


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HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO 234  
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO: 384  
(Jap Intell No 32)

PLACE:  
DATE:

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section,

Subject: Organization and Operation of First Naval Air Technical Arsenal.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN

- 1932: Graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo in Aeronautical Engineering. Entered the Navy upon graduation as a regular Naval Officer.
- 1942: Received three months of indoctrination training at the Naval Air Base at Tsingtao in Northern China.
- 1943: Joined the YOKOSUKA First Air Technical Arsenal, 2d Department, KOKU HOMBU (Air Headquarters) and worked with the Airframes Unit to the end of the War.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR  
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. KAWAKITA, S.

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

The 1st Section of the 2d Department of KOKU HOMBU (Air Headquarters) was organized into technical subdivisions concerned with every phase of aircraft development and research. During the course of the War it studied a crashed F4F, F4U, SB2C, TBF, TBM-1C, and PB4Y-1 and testflew a captured F6F, P-40E, and A-20A. The comparable section in the Army testflew a captured F2A, Hurricane, PBO, B-17D, B-17E, and PBM. On the basis of such studies and flights, detailed information was compiled concerning the performance of enemy planes.

In the case of an enemy plane shot down or crash landing in the Home Islands, the Naval Air Technical Arsenal (1st Section of KOKU HOMBU's 2d Department), if interested, would send experts to analyze it and in some instances they brought back the crashed plane or parts of it for further study at the main office in YOKOSUKA. Only once were technicians sent overseas to make similar studies and that was early in the War when a rather unprofitable trip was made to BURMA to examine a DeHaviland Mosquito oleo. Army technicians, however, made such studies throughout the War and supplied the Technical Arsenal with copies of their reports.

The same organization that developed Japanese aircraft made all of the studies of crashed or captured enemy aircraft until late in the War when a small unit of 3 Officers and 12 to 14 men was specially created to devote its time exclusively to analyzing such planes.

When the War ended, the Technical Arsenal had two experimental jet propulsion planes - the SHUSHI based on plans of the German ME 163 and the KIKA designed by the Arsenal. The SHUSHI employed a liquid rocket engine designed to use hydrogen peroxide for fuel and KIKA had two turbo-driven jet engines.



Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN.

Q.1. You helped design the KEIUN ("Beautiful Cloud"). Describe it to us.

A. Commander OTSUKI was the chief designer and I helped him. KEIUN was a twin seater, single-engine experimental scouting and reconnaissance plane produced in late 1944 by YOKOSUKA First Air Technical Arsenal. It had an AICHI KEN No 1 engine (AEIT) behind the pilot. The one experimental model was manufactured in late 1944 and test flown in January 1945, but was never flown in combat. The tempo of war was too fast to warrant production of the plane for combat use. Some of its performance features were as follows:

- Ceiling: 36,000 feet
- Critical Altitude: 30,000 feet
- Speed: 400 Kts
- Wing Span: 14 Metres
- Length: 13.05 Metres
- Height: 4.24 Metres
- Horsepower: 3,000
- Operational Range: 1,500 - 1,600 Nautical Miles
- Rate of Climb: 30 minutes to 10,000 Metres

Q.2. When was your plane test flown?

A. January 1945

Q.3. How did the plane perform on the test flight?


A. Satisfactorily, but the engine caught on fire. A safe landing was made, however. Only this one Plane (KEIUN) was ever built.

Q.4. What kind of technical intelligence organization did you have for testing and checking crashed or captured Allied aircraft?

A. I was in the 1st Section of the 2d Department of KOKU HONBU (Air Headquarters). Captain TERAJ, K. Was in charge of the Section.

Q.5. Just what was the organization of the Section?

A. I will draw you a diagram. After each subdivision, I will give you a rough estimate of the number of Officers in the unit.



I was in the Airframes subdivision.

Q.6. You have given us a chart showing the organization working on the technical development of your own planes. Was there a similar organization for technical analysis of enemy aircraft?



Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd)

A. No, but the head of each unit in the organization I have outlined was interested in enemy aircraft and would analyze such parts of the plane as concerned his specialty.

Q.7. What would you do with an enemy aircraft that was shot down or made a forced landing?

