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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1248	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. #4269	DATE OF DOCUMENT 18 May 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 4 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM</p> <p>Japan Press Summary</p> <p>Today's Tokyo Newspapers</p> <p>Big Three papers blanketed their front pages with stories linked to Prime Minister YOSHIDA's trip abroad: his itinerary, his purpose for the trip. The joint Socialist questioning of YOSHIDA also came in for good coverage: They will sound YOSHIDA out if he shows at the Diet today...One paper also gave midfold space to the prosecution questioning of Nippei Shipbuilding President MIYAJIMA. It stressed the "delicate situation" over the firm's political donations, linking in the names of Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> and Liberal Chief Secretary SATO...</p> <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SECRET</p>				
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CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-70030-1

(35)

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1252	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. # 4273	DATE OF DOCUMENT 22 May 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 4 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
Japan Press Summary Today's Tokyo News paper POLITICS Prime Minister YOSHIDA and people in his circle are thinking about Cabinet personnel affairs. YOSHIDA has decided to put off a Cabinet reshuffle and re-election of the three top Liberal executives, though, until he gets back from his trip abroad. There have been different guesses on who will take the Prime Minister's job while YOSHIDA is away. Best bet: Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> ..			
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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-70326-1

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1253	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. #4274	DATE OF DOCUMENT 23 May 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily		DATE 4 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
Japan Press Summary			
Today's Tokyo News paper			
NATIONAL DEFENSE			
The National Safety Agency plan, for a national defense council that NSA Director KIMURA explained at yesterday's Upper House Cabinet Committee meeting is different from the "tentative" plan submitted the day before. This one calls for six cabinet members, including the Deputy Prime Minister, to be members of the proposed council. No provisions are made for civilian experts.... Heated arguments when the NSA's plan was submitted yesterday arose from opposition party dissatisfaction over the plan, since it disregarded earlier tri-partite agreements. Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> was invited to yesterday's committee meeting in order to sound out whether the government wants to have the national defense council set up along the lines of the NSA's plan. This is what OGATA had to say: "Efforts will be made through tri-partite negotiations to have it approved by the Diet as a government proposal." In order to get a definite stand on this, OGATA requested Liberal Chief Secretary SATO and Liberal Diet Policy Committee Chairman OZAWA to work out some agreement on the national defense council among the three conservative parties....			
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FORM NO. 59-34
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-154	SOURCE 0233 IN-12264	DATE OF DOCUMENT 28 May 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Appointment of Acting Premier			DATE 16 Sept 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B,C,?-3
<p>Cable from () Source: American businessman in Tokyo (B) from Japanese journalist (C) from Japanese () (?) Date of Info: May 1954</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASED (Ichiro) The appointment of HATOYAMA as acting Premier has been changed to <u>OGATA Taketora</u>. The reasons for this change are: 1) Mrs. HATOYAMA leaked the plan which dis- pleased the YOSHIDA men; 2) Hearing of the plan, ISHIBASHI Tanzan and KISHI Shinsuke started plotting to form a new party during YOSHIDA's absence, displeas- ing YOSHIDA still more.</p> <p>Note: The "B" evaluation of Japanese () based on direct contact between him and KUBARK officers.</p>			
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FORM NO. 59-34
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1257	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. #4279	DATE OF DOCUMENT 28 May 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FEC/MI S Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 6 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
Japan Press Summary			
Today's Tokyo Newspapers			
NATIONAL DEFENSE			
Deliberation schedule for the twin defense bills may be decided today. Late yesterday the Upper House Cabinet Committee held an executive meeting and discussed the schedule. They decided to put off a decision until this morning, since the opposition parties had "conflicting" opinions. Also, the committee will ask Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> to appear before the committee today to clear up the government stand on the proposed national defense council....			
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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trade, Mikoyan.¹² He called attention to the increased quantity of goods allocated for sale to the population already during April-December, 1953, that is, following Stalin's death, and to the sixth consecutive annual reduction of retail prices in state stores, ordered by the Soviet government on April 1, 1953.¹³ He further stated that, in the course of three years, 1951-53, the production of manufactured consumer goods will increase almost by

assumption; cotton and woolen goods and leather footwear. It will be noted that the production goals provide for a relatively moderate increase in 1954, a sharper increase in 1955, and an enormous rise in 1956. Parenthetically, the 1955 goals are only slightly higher than those specified in the Fifth Five Year Economic Plan, promulgated in October, 1952, namely, 2 per cent for cotton goods, 5 per cent for woolen goods, and practically no

TABLE 1*

Production of Selected Consumer Goods in the Soviet Union, 1951-56
 (Production in 1951 = 100)

Year	Cotton Goods	Woolen Goods	Leather Footwear
1951	100	100	100
1952	102	105	100
1953	104	110	105
1954	106	115	110
1955	115	130	125
1956	135	160	150

50 per cent and that each percentage represents an increase in the quantity that is sold.¹⁴

More significant than such composite figures are the actual production targets for the most important commodities. Table 1 provides figures for three of the most important articles of mass con-

sumption: cotton and woolen goods and leather footwear. Even if the sweeping increase planned in the output of these goods were achieved, the Soviet Union still would not reach the Western, let alone American, living standards. Thus, for textiles, the 1954 and 1955 goals are below the 1952 output in the United States of 9,510 million yards, 8,096 million meters of cotton goods and 351 million yards, 321 million meters of woolen goods, though the Russian population at the beginning of 1954 was roughly 25-30 per cent larger than that of the United States. Only in 1956 is the planned Russian production

* The figures in this table are based on the production targets for 1954-56 set forth in the 1953-56 Five Year Economic Plan, promulgated in October, 1952, *Izvestia*, 1952, January 31, 1953.

make up for lost time. In our land of socialism, this equipment will become, in the not too distant future, an inalienable possession of the majority of Soviet households." Be it as it may, it is reasonable to suppose, however, that during the next few years such appliances will constitute "inalienable possession" of the Soviet aristocracy, not of the masses. However, as to the simpler articles of mass consumption, it can hardly be gainsaid that, if the goals set by the Malenkov administration for 1955, and especially for 1956, were realized, the U.S.S.R. would take an important step in a long journey to extricate itself from the sharply deficit stage of the mass-factured consumers' goods "crisis" which has so long plagued this economy.

But will the goals be realized? What can be said about the outlook for the new campaign? There are obviously many uncertainties, but it is possible to adumbrate some of the essential elements in the equation. To begin with a highly important positive factor, never before since the inception of the five-year plan era—a quarter century ago—has so energetic and determined an effort by the Kremlin been evident on behalf of the consumer. It appears to represent a significant shift in Soviet economic policy. However, many misgivings occur with regard to the success of this campaign to give a new deal to the Soviet consumer. First of all, a serious question arises as to the continuity of the new policy trend. Will the Soviet rulers persevere in their new solicitude for the welfare of the people, or will the campaign lose much of its momentum after a few months or perhaps a year, and eventually fade away? And there always lurks the possible premature reversal of the policy before it is able

to bear fruit, particularly because of competition with the heavy industry and armaments production—a point I shall touch upon a little later. Incidentally, the Kremlin can scuttle a policy or program without the benefit of publicity. Yet, continuity, the so-called element in this matter, is the more important, since a reorientation of Soviet industry to serve the consumer, though it presents no insuperable technological stumbling blocks, nonetheless involves some difficult problems of readjustment.

First, there is the problem of technical reversion. It is accentuated by the fact that production of many consumers' goods, such as bicycles, electrical appliances, etc., is parcelled out to industries controlled by different ministries. Thus, in addition to the Ministry of Consumer Goods Industry, there were the Ministry of Electric Power and Electric Industry and the ministries of machine building, aviation, defense, metallurgy, chemicals and paper, and construction materials. Industries and local industries not subject to the control of the national ministries, all these must cooperate. A new subdivision of industrial ministries in the spring of 1954 does not sharply the problem.

And the Soviet economic apparatus has been notorious for poor coordination of its component parts. In general, the technical reversion, involving retooling and reeducating of management and labor, is more difficult in the U.S.S.R. than in the more industrialized countries of the West. This is so partly because the Soviet industrial system is less developed and partly because of the considerable inflexibility and inertia induced by the rigid centralised planning and excessive supervision from above and by the absence

of competition." Closely related is the unwillingness on the part of the management to take risks, make decisions, and shoulder responsibility, except at the highest level of authority, as a consequence of the fear instilled by a quarter-century of purges. It will be recalled that the first "witch" trial, involving alleged sabotage by engineers in the Donbas coal industry, the so-called "Shakhtinsky" trial, took place as long ago as 1928. While the Soviet captain of industry can be perfectly serene about market demand and competition and can easily take care of the official synthetic substitute for the latter in the guise of "socialist competition," he is quite insecure against the terror of the Soviet police state. However, managerial flexibility and creative ingenuity are no less and perhaps are even more essential in the manufacture of the much more variable consumers' goods than in the manufacture of standard producers' goods.

In the second place, the process of reorientation to serve the consumer must overcome certain psychological obstacles arising from the attitude of the managerial bureaucracy of the non-politic nationalized industry. It became thoroughly imbued with the spirit that may be epitomized by the motto, "The consumer be damned." Therefore, something in the nature of a psychological reversion of the managerial class is essential, particularly in the matter of improvement of quality of consumers' goods and their assortment, which is so much stressed by the new program.

To the need of reversion of exist-

¹² See Alexander Vucinich's chapter, "The Factory," in his *Soviet Economic Institutions*, Introduction by Sergius Yakobson (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952), pp. 6-36.

ing plant facilities is added that of expansion of plant and equipment. For instance, in the textile industry it is planned to add 480,000 new spindles in 1955 and 1,381,000 in 1956 and 15,507 and 38,000 looms, respectively, during the two years. Expansion in textiles presupposes a similar process in the dye industry, which had often been blamed for the inadequate quan-

TABLE 3
PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTION COSTS OF SELECTED FOOD PRODUCTS IN THE U.S.S.R., 1951-1956
INDEX OF 1951 = 100 YEARS

Food Product	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Wheat	100	105	110	115	120	125
Rye	100	102	104	106	108	110
Oats	100	101	102	103	104	105
Barley	100	100	100	100	100	100
Maize	100	105	110	115	120	125
Soybeans	100	102	104	106	108	110
Peas	100	101	102	103	104	105
Beans	100	100	100	100	100	100
Apples	100	105	110	115	120	125
Pears	100	102	104	106	108	110
Oranges	100	101	102	103	104	105
Lemons	100	100	100	100	100	100
Vegetables	100	105	110	115	120	125
Meat	100	102	104	106	108	110
Fish	100	101	102	103	104	105
Dairy	100	105	110	115	120	125
Alcohol	100	102	104	106	108	110
Wool	100	101	102	103	104	105
Textiles	100	105	110	115	120	125
Shoes	100	102	104	106	108	110
Leather	100	101	102	103	104	105
Iron	100	105	110	115	120	125
Steel	100	102	104	106	108	110
Coal	100	101	102	103	104	105
Oil	100	105	110	115	120	125
Electricity	100	102	104	106	108	110

¹³ See S. Yakobson's introduction, "The Soviet Economy," in *Pravda*, November 12, 1954.

ity and poor quality of the dyes supplied to the textile mills. Expansion is also contemplated in the leather, shoe, clothing, and many other industries. Increased investment will also be needed if the distribution systems is to be improved, because of a great shortage of retail store space and warehouse facilities reported by Mikoyan.

But this is not all. As part of the planned rise in commercial production of various foodstuffs indicated in Table 3, there is projected a considerable expansion of the food processing industry, requiring construction of new plants and equipment. Capital investment in the enterprises of the Ministry of Food Industry is scheduled to increase from

¹⁴ S. Yakobson's introduction, "The Soviet Economy," in *Pravda*, November 12, 1954.

4,800 million rubles in 1953 to 8,500 million in 1954 or by 77 per cent. Corresponding figures for the Ministry of Manufactured Consumers' Goods are 3,148 and 5,850 million rubles, or an increase of 80 per cent.

There is, furthermore, the demand imposed on industry by the raised targets for agricultural machinery and fertilizer, dictated by the new agricultural program, which will be discussed later. There is also the problem of extensive housing construction, as well as of building new schools and hospitals, strongly emphasized by Malenkov.²¹ And what about his promise of continuing development of heavy industry?²² Such a promise regarding a favorite Soviet child cannot be lightly disregarded, especially should the Kremlin be unwilling to negotiate a settlement that would reduce international tension and the armaments race. Finally comes the question of the increased supply of agricultural raw materials required by the expanded light industry. Will it be possible, for example, to supply the textile industry with cotton, flax, wool, etc. As will appear from the subsequent discussion of the agricultural situation, there is much room for skepticism also on this score. Thus the new policy poses the task of simultaneous expansion in various directions to a deficit economy, characterized as it is by scarcity of many resources, including since the war even the formerly plentiful labor force.

What emerges from this assessment is the need for caution. The situation in consumers' goods industries will, of course, be influenced by the progress, or lack of it, in agriculture. Much will depend also upon the foreign policy of the Kremlin and its effect on inter-

national tension. A more peaceful, less aggressive foreign policy, which would help to relax international tension, would *ipso facto* provide a more favorable environment for concentration on consumers' goods at home, and vice versa.²³

Barring further complications on the international scene, it seems reasonable to anticipate an expansion of consumers' goods output in 1955-56 at a more rapid rate than perhaps during any comparable period of the preceding quarter century, though the improvement in 1954 is likely to be at best a moderate one. But it would be premature and risky, at the present juncture, to expect the fulfillment of the high targets set up by the Malenkov-Khrushchev program. As to a marked improvement in the quality and assortment of goods, it appears to be the more problematical the greater the quantitative achievement; for it is precisely the chase after "statistical" fulfillment of government plans that so often interferes with qualitative results in the U.S.S.R.

It is tempting to speculate about the psychological effects of nonfulfillment or partial achievement of the high targets set for manufactured consumers' goods. Many observers believe that even a modest advance in the standard of living would go far in satisfying the Soviet consumer, so long as such an advance is continuous. But it may be also true that the Russian appetite for consumers' goods will be greatly whetted as it becomes a little easier to acquire.

²¹ Whether the emphasis on increased production of consumers' goods is a signpost of a more liberal international policy on the part of the Kremlin, or the converse, that is, as some observers believe, a psychological maneuver to prepare the population for the approach of the war, is a moot question on which in the nature of judgment seems hardly possible, and best left to the economist. It may be suggested, however, that the two views are not necessarily irreconcilable if it is true that the Kremlin, like a good chess player, usually seeks to prepare for several alternatives.

²² *Pravda and Izvestiya*, August 9, 1953.

²³ *Ibid.*

them, and the Soviet citizen may feel that he is getting too little too late. Thus, the growing popular discontent may force the Krenin to make even greater concessions. For one of the lessons of history is that revolts usually are not started by those who are in the slough of despair but by those whose lot is improving, albeit too slowly.

It must not be overlooked that the supply of consumers' goods may also be expanded by increased importation from abroad, and a definite tendency in this direction was discernible in the bilateral-trade agreements and trade deals concluded by the Soviet government during the second half of 1953. It is possible, however, of how far the Soviets would be willing to go in changing the basic character of their imports, which had long consisted predominantly of producers' goods and raw materials.²¹ But even assuming a far-reaching change in Soviet foreign trade policy, it would be hampered by the deficit character of the Soviet economy, which, as experience has demonstrated, tends to limit available exports and, consequently, the paying capacity of the U.S.S.R. A serious effort to improve living standards at home, under such conditions, would probably aggravate export difficulties unless the Soviet government were willing to ex-

port gold on a large scale from its presumably substantial stocks. There were straws in the wind during the winter 1953-54 pointing to a new major role of gold in Soviet foreign trading, but the situation is still enigmatic. The question of a possible expansion of consumers' goods imports from the satellite countries is complicated and will not be discussed here.

IV

If light industry were something of a Cinderella, then agriculture could be described as an Achilles heel of Soviet economy. However, it is often forgotten that "Achilles could, after all, walk upon his heel," and, likewise, the Krenin was able to lean heavily on Russian agriculture in its searing industrialization drive. Nevertheless, the existence of a serious problem of lagging agricultural production cannot be gainsaid.²² This was acknowledged by Malenkov and more explicitly by Khrushchev, who adduced considerable supporting evidence. In fact, not since A. A. Andreev's Khrushchev's predecessor as the top "agriculturalist" among the Bolshevik leaders celebrated report on the agricultural situation, in February, 1917,²³ was so much statistical agricultural information revealed as by Khrushchev.

According to Khrushchev, agricultural production in 1952 was only 10 per cent

²¹ For a report by Fred L. Bussey, one who accompanied the trade negotiations in Moscow in the summer of 1951 that "there was virtually no import of consumer goods from the U.S.S.R. and that the U.S.S.R. had a great deal of a surplus for the U.S. but that it was producing a surplus of other goods." *Am. Foreign Cor.*, February 17, 1951. Such a surplus and possible intention of to be a cash seller of a surplus production in increasing the supply of consumers' goods.

²² The Soviet system differs greatly in this respect from that of a normally functioning free economy in which commodities are automatically made "available" for export by the movements of exchange rates and prices and the process of substitution.

²³ Fred Wilcox, "The Soviet Economy Compared to the West," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI, Feb. 1953, 366-80.

²⁴ Cf. A. P. Tuzov's article, "New Soviet Plan: Its Agricultural Aspect," *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, 31, XI, December, 1953, 489-90.

²⁵ It was published in the Soviet press on March 7, 1917, and the address of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in mentioning the report, appeared in Soviet newspapers on February 28, 1917.

higher than in 1940,²⁹ while industrial production was more than twice as high. Moreover, the estimates of the chief component of agricultural output, crop production, have been obfuscated by Soviet reports of unrealistic figures of so-called "biological crops." These were estimates of crops standing in the field prior to harvest, which did not reflect the officially admitted large harvesting losses and, in general, lent themselves

not be forgotten that our country, our collective farms can prosper with a crop gathered in the barn and not with a crop standing in the field.³⁰ Presumably the practice of reporting biological yields will be discontinued.

The crop picture, however, is not uniform. On the one hand, the areas sown to such important crops as flax and hemp failed to reach the prewar level by 1953 and even exhibited a downward

TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF SOWING AREA IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE 1953 YEAR

CROPS	1928		1940		1953		1953		1953
	M. Ha.	% A.	M. Ha.	% A.	M. Ha.	% A.	M. Ha.	% A.	
Cereals and legumes	6.1	53.0	71.8	70.4	17.8	13.1	107.3	53.1	68.9
Wheat	41.8	307.7	40.3	40.1	99.3	7.7	46.7	111.7	79.7
Industrial crops	11.0	9.7	8.0	11.7	28.9	7.8	17.8	4.6	8.2
Planting and other	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Vegetables	0.4	3.4	0.9	0.9	1.4	0.6	9.0	1.3	6.4
Forage crops	11.1	94.9	10.8	18.0	44.8	1.0	8.7	33.7	46.8
Total sown area	11.6	100.0	100.0	150.48	371.64	100.0	131.7	100.0	100.0

²⁹ *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 14, 1953.
³⁰ *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 14, 1953.
³¹ The total area sown to all crops in 1953 was 131.7 million hectares, 11.7 per cent more than in 1940.
³² *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 14, 1953.

to exaggeration for fiscal, propaganda, or other injudicious purposes.³¹ They were not comparable with crop figures for other countries or, indeed, with Russian figures prior to the 1930's. Such a statistical practice, or malpractice, which has been current for the last twenty years, brought down the wrath of Malenkov, who declared that "it should

ward trend after 1950. On the other hand, cotton, sugar beets, and wheat acreages were above prewar levels. Wheat particularly showed a spectacular increase at the expense of its old competitors, rye, and feed grains. Total grain acreage also decreased, but the group of so-called "industrial crops," and especially forage crops, including sown grasses (cane hay), showed a gain (see Table 4). However, the positive effect of the large increase in acreage under forage crops and grasses was largely offset by

³³ *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 14, 1953.
³⁴ See Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Statistics in Soviet Russia: Their Usability and Reliability," *American Statistician*, VII (June-July, 1953), 8-12.
³⁵ *Pravda and Izvestiya*, August 9, 1953.

low yields per acre, especially in the dry regions where it is now officially recognized that the acreage under grasses was over-extended. Animal husbandry has long been considered the weak spot of Soviet collective agriculture and was repeatedly an object of widely publicized critical official reports. According to Khrushchev's figures, the cattle numbers, at the beginning of 1953, were below those of 1916 (when Russia was in the throes of the first World War) and of 1928, before agricultural collectivization began. (There is a question whether the 1916 and 1928 figures given by Khrushchev are fully comparable territorially with 1953. The 1953 figures were likewise lower than the estimated numbers for the present territory in 1938. Khrushchev's figures also reveal the further alarming fact that, while cattle numbers were increasing during the postwar years until 1951, they declined again between 1951 and 1953. The situation was aggravated by a decrease in the proportion of cows in the cattle herd, from a half or more before the war to 43 per cent in 1953, with a consequent detrimental effect on dairy production.

A glaring example of this deterioration was the decreased production of butter in Siberia compared to the period before the first World War, when Siberia was the principal butter-exporting region of Russia. According to Khrushchev, Siberian butter production in 1952 was 65,000 metric tons as compared with 75,000 in 1913,²² and this, despite the large increase in population and the boasted agricultural development of Siberia under the Soviets. Mikoyan actually admitted the fact that the U.S.S.R., formerly a significant exporter of butter, is now an importer.²³

²² *Pravda and Izvestiya*, September 15, 1953.

²³ *Pravda*, October 25, 1953; *Izvestiya*, October 25 and 27, 1953.

The situation was better with respect to most other types of livestock, as Table 5 indicates; but even at the end of 1953 none was anywhere near the goals set for 1951. As compared with the United States, with a population about a fifth less than that of the U.S.S.R., the latter had 37 million, or 40 per cent, less cattle and 26 million, or nearly 50 per cent, less hogs at the beginning of 1953. Only with respect to sheep, of

TABLE 5
NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK IN THE SOVIET UNION,
JANUARY 1, FOR SELECTED YEARS
(In Millions)

Year	Cattle		Hogs		Sheep	
	Total	Cows	Total	Pigs	Total	Wool-bearing
1916	88.4	38.8	10.7	10.7	100.0	100.0
1928	114.4	51.4	13.4	13.4	134.0	134.0
1941	102.8	47.2	12.2	12.2	122.0	122.0
1943	110.0	50.0	13.0	13.0	130.0	130.0
1951 (planned)	150.0	65.0	18.0	18.0	180.0	180.0
1953 (actual)	128.8	54.8	15.8	15.8	158.0	158.0
1953 (planned)	130.0	55.0	16.0	16.0	160.0	160.0

¹ Figures for 1916, 1928, 1941, and 1943 are based on official Soviet sources and livestock censuses in the U.S.S.R. for 1916, 1928, 1941, and 1943. Figures for 1951 and 1953 are based on *Pravda*, Washington, D.C., 1951, p. 13.

² Included in total cattle.

³ While figures are not provided for 1941, it is assumed that the death losses were not so great as to cause a radical change.

⁴ Figures roughly comparable with post-World War II figures.

⁵ U.S.A., Not available.

which the United States had 32 million, is the U.S.S.R. much ahead.

Khrushchev boasted of the great increase in collectivized livestock or communal herds, which Soviet policy has consistently aimed to accomplish since 1939 and especially since the end of the war. Collectivized livestock in 1953 accounted for more than half of total cattle and hog numbers and for 70 per cent of total sheep and goats, as compared with 37 per cent for cattle, 30 per cent for hogs, and 46 per cent for sheep and goats in 1941. But, though the decree of September 7 acknowledged it,²⁴

²⁴ See above, n. 10.

Khrushchev does not mention the well-known fact that much of the build-up of collective herds resulted from acquisition of private stock, especially in the more recently collectivized regions, since the war. Nor does he allude to collectivization as a major factor in the decline of livestock numbers, though he has plenty to say, as does the above-mentioned decree, about inefficient management, shortage of food and low productivity of the individual herds.

Historical experience, however, demonstrates clearly the insupportability of prospering individual land-holding and the Soviet collective farm pattern. When following the disastrous collectivization of livestock, pasture lands, the early stages of collectivization, the collective farms, though in a rudimentary way, were able to carry out considerable repairs and maintenance of pastures. But when the collective farms were unable to do so in the late 1930's, a deterioration set in.

Clearly, as well with collectivization of the means of government, operations of animal products, which undoubtedly played a major role in the decline of livestock numbers. Malenkov and Khrushchev provided the country with a program of collectivization. This Malenkov pointed out that collectivization was a very important step which contributed to the increase in livestock in 1952, and that the country's live weight of livestock was 14.4 billion, or 1.1 billion of 1930, or 80 per cent of 1929, with a million head of 1930, or 10 per cent of 1910. Khrushchev indicated that the total production of meat was 1.4 billion, or 1.4 per cent of the output, which is a very small part of the output, which is a very small part of the output, which is a very small part of the output.

1926-27 and 1952-53 from 2.1 million to 5 million metric tons live weight and similarly that commercial production of milk was from 1.5 million to 1.8 million tons. And this doubling or tripling of commercial production of Soviet figures are correct, or nearly so, despite the widely reported reduction in herds and low productivity of livestock. Of course, Malenkov and Khrushchev, like with people, these figures are correct, or nearly so, despite the widely reported reduction in herds and low productivity of livestock. However, the increase in commercial production and herd size, with the growth in the animal population, which is a very important part of the territory, and a substantial increase in the number of livestock, could not be explained by the increase in the number of livestock.

That the herd population was a very important part of the territory, and a substantial increase in the number of livestock, could not be explained by the increase in the number of livestock. The situation was aggravated, as can be seen, as a result of many years of neglect, the animal population, and in which and the country's government had to be deprived of part of the country's government's resources, which was the only way to maintain the country's total production of livestock. There is an instructive example of the country's herd of live weight, or 1.4 billion, or 1.4 per cent of the output, which is a very small part of the output, which is a very small part of the output.

But, money, however, was a very important part of the country's government's resources, which was the only way to maintain the country's total production of livestock. There is an instructive example of the country's herd of live weight, or 1.4 billion, or 1.4 per cent of the output, which is a very small part of the output, which is a very small part of the output.

go too far to speak of a "breakdown" of Russian agriculture at present.

V

The revelation of the various weaknesses of Soviet agriculture by Malenkov and Khrushchev was followed by a program of remedial measures announced in the postwar 1953 decrees.¹⁷ The crux of the new program is the further strengthening of Soviet central and the technical strengthening of the present collective farm system without changing its basic structure. The key role in this process is assigned to the state machine tractor stations. The interest will be observed in the government policy which is being pursued in the collective system, the expansion of the machine tractor stations, the increased co-operation in the districts. In the various fields of strengthening collective agriculture, capital investment is to be increased to provide increased quantities of fertilizer and insecticides, and building materials. Also, the supply of technicians and skilled labor is to be increased by the training of stations' own farm laborers. The latter, it is to be increased by "voluntary" transfer from the cities.

To come with the program, there cannot be a total change of mind toward the peasant farming in the country. In fact, the collective farmers' little "back garden plots" discussed in a previous article, the traditional policy toward this group remained there and a few farms which became approximately at the 1950 of the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress in the spring of 1959. It reached a culminating point in the subsequent program.

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Part 1, pp. 10-11, 1953.

proposal of Stalin, on the eve of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress in October, 1952, for a barter system between collective farms and Soviet industry which would have eventually eliminated the laborer-private trade that is closely bound with the private rationing of kolkhozniki.

There was good reason to expect, therefore, that the "more and a little" slogan would be swallowed by a not too distant future by the collectivists kolkhozniki. However, as I indicated in the last article, Soviet economic realities thwarted this.

As a result of the economic difficulties in the USSR, the government has been forced to take a number of steps to improve the economic situation. These steps include a reduction in the amount of grain and other agricultural products that are exported to the West, and a reduction in the amount of foreign currency that is spent on the purchase of foreign goods.

And while the world has heard the most few words of the latter Stalin's death, the Soviet Union's position toward the "more and a little" slogan was complicated. The possibility of a policy of concessions or "approach to the West" cannot be ruled out. Thus, in the light of Soviet history, the turnabout in the direction of greater tolerance of private farming and of the "back garden plots" is not surprising. In the August 1953 issue of the *Soviet Socialist*, it was stated that the "back garden plots" policy of strengthening the collective farm system.

¹⁸ *Soviet Socialist*, August 1953, p. 10. The article also stated that the "back garden plots" policy was a "necessary and inevitable" part of the Soviet economic program.

The first of a series of concessions was the abolition of the cumbersome system of taxation of the private farming of individual plots is the so-called "agricultural tax" to which only the kolkhozniki and workers having garden plots are subject but not the kolkhozy taxed separately on the basis of their annual income. Under the old system each crop grown and each type of livestock was assessed separately at varying rates, depending upon their assumed profit potential. To this, were added any earnings the kolkhozniki may have had from other sources than the kolkhozy or from private holdings, such as temporary work, the home etc. The total sum the kolkhozniki was subject to taxation at progressively rising rates, calculated according to the same residual formula that in the United States is now known except that there was no overall ceiling on the amount.

The agricultural tax was replaced by a straight tax on land based so many years ago on 7,000 rubles per hectare regardless of the crops grown or livestock raised. An overall rate, as well as an upper and lower limit, is fixed by law for each of the constituent republics on the basis of the average rate and within these limits, varying rates are set for different regions and districts, depending upon the crops grown, their yields, the market situation, and farm income. Lower rates, however, were established by law for the more recently cultivated areas opened since the war. The rate in the old Soviet provinces of So-

called "Eastern Ukraine," the average tax rate is 8.5 rubles per 1,000 hectares, with variation from 5 to 12 rubles, while in the western and southern parts of the Ukraine the rates are 1, 2, and 6 rubles, respectively. Higher tax rates are set for irrigated land. In the Uzbek Republic of Soviet Central Asia, the tax rate is 22 rubles for irrigated land and 8 rubles for nonirrigated land on the average.

Exemption from the agricultural tax is granted to the workers of the kolkhozniki, to the herders, agronomists, etc., and Soviet citizens living in rural areas and having private holdings, thereby creating a certain disincentive. Where invalids, the aged and sick individuals are also granted tax reductions under certain conditions.

As a result of the reform, the total amount of the tax was decreased by 1953 to 1,137 million rubles, or 13 per cent, and for 1954, 60 per cent as compared with 1952. Moreover, the tax amount of kolkhozniki was reduced. This action by the Government ending the last evidence of the heavy burdened tax system.

