
	-	r	14	C	D	A	
١.	G	C	14	E	N	M	L

II. OW	N AIRCRA		ALLY COVE			ORT.			f Return 1710	
TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	TAKING OFF	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)			(PER PLANE)		FUZE, SET	TING
11-2	VC-84	1 .	0	1	(6) H	Rocke	ts Mk 1	body.	Nose - none	
									3	
111 0	THER U. S.	OR ALLIED	AIRCRAFT	EMPLOYE	D IN TH	IIS OPERA	ATION.		•	
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE		TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	-
FM-2	VC-76 VC-81	4	USS PETR USS NATO	OF BAY						
IV. EN	NEMY AIRC	RAFT OBSE	RVED OR E	NGAGED (By Own	Aircraft I	isted in 11	Only).	00.9	· · · ·
(a) TYPE	(b)	NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d)_		(e) ATION OF COUNTER		BOMBS, TORPE GUNS C	DOES CARRIED	CAMOU MA	IFLAGE AND ARKING
			(ZON	E)						
			(ZON	(E)						
			(ZO:	(E)						
(h) Appare	ent Enemy N	lission(s)	t /							
				If so Desc	cribe Clo	uds			IND TENTUS OF COV	/ED\
Did An	stor(c) Occi	II III Clouds:	(YES OR NO)	_ 11 30, 200	0,,00	-	(BASE I		and TENTHS OF COV	LK)
Time o	f Day and Br	illiance						(k) Vis	11 /11 1 V	
(j) of Sun	f Day and Br or Moon	illiance	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	ST; ETC.)	Aircraft Li		, (N	MILES)
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	ST; ETC.)	Aircraft Li	sted in 11 (Only).	(d) DAMAGE
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	ST; ETC.)		sted in 11 (Only).	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAGE CLAIMED
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAGI CLAIMEI
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own		sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAG CLAIME
(j) of Sun V. EN	or Moon NEMY AIRC (b) DESTRO	RAFT DEST	(NIGHT, BRIC	HT MOON; DA	Y, OVERCA	(By Own	USED	sted in 11 (Only).	DAMAG CLAIME



NA/C	(b) SQUADRON	CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
70.7				

TYPE OWN A/C	SQUADRON	TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1	Y			
2				
3				
4				
5				
6		•		
7				
8				
9				
0	-			
1				
2				
3				•
4				


	VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).										
(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS							
		•									
				•							
		,									
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·								


VIII.	RANGE,	FUEL, AN	D AMMUN	TION DAT	A FOR PLAN	VES RET	URNING			
(a) TYPE	(b) MILES	(c) MILES	(d) AV. HOURS	(e) AV. FUEL	(f) AV. FUEL	(g) TOTAL AMMU	INITION EXPEN	NDED	(h)
A/C	OUT	RETURN	IN AIR	LOADED	CONSUMED	.30	.50	20MM	MM	NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
FM-2	84	36	4.7	232	210		1550			1
5,										

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	x .			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm				
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm	**		•	

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes TURNS DIVES CEILINGS RANGE PROTECTION ARMAMENT





(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)



REPORT No. VO-84 163


1	Clouds Over Target	A second of		UNDER ATTACK) TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)		
	Clouds Over Target					90
	Visibility of Target	(CLEAR, HAZ	Y. PARTIALLY OBSCURED	BY CLOUDS, ETC.)	isibility	(MILES)
	Bombing Tactics: Type	0		Bomb Sight Use	edb	(TYPE)
			(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE)	Altitude of	f Romb Pole	2250
4 1750	Rombs Dropped per Ru	IN (NUMBER	macing	(FEET) AITITUDE C)I DOMD Rele	(FEET)
	Number of Framy Air	craft Hit on Gro	und: Destroyed	Probably Destroyed_	0	_ Damaged
	Number of Liferry 7 m	Crart Titt Oil Oil				(n)
-	(h) AIMING POINT		(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	BOMBS, AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	NO HITS On Aiming Point	DAMAGE (None, slight serious, destroyed or sun
-		600 x 400	1 111-2	(6) HE Rookets Mk 1 body, Mk 7 motor.	All in	Unlencom
	Area No. 1	yards	VC-84	1050 round .50 cal.	All in	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
			4 191-2	Unimown	area	Unlmoun
	A 25 62	600 yards	YC-76 1 FM-2	E00	Files been come	n Fin in name
	ATOM MU 6	x 200 yard	8 VC-84	Homber of hombs and	· Carmeria	A CALABOL AND VALUE
1		7	9 1 222-0	rockets not known		
A.			57 E.3 - CO L			

Results of the attacks could not be observed. Fires were started in both areas. It is believed that at least serious damage was caused in area No. 1 because on complation the attack CSA advised the Air Coordinator that it had been an excellent job.

- # 1- Area bout 600 yards south of northern end Iwo Jima, gum and troop positions and trenches.
 - 2- Area 400 yards east of sugar refinery Iwo Jima and extending southeast.
- * Rockets only.

(n)	Were Photographs	Taken?	Photographs of Damage	, When Taken,	Should Be	Attached By Staple.
DI	Were inotograpis				1.0	

of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary)



REPORT No. VC-84 63

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness Distance of Opening Fire Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses Enemy Weaknesses Offensive Tactics, Own ", Enemy Defensive Tactics, Own " , Enemy Flexible Gunnery, Own Escort Tactics Fighter Direction Use of Radar Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target Approach to Target Altitudes, Speeds Approach Dive Pull-Out Dive Angle Strafing Retirement Defensive Tactics Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics Torpedo Tactics Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes Selection of Targets Fuzing Strafing Tactics Defensive Tactics Use of Radar Reconnaissance Photography Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation Homing Rendezvous Recognition, Ships Communications Flight Operations Search and Tracking Base Operations Maintenance

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

> Lt. George Shew-Corthorn took off in an FM-2 from USS MAKIN ISLAND at 1230 (K) on 27 February 1945, D plus 8, to act as Air Coordinator for Iwo Jima support operations. His first target was an area (235 Baker Charlie George How Item Mike on local grid) about 600 yards south of the northern end of the island containing gun and troop positions and trenches. He was assigned 4 MM-2 of VC-76 for the attack. The Air Coordinator made dummy and strafing runs does to 500 feet to spot target for the group. At 1450 the attack started and the area was hit hard by rookets and strafing the latter carried down to low level. Lt. Shaw released 6 rockets from slant range of 2500 feet. Fires were started in the area. Upon completion of the attack CSA told the Air Coordinator that an excellent job had been done. As his last target and group Lt. Shew was given 4 TBM-3 of VC-81 to attack an area (201 Nan Tare 202 Uncle on local grid) 400 yards east of the sugar refinery and extending to the southwast from there. Lt. Show again went down to around 500 feet to spot the targets. It was found that strafing with tracers was very much less effective for target spotting than use of rockets. He made strafing runs ahead of the VT bombing and rooket runs. Fires were started in the area. Lt. Shaw returned to base at 1700 (K).

RESTRICTED

(Reclassify when filled out)

REPORT No.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

Radio was out except for guard frequency. Otherwise equipment was normal.

APPROVED BY:

ALLSET - MFD. BY THE EGRY REGISTER CO., PATENTED