ σαφέστερον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ βούλεσθαι
 Γλαῦκων, λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέ-
363 ρες τε υἱέσι καὶ πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρῆ
 δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες,

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'as the proverb goes.' The phrase occurs again in Book VI. 492 C, ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶε καρδίαν ἴσχειν. So τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, 'as they say in the game.' ἐκάστη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλις εἰσὶ παμπολλαί, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις, τὸ τῶν παιζόντων. Book IV. 422 E. Also Euthydemus *fin.* Θαρρῶν διώκε καὶ ἕσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παῖδια, *id.* Ch. XIX. *fin.* ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος γίγνεται; also Chaps. XX., XXIV. The expression stands in apposition to the proverb it recalls, and some verb such as γίγνεται is understood, as we had above, τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται, Book I. Ch. III. οὐκοῦν, *i.e.* 'is it not as we should expect?' 'Naturally,' as in Book I. Ch. V. *fin.* where there is also a reference to relationship, οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁ Πολέμαρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρόνομος, 'Should we not expect it, Polemarchus being your heir?'

ἐμέ γέ, εἰρωνικῶς, 'poor me.' καταπαλαιῖσαι, a favourite metaphor; more generally, in Book IX. 583 B, δις νενικηκῶς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἀδικον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτήρῳ τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Διὶ, κ.τ.λ. And below, *ibid.* with this metaphor, καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτώματων. Similarly in the contest between the Ἀδῶγοι in Aristophanes' Clouds, the Ἀδικὸς says:—
 ἐπισχες. εὐθὺς γὰρ σε μέσον
 ἔχω λαβῶν ἄφικτον, l. 1045.
 οὐδὲν λέγεις, Adeimantus means that he takes Socrates' denial as merely εἰρωνεία. For he proceeds to make the task of explanation harder than ever.
 οἱ sc. τούτων οἱ.
 βούλεσθαι, 'to mean.' Lat. velle dicere.

πάντες οἱ τινῶν κηδ. 'all kinds of guardians.'

οὐκ αὐτὸ δικ. ἐπ., 'not praising the thing itself, justice.' Adeimantus is here taking up Glaucon's original point; viz. that some things are desirable

ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις, ἵνα δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ εἶναι γίγνηται ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης ἀρχαί τε καὶ γάμοι καὶ ὅσαπερ Γλαύκων διῆλθεν ἄρτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ ἀδίκῳ. ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὗτοι τὰ τῶν δοξῶν λέγουσι· τὰς γὰρ παρὰ θεῶν εὐδοκιμήσεις ἐμβάλλοντες ἄφθονα ἔχουσι λέγειν ἀγαθὰ, τοῖς ὀσίοις ἃ φασὶ θεοὺς διδόναι, ὥσπερ ὁ γενναῖος Ἑσίοδος τε καὶ Ὁμηρὸς φασιν, ὁ μὲν τὰς δρῦς τοῖς Β δικαίοις τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν—

in themselves, others for their effects, and others for both. *Supr.* Ch. I. Ἄρά σοι δοκιῖ τοῖονδε τι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὃ δεξαίμεθ' ἂν ἔχειν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα ἀσπαζόμενοι; cf. *Juv. Sat. X. 141.*

Quis enim virtutem amplectitur ipsam

Præmia si tollas.

γίγνηται... ἀρχαί τε, &c. The schema Pindaricum; where the plural substantive is masculine or feminine; but the word ὅσαπερ here helps out the irregularity. See *Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 49,*

Ζεῦται δ' ἱεροῦ Τμῶλου πελάται

Ζύγον ἀμφιβαλεῖν δούλιον Ἑλλάδι.

And see *Book V. infr. 462 E cast.* ἔστι μὲν που καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες τε καὶ δῆμος. *Jelf, Gr. Gr., 386,* notices that this schema amongst Attic writers is chiefly limited to the verb ἔστι, ἦν, at the beginning of a sentence.

ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ... 'And these people carry out this principle, the advantage of a good reputation, still further.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν is something like τὸ τῶν παιζόντων quoted above. The expression is indefinite in both cases, because it is as short and

elliptical as possible. And it is shortened thus because there can be no doubt in the mind of the hearer as to the reference in both cases. τὸ τῶν παιζόντων means 'the (saying) of people who play a game.' τὰ τῶν δοξῶν means 'the (advantage) of (gaining) reputation.' τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, 'the (case, or circumstances, of) Sophocles.' *Supr.* Ch. III. The article, in short, is used thus indefinitely with the purpose of suggesting to the hearer some known fact about the substantive which depends on it as genitive. See *Ch. II. Book I., fin.* note τούτο..., τοῦ βίον.

ὁ γενναῖος Ἑσ. Spoken sarcastically: in the same spirit that *Thrasymachus* uses the expression *γενναῖα εὐθθεια*, *Ch. XX. Book I.* 'Ingenuous' is the sense meant to be conveyed. Translate, 'as our good *Hesiod* and *Homer* say.' For *Hesiod's* theology, v. *Introd. p. 25, 26;* and *Ch. V.* here, note on *θεραπεύειν τοῦ δικαίου*. And, for another charge against *Homer's* morality, p. 133.

Τὰς δρῦς, &c., see *Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 230.* Τοῖσι φέρεται μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον. ἔρσει δὲ δρῦς Ἄκρη μὲν τε φέρεται βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας· Εἰροπόκοι δ' εἶες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι.

ἄκρας μὲν τε φέρειν βαλάνους, μέσσας δὲ μελίσσας
 εἰροπόκοι δ' ὄϊες, φησίν, μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι,
 καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα· παρα-
 πλήσια δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος· ὥστε τευ γάρ φησιν

ἢ βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος, ὅστε θεουδῆς
 εὐδικίας ἀνεχῆσι, φέρησι δὲ γαῖα μέλαινα
 C πυρούς καὶ κριθάς, βριθησι δὲ δένδρεα καρπῶ,
 τίκτη δ' ἔμπεδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχη ἰχθύς.

Μουσαῖος δὲ τούτων νεανικώτερα τὰγαθὰ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς
 αὐτοῦ παρὰ θεῶν διδόασι τοῖς δικαίοις· εἰς "Αἶδου

τούτων ἐχ., 'connected with,'
 'related to these,' and so 'like
 these.' A similar sense is found
 in the case of εἶναι with genitive,
 Book IV. 438 B. ὅσα γ' ἐστὶ
 τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, 'All things
 that bear a relation to some-
 thing.' For ἔχομαι see above
 πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον. The
 subject and object of ἔχομαι used
 thus represent consecutive mem-
 bers of a sequence. See Xen.
 Anab. I, 8, 4. Κλέαρχος μὲν τὰ
 δέξια..., Πρόξενος δὲ ἐχόμενος, οἱ
 δὲ ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτων. Cf. ἐφεξῆς,
 ἐπισχέρω.

ἢ βασιλῆος, &c. Hom. Od.
 XIX. 109.

Μουσαῖος. According to
 Herodotus (VII. 6) he was a
 seer. ἔχοντες Ὀνομάκριτον,
 ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, χρησμολόγον τε
 καὶ διαθέτην χρησμῶν τῶν Μου-
 σαίου. His χρησμοί were of
 sufficient importance to make
 tampering with them criminal:
 ἰδίᾳ. ἐξηλάσθη γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἰππαρ-
 χου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου ὁ Ὀνομά-
 κριτος ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν, ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ
 ἄλούς ὑπὸ Λάσου τοῦ Ἑρμιονέος
 ἐμποιέων ἐς τὰ Μουσαίου χρησμῶν,
 ὡς αἱ ἐπὶ Δήμου ἐπικείμεναι νῆσοι
 ἀφανίζοιτο κατὰ τῆς θαλάσσης.

He is said to have foretold the
 particulars of the battle of
 Salamis; *id.* 8, 96. ὥστε
 ἀσπληῆσαι τὸν χρησμῶν, τὸν τε
 ἄλλον πάντα τὸν περὶ τῆς ναυμα-
 χίης ταύτης εἰρημενόν Βάκιδι καὶ
 Μουσαίῳ, κ.τ.λ. He is mentioned
 in the same capacity with Bacis
 again in 9, 43. ταῦτα μὲν καὶ
 παραπλήσια τούτοις ἄλλα Μου-
 σαίῳ ἔχοντα οἶδα ἐς Πέρσας.
 Plato in the *Ion* 536, speaks of
 him as possessing with Homer
 and Orpheus poetic inspiration
 and occult influence upon other
 poets and rhapsodes. οἱ μὲν
 ἐξ Ὀρφέως, οἱ δὲ ἐκ Μουσαίου
 (ἠρτημένοι εἰσὶ), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
 ἐξ Ὀμήρου κατέχονται τε καὶ
 ἔχονται. Musæus, according to
 Plato's system of theology, see
 above p. 126, note on σοφὸς καὶ
 θεῖος, was one of those men in
 whom τὸ θεῖον was present to a
 great extent. See *id.* 533 D.
 ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ἔν
 παρά σοι περὶ Ὀμήρου εὖ λέγειν
 ἢ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναιμι.
 Again 534 D. οὐκ ἀνθρώπινά ἐστι
 τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ποιήματα, οὐδὲ
 ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ θεῖα καὶ θεῶν.
 Compare also πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον
 πεπόνθατε in the *Republic*, II.

γὰρ ἀγαθόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλίναντες καὶ συμ-
πόσιον τῶν ὀσίων κατασκευύσαντες ἐστεφανωμένους D
ποιούσι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἤδη διάγειν μεθύοντας,
ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον·
οἱ δ' ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσι μισθοὺς
παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος
κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα
δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσι δικαιοσύνην· τοὺς
δὲ ἀνοσίους αὐ καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύτ-

Ch. X. *in it.* He is included by Protagoras among the first σοφισταί or 'Wise men', who veiled their true profession under that of poetry, or soothing, or gymnastic, or music; Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, having the reputation of poets, Musæus and Orpheus of soothsayers. Prot. 316 D. φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς αὐτῆς (sc. τὸ σοφιστὰς καλεῖσθαι) πρόσχημα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεισθαι τοὺς μὲν ποιῆσιν, οἷον Ὀμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς τε αὐτὴ τελεταί τε καὶ χρησημφδίας, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφεία καὶ Μουσαίον. His son Eumolpus, migrating from Thrace to Attica, founded the Eleusinian mysteries: hence the sacred family of Eumolpidæ. V. *in fr.* Ch. VIII. *in p.* βίβλων δὲ δμαδὸν παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφείως.

νεανικώτερα, v. *in fr.* Book IV. 425 C, καὶ τελευτῶν δὴ, οἶμαι, φαίμεν ἂν εἰς ἓν τι τέλεον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τούναντιον, Æschylus (Ag. 75) speaks of the νεαρὸς μυελὸς στέρνων ἐν τῷ ἀνάσσειν.

τῷ λόγῳ, v. *in fr.* Ch. X. *ad fin.* εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ.

κατακλίναντες... ὀσίων... ἐστεφαν. v. s. Book I. Ch. II.

καθῆστο δ' ἐστεφανωμένος, and note.

μέθην αἰώνιον. This view of the after life is evidently a survival from barbaric times. Μεθῆ is emphatically proscribed in the account of the régime under which the φύλακες are to live; see Book III. 403 E. A connection between old Greek and Scandinavian mythology is apparent here; for in Valhalla the Valkyries or attendant nymphs are said to serve warriors after their death with cups of mead and ale; and thus the promise used to be made to a warrior: 'You shall quaff beer out of the skulls of your enemies.'

μακροτέρους ἀποτ. A common phrase to express a lengthy speech. Eurip. Med. 1351—

μακρὰν ἂν ἐξέτεινα τοῖσδ' ἐναντία

λόγοισιν.

Æsch. Ag. 916: μακρὰν γὰρ ἐξέτεινας.

τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους αὐ... To answer this travesty of the rewards of virtue and vice, Socrates at the end of the whole Dialogue tells a tale in which fearful punishments and great enjoyment are meted out to the bad and good respectively. This

τουσιν ἐν "Αιδου καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὕδωρ ἀναγκάζουσι
Εφέρειν, ἔτι τε ζῶντας εἰς κακὰς δόξας ἄγοντες, ἅπερ
 Γλαῦκων περὶ τῶν δικαίων δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων
 διήλθε τιμωρήματα, ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων λέγου-
 σιν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἔπαινος καὶ ὁ
 ψόγος οὗτος ἐκατέρων.

CAP. VII.

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκεψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ
 εἶδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἰδία τε
364 λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς
 στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἢ σωφροσύνη τε

tale of Er the Pamphylian (see Argument Book X.) did not represent Socrates' belief regarding a future existence; and is merely popular. His general audience, for whose sake the tale is told, could hardly understand, much less appreciate his ideal of existence, viz.: ἀνακλί-
ναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, sc. *ιδεῖαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*: 'To lift the eye of the soul up to the contemplation of the Real Good.' Book VII. 540 A.

ἄγοντες, 'representing them as coming to an evil reputation.' Like *κατορύττουσιν* above, 'submerge them' i.e. 'represent them as submerged.' It is a brachylogy of expression, where the first and prominent subject of the sentence is constituted subject also to an action which does not really belong to it. In Soph. Œd. Tyr. 742, we have the expression used of an old man—

χνοάζων ἔρτι λευκανθὲς κᾶρα,
 an action where the person is

not properly an agent. And *id.* 480--

*τὰ μεσόμφαλα γῆς ἀπονοσφίζων
 μαντεῖα.*

i.e. 'going away from,' but literally, 'separating.' In the same way Virg. *Æn.* 7, 173—

'*Hic primos attollere fasces
 Regibus omen erat.*'

Where the kings are said 'to raise,' when properly they should be said 'to have raised for them.' Other examples in Virgil are, 'dare *classibus Austros*,' 'seram dedit per membra quietem'; and see below here Ch. XVI. *παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας.*

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, i.e. 'they have none better to speak of.'

CH. VII.—*The poets too one and all describe virtue as toilsome, and vice as pleasant, whilst soothsayers offer to purge men from crime with a few prayers.*

ὑμνοῦσιν, 'harp on this'; see Book VIII. 549 E: ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα καὶ οἶα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες

καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον ἀκο-
λασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι,
δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν. λυσιτελέστερα δὲ
τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἀδίκᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγουσι, καὶ
πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας
εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσι δημοσίᾳ
τε καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πη
ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοὺς Β
ἀμείνους εἶναι τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ
περὶ θεῶν τε λόγοι καὶ ἀρετῆς θαυμασιώτατοι λέ-
γονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυ-
χίας τε καὶ βίον κακὸν ἔνειμαν, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίους
ἐναντίαν μοῖραν. ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντις ἐπὶ
πλουσίῳ θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ

περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν. And
supra. Book I. Ch. III.: τὸ
γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν, ὕσων κακῶν
σφίσι αἴτιον.

πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ...δυνά-
μεις ἔχ. Cf. Seneca, Herc. Fur-
2, 250—

‘Prosperum ac felix scelus
Virtus vocatur.’

τοὺς δὲ ἀτιμ. Juv. I, 74—

‘Probitas laudatur et alget :
Criminibus debent hortos,
prætoria, mensas,
Argentum vetus et stantem
extra pocula caprum.’

ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες. With
this passage the third satire of
Juvenal may be well compared ;
e.g. ll. 20 seqq.—

‘artibus, inquit, honestis
Nullus in urbe locus.’

160 seqq.—

‘Quis gener huic placuit censu
minor atque puellæ
Sarcinulis impar? Quis pau-
per scribitur hæres?
Quando in consilio est Œdi-
libus? Agmine facto

Debuerant olim tennes mi-
grasse Quirites.’

And for the admiration and
influence which wealth brings
with it, Sat. VII. 124, seqq.

ὁμολογ. ‘although they allow
the just to be better.’

πολλοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς δυστυχίας.
At the end of this Book it is
argued that God cannot be the
author of evil to any one ; 379
C : οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων
αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀνάτιον...
τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἕλλ' ἔττα δεῖ
ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.
ἄρα, introducing the words or
thoughts of others, stigmatizes
them as incorrect or absurd ;
see below : πείθοντες...ὡς ἄρα
λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημά-
των διὰ θυσίων καὶ παιδίας ἡδονῶν
εἰσι. See also Æschines contr.
Ctes. 13 (ed. Simcox) : Λέγουσι δὲ
...ὡς ἄρα, ὅσα τις αἰρετὸς ὢν πράτ-
τει κατὰ ψήφισμα, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα
ἀρχή. Where the orator is antici-
pating the case for the defence.

Q

σφίσι δύναμις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζομένη θυσίαις τε καὶ
 C ἐπφδαῖς, εἴτε τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προ-
 γόνων, ἀκείσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἑορτῶν, εἴαν τέ
 τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν
 ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάβειν, ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶ καὶ
 καταδέσμοις τοὺς θεοὺς, ὡς φασι, πείθοντές σφισιν
 ὑπηρετεῖν. τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας
 ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται, οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας
 διδόντες,

ὡς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
 D ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
 τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ ἀνάντη· οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν
 θεῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὅμηρον μαρτύ-
 ρονται, ὅτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος εἶπε

λιστοὶ δέ [στρεπτοὶ] τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
 καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαισι καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγαναίσι

ἐπφδαῖς. These were also used
 to keep off disease; Eurip.
 Hippol. 478—

εἰσὶν δ' ἐπφδαὶ καὶ λόγοι
 θελεκτήριοι
 φανήσεται δὲ τῆσδε φάρμακος
 νόσου.

ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, v. s. Book
 I. Ch. XXI. τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἑαυτῷ.

ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶ καὶ καταδ. In
 Aristoph. Nub. 749 we have a
 caricature of this witchcraft—
 γυναῖκα φαρμακίδ' εἰ πριάμενος
 Θετταλήν,
 καθέλοιμι νύκτωρ τὴν σελή-
 νην...

As in Horace Epod. 17, 5—

Refixa cælo devocare sidera.

And again, Epod. 5, 45—

Quæ sidera excantata voce
 Thessala

Lunamque cælo deripit.

Virg. Ecl. 8, 69—

Carmina vel cælo possunt
 deducere Lunam.

And Plato in the Gorgias 513:
 τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας,
 τὰς Θετταλίδας.

ὡς τὴν μὲν, &c. Hesiod.
 Opp. et Dies 285. See Xen.
 Mem. 2, 1, 22 in the choice
 of Hercules. ὁ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς
 χαλεπὴν καὶ μακρὰν ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὰς
 εὐφροσύνας ἢ γυνή σοι αὐτῆ
 διηγείται. *Et surr.* for ἰδρῶτα
 here: εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ σώματι βοῖλει
 δυνατὸς εἶναι, τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπηρε-
 τεῖν ἐθιστέον τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμνασ-
 τεῖον σὺν πόνοις καὶ ἰδρῶτι.

λιστοί, &c. Hom. Il. ix.
 497

λοιβῆ τε κνίση τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι
 λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβῆῃ καὶ ἀμάρτη. E

βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρ-
 φέως, Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασι,
 καθ' ἃς θνητολοῦσι, πείθοντες οὐ μόνον ιδιώτας ἀλλὰ
 καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικη-
 μάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι
 ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς κα- 365
 λούσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ
 θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.

CAP. VIII.

Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ
 τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄν-
 θρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα
 ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ

τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν. See p. 120
 supr., and Ch. V. B, ἐκεῖσε
 ἀπιέναι, τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν.