The simplification of the agricultural taxes, however, the direct advantage, as the number of farmers, regard, of easier and less expensive administration. But, even more important, the tax reform aimed, as Zverev and other Soviet specialists insisted, to reduce the deterrent influence of the old system on the private farming of kolkhozniki and again to stimulate its development. Since the low tax rate at a flat rate, regardless of the crops grown, offers an incentive to use the little plots of a most advantageous manner to grow the most valuable crops. The new tax attention is

¹ "Pravda," Moscow, 1954, p. 1.

² "Pravda," Moscow, 1954, p. 1.

³ "Pravda," Moscow, 1954, p. 1.

⁴ "Pravda," Moscow, 1954, p. 1.

⁵ "Pravda," Moscow, 1954, p. 1.

pecially to encourage livestock ownership by kolkhozniki, which was adversely affected by government policies since 1930, with the result that 15 per cent of kolkhoz peasant households had no cows, according to Khrushchev. Livestock is not taxed separately, and furthermore, those kolkhozniki who do not possess cows of their own are to be granted a tax reduction of 50 per cent in 1953 and 30 per cent in 1954 to help them purchase cows.

However, the management of private farming slips short of possible contribution on the collective farm economy. There is a structural provision in the new tax law that if a taxable household of a peasant household of work engage does not contribute without valid reasons to the special fund of increase of taxes for the kolkhoz. The tax on the private holding of each member is to be reduced by 50 per cent. It is further also provided that the agricultural tax on the private holding of a kolkhoz will be increased by 75 per cent if an able-bodied member of working age of the family is not a member of the kolkhoz or if he left or was expelled from it and is not working for some state or co-operative enterprise. Thus, the old spirit of competition of the kolkhozmen against private plots with the huge collective farms for labor and devotion of the kolkhozniki to the kolkhoz, the Kretin, the more, regardless as the pressure made for private farming of kolkhozniki reduced.

The second concession dealt with an even more important form of taxation, the compulsory deliveries by kolkhozniki of farm products to the state at exceedingly low fixed prices. A reduction of delivery quotas of animal products and

potatoes was ordered, and all arrears accumulated by January 1, 1953, were canceled. Those kolkhozniki who had not personally owned livestock on June 15, 1953, were entirely exempt from meat deliveries during the second half of 1953 and for the whole year 1954.

The third concession, closely related to the second, was the increase in the very low prices paid by the government for compulsory deliveries of animal products, potatoes, and vegetables. These increases apply to the compulsory deliveries both of the kolkhozniki and of the kolkhoz, so that the government benefited directly and personally, also indirectly. Prices were increased as follows: livestock and fish products, 50 to 75 per cent; meat and fish products, 25 to 50 per cent; potatoes, 25 to 50 per cent; and vegetables, 25 to 50 per cent. These increases are less significant than they appear, because of a very low initial base.

Prices at which the government bought fat sheep to the excess of the annual sex quotas were also increased. Such prices, which were always higher than those for compulsory deliveries and often were supplemented by subsidies in the purchase of dead animals, increased goods were raised, on the average, to 30 per cent for meat and 30 per cent for milk.

The fourth concession was the new official blessing given to the kolkhoz trade, ever when Stalin's notion of a barrier system between the kolkhoz and industry seemed for a time to be holding a Damocles' sword. But since Stalin's heirs embraced the latter, of course, the barrier idea again collapsed, at least for the time being. Trade in kolkhoz trade also received new impetus in several Soviet government decisions. Thus, according to the minister of trade, Milovan, the "kolkhoz trade is an important component part of Soviet

Pravda, and *Izvestia*, Sept. 14, 1953.

trade. A number of measures are to be introduced, according to M. G. Ivanov, in the course of "Concerning Measures for the Development of Soviet Trade with a view to the Expansion and Improvement of Collective Farming" (the institution of taxation fulfilling the obligations of the collective farms, the importance of which can not be exaggerated, particularly for the development of the urban centers, the recovery and expansion of foreign markets and increased production of the agricultural products in accordance with the collective markets, etc.). What always surprised me in the comparison of the M. G. Ivanov's views regarding with the new program of the NEP, which was announced by Lenin in 1921, is the absence of any reference to the response of wage earners, the industrial workers, to the economic program, but not to Lenin's NEP of the 1920's. Rather, the impact of the government's return to the policy of stabilizing the middle 1930's, which is called "socialism" and all varieties of "collectivism" was combined with the encouragement of the "free and private" farming of the collectivized peasants.

Despite Lenin's forecast that the NEP was to be effective for a long time, it was abandoned by Stalin in the immediate aftermath of the 1929's. The encouragement of free and private farming of the NEP in the 1930's was even denied. As to the present case, Khrushchev has not abandoned its temporary character when he said:

It is not possible to expect that the NEP will be maintained for a long time. There is no doubt that in the near future we will have to pass to a new economic system.

Pravda, 1959.

Will come a time when the collectivized agriculture will reach such a level of development that the personal requirements for its needs, provided by the collective economy and they will be completely for the collective farm livestock.

When it is collected how precious possession of livestock is to the collectivized peasantry, that it is without exaggeration a system of its personal farming, the words of Khrushchev assume a rather sinister meaning.

What reaction can be expected from the peasants to the new concessions? They are, no doubt, welcome as far as they go. But can the peasants feel secure with regard to their personal farming in the light of past experience? And Khrushchev's subtle statement: "And since the answer is obviously in the negative, will they again show zeal in building up the livestock herds, realizing that when the goal is achieved, their livestock will probably again be collectivized? And if the collectivized apply themselves diligently to their kitchen garden plots, will they not find encouragement to contact with the authorities, who are so strongly concerned with the prosperity of the collective farm economy? The Russian peasants are well aware, after more than three decades of experience with the Soviets, that the land that grants may also withdraw at will. They will hardly trust Stalin's disciples and Lushchikov, who are his successors, more than they trusted the crafty Georgian. Nor is it likely that their confidence will be gained by the Soviet leaders to defame the public memory of the formerly grossly vilified dictator and his substitute, the more popular name of Lenin, who symbolizes the happy days of the NEP. Thus, the new concessions may not be too tempting from

Pravda, *Trud*, September 15, 1958.

the peasant's standpoint, or too fruitful from that of the Kremlin.

However, the Kremlin, as both Malenkov and Khrushchev made crystal clear, continues to place reliance predominantly in the kolkhoz, which in recent years has grown larger. The campaign for consolidating kolkhozy, spearheaded by Khrushchev, reduced their number from more than 250,000 early in 1950 to 97,000 in 1953. The gap has thus increased between the rural and the membership of the enlarged kolkhoz and the management, consisting now and more of specialists and other officials, with the resulting enhanced driving power of re-assignment over labor. There is no indication of any change from this course, though, judging from statements of Soviet spokesmen, the problem of finding loyal and competent managers continues to be a headache to Soviet authorities. Needless to say, the election of kolkhoz managers prescribed by law has become more of a fiction than ever before.

It is true that Khrushchev criticizes the excessively centralized planning of agriculture,¹ which, as many objective observers had long ago pointed out, kills "grass roots" initiative. However, the Malenkov-Khrushchev program actually calls not for relaxation of controls but for increased regimentation by tightening the total party tutelage over the kolkhoz. In this connection, Khrushchev's "suggestion" that 50,000 Communists be sent as party workers to the countryside is symptomatic.

The rural Communist party apparatus was reorganized so as to allocate better the responsibility for supervision over

kolkhozy. A responsible party official secretary of the regional committee of the Communist party is to be detailed with a group of Communist associates to each state machine tractor station or MTS, serving a group of kolkhozy. He is to be accountable to the first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist party—the real boss of the regions.

The role of the increasingly important MTS was further enhanced. It is to become the decisive force in the development of kolkhoz production, the most important prop for direction of policy by the socialist state.² In general, the tie-up between the kolkhoz and the MTS has become closer with the enlargement of the farm unit. This has been further developed by the Malenkov-Khrushchev program, still without changing their identities.

Various measures were prescribed for the improvement of technical education and training of the workers of the MTS. Two decisions merit special attention. First, there is the reorganization of the staff of permanent MTS workers by the transfer of several categories of kolkhoz men who were formerly employed only seasonally. This strengthens the staff of MTS over the farm labor force, to the disadvantage of the latter. The kolkhoz, however, will continue to contribute a part of the wages of these workers. The second decision is the transfer of industry and the administrative apparatus to the MTS and kolkhoz extralaboratory of technicians, engineers, agronomists, and livestock specialists, and skilled labor, especially workers with farm experience, such as tractor drivers, combine operators, etc. The novelty of this move will be fully apparent when it is remembered that, especially since the

¹ *Izvestia*, the USSR newspaper, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.

² *Izvestia*, *L. Chkhv.*, September 18, 1953, and March 21, 1954.

³ *Izvestia*, *L. Chkhv.*, September 18, 1953, and March 21, 1954.

war, skilled labor was channeled for the most part out of agriculture. Even Khrushchev admitted that during the postwar period "a large number of the most literate and cultured kolkhozniki have transferred to industry,"⁸ with unfavorable repercussions on agriculture.

Various inducements are offered to the technicians and workers transferring to the MTS, including noninterest-bearing ten-year loans for building individual houses. The shift from the cities to the countryside is supposed to be, in accordance with the time-honored Soviet custom, "an enthusiastically voluntary" one, and many stories have appeared in the Soviet press since the autumn of 1953 confirming such "socialist enthusiasm." But there were also reports of a distinct lack of enthusiasm for roughing it in the countryside beyond the suburbs. That the qualifications of those transferred are often not up to the mark is patent from Khrushchev's remarks at a conference of provincial editors. He said that, while much is being written about the number of specialists and other workers shifted from industry to agriculture, "there is silence as to who is being sent and whether these workers are able to render real assistance to the kolkhozy, MTS, and state farms." In any event, it was officially reported in the Soviet press on January 31, 1954, that by the end of 1953 more than 100,000 agronomists and animal husbandry specialists and a considerable number of engineers and mechanics were transferred to MTS and kolkhozy.

More important perhaps than this mobilization campaign, which, like all Soviet mass campaigns, is bound to have many pitfalls, is the laying down by the highest Soviet authorities, even if im-

plicitly, of the principle that Soviet agriculture should not be denuded of brains and skill in favor of industry. Thus, Khrushchev chides the "gentlemanly bureaucratic" attitude toward the work in the countryside among "some Communists occupying even responsible positions. . . . Such people do not understand the simple truth that without the advance of agriculture the problem of building Communism cannot be successfully solved. Communist society cannot be built without an abundance of grain, meat, milk, butter, vegetables, and other agricultural products."⁹ However, to implement this principle of nondiscrimination against agriculture in distribution of manpower will be difficult unless the living conditions in the countryside, which are inferior even to those in the Russian cities, are considerably improved.

Like so many previous Soviet plans, the Malenkov-Khrushchev program concerns itself with raising the productivity of Russian farming and with increasing crop yields per unit of land and per worker. The problem of improved farm practices and management, planned and directed from above, therefore looms as large as it did during the Stalin era. But there are significant departures from the Stalin pattern. The prominent nostrum of the magic-producing Lysenko-Michurinist science and the "Great Stalinist Plan of Reconstruction of Nature" through afforestation of the dry steppes and irrigation are considerably deflated or shelved.

While apparently shedding or modifying some of the unrealistic aspects of

⁸The Russian word *kolhoz*, translated as "collective farm," has come to mean in Russia even before the Revolution "agricultural" in the Vernadskian sense.

⁹*Pravda*, October 18, 1953.

⁸*Pravda* and *Isvestia*, September 15, 1953.

⁹*Pravda*, December 3, 1953.

Stalin's program of agricultural improvement, his successors went far beyond in one important respect, namely, the increasing use of commercial fertilizer. The idea itself is sound, since higher crop yields depend upon increased application of fertilizer, especially in the northern and central agricultural regions outside the Black Soil belt, where soils are naturally less productive but crops are not endangered by frequent droughts. Furthermore, the reduced supply of manure, owing to smaller numbers of livestock, increases the need for commercial fertilizer, which so far has been used predominantly for the more valuable crops, such as cotton and sugar beets, and very little for grains, forage crops, and oil seeds. However, the exceedingly high targets for fertilizer production, increasing from some 6 million metric tons in 1953 to 16.5-17.5 million in 1959, and to 28-30 million in 1964, do not appear realistic. No less problematic seems to be the most recent phase of the new agricultural program, the projected considerable extension of acreage under grain in the dry area.¹⁰

In accordance with a long established Soviet practice, the big stick in the

¹⁰ Yet another serious weakness in the agricultural front, that of inadequate crop production, was revealed, contrary to earlier Soviet optimism, by an expedition of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in March 1954. *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 6, 1954. A report on the subject by Khrushchev, made on February 23, 1954, was published in *Pravda* and *Trud* on Mar. 21. The area called for the sowing by 1955 of at least 15,000,000 hectares of 100,000 acres of grain, mostly spring wheat on the Virgin Land or large long-out-of-cultivation east of the Volga and parts of the Urals, south of the Siberia and Kazakhstan. Thousands of young men and women all over the country have been mobilized as "volunteers" to help in this project. The unfavorable climatic conditions and often inferior soils in many of these regions, coupled with organizational difficulties that have already cropped up, make the Kremlin's expectation of a production of an additional 18-20 million tons of grain seem exceedingly optimistic.

Malenkov-Khrushchev program was accompanied by the proverbial carrot, perhaps a somewhat larger carrot than usual, for the "Lokhovy." During the Stalin era the provision of economic incentives in agriculture usually took two directions. The main one was *stakhanovism*, in which high material rewards and often better working conditions were set for a small number of pace-making workers or groups of workers. The high performance standards of *stakhanovites*, frequently achieved under such favorable conditions, helped the management to drive the rest of the labor force harder. The other direction, a more bypath, was the increase of *lokhozy* earnings through higher prices. It was practiced during the Stalin era with regard to a limited number of crops, such as cotton, sugar beets, and a few others, when a rapid and large increase in production was deemed urgent.

The Malenkov-Khrushchev program has concentrated on the second method of increasing economic incentives by raising prices in those branches of agriculture where progress was slow or non-existent. As was pointed out earlier, the prices for compulsory delivery of animal products, potatoes, and vegetables were increased. The compulsory delivery quotas for potatoes and vegetables were at the same time reduced for *lokhozy*.

Enough has been said already about Soviet failure in animal husbandry. It is only necessary to call attention to the new serious obstacle to future statistical appraisals of the Soviet livestock situation created by moving the count of livestock from January to October. As a consequence, the needed historical statistical framework of reference will be lacking, since livestock data are only available for winter and, for a few years, for summer months. Livestock numbers vary, some

times considerably, between different periods of a year. For instance, during the period 1931-38 the average variation between winter and summer counts was as follows: cows, 8.1 per cent; all cattle, 23.7 per cent; hogs, 21 per cent; and sheep and goats nearly 50 per cent.¹¹ This factor precludes comparison between different years unless the data are for the same period.

As for potatoes, they not only are a valuable article of the human diet but also are important in animal feeding—a problem that looms large on the Soviet agricultural horizon. Potatoes are also an inexpensive source of alcohol, which has varied industrial uses. I shall not venture into the details of the unsatisfactory potato and vegetable situation revealed by the Khrushchev, except to note the difficulties arising from the low degree of mechanization contrasted with such crops as wheat and other small grains, sugar beets, and cotton. This has meant heavy reliance on hand labor, which has become a long-standing bottleneck in Russian agriculture since the second World War. Certainly the present shortage of potatoes and vegetables in state stores contrasts the pessimistic analysis of the Soviet leaders. Under such conditions the 50 per cent reduction of retail prices of potatoes and vegetables in state stores on April 1, 1953, is a vivid example of how a controlled price mechanism should not be administered.

I have already pointed out that the increase in delivery prices is not as imposing as it appears, since it applies to a very low price base. Furthermore, it is significant that the low prices of grain, the most important crop, accounting for about 70 per cent of the Russian crop acreage, have not been raised. It is also a question

of how much the increase in delivery prices will percolate to the rank and file members of collectives, considering the large capital investment, the heavy overhead for administration, and the huge waste prevalent in collective farming. And, in the last analysis, there is the problem of the supply of consumers' goods, on the adequacy and reasonable pricing of which the real value of any increase in cash income of collective farmers depends.

Another reform which bears on economic incentives is the elimination of the widespread practice of saddling with higher delivery quotas the more efficient collective farmers having a larger output. As Khrushchev put it, "as soon as a kolkhoz surpasses its neighbor, the government procuring agents trip it just as a gardener trims the Zlashes with shears."¹² This squeezing of the more efficient collectives is contrary to Soviet law requiring, as a rule, uniform quotas per unit of land for kolkhozy in the same district. Yet, the palpably illegal practice revealed by Khrushchev was obviously tolerated by authorities, and it would be hazardous to bank on its disappearance, despite the frowning of the Kremlin.

So much for the Malenkov-Khrushchev program. Returning to the question raised at the outset, it appears on the basis of the foregoing review that, with a more decisive emphasis on consumers' goods, the Soviet economic policy has, in a sense, acquired a "new look," though its continuity is by no means assured. In agriculture this is much less so. Some of the Stalinist farm programs were delated to more realistic proportions by elimination

¹¹ *Izv. TsSU SSSR*, 1953, No. 13, 1953. The data on agricultural production are not included in the report, as well as the employment, and quantities of land, from better land, more advanced as to form and superior capital endowment.

¹² *Izv. TsSU SSSR*, 1953, No. 19, 1953. See also *Izv. TsSU SSSR*, 1949, p. 1.

ing a certain amount of gigantomania. Private farming of *kolkhozniki* has won what seems to be a temporary reprieve. Greater attention is focused on economic incentives in line with the more liberal policy with respect to consumers' goods. But the main emphasis continues to be centered, as during Stalin's era, on the agrarian supercollectivism and party domination, even though they have largely failed thus far to raise agricultural productivity in the U.S.S.R.

That a serious improvement is likely to take place in the short run in the agricultural situation, as a consequence of the Malenkov-Khrushchev policy, is problematical. It is symptomatic that shortly after his celebrated report to the Central Committee, Khrushchev was

already denouncing the delays in implementation of the new policy decisions.¹⁷ And once again the most backward sector—animal husbandry—was a prominent target for complaints which sang that familiar duet about the inadequacy of forage supplies and livestock shelters. But in the long run, one must not overlook the impact of the new industrial, labor, and investment policies on agriculture, assuming, of course, that such policies are not short-lived. By creating a more favorable environment for collective agriculture, they would provide, by the same token, a decisive test of its productive capacity.

¹⁷ For a detailed account of the policy of de-Stalinization, see *The Soviet Union: A History*, by G. F. Taylor, 2nd ed., (New York, 1957), pp. 107-110, 113-114, 117-118, 121-122, 124-125, 127-128, 130-131, 133-134, 136-137, 139-140, 142-143, 145-146, 148-149, 151-152, 154-155, 157-158, 160-161, 163-164, 166-167, 169-170, 172-173, 175-176, 178-179, 181-182, 184-185, 187-188, 190-191, 193-194, 196-197, 199-200, 202-203, 205-206, 208-209, 211-212, 214-215, 217-218, 220-221, 223-224, 226-227, 229-230, 232-233, 235-236, 238-239, 241-242, 244-245, 247-248, 250-251, 253-254, 256-257, 259-260, 262-263, 265-266, 268-269, 271-272, 274-275, 277-278, 280-281, 283-284, 286-287, 289-290, 292-293, 295-296, 298-299, 301-302, 304-305, 307-308, 310-311, 313-314, 316-317, 319-320, 322-323, 325-326, 328-329, 331-332, 334-335, 337-338, 340-341, 343-344, 346-347, 349-350, 352-353, 355-356, 358-359, 361-362, 364-365, 367-368, 370-371, 373-374, 376-377, 379-380, 382-383, 385-386, 388-389, 391-392, 394-395, 397-398, 400-401, 403-404, 406-407, 409-410, 412-413, 415-416, 418-419, 421-422, 424-425, 427-428, 430-431, 433-434, 436-437, 439-440, 442-443, 445-446, 448-449, 451-452, 454-455, 457-458, 460-461, 463-464, 466-467, 469-470, 472-473, 475-476, 478-479, 481-482, 484-485, 487-488, 490-491, 493-494, 496-497, 499-500, 502-503, 505-506, 508-509, 511-512, 514-515, 517-518, 520-521, 523-524, 526-527, 529-530, 532-533, 535-536, 538-539, 541-542, 544-545, 547-548, 550-551, 553-554, 556-557, 559-560, 562-563, 565-566, 568-569, 571-572, 574-575, 577-578, 580-581, 583-584, 586-587, 589-590, 592-593, 595-596, 598-599, 601-602, 604-605, 607-608, 610-611, 613-614, 616-617, 619-620, 622-623, 625-626, 628-629, 631-632, 634-635, 637-638, 640-641, 643-644, 646-647, 649-650, 652-653, 655-656, 658-659, 661-662, 664-665, 667-668, 670-671, 673-674, 676-677, 679-680, 682-683, 685-686, 688-689, 691-692, 694-695, 697-698, 700-701, 703-704, 706-707, 709-710, 712-713, 715-716, 718-719, 721-722, 724-725, 727-728, 730-731, 733-734, 736-737, 739-740, 742-743, 745-746, 748-749, 751-752, 754-755, 757-758, 760-761, 763-764, 766-767, 769-770, 772-773, 775-776, 778-779, 781-782, 784-785, 787-788, 790-791, 793-794, 796-797, 799-800, 802-803, 805-806, 808-809, 811-812, 814-815, 817-818, 820-821, 823-824, 826-827, 829-830, 832-833, 835-836, 838-839, 841-842, 844-845, 847-848, 850-851, 853-854, 856-857, 859-860, 862-863, 865-866, 868-869, 871-872, 874-875, 877-878, 880-881, 883-884, 886-887, 889-890, 892-893, 895-896, 898-899, 901-902, 904-905, 907-908, 910-911, 913-914, 916-917, 919-920, 922-923, 925-926, 928-929, 931-932, 934-935, 937-938, 940-941, 943-944, 946-947, 949-950, 952-953, 955-956, 958-959, 961-962, 964-965, 967-968, 970-971, 973-974, 976-977, 979-980, 982-983, 985-986, 988-989, 991-992, 994-995, 997-998, 1000-1001.

1 SEC

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1272	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. # 4284	DATE OF DOCUMENT 2 June 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 6 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
NATIONAL DEFENSE				
2. <u>Current Developments:</u>				
....				
b. Government Makes Concessions on NDC: Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> told Diet members on 31 May that government plans for the National Defense Council will include membership for about five non-government persons, with tenure of from three to six years. OGATA indicated no change in plans for membership of key cabinet ministers.				
<u>Comment.</u> OGATA insisted that including non-government personnel on the National Defense Council would not involve reduction in the authority of the Prime Minister, who will head the Council.....				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
1 SEC				
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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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(35)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-124-3-343	SOURCE Enc. 1 FJBA-717	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 June 1954	ANALYST
SUBJECT Semi Monthly Report - 16-31 May 1954			DATE 3 Nov 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Dispatch from			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM A COPY RETAINED AT AREA DESK.			
B. POLITICAL			
1. <u>The Defense Situation in Japan and BGSAMURAI</u>			
.....			
f. The leadership of the ten sub-projects include some of the more prominent personages in the spheres of industry, politics, government, military, etc.(5) () president is <u>OGATA Taketora</u> , currently Deputy Premier of Japan and a strong contender for the premiership.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
PERMISSION TO INCLUDE IN () GRANTED BY: ()			
DIV. <u>FE (L) Japan</u> <u>2 Nov 1955</u>			
SECRET			
CROSS-REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-164	SOURCE FJB-131	DATE OF DOCUMENT 14 June 1954	ANALYST []
SUBJECT Attitude of Proposed Conservative Party towards Japan Communist Party			DATE 15 Sept 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Report from Tokyo Japan Under <u>Source, Operational Data, and Comments</u> in this report subject is mentioned in connection with one ETO, fnu. [] took part in the survey and interviewed ETO, fnu, a confidant of <u>OGATA Taketora</u> whom [] believes to be a "nationalist" and Diet member".			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
SECRET			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM		FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. []	

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1269	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. # 4303	DATE OF DOCUMENT 21 June 1954	ANALYST []
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 6 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
Economic Report			
2. <u>Economic Policy:</u>			
a. <u>Government and Banking Leaders Express Views:</u> High government and banking officials spoke on economic policy matters at an annual Japan Banking Association conference on 10 June. Speakers included Prime Minister YOSHIDA, Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA Taketora</u>			
<u>Japan Press Summary</u>			
<u>Today's Tokyo News papers</u>			
POLITICS			
.....			
Yesterday HATOYAMA Ichiro held "an important conference" on the new party question with Japan Liberals: ISHIBASHI and MIKI Bakichi. It seems that they agreed to "do their most to prevent new party negotiations from rupturing." But ISHIBASHI had talked over the story earlier with Deputy Prime Minister OGATA, discovering that YOSHIDA and most Liberal leaders felt more new party talks would be "meaningless."			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1271	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum.# 4320	DATE OF DOCUMENT 8 July 1954	ANALYST E J	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 6 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
Japan Press Summary				
Today's Tokyo News papers				
POLITICS				
The Liberals yesterday tried to adjust intraparty differences over the new-party issue. Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> and Liberal Chief Secretary <u>SAITO</u> conferred with <u>KISHI Shinsuke</u> , <u>ISHIBASHI Tanzan</u> and <u>KANEMITSU Tsuneo</u> —three Liberals actively pushing the new-party campaign. They worked out a three-point agreement that temporarily averted an open break.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> CROSS REFERENCE FORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(C) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. E J	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-16-171	SOURCE FJB-184	DATE OF DOCUMENT 9 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT Threat by INOUE Nissho			DATE 15 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Report from () Source: American businessman in Tokyo (B), from one of his employees (F), from a Japanese politician (F). Date of Info: 1 July 1954 Dissemination number: CS-44210			Evaluation: B,F,F,-3	
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
INOUE Nissho recently told a State Minister (name unknown) that he (INOUE) would arrange the assassination of Prime Minister YOSHIDA and KIMURA Tokutaro. ¹				
¹ Source Comment.An extreme rightist, INOUE is a strong supporter of the former Genyosha of which OGATA Taketora was a member.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1280	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. #4322	DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 July 1954	ANALYST C)	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM</p> <p>Communist Trends and Activities -- Summary of Japanese Press</p> <p>"PEACE" CAMPAIGN</p> <p><u>JCPer Tells of "Merchant of Death" Party.</u> The Defense Production Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations will challenge the "national craving for peace" in a day or two with a US-Japan joint party at the Industrial Club "to celebrate the 1,000,000-mark in shell production."...The planned toasting will be "to increased consumption of shells by the US Forces and bigger special procurement orders." General HULL and US Embassy staff members are on the invitation list, along with Japanese Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA....</u></p>				
<p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT. ✓</p>				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Not Classified	SOURCE State F # 59	DATE OF DOCUMENT 13 July 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Despatch from () The following information is excerpted verbatim from the FE/1/dossier. <i>Japan</i> The three most prominent anti-Yoshida leaders of today, KISHI Shinsuke, ISHIBASHI Tanzan and ASHIDA Hitoshi, are said to have some sort of agreement with <u>OGATA</u> , whereby they would back him at some future date should YOSHIDA try to bypass OGATA for IKEDA Hayato. Probably the three would not support OGATA for long, even if he did inherit YOSHIDA's mantle. Foregoing is opinion of MATSUDA Takechiyo, 7-times Diet man from Osaka.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1286	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel Sum. 4326	DATE OF DOCUMENT 14 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intel. Summary - Daily			DATE 7 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
POLITICAL REPORT				
1. <u>Conservative Merger Efforts:</u>				
....				
b. <u>Liberal Party Blocks Preparatory Committee:</u> At the 9 July Tri-Party Council meeting, leaders of the new party movement had planned to form a "New Party Preparatory Committee," but dropped the idea after the main leadership of the Liberal Party voiced strong objections. The Council decided to go ahead, however, with a nationwide stumping tour intended to build public support for the new party movement. On 12 Jul, KISHI Shinsuke met with Liberal Party Sec. Gen. SATO, Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> , KISHI, ISHIBASHI and KANEMITSU to work out agreement on the stumping tour.				
<u>Comment:</u> The New Party Preparatory Committee, if formed, would have represented the most definite commitment to date on formation of a new conservative party. Prior to the 9 Jul meeting, OGATA and SATO had made it clear to KISHI, ISHIBASHI and others that the main leadership of the Liberal Party opposed such a move.....				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ()	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1282	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum.	DATE OF DOCUMENT 18 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 7 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
POLITICS				
Prime Minister YOSHIDA telephoned Chief Cabinet Secretary FUKUNAGA from his Oiso residence yesterday morning. He told FUKUNAGA to work on raising necessary yen in line with talks with the World Bank survey mission—due to arrive today. FUKUNAGA followed up YOSHIDA's advice. He made arrangements with Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> and Trade-Industry Minister AICHI on loan talk matters.....				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1290	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. # 4333	DATE OF DOCUMENT 21 July 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 7 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
Japan Press Summary Today's Tokyo Newspapers POLITICS Strong opposition has emerged within the Liberal Party to Prime Minister YOSHIDA's plan to give the chief secretary post to IKEDA Hayato.... Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> advised YOSHIDA to drop IKEDA. He explained that too many Liberals would oppose IKEDA's taking over the chief secretary post.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 201-60842	SOURCE FJB-209	DATE OF DOCUMENT 23 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT TANAKA Eiichi			DATE 2 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: 2	
Report from [] Source: Through an [] Japanese () Date of Information: July 1954				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
2. TANAKA believes that the chances of the conservatives forming a new party this summer are quite good. There is also a possibility of the Diet being dissolved in the fall or possibly in February. Most likely candidates for the next Prime Minister, in his opinion, are KISHII Shinsuke, HAYASHI Joji, <u>OGATA Taketora</u> , ASHIDA Kin or NOMURA Kichisaburo.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. Not Classified	SOURCE FBIS 145	DATE OF DOCUMENT 28 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT Foreign Broadcast Information Service			DATE 24 October 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION The following information is excerpted verbatim from FE/1/dossier. Japan Deputy Premier <u>OGATA Taketora</u> was appointed Jul 27 to head the Hokkaido Development Board, succeeding new Liberal Executive Board Chairman ONO. Earlier, Construction Minister OZAWA had been announced for the post. The change was made at the request of Hokkaido local officials who asked that a minister without portfolio be selected. (FBIS No. 145, 28 July 54, Tokyo, Kyodo)				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ()	

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1291y2	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. #4341	DATE OF DOCUMENT 29 July 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 7 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
POLITICAL REPORT				
2. <u>Current Developments:</u>				
a. OGATA to Head Hokkaido Development Agency: Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA</u> Taketora on 27 July was appointed director of the government's Hokkaido Development Agency. He will retain his position as Deputy Prime Minister.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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Date: 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 14 AUG 54

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ()

ACTION: FE 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/I, DD/P, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, AD/CI, FI/RI 2

() 0655 (IN 36633)

1153Z 14 AUG 54

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

INFO: ()

CITE: ()

JAMI INTEL

DURING ROUTINE LIAISON MEETING 12 AUG KIMURA KOZO, CHIEF CABINET RESEARCH CHAMBER, INFORMED () THAT HE HAD CONFERRED WITH DPM OGATA EARLIER THAT DAY. OGATA HAD ASKED KIMURA TO CONVEY FOLLOWING TO () (FOR KUEARK): WHILE MANY PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED RE POSSIBILITY JAPAN MAY EXPAND RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, OGATA WISHES ASSURE US THAT NO CHANGE IS CONTEMPLATED IN JAP FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON POLICY OF CONTINUING CLOSE COOPERATION WITH U.S., ENGLAND AND OTHER FREE NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

X REF FORM FILED

S-E-C-R-E-T

41	11	10	14
ABSTRACT	INDEX		
DATE NOV 2 - 1954			

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

ORIG : ()
UNIT : FE
EXT : 8742
DATE : 16 AUG 54

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, NSA, JCS, SECDEF, ONE, OCI
FROM : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF : FE 6
INFO : DD/1, FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/STC, FI/STD 2, FI/RQM 3, PP 3,
FI/RI 2

CONTROL U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CS PD 935 (OUT 69355) 1829Z 16 AUG 54

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

FROM : () (12 AUGUST 1954)
DATE OF INFO: 12 AUGUST 1954
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : 2 (THAT STATEMENT WAS MADE AS REPORTED).
SOURCE : THROUGH AN () JAPANESE ()
SUBJECT : STATEMENT BY OGATA TAKETORA ON JAPANESE FOREIGN
POLICY

ON 12 AUGUST, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER:
OGATA TAKETORA MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AND ASKED THAT IT BE
CONVEYED TO U.S. OFFICIALS: WHILE MANY PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED
REGARDING POSSIBILITY JAPAN MAY EXPAND RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNIST:
CHINA, OGATA WISHES TO ASSURE U.S. OFFICIALS THAT NO CHANGE IS
CONTEMPLATED IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO
BE BASED ON POLICY OF CONTINUING CLOSE COOPERATION WITH U.S., GREAT
BRITAIN AND OTHER FREE NATIONS.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE
FORMAL DISSEMINATION FOLLOWS IN CS - 44733 (END OF MESSAGE)

THE ABOVE INFO BASED ON () 0655 (IN 36623)

()
CHIEF, ROW/RC
RELEASING OFFICER

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FOR

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CHIEF, EE/ET/REPORTS
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JAPA-655 89

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS-44733
SUBJECT	Statement by OGATA Taketora on Japanese Foreign Policy	DATE DISTR.	19 August 1954
DATE OF INFO.	12 August 1954	NO. OF PAGES	1
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo (12 August 1954)	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Through an () Japanese () Appraisal of Content. 2 (that the statement was made as reported).

THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREVIOUSLY
CLASSIFIED AS PRELIMINARY PD-935
DISSEMINATION NUMBERED

On 12 August 1954, in a private conversation, Deputy Prime Minister OGATA Taketora made the following statement and asked that it be conveyed to U.S. officials:

While many people are concerned regarding the possibility that Japan may expand her relationship with Communist China, OGATA wishes to assure U.S. officials that no change is contemplated in Japanese foreign policy, which will continue to be based on a policy of continuing close cooperation with the U.S., Great Britain and other free nations.

1. Washington Comment. According to press reports from Tokyo dated 12 August, a similar statement on Japanese foreign policy was made by an official spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Office.

LIBRARY SUBJECT AND AREA CODES

C-02-0404 8/54
122.162 3L(YZ)(CL) (71)

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(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

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NE		WH					TAMI	4		C 0655					
SE										N					

TIB
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CABLE

444-1-24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 20 AUG 54

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ()

ACTION: FE 6

INFO: FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2

Japanese Foreign Relations
OSATA Taketara

() 0673 (IN 33182)

0614Z 20 AUG 54

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: ()

PRECEDENCE

CITE: ()

SAWI INTEL

RE: () 0655 (IN 36623)

REF SHOULD BEAR FJB 267.

END OF MESSAGE

44	7	24	24
ABSTRACT		INDEX	
<i>Search 11/16/55</i>			
DATE: NOV 16 1954			

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-16-190	SOURCE FJB-359	DATE OF DOCUMENT 5 Sept 1954	ANALYST C)	
SUBJECT Anti-Democratic Activities Countermeasures Committee			DATE 15 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B-2	
<p>Report from : C)</p> <p>Source: Japanese official close to a member of the Japanese Cabinet</p> <p>Date of Info: September 1954</p> <p>Dissemination no. CS-49701</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The Anti-Democratic Activities Countermeasures Committee (Han Minshu Shugi Katsudo Taisaku Iinkai) was established on 15 September 1954 by the Japanese Cabinet to combat the activities of the extreme rightist and leftist elements... The Committee will be managed by Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA Taketora</u>,⁴ but it will not be an extension of his intelligence organization (the CRC). It will be more a coordinating agency for the exchange among government agencies of information on the extremist elements. Major emphasis will be placed on matters concerning the Japanese armed forces. The Committee will also be concerned with the dissemination of information to private organizations such as the Central Investigation Agency (Chuo Chose Sha)⁵. <u>Source Comment.</u> In his management of the Committee OGATA will be advised and guided by Defense Chief KIMURA. <u>Field Comment.</u> The Central Investigation Agency was established on 1 Oct 1954, according to Japanese press announcement of that date...Acting Prime Minister OGATA Taketora announced that this Agency will not be connected with the Government, but the <u>Tokyo Shimbun</u> stated that it is slated to receive about 5,400,000 yen as a subsidy from the government this year and is being considered for a 20,000,000 yen subsidy for the next fiscal year.. <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
SECRET			C)	

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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(3) Foreign Relations

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(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJBA-2100

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1 OCT 1954

TO Chief, FE

DATE _____
Info: SR/NA

FROM Chief, () Mission CPM

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
 SPECIFIC Meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister

Ref: FJBA-2017 dated 22 Sep 54 Ag Op

Attached M/R is enclosure to Ref.

[]
Deputy KUFIRE

Enclosure:
1 - M/R, 21 Sep 54 (in dup.)

28 September 1954

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters, w/encl as noted
1 - SR/NA, w/o encl

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
200-7-23-1296	FEC/AIS Intel. Sum. 4/1/09	5 Oct 1954	C J	
SUBJECT			DATE	
FEC/AIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			10 Oct 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>INTELLIGENCE TOPICS</p> <p>1. <u>Current Developments:</u></p> <p><u>d. Debut of CIA:</u> (CONFIDENTIAL) The Central Investigation Agency (CIA) (Fecuo Chosha), allegedly a private business enterprise (INTSUM 4396), started functioning on 1 Oct 54. CIA's offices are in the Jiji News Agency's branch, and the organization is composed of Jiji personnel and members of former National Public Opinion Survey Institute (NPOSI). (The NPOSI was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office, but was abolished recently under the Administrative Structural Reorganization Law enacted in the last Diet session.) A combination survey and polling institute and commercial detective agency, CIA consists of six departments whose functions include: 1) survey of the press, radio and other mass media of information; 2) market and corporation research; 3) answering inquiries on trade and other topics; 4) quality control services; and 5) sampling of domestic and international public opinion. TODA Tamao, 68, professor emeritus of Tokyo University and expert on public opinion polling, is president. Prominent on the CIA board of directors are: MATSUKATA Yoshisaburo, managing director of Kyodo News Agency; HASEGAWA Saizo, president of Jiji Press; and FURUNO Inosuke, presurrender chief of the defunct Domei News Agency.</p> <p>The Japanese Government is to be CIA's prime customer, and expects to pay it 5,400,000 yen (originally appropriated for the abolished NPOSI and left unused in the 1954 budget) during the first year of its operations as a fee for supplying varied types of information to the Government. This sum is expected to amount to 20,000,000 yen the following year. Because Deputy Prime Minister OGATA Taketora was among CIA's promoters, and because the Government business CIA is to handle will consist mainly of feeding information to the recently formed intra-Cabinet body, the Anti-Democratic Activities Countermeasures Council (ADACC) (INTSUM 4396), suspicion has been aroused that CIA may become a special Government intelligence agency such as envisioned by OGATA some time ago. The Japanese press has widely criticized both ADACC and CIA as bureaucratic publicity instruments to serve the will of the Government in leading public opinion and forcing Government-made news on the press.</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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DEC 1952

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REPORT NO. FJD-41C

CONTROL
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INFORMATION REPORT
(CONTROLLED AMERICAN SOURCE)

COUNTRY Japan

DATE DISTR. 28 October 1954

SUBJECT Recent Political Developments

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo

NO. OF ENCLS. 0
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF
INFO. September-October 1954

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	1.	2.	3. X	4.	5.	6.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Japanese journalist (B) from another Japanese journalist (F)

1. KISHI Nobusuke met with OGATA Takatora on the night of 1 October 1954 and invited OGATA to join the New Party Formation Preparatory Council as the representative of the OGATA faction of the Liberal Party. KISHI proposed as an inducement that OGATA become president of the new party following short intermediary incumbency by HATOYAMA Ichiro. KISHI emphasized the importance of OGATA's help in obtaining a majority for the new party in the House of Representatives. OGATA gently declined the offer stating that it would be improper for a deputy Prime Minister to join an organization planning to overthrow the Premier.¹ During the meeting OGATA also expressed the opinion that YOSHIDA would retire after his return from abroad.
2. OGATA's refusal of KISHI's offer widened a split in OGATA's supporters, the majority of whom backed OGATA's refusal to join the New Party Preparatory Council. A minority, however, favor cooperating with KISHI in promoting the candidacy of HATOYAMA on the grounds that the YOSHIDA era is already a thing of the past and will give way to a new era to be dominated either by SHIGEMITSU or OGATA.
3. SATO Eisaku recently stated the one of the major factors standing in the way of YOSHIDA's retirement in favor of HATOYAMA is that HATOYAMA is too honest and too talkative. He cannot therefore be made aware of all the secret understandings and commitments existing between the U.S. and Japan for which YOSHIDA is responsible.
4. Business circles have no confidence in HATOYAMA or in his supporters IKKI Bakichi and KONO Ichiro. It is rumored, however, that business groups would support HATOYAMA as a temporary candidate if assured he would give way to either OGATA, SHIGEMITSU, or KISHI.
5. The program favored by KISHI and his supporters calls for modification of deflationary measures and opening of trade with the Communist bloc. This program has strong appeal in business, industrial and financial circles. YOSHIDA will have to bring back important commitments from the powers he is visiting if he is to offset the allure of KISHI's pronouncements (opinion). Most prospective members of the new conservative party do not wish to commit themselves before YOSHIDA returns.

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44-7-25-45

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FJB-410

Page 2

- 1 Source Comment. It may be recalled that the new party movement was started originally by OGATA as an expedient to ward off the threat to the YOSHIDA cabinet resulting from the ship-building scandal. OGATA launched the new party movement to distract the nation's attention from the scandal, intending to use it to consolidate the Liberal Party under the leadership of YOSHIDA.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-35-5	SOURCE ()-1021 IN-20160	DATE OF DOCUMENT 1 Nov 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Pre-Election Situation	FJB-421 (CS-50134)	DATE 8 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: F-3
Cable from () Source: Japanese conservative Member House of Councillors with long Diet and government experience (F) Date of Info: 30 Oct 1954			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 9 Nov 1954			
2. The ninety-four Upper House members of the Liberal Party are united under the leadership of MATSUNO Tsuruhei. If the Lower House liberals reach a stalemate, the Upper House liberals plan to force the acceptance of the following persons to the NPPC: pro-YOSHIDA liberals UCHIDA Shinya, ONO Bamboku, MASUTANI Hideji, HAYASHI Joji; OGATA Taketora and TAGO Ichimin; HATOYAMA and his followers TANAKA Manitsu, HOSHIJIMA Jiro, KANEMITSU Tsuneo, ASHIDA Hitoshi and ISHIBASHI Tanzan; neutrals KISHI and MATSUNO; and five other persons not yet named. The present chairman and the secretaries-general of the present parties would not be permitted to sit on the NPPC.			
4. IKEDA desires the Premiership for HAYASHI Joji, whom IKEDA believes he can control, although IKEDA appears to favor YOSHIDA and OGATA as his first and second choice for Premier.....			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.			
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DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. ()	SOURCE FJB-426	DATE OF DOCUMENT 4 Nov 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT ASHIDA Hitoshi		DATE 2 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Report from () Source: Japanese Conservative member of the House of Councillors with long Diet and Government experience Date of Info: October 1954			Evaluation: F-3
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
1. ASHIDA Hitoshi's relationship to Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA Taketora</u> is very close. If OGATA were to become Prime Minister, ASHIDA would most likely become his Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister concurrently.....			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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Date: 2005

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-35-12	SOURCE -1064 IN-2293	DATE OF DOCUMENT 12 Nov 1954	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT Japanese Foreign Minister OKAZAKI Taipei Trip Cancellation			DATE 16 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B-3	
<p>Cable from () Source: Trained American observer (B) 11 Nov from ChiNat Ambassador Hollington TONG Date of Info: 10 Nov</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 17 Nov 1954</p> <p>1. On 10 November 1954 Hollington TONG learned that Japan Foreign Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo cabled the Japanese Ambassador in Taipei that OKAZAKI's visit to Taiwan was cancelled and that OKAZAKI was returning to Tokyo for "pressing business." The Japanese Ambassador in Taipei told the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry, which cabled TONG. Upon learning of the cancellation, TONG searched for acting Premier OGATA Taketora. TONG found OGATA in the country at 11 p.m. and pleaded for a half hour for OGATA to cable OKAZAKI. TONG told OGATA that he had learned of OKAZAKI's change in plans from United States sources in Taiwan, and that the United States was concerned. TONG also told OGATA that if OKAZAKI did not go to Taipei, the press would interpret it as a slap at free China and the United States.</p> <p>2. OGATA finally agreed with TONG and sent a cable at 11:30 p.m. on 10 Nov to Hong Kong advising OKAZAKI to go to Taipei and that there was no important business in Japan.</p> <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-197	SOURCE FJB-453	DATE OF DOCUMENT 15 Nov 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Political Developments			DATE 15 Sept 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Report from () Source: Japanese journalist Date of Info: 1 Nov 1954			Evaluation: B-3
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM			
3. Liberal Party members IKEDA Hayato, <u>OGATA Taketora</u> and HAYASHI Kamejiro are leading a movement to split the Progressive Party. They are working in close cooperation with ASHIDA Hitoshi. OGATA and IKEDA have reportedly obtained 10,000,000 yen to be used for this purpose.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-16-195	SOURCE FJTA-5746	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Nov 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT SIS/NA Study on Japanese Conservative Leaders			DATE 17 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Dispatch from : () THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM <u>Brief Evaluation of Pro US Orientation of Possible Future Conservative Leaders.</u> 2. <u>OGATA Taketora</u> - There seems to be general agreement that OGATA may have a good chance to be Prime Minister if YOSHIDA has anything to say about it. Even though OGATA's policies are difficult to separate from those YOSHIDA's there is no doubt that OGATA would continue to adhere to a strong pro-US position as long as it were possible. He is described politically as strongly conservative, and would not conceive of any political rapprochement with the Soviet Orbit. He would probably see future relations with the US in a more nationalistic context than YOSHIDA. Any position he might take on economic relations with Communist China must naturally be viewed in the context of Japan's deteriorating economic situation and the loud voices, including many conservative ones, which are being raised in support of increased trade with the mainland. One Liberal Party source states that OGATA believes "coexistence" to be impossible and would result only in a "snare" for Japan. If he states to the contrary, this well-informed source believes that it would only be in terms of immediate political expediency. While OGATA is not known to bear any resentment toward the US, he is reported to feel that certain acts committed			
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under the US occupation were foolish. In the economic field, OGATA is understood to be committed to getting Japan back on her feet. While he himself has little knowledge of economics, it is believed that he would pursue a strong economic policy insofar as he were able. He does believe that generous US aid is necessary for real Japanese economic recovery. OGATA is universally described as a strong anti-Communist, and, as stated above, would not attempt to deal politically with the Orbit. In this sense, he appreciates the necessity for the maintenance of US bases in Japan and the fearment of Japan. In the view of at least two prominent Liberals, OGATA would be the party's choice for YOSHIDA's successor. This is so despite the fact that he is not a politician and that he is not so popularly known as YOSHIDA. One highly-placed Liberal believes that OGATA is incapable of making domestic political decisions. This indecisiveness is not borne out, however, in his conduct of government and international affairs during Yohsida's prolonged absences from the scene in 1954.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS-50611
SUBJECT	Views of Japanese Political Leaders	DATE DISTR.	17 November 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	2
DATE OF INFO.	Late October 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo (25 October 1954)	REFERENCES	

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
(FOR KEY REVERSE)

BY CABLE

SOURCE: Former Japanese naval officer with highly placed contacts in conservative political circles (B). Appraisal of Content: 3.

THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREPARED:
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FD-959

1. As Prime Minister of Japan, OGATA Taketora, IKEDA Hayato, HATOYAMA Ichiro, ICHIMADA Hisato, NUMURA Kichisaburo and ASHIDA Hitoshi would favor a policy of close cooperation with the United States; while SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, KISHI Nobusuke and ISHIBASHI Tanzan could not be depended upon for close cooperation as they are more likely to be influenced by opportunistic considerations if domestic pressures for rapprochement with the Communist orbit develop.
2. OGATA, IKEDA and ICHIMADA are best equipped to carry out a long-range program of cooperation owing to the breadth of their political influence and support. HATOYAMA and NUMURA would probably not be able to remain in office long enough to establish and activate their policies. HATOYAMA is handicapped by his health and indecisive character. NUMURA is handicapped by his narrow political and popular support, which is limited to pre-war politicians and bureaucrats. KISHI, SHIGEMITSU, ISHIBASHI and ASHIDA lack sufficient power and influence to be depended upon to activate even a short-range policy of cooperation.
3. None of these persons would promote a policy of cooperation with the Communist orbit of his own choice, nor would they be likely to promote policies of neutralism or co-existence. However, if sufficient temptations were offered by the Communists or if domestic pressures become strong, a Nehru-type policy might be espoused by KISHI, ISHIBASHI, SHIGEMITSU and HATOYAMA. There is also a slight possibility that IKEDA might be influenced in this direction.

NUMURA, IKEDA, OGATA and ISHIBASHI would be most likely to promote vigorous action to restore Japan's economy. IKEDA is handicapped in this as he is mistrusted by business leaders who fear his inflationary policies.

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5. None of these persons are known to hold resentment toward the United States. They all realize that Japan must strengthen its own economy, but they also realize that aid from the United States is indispensable for the time being. They all recognize the need for rearming Japan and for the maintenance of United States troops and bases in Japan until rearming is accomplished.

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No. of Pages: 1

Report Made By: ()

Distribution: F G

Source Cryptonym: ()

Report No. FJB-478 Local File No. EH-133

Approved By: []

() obtained this information from () Political reporter of Sangyo Keisai Shinbun, who obtained it from () member of the Sangyo Keisai Political Section, on 29 October 1954. () received it from () on 2 November 1954. Project: ()

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29 Nov 54

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COUNTRY Japan DATE DISTR. 29 November 1954
 SUBJECT Payment of Funds to OGATA Taketora by Former Mitsui Companies NO. OF PAGES 1
 PLACE ACQUIRED Japan, Tokyo NO. OF ENCLS. 0 (LISTED BELOW)
 DATE OF INFO. Late October 1954 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE						COLLECTOR'S PRELIMINARY GRADING OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	B	C	D	E	F	1	2	3 X	4	5	6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Japanese Journalist (B), from another Japanese Journalist (F) from another Japanese Journalist with high-level contacts in political circles (F)

OGATA Taketora has obtained a political contribution of from 40 to 50 million yen from three companies which were formerly part of Mitsui Bussan. The companies are *firms* Dai Ichi Bussan, Dai Ichi Tencho, and Mitsui Bussan. In return for the contributions OGATA, as Director General of the Hokkaido Development Agency, a part of whose program is the importation of substantial quantities of American tools and machinery to be used in the development of Hokkaido, will use his influence to import tools and machinery through the Mitsui companies.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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OUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS DB-28436
BJECT	Views of OGATA Taketora on Japan's Economic Situation	DATE DISTR.	1 December 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	1
ATE OF INFO.	26 November 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
ACE ACQUIRED	Japan, Tokyo (26 November 1954)	REFERENCES	

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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

BY CABLE

SOURCE: Trained American observer (B). Appraisal of Content: 3. The statements were made to an American observer known to OGATA as a []

Deputy Premier OGATA Taketora stated that he was deeply disturbed over the recent visits of Dietmen and businessmen to Communist China who came back to Japan pressuring for increased trade. OGATA said he realized this was not the answer to Japan's needs and therefore any United States efforts to effect the economic improvement of Southeast Asian countries would inevitably aid Japan. Consequently, he hoped the United States would be as generous as possible in Southeast Asia aid.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Not Classified	SOURCE Pub D	DATE OF DOCUMENT 10 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION The following information is excerpted verbatim from the desk dossier - FE/1 <i>Japan</i> Washington Post Newspaper With YOSHIDA and his Cabinet out, HATOYAMA elected as Prime Minister with a vote of 257 to <u>OGATA's</u> 191 votes. New Deputy Premier, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru.			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-28-29	SOURCE TAMI-8946 IN-31426 FCT-2093 (CS-52837)	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Japanese Foreign Minister OKAZAKI's Visit to Taiwan		DATE 16 Sept 1955	
<p>PERTINENT INFORMATION Cable from () Source. () from a high level Chinat official Evaluation: B,F-3 (F) Date of Info: 12-13 Nov</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 17 Dec 1954</p> <p>1. The trip to Taiwan of Japanese Foreign Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo on 12 November 1954 was not at the invitation of the Chinese Nationalist Government but on his own initiative and at the urging of Deputy Premier <u>OGATA</u>.</p> <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SECRET</p>			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-35-26	EXEMPTION ()-1205 FJB-547	DATE OF DOCUMENT 14 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Political Developments in Japan		IN-31907 (CS-52873)	DATE 24 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Cable from () Source: American observer (B); from a Japanese conservative member of the House of Councilors with long Government and Diet experience (F). Date of Info: Early December 1954			Evaluation: B,F-3
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 20 Dec 1954			
8. The LP decision to resign the Cabinet rather than dissolve the Diet was motivated by the desire to gain time to rally their forces while the JDP took the responsibility for the Government, rather than set up a weak new LP Cabinet which would fall after a short time; and the desire to put the onus for a Diet dissolution, which is both unpopular and inevitable, on HATOYAMA rather than themselves. YOSHIDA championed a Diet dissolution, but the Cabinet decision to dissolve the Diet must be unanimous and OGATA Taketora refused flatly to go along with YOSHIDA. YOSHIDA tried to get MATSUNO to talk to OGATA for him, but MATSUNO backed OGATA and even threatened to have YOSHIDA expelled from the LP if he would not agree. The showdown came when the YOSHIDA opposition produced statements by 130 House of Representative and 90 percent of the House of Councilors LP members stating that if YOSHIDA would not resign they would.			
9. OGATA's stand, forcing YOSHIDA to the Cabinet resignation, has earned him the enmity of YOSHIDA's entourage, notably IKEDA, important for his financial sources, and SATO Eisaku. ISHII Mitsujiro, who replaced IKEDA as LP secretary-general, is an old friend of OGATA since they both worked on <u>Asahi</u> , but he			
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lacks IKEDA's assets and capabilities. However, ISHII is on good terms with HATOYAMA and, working with MATSUNO, may be able to bring about a JDP - LP merger.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 200-7-23-1129	SOURCE FEC/MIS Intel. Sum. 4119	DATE OF DOCUMENT 19 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FEC/MIS Intelligence Summary - Daily			DATE 29 Sept 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATI			
1. <u>Current Developments:</u>			
b. MURAI Removed from Intelligence Post: The chief of the Cabinet Research Office (Naikaku Chosa-shitsu), MURAI Jun, has been removed from his post and appointed chief of the National Rural Policy (NRP) Kyoto Prefectural Headquarters....			
<u>Comment:</u>The person primarily responsible for his removal is Chief Cabinet Secretary FUKUNAGA Kenji who has opposed MURAI and the latter's benefactor; Deputy Prime Minister <u>OGATA Taketora</u> , in their various plans for expansion of the Cabinet Research Office into a larger intelligence organization			
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. KAPOK	1259 IN-33976	DATE OF DOCUMENT 21 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT			DATE 17 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Cable from ()			
THE FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASED FROM A COPY RETAINED AT THE AREA DESK			
1. () held a meeting with <u>OGATA</u> on 18 December. The primary purpose was to extend your and () seasonal greetings and try to obtain OGATA's views on the current political situation.			
2. OGATA made several points including:			
A. A point of major concern to Conservative elements is the outside financial help being received by Socialists, which, OGATA states, is coming primarily from the Chicoms. He believes this assistance will make a Socialists unit possible, an action heretofore believed by the Liberal Party as unlikely.			
B. Money is a big question in the coming election. If Conservative elements have funds, they will win; if they do not, they will lose. (His statement was just about that simple and direct.)			
C. Too early to discuss the possible US financial assistance. This point was raised by OGATA himself. He wanted you personally to know that he feels the US should be prepared to help when the time comes.			
D. He believes it essential that you and the Secretary of State be kept informed on an accurate and timely basis of Japanese political developments and to this end requested more frequent and periodic meetings than has been			
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practiced in the past.

3. OGATA seemed relaxed but extremely busy. While he was not at all apathetic, he did not show any signs of confidence in the coming elections.

4. OGATA sends his warmest personal greetings and best wishes for the new year.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

PERMISSION TO INCLUDE IN
() GRANTED BY:

DIV: *EE/L/...* *V. DAVIS*

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DEC 23 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Alfred T. Wellborn
Assistant Operations Coordinator
Office of the Under Secretary of State

SUBJECT : OGATA Indications of Probable Conservative
Need for United States Aid

1. On 18 December 1954, a liaison representative of our ()
Mission met with Liberal Party President OGATA Taketora. The main
points made by OGATA are summarized as follows:

a. The amount of outside financial assistance received by
the Socialists is a matter of major concern to conservative
elements. OGATA believes that such assistance will enable the
Socialists to unite - an action which the Liberal Party here-
tofore believed unlikely.

b. Money will be the key factor in the forthcoming election.
If the conservatives have sufficient funds they will win; if
they do not have ample funds, they will lose. OGATA's statements
were just about that simple and direct.

c. OGATA raised the issue that although he felt it was too
early to discuss possible U.S. financial assistance, (presumably
to conservative elements), he wanted us to know that he feels
the United States should be prepared to help, when the time
comes.

d. He believes it essential that the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of State be kept informed of
Japanese political developments on an accurate and timely basis.
To this end, at OGATA's request, our representative agreed to
hold more frequent meetings in the near future.

2. It would be appreciated if you would transmit the above to Mr.
() for his information, in view of his recent conversations on
the subject of Japanese political action with representatives of this
Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

SIGNED

[]

23 December 1954
FE/1 [] /cc

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FILE NO. 16-62-43	SOURCE FJY-6688	DATE OF DOCUMENT 24 Dec 1954	ANALYST C J	
SUBJECT Visit of Japanese Foreign Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo to Taiwan			DATE 13 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Report from C J Source: Chinese writer closely connected with Nationalist government officials (B); from a high-level Chinese Nationalist official (F). Date of Info: 12-13 November 1954			Evaluation: B,F-3	
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
1. The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo to Taiwan on 12 November 1954 was not at the invitation of the Chinese Nationalist government but on his own initiative (F-4) and at the urging of Deputy Premier <u>OGATA Taketora</u> . ²				
<u>Field Comments</u>				
2. According to information available in this office, OKAZAKI cabled the Japanese Ambassador in Taipei that he was cancelling his visit to Taiwan and was returning to Tokyo for pressing business. When Chinese Nationalist Ambassador to Japan Hollington TONG learned of this fact, he contacted OGATA and pleaded with him for half an hour to cable to OKAZAKI in Hong Kong on 10 November at 11:30 p.m. advising him to go to Taipei and informing him that there was no important business in Japan. According to the informant OKAZAKI's important business was to see the Chinese Communist visitors, Mme. LI Te-chuan and LIAO Ch'eng-chih.				
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FILE NO. 44-7-35-49	SOURCE ()-1281 LN-35833	DATE OF DOCUMENT 29 Dec 1954	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FJB-579 (CS-53756) Dissident Factions Within Japanese Political Parties		DATE 9 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Cable from () Source: from prominent rightist Japanese businessman with contacts in publishing circles (F) with para 1 from Japanese in close contact with Liberal Party circles (F). Date of Info: Mid-Dec 1954			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 31 Dec 1954			
1. The resignation of the YOSHIDA Cabinet was arranged by <u>OGATA Taketora</u> at the insistence of business groups. OGATA was taken by surprise when HATOYAMA Ichiro made a deal with the Socialist Parties. ² OGATA accused ISHIKAWA Ichiro of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) of betraying the Liberals. ISHIKAWA replied that he had had no knowledge of the HATOYAMA Socialist Parties deal. ³			
2. The Liberal Party (LP) is in danger of splitting into YOSHIDA and OGATA factions. The YOSHIDA Faction (which would include IKEDA Hayato, SATO Eisaku, HORI Shigeru, and KOSAKA Zentaro) has the most money and is apt to use it in its own behalf.			
2. <u>Field Comment.</u> HATOYAMA promised Diet dissolution in January 1955 in return for Sociality support.			
3. <u>Field Comment.</u> This may be only a partial story, since the 23 December edition of Mainichi Shimbun stated that OGATA had made a "present" to KATO Kanju of the Right Wing Socialists and KATSUMATA Shiichi of the Left Wing Socialists in hopes that they would support him for premier.			
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China and the Stakes in Asia

by Alfred Le S. Jenkins

America has come to the fore as a world power at an especially trying and demanding time. The atomic age has arrived just when the world was beginning to find some solutions to the many problems presented to it in rapid succession by the age of steam and electricity. No one doubts that these threshold years of the atomic age through which we are passing can bring us either undreamed-of good or indescribable evil. This is the promise—and the threat—of breathtakingly rapid material progress. Whether we shall harvest the fruits of the promise or of the threat will depend upon the moral direction which humanity as a whole can give to the immense physical forces which it now possesses. This whole question is given added urgency by the highly charged situation in which a shrunken world is largely divided into two opposing camps, each possessed of the ability virtually to destroy the other.

