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**The documents in this  
folder continue from the  
previous folder.**

March 10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Check List for Your Second Meeting in Jerusalem  
Morning, March 10

Negotiating Issues

Attached are the following documents:

--Tab A: The re-typed version of the Egyptian paper with the deletions you requested. There is an extra copy loose in your folder for you to give Rabin. We will have extra copies at the meeting if you wish them.

--Tab B: Rabin's Seven Points.

--Tab C: Rabin's Seven Points, each with the Egyptian position under it as we understand it and a possible interpretive point you might wish to make as your impression.


--Tab D: General Gamasy's six principles for your reference.

--Tab E: The original Egyptian paper for your reference.

Also in your folder for reference is the map reflecting General Gamasy's military briefing in Aswan.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY Hrc DATE 9/24/03




A  
18

SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

- - - - -

- 1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.
- 2- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Sinai.
- 3- The United Nations Zone will be subject of agreement.
- 4- The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement.
- 5- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should




be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7- Egypt and Israel are ready to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Agreement and they agree that the Mixed Armistice Commission resume its work to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement.

8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt, during the duration of this agreement. Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar guarantee or assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this




agreement but will fulfill its obligation towards Syria. In addition, Egypt if attacked by Israel will exercise its right of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

9- Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.

10- Egypt would respect its commitment so far as the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.

11- Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

12- Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some American firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This commitment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.



Rabin's Seven Points

Dinner, Sunday, March 9

1. Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet. But Israel remains ready to negotiate with each of its neighbors without making conditions connecting one to the other. Nor do subsequent agreements have to be of the same pattern. But it is easiest to start with Egypt.

2. It has to be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording.


3. It has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force in the context of an interim agreement. Whatever the legal formula is -- nonaggression, non-belligerency, whatever -- it must be a declared public commitment towards Israel, between Egypt and Israel.

4. There must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack.

5. Duration: (a) How to solve the dilemma of indefiniteness versus a long specified period, and (b) the length of time between signature of the agreement and its complete implementation.

6. Relation between the interim agreement and what takes place at Geneva: What is it that commits Egypt to continued moderate behavior under the terms of the interim agreement?

7. The nature of the new line is related concretely to what is attainable on the six points above.





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TALKING PAPER

Response on Rabin's Seven Points

March 10, 1975

1. Rabin point: Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet. But Israel remains ready to negotiate with each of its neighbors without making conditions connecting one to the other. Nor do subsequent agreements have to be of the same pattern. But it is easiest to start with Egypt.


Egyptian position: For political reasons, Egypt needs some assurance that:

- the process of negotiation will continue with a view to reaching a second "disengagement" agreement on the Syrian front in the near future (Fahmy says mid-1975);
- the U.S. will engage itself actively in this process;
- Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that Palestinian representatives take part at the appropriate time.

Possible Interpretive Point to Make:

We think Egypt may be prepared for a separate agreement ("partial" agreement in Asad's terminology), so long as it doesn't look like a separate agreement. Sadat needs a fig leaf to protect him against charges that he has sold out Syria; this is especially important vis-a-vis Faisal. The more Sadat gets for Egypt in the agreement, the more transparent the fig leaf can be.

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BY LJR NARA, DATE 9/24/03



2. Rabin point: It has to be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording.


Egyptian position:

Words

- Egypt would presumably repeat the wording in the January 1974 agreement that this agreement is a step towards a final peace, not peace itself.
- Egypt would agree to continue peace negotiations.
- Egypt is prepared to accept restraint on use of force (see para 3 below).

Deeds

- Egypt would commit itself to annual extensions of UNEF while the agreement is in force.
- Egypt accepts an effective buffer zone (see para 4 below).
- Egypt will proceed to re-open the Canal and permit Israeli cargo to pass. Egypt would continue reconstruction in the Canal area.
- Egypt would give the U.S. an oral commitment to lift restrictions on some American firms.



3. Rabin point: It has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force in the context of an interim agreement. Whatever the legal formula is -- nonaggression, non-belligerency, whatever -- it must be a declared public commitment towards Israel, between Egypt and Israel.


Egyptian position:

- Presumably Egypt would be willing to restate its commitment in the January 1974 agreement to continue to observe the ceasefire.
- Egypt is ready to give its guarantee or assurance to the U.S. that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Israel if Israel gives the U.S. its written formal guarantee or assurance that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria or Egypt during the duration of this agreement. If Israel attacks Syria or Egypt, Egypt will no longer be bound by this.

FYI: Sadat told you he would accept a "no war" pledge.

Possible Interpretive Point to Make:

We doubt an absolute renunciation of force by Sadat is achievable -- and it would be meaningless in any case.




4. Rabin point: There must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack.

Egyptian position:

- Gamasy said: "The buffer zone should be wide enough to avoid clashes."
- Egypt would agree to annual extensions of UNEF as long as the agreement is in effect and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.
- Egypt would agree to something like the old Mixed Armistice Commission which would allow Israeli and Egyptian officers to work with the UN in supervising the buffer zone.

(N.B. The Israelis should like the concept but the name Mixed Armistice Commission and the idea of its renewal are anathema to the Israelis; however, a different, similar title such as Mixed Commission and simply incorporating it in the new agreement rather than "renewing it" might sell with both sides.)




5. Rabin point: Duration: (a) How to solve the dilemma of indefiniteness versus a long specified period, and (b) the length of time between signature of the agreement and its complete implementation.

Egyptian position:

- At this point, Egypt seems willing to accept an indefinite duration for the agreement.
- Egypt is talking of completing implementation within two months of signing the agreement.

Possible Interpretive Comment to Make:

Any attempt to agree on a specific time limit would inject an additional contentious issue and lead to endless haggling over an essentially legalistic issue. As for the duration of the implementation period, we understood Israel's desire for sufficient time to have an orderly transition to a new situation on the ground. On the other hand, the danger in too protracted a period is that it will permit pressures to build up for linkage to a Syrian/Palestinian agreement.



6. Rabin point: Relation between the interim agreement and what takes place at Geneva: What is it that commits Egypt to continued moderate behavior under the terms of the interim agreement?

Egyptian position:

Egypt seems willing to see the agreement remain in force (e.g., extend UNEF) as long as the points of the agreement are observed and "efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue."

Possible Interpretive Comment to Make:

We have seen no indication that the Egyptians want to link an interim agreement to any deadlines for progress at Geneva. The Egyptians may see Geneva as a way to get the Palestinians and Syrians off their back.

7. Rabin point: The nature of the new line is related concretely to what is attainable on the six points above.

Egyptian position is reflected in the Gamasy lines and six principles.