CH. VIII.—*What wonder if
 young men, then, make this per-
 fect injustice their object? It is
 no easy task, but all things
 perfect are difficult to realize;
 and if we prosper in wickedness
 we can appease the gods with
 sacrifice.*

περὶ ταῦτα ἔχουσι τιμῆς, see
 Jelf Gr. Gr. 528. Thuc. l. 22,
 ὡς ἐκατέρων τις εὐνοῖς... ἢ μνήμης
 ἔχοι. Ἔχειν in this sense usually
 refers to the condition not the
 action of the subject, e.g. ἔχειν
 τρόπον, εὐδαιμονίας, γνώμης,
 ἐμπειρίας, but here τιμῆς stands
 for τοῦ τιμᾶν

τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νεῶν
 ψυχὰς. A similar case is put
 below, Book VI. 492, ὅταν, εἰπον,
 ξυγκαβεζόμενοι ἄθροοι οἱ πολλοὶ
 εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ
 θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα ἄλλον
 κοινὸν πλῆθος ἐύλογον ξὺν
 πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι
 τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων,
 τὰ δὲ ἐπαινώσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως
 ἐκότερα, καὶ ἐκβοῶντες καὶ κρο-
 τοῦντες, πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς αἱ τε
 πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν
 ἐπηχούντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον
 παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου.
 ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ
 λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶφι καρδίαν
 ἴσχειν; ἢ πόταν ἂν αὐτῷ παιδείαν
 ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατα-
 κλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου
 ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι
 φερομένην κατὰ ῥοὴν ἢ ἂν οὕτως

ικανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι
συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν, ποιός τις ἂν ὦν καὶ πῆ
B πορευθεῖς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι; λέγει γὰρ
ἂν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν κατὰ Πίνδαρον
ἐκεῖνο τὸ

πότερον δίκαια τεῖχος ὕψιον
ἢ σκολιαῖς ἀπάταις

ἀναβῆς καὶ ἐμαντὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιώ; τὰ
μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα δίκαιῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, εἰ μὴ καὶ
δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδὲν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας
C μένω θεσπέσιος βίος λέγεται. οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ
δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν

φερῆ, καὶ φήσει τε τὰ αὐτὰ τού-
τοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ
ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἕπερ ἂν οὔτοι, καὶ
ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον; In this pas-
sage we see that 'flood' of
words which Socrates has already
complained of in Thrasymachus
(Book I. Ch. καταγλήσας κατὰ
τῶν ὧτῶν ἀθρόον καὶ πολὺν τὴν
λόγον), and Glaucon has men-
tioned in the beginning of his
speech (διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὄντα,
ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων
ἄλλων). All such doctrines as
are conveyed through these
means, says Adeimantus are
depraved; and, as might be ex-
pected, the young believe them.
Now it is the young to whom
Socrates principally addresses
himself: Cephalus, as has been
noticed, p. 111, and Polemar-
chus, p. 109, alike hold out the
inducement of converse with
the young to Socrates; and in
the Euthydemus we find Socra-
tes telling two Sophists what a
strong interest he takes in a
young man Clinias. Later on

in the Republic we find a partial
explanation of this interest.
Apart from other reasons,
Socrates was interested in the
young, because they were most
susceptible to his teaching, and
he hoped to imbue them rather
than the older men with his
beliefs; see Book III. 415 D:
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτὰ
οὔτοι· ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων
νιεῖς καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι
ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λέγ. ὡσπερ ἐπι-
τόμενοι, 'fitting as it were over
the whole field of words.' Al-
though the metaphor is different,
the sense of the present passage
reminds us of that in Book I. Ch.
XXIV.: τοῦ δὲ παραφερομένου
ἀπογεύονται ἀρπάζοντες, and see
below Ch. XII. ψη.: ἐπιπίνον-
τες.

τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι, v.s.
Book I. 352 E: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ
ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ
τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆσθην, and
Note.

τὰν ἀλάθειαν βι. Plato is

βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὴ τρεπτέον ὅλως· πρόθυρα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλω περὶ ἔμαντον σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περιγραφτέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλώπεκα ἔλκτεον ἐξόπισθεν κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, φησί τις, οὐ ῥάδιον αἰεὶ λαυθάνειν κακὸν ὄντα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν εὐπετές, φήσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων· ἀλλ' ὅμως, εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη τῶν D λόγων φέρει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε

quoting Simonides: hence the peculiarity of dialect.

σκιαγρ. ἀρετῆς, see Book VII. 523 B, where the word σκιαγραφέω refers to objects drawn in outline, not clearly and sharply presented to the sight: τὰ πύρρῳθεν, ἔφη, φαίνόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἔσκιαγραφημένα. And in Book X. 602 D, σκιαγραφία is described as deceptive: φ δὴ ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἡ σκιαγραφία ἐπιθεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει; and in Book IX. 583 B, the pleasure of the φρόνιμος is said to be the only true pleasure, that of others being shadowy: οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονή· πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρά, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις. σχῆμα means the figure or general outlines of an object; thus it denotes the movement of troops. Book VII. 326 D: ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε μάχαις καὶ πορείαις; and in Book VIII. 548 D, we find the word itself explained: αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἔν τις εἶη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράφαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι, 'in outline, not in detail.'

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφ. Fr. 89, τῷ

δ' ἄρ' ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέα συνήντητο. "Αλώπηξ dicitur pro pelle vulpina, ut λέων pro pelle leonina, et ejusdem generis alia; de quibus Horatius de Arte Poetica, 437:—

Nunquam te fallent animi sub vulpe latentēs.—

Ruhnken.

οὐδὲν εὐπετές τῶν μεγάλων. Socrates expresses this sentiment in Book VI. 497 E in the words, χαλεπὰ τῷ ὄντι τὰ καλὰ. εἰ μέλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, see note, Book I. Ch. XVIII.

ταύτη ἰτέον, ὡς τὰ ἴχνη, see notes, pp. 128, 132, 135, and *infra*. Book III. 401 C: τοὺς εὐφῶς δυναμένους ἴχνεύειν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, and Book VIII. *ἰνί.*: ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν; and Book V.: ἄρα ἂ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν εἰς μὲν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴχνος ἡμῖν ἀριόττει. And the final discovery of justice Plato compares to threading the way through a dark and tangled thicket, in pursuit of game. Book IV. 432 C: καὶ μὴν, εἶπον ἐγὼ, δύσβατός γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκοις· ἐστὶ γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερευνητός, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὅμως ἰτέον.

καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν, εἰσὶ τε πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικανικὴν διδόντες, ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ δίδοναι. ἀλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκουν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσὶν ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν· εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν τοι αὐτοὺς ἴσμεν ἢ ἀκηκόαμεν ἢ ἔκ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν· οἱ δὲ

πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι, *i. q.* σοφισταί, see Ch. II. note ἀρίστου ὄντος; and Protagoras 312 C: τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι σοφιστήν; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἦδ' ὅς, ὡσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα... Ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστὶ... ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. Gorgias was a sophist of this sort, see Philebus 58 A: Ἦκουον μὲν ξῶγαγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὡς ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν. And for σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν see Sympos. 198 C, where Socrates bears witness to his powers of rhetoric: ἐφοβούμην μὴ μοι τελευτῶν δ' Ἀγάθων Γοργίου κεφάλην δεινοῦ λέγειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πέμψας, &c. Also Aristophanes makes the ἄδικος λόγος the principal accomplishment of the Socratic School; Clouds 114 seqq.—

τούτῳ τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοις,
τὸν ἤττονα

νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τὰδικώτερα.

And one of the first questions Socrates asks the Neophyte in the same play is—

ἐνεστί δῆτά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ
φύσει;

τὰ μὲν πείσομεν τὰ δὲ βιασ.,

v. s. Ch. IV. βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βιάς δεῖται.

θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν. See 612 E, Book X.: θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἷός ἐστιν. And here above Ch. V. *fin.*: θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι; *sc.* τὸν ἄδικον. ἀλλὰ δὴ introduces an objection, 'But one might say the gods know who is unjust.' And the objection is answered on each of two suppositions: (i.) The gods do not exist; therefore we need not trouble ourselves. (ii.) We can appease them with sacrifice.

καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν. This is C. F. Hermann's alteration of the old reading ... μέλει, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐ μελητέον. οὐ is not supported. Stallb. replaces *τι* καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον with certain MSS. All agree as to the sense; for it will be noticed that Hermann's text gives οὐκουν, whilst Stallb. οὐκούν. And so G. Baier, while reading ἀμελητέον, keeps οὐκούν.

λόγων καὶ γενεαλογ, ποιητῶν. In his construction of a state, which begins at Ch. XI., Socrates soon comes to this point, *viz.* the popular theology, and treats it with the greatest strictness. See below Ch. XVII. seqq.

αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν, ὡς εἰσὶν οἱοὶ θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχολαῖς ἀγαπήσι καὶ ἀναθήμασι παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι· οἷς ἢ ἀμφοτέρω ἢ οὐδέτερω πειστέον· εἰ δ' οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων. δίκαιοι μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀζήμιοι ὑπὸ θεῶν 360 ἐσόμεθα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀδικίας κέρδη ἀπωσόμεθα· ἀδικοὶ δὲ κερδανούμεν τε καὶ λισσόμενοι ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες πείθοντες αὐτοὺς ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν Ἄιδου δίκην δώσομεν ὧν ἂν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσωμεν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ παῖδες παίδων. ἀλλ'

Θυσίαις, &c., v.s. Ch. VII. εἰσὶν οἱοί, sc. θεοί. Such priestcraft as this was not uncommon in Greece, and was practised by the ministers of Cybele, called *μητραγῦρται*. In the time of the Roman Empire the priests of Isis, besides those of Cybele, flocked to Italy to practise similar knaveries, and even Jews traded upon their religion. See Juvenal VI. 543,

Arcanam Judæa tremens mendicat in aurem

Interpres legum Solymarum. We find mention of these priests of Cybele in *Juv. II. 111*; VI. 512; and we gain some idea of their quack religions from Demosthenes' reflections upon Æschines, when he is accusing him of having assisted his mother in inaugural rites or mysteries of initiation. *De Cor. 312* (Reiske), ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος τῇ μητρὶ τελούσῃ τὰς βίβλους ἀνεγίνωσκας καὶ τἄλλα συνσκευωροῦ, τὴν μὲν νύκτα νεβρίζων καὶ κρατηρίζων καὶ καθαίρων τοὺς τελομένους καὶ ἀπομάττων τῷ πηλῷ καὶ τοῖς πιτύροις καὶ ἀριστὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ καθαρμοῦ κελεῖων λέγειν 'ἔφυγον κακὸν, εἶδον ἄμεινον,' &c. Arnold *ad loc.* states that Lobeck has proved these mysteries to

have been of an Orphico-Bacchic character, to which the word *νεβρίζων*, amongst others, points.

Θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικ. Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* 620, calls this a temporal genitive, 'where a point of time is marked by an action,' and compares Herod. VI. 129, γενέσθαι ἀπὸ δείπνου. It is a condensed expression, the notion of ἀπαλλάττειν (v. *inf.* ἀζήμιοι ἀπαλλάξομεν) being probably present to the writer's mind; thus, fully expressed, θυτέον ὥστε ἀπαλλάττειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

κερδανούμεν τε καὶ...ἀπαλλάξομεν, 'But if we do wrong we shall not only gain by it, but get off scot free, by making prayers when we transgress and using persuasion when we commit crimes.' For the various senses of ἀπαλλάσσω and its compounds v.s. note p. 115.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ..., reply of the objector: which is answered by a sentence introduced by ἀλλὰ repeated, as above, Book I. *in il.* ἀλλὰ περιμένετε· ἀλλὰ περιμενούμεν, and p. 109. note. Also Ch. IX. Book I., Ἄλλὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ δὴ οἱ δίκαιοι ἀδίκους; ἢ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῇ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακοὺς; Ἄλλὰ ἀδύνατον.

ὠφελήσουσιν ἀγνιζομένους αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ οἱ λύσιοι
B θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγιστα πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν
 παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφήται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ
 ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μνηύουσιν.

CAP. IX.

Κατὰ τίνα οὖν ἔτι λόγον δικαιοσύνην ἂν πρὸ
 μεγίστης ἀδικίας αἰροίμεθ' ἂν; ἦν ἔαν μετ' εὐσχη-
 μοσύνης κιβδήλου κτησώμεθα, καὶ παρὰ θεοὺς καὶ
 παρ' ἀνθρώποις πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν ζῶντές τε καὶ
 τελευτήσαντες, ὡς ὁ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων
 λεγόμενος λόγος. ἐκ δὴ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τις
 μηχανή, ᾧ Σώκρατες, δικαιοσύνην τιμᾶν ἐθέλειν, ᾧ
C τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος
 ἢ γένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ γελᾶν ἐπαινουμένης ἀκούοντα;

αἱ τελεταί, v. Dem. de Cor.
 loc. cit.

θεῶν παῖδες, i.e. Orpheus,
 Musæus, &c., v.s. not. ad Μου-
 σαῖος; and not. ad σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ
 θεῖος, p. 126. Ion 534 E, οἱ δὲ
 ποιητὰ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἐρμηνεῖς τῶν
 θεῶν εἰσὶ, κατεχόμενοι ἐξ ὅτου ἂν
 ἕκαστος κατέχηται.

CH. IX.—*In fine, all who can
 commit injustice with impunity
 will continue to do so, until those
 who praise justice praise it for
 itself, not for its rewards. To
 you, Socrates, we look for a better
 recommendation of Justice.*

ἔτι, i.e. 'after this comparison
 of their respective values.'

πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν, join in
 translation.

τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ ἄκρων.
 There is a slight touch of sar-

casm discernible here in Adei-
 mantus' words. This expression
 is a Hendiadys:—'many of the
 most competent.'

δύναμις, so below, ἀδύνατον
 αὐτὸ δρᾶν. This is in agreement
 with Glaucon's original account
 of the nature of justice, v.s. Ch.
 II. τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν
 ἐκφεύγειν τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖν, &c.,
 'Those who have no power';
 whilst those who have power, be
 it bodily or mental, direct or
 indirect, find injustice to be to
 their advantage rather than
 justice. Hence we are at present
 only listening to Thrasymachus'
 case elaborated,—that Justice is
 the Interest of the stronger; for
 Thrasymachus made it clear that
 the interest of the stronger was
 injustice towards the weaker.

Ch. XVI. Book I.

ἀλλὰ μὴ. *u*ἦ is used, the case

ὡς δὴ τοι εἴ τις ἔχει ψευδῆ μὲν ἀποφῆναι ἃ εἰρήκα-
μεν, ἱκανῶς δὲ ἔγνωκεν ὅτι ἄριστον δικαιοσύνην,
πολλὴν που συγγνώμην ἔχει καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τοῖς
ἀδίκους, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσει δυσχε-
ραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται
αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ D
ἀνανδρίας ἢ γῆρωσ ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει
τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν. ὡς δέ, δῆλον· ὁ
γὰρ πρῶτος τῶν τοιούτων εἰς δύναμιν ἐλθὼν πρῶτος
ἀδικεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἶός τ' ᾖ. καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων
οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὅθεν περ ἅπας ὁ λόγος
οὗτος ὤρμησε καὶ τῷδε καὶ ἐμοὶ πρὸς σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,

being hypothetical. For ἀλλὰ
with the negative, *v. inf.* 379
D., ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

ἔχει...ἀποφῆναι *v.s.* pp. 181
and 190; *ei inf.* Ch. XI. Ἰνα
οἱ οἰκοδόμοι (ἔχοιεν) χρῆσθαι
ἰποζυγίοις.

ἄριστον δικ., *v. inf.* Ch. IX.
ἢ μὲν κακὸν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ,
'One is an evil, the other a
good,' ἄριστον, 'the Best.'

ἱκανῶς ἔγνωκεν...πολλὴν συγ-
γνώμην, Tout comprendre c'est
tout pardonner. The particles
ὡς δὴ τοι, introduce a statement
explaining or corroborating that
preceding, 'At any rate the fact
is...' ὡς here is like ἐπεὶ in
Euthyphr. 9 B. Μανθάνω ὅτι
σοὶ δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέ-
στερος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε
ἐνδείξει, κ.τ.λ. And Arist. Nub.
785,

'Ἄλλ' εὐθὺς ἐπιλήθει σύ γ' ἄττ'
ἂν καὶ μάθης·

ἐπεὶ τί νυνὶ πρῶτων ἐδιδάχθης;
λέγε.

Both particles bring in a further
consideration not to be lost sight
of.

πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύς., *v.s. not.*
ἀδ σοφὸς καὶ θείος, p. 126. εὐ

γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναί τι περ ἂν σωθῆ
τε καὶ γένηται οἷον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ
καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν
αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.
Book VI. 492 E. These words
are part of the description men-
tioned above in Ch. VIII. (on
the words τί οἰόμεθα ἀκούουσας);
where it is shown that a young
man who is exposed to the
ordinary influences of life can-
not fail to be depreciated by
the noise and struggle. Adei-
mantus here, and Socrates in
the passage quoted, are speaking
the same words: it is the same
expression of Plato's belief that
God works by means of and in
man: see Ion 534, where it is
shown that the best poetry is
the direct inspiration of God.

ψέγει τὸ ἀδ., ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ
δρᾶν, Ch. III. *ipit.* ἀδυναμία τοῦ
ἀδικεῖν ἕκοντες αὐτὸ (δικαιοσύνην)
ἐπιτηδεύουσι.

πρῶτος ἀδικεῖ, *v.s.* Ch. III.
ἐπ' αὐτοφάρφ οὐδν λάβοιμεν ἂν
τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταῦτόν
ἴοντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν.

τῷδε, Glaucon, who insisted
upon this point, Ch. II. *ad
med.*

εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ὦ θαυμάσιε πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅσοι ἐπαινέται
Εφατέ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἠρώων
 ἀρξάμενοι, ὅσων λόγοι λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν
 ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἔψεξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπή-
 νεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ δόξας τε καὶ τιμὰς καὶ
 δωρεὰς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένας· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκάτερον
 τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος ψυχῇ ἐνὸν καὶ
 λαυθάνου θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ'
 ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἰκανῶς τῷ
 λόγῳ, ὡς τὸ μὲν μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχῇ ἐν

ἠρώων, notably the choice of
 Heracles, given at length in
 Xen. Mem. II. 1, 21, *seqq.* e.g.
 28. εἶτε τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναι
 σοὶ βούλει, θεραπευτέον τοὺς
 θεοὺς, εἶτε ὑπὸ φίλων ἐθέλεις
 ἀγαπᾶσθαι, τοὺς φίλους εὐεργετη-
 τέον, εἶτε ὑπὸ τινος πόλεως ἐπι-
 θυμείς τιμᾶσθαι, τὴν πόλιν ὠφελη-
 τέον, εἶτε ὑπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης
 ἀξίους ἐπ' ἀρετῇ θαυμάζεσθαι, τὴν
 Ἑλλάδα πειρατέον εὐ ποιεῖν.

