

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATIONS

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY ISHIWATA, Setaro

ADDRESS Liaison Office

TOJO was President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association from October, 1941, to July, 1944.

KOISO was President from July, 1944, to April, 1945. (16 March, page 3)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 257

SERIAL _____

PAGE 3

NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Hyder

NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Hyder

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY OHADA, Keisuke

ADDRESS Liaison Office

In the summer of 1943 the former Premiers decided that Japan should terminate the war and decided to talk to TOJO. Such a meeting was held but TOJO had the full cabinet with him preventing the discussion of such a delicate question. He was asked to appear alone again and he did in 1944. The former Premiers suggested that TOJO must terminate the war but their advice was to no avail.

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 278 SERIAL _____ PAGE _____
NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Ryder _____
NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Ryder _____

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY OKADA, Keisuke

ADDRESS Liaison Office

On November 29, 1941, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Premier TOJO summoned all former Premiers to the palace. They came and in addition TOJO, H., TCGO, S., AOKI, General NUFO, A., Admiral OIKAWA, K., and SUZUKI, T., were present. At this gathering TOJO spoke to the effect that America had imposed on Japan an economic embargo; their economic supplies were running low endangering the security of the country. "It is high time to make up our minds." All former Premiers were against going to war except possibly HAYASHI and ABE (two generals) who were of the opinion that perhaps it was unavoidable that Japan went to war. OKADA stressed the point that if ordered to war Japan should conserve the resources that it cannot hope to replenish if they did not find resources in the war. After a lunch in the palace the Emperor asked for the opinion of the former Premiers. When invited by the Emperor, almost every former Premier replied that it was almost impossible to go to war. The Emperor looked grave and most concerned. OKADA saw that TOJO was fully armed to risk war. He stated that the former Premiers were afraid to conflict with the army because the army would take the matter into their own hands. (26 February, page 4-5)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 278 SERIAL _____ PAGE 4-5
NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Hyder _____
NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Hyder _____

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

ADDRESS Liaison Office

The answers and replies to the Swiss requests and protests were decided upon by the Information Bureau in the War Ministry and transmitted through the Foreign Office. Regulations gave that Information Bureau jurisdiction to make the decision as to the reply. (19 March, page 7)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 407 SERIAL _____ PAGE 7
NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Hyder _____
NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Hyder _____

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

ADDRESS Liaison Office

From 1941 to 1945 the responsibility for the maltreatment of prisoners of war rested on the War Minister. (20 March, page 3)

SHIGEMITSU, as Foreign Minister, informed Premiers TOJO and KOISO of the protests and requests of the Swiss Minister relative to prisoners of war. The two Premiers told SHIGEMITSU that prisoners of war were properly treated. (20 March, page 3)

The policy as to the treatment of the prisoners of war was decided upon in the cabinet but how to exercise it was military domain. The cabinet could not step into it. This was by custom and legal. (20 March, page 5)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 107 SERIAL _____ PAGE 3.5
NAME OF INTERROGATOR E. M. Hyder _____
NAME OF WRITER E. M. Hyder _____

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY WAKATSUKI, Reijiro, Baron

ADDRESS Liaison Office

WAKATSUKI stated that on the 9th of August, 1945, the cabinet had decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and on the 9th also former Premiers HIRANUMA, OKADA, KONOYE, KOISO, TOJO, and WAKATSUKI met and were informed by the Prime Minister of the cabinet's decision. This meeting was called by the Premier. On the 10th of August the Emperor called a meeting and Premiers OKADA, HIRANUMA, KOISO, TOJO, and WAKATSUKI were present. In this meeting in the presence of the Emperor they decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration. (28 February, page 2,3)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 275 SERIAL _____ PAGE 2-3
NAME OF INTERROGATOR John Barry _____
NAME OF BRIEFER K. M. Hyder _____

FORM 2

SUBJECT TOJO, Hideki

FILE NO. _____

SUMMARY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS

MADE BY WAKATSUKI, Reijira, Baron

ADDRESS Liaison Office

WAKATSUKI attended the meeting of former Premiers on December 5th or 6th, 1941 (November 29th, 1941). He stated that TOJO (Premier), Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro (Navy Minister), KAYA (Finance Minister), and SUZUKI (President of Planning Board), OKADA, KONOYE, HIRATA, YONAI, HIRANUMA, ABE (former Premiers) and the President of the Privy Council were present. (28 February, page 2)

SUMMARY EXTRACTED FROM FILE 275 SERIAL _____ PAGE 2
NAME OF INTERROGATOR John Barry
NAME OF BRIEFER E. M. Hyder

INTERROGATIONS

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

ROUGH DRAFT

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 19 March 1946, 1400-1630 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Tojo, Fihelly, Maxon, Mills

Questions by : Fihelly.