A. A B-29 was shot down in ARIAKE BAY on 10 November 1944 and I went along with 10 Officers to study it. They represented the Airframe, Engine, Propeller, Material, Bomb, Machine Gun, Instruments, and Electrical Sections. A pilot and an aircraft engineer from YOKOSUKA also were in the party. It was down in the Bay 1,500 feet from the base. We raised it up and took as much of it as we could to the shore. Small parts were brought back to YOKOSUKA and were studied for about three weeks. The larger parts were left at ARIAKE for study by a second party which later went down there.

Q.8. What interested you most about this B-29?

A. The gun turrets, Norden bombsight, radar (which was examined only by the Army), and communications equipment.

Q.9. Were the bombsight and radar in good condition?

A. The radar was not. The calculating box of the bombsight and some of the communications equipment were alright.

Q.10. What struck you as outstanding about the B-29?

A. I was surprised at the very skilled workmanship and was impressed by the efficiency of the plane. We had examined a B-29 earlier shot down in Northern KYUSHU. In that plane we found a chart giving operational details of the B-29 and some photographs. In the pocket of the pilot was a notebook containing useful data regarding the plane and its performance. From the photographs, we secured dimensions of the plane.

Q.11. Just what information did the operational chart contain?

A. Such data as speed, rate of climb, gasoline consumption, etc. There were many graphs illustrating details.

Q.12. What design features did you find helpful?

A. From the construction standpoint, we were impressed by the rugged character of the plane, its ability to take punishment. Also we were struck by your lavish use of all materials. Unlike us you seemed to have no problem of critical shortages. The machine gun construction was of such a nature that you had remote control which we thought very good.

Q.13. Did you have remote control of guns in any of your planes?

A. No.

Q.14. Did anything else strike you?

A. Yes, the electrical equipment and the turbo supercharger. We had had much trouble with our own supercharging equipment.

Q.15. In earlier years of the war did you study enemy aircraft?

A. In early 1942 we captured, at JAVA, I think, a P-40E which was studied in the same way as we studied the B-29. In addition we test flew it. At about the same time, we also captured the following:



Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd)

Douglas A-20A  
Martin PBM  
Brewster F2A  
Hawker Hurricane  
Lockheed Hudson PBO (1 and 2)  
Boeing B-17D, B-17E

All of them were testflown, although the Navy test flew only the P-40E and A-20A. The Army flew the rest.

Q.16. Were any other enemy planes captured or shot down during the War and test flown?

A. Yes, an F6F was taken and flown in OKINAWA. The data was sent to JAPAN. Also shot down and studied (but not flown) were an F4F, F4U, SB2C, TBF, TBM-1C, and PB4Y-1 (B-24).

Q.17. Which of these wrecked planes were brought to YOKOSUKA?

A. F4U, SB2C, TBM-1C. Not much time was spent studying them because we had so much else to do at the time.

Q.18. Did any group devote itself exclusively to studying enemy planes?

A. Toward the end of the war about 3 officers, 3-4 non-coms, and 9-10 men were taken from the Airframe Section to devote all their time to analyzing enemy aircraft.

Q.19. Were any technicians sent to examine enemy planes in outlying areas?

A. In 1942, we sent some to BURMA to study the DeHaviland Mosquito oleo. The trip was not very successful and we never sent anybody else outside the Homeland. The Army did, however, and supplied us with copies of its reports.

Q.20. What was the relation between the Arsenal and KOKU HOMBU?

A. We sent our reports to the Headquarters of KOKU HOMBU.

Q.21. Were regular reports prepared?

A. Yes.

Q.22. Were the reports detailed?

A. Yes, very detailed - drawings, blueprints, etc.

Q.23. To whom in KOKU HOMBU did the reports go?

A. To the chief of whatever section would be most interested in the report - fighter, dive bomber, torpedo bomber, transport and heavy bomber sections.

Q.24. Who was the intelligence officer of KOKU HOMBU?

A. Comdr. NOMURA, Suetsu first and then Comdr. IWAYA, Eiichi.

Q.25. Would a copy of the report go to the Naval General Staff?