Possible Interpretive Comment to Make:

Rather than holding out on this for Egyptian satisfaction on Points 1 - 6, it may become necessary to consider telling the Egyptians that Israel will agree to give up the passes and oilfields contingent on satisfactory quids from Egypt.




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EGYPTIAN PRINCIPLES  
ON TROOP DEPLOYMENT LINES IN THE SINAI

1. Any lines should provide physical security for the troops of both sides.
2. No line should give one side a military advantage.
3. There should be balance between the troops of both sides.
4. The Egyptian line should be far enough from the Canal to provide security for the cities along the Canal.
5. The buffer zone should be wide enough to avoid clashes. The wider the zone, the better for both sides.
6. Once the Canal is open, it will be an obstacle for Egyptian troops. The balance of forces in the Sinai should therefore be 1.5 to 1 in Egypt's favor.

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
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BY HR, NARA, DATE 9/24/02

**SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT**

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL**

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- 1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.
- 2- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Sinai.
- 3- The United Nations Zone will be subject of agreement.
- 4- The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement.
- 5- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should






be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7- Egypt and Israel are ready to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Agreement and they agree that the Mixed Armistice Commission resume its work to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement.

8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt (during the duration of this agreement,) Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this




agreement but will fulfill its obligation towards Syria.

In addition, Egypt if attacked by Israel will exercise its right <sup>of</sup> to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

[ 9- Should Israel give solemn assurances to the United States that it will engage itself in an active process of negotiations with a view to reach a second Disengagement agreement on the Syrian front and if the President of the United States gives his assurances to President Sadat that the United States Government will actively deploy its efforts and weight so that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975, President Sadat would be prepared to give to President Ford his assurances that Egypt will not violate the Disengagement Agreement reached between Egypt and Israel as long as the efforts pertaining to further progress towards a just and durable peace are continuing.]

10- Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.


11- Egypt would respect its commitment so far as the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.



12- Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

13- Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some american firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This committment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.

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HAK/Rabin  
Memcon

# ISRAEL and Occupied Territories


- International boundary
- - - Armistice line
- Railroad
- Surfaced road

● Israeli airfields

0 25 50 Miles  
0 25 50 Kilometers

~~SECRET~~

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

Amb. Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to Israel  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary for Press Relations

Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff


Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE & TIME:

Monday - March 10, 1975  
10:02 a. m. - 1:00 p. m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, good morning, and to your colleagues. If we can start now and go into the details of what kind of impressions, points, you bring from Egypt, and what should be the procedure we follow in this kind of negotiations.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (1,3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to determine

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 5E 9/16/03  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 9/22/03

Kissinger: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, let me say a few words about the procedure first. I feel I should go to Egypt sometime during the day Wednesday, say around noon, with some Israeli propositions based on our discussions here that permit Sadat to react, so the process of negotiation can get finally engaged and the fencing can stop.

My experience with Sadat is different from my experience with Asad. Once Sadat has made a decision, he moves fairly rapidly; Asad fights for every point. That's something to keep in mind, not related to anything in particular. Therefore it is better to start with something closer to your position than [we did] with Asad.

We can start with Gamasy's points, since Gur's getting restless.

Allon: He has good nerves, Gur.

Kissinger: Or with your seven points, which would take a little longer.

Rabin: Start with Gamasy.

Kissinger: [Unfolds large map, copy of which is at Tab A:] Here is a map Gamasy gave us. These are not proposals. These are a series of theoretical lines that would implement his principles according to the nature of the agreement. The basis of his position was he wasn't talking of the political side but of possible lines in the Sinai that would reduce the risk of conflicts, and to implement the principle of military equilibrium.

He said privately to Sisco that this [Dikla-Ras Mohammed] was the best line of Israeli defense, and this [the 1967 line] was not a good line for Israeli defense.

Then he said it would require various combinations of forces. It would be one-and-a-half to one if the line is here [the westernmost line] because no Egyptian airfields are here. As the lines move over, the force ratios would vary.

[The Israeli side studies the map.]

Let me explain. He said these were "principles of troop deployment in the Sinai:



-- First, any lines should provide physical security for both sides.

-- No line should give one side a military advantage.

-- There should be a balance between the troops of both sides.

-- The Egyptian line should be far enough from the Canal to provide security for the cities along the Canal.

-- The buffer zone should be wide enough to avoid clashes. The wider the zone, the better for both sides.

-- Once the Canal is open, it will be an obstacle to the Egyptian troops.

[Indicates on map] These are airfields. The blue dots are the airfields he said you have that in his view are relevant to a Sinai battle.

Rabin: What is this one?

Saunders: He said it was under construction.

Kissinger: Is that right?

Allon: He's well informed.

Kissinger: Since you have the fields there, you have the strategic balance in your favor anyway, and you have six if you give one up. If I'm wrong, you can count.

Then he says this line [westernmost red line, including passes in Egyptian zone] obviously puts the mountains at their back. He says the Egyptians will have no effective offensive capability.

Gur: He likes elevations! [laughter]

Kissinger: I told you -- you have a brother! His view is they can't mass here very easily for offensive operations. It's a good defensive line. He bent the line over here [east of Bardawil marshes, in the north], so there can be no clash over fishing. He says this is good for tracked vehicles.

Allon: There may be oil there.





Gur: To avoid clashes, he could move the line that way [indicating to the west of Bardawil marshes].

Kissinger: No, he said he wants the fishes. He says in this area only tracked vehicles can go and this is a reasonable barrier. [Indicating.] He can't build up for an offensive thrust through these passes. There was another area here, and of course down here, that he says are impassable except on tracks. So he thinks these two lines [the westernmost red and blue lines] are good defensive lines. It depends on the nature of the political settlement, with respect to these other lines.

He told Joe this [easternmost blue line] was the best defense line and that this [the 1967 line] wasn't a good one.

Peres: What is his line?

Kissinger: According to his strategic concept, the main Egyptian line should be here [westernmost red line].

One point Sadat made is the present disposition of Israeli forces in the Sinai is a military threat to Egypt. Twelve armored regiments.

Rabin: Brigade or battalion?

Peres: In the thinned-out area?

Kissinger: No, what you have in the Sinai today is an offensive military threat to Egypt, apart from where the line is. Sadat said to me he hoped as part of the understanding there could be some thinning out, apart from the agreement. He claimed there are twelve armored regiments. He may count your brigades as a regiment.

Rabin: He should know the bulk of the Israeli army is in reserves and the bulk of his is army.

Kissinger: It would be helpful to me to give me some of the facts. I don't insist.

Allon: General Gamasy is no longer merely a military man; he's a politician, a Minister of Defense. When he thinks of alternative lines, was it related to political elements?



Kissinger: No, this was presented as elements of strategic balance in the Sinai.

Allon: When we said the line is related to political elements.