- - - -

Q Yesterday you referred to the "Four-Minister" and "Five-Minister" meetings. What ministers constituted each of these?

A I was not a Cabinet Minister then, but, from what I have heard, the "Four-Minister" Conference was composed of the Premier, the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers, and the "Five-Minister" Conference included these, with the addition of the Finance Minister. I think it is important to mention why it was that the "Four" and "Five-Minister" Conferences became or grew into the Liaison Conference.

Q Yes, please explain. We have some information, but we would be glad to have any additional information you can give us.

A The Chiefs of Staff were not represented at the "Four-Minister" or "Five-Minister" Conferences. When problems arose from the over-lapping spheres of authority between the cabinet and the Supreme Command, the views of the Supreme Command had to be transmitted to the "Four" or "Five-Minister" Conferences via the War Minister or the Navy Minister and, as time went on, particularly after the China Incident started and after Imperial Headquarters was set up in 1937, the Chiefs of Staff had to have closer relations with the government for carrying on military operations and because of the situation abroad. Therefore, this method of working through the War and Navy Ministers was not so satisfactory and the Liaison Conferences were begun on which the Chiefs of Staff would be directly represented. The civil sphere of authority, of

course, was handled by the cabinet and not by the Chiefs of Staff. This business of the adjustment /chōsei/, as between the Supreme Command and the civil government, was always very difficult. The "Four" and "Five-Minister" Conferences were not too successful and they were replaced by the Liaison Conferences, but even the Liaison Conferences were not wholly without difficulties. When KOISO became Prime Minister, the Liaison Conferences were replaced by a Conference for the Supreme Direction of the War /Saikō Shidō Kaigi/. This, however, was a change in name rather than in form. When this did not work any too well, the Premier began attending Imperial Headquarters Conferences /Dihon-ei Kaigi/, but without participating in strategic or tactical matters. Even this latter was not too successful, since the Premier had nothing to say about strategy or tactics. However, you may say that these four steps, to wit: the "Four-" and "Five-Minister" Conferences, the Liaison Conferences, the Conferences for the Supreme Direction of the War, and the Imperial Headquarters Conferences, attended by the Premier, were four steps of the attempt to solve this problem of the over-lapping spheres of authority. With regard to the over-lapping spheres, there was a certain amount of success, but the political forces, that is to say, the political power, of the cabinet, could not control the pure command sphere of authority of the Supreme Command. I am not saying that the independence of the Supreme Command is a bad thing. There are some good points about it too, for example, being able to conduct operations without political interference. It was a good thing in 1890, when the Constitution was established, for the High Command to be untrammled, but in these days where the influence of a single action is felt around the world, a certain amount of control by the political authority is necessary.

However, under the Japanese system, it was impossible. /The preceding portion of this answer was read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./

There was one important point that I would like to make clear. I have been talking about difficult problems of the Japanese Government system and of the independence of the Supreme Command. However, the foreign problems arising from the actions of the Supreme Command, I am responsible for.

Q So that the independence of the Supreme Command was good from a military standpoint but not good from a political or civil standpoint?

A The independence of the Supreme Command is good from a military point of view only if fighting were the only thing to be considered, but fighting today is also a part of politics. From the political point of view, under modern conditions, the independence of the Supreme Command requires consideration. I believe that under modern conditions, war is a part of politics - they are not separate any more.

Q Do you realize that the position in which Japan finds herself today was due greatly to the independence of the Supreme Command?