A. Yes, to the 3d Department - the Aircraft Unit of the 5th Section. They were not very interested in our reports because they were not technical minded.

Q.26. From your study of U.S. planes which fighter did you conclude was best?



Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN, (contd) -----

A. P-51.

Q.27. Which of the Navy carrier-based planes?

A. F6F.

Q.28. Which of your fighters did you think was the best?

A. SHIDEN, Modified (George II). We didn't have in action any carrier-based planes in the last phases of the War. In the early phases I liked the ZERO 52 (ZEKE 52).

Q.29. What was your program for developing jet-propelled planes?

A. We had plans of the Me 163. We built the SHUSHI from these plans, using a liquid rocket engine. It employed hydrogen peroxide for fuel.

Q.30. How did it perform on its test flight?

A. It went up on first flight to 9,000 feet and the engine stopped. On landing, the plane crashed into a building.

Another jet plane was called KIKA which was to be used as a fighter. It could be employed either as a KAMIKAZE plane or as a standard fighter. One engine was carried in each wing, a bomb under the fuselage (250 kilogram load). It used turbo driven jet engines.

Q.31. What was the top speed of KIKA?

A. 365 Kts at 6,000 metres.

Q.32. How was the performance of KIKA?

A. KIKA had 2 turbo driven Jet engines as compared to SHUSHI's one liquid rocket engine. SHUSHI was designed primarily for attacking B-29s at high altitudes. It could climb to 10,000 metres in  $3\frac{1}{2}$  minutes. The endurance of SHUSHI was 5.5 minutes at 430 Kts after reaching 10,000 metres. KIKA's endurance was 37 minutes when flying at sea level at 324 Kts. At 6,000 metres its endurance was 49 minutes at 365 Kts.

Q.33. What equipment or engineering principles that you found on enemy aircraft were used on your own aircraft?

A. We learned that your planes were mass produced and by examining them we found out how to employ certain of your techniques. Examples:

- (1) Stamp forged instead of machine cut parts.
- (2) The elimination of certain washers.

Q.34. How about engines?

A. Our engines were troubled with oil leakage which yours were not. I think we learned something on this point from you, too.

Q.35. Did you gain anything from enemy radar?

A. The Army gained a great deal, but the Navy studied the radar in your crashed planes very little. On the whole, I thought your radar was much more delicate (sensitive) than ours.

Q.36. You have with you some notes and blueprints of the performance of enemy aircraft, performance of captured enemy planes, and data on your own experimental planes. May we have the notes and copies of the blueprints?



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Interrogation of Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN. (contd) -----

A. Yes, but may I have the notes back when you are through with them? I will get the blueprints to you within a week.

Q.37. We will return the notes. Who in your opinion are the leading Japanese aircraft designers?

A. Comdr. YAMANA (dive bombers) and HORIKOSHI (fighters).

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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(Pacific)  
APO 234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO.



INTERROGATION NO: (ADDENDUM TO INTERROGATION  
No. 384. Lt. TOYODA, T. IJN)

PLACE: TOKYO  
DATE: 26 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: Organization and Operation of First Naval Air Technical  
Arsenal.

Person Interrogated:

Lt. TOYODA, Takogo, IJN

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER USNR  
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. KAWAKITA, S.

Allied Officers Present: None.

NOTE: This is additional information supplied by  
Lt. TOYODA.

ITEMS CONCERNING INVESTIGATION OF CAPTURED AIRCRAFT.

No aircraft captured by the Imperial Navy during the Greater East Asia war, were operational. Two planes—a Curtis P-40E and a Douglas A-20A—which were picked up by the Army early in the war were used in flying tests, described below. Toward the end of the war tests were carried out by units, or arsenals on the spot, using planes shot or forced down in the SW Pacific Area. Although investigations had been conducted since the beginning of this year by the authorities concerned, on carrier-based aircraft forced down in air raids and at the end of last year on B-29's, the war came to an end before they could be coordinated and reports made. The investigations of these aircraft were the province of the Army and the Navy merely received reports from them. Investigations brought technical scrutiny to the following: fighting performance, equipment, construction and parts and provided reference material for research and design.

Subjects of Investigation.

