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INTERROGATION OF

General (Baron) Sadao Araki

Date and Time: 22 January 1946, 0145-1620 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General (Baron) Sadao Araki  
Mr. Edward M. Dell, Interrogator  
Mr. Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter  
Miss Jewel E. Newman, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Dell

Oath given to interpreter by Mr. Dell

"Do you solemnly swear (affirm), by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding."

- Q. General, this morning you told us that in an attempt to secure cooperation between the Cabinet and the Cabinet Advisory Council Premier Konoye appointed General Ugaki a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council as Foreign Minister. Is that correct?
- A. I think that was his reason--that by bringing General Ugaki in as Foreign Minister, General Ugaki, a member of the Cabinet Council, would have the same views as Prince Konoye and, as Foreign Minister, would be able to carry out policies that Prince Konoye favored. This is my own view. The Advisory Council having become worthless, perhaps the object was to form a nucleus in the Cabinet of council members who could cooperate and carry out the policies originally favored by the Council.
- Q. After General Ugaki's appointment as Foreign Minister did he accept advice from the Council?
- A. No.
- Q. Can you tell us why General Ugaki, who had formerly as a member of the Council been opposed to the spread of the China incident, did not accept advice or cooperate with the Council after he became Foreign Minister?
- A. I think that Yonai and some others were still members of the Cabinet and the view generally was that the Advisory Council was not to be taken seriously and, as stated before, it was merely an ornament.

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- Q. Who were the others to whom you refer in addition to Yonai?
- A. The only ministers that were changed were the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Finance Ministry, the Commerce, and Education. All the previous ministers remained at their posts and held the same views.
- Q. General, you referred to Yonai, the Navy Minister, and some others in the Cabinet. Will you give us names of the persons whom you refer to as some others?
- A. The others in the Cabinet were Navy, Admiral Yonai; Army, General Itagaki; Finance, Ideda; Foreign Office, Ugaki; Education, (later Naval Minister) Kido; Justice, Shiono; Home Minister, Admiral Suetsugu; Agriculture, Arima; I do not remember the Railway Minister. Perhaps it was Nakajima. I do not remember the Communications Minister.
- Q. General, are the names you have just furnished the names of the members of the Cabinet or the names of the persons which I have requested in my previous question?
- A. Prince Konoye formed the Cabinet Advisory Council against the wish of Admiral Yonai; as a result it was difficult to obtain cooperation between the two offices. And I believe that the others merely followed Yonai's leadership in this matter.
- Q. Well, then, General, please tell us what you meant when you said "and others" when you used that phrase in connection with Yonai.
- A. With the exception of Generals Itagaki, Ugaki and myself and Mr. Ideda "the others" referred to the balance of the names in the Cabinet.
- Q. Are those the persons you meant when you said "Admiral Yonai and others"? Please name the ones you mean and not the exceptions.
- A. The names are Shiono, Arima, Nakajima, Kido, Suetsugu and one other whose name I do not remember.
- Q. Now those five persons you have just named and Admiral Yonai, all of whom were members of the first Konoye Cabinet, did not permit General Ugaki after he became Foreign Minister to receive advice and cooperate with the Cabinet Council, is that correct?
- A. General Ugaki could, on his own responsibility, have requested cooperation from the Advisory Council; also advice had he so desired, but, as stated before, the Council was not an influential body and there seemed to be no desire on the part of the Cabinet members to refer matters to the Advisory Council.

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- Q. You also said before, General, that the Council was not an influential body because of opposition to it in the Cabinet. Are these the persons, Yonai, Shiono, Arima, Nakajima, Kido, and Suetsugu, who provided the opposition in the Cabinet after General Ugaki became Foreign Minister?
- A. The word "opposed" was used unfortunately. The opposition came originally on the establishment of the Cabinet Council and to the best of my knowledge there was no opposition afterwards. It was just a case of non-recognition of the Advisory Council.
- Q. You have told us, General, that the Cabinet Advisory Council generally believed in limiting the spread of the China incident. Were not the Ministers, Shiono, Arima, Nakajima, Kido, Suetsugu, and Yonai opposed to the Cabinet Advisory Council because they were opposed to its position and opinion with reference to the China incident?
- A. Definitely, no. The view was merely that it was necessary to refer matters to the Cabinet Advisory Council.
- Q. General, will you give us the names of the members of the Cabinet who differed with the Cabinet Advisory Council in the matter of the China incident and how it should be handled?
- A. I am not acquainted with the views of the individual members. I believe actually that Yonai's ideas on the China incident were the same as the Cabinet Council and Yonai's only objection was to the formation of the Council. I do not think that Cabinet members, aside from Army, Navy, Foreign Office, Finance Office, and the Prime Minister, concerned themselves with the China incident.
- Q. Can you explain why the Cabinet Council, which was formed to advise and confer with the Cabinet, did not resign when the creation of the Council was so strenuously opposed by the Cabinet?
- A. This was established by Prince Konoye and he was responsible for the continuation of the Cabinet Council as an organization. Prince Konoye's main idea in forming this Cabinet Council was to have it as a balancing factor against the Cabinet which was considered responsible for the China incident and with a view to reforming the Cabinet members of the new Cabinet were taken from the Cabinet Council. I think that Prince Konoye must have conferred with the Emperor and, desiring to settle the China incident as soon as possible, the Cabinet Council was composed of influential Japanese.