A To speak plainly - - that is a big cause. In fact, it is, but in the trials, I don't want to emphasize that too much. What I do want to plead is that we, as subjects, I and the Chiefs of Staff, did not discharge our responsibilities to the Emperor. It is not the Emperor's responsibility. The civil ministers ought to have understood the ~~extreme~~ problems of command and the Chiefs of Staff, the civil problems and to have cooperated to have discharged their responsibilities to the Emperor.

Q In what respects did you and the Chiefs of Staff not fulfill your responsibilities to the Emperor?

Men use systems; men should not be used by systems /Hito go seido wo tsukau seido ni hito ga tsukawa reruni arazu./ This is an important principle. If I and the other men had fully understood this, the Supreme Command should have taken account of the political aspect of things and adjusted military operations accordingly. We should have risen above the system in which we found ourselves, but we did not. It was the men who were at fault. /Read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./

Q To whom do you refer when you say "we"?

A I mean myself and the two Chiefs of Staff, especially myself.

Q When did you first come to realize the truth of this situation that you have just explained?

A From the time I became Prime Minister I have felt it poitnantly, and I imagine that not only I but all Prime Ministers have felt the same.

Q According to the information we now have, both MATSUOKA and KONOYE used the phrase, "GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere" as early as 1938 to 1940. Are you not aware of this fact?

A They used the words, but the idea was different. Just as I have said. They used it to refer to Japan, Manchuria, and China. The scope was different. The scope was limited to Japan, Manchuria, and China, but, after the GEA War, the scope of the GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere was definitely ~~demarcated~~ demarcated. I can't find it here /referring to his little book/. It is a question of what other people said and not what I said, but I dare say, they did say it. However, I think it was with the meaning that I have explained before.

Q The 2nd KONOYE Cabinet came into power in July 1940. A part of its announced policy was the creation of a New Order in East Asia. Is it not true that shortly thereafter, representatives of Japan and representatives of Germany discussed in detail this New Order in East Asia?

You mean in Japan or Germany?

Either or both places.

A I don't know about the detail, but I dare say they discussed it. It was the Foreign Minister's business. The treaty aspects of it were under consideration, I imagine.

Q Were not reports made to that effect to the cabinet in which you were War Minister at that time?

A I dare say, since it is reasonable to suppose so, but I don't remember such small details as that. I don't remember definitely whether it was reported or not, but it seems natural enough.

Q Were there not discussions held here in Tokyo prior to 27 September 1940 with regard to the New Order in East Asia and other provisions of the Pact?

A The Foreign Minister and STAHRER were talking, but I don't like to say that they were talking about this or that when I was not concerned. This was the Foreign Minister's business.

Q Do you not remember that the Foreign Minister - wasn't it MATSUOKA - reported to the cabinet on the progress of these negotiations?

A MATSUOKA was Foreign Minister, but I don't remember that he made a series of reports.

Q MATSUOKA was in Tokyo just prior to the signing of the Three-Power Pact, was he not?

A I think so.

Q Do you remember that he made any report to the cabinet on this matter?

A I do remember that STAHRER came from Shanghai and that, after a short period of conferences with MATSUOKA, the Three-Power Pact was signed. The discussions had been going on prior to that as to whether Japan should sign the Pact or not, but the actual putting through of the thing was done in a matter of a few days.

STAHMER came to Tokyo as VON RIBBENTROP's representative for that particular purpose, did he not?

A I think so - yes.

Q What was the nature of the discussions before this, and where had they been going on?

A I don't remember clearly, but I think that the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers met a number of times on the problem and were informed by the Foreign Minister as to the status of the talks, but I don't remember that the cabinet was so informed.

Q What do you remember that you, as War Minister, learned from these meetings, particularly in regard to Japan's desire for a New Order in East Asia?

A I don't remember.

Q If anything had been said at these meetings to the effect that Japan would not get the cooperation of Germany in setting up a New Order in East Asia, you would have remembered it, would you not?

A There was no such thing as that, I think.

- - - -

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

ROUGH DRAFT

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 7 February 1946, 1300-1530 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Mazon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly.

- - - - -

Q.: You said yesterday that you only remember the Emperor having spoken once during any Imperial conference. What one was that and what did the Emperor say?