(1) - Measurements of fuselage.

We determined measurements of those (planes) left generally in their original model (unmodified), checked them against plans obtained from other intelligence sources, carried out tests and obtained results which were practically the same.

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- (2) Engine identifications.  
We carried out comparisons of actual horsepower based on engine construction, measurements and actual surveys with horsepower determined from other intelligence sources. In cases when we obtained graph curves of horsepower we carried out tests on these and generally obtained results conforming to actual conditions.
- (3) Performance.  
It was the Army's job, mainly, to make tests of performance, using undamaged fuselages; e.g. take-off speed, continuous cruising range, rate (time) of climb, ceiling, taxi distance on take-off, landing speed and landing taxi distance, stability, and maneuverability. In addition we carried out research on the dog fighting performance of fighters against Japanese; disappearing (3-) wheel construction medium bombers; and the exhaust turbines on B-17's.
- (4) Construction.  
Discussed type of construction of fuselages upon which various flying performances tests were completed, and those which were damaged. From a general point of view, construction was very durable and was thought to be suitable for the most reckless action. Various types and materials were used throughout and since they were able to command large scale precision metal work it was thought that little difficulty was encountered by designers; furthermore it was believed that sufficient thought had been given to large-scale production.
- (5) Construction Materials.  
Discussions were carried out concerning raw materials, namely, light metals, iron, and rubber. It was thought that materials used in Japan were not greatly different but the Al-alloy (T.N.:sic. Probably "Aluminum-alloy") used in the B-29 propeller was superior.
- (6) Equipment (Ordnance), Camouflage, and Safety Equipment.  
Discussions from the standpoint of persons concerned were carried out in re: Instruments, optical equipment, radar, effectiveness of camouflage, oil pressure, "window" (TN: denki-gise) etc. Since "window" and radar equipment developed slowly in our country relative to the enemy it was thought these should be taken as examples. There was much to learn about camouflage, ordnance, and instruments.
- (7) Aircraft Instructions and handling Manuals.

Investigation of Plane Types: Facts and opinions.

- (1) P-40E  
Using a plane picked up by the Army about 1942, made complete observations concerning flying performance and ability pitted against the Zero type Fighter. Although the Zero demonstrated a qualitative superiority in fighting performance, it did not match the speed of the P-40E. Under technical items for investigation, aside from the fact that a main undercarriage was recovered, etc. its construction and shock absorbability investigated—no special comments.



## (2) Douglas A-20A (Boston).

Plane which was picked up by the Army in the same year as the P-40, used mainly to determine the load of the tricycle landing gear. There were no definite test facts, in this country and a logical conclusion on load calculation of the tricycle landing gear, in terms of study of basic materials or ground strength tests, had not been arrived at. We dismantled only the nose and undercarriage and carried out tests on nose vibration. Using KBIUN (T.N.: Japanese A.C. designation) as a prototype, plans were laid out, using exactly the same measurements even to the "damper". When airborne, there was practically no oil leakage from engine or propeller; no observations of equipment in and about the fuselage. The extreme ease of handling received favorable comment.

## (3) B-29

November 10, 1944: Since there was one plane, shot down in ARIAKE-WAN, with an undamaged nose (T.N. KUBI: may mean engine head) remaining, assumptions of great value in re: principal facts of various characteristics were made quite clear with this; further, equipment in great numbers were captured and one by one examined by personnel concerned. Since the B-29 had actually become the No. 1 miracle, as far as we were concerned, when the first raid was carried out on Northern KYUSHU in 1944, the Army and Navy in collaboration carried out an investigation concerning (B-29) performance at high speed, assuming the fact that violent raids would be carried out. At the same time, despite the fact that a captured "operational Chart" was extremely accurate, it was evident there was unanimous agreement that raids would develop in completely convincing fashion, numerically. Nor was there a single idea as to defensive grouping against this plane which flew at the high altitude of 10,000 meters, 320 knots.

(a) Construction: Suitable for most reckless action. Fact that they planned extremely bold raids. Use of various types of materials and precision metal work, U.S. types.