οὐδεὶς πώποτε' ἐν ποιήσει. The-
 ognis, for instance, as it has
 been noticed in the Introduction,
 describes justice as κάλλιστον,
 the Fairest, *i.e.* he commends it
 rather for its external than its
 intrinsic value. This sentiment,
 the devotion to τὸ καλόν, is
 characteristic of the Greeks who
 were an emulous people, and to
 some extent of the Romans also.
 The Greeks possessed to an extra-
 ordinary degree the sense of the
 beautiful, and they lived very
 much in public: hence they
 were prone rather to judge of
 actions by their effects than by
 the motives which prompted
 them. τιμαί, δωρεαί, στέφανοι,
 the rewards of probity and great
 deeds, are set forth and insisted
 upon instead of probity itself.
 Thus Aristotle, in describing the

good man's patience under ad-
 versity, speaks of τὸ καλόν, the
 beauty of the endurance and the
 decency (εὐσχημόνως) of his con-
 duct. ἐν τοῦτοις διαλάμπει τὸ
 καλόν, ἐπεὶ δὲ φέρη τίς εὐκόλως
 πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας.
 Eth. Nic. I, 10, 12, *et inf.* 13.
 τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν καὶ
 ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας
 εὐσχημόνως φέρειν. Similarly in
 8, XIII. 8, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν.
 It is the same feeling which
 prompts the use of the word
 'laus' in Virgil's poem for
 'noble deeds.' See Æn. VIII.
 273—

Tantarum in munere laudum
 Cingite fronde comas.
 and IX. 252—
 Quæ vobis, quæ digna, viri,
 pro laudibus istis
 Præmia posse rear solvi ?
 Also I. 461—
 Sunt hic etiam sua præmia
 laudi.
 Adeimantus's complaint is that
 the good deed and its intrinsic
 value is lost sight of in the
 honour and glory of the reward.
 ἰδίοις λόγοις, *h.e.* pedestri
 sermone. Stallb. See Ch. VII.
ad init. ἰδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ
 ποιητῶν.
 μέγιστον κακῶν ὅσα ἴσχει ψυχῇ

αὐτῇ, δικαιοσύνη δὲ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως 367
 ἐλέγετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ ἐκ νέων
 ἡμᾶς ἐπέιθετε, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ
 ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιὼς
 μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ξύνοικος ᾗ. ταῦτα, ὡ
 Σώκρατες, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἔτι τούτων πλείω Θρασύμα-
 χός τε καὶ ἄλλος πού τις ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
 ἀδικίας λέγοιεν ἂν μεταστρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύνα-
 μιν, φορτικῶς, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν γάρ Β
 σε δέομαι ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, σοῦ ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούσαι
 τὰναντία, ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατεινας λέγω.
 μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
 ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἑκατέρα τὸν
 ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἢ μὲν κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἀγαθόν
 ἐστι· τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὡσπερ Γλαύκων διεκε-
 λεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς
 ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον
 φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον
 εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι C
 ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ,
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ξυμφέρον τοῦ
 κρεῖττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐτῷ μὲν ξυμφέρον καὶ

ἐν αὐτῇ. So in Book III. 491
 C. Ἀχιλλεύς ... ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ
 νοσημάτε δύο ἐναντίω ἀλλήλων,
 whilst in Book IV. 444 E. as
 already noticed, virtue is de-
 scribed in the same metaphor as
 ὑγιειά τις.

φορτικῶς, 'in a vulgar or un-
 appreciative way.' See VII.
 528 E. ἐπέπληξας (μοι) περὶ
 ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαι-
 οῦντι, and IX. 581 D. οὐ τὴν
 μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν
 φορτικῆν τινα ἡγείται;

κατατεινας, v. s. p. 115, note.

τί ποιούσα τὸν ἔχοντα, after
 the analogy of εἶ, κακῶς, ποιεῖν

with accusative.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφ., &c. 'If you do
 not remove their real characters
 and give them the credit of false
 ones,' &c. See above Ch. IV.
 ad mod. οὐκ ἀφαιρετόν (ἀδίκῳ)
 ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικούντα
 τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρε-
 κευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην... ἀφαι-
 ρετόν δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν (δικαίῳ). εἰ
 γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται
 αὐτῷ τιμαί, &c. The unjust
 man is to have the credit of
 justice, whilst from the just
 man is to be taken away even
 the reputation of the justice
 which he practises.

λυσιτελούν, τῷ δὲ ἤττονι ἀξύμφορον. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὠμολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ἄξια κερτῆσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, οἶον ὄραῖν, D ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν, καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δῆ, καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ γόνιμα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει ἀλλ' οὐ δόξη ἐστὶ, τοῦτ' οὖν αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσον δικαιοσύνης, ἃ αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα ὀνίνησι καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει μισθοὺς δὲ καὶ δόξας πάρες ἄλλοις ἐπαινεῖν. ὡς ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων, σοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἄν, εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, διότι πάντα τὸν

ὠμολόγησας, *surp.* Ch. I. *fin.* ἐν ποίῳ τούτων τὴν δικαιοσύνην τίθησ; Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον.

αὐτῶν. *sc.* ἔνεκα.

ὄραῖν, ἀκούειν, φρονεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν δῆ. It is pleasant to notice here the optimistic tone of Adeimantus' words — the sense of healthy enjoyment in mere existence. There is no question, 'Is life worth living?' Existence itself is a pleasure, as long as health is with us. Ἐπαινέειν concludes the list of blessings, and emphasized as it is by δῆ, is marked out as the greatest blessing of all. In Book IX. 583 D, we have an analysis of such pleasurable states. Ἄρ' οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοὺς τῶν καμόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἥδιστον ὖν. See also Argument, p. 91.

τοῦτ' οὖν...δικ., *v.s.* p. 113, note. 'Make your commendation then of justice regarding its very nature, viz. that, &c.' τοῦτο δικαιοσύνης, 'this aspect of justice,' is here further defined and emphasized by αὐτὸ, which, if we have regard to the use of αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, and αὐτῇ δι' αὐτὴν, above, will be seen to mean more than 'itself' in the present passage: rather 'the essence' or 'nature.'

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει, loosely constructed co-ordinately with αὐτῇ ὀνίνησι, because the two thoughts are co-ordinate in the speaker's mind. See above καὶ αἰ ἡδοναί, κ.τ.λ. Ch. I.

τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀνασχοίμην... ἐπ. See Book VIII. 564 E. οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, and X. 613 C. Ἀνέξει ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ;

εἰ μὴ σὺ κελεύεις, the entire confidence which Socrates' character commanded is here strikingly exemplified. Adeimantus is convinced that to commend justice for its reward

βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπῶν διελήλυθας ἢ τοῦτο. . μὴ ἔ
 οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνου τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνη
 ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιούσα ἑκατέρα τὸν
 ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὐτήν, εἴαν τε λαυθάνῃ εἴαν τε μὴ
 θεοῦς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ κακόν
 εἶστιν.

CAP. X.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας αἰεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε
 Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν
 καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἤσθην καὶ εἶπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς 368
 ὑμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν

is a mistake, but if Socrates choose to do so, he is ready to hear him, as believing that he would have something valuable to say.

πάντα τὸν βίον, *v.s.* Ch. II. *περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλὰ-
 κισ τις νοῦν ἔχων χairoι λέγων
 καὶ ἀκούων.* And in Book V. 450 C. *μέτρον δέ γ' ἔφη, ὃ Σώ-
 κρατες, ὃ Γλαύκων, τοιούτων λόγων
 ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσι.* Such are Socrates' own expressions, which bear witness to the truth of Glaucon's words here. With this chapter the case for injustice comes to an end, and with it the first part of the Republic. It has been an elaborate criticism of popular beliefs and definitions. We have seen Cephalus decline to enter upon the question, 'What is justice'? We have had definition after definition of justice tried and found wanting, and lastly, we have seen the spectacle of two earnest minds, fully convinced that integrity is the best, but harassed and wearied with

the commendations of wickedness, demanding of their friend and teacher a solution of the paradox which distresses them. Besides this, the matter of the dialogue, there has also been no small preparation for a lengthy controversy. Side subjects, bearing on the main question, have been suggested for future settlement; methods of argument have been tested, and approved, or found wanting; accuracy in description and definition has been demanded, and all is ready for Socrates' task, the justification of justice.

CH. X.—*I said that their able words had filled me with admiration; I was however unequal to the task. Then they besought me again to try. So I said: Let us take a larger organism than man, the State, and try first if we can find justice there.*

καὶ τότε. καὶ emphatic; see above p. 140.

ἐλεγείων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμήσαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην, εἰπών·

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θεῖου γένος ἀνδρός.

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν· πάνυ γὰρ θεῖον πεπόνθατε, εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης ἄμεινον εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, δοκεῖτε **B** δὴ μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐ πεπεῖσθαι. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἠπίστου ἀν ὑμῖν ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρῆσωμαι· οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω· δοκῶ γάρ μοι ἀδύνατος εἶναι· σημεῖον δέ μοι, ὅτι ἂ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον λέγων ὤμην ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας, οὐκ ἀπεδέξασθέ μου· οὔτ' αὖ ὅπως μὴ βοηθήσω ἔχω· δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν

θεῖον, *v.s. not. ad Μουσαῖος* Ch. VI. *ad med.*, and *nott.* pp. 126, 150. 'You have received a divine afflatus.' This remark of Socrates must not be taken too seriously; there is a spice of raillery intended. But he goes on to pay them a compliment, which, coming from him, is of the greatest value, for their able statement of the case for injustice. For *πεπόνθατε* see note p. 114.

ἀπορῶ ὅ τι χρῆσωμαι. Elliptical. 'I don't know what to do (with the situation).' For this sense *v.s.* p. 131, note. Here the usual dative is omitted, the object of *χρῆσωμαι* being *τούτοις*, or *ταύτῃ τῇ πίστει*, to be supplied from *πιστεύω*. This omission occurs in Arist. Nub. 439—*Nῦν οὖν χρήσθων ὅ τι βούλονται.* Sc. *ἐμοί*.

ὅπως βοηθῶ ἔχω. We have seen *ἔχω* used above in this sense but with an infinitive; see Ch. IX. *ἔχει...ἀποφῆναι.*

δοκῶ ἀδύνατος, v.s. δῆλος ἐὶ ὅτι φήσεις, Book I. Ch. XX. *ad med.*; and *ἐμοί γε δοκῶ* Book I. 339 D. So on p. 175 it has been noticed above that *μέλω* and *ἔοικα* are used.

ἀπεδέξασθε. See note p. 122. *οὔτ' ἀδ...* Socrates' devotion to the defence of truth against falsehood is here expressed with words of grand simplicity. Similarly Aristotle, when investigating the nature of moral action, and finding a difficulty in providing for particular acts: *ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὕντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.*—Eth Nic. 2, 2, 5.

ἀπαγορεύειν, 'to refuse'; hence 'to give up,' or 'fail';

ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι. κράτιστον οὖν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι ἐπικουρεῖν αὐτῇ. ὁ τε οὖν Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο παντὶ τρόπῳ βοηθήσαι καὶ μὴ ἀνεῖναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ διερευνήσασθαι τί τέ ἐστιν ἐκάτερον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὠφελείας αὐτοῖν τάληθές ποτέρως ἔχει. εἶπον οὖν ὅπερ ἐμοὶ ἔδοξεν, ὅτι τὸ ζήτημα ᾧ ἐπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον ἀλλ' ὄξυ βλέποντος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα σμικρὰ πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὄξυ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι μείζω τε καὶ ἐν μείζονι, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη, οἶμαι, ἐκείνα πρῶτον

see Book VIII. 568 D: ὅσα δ' ἂν ἀνωτέρω ἴωσι πρὸς τὸ ἕναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή.

διερευνήσασθαι. In the discovery of justice the spot where it lies hid is called *δυσδιερευνητός*; Book IV. 432 C. For the eagerness of all those present to hear Socrates and to follow the discussion, see Book I. Ch. XI.: πάντες γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σωκράτει εἰσοίσομεν. *Ibid.* XII. *ἰπιτ.*: ὁ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. Ch. XVII.: οὐ μὴν εἰσάν γε αὐτὸν οἱ παρόντες, ἀλλ' ἠνδγκασαν ὑπομείναι τε καὶ παρασχέειν τῶν εἰρημένων λόγον.

οὐ φαῦλον, *v.s.* Book I. Ch. XXIII.: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντινα τρόπον χρῆν ζῆν. *Et inf.* here Ch. XV. *ἰπιτ.*: οὐκ ἔρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἠράμεθα.

ὄξυ βλέποντος. So in the account of the cave, Book VII. 516 D: γέρα τῷ ὄξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα.

ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί. Not necessarily *εἰρωνεῖα*; but with Socrates customary self-depreciation. When this self-depreciation is excessive, and has the direct intention of deceiving an opponent, it becomes *εἰρωνεῖα*; *v.s.* εἰ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ εἴη, Ch. I. *ἰπιτ.*

οἶανπερ ἂν εἰ... For this position of ἂν, repeated below (*ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη*), see p. 128 note. The construction is broken off at *οἶανπερ* and a fresh sentence begun.

ἐν μείζονι, *sc.* *χρήματι*, or *τόπῳ*, 'in a larger place,' or 'on a larger object.'

ἔρμαιον, 'a piece of good luck.' Hermes was the divinity from whom good fortune came; see II. 14, 491—

τόν ρα μάλιστα
'Ερμείας Τρώων ἐφίλει καὶ
κτῆσιν ὅσασσε.

For the word *ἔρμαιον* see Euthydemus 273 E: πόθεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον εὐρέτην; *et id.* *inf.*: τί μείζον ἔρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὐροίμι ἐν πάντι τῷ βίῳ;

ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. Πανυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Ἄδει-
Εμμαντος· ἀλλὰ τί τοιοῦτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῇ περὶ
τὸ δίκαιον ζητήσῃ καθορᾶς; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ.
δικαιοσύνη, φαμέν, ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἐνός, ἔστι δέ
που καὶ ὅλης πόλεως; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν
μεῖζον πόλις ἐνός ἀνδρός; Μεῖζον, ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν
πλείων ἂν δικαιοσύνη ἐν τῷ μεῖζονι ἐνεῖη καὶ ῥάων
369 καταμαθεῖν. εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πό-
λεσι ζητήσωμεν ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἔπειτα οὕτως ἐπι-
σκεψώμεθα καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ, τὴν τοῦ μεῖζονος
ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέα ἐπισκοποῦντες.
Ἄλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, καλῶς λέγειν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ'

οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν. οὕτως here is like ἔπειτα in Book I. Ch. V. *ad med.*: μηδ' αὐτὸ ὀφείλοντα ἢ θεῶ θυσίας τινὰς ἢ ἀνθρώπων χρήματα ἔπειτα ἐκέισε ἀπιέναι. See note *ad loc.*

ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρὸς ἐνός, ἔστι δέ που καὶ ὅλης πίλεως. The common possession of certain qualities, habits, and morals is attributed to men and states in Book VIII. 544 E: οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἷε ἐκ δρυὸς ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίνεσθαι; καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. Also Book VIII. *passim*, and Book IX.

πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι. With this system Aristotle agrees, *Pol.* i. 1, when he says, after describing the origin of the πόλις from the οἰκία and κωμή, that the πόλις is in its nature prior to the οἰκία, and κωμή as the whole is prior to its parts: καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστι·

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. In *Xen. Mem.* i, 2, 17 the charge is brought against Socrates: χρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικά διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν, a charge pointed by the fact that Critias and Alcibiades were his pupils. But it is there urged that these two men came to Socrates merely with the object of learning politics; and we know from the rest of Plato's dialogues that ethical rather than political enquiries commanded Socrates' attention when dealing with the young. Aristotle again puts political science above ethic in *Nic. Eth.* i, 2, 8: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν (sc. τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν) ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζον γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πίλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν. ἀγαπητόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔσθαι καὶ πόλεσιν. ἦ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφέταται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα. In short, Ethic is a kind of Politic.

ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαιμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; Τάχ' ἂν, ἢ δ' ὄς. Οὐκοῦν γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἐλπίς εὐπετέστερον ἰδεῖν δὲ ζητοῦμεν; Πολύ γε. Β Δοκεῖ οὖν χρῆναι ἐπιχειρῆσαι περαίνειν; οἶμαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον αὐτὸ εἶναι σκοπεῖτε οὖν. Ἔσκεπται, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

CAP. XI.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν

εἰ γιγνομένην πόλ. θε. λόγ., 'If we were to see in our argument how a city comes into being,' i.e. 'picture to ourselves.' See *infra*. Book V. 458 A: ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγογεῖ τὴν διανοίαν εἰώθασιν ἐστιασθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν, i.e. 'feed their imagination.' And above here, Ch. III. *init.*: εἰ τόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, 'if we were to put this case before our minds.' Plato describes the city as a sketch, when accomplished; Book VIII. 548 D: ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα. περαίνειν. ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν, Book I. Ch. XVIII. *init.*

CH. XI.—A city arises from man's necessities, which cause him to join with his fellow-man for mutual benefit. And one man must devote himself to one kind of production, not to many.

Γίγνεται τοίνυν, *et seqq.* With this account it will be well to compare Aristotle's history of the origin of a community. He

describes a city as a *κοινωνία*, or clubbing together, directed towards some good: *πάσαν πόλιν δρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ ὄσαν... πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται*. It is also that *κοινωνία* which includes and joins together all other *κοινωνία*: *ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας*. He then proceeds to analyse this *κοινωνία* by going back, as Plato does here, to the origin of the state: *Εἰ δὲ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φύμενα βλέπειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν*. Those who cannot exist without each other's help naturally come together: *ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι*. But Aristotle goes farther back than Plato; he finds the first *κοινωνία* in family relations, man and wife, and man and slave; not between man and man, as Plato does here; and this is the first germ of the state, viz. *οἰκία*. Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο *κοινωνιῶν οἰκία*

B

Coικίξιν; Ουδεμίαν, ἢ δ' ὄς. Οὐίω δὴ ἄρα παρα-
λαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου

πρώτη. For this he compares
Homer's expression—

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος

Παιδῶν ἢδ' ἄλόχων.

He then proceeds from the family to the κοινωρία πλείωνων οἰκιῶν, or κώμη; thence from the κώμη to the κοινωρία πλείωνων κωμιῶν, or πόλις. Still Aristotle agrees on the whole with Plato in his account of the origin of a state, viz. that it lies in man's need (χρεία) of his fellow-man. For instance when speaking of the πόλις he says: γυγνομένη οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εἶδ' ζῆν, 'In its origin existence is the object, in its complete state, orderly existence.' And in speaking of the former of these two original relations, viz. that between master and servant, he says: πρώτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε πρὸς ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν ἴδωμεν, &c. ἀναγκαῖα χρεῖα, 'necessities that must be satisfied.' And in agreement with this principle, a family is said to be more αὐτάρκης than an individual, and a city than a family; see Pol. 2, 1: οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐτάρκτερον ἑνὸς, πόλις δ' οἰκίας. And, again, a man who wants nothing and shares nothing, but is self-sufficient, cannot, Aristotle says, be part of a city at all: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωρῆναι, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως. For which see also Herodotus 1, 32, 14: ἄς δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐτάρκεις ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλον δὲ ἐνδεές ἔστι. Whilst upon this subject of the origin and growth of the state, it may be as well to give Aristotle's

definition of justice, which he draws from his description of the state, viz. 'Justice is the adjustment (τάξις) of common relations in the πόλις.' ἢ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωρίας τάξις ἐστίν. For this, in effect, is Plato's view of justice also; see Rep. IV.: τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πυλοπραγμανεῖν; 433 A. 'To do one's own business and not meddle with other people's,' i.e. 'To act in those relations where you are called to act, and not in those where you are not.' Hobbes, also, points out, as Plato does here, that physical necessity is the cause of a commonwealth coming into being. 'The finale Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love liberty and Dominion over others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall passions of men.' He then shows that covenants (see note on ξυθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, Ch. II.), the outcome of the first and second Laws of Nature, are by themselves so liable to be broken, that a further step in the same direction is taken by a multitude of people, not by a few. This step is to centre the rights which they have renounced (see above *not. cit.*), in the hands of an individual or a representative body of

χρεία, πολλῶν δεόμενοι, πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν οἴκησιν ἀγείραντες κοινωνοὺς τε καὶ βοηθοὺς, ταύτη τῇ ξυνοικία ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα. ἡ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλω, εἴ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἡ μεταλαμβάνει οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι. Πάνυ γε. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ λόγῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ποιῶμεν πόλιν. ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν **D** χρεῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα. Παντάπασί γε. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει ἐπὶ τοσαύτην

persons, who will enforce their adjustment (τάξις, in Aristotle's words) by the strength of the whole people. 'The only way to erect such a Common Power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another ...is to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of Men, that they may reduce all their Wills by plurality of voices, unto one Will.' Hence the following definition of a Commonwealth. 'A Commonwealth is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multiude by Mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the Strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common Defence.' 'This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.'

For *αὐταρκῆς* v.s. note, p. 118.

Μεταδίδωσι δὴ, Aristotle again shews that ἡ χρεία is the principle of commerce. Eth. Nic. 5, 5, 13, "Ὅτι δὲ ἡ χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἔν τι ὄν, δῆλον ὅτι δταν μὴ ἐν χρεῖα ὄσιν ἀλλήλων, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται. And again Pol. 2, 1. 'Ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ (πίλιον) ἐν γενέσθαι εἶδει διαφέρει. Διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηδὸς σώσει τὰς πόλεις, i.e. 'the men composing a city must differ, but by reciprocity they will constitute one and a prosperous city.' And he speaks thus of the principle of exchange in Book I. iii., "Ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων ἀρξαιμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλεῖω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκάνων ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

τῷ λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, v.s., εἰ τοίονδε ποιήσαιμεν διανοία, quoted above, Ch. III. *iii.*

τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα, v.s. γιγνομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκα, quoted above.