A.: It was either the one in July or the one in September. The one in September, I believe. It was at the September 6 conference, I believe. Japanese-American relations at that time had become very grim. The important question was that of war or peace and on this there was a difference of opinion. On the one hand, some believed that every attempt should be made by diplomatic means without war to effect a change in the diplomatic deadlock between Japan and America. On the other hand, there were those who thought that such a solution was impossible and, hence, favored war. There were various opinions expressed by those present, after which the Emperor's final words were to the effect that everything possible should be done to effect a settlement by diplomacy and to avoid war. This was not just the Emperor's opinion on that occasion. He always felt so. I had many occasions to report to the Throne on military matters and he always had that opinion. After the draft of the Declaration of War had been prepared by the cabinet, I took it to the Emperor (on the 5th or 6th of December, 1941, I believe it was), and he himself,

in reference to the opening of hostilities with America and Britain, added this phrase, "It is our purpose to go to war with America, but it is unavoidable". (Interpreter; Please insert Japanese text.) That was the first time in my experience that the Emperor had inserted something like that with his own hand.

Q.: This is a rather important matter. Are you sure you do not remember the day when you reported to the Emperor on this matter?

A.: I really do not remember exactly, since I did not keep a diary or anything. The Grand Chamberlain or the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, however, might have a record of the interview.

Q.: You remember the 8th, of course. That was the first day of the war. Don't you remember what you did on the 7th and the 6th?

A.: I don't remember clearly the day that I presented the draft to the Emperor. However, the draft went from the Emperor to the Privy Council at the latest on the evening of the 7th and, on the morning of the 8th, the Privy Council approved it and sent it back to the Emperor who, in turn, sent it to the cabinet. It was released by the cabinet to the press at about 11:30 or 12:00 the day of the 8th, I believe.

Q.: Were the newspapers allowed to publish it at once, or were they asked to hold publication for awhile?

A.: I don't know. All I was referring to was the time. It is my recollection that they were called to the cabinet between 11:30 and 12:00 of that day. As to just when they were given the story, I do not know as these are matters of procedure. The people who would know are the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. HOSHINO, or the President of the Cabinet Information Board, Mr. AMAO.

Q.: But you do know that the information was not printed until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A.: No, I don't know that. These are procedural matters for which I was not responsible and I cannot answer them. I do not want to give wild answers about matters for which I was not responsible.

Q.: So that it was several hours after the attack had taken place that the Japanese people learned of the Pearl Harbor attack?

A.: Yes, I think so - 4 or 5 hours afterwards perhaps.

Q.: Then it is your opinion that the Emperor should not be tried in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor and American possessions and practically simultaneous attack on British possessions?

A.: As a Japanese citizen, I would not like to see the Emperor tried.

Q.: Are you not the responsible person who ~~must~~ should be charged and tried in that connection?

A.: Yes, it is very appropriate, but I cannot stand to think of the Emperor's being tried. Not only my feelings are so, but the Japanese people would be distressed if the Emperor were tried. I am the chiefly responsible one from the standpoint of the Ministers of State / kokum / . From the standpoint of prerogative of command / ~~sh~~ ^o tsu sui / , the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff are responsible. The other Cabinet Ministers are responsible to a lesser degree than I.

Q.: You said that the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff were responsible. Does that mean that they are also responsible?

A.: I did not mean to act as an informer in saying that they were responsible. I was speaking from the standpoint of Japanese constitutional structure. Under the Japanese Constitution, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff are responsible solely to the Emperor in matters of strategy and evaluation of the probable gains or losses from warfare. The Ministers of

State, that is to say, the Premier and the Cabinet Members, are responsible to the Emperor for other governmental functions. The Ministers of State have no right to interfere with the conduct of military affairs nor have the Chiefs of Staff the right to interfere in civil matters.

Q.: Then you mean that it is the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff to advise the Emperor on the probable beneficial or ill-effects of war?

A.: Yes. This is an important point about the prerogative of the command. In America it is a function of the civil government. In Japan, you might say that the two spheres of military command and civil government over-lap. Matters of purely military importance are no function of the civil government; matters of purely civil importance are no function of the military command. However, the over-lapping area, which includes such matters as foreign policy and decisions to go to war for example, presents problems which in practice are taken up by the liaison conference /renraku kaigi /. For example, the strategic war plans are a matter of pure strategy and were not known to the Cabinet Members. I did not even know them myself.