It was agreed that enemy had superiority in engineering ability. Pressurized cabin construction was subject of research by experts. Since at this time our country had as a goal a completely pressurized cabin, the point that this plane had a semi-pressurized cabin was considered logical for a military plane.

(b) Engine and Gas Exhaust Turbine. Concerning method of installation and effective camouflage of exhaust turbine, in brief; although there was much to learn, since at this time we were entirely in a fog in terms of methods of camouflage of exhaust turbines it was impossible definitely to decide what points to investigate

(c) Concerning various capacities, we were in agreement as to the value to be obtained from assumptions of other intelligence sources.



- (d) Ordnance & Equipment.  
Gunnery: HS electrical remote control mechanism set an example because of its extreme superiority in stern attack tactics.  
Bombing Equipment: We were able to obtain no data.  
Optical equipment: Obtained calculator kit for the Norden bomb sight.  
Instruments: No special equipment.  
Radar Equipment: Since Radar was the Army's responsibility, no special comments.  
Communications Equipment.
- (e) Operating instructions.  
Captured an Inspection Manual from plane shot down in TOKYO BAY, spring, 1945. Since this inspection manual had an illustration arranged on one side, drawn with scrupulous care, even the inexpert could easily comprehend it; it was compared with ours and we built one easily, exactly like the original. Thenceforth errors in our handling operations manuals were indicated and this was used as a prerequisite model in design.
- (4) F6F Hellcat.  
Investigation carried out by force on the spot of a plane shot down in OKINAWA, autumn, 1944.
- (5) F4U Corsair.  
Spring, 1945: Captured on Coast off ZUSHI and in vicinity of KASUMIGAURA. Investigation of parts, one by one, was under way. We were surprised in that there places on the wing covered with fabric, Used as reference for our plan to use substitute materials.
- (6) SB2C Helldiver  
Forced down in KAURA about the first of the year, 1945. Were in the process of investigation. No comments which deserve special mention.
- (7) TBM-1C Avenger  
Forced down in SOERABAJA, 1944. Was investigated by (Naval) Air Depot at same place. Transported to YOKOSUKA about 1945. Extremely strong construction. Were in midst of investigation of parts.
- (8) B-24 Liberator.  
Flight Manual, 1944, summer.

General Opinions.

- (1) Superiority
- (a) Since (U.S.) planes were durable and suitable for reckless tactics, time for upkeep and handling was unnecessary.
- (b) Standards for variety of parts, engineering of production superior.
- (c) "Jamming" (T.N. DENKIGISE) was simple.
- (d) General technological ability was harmonized and synthesized and demonstrated in the special performance of the aircraft.
- (e) Various types of handling manuals were adequate and there was a handful of the vital parts.



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## (2) Points for Reference.

(a) Fuselage designers were unconcerned about weight, i.e., compared with Japanese planes, weight was extremely great. They gave careful thought to whichever was their aim: producing in large volume or choosing to carry excessive weight when loaded; in any case, wing pressure, etc. were made excessively large.

(b) Compared with the great horsepower, performance was poor; i.e., Ylex was extremely low. It was thought the fuselage designers were practically unconcerned with the profile of the planes.

NOTE: The following letter was written to Lt. Condr. William H. Botzer by Lt. T. TOYODA, IJN.

Lt. Condr. Botzer:

26 November 1945

I was very glad to attend the meeting with you last Monday, because we could talk over various airplanes of Japan as well as of the U.S.A.A.F. Frankly speaking, the unconditional surrender of our country to the Allied Powers was the most regretful matter we ever had, and for some period since that time I had a dislike even for seeing the airplanes belonging to the U.S. Army or Navy. But I could not forget beautiful and splendid features of airplanes and now I am glad to see airplanes of U.S.A.A.F. flying in clear autumn sky. So, I was very glad last day.

I have the honor to send you the following documents, which, at that time I replied to submit you later.

- a. List of Principal Dimensions and Performance of Experimental Airplanes of I.J.N.A.F.
- b. Specification and performance of Service Airplanes, I.J.N.A.F.
- c. Document about the 1st Naval Air Tech. Arsenal and outline of researches and experiments of this Arsenal. (excluding that of Branch)
- d. List of Flight Test Data of captured U.S. Airplanes.
- e. Summaries about Special Purpose Planes.