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- Q. And was the selection of General Ugaki as Foreign Minister in May 1938 an effort on the part of Prince Konoye to transfer to the Cabinet a member of the Cabinet Council who wished to end the China incident?
- A. I think so.
- Q. Do you think that at that time Prince Konoye was still of the opinion that the China incident should be ended and limited as much as possible?
- A. Rather than limiting it Prince Konoye favored the settlement of the China incident.
- Q. Do you remember the announcement of Prince Konoye, which he made in August 1937, in which he stated that a policy of punishing China had been substituted for that of seeking cooperation and that no third power would be allowed to intervene?
- A. I do not remember this. I was not in office.
- Q. You were on the Cabinet Council, were you not?
- A. I became a member of the Cabinet Council in October or November.
- Q. And you became a member of the Cabinet Council at the request of Prince Konoye to advise the Cabinet and you were not aware of an important statement by the Premier which I have quoted and which was made only two months previous thereto?
- A. I do not remember the speech. I was practically in retirement at the time. It was only upon the arrival of a messenger from Prince Konoye requesting me to join the Cabinet Advisory Cabinet that I left retirement.
- Q. Did you inform yourself as to the Premier's stand on the China incident when you considered membership in the Cabinet Advisory Council?
- A. I believed that Prince Konoye desired to settle the China incident as soon as possible--not to expand hostilities. I had heard this from Prince Konoye himself on several occasions.
- Q. Was that not inconsistent with Konoye's announcement of August 1937?
- A. The two cannot be reconciled. I consider Prince Konoye somewhat weak willed and easily led by people around him. And perhaps he was pressed by the Military.
- Q. Who in the Military.
- A. I do not think any one individual but a group which the War Ministry was not able to control. I can think of no names.

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This group was the younger element or younger officers most of whom had the rank of Colonel down to Major.

- Q. Would it not be necessary for this younger element or group to have representatives in the Cabinet or the General Staff in order to influence the Premier, Prince KONOYE?
- A. I blame all this on the weakness and inefficiency of the War and Navy Ministers. If these Ministers had been able officials they would have been able to control the younger element. Actually, I think the War and Navy Ministers were controlled by the younger element.
- Q. And through the War and Navy Ministers the younger element influenced the Premier?
- A. Naturally, of course.
- Q. Will you name those War and Navy Ministers for me?
- A. First, General SUGIYAMA, later General ITAGAKI for the War Office, and Admiral YONAI for the Navy. I point out that War and Navy Ministers have to be appointed from the active service and if the Premier had been strong enough he could have insisted on efficient ministers instead of accepting the ministers proposed by the Army and the Navy. His final resort could have been the Emperor. I, myself, have always advocated the appointment of strong, forceful ministers to control the younger elements and I believe General ITAGAKI also held the same view but found he was powerless to do as he wished.
- Q. Who held General ITAGAKI powerless?
- A. I don't think there was any individual that held down General ITAGAKI but I consider that ITAGAKI was very easily persuaded and became the tool of the younger officers.
- Q. And as the tool of the younger officers he influenced the Premier?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you recall the Chang-Ku-Feng affair which occurred on the border between Manchuria and Russia in July 1938?
- A. Yes, I recall it.
- Q. Do you recall that during the Chang-Ku-Feng affair, or incident, you gave an interview to the Berliner TAGESBLATT in which you said that Japan is not afraid to fight on two fronts if the Soviets continue provocative?

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- A. I have met newspaper men from various nations and I do not remember just which one but I think that perhaps I did meet this person.
- Q. This interview appeared in the Japanese press; do you recall reading about it there?
- A. I do not remember having seen that.
- Q. Do you remember making that statement?
- A. I do not remember exactly what I said but I point out that newspaper men are prone to change words and sentences to suit themselves but as a military man I point out that I, myself, would have no desire to fight on two fronts unless attacked.
- Q. In August of 1938 did you, as a military man, believe that Japan was militarily prepared to fight on the two fronts that you referred to?
- A. I am not acquainted with the preparations made by the Army in 1938. I had retired from the position of War Minister. I was only a member of the High Military Council which was only an advisory council, but my opinion is that preparations were not complete when I was War Minister.
- Q. As a member of the High Military Council what were your duties and functions?
- A. Important questions were referred to me for advice and counsel only when requested.
- Q. In order to give advice on important questions would it not be necessary to have reliable information on the military strength of this country?
- A. Yes, but there were no such requests or meetings while I was a member. This was during General HAYASHI'S tenure of office as War Minister and, owing to complications in the War Ministry, there was no time for meetings of the High Military Council.
- Q. It was also during a critical period in the China War, was it not?
- A. I do not think it was so critical in 1938. It certainly was not good.
- Q. And do you want us to understand that as a member of the High Military Council in that period you were not informed and aware of the military preparedness and strength of Japan in Manchuria?
- A. I was not in the Military Council in 1938. I was Education Minister.

