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STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Public Instruction
LANSING

Democracy and the Great War

AN OUTLINE OF THE FACTORS WHICH HAVE
CULMINATED IN THE PRESENT
WORLD STRUGGLE



BULLETIN NO. 20

Published by
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
1918

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AN OUTLINE OF THE FACTORS WHICH HAVE CULMINATED IN THE PRESENT WORLD STRUGGLE

by

GEORGE N. FULLER, Ph. D.
Secretary Michigan Historical Commission

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March 6, 1918

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Public Instruction
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What can teachers do to win the war? The most important thing they can do to sustain our country is to teach thoroughly the causes of the war. People must know the principles that are at stake. If they are firmly grounded in this they will know that our cause is just. Their belief can never be shaken. They will be ready to make any sacrifice rather than yield.

Teachers are everywhere anxious to do their part in this matter. However, they have not found any comprehensive treatment of the subject in convenient and teachable form. This bulletin, "Democracy and the Great War" is published to supply teachers with a reliable guide in teaching the issues of the present crisis.

We are indebted to Dr. George N. Fuller, Secretary of the Michigan Historical Commission, for this treatment of Democracy and the Great War. In putting this material in accessible and teachable form Dr. Fuller has rendered a distinct service to the teachers of our state and country.

The bulletin is furnished to superintendents and commissioners of schools in quantities as requested. Always state the exact number desired.

Very respectfully,

Fred L. Keeler

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

April 6, 1918.

Acknowledgments

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Preface

The Great War may be studied from many angles. In 1915 under the direction of President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University, one of his students sent out a circular to cities in eight states to discover how many schools were teaching the war, and if so, why. Replies were received from eighty-seven cities, and these reasons President Hall has summed up roughly as follows:

First.—It is a great vitalizer of geography. To bring and show maps of the positions of the armies and of the countries involved, with places that come to a focus of interest from day to day, is capable of impressing a very wide vital interest in Geography.

Second.—We have a chance to see history in the making. Historic tendencies from many centuries are focusing to, and will diverge from, this momentous epoch in which history is made day by day more rapidly than ever before.

Third.—In the higher school grades innumerable questions of economic trade, markets, effects on various industries, social, civic and political organization of the countries involved can be given a high degree of vitalization.

Fourth.—It is the greatest opportunity ever afforded to impress upon the minds of young people the barbarity, destructiveness and brutality of war and the blessings of peace.

Fifth.—It gives a large surface of contact between the school and life, which tend so strongly to be isolated from each other. Considering the interest of every live boy in conflict the war is a dynamo of educational energy which

should make the entire school system vastly more effective while it lasts and perhaps for some time after.

Sixth.—It makes of young Americans citizens of the world, not only of the country, and teaches them the right appreciation of the relations of other lands to theirs.

Seventh.—It teaches the great lesson of Americanism and toleration. It teaches the young to agree to differ, and cultivates a judicial as above a partisan attitude, which is perhaps the very palladium of the strength of this country in the world, because here citizenship means outgrowing and rising above the old world prejudices and racial animosities that have come down from centuries since the old religious wars and which have made nations suspect and hate their neighbors. It gives us a wholesome realization that we have none of these old dangerous European chimneys in our political structure liable at any moment to set fire to the whole.

To these President Hall himself adds others, related principally to the lines of study in which he has a special interest. This was before America entered the war.

As the war progressed we began to see things from another angle. As a nation we had mourned for the victims of the *Lusitania*. We had heard with surprise and sorrow of the drowning of women and children of other neutral nations on the high seas, the bombing of hospitals and schoolhouses, the tearing of families apart and the scientific enslavement of men, women and children to work at forced labor against their kindred, and of the pursuit by Germany of a general policy of "terrorism," both in the method of conducting military offensives and afterwards against the helpless inhabitants of

conquered lands. These things were more than a surprise, we were enlightened.

When President Wilson declared that "the world must be made safe for democracy," we began to ask, Is the Imperial German Government the enemy of democracy, and, therefore, the enemy of America?

We did not lose our poise as a judge, but we began to reach a judgment. We began to understand the character of the forces behind the Imperial German Government, and with this understanding there was added another reason for studying the Great War, namely, to find out why the great democracies of the world were lining up against Germany, and why there were no democracies at all in alliance with Germany. We began to ask, Why do the German people, whose kindred among us are zealous lovers of liberty, tolerate such a government? Then we began to remember that from 1848 onward many of these Germans came to America, as they said, to escape the yoke of "Prussian autocracy" and "Prussian militarism."

We began, in fact, to see that there were two Germanies,—the Germany of other days, with its glorious musicians, its thinkers, its poets, its idealists, which we loved to recall, and the Germany of today, the Germany of sordid materialism, the cold hard nation of the mailed fist at the heart of which is Prussia. We saw in action the Prussian theory of war, that Might makes Right,—that war, and not peace, is the natural relation between nations. We came to see that the triumph of that nation would mean that the world must become an armed camp, and live under the shadow of war. And as this conviction was borne in upon us the study of the War took on a new meaning.

To the boys and girls of Michigan for whom this little sketch is prepared let me commend these words written by an eminent countryman of one of our Allies but which apply as well to the boys and girls of America :

“In all your study of the War, make this your first and foremost thought, that the War is for you. It is you who will enjoy the new order of things when the War is done. Your countrymen are giving their lives for their country; it is your country, and in it you will pass your life. Our dead have died for you. . . . It is you who will find this world better than they found it. You will live in peace, because they died in war; you will go safe and free, because they went under discipline and into danger up to the moment of their death. You will have a good time, because they suffered. To you, who gain by their loss, and whose life is made comfortable by their lives laid down, comes the question, from countless little wooden crosses over graves in France and Belgium and Gallipoli, and from all the unmarked graves of the sea—Is it nothing to you? Why, the War is your War. You will enter into all that it achieves, and inherit all that it earns; and the miseries of it will be the making of your happiness. There are many good reasons why a man should fight for his country, but they come to this one reason, that he is fighting for the future of his country. And you are the future. We older people so soon will be gone; you will stay here, you for whom your countrymen today are in the toils of this War. You are the future, we are the past. We have lived in a world which you never saw, and you will live in a world which we shall never see.”

This little brochure is frankly a war appeal. It recognizes the character of the enemy at the outset. The enemy is

Autocracy, as embodied in the Imperial German Government. Its antagonist is Democracy. The Great War is a conflict of these principles. As between nations, it is a world crisis in morals. This is your war, and my war. We are fighting for all that America has stood for, all that our fathers have died for. We must grasp the significance of this. This war is a fight to a finish, for either Democracy must win, or it will perish from the earth as a form of government. There is a duty for each of us. "In union there is strength." A study of the Great War at this time should appeal not only to the intellect, but to the heart and the will.

GEORGE N. FULLER.

Lansing, April 6, 1918.

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France

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- Huidekoper. "The armies of Europe," in *World's Work* (September, 1914)
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- Bridgman, Raymond L. *World organization*
- Carnegie, Andrew. *A league of peace*
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- Ginn, Edwin. *Organizing the peace work*

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- Hay, (John) and Root (Elihu). *Instructions to the American delegates to the Hague conferences, 1899 and 1907*
- Historical light on the League to Enforce Peace*
- Hobson, John A. *Towards international government*
- Hugo, Victor. *United States of Europe*
- Hull, William I. *Two Hague conferences* (\$1.65)
- Jordan (David Starr) and Krehbiel (Edward B). *Syllabus of lectures on international conciliation*
- Levermore, Charles H. *Anglo-American Agreement of 1817*
- , —. —. *Suggestions for lectures on international relations.*
- Lowell, A. Lawrence. *A league to enforce peace*
- Ralston, Jackson H. *International arbitral law and procedure* (\$2.20)
- Root, Hon. Elihu. *The outlook for international law with letter commending the League to Enforce Peace*
- Scott, James Brown. *American addresses at the Second Hague Conference* (\$1.50)
- , —. —. *Texts of the peace conference at The Hague, 1899 and 1907* (\$1.65)
- Sumner, Charles. *True grandeur of nations*
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- Tolstoi, Leo. *Bethink yourselves!*
- The Central American league of nations*
- The conciliation plan of the League to Enforce Peace, with American treaties in force*
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- Wilson, George Grafton. *The Monroe Doctrine and the program of the League to Enforce Peace*
- World Peace Foundation: work in 1914*
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- Butler, Nicholas Murray. *The Carnegie endowment for international peace* (Feb., 1914)
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Guerard, Albert Leon. *The land where hatred expires* (Jan., 1916)

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- Fortescue, J. W. *A history of the British army* (Macmillan—6 vol. 1, 3, 5 and 6. \$6 each. Vol. 4, 2 parts. \$13.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 16: 816)
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- Grant, A. J., and others. *International relations* (Macmillan—1916, p. 207. \$.75)
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- Mahan, A. T. *Interest of America in sea power, present, and future* (Little—1910, p. 212. \$1.50)
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- Owen, Charles H. *The justice of the Mexican War: a review of the causes and results of the war, with a view of distinguishing evidence from opinion and inference* (Putnam—1908, p. 291. \$1.25.—*American Hist. Rev.*, 14: 390)
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- , —. *Termination of war and treaties of peace* (Dutton—1916, p. 486. \$7)
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- Rives, George L. *The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848* (Scribner—1913, 2 vol., p. 720, 726. \$8.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 19: 659)
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- Weyl, W. E. *American world policies* (Macmillan—1917, p. 307. \$2.25)
- Williams, Mary W. *Anglo-American isthmian diplomacy, 1815-1915* (*Amer. Hist. Assoc.*—1916, p. 392. \$1.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 185)
- Veblen, T. B. *An inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation* (Macmillan—1917, p. 367. \$2)
- Willoughby, W. W. *Problems of readjustment after the war by nine eminent specialist authors* (Appleton—1915, p. 185. \$1.10)

IX. America for Humanity

Brief Readings:

- American interest in popular government abroad*
 (Contents: A clear, historical account, with quotations from Washington, Monroe, Webster, Lincoln and other public men showing America's continuous recognition of her vital interest in the cause of liberalism throughout the world. Unpublished material from the government archives throws an interesting light on our policy during the great German democratic revolution of 1848. This pamphlet will prove an inspiration in showing that this country is but living true to its destiny by helping to make the world safe for democracy. Published by the Com. on Pub. Information)
- Boas, Franz. *Race and nationality* (A. A. for I. C., Jan., 1915)
- Butler, Nicholas Murry. *Nationality and beyond* (A. A. for I. C., Oct., 1916)
- Ruyssen, Theodore. (Mez, John, Trans.) *The principle of nationality* (A. A. for I. C., Dec., 1916)
- _____, _____. (_____, _____.) *What is a nationality?* (A. A. for I. C., March, 1917)
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- Spiller, G. *Inter-racial problems* (World Peace Foundation.—Papers communicated to the first uni-

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- Stephens, H. Morse. "Nationality and history," in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 21: 225-236
- Longer Readings:
- Brandes, G. *The world at war* (Macmillan—1917, p. 272. \$2)
- Courtney, L. H. (Ed.) *Nationalism and war in the Near East* (Oxford—1916, p. 428. \$4.15)
- Dominian, Leon. *The frontiers of language and nationality in Europe* (Holt—1917, p. 375. \$3.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 13: 171)
- Eversley, Lord. *The partitions of Poland* (Dodd—1915, p. 328. \$2.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 21: 590)
- Hull, W. I. *Monroe Doctrine: national or international? The problem and its solution* (Putnam—1915, p. 136. \$.75)
- Krehbiel, Edward. *Nationalism, war and society: a study of nationalism and its concomitant, war, in their relation to civilization; and of the fundamentals and the progress of the opposition to war* (Macmillan—1916, p. 276. \$1.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 365)
- Lord, Robert Howard. *The second partition of Poland: a study of diplomatic history* (Harvard University Press—1915, p. 586. \$2.25.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 21: 590)
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- Morfill, W. R. *Story of Poland* (Putnam. \$1.50)
- Phillips, W. A. *Poland* (Holt—1916, p. 256. \$.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 198)
- Mu', Ramsey. *Nationalism and internationalism* (Houghton—1917, p. 229. \$1.25)
- Rose, J. *Nationality in modern history* (Macmillan—1916, p. 202. \$1.25.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 439)
- Toynbee, A. J. *Nationality and the war* (Dutton—1915, p. 522. \$2.50)
- Van Norman, L. E. *Poland, the knight among nations* (Revell—1907. \$1.50)

X. Democracy and the Industrial Revolution

Readings:

- Eve of the industrial revolution: Toynbee, *The industrial revolution* (Longmans—1908. \$1), 38-72.
- Robert Owen and the humanitarian movement: Cheyney, *Introduction to the industrial and social history of England* (Macmillan. \$1.60), 244-260
- Organization of industry before machinery: Hobson, *Evolution of modern capitalism; study of machine production* (Scribner, \$1.50), Ch. II.
- Factory legislation: Kendall, *Source book of English history* (Macmillan—1900. \$1), 406-413
- Employment of women in industry: Hobson, *op. cit.*, Ch. XII
- Development of the industrial town: *Ibid.*, Ch. XIII.
- Industrial revolution in Germany: *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 21: 801
- The Zollverein: Andrews, *Historical development of modern Europe* (Putnam) I, 252-257
- Industrial revolution in Russia; Skrine, *Expansion of Russia* (Macmillan—1903, p. 386. \$1.50), 313-321
- "War and the interests of labor," by A. S. Johnson, pamphlet published by the A. A. for I. C., July, 1914
- Maps:
- Industrial England since 1750: Sheperd, *Historical atlas* (Holt—1911. \$2.50), 162
- Industries of the British Isles: Gardiner, *Atlas of English history* (Longmans. \$1.50), 64
- England before the industrial revolution: Muir, *School atlas of modern history* (Holt. \$1.25), 36
- England after the industrial revolution: *Ibid.*, 36
- Rise of the German customs union: Shepherd, *op. cit.*, 160

XI. Socialism and the War

Brief Readings:

- Socialism in Germany: Macdonald, *The Socialist movement* (Holt. \$.60), 205-217
- Karl Marx and Socialism: Spargo, *Socialism* (Macmillan. \$1.50), 46-81
- Bismarck and social reform: Dawson, *Bismarck and state socialism* (Scribner), 23-36
- Conflict with the socialists: Dawson, *German socialism and Ferdinand Lasalle* (Scribner), 247-278
- Leo XIII on socialism and labor reforms: Robinson

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and Beard, *Readings in modern European history* (Ginn), II, 500-505

Recent progress of socialism: Kirkup, *History of socialism* (Macmillan—1909. \$2.25), 311-349

“The History of German socialism reconsidered,” by C. J. H. Hayes, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 23: 62

Longer Readings:

Boudin, L. B. *Socialism and the war* (New Review Pub.)