The last documents is submitted to supplement my explanation about "KIKKA" and "SYUSUI". But you will find another special attacker named "BAIKA" and "TOKA" in this paper. These are the planes planned for purpose to attack the vessels which neared the JAPAN proper as well as KIKKA. The salient features of these are that construction is extremely simplified and materials used in them are very easy to obtain even in that time in our country. The reason why we were so enthusiastic about the special attacker was, as you knew, that, owing to damage of airplane factories and their cooperating sub-contracting companies, reduction of output of aluminium alloys, shortage of fuel and transportation disturbances by air raids of B-29 and carrier based planes and P-51, and blockade of submarines and phonic mines, we could not manufacture the ordinary airplane. The defeat of our country is mostly due to these facts. In other words, we had too insisted the power of spirit and had forgot the power of material and intelligence which control them.



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At any rate we must cultivate our minds and reconstruct our country so as to follow the advanced nations as close as possible at present. We Japanese, must sweep the all hatred in the war time from our minds, and if we conduct as one of the most civilized nation in future notwithstanding the ugly status which seem yet be kept between the most powerful contries as to some matter, we will be accepted by all the nations, and can walk brilliant highway.

Last Monday, as I, for the first time, called on foreign officers, I couldn't say what I intended. I fear you were very disappointed in my report, especially in my explanation about what we learnt from the captured planes and the points we utilized in development of Japanese planes. As it was indicated in my draft papers concerning the captured planes, the tricycle undercarriage of A20-A (Boston) was imitated in detail by us. I myself designed tricycle undercarriage of "KEIUN", land based local scout plane, and dissolved its nose shock strut, shimmy damper and drew the picture. As we had no data as to load factor in landing cases of nose wheel plane; so the flight test of this plane as well as ground test was done for long period to obtain the fundamental data.

Also, the first all-metal airplane in this country was manufactured by NAKAJIMA Airplane Company as "97" carrier based torpedo bomber, which prototype was Northrop's airplane. So it can be said that we learnt all the modern fundamental conception about metal plane from U.S, and we may say that all of the Japanese planes were influenced in the methods of designing and constructing, by U.S., though lately greatly advised by Germany.

We had not spent much time on studying the captured planes. It was very regretful metter because there were may points to study in their components rather than in airplanes themselves. The reason of this shortage of study was due to the fact that we were too busy about the plan and building of special purpose planes stated above, and we could get so many intelligence from German authorities about the planes of Allied Air Forces. Seeing "Die Ergebnisse der Beaute answertung" issued from "Deutsche Luftwaffe" I often thought that we must organize more powerful intelligence section in the 1st Naval Air Tech. Arsenal or Air Hq. or Office of Imperial Naval General Staff.

But there were many matters to be done. Especially, since the defeat in Saipan, the attention of almost all officers and en-listed men and workmen was focused to so called new weapons, such as OOKA. So the study of booty planes was sent to background.

A few years ago, it was said in Japan that the air was where nan should go. It is my regret that we can not manufacture an airplane in Japan, and that even studying aerodynamics and sciences about airplane were strictly prohibited. Lamb's Hydrodynamics, Goldstein's Modern Developments in Fluid Dynamics, Fuch-Hopf-Seewald's Flugdynenik, Prandtl-Tietjens's Hydro-und-Areodynamik, and Karman's Vortex Theory, and boundry layers, Theory of plates and shells, have no meaning to me at present. This is very sad matter.



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But aviation is one of the most valuable gifts which we have ever enjoyed. So I hope that you will develop "Know-How" (I fear this word is not adequate) of the airplanes to their extreme extent, as the representatives of human-beings.

I believe airplanes such as present types can't be main weapons in the future warfare if it occurs. But we must develop this not for preparation of warfare but development of welfare of human beings.

I fear that you will misunderstand my sentence because it is written in broken English.

Would you please send my kindness to Lt. Comdr. Sharkowitz.(This may refer to Lt. Comdr. Shackelford)

Yours truly,

Lt. T. TOYODA  
I.J. NAVAL AIR HQ.

R E S T R I C T E D

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