Kissinger: From my knowledge of Gamasy he wouldn't understand your question. Nor would he be permitted to express a view of a political nature. He never expressed a view of Israel. The Syrian generals have a passion; to Gamasy Israel is a strategic problem.

Sisco: He has great admiration for you.

Kissinger: He thinks your generals are very professional. He speaks with respect of the ones he dealt with on the Armistice Commission.

He said if this is your defense line, you could get tank forces in.

He showed us that the way the lateral roads go, you have the possibility of rapid movement and there is a certain balance of defensive capability.

There was a long discussion of this airfield. When he first described it, it was in the buffer zone; then on his map it was on his side. He said your concern wasn't the airfield but he knew you would create another Kuneitra and want the hills around it.

Rabin: Why does Gamasy think we should move?

Kissinger: He didn't consider it.

Sisco: He said if there is to be peace, these lines give equal security. Literally.

Kissinger: He said this [the present] line is an absurd line. It gives no protection, no security, no balance. Because they are all in the open -- no depth, no possibility of defense. Therefore, these are the lines at which -- if there can be peace -- there would be a balance. He knows you are not going here now, [the easternmost red line, through the center of Sinai] -- this line isn't an asset to Sadat in this negotiation.

This situation makes the Egyptians feel insecure, he says, and the Israelis secure.

Dinitz: Does it mean the Israeli line moves too and there is a buffer zone?



Kissinger: In his concept, the furthest Egyptian line is this one [the easternmost red line] -- but this doesn't exclude a thinned-out zone.

Sisco: He favors a wide buffer zone.

Kissinger: Generally in his concept, when the Israeli line moves, the Egyptian line moves. But the correlation of forces changes: It's 1.5 to one if it's here [the westernmost line], or here it could be different. Or it could be any combination.

This [the westernmost red line] is the line he thinks is the defensive line for Egypt. I explained this red line was totally out of the question.

Allon: Gamasy wants Egyptian control of the passes.

Kissinger: But Sadat knows it is impossible.

Allon: So let's move now to how to conduct the negotiations.

Kissinger: No, this is intelligence, not a proposal. You can keep this map.

I think it is interesting that the Egyptian War Minister put it in terms of balance and in terms of peace. It is inconceivable to me that the Syrian Defense Minister would present various lines across what he considers Syrian territory in terms of military balance.


Peres: We have evidence there is a gradual buildup on the Egyptian side. We hold back on sensational publicity as much as we could. And the same with the Syrians. Is it your impression there are parallel preparations for military activity?

Kissinger: I would like to raise this with Sadat, quite frankly. Not that he tells us the truth, but I have no basis for judgment.

Rabin: What is your intelligence?

Kissinger: Our intelligence confirms the disposition but our intelligence and our Ambassador believe there is no war intention. But there is no assessment of what is their intention. It could be their version of psychological warfare.

Peres: The Syrians?



Kissinger: I have no assessment. Asad told me if he doesn't renew UNDOF he'll call up the reservists and it will be a tense situation. That was at the end.

Gur: And in order to prevent an agreement with Egypt?

Kissinger: My own estimate -- whatever it's worth -- is that the flash point will come at the time of UNDOF renewal. But he might do things to prevent an Egyptian agreement which he misassesses. There will be some activity of some form. He now knows he won't get anything but he's not yet clear that there will be an agreement with Egypt. Once he is...

Peres: There is a very strange situation in Fatahland now. Some villagers left their homes and their villages have been taken over by what is the closest to a regular army for the Palestinians. Our impression is that Asad has a considerable say in what happens. The Palestinians are guided and possibly infiltrated by Syrian soldiers.

Rabin: And it is strangely quiet.

Peres: Three large villages are completely under Fatah. They are fortifying it.

Kissinger: Let me make one other point. I told Sadat that the red line is out of the question. But Gamasy's views cannot be completely disregarded. Our Ambassador, who is extremely thoughtful, thinks if Fahmy and Gamasy gang up, Sadat won't be able to do it. If Fahmy sticks with Sadat, the domestic situation will be manageable. Sadat will go to considerable lengths to get an agreement.

Peres: What is your impression of the Soviet-Egyptian relations? Is there a renewal of supply?

Kissinger: There is a renewal of supply. He says he got 25 MiG-23s, of which twelve are fighters which aren't any good.

Rabin: MiG-25s?

Kissinger: No, MiG-23s, of which he says twelve are of the fighter model and aren't any good. The other 13 are fighter-bombers which are good. The MiG-25s are quite good, he says, but they never let anyone look at it.

He calls the MiG-25 the Foxbat.

They have four Soviet reconnaissance planes -- that he says is a good plane.



Peres: Foxbat?

Kissinger: He says the 23's, which he never had -- aren't as good as fighters as the 21's.

Peres: Did Sadat refer to the military intentions of Asad?

Kissinger: Yes. He made the general comment that the Syrians make more noise than they do.

Sisco: Gamasy said the Syrians could not go to war alone.

Allon: About the diplomacy, you heard last night that we're willing to go ahead with an interim agreement with Egypt and leave open the possibility of a peace agreement with Syria.

Is it conceivable that you could get agreement with both Arab Presidents that in order to establish an atmosphere that would be helpful, the first step that should be decided upon is that all parties -- this week -- would agree to renew the UN?

Kissinger: Absolutely totally out of the question. Egypt won't do it now, first of all.

Allon: Egypt?

Kissinger: He'll do it in the context of another agreement. Asad might if we could give him assurance that it would be done in Syria simultaneously with Egypt.

Allon: The disengagements weren't parallel.

Kissinger: But he accuses Sadat of betraying him.

The proposal he made yesterday was, now that we have established a good relationship with Egypt, we should leave it where it is and turn to Syria so both can be implemented simultaneously.

Another proposal he will make -- he did it last year -- is to delay implementation of the Egyptian one.

Rabin: What are your impressions of the seven points we made [on Sunday night, March 9]? Or how would you like to go?



Kissinger: Let me go through your seven points, and then give my general impressions. [see list of Rabin's points, Tab B]

First, "Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet." In order to bring this about, we need a document that doesn't link to any other agreement that might have to be made; that is the essential point. My instinct is, this is attainable. What it means is, in the agreement itself there is no obligation stated for another agreement with another country. There will have to be a statement that the negotiations continue and that this isn't a final agreement.

I'm certain that outside the agreement Sadat will give verbal support to other agreements, but not in the document. But it is attainable to have nothing in the document. We will need the phrases we had -- "the process of peace will continue, within the framework of 338," or something. And we may have to give him an assurance that we will support actively a continuation of the process of peace.