There are many who fear that this situation can end only in mutual destruction. The Communists would appear to believe that some great holocaust is in store for mankind, inasmuch as the one recurring theme in Communist dogma is the "inevitable" fight to the finish between the Communist and capitalist worlds—despite Communist tactical protestations from time to time of peaceful intent. This seeming conviction is indeed one of the greatest dangers of communism, for it is a certainty that both men and nations tend to gravitate toward what they constantly hold before the mind's eye. I cannot believe, however, that we are inexorably moving toward some great Wagnerian catastrophe on a world scale. The universal will to live is a powerful force in God's human experiment on earth, and I cannot believe that anything as meaningful as that great experiment is destined either to explode or to fizzle out.

There is no mistaking the fact that the international problems which our country faces are many and complex, and some are exceedingly frustrating in that there does not seem to be an easy or quick solution to them. To some degree we Americans must share the guilt of all, that these problems confront our present world in the forms which they take. I believe, however, that we will be called upon to contribute to their solution in far greater measure than we may have, through sins of either commission or omission, contributed to their emergence. This is natural and right, if only because our equipment to meet them is without any doubt adequate to the challenge, provided we fully recognize and rightly use both our vast material and spiritual strength. We need to remind ourselves that our nation is in fact something new and different on the face of the earth. It is the first nation in history which at its inception was founded consciously, carefully, and prayerfully on the daring proposition that all men are created equal and which was designed to insure for each individual personal freedom and opportunity, as nearly equal and unlimited as imperfect human institutions can contrive.

I have devoted this much time to reminding ourselves both of the precarious state of our world and of the challenge which is presented to our country, because Asia's problems are peculiarly the product of these forces which have converged on the 20th century and because Asians seek precisely what we ourselves have sought and won in such gratifying measure.

Most of Asia has up to now not enjoyed much of the material, social, and political advantages which the 20th century has brought to many of the other areas of the world. It has been said that Asia for some time has had a window on the 20th century

January 3, 1955

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and that it is now determined to find the door to it. This determination is as real and strong as it is natural and right. Asia will find this door, or come very near to battering down our whole structure in the attempt. The real Asian revolution of our time is aimed at very nearly the same things which we ourselves respect as man's highest values: freedom of each individual to walk upright in the dignity of his God-given manhood, the provision of material necessities and some comforts for all, and a sense of "belonging" to a group of which he can be proud. The great tragedy is that the world Communist conspiracy has with some success attempted to ride the crest of this largely readymade, truly Asian revolution, diverting it from its natural course and denying to those who have been victimized most of the things which they seek. And the irony of it is that it is the free world which has developed the institutions and the experience which can best produce those very things.

Asia's Stake In Asia

Our stake in Asia, while it includes our material and other investments there, has far broader meaning also. In the closely interdependent world of today everyone has a stake in what happens in Asia, and for no lesser reason than concern lest our whole human experiment on this little globe may end in an explosion rather than continue without major interruption on its evolutionary way. We, of all people, should be able to understand Asian aspirations. And we must never for one moment forget the obvious fact that it is the Asians themselves who have the greatest stake of all in Asia. It is only by holding to this truth that our own interests there will be served in the long run. The extent of Communist objectives is easily discerned: the Communists will go just as far as free men will let them. If we have learned anything in Asia in the past few years it should be the lesson that it is largely up to the threatened Asians to stop communism in Asia—with fraternal support from other free peoples where it is wanted and where it will be effective. We must, of course, in the last analysis reserve freedom of action in any area open to us when we believe our own security interests to be threatened. But the problem is a mutual one and will be solved satisfactorily only in willing and understanding concert. We sincerely believe that our stake in Asia

is in no way incompatible with Asia's own stake in Asia, and I shall speak of it in this sense.

Our stake in Asia is in fact now gravely endangered partly because for so long we and most of the West were scarcely aware that we had very high stakes there. Asian questions are the most controversial because they are perhaps the least understood. The Soviet Union, however, partly because of the dictates of geography, has always had to keep an eye on Asia. It seems to have recognized quite early those tremendous forces in Asia which are revolutionary and to have seen its opportunity to capture those forces for the sinister purposes of Russian imperialism, using as vehicle and guise the mechanism of the so-called world socialist revolution powered by the Kremlin and the Communist Party. This was made easier after World War II not only because of the increased economic misery and social ferment resulting from protracted warfare and the tremendous difficulties faced by those nations which had recently won independence, but also because of the widespread and deep resentment of previous forms of Western exploitation in the area.

The undeniable fact that Western activities in Asia also brought much that was good did little to salve injured Asian sensibilities. It is human nature that help to the weak may be resented almost as much as harm, and in some subtle ways perhaps even more. Any man worthy of the name wants to stand squarely on his own two feet and compete in industry, science, and education, rather than accept a donation and feel obligated to the donor. This is a problem which we frankly have to face in our aid programs to free peoples who want to preserve their freedom. Our intentions are good, and the need may be great—in the interest of the recipient and in our own enlightened self-interest—but the emphasis must be on fraternal help to stand up straight until we can look each other in the eye at the same level and proceed with the proper business of mutual contribution to progress.

Communism is eager to promise what Asia wants: economic plenty and even individual and national dignity. It is not too difficult to sell these false promises to people who are to a considerable extent politically inarticulate. The surprising and heartening thing is that under the circumstances communism has not made more progress than it has in postwar Asia.

Our central problem in Asia is the coming to

power of a fanatically hostile Chinese Communist regime in close partnership with the U. S. S. R., to all appearances charged by world communism with special responsibilities for Communist enslavement of the rest of Asia. In addition to the manpower of China and its material resources, largely potential, communism wants to control the industrial capacity of Japan and the food and mineral resources of Southeast Asia.

Communist Success In China

A great deal has been said about the reasons for the Communist success in China, and much of this has been highly charged with emotion. This is understandable. I confess to feeling very deep emotion myself about any development which affects our national interest so greatly and which affects the lives of 600 million human beings even more immediately. But it is important to remember that one of the chief causes, if not the chief cause, of the Communist triumph in China is that the Communists successfully hoodwinked a large proportion of the Chinese people into believing that they could provide what the Chinese wanted. For countless millions this was their own plot of land; for hundreds of thousands of others, including the intelligentsia, it was enhanced national prestige. Private business was promised a relatively long life and an easy and promising transition to socialism. The workers were assured that eventually they would inherit the whole and be the masters. All of this was made even more attractive by the familiar, spurious, and always short-lived Communist device of the "United Front," by which the Communist Party purports initially to cooperate with non-Communist parties and institutions until the growth of police state controls makes this sham unnecessary.

This program, to the uninitiated Chinese, was enticing—as it appears on surface examination to many others in predominantly agrarian Asia. Communism was also portrayed as the "inevitable wave of the future" and as the newest and most progressive of all ideologies. "New" and "progressive" are particularly appealing terms to peoples who have comparatively recently and with agonizing embarrassment been forced to view some important elements in their civilization as "outmoded" and "lagging."

We know not only that communism is actually "old hat" but also that it has been tried and found

wanting in practically all respects, and particularly in those respects most essential to man's happiness and well-being. We know that Communists, conversely, in speaking of our free systems as "old," "outmoded," and "discredited," are harking back several decades to the growing pains and admitted dislocations and injustices which marked the emergence of industrial capitalism in the period of the Industrial Revolution, and that they are depicting even this adolescent age of capitalism with wild exaggeration. We know that democracy and planned capitalism have solved these problems to an amazingly successful extent, while preserving individual liberties and the drive, virility, and ever renewed newness which free thought and essentially free enterprise and competition alone can produce—and which communism can never achieve, by its very nature. We know, indeed, that theoretical communism has proved unworkable largely because it is blind to the basic nature of humankind; that when it is tried it evolves, despite itself, into a tyrannical, bureaucratic dictatorship with privilege for the few and the most clearly stratified society imaginable.

Many Asians know none of these things, or are not convinced of them. We are trying our best to help them know the truth. I say we are trying our best; I hope we are. We estimate that the Communists are spending at least ten times as much money on their propaganda campaigns as we are in the informational aspects of our "campaign of truth." We may perhaps take some comfort from the belief that the truth, at least where it can be seen plainly, may be more cheaply and successfully marketed than even cleverly packaged falsehood.

Disillusionment With Communism

Fortunately there are holes in the Iron Curtain. The truth can be seen fairly plainly in parts of Germany, and as a result 1,800,000 refugees in 5 years have chosen truth and freedom at great personal sacrifice. The truth is more clearly emerging to the Vietnamese; nearly a half million refugees have already chosen to forsake Ho Chi-minh's "paradise," taking with them what few belongings they could. In divided Korea the truth is not hard to discern, and the overwhelming majority, not only of North Korean but of Chinese prisoners of war as well, responded to the pull of

truth by forsaking ties of home and family and electing to join forces with the truth. The Chinese and North Koreans now know communism intimately, and most of them appear to want no more of it. The Communists' ill-fated Korean adventure ironically but happily established two principles which may yet prove to be their own undoing: the principle of determined collective security through the United Nations and the principle of nonforcible repatriation. The two million Chinese in British Hong Kong are close enough to stark realities to know the truth—and in Hong Kong each and every succeeding year since the Communist takeover of the mainland fewer Chinese Communist flags and more Chinese Nationalist flags have been displayed on the respective national holidays.

The gains which communism may achieve through its mammoth propaganda campaign can be more than offset under circumstances where communism in action can be clearly seen. An iron curtain is literally the shield of communism and the badge of basic failure and fear. The Communists want to obtain vital materials through barter, but they fear above all things an exchange of ideas and accurate knowledge.

For those behind the Iron Curtain knowledge has come too late to save them, at least for a while. The Chinese, among the other victims, have learned the hard way. The peasant who was promised land first actually received it, but many have already been dispossessed by the process of state collectivization; and the others, already suffering from Communist requisition of the fruits of their toil, now see the same fate in store for them. Resistance there has surely been, but the Communists have been careful to vary the pressure for collectivization in order to restrict resistance to proportions which will be manageable for their increasingly efficient police-state methods.

Perhaps the greatest of communism's failures has been with regard to food production. The march of forced collectivization has invariably left both bloodshed and famine in its wake, and further misery is surely in store for a China whose marginal subsistence level has always been precarious. At times when natural disaster is added, suffering is incalculably compounded. In the past other countries have rushed to China's aid at such times. During the recent unprecedented floods, however, while China was continuing to ship vast quantities of foodstuffs to the Soviet

Union in payment for industrial and military aid, China twice rejected offers of help from the League of Red Cross Societies. And at the same time Communist China's own radios were callously recording the magnitude of suffering visited on its people, in large measure due to the false pride of a boasting regime.

Inhuman Treatment in Red China

As for other characteristics of the Red Chinese regime, everyone has read reports of the countless killings and induced suicides in connection with the so-called reform of agriculture, business, labor, education, and religion; of the turning of children against parents and of friend against friend; of mass and individual "brain-washing"; of forced labor camps; of the "People's Courts" where "justice" is made the shameless handmaiden of politics; and of the inexcusable treatment which our own business-men and missionaries and, in the early days, our officials have received from the Chinese Communists. There are still 28 American civilians languishing in Chinese Communist jails under intolerable physical conditions, all but incommunicado, many of them without trial or even a statement of charges against them. The recent sentencing of 13 Americans on "espionage" charges is but the latest shocking chapter in the Communist mistreatment of foreign nationals, and evidence of their utter disregard for commitments which they assumed under the Korean Armistice Agreement on prisoners of war.

Even better known and documented is the external conduct of Red China, which includes overt aggression in Korea and the related defiance and contempt shown for the United Nations, in which the regime claims a seat "by right"; semicovert but very substantial aggression against Indochina; forcible occupation of Tibet; subversion and intimidation throughout Southeast Asia; unspeakable atrocities against prisoners of war; conducting an extortion racket among overseas Chinese, using relatives on the mainland as hostages; and sponsorship of a huge trade in banned narcotics in order to gain badly needed foreign exchange.

Is there no good that can be said of the regime? There is a little. The streets are reported to be cleaner, and there have been spotty advances in public health. On the other hand there appears to be a rise in tuberculosis, especially among overworked cadre and industrial workers, and an in-

creasing incidence of nervous breakdowns and other mental troubles, maladies with which China had amazingly little experience before the Communists came. There have, it is true, been some advances in industrial recovery and in new industrial enterprises. Such advances have for the most part been inefficient and wasteful of human energy and life, but these factors seem to be of minor concern to the regime, which is bent upon building a heavy-industry base. Communist China's 5-year program, however, is seriously behind schedule. The Communists lack trained technical and managerial personnel, and there are indications that the Chinese are not as impressed as their propaganda would have one believe with their results in emulating "advanced Soviet methods."

Tremendous Energy in "New China"

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that there is not tremendous force behind the so-called "New China." Most of this force derives from the energy of the true Asian revolution, which in China has been captured and imperfectly but dangerously harnessed by communism—but force is communism itself has been able to supply in limited and usually warped form a few of the things which the Chinese sought and needed. Communism has succeeded to some extent in flattering youth and women by giving them difficult and important jobs to do. Insofar as communism with its demands and challenges resembles a religion, albeit a perverted and materialistic one, it has helped fill the uncomfortable vacuum left by the earlier breakdown of the ancient Confucian morality and of the closely knit, authoritarian family. Last but not least, the Chinese Communist regime, while it has certainly not brought to the Chinese a national dignity by its lawless acts, has managed to get very much into the limelight and with Soviet help has achieved a military potential of menacing proportions. Although Communist China was at the Geneva Conference largely because it was the chief instigator of the troubles which the Conference itself was designed to settle, its presence there inescapably gave it added "prestige." Even those Chinese who in their hearts oppose the regime must derive some satisfaction from this "prestige," even though they may have vastly preferred that it be attained by more honorable means.

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China and the Soviet Union are losing no time in attempting to capitalize on the Mao regime's growing prominence, in an attempt to gain it international acceptance, through wider diplomatic recognition and a seat in the United Nations. The current Communist tactic of a "peace offensive" is admirably suited to the need quickly to garb the Mao regime in respectability. The Sino-Soviet agreements of October 12, 1954, seem especially to be designed further to increase Communist China's prestige and at the same time to give at least the surface appearance that Communist nations can deal with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. We have all along considered the Red Chinese regime as a willing accomplice of the Soviets and, as such, a sort of junior partner rather than a full-fledged satellite in the Eastern European sense. These agreements strengthen this view and at least on the surface appear to create a kind of Moscow-Peiping axis within the Communist orbit, in further contrast to Moscow's relations with its Eastern European satellites. This surface "government-to-government" camaraderie, however, does not necessarily alter the subsurface unified Communist Party control of both governments.

We have learned to be wary of frenzied Communist protestations of peaceful intent such as are now issuing forth with stereotyped consistency from all Communist capitals. I doubt that under present conditions of the world the Communists want a big war. But experience has shown that they are never averse to small wars if they think their ends can be gained thereby. The trouble is that we may not always succeed in preventing small wars from growing. Communists consider that in a very real sense they are always at war with the non-Communist world and that periods of cease-fire are but a tactic of expediency in a continuing war. Peace is but the other side of the war coin. George Orwell may prove to be one of the most perspicacious writers of our time.

The Communists need a "breather" now, and they will doubtless get it. The free world is not going to start a war. For that reason they can get a "breather" any time they want it and for a duration of precisely their own determining. This is a great advantage for them, but I see no sensible way out of it. At the same time, so long as the Communists are the self-proclaimed mortal enemy of all who are not in their camp (in their eyes, and by their own admission, they recognize

no "neutrals"). I can see no rhyme nor reason whatsoever in helping them to solve their great internal difficulties, in helping them to make the most of these breathing spells which they can always have. A "peace offensive" for their purposes is in large measure a bid for trade—especially trade in strategic materials in which they are short—and in this instance also a bid for full free world acceptance of Communist China into the family of nations.

Question of Recognition

We do not recognize the regime of Mao Tse-tung as representing the will of the masses of Chinese people, for whom we continue to have the deepest feelings of friendship. We cannot recognize this regime, and we consider it inconceivable that it should be seated in the United Nations when its entire 5-year history has been a clear denial of the basic principles on which that organization is founded.

We are determined in our support of Free China because we believe not only that it more truly represents the wishes of the Chinese people than does the Peiping regime but also that it better serves the interests of the free world as a whole, as well as our own interests. The Government of the Republic of China has made great strides in many areas during its time on Formosa. We will not forsake the people of Free China. It would clearly be the height of injustice to allow the 10 million Chinese there to fall under Communist sway against their clearly demonstrated wishes. These people know communism. Many of them have relatives on the mainland who have suffered greatly due to the excesses of the mainland regime. Furthermore, if there were not a free Chinese government which is a going and growing concern, the Chinese Communists would have a much stronger hand among the 12 million overseas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia. The direct and indirect influence which could then be more effectively wielded by the Communists in the economic and political life of these countries would be dangerously enhanced.

In addition to Communist China the only territorial gains which communism has made in Asia are in North Korea and North Viet-Nam. These gains are tragic, most of all for the peoples directly affected. But there is much from which we can take encouragement. For one thing, no

group of people has yet voted itself into communism. The precedent of collective action against overt aggression gives us hope that this road may be forever closed to communism, and the growing awareness among Asians of the reality of Communist threats gives us hope that infiltration and subversion will be increasingly difficult. Our military support and technical cooperation programs in the Far East are proof of our desire to assist the independent governments of the area in their difficult tasks of meeting defense needs and at the same time building stable and progressive societies patterned on democratic principles.

I do not begin to believe that the Communists are pursuing with masterly skill an infallible blueprint of strategy in Asia or anywhere else. In Japan the Communists counted upon a long and unpopular occupation and upon economic distress to make the Japanese people turn to communism. This has not happened. Japan has now resumed an honorable place in the community of nations and despite some unsolved economic difficulties has made a most impressive recovery. The Communist aggression in Korea was not only thrown back; it established the two very important principles of collective action against aggression and of nonforcible repatriation. The Communists have met with a near total defeat in the Philippines, after a period which must have given them considerable cause for hope. Indonesia, according to the Communist timetable, was to have fallen some 4 years ago, but the Communist uprising at that time was put down with determined effectiveness. The Communists have gotten virtually nowhere in Thailand, Burma, or India. Communist-led rebels in Malaya are still a problem, but less so than was the case some months ago. There appears to be a real determination on the part of the free peoples of the Associated States to remain free, and the recent pact signed at Manila should help insure that this will be possible. Edmund Burke once said, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." Asians are increasingly aware that there are things to be done if their freedom—in many cases recently won—is to be safeguarded. And in the last analysis, the only effective anticommunism in Asia must be Asian.

We should not be overly concerned by differences which may be debated among the free-world nations. In areas of free speech things are never so bad as they sound, just as in areas of controlled

speech things are never so good as they sound. There will be differences among free friends. But dependable friendship is needed in order to preserve freedom, and I believe that this is a deep conviction of the free world. We cannot go it alone and we have no desire to try it. We will all make some mistakes, for our governments are made up of human beings; but our aim is to achieve the highest possible degree of fraternal concert with our friends.

Asia is determined to find a new day. Whatever else may be in doubt in that changing continent, it is a certainty that a determined effort is going to be made by Asians to better their lot—through whatever auspices appear to them most attractive.

The whole world has high stakes in Asia, and we, the wealthiest and most powerful nation in the free world, have special and inescapable responsibilities for the outcome in Asia, although the solution in the last analysis must be essentially of, by, and for Asians.

Recently a great friend of the American people, and one of the great men of all time, Winston Churchill, had this to say of the United States: "There is no other case of a nation arriving at the summit of world power, seeking no territorial gain, but earnestly resolved to use her strength and wealth in the cause of progress and freedom." God grant that our nation will always measure up to this great compliment. As long as it does, provided we look also to defense through material strength, that spiritual drive which is the indispensable ingredient of the American spirit will afford us at least the surest security which can be had, in a future which must be dangerous and adventuresome at best. For this I believe, and I believe it more the longer I watch events in both hemispheres: a nation, like a man, can in the long run, and especially in things that really matter, reap only what has first been sown.

It is true that the real battle between communism and the free world is for the minds and hearts of men. It must be demonstrated beyond the power of iron curtains to hide that free systems of government and economy can inspire the hearts, tap the energies, and meet the needs of mankind incomparably better than can systems of state regimentation and control. This is the battle which we welcome, for we can win that battle. But we and the free world must survive, in order to fight it. We cannot afford to allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of false security by the

"peace offensive" soporific. Certainly at the same time we must continually seek safe avenues to a more peaceful world. As President Eisenhower recently put it, "Since the advent of nuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace, if there is to be a happy and well world." But we must keep our guard up. Our guard is up at present. I know of no spot in the free world which the Communists today can attack with impunity. We must keep it that way.

• *Mr. Jenkins, author of the above article, is Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs. His article is based on recent addresses.*

North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris

NEWS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 726 dated December 21

I returned yesterday from the Paris meeting of the Naxo Council. The communique which was issued reports in summary form what took place. I would like to comment briefly on two items in the communique.

The first was the statement that Soviet policy continues to be directed toward weakening and dividing the Western nations and that the threat to the free world has not diminished. It is significant that there was complete agreement on this proposition by all of the 14 nations represented on the Naxo Council.

During the course of the discussion of this matter at the Council, I made a statement on behalf of the United States delegation in which I said that Soviet policy is like a powerful stream, the surface of which is sometimes ruffled, the surface of which is sometimes calm, but that we cannot judge the force and direction of the current merely by looking at the surface manifestations. The important thing, I said, is that we should proceed in our own way, steadily building our own strength and our own unity upon which our strength depends. There were, I said, three great dangers to be avoided:

(1) that we might by surface calm of the Soviet stream be lulled into a false sense of security;

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(2) that by the rough appearance of the Soviet stream we might be frightened into a state of paralysis, or

(3) be provoked into ill-considered and divisive action.

In developing the first danger, I pointed out that behind the recent Soviet peace offensive was to be found ever increasing military strength far beyond defensive needs and the development of subversive activities in every free country, and notably attempts to exploit the theme of colonialism so as to divide and weaken the free world.

In connection with the second danger—being frightened into reaction—I quoted violent Soviet threats which had been directed against the West in connection with the Marshall Plan, the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty, the adherence of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, the development of the Federal German Republic in West Germany, and against Yugoslavia when it broke loose from the Soviet Communist orbit. At that time, the Soviet Union denounced the treaty of friendship which had been made in 1945 between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

I recalled that, at the time of the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty, the Communists had suggested that, since the peace was not imposed by the Soviet Union, it was a separate peace which violated the armistice and that the Soviet Union would be free to resume hostilities.

There is a striking parallel in the past to what is going on in the present. I expressed confidence that, if we persist in building defensive strength and unity in Western Europe, it will actually promote peace.

To illustrate the third danger of being provoked into rash and divisive action, I referred to the provocation to which the United States is now being subjected by Communist China and the patience being demonstrated by our country under the direction of President Eisenhower.

I took occasion to thank the NATO nations which were members of the United Nations for their support of the recent United Nations resolution¹ condemning the Chinese Communists and calling for the liberation of our wrongfully imprisoned airmen.

The second item of the agenda to which I would allude is that which reports the approval of a report by the Military Committee which defined the

most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength for the next few years, taking into account modern developments and weapons and techniques.

This report, which assumes a unity that includes Western Germany, shows for the first time the means of developing a forward strategy which could be relied on to protect Western Europe from invasion. As that capability is developed, it will surely constitute the strongest deterrent against military aggression. Furthermore, it will assure that, if unhappily aggression should be attempted, it would not succeed and that the aggressor would be thrown back at the threshold. Thus we see the means of achieving what the people of Western Europe have long sought—that is, a form of security which, while having as its first objective the preservation of peace, would also be adequate for defense and which would not put Western Europe in a position of having to be liberated.

The Council action made it clear that, in approving the report, it did so for the purposes of planning and preparation and that this did not involve a delegation to the military in a field which is properly the responsibility of government, with respect to putting plans into action in the event of hostilities. The situation is thus normal in this respect. In this country, as in the other NATO countries, it is the civil authorities of government and not the military who make the grave decisions. That, of course, will be the situation as regards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Council meeting showed a spirit of fellowship and a spirit of optimism which grew out of the prospect that the Western European unity planned by the recent London and Paris accords would shortly become an accomplished fact and thus both strengthen NATO and assure that it will effectively serve its purpose in deterring aggression and preserving peace.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Following is the text of a communique issued at Paris on December 18 by the North Atlantic Council at the close of a 2-day session:

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in ministerial session under the chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, completed its work today. It

¹ Bulletin of Dec. 29, 1951, p. 932.

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-35-61	SOURCE () 1371 IN-37979	DATE OF DOCUMENT 5 Jan 1955	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FJB-605 (CS-54138) Meeting of Liberal Party Representatives			DATE 2 Nov 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Source: Japanese () whose source was Japanese journalist (F). Cable from () Date of Info: 17 Dec 1954			Evaluation: C,F-3	
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 11 Jan 1955				
<p><u>OGATA Taketora</u> called a meeting of Liberal Party (LP) representatives at the Imperial Hotel on 17 December 1954 without prior coordination with <u>IKEDA Hayato</u> and <u>SATO Eisaku</u>. After the meeting <u>IKEDA</u> and <u>SATO</u> warned the representatives that the LP would not back members "who cannot decide where their loyalty lies." ¹</p> <p><u>OGATA</u> apologized to <u>IKEDA</u> and <u>SATO</u> for not contacting them before deciding on the meeting.</p> <p>1. <u>Field Comment</u>. This presumably refers to the loyalty to <u>YOSHIDA</u> vs loyalty to <u>OGATA</u>. <u>IKEDA</u> and <u>SATO</u> are both members of the <u>YOSHIDA</u> groups of Liberals, which is generally supposed to have more money than the <u>OGATA</u> group, although the latter has formal power and numerical majority...</p>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
SECRET				
CROSS-REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
			()	

FORM NO. 59-34
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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-35-65	ACROSS-REF ()-1394 IN-38616 FJB-607	DATE OF DOCUMENT 7 Jan 1955	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Election Plans of Japan Liberal Party Leaders			DATE 8 Sept 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Cable from () Source: from Japan journalist (F) with numerous contacts in conservative political circles. Date of Info: 5 Jan 1955			Evaluation: F-3
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 14 January 1955			
3. IKEDA Hayato controls the Japan Liberal Party money which he will not pass to <u>OGATA Taketora</u> . IKEDA will give funds only to those candidates who will support IKEDA.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ()

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-35-68	SOURCE () -1433 IN-40201	DATE OF DOCUMENT 12 Jan 1955	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FJB-634 (CS-54579) Efforts to Form Alliance between OGATA Taketora and KISHI Nobusuke			DATE 8 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION Cable from () Source: from prominent Japanese police official (B) in contact with liberal politicians. Date of Info: early Jan 1955			Evaluation: B-2	
<p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 14 Jan 1955</p> <p>TAGO Tomihiko, president of Kobe Steel (Seiko) Company and one of the chief backers of KISHI Nobusuke, is urging KISHI to form an alliance with OGATA Taketora to stabilize the political situation. Corresponding approaches are being made to OGATA to ally with KISHI.</p>				
<p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>				
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Should U.S. Recognize Peiping?

by Nicholas Roosevelt

Mr. Roosevelt, a cousin of Theodore Roosevelt, has served as editorial writer and special correspondent for *The New York Times* (1923-1930), deputy director of the Office of War Information (1942-1943) and Minister to Hungary (1930-1933) as well as in other diplomatic posts. He is the author of *The Restless Pacific* (New York, Scribner, 1928) and *A New Birth of Freedom* (New York, Scribner, 1938).

(Public opinion in the United States, as well as in the rest of the world, has become focused on Communist China as a result of two far-reaching developments. The first has been the serious thrusts and counterthrusts between mainland China, controlled by the Communist government of Premier Mao Tse-tung, and the island of Formosa, controlled by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The second has been the intervention of the United Nations, represented by its secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, in the case of the 11 American fliers condemned as spies by the Peiping government.)

Will these developments lead to war in the Far East? Or will they result in an easing of tensions in that strategic area? What should be the next steps in United States policy toward Peiping and Formosa? In this issue of the BULLETIN one view is presented by Nicholas Roosevelt, former Minister to Hungary and distinguished writer on world affairs. In the issue of February 15 another view will be expressed by Senator William H. Knowland, Republican of California, leader of the Republican party in the Senate. - Editor)

To form an enlightened opinion about the question, "Should the United States recognize the Peiping government?" it is necessary to consider (1) whether such recognition would imply an endorsement of the political system and ideals of that government, (2) whether it would involve turning over Formosa to Red China, and (3) in the event that recognition were to be decided upon as desirable, whether such recognition should be

extended forthwith and unconditionally or only when and if the government of Red China agrees to recognize the rights and principles commonly accepted by civilized nations in diplomatic intercourse.

Recognition Issue

Let us consider these three points briefly:

(1) The government of the United States recognized the government of the U.S.S.R. in November 1933. By no stretch of the imagination could this routine diplomatic act be twisted into approval of communism or of Soviet imperialism. Similarly, recognition of Red China in no way would imply approval of the methods or the political ideals of the Peiping government. Rather it would be merely a diplomatic acceptance of the reality that the Peiping government is the *de facto* government of present-day China. It is not amiss to note here that many students of Far Eastern affairs believe that if the United States had recognized this government six or eight years ago our relations with China might have been better than they have been under the policy of nonrecognition.

One of the diplomatic arguments against recognition of the Peiping government is that the United States has for years officially dealt with the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the *de jure* government of China and that, consequently, to recognize Peiping would necessitate withdrawing recognition from the "Nationalist" government. This is true. But it should be borne in mind that at no time did the Chinese "Na-

tionalists" exercise sovereignty over more than a part of the mainland of China and that for the last five years they have not controlled a single square mile of the Chinese mainland. Thus in actual fact the continuing recognition of the so-called "Nationalist" government is nothing more than diplomatic prolongation of a political myth. One might just as well recognize one of the Russian grand dukes as head of the government of Russia as to make believe that Chiang is head of the government of China.

No Need to Relinquish Formosa

(2) Formosa never formed an essential part of the Chinese Empire and was never under the control of the republic. Its transfer to Red China would be so clearly against the interests of the free world that it is inadmissible. The Chinese Communists want it for two reasons: (a) to have a military outpost through which the U.S.S.R. and Red China could embarrass the United States and (b) to enable the Chinese Communists to liquidate or disperse and despoil those Chinese who fled to that island in order to escape the persecutions of the Red China government. Both these arguments work strongly in favor of preventing Formosa from falling into the hands of the Reds.