πῶς ἡ πόλις ἀρκέσει, 'How is the city to meet such a demand,' *iii.* 'How will the city be sufficient in itself to make such preparation?' Πῶς, 'in what

παρασκευήν; ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἰς, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλος δὲ τις ὑφάντης; ἢ καὶ σκυτοτόμου αὐτόσε προσθήσομεν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν; Πάνυ γε. Εἶη δ' ἂν ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη Ἡ πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. Φαίνεται. Τί δὴ οὖν; ἓνα ἕκαστον τούτων δεῖ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον

way?' i.e. 'what must be its elements, or constituent parts, if such a result is to be obtained?'

ἄλλο τι, v.s. *pol.* p. 145.

ἢ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις. For Aristotle's limits of the city, see *Intro.* p. 21. His words are οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. 'Αναγκ. 'The least possible.' So when the Athenians were working at their wall (*Thuc.* I. 90), they raised it to the 'least height necessary' for defence before they informed the Lacedemonians. ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους. Similarly, of words, to say the fewest necessary. *Demosth.* de Cor. 269, αὐτὰ τὸναγκαιοτάτα' εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. And here *infra.* Book VI. 486 E, μή πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι... 'Αναγκαιοτάτα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

ἓνα ἕκαστον τούτων. The principle of specialization, i.e. that each man should have 'but one employment and confine himself to it, runs through the whole of this Dialogue, and is employed to such an extent by Plato, that Aristotle complains of it as excessive. Thus in reviewing the Republic, he says, 'Ἐτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὃ φησι τῆ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον... λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν πᾶσαν ὡς ἄριστον ὅτι μάλιστα. λαμβάνει γὰρ

ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. Καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν, ὡς προοῦσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται. πληθὸς γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις'... Οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλείονων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. And so below, τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ζητεῖν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμείνον. And again φανερόν, ὡς οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ὡς λέγουσι, *Pol.* 2, 1. This criticism of Aristotle's arises in a discussion of the merits of Plato's suggestion that wives and children should be in common to the citizens of the state (see Book V.); the extreme point to which Plato's communistic tendencies lead him in the Republic; and if taken as a criticism of that point, we must accept it as just. But, if we see how Plato in certain other places works out the principle of specialism, and employs it in his discovery of justice, we shall be unable to agree with Aristotle's complaint. Thus in Republic IV. 423 B, we read οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὄρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὄσσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἡλικὴ οὕση ὄσσην χώραν ἀφουρισμένους, τὴν ἄλλην χαίρειν εἶναι. τίς, ἔφη, ὄρος; οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὐ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὐξείν, πέρα δὲ μή. Αὐδ

ἅπασιν κοινὸν κατατιθέναι, οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἕνα ὄντα παρασκευάζειν σιτία τέτταρσι καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ πόνον ἀναλίσκειν ἐπὶ σίτου παρασκευῇ, καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν; ἢ ἀμελήσαντα ἑαυτῷ μόνον τέταρτον μέρος ποιεῖν τούτου τοῦ σίτου ἐν

below, φυλάττειν παντὶ τρῶπι ὅπως μήτε μικρὰ ἢ πόλις ἔσται μήτε μεγάλη δουκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ τις ἰκανὴ καὶ μία. And below D, as here, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἕνα πρὸς ἕν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὥπως ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ εἰς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἢ πόλις μία φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλαί. See also the description of σωφροσύνη in 432 A, δι' ὅλης (πόλεως) ἀτεχνῶς τέταται διὰ πασῶν παρεχομένη ξυνάδοντας τοὺς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταῦτόν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους. Again, the definition of justice itself is based upon this principle of harmony, or unity, see Book IV. 433 A. ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν δέοι ἐπιτηδεύειν τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἢ φύσις ἐπιτηδαιοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη... Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ. And in Book V. 462 A, Ἐχομεν οὖν τι μείζον κακὸν πόλει ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν αὐτὴν διασπᾷ καὶ ποιῇ πολλὰς ἀντὶ μίας; ἢ μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ὃ ἂν ξυνδῆ τε καὶ ποιῇ μίαν; (The principle involved in these remarks is unimpeachable. But it is rather upon the passage noticed above, which advocates the community of wives and children, that Aristotle finds his objections, and upon the further development of the principle of unity in the later books of the Republic, the system of Ἰδέαι, or

Single and Primary Forms, which are transcendent, and furnish life and reality to the objects of the world of sense.) Further, in 476 A, Plato strongly insists upon the unity that pervades Nature, the model of the unity which he would introduce into his state: καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν περὶ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωματίων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. Lastly he passes on from this unity of the world of sense (apparently diverse) to the 'Real Good,' or the 'Form of Good,' which supplies their truth to all things that are known, and the capacity of knowing them to the knower; and is, in a word, the Single Source of all that is Real and Good: see Book VI. 508 E. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀληθειᾶν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας. Such in brief is the Platonic unity, which is carried on from the physical to the transcendent world. The remarks quoted from Book IV. respecting the unity of the city itself must commend themselves to our acceptance, whatever we may think of the system of ἰδέαι.

- 370** τετάρτῳ μέρει τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ τρία, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς οἰκίας παρασκευῇ διατρίβειν, τὸ δὲ ἱματίου, τὸ δὲ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοις κοινωνοῦντα πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δι' αὐτὸν τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν ; καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος ἔφη Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω ῥᾶον ἢ κείνως. Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δί' ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰπόντος σου, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν
- B** φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὁμοῖος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πράξειν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ; Ἐμοιγε. Τί δέ ; πότερον κάλλιον πράττοι ἂν τις εἰς ὧν πολλὰς τέχνας ἐργαζόμενος, ἢ ὅταν μίαν εἰς ; Ὅταν, ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰς μίαν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, οἶμαι, καὶ τότε δῆλον, ὡς, ἐάν τις τινος παρῆ ἔργου καιρὸν, διόλλυται. Δῆλον γάρ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐθέλει τὸ πραπτόμενον τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος σχολὴν περιμένειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸν πράττοντα τῷ πραπτομένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν μὴ ἐν παρέργου μέρει.
- C** Ἀνάγκη. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίνεταί καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη. Παντά-

ἄλλ. κοιν. πράγματα ἔχειν. See Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 9 : ἐγὼ οὖν τοὺς μὲν βουλομένους πολλὰ πράγματα ἔχειν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ ἄλλοις παρέχειν, &c. ; where the sense is slightly different, 'to be busy'; here it is 'to give one's self trouble.'

φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὁμοῖος. So Aristotle, *loc. supr. cit.* : οὐ γὰρ γίνεταί πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. *v.s. pol. ad μεταδίδωσι δὴ*, and the passage where Aristotle says that men *must* be different if they are to form a mutually beneficial community.

ἐν παρέργου μέρει. See Book I. *pol.* p. 184. For *πάρεργον v.* Book VII. 527 C : καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ (*sc.* γεωμετρίας)

οὐ σμικρά, *i.e.* the secondary uses of geometry, besides its value as leading to the acquisition of pure knowledge. And Book VI. 498 A : μεγάλη ἡγοῦνται, *πάρεργον οἴμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν*, where the study of philosophy is said to be taken up off hand, as a leisure employment, by most men, if they take it up at all. See also Euthydemus 273 D : *παρέργου αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.*

κατὰ φύσιν. See what has been said in Book I. of the *ἔργον* of man, p. 138 ; and the recurrence of this expression in the passage there quoted from Book V. : *δεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστον ἓνα ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ πράττειν.*

πασι μὲν οὖν. Πλειόνων δὴ, ὧ Ἀδείμαντε, δεῖ πολιτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἐπὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς ὧν ἐλέγομεν· ὁ γὰρ γεωργός, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ποιήσεται ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἄροτρον, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ σμινύην οὐδὲ τὰλλα ὄργανα ὅσα περὶ γεωργίαν· οὐδ' **D** αὐτὸ οἰκοδόμος· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ δεῖ· ὡσαύτως δ' ὁ ὑφάντης τε καὶ ὁ σκυτοτόμος. Ἀληθῆ. Τέκτονες δὴ καὶ χαλκῆς καὶ τοιοῦτοί τινες πολλοὶ δημιουργοί, κοινωνοὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ πολιχνίου γιγνόμενοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν πω πάνυ γε μέγα τι εἴη, *οὐδ'* εἰ αὐτοῖς βουκόλους τε καὶ ποιμένας τούς τε ἄλλους νομέας προσθῆμεν, ἵνα οἳ τε γεωργοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροῦν ἔχοιεν βούς, **E** οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν χρῆσθαι ὑπόζυγιοις, ὑφάνται δὲ καὶ σκυτοτόμοι δέρμασί τε καὶ ἐρίοις. Οὐδέ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, σμικρὰ πόλις ἂν εἴη ἔχουσα πάντα ταῦτα. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κατοικίσει γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον, οὗ ἐπεισαγωγίμων μὴ δεήσει, σχεδὸν τι ἀδύνατον. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ. Προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων, οἳ ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως αὐτῇ κομίσουσιν ὧν

εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι, 'if it is to be a good one.' See *not.* Ch. XVIII.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἄροῦν ἔχοιεν βούς. Hesiod makes the ox an indispensable part of the most primitive household—

οἶκον μὲν πρῶτιστα, γυναῖκά τε, βούν τ' ἄροτῆρα.

οἳ τε οἰκοδόμοι. Supply ἔχοιεν before χρῆσθαι.

μετὰ τῶν γεωργῶν. To be joined closely with πρὸς τὰς ἀγωγὰς. 'For their carrying-traffic with the farmers.'

ἀλλὰ μὴν, 'but again.' ἀλλὰ οργῶσες, and μὴν shows that a

fresh instance is to be added.

προσδεήσει ἄρα ἔτι καὶ ἄλλων. So Aristotle in Pol. I, 3, shows that some nations support themselves from a single pursuit, e.g. νομαδικοὶ, ἀλιευτικοὶ, θηρευτικοί. But those, he adds, who combine them live pleasantly, filling up the life that lacks much; to which conclusion Plato is gradually coming here. οἳ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τούτων, ἠδέως ζῶσιν, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ἢ τυγχάνει ἑλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι.

δεῖται. Δεήσει. Καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν ἦ ὁ διάκονος
 μηδὲν ἄγων ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται, παρ' ὧν ἂν κομίζονται
 371 ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία, κενὸς ἄπεισιν. ἢ γάρ; Δοκεῖ
 μοι. Δεῖ δὴ τὰ οἴκοι μὴ μόνον ἑαυτοῖς ποιεῖν ἱκανά,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ οἶα καὶ ὅσα ἐκεῖνοις ὧν ἂν δέονται. Δεῖ
 γάρ. Πλειόνων δὴ γεωργῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 δημιουργῶν δεῖ ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει. Πλειόνων γάρ. Καὶ
 δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διακόνων που τῶν τε εἰσαζόντων
 καὶ ἐξαζόντων ἕκαστα· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν ἔμποροι· ἢ
 γάρ; Ναί. Καὶ ἐμπόρων δὴ δεησόμεθα. Πάνυ γε.
 Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε κατὰ θάλατταν ἢ ἐμπορία γίγνηται,
 Βσυχνῶν καὶ ἄλλων προσδεῖσεται τῶν ἐπιστημό-
 νων τῆς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐργασίας. Συχνῶν
 μέντοι.

καὶ μὴν κενὸς ἂν... 'And again, if the carrier go empty, taking nothing with him of those things which the people want, from whomsoever they are importing their own requirements, he will have to go away empty.' ἐκεῖνοι is the people to whom the trader comes; whilst the subject of κομίζονται and αὐτοῖς, refer to the people who send the trader. The principle is that the trader must come with some import to exchange for a nation's exports; and therefore production must not be limited by the bare requirements of the country itself, but there must be a surplus, with which to purchase the exports of other nations. See

the passage in Arist. Pol. I, 3, quoted above, regarding this surplus: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητική πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. It will be noticed that Aristotle makes this surplus a natural result, in which he practically agrees with Plato. *Et infra*, regarding the πλήρωσις or 'filling up,' in which all exchange consists: εἰς ἀνάπληρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν. εἰσαζόντων καὶ ἐξαζόντων. Arist. loc. cit.: τῷ εἰσαγεσθαι, καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον. Exportation results from over production.



Τί δὲ δὴ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει ; πῶς ἀλλήλοις μετὰ-δώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται ; ὧν δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιησάμενοι πόλιν ᾠκίσαμεν. Δήλον δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι. Ἄγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενήσεται ἐκ τούτου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: Ἄν οὖν C κομίσας ὁ γεωργὸς εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν τι ὧν ποιεῖ ἢ τις ἄλλος τῶν δημιουργῶν μὴ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἦκη τοῖς δεομένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάξασθαι, ἀργήσει τῆς αὐτοῦ δημιουργίας καθήμενος ἐν ἀγορᾷ ; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ τούτο ὀρώντες ἑαυτοῦς

CH. XII.—*This barter must be made more convenient through a medium of exchange, money, and through middlemen, i.e. retail traders. How then will our citizens live ?*

ὧν, partitive genitive, from the sense of 'sharing' in μετὰ-δώσουσιν. The second ὧν refers also to the results of labour, the several productions, which were to be mutually exchanged and shared.

νόμισμα ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλ. νόμισμα means that which is recognised, anything instituted. See Soph. Antig. 295—

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν οἶον ἄργυρος
κακὸν νόμισμ' ἔβλαστε.

And ξύμβολον has reference to interchange with agreement ; see note p. 130. νόμ. ξύμβ. then means, 'a recognised medium,' or 'a common token.' In Aristotle's Ethics 5, 5, 11, the reason for using money is thus given : δεῖ ἕρα ἐνὶ τινι

πάντα μετρεῖσθαι...οἶον δ' ὑπάλ-λαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ ξυνηκῆν. Where κατὰ ξ. represents ξύμβολον in Plato's definition. And again in Pol. I, 3, 16, the origin of the use of money is explained in accordance with the principle of the origin of society : Πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς, κ.τ.λ. *Et sup.*: ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις· οἱ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· Διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συν-έθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς δίδοναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ἐν, εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμετα-χείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἶον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος, κ.τ.λ. *et inf.* 18 : τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοι-χεῖον καὶ πέρασ τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν.

εἰσὶν οἱ τούτο ὀρώντες. With reference to the necessity and growth of middlemen or tradesmen, Aristotle (*loc. cit.*) shows that they are not found in the

ἐπὶ τὴν διακονίαν τάττουσι ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα καὶ ἀχρειοί τι ἄλλο ἔργον πράττειν. **Δ** αὐτοῦ γὰρ δεῖ μένοντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ μὲν ἀντ' ἀργυρίου ἀλλάξασθαι τοῖς τι δεομένοις ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτῷ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν, ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίασθαι. Αὕτη ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ χρεία καπήλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐμποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐμπόρους; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὴ τινες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, οἳ ἂν τὰ **Ε** μὲν τῆς διανοίας μὴ πάνυ ἀξιοκοινωνήτοι ὦσι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἰσχὺν ἰκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόνους ἔχωσιν οἳ δὴ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρείαν, τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληνται, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,

primitive community where all exchange is barter, and that ἡ καπηλικὴ ἰσχυρία ἐστὶν ἀπὸ φύσιν. Ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ἐστι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς (sc. καπηλικῆς) ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσίας.

ἀλλάξασθαι... διαλλάττειν, 'to take.. and give in exchange.' The difference of voice is noticeable.

οἳ ἂν τὰ μὲν τῆς διαν. Aristotle also draws this distinction in Pol. i. i. And the extreme case of those whom Plato is describing in the text is the δούλος, whom Aristotle in a like spirit calls ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, 'a live machine'; Eth. Nic. 8, II, 6. It is characteristic of Plato's broader views, as compared with those of his age, that he makes no mention here of the δούλος, in other words he does not consider a slave

necessary to a community. Aristotle, on the other hand, considers that superiority of intellect constitutes the relation of slavery at once: Ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν, ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει· τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλον. Here it will be noticed that he grounds his principle upon the same distinction as Plato, viz. that between mental and bodily efficiency; but where Plato concludes that some men must be μισθωτοί, Aristotle condemns them to slavery. He commends slavery agsin in I, ii. thus: τὸ γὰρ ἄρχεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ζυμπερόντων ἐστὶ· καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἐνια διέστηκε, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεῖν.

μισθωτοί· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεώς εἰσιν, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ μισθωτοί. Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἤδη ἡμῖν ἠϋξῆται ἡ πόλις, ὥστ' εἶναι τελέα; Ἴσως. Ποῦ οὖν ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; καὶ τίνι ἅμα ἐγγενομένη ὧν ἐσκέμμεθα; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ 372 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεῖα τινὴ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς λέγεις· καὶ σκεπτέον γε καὶ οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. πρῶτον οὖν σκεψώμεθα, τίνα τρόπον διαιτήσονται οἱ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι. ἄλλο τι ἢ σίτον τε ποιούντες καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἰκοδομησάμενοι οἰκίας, θέρους μὲν τὰ πολλὰ γυμνοὶ τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητοι ἐργάζονται, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἡμφιεσμένοι τε καὶ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἰκανῶς; θρέψονται δὲ ἐκ Β μὲν τῶν κριθῶν ἄλφιστα σκευαζόμενοι, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα, τὰ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μάξαντες, μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμόν τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρὰ, κατακλινέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις,

χρεῖα τινὴ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Aristotle says in Pol. I, 2: ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐποίησις ἐστὶ, 'Life is action, not creation,' i.e. 'Our life lies more in our relations with others than in our own several acts themselves.' Adeimantus' suggestion here is prompted by a similar thought. Justice as noticed above (p. 129, note) has to do not so much with persons and things, but with the relations between persons and things, inasmuch as it has to do with the whole of life. And so Aristotle gives the following definition of justice as popularly accepted: Ὅρωμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βου-

λομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ.

οὐκ ἀποκνητέον. See below 380 C: διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ: and above Ch. X.: δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὄσιον ἢ παραγεγόμενον δικαιοσύνη κατηγορουμένη ἀπαγορεύειν. So in Ch. XV. ἰνὴ.: ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἀποδεικνυτέον, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκη.

γυμνοὶ, 'without the upper garment.' See Hesiod Opp. et Di. 389—

γυμνὸν σπεῖρειν, γυμνὸν τε βοιωτῆιν,

Γυμνὸν δ' ἀμείν.

Which Virgil imitates Geor. i. 299—

Nudus ara, sere nudus.

εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοί τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά, ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, ἠδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν **C** ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον ;

CAP. XIII.

Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων ὑπολαβὼν, Ἄνευ ὄψου, ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐστιωμένους. Ἄληθῆ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμεν ὅτι καὶ ὄψον ἔξουσιν ἄλλας τε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάας καὶ τυρόν, καὶ βολβοὺς καὶ λάχανα, οἶα δὴ ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήματα, ἐψήσονται· καὶ τραγήματά που παραθήσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἐρεβίνθων καὶ κυάμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ **D** φηγοὺς σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες· καὶ οὕτω διάγοντες τὸν βίον ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας,

Εὐωχῆσονται. For this word v.s Ch. XXIII., note on εὐωχοῦ.

ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, 'sipping their wine;' opposed to ἐκπίνω, 'to drain.' The force of ἐπι here is similar to that in ἐπιπτόμενοι, 'skimming over,' in Ch. VIII. *in part.*, i.e. 'superficially,' 'slightly'; cf. the words ἐπιπόλαιος, ἐπιπολάζω; and see Book X. 601 A, χρώματ' ἔττα ἐπιχρωματίζειν. οἴνου, partitive genitive, see Od. iii. 4—

Τοῦ (sc. οἴνου) ὁ γέρον κρητῆρα κεράσσατο.