Second, "it must be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording." The first part of this is a drafting problem. Judging by what Sadat has said publicly, it should be possible to make it say it's a step to peace. With respect to the second point, it depends on the concrete ideas we incorporate in it, what the concrete wordings will be. Of the concrete steps to peace which on the basis of conversations with Sadat I believe progress is possible, or firm statements are possible, there is no problem with the principle of an effective buffer zone. Second, Egypt will be prepared to give two things with respect to forces in the buffer zone -- a renewal commitment in agreement so it doesn't have to be negotiated every year, and...

Allon: But the veto remains with the Soviet Union and the Chinese even if the Egyptians don't object.

Kissinger: Yes.

Crews can go through the Canal without discrimination, and some moves on the boycott question, not part of the agreement but they would be rapidly visible -- some American firms like Ford, Coca Cola and Xerox would be allowed. Of course, Bab el-Mandeb.

Allon: The trouble is not only with Egypt.



Peres: But there would be an understanding.

What did he say about the crews?

Kissinger: Let me be precise. All-Israeli crews would be an impossible problem for him. He distinguishes between crews that are 100% Israeli and...

Did I ever tell you the story that Luns told? A town council in northern Holland deliberated over whether to allow mixed bathing. They decided to allow it. A few weeks later one councilor came to a meeting and expressed shock: "I've just been to a public bath and there are women there!" The other members said to him: "But we voted on it and you voted for it." He said, "I thought you meant Catholics." [Laughter]


Thirdly, "it has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force...a declared public commitment." I believe some declaration of nonuse of force, through us, is attainable. Whether it is attainable to state that in an agreement, I do not know. But I think some statement of nonuse of force is attainable. I repeat: There are two ways to make it public -- (1) that Egypt has given us a statement that we convey to Israel, or (2) that in the agreement there is a statement. I don't know whether in his context it can be public nor do I know how the formulation would be. I haven't made a serious attempt to explore it.

Fourth, "there must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack."

They agree to one-year periods of UNEF and they will commit themselves now to one renewal. So it is in the agreement. They have no answer to the veto point Yigal raised.

They agree to resurrect the Mixed Armistice Commission in addition to UNEF. I told him my impression was that Israel wouldn't agree to the word "Armistice." He said, "I need something as a shelter for a mixed Egyptian-Israeli commission, if it could be set up independently of UNEF even if associated with UNEF."

Allon: Military or civilian?



Kissinger: I didn't go into it.

Peres: A commission or commissions?

Kissinger: I didn't go into it.

If it is possible to create an Egyptian-Israeli supervisory apparatus, even if it works with UNEF, as long as it has independent legal existence, then one of your fears about UNEF removal would be eased. And second, the Soviet incentive for a veto would be less if all that is left is a commission, which is less interesting to them.

I haven't gone into the details.

Fifth, duration. On the question of duration -- the Prime Minister attacks me more when I agree with him -- I think the problem is exactly as he stated it. I think the Egyptians will agree to indefinite duration; I don't think they will agree to a term duration.

And of course there is the problem of length of time between the signature and complete implementation. On that I'm positive that they have completely different ideas from you. They are thinking of relatively rapidly. But Sadat told me if he can get the oil fairly rapidly, he will be more relaxed about the passes. But it is not the same as you have in mind.

Point seven, we can't discuss yet.

Point six, [Geneva], first: We are in a curious position. If there is no agreement, there will be rapid movement for Geneva in crisis conditions. If there is an agreement, the only one who wants Geneva is Israel. [Laughter] The Russians will press for it; Egyptians will say they will go if the Palestinians are invited from the beginning. The Syrians may well say they won't go. My impression is, unless Asad is bluffing, the Syrians will say they won't go to Geneva but are preparing for war because the objective conditions for Geneva don't exist.

He told the press... Incidentally our official transcript left out the best part, his crack about he didn't like treaties, even treaties of friendship. My impression before was, the only way we could have Geneva is if there is something in the agreement saying we go to Geneva within a measurable time after the agreement. The Egyptians are not eager, and the Syrians are not in the present mood interested in going. Our press asked him [Asad]:





Will your joint command with the Palestinians make it easier for you to go to Geneva? He said, "yes, and also easier not to go." He made disparaging remarks to me about it: "What's in it for me?"

But if there is no agreement, they will all want to go. This is the paradox.

But our planning shouldn't assume this analysis. We should plan that if there is an agreement, it would be desirable to go fairly rapidly unless we can delay it indefinitely. Not five months later. Why do I say this? Because close to the agreement, there will be maximum disagreement between Egypt and Syria, and while you are still implementing the agreement and will not have fully implemented it. Because the behavior of Egypt will be established as moderate, and it will remove the crisis atmosphere and may move it into a European-Security-Conference type of operation.

As for Soviet behavior on Geneva, I've had no communication from the Soviets on the Middle East since I met with Gromyko at Geneva. I made a proposal to meet with him. The Egyptians say the Soviets are egging on PLO; you can judge. We offered to meet him; he acknowledged it.

I think the disintegration of executive authority in the United States, plus what happened to the trade, is producing a noticeable -- noticeable to me -- increase in Soviet toughness. The tone of communications is noticeably decreasing in respect. We got a message on the European Security Conference -- which is not an issue on which the US will spill blood -- on setting the date. The issue between our positions was only a matter of two weeks, and the tone is of a nature that would be inconceivable before. The Trade Bill isn't the reason; I think the executive situation is the reason. You were Ambassador in '69 to '71; the Soviets didn't like it but were impressed with the brutality with which we would do things. This is something you ought to bear in mind; it's not related to the Middle East. Normally, I would have thought we could push the Soviets to a moderate course.

Whether anything should be put in an agreement on Geneva we should consider. Your concern is, Egypt should not use Geneva to make irrelevant issues in the agreement -- or that these issues should not be raised. We can't prevent them from being raised. My impression is that Sadat wants this agreement in order to close down. In the previous one he said often that he wanted another one; this time he's never mentioned it. Let's not fool ourselves; he's capable of doing what the Shah did. He doesn't expect to get more for a long time. He wants an agreement, I think at present, to keep a stalemate.



He's never stated a view on the line. After Gamasy's briefing, I asked them all to leave the room and I told him I wanted to leave no misapprehension that there is any chance of that line. He said he recognized this, but it would be extremely helpful if there could be some symbolic moving across the line, perhaps across the present UN line. I think he would prefer some movement so he can show Gamasy something. But he knows the Egyptian line cannot be where Gamasy put it, and he knows the area evacuation will be substantially a buffer zone -- I say "substantially" because of that one proviso. It will be somewhat difficult but I made it very clear.


Whatever the line is, the Israeli line he has adamantly insisted must be east of the passes. His line he's flexible about.