The fact that Formosa must be denied to the Reds does not justify using the island as the main base of military operations against the Chinese mainland. Military experts are agreed that an invasion attempted by Chiang's troops would be doomed to

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failure unless backed by the full might of the American Navy, Army and Air Force. The United States could not give such backing without, in fact, going to war with Communist China. Nothing would better suit the Soviet imperialists than to see the United States thus embroiled. Not only would such a war disastrously weaken the United States, but it would make it impossible for us to help Europe curtail new Russian plans of aggrandizement on that continent. Moreover, it would justify Soviet propaganda throughout Asia that the United States is determined to impose its will on the Asian peoples by war. Greater folly than all-out war by the United States against Red China is hard to imagine.

Incidentally, one of the arguments in favor of placing Formosa under

a trusteeship of the United Nations or an international body is that this would keep it out of the hands of the Chinese Communists and at the same time deprive the Peking government of the propaganda argument that Formosa is a "threat" to mainland China.

(3) It is axiomatic that should the government of the United States decide to extend recognition to the Peking government, it would not do so until such time as several politically expedient and that recognition would be conditional on the bona fide granting by the Peking government of those diplomatic rights and personal safeguards which are the basis of relations between civilized nations.

Even should these conditions prove impossible to obtain, and recognition thus be indefinitely postponed,

no valid reason exists for continuing to act on the assumption that support of Chiang and the Chinese "Nationalists" is an indispensable prerequisite to curtailing or ending the control of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. Chiang is the *de facto* head of the government in Formosa, thanks to the overwhelming and largely godless generosity of the American government. Why not recognize him as such and put an end to the deplorable pretense that the "Nationalist" government is the government of China? The main objective is to keep Formosa out of the hands of the Reds, not to continue forever to forward the political and financial ambitions of Chiang and his relatives and friends, or to perpetuate a diplomatic farce in support of a lost cause.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Untapped Resources of the U.S.

In the course of the televised Cabinet meeting of October 25, at which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported on the success of negotiations for a Western European Union, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey asked how much the new arrangement would cost the United States. Mr. Dulles cheerfully replied that it would not cost us another nickel a year, and this seemed to reassure the budget-makers.

The Cabinet TV program, however, could have been made highly educational for the voters who are also taxpayers if time had been taken to explain that the cost of world leadership cannot be measured—and when Britain played this role, never was measured—by money alone. In fact, the less emphasis we place on the material contribution we intend to make to the non-Communist com-

munity in terms of manpower, equipment and economy, and the more important our other resources are to become. And these resources, far from being exhausted, have hardly begun to be tapped. The most important are (1) our scientific achievements, (2) our labor resources, (3) our tradition of self-determination, and (4) our idealism.

A Share-the-Culture Program

Since we started giving aid to foreign countries in 1945, with the Marshall plan, followed by NATO, Point Four and other programs, there has been a good deal of talk, here, most of it bitter, about the "despite the wealth" philosophy of both those who advocated such aid and those who accepted it. So should it occur to anyone in the United States that perhaps the recipients of our "scanty

aid" are really something else from us than "despite the wealth" people. Now it begins to look as if by taking this "freedom" talk very seriously, we have done an injustice both to our friends abroad and to ourselves. For we give them 100% of our opportunities to the goods that we are something other than "despite the wealth" people. We give them Communist propaganda, and we in turn lose a chance to enjoy sharing our art, music, theater and literature with other peoples.

Sad to admit, the Russians and Chinese beat us to the chase in this game. The Peking Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Communist and Communist-led groups, and Peking captured the interest of Indians, otherwise reluctant to applaud the Chinese Communist dictatorship by presenting a well selected,

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-7-35-77	1518 IN-42613	DATE OF DOCUMENT 19 Jan 1955	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT FJB-663 (CS-55238) Views on the Coming General Elections		DATE 8 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Cable from () Source: from American observer (B) whose source was Japanese businessman (C) whose source was political commentator for major Japanese newspaper (F) Date of Info: about 14 Jan 1955			Evaluation: B,C,F-3
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 25 January 1955			
3. Besides a relative lack of funds, the LP is split into three groups led by <u>IDEDA Hayato</u> , <u>OGATA Taketora</u> , and <u>ONO Bamboku</u> , each of which will monopolize such funds as they get. Also, the LP is unused to its position of the opposition party. Many Liberals in the prefectures are revolting against the Party.			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ()

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FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-70390-1

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-35-83	IN-43101 FJB-667 (CS-55329)	DATE OF DOCUMENT 20 Jan 1955	ANALYST ()
SUBJECT Right Socialist NISHIO Suehiro		DATE 8 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Cable from () Source: from close associate of a former Japanese Naval officer (F) who has contacts in conservative political circles. Date of Info: Dec 1954		Evaluation: As stated- below	
THE FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASED			
2. The <u>OGATA Taketora</u> faction of the Liberal Party is trying to ally itself with the <u>WADA Hiroo</u> faction of the Left Socialist Party. (F-4)			
3. The <u>OGATA Liberals</u> would have the support of <u>ASHIDA Hitoshi</u> in a showdown and may get the support of <u>KISHI Nobusuke</u> , who is now wavering between <u>OGATA</u> and <u>ONO Bamboku</u> factions of the LP. (Opinion)			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
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DEC 1952

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 27 JAN 55

S-E-C-R-E-T
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

SUBJECT: FE (1-7)

INFO : DCI (8), D/DCI (9), GOP (10), DD/P-PPG (11-12), FI (13), FI/OPS (14), A/DD/P/P (15), PP (16-17), PP/OPS (18), FI/RI (19-20)

OGATA Tak...

() 1618 (IN 4545)

1132Z 27 JAN 55

ROUTINE

TO: DIR (ASCHAM)

INFO: ()

CITE: ()

1. IN MEETING 26 JANUARY OGATA STATED THAT CONSERVATIVE POSITION RE ELECTION IS GOOD AND ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT ASCHAM BE TOLD NOT TO WORRY, FOR WHILE IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME, CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS WILL WIN OUT IN THE END. FJB 700 CONTAINS INFO DERIVED FROM MEETING.

2. PLEASE INFORM () AND ()

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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DATE : 28 JAN 55

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : DD/L COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/OPS, CI, C/CI, AD/CI, FI/RI 2

Handwritten signature/initials

1628 (IN 46052)

1554Z 28 JAN 55

ROUTINE

TO: DIR

INFO: ()

PRECEDENCE
CITE: ()

FJB 700. DIST F. INFO RECD 26 JAN 55 BY AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM OGATA TAKETORA, PRESIDENT LIBERAL PARTY. DATE OF INFO: LATE JAN 55. EVAL OF INFO: 2 (REPORTORIAL ACCURACY).

- OGATA TAKETORA BELIEVES LIBERAL PARTY WILL LOSE MAXIMUM TEN SEATS IN 27 FEB 55 LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS, AGAINST MAXIMUM 20 SEAT GAIN FOR JAPAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, LEAVING LIBERALS WITH 30 SEAT PLURALITY.
- OGATA DESIRES MERGER WITH DEMOCRATS BUT FEELS SPADEWORK FOR THIS WILL REQUIRE AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. OGATA THINKS LIBERAL MINORITY GOVT MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY MERGER LATER. OGATA CONSIDERS DEMOCRATIC SECY-GEN KISHI NOBUSUKE FINANCE MINISTER ICHIMADA HISATO, AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY ADVISER ASHIDA HOTOSHI DEMOCRATS MOST STRONGLY FAVORING CONSERVATIVE MERGER AND BEST DEMOCRATS TO WORK WITH FOR MERGER. OGATA DETERMINED TO REFUSE COALITION GOVT WITH DEMOCRATS.
- OGATA DETERMINED, IF HE BECOMES PREMIER, TO LAY BASIS FOR CONSERVATIVE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY ABOUT ONE YEAR LATER. HE STATED

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

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28 JAN 55

() 1628 (IN 46052)

PAGE 2

WOULD REVISE ELECTION LAWS IF NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. HIS LONG-RANGE AIM IS REAL TWO PARTY SYSTEM; HE FEARS EVOLUTION OF DISASTROUS FRENCH-STYLE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM.

4. OGATA STATED JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP) DECISION TO USE REGULAR ELECTION METHODS (FIELD COMMENT: EVIDENCED BY RECENT SURFACING OF LONG-UNDERGROUND JCP NO. 3 MAN SHIGA YOSHIO TO RUN FOR DIET) WILL HAVE TWO EFFECTS, ONE GOOD, ONE BAD: (A) UWK (AS RECEIVED) CANDIDATES WILL SPLIT LEFTIST VOTE AND MAY COST LEFT-WING SOCIALIST PARTY SEATS, THUS HELPING CONSERVATIVES, WHILE JCP WILL PROB NOT GET MORE THAN THREE SEATS; (B) JAPANESE PEOPLE MAY GET ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION OF JCP AS ORDINARY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY RATHER THAN TOOL OF USSR.

5. OGATA HAS HEARD RUMORS THAT SOCIALISTS (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD (FIELD COMMENT; I.E., USSR AND CHICOMS) ON LARGE SCALE BUT HAS SEEN NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THIS (SOURCE COMMENT: OGATA EXUDED CONFIDENCE AND VITALITY AT THIS MEETING, SEEMED TO RELISH COMING FIGHT FOR DIET SEATS.)

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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DATE : 28 JAN 55

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ()

SERVICE

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : DD/I, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/OPS, CI, C/CI, AD/CI,
FI/RI 2

() 1628 (IN 46052) CORR: 0908Z 29 JAN 55 ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

COMPLETE PAGE 2, PARAGRAPH 5, LINES 1 AND 2 TO READ:

5. OGATA HAS HEARD RUMORS THAT SOCIALISTS ARE GETTING
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD (FIELD COMMENT;..."

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ORIG :
UNIT : FE/1
EXT : 8742
DATE : 28 JANUARY 1955

SECRET

ROUTING	
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TO : STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, NSA, JCS, SECDEF, OMB, OGI *Japanese Pol Parties*
 FROM : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *R-act*
 CONF : FE 7 *0001110*
 INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/STD 2, FI/RQM 3, PP 3, PP/OPS, C/CI, CI, FI/RI 2, SPECIAL: DD/1, OCD, OCI 13, ONE *Takemura*

OS PD NO. 829 (OUT 58746) 2234Z 28 JAN 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

FROM () (26 JANUARY 1955)

DATE OF INFO: 26 JANUARY 1955

APPRAISAL
OF CONTENT : 2 (REPORTorial ACCURACY)

SOURCE : AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM OGATA TAKEMURA.

SUBJECT : VIEWS OF OGATA TAKEMURA

1. OGATA TAKEMURA, PRESIDENT OF LIBERAL PARTY, BELIEVES LIBERAL PARTY WILL LOSE A MAXIMUM OF TEN SEATS IN 27 FEBRUARY LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS, AGAINST A MAXIMUM 20 SEAT GAIN FOR THE JAPAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, LEAVING THE LIBERAL PARTY WITH A 30 SEAT PLURALITY.

2. OGATA DESIRES A MERGER WITH THE DEMOCRATS BUT FEELS SPAINWORK FOR THIS WILL REQUIRE AT LEAST THREE MONTHS. OGATA THINKS LIBERAL MINORITY IN THE GOVERNMENT ~~WILL~~ IS THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY MERGER LATER. OGATA CONSIDERS DEMOCRATIC SECRETARY-GENERAL KISHI NOBUSUKE, FINANCE MINISTER ICHIMADA HISATO, AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY ADVISOR ASHIDA HITOSHI AS DEMOCRATS MOST STRONGLY FAVORING A CONSERVATIVE MERGER AND BEST DEMOCRATS TO WORK WITH FOR A MERGER. OGATA IS DETERMINED TO REFUSE A COALITION GOVERNMENT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO :
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PRIORITY

WITH THE DEMOCRATS.

3. OGATA IS DETERMINED, IF HE BECOMES PREMIER, TO LAY BASIS FOR A CONSERVATIVE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY THREE ABOUT ONE YEAR LATER. HE STATED HE WOULD REVISE ELECTION LAWS IF NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. HIS LONG-RANGE AIM IS A REAL TWO PARTY SYSTEM, AND FEARS EVOLUTION OF DISASTROUS FRENCH-STYLE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM.

4. OGATA STATED THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP) DECISION TO USE REGULAR ELECTION METHODS (FIELD COMMENT. EVIDENCED BY RECENT SURFACING OF UNDERGROUND JCP MEMBER THREE MAN SHIGA YOSHIO TO RUN FOR DIET) WILL HAVE TWO EFFECTS, ONE GOOD, ONE BAD: (A) JCP CANDIDATES WILL SPLIT LEFTIST VOTE AND MAY COST LEFTIST SOCIALIST PARTY SEATS, THUS HELPING CONSERVATIVES, WHILE JCP WILL PROBABLY NOT GET MORE THAN THREE SEATS; (B) JAPANESE PEOPLE MAY GET ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION OF JCP AS ORDINARY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY RATHER THAN A TOOL OF THE USSR.

5. OGATA HAS HEARD RUMORS THAT THE SOCIALISTS ARE RECEIVING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD ON A LARGE SCALE, BUT HAS SEEN NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THIS. (FIELD COMMENT. OGATA EXUDED CONFIDENCE AND VITALITY, AND SEEMED TO RELISH COMING FIGHT FOR DIET SEATS.)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PRECEDENCE

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: STATE

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(END OF MESSAGE)

THE ABOVE INFO BASED ON () 1628 (IN 46952)

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

FB/FI/R AUTHENTICATING OFFICER []

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

OGATA
Jaketora

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/OPS, FI/RI 2

[] 1629 (IN 45943)

1447 28 JAN 55

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

INFO: []

CITE: []

INTEL

Subj

SOURCE FJB 700 SKAGGS FROM OGATA AT MEETING 26 JAN 55.

END OF MESSAGE

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ABSTRACT	INDEX		
<i>encl 1618</i>			
DATE	MAR 1	1955	

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Today, in Southeast Asia, "Soviet policy seeks to exploit existing differences, promote the alienation of East and West and thereby sow the ground for eventual Communist subversion."

RUSSIA, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND POINT FOUR

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

UPON the present timid and inadequate approach of the United States to the pressing problems of under-developed areas, the Soviet Union is carefully preparing the way for eventual Communist control of Southeast Asia. Through a combination of Western hesitation, a regrettable degree of xenophobic Asian nationalism, and astute Soviet diplomacy, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. is on the rise in this crucial area. It is rapidly approaching a position where it may seriously compete with the West for the attention and tacit allegiance of non-Communist Asia.

No post-war Western proposal so imaginatively captured the interest of the under-developed countries as did the concept of "Point Four." But the dream of Point Four appears to be fading under the impact of partisan bickering. Originally proposed by former President Truman, and now implemented through the United Nations technical assistance program as well as the Foreign Operations Administration, Point Four is designed to provide technical assistance and limited amounts of financial aid to backward

areas. It seeks to accelerate a vigorous economic growth, increase agricultural and industrial productivity, and encourage the backward countries to help themselves.

The appeal of Point Four has been particularly strong for those Asian countries which only recently emerged from a long period of colonial domination. As a program conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, it remains sensitive to the needs and desires of the under-developed countries without in any fashion compromising their newly acquired, and jealously guarded, sovereignty. This psychological ingredient is of great significance. The non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia, i.e., India, Indonesia, and Burma, are still intensely suspicious of any foreign attempt to penetrate economically into their national life. Now, independent, they are perhaps even more sensitive to imagined offenses at Western restoration. Indeed, they appear more concerned over instances of former colonial economic practices than over the entire pattern of post-war Soviet imperialism. An understandable, though essentially irrational, reaction to their former experience with the West, it serves to complicate the task of communication between the Western democracies and the nations of Southeast Asia.

Soviet policy seeks to exploit existing differences, promote the alienation of East and West, and thereby sow the ground for eventual Communist subversion. The Great Power struggle is often referred to as a struggle for the

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, now serving as Lieutenant, j.g., in the U.S.N.R., was a Harrison Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, where he received his Ph.D. in 1954. He has done economic analysis for the National Committee for a Free Europe, and has written on "France in Africa" for CURRENT HISTORY, April, 1954.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

mind of man. In competition for the friendship and respect, if not the open allegiance, of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, this conflict has focused on one fundamental issue, namely, the different approach of the Great Powers to the national aspirations and economic needs of the under-developed countries.

THE UNFOLDING PATTERN

More than in any other area of Soviet behavior in the United Nations, early post-war Soviet policy toward the problem of under-developed areas reflected a basic discrepancy between what it said and what it did. This policy became apparent during the initial sessions of the Economic and Social Council and crystallized at subsequent sessions of relevant subsidiary bodies. This policy remained unchanged throughout the Stalinist post-war period. Rigid, unimaginative and greatly influenced by the character of its Eastern European objectives, early Soviet policy toward the under-developed areas was designed primarily to embarrass the West and sharpen East-West differences.

Through a Machiavellian combination of Marxist idealism, natural suspicions of the West, and deep-rooted Asian nationalist sentiments, the U.S.S.R. sought to establish itself as the self-styled champion of the under-developed areas. At the various meetings of United Nations economic bodies the Soviets invariably came out in strong support of the PRINCIPLE of technical assistance. However, while affirming support for the principle involved, the Soviet delegates insisted that significant differences existed over the approach to be adopted. In practice, this not only resulted in the Soviet failure to approximate its stated position, but the U.S.S.R. pursued a course of opposition to all United Nations efforts to institute a working program of technical assistance.

Soviet proposals were dominated by a rigid ideological dogma admitting of

no compromise. One of the fundamental aspects of Soviet thought stresses the importance of heavy industry. The Soviet delegates maintained that, in order to achieve national independence, all United Nations programs of technical assistance should be devoted to creating a heavy industrial network in the under-developed countries. They held that only in this manner could independence be assured.

On the other hand, the Western approach suggested that available resources and technicians be utilized to foster higher agricultural productivity, attack problems of health and communication, and promote light industry. It regarded economic development as an intricate and inter-related process demanding growth in several areas of economic life and not merely in heavy industry. The Soviets refused to acknowledge that economic logic precluded the rapid development of heavy industry in ALL under-developed areas. In the interest of propaganda effect, they chose to ignore the insurmountable obstacles raised by an obvious lack of iron and coal and other necessary resources.

The under-developed countries of Southeast Asia tended toward the Soviet approach in theory. For the Soviet emphasis on heavy industry coincided with their national striving for military power and appeared to offer a more rapid solution to the problems of unemployment and under-employment. However, they soon realized that the Soviet proposals were not feasible in terms of their physical resources, available investment capital, and technical know-how. These facts of economic life loomed large as barriers to any inordinate expansion of heavy industry. Innumerable United Nations surveys lent credence to the Western view. But despite the weight of evidence, the Soviets persisted in their approach to the problem of the economic development of under-developed areas, often flavoring it with bitter attacks on the West. This occasionally incurred

the impatience of those under-developed countries which the Soviets sought most to impress. Their problems demanded immediate attention. As a result, the Asian countries accepted the need to compromise and supported moves to institute a concrete program as soon as possible. No similar sense of urgency motivated Soviet policy during these early years. Rather, the Soviets exploited ingrained Asian prejudices and fears, employing deceit, simplification and tenuous offers of help, to obstruct any effective cooperation with the West.

Several instances may be cited. In sessions of the Economic and Social Council and the Economic Commission for Europe, the Soviet delegates indicated their opposition to all modes of international investment, insisting that such financial arrangements inevitably led to political interference. It should be noted that no comparable hesitancy afflicted Soviet investment practices in Eastern Europe where they were manipulated to promote subsequent Soviet political domination. The Soviets inferred that the "evils" attributed to international investment occurred only in the non-Communist world.

The Soviets repeatedly insisted that all technical assistance should be given through the United Nations as the organization best equipped to safeguard the integrity of the countries concerned. However, they refused to extend their support when presented with the opportunity of establishing a system of disbursing loans and credits through the United Nations. Significantly, and contrary to its supposed intentions, the U.S.S.R. utilized bilateral agreements in carrying out its own program of technical assistance in the Eastern European countries. No effort was made to channel the funds through the United Nations. Indeed, the Soviets opposed every measure which entailed the sending of United Nations officials and fact finding missions into Eastern Europe. This stemmed from the Soviet policy of eliminating Western influence from the area.

Finally, at one session of the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet delegate, M. Morosov, affected a grave concern over the high prices exacted by the "capitalists and monopolists." He proposed that the United Nations take immediate steps to reduce prices to under-developed areas. Again the Soviets cynically toyed with Asian needs and belittled the validity of past efforts. However, analysis of Soviet trade negotiations with the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, e.g., India, reveals that the Soviet Union has always demanded top world prices for its products. Soviet benevolence apparently does not extend to the negotiation of actual trade treaties.

Despite its formal statements of principle, the Soviet Union opposed every constructive endeavor to establish and expand the United Nations technical assistance program. With the creation of the Technical Assistance Administration in 1950, prospects for an expanded program seemed bright. The Soviets took advantage of their status to become a member of the Technical Assistance Committee, the policy-making group responsible for implementing the resolutions of the Economic and Social Council. However, it did not participate in any of the concrete projects nor did it contribute to the financing of technical assistance. In great measure this aspect of Soviet policy proceeded from Stalin's preoccupation with the entrenchment of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the corresponding perpetuation of Western European instability. It precluded any active support for the United Nations technical assistance programs.

The problems of under-developed areas were relegated to a secondary position in the hierarchy of Soviet strategy. At no time during the 1946-1953 period did the Soviet Union join in any of the United Nations technical assistance projects designed to improve the lot of the under-developed areas. The poverty of the Soviet record exposed the insincerity of Soviet state-

ments. To detract attention from their pitiful record, which was a constant source of embarrassment, the Soviets tried to minimize the achievements of United Nations efforts and to raise the specter of a return of colonialism to Southeast Asia.

RECENT TRENDS

Since the death of Stalin, Soviet policy toward the under-developed areas of Southeast Asia has experienced a drastic and challenging reversal of tactics. This "new look" of Soviet diplomacy is clearly evident in those United Nations agencies most concerned with the problems of economic development. It is also apparent in the recent conduct of Soviet relations with the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia. Bearing a moderate, deceptively reasonable stamp, Soviet policy compares advantageously with the blunt, often ill-conceived and halting approach of the West, particularly the United States.

In the summer of 1953, the Soviet Government made its first offer of financial aid to the United Nations technical assistance program. Though the amounts contributed have been small, approximately one million dollars in both 1953 and 1954, the attendant prestige accruing to the Soviet Union has been great. The uncommitted countries of Southeast Asia, and certain members of the NATO coalition, purport to see in such moves the unfolding of a new pattern of Soviet policy, one aimed at a less truculent type of "competitive co-existence." In theory, there are three ways in which the Soviet contribution may be spent. First, the rubles may be used to hire Soviet experts; second, to defray the expenses of nationals from the under-developed countries desiring to study in the Soviet Union; and third, to purchase Soviet equipment.

Thus far, the under-developed countries have hesitated to partake of Soviet benevolence. However, of late, their reluctance seems to be waning un-

der the growing weight of Soviet reasonableness and national need. Soviet aid would serve to supplement the small, but increasing, exchange of personnel already occurring on a bilateral basis between the U.S.S.R. and several of the governments of Southeast Asia.

Of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, India has the firmest ties to the West, to Western institutions, legal and political traditions. But as a nation contiguous to Communist power it must seek a suitable accommodation. This, tends, at times, to tinge Indian foreign policy with an anti-American sentiment which does not accurately mirror the spirit of India's position. It is vital for the United States, as the leader of the free world, to appreciate the dilemmas confronting India, to be patient, and above all to understand that the present leaders are men of the West. They deserve Western support and sympathy in their Olympian efforts to channel revolutionary currents toward Western inspired principles and institutions. Should these basic considerations of international equity be denied to them, the results would be tragic and might indeed ensure the decay of Western civilization.

Influential Indians, burdened with the responsibility for effecting an economic revolution, have long been impressed by the success of the rapid Soviet industrialization. It reinforces the attraction of a Soviet "Point Four" program for these seeking to transform India from a backward society to an industrial one. This Indian interest takes many forms. Students, professors and technical experts, representing a variety of fields, now visit the U.S.S.R. at Soviet expense. Occasionally the returns are rapid and tangible. Last summer the Director of the Indian Statistical Institute, P. C. Mahalanobis, was an official guest of the Soviet Government. As a result of his visit negotiations are in progress to permit Soviet experts to teach at the Institute.

The recent Soviet offer to build and equip a huge steel plant is by far the most spectacular yet proposed. New Delhi is interested. If consummated, it would represent the first major industrial enterprise built in the non-Communist world under Soviet supervision and would pave the way for an expanding economic exchange. A similar offer is being entertained by the Indonesian Government. India is also experimenting with Soviet tractors. Reputed to be cheaper, more economical to operate, and better suited to the peculiarities of Indian agricultural needs than their British and American counterparts, they pose an immediate challenge to the ingenuity of Western business concerns. Indian experts, attending the mammoth October agricultural exhibition in Moscow, expressed a keen interest in Soviet wares.

Seemingly unimportant in themselves, these isolated instances nevertheless presage the establishment of more vigorous Soviet-Indian economic and technical associations. The writer is well aware that there are now, and will remain for many years to come, a far greater number of Indian students studying in the United States than in the Soviet Union. But if Soviet policy continues in its present vein, the psychological effects of the Indian-Soviet rapprochement may make an indelible impression upon the molders of India's future, the budding intelligentsia.

A corresponding pattern of economic inducement has been offered to Indonesia and Burma. Stressing the political, as well as the economic, the Soviet Government recently sent its first Ambassador to Indonesia. A fragile governmental structure, torn by internal dissension, revolution, and a significant Communist minority make Indonesia especially vulnerable to external influence. The lure of a large Soviet loan to develop a heavy industry and the promise of increased technical assistance and trade appear to have blinded Indonesian leaders to the realities of international politics. The

present pittance of Soviet assistance can never hope to approach the available surplus of Western capital. But the Indonesian leaders, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, show little grasp of the need to make the most elementary compromises necessary to attract Western investment. Private business interests ask only the chance to function unfettered by oppressive restriction though willing to accept reasonable supervision and modest profits.

The financial needs of these countries are great. Despite the steady post-war increase of direct investment by private enterprise, only a small percentage of this available capital has trickled to the under-developed areas of Southeast Asia. The bulk has been invested in Latin America and Western Europe. If a recent report by the Indian Minister of Finance on foreign capital investment is indicative of future prospects, the death knell of democracy in India may well have sounded. During the 1948-1953 period, private investment by foreign concerns totaled about \$200 million. Measured against a population growth of one and a half million annually, deteriorating economic conditions and the enormity of India's problems, the amount is depressingly inadequate.

United States policy in the United Nations offers little cause for optimism. Highlighted by the recently signed Manila Pact, it has been preoccupied with the immediate task of curbing the expansion of Communist power through a series of military alliances.

THE FUTURE

The significance of Soviet participation in the United Nations technical assistance program cannot be over-emphasized. Its purpose is nothing less than the demise of the "Point Four" concept. Realization of this objective would ensure the allocation of East and West. In such an eventuality lies the key to a possible Communist triumph in Asia and Europe. Stalin reaffirmed this tenet of Soviet dogma in October, 1952, at the Nineteenth Party Congress.

A vigorous Point Four program is the best answer to the specious idealism of international communism. It can provide the stimulus and reassurance so vitally needed by the frail democratic forces struggling for vindication in the crucible of Asian economic, social, and political ferment. The Soviets are certainly aware of the potency of its appeal. How else can the tardy Soviet membership in United Nations agencies, intimately concerned with the implementation of technical assistance, be explained? The rationale behind the recent decision to join the International Labor Organization and UNESCO can only be understood in terms of basic Soviet opposition to all efforts designed to promote the stability, progress and independence of the Southeast Asian countries.

Soviet participation in international organizations is determined by political considerations. The newly acquired memberships are designed to increase the Soviet voice in guiding the pattern of economic development of underdeveloped areas.

The long term objectives of Soviet foreign policy remain unchanged. However, the shifting pattern of Soviet tactics requires a corresponding flexibility on the part of the West. The present Soviet leadership seeks to undermine the non-Communist world by an illusory cooperativeness. Only through a Western-supported expansion of United Nations technical assistance activities can the underdeveloped nations of Southeast Asia be enabled to perceive the true character of Soviet policy and Soviet intent.

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What is Russia's attitude toward the various nations of the world today? As this author sees it, the notion of traditional friendship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is unfounded, although at various times a common enemy or parallel interests have seemed to bring the nations into harmony. Here is a history of Russian-American relations since the reign of Catherine II.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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THE "traditional friendship" between Russia and the United States is a pleasing notion which strikes a responsive chord in the hearts and minds of many Americans. It was probably inevitable that it should have gained considerable popularity in the early and middle 1940's when the Red Army, much against the will of the Kremlin, found itself fighting the common enemy in partnership with the Western Allies.

The doctrine of "traditional friendship" stems from vague concepts such as the similarities of background and character of the two nations, the vast

expanse and great natural riches of their territories, and the belief that the fundamental objective of their foreign policy has been the same—the maintenance of peace. "A deep love of peace," President Roosevelt told the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Alexander Troyanovsky, in 1933, "is the common heritage of the people of both our countries." This assertion is hardly supported by Russia's historical record.

Throughout the entire history of the United States, Russia has been its best friend [the noted sociologist P. A. Sorokin

wrote in 1944 (*Russia and the United States*). If the respective governments do not commit the stupidest blunders, Russia will constitute in the future our best and most important ally.

There were, of course, dissenting voices even at a time when clear thinking about Russia was discouraged. Referring to the "historic tradition" of American-Russian friendship, E. H. Zabriskie (*American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East*, 1946) rightly stated "upon examination, it is found that this tradition has no basis other than the existence at given times of a common enemy and an absence of competing interests."

What Sorokin described as the "miracle of lasting, unbroken peace between the United States and Russia" is thus reduced to its true proportions, and the present unhappy state of Russian-American relations ceases to be an incomprehensible violation of a pre-ordained historical process.

In the Nineteenth Century, the anti-British sentiment shared by the two governments was the one element which, at times, tended to create the impression of the solidarity of Russian and American interests.

CATHERINE II AND ALEXANDER I

To interpret realistically the policies of imperial Russia it is well to keep in mind that until 1906 Russia was an autocracy. Both before and after that date the Crown, most of the time, exercised considerable influence upon the conduct of foreign affairs which were not subject to public control and did not reflect the feeling of the country although, especially during the later period, they were discussed in the press.

Empress Catherine II, in spite of her professed admiration for the Enlightenment and her frequent references to her *âme républicaine*, believed in autocracy and upheld the principle of monarchical solidarity. She was much distressed by the revolt of the American colonies and while the request of King George III (August, 1775) for the

sending of a Russian expeditionary force to fight the American rebels was refused, the Empress promised to help England in any possible way. In fulfillment of an obligation assumed in 1778, Russia withheld recognition until after England had established relations with the United States. St. Petersburg, indeed, was the last European capital to recognize American independence.