Commons, John R. *History of labor in the United States* (Macmillan—1917, 2 vol. \$6)

Howe, F. C. *Socialized Germany* (Scribner. \$1.50)

Hughes, T. J. *State socialism after the war: an exposition of complete state socialism, what it is; how it would work* (Jacobs—1916, p. 351. \$1.50)

Ogg, F. A. *Social progress in contemporary Europe* (Macmillan—1912, p. 384. \$1.50)

Walling, W. E. *Socialists and the war* (Holt—1915, p. 512. \$1.50)

XII. The Prussianized Imperial German Government

Brief Readings:

Gooch, G. P. “The German theories of the state,” in *Contemporary Review*, 107: 743-753

Hayes, C. J. H. *Political and social history of modern Europe*, II, 397-426, 490-539, 679-719 (Macmillan—1916, vol. 1, p. 582. \$2. Vol. 2, p. 726. \$2.25)

Hazen, C. D. *The government of Germany* (Com. on Public Information)

Lowell, *Governments and parties in continental countries*, II, 1-8

Ogg, *The governments of Europe* (Macmillan—1913, p. 668. \$3), 202-225, 251-281

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Adams, E. D. *The Germans as a chosen people* (Liberty Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco)

Willoughby, W. W. “The Prussian theory of monarchy,” in *American Political Science Review*, Nov., 1917

Longer Readings:

Baldwin, J. M. *Super-state and the eternal values* (Oxford—1916, p. 38. \$.60)

Dewey, John. *German philosophy and politics* (Holt—1915, p. 134. \$1.25)

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- Fife, Robert H. Jr. *The German Empire between two wars: a study of the political and social development of the nation between 1871 and 1914* (Macmillan—1916, p. 400. \$1.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 157)
- Guilland, Antoine. *Modern Germany and her historians* (McBride—1915, p. 360. \$2.25.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Review*, 22: 151)
- Howard, B. E. *German Empire* (Macmillan—1906, p. 449. \$2)
- Paterson, W. P. *German culture* (Scribner. \$1.25)
- Schevill, Ferdinand. *The making of modern Germany* (McClurg—1916, p. 259. \$1.25.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 23: 145)
- Swope, H. B. *Inside the German Empire* (Century—1917, p. 366. \$2)

XIII. German Colonization and Imperialism

Brief Readings:

- Beginnings of colonization: Cheyney, *European background of American history* (Harper. \$2), 147-167
- Colonial policies: Seeley, *The expansion of England* (Little—1883, p. 359. \$1.75), 56-76
- How Europe began to extend its commerce over the world: Robinson and Beard, *Readings*, I, 90-95
- The partition of Africa: Johnston, *The opening up of Africa* (Holt—1911, p. 255. \$.60), 101-252
- The expansion of Europe into Asia: Rose, *Development of the European nations, 1870-1914* (Putnam—1914, 2 vol., p. 376, 410. \$2.75), II, 44-91, 299-319
- Present extent of European colonies: Robinson and Beard, *Readings*, II, 413-415
- Commercial basis of imperialism: Reinsch, *World politics at the end of the nineteenth century as influenced by the Oriental situation in 1900* (Macmillan—1900. \$1.25), 3-80

Longer Readings:

- Barker, J. E. *Modern Germany, her political and economic problems, her foreign and domestic policy, her ambitions, and the causes of her successes and failures* (Dutton—1915, p. 852. \$3)
- Clapp, E. J. *The economic aspects of the war* (Yale Univ. Press—1915, p. 340. \$1.50)
- Harris, N. D. *Intervention and colonization in Africa*

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- (Houghton—1914, p. 384. \$2.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 20: 663)
- Gibbons, H. A. *The new map of Africa (1900-1916): a history of European colonial expansion and colonial diplomacy* (Century—1916, p. 503. \$2.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 23: 873)
- Howard, E. D. *Cause and extent of the recent industrial progress of Germany* (Houghton. \$1)
- Johnston, Sir Harry. *A history of the colonization of Africa by alien races* (Macmillan—1899. \$1.50)
- Keller, A. G. *Colonization: a study of the founding of new societies* (Ginn—1908, p. 632. \$3.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 14: 861)
- Reinsch, *Colonial administration* (Macmillan—1905. \$1.25)
- McClellan, G. B. *European economic policy* (Princeton Univ. Press—1916, p. 59)
- Ogg, F. A. *Economic development of modern Europe* (Macmillan—1917, p. 657. \$2.50.—Discusses industries, commercial expansion, labor, socialism, etc., in leading European countries)
- Pratt, Edwin A. *The rise of rail-power in war and conquest, 1833-1914* (Lippincott—1916, p. 405. \$2.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 23: 160)
- Schmitt, B. E. *England and Germany, 1740-1914* (Princeton Univ. Press—1916, p. 524. \$2.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 22: 146)
- Veblen, T. B. *Imperial Germany and the industrial revolution* (Macmillan—1915, p. 324. \$1.50.—Reviewed in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 21: 801)

Maps:

- The expansion of Europe—the great discoveries: Dow, *Atlas of European history* (Holt), 16
- Europe in the Americas: *Ibid*, 31
- The partition of Africa: Shepherd. *Historical atlas* (Holt), 174
- Australasia: Muir, *School atlas of modern history* (Holt), 48
- British possessions in 1907: Gardiner, *Atlas of English history* (Longmans), 65

XIV. The Kaiser and the Pan-Germanists

Brief Readings:

Conquest and Kultur (Com. on Pub. Information—Contents: A brief introduction outlining German war aims and showing how the proofs were gathered; followed by quotations from German writers revealing the plans and purposes of Pan-Germany, one chapter being devoted entirely to the German attitude toward America. The quotations are printed with little or no comment, the evidence piling up page after page, chapter after chapter)

How Germany wanted the world to look (Natural Security League.—A graphic explanation of why there is a war. With map)

Judson, Harry P. *The threat of German world-politics* (Univ. of Chicago Papers)

Adams, E. D. *The material aims of Germany* (Liberty Loan General Executive Board, San Francisco)

Germany's war plans (American Defense Society)

Longer Readings:

Barron, C. W. *The audacious war* (Houghton—1915, p. 192. \$1)

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DEMOCRACY AND THE GREAT WAR

I

Autocracy and Democracy

In all the great wars of history the fundamental causes have lain deep under the surface. For many years the outward calm of Europe has concealed deep-seated antagonisms which needed but a slight incentive to burst forth with fury. It is needful to understand something of the nature of these underlying causes before it is comprehensible how the murder of an archduke in an obscure corner of the continent of Europe could precipitate a struggle of such vast dimensions as to reach over the Atlantic and draw into its vortex one of the most peace-loving of the great nations.

If any one cause can be said to be preeminently fundamental in the Great War, it is doubtless to be found in the conflict between the ideals of Autocracy and Democracy. The strongest champion of autocratic government in Europe since 1870 has been the German Empire, at the heart of which is Prussia, whose weapon of offense and defense is found in militarism. Autocracy holds that the state is all important; that the people exist for the state, not the state for the people. Sovereignty in Germany exists not in the people, but in the state, whose head—today the Kaiser, William II, King of Prussia and German Emperor—claims to rule by Di-

vine right, and to be responsible not to the people, but to God alone for his acts of sovereign will. In international affairs this German autocracy holds that the natural relation between nations is not peace, but war. This doctrine it claims to have learned from Nature, "red in tooth and claw,"—the law of the "survival of the fittest." German autocracy has no place for "weak" nations. It does not recognize ethical relations of the Christian type as existing between strong and weak nations. Might makes right. The strong destroy the weak. Justice and mercy stop with the frontier. Not only do international agreements cease to be held binding when they become inconvenient, but all laws of man or of God, of justice and mercy, are as naught when they are in the way of the self-interest of the state. This doctrine is not only promulgated by eminent thinkers, teachers, and writers of Germany, but actually practiced by the Imperial German Government in the Great War. It was the practice of this theory, as affecting our own international relations, that brought the United States into the war. It is now seen that only by absolutely destroying the power of the Government which acts upon this theory, can the world be made safe not only for the United States, but for democratic Governments everywhere.

Democracy, exemplified by the United States, England, France, and most of the enlightened nations, holds to the contrary of all these things. Its motive is to secure the highest well-being and the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Its weapon is the moral power of reasoned public opinion. In Lincoln's immortal phrase, democracy holds that government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" is the best government; according to which the

state is a means to an end, not an end in itself; it exists for the people, not the people for the state. Sovereignty resides not in any special, hereditary, "divine right" institution, person or class, but in the governed, who for practical purposes in the administration of government submit to the will of the majority as restrained by recognized fundamental limitations embodied in a "constitution." In relations between nations it recognizes no code of morals distinct from that which governs the relations of individuals as citizens of the state or as neighbors in a social community. Its international code is essentially Christian, for it recognizes all nations as equal in their sovereign capacity, protects the weak nation against the strong, and tempers justice with mercy in dealing with the less fortunate peoples. It stands for law and order in the relations of nations, and for the inviolability of international contracts and agreements. It stands, not for the mailed fist, but for reason, as the means of settling international disputes. If this principle of government is not to perish from the earth, then it must be vindicated in the war that is now being waged on the battle fields of Europe, for even a compromised victory by autocracy would mean that the democratic nations of the earth must resume indefinitely the financial burdens of great armaments, with all the dangers to free government which are involved in militarism.

II

Prussia and the Army

The determining factor in the German Empire today is Prussia, whose King is by virtue of his kingship, German Emperor. To understand the essential features in the history of modern Germany one must know at least the chief steps in the rise and growth of Prussia, for the Germany of today is but a Greater Prussia. The central facts in her history are the Prussian army and the House of Hohenzollern. Prussia was born in war, and under the leadership of the princes of this House she has by successful war so increased her territory and strengthened her army that today she presents the most powerful military organization known in history. The steady beating of this "hammer of Thor" has welded into a unity the German states of the present Empire. It is in keeping with this warlike spirit of Prussia that the German Empire should have been founded in the very midst of a successful war deliberately provoked for the purpose of national aggrandizement. As was said by Mirabeau over a century ago, war may properly be called "the national industry" of Prussia. The success of this "industry" has been chiefly due to the constructive power, the consecutive policy, and in recent times the national support, which has followed the House of Hohenzollern.

For purpose of illustration we need not go further back than the Great Elector, who came to his inheritance in 1640. His lands were scattered in patches from the Baltic to the Rhine. By the power of his army he welded these pieces into

a powerful state. Coarse in nature, merciless to his opponents, treacherous in negotiation, he swept away the local assemblies of his provinces, concentrated the government in his own hands and built up an army out of all proportion to the size and wealth of his lands. Under his son those lands were organized into the kingdom of Prussia. Under his son's successor, the father of Frederick the Great, the army was still further built up, and the power of Prussia began to be known and feared.

Frederick's father was a coarse and brutal man whose sole interest was in his army. From childhood he had loved the life of the soldier. He ruled his family as he did his country with an iron hand. "Salvation belongs to the Lord,—everything else is my business," was the motto that he lived as well as preached. As leader of his army he took a special pride in gathering from all parts of Europe and often at much expense soldiers of unusual height and physical strength. By the end of his reign he had doubled the strength of his army, which he handed on to his son, together with an ample surplus of gold in the treasury.

Frederick the Great thus had ready to hand when he came to the throne in 1740 a weapon with which he was destined to stir Europe to its depths. Frederick was not a boor like his father, but he proved to be a genius in the art of war. In the face of a large part of the military power of Europe he widened his lands and strengthened the power of his army. The conquest of Silesia and the division of Poland made Prussia one of the great powers of Europe, but the process by which this was done was militaristic robbery, as reprehensible from the standpoint of democracy as the act of the skillful burglar who breaks, enters and steals. Whatever

Frederick's "enlightened" political theory, or however much he had at heart the real welfare of his subjects, his methods in relation to other states would have done credit to Machiavelli. In the War of the Austrian Succession he threw his army into a defenseless province of a sister state without a declaration of war, and during the war twice abandoned his allies for his own advantage without hesitation. The series of wars he thus started lasted nearly a quarter of a century almost without interruption, involving all Europe and altering fundamentally the map of the world. In him is revealed the typical Hohenzollern when he said that he was engaged in "the finest game in the world."

Before his death Frederick joined hands with Russia in a crowning robbery, the first partition of Poland. This act is characteristic of the Prussian policy of aggrandizement by war. Poland was weak. Austria and Russia and Prussia had long shamelessly opposed reforms in the Polish constitution in order that they might keep it so and profit by the feudal anarchy which the Polish nobility had taken pains to perpetuate for their own selfish advantage. Polish lands were tempting. The central portions of Frederick's kingdom were separated from the eastern portion by the Polish lands now known as West Prussia, and to fill this gap Frederick took, as any robber might, from the weaker state what she was not able to defend. Under his successors, in the partitions of 1793 and 1795, the ancient Kingdom of Poland, once one of the most important in Europe, was blotted from the map. These acts constitute a series of depredations as scandalous and violent as history can show. Even at that time the conscience of Europe was shocked. The Austrian Queen is said to have wept at the first partition as she received her share

of the plunder, which in a real sense was forced upon her. In the history of the destruction of Poland we touch upon two facts, both deeply significant for the Great War, namely, the violation of race nationalism and the struggle for the balance of power.

Europe now began to recognize in Prussia a second great German power, a rival to Austria. Frederick's reign was a considerable step on the way to that military predominance of Prussia which was destined first to exclude Austria from power in the affairs of the German states, and in our own day to make her the tool along with other states in her stupendous plot for economic and political control of the world. A tremendous impulse was given to her growth by the reforms following the downfall of Napoleon, especially the nationalizing of the Prussian army under the military genius of Scharnhorst. His aim was to enlist every man's interest by giving him a share in the defense of the state. By constantly recruiting the army with new men and retiring as reserves those who should have received the proper training in the ranks, he created a large body of trained men ready to fight when the opportunity should come. This was a momentous step for all Europe. It not only laid more firmly the foundations of militarism in Prussia, but was a first step in that system of universal military training which is the basis of the great European armies of today.

This system was further developed under William I and Bismarck, though in the face of violent popular opposition. Three years of active military service were required from all healthy male citizens, and two years in the reserve. William wished to increase the term in the reserve to four years. Popular opposition induced William to appoint Bismarck his

chief minister (1862), and the proverbial "blood and iron" policy of that minister overcame all obstacles. His methods were practically those of an absolute despot. He nullified whatever control the people were supposed to have over the granting of taxes, going ahead with his plans for increasing the army in express opposition to the will of the people. "The great questions of the time are to be decided not by speeches and votes of majorities, but by blood and iron," he said.