One final point about counterproposals. I believe he will be very realistic, very mature, very cool. Within the framework he considers acceptable, I believe he will try to be cooperative and not haggle over every point. If proposals are made that he considers an insult, his reaction may be more violent than Asad. What the framework is, I'll see when I see what you come up with.

Psychologically, he's a man of great pride who acts with great brutality when he moves. But he will be less nitpicking, less obliged to do mock-heroic things than Asad.

Sisco: Henry, I just couldn't agree with you more. [to the Israelis] If I can go back to the point before: If what you come up with meets the points before, once he grasps the seriousness, on many of these points he will be very relaxed. If you come up with something niggardly, he could be violent. I know it's a little inconsistent with your negotiating posture as I've known it over the years.

Kissinger: When we talk to Asad at dinner, whenever you scratch him, he always comes back to something like a Greater Syria. I never hear him talk with passion about the Syrian national state. Even though he talks about peace with Israel on the '67 lines, he always talks about Jordan and the West Bank. The orientation of his foreign policy will inevitably be to link Jordan and the West Bank to Syria. With Sadat, his talk about the Palestinians is as a problem, a fact, but never as an emotion. Sadat talks about the other Arabs as foreign nations -- whom he must take seriously -- but as foreign.



Thirdly, he may be the best actor in the world. If the opportunity presents itself, or if necessity forces him, he has the capability to be as ruthless as the Shah treated the Kurds. Nevertheless, when he's alone with me, he always says he wants to move towards peace. When he and his children are sitting around, they all say "Why can't they understand we want to move towards peace?" Maybe he coached them all.

Sisco: He always implies: "Whatever the other Arabs say, I'm different."

Allon: But he never concedes an inch.

Kissinger: He says the same about you.

Allon: Not an inch. "Nonbelligerency, out of the question."

Kissinger: That's not quite true. If we can work out nonuse of force, even if it's not enough, that's a political concession. If we can commit him to UNEF renewal, that's a political concession. To end the boycott, that's a political concession. Whether it's enough is another point.

Sisco: The question is the room for maneuver he has, particularly in the Arab world. This is what he's focussing on.

Kissinger: He said if it can be presented as an achievement in the Arab world, this will determine the attitude in the Arab world towards the peace process. If it looks like surrender, it will be the opposite effect. Asad said he's a beggar, and there is no need because of the conditions.

Allon: The lines aside, it is clear he'll get back substantial territory and he's the only leader who's got back territory. So it can't be a surrender. Asad can leave it to history, but history has to do the work. This is a tangible achievement.

Secondly, it is not a permanent solution.

Kissinger: Incidentally, one other point Gamasy made that Sadat didn't -- on the operation of Israeli naval craft in the Gulf of Suez. If they can be kept near the Gulf of Aqaba -- this is a major irritant.

Allon: The Sharm el-Sheikh side?



Kissinger: No, he specifically said that's all right, but on the other side.

Allon: Ras el-Millan?

Kissinger: Right. This is a "problem" for him, he said.

Allon: He is ready, you say, to have a longer interval from one to the other, 12 months instead of six, and a commitment to renew it. As you say, there is no answer to the problem of a veto. Therefore, I go back to the old idea: instead of having to renew year after year, we go back to...

Kissinger: He won't accept it.

Allon: No, I've improved it! A permanent agreement, but we add an understanding between you and us to start at a definite time to start discussions for a permanent peace. So it's not a trick to get a permanent agreement. Otherwise, the problem we have every six months we suffer every 12 months.

Kissinger: No, you suffer it in a different way. Soviet relations depend on the state in the United States. If the situation is restored, then the Soviets would take responsibility for the end of UNEF and the risk of war only at great peril. In a situation where Egypt and Israel agree, it would have very serious political consequences and therefore would be a major foreign policy decision. It makes a difference in America.

With Israel they will do anything; but it is another thing for the Soviet Union to risk the consequences in America for being responsible for a major Middle East crisis. It's different if relations with the US are shot anyway.

Allon: What about China? She doesn't care.

Kissinger: China's interest is to keep the Soviet Union out. Under present conditions. But as our domestic situation declines and they conclude we can't act decisively to help them against an attack -- which is all they want from us -- they have nothing to lose and they will adopt the Third World position against us.

Allon: This is a lacuna.

Kissinger: But they can't influence events after a veto and the only beneficiary is the Soviet Union.

Allon: There is France.

Kissinger: France won't veto.



Allon: We haven't yet found the answer to duration. Maybe we will, but not yet.

Second, on the question of no war.

Peres: Are the Egyptians considering, instead of UN forces, a notion of UN Observers?

Kissinger: No, but neither have we. Are they permanent?

Peres: Yes, and then we don't have to return year after year. And they are in the budget.

Allon: Incidentally, the original UNEF wasn't limited in time.

Sisco: Except for financial purposes.

Rabin: There was a financial need.

Peres: I would like to state my worries. The question is what level of suspicion are we going to maintain in the Sinai Peninsula? Now, incidentally, we have the best line of defense we've had. I'm sure Damascus agrees -- we are entrenched there, fortified. The question of maintaining a line is the problem of peace. It is for us not only geography but manpower. It is a big decision for us, to surrender such positions unless we know we are not exposing ourselves to increased difficulties. So where Sadat must make progress -- as stated yesterday, in the philosophy the Prime Minister suggested -- we can't change the line without a different situation. The problem is not public opinion, but the fate of our country. Once he misled us, with a surprise attack.

Kissinger: No, he told you he would go to war.

Peres: I read his peace statements, which were flourishing.

Kissinger: We didn't believe him. We thought he was a clown. We were told many times by the Egyptians. Arnaud de Borchgrave told me that Sadat told him he would go to war in '73. Mr. Prime Minister, you and I used to discuss it.

Rabin: Eban used to talk of Sadat as the prototype of anti-charisma.  
[Laughter]

Kissinger: He said that in a public speech?

Rabin: In the UN.

Peres: Suppose we take his words as dependable ones. He says without a move in Syria and Jordan, he doesn't guarantee any acceptable situation in Sinai.

Kissinger: He doesn't say that to me.

Peres: In his public statements. But for Israel to abandon an excellent line of defense, a small country, attacked many times, is a serious decision. I'm convinced we want peace; I know no Israeli, even Begin, who doesn't. He must understand this.

Kissinger: Let me put your dilemmas as I see it. You want peace on lines other than '67. Therefore if you talk about final lines now and a crisis occurs, you will have no support. The rationale of the step-by-step is not to salami you back to '67 -- if we wanted that, we would join the others. Therefore it is better to argue about something else, and to have a process.