Although the Armed Neutrality Declaration launched by Catherine in 1780 gave much comfort to the United States, the text of this document was not officially communicated to the United States government. American ships, unlike the ships of other belligerent powers, were denied the use of Russian ports. Francis Dana, the first American envoy to St. Petersburg, who reached his destination in 1781, was not received at court and two years later returned home empty-handed.

Emperor Alexander I was emotionally attached to liberal thought, professed admiration for the United States constitution, and corresponded with Thomas Jefferson. During his reign relations with the United States became normal and, for a time, cordial.

In 1808, Alexander Dashkov was appointed "charge d'affaires near the Congress of the United States" and the next year John Quincy Adams went to St. Petersburg as the first fully accredited American minister. In September, 1812, the Czar offered to mediate the Anglo-American war. President Madison accepted the proposal somewhat too hastily and the American plenipotentiaries who went to St. Petersburg found themselves in an embarrassing position: England had refused mediation; Alexander, engrossed in the struggle with Napoleon, lost all interest in the matter, and peace between England and the United States was finally concluded without Russian participation.

More damaging to Russian-American relations were Russian expansionists' designs on the American continent and Alexander's plans for the restoration of

Spanish sovereignty over her South American colonies.

In the Eighteenth Century, Russian adventurers and hunters, attracted by the lucrative fur trade, began to settle on the Aleutian Islands, in Alaska, and along the northwest coast of America. In 1799, an imperial decree reorganized the Russian settlements as the Russian-American Company. The agency was granted a trade monopoly, exclusive jurisdiction over the American coast north of the fifty-fifth degree, and the right to occupy further vacant territories in the name of the Russian Crown.

The resulting friction with American traders and the United States government came to a head when, in September 1821, an imperial decree laid claim to the Northwestern coast north of the fifty-first degree and ordered the exclusion of non-Russian vessels from the adjoining territorial waters. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, rejected the Russian contention, but St. Petersburg showed a conciliatory spirit and after protracted negotiations the question was amicably settled. Russia renounced her territorial claims and recognized freedom of navigation in territorial waters (Treaty of April 17, 1821).

The second important source of friction was the Holy Alliance inaugurated by Alexander in September, 1815. Ostensibly a league for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of the principles of Christian morality, the Holy Alliance was actually the instrument of extreme reaction, its policies being directed to the suppression of revolutionary and independence movements and to the safeguarding of "legitimacy." Repeatedly urged by the Czar to join the Alliance, the United States notified Russia in July, 1820, of its "absolute and irrevocable determination" not to participate in any European league.

Meanwhile Alexander, in pursuance of the doctrine of "legitimacy," became the protagonist of the restoration of

Spanish rule over her South American colonies whose independence the United States recognized in 1822.

Russia's attempted expansion in North America and her plea for intervention in South America were weighty considerations behind the Monroe Doctrine (December 2, 1823) which stipulated that the Americas "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power," and that the United States should regard any attempt to extend the European system to any part of this hemisphere "as dangerous to our peace and safety."

Surprisingly, St. Petersburg took no exception to this momentous pronouncement, probably because the Russian colonies in America were a matter of very minor importance and plans for intervention on behalf of Spain but a passing whim of the Czar. The whim, moreover, in the existing international situation, had little chance of success.

RAPPROCHEMENT AND ESTRANGEMENT

For three decades following the Treaty of 1824 relations between Russia and the United States were uneventful. In 1832, the two countries signed a commercial treaty, but trade between them remained insignificant. Faithful to the tradition of the Founding Fathers, the United States kept aloof from European entanglements which absorbed the attention of Russian diplomacy. St. Petersburg and Washington had no common interests, little to quarrel about, indeed, hardly any points of contact.

Extraneous events—the Crimean War, the Polish rebellion of 1863, and the Civil War in the United States—injected new life in Russo-American relations and brought about a temporary *rapprochement*.

During the Crimean War the Russian Government, fearing an attack by the British on Alaska, arranged for the transfer, for three years, of the properties of the Russian American Company to American interests, thus put-

ting them under the protection of the American flag. This precaution proved unnecessary: a convention negotiated by the Russian American Company and the British Hudson's Bay Company and ratified by both governments excluded the territories held by the two companies from the sphere of military operations.

During the American Civil War the attitude of the imperial government was one of support of the North and of the cause of American unity. As Edward Stoeckl, Russian minister to Washington, put it, "the American confederation is a counterpoise to English might" and, from the Russian standpoint, "the disintegration of the United States, as a Power, is most undesirable." In 1862, Prince Gorchakov, Russian minister of foreign affairs, turned down the Anglo-French proposal for mediation between North and South.

Washington reciprocated in 1863 by refusing to participate in a collective *démarche* advocated by England and France on behalf of the Poles in revolt against Russian rule. Russian popularity in the United States reached its peak in the early autumn of the same year when squadrons of the Russian fleet made unheralded appearances in New York and San Francisco. Their arrival was generally held as evidence of Russia's determination to lend naval support to the federal government in case of foreign intervention. This was not, however, the intention of St. Petersburg. Fearing an outbreak of hostilities with England over the Polish question the Russian government endeavored to remove its weak Navy from the reach of the British and sent it to America because, to quote R. F. Dulles, "there was in fact nowhere else the Russian vessels could go."

Of far greater moment, although little appreciated at the time, was the purchase by the United States of Russia's American colonies. Negotiations for the sale of Alaska began in 1854 but were not completed until 1867. Two main reasons account for the Russian

decision to dispose of her American possessions: (1) economically, the colonies were unprofitable and, according to an official Russian report in 1863, presented a picture of "complete stagnation in all matters of colonization, industry, commerce, and citizenship"; (2) militarily they were indefensible and it was realized that sooner or later they would be taken over either by the United States or by Great Britain.

The price agreed upon was \$7.2 million; that is, substantially more than the \$5 million that the Russian Government was prepared to accept. The transaction was unpopular in both countries, but far more so in United States than in Russia, where the sale of Alaska—a distant and little-known land—received little attention.

The aggressive anti-Semitism of the closing decades of the Russian Empire and the clash of national interests resulting from Russian expansion and American economic penetration in the Far East tended to embitter relations between the two countries. The pogroms which swept Russia in 1881 and again in 1903-1906 were the direct cause of mass migration of Russian Jews to the United States. Pogroms, tolerated and sometimes instigated by the authorities, and discriminatory anti-Jewish legislation aroused public opinion abroad, especially in the United States and England, and finally led to the abrogation of the American-Russian Treaty of 1832 on the ground that its provisions were violated by the treatment accorded in Russia to United States citizens of Jewish-Russian origin.

FAR EAST FRICTION

Russian expansion in the Far East entered a new and active phase with the conquest of the vast Amur region and the founding in 1860 of Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, near the Korean border. Beginning in the 1840's the United States, too, displayed marked interest in China and the Far East. Washington and American business leaders thought in terms of trade, railway concessions and opportunities for

commerce and investments; St. Petersburg, in terms of annexations, conquest and ice-free outlets to the Pacific.

In September, 1899, John Hay, the Secretary of State, enunciated the doctrine of the Open Door in China. The Russian government, grudgingly and with reservations, accepted the principle of the Open Door but immediately proceeded to violate it, particularly in Manchuria which was under Russian occupation. American government and business circles were alarmed and their dislike and suspicion of Russia's Far-Eastern policy were widely shared in England and other Western European countries (with the exception of Germany) with interests in the Far East.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in January, 1904, American and British opinion were solidly aligned behind the Japanese. "I have from the beginning favored Japan and have done all that I could . . . to advance her interests," Theodore Roosevelt wrote in May, 1906. "I thoroughly admire and believe in the Japanese." Although President Roosevelt had at times doubts about Japan's ultimate intentions, the importance of American assistance to that country during the Russo-Japanese War cannot be exaggerated.

The peace conference that terminated the Russo-Japanese War met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, under the auspices of President Roosevelt. The Treaty of Portsmouth (September, 1905), although it involved the loss by Russia of half of Sakhalin, the Liaotung peninsula with Port Arthur (which Russia had wangled from China in 1897), and a section of the Southern Manchurian Railway, was no worse than could have been expected in view of Russia's undistinguished war record. Indeed, the treaty was much more resented in Japan than in Russia. Significantly, during the next decade relations between Russia and Japan improved greatly, while tension between Russia and the United States continued in the Far East.

The Russian revolution of March, 1917, which overthrew the monarchy, and the entry of the United States in World War I opened promising vistas of cooperation between the two nations. Washington recognized the Russian Provisional Government five days after the abdication of the Czar and there was much real enthusiasm in the United States for the newly born Russian democracy.

The course of the Russian revolution, however, proved disappointing. The promise of the Provisional Government to carry the war to a victorious end could not be fulfilled and much embarrassment was caused to Allied leaders, including President Wilson, by persistent Russian demands for the clear definition of war aims.

Meanwhile Russia's social and economic structure rapidly disintegrated: the army refused to fight and melted away; and on November 7, 1917, the helpless and tottering Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky was overthrown by the Bolsheviks.

THE SOVIET PERIOD

The advent of Lenin to power was a great deal more than a mere change of government: an untried and formidable factor—international communism—had entered the arena of world politics. The policies of Moscow, where the Russian capital was transferred in March, 1918, were henceforth determined by the Marxian doctrine which predicated the inevitable downfall of capitalism.

The momentous implications of the change were not grasped at the time nor, indeed, for many years to come. In 1918, the Western Allies, shocked as they were by Soviet theories and excesses, were primarily concerned with the continuation of the war and the maintenance of the Eastern front. On March 3, 1918, however, the Soviet Union withdrew from the struggle by concluding with Germany the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Intervention in Russia was designed primarily to prevent the massive trans-

fer of German troops to the hard-pressed Western front. The decision of the European Allies and Japan to land troops in Russia was reluctantly accepted by President Wilson. The American soldiers sent to Archangel and in Siberia in June, 1918, were instructed not to interfere in Russia's internal affairs. This condition could not be observed and the American expeditionary force, like other Allied troops in Russia, became hopelessly enmeshed in the unspcakable disorder of the Russian civil war.

Intervention was a disheartening and sobering experience. It was denounced by the Soviets as "wanton aggression," and its one lasting result was to provide a semblance of justification for the Communist doctrine of capitalist "encirclement."

Until about 1921 Soviet policy was predicated on the assumption of the imminence of the world revolution. When the international revolution failed to materialize, the Kremlin resigned itself to temporary co-existence with capitalism and embarked on the stupendous task of rebuilding the Russian economy in accordance with Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country.

Co-existence led to diplomatic recognition which was granted to the Soviet Union by the principal countries in 1922-1925. Diplomatic recognition by the United States was withheld until November, 1933.

Among the obligations assumed by the Soviet Union on this occasion was the promise to negotiate a settlement of American claims arising from the confiscation of American properties in Russia and loans made to the Kerensky government, as well as the undertaking to refrain from subversive propaganda in the United States.

Neither promise was honored. Negotiations dealing with American claims were abruptly terminated early in 1935 and in the summer of the same year the State Department vainly protested against the meeting in Moscow of the seventh congress of the Communist In-

ternational—in violation of the pledges given to Washington in 1933.

The Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, prelude to World War II, sharpened the estrangement between the American and the Russian government, but Hitler's attack on his erstwhile partner (June, 1941) once more reversed the situation. Stalin became talkative and almost amiable, he corresponded with Churchill and Roosevelt, the doors of the Kremlin were thrown open to American and British envoys, and the Communist International "dis-solved itself" (May, 1943), while \$11 billion of Lend-Lease supply sent by the United States played their part in helping to stem the tide of German invasion.

In England, and in the United States, enthusiasm for Russia mounted with the retreats of the German armies. In war-time negotiations, especially at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, the Soviet Union won a number of major points that paved the way for the expansion of the Soviet rule over central and southeastern Europe.

The post-war world—divided, shattered and impoverished—offered fertile ground for Communist propaganda. It was not surprising therefore that the Comintern was revived as the Cominform in September, 1947.

While the methods of Soviet foreign policy are flexible, its basic objectives have been maintained unaltered since 1917. The principal of these objectives in the phrase of Stalin, is the elimination of capitalist environment. Since World War II, this aim has been pursued by Moscow with considerable perseverance and no small success. Hence the conflict between American and Soviet policies in every part of the world today.

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Because "there is no alternative to co-existence," we must study Russian policy and ideology very carefully, according to the author of this concluding article. As he sees it, "... the highest principle guiding the makers of Soviet foreign policy is the rule of expediency, the considerations of a Soviet raison d'etat."

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM

By ALFRED G. MEYER

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WHEN the Communist Party came into power in November, 1917, its leaders had not yet formulated a foreign policy platform for the simple reason that they had no intention to enter into any relations whatsoever with non-Communist governments across the globe. To do so, they felt, would compromise their principles and sully their ideological purity. They were convinced, moreover, that no such relations were necessary, because they firmly counted on the immediate disappearance of the non-Communist states.

To be sure, the first Soviet cabinet included a People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. But this office was in the hands of the chief strategist of the revolution, Lev Trotsky, and, if we can speak about its policies at all, we find that they consisted of measures designed only to hasten the disappearance of the bourgeois governments. The Foreign Commissar regarded it his

chief task to help "transform the international war into a world revolution," i.e., into a world-wide civil war. No longer should nation be pitted against nation, or state against state, but class should line up against class on a global scale. Lacking any more effective means of attaining this end, the Foreign Commissariat relied chiefly on propagandic devices of various sorts designed to embarrass, weaken, and undermine the bourgeois order. Since the Communist leaders were convinced that the fall of capitalism was imminent in any event, they carried out these policies with boundless enthusiasm and optimism.

At the same time, they were prepared to take up arms for a revolutionary war, to give developments a push in the direction which they *know* they would take. The beginning of such a revolutionary war, they thought, would act as the psychological catalyst around which the revolutionary class consciousness of proletarians everywhere would crystallize at once; and bourgeois rule would be at an end. This would also end the necessity of engaging in foreign policy, since the workers of all the world would unite in a single socialist commonwealth.

The basis for these sanguine expectations is to be found partly in traditional Marxist commonplaces concerning the nation states, which we have not space

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

enough to discuss; and partly in some peculiar Russian circumstances. According to the Marxist theory of revolution, Russia could not be considered a country ripe for socialism, because this comparably backward society possessed neither the material nor the human resources which were regarded as the pre-conditions for a successful proletarian revolution. Still, the Communist leaders insisted on carrying through such a revolution in Russia. In order to give it meaning, they argued that this revolution was going to be supported by similar uprisings everywhere. The Russian revolution would act as a spark which would kindle a world conflagration, an explosion which would set off a chain reaction of explosions everywhere. Lenin made the belief in this chain reaction into a dogma, and could thus conclude that the seizure of power in Russia would surely start the world revolution, which in turn would insure the viability of a Communist régime in backward Russia.

MINORITY NATIONALITIES

These ideas were supplemented and complicated by certain considerations regarding the viability of the nation-state in general, considerations which were expressed on a tactical level in Lenin's policy toward national minorities, and, on a broad theoretical level, in his theory of imperialism. Communist nationality policy was based on the recognition that national loyalties and aspirations were a strong force in the contemporary world, and on the desire to make use of this force. Communist strategy is characterized by the readiness and eagerness to use any and all forces available at the moment, even though they be basically hostile.

To the Communist, all groups that constitute society are anyway hostile as long as they are not part of his own Party machinery; yet, many of his enemies may have certain goals in common with the Party, and may therefore be natural allies. The Party sees its own goal as a two- or three-fold one. Its

long-range aim is to transform world society into a socialist commonwealth. As a means to this end, it wants to rule over society. Finally, in order to accomplish both these ends, it seeks to destroy the existing social and political order. It is this last goal which is shared by many individuals and groups in the contemporary world who are not Communist; and among these groups are minority nationalities which feel themselves wronged by the nation to whose state they belong.

The Russian Marxists were naturally aware of the political dynamic stirring among the minorities on Russia's borders, and the Communists sought to release this explosive stuff to their advantage. They sought to attract minorities to the movement by espousing their cause in an uncompromisingly radical fashion. Their platform declared that every nation had the right to self-determination. In actual fact, the position was qualified by many in effect and explicit reservations, and after the revolution, was disregarded whenever the régime found it necessary to do so. Still, the first acts of Russian foreign policy undertaken by the Communist government were acts to formulate the separation of Finland, Latvia, Estonia and other minorities from the erstwhile Russian empire.

The theory of imperialism was a broad and all-comprising revision of the Marxist theory of capitalism and its breakdown. It attempted to explain why the most important predictions and promises of Marx had turned out wrong, and at the same time to resurrect confidence in their eventual fulfillment. The gist of this theory was that capitalism had escaped from the dead end road of its insurmountable contradictions by widening the scope of its activities from Europe and North America to the entire world through the export of capital to underdeveloped areas. As a consequence, capitalism had failed to collapse. Instead it had brought unprecedented prosperity to the West which had raised the living standard

even of the working class to such an extent that its revolutionary movement was softened and weakened.

At the same time, however, the contradictions of capitalism had reappeared, though on a global level, as a struggle between exploiter nations and exploited nations. When talking about the coming world revolution, Communist leaders now visualized it as a double process in which the revolt of the workers in economically advanced nations would be accompanied by the revolt of the underdeveloped nations against the White Man. For this reason, another aspect of foreign policy emerged at once after the October revolution: friendship of the Communist state with Asia in its fight against the West. Hence our previous statement that Soviet Russia did not at first have a foreign policy applies only to her relations (or absence of relations) with the bourgeois West proper. In Asia, on the other hand, the Kremlin from the beginning sought to establish friendly relations with anti-Western governments whose revolt against foreign capital was to help bring about the immediate downfall of the bourgeois world order.

The fact that the expected chain reaction, the world crisis of capitalism, did not come off meant not only that the Communist regime faced isolation in the midst of bourgeois states; it actually threatened the very existence of the regime. This threat of doom, which became very tangible at the time of the Allied intervention in the civil war, was dramatized for the first time by the German advance into Central Russia in the spring of 1918. The German offensive threatened to destroy Communist Russia even before the workers of the world could rise in revolution, and faced the Soviet rulers with the terrible dilemma of either a complete defeat, defeating the revolution, or a complete rejection of their own ideas of proletarian orthodoxy by joining a surrender agreement and accepting the Ger-

man peace terms. The decision which was taken after long and bitter debates constitutes the beginning of Soviet foreign policy: by signing the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Communist Russia for the first time entered into formal relations with a bourgeois government and thus began to conduct foreign policy.

In arguing for the acceptance of the German terms, Lenin declared that the international revolution of the proletariat had, so far, made one important gain, namely, the establishment of a stronghold in the form of the Russian Communist state which constituted a bridgehead in the territory of capitalism. This bridgehead, if it remained isolated, would never be able to transform itself into a socialist community. Yet giving it up would be a betrayal of the working class everywhere. For the time being, he implied, the interests of workmen everywhere were being promoted and symbolized by the Communist state. In preserving and strengthening it, Communists would therefore be working for the world revolution.

A "BREATHER"

These arguments have become the basic principle underlying all Soviet-Russian foreign policies since. Its leaders argue that the national interest of the Soviet state are identical with the interests of the proletarian revolution, at least as long as this revolution does not make significant gains in the more important strongholds of capitalism. How long this situation will prevail is not explained. Lenin at first spoke about a "breather," i.e., a short moment during which the world revolution might catch its breath, if were, before making further advances. It was during this breathing space that Russia was to regard the preservation of her own power as the chief aim. Later, as Europe overcame the difficulties of the post-war aftermath, the term "transitional period" was substituted for "breathing space," and Lenin came

to talk about this transitional period as an entire "era of world wars and revolutions." The national interests of Soviet Russia would thus be high on the agenda of world communism for an entire historical "era."

In this manner, the highest principle guiding the makers of Soviet foreign policy is the rule of expediency, the considerations of a Soviet *raison d'état*. The unprincipled pursuit of the Soviet-Russian national interest turned into the over-riding principle, while the abandonment of old doctrines was made palatable to the Communist rank and file by talmudic manipulations of ideas and slogans. This raises the question whether the study of Communist ideology was thus made irrelevant for an understanding of subsequent Soviet policies. Our answer is in the negative. For one thing, the very insistence on realism and expediency can be understood only in connection with the traditionally realistic bent of Communist thinking. Further, Marxist-Leninist concepts have not ceased to be tools of analysis for Soviet political intelligence. Finally, Communist ideas remain as a guide to action. This statement does not contradict what we said about the rule of expediency. For this rule does not indicate precisely what the Soviet national interest is, or how it is best promoted.

All these are problems to be solved, and they are solved in terms of Marxist-Leninist concepts. Here, as in the Communist attempt to understand and describe the world, the theory fails utterly in short-range problems of policy-formulation, and retains its importance in formulating long-range programs. For instance, the Soviet attitude toward the underdeveloped nations is broadly determined by Lenin's theory of imperialism, so that Moscow is likely to support all anti-Western strivings in such areas, and to base its policies on the firm expectancy that such strivings will always be strong. The theory does not, however, give prescriptions as to how this support is

to be given, in what form, by what means, to what parties or groups, and a great number of policies have been tried with varying degrees of success.

MOSCOW PARANOIA

Similarly, the Western world is analyzed in Marxist-Leninist terms, and a general mode of action, which Nathan Leites has called the "operational code" of the Kremlin, is derived from this analysis. To be sure, this operational code is highly contradictory, even in its most fundamental principles. Two axioms form its basis: one, that the non-Soviet world is hostile to Communist Russia and wishes to destroy her; the other, that the non-Soviet world is doomed to destroy itself by crises and internecine wars. The first of these axioms leads to an attitude of intense suspicion, to an almost pathological sensitivity, and to the desperate resolve to use Machiavellian cunning and utilize all possible means for the purpose of maintaining national independence.

The second one gives the Soviet policy-makers a measure of patience and flexibility, an ability to stage retreat without embarrassment. It provides a certain counter-weight against jumpiness and hyper-sensitivity. These and other elements of the operational code are determined by Marxist-Leninist theories. Russian policy-makers do think in terms of decades, but not in terms of momentary situations. Or, rather, think in both terms: They are resolved to make the most of any temporary constellation, and even seem preoccupied with problems that are immediately at hand. Yet they are ready to trust in long-range developments, to be patient, to recede when reacting force

Pragmatism and opportunism, combined with remarkable doctrinal stability. Within the wider or conflicting aims and policies governing parallel with each other or alternating in zig-zag fashion, the Soviet leaders feel that they have, if not a plan, then a well-articulated, firm orientation by which

to guide their steps. What should be remembered, however, is that these broad theories do not indicate how the long-range aims ought to be pursued, what policy-conclusions should be drawn, or how such policies had best be implemented.

WHAT IS NATIONAL INTEREST?

We have seen that Communist doctrine elevates the pursuit of the Soviet national interest to a world mission. But what is this national interest?

In the case of Communist Russia, the national interest obviously consists in a number of objectives, such as *security* from attack by enemies; *profits* from the exploitation of dependent areas; *alliances* with non-Soviet states for any number of purposes; *territorial expansion* for the sake of increasing the nation's economic, demographic and military strength; *controlling the non-Soviet world*, be it for defensive or aggressive reasons; *peaceful relations* with the outside world, for a variety of reasons. These are typical objectives of any government conducting foreign relations with its neighbors; hence it would be banal merely to enumerate them. The specific nature of Soviet foreign policy becomes apparent only when these different aims are seen in their relation to each other. In particular, we have to examine which of these aims have been dominant in the minds of Soviet policy makers.

Soviet foreign policy was characterized by the fact that it was guided almost throughout by an overwhelming fear of the foreign world, coupled with a sense of weakness. The Soviet state was seen as like a precarious existence in the midst of the imperialist world which Hitler, 1933, and for decades Soviet policy makers lived with the nightmare of an anti-Soviet crusade undertaken by a united Western world. As long as this was their view of the world situation, the chief aim of the Kremlin was security; and one of the means toward this aim was old-fashioned power politics. In the traditional manner of

weak states, the Soviet government aimed at isolating the strongest nations and allying itself with the weak, the disgruntled, the threatened, the revisionists—Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1920's; France in the mid-1930's.

Its current interest in fostering "neutrality" is related to this effort. Communist ideology does not, fundamentally, believe in the possibility of neutrality, and its adherents take a stern "either-for-us-or-against-us" attitude toward all outsiders. In practical politics, however, this rigorous dogmatism is tempered by pragmatic considerations; hence, failing to make actual allies out of nations that might be weaned away from collaboration with the leading nations of the West, the Soviet leaders accept an attitude of neutrality as a limited advantage.

Germany's attitude in the 1920's, symbolized by the treaty of Rapallo, was basically a neutralist attitude. And although the Kremlin never tired in its attempts to transform this German policy into one of repudiating the West and collaborating with the Soviet Union, the Russians must have been aware that German neutralism was all they could hope for, and should therefore try to foster.

The actual implementation of Soviet aims in the game of power politics thus is adapted to the possibilities which are open. The position which Russia would like to maintain is a position of aloofness from the conflicts of the Western world, so that she can at the same time fan and exacerbate these conflicts. "When two men fight, the third man is pleased," says a German proverb, and we might therefore speak of the position of the *laughing third man* as the chief aim of Soviet foreign policy.

It is a position of strength which promises dividends in the form of even greater strength in the future. Soviet Russia has, so far, occupied it only once, in the summer of 1939, when a stroke of Molotov's pen made a major war between Germany and the Western powers inevitable, a war which the

Kremlin believed would last long, cripple the major European powers, and leave Russia time to build up her own strength.

However it might be defined, the Soviet national interest, we saw, was identified with the interest of the world revolution. The two pursuits were seen as complementing, supporting and fulfilling each other. The Communist state was defined as the *ochag revoliutsii*, the hearth of the Revolution, a term which intentionally left the meaning open to interpretation, but gave the vague impression that the revolution would flame up if the hearth were tended carefully.

Conversely, the Soviet state came to regard proletarian revolutions abroad as a weapon of foreign policy. It began, as it were, to invest in Communist activities for the sake of furthering national aims, so that the Communist trade union network, the Communist International, and all its affiliates and dependencies turned into operational branches of the Soviet foreign office. There is no doubt that Soviet foreign policy, particularly military intelligence, profited by this novel way of conducting foreign relations.

But these gains should not be overestimated. On the contrary, a careful analysis of Soviet policies and international Communist policies will reveal that this merger of revolutionary with diplomatic pursuits has handicapped both these aims.

After the Second World War, when Germany was beaten, the colonial world seemed to be disintegrating, communism emerged in great strength in Western Europe, and Russia emerged as the second strongest nation of the world, the two interests seemed to coincide for the first time. Soviet foreign policy became expansive; the Red Army exported revolution. At the same time, revolutionary drives in Asia gave the Soviet states powerful allies. But the Red Army did not march for long; and when it waits, revolution must wait. And, where it occurs nevertheless, it

may be a source of embarrassment to the Kremlin, or it may crystallize into a hostile regime, as in Yugoslavia.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

But let us return to our examination of the Soviet national interest. To a certain extent, this interest is derived from constant (geographical) facts which have nothing to do with the type of government ruling Russia. We have also discussed the role played by Marxist-Leninist ideas in modifying these "natural" aims of any Russian state. In addition, we ought to be aware of the impact of domestic problems on the conduct of any country's foreign policy. Anyone who follows congressional debates over the aims of American foreign policy knows that international relations are a domestic issue and have a strong impact on domestic politics.

Many of us are somewhat less aware that this is a reciprocal relationship, so that purely domestic events inevitably influence the conduct of foreign relations, to such an extent that a strict separation of foreign from domestic affairs is meaningless. For instance, students of Soviet politics know that the Communist International was emulated by Moscow not only because world communism became a number one liability, but also because the administrative apparatus of the International had to be "Stalinized" in order to make the Stalinization of the Soviet Russian state apparatus more effective. Stalin's struggle over Communist policy were thus a part of his fight against his domestic opponents.

Similarly, the war scare which shook Moscow in the summer of 1927 and which had a number of repercussions in the conduct of Russia's foreign affairs, was a consequence not only of important international setbacks, but acquired importance to the regime mainly because it could be used to cow the oppositionists, to rally the people behind Stalin's leadership, and to strengthen the arm of the political

police: an imaginary crisis in foreign affairs was conjured up in order to justify the introduction of police-state methods. Again, the isolationism which characterized Soviet foreign policy around 1930 is clearly a consequence of Moscow's intense preoccupation with domestic affairs—the first five-year plan and the civil war against the peasantry.

Similarly, the debacle of Soviet politics in Spain during the Civil war is intimately connected with the ravages of the Great Purge then at its heights in Russia; and, conversely, both the five-year plans and the purges of the mid-1930's are explained in part by Soviet Russia's international situation, namely, the clear and present danger of German and Japanese aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policies can be complicated by inconsistencies. To take a simple example, foreign trade is not only an economic matter, but also a political one; the economic acts may conflict with the political. The concessions granted to foreign capitalists in the 1920's were both a means to help the Soviet economy back on its feet and a tool of the Foreign Office in luring the outside world to do business with Russia. Here domestic and international considerations collided. But, at the same time, the concessions granted constituted a thorn in the flesh of the socialist economy, and, finally, the presence of foreign businessmen on Soviet soil was highly undesirable from the point of view of counter-intelligence and the political police.

Finally, the whole "peace campaign" that has been waged by Soviet leaders in the last few months and years is intimately related to domestic problems. The opinion is often voiced that Soviet Russia is inevitably driven to war by the necessity to maintain control over its population. "Totalitarian rulers," George Kennan said recently, "are always moved to try to eliminate the awkward standard of comparison involved in the existence of freedom elsewhere,

particularly in the country just next door." And it is true, that international complications, such as "capitalist encirclement" are used by Russia's rulers as ideological devices to instill loyalty and enforce compliance. But it would be a mistake to think that they are really dependent on such devices. Moreover, such talk need not lead to aggressive action.

On the contrary, all evidence points to the conclusion that the Kremlin fervently wishes to stay out of a war. The reasons, as we indicated, are primarily domestic. For one thing, the present government seems to deem it expedient to satisfy its subjects' yearning for peace by tangible successes. In addition, they have apparently decided to raise the living standard of the population, a goal which can be achieved only if the international scene remains undisturbed. Finally, the Soviet policy makers must surely remember the disastrous weeks of the German advance in 1941, when millions of soldiers deserted to the enemy, and the government temporarily lost control of the civilian population in the rear, particularly in the city of Moscow. They must surely know that the only thing that threatens their rule is war.