It was from the fertile brain of Bismarck that emanated the scheme for exalting Prussia over Austria and incidentally gaining both new prestige for the Prussian army and new territory for the Kingdom. The opportunity came in arranging relations with the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Prussia and Austria were the leading members in the German Confederation formed in the reconstruction of Europe after Napoleon; when in 1863 Denmark practically annexed Schleswig against the will of the Confederation, Bismarck contrived that Austria should be obliged to share with Prussia a military invasion of Denmark, which was of course successful, wresting from Denmark both Schleswig and Holstein. Bismarck thereupon tricked Austria into his hands by planning deliberately a situation respecting the administration of the two provinces which would not only afford occasion for a break with Austria but make the latter seem the aggressor. The crisis was precipitated in 1866. The injustice of Prussia's cause is shown by the fact that she had to face not only Austria but almost all of the other German states. Under the guidance of the strategist Von Moltke, Prussia concluded the war in seven weeks. As a result she not only humbled Austria and gained supreme leadership among the German states, but added to her own territory Schleswig, Holstein,

Hanover, Hesse-Homburg, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt. The remaining states of north Germany were incorporated with her in the North German Confederation, from which Austria was excluded.

Bismarck gave attention next to the South German states—Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. By a clause in the constitution of the Confederation it was provided that when they should be ready to come in, the constitution would be adjusted to meet their needs. In the meantime Bismarck entered into a military alliance with them. The success of the Prussian army was a cogent argument with these states, and Bismarck knew that to strengthen this alliance and even to bring them into the Confederation only a successful war was needed which should involve their common action. This he soon brought about, and in the characteristic Prussian way, by which the antagonist is made to appear the aggressor. He determined upon a war with France. By editing a press notice, the famous “Ems despatch,” in such a way as to inflame the militaristic parties of both France and Prussia, France was led to declare war in 1870. The story is that when General Von Moltke heard the news he drew from his desk a series of documents containing every step for the invasion of France carefully worked out which the Prussian staff followed in detail. Whether or not true, within a few months the Prussian army was in Paris. France was forced to yield Alsace and Lorraine—an area of over 5,000 square miles with a population of a million and a half people—to pay an indemnity amounting to a billion of dollars, and to grant to Germany in commerce the treatment of the most favored nations.

A tide of patriotism swept through the South German

states and cemented their union with the North. To crown the edifice, on January 18, 1871, in French Versailles, William I of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of the German Empire. By its success the "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck was now justified in the minds of the German people and the way was prepared for that national egotism and assertiveness which has supported the House of Hohenzollern in its attempt to gain world domination.

This brief outline of the war policy of Prussia to the founding of the Empire is not meant to minimize the achievements of the German people in science, literature and the arts. It should however help to make clear the fact that from her earliest history Prussia has regarded war, and not peace, as the necessary condition to her expansion and growth, and that in the minds of the German people her army through its persistent attacks upon neighboring nations and upon the German states themselves has been glorified by its success. In their minds Prussia owes her greatness to the army. In the words of one of her leaders: "The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred war. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. . . . None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results."

III

German Militarism

This state of mind which exalts the army to the chief place in the state, even above civil authority, and which looks to its power as the arbiter in every dispute and the chief means of national aggrandizement is characteristic of militarism. It regards war not only as inevitable but as desirable and beneficial. In reference to the present war Prof. Karl Rathgen of Hamburg said recently, "War is glorious; even if we perish, war is still glorious; but if we win, war is unspeakably glorious!"

Not only the wars of Germany are pointed out, but the great wars of history, from which the champions of this doctrine see great benefits resulting for humanity. War, they allege, has moral values not otherwise to be achieved. As one of them writes: "Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy." Ernest Hasse wrote in 1908: "If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." In a widely

distributed German periodical (1913) we read: "War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common." That the old spirit of Bismarck still guides the German state is seen in these words of the Kaiser, spoken before the war; "It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army!"

In the background of this exaltation of the army there lies an argument which the Germans claim to have found in nature. "War is a biological necessity of the first importance," says Bernhardt, "a regulative element in the life of mankind which can not be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. . . . The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favorable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of nature. . . . Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. . . . The efforts directed toward the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral. . . . It is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between nations and states by Courts of Arbitration—that is, by arrangements. A one-sided restricted formal law is to be established in the

place of the decisions of history. The weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally."

In the domain of German philosophy this doctrine is exemplified in the teachings of Nietzsche: Man must follow nature; the struggle for existence applies as well to human beings as to the lower animals; the strong must use the weak for their own good. Nurture and care of the weak is a crime against humanity; "the hope of the future lies in perfecting the strong, not in strengthening the weak." Nature produced man by a process in which the higher forms of life have preyed upon the lower; and only by the continuance of this process can the "Superman," the highest possible type of mankind be developed. "The weak and ill-constituted shall perish. . . Nothing is more injurious and criminal than this practical sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak which we know as Christianity."

It was nothing to Nietzsche that this teaching would tend to harden the heart against all human sympathy and to blunt all finer sensibilities. It could not have escaped him that such a doctrine is essentially antisocial. He was too intelligent not to know that it would justify any selfish assertiveness, individual or national. Indeed it is the negation of any true international morality. It is precisely this doctrine that has been used by German imperialism to justify the entire course which the Imperial German Government has pursued in its plot to dominate the world.

IV

Policy of Terrorism

A natural corollary of the German theory of war is the German theory and practice of "Frightfulness." A good example is the German use of the submarine. On the arrival of a convenient moment for the ruthless employment of this weapon, the German Chancellor announced to the Reichstag (January 31, 1917): "When the most ruthless methods are considered the best calculated to lead us to victory and to a swift victory . . . they must be employed . . . The moment has now arrived." Germany had allowed the American Government to believe that in response to its protest she had laid aside such ruthless methods. Now it appeared by her own confession that it was only because the moment had not come when Germany could undertake this enterprise successfully. When the time came she undertook it without scruples. On February 1, 1917 began the systematic and merciless destruction of innocent lives—men, women and children, citizens of the United States, bound on peaceful missions upon the seas. Instructions were given to sink even hospital ships. President Wilson reported to Congress: "The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents." At the time of the declaration of

a state of war by the United States some 250 American citizens had been killed by Germany upon the high seas.

Curiously enough, the doctrine of "frightfulness" is advocated by Germany as really humane because a means of shortening war. In the official German War Book we read: "Since the tendency of thought in the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations, which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its objects. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences . . . The danger that in this way he [the officer] will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of . . . By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. . . . Every means of war without which the objects of the war can not be obtained is permissible. . . . It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the commanding officer." General von Hartmann writes, in a German periodical widely read: "War in the present day will have to be conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past. . . . Distress and

damage to the enemy are the conditions necessary to bend and break his will."

That this is not mere theory but is actually and most thoroughly practiced by the German army is abundantly illustrated. We see it in the recent treatment of Belgium, northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, and other occupied territories. The evidence is indisputable from letters and diaries taken from captured German soldiers, from proclamations of German commanders, and from testimony of victims and witnesses. In the campaign of 1914 large numbers of civilians in conquered districts were deliberately and systematically massacred, women abused and children brutally slain. Tens of thousands of Belgian and French civilians were later deported to Germany and forced into German industries. Belgium was very largely denuded of its industrial and agricultural machinery, its food stuffs, and even its raw materials, either appropriated by the German army or sent back of the lines to Germany. This was not done merely in passion or the spirit of vandalism, but in accord with a plan scientifically elaborated. It is known as the "Rathenau plan" from Dr. Rathenau who worked out a scheme "for the systematic exploitation of all the economic resources of occupied countries in favor of the military organization of the Empire."

"Frightfulness" went further. Houses and property were systematically pillaged and destroyed. In Hindenburg's "strategic retreat" through a part of northern France in March, 1917, the country was devastated even to the complete destruction of whole villages and the systematic demolition of every growing thing of value. A Berlin newspaper of the time says: "No village or farm

was left standing on this glacis, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up; wires, cables, and pipelines destroyed. In front of our new positions runs, like a gigantic ribbon, an empire of death."

Action to this extent was not needed to hamper the operations of the Allied armies. It seems adequately accounted for only as a deliberate measure to ruin one of the most fertile regions of France, to weaken for many years to come the power of an industrious rival. In a nameless category must be placed the wanton destruction of historic works of art, the library of Louvain, the priceless cathedrals of Rheims, Soissons, Ypres, Arras, St. Quentin, the castle of Coucy, and the ancient townhalls of the Belgian cities.

Germany's violations of international law are too numerous to mention in detail. The use of poison gas and liquid fire, the poisoning of wells, disseminating of disease germs, the bombing of hospitals and school buildings, the use of civilians including women and children as screens in advancing against the enemy, the killing without quarter of wounded and prisoners on the battlefield, and the inhuman treatment of captives in German prison camps,—these things seemed at first unbelievable, but they have been investigated authoritatively and fully substantiated, and are in keeping with the German theory of war. The atrocities of the Turks among the Christian Armenians, amounting practically to their extermination, have been countenanced by the Kaiser upon the plea that he "can not interfere with the internal affairs of one of his allies." The well authenticated stories as told by

a German eye-witness of the savage outrages committed against the women and children of this innocent and Christian people are too horrible to relate here; enough has been told for an understanding of the German theory and practice of war.

V

Democracy Against War

From earliest times there have been people to protest against war. Poets, philosophers and statesmen have opposed war and espoused peace. Practical programs have been formulated to make war less probable, but especially in the last century has the growth of the spirit of "peace on earth, good will towards men" been noteworthy. This movement has owed no small debt to the great founder of Christian civilization who taught the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. "Love one another as I have loved you" is the great commandment that missionaries of the Cross have carried to foreign lands, whither they have almost invariably preceded the explorer, the trader and the settler. The influence of Christianity in the last century is reflected in the diplomacy of all the great democracies of the world. Upon these governments it has brought to bear the influence of the unbounded tenderness and love and self-forgetting service of the great Nazarene. Christian fellowship is the highest ethical ideal the world has experienced. In the words of the English historian Lecky: "It was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal character, which through all the changes of eighteen centuries has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love; has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the highest pattern of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice; and has exercised so deep an influence that it may be truly said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done

more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers and the exhortations of moralists."

Christianity is at the foundation of democracy, and hence democracy is fundamentally hostile to war. Autocracy is anti-Christian, and always pro-war. The cause of democracy against autocracy is but a new form of the age-old cause of Christianity against Paganism. The German state is not Christian but Roman, based consciously upon the ideals of Rome, which sought peace through world conquest and the universality of the Roman Empire. Its methods were the methods of autocracy. Every man's hand was against every other man's except within the bounds of the conquering state. Politically the German Empire like the Roman Empire, is the negation of Christianity. As put by the German leader Friedrich Naumann, in his book printed before the war entitled "Letters on Religion": "The more exclusively Jesus is preached, the less does he help to form states; and where Christianity attempted to come forward as a constructive force, that is, to form states, to dominate civilization, there it was furthest away from the Gospel of Jesus. Now this means, for our practical life, that we construct our house of the state, not with the cedars of Lebanon, but with the building stones from the Roman Capitol. . . . Hence we do not consult Jesus when we are concerned with things which belong to the domain of the construction of the state and of Political Economy."

The natural corollary of the brotherhood of man is the brotherhood of nations. It was to avoid the charge of warlike motives that France left unfortified her Belgian frontier; Germany with coldly calculated strategy planned to strike her there. It was fear of Germany that inspired France to

keep a large standing army. A democracy can never be safe from the designs of a neighboring and powerful autocracy, which can plan secretly, since it does not have to go to the people for money and thus advertise its needs, and which can strike suddenly because needing to consult only its own will to declare war. England, protected by her island position and her navy, kept only a small army. Even the size of her navy she was willing to reduce,—in fact led the movement at the Hague conferences to find a common plan of disarmament upon which the nations could agree. The United States Government, isolated from Europe, and responsible to the American people has consistently refused to maintain a large army and navy. American generals—like Washington, Grant, Lee, McClellan, Sherman—have all been civilians, who loved the home and fireside better than the camp, and returned to civil life after their wars. What democracy fears the voice of the people in its affairs of war? The voice of the people is the voice of peace. There is nothing that Germany fears more. The peace conferences of the world have been led by the great democracies inspired with the spirit of international brotherhood. The world's pacifist movement has for its indwelling spirit the motive of brotherly kindness, and the same spirit has animated all movements for the amelioration of the hardships of war. It was the violation of the international conscience of the world by the German war practices, more than any other one thing, that aroused and centered the world's thought upon the real meaning of German autocracy.

There are many outgrowths of the Christian spirit of brotherhood as a force making against autocracy and war. One of the most important is the progress of popular education. This progress in the last century has been a world

movement from which scarcely any country has escaped. The state has taken a noteworthy part. In early Europe the beginnings of education were fostered by the church, and church schools still continue. Parochial schools and denominational colleges are familiar features of education in America today. The religious schools as a whole have done a great service in fostering the Christian qualities of democracy. But since about the middle of the century the state has taken over from the church more and more the duties of public instruction. In Germany this movement has contained the elements of grave danger. It has made possible the absolute control of public opinion and hence of the public will, by the German Government. It has worked differently in the great democracies. Indeed it has worked quite as was prophesied by those who at first opposed state control of education. It has created social unrest and led people to question the rights of privilege and the sources of authority. It has enabled the people to read misleading and vicious literature on government. On the other hand it has opened to them the appeal of a free press; and this along with the right of holding public meetings and freely criticizing the policy of governments has helped to lay firm and sure the foundations of democracy in the world. The reaction of popular education upon the moral sense of the proper relations of nations is not the least of its blessings, and this sense is keenest in the great democracies where all avenues of knowledge have been most freely open. In America this spiritual outlook has been one of the principal agents in destroying narrowness and prejudice. It has prepared the minds of her citizens for that vision of the freedom of the world which has appealed so powerfully to America and which

is so largely the moral sanction of her entrance into the Great War.

The logic of democracy has included woman in the general program of emancipation. This is highly significant in its bearing upon popular opposition to war. Woman does not want war. The burdens of war, which always fall ultimately upon the people, fall with keen distress upon women. The justice of equal education for the sexes is today so much taken for granted in America that scarcely anyone thinks of arguing its merits. Woman has demonstrated her ability to serve equally well with man in almost every activity open to both. She has entered many of the professions and is taking an increasingly larger place as a leader of thought. In some of the states of the American Union she has been entrusted with the ballot and given political office. We may well believe that when equal suffrage shall have become a universal fact as a feature of the extension of a more complete democracy in the world, the probability of wars among nations will be indeed remote.