In his talks with me, Sadat didn't say: "You must bring me a commitment to get something in Syria." Nevertheless he will maneuver to give the impression he didn't betray Syria and Jordan. I've heard Faisal say it. He can't link it organically but he can't afford not to say something. It is interesting in itself that he doesn't insist on a clause in the agreement.

Rabin: The agreement will be silent on Syria and the Palestinian question. But he says publicly ...

Kissinger: But he has not yet said to me: "You must do something on Syria and the Palestinians." The Prime Minister is right; the agreement is silent.

Sisco just gave me a note that reminded me: Asad hopes Begin will become Prime Minister, because that will clarify things. [Laughter] I said, "What happens if Begin then seeks peace?" He said that will be a real problem. [Laughter]

Allon: That's interfering in our domestic affairs, and I protest!



Kissinger: Could we have a two-minute break? For objective necessity.  
[laughter]

Rabin: I never expected Asad to support me. [laughter]

Sisco: Don't take it personally, Yitzhak!

[There was a brief break from 11:43 to 11:46 a.m.]

Rabin: Can we try to see where we stand? What you just said I understand as your impressions, not the Egyptian positions.

Kissinger: My understanding on the basis of my discussions.

Rabin: On the seven points -- the military analysis we can do later.

First, "The agreement stands on its own feet." I understand what you have said: In the agreement there will be no clause that relates it to anything except as a step towards general peace. But he is by no means publicly committed to say anything different.

Kissinger: Correct.

Rabin: As "a step towards peace," you don't know if anything new can be in the disengagement agreement.

Kissinger: The boycott.

Rabin: No, I mean the general state.

Kissinger: I haven't tried anything out. It would be good if you could give me something.

Rabin: Third, "exemplification of a turn towards peace" -- the boycott: you say you got the impression something concrete can be done.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: "The commitment not to use force," nonaggression: Your impression is it's possible, or might be.

Kissinger: My impression is it is possible. Secretly, it is conceivable; if it is leaked, barely possible.



Rabin: He said it publicly for nothing.

Kissinger: Maybe we can get it.

Rabin: This is the key for me -- can we get it, and how is it expressed publicly? We are not talking in a legal way.

Then, of course, "arrangements on the ground." You put Gamasy's position, which is for us out of the question.

Kissinger: Yes, you will have no problem with us.

Rabin: UNEF renewal annually in the agreement, automatic for as long as the agreement is in force.

Then the duration will be unlimited in the general sense.

Allon: All the agreements to date are unlimited.

Rabin: Yes, but the Legal Advisor told me because it is a disengagement agreement it has the clause that it lasts until it is replaced by another.

Gazit: The Legal Advisor was referring to ceasefire arrangements; if there is no time limit, if anyone decides to open fire, the agreement comes to an end.

Kissinger: But that is true of a peace agreement, which has to be abrogated to go to war.

Gazit: Technically.

Rabin: The period of time between the making of the agreement and the completion of the implementation. There is a big gap between what we discussed -- six-nine months.

Kissinger: A big gap. I think he is thinking in terms of two months, but there is more urgency with respect to the fields.

Rabin: Geneva has not been discussed.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Withdrawal: He is talking about a big one.





Kissinger: It is safe to say he is thinking of nothing else.

Rabin: So the gap between the sides is very wide. I assume it is only an opening position.

Kissinger: May I make a suggestion that occurred to me while we were talking?

My idea would be to present your ideas as something not associated with the Israelis. You think you are desirous of peace -- they think the process always starts with an attempt to humiliate them. And strangely enough they have an inferiority complex. They see you as arrogant, insensitive, extortionist and demanding.

Allon: They should meet with us!

Kissinger: They didn't like the behavior of your generals at Kilometer 101 either. I'm trying to be helpful to you. I'm wondering if I could bring with me a letter from you, of some of Peres' points -- which doesn't give away anything. In human terms.

Sisco: "We don't want to humiliate you."

Kissinger: It shouldn't humiliate either side.

The last time he said "We are lucky to have Kissinger. Let's use him." You don't have to mention me; that is not the point. Do something unusual, something he doesn't expect. He sees you as a military state, that thinks only in terms of strategy. He may be wrong. He is wrong.

What would be the problem with saying to them what Peres said to me? Take Mrs. Sadat... Like a letter to him. You don't risk anything if he publishes it; I don't think he can afford to publish it. If he does, it's an asset. "If you have a different idea, tell us what it is." So he doesn't think you are trying to humiliate him on his own territory. Something unusual.

Your danger is not that he tricks you now, but the danger that in a year something will happen that will make it in his interest to change. That is a real danger. I think it is not his intention to go to war now. He likes the easy leisurely style of life anyway. He has proved his heroism [in October]. So the problem is to get him into the frame of mind where he thinks he is working with you, not that he has to match what you do.

What Yigal said on UNEF isn't doable.

He claims he wants to turn the Arab world towards peace. He claims he is the only one who can do it. He claims you always make it impossible for him to do it, so it's self-defeating.

Dinitz: Why does he think we do it?

Kissinger: He thinks you are stupid. He doesn't understand.

Rabin: What you suggest is no problem.

Kissinger: If he thinks you are working with us, he will override his advisors. If he thinks you have challenged his dignity, it will be a bloody battle and everything will be wrong.

Rabin: So, for your trip, what?

Kissinger: First, give me a letter. Second, give me some tentative ideas. Say, "we are partners towards peace," and tell me what concretely you want. I have to show him some proposals.


I'm trying to convey his mentality. Say what Israel has gone through; say "we have a particular mentality. It may be hard for you as a big country with 39 million people to understand. You will gain territory; we give up strategic position. We really want peace. Take what we say in this spirit." Give him the seven points. Surprise him by your moderation. Don't ask for three times what you want; ask for 1-1/2 times of your final position. It would be a mistake to give your final position. It would be a big thing.

This may sound ridiculous to you. To be treated as an equal by Israel means something to him.

Sisco: It's the opposite of how to treat Asad.

Kissinger: Send a letter like that to Asad and he would attack you a week later. [Laughter] Do something un-Israeli. [Laughter] He says, "The trouble with the Israelis is they are auctioneering. There is no sense giving them anything because they will auctioneer it anyway." His perception is you have no strategic sense and you are tough on every little point.

With Asad, it is a military problem. With Asad, nothing like this would work. With him it is a problem of balance of forces; with him the strategy is to start with the toughest demands and bargain it down.



Allon: I'll be very frank. The people in this country -- that includes the Knesset -- think an interim agreement will be good if it leads to peace. People are of the impression that non-belligerency is the next step between a ceasefire and real peace. It is not a legal argument, but they see it is a political step which means all disputes must be settled by political means. Our neighbor to the south repeats the statements all the time that non-belligerency is impossible as long as one soldier remains on Arab territory. He doesn't even say Sinai. This will be very hard.