The same sense is more definitely given below in the words μετρίως ὑποπίνοντες, Ch. XIII.

ἐστεφανωμένοι καὶ ὑμνοῦντες τοὺς θεούς, see Book I. Ch. II. *in part.* where Cephalus is making a sacrifice; καθῆστο δὲ ἐστεφανωμένος, and see note.

CH. XIII.—*Glauccon, interrupting, said that I ought to give them some slight amenities of life. Ah! said I, you mean that, instead of a simple, happy community, I am to form a luxurious and fevered city, full of doctors, cooks, dancing girls, and the rest.*

ὑπολαβὼν, v.s. note p. 150.

σποδιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς σποδὸν ἦγουν εἰς ἀνθρακίαν ἐσβεσμένην ἐψήσουσιν. Schol.

ὑποπίνοντες. Other words in which ὑπὸ has this force are ὑποάμουσος; see Book VIII., 548 E, 'rather less intellectual;' ὑπογράφειν, 'to sketch slightly,' *ibid.* D, i.e. give in outline, v.s. note on σκιαγράφου, ἀοετῆς, Ch. VIII.

ὡς εἰκός, γηραιοὶ τελευτῶντες ἄλλον τοιοῦτον βίον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδώσουσιν. καὶ ὅς, Εἰ δὲ ὑὼν πόλιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔφη, κατεσκευάζεις, τί ἂν αὐτὰς ἄλλο ἢ ταῦτα ἐχόρταζες; Ἄλλα πῶς χρή, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὡς Γλαύκων; Ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τε κλινῶν κατακείσθαι, οἶμαι, τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν καὶ ἔσφα ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι καὶ τραγήματα. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, μανθάνω· οὐ πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὅπως γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυφῶσαν πόλιν.

παραδώσουσιν, 'bequeathe,' v.s. Ch. V. Book I. παραδίδωμι ὑμῖν τὸν λόγον... Οὐκοῦν Πολεμάρχος τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμος;

ἄπερ νομίζεται, 'the proprieties of life.' Jowett.

τοὺς μέλλοντας μὴ ταλ., v.s. Book I. Ch. XVIII., and note. See also *notit.* pp. 214, 229, 247.

τρυφῶσαν πόλιν, 'a city of indulgence.' See *infra*. Book III. 399 E, καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, εἶπον, λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἦν ἄρτι τρυφῶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν. 'It seems that we are purging the city again which we said just now was becoming luxurious.' Again in Book IV. the two great enemies of a healthy constitution are said to be wealth and poverty, the one as causing luxury and idleness, and the other crime. 421 E, Extr. πλοῦτός τε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ πενία, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τρυφήν καὶ ἀργίαν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ποιοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ κακοεργίαν πρὸς τῷ νεωτερισμῷ. Again, in the investigation of democracy, the rulers are said to bring the young men and all that have to do with them into a luxurious and effeminate con-

dition. ...σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἄρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους; 556 B. The exact meaning of the word may be gathered from an expression in the context of the last passage quoted:—μαλακοὺς καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λυπὰς καὶ ἀργούς. See Æschines *contr.* Ctes. 20 (Ed. Simcox), οὐκ ἄρα στεφανωθήσεται ἡ βουλή ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου; οὐδὲ γὰρ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. οὐκ ἄρα φιλοτιμοῦνται; Πάνυ γε, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγαπῶσιν, εἴν τις παρ' αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικῆ, ἀλλ' εἴν τις ἐξαμαρτανή κολαζοῦσιν' οἱ δὲ ὑμέτεροι ῥήτορες τρυφῶσι. 'Are not Areopagites then able to receive crowns? No, it is not the custom. Have they then no ambition? Certainly, but it is to punish vigorously any crimes that come under their jurisdiction. But the orators who come before you have no principle,' i.e. they are weak and liable to urge considerations of indulgence and pity; in Plato's words, μὴ καρτερεῖν. For which sense compare Euthyphro, 11 E, μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, used of one who is not energetic.

ἴσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἔχει σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅτη ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλύθαμεν, ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις· εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε καὶ φλεγμαίνουσιν πόλιν θεωρήσωμεν, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τισιν, ὡς δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδ' **373** αὕτη ἡ διαίτα, ἀλλὰ κλῖναί τε προσέσονται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τᾶλλα σκεύη, καὶ ὄψα δὴ καὶ μύρα καὶ θυμιάματα καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ πέμματα, ἕκαστα τούτων παντοδαπά· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἂ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα θετέον, οἰκίας τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ ὑποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τήν τε ζωγραφίαν κινητέον καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ **B** τοιαῦτα κτητέον. ἡ γάρ; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μείζονά τε αὐτὴν πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ὑγιεινὴ

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀληθ. Stallb. makes ὥσπερ ὑγιῆς τις the predicate of εἶναι: but it is open to us to take ἀληθινὴ; thus 'the city which we have described seems to be the true one, being as it were healthy.' 'Healthy,' or 'sound,' is a favourite metaphorical expression with Plato. It occurs again in conjunction with ἀληθῆς in Book X. 603 B, where Plato is speaking of the painter's art, of which he says, προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ ἑταῖρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ. And in speaking of the middle state, which, compared with pain and pleasure respectively, seems to be pleasure or pain, he says, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄρα τοῦτο ἀλλὰ φαίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινόν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιῆς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γητεία τις.

οὐκέτι τὰ ἀναγκ. θετ. 'And we must no longer lay down as the only requirements those that we mentioned at first.' For ἀναγκαῖα, 'the least necessary,' v.s. Ch. XI. ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις.

ζωγραφ. κιν. 'we shall have to start painting.' κινέω is 'to set in motion.' See Book I. Ch. IV. *ἰνί.* βουλόμενος ἔτι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκίνουν. It is used of a top in Book IV. 436 D, which is stationary (ἔστηκε) and in motion (κινεῖται), simultaneously, viz. in respect of axis and circumference. 'Begin,' here would not convey the whole meaning; the art of painting is to be 'set going.'

χρυσὸν, κ.τ.λ. governed by κτητέον.

αὐ v.s. note p. 124; and above in this chapter, εἰ δ' αὖ βούλεσθε.

οὐκέτι ἰκανή, ἀλλ' ἡ δη ὄγκου ἐμπληστέα καὶ πλήθους, ἃ οὐκέτι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἷον οἳ τε θηρευταὶ πάντες, οἳ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματά τε καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικὴν, ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψωδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι, σκευὼν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν C περὶ τὸν γυναικεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλειόνων δεησόμεθα. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ δεήσειν παιδαγωγῶν, τιθῶν, τροφῶν, κομμωτριῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὐτῶν ὀψοποιῶν τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβωτῶν προσδεησόμεθα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει οὐκ ἐνῆν· ἔδει γὰρ οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ τούτου προσδεήσει, δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βοσκημάτων παμπόλλων, εἴ τις αὐτὰ ἔδεται. ἡ γάρ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρῶν ἐν χρεῖαις ἐσόμεθα D

οἳ τε θηρευταὶ κ.τ.λ. We should be surprised, if we were not aware of Plato's hostility to poets, to find them thus unceremoniously thrust in among the rabble of the Larger City, as if they were no more than Horace's

Ambubaiarum collegia, phar-
macopola,

Mendicī, mimæ, balatrones,
hoc genus omne.

See pp. 121, 133, notes. We shall find below (Ch. XVII.) what is the moving cause of this hostility to poets in Plato's mind. For *σχήματα*, 'drawing,' v. s. note on *σκιαγραφ. ἀρετῆς*. Ch. VIII. In Book X. 601 A, it is explained that poets are nothing but 'word-painters,' and that *ῥαψωδοὶ* are nothing but copyists, poets are the same, and have no claim to originality or truth. Thus we can understand why Plato includes them

here among the vulgar herd. In the passage referred to we find these same words coupled together. Οὕτω δὴ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπιχρωματίζειν. And for Plato's opinion of painting see 603 A, ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πρόβρω μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται.

κόσμον, the general word for a lady's toilette, mundus muliebris, including many different articles. One of these we know to have been rouge, which Professor Newton tells us has been found in a grave at Athens; it being usual to bury with the dead articles of all kinds which they had used in their lifetime.

ἰατρῶν. Plato's hatred of doctoring is so strong that, as has been noticed in the Argu-

πολὸν μᾶλλον οὕτω διαιτώμενοι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρότερον ;
Πολύ γε.

CAP. XIV.

Καὶ ἡ χώρα που ἡ τότε ἱκανὴ τρέφειν τοὺς τότε
σμικρὰ δὴ ἐξ ἱκανῆς ἔσται ἢ πῶς λέγομεν ; Οὕτως,

ment, p. 55, note, he allows it to blind his logic, in replying to Glaucon's suggestion that the best doctor is he who has had the largest and most varied experience of disease. His suggestion in another place (Book III. 410 A) that, where a man is of a weakly constitution, he had better take his leave of life as soon as possible, has been already noticed. For his general treatment of the question in brief see Argument, p. 54 ; and Book IV. *fin.*, where he draws an elaborate comparison between illness and wickedness ; illness, as he describes it, being a *στάσις* in the body. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναί κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου. And again Book VIII. 556 E. σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρὰς ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δέεται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ... Generally, Plato thought illness almost culpable, because he considered that most diseases arose from indulgence : in which opinion he was not far wrong. Hence his expression above here, *φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις* ; and in Book VIII. *loc. cit.* he shows what an advantage the poor, sunburnt, yet wiry (*ισχνός*) citizen,

possesses in any contest over one who is rich but incapable, through having too much flesh and too little wind.

CH. XIV.—*We shall then want to take our neighbour's land, i.e. we shall go to war ; and the warriors must be carefully trained from their youth up.*

Aristotle agrees with Plato that war is, in its nature, a form of acquisition, drawing this fact from man's universal pursuit of wild, and acquisition of tame animals. See Pol. i. 3. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἔσται, et præcedd. But he considers that the immediate cause of war is the refusal of men who are φύσει δούλοι, to submit. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον Sir Thomas More does not follow Plato upon this point, but assigns as the chief cause of war the wantonness and pugnacity of princes. Thus, 'The most part of all princes have more delyte in warlike matters and feates of chivalrie than in the good feates of peace, and employe muche more study, how by right or by wrong to enlarge their dominions, than howe wel and peace-

ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ὑπομνητέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκανὴν ἔξαι νέμειν τε καὶ ἀροῦν, καὶ ἐκείνοις αὐτῆς ἡμετέρας, ἐὰν καὶ ἐκείνοι ἀφώσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρον, ὑπερβάντες τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὄρον; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκратες. Πολεμήσομεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὦ Γλαύκων; ἢ ἢ πῶς ἔσται; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Καὶ μηδὲν γέ πω λέγωμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτ' εἴ τι κακὸν μήτ' εἴ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόλεμος ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι πολέμου αὐτὸ γένηται εὐρήκαμεν, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ κακὰ γίνονται, ὅταν γίνηται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἔτι δὲ, ὦ φίλε, μείζονος τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὔτι σμικρῶ, ἀλλ' ὄλω στρατοπέδω, 374 ὃ ἐξελθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί; Οὐκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

able to rule and gouverne that they have alreddie.

τῆς τῶν πλ. χώρας, with this genitive compare ἐπιπίνοντες τοῦ οἴνου, Ch. XII. *fin.*

εἰ μέλλομεν ἱκ. ἔξαι, 'if we are to have enough'; see Book I. Ch. XVIII. note.

ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτ. ἄπειρον. Aristotle shows in Pol. 1, 3, that there are two kinds of wealth, ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, which is not the possession of so much money, but abundance of those things necessary to a comfortable life: this he brings under the province of οἰκονομική; the other is ἡ χρηματιστική with which is closely allied καπηλική, money-making by trade. He then goes on to show that in οἰκονομική there is a πέρασ τέλους, or 'limitation of wealth, in its object'; whilst in χρηματιστική there is no πέρασ, the object of

money-making being to go on continually amassing more. Οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρασ· τέλος δὲ, ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρηματιστικῆς, ἔστι πέρασ. And therefore, he adds, those fall into error who think that amassing money is the part of οἰκονομική, — ἀξαι τὴν τοῦ νομίματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον, agreeing with Plato in this, viz. that where there is unlimited covetousness (εἰς ἄπειρον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσης, as here ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσιν ἄπειρον) it is the result of an abnormal state of a community, not of πλοῦτος κατὰ φύσιν.

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί; The necessity for a standing army is here shown, on the continually recurring principle of specialization. 'What we do, we must

S

καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὠμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἦνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν· ὠμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ἓνα πολλὰς καλῶς ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἢ
Β περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνικὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ἦ οὖν τι σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν μὲν σκυτοτόμον διεκωλύομεν μήτε γεωργὸν ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἅμα μήτε ὑφάντην μήτε οἰκοδύμον, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἔργον καλῶς γίγνοιτο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς δὲ πεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολῆν
Γ ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος οὐ παριεῖς τοὺς

do well. We cannot do our business well, unless we attend to it and to it alone: therefore each man must choose one profession and no more.' *V.s. Ch. XI.*

τεχνικῆ, 'an art in itself,' 'a special art'; for which word see *Ar. Pol. I. 1.* πόλιν ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων (sc. ἐξ ὧν ξυγκείται) μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ρηθέντων. i.e. 'any characteristic,' or 'special distinction.' *V. infr. Ch. XV. inii.* where the defence of the city, in regard of its great importance, is said to require the greatest elaboration and study (τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον).

τὸν μὲν σκυτ. διεκ. μήτε γεωργ. ἐπιχ. εἶναι. Upon this principle Socrates refuses in *Ch. XVIII.* to prescribe what the poetry of the State is to be, for he says, we are not poets but founders of a city: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὃ Ἄδειμαντε, οὐκ ἐσμὲν

ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλὰ οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. On the same principle actors in tragedy do not succeed in comedy; see *Book III. 395 B'*: ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμφοδοῖς τε καὶ τραγωδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί. Where Socrates adds that man's nature is so atomic, that it is impossible for him not only to do many things, but even to imitate many things, with success: καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὃ Ἄδειμαντε, φαίνεται μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακερματίσθαι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μμημάτ' ἐστὶν ἀφομοιώματα. Cf. the Latin proverb, 'Ne sutor ultra crepidam.'

καὶ τῶν ἄλλ. ἐνὶ ἐκ. See *Ch. XI.*: Ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ βῆον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολῆν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη.

αὐτὸ. This demonstrative thrown in to help a long relational construction, has al-

καιρούς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι· τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ποτερον οὐ περὶ πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθέντα ; ἢ οὕτω ῥάδιον, ὥστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ἅμα πολεμικὸς ἔσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἠντινοῦν ἐργαζόμενος, πεττευτικὸς δὲ ἢ κυβευτικὸς ἰκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύων, ἀλλὰ παρέργω χρώμενος ; καὶ ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν πολεμικῶν ὅπλων τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὀπλιτικῆς ἢ τινος ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανὸς ἔσται ἀγωνιστής, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργὸν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθὲν ποιήσει, οὐδ' ἔσται χρήσιμον τῷ μῆτε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μῆτε τὴν μελέτην ἰκανὴν παρασχομένῳ ; Πολλοὺ γὰρ ἂν, ἡδ' ὅς, τὰ ὄργανα ἦν ἄξια.

ready been noticed in Ch. I.: οἷον τὸ χαίρειν καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὄσαι ἀβλαβεῖς κἂν μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνηται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα.

ἔμελλε καλ. ἀπ. For this sense, expressing an indispensable condition, see above note Ch. XVIII. 'Which he cannot bring to perfection unless he concentrate himself thereupon,' or 'Which he will bring to perfection only if he give all his attention thereto.'

τὰ δὲ δὴ. δὴ recalls the hearer to the point on which this recapitulation bears; 'To come to the point, then, &c.'

ἔσται...ἂν γένοιτο. The former case, that a mechanic could at once become a soldier, is cast into the mood of facts, so that it may stand, in all its glaring absurdity, contrasted with the potentially stated

yet truer assertion, that for a man to become even a good chess-player the study of years is requisite. For πεττευτικὸς, v.s. p. 130 note.

παρέργω χρωμ., sc. τούτῳ ; παρ. being predicate. So παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ ; Book VII. 540 A. Philosophy, Socrates shows, is treated as a πάρεργον by most men ; Book VI. 498 A : πάρεργον οἴομενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν. In Book VII. the word bears a slightly different sense, 'the details, or minor aspects, of a study' ; 527 C : καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ (γεωμετρίας) οὐ σμικρά. For the predicative sense see also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 56 : ἔφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα, καὶ τούτοις μαρτυροῖς χρώμενον, κ.τ.λ.

CAP. XV.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μέγιστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἔργον, τοσοῦτ' ἰσχυροῦς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἀνείη καὶ αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιτηδεύμα; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἡμέτερον δὲ ἔργον ἀνείη, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴπερ οἰοῖται ἔσμεν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποῖαι φύσεις ἐπιτηδεύει εἰς πολέως φυλακὴν. Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἄρα φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ἡράμεθα ὁμῶς δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέον, ὅσον γ' ἀνδύναμις
 375 παρείκη. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οἶε οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενούς; Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; Οἶον ὀξύν τέ που δεῖ αὐτοῖν ἑκάτερον εἶναι πρὸς αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐλαφρὸν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθανόμενον διωκᾶσθαι, καὶ ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῶν, εἰ δὲ ἐλόντα διαμάχεσθαι. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, πάντων τούτων. Καὶ μὴν ἀνδρείου γε, εἴπερ

CH. XV.—*The defenders of our state must unite in themselves the two traits of courage and gentleness, lest they turn and illtreat those whom they defend.*

τέχνης, 'special work,' v. s. Ch. XIV. note on τεχνική.

ἡμέτερον δὲ ἔργον... ἐκλέξασθαι. Arist. Nub. 1594—
 ὅσον ἔργον, ὃ δὲ, ἰέναι πολλὴν φλόγα.

ἡμέτερον μέντοι, v. s. not. pp. 111, 124. A salient instance of μέντοι without adversative import.

φαῦλον, v. s. Ch. X.: τὸ ζήτημα ἔπιχειροῦμεν οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ ὀξὺν βλέποντος.

ἀποδειλ., v. s. Ch. XII.: οὐκ ἀποκνητέον.

παρείκη, 'allow'; not 'fail' or 'submit,' as εἰκω uncom-pounded.

σκύλακος, v. s. p. 140, note. εἰς φ. i. e. πρὸς τὸ φυλάσσειν.

νεαν. εὐγ., i. e. τῆς φύσεως νεαν. εὐγ.

τὸ ποῖον λέγεις; as in Thrasy-machus' reply, Book I. Ch. XV.: πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς; the sense is, 'in what respect do you mean?' 'what is the bearing of your question?' And again, πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, Ch. XIX. Book I. *in illo.*

καὶ μὴν, v. s. p. 112, note.

εὐ μαχεῖται. Πῶς δ' οὐ ; Ἄνδρείος δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ἐβελήσει ὁ μὴ θυμοειδῆς εἶτε ἵππος εἶτε κύων ἢ Β ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ζῶον ; ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας, ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὐ παρόντος ψυχῇ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἀφοβός τέ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀήττητος ; Ἐννενόηκα. Γὰρ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦ σώματος οἶον δεῖ τὸν φύλακα εἶναι, δῆλα. Ναί. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι γε θυμοειδῆ. Καὶ τοῦτο. Πῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὐκ ἄγριοι ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ὄντες τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις ; Μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ ραδίως. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκέλους πρᾶγος αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς C πολεμίους χαλεπούς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμενοῦσιν ἄλλους σφᾶς διολέσαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ φθῆσονται αὐτὸ

ἐβελήσει, v. *infra*. Book IV. 440 C ; also in a psychological discussion : οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός ; and Book VI. 504 B : Εὐμαθεῖς ... οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἄμα φέσθαι καὶ ρεανικοί. The certainty of a physical effect following upon its cause is emphasized by the use of the word, which properly belongs only to the mental sphere.