Significant of the influence of Christianity upon war is the humanitarianism fostered by democracies. Here again the state has assumed functions which before were left mainly in other hands. Formerly it was the church which built the hospitals, asylums and poorhouses and cared in general for the weaker members of society; that the state should undertake these things seems to indicate that with the coming of the people to power they have put into the Government the spirit fostered in them by Christianity, and to this extent we may say that the state has become inspired with the ideals of Christianity. There are other reasons for this action, but the spirit of Christianity has been there as the animating

spirit. Recently we have heard the well-known "Onward Christian Soldiers" proposed as the national hymn of America, as expressing vigorously the militant Christian character of American democracy aroused. It is not remarkable that the autocracies of Europe can not grasp the idea of a nation going to war for abstract altruistic motives. But well America knows that only with the world safe for democracy can it be safe for the great humanitarian ideals which are the bone and sinew of her national life; and among these ideals none is greater than freedom from the burdens and ravages of war.

The German theory of war, as well as the German theory of the state, is a strange misreading of nature and of human history. To say that competition, conflict, mutual effort to destroy, is the law of the animal world, is to overlook the supreme fact of motherhood. If there is anything in nature divine, it is motherhood, involving the very highest expression of self-sacrifice. Not competition, but cooperation, is the controlling factor in evolution. If this were not so, then animals of solitary habits would outnumber those of social habits; but the contrary is true; animals that live by preying upon one another are becoming extinct. The same is true of mankind. Those tribes and races which have most persistently practiced mutual aid are most numerous and have attained to the highest development. Cooperation, self-devotion to the welfare of the community, rather than egotism, self-assertion, and war, are the motives which are basic and fundamental in nature. How else, indeed, could have been produced such a being as man, the most altruistic of the animals? It is the altruistic instinct in man which leads him to care for the poor, the defective and the criminal classes instead of destroy-

ing them. In his normal expression, man prefers good to evil, reveres truth, and loves mercy and justice; he holds self-sacrifice nobler than selfishness; no higher expression of unselfishness could be found than his acceptance of Christianity as the basis of civilization; no nobler application of Christianity is possible than that implied in democracy. The sincerity of man's determination to save Christianity and democracy is attested by the well-nigh world-wide protest in arms against an interpretation of nature and history which might well make us despair of a moral order in the universe.

The hope for the ultimate abolition of war is strengthened by the evident truth that war cannot be permanent in a Christian civilization. One or the other, war or Christianity, must go. It may help, no doubt, to prove to Germany, and to all warlike nations, that war is unprofitable; the economic motive in all civilization is powerful; but it must be proven to Germany that the dominant motive in a Christian civilization is moral. It was the dawning Christian conscience of pagan Rome that abolished the combats of the arena; it was the conscience of America that destroyed slavery; conscience has put an end to duelling, except in militaristic groups; it has humanized war among civilized peoples. And conscience will abolish war when men no longer can fight with a good conscience. When war is held to be criminal it will be punished as crime. And war is criminal, from the viewpoint of private Christian ethics. It involves the suspension of all the Commandments. It is a survival from savagery; the very basis of war is the rule of primitive ages that the injured is both judge and avenger. As long as men employ violence to obtain justice, they will seek justice through violence. In the long run, if our civilization is to remain

Christian, the conscience of the world will brand war as murder, and the nation that makes war will be treated by Christian nations as a murderer and a common enemy of mankind.

VI

Apologies for War Considered

It is true that militarism in Europe has not been confined to Germany. Russia for example, under czarism, was notoriously militaristic in spirit. England has had her preachers of militarism. Even the gentle Ruskin says: "All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war. . . . There is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle. . . . All great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace." In France the Dreyfus case laid bare in its worst features the spirit of militarism in the French army, in which it took ten years for the cause of justice to triumph over the forces of prejudice, partisanship, and irrationality. Even America has had her militarists. But the significant feature is that the militarists in England, France, and America have not converted either the people or the governments of those nations, while the German militarists have long held sway over the German mind; since the founding of the Empire it has seldom refused the demands of the German General Staff. Militarism in Russia and England and France and in all the nations as well as in Germany must share responsibility for the Great War, yet we remember it was Prussia that originated and first adopted universal compulsory military service which laid the foundations of militarism in Europe. In the war of 1870-71 Prussia as leader of Germany planted in France the seeds of deep-seated hatred by wresting

from her Alsace-Lorraine, and through the subsequent increase in her army, inspired by fear for the stolen goods, forced upon France the nationalization of the French army. Immediately after the recent Balkan wars Germany made another enormous increase in her standing army, the significance of which we now understand. Germany within very recent times forced upon a reluctant England a staggering race in naval armament. German militarism, as the efficient cause of the survival of militarism in Europe into the twentieth century, must be held a very real cause of the Great War.

It is true that Germany is not the only nation that has increased its lands by war. All of the great powers of Europe have done so. The wars of Louis XIV, the wars between France and England in America, England's wars on the Continent and in India and South Africa, all resulted in material advantage for the conqueror. Our own Mexican War was not without profit in lands. We remember that America once went to war with England to resist alleged violation of American rights upon the high seas, and that envious eyes were cast upon Canada. Of all these wars at least two things may be observed. In none of them was there the faithless abandonment of treaty obligations that has characterized Germany's action in the present war, and in none of them was resort made to war practices that shocked the conscience of the world. No sound argument can be drawn from these wars, nor from any wars, in favor of the militaristic regime of Germany. History knows other constructive forces than war. Canada, Australia, South Africa, are not the products of war, and they are not inferior to Prussia. The Federal Union of the United States, a union of free states, does not admit of comparison with the union of paternal despotisms

which we know as the German Empire. A just appraisal of warlike qualities in nations show that these qualities have not tended uniformly to well-being; on the contrary, in many nations, as with the Indian, the wolf, and the pirate, they have tended to extinction. It is the fittest, not the fiercest, that survive. Germany is not yet through with war.

It may readily be admitted that conditions beneficial for the race have resulted from war. It is true for example that the Greek wars against the Persians made it possible for the superior civilization of the Greeks to continue its development; that the wars of Rome paved the way for the introduction of her superior political and legal institutions among the peoples of the Mediterranean and for the spread of Christianity; that in the French wars after the Revolution there was developed the French national spirit. Our own Revolutionary War gave birth to a nation, and the Civil War preserved it and rid it of slavery. The Spanish-American War freed Cuba and the Philippines from oppression. But is the fact that good came of these wars conclusive evidence that the wars were the cause of the good? Does it show necessarily that war is the way to ascertain what is right? By the Revolutionary War, it is true, democratic government was achieved for America, yet the same or a greater degree of democracy has been achieved peacefully for those who stayed in England by a series of Reform Bills in Parliament. Human slavery was neither more right nor more wrong as a result of the Civil War. The doctrine that issues of moral conscience are made right or wrong by physical force can not be admitted in a Christian civilization. "Come, let us reason together," is the spirit of the Great Teacher. Reason and justice are even by Germans acknowledged to be

the foundation of civil relations within the state, then why not between states? As to wars in the past, is it not well to remember that these wars *were* in the past; the question really is, what are we going to do in the present? Is it not the part of wisdom to put away the crude methods of ages that are gone, and recognize that right and justice between civilized nations are to be determined, as they are between citizens of peaceful communities, by the methods of Christian civilization?

It is sometimes pointed out as an argument for war that the sanction of force is in reality back of our courts. Doubtless, as long as man retains his pugnaciousness and other brutish inheritances, force in some form will be necessary to restrain law-breakers; it is now being used to restrain Germany. The league of the Allies, embracing practically the civilized world outside of Germany, is a league to enforce peace and to punish the crimes Germany has committed. It is doubtless true that just as we have to have physical power back of our courts of justice there will always need to be an international police force,—“the organized major force of mankind,” as President Wilson puts it,—to curb national law-breakers and to enforce the judgments of such international tribunals as may be established.

Strangely enough the German argument for the moral values of war seems to have had weight even in America, and with minds of intellectual power. They have argued that war fosters physical strength, courage, self-sacrifice, efficiency, devotion to an ideal, consideration for others, willingness to dispense with ease and luxury, etc., all of which at first hearing sounds well. It may even be admitted that war, like any national calamity, may enhance noble qualities called upon

by great stress and strain. On the other hand, this can scarcely offset for the rank and file the growth of hate and evil that has always followed the unloosing in war of the worst passions in human nature. War is a doubtful moral agent, if we accept the statistics of crime in war times, especially among youth released from the restraints of the home. There are moral equivalents for war. If civic education through the home, the schools and the colleges, the press, the pulpit and the platform, and the manifold exigencies of practical life are not conducive to the growth of these qualities, we may well despair and, as someone has said, it were well that the human race be destroyed and that the Almighty should begin over again.

VII

America and the Great Democracies

The growth of the people's influence in government has been opposed by the privileged classes in all periods of history. The clash of these two forces in some countries has brought results by force of arms, as in the American Revolution; in others, results have come through violent social upheaval, amounting almost to civil war, as in France and more recently in Russia. As a result of one form or another of effective protest against absolutist government, democracy made rapid strides during the last century. The advance was especially marked in England, the United States and France. Indeed, throughout the world, never since people came to live together under political institutions have the masses of people enjoyed so large a share in their government as in the years immediately preceding the present war.

England may indeed be called the mother of democracies, qualified by a history of protest against absolutism extending over a thousand years. For the people of the United States the achievements of our great Ally in democracy are absolutely fundamental; the very roots of American institutional and constitutional life are embedded deep in English foundations. While England's government retains forms of monarchy, it is in spirit and practice essentially democratic. Her parliament was the mother of our colonial assemblies, and out of the elements of these was fashioned the American Congress. American colonial life reproduced almost completely English local government in its counties, townships, hundreds, manors,

and parishes, which have been passed on in one form or another from the Atlantic seaboard to our western States. Our legal and political ideas are essentially English. The English common law is the foundation of American jurisprudence. The practice of our courts is English. In political ideas it was the Englishman John Locke who in his *Treatise on Government* furnished the groundwork for patriot philosophizing in 1776. It is needful that Americans understand clearly this English heritage in America's life in order that Americans and Englishmen may in all sincerity emphasize before the world our common aim in fighting for those principles which we would make the foundation of a future brotherhood of nations.

A great harm has been done to the cause of democracy by the foolish and stupid, albeit well-intentioned and "patriotic," account which the older textbooks of American history were wont to give of the causes of the American Revolution. As someone has truly said, if England had been as democratic in 1775 as she was some years later, undoubtedly we would still be living, as Canada now is, as a part of the British Empire. Many conditions favored separation. The social and political tendencies under which the American colonies were founded, their remoteness from the seat of imperial authority, the environment of the wilderness, and the greater or less need of self-dependence in local arrangements to meet emergencies, had led in America to more rapid development along lines of popular rule than had been possible in England. England naturally desired to maintain the unity of the Empire, economically as well as politically, but was not wise in her methods. She was hampered by the reactionary theory and practice of the German King of England, George III, of the

House of Hanover, whose governmental vision was essentially anti-English and opposed to the whole trend of English constitutional development. The Declaration of Independence is not anti-English. Its summary of grievances is not against England but against the King; it demands "the rights of Englishmen" as against the usurpation of those rights by the King and the Court party. Americans will do well to remember that when the break became imminent the great English statesmen Pitt, Fox and Burke definitely took sides with the colonies and championed their cause in Parliament.

The British Empire today is an imperial commonwealth of democracies. It is to the credit of England that she was among the first of the great nations to abandon the idea that colonies exist primarily for exploitation by the mother country. Since the middle of the last century England has introduced self-government into every one of her colonies that was ready for it, and under the stress and strain of the Great War they have rallied loyally to her support upon the battlefields in France. No other nation in history has accomplished such a feat in government and such an achievement would not be possible to a nation bent upon a policy of selfish aggrandizement. Canada today is almost as independent of England as the United States and hardly less democratic, yet from her handful of people since the beginning of the war some 500,000 volunteers have gone over-sea to fight for England; and now Canada has adopted conscription. In point of loyalty what is true of Canada is true of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. In the latter colony after the Boer war, with a people mainly Dutch, England not only restored self-government but allowed the people to elect as administrative officers the Dutch generals that had fought against her. The

world furnishes no political spectacle of similar nature except in the history of democracies. In India and Egypt, England has achieved much for the cause of democracy. Reluctantly she has extended her dominion in India. Repeatedly she refused to take possession of Egypt, until in 1882 she was forced to do so, and declared formally her protectorate only in 1914. In both countries the native people are permitted to share in the government. Ireland presents political problems of gravest nature, but even Ireland's friends admit that the obstacles to their happy solution are not so much a matter of the Government as of Ireland's inability to unite upon what it will have. The best justification of England's colonial policy is the loyalty with which her colonies have responded to her needs in the present great crisis of her national life.

Vital to the existence of this great bulwark of democracy is the supremacy of the British navy, a power England has never abused. England's enemies claim that she has contemplated world conquest, and that her great navy is a menace to the freedom of the world. It is a menace to the world ambitions of Germany, but not to the legitimate ambitions of any free people. Naval power is not a weapon of offense, but of defense. By her naval power England is prepared to defend her island from invasion and to protect her colonies; but no naval power, however great, would enable her to take the offensive and conquer a defended country. Many features of England's life have made her naval power imperative,—her island position, her dependence on importations for food, and her vast manufactures for export. If England dreamed of world conquest she would be found with a great army and a compulsory military system, like Germany's,—whereas her army until recently was small and her soldiers were volun-

teers. England's lack of a nationalized army speaks louder for her peaceful intentions than even her traditional policy of aloofness from European alliances or her leadership in the world's peace movements for disarmament.

The disposition of England for peace is not difficult to understand, except by persons afflicted with Anglophobia. It is not a question of what England has been, nor yet is it a question of a few mistaken dreamers of "Pan-Angloism" or of gossip and personalities. It is the larger question of the power the English people have acquired through England's great transformation in terms of democracy during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Americans to whom the names of Cobden, Bright and Gladstone do not bring a realization of this change have something significant to learn about the history of their own country. England's economists and statesmen of the last century have been the teachers of America, and America has been the teacher of England. It was from America that the lessons were learned which brought to the English people the great reform bills of 1867 and 1885. It has been the voice of the English people through Parliament, as it has been the voice of the American people through Congress, that liberty has spoken with determination against a policy of militarism as a support for imperialism; and this is the essential point to remember in any talk about "British imperialism."

America, the daughter of England, has been faithful to her inheritance. By the American Revolution, liberalism was promoted not only in America but throughout the world. Excepting in Switzerland, no nation in the world in 1789 had a written constitution; in that year the United States of America wrote into the great charter of this nation's liberties

a conception of citizenship which constitutes her chief contribution to popular government, the doctrine that the state consists essentially of its citizens. This new departure was involved in the theory that the government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. Sovereignty in America lies in the people; the state exists for the people, the exact opposite of the German theory, that the people exist for the state. Further than this, America, through her naturalization laws, has offered this citizenship to the people of all nations, opening thus the way for the oppressed of the world to become a part of the American state; and the wisdom of her course has been justified by the loyalty with which her foreign-born citizens, recognizing the righteousness of her cause, are standing by the flag.