Q.: You mean that as Premier you did not even know what the war plan was?

A.: In my character as Premier, I did not. However, I was concurrently Home Minister and War Minister and also a member of Imperial Headquarters and also a War Councillor /iaku ni sankaku /. In these latter three capacities, I received military reports of plan of operations. These were forwarded by the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, by the war plan, which I referred to a moment ago, I mean Army war plan. I did not know anything about the Navy war plan. However, the fact that I received reports did not mean that I had the right to interfere or participate in matters involving command. These were the sole prerogative of the Chief of Staff.

Q-: You said that at the beginning of the war, you knew nothing about the Navy war plan. Do you mean that you knew nothing about the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A-: Well, I knew the date. That was a matter of importance from the standpoint of foreign relations, for example, and as Prime Minister, I knew that, but as for the details of the Navy's campaign throughout the war, I did not know them. Since the war has come to an end, I have read in the newspapers for the first time about Japanese fleet movements and the like. I am not trying by this explanation to avoid political responsibility but am only explaining these things in order to make clear the Japanese system of government organization.

Q-: By the fleet movements that you read of in the press to which you referred a moment ago, do you mean movements relating to the Pearl Harbor attack or movements that took place during the course of the war?

A-: I am referring to the dispositions of naval forces previous to the attack. I learned about these things for the first time by reading about them in the newspapers since the end of the war. You need not put that in the record if you don't want to.

Q-: Did the Navy inform the Army of its war plans and did the Army inform the Navy of its war plans?

A-: As Premier, I did not see the Navy war plans or get reports upon Naval matters. As to whether the Navy Chief of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff consulted each other with regard to war plans, I was not responsible and cannot say.

Q-: We have asked you various questions regarding responsibility in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor and on American possessions. Were the responsibilities the same in relation to the attack made on British possessions which was made on or about the time of the American attack?

A.: Yes, they were.

Q.: So that you realize that you are the one primarily responsible for the December 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor and American and British possessions?

A.: Yes, I am responsible.

Q.: And the other parties whom you have mentioned are responsible, along with you, for those attacks?

A.: From the standpoint of assistance to the Throne /hō shitsu /, the Cabinet is jointly responsible and, hence, the other Cabinet Members bear responsibility; however, I, as Senior Member, am the one chiefly responsible. The Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff also bear responsibility.

Q.: You realize, do you not, that you and these other responsible officials will probably be charged and tried as war criminals as being the parties responsible for the aforementioned attacks on American and British possessions?

A.: I have not yet received the indictment so I do not know for what reasons I am to be tried. You are the representatives of the victorious nation and I am the representative of the defeated nation, and I know that I am suspected of being a war criminal. However, I have not yet received the indictment.

Q.: Actually, no one has been indicted yet in connection with the matters on which we have been interrogating you. It is true that some people have been charged by military courts martial in connection with atrocities.

A.: I realize that at the present time I am a war crimes suspect, but I understand that you are investigating the facts. I do not know for sure that I will be charged until I receive an indictment. Regardless of whether the present investigation results in the finding of my guilt or innocence as a war criminal, I am the person bearing chief political responsibility.

Q.: During the various interrogations to date, you have received fair treatment from us, have you not?

A.: Yes. I appreciate very fully that I have.

Q.: If you should be charged, as a result of this investigation, in any trial in which the American Government would participate, you would expect to receive the same fair treatment, would you not?

A.: Yes. I would like to say one thing. Here I have access to no documents or records or papers at all. Hence, there are many things which I ought to know which I do not know because I have to depend solely on my memory and therefore there are probably a certain number of mistakes in things I have said.

Q.: If there are any documents we can get to assist you, we will be glad to do so, but we want only your best recollection.

A.: I had a tremendous amount of work, you see. If I were confronted with a record or document and could examine it, I can say yes it was so, or no this was not so, but when I must depend only on my memory, it is very difficult.

- - -

Chair Maxon; Please write in the last-minute info he gave you re notes on Imperial conferences being available from the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet; also that there are records of the Imperial conferences in the Palace.