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Q. So that we may understand your statement I want to ask you whether you deny or admit that you made that statement attributed to you in August 1938?

A. I have met so many newspaper people that I do not remember having made any certain statement to any certain specified newspaper.

Q. Let us disregard the newspaper. The statement is an unusual statement whether true or false and I would like to know whether you made such a statement in August of 1938 to any newspaper or if you deny that you made such a statement.

A. I do not remember exactly all the statements that I made but I point out again that it is elementary strategy not to wish to fight on two fronts but if attacked I would fight on two, or even three, fronts, so that it is not impossible that I made some such statement.

Q. I am not prepared to discuss military strategy with you, I am merely interested in this statement if it was made and in knowing whether you admit or deny it.

A. I cannot certainly remember.

Even while I was War Minister I was always fighting for reform in the War Ministry. I always believed that a strong ministry was a necessity and I fought tooth and nail for this. I have often been accused of being an aggressive man but I would like to point out my belief that if any war is fought it should be a righteous one and any war in which blood is shed is a mistake. I was an observer in World War I and I know warfare well. In my fifty years as a military man my sword has never drawn blood. My views did not coincide generally with views held by military men here. I consider that instead of using poison gas sleeping gas should be used. When I was on the General Staff I gave instructions that some thought should be given to this phase of warfare. These have been my ideas unchanged for a long while.

Q. You speak of a righteous war; I would like to ask you at this point whether you consider the Chinese incident a righteous war on the part of Japan?

A. I did not start the war nor prosecute the war and I do not approve of a war of that description and have stated that view in public very often. As an individual I regretted the dissolution of the Japanese - English Treaty after the London Conference.



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- Q. Do you have reference to the London-Naval Arms Limitation?  
A. It was before that.
- Q. Is your disapproval and regret over the China War based upon a belief that the China War was not a righteous one on the part of Japan?  
A. If it were my own responsibility I would be willing to pass judgment but I am not so well acquainted with the causes but I think it was a regrettable war. If I had been in a position of responsibility the war would not have happened.
- Q. I would like to direct your attention to a period about July 1938 and ask you if you recall the delegation of Japanese youths who went to Germany as guests of the Hitler youth?  
A. I remember that because at that time I was Education Minister and the proposal was advanced.
- Q. And that delegation did require your approval and come under your jurisdiction as an Education Minister, did it not?  
A. When I became Education Minister the party was already on its way; the matter had been decided before my appointment. The Hitler Youth Group arrived at Japan when I was Education Minister. In meeting the Hitler Youth Group I pointed out the difference between Japan and Germany and stressed the fact that they should not forget this difference.
- Q. You are referring now to an address which was made to the delegation of Hitler Youth which visited Japan simultaneously with the visit of the Japanese Youth to the Hitler Youth? Would you like to make a statement or tell us anything about the purpose of those exchange visits?  
A. The purpose of the visit was decided before I became Minister and I am not well acquainted with this but I think that it resulted from the treaty between Germany and Japan.
- Q. To which treaty do you refer?  
A. I think it is the anti-Comintern pact. Perhaps it was an exchange of cultural groups.
- Q. Do you consider the Hitler Youth a Cultural Movement?  
A. I think that it was a sort of cultural exchange as the Education Minister was concerned in it, but so far as the Hitler Youth Group was concerned they were merely on a sightseeing tour of Japan. To me it was more like children playing than anything else; a gesture.

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- Q. Of course you know that the Hitler Youth even if they are children playing, play rough?
- A. I think it was just an idea somebody had and as a result two sightseeing parties left, one from Japan and one from Germany.
- Q. Are you aware that the Hitler Youth were well indoctrinated in the principles of fascism?
- A. I think they must have been because they were called Hitler Youth.
- Q. And according to you the arrangements for this exchange of delegations was made during the tenure of your predecessor in the Education Ministry who was Koichi KIDO?
- A. There were several changes there and I am not quite sure but perhaps it was KIDO. I do not know for certain but I think it was KIDO.

WITNESS DISMISSED AT 1620 HOURS

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Denis Kildeyle, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of eight and one-half pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Interpreter's Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 194\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)  
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

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Certificate of Stenographer

I, Jewel E. Newman, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Stenographer's signature)

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Certificate of Interrogator

I, Edward M. Dell, certify that on 22nd day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me General Sadao ARAKI, and according to Denis Kildoyle, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Place)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2341-2353, inclusive

2 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Transcripts of Interrogations of  
General ARAKI, Sadao

Date: (See Below) Original  Copy  Language:  
English

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao, et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression, Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Interrogations of ARAKI have been assigned following  
document numbers: (All are from Document Division Exh.290)

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2341	5 Feb 46
2342	18 Jan 46
2343	19 Jan 46
2344	22 Jan 46 (A.M.)
2345	22 Jan 46 (P.M.)
2346	6 Feb 46
2347	12 Feb 46
2348	14 Feb 46
2349	15 Feb 46
2350	18 Feb 46
2351	20 Feb 46
2352	23 Feb 46
2353	25 Feb 46

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2341-  
2353,  
inclusive.