TRADITIONAL POLICIES

To conclude this brief discussion of the Soviet national interest, let us compare the aims of Communist Russia with those of the Czars. It is here, of course, that the constant geographical factors mentioned above come into play and give continuity to Russian policies, regardless of the nature of the regime. The necessity to command ice-free ports, once a compelling motive for international advances, is still worrying the Soviet Foreign Office, although it may have declined in importance in the air age, which gives unprecedented strategic weight to the Arctic.

Today as under the Czars Russia is a multi-national state with fluid and open borders both in the steppe area of Asia and in the North-European plain.

Today as before Russia, as the strongest power to the east of Germany, is a major disturbing factor in European politics. Today as in the decades preceding the revolution she is weak and underdeveloped in comparison with the leading nation of the West; and her awareness of this, her ambivalence toward the West, and her readiness to use the West in order to beat the West are in tune with a tradition dating back to the Sixteenth Century.

Still, it should be clear that the differences far outweigh the similarities. Russia may still be an expansionist Eurasian power commanding vast areas of barren territory, locked in by mountains, deserts, ice and a hostile West with its Asiatic dependents. But the Soviet way of analyzing their situation, their program of dealing with it, and the methods at their disposal give Soviet foreign policy such novelty and dynamism that the similarities with Czarist politics become almost coincidental. And the successes of Soviet policy in the last ten years have virtually obliterated all similarities.

Can we "co-exist" with a powerful state whose leaders regard us with such undisguised hostility, and who can justify the pursuit of their national interest by reference to an ideal which is still making converts daily? Part of the answer to this question must be derived from the nature of the technological revolution of our time. It seems pretty clear that in the age of thermo-nuclear weapons the only alternative to co-existence is co-non-existence. But, in this article, we have to discuss the question in the light of Soviet foreign policy. From what has been said, it becomes apparent that, in the short run, co-existence is entirely possible.

The Soviet people are tired, and their leaders afraid, of war. Indeed, the Kremlin so much wishes to avoid war that it tends even to restrain revolutionary activities abroad, for the sake of peace. This is something seldom pointed out to those who, openly or in veiled fashion, advocate preventive war:

Russian domination has weighed heavily on world communism, and there are many indications that many revolutionary parties would have fared better if Moscow had left them manage their own affairs. In the light of this, the destruction of the Soviet state would only liberate these movements and give them greater virulence. In any event, the destruction of the Soviet state would not by any means signify the destruction of world communism.

The point is that there is no alternative to co-existence. Co-existence of two hostile worlds need not be "advocated" or "defended"; it simply is a fact to be taken into consideration, and a problem to be solved. The problem takes the form of the Cold War, a state of suspended hostility between the two worlds during which they engage in a race for strength and for position. It is an atomic race in which the stalemate may have been reached already; a race for industrial development, in which the United States is still safely ahead of Communist Russia; and a race to win friends and influence people, which we may be losing since it began.

This race for friends and influence is perhaps the most important part of the Cold War, and the most difficult one to win. Obviously, this essential combat for the minds of men cannot be discussed without a thorough examination of everyone involved, hence it transcends the bounds of a discussion of Soviet policies. As a matter of fact, Soviet policies play the least important part in this Cold War, which goes on with each nation and each individual.

It is a war in which Communist Russia has the advantages of a revolutionary tradition, while the rest of us come through a heap of years as an allies' imperialist party. If we are to overcome this handicap, we must do so not, then Communist Russia, but by patiently watching the non-Soviet world disintegrate and turn to the Left. Indeed, this seems to be the present foreign policy of the Soviet regime.

In the Far East, the U.S.S.R. has changed both tactics and methods, but has maintained the imperialistic foreign policy of the Czars. "The Soviet regime did not renounce the expansionist ambitions of Czarist Russia as the Soviet declarations of 1919 and 1920 led many to believe."

RUSSIA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY

By THEODORE HSI-EN CHEN

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YEARS before the "opening" of China and Japan for trade with the West, Russia had by virtue of geographical proximity felt the need of negotiations with these Far Eastern countries. Before the Perry expedition to Japan, Russia had made repeated attempts to establish relations with the Japanese government; and as early as 1689 Russia signed a treaty with China to define the boundary lines between Chinese and Russian territories in the Amur region. Consequently, when the Western powers began trade and diplomatic relations with the Far East, Russia was more than ready to take full advantage of the opportunity now available to all.

The weakness of China in the Nineteenth Century opened the way for foreign exploitation. Each time there was an opportunity for further advance in China, Russia took advantage of it and reaped sizeable gains. In 1858, despite her own weakened position as a result of the Crimean War, she took advantage of China's preoccupation with the Taiping rebellion and the second war with England, and successfully pressed

China into conceding to Russia all territory north of the Amur river.

Even at this early time, however, one notes her clever way of pursuing aggressive plans while posing as the friend and defender of helpless China. In 1860, when British and French troops occupied Peking and demanded further concessions from China, Russia broke with her former allies and declared her opposition to pressure on the Manchu government. At the same time, however, Russia exacted from China, for due reward — all territory east of the Ussuri river. One may either praise the Russian tactics as shrewd diplomacy or condemn them as hypocrisy, but the fact remains that from the Chinese-Western conflict of 1858-1860, Russia emerged as the country which achieved the greatest territorial gain in the Far East.

The same approach was followed in 1895 and in 1900. On the former occasion, Russia offered to defend China against Japanese encroachments, and with the aid of France and Germany, successfully blocked the Japanese acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula after the Sino-Japanese war. As a reward, Russia got the permission to construct an extension of the Siberian railway through the heart of Manchuria, and port at Vladivostok by a direct route. That Russian defense of Chinese territory was no more than a temporary ruse is evidenced by the fact that three years later she appropriated for herself the same Liaotung peninsula.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

The Boxer uprising in 1900 gave Russia another chance to pose as China's friend and defender. With the allied troops in occupation of Peking, Russia insisted that the foreign troops must evacuate before the signing of the Boxer Protocol in order to avoid undue pressure on the Chinese government. While she stood opposed to allied intervention in the internal affairs of China, she was pushing her own aggressive design in Manchuria. Moreover, her professed friendship for China did not prevent her from claiming the biggest share of the indemnity that the Boxer settlement imposed on China.

By this time, however, the other powers had become alarmed by the aggressive nature of Russian policy. Russian occupation of Ili in Sinkiang province in 1871 and Russian occupation of Manchuria during the Boxer disturbances showed that Russia was quite ready to use direct force if it was not possible to get what she wanted by diplomacy. In both instances Russia sent troops into Chinese territory on the pretext of protecting Russian interests, and in both instances Russia refused to withdraw her troops after the disturbances were quelled.

It is natural that Britain, having more at stake in the Far East than the other powers at that time, should be the most anxious to curb Russian expansion. Britain had initiated the idea of the Open Door in order to preserve the *status quo*. Alarmed by Russian expansion, the British had made specific moves to block Russian advances. In 1884, when Russia threatened to occupy Port Lazareth on the Korean coast, Britain occupied Port Hamilton off the southern coast of Korea and finally withdrew only when she was satisfied that Russia would not occupy Port Lazareth. Then in 1898, when Russia acquired the lease of Port Arthur, Britain again made a countermove by demanding the lease of Weihaiwei, to be effective "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia."

Now, in the intervening years between the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Russian designs on the Far East were becoming increasingly clear. Russian aggressive policy in Korea in 1896-1898 worried Britain as much as Japan. And Russian refusal to withdraw troops from Manchuria after the Boxer Protocol left little doubt that Russia intended to dominate Manchuria as well as Korea. In order to stop Russia, Britain decided to support Japan in her struggle for power in East Asia, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was the result. The United States, it may be noted in passing, also identified Russia as the chief threat to the Open Door Policy and took a definite stand on the side of Britain and Japan. There is no doubt that American sympathy was entirely with Japan in the course of the Russo-Japanese conflict culminating in the war of 1904.

EARLY SOVIET OVERTURES

Shortly after the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia, its leaders turned their attention to the Far East. Early in 1919, the Chinese Workmen's Association in Moscow was already pushing a plan to send propagandists into China. Asian delegates were invited to attend the First Congress of the Communist International at Moscow in 1919, and in the following year the Congress of Oriental Nations was held at Baku. The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East at Moscow in 1922 and the establishment of the Communist University for the Toilers of the Orient in 1923 were only a part of a planned program to spread communism into the Far East.

Starting off a vast propaganda campaign, the Soviet authorities declared in 1919 and 1920 that they were ready to relinquish the territorial gains and other privileges exacted from China by the Czarist government and they offered to open new negotiations with China on the basis of complete equality. Coming at a time when China had become

thoroughly disgusted with Japanese imperialism and was sorely disappointed by what seemed to be an indifferent attitude on the part of the Western powers, such promises by Moscow sounded like sweet music to Chinese ears and produced a deep impression on all Asians struggling to free themselves from the shackles of imperialism and colonialism.

Keenly aware of the powerful force of rising nationalism in Asia, the Soviet leaders knew that there is no quicker way of winning the hearts of Asians than the promise of support in the liquidation of imperialism and the attainment of national independence. Ever since then, anti-imperialism has been the constant keynote of Communist propaganda in the Far East, and it would be foolish to think that this propaganda has not been effective. The initial approach to the Far Eastern countries has always kept communism itself in the background, and in each country the Communists have made their biggest advance by posing as the champions of national independence and taking an aggressive lead in a concerted attack upon imperialism. Raising the banner of nationalism, they have captured the imagination of youth and secured the cooperation and support of patriots who firmly believe that deliverance from foreign domination must be the first step in national salvation and national regeneration.

In China, Soviet promises made a strong appeal to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He had become a sadly disillusioned person after repeated betrayals by scheming warlords at home and after the failure of the Western powers to lend support to China's national cause in the Paris peace conference and the Washington conference. The founder of the Chinese Republic thought at the beginning of his revolutionary career that Japan would be the country to lend China a helping hand. After Japan launched its program of aggression, Sun looked to the West for assistance; but the assistance failed to come.

Now, the words from Moscow were precisely what he had been hoping for; at last, China was to get the help of a friendly nation in her struggle for national unity and national independence. The Soviets exploited this psychology with adroitness. They assured Sun that they had no motive other than that of helping China fulfill her legitimate aspirations. Their emissary, A. A. Joffe, conferred with Sun in Shanghai and the two leaders issued the famous joint statement of January, 1923, in which they declared their complete agreement that communism or Sovietism was not suitable for China and that China's most pressing problems were the achievement of national unification and independence. Thus the Soviets managed to allay Sun's fears of communism and paved the way for his consent to allow Chinese Communists to join the Nationalist Party.

SINO-SOVIET HONEYMOON

Russia's gestures at this time did not consist merely of sweet words. A familiar technique of Communist propaganda is to make many big promises and to make good just enough of them to justify their claim that they always carry out their promises. Following the grandiloquent pronouncements against Czarist imperialism and in favor of the independence and equality of all peoples, Soviet Russia declared null and void the obnoxious secret agreements made by the Czarist government with Japan for the joint exploitation of the northern Chinese territories. She actually relinquished extraterritoriality and the remaining unpaid portion of the Boxer indemnity.

Ever since then, Communist propaganda has never ceased to cite such actions as proof of genuine Soviet friendship for China and Soviet desire to help all oppressed people in their fight for freedom and independence. It has seized every opportunity to point out to the people of China and of Asia that at a time when all the powers were lined up in an imperialist bloc clinging

to the special privileges of Nineteenth-Century imperialism, Soviet Russia alone willingly renounced all such special privileges and offered to readjust relations with China on a basis of equality and reciprocity.

EXPOSURE OF REAL SOVIET INTENT

This propaganda still sounds convincing to many uncritical people. It certainly created no small measure of goodwill toward Russia during the 1920's. At a time when China's instability caused much friction with the powers, Soviet Russia again posed as China's friend and loudly condemned the imperialist actions of the powers. As time went on, however, Soviet policy did not seem to have made such a clean break with Czarist policy. Even in the negotiations immediately following the sweet promises, Soviet representatives made it clear that Russia was not willing to give up the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. As a matter of fact, over the protest of other interested powers, Soviet Russia tightened her economic grip on the Chinese Eastern Railway and fully restored the pre-war Russian position in northern Manchuria. So uncompromising was the Soviet attitude in Manchuria that increasing friction developed between Russia and Nationalist China until relations were officially severed during the second half of 1929.

The essential continuity of Russian Far Eastern policy was also observable in Outer Mongolia, which the Czarist government had tried to claim as a sphere of influence. Russia had actively interfered with the internal affairs of Mongolia and encouraged the growth of a movement to weaken the ties with China. Although China had tried to reassert her authority in Mongolia at the time when Czarist authority was declining, the Soviet authorities promptly took steps to reinforce the policy which the Czar had pursued.

Bolshevik troops from Siberia invaded Mongolia and organized a "Mongolian People's Revolutionary Govern-

ment" at Urga in 1921. At the very time that Joffe affirmed in a written declaration that his government had no intention to carry out imperialist policies in Outer Mongolia, at the very time that Soviet Russia signed a treaty recognizing Outer Mongolia "as an integral part of China," Russia continued to maintain troops in Mongolia and negotiated a treaty with the "Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government" without any reference to China. In August, 1922, the First Congress of the Mongol Peoples was held in Urga in which it was resolved that the policies of Mongolia should be in keeping with Soviet policies. Thus, when the secret Yalta agreement of 1945 provided for the independence of the "Mongolian People's Republic" it was merely the final fulfillment of a scheme that Russia had consistently pursued since the Czarist days.

The story of Russian expansionism up to this point shows that although the change of regime in Russia brought about no essential change in the objective of extending Russian influence in the Far East, the Soviets did adopt new methods. One of them is propaganda, as seen in the Moscow declarations of 1919 and 1920. Another important method is the use of the Communist party. Through the Third International, Russia directed the activities of Communist parties in other countries and was able to exert influence without sending any troops. The Chinese Communist Party, which was formally organized in 1921 and joined the Communist International in the following year, became an important instrument of Soviet policy. From now on it was not necessary for Russia to resort to the outmoded methods of territorial occupation, leases and concessions. Instead, it was possible to exercise a powerful influence on Chinese affairs by means of an indigenous Communist Party.

Misled by Soviet protestations of friendship, Dr. Sun welcomed Borodin and other Soviet advisers and entrusted

them with the important mission of reorganizing and revitalizing the Kuomintang. He agreed to admit Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang with the understanding that the Communists would accept the Kuomintang ideology and submit to Kuomintang discipline. Little did he suspect that Borodin was at all times acting as an agent of Moscow to guide a plot for Communist advance in China; nor did he realize that the decision of the Chinese Communists to cooperate with the Kuomintang was the execution of a plan that originated in Moscow.

At any rate, the ensuing years of "cooperation" witnessed a steady increase of Communist influence and growth of membership in the Chinese Communist Party. Communists occupied high positions in the Kuomintang, which was also being skillfully manipulated by the Russian advisers. Communists took charge of the propaganda machinery and gave Kuomintang ideology a new pro-Communist orientation. During the Nationalist expedition against the Northern warlords the masses as well as the armies were given intensive indoctrination in this Communist-flavored propaganda.

It is now a truism to say that the Russian advisers and the Chinese Communists used the Kuomintang for their own ends. Their machination culminated in moving the seat of the Nationalist government to Hankow, where they set up a government dominated by the Communists and Leftists. After Chiang Kai-shek and his followers set up their Nationalist government in Nanking, the collapse of the Wuhan government was hastened by the seizure of Soviet documents in Manchuria, Tientsin and London and by revelations made by M. N. Roy, a Comintern representative in Hankow. These proved beyond doubt that the Soviet advisers and the Chinese Communists were acting upon orders from the Comintern. No Czarist troops occupying areas in Sinkiang or Manchuria could have influenced China's internal affairs so much as the new

Soviet method of control through the Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party.

As a result of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist purge, the Chinese Communists went underground and finally established their base in the southeastern part of China. Through their vicissitudes, the Chinese Communists continued to retain their ties with the Comintern. The hand of the Comintern is clearly seen in the major shifts in policy and in party leadership.

True, policies dictated by the Comintern and the official leadership of the Chinese Communist Party did not always succeed and at one time it was necessary for Mao Tse-tung to move ahead in the face of contrary instructions. But communism has a way of covering up mistakes by putting the blame on scapegoats and the Comintern managed to maintain its prestige and its hold on the Chinese Communist Party. Disputes on crucial issues were often referred to Moscow for final decision. The decision on the Long March to the northwest was not made until specific instructions were received from Moscow.

WORLD WAR II

The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 brought the danger of further invasion close to Russian doors. Stalin decided to adopt all possible means to stay out of war. Russia became an ardent protagonist of collective security. In the Far East, Russian policy was threefold: to appease Japan and avoid conflict, to sustain Nationalist China's resistance against Japanese aggression, and to make preparations for an eventual military showdown. To placate Japan, Russia sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo, over China's strong protests. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 was also signed in the face of Chinese protests.

At the same time, Russia tried to make sure that China would not yield to Japanese conquest. Knowing that a

stable Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek was necessary for resistance against Japan, Russia instructed the Chinese Communists to join the Kuomintang in a united front. The Soviet Union used her influence to save Chiang Kai-shek's life at the critical time when he was "kidnapped" in December, 1936. After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937, Russia signed a non-aggression pact with China, and for a short while Russia sent direct aid to Chiang Kai-shek's government to sustain his war against Japan. These conciliatory gestures toward Japan and support of China seemed contradictory to other nations, but they were manifestations of a consistent Soviet policy designed to stave off the Japanese threat as long as possible.

Meanwhile, Russia was fighting the Japanese menace in other ways short of war. Again ignoring China's protests, she negotiated a Mutual Assistance Pact with the "Mongol People's Republic," thus serving notice that Russia would not tolerate Japanese advance into Outer Mongolia. Preparing simultaneously for an eventual showdown, she took steps to consolidate her position in the Far East. The colonization of Siberia was stepped up, and an economic program was launched to develop resources and increase agricultural production in Siberia. Railway construction was speeded up and military defense was strengthened. Russia was not putting all her eggs in one basket.

During the latter part of the war, the Allies tried hard to get Russia to play an active part in the Far Eastern theater. Soviet policy seemed to be to avoid military commitments in the Far East as long as possible but to get into the war in time to have a share in knocking out Japan to ensure a voice in Far Eastern affairs at the conclusion of the war. As late as 1944, Russia was still making friendly gestures toward Japan. In March 30 of that year a Soviet-Japanese agreement was signed in which Japan surrendered her coal and iron concessions in northern Sak-

halin while Russia promised to supply oil to Japan for a period of five years after the war. When the Allies pushed Stalin for early action in the Far East, Stalin's stand-by excuse was that Russia was bound by a neutrality pact with Japan.

The fact is that Russia was better informed in regard to Japanese weakness than the Allied powers. Before Russia entered the Far Eastern war, Japan had approached Russia and asked for good offices in mediation for peace. That the Neutrality Pact could have been no deterrent whenever Russia wanted to join the Far Eastern war is evidenced by the fact that when Russia finally declared war on Japan in August, 1945, the Neutrality Pact, signed in April, 1941, to be valid for five years at least, was technically still in force. One must conclude that Russia's real intent was to wait till the last moment in order to avoid too much effort but still to claim the rightful rewards of a co-belligerent.

POSTWAR AND PRESENT

The last act of the war-time period was the signing of the Chinese-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1945. This treaty seemed important at the time and was heralded by optimists as an indication of Soviet readiness to cooperate with the Chinese Nationalist government. While China agreed to the independence of Mongolia, to joint Sino-Soviet ownership of the important Manchurian Railways, and to joint use of Port Arthur as a naval base, Russia pledged support for the Nationalist government and non-interference in China's internal affairs. Actually, the treaty was only a confirmation of what Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had agreed upon at Yalta.

It is now well known that Russia did not carry out the spirit of the treaty in good faith. She did not withdraw her troops from Manchuria in accordance with the agreed schedule; she blocked the establishment of Chinese Nationalist authority in Manchuria; she turned

Dairen into a closed port and refused to transfer its civil administration to Chinese Nationalist authorities. In a word, Russia acted in such a manner as to open the way for the occupation of Manchuria by the Chinese Communists. So reprehensible was Russian behavior that the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Soviet violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945.

It is not possible in this article to discuss the various aspects of relations between Russia and Communist China in the last few years. The various treaties and pacts signed since 1949 and the intricate ramifications of the "Learn from Russia" movement in China which has opened the way for the influx of Russian advisers and the wholesale introduction of Russian influence into many phases of Chinese life would require a separate article. We must be satisfied at this point with a few generalizations without detailed discussion.

No one can gainsay that Russian influence in China is today greater than it has ever been. Furthermore, Russia today plays a more prominent role in the Far East than ever before. Much speculation has been made by observers in regard to the nature of the new relationship between Russia and China, and whether there is a tendency for China to vie with Russia in assuming the role of leadership in East Asia. They have also raised the question whether China is not becoming too big for Russia to handle, or whether Mao Tse-tung may turn out to be a "Chinese Tito." Much of this speculation seems to the writer to be of academic interest only.

People who pose the alternatives of satellite relationship or Chinese Titoism are looking for two hypothetical phenomena which are not there. To be sure, Red China's position is quite different from that of the satellite states in Europe. But there is no doubt that Red China remains unshakably in the Soviet orbit and considers its entire domestic and foreign program as a part of the world revolution of which

the Soviet Union is the unquestioned pioneer and leader. Red China calls Russia the "Big Brother" and insists that the example and guidance of the Big Brother is essential to the success of the Chinese revolution.

Certainly, there are no signs that Red China is about to break away from Russia the way Tito did. Up to this time, in spite of the great effort made by some observers to look for and to point out possible points of friction between Russia and Red China, there are no clear signs that the "Love Russia" and "Learn from Russia" campaign of Red China has in any way been de-emphasized. Evidently, China is neither a satellite nor a Yugoslavia-in-the-making. But as long as Red China willingly accepts Russian guidance, Russian influence will continue to exercise dominant influence in China.

It seems that Russia is quite ready to adjust her relations with other Communist countries as long as she can get them to accept the major objectives of the world revolution, which is now the vehicle Russia has chosen for her expansionism. It is possible that Russia learned a lesson in dealing with Tito and is now treating Red China with more finesse and avoiding excessive pressure that may possibly arouse a belligerent Chinese nationalism. There is no question that Russia has accorded more respect to Red China than to the smaller satellite states of Europe and Asia, and the leaders of the Kremlin have taken pains to speak of "the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, and the people's democracies" when they refer to the nations within the Soviet orbit. This does not necessarily mean an emergent "Chinese Titoism."

RUSSIA AS SENIOR PARTNER

To keep China within the Soviet orbit, Russia may be willing to adjust relations with China on a partnership basis, provided that Russia is recognized as the senior partner. In recent months, the Soviet leaders have made a definite effort to bring Tito back into the fold, and it is possible that they may succeed.

If they do, they will probably be ready to treat Yugoslavia, too, as an equal and a partner. As far as actual Russian influence is concerned and for the benefit of the world revolution, this partnership relationship serves all practical purposes and may even produce better results than the satellite relationship. Russia will be satisfied as long as she is recognized as the senior partner whose voice will carry greater weight than that of the other partners. So far, all indications point to Red China's readiness to accept and respect Russia as senior partner or "the Big Brother."

By way of summary and conclusion, we observe that the Soviet regime did not renounce the expansionist ambitions of Czarist Russia as the Soviet declarations of 1919 and 1920 led many to believe. Soviet Russia, however, employs methods and tactics which are very different from those of Czarist Russia. The Czarist government used the regular methods of imperialism shared by other imperialist powers in the Far East. In the Nineteenth Century, this imperialism took the form of invading troops and territorial conquests, ranging from leases and concessions to cessions and annexations. After 1900, military and territorial imperialism was overshadowed by financial and economic imperialism.

The new Soviet imperialism is different from the imperialism of the past because it employs an entirely new weapon, namely, the ideological weapon. The ideological weapon works in two ways. First, it enables Russia to exercise control in foreign lands by means of an organizational tie-up between the Kremlin and the Communist parties in various countries. Secondly, it co-ordinates action by virtue of the dedication of Communists all over the world to the common goal of the world proletarian revolution.

We must recognize that the new ideological weapon is more effective than the methods of the old imperialism. It enables Soviet Russia to attack the old imperialism and to pose as the

leader of the struggle against imperialism, a struggle dear to the hearts of Asians. It makes possible the technique of infiltration, which incites uprisings and makes them appear as indigenous revolutionary movements. It is less conspicuous and not so likely to arouse nationalistic opposition as the old methods of imperialism. It seems to support the Soviet contention that revolutions cannot be externally imposed and that the Soviet government does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

Native Communists and pro-Communist "independents" are in the limelight and occupy the official positions, but Russian advisers wield great power behind the scene. The government is under the direction of an indigenous Communist party, but that party accepts the leadership of the Kremlin.

Common allegiance to the world proletarian revolution makes the old imperialist-colonial relationship unnecessary and obsolete. Ideological fervor insures common action without conspicuous external pressure or compulsion. In co-ordinated international action, Communists in different lands are led to believe that they are engaged in the common cause of proletarian revolution and the population in general is led to feel that there is voluntary national action rather than submission to foreign domination.

The one all-important assumption, of course, is that the proletarian or socialist revolution in any part of the world cannot succeed without the leadership and guidance of the U.S.S.R. As long as this is accepted, united action within the Soviet orbit is assured. It may be feasible for Russia to accept some of the nations within the orbit as full equals and to accord to all a large measure of freedom and independence in purely domestic affairs; but as long as there is co-ordinated action in foreign relations, Russia is getting what she wants and she is expanding her influence more successfully than the imperialist powers of the past.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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I. INTRODUCTION
Beyond Friendship

Stalin, addressing the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, 1952, spoke of the relationship between the Russian and foreign Communist Parties in the following words:

Naturally our Party cannot remain in debt to the fraternal parties, and it must in turn support them and also their people in their struggle for liberation, in their struggle for the preservation of peace. As is known, that is precisely what it does. Of course, it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable role so long as the shock brigade* was all alone and had to carry out this leading role practically single-handed. But this belongs to the past. Now things are altogether different. Now, when from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary new shock brigades have appeared in the shape of the People's Democratic countries, now it has become easier for our Party to fight, and indeed work is going with a swing. The Indian Communist weekly *New Age*, in an article (December 26, 1954) commemorating the 75th anniversary of Stalin's birth, quoted at length from his speech, which is also studied as a precious testament in Communist China. Yet in preceding issues of *New Age* (December 5 and 19) Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, strove anxiously in two articles to represent the idea of international Communism as just "an old bogey." At Lucknow on December 12, Mr. Nehru was

*The "shock brigade of world revolution" is an official synonym for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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reported as saying that "if the pattern of international Communism were not what it was to-day, there might have been less fear and suspicion in the world." According to Ghosh this is nonsense. All Communist Parties, he allows, are guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and subject to "fraternal bonds that help the interests of the people in all countries"; yet revolution has never been for export.

Ghosh's contention is hardly borne out by the speeches made at a rally held in Northern Viet Nam on January 21 under the joint auspices of the Viet Nam National United Front, the Viet Nam-Soviet Friendship Association and the Viet Nam-China Friendship Association. After the Foreign Minister, Pham Van Dong, had expressed gratitude for the support given for Northern Viet Nam, both during the war "and in the present struggle," Hoang Quoc Viet (Vice-Chairman of the United Front) noted that these friendships had a deep-rooted origin and that the (Viet-Minh) Revolution had been closely connected with the development of the world revolutionary movement.

Simultaneously in Japan, Communist broadcasts have been reminding comrades that they are not alone in their struggle. On January 20 *Radio Free Japan*, broadcasting from the neighbourhood of Peking, summarised from the Cominform journal *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* (published in Bucharest and checked in Moscow) a long article by D. N. Aidit, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Indonesia, on the need for collective leadership, ideological and organisational reform and incitement of the peasants—matters to which the Japanese Communists are now attending.

In Indonesia the award of a Stalin Peace Prize to Professor Prijono—the first Indonesian to receive one—and his election as an official of the newly-created Indonesia-China Friendship Association, form part of the same pattern. For as *Moscow Radio* (December 21) observed: "This

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award means that the struggle of the Indonesian people enjoys the recognition and extensive support of the democratic international public" (that is, international Communism).

An Axis Manifesto

That the leadership of this public must now be accepted as coming jointly—and indivisibly—from Moscow and Peking was affirmed when the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association opened its second national conference on December 28 in Peking. The association is the largest mass organization in China and its first aim, according to its new Constitution, is to develop and solidify friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union. Speakers at the meeting agreed upon China's need to learn more intensively from the U.S.S.R. in all fields. Mme. Soong Ching-ling, who made the opening speech, held up for all to see new China's vision of herself as part of a fortified "shock brigade."

"The very existence of the People's Republic of China has changed the political face of Asia and lifted to new heights the liberation movements among peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Now each economic and cultural advance of the Chinese people will further illuminate the minds of those still exploited and dependent, making it clear that real salvation lies only along the path of true independence and of association with those States which offer true friendship.

Here the use of the words liberation, colonial and semi-colonial, independence, etc. is a device used by Communist publicists to conceal the true intention of the Communist international conspiracy, but the intention sooner or later to force a choice upon free peoples is clear enough. Mme. Soong went on to indicate the position of "peaceful co-existence" in Communist strategy. In the meantime, she said, the Soviet Union, China and

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all the peoples' lands unceasingly strive for relations based on the principle of peaceful co-existence." Afterwards, the strife will be redirected: five years of Sino-Soviet alliance, she declared, "have begun to bear out the prophetic words of Chairman Mao Tse-tung: this great unity, will inevitably influence not only the prosperity of two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, but also the future of all mankind. "

The Peking *People's Daily* of January 5, in a leading article on the Asian-African Conference, to be held at the end of April in Indonesia, said:

"It should be pointed out in particular that the Soviet Union is a country situated in both Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union has made unflagging efforts in all directions to promote peace in the Asian-African region and to support the national rights and economic development of the overwhelming majority of people."

In other words, Sino-Soviet friendship is harnessed to the Communist policy of intervention in the affairs of free nations to promote world revolution.

II. COMMUNISM IN OPERATION

The Cult of Security

On December 31, 1954, Peking published three sets of regulations which, by standardising much that has already been in practice in the large cities of China, carry Government and police control to the heart of civil life. They govern the setting up of "Residents Committees" (urban mass organisations), of "Street Offices" (urban governments) and of "Public Security Stations" (police).