The influence of England and America upon France, and in turn of these three great democracies upon the development of democratic institutions in Europe, has been incalculable. A hundred years before the French Revolution, the Puritan Revolution in England under Cromwell had established the principle, that when a conflict arises between the crown and the representative body, the crown must give way. On the Continent at that time despotic government was at its height; but the example of England was not forgotten. The example of the execution of Charles I served the people of France in dealing with Louis XVI. The philosophers Hobbes and Locke, who developed in England the political ideas of this time, had a large influence upon the thinking of Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau; and these thinkers in turn furnished directly the intellectual stimulus of the French Revolution. The "divine right" of Kings was dealt its final blow in England in the Revolution of 1688. Locke furnished the

philosophical justification. Government, he says, was originally formed by a contract among the citizens constituting a nation, who covenanted together for their common advantage, from which it follows that absolute monarchy is a usurpation of power by a single citizen; only when a government is controlled by the people as originally intended can there be enjoyed the maximum amount of personal liberty for all citizens. Both Voltaire and Montesquieu visited England and lived there for a time. Especially Montesquieu became a great admirer of the English system of government, which he described for Frenchmen in his *Spirit of the Laws*. Later Rousseau, under the same influence, embodied in story form in *Emile* much that was vital in English education. In the writings of all these men there appear clearly outlined the revolutionary principles of natural rights, the contract theory of government, the sovereignty of the people, and the right of resistance to tyranny even to the extent of tyrannicide and political separation by force.

All of these ideas had their influence upon the American colonies, and the minds of Frenchmen were deeply stirred with the fact of the success of the American Revolution. Many Frenchmen, with Lafayette and Rochambeau, had fought in America. In American success they saw the possibility of establishing in France a state based upon a free citizenship electing its own rulers. Such was our gift to France, in return for the assistance she had sent to us, and out of it emerged the French Revolution. The French "Declaration of the rights of Man" was taken almost directly from the old Bills of Rights which the American colonies had shaped before the Revolution, which are filled with the spirit of the citizen-state. The French people, out of the struggles of many

years across the Napoleonic era and the restorations and reactions of the various privileged classes, erected finally the great French Republic, which since the downfall of Napoleon III has been the open and sincere friend of the United States.

The continental influence of the French Revolution was in keeping with the appeal which the history of France has always made to the nations of Europe. A true sentiment was voiced by Benjamin Franklin when he said that every man has two countries, his own and France. French thought and French history have so dominated the thinking of Europe that an understanding of France is indispensable for an understanding of the rest of Europe. Especially is this true of the influence of the French Revolution. Only gradually at first, however, could the conception of a state based upon the rights of man, with a government responsible to the people, spread in face of the repressive measures of absolutism. With the February Revolution of 1848 in Paris it received new impetus. The principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man were then adopted by the liberal parties in every nation of Europe, and a new era dawned for popular government, for a free press, and for equality of all men before the law.

The French Revolution was not lost on Germany. The new spirit took hold in the shape of rebellion against the autoocracy of Napoleon. An expression of this spirit is contained in the patriotic poems of Arndt and the formation of patriotic societies, like the Burschenschaft, formed mainly by students in the universities. It took the form of an intense nationality. The Rhine provinces in the south were thoroughly imbued with the principles of "liberty, equality and fraternity," and received constitutions more or less popular. In Prussia itself the discontent with the old absolute monarchy grew along

with the budding desire for popular participation in the government on the basis of a written constitution. The King of Prussia had promised such a constitution to his people, but delayed. In 1817 occurred a student demonstration and at about the same time the murder of a journalist named Kotzebue by a fanatical student, which formed the pretext for violent reaction against liberalism under the leadership of Metternich. For the time being the liberal elements, except in the south, were forced to yield; but they bided their opportunity.

From France again came the impulse to liberalism, in 1848. On May 18 an assembly of some four hundred representatives of the German people met at Frankfort in south Germany and began deliberations looking to a new constitution that should satisfy the nationalistic aspirations and longings for popular government surging in the breasts of the German people. A constitution was finally devised, providing for various popular organs and an hereditary emperor at the head of a united Germany. The imperial dignity was offered to the King of Prussia. But the King was alienated from the whole movement, by the conduct of the revolutionists in Berlin. He was by nature timid and conservative. The reactionists had profited by the dilatoriness of the Assembly, which instead of bringing things quickly to a head, had spent months theorizing about the "rights of the German citizen"; when finally the Assembly was ready, the autocrats were more than ready. They had mustered all the forces of reaction, and met the new movement so effectively that for immediate results it came to naught.

Of special importance as an expression of hope for democracy was the phase of this revolution in Prussia. A popular

assembly had met in Prussia in the same month as the general assembly at Frankfort. It proposed to abolish the nobility and to strike from the royal title the phrase "King by the Grace of God." In June a mob stormed the arsenal. The King was frightened, withdrew from Berlin, and ordered the assembly to disperse; which, with many protests, they did. The next year the King, as a measure of safety, submitted to an assembly selected from his subjects with scrupulous care a constitution drawn by himself. This constitution was declared in 1850, and with a few changes it is the constitution of Prussia today. How far it went in the direction of democracy may be judged from the fact that a single man of wealth in an electoral district, if he paid a third of the taxes, had as much influence in the elections as all of the working people together. It was a great disappointment to the Liberals, many of whom replied by emigrating to the United States, and the immigrations then begun were only the first of a steady tide which has since flowed from German lands to America.

On the whole during the last century the vested interests of Europe forced compromises from the rebellious champions of democracy. In all countries excepting France, Switzerland, and Portugal, the forms of limited monarchies have been retained. But democracy is dynamic. It continually demands greater sacrifices from the few fortunates for the many poor. In the light of the rapid advance of popular government in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth it seems doubtful that such compromises can be permanent.

The more recent democratic movements seem to afford new hope that the future belongs to democracy. The Russian

Revolution is to many one of the great surprises of history, but not so to those who have known the Russian people, whose instincts and local institutions have always been fundamentally democratic. The world's attention, in so far as it has concerned Russia at all, has been confined chiefly to the Government, a superimposed autocratic regime whose chief ambition was expressed in a mass of secret treaties exposed by the Revolution, looking to the absorption of neighboring peoples. The deposed dynasty of the Romanoffs began in an election among the nobles dating before the time of Peter the Great, making a long line of despotic rulers who have modelled their governmental machinery very largely by imitating and adapting features of the Prussian system. The Czar and the Kaiser stood for much the same thing. In the Russian Revolution of 1905-6 the German Government did its best to help the Czar repress his subjects, arresting revolutionary exiles attempting to cross into Germany, and keeping all comers from Russia under the watchful eyes of the German secret service. Previous to the outbreak of the present war, as shown by documents now published, the Czar and the Kaiser had secret understandings in which their mutual appeals reflect very clearly their common stand for autocracy. The Russian Revolution has drawn sharply the difference between autocratic and democratic policies, among others that democracies are not engaged in the business of looting their neighbors, and the prompt recognition of Russia's revolutionary government by the United States gave further evidence of that basic quality of democracy, sympathy with the oppressed of other nations and recognition of their rights.

Someone has rightly said that it was not merely the breakdown of an economic system, but moral enthusiasm for the

rights of man, which created modern democracy. The revolutions of Europe have shown that the deepest motives and impulses have been not so much political and economic as moral. "Liberty, equality, and fraternity," the watchwords of the French Revolution, are words of moral import, instinct with living forces opposed to the age-long abuse of the many by the privileged few who have made the wars of the world. These forces are hostile to all unjust class distinctions, recognizing in all humanity capacities for the highest attainments, and extending equal opportunity and privilege to all mankind. When it shall be established universally that the great masses of struggling humanity may no longer be exploited selfishly for the benefit of privileged classes, the world will be near the dawn of that day when war shall be relegated to the limbo of absurdities whither have long since departed the ghosts of other barbarities of primitive ages.

VIII

American Democracy for Sane Internationalism

The effect of democracy upon international relations is best illustrated for us in the history of the United States. Not that this history is entirely one of "sweetness and light." As in all human affairs, along with the enthusiasm for ideals and patriotic self-sacrifice have gone sordid personal ambitions and the blight of privileged interests. War is one of the hard realities of American history. Yet it is not needful nor wholesome to minimize the weak points in America's war record; attempts in the past to do so have resulted only in dangerous optimism and in a questionable sort of patriotism, here consisting largely of self-glorification and a failure to understand other nations. Any judgment of America that is worth while must result from examining honestly her record, and there need be no fear but that if it is examined in the spirit of her whole history it will be found in harmony with the permanent interests of the peoples of the world everywhere.

The failure of Americans at the outbreak of the Great War to realize fully its meaning was due in large measure to a traditional, and for the present narrow, interpretation of our history. It was due to that feeling of isolation from Europe which has more or less consciously dominated the foreign policy of the United States since the days of Washington. It is this feeling and this policy which has prevented us from realizing that the whole history of the United States is but a chapter in the westward expansion of European peoples and European civilization. It is only now beginning to dawn

upon us that America has become a world power, and that, as such, a policy of isolation is for her no longer possible or desirable.

In Washington's time there was reason for keeping free from "entangling alliances." The colonies had four times been drawn into war since 1689 as a result of European conflicts. Before the new nation was the spectacle of the French Reign of Terror and the exhausting wars following the French Revolution. Washington saw clearly that as a young nation the United States must conserve its energies for developing its own resources. But when in 1916 President Wilson declared, "This is the last war . . . that involves the world that the United States can keep out of," he measured for America the full distance between Washington's day and our own. Indeed, Washington found isolation easier to preach than to practice; and his successors, after maintaining for a time neutrality with England and Napoleon, went to war with one of them. It is significant that in the terms of the treaty of 1814 not one of the alleged causes of the war was alluded to; and Jefferson communicated to Congress that the treaty "terminates with peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most brilliant successes." More brilliant was his purchase from France, in 1803, of Louisiana. The purchase of Florida in 1819 from Spain further lessened the chances of America's embroilment with Europe. But autocracy on the Continent was wide awake to the new gains being made by Democracy. It had set in motion reactionary forces which were bitterly hostile to liberalism in the New World as well as the Old. Russia, Prussia, and Austria entered an agreement known as the "Holy Alliance," whose principal purpose was to maintain "the divine right of kings" and the privileges

of the aristocracy. An occasion for an expression of this service came in 1822 in helping Spain to crush out rebellion in her colonies in South America. Russia at that time was looking prospectively down the Pacific coast of North America with a view to extending her possessions southward from Alaska. European intervention and colonization in the New World was then imminent when President Monroe announced, that "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

For that day this doctrine was a far-seeing pronouncement. It was not wholly unselfish. Yet there is little doubt that people so close to the struggles of the American Revolution rejoiced over the triumph of the principles of freedom and self-government in the revolted South American colonies which were seeking to pattern after the new republic in the North, and that along with concern for their own peace and prosperity there went something of generous enthusiasm for the welfare of these little states and the hope that for the future in both Americas there might be freedom to work out to their fullest capacity the principles of human liberty under free government.

The Monroe Doctrine was one way of saying that America "must be made safe for democracy," but such a message from such a source would hardly have been taken seriously by the powers of Europe except for one substantial fact, namely, the British navy. From that day to this England's recognition of her common interest with the United States in maintaining

the Monroe Doctrine has been the chief bulwark of the New World against the designs of autocracy.

In the present war America has announced the policy of the Monroe Doctrine for the world. President Wilson, in his Senate address, in commenting on the nations' replies to his request for their war aims, said: "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." As in the early day, so now, the British navy stands pledged to secure the extension of this doctrine to the world, and not only the British navy but the whole resources of the people of the British Empire and the allied resources of practically all civilized peoples outside of the Germanic powers and Turkey stand pledged to secure the freedom of the world from the aggressions of brutal and warlike nations.

The course of the United States in the New World has been fairly consistent with the Monroe Doctrine. An apparent exception is the war with Mexico. The payment of \$15,000,000 to Mexico for lands acquired by the war, although such action was a radical departure from the previous usage of nations, does not excuse the war. The later spirit of the United States toward Mexico has in some measure atoned. In behalf of Mexico the United States thwarted the encroachments of Napoleon III after the Civil War. Recently President Wilson refused to intervene in Mexican affairs, which has been a practical demonstration to all of the Latin states that German

propaganda there has misrepresented this nation, which has no policy but that of protecting them as part of its own self-protection. The effect of this demonstration is seen in the response to the President's appeal to neutrals. The people of most of these states are at heart with the United States in the war. The growing enthusiasm for Pan-Americanism has been newly illustrated by the Washington conference of states in 1915. Other such conferences to be held in the future hold promise of gradually overcoming the natural prejudices and jealousies arising out of diversity of race and customs.

The relations of the United States with Cuba and the Philippines are further evidence of this nation's policy towards weaker peoples. The Spanish war, by which the Philippines were acquired, was to many unwelcome. They saw in it an expression of the imperialistic tendency of the age. In a sense they were right. In reality, however, our interference was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Cuba. America went to war, in the general understanding of the people at that time, to free Cuba from oppression by Spain—the Spain against whose policy of exploitation the South American colonies had rebelled three-quarters of a century before. America's motive respecting Cuba holds deep meaning for her growth in international morality. How different in spirit from the Ostend Manifesto of 1854! And this spirit towards Cuba has characterized America's treatment of her since 1898. Twice we have had Cuba, and each time we have regarded possession as a public trust, and have restored Cuba to self-government at the earliest moment consistent with her welfare. The same is true of our treatment of the Philippines. Our Government has repeatedly protected the people of the islands from exploitation, and early in our rule we sent some

five hundred American teachers to carry to them the principles of self-government and the best of our civilization. Mr. Roosevelt says: "I believe that I am speaking with historic accuracy and impartiality when I say that the American treatment of and attitude toward the Filipino people, in its combination of disinterested ethical purpose and sound sense, marks a new and long stride forward in advance of all steps that have hitherto been taken along the path of wise and proper treatment of weaker by stronger races."

The Monroe Doctrine is working out in the New World a policy of international cooperation vital to the democracy of the world everywhere. To the north of us, between Canada and the United States, stretches a boundary line of three thousand miles, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, upon which there is not a single fortification, nor is there a battle-ship of either nation upon the Great Lakes; the United States and Canada are fortified in the hearts of their people. In our Civil War the Canadian people sympathized with the North, as did also the people of England. The Civil War was not ours alone. It was a war in which the democracy of Europe was interested, to save for mankind the world's greatest experiment in self-government. It would of course have pleased the autocrats of England, as well as of the Continent of Europe, to have seen British intervention in behalf of the Confederacy. It would have been a capital victory for autocratic government everywhere if popular government might thus have been wrecked before it should become too strong to be discredited. But the letters of Lincoln to English working-men struck the responsive chord in the struggling masses of the English people, whose blind and often ignorant groping upward towards better things the American democracy was

trying to make good for them; and thus though cut off by the war from the cotton of the Southern States which fed their mills, they were willing to starve rather than give their voice in the counsels of their nation in favor of the autocrats who would intervene against the United States.