ἢ οὐκ, nonne. For the nature of θυμός v. Book IV. *loc. cit.* In the triple division there made of the human mind into λογιστικὸν, θυμοειδῆς, and ἐπιθυμητικὸν, the second kind is said to range itself most frequently upon the side of the first, and to unite with it, in case of a στάσις, or disagreement between reason and desire ; and, again, it refuses to be aroused, in cases where it would be unworthy and unreasonable. τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ.

τὰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ. v. *z.* τοιοῦτοι τὰς φύσεις.

πῶς οὐκ ἄγριοι, v. *z.* Book III. 410 E, where a just admixture of music and gymnastic in education is said to produce this harmony of courage and gentleness ; the defenders being neither allowed to sink into effeminacy (μαλακία) by a preponderance of intellectual study, nor into roughness and crudity by applying themselves wholly to gymnastic. Δεῖν δὲ γέ φαμεν τοὺς φύλακας ἀμφοτέρα ἔχειν τούτῳ τῷ φύσει... Οὐκοῦν ἡρόδοτος... καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἡρμωσμένου σώφρων ἵτι καὶ ἀνδρεία ἢ ψυχῆ... τοῦ δὲ ἀναρμόστου δειλῆ καὶ ἄγροικος ; and see Argument p. 55. In the reply it is to be noticed that οὐ ραδίως refers to the efforts of the οἰκιστής, not to the φύλακες.

σφᾶς pro αὐτοῦς. Jelf notices the use, Gr. Gr. 654 i. *δ.* Thuc. I, 126 : ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι ὅπως σφίσι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη. The prevailing sense of the plural is reflexive ; and

δράσαντες. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη. Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιήσομεν; πόθεν ἅμα πρᾶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὐρήσομεν; ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδεῖ πραεῖα φύσις. Φαίνεται. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι τούτων ὁποτέρου ἂν στέρηται, φύλαξ ἀγαθὸς οὐ μὴ γενηται· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξυμβαίνει ἀγαθὸν **D** φύλακα ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, Δικαίως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἀπορούμεν· ἡς γὰρ προυθέμεθα εἰκόνας ἀπελείφθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνόησαμεν, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄρα φύσεις, οἷας ἡμεῖς οὐκ ᾤήθημεν, ἔχουσai τὰναντία ταῦτα. Πού δή; Ἴδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζώοις, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν **E** ἤκιστα ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς παρεβάλλομεν τῷ φύλακι. οἶσθα γάρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶόν τε πραοτάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον. Οἶδα μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατόν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητούμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

in the present passage we may consider that the defenders are, as it were, identified with those whom by their conduct they might ruin, p. 261.

ἐναντία γάρ που θυμοειδ. See what is said of Socrates' opinions regarding the *θύμος* in Book III. note *ἢ οὐκ*, p. 261.

δικαίως γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀπ. See Book IV. 432 C, where the search for justice is brought to a crisis, as here the search

for the good defender: Ἦ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βλακικόν γε ἡμῶν τὸ πάθος.

εἰκόνας ἀπελ., 'we have stopped short in the illustration we employed,' 'we have not fully carried out our illustration.' Privative genitive.

ἔρα, 'as it seems,' 'as it turns out'; see note p. 108, and above here, Ch. V.

ἐν ᾧ, ἐν τούτῳ δ.

CAP. XVI.

Ἄρ' οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι τοῦδε προσδεῖσθαι ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν; Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. 376 Καὶ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς κυσὶ κατόψει, ὃ καὶ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι τοῦ θηρίου. Τὸ ποῖον; Ὅν μὲν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνώτα, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδὲν δὲ κακὸν προπεπονθῶς· ὃν δ' ἂν γνώριμον, ἀσπάζεται, κἂν μηδὲν πώποτε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθη. ἢ οὐπω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, μέχρι τούτου προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν· ὅτι δέ που δρᾷ ταῦτα, δῆλον. Ἄλλὰ μὴν κομψὸν γε φαίνεται τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς φύσεως καὶ

CH. XVI.—*This discrimination is philosophic: so that in addition to being spirited, swift, and courageous, our ideal defender must be also of a philosophic nature.*

ὁ φυλακ. ἐσόμενος. ἐσ. here is equal to ὁ μέλλων ἔσεσθαι.

δ...τοῦ θηρίου. v.s. note p. 113 and *supra*, here Ch. IX.

κομψόν, like ἀστεῖος, 'fine' or 'splendid,' and very often, like ἀστεῖος, used sarcastically, or in a passage through which runs a vein of humour, as in the present case. For the first use see Book VI. 505 B. τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψότεροις φρόνησις, i.e. 'finer natures.' And in Book VII. the study of number as directed to the acquisition of pure knowledge is contrasted with its use in trade (καπηλεύειν) as κομψόν, 525 D. καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ βηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῆ χρησιμὸν ἡμῖν πρὸς

ὁ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἐνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν. Whilst in the humorous description of the democracy (Book VIII. 558 A), in which even the draught animals are so replete with freedom that they push people out of their way in the streets (563), and condemned criminals are suffered to walk about in public unmolested, the demeanour of the latter is termed κομψή. Τί δὲ, ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή, 'exquisite' (D. and V.), 'charming' (J.). The word means 'lautus,' or 'compustus,' 'neat,' 'smart,' and suggests the further notion 'with an eye to effect.' From this further notion it results that the word specially suits a sarcastic context; because to challenge admiration is also to challenge criticism. Compare note on *πότ' ἐν ποιήσει*; and for ἀστεῖος, Book I. Ch. XX. Here the word gives a humorous, not a sarcastic tone to the passage.

Βὼς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον. Πῆ δὴ; Ἦι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄψιν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει, ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι· καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἂν φιλομαθὲς εἴη, συνέσει τε καὶ ἀγνοία ὀριζόμενον τό τε οἰκείον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅπως οὐ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, τό γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦτόν; Ταῦτόν γάρ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν θαρροῦντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶως τις **Ἐ**σσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτόν δεῖν εἶναι; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδῆς

φιλόσοφον. For the first two requisites of the philosophic nature are said, in Book VI, to be memory (*μνήμων*) and aptitude for gaining knowledge (*εὐμαθής*). It is thus termed because there is discrimination (*διακρίνει*) and limitation (*ὀριζόμενον*), which are characteristic of a mind that gains knowledge, and partakes in an elementary degree of the nature of the philosopher, *οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι*. Book VI. *ἰπί.* For another definition of the philosophic mind see Book V. 475 C. *Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητὴν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσης; εἰ ἴψῃ.* φιλομαθῆ καὶ φιλόσοφον, as synonymous.

φιλόσοφος δὴ. It should be noticed that this conclusion has been reached on analogical grounds, as usual: by an appeal to experience of common objects and common events Socrates encourages the listener to agree to his larger propositions. See the remarks upon his method, *Introd.* p. 30. In Book VI, where the philosophic

nature is defined, as quoted above, it is also analysed, and like the φύλαξ here, the φιλόσοφος is characterised by several different traits; *εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπῆς εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ συγγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης*; 487 A. The difficulty of combining all kinds of bodily and mental excellences is again insisted upon in the same Book: *εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φέσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαίτητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ δξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῳσι καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται*. That is, the element of steadiness, which alone can ensure valuable results, is especially hard to find in brilliant natures. Hence the need of education: the mind must be as thoroughly disciplined as the body; *οὐκ ἦττον μαθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ*. And again (Book VII. 536 B) *Δριμύτητα δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν*.

καὶ ταχὺς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἔσται ὁ μέλ-
λων καλὸς κάγαθὸς ἔσεσθαι φύλαξ πόλεως ; Παντά-
πασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἂν οὕτως ὑπάρχοι
θρέφονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα
τρόπον ; καὶ ἄρά τι προὔργου ἡμῖν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκο- **D**
πούσι πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὐπερ ἔνεκα πάντα σκοποῦ-
μεν, δικαιοσύνην τε καὶ ἀδικίαν τίνα τρόπον ἐν πόλει
γίνγεται ; ἵνα μὴ ἐὼ μὲν ἰκανὸν λόγον ἢ συχρὸν
διεξίωμεν. καὶ ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφὸς Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε προσδοκῶ προὔργου εἶναι εἰς
τοῦτο ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ
φίλε Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ ἄρα ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακρο-
τέρα τυγχάνει οὔσα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ
ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολῆν ἄγοντες λόγῳ
παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας. Ἄλλὰ χρῆ. **E**

ἡμῖν, Ethic dative, *v.s.* note
p 165.

οὐκ ἄρα ἀφ. οὐδ' εἰ μακρ. For
the sentiment *v.s.* οὐκ ἀποκη-
τέον, Ch. XII. and the passages
compared.

μακροτέρα, 'rather long.'
For this absolute comparative,
very frequent both in Greek
and Latin, see Euthyphr. *inil.*
τί νεώτερον ; Hom. Od. 3,
4—

ἀλλὰ νεώτερός ἐστιν, δημηλική
δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ.
Et infr. 362—

Ὅλος γὰρ μετὰ τοῖσι γεραίτερος
εὐχομαι εἶναι.

Cic. Lælius 16, 59. Sæpe enim
in quibusdam aut animus ab-
jectior est, aut spes amplificandæ
fortune fractior. *Et infr.* 60.
Quis etiam si minus felices in

deligendo fuisse, ferendum
id potius. *Id.* Cato Major,
inil. Et tamen te suspicor
iisdem rebus, quibus meipsum,
interdum gravius commoveri.
See also Virg. *Æn.* 1. 228—

Tristior et lacrimis oculos
suffusa nitentes
Alloquitur Venus.

παιδεύωμεν τοὺς ἄνδρας, *i.g.*
'let us represent them as re-
ceiving their education.' For
this mode of expression, where
a narrator is referred as subject
to an action not properly his
own, but which he is describing,
see above Ch. VI. p. 224, note
on ἄγοντες, and κατορύπτουσιν
ἐν Ἄιδου, p. 223.

ἀλλὰ χρῆ. For ἀλλὰ in as-
sentient replies *v.s.* p. 107.
ἀλλὰ περιμενοῦμεν.

CAP. XVII.

Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία ; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς
ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης ; ἔστι δέ που ἡ

CH. XVII.—*Education is divided into music and gymnastic ; and narration is a part of music, and in narration we must begin with fiction, avoiding however those legends that attribute immorality to the gods.*

We here enter upon the first system of education, viz. that destined to train up a class of efficient soldiers whose military ardour is tempered with patriotic tenderness. The education comprises two branches, music, *i.e.* intellectual labour, and gymnastic, exercise of the body. In another place Socrates explains that it is necessary to employ these two exercises, because if a man give all his time to his body, he becomes *ἄμουσος*, vulgar, or incapable of appreciating things intellectual, whilst if he confine himself to mental work he becomes softer than is fit and unnerved in the presence of danger. The account of this first education continues from the present chapter to the end of Book III., after which the question is discussed, how the guardians will manage the city, and justice is discovered. But then the *ἀπορία* arises, Until kings are philosophers and philosophers kings, the city will never be governed aright ; and this results in the question, What is a philosopher ? To answer this question a second, esoteric, system of education is required,

much more elaborate, and much more searching than that before us, treating of all the sciences as they bear upon each other and upon their source, Real Knowledge, which is to human knowledge as the sun's light to the human eye.

Aristotle recognises the necessity for education, in order to curb individual peculiarities, and to make the welfare of the state an object of serious interest ; and thus he agrees with Plato in the principle that the general object of education is to steady the mind. *V.s.* note on φιλόσοφος δὴ, p. 264, and the words quoted μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν. Aristotle's words are, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει, πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίους. Again in the Ethics 10, 9, Aristotle speaks of the necessity, not merely of education in letters for children when growing up, but also of a training in morals as soon as they are capable of understanding, a training which corresponds to the inculcation of principle through *μῦθοι* which Plato here advocates for the very young. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προὔπάρχειν πῶς οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχροῦν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις

μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.
Ἔστι γάρ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μουσικῆ πρότερον ἀρξόμεθα
παιδεύοντες ἢ γυμναστικῆ; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Μουσικῆς
δ' εἰπὼν τίθης λόγους, ἡ οὐ; Ἔγωγε. Λόγων δὲ
διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον; **Ναί.** 377
Παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς
ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μαν-
θάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους
λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἐν
δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία
ἢ γυμνασίους χρώμεθα. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τοῦτο δὲ
ἔλεγον, ὅτι μουσικῆς πρότερον ἀπτεόν ἢ γυμναστικῆς.
Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου **B**
μέγιστον, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέφ καὶ ἀπαλλῶ ὄφουον;
μάλιστα γάρ δὴ τότε πλάττεται καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος,
ὃν ἂν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἐκάστω, Κομιδῆ

τραφέντα νόμοις... Διὸ νόμοις δεῖ
τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν (i.e. their
nurture) καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα·
οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη
γενόμενα. Οὐκ ἰκανὸν δ' ἴσως
νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας
τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ
ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ
καὶ ἐθίξασθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
δεοίμεθα ἂν νόμων, καὶ ἕως δὴ
περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. And again,
a direct reference to this passage,
Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων,
ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν
καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ
παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Eth. 2, 3, 2.

Μουσικῆς δ' εἰπὼν... and
when you speak (of music) you
include narration under music!'
Stallb. reads εἶπον from Ast's
emendation.

ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰπεῖν, v. i. ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ. ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν.
Euthydemus 279 E.

οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχή. See

Aristotle Eth. i. vii. 23, where
the necessity for strict definition
follows upon this principle: σπου-
δαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς·
μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι βροπήν πρὸς
τὰ ἐπόμυνα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ
ἡμισυ πάντος εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή. Cf.
Hesiod's proverb, Opp. et Di. 40,
νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ἴσφ πλέον
ἡμισυ παντός.

ἐνσημήνασθαι, to stamp, to
impress; cf. the words παρά-
σημος, ἐπίσημος. For the meta-
phor, cf. Theat. 191 C, Θεὸς δὲ
μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς
ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κηρινὸν ἐκμαγαῖον. Cf.
also the word πλάττειν below
here. And Aristotle speaks
again of the importance of train-
ing from the earliest age in
Eth. 2, 1, 8, οὐ μικρὸν οὖν
διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς
ἐκ νέων ἐθίξασθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ,
μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν, see preceding
note.

μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ῥαδίως οὕτω παρήσομεν τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων μύθους πλασθέντας ἀκούειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐναντίας δόξας ἐκείναις, ἄς, ἐπειδὴν τελεωθῶσιν, ἔχειν οἰησόμεθα δεῖν αὐτούς; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν παρήσομεν. Πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν **Κ** καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀποκριτέον τοὺς δ' ἐγκριθέντας πείσομεν τὰς τροφούς τε καὶ μητέρας λέγειν τοῖς παισὶ καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέον. Ποίους δὴ; ἔφη. Ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτόν δύνασθαι τοὺς τε μείζους καὶ **Δ** τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἦ οὐκ οἶει; Ἐγώ, ἔφη ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐννοῶ οὐδὲ τοὺς μείζους τίνας λέγεις. Οὗς Ἡσιόδος τε, εἶπον, καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

τοὺς ἐπιτυχόντας, *v.s.* Book I. Ch. XXIII. οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, and note. On the question of this inconsistency between mythology and religion, see Sir G. W. Cox, *Aryan Mythology*, Vol. i. Ch. vi. Book i.

ὃν μὲν ἂν, *sc.* μῦθον.

ἐν τοῖς μείζουσιν, *i.e.* 'if we settle the claims of the larger tales and compositions we shall thereby settle also the less.'

ταῦτόν δύνασθαι, 'have the same import.' See Euthydemus, 286 C, τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. Also see Dem. de Cor. 10 (ed. Arnold), τί δὲ τοῦτ' ἡδύνατο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἐγὼ διδάξω. And in Aristoph. *Clouds* 674, the Socrates of the play explaining that κάρδοπος is, by virtue of

its termination, as much masculine as Κλεώνυμος, uses the same expression: ταῦτόν δύναιται σοι κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμω.

Ἡσιόδος τε καὶ Ὅμηρος, *v.s.* pp. 133, 121, see also Book X. *ipit.* 607; where the case for and against Homer is thus summed up: Συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν, εἶδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πῖλιν, and compare Xenophanes' words ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. i. 289, ix. 193—

Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσιόδος τε
ἔσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειδος
καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν.

* * *

ποιηταί. οὗτοι γὰρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσιν. Ποίους δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις ; "Ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδῃται. Τί τοῦτο ; 13
 "Ὅταν εἰκάξῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἰοί εἶσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὁμοία βουληθῇ γράψαι. Καὶ γάρ,

ὡς πλείστ' ἐφθέγγαντο θεῶν
 ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
 κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ
 ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

For the connection between the Eleatic Xenophanes and Plato's philosophy, see *infra*. Ch. XX. Xenophanes acutely presents the necessity, and, at the same time, the absurdity of anthropomorphism in religion thus—

'Ἄλλ' εἶποι χεῖρας γ' εἶχον
 βόες ἢ ἑ λένοντες
 ἢ γράψαι χεῖρεσσι καὶ ἔργα
 τελεῖν ἄπερ ἄνδρες
 καὶ κε θεῶν ιδέας ἔγραφον καὶ
 σώματ' ἐποίουν
 τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὶ τοὶ δέμους
 εἶχον ὁμοῖον,
 Ἴπποι μὲν θ' Ἴπποισι, βόες δὲ τε
 βουσίην ὁμοῖα

τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις. The objection to Homer and to poets in general, as it has been noticed above, is that they are imitators thrice removed from realities, that, instead of studying arts, they write about arts of which they practically know nothing, and that therefore what they have to say upon them is worth nothing. See Book X. 598 E, extr. δεῖ δὴ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον μιμηταῖς τούτοις οὗτοι ἐντυχόντες ἐξαπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ

εἰδότε τὴν ἀλήθειαν. φαντάσματα γὰρ ἄλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν.

μὴ καλῶς ψεύδῃται, 'if any one of them write debased fiction.' Ψεῦδος, fiction, is of the highest value as a moral instrument. Aristotle considers poetry to be more philosophic than history, because it deals in fiction (οἷα ἂν γένοιτο) in contrast to fact (οἷα ἐγένετο). See Poet. IX. 1451b, quoted on p. 10. This καλὸν ψεῦδος is opposed to the ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος (*infra*. 382 A) or 'lie with intent to deceive,' or 'lie in the soul;' the object of the καλὸν ψεῦδος being not to deceive but to instruct. Hence it is described also as the 'lie in words' (τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημα), and contrasted with the 'lie in the soul' (τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι), 382 B. Compare also the Laws 663 E, where the legislator, it is suggested, may invent fictions, to point the moral for the young. Νομοθέτης δὲ οὐ τι καὶ μικρὸν ὕφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν ὁ τι τοῦτου ψεῦδος λυσιτελέστερον ἂν ἐψεύσατο ποτε; ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν, κ.τ.λ. This simile, introduced here merely as an illustration, is worked out at length in Book X.

ἔφη, ὀρθῶς ἔχει τά γε τοιαῦτα μέμφεσθαι. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα ; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψεύδος ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο, ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργάσατο ἄφησι δρᾶσαι αὐτὸν Ἡσίοδος, ὃ τε αὐτὸν Κρόνος ὡς
378 ἐτιμωρήσατο αὐτόν· τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱέος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ, ὥμην δεῖν ῥαδίως οὕτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ νέους, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν, δι' ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ὀλιγίστους, θυσα-

598 C, *aeqq.* in order to prove the poet an imitator of an imitator. The painter, it is there maintained, is a deceiver because he represents not the nature, but the appearance of objects, *οἶον ὁ ζωγράφος, φαμὲν, ζωγραφῆσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον, τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τούτων ἐπαίων τῶν τεχνῶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως παιδᾶς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἄν.* In that passage it is not false representation, as here, that is complained of; but representation, however accurate, of appearances, is disparaged: in the present passage, the painter is considered as drawing upon his imagination, not even upon appearances.