Kissinger: I tell you, maybe a statement...

Allon: It's not contractual.

Kissinger: But a statement. Why not say what you really feel? It costs you nothing. I think you are more sincere than he is, although I think he is sincere.

I've never heard Sadat say to me, as Asad does, that he can sacrifice 10 million.

Allon: He said it, before the war.

Kissinger: Never now.

Peres: There are two heavy points. One is duration -- what if it is unlimited but if you want to escape it, declare it one year ahead? Our people ask what are the assurances it will last. Can there be an understanding that the party that breaks the agreement is considered the aggressor and the party affected has the right of self defense?

Kissinger: How to express it?

Peres: One, the agreement is unlimited. Two, a party that wants to escape it has to declare one year ahead. Three, the party that violates it, the other one has a right to self-defense according to Article 51.

Kissinger: You better think about whether that is what you want.

Abrogation of the agreement abrogates the ceasefire anyway. But to write in the agreement that violations abrogate it may weaken the nonuse of force. Given the complexity of it, it may be possible to construct technical violations.



We know around this table that if they want to attack, they will attack. The advantage of the agreement is that the bigger the violation, the better your position is. Whether to write something into the agreement permitting the use of force...

Peres: Between the US and Israel.

Kissinger: Oh, between the US and Israel?

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: That's conceivable.

Allon: Is it possible that in the letter, the meeting can be arranged between Yitzhak Rabin and Anwar Sadat?

Kissinger: Not in my imagination.

Allon: Maybe later?

Kissinger: Maybe after the stalemate in Geneva.

Dinitz: After an agreement with Egypt and a stalemate in Geneva.

Kissinger: Yes. You guys -- if I said there should be a stalemate in Geneva you would probably settle. [Laughter]

Rabin: When will you be back?

Kissinger: Six o'clock tomorrow evening.

Rabin: When should we meet?

Kissinger: For the sake of my marriage, it would be better Thursday morning. For the sake of substance, it would be better to meet at dinner. So if there are any suggestions, you can adjust it.

Peres: The problem of missing bodies, Mr. Secretary.

Kissinger: I will raise it. I'm absolutely confident that in the course of this negotiation...

Peres: He should have done it without an agreement.



Kissinger: Some day I will write down the perception of other Arabs of Israel.

Gur: Why not now? It would be helpful.

Kissinger: Sadat's perception is, there is no one in Israel with sufficient political vision to do it. Ever, not the present Government.

Rabin: It is interesting because our question is whether there is anyone in Egypt with sufficient political vision to realize he has to live in peace with Israel. People wonder how to give something for nothing can be a move towards peace. Many people would be willing to give much more.

Kissinger: His problem is, first, you are not sensitive to the fact that we are talking about his territory.

Rabin: Talking about his vision, he gets territory; what does he give?

Kissinger: I just thought a letter could just give the points Peres made.

Rabin: If you suggest it, we will do it. But what about the business part of it?

Kissinger: If I come with just a list of Israeli demands, there will be an explosion.

Rabin: Why is there no explosion when you come here with a list of Egyptian demands?

Kissinger: There is a sort of explosion...


Rabin: What about Sadat, who wants a partner of vision...

Gur: And prepares the military option right away.

Rabin: I'm not denying he has a vision.

Kissinger: I've always said he is capable of doing what the Shah did to the Kurds. The existence of Israel is not a psychological necessity for him. I don't exclude he tells his people it is a better tactic. When we sit with his family, maybe he coached them all. The rhetoric when we meet socially is different.

Rabin: They are all different anyway.



Kissinger: The Jordanians really accept the existence of Israel but don't feel that what they do is symbolic for the Arabs.

Put your demands in a way that is psychologically acceptable to them.

I'm not saying he is a man of vision and there are no men of vision here. I report as faithfully to him what you say as I explain to you.

Dinitz: May I ask what you tell him when he says there are no men of vision here?

Kissinger: I tell him that we can't just put things in an abstract way but in a democratic country you have to be able to explain it publicly.

Sisco: Which he has some difficulty understanding too.

Rabin: So he has difficulties too. You say he has to worry about Fahmy and Gamasy.

Kissinger: You know, Mr. Prime Minister, when you were Ambassador in Washington I used to ask your advice on things not related to Israel, which suggests a certain judgment, and you can assume I convey this to him.

Allon: Public opinion is a secondary consideration for us.

Kissinger: Write the bloody letter. If it blows up, the letter shows your good faith. Secondly, think about your proposals.

Allon: Yes, but what can we tell our Cabinet about Egypt's proposals?

Kissinger: It will leak. If you put out that no-force thing, I don't think we can afford that. Even that one-year thing.

Allon: For the letter, we don't need a Cabinet meeting.

Rabin: We have to have a Cabinet meeting. On the use of force, we will find a way.

Kissinger: Even the one-year thing.

Sisco: Not only on the Egyptian thing.

Allon: It is assumed in the world that you did not get something concrete from Egypt, and what you sought was unattainable. If we are to advise



you to tell Sadat something that is a little different from what we told you earlier, in our system of government we cannot do it without the Cabinet. It is not public opinion but the system.

Kissinger: But first of all, I told Asad there was no Egyptian proposal, so he has nothing to worry about.

Allon: You told him there is no Egyptian proposal but there are Egyptian...

Kissinger: Ideas.

Allon: Ideas.

Kissinger: And there are Israeli ideas I can explore. Then after the next round we might be able to put forward more concrete ideas. I would rather take whatever you gentlemen can construct, explaining to him exactly what I did. If we tell the Cabinet now, with your disappointment and your papers saying I am being sent back to extract more, we can't do it.

Rabin: Just general ideas.

Kissinger: And no lines. The line is secondary at this point. As long as we in this room understand what we are talking about.

Sisco: What do we tell the press now?

Kissinger: I think we should do what the Prime Minister said yesterday, and get them used to the idea I will be here two weeks.

Allon: We need something.

Kissinger: No one should draw the conclusion from the loud voices heard...  
[Laughter]

Gazit: It was firm but not abusive. No one was arrogant!

Rabin: Tomorrow night.

Kissinger: Let's say 9:00, 9:30.

Allon: 9:30 here.



Rabin: 9:30 here.

Sisco: 9:30 here.

Rabin: Good.

Kissinger: Look, I have no illusions about Sadat. With most Arabs I've met, you can't tell where reality ends and the epic poetry begins. With him, he's at least in touch with reality.

Rabin: If he wants an agreement, he has to know he has to pay for it.

Kissinger: If I may suggest... a way to put it is in terms of your necessities which need as much understanding as his.

All right, what do we say to the press?

Dinitz: We are in a long negotiation and we can't give a report every day.