Typical of America's treatment of weaker peoples is her policy respecting indemnities. The payment of \$15,000,000 to Mexico for lands at the close of the Mexican War has its counterpart in the payment to Spain of \$20,000,000 for the Philippines after the Spanish War; the victor paid the indemnity. Some fifty years ago when America became involved through European nations in a war with Japan, her share of the indemnity at the close was \$800,000; in 1883 she paid back the entire amount to Japan with interest. At the close of the Boxer Rebellion in China the United States received an indemnity of some \$20,000,000, of which \$19,000,000 (all but a million for actual damages to American property in China) was returned to China as an educational endowment, the income from which she might use to send Chinese youth to American schools.

This policy is the exact reverse of that practiced by Germany. Germany makes war for what there is in it. Annexations and indemnities have always been a fixed part of her program. The treatment accorded to France in 1871 was expected to crush her, and in the present war, failing of world dominion, Germany will do the next best, and is proceeding now to do the preliminaries in Belgium, northern France, the Balkan states and Russia, preparatory to the demands she will make if she can force a peace by compromise.

The United States has stood consistently for a sane internationalism. Her wars have been on the whole not wars of

aggression, but wars on behalf of some issue vital to the highest interests of popular government and world peace. She has been one of the foremost advocates of arbitration as a method of settling international disputes, diligently helping to seek some basis upon which the nations might live together with the least friction and the highest good for all. As a result of her leadership, supported by other civilized nations, a considerable body of international law has been made and codified. So firmly had the ideal of peace and orderly relations taken hold upon the nations at the beginning of this century that willingness to abide by these international agreements had become the supreme test of the fitness of a government to exist in a civilized world. International law is, like all human law, the product of man's effort through the ages to devise some basis whereby men may dwell together without the sanction of force. In her obedience to international law the United States presents a striking contrast with Germany. Not only does Germany both in theory and practice assail the ethical nature of international law, she does not recognize any such law. She rejects arbitration on principle. For her, war alone is the arbiter between nations. The weak nation has no right to exist, much less has it a right to respect from a strong nation, for might makes right; in her view only weak states would invent arbitration, to hamper the strong.

In striking contrast with the policy of the United States is Germany's conduct at the Hague conferences. By her action at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 Germany alone defeated the great humanitarian aims of those conferences, both as to compulsory arbitration and the limitation of armaments. She would not even discuss the latter. Great Britain, France and the United States, as leaders of the democracies of the world,

avored both propositions; Germany led the opposition, and both were defeated; for no nation would dare disarm unless all would do so. As to "freedom of the seas," it was revealed in the Hague conferences that Germany's idea was to take away from England her principal weapon, namely, the power to blockade enemy commerce, while Germany wished to preserve for herself every possible means of doing harm to enemy and neutral ships alike. In her general program of action at these conferences Germany may justly be said to have made inevitable the entrance of America into the Great War the moment there should arise with her a controversy which could not be solved by direct diplomatic notes. With Great Britain, and with nineteen other nations, the United States had a general arbitration treaty. During any war in which they might be concerned scarcely an issue could arise which might not honorably be deferred for settlement until after the war. But with Germany—a nation which rejects arbitration, for which war is the sole arbiter between nations, which believes that might makes right—war was inevitable. Germany has always borne an insolent attitude in her relations with the United States; she has regarded America as a weak nation. Since the beginning of the war Germany's total disregard of international law in respect to all nations has condemned her as an international desperado. The facts are there and speak for themselves.

IX

America For Humanity

The United States, despite her policy of isolation, has always felt the solidarity of democratic interests throughout the world. While this country has not actually intervened in European affairs, it has unofficially expressed its sympathy with all movements in Europe calculated to promote the cause of human freedom. In particular has it been in accord with the great nationalistic uprisings during the last century through which the people have expressed their longings for independence. President Monroe himself, in his message to Congress in 1823, expressed the sympathy of the United States for the Greeks in their war for independence. Similar expressions of sympathy were made unofficially for the revolutionists of 1848. The Austrian Government protested vigorously against the sympathy expressed by President Taylor for the Hungarians. Still closer became America's sympathy with all these peoples through their immigrations to the United States in the middle of the century, particularly from Germany, whence came Carl Schurz and other idealists, the ancestors of many of our present German Americans.

When during the course of the Greek Revolution the Russian minister in behalf of the "Holy Alliance" undertook to make clear to the United States the beauties of the "European system," Monroe, Jefferson and Madison were much alarmed, and considered seriously a proposal, made by England, for a joint protest against the system, not only for America, but for all Europe as well. This would have meant the extension of the

Monroe Doctrine to Europe even at that early day; but America was cautious. As events have shaped themselves since, the inner principle of the Monroe Doctrine, the protection of the weak nation against the strong, has now gained a recognized place in the conscience of the world. It is the verdict of an international conscience that is felt today, in the declaration that such defiance of the principle of nationality as has been committed against France and the Slavic peoples of Europe should not longer be tolerated by civilized nations,—and more, that these wrongs must be redressed.

The "European system" was based upon the doctrine of the Balance of Power. By this principle, the distribution, division or annexation of territory was the concern of kings in whom all government was vested. The people were only as herds of cattle. The royal solicitude was to keep an equilibrium of power among the states. When the great awakening came at the opening of the nineteenth century, the people began to feel that a nation is a living organism, a thing of growth, of which the people themselves are the essential elements, whose government should be suited to their particular race, language, literature, customs, traditions and needs, and should be administered by their own elected officials. The French Revolution gave a sharp spur to this new national self-consciousness. The arbitrary policy of Napoleon greatly intensified it; it was largely the opposition he called forth that resulted in the series of uprisings against which the Holy Alliance was formed. Despite all reactionary efforts, racial and political independence was attained in Greece and Belgium, and strong national movements in Italy and Germany made for Italian and German unity; in the Balkan peninsula six independent states came into being out of territory ruled by the Turks.

The people's yearnings for national solidarity along racial lines have made them increasingly sensitive to the injustice of domination by a state foreign to them. In some cases religious differences have been involved, as with the Christian peoples under Turkish rule. Russia has absorbed various border peoples, including the Finns, lately in revolution. Poland long ago was effaced politically by absorption into Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The Germans of Austria are excluded from Germany. Italians are outside of Italy,—a population of several hundred thousand people at the head of the Adriatic are under Austrian rule; one of Italy's motives in the present war is the recovery of these lands and their people from Austria. The very existence of Austria-Hungary is a defiance of the principle of nationality. Her entire political fabric is a mesh of different peoples more or less hostile to one another. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavic peoples, against the intense nationalistic spirit of the Slavs led by Serbia, had much directly to do with the outbreak of the present war. The wresting of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from France by Germany was distinctly a violation of the principle of nationality and makes a vital factor in the war. If the principle of nationality had been thoroughly applied in Europe during the last century, a very large part of the friction among European states would have been removed and war postponed indefinitely, if not permanently.

Not that the ideal of racial nationalism can ever be completely realized. The complex mixture of peoples from all parts of Europe in any given state makes the ideal of a national unit in each geographic unit impossible. The absence of natural boundaries, the intricate arrangement of territories, the demands of political and commercial interests, the changes

effected in the people themselves by residence under foreign government, make even an approach to the ideal difficult. Notwithstanding, there is imperative need that adjustment be made at the points of positive friction. How important this is to the world's peace is strikingly reflected in the peace terms proposed by President Wilson on January 8, 1918, fully half of which bear on this one issue: "The wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871, in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine should be righted." The Italian frontier should be readjusted "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality." The people of Austria-Hungary "should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." "International guaranties of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into." Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire should have "secure sovereignty;" but peoples under Turkish rule should have "unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Poland should be reestablished to include territories "inhabited by indisputably Polish populations," and its independence and territorial integrity should be "guaranteed by international covenant." The nations must form an association for the purpose of "affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

With these terms Great Britain is in accord, as evidenced by the address of her Prime Minister delivered at about the same time. France is deeply in sympathy with them. And it is more than a matter of sentiment. No nation that loves peace can fail to realize that deep under the sentiments of race, religion and language lies the pressure of material needs and interests, of which these nationalist movements are all expressions. The solicitude of democracy is not merely a

sentimental care for humanity, but a recognition of the necessity of justice to all nationalities as a necessary pre-condition of any permanent peace.

Even with this, it seems doubtful whether peace can be made permanently secure except through some permanent and powerful league to enforce peace after the war. It is no doubt true that during the war the world is acquiring a deeper consciousness of its unity, and that the moral conscience of the world has been quickened by the example and retribution of Germany's lawlessness. Yet human nature remaining what it is, collective groups of mankind, like citizens in civil life, will undoubtedly require the restraint of some overshadowing force which the rest of the world can threaten to bring into action if needed. The possibility of some such organized force after the war is more than a chimera. A "League to Enforce Peace" has already been organized, with the United States as leader, and has held several sessions attended by educators, capitalists, diplomats, mayors, governors, and congressmen from all parts of America addressed by such men as Mr. Taft, Mr. Hughes and President Wilson. In England Lord Bryce and Viscount Grey have publicly supported this effort to place humanity above national ambitions and to create the machinery necessary for the enforcement of international justice.

The central ideas of this League are derived from the American Union. Here on this continent a century ago thirteen sovereign states put aside narrow and bigoted patriotism and, profiting by the experience of a loose Confederation, merged their fortunes in a greater state under a federal constitution. A supreme interstate court was erected, whose interpretations of the national law strengthened the federal

bond of unity, later to be preserved by the Civil War. The success of this Federal Union laid the foundations for The Hague Tribunal; an American capitalist of British descent financed the building of The Hague Peace Palace; and the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, called the first Hague Conference. The entire movement was brought to naught by Germany. While Germany has wrecked the peace of the world, the constructive work already done at The Hague will live after the war and, indeed, is receiving great impetus during its course. If the world succeeds in organizing a permanent world court with power to call cases before it and to enforce its decisions, which shall recognize as equal before it all nations both great and small, it will owe this achievement largely to the spirit of democracy as embodied in the Governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States.

X

Democracy and the Industrial Revolution

Among the powerful factors contributing to the adoption of democratic theories and the establishment of war-opposing governments in the last century was the influence of industrialism. With the dawn of the century came the beginnings of that series of great inventions in textile manufacturing which with the application of steam was destined to revolutionize industry and develop the seeds of great social and political upheavals. Spreading from England to the United States and to the continent of Europe these changes affected vitally every nation of the western world. Before the revolution, manufacturing was in accord with the original meaning of the word, "made by hand," which method had existed almost unchanged from primitive times. Steam and mechanical invention substituted great power machines for human labor, established great factories in place of domestic industries, and immensely increased the output of industrial products. The names of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, Whitney and Watt should be as familiar to the school boy as the names of the great generals of history. In the division of labor, the increase of production, the change of workmen from country to city and the growth of manufacturing towns, the creation of great fortunes for employers and the appearance of a capitalist class with dependent laborers, the entrance of women and children into the factories, the broadening effects of population upon the working classes of this mass of population, the rise of trade-unionism, and withal the expan-

sion of international transportation and commerce and its effect upon national policies of free-trade and protection,—in all these ways the Industrial Revolution has exerted as profound an influence upon human life as any war or series of wars in history.

The special significance of industrialism for the expression of democracy against war is the advance of the people to political power. The Industrial Revolution in many of its essential ramifications of influence was democratic. As well in the creation of a capitalist class as in the massing of workmen in great industrial centers, the movement tended to increase class consciousness and to define for each class a sense of its duties as well as rights. In city and factory the denser population of the industrial class gave opportunity for the rise and influence of leaders and paved the way directly to political expression. In almost every country the reconstruction of economic and social arrangements in Europe was followed by a political revolution that looked towards democracy.

Especially in England and France were the democratic effects noteworthy. In England the shifting of population from the rural south to the manufacturing north precipitated new problems of representation in Parliament. The north contained the greatest abundance of fuel, and there the great manufacturing towns grew up, drawing laborers from all parts of England but particularly from the south. The decay of the rural towns which still continued to send members to Parliament—from the so-called “rotten boroughs” controlled by the owners of the land—while the great new northern towns had no representation at all, led to the Reform Bill of 1832, in which the new industrial class of laborers gained some measure of political recognition. In France as in Eng-

land the evils of the new system,—the greed of employers, the excessive labor hours, the ill-treatment of women and children, and the unwholesome and dangerous labor conditions,—did much to increase that social unrest which came to political expression in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.

Austria and Germany lagged far behind both France and England in industrial development. In the Austrian Empire workmen drifted to Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, where they formed a social element bitterly opposed to autocratic government and ready to join in a political upheaval. In Germany industry and commerce silently but surely worked towards welding the German people into a nation. Steam transportation was inaugurated. In 1835 was built the first railroad. Telegraph lines, forming a network of new social bonds, laced the German states closer together. With steam and electricity came machinery in the industries to further the development of mutual interdependence. Her statesmen as well as merchants began to feel more keenly the commercial disadvantages of the division of Germany into practically independent states. To overcome these, steps were initiated by Prussia's leaders to sweep away the customs lines and introduce uniform rates. Economic pressure was brought to bear and in 1834 the Zollverein, or tariff union was formed, composed of 17 states with a combined population of 23,000,000 people. The marvelous effect of this union in welding together German interests, stronger even than any political ties up to this time, was the forerunner of definite political union. But with her large agricultural interests and few large cities Germany did not then feel the pressure for change in manufacturing methods which came after the war with Austria and particularly after the war with France. Since

that time her industrial development has increased by leaps and bounds.

A characteristic of the new industrialism has been the awakening of new moral judgments respecting war. For the masses in all civilized lands the great discoveries and inventions have altered fundamentally the conditions of life, and in such a complex manner that war has become a terrific instrument of inequity and oppression. Labor has always been the enemy of war. Labor is constructive, war destructive, but especially so in modern industrial life. The effect of war upon modern industry is chaos. To shape into an instrument of social justice and peace the new industrial life imposed by modern science upon labor is the great end of the labor movements of our day.

XI

Socialism and the War

Out of this new industrialism have grown the ethical aspirations and enthusiasms of socialism. In its broader sense, as one expression of democracy, socialism is an attempt to extend the Christian principle of equality from the spiritual world to social and economic conditions. As Christianity makes all men equal before God, socialism would make them equitable sharers in the products of their toil. Socialism aims at the democratization of industry. The alliance of modern industry and science at first seemed to promise that with the increase of man's powers of production all people might be easily and adequately fed, clothed and sheltered, but it turned out that the poverty of the workers continued and in places even grew worse. The trouble was observed to be that the alliance of industry and science was accompanied by the divorce of industry and ethics. It became clear to many that moral conduct, the obligations of the strong to the weak, could not in a civilized society be dispensed with between the employer and the employed. Disregard of these obligations had resulted in the prevalence of strikes, riots, panics, and class hatred. It was but a step from the democratic theory of legal and political equality to the idea of socializing and moralizing the industrial processes by legislation and state control. With the program of the socialists to achieve these ends we are not here concerned, nor with the wild and mistaken notions that well-meaning people have evolved to carry on the "war on poverty." It is intended only to point out the essentially Christian

foundation of the general movement, its natural correlation with democracy, and its inevitable influence in producing among the laborers of the world a repugnance to war.