ὡς Οὐρανός τε εἰργ. Theogon. 154 and 179.

...τῶν μὲν (sc. παιδῶν)
 ὅπως τις πρῶτα γένοιτο,
 πάντας ἀποκρύπτεισκε, καὶ ἐς
 φῶς οὐκ ἀνέεικε
 Γαίης ἐν κευθμῶνι, κακῶ δ'
 ἐτέρπετο ἔργῳ
 Οὐρανός.

τὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ παθ. See Euthyphr. 5 E, τοῦτον (sc. Δία) ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπιεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ κακείνόν γε αὐ

τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, and similarly in Ar. Nub. 904—

πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὐσης ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ' αὐτοῦ

δῆσας ;

For the question of mythology see Introd. p. 24.

ἄφρονας καὶ νέους, as in the passage quoted from Book X. παιδᾶς τε καὶ ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους ἐξαπατῶ ἄν.

μάλιστα μὲν σιγᾶσθαι, εἰ δὲ... 'to keep silence if possible, and failing that, &c.' For this expression see Book V. 461 C, μάλιστα μὲν μὴδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κῆμα, μὴδ' γ' ἐν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δὲ τι βιάσθαι, οὕτω τίθεναι. 473 B, μάλιστα μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δυοῖν. Also Book VIII. 564 C, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγένησθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, κ.τ.λ. Demosthenes de Cor. 317, μάλιστα μὲν μὴ ἔχειν ταῦτ' ἐν τῇ φύσει, εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. Also in poetry, Soph. Antigone, 327—

'Ἄλλ' εὐρεθείη μὲν μάλιστ'· ἐὰν δέ τοι

ληφθῆ τε καὶ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

δι' ἀπορρήτων, cf. 460 C, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν.

μένους οὐ χοῖρον, ἀλλὰ τι μέγα καὶ ἄπορον θῦμα, ὅπως ὁ τι ἐλαχίστοις συνέβη ἀκούσαι. Καὶ γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐτοί γε οἱ λόγοι χαλεποί. Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἔφην, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα πόλει, οὐδὲ λεκτέον Β νέφ ἀκούοντι, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἂν θαυμαστὸν ποιοῖ, οὐδ' αὖ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῶν ἂν ὅπερ θεῶν οἱ πρῶτοί τε καὶ μέγιστοι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ ἐπιτηδεῖα εἶναι λέγειν. Οὐδέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ παράπαν, ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀληθῆ· εἴ γε δεῖ C ἡμῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας τὴν πόλιν φυλάξειν αἰσχιστον νομίζειν τὸ ῥαδίως ἀλλήλοις ἀπεχθάνεσθαι· πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέοι, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς

θυσασμένους οὐ χοῖρ. So in Book V. when the important and sacred marriage ceremonial takes place, sacrifices are made, οὐκοῦν δὴ ἑορταί τινες νομοθετηταί ἔσονται, ἐν αἷς ξυνάζομεν τὰς τε νυμφὰς καὶ τοὺς νυμφίους, καὶ θυσαί καὶ ὕμνοι ποιητέοι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ποιηταῖς πρέποντες τοῖς γιγνομένοις γάμοις.

συνέβη. Stephanus notes that we should expect συμβαίη; Stallb. however supports the indicative on the ground that the protasis was indicative, εἰ δὲ ἀνάγκη τις ἦν λέγειν.

ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων, see Arist. Nub where this very case is exhibited as a result of Socratic teaching. See ll. 1330, seqq.—

ΣΤ. τὸν πατέρα τύπτεις ;

ΦΕ. κάποφανῶ γε νῆ Δία ὡς ἐν δίκῃ σ' ἔτυπτον.

ΣΤ. ὦ μιαρῶτατε, καὶ πῶς γένοιτ' ἂν πατέρα τυπτειν ἐν δίκῃ : κ.τ.λ.

The comedy of the Clouds was first acted B.C. 423, and for the second time B.C. 421; hence it is probable, as stated in the Introd. p. 13, that this, among other passages in Plato's works, has direct reference to that comedy which traduces Socrates so cruelly.

ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολ. Plato here is probably thinking of the disputes of the gods over the Trojan war. See ll. i. 531-568; iv. 422, seqq. and especially v. 846, seqq. where Pallas with Diomed attacks Ares and drives him wounded to Olympus.

Λάξετο δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ἡνία Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

Αὐτίκ' ἐπ' Ἀρηϊ πρώτῳ ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους.

πολλοῦ δεῖ. Like οἷδ' ὅτι, δῆλον ὅτι, πῶς οἶε, πῶς δοκεῖς, and many others, this has passed into a merely adverbial expression.

θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν· ἀλλ' εἴ πως μέλλομεν πείσειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ ἀπήχθετο οὐδ' ἔστι **Δ** τοῦτο ὄσιον, τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδιά εὐθύς καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γρᾶσι καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις, καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγὺς τούτων ἀναγκαστέον λογοποιεῖν. Ἦρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός, μέλλοντας τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένην

ὡς οὐδεὶς πώποτε πολίτης ἕτερος ἐτ. It is with the intention of arriving at this result that Plato proposes and works out his theory in Book V. that, in the model state, the wives and children should be in common to all the citizens. For, according to his scheme, all the younger people will look upon each other as brothers and sisters, and upon all the elders as fathers and mothers, that thus there will be ever present the sense of relationship, to prevent quarrels and injuries, and that the whole state, like one body, will respond either in pain or in pleasure to everything that affects a single individual in it. See 462 D: Καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, ὅλον ὅταν πονῆ μῶν δάκτυλός του πληρῆ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἢ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν ξύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσθετό τε καὶ πᾶσα ἅμα ξυνήλγησε μέρος πονήσαντος ἕλλη, καὶ οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὁ ἑνῶπιος τὸν δάκτυλον ἀλγεῖ. And for the statement that this result will be arrived at by a community of wives and children, see 464 B: Τοῦ μεγίστου ἄρα ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡμῶν πέφανται ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικούροις τῶν τε παιδῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

γέρουσι, sc. μυθολογητέον, to be supplied from the preceding sentence. For the whole of this passage see Euthyphro 6 B: Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐχθράς γε θεῖνὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερά ἡμῖν καταπεποιικίται.

Ἦρας δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος, κ. τ. λ. In ll. i. 588, Hephæstus recalls to his mother how he was thrown out of heaven by Zeus, when striving to help her, ἀλεξέμεναι μεμῶτα. And for the actual binding of Hera by Zeus, see ll. xv. 18—

Ἦ οὐ μέμνη, ἕτε τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῖν

Ἄκμοναι ἦκα δύο, περὶ χερσὶ δὲ δεσμὸν ἔηλα

Χρῦσεον, ἔρρηκτον.

Ast ingeniously clears up the expression here, δεσμ. ὑπ. υἱέος· by pointing out that Hephæstus made the chains to confine Hera at Zeus' bidding, although willing himself to connive at her escape.

Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις. ll. i. 590—

Ἦδη γάρ με καὶ ἄλλοτ' ἀλεξέ-

μεναι μεμῶτα

ῥίψε, ποδὸς τεταγῶν, ἀπο βηλοῦ θεσπεσίω.

Compare Euthyphro 6 B.

ἀμύνειν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὄσας Ὅμηρος πεποιήκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἶος τε κρίνειν ὃ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ἂν τηλικούτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι. ὢν δὴ ἴσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον, ἂ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν, ὃ τι κάλλιστα μεμβολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.

ὑπονοίαις, 'allegory.' This appears from Plutarch 2, 19 E: ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις, ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις; Stallb. So Horace professes to regard the Homeric poems in Ep. i. 2—

Qui (Homerus) quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,

Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dixit...

Rursus quid virtus et quid sapientia possit

Utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen.

δυσέκνιπτά, cf. Hor. Od. 3, 5, 28—

Neque amissos colores

Lana refert medicata fuco:

Nec vera virtus, quum semel excidit,

Curat reponi deterioribus.

And a similar moral is expressed by a different metaphor in Ep. I, 2, 67—

Nunc adhibe puro

Pectore verba puer; nunc te melioribus offer.

Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem

Testa diu.

i.e. the young, as Plato demands here, must be subject to good influence from their first years.

In Book IV. 429 D this metaphor, as we have seen in other cases, is expanded and detailed. The legislator, it is there said, must imbue the defenders of the state with courage, as with a dye that cannot be washed out. Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ βαφεῖς, ἐπειδὴν βουληθῶσι βάψαι ἔρια ὥστ' εἶναι ἀλουργά, πρῶτον μὲν... λευκῶν, ἔπειτα προσπαρασκευάζουσιν οὐκ ὀλίγη παρασκευῆ θεραπεύσαντες, ὅπως δέξεται ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ ἔνθος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ βάπτουσι. Καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ταύτῃ τῷ τρόπῳ βαφῆ, δευσοποιὸν γίγνεται τὸ βαφὲν, καὶ ἡ πλύσις οὐτ' ἄνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ῥυμμάτων δίνεται αὐτῶν τὸ ἔνθος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἂ δ' ἂν μὴ, οἶσθα οἷα δὴ γίγνεται, ἐάν τέ τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτῃ ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπέυσας. Οἶδα, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκπλυτα καὶ γελοῖα. Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύνάμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῆ καὶ γυμναστικῆ. Μηδὲν οἴου ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νέμους πεισθέντες δέξιντο ὥσπερ βαφὴν, ἵνα δευσοποιῶς αὐτῶν ἢ δόξα γίγνοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

T

CAP. XVIII.

Ἐχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. ἀλλ' εἴ τις αὐ καὶ ταῦτα ἐρωτῶν ἡμᾶς, ταῦτα ἄττα ἐστὶ καὶ τίνες οἱ μῦθοι, τίνες ἂν φαίμεν; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, οὐκ
 379 ἐσμὲν ποιηταὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι, ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' οὓς ἂν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτόν, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητέον μύθους. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν; Τοιοῖδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὦν, αἰὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάν τέ τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσι ποιῇ ἐάν τε ἐν τραγωδίᾳ. Δεῖ γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὁ γε
 B θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτως; Τί μὴν; Ἄλλὰ

CH. XVIII.—*We are not poets ourselves, but legislators; we proceed therefore only to lay down the lines upon which the poets must compose.*

Plato's attitude towards poets in this Book is merely critical; he gives his opinion as to what they should say and what they should not say; and he disparages their general tone. But he reserves for Book X. his complete and most exhaustive indictment against them. He treats them here only as they stand in relation to theology, and as regards the effect of their writings upon the children in the State; *v. s.* note p. 121.

τύπους, cf. Book III. 403 D: καλὰ ἦθη ψυχῇ ἐνοντα καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶδει ὁμολογοῦντα ἐκείνοις, τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου. And again in Book VI. 491 D it is

used as equivalent to τὸ καθ' ἑλίου, the general, as opposed to individual instances: ἔ εἰς γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὦν λέγω... Λαβοῦ τοίνυν ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ. And similarly to this present use in Book III. 414 A: ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας.

οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας. For this question see *Introd.* pp. 13-15, 24-29. It has been already shown in Book I. Ch. IX. that good men do no harm (βλάπτειν) to any person, (see note p. 137, ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη): Οὐκ ἄρα τοῦ δικαίου βλάπτειν ἔργον οὔτε φίλον οὔτ' ἕλλον οὐδένα. And hence it would follow *à fortiori* that God does not harm anyone. But Socrates reviews rapidly the steps of the argument which proved in Book I. that it was unnatural for anything good to do anything bad.

μὴν οὐδέν γε τῶν ἀγαθῶν βλαβερόν. *Ἄμην* Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ μὴ βλαβερόν, βλάπτει; Οὐδαμῶς. Ὁ δὲ μὴ βλάπτει, κακὸν τι ποιεῖ; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Ὁ δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ' ἂν τινος εἴη κακοῦ αἷτιον; Πῶς γάρ; Τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; Ναί. Αἷτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας; Ναί. Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἷτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὐχόντων αἷτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. Παντελῶς γ', ἔφη. Οὐδ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἷτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἷτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἷτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἷτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Οὐκ

Αἷτιον ἄρα εὐπραγίας. See Hom. Od. xv. 532—

Ὅθι τοι ἄνευ θεοῦ ἔπτατο δέξιός ὕρnis.

τῶν μὲν εὐ ἔχ. Xenophon, in the Memorabilia I, 3, 2, bears witness to this belief of Socrates: Καὶ εὐχετο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀπλῶς τὰγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστ' εἰδέναί ὅποια ἀγαθὰ ἐστί. For his belief in God's direct care of man, see Mem I, 4, 10, seqq.

πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ. Perhaps the most pessimistic statement that can be found in the Republic. We find a trace of the same feeling in Book IV. 442 A, where the lowest part of man's nature is said to be the most extensive and exacting: τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, ὃ δὴ πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἐκάστω ἐστί καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον. And see Book VI. 491 A and 495 B, where he complains of the scarcity of

natures susceptible of higher training. But these are isolated passages; through the whole of the Republic there breathes a hopeful spirit, if not of consummation, at any rate of amelioration; see Introd. p. 18 seqq., on the question whether Plato thought such a state could be realized, and his favourable opinion of the common mass of mankind, in Book VI. 499 E: Ὁ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγορεῖ, ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσι, κ.τ.λ. See also Ch. IX. note on ὄραν ἀκούειν.

τῶν δὲ κακῶν...οὐ τὸν θεόν, Hesiod gives utterance to the opposite opinion in Ἔργ. 47—

ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε, χολωσάμενος φρεσὶν ἦσιν,
ὅττι μιν ἐξάπατησε Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης.

τοῦνεκ' ἄρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρά.

For ἀλλ' οὐ, v. s. p. 173.

ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀποδεκτέον οὔτε Ὀμήρου οὔτ' ἄλλου
D ποιητοῦ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
 ἀνοήτως ἀμαρτάνοντος καὶ λέγοντος, ὡς δοιοὶ
 πίθοι

κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
 κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν
 καὶ ᾧ μὲν ἂν μίξας ὁ Ζεὺς δῶ ἀμφοτέρων,

ἄλλοτε μὲν τε κακῶ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ'
 ἐσθλῶ,

ᾧ δ' ἂν μή, ἀλλ' ἄκρατα τὰ ἕτερα,

τὸν δὲ κακῆ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα διὰν ἐλαύνει·

E οὐδ' ὡς ταμίας ἡμῖν Ζεὺς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε
 τέτυκται.

CAP. XIX.

Τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκων καὶ σπονδῶν σύγχυσις, ἦν
 ὁ Πάνδαρος συνέχεεν, εἴαν τις φῆ δι' Ἀθηνᾶς τε
 καὶ Διὸς γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα· οὐδὲ θεῶν
 ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν διὰ Θέμιτός τε καὶ Διός·

ἀποδεκτέον Ὀμήρου, supr. pp.
 144, 156.

κατακείαται, seqq. II. xxiv.
 527. In Book X. (see Argument)
 a choice is allowed to the
 souls who are going to enter
 into life, and their career does
 not depend upon the will of
 Fate. But, as remarked above,
 the story of Er is only popular.
 ἀμφοτέρων, partitive genitive,
 v. s. p. 249.

τὸν δὲ. II. loc. cit.
 οὐδ' ὡς, κ. τ. λ. these words
 depend upon λέγοντες.

CH. XIX.—And we will refuse
 to hold God as the author of
 trouble and misfortune. Neither
 does God change.

τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄρκ. II. iv. 55.
 seqq.

Πάνδαρον ἀντίθεον διζημένη, εἴ
 που ἐφεύροι.

διὰ Θέμ. τε καὶ Διός, II. xx. 4,
 l. 88—

Ζεὺς δὲ Θέμιστα κέλευσε θεοὺς
 ἀγορήνδε καλέσσαι.

Pars illa Iliados vocatur a
 veteribus θεῶν μάχη. Pro Græcis

οὐδ' αὖ, ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγει, ἐατέον ἀκούειν τοὺς 380
νέους, ὅτι

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλη.

ἀλλ' ἐάν τις ποιῇ, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα τὰ ἰαμβεῖα ἔνεστι,
τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη ἢ τὰ Πελοπιδῶν ἢ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ
ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ
λέγειν, ἢ εἰ θεοῦ, ἐξευρετέον αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ὃν νῦν
ἡμεῖς λόγον ζητοῦμεν, καὶ λεκτέον, ὡς ὁ μὲν θεὸς Β
δίκαιά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἰργάζετο, οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζό-
μενοι. ὡς δὲ ἄθλιοι μὲν οἱ δίκην διδόντες, ἦν δὲ δὴ
ὁ δρῶν ταῦτα θεός, οὐκ ἐατέον λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν·
ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅτι ἐδεήθησαν κολάσεως λέγοιεν, ὡς
ἄθλιοι οἱ κακοί, διδόντες δὲ δίκην ὠφελούντο ὑπὸ

pugnant Juno, Minerva, Nep-
tunus, Vulcanus, Mercurius :
pro Trojanis Venus, Apollo,
Diana, Latona, Mars, Scaman-
der. Muretus.

ὡς Αἰσχύλος λέγ. Cf. Æsch.
Ag. 1468—

δαῖμον, ὃς ἐμπίτνει δώμασι
καὶ διφυ-
οῖσι Τανταλίδαισιν.
Et infr. 1481.

ἡ μέγαν οἶκος τοῖσδε
δαίμονα καὶ βαρυμήνιν αἰνεῖς.
and again, 1532, πῖτνοντος οἴκου.
And in the Choephorce the
chorus pray that the house be
not entirely ruined, l. 805.

γέρον φόνος μήκετ' ἐν δόμοις
τέκοι,
τῶδε καλῶς κτάμενον. ὦ
μέγα ναίων στόμιον, εἰ
δὸς ἀνιδεῖν δόμον ἀνδρός.
λόγον, 'some account,' 'ex-
planation'; v. s. Ch. XVI. *inil.*
ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος, the 'account
of justice.'

οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολ. v. *infr.*

Book X. 613 A, τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ
οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ
θεῶν γίνεσθαι, πάντα γίνεσθαι
ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ μὴ τι
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προ-
τέρας ἀμαρτίας ὑπῆρχεν; Πάνυ
μὲν οὖν. Ὅπως ἔρα ὑποληπτέον
περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, ἐάν τ' ἐν
πενία γένηται, ἐάν τ' ἐν νόσοις, ἢ
τινι ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκούτων κακῶν,
ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι
τελευτήσῃ ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθαν-
όντι. The Socrates of the Clouds
is made to rest his disproof of
the existence of Zeus upon the
consideration that the thunder-
bolt often falls not upon the
guilty but upon inanimate
objects. ll. 398, *seqq.* καὶ πῶς,
ὦ μῶρε σὺ καὶ κρονίων ὄζων καὶ
βεκκεσέληνε, εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς
ἐπιόρκους, δῆτ' οὐχὶ Σίμων' ἐνέ-
πρησεν; Οὐδὲ κλεάνυμον οὐδὲ
Θέωρον; καίτοι σφόδρα γ' εἶσ'
ἐπιόρκοι Ἄλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ γε νεῶν
βάλλει καὶ Σούνιον ἄκρον Ἀθη-
νέων καὶ τὰς δρῦς τὰς μεγάλας.

τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐατέον· κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεὸν τινὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, διαμαχετέον παντὶ τρόπῳ μήτε τινὰ λέγειν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει, εἰ μέλλει **C** εὐνομήσεσθαι, μήτε τινὰ ἀκούειν, μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, μήτ' ἐν μέτρῳ μήτε ἄνευ μέτρου μυθολογούντα, ὡς οὔτε ὄσια ἂν λεγόμενα, εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε ξύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. Σύμψηφός σοι εἶμι, ἔφη, τούτου τοῦ νόμου, καὶ μοι ἀρέσκει. Οὗτος μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἂν εἶη τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νόμων τε καὶ τύπων, ἐν ᾧ δεήσει τοὺς λέγοντας λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ποιούντας ποιεῖν, μὴ πάντων αἴτιον τὸν θεὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Καὶ **D** μάλ', ἔφη, ἀπόχρη. Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὄδε; ἄρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἶει εἶναι καὶ οἶον ἐξ ἐπιβουλήσ φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ιδέαις, τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν

διαμαχετέον. See Book I. Ch. XV. where Thrasymachus is obliged to assent to Socrates' proof but 'struggles' against agreeing to the several steps of the Argument, *Συνομολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι.* See also Book I. 335 E, *μαχοῦμεθα, ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν τις φῆ Σιωωνίδην, κ.τ.λ.* Also in Parmenides 127 E, *ἄρα τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ βούλονται σου οἱ λόγοι; οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἔστιν.*

μήτ' ἐν μέτρ. v.s. Ch. IX. *οὐδεὶς πώποτ' οὐτ' ἐν ποήσει οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις.*

σύμφωνα, 'inconsistent.' So the inconsistency of the belief that the Gods can dispute or be in any way divided is shown in Euthyphro 8 A, *ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς εἴκε, μισεῖται τε ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἂν εἶη. καὶ ὄσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἶη.*

σύμψηφος. See Æsch. Ag. 1353—

*κἀγὼ τοιούτου γνώματος κοινῶνός ἄν
ψηφίζομαι τι δρᾶν.*

ἐν ᾧ δεήσει, κ.τ.λ. See Book I. Ch. XV. where the ruler is proved to have regard only to the interest of the ruled in all his words and actions, *καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνο ξυμφέρον καὶ πρόπον καὶ λέγει ἂ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἂ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.*

γόητα. In Book III. 413 A, men are said to lose their 'right opinions' not intentionally, but by force or 'bewitchment,' *οὐ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀκουσίως στέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους... κλαπέντες ἢ γοητευθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες;* and *infra*. B, all things that deceive are said to bewitch, *Ἔοικε γὰρ γοητεύειν πάντα ὄσα ἀπατᾶ.* See below here also Ch. XX. *ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες.*

γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιῶντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη,

ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι. In this assertion of the Unity and simplicity of God, we trace the effect of Eleatic philosophy as interpreted by Xenophanes (c. 650). This philosopher attacked Homer and Hesiod in much the same way as Plato does here. See Diog. Laert. ix. 18, Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ἐν ἔπαισι καὶ ἐλεγείαις καὶ ἰάμβους κατ' Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ὀμήρου, ἐπικόπτων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ θεῶν εἰρημένα, for which see also Ch. XVII. note on 'Ἡσιόδός τε καὶ Ὀμ.'. His words regarding the Unity and nature of God are as follows,

Εἰς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
ὅθ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖός οὐδὲ νόημα.

This passage supplies us with further evidence of the connection between Xenophanes and Plato mentioned on p. 3. Compare also Ar. Eth. 7, 14, 8, who is speaking of human fondness for change: he there explains it by the fact that human nature is not ἀπλή: but, he adds, God inasmuch as He is perfect is unchangeable, οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺν τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλήν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν... Διὸ δ' Θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν. This Unity of the divine nature is again touched upon in Book X. 397 C, where Socrates is explaining his theory of Ideas or Original Essences (see Argument, p. 95). He there supposes that all things upon the earth of the same kind have a single original or prototype in heaven, made or

emanating from God, and he implies that it is in accordance with God's single nature that the prototype should be single, ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἶτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἶτε τις ἀνάγκη ἐπὶν μὴ πλεον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι αὐτὸν κλίην, οὕτως ἐποίησε μίαν μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ὅ ἐστι κλίην. And *infra*. ταῦτα δὴ εἰδὼς ὁ θεός (sc. that there must always be one simple original of any number of individual objects), βουλόμενος εἶναι ὄντως κλίης ποιητῆς ὄντως οὐσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίης τινὲς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν.

οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη. This challenge on behalf of monotheism comes upon Adeimantus with a startling effect. To a Greek, who saw a divinity in every stream and grove, and even in every tree, the monotheistic conception of God would be at once repugnant and hardly intelligible. Socrates' belief, as far as we can formulate it, beside the limitations in the present book, included the doctrine of τὸ θεῖον, or the communication of God's spirit to mankind. See notes, pp. 126, 150. Hence, although no polytheist, he believed in the present and pervading character of the Divine Nature throughout the universe. In advocating monotheism Plato follows strictly upon Xenophanes' belief concerning God, εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστον, ἕνα φησὶν αὐτὸν προσήκειν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλείοι εἶεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κράτιστον καὶ βέλτιστον αὐτὸν

ἴνυ γε οὕτως εἶπειν. Τί δὲ τότε; οὐκ ἀνίγκη, εἶπερ
 τι ἐξίσταται τῆς αὐτοῦ ιδέας, ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ
Εμεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου; Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκ οὖν ὑπὸ
 μὲν ἄλλου τὰ ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται τε
 καὶ κινεῖται; οἶον σῶμα ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποιῶν
 καὶ πόνων, καὶ πᾶν φυτὸν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεων τε καὶ ἀνέ-
381μων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, οὐ τὸ ὑγιέστατον
 καὶ ἰσχυρότατον ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται; Πῶς δ' οὐ;
 Ψυχὴν δὲ οὐ τὴν ἀνδρειοτάτην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην
 ἤκιστ' ἂν τι ἐξῶθεν πάθος ταραξείε τε καὶ ἀλλοιώ-
 σειεν; Ναί. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τά γε ξύνθετα πάντα
 σκευή τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τὰ
 εὖ εἰργασμένα καὶ εὖ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων παθημάτων ἤκιστα ἀλλοιοῦνται. Ἔστι δὴ
Βταῦτα. Πᾶν δὴ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ
 ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐλαχίστην μεταβολὴν ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐν-
 δέχεται. Ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ
 θεοῦ πάντῃ ἄριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ
 ἤκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἴσχοι ὁ θεός. Ἦκιστα
 δῆτα.

CAP. XX.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεταβάλλοι ἂν καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ;
 Δῆλον, ἔφη ὅτι, εἶπερ ἀλλοιοῦνται. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ

εἶναι πάντων. Arist. de Xen.
 Zen. et Gorg. 3.

παθημάτων...πίθος, the objec-
 tive use of these words is
 curious. As a rule the word
 πάσχω and its derivatives apply
 only to the subject, but here we
 have it, by the use of ὑπὸ,
 constituted an agent.

ἐνδέχεται, 'admits of.' This
 word in Attic writers is generally
 neuter, and equivalent to 'it is

possible.' See 501 C, Book VI.
 ἀνθρωπεῖα ἦθη, εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται,
 θεοφιλή ποιησεῖαν, but its use with
 accusative is not uncommon.

Ἦκιστα δῆτα, v. s. not. p. 177.

CH. XX.—He cannot change for
 the better: he would not change
 for the worse.

ἀλλ' ἄρα, 'but some one will
 say that' &c. For ἄρα and ἄρα

τὸ βέλτιόν τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἰσχίον ἑαυτοῦ ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἴπερ ἀλλοιοῦται· οὐ γάρ που ἐνδεᾶ γε φήσομεν τὸν θεὸν κάλλους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὁρθότατα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, λέγεις· καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκὼν αὐτὸν χεῖρω ποιεῖν ὀπηοῦν ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ; Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἔφη, καὶ θεῶ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἀλλοιοῦν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, κάλλιστος καὶ ἄριστος ὦν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν μένει αἰεὶ ἀπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. Ἄπασα, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν, ὡς

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν εἰκότες ἀλλοδαποῖσι
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες ἐπιστροφῶσι πόληας·

μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθω μηδεῖς,
μηδ' ἐν τραγηδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν

introducing another's words or opinions see above p. 225, and below here, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινας περιέρχονται.

χεῖρον ἑαυτ. a mode of expression not at all unusual, see below Book VII. 526, C, ὅμως εἰς γε τὸ δεξιτέροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιιδόασιν. So the superlative is used: Xen. Mem. I, 2, 46. Εἶθε σοι, ὦ Περικλείς, τότε συνεγεγόμεν, ὅτε δεινότατος σαυτοῦ ταῦτα ἤσθα.

χεῖρω ποιεῖν. This is in accordance with Xenophanes' teaching of the nature of the gods. See Arist. Rhet. ii. 23: Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. And he also gives the reason for this belief among men—

ἀλλὰ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι θεοὺς
γεγενῆσθαι

τὴν σφετερὴν τ' αἰσθησιν ἔχειν
φωνὴν τε δέμας τε.

And the principle of the immutability of the divine nature is thus expressed by him: Τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐν, ἦν τὸν θεὸν εἶναι λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι οὔτε κινήτην εἶναι. ...οὔτε γὰρ ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ ἕτερον οὔτε ἐκείνου εἰς ἄλλο ἐλθεῖν. — Arist. de Xenoph., &c. 3.

μένει αἰεὶ ἀπλ. ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μορφ. Fancifully expressed by Xenophanes thus: Ἄϊδιον δ' ὕντα (τὸν θεόν) καὶ ἓνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ.

θεοὶ ξείνοισιν, κ.τ.λ. Odysse. xvii. 485.

Πρωτέως, see Euthyphro 15 D: οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. Euthydemus 288 B: τὸν Πρωτέα

εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην ὡς ἰέριαν ἀγείρουσαν

Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις·

Εκαὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ μὴ ἡμῖν ψευδέσθωσαν· μηδ' αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδιὰ ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοὶ τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζονται δειλοτέρους. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ θεοὶ εἰσὶν οἱοὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν, ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι, **382** ἐξαπατῶντες καὶ γοητεύοντες; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψευδεσθαι θεὸς ἐθέλοι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ ἢ ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὄς. Οὐκ οἶσθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, πάντες θεοὶ τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι μισοῦσιν; Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι τῷ κυριωτάτῳ που ἑαυτῶν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα

μιμείσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.

ὡς ἰερ. ἀγείρω. Ruhnken points out that ἀγείρω here is 'mendicando colligere'; he supposes the poet to be Sophocles, and the verse to be taken from the *Inachus*, a satyric play. Stallb. thinks with Valcknaar that it more likely belongs to Euripides or *Æschylus*.

δειλοτέρους. sc. τοῦ δέοντος. For an absolute comparative v.s. μακροτέρα, Ch. XVI. and note.

Ἴσως. This reply is not to be wondered at, if we recollect the character attributed to *Hermes*; see the description of *Autolycus* in Book I. Ch. VIII. and note.

τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, contrasted with the ψεύδος τὸ ἐν λόγοις; v.s. μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται, Ch. XVII. and note. Aristotle implies the existence of the 'good lie' in *Eth.* 4, 7, 6: Καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεύδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, i.e. there are cases in which it may be justifiable. And see also Book V. of the *Republic* 459 D: πρὸς τὸδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, συχνῶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ἀπατῇ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

τῷ κυριωτάτῳ. See *Ar. Eth.* 9, 8, 6: χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ. And in Book x. 7, 8, he speaks of νοῦς as τὸ θεῖον and κέρριον in man: Εἰ δὴ θεῖον

οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἐθέλει, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα φοβεῖται ἐκεῖ αὐτὸ κεκτηῖσθαι. Οὐδὲ νῦν πω, ἢ δ' ὅς, μανθάνω. Οἷει γάρ τί με, ἔφην, σεμνὸν λέγειν· ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω, ὅτι Β τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ψεύδεσθαι τε καὶ ἐψεύσθαι καὶ ἀμαθῆ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔχειν τε καὶ κεκτηῖσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος πάντες ἥκιστα ἂν δέξαιντο καὶ μισοῦσι μάλιστα αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. Πολύ γε, ἔφη. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὀρθότατά γ' ἂν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος καλοῖτο, ἢ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄγνοια ἢ τοῦ ἐψευσμένου· ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστὶ παθήματος καὶ ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἰδῶλον, οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Πάνυ μὲν C οὖν.

CAP. XXI.

Τὸ μὲν δὴ τῷ ὄντι ψεῦδος οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων μισεῖται. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δὲ δῆ;

ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον... εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρὸν ἐστὶ δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἕμεινον. *i.e.* the intelligence may be said to 'be' the man, as it is the strongest and finest part of him. In accordance with this principle, a poet who is only an imitator, is, in Book X. 605 C, debarred from the state because he gratifies the least intelligent part of it: ταῦτόν τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον. σεμνὸν, *v. infr.* Book III. 413 B: οὐ δὲ νῦν, ἔφη, μανθάνω. Τραγικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν.

ἐπεὶ τό γε ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, *sc.* ψεῦδος.

ὕστερον γεγονὸς εἰδῶλον, an expression which points to the system of Ἰδέαι or first essences, found in Book VI., see Argument p. 69; all things of the same kind derive what being they have from a common source. And if there be anything derived from them or representing them, it is one step farther removed from the Really Existent. Thus τὸ ἐν λόγοις is merely the shadow of the principle, τὸ ἐν ψυχῇ, and not the substance.

CH. XXI.—*God then neither changes nor deceives man: this also must be laid down as a precept for the use of the poets.*

τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τῷ χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; ἄρ' οὐ πρὸς τε τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων οἱ ἂν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα **Δ** ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἔνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίνγεται; καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι, ὅπη τάληθές ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὃ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιούμεν; Καὶ μάλα, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχει. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν τούτων τῷ θεῷ τὸ ψεῦδος χρήσιμον; πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἀφομοιωῶν ἂν ψεύδοιτο; Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, ἔφη. Ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψευδῆς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ δεδιὼς τοὺς **Ε** ἔχθρους ψεύδοιτο; Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. Ἄλλὰ δι' οἰκείων

πότε καὶ τῷ, see Argument p. 56. And compare Book III. 389 B where, in recapitulation of these remarks, it is stated that falsehood must, like strong medicine, be used sparingly, and only by experts; and that the truth must be jealously guarded: 'Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν γε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιητέον' εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἐλέγομεν ἔρτι, καὶ τῷ ὄντι θεοῖσι μὲν ἄχρηστον ψεῦδος, ἀνθρώποις δὲ χρήσιμον ὡς ἐν φαρμάκῳ εἶδει, δηλον, ὅτι γε τὸ τοιοῦτον ἰατροῖς δοτέον, ἰδίωται δὲ οὐχ ἁπτόον. Therefore the rulers may speak falsely in behalf of the city, but for a citizen to speak falsely to the rulers, is a worse fault than if a patient lied concerning his bodily condition to a doctor, or a sailor about the steering to his captain.

τῶν καλ. φίλων, sc. πρὸς τοὺς τῶν καλ. φίλ.; or the genitive may be merely described as partitive.

καὶ ἐν αἷς, κ.τ.λ. 'And in the case of those tales of mythology, which we were speaking of just now, because we cannot be sure of the exact truth in antiquity, we shall try to make fiction profitable by assimilating it as far as possible to truth,' i.e. 'In telling tales about gods and heroes (ψεῦδος) we shall not lose sight of the principles of rectitude (ἀλήθεια).' So in Book III. *loc. cit.* where Socrates is trying to find a means of preserving the right adjustment of classes in the state, he says: τίς ἂν οὖν ἡμῖν μηχανῆ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δεόντι γιγνομένων;

Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν. See Book III. 404 E: γελοῖον γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸν γε φύλακα φύλακος δεῖσθαι.

ποιητῆς μὲν ἄρα ψ. The speaker for the moment is regarding the divine nature as comprehending all others, the poet, philosopher, &c.

ἄνοιαν ἢ μανίαν ; Ἄλλ' οὐδέεις, ἔφη, τῶν ἀνοήτων καὶ μαινομένων θεοφιλῆς. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν οὐ ἔνεκα ἀνθεὸς ψευδοίτο. Οὐκ ἔστιν. Πάντη ἄρα ἄψευδές τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ θεῖον. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Κομιδῆ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθές ἐν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξυπατᾶ, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπάς, οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ. Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται 383 σοῦ λέγοντος. Συγχωρεῖς ἄρα, ἔφη, τούτον δεύτερον τύπον εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ δεῖ περὶ θεῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτοὺς μήτε ἡμᾶς ψεύδεσι παράγειν ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ἔργῳ ; Συγχωρῶ. Πολλὰ ἄρα Ὀμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες ἄλλα τούτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπῆν

ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. the proverb, 'Quem Deus vult perdere prius dementat.'

Κομιδῆ ἀπλ., *v.s.* Book I. Ch. XXIII., κομιδῆ ὄντες ἄδικοι.

οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ, 'a sign either when we are awake or when we are asleep.' In the later Books of the Dialogue these two words are again employed together in contrast, but ὕπαρ there means 'a reality'; see Book IX. 576 B: Ἔστι δέ που (ὁ κάκιστος) οἶον ὄναρ διήλομεν, ὅς ἂν ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος ᾖ. And in Book V. 476 C the two are defined: τὸ ὄνειρύττειν (sc. τὸ ὄναρ) ἄρα οὐ τὸδε ἔστιν, ἐάν τε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάν τ' ἐγρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοῖόν τῳ μὴ ὁμοῖον ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ᾧ ἕοικεν; Τί δὲ ὁ τάναντία τούτων ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος, ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ σοὶ ζῆν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ὕπαρ.

Πολλὰ Ὀμ. ἐπαιν. See Book X. 607 A, where Socrates allows that Homer is the first among tragic poets, before finally excluding him from his state: Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ᾧ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχης, λέγουσιν, ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής...φιλίειν μὲν χρῆ καὶ ἀσπάξασθαι... καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὀμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν. Whilst in 612 A, the conclusion is reached by proof that Homer and Hesiod are wrong upon the whole in their views of justice: οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης ἐπηνέγκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδον τε καὶ Ὀμηρον ὑμεῖς ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον εὔρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἐάν τ' ἔχη τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἐάν τε μῆ.

τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπν. πομπ. For this dream was a deception; see ll.

Β ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι· οὐδὲ Αἰσχύλου, ὅταν φῆ ἡ
Θέτις τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν τοῖς αὐτῆς γάμοις ἄδοντα

ἐνδατεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς εὐπαιδίας,
νύσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους.
ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας
παιῶν' ἐπευφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.
κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα
ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνη.
ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών,
αὐτὸς τὰδ' εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κτανῶν
τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν.

Ἐὐταν τις τοιαῦτα λέγῃ περὶ θεῶν, χαλεπανοῦμέν τε
καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν
ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ
φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεοὶ γίγνεσθαι, καθ' ὅσον
ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλείστον οἶόν τε. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη,
ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις
ἀν χροῖμην.

ii. 8: Βάσκ', ἴθι, οὐλε ὕνειρε.

Et infr. 35—

ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπεβήσετο,
τὸν δ' ἔλιπ' αὐτοῦ
τὰ φρονέοντ' ἀνά θυμὸν ἃ β' οὐ
τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον,
φῆ γὰρ ὃ γ' αἰρήσειν Πριάμου
πόλιν ἤματι κείνῳ,
νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὰ ἤδη ἃ ρα Ζεὺς
μήδετο ἔργα.

ἐνδατεῖσθαι. Fr. 266. ἐνδατ.

quod proprie significat *dividere*,
nunc *per partes celebrare*, quo
sensu item positum videtur apud
Sophoclem, O. T. 205—

βέλεια θέλομ' ἂν αἰδοματ' ἐνδα-
τεῖσθαι.—Stallb.

εἰς ... ἐμὰς. The passage
passes from an indirect to a

direct quotation. We should
have expected *αὐτῆς* instead of
εἰς, but *εἰς* is probably metri
gratia to preserve the run of the
line.

χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν. A poet
who desired to exhibit a play,
applied to the ἄρχων βασιλεὺς
if the play were to be repre-
sented at the Lenæa in the
month Gamelion, or to the
Ἄρχων, if at the Διονυσία ἐν
Ἄστει in Elaphebolion. If the
play were approved, a chorus
and actors were assigned to the
poet; whom he trained and
supervised for the performance.

εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν, 'if we
intend that our protectors,' &c.

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