The Residents Committees, comprising 100-600 householders living in the same neighborhood, are being founded to "mobilise residents to respond to Government

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appeals and obey the law." They also have other duties, ranging from welfare work to mass security and informing. The Street Offices, to be set up in city areas with a minimum population of 50,000, are branches of local governments with the task of "guiding the work of Residents' Committees" and carrying out superior orders "on matters concerning the residents." As the *People's Daily* (January 2) explained, the institution of Street Offices is designed to relieve the police of certain duties in civil administration and so leave them free for their proper work. "Now they will not only be able to devote their full strength to combating secret agents, ruffians, bandits and other saboteurs . . . they will also be in a position to carry out systematic social investigations and impart more initiative and planning to urban security work." In view of the elements who "continue to resist reform and frequently collude with enemy agents in the cities to step up their sabotage," the paper went on to say that such work was absolutely vital. The new establishment of Public Security Stations, to strengthen the work of the existing Public Security Bureaux, should be helpful here. Among the functions which the new regulations prescribe for them are the restriction of counter-revolutionaries, the guidance of security defence committees, and the conducting of "publicity work regarding the elevation of revolutionary vigilance."

A fourth set of regulations, those governing arrest and imprisonment, promulgated on December 20, 1954, cast a strange light on the "inviolable freedom of the person" which the Chinese Constitution guarantees. The Regulations leave certain points obscure, but clearly state the following. Public security organisations may make emergency arrests either "if circumstances call for an investigation" or in certain listed situations, *e.g.* (a) "if the criminal is in the act of preparing a crime"; (b) "if the criminal is planning to escape"; and (c) "if the criminal's identity

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is not clear or his residence is not definite." Those arrested must be interrogated within 24 hours, but nothing is said about producing them before a court of law.

The formal sanction here given to procedure which totalitarian régimes usually prefer to leave uncodified has evidently caused comment in China: in a leading article on January 8, the *People's Daily* especially defended the authorities' right to arrest a person before he had committed a crime. If there was evidence that he was preparing to commit one, his mail should, where necessary, be inspected and his belongings searched. Such action would not constitute an infringement of personal freedom, or democratic rights.* Had not Mao Tse-tung declared in his *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* (1949) that China would never be lenient to reactionaries? Now, the building of Socialism in China had ushered in a new period in which class struggles would become more pronounced and complex than before. China must suppress the enemy more vigorously. Consequently the new regulations were to be welcomed.

Some features of this new period in Socialist construction were noted in the *Asian Analyst* (January 1955). Chinese publicity, reiterating that 600,000 agricultural producer co-operatives must be formed before the spring ploughing, has since called for intensified security and more vigorous leadership in the countryside "so as to correct the erroneous ideology and concepts of certain peasants." (*People's Daily*, January 15). In North Korea, too, the peasants' failures in class struggle, Socialist consciousness and revolutionary vigilance are deplored, and the need to establish a "production culture" among both workers and peasants is asserted.

Revolutionary vigilance" is the Communist term for war consciousness, which must always be ready for projection

* It should be remembered that for Communists "enemies of the people" possess neither.

against imaginary enemies both at home and abroad. In its leader of January 4 on the importance of mass education in national defence, the *People's Daily* observed: "...any indifference to enemy conspiracy, any single-minded pre-occupation with construction, any loss of revolutionary vigilance will lead to grave disasters. . . . Since the Resist-America-Aid-Korea war ended and the nation entered upon large-scale economic construction some people have thought that all is peace. They consider that safeguarding the fatherland and national defence is a matter for the army and does not concern them. . . . this has led to somewhat muddled actions." Hence war education is needed to promote patriotism and revolutionary heroism, and "at present it is especially important to carry out the system of compulsory military service, step by step."

Straightening out the Mind

The National Committee members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (C.P.P.C.C.) who met from December 21-25 were probably aware that their main future tasks in China include "strengthening the unity among all nationalities, democratic strata, parties and groups, People's organisations and Overseas Chinese" (*People's Daily*, December 22), and that "the task of this united front is to unite the people of the whole nation under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (*Kwangming Daily*, December 21). And since Communists consider "unity in thought" fundamental to all other unities, they must also have expected pronouncements on ideological reform. But, in the event, authority demanded not mere unity but *unanimity*. The central speech was made by Kuo Mo-jo, representing writers and artists on December 24. It deserves study in full, but some of its flavour can be conveyed in quotation:

"The central assignment of our People's democratic united front is to unite among ourselves and to unite the masses. The wider and more

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successful this unity, the more consolidated and excellent it will be. However, the best method for the expansion and consolidation of our unity is to strengthen to the utmost the unanimity in our thinking . . .

"In his opening speech at the second session of the first National Committee of the C.P.P.C.C. on June 23, 1950, Chairman Mao said: 'The method of criticism and self-criticism is an excellent method for providing us with impetus for cleaving to truth and rectifying error; and the only correct method for the entire revolutionary population of a People's State is to conduct self-education and self-reform . . .' The facts have proved that this ideological reform is a process in the study of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, a long and arduous ideological struggle. . . . This point was clearly proved in our current study and criticism of *The Dream of the Red Chamber*.* The subjective erroneous ideologies of the bourgeois class not only have their firmest base in the minds of old people, but also hold captive some people who think they are standing under the banner of Marxism. Such persons have discarded criticism and have advanced and lauded these ideologies. When a new force sprang up, using the theory of Marxism-Leninism for conducting sharp criticism, they attempted to suppress it. This fact has given me the deep conviction that it is more difficult to eradicate the intangible domestic and foreign enemies than the tangible ones. If the tangible enemies are allowed to remain in our minds, they are highly capable of conducting inner subversive activities.

"Hu Shih,† with whom we are familiar, is a good specimen of such a person. For the past 30 years, he has been selling pragmatism in the service of American imperialists . . . The political life of Hu Shih is completely finished, but the poison bequeathed by his ideologies is still deeply embedded. Therefore, it is necessary for us to destroy thoroughly the poison of the reactionary ideologies of Hu Shih . . .

"All classes will naturally die, so the class nature of everyone will be changed. The quicker the change and the earlier the death, the better it will be for the building of our great Socialism."

A guide to the implications of Kuo's speech has been provided by the ex-Communist poet, Czeslaw Milosz, in his book *The Captive Mind*. Here the Communists' demand for intellectual servitude and their technique for imposing it are fully explained. The technique was worked out in Europe, but "Marxism-Leninism is universal truth," and Kuo's directive confirms that his Government intends to apply it even more thoroughly in China.

* See the *Asian Analyst* December, 1954, pages 1-2

† Dr. Hu Shih, leader of the Chinese renaissance, had a dominant influence on the modernisation of the national language.

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...the Communist Parties are pursuing in Indonesia and Japan have now been extended to the Indian State of Andhra, where Communists, in an all-out effort, propose to contest 174 seats out of 196 in the February-March general elections. The Andhra Communists, who conducted the Telengana insurrection in 1948-49, and are the authors of a thesis urging the consolidation of peasant resistance to authority, are the most violent group within the Communist Party of India. But in India, no less than in Indonesia and Japan, the Communists recognise that "former inappropriate acts have obstructed unity with the masses," and now it is for "a lovable Party" that votes in all three countries are invited. The Communists have made it clear that they will depart from their ultra-Leftist adventurism of the past. (Radio Free Japan [Communist] January 17, 1955.)

This decision has not sufficed to gain Communists organised Left-wing support of the kind they aim at. In Indonesia, the Socialist Party opposes them; and both the Left and Right-wing Socialist Parties of Japan have demanded that potential allies draw a clear line between themselves and the Communists. For while the latter freely usurp the political platforms of all the above-named parties, Socialist leaders show increasing resistance to joining united fronts; the consequences are becoming too well known. In Andhra, where the Communist Party feels itself strong, no such temporary allies are even sought. The Communists, therefore, seek mass support, and to obtain it are prepared to enrol mass membership. In this struggle, according to Aidit, "every effort must be

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made to establish unity of action and co-operation between the Communist masses, the Nationalist masses and the Islamic masses based upon a definite concrete programme. These joint mass actions will, at the same time, unmask the real intentions of these Nationalist and Islamic Parties and leaders . . ." This policy of mass recruitment has its disadvantages; as Aidit wrote, "our Party will become weak and impotent if it does not consolidate itself, but we are compelled to forge ahead with what is at hand" (Cominform journal, December 31, 1954). Purges can always take place later.

Canvassing the Peasants

Mass support means primarily peasant support. The fact is painful for Communists and progress is slow. Nevertheless, their approach to the peasants is notably less clumsy than before. While their platform, naturally centred on land reform, past failures have taught them that their slogans must be chosen with care. Contemptuously recognising that the peasants "cannot understand an agrarian revolution in any form other than that the lands of the landlords should be distributed to them as their own private property," Aidit (in the Cominform journal, October 15, 1954) reported a unanimous Party decision to replace slogans mentioning collectivisation (and even nationalisation) with others offering individual land ownership. These naturally give no hint at all of the coercive transformation of peasants into rural factory workers which Communists carry out when in power.

But in view of the land reform measures which the Governments are already applying in these countries, even "Land to the Tiller" has lost much of its rallying power. The Communists accordingly denounce all non-Communist land reform movements, especially those providing for compensation, as fraudulent or imaginary (i.e., unmarked by class struggle). In India, for example, the Communist

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Party has characterised the Congress Government's measures for the reform of land tenure, as "continuing and further intensifying the pauperisation of the peasantry." "*Bhoodan* (the movement for voluntary land giving) is recognised as an obstacle to Communist organisation among the peasants—as "preventing the strengthening and development of the organisation and struggle of the peasant masses." In **Burma** the Communists have recognised that the Government's programme of social and agrarian reform challenges their claims to represent the peasantry, and have denounced the *Pyidawtha* (welfare) schemes. The Communist Parties are putting forward detailed programmes of their own, which feature a cynical support for squatters as well as the usual postponement of compensation to middle-men, moratoria on poor peasants' debts, and the free distribution of confiscated land.

Communists as Partners

"Socialism, unlike totalitarian Communism, does not believe in throwing overboard all scruples, nor does it believe that the ultimate victory would wash away all the deceit and disruption practised in the battle." These words are taken from a 15-point resolution on common Asian problems approved at the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon. In a discussion inspired by this conference and printed in *Sov. International Information* (January 1, 1955), the Indonesian Socialist Party (P.S.I.) Executive outline the circumstances which have made co-operation with the Communists in the countryside impossible for them.

"The Indonesian Communist Party," they write, "controls a peasant organisation called the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (B.T.I.)—using it mainly for its own political purposes, at present particularly to further the Communist Peace Movement. . . . As for the Indonesian Socialist Party, after the liberation of the country it formed a common front with the Communist Party, the B.T.I. and the Socialist Youth

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(*Permuda Sosialis*), the so-called Left wing . . . The B.T.I. became a fighting ground in the struggle between Socialists and Communists after the Socialists had left the united front with the Communists." Finding that no constructive work could be done in the B.T.I., the P.S.I. has set up its own peasant organisation.

Whatever the outcome of these Communist tactics, no results will be final. The experience gained in Andhra, Indonesia and Japan will be pooled for application by Communists elsewhere.

IV. CURRENT QUOTATIONS

"I am a philosopher. The duty of a philosopher is to propagate Marxist-Leninist philosophy and to wage a determined, relentless struggle against reactionary capitalist philosophies of all shades and colours."

Professor Chin Yueh-lin, *People's Daily*, Peking, December 25, 1954.

"I feel that the minds of many of the older people are really in question. The outer layer of their fore-brains is like the suitcase of a world tourist, plastered with hotel labels. This sort of people are really in a mess, having little room in their minds for new things and new ideas. Although they have studied Marxism and Leninism for five years, they have not learnt much. Many old people often say, 'My ideological standard is low.' That, I think, is not just modesty."

Kuo Mo-jo, quoted in *People's Daily*, Peking, December 9, 1954.

"... It should also be appreciated that ideological reform is not a simple process, but requires a long, arduous course of struggle. Progress one day may be followed by new problems another day. On one subject the mind may be straightened out, but on another it may get confused again."

People's Daily leader, Peking, December 22, 1954.

"For the study of Soviet methods, we will not only study modern and progressive scientific techniques, but the more

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important thing is to master the basic spirit. We have learned from the progress of Soviet scientific work that, only under the ideological leadership of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical materialism and historical materialism, can we keep scientific research from going astray."

Li Szu-kwang, representative of Chinese scientists, in a speech to the C.P.P.C.C. reported by the *New China News Agency*, December 23, 1954.

"Some comrades, influenced by spontaneous capitalist developments, harbour doubts about the correctness and necessity of requisitioning and rationing of grain. They hold that this is 'restricting the peasants too tightly.'" *Southern Daily*, Canton, December 5, 1954.

So, when Pandit Nehru attacks us for indulging in violence, we do not think it necessary to go into any argument over it.

Ajoy Ghosh, General Secretary, Communist Party of India, in *New Age*, December 5, 1954.

Kuo Tse-tung in *People's Daily*, Peking, December 2, 1954.

It should also be appreciated that ideological work is not a simple process but requires a long and arduous struggle. Progress one day may be followed by regression another day. One must subject the mind to constant re-education and put on another if it may get confused.

People's Daily, Peking, December 2, 1954.

For the study of Soviet methods, we will not only study modern and progressive scientific techniques, but the more

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COUNTRY	Japan	REPORT NO.	CS-55991
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DATE OF INFO.	26 January 1955	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
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BY GABLE

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- OGATA Taketora, president of the Liberal Party, believes the Liberal Party will lose a maximum of ten seats in the 27 February Lower House elections, against a maximum 20 seat gain for the Japan Democratic Party, leaving the Liberal Party with a 30 seat plurality.
- OGATA desires a merger with the Democrats but feels the spadework for this will require at least three months. OGATA thinks that a Liberal minority in the government is the most likely outcome of the elections, to be followed by a merger later. OGATA considers Democratic Party Secretary-General KISHI Nobusuke, Finance Minister ICHIMADA Hisato, and Democratic Party advisor ASHIDA Hitoshi as the Democrats most strongly favoring a conservative merger and the best democrats to work with for a merger. OGATA is determined to refuse a coalition government with the Democrats.¹
- OGATA is determined, if he becomes Premier, to lay the basis for a conservative absolute majority about one year later. He stated he would revise the election laws if necessary to accomplish this. His long-range aim is a real two party system, and fears an evolution of the disastrous French-style multi-party system.
- OGATA stated that the Japan Communist Party (JCP) decision to use regular election methods² will have two effects, one good and one bad: (a) the JCP candidates will split the leftist vote and may cost the Leftist Socialist Party seats, thus helping the conservatives, while the JCP will probably not get more than three seats; (b) the Japanese people may get an erroneous impression of the JCP as an ordinary parliamentary party rather than a tool of the USSR.
- OGATA has heard rumors that the Socialists are receiving financial assistance from abroad on a large scale, but has seen no concrete evidence of this.³

OGATA
 TAKETORA

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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- 2 -

1. Field Comment. OGATA exuded confidence and vitality, and seemed to relish the coming fight for Diet seats.
2. Field Comment. This is evidenced by the recent surfacing of the underground JCP number three man SHIGA Yoshio to run for the Diet.
3. Washington Comment. According to CS-53382, OGATA states that the outside financial help being received by the Socialists is coming primarily from the Chinese Communists. Also see CS-52873.

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PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: B,F,F,-3	
<p>Cable from () Source: from Japanese journalist (B) from Japanese political commentator (F) who met with leaders of Democratic Party (F) Date of Info: 30 Jan 1955</p> <p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 11 February 1955</p> <p>2. MATSUMURA Kenzo of the Democrats is still in close contact with ONO Bamboku and OGATA Taketora of the Liberal Party.</p> <p>4. SHORIKI Masutaro is running for the Diet as an independent in the hopes of leading a conservative coalition later...SHORIKI and OGATA hate each other.³</p> <p>3. <u>Source Comment.</u> Their feud began in wartime when OGATA headed the Cabinet Information Bureau.</p>				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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Foreign Report

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All France's To-morrows

Khrushchev's Link with Liu

The triumph of Mr. Khrushchev over Mr. Malenkov should make no difference to the Far East, or to the present relations of Russia to China. Mr. Khrushchev already had command of policy towards China, in company (on the military side) with the new Prime Minister, Marshal Bulganin. It was made doubly evident in October—when the Party Secretary and his Army chief went to Peking to extend and clarify the Russo-Chinese treaty—that relations with China do not count as foreign affairs. Mr. Malenkov was right out of the picture.

The alliance with China is a matter of party to party, and, specifically, of Mr. Khrushchev to Mr. Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese Party Secretary-in-Chief. Therefore it is probable that, if a change in relations to China takes place, it will be indicated by a change inside the Chinese party leadership, rather than in Moscow. Eyes should be fixed on the position of Mr. Liu Shao-chi, the man who has co-ordinated the Chinese party line with Mr. Khrushchev.

The main characteristics of the Khrushchev-Liu line in internal affairs are:

1. Heavy industry must be built up and the consumer told to wait patiently for the good life they had been promised.
2. President Mao Tse-tung steps out of the limelight as maker of the Chinese revolution, just as Stalin did in Russia. The Chinese revolution must be followed by a period of concentration on heavy industry, just as that in Russia. With the concentration on heavy industry, the Chinese revolution must be followed by a period of concentration on heavy industry, just as that in Russia.

If it is a serious matter, the Chinese party leadership will be in a position to oppose...

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has revealed that there are forces in the party itself, which would like to call a halt to the orthodox Communist revolution and to remain at the present half-way house, where capitalists still have a limited place. Mr. Mao's own attitude may be wavering. He is known to have ordered the party to win over rather than terrorise non-Communists. He is, after all, a national leader.

Therefore, if the Formosan crisis were peacefully settled, it is just possible that forces inside China would break with the Khrushchev-Liu line and slow down the pace of the revolution. But this is very unlikely while the Communist leaders have reason to believe that their revolution is passing through the same stage as the young Soviet Union went through in the period of foreign intervention.

While Marshal Chiang Kai-shek still threatens to return to the mainland and the American government does not categorically repudiate this aim, the Communist leaders have cause to think that Liu and Khrushchev are right. Heavy industry will have to come first and foremost, in order to gain strength with which to conquer the foreign interventionists.

In this connection, the New Year message which was issued to both the Soviet and Chinese publics by Marshal Voroshilov, the technical head of the Soviet State, is significant. Marshal Voroshilov, an unimportant figurehead, is an "old faithful" follower of Stalin, who was identified in the past with the line "heavy industry first." He was presumably speaking as the mouthpiece of Mr. Khrushchev, and he argued in favour of pure Stalinism. In China, he said, we must build up heavy industry in order not to fall victim to interventionists. He also revised Soviet history in order to prove that Russia had won over the peasants to collective farming. The implications of Voroshilov's message were:

1. Russia cannot be relied upon alone to supply China. China must build up its own industry quickly.
2. China must avoid a major war, and keep the interventionists out by other means until it is ready to deal with them.
3. The Soviet Union maintains its claim to have the world leadership as a result of revolutions. Mr. Mao did nothing that the Russian Communist leaders did not do in their early days.

TERMS FOR CO-EXISTENCE

There will probably also be no change in the "soft policy" that has been carried out by Khrushchev under Malenkov and Khrushchev. Indeed, the Soviet government under Khrushchev and Brezhnev will probably present the world with more opportunist compromises.

It should, moreover, be recalled that the Soviet attitude towards co-existence had already been modified for some years before the new line was announced.

The public fall of Malenkov, which was the last of a change in the policy of co-existence with the West which has been evident ever since Khrushchev signed the new alliance with France in 1955, indicates that co-existence was possible and that all previous Soviet policy was a mere expedient.

by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai; and by Mr. Molotov has been in some months past:

1. Co-existence is possible only if American bases are removed. The "National Fronts" organized by Communists must remove them.
2. Formosa must be "liberated."
3. The chain of US alliances must be broken by extending the number of neutral countries.

All these lines were laid down last October, and there is no reason to think that they will change. In fact, the key to all the recent moves by the Soviet Union and China over Formosa lies in the October treaty, when it was decided to isolate America from its allies, and to force it to withdraw by those means. Indeed, Gorbachev, Khrushchev and Chinese made their demarches to the United Nations, and partly explain why China refused to accept the Secretary-General's invitation to attend the Security Council meeting.

CO-ORDINATED MOVES

All these moves fit in with the analysis of the treaty in FOREIGN REPORT of October 14th. They were doubtless co-ordinated, and had the object of isolating America. The only signs of divergence between the Chinese and the Russians (Molotov acting presumably in agreement with Khrushchev) are: (a) the Chinese would have liked to attack Tachen and have a spectacular victory over Chiang; and (b) the Chinese do not suggest, as did Mr. Molotov, that Chiang and his army supporters could be removed by the Americans. The Chinese, in fact, are hell-bent and are finding it hard to restrain themselves; but it may be assumed that they undertook to do so when the new rulers of the Soviet Union signed the new treaty last autumn. In return for Soviet support over Formosa, and the various other concessions made to China at the time, the Chinese agreed to give military aid to Russia if it is involved in war in Europe (that is, in Germany). It is clear that Khrushchev and Bulganin made their principal move in the international sphere before they were publicly in their present position of supremacy (which we forecast in FOREIGN REPORT of July 16th and August 27th, 1953). This consisted of tightening the political-military links with China.

Mao Eyes Formosa's Hills

It has never been seriously suggested that the Chinese are capable of mounting a full-scale invasion of Formosa in the face of American opposition, but it would not be out of the question for the Communists to land a few hundred guerrillas against the island. This could be done either by air or by submarines, and the material used in either case would, of course, be of Russian origin. Between them, the Communists have enough paratroops and trained submarine personnel to consider either method of infiltration; but the Chinese probably could not manage the submarines alone.

An operation of this kind would become more feasible if the Chinese Nationalism evacuated Quemoy and Matsu as well as this island. So long as Chiang Kai-shek has held these islands he has been able to furnish the assistance and support guerrillas

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-31-28	SOURCE FJB-803	DATE OF DOCUMENT 11 Mar 1955	ANALYST C)	
SUBJECT <u>Asahi Shimbun's</u> Editorial Policies			DATE 9 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Report from () Source: Japanese Journalist (B) Date of Info: January 1955 DISSEMINATION No. CS-61348			Evaluation: B-3	
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM				
NAKAMURA Shogo (0022/2625/2973/0710) ¹ , chief of the <u>Asahi Shimbun</u> Political Section, was responsible for the recent political bias of that newspaper. ²				
This bias resulted in unpopularity for Asahi after the Japan Democratic Party took over the Cabinet. Most of the members of the Political Section have become opposed to NAKAMURA.				
1 <u>Source Comment.</u> Prior to his present assignment, NAKAMURA was in New York as chief of the Asahi's bureau there. He is known as a "kobun" of <u>OGATA Taketora</u> , leader of the Liberal Party.				
2 <u>Source Comment.</u> <u>Asahi</u> policy had a definite pro-OGATA bias.				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. 44-7-16-241	SOURCE () -2060 IN-21511	DATE OF DOCUMENT 16 Mar 1955	ANALYST ()	
SUBJECT FJB-867 (CS-59302) Views on Japanese Cabinet Post Successors			DATE 19 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p style="text-align: right;">Evaluation: B,F-3</p> <p>Cable from () Source: from former Japanese naval officer (B) from another former Japanese Naval officer (F) with contacts among prominent conservative politicians. Date of Info: Early Mar 1955</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 21 March 1955</p> <p>1. In the event of Prime Minister HATOYAMA Ichiro's sudden death, the Japan Democratic Party would disintegrate and split into factions. Of the possible successors, Liberal Party President <u>OGATA Taketora</u> is the obvious choice and the only able statesman. Finance Minister ICHIMADA Hisato is hated by many.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">SECRET</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
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DIFFERENT alarms and disputes, abrupt changes of prescriptions and even of doctors have made it plain that something is seriously wrong with the stomach on which the Soviet system marches—that is, with Soviet agriculture. Since Stalin's death, the absorption of quantities of Argentine, Danish and Dutch foodstuffs by an economic body quite unaccustomed to such external supplies has caught the world's eye (for a time Russia was the third largest importer of meat and dairy produce); and the linking of Mr Malenkov's agricultural "sins" to his deposition, followed by the dismissal of ministers concerned with food and farming, has heightened the sense of drama. Against this background, the orders which Mr Khrushchev issued last week for the decentralising of agricultural planning have been interpreted in some quarters as a prelude to the

winding up of the whole Soviet system of farming.

Undoubtedly the countryside has always been the Achilles heel of the Soviet regime. The country is as vulnerable as some western observers would claim it is a peculiarly embarrassing weakness for a country which seeks not only complete independence from "capitalist" supplies but also the allegiance of peasant populations in backward countries. Soviet biologists, of course, cite extenuating circumstances after a world war and two world wars, they might even claim it to be an achievement that the number of livestock is now not much lower than in 1913, and they can point to the credit side the increased proportion of wheat in total grain output and great increases in cotton and sugar beet. Their chief

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that collective farming has fulfilled its essential task: it has made it possible to extract from the countryside enough supplies for the industrialisation of the towns.

It can safely be assumed that nothing is further from the mind of the Soviet leaders than to admit the bankruptcy of planned collective farming, for that is an inherent part of the Soviet system, and to jettison it would amount to admitting the bankruptcy of the system as a whole. The *kolkhozes* cannot be so easily uprooted from the Russian landscape. The present measures represent not the dismantling of a broken-down machine, but an attempt to lubricate and keep in motion a machine that is groaning with the strain of its effort. Moscow no longer tries to deny that the machine is inefficient. Soviet leaders have lately been crying on the rooftops that agricultural supplies are failing to match up either to growing demand or to the planners' expectations, failing even to correspond to what has been invested in the agricultural sector. Article after article in *Pravda* denounces the "intolerable situation" in state farms, in fodder output and in stockbreeding, revealing countless errors and failures in both production and distribution.

The planners' problem is not merely to feed a rising population but specifically to ensure food for the mushrooming towns. Russia's rural population has remained roughly unchanged since 1913 at about 120 million people. But during the quarter century of the planned era, the urban population has risen by 50 million, and in the last five years alone by 17 million, of whom nine million represent the influx from the countryside. And a *moshik* who has come to town is not only, in Khrushchev's words, "a food producer turned food consumer": he is also apt to demand a richer and more varied diet. The promises made by Stalin's heirs in 1953 have whetted his appetite, and the relatively bigger price cuts of recent years have also added to the inflationary strain.

The countryside has also been a headache for Soviet leaders in more than a strictly economic sense. Its life as well as its production cannot be controlled, planned and ruled as can be done in the towns. It was no accident that Stalin, in his last pamphlet, dwelt on the need to eliminate the difference between "collective" property in the country and state ownership in the towns. The avowed aim is to bridge the gap, to uproot the remnants of private property and transform the peasants—now collective farmers—into agricultural workers. A step was taken in this direction, under Khrushchev's own guidance, in 1950 when some 250,000 collective farms were amalgamated into 93,000 larger units. In face of peasant resistance, however, the regime did not dare to proceed any further along the road towards "agro-towns."

Thus Stalin's successors were left with a dual task. They had to step up food supplies for the towns rapidly;

they were also determined in the long run to transform the countryside and tighten their control over it. Popular pressure, encouraged by the pledges made to the consumer by the new regime, rendered the first task so urgent that the second had to be pushed temporarily into the background. In the second half of 1953 Russia's new leaders admitted openly that the state of Soviet livestock was poor, and that dairy produce, meat, and even vegetables and potatoes were in short supply. Stalin's method of coping with such a situation and extracting surpluses from the countryside was to burden it with taxes and offer low prices. In their urgent need, his heirs applied the opposite remedy: they granted tax reliefs, reduced compulsory deliveries and paid higher prices. Soon afterwards, Khrushchev exploded another myth, that of Soviet self-sufficiency in grain. He insisted that the crop of coarse grains in particular would have to be greatly increased if his ambitious plans for livestock breeding were to be fulfilled, and "volunteers" were sent to "conquer lands" in cold and distant Kazakhstan and Siberia, with strict orders to get some 30 million tons of grain within a few years.

At the beginning of this year, on the eve of Malenkov's sensational fall, these new policies had had little time to mature and the results were still very meagre. A slight improvement was claimed for livestock, while additional grain from the reclaimed land was barely sufficient to compensate for bad weather in other regions. As yet no great achievements can be claimed for the policy of incentives. Imports had to be continued and stocks run down still further; yet even this did not prove enough to counteract the inflationary pressure resulting from price cuts. The sequel was the classical one: shortages of meat and other foods, queues, and mounting discontent. Khrushchev's latest intervention must be seen against this background. His new formula, borrowed from American experience, apparently without much consideration for climatic and other differences, is a gigantic, and highly dubious, expansion of maize cultivation for fodder. Both the policy of incentives and the drive eastward are to be continued as well.

Simultaneously Khrushchev announced a new concession which is elaborated in the decree published last week. Local authorities and individual collective farms are promised a little more elbow room. The central authorities will continue to determine regional contributions and each farm will still be faced with its minimum quota, but both farm and district will have a greater say in planning and will tend to benefit more if they overfulfil their tasks. It would be naive, however, to hail this measure as a major abandonment of centralised planning. It is significant that Khrushchev announced at the same time that control over deliveries will be exercised by the Machine and Tractor Stations.

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
44-7-35-139	() 2316 IN-30935	11 Apr 1955	()	
SUBJECT			DATE	
FJB-953 (CS-61483) Dissentient Elements among Political Groups in Japan			8 Sept 1955	
PERTINENT INFORMATION			Evaluation: F-3	
Cable from : () Source: from prominent rightist Japanese businessman (F) with para 3 from OGATA Taketora Date of Info: early April 1955				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DISSEMINATION dated 14 Apr 1955				
<u>Early April 1955</u>				
3. Although YOSHIDA Shigeru still considers himself the leader of the LP, many Party members are strongly against him, and even former LP Secretary-general IKEDA Hayato is not too sure YOSHIDA should lead the Party.				
4. Businessmen are criticizing LP President <u>OGATA Taketora</u> severely on the grounds that he is not a forceful leader and that he, as a former Genyoshi (Dark Ocean Society) man, he should have followed the Japanese tradition of Bushido (the way of the warrior) and resigned when his leader YOSHIDA resigned.				
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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. 44-126-1-173	AGENCY FJBA-4672	DATE OF DOCUMENT 18 Apr 1955	ANALYST C S
SUBJECT <u>Kaizo Magazine</u>			DATE 14 Oct 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION Dispatch from ()			
<p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS EXCERPTED VERBATIM FROM THE DESK COPY.</p> <p>6. With <u>Kaizo</u> on its knees, at least two groups other than [] showed interest in the magazine:</p> <p>A. SAJIMA Yoshinari, on 5 February 1955, told [] that he felt sure <u>Kaizo</u> could be had for \$15 million and he was trying to interest <u>OGATA</u> in the deal in the hope of having someone like ABE Shinnousuke run it.</p>			
<p style="text-align: right;">PERMISSION TO INCLUDE IN [] DIV: EG/1-DATE 2 Nov 1955 Japan</p>			
<p style="text-align: center;">THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.</p>			
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