The relation of socialism to democracy is seen in the new interest in social reform which came in turn with the French Revolution and the Revolution of 1848. Mankind of course has dreamed of "a civilization without poverty, idleness or ugliness" from before the days of Plato's *Republic*. Following the French Revolution came those programs of reform associated with the names of Saint-Simon and Fourier. Saint-Simon, in his book *The New Christianity* is the founder of French socialism, the basis of which was the slogan of the Revolution, "the brotherhood of man." Fourier's program had many sympathizers in America, among them Horace Greeley and Nathaniel Hawthorne, the latter connected with the famous Brook Farm experiment in Massachusetts. Robert Owen, a successful English manufacturer and friend of the poor, was influenced by Fourier and became the founder of English socialism; it is probably to Owen that we owe the word "socialism." He came to the United States to defend his plan before the American Congress. "The New Harmony Colony" founded in the State of Indiana at about that time was based upon his teachings. These leaders are known as the "Utopian" socialists, who relied upon the intrinsic appeal of a beautiful theory of harmony and plenty without taking into account the complexity and inertia of human nature on the one hand and the positive opposition of the privileged classes on the other.

With the Revolution of 1848 came a new movement, the attempt to organize the great mass of workingmen into a political party for the purpose of getting control of the gov-

ernment and forcing it to forward their plans. This movement began in Germany under the leadership of Karl Marx. On the eve of the Revolution he issued the *Communist Manifesto*, a formulation of the principles of the new socialism, which became the platform of organized political socialism in every country and eventually the creed of a great international political movement against autocracy, militarism, and war. Karl Marx, educated in the University of Bonn, intended to become a university professor, but his boldness and radical teachings barred him, and he went into journalism. The vigor of his attacks on the Prussian Government led to the suppression of his paper. Continued persecution drove him out of Germany and after many wanderings he settled in London where he studied and wrote during the remainder of his life. At one time he was a correspondent of the *New York Tribune*. His work on "Capital" is sometimes called "the workingman's Bible" and has been translated into all the continental languages. While from its program have been derived some of the worst elements of class hatred and class war, yet, on the whole, the so-called "social democratic parties" founded upon its teachings have powerfully voiced the longings of the people and tended towards a greater measure of political freedom.

Socialism comparatively early became an international movement. In 1864 was organized the International Association of Workingmen in London with Karl Marx as leader. It gained such headway as to frighten thoroughly the European autocracies; but extreme radicalism caused its collapse in 1876. Other radical international movements, such as the Industrial Workers of the World, have brought great discredit upon the whole movement by their appeals to class hatred and violence.

The international aspect, however, is significant of labor's growing consciousness of world unity. In the monarchies of Europe it was predicted that war could not be entered upon in the face of this opposition of labor. The loyalty of labor in America in the Great War against autocracy is inspired partly by the hope and belief that by a supreme effort democracy may at last destroy autocracy, and with it the power of the ruling classes to involve nations in war.

The political organization of socialism has been strongest in those countries where the industrial classes have least influence, notably in Germany. In 1863 the German Workingmen's Association was formed to work for universal male suffrage. In 1869 was formed the Social Democratic Labor Party. The tremendous industrial development in Germany following the Franco-Prussian War massed the people and built up great industrial centers as in England, and the new industrial population voiced its demands through political channels in no uncertain terms. In the elections of 1875 for the Reichstag the German Socialists polled 340,000 votes. So powerful did the Socialists become that Bismarck in alarm sought by a combination of repressive legislation and relief measures to undermine the movement. By repressive measures he temporarily disorganized their political power as a national party, but on the other hand he introduced a number of reforms upon the theory, as he said, of reviving the old paternal policy of the House of Hohenzollern "to care for its children." In 1884 he said, "Give the workingman the right to work as long as he is healthy, assure him care when he is sick, and maintenance when he is old," and then, "the Socialists will sing their siren song in vain." Laws were made granting insurance for accidents, sickness, and old age. But no substantial additions to these laws have been made in Ger-

many since 1889. The Socialists despise these laws as "fear-inspired poor-law legislation" and the socialist influence has grown steadily. At the outbreak of the war the Social Democrats were credited with 110 members out of the 397 members in the Reichstag.

But as against the outside world, the position of the German socialists during the present war may be taken as characteristic of an overwhelming majority of the German people. They have been loyal to the Government. They had shown before the war what was to be expected. In June, 1913, they voted with the rest of the Reichstag the exorbitant military law of that year. Their leading party paper, the *Vorwaerts*, pronounced the Kaiser "a sincere partisan of the peace of the peoples," and denounced "the imperialism of France, the greed of England, and the barbarism of Russia." In 1914 the Socialists, with exception of Karl Liebknecht who was later imprisoned for his opposition to the war, no protests were made by the Socialists against the atrocities in Belgium and northern France. What is further to be expected is indicated in these words of a prominent leader (Paul Hirsch) justifying the position of the party in voting the 1914 war measures:

"It is certain that by voting these credits we have shown the Government a special mark of our confidence, which the party certainly could not have extended to it in normal times. But at such a moment as this, when national unity is at stake, it was quite impossible for anyone who is influenced by practical rather than tactical considerations to commit himself, by rejecting their proposals, to a vote of no-confidence in the Government on the ground of their internal policy. By adopting such an attitude as this, the socialist group in the Prussian Chamber would not merely have dealt the severest blow to the interests of labor, but would

have weakened the Fatherland in the face of its enemies. High as we place the idea of international solidarity, we place still higher the good of our own country, the economic aggrandizement of our people. The greater our economic power as a nation, the stronger also will be the foundations of the modern labor movement. It is the guarantee of civilization in the future. The most dangerous of our adversaries, England, counts on the economic starvation of Germany. This calculation will be upset. It will beat and break against the solid common sense of the nation, which does not hesitate, when the country's salvation is at stake, to rise above party questions, nor to shrink from the bitterest sacrifices."

Again, in the speech of a socialist deputy (Wolfgang Heine) in 1915, which was applauded and quoted widely in Germany, we read: "Before peace can be seriously thought of, there should be further enlightenment on the situation of the war. We have every confidence in the German armies and the nation at war: its achievements command our respect and admiration. Out there, there is not one soldier who would not welcome peace as soon as possible, and yet each man does his duty with heroism and sacrifice. The Army and the People are one, and we, too, should follow the example set by our fighting heroes.

"Then, too, our hopes of peace may confidently repose in the will for peace of our peace-loving Emperor. Everyone knows that twice in the last few years he has given proof of it at a critical time, twice his personal intervention has, so to speak, come to the rescue of Peace.

"The working classes are attached to the nation in the closest possible way by their desire to share in the nation's spiritual culture and economic solidarity, unshakable despite

all the conflicts of class interests. If German industry were destroyed, the workers would suffer like their employers, even more indeed, than the latter. The workman is bound also to the state in spite of all its imperfections and conflicting interests. The workman is a part of the German people and at this time of war he feels more than ever that his country's destiny is his own."

When, after the battles of the Marne, Verdun, and the Somme, it began to dawn upon Germany, or upon the German Socialists, that victory with annexations and indemnities had become impossible, the Socialists talked of peace on the basis of "no annexations, and no indemnities." This plea has had a notable effect upon Russia; it has hardly aided the cause of democracy. It appears that the intense nationalism and the covert imperialistic spirit of the German Socialists would accept "the economic aggrandizement of our people" at the expense of other nations. England, the mother of democracies, is "the most dangerous of our adversaries." Thus, when it comes to an issue of the German laborer as against the laborers of other nations, the German Socialists stand solid with the Imperial German Government. Some degree of democratization of the Government may come after the war, but it seems fairly certain that the elements of any extensive revolution during the war are absent.

XII

The Prussianized Imperial German Government

How small the political power of the German people really is becomes clear when we realize the character and overwhelming power of Prussia. The whole imperial system is essentially Prussian. The present constitution is the work of Bismarck who merely continued the constitution of the North German Confederation, slightly modified to suit the South German states. In the quasi-democratic Reichstag the people of the Empire have little more power than the people of Prussia have in the Prussian Landtag. In Berlin, in elections to the Landtag, a rich man's vote counts for that of fifty poor men; two-thirds of the representatives are elected by the wealthiest one-sixth of the voters. The constitution of Prussia, granted in 1850, embodies the reactionary spirit against the Revolution of 1848. It was intended to satisfy the popular demand for universal suffrage and to nullify it in practice. It practically excludes the poorer classes from representation. Almost the entire power in what we would call the House of Representatives stands for the interests of property. Above this house, and with power of veto on its action, the House of Lords represents the rights of blood, of property, and of official authority. The privilege of membership is conferred by the Crown. This upper house stands for loyalty to the King, who rules by "Divine right." Democracy is truly less than a shadow in Prussia.

It is little less than a shadow in the Empire. Prussia is the dominating power in the Imperial Government. In drawing

up the Imperial constitution the one idea that dominated Bismarck was to make Prussia supreme. The King of Prussia is by hereditary right the Emperor of Germany, and as such can not be impeached. The entire executive power is in his hands through his appointment of the Imperial Chancellor who is responsible only to the Emperor, by whom alone he can be removed. The Emperor has almost absolute control over foreign relations. He may even declare war of his own will in case of alleged attack by a foreign country, as he did in 1914, without consulting any other department of the Government. The popular branch, the Reichstag, is never consulted on the question of declaring war—the exact opposite of the American practice in which war is declared by Congress. The initiation of a German war therefore can never be made by the people, but only by the Emperor, that is, by the King of Prussia. Very few cases could arise in which the Emperor could not allege a threatened attack by the enemy and thus avoid the constitutional need of consulting the Bundesrath. In times of peace he has practically a controlling influence in the Bundesrath, which in turn has an absolute veto upon the Reichstag. Absolute monarch of Prussia, he is in practice an absolute monarch in the Empire. The sentiment of the present Kaiser is well known. "The will of the king is the supreme law," he once wrote in the Visitor's Book in the Town Hall of Munich. The French Revolution, he charged in an address to a body of history teachers, "was an unmitigated crime against God and man." To a group of soldiers in 1891 he said, "You are now my soldiers. You have given yourselves to me, body and soul. There is now but one enemy for you, and that is my enemy. In these times of socialistic intrigue, it may happen that I shall order you to fire upon your brothers or fathers. God save us from it! But in such a case you are

bound to obey me without a murmur!" Not long afterward, in a carefully prepared address to the people he set forth his position as "vice-regent of God" upon earth.

From the viewpoint of "Who rules Germany" it is scarcely necessary to examine the other departments of the Imperial Government. Nominally, sovereignty is vested in the Bundesrath, an administrative council of delegates appointed by the sovereigns of the 25 states of the Empire. In this body Prussia has about one-third of the votes. The Imperial Chancellor presides ex-officio at its meetings. It has practically the sole initiative in legislation, and its power of absolute veto upon the Reichstag makes it exceedingly improbable that any measure not submitted to that body by the Bundesrath would receive its approval. An amendment is made in the same way as an ordinary law. As only fourteen negative votes in the Bundesrath are sufficient to defeat an amendment to the constitution, Prussia's seventeen votes can always prevent a change. In the Reichstag Prussia has about two-thirds of the votes, no reapportionment having been made since the constitution was adopted. In practice the powers of the Reichstag are limited to considering Bundesrath measures. Its control over taxation is further limited in that a tax once voted is not merely an appropriation but a standing law. It has no control over the ministry, which is not obliged to resign, on vote of lack of confidence. The Reichstag serves the Emperor as a sort of index of popular feeling, and is thus a sort of governmental safety valve. Its debates, constituting an expression of the people's desire, may at times suggest caution, as in Bismarck's dealings with the Socialists. In relation to war the people's power is *nil*. The German General Staff is subject alone to the Emperor and is practically an organ of government. On this point an eminent German publicist, Prof.

Delbrueck, has recently declared: "The essence of our monarchy resides in its relations with the army. Whoever knows our officers must know that they would never tolerate the government of a minister of war issuing from parliament."

This superstructure of absolutism is faithfully reflected in the Empire's internal arrangements. Militarism, police rule and paternalism are met everywhere—a memorial of the fact that the German Empire was made by violence. The contemptuous and often brutal treatment of civilians by army officers is well known, and it is difficult to get redress from the courts against this privileged order. Indeed the courts afford small security for any personal rights as against the Military and the Government. The courts have no power to declare an unconstitutional law void. Trial by jury is limited. The Government can appeal to special courts without juries any case in which it is interested. Freedom of speech and of the press is guarded. Criticism of the Emperor is *lèse-majesté*, subject to fine or imprisonment or both. Freedom of public assembly is strictly limited. To hold a public meeting permission must first be obtained from the police; even a picnic gathering can not be held otherwise except at the risk of fine or imprisonment. Indeed the police are omnipresent in private as well as public affairs. A policeman may be expected at any time to stroll into a man's house or garden just as a teacher might enter a classroom to see how things are going. Living in Germany suggests to an American or an Englishman the control of the nursery, but it is deeper than this gentle paternalism. This police system, with its secret service attachment, is the ever watchful eye of the Government, the German spy-system, for it is only so that in these enlightened days autocracy can live and become strong.

One may well ask how the German people can tolerate such

a Government. The answer is to be found partly in the lulling influence of paternalistic legislation, partly in the molding of opinion through a state-controlled press, but mainly in the German system of education, a system which from the German universities down to the smallest school house is centralized in the Imperial Government. In this system German school books and reading are most carefully guarded against liberal ideas; and officialdom, from the Minister of Instruction down to the pettiest policeman is ever watchful of any violations.

The story is told by Hjalmar Boyesen who issued thirty years ago a life of the German poet Goethe, that on its publication in German he received an invitation to call on the Minister of Instruction in Prussia:

"This," said the minister, "we feel is the best life of Goethe that has been written, but there are two chapters in it which dwell upon the liberal views of Goethe, which we all regret, which he would never hold today, which have no real part in his life as a whole. If you will take this volume, leave out these chapters, or rewrite them so they are not a republican propaganda, I will put it into our schools wherever there is a course in literature. All the other units of the Empire will follow, and Austria will probably do the same."