Kissinger: We are in a complicated negotiation. We are engaged in a detailed examination.

Rabin: Don't say details.

Gur: I once said elements and ideas and got shot down.

Kissinger: By whom?


Gur: By the Secretary. At Geneva.

Kissinger: Because you gave the real position at a time when I said there was none!

For domestic politics it must be significant that Sadat let Gamasy spend an hour making a presentation. Fahmy never speaks when he is in the room. Gamasy has never spoken except that one time when I proposed that 30-tank idea and Gamasy burst into tears. He said he can't give a military judgment; it was a political judgment. Sadat took me aside and did it.

Allon: What do we tell the press?

Kissinger: This is a negotiation which will take some time to come to fruition. Therefore we are engaged in careful examination of the elements





developed by all sides. And we will continue this process when I come back from Ankara. And the talks were friendly and comradely. [Laughter]

[The meeting concluded. The Secretary's remarks to the press outside are at Tab C.]



SECRET/NODIS

Rabin's Seven Points

Dinner, Sunday, March 9

1. Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet. But Israel remains ready to negotiate with each of its neighbors without making conditions connecting one to the other. Nor do subsequent agreements have to be of the same pattern. But it is easiest to start with Egypt.
2. It has to be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording.
3. It has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force in the context of an interim agreement. Whatever the legal formula is -- nonaggression, non-belligerency, whatever -- it must be a declared public commitment towards Israel, between Egypt and Israel.
4. There must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack.
5. Duration: (a) How to solve the dilemma of indefiniteness versus a long specified period, and (b) the length of time between signature of the agreement and its complete implementation.
6. Relation between the interim agreement and what takes place at Geneva: What is it that commits Egypt to continued moderate behavior under the terms of the interim agreement?
7. The nature of the new line is related concretely to what is attainable on the six points above.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/02, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR PARA. DATE 9/24/03



Handwritten: *Memorandum* (C) 20



Department of State  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
ANKARA TURKEY

Jerusalem 403  
**TELEGRAM**

INFO

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Classification

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E.O. 11652: N/A  
 TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
 SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S REMARKS IN JERUSALEM,  
 DEPARTMENT FOR NSCE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN;  
 S/PRS FOR FUNSETH

- FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER FOLLOWING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RABIN AND OTHER ISRAELI OFFICIALS AT THE PM'S OFFICE IN JERUSALEM MARCH 10, 1975:
- SECRETARY KISSINGER: AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE COMPLICATED AND WHICH WILL TAKE SOME TIME. WE ARE ENGAGED HERE IN ANALYZING ALL THE IDEAS AND ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE PART OF A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT AND WE ARE DOING SO WITH GREAT CARE. WE HAVE DONE SO IN A VERY FRIENDLY, VERY COMRADELY AND VERY POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. I AM GOING TO ANKARA THIS AFTERNOON AND I AM RETURNING TOMORROW EVENING-- BACK TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW EVENING TO CONTINUE THIS EXAMINATION OF THE IDEAS AND THE ELEMENTS OF THE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT.

3. Q: DR. KISSINGER, YOU SAID THE CHANCES WERE FIFTY-FIFTY BEFORE YOU STARTED OUT. WOULD YOU SAY THEY ARE BETTER NOW OR WORSE NOW?



CN 3941

PAGE - 2 -

SECRETARY: I DON'T WANT TO BE IN A POSITION IN WHICH EVERY DAY I HAVE TO GIVE AN ASSESSMENT AND A PERCENTAGE FIGURE BECAUSE WE WILL BE IN A HOPELESS TRAP AFTER AWHILE. I CAME HERE BECAUSE I BELIEVED THAT AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. I HAVE NO REASON TO CHANGE MY MIND.

4. Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY ASSESSMENT OF HOW LONG THIS MISSION WILL LAST?

A: I DON'T WANT TO PUT MYSELF INTO ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAME BECAUSE IT IS AN AGREEMENT OF SOME IMPORTANCE, IF IT IS ACHIEVED, IT HAS TO BE DONE WITH GREAT CARE.

5. FOR ANKARA: WOULD APPRECIATE IF COPIES OF ABOVE ARE DUPLICATED FOR DISTRIBUTION TO PRESS TRAVELING WITH SECRETARY.

DAY

BT  
#0403



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

*B* *MR*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Prime Minister Rabin.

"I have just completed a total of about eight hours of discussions with Prime Minister Rabin and his negotiating team which includes Allon, Peres and Chief of Staff Gur. I shared with them my analysis that he has limited room for political maneuver. I also gave them the sense of the mood I found in Damascus, stressing the tough talk about a possible war expressed by Asad, his strong opposition against a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, and Asad's strong desire that something be achieved in the Sinai and the Golan more or less simultaneously.

"I explained at some length the conceptual approach of the Egyptians to the next-stage agreement, as described to us by Minister of Defense Gamasy. I described the specific Egyptian thinking, all of which would involve from their point of view an Egyptian defense line east of the strategic passes. I informed the Israelis that I had made clear to Sadat that such a substantial withdrawal was out of the question as far as Israel was concerned, and Rabin of course confirmed this fact during our talk.

"Rabin outlined the principal seven considerations from Israel's point of view, emphasizing two that were particularly key.

"(A) An Egyptian commitment not to make war against Israel; and

"(B) the importance attached to the duration of the agreement, including continued insistence that there must be an Egyptian assurance that the UN force could not be removed except by affirmative Security Council action.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NADA, DATE 9/24/03


"The key statement which was underscored by Rabin and Allon is, to put it in their words: Israel wants an interim agreement, and it also leaves open the option to pursue a Syrian negotiation on a permanent peace.

"As you can imagine, the Israelis cast all sorts of doubts and threw up all sorts of hurdles on specific issues and points, but on the whole their posture and mood is positive, and they seemed to be ready to discuss matters seriously.

"I left it that I would return to Israel Tuesday evening for a further meeting. This will give Rabin and his colleagues 24 hours to reflect on what I have reported, to discuss my report with the Cabinet, and hopefully to come up with some concrete counterproposals which would not be intended as a final Israeli position but be sufficient to keep the negotiations moving. I urged that they be as generous as possible in the belief that this would have a favorable psychological impact on Sadat and in the long run possibly make him more favorably disposed to meet Israel's principal needs. I am trying to get the Israelis to adopt a strategy which is entirely different and new for them: rather than stick rigidly to point after point, that they make a generous counterproposal which could convince Sadat of their seriousness. It will be interesting to see what they come up with for us to consider on Tuesday evening.

"In short, I think the process is going just about as one might expect at this stage.

"I now take a 24-hour break from the Arab-Israeli dispute to see whether I can encourage the Turks to take some step that will help get a meaningful negotiation restarted."





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