Boyesen says, "I looked at him as he sat there in his undress uniform and I realized I was face to face with the military power of a great country stifling freedom, and I told him as politely as I could that nothing would induce me to change those chapters. As it was copyrighted in Germany and by other countries of the Geneva Convention, I knew that the minister could not alter it; but the dream of royalties which would have meant to me a competence for life, if this book were

once made a text-book, which came before me when I saw my volume in his hand, vanished.”

In relation to foreign nations, two generations of the boys and girls of Germany have been taught that the German social and political organization is the best in the world. As adults they have come to believe in the Divine right of the Emperor to rule, and that, at least in relation to other nations, the German Government can do no wrong. They have been taught that the German mind and character are the highest in the world, and that Germany is the center of God's plan for the human race. The logical conclusion is, that it is the duty of Germany, with God's aid, to impress these qualities upon the world, by war if necessary, or even by the extermination of inferior and obstinate peoples, to make room for Germans. This is the meaning of “Deutschland Ueber Alles,” as against the ideals of the rest of the world. It is clear that the only way to break the logic of this position is to discredit the premise, namely, that God is with the German army.

The military support of the masses has been assured by the thorough militarization of the German mind and the nationalization of the army. The Prussian system has been extended throughout the Empire, involving compulsory military training for all males. They are required to enter the army at the age of twenty, serve for two years in active service and five years following in the active reserves, and then twelve years more in the territorial reserve, making 19 years of continuous focusing of the mind upon military affairs. Few exemptions are allowed. Germany is thus, even in peace, an armed camp. At the outbreak of the present war she could put into the field instantly 4,000,000 veterans.

XIII

German Colonization and Imperialism

This national egotism and militaristic spirit of the German people has lent itself easily to the world designs of German imperialism. Since the Franco-Prussian War the imperialistic spirit has rapidly taken hold of all the western nations. Its growth has been spurred by the Industrial Revolution. Science in providing the means of rapid transportation and communication has made the oceans no longer barriers but bridges to distant lands. In Germany industrial production and wealth soon outgrew the national area. New markets and new spheres of investment were demanded. The profits of industry were supplied to large banking concerns in South America and elsewhere, and stock companies were formed to develop railroads and mines in backward countries which might be brought under German influence. Added to the demand for new markets and new spheres of investment came new demands from a surplus of population. Emigration increased, especially to the United States and South America. But Germany thereby aided, at her own expense, the development and enrichment of foreign countries. All of these causes greatly stimulated the German Government to the policy of imperialism, which should add to the Empire new lands to which her people might go and still remain under the German flag, and where new markets might be created and new resources developed for the enrichment of Germany.

In this policy Germany came late upon the scene. The war-like spirit of the petty German princes had perpetuated feudal-

ism and prevented the German peoples from attaining national existence until the rise of the overwhelming military power of Prussia. But the best parts of the earth had then been taken. The expansion of Europe had gone steadily forward since the explorations and discoveries of the fifteenth century. England, France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal were great colonizing powers in the 17th and 18th centuries. Russia, Italy, Belgium, and Denmark had entered the race, and in the 19th century the United States and Japan were caught up in the imperialistic program. When Germany came upon the scene, she found North America occupied by England and the United States, and the rest of the New World guarded under the Monroe Doctrine. In northern Eurasia, Russia extended across two continents to the doors of Japan. In India, Australia, and New Zealand was England, and in the East Indies the English and the Dutch. In China was met the "national integrity" and "open-door" policies of the United States. Most of the islands of the sea were taken. Japan had saved herself by adopting the civilization of Europe. Turkey and Persia were under the protection of European states. Only in Africa was there yet an opportunity for Germany to colonize.

It is noteworthy that the partition of Africa among the great powers of Europe, completed about 1893, should have been accomplished without war or serious collision and without Germany's claims arousing noteworthy suspicion. Germany's entering wedge was a cession of land to a Bremen merchant by the Hottentots in 1883 which became the nucleus of German Southwest Africa. In 1884 were acquired the Cameroons and Togo Land and about the same time beginnings were made in German East Africa. Almost all of Germany's colonial possessions were acquired while Bismarck was still

at the helm of the German ship of state. Bismarck however was not interested in the idea of foreign colonies. He regarded such ventures as likely to embroil Germany with powerful neighbors. He sought rather, in England's friendship and in the colonial rivalries of England and France, security against a French war to recover Alsace-Lorraine. On the east he sought to cultivate the friendship of Russia—a friendship damaged somewhat by the Congress of Berlin over which he presided (1878) and which prevented Russia from reaping the fruits of her war with Turkey. His aim was to strengthen Germany in Central Europe and to this end to build up a strong alliance with Austria. A colonial policy he saw would be the more likely to estrange both Russia and England in that a German navy would be essential to its success. Bismarck's colonizing activity was a concession to the "Industrials," and measures the growing strength of the new industrial order in Germany.

XIV

The Kaiser and the Pan-Germanists

It was a solemn moment for all Europe and for the world when in 1890 the present Kaiser, William II, dismissed Bismarck and himself undertook to direct the destinies of Germany. The Kaiser had come to the Prussian throne in 1888, which made him *de facto* Emperor of Germany. He was then twenty-nine years old. His personality was a curious compound of the dreamer and the man of affairs. His mind was well informed, versatile, tireless, but impulsive and erratic, and impatient of control. He was given to grandiloquent spread-eagleism in his speeches, to the despair of his conservative friends, but his fatal weakness was his over-weening self-confidence and egotism and his poor judgment of men. Bismarck was his best friend. The great Chancellor had practically made the German Empire and had guided it clear of the rocks for a quarter of a century. It is a sufficient commentary on the Kaiser's unfitness that as a mere boy, and entirely new to the affairs of state, he should at the very outset of his career have dismissed such an experienced, tried and trustworthy counsellor.

While some may question whether from 1890 the Kaiser planned deliberately world dominion by a world war, we can see now that from that time on the policies adopted by Germany were such as to lead inevitably in the direction of a world war. Great economic temptations were then before Germany. Some have the charity to think that the Kaiser was unconscious of the pressure which when once under way

would bear him along until affairs should force themselves from his personal control and make him virtually a tool in stronger hands. Bismarck's course for Germany at the Congress of Berlin was along the line of the free and independent development of nations as then existing. In direct opposition, the course chosen by the Kaiser involved the exploitation of all lands and peoples that could be brought under German control. His colonial policy, as Bismarck had foreseen, led to the building up of a strong navy, which, as Bismarck said it would do, alienated England; especially when England saw it growing out of all proportion to the possible field for peaceable German colonial expansion. The Kaiser's second policy was supremacy in southeastern Europe. This spurred the rapid increase of the German army, alienating Russia and further alarming France. Within a few years Germany had driven France and Russia into an alliance, England and France began to patch up their colonial differences, and the Kaiser was suddenly face to face with three powerful enemies. If, as is claimed by German apologists, Germany was "ringed in" by enemies, she herself welded the ring by her policies. We may grant her need of new markets and colonies, as we might grant a farmer's need of more acres for a growing family. But as in the case of the farmer a remedial course which surrounds him with enemies is not to be commended, so much less can a civilized world endorse in Germany the methods of the burglar and the pirate to secure by foul means what can not be gotten by fair.

The Kaiser was both leader and tool in this demand of the "Junkers" and the "Industrials" for the forcible expansion of Germany. The Junkers, who constituted the original landed proprietors of Prussia and were the mainspring of the military caste, had common interests with the newer aristoc-

racy throughout the Empire—the new “Vons” of the land. The Industrials, that is the manufacturing and commercial classes, were in the view of this class “plebeians,” the “nouveau riche,” over whom at first they affected a supreme superiority. But discordant social elements tend to draw together under the influence of common economic interests. Following the example of the Kaiser, the Junkers invested in Krupp stock, in railway and steamship lines, and in the growing industries. They thus gathered into their hands ever more firmly the reins of autocratic power. The educated sons of bankers and manufacturers gradually gained admission to the hitherto exclusive social, military and political circles of “well-born” junkerdom, for which they were willing to pay the price. In the Kaiser’s sunlight were fused into one powerful unit the forces of the new Germany in support of German autocracy, if need be, against the world.

The intended extent of this German expansion is more than hinted in the plans of the Pan-German League. It is significant that this league was formed in the year in which the Kaiser dismissed Bismarck. “I hope,” said the Kaiser, “that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said *Civis Romanus sum*, one may in the future need only to say *I am a German citizen!*” The original ideal of the League was the inclusion of all peoples of Teutonic stock under the German flag. Germany should absorb Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and the German parts of Russia. As the League gathered power its ideal widened. It was extended to include a dominant influence in the affairs of the great states and the annexation of all such lands and peoples as might afford economic advantage. Professor Tan-

nenberg's *Gross-Deutschland* (1911) is an expression of the territorial ideals of the League and the spirit in which they were to be realized. "A politics of fine sentiments," he says, "is stupidity; humanitarian dreams are mere silliness. Charity begins at home. Politics is business. Right and wrong are ideas that have a necessary place only in the life of the private citizen. The German people is *always* right, because it is German and because it numbers eighty-seven millions. Our fathers have left us much still to do." Another writer (Ludwig Woltmann) said the year before the war: "The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passive races, that is, the Christian races who turn the other cheek, in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." Bernhardi said (1911): "Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall' will be our rallying cry."

So fantastic was this ambition, so abhorrent to everything in the character of the American Republic, that Americans could not at first believe it existed as a practical program. The Great War has forced some of the events of the last quarter of a century into a new light.

XV

The Kaiser's Naval Policy

One phase of the policy of this group was summed up in the words of the Kaiser delivered in 1899 at Stettin when he said, "Our future lies upon the water." As high-priest of this program the Kaiser selected Chief Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, destined later to become famous or infamous as the promoter of Germany's ruthless submarine campaign. He became Minister of Marine in 1897 and his efficiency is shown in the increase of naval appropriations from \$30,000,000 in 1898 to \$116,000,000 in 1913. He aimed to introduce into the navy the standard of efficiency which prevailed in the army. He became the inspiration of the Navy League, which was organized to mobilize the forces of public opinion in favor of German sea-power, and under whose branches in all parts of the Empire there were carried on a vigorous press campaign, public lectures, and excursions of school children to visit units of the fleet in behalf of the ever increasing naval appropriations. Of the pacific intentions of Germany's naval policy at this time we may judge in the light of the preamble of the naval bill of 1900, which states that "Germany must possess a battle fleet so strong that a war with her would even for the greatest naval power be accompanied with such dangers as would render that power's position doubtful."

This policy did not seem pacific to England, France, and Russia. In 1894 Germany had opened the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (Kiel Canal) connecting the Baltic Sea with the North Sea through Schleswig at Kiel, enabling the German fleet to

be used interchangeably in either body of water. Later the canal was enlarged to admit Germany's larger war ships. By this canal Germany saved some two-hundred miles of water passage by the old route around the north of Denmark.

The near collapse of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 which revealed an unsuspected degree of weakness in the Russian army, made Germany feel safe to divert expenditures from the army to the navy. A tremendous impulse was given to naval construction by the new navy bill of 1906, against which the leader of the Social Democrats, Herr Bebel, protested vigorously in the Reichstag: "I am unable to see," he said, "what other object this agitation could have than to arm for a war against England." He pointed out that a German navy was not required to fight Russia, as Russia would be paralyzed for many years by the war with Japan. This appropriation, which was to cover a period of twelve years, amounted to over \$890,000,000, and in 1908, through the efforts of the Navy League which had passed the million mark in membership, another bill was voted to accelerate naval construction.

Ostensibly these things were all done in the interests of German commerce. But if Germany valued the world's peace the inexpediency of such a policy should have given her pause. The size of the German navy could not fail of challenging comparison with that of England, in view of relative commercial needs. Germany's colonial interests were insignificant compared with England's. Her foreign commerce was only about three-fourths of England's and was carried on almost entirely by land routes. On the other hand, almost the whole of British commerce depended on the protection of the British navy. On this basis, the proper ratio of naval strength should have been 3 : 8 instead of 5 : 8. Again, the British homeland

was an island, for which imports and naval defense were indispensable, whereas Germany could in a crisis be almost self-supporting.

On the theory that Germany was solicitous of the peace of Europe, why this great haste in German naval construction, in face of the certain alarm it would cause to neighboring powers and at the almost certain risk of endangering her best markets, namely, Great Britain, Russia and the United States? England would naturally regard Germany's action as a direct challenge to her naval supremacy. Why should Germany force England into a race in naval armament at a time when England was least inclined to increase her navy? England had long held aloof from alliance with the nations of the Continent; indeed it was in this policy that the phrase "grand isolation" originated; why should Germany now drive her by direct antagonism into alliance with France and Russia? The answer is suggested in the words of Heinrich von Treitschke, who as Professor of history in the University of Berlin since 1874, and who, as one of whom the Kaiser speaks as "our national historian," might well speak for the German Government: "If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It is natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. . . The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult."

In the German navy a favorite toast was "Der Tag" (the day when war should come), and when war did come, a leading German Socialist, Maximilian Harden, wrote: "Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it; because we had to wish it and could wish

it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe . . . Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples, and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them.

. . . Now strikes the hour of Germany's rising power . . . To be unassailable—to exchange the soul of a Viking for that of a New Yorker, that of the quick pike for that of the lazy carp whose fat back grows moss-covered in a dangerless pond—that must never become the wish of a German!"

XVI

Germany in the Far East

Germany's colonial policy in the Far East and her designs upon South America could not but have brought on ultimately a conflict with the United States independently of Europe. As far back as 1889 Germany began to test American feeling. An occasion arose in the Samoan Islands where the United States had been ceded a harbor in 1872. In that year a hostile German fleet of three vessels appeared off the islands ready for action if opportunity afforded. But the American press including the German-American press rang out a note of no uncertain tone, and Germany paused.

In 1895 Germany's designs on China began. By cleverly manipulating the relations of Manchuria with Russia and Japan after the latter's war with China she prepared the ground for the Russo-Japanese War. In 1897 Germany acquired the long coveted "sphere of influence" in China, by seizing Kiao Chau in reprisal for the murder of two German missionaries. At the same time she secured other concessions, which amounted practically to a monopoly of the mining and railway privileges in the populous province of Shantung. The German method of intercourse with the Chinese was foreshadowed in the Kaiser's address to his troops in 1900 on the eve of the departure of a "punitive expedition" following the Boxer uprising, in which he said:—"As the Huns under their King, Attila, a thousand years ago, made a name for themselves which is still mighty in tradition and story, so may the name of German in China be kept alive through you *in such*

wise that no Chinese will ever again attempt to look askance at a German." These troops were thus officially instructed to emulate and imitate the Huns, a policy which was faithfully carried out at Pau-ting-fu upon helpless women and children in a manner too horrible to tell, not exceeded by Germany even in Belgium. It has become clear that the recent attempt to restore the autocracy of the Manchu dynasty was financed by Germany. If the policy of the United States for "national integrity" and the "open door" for China is to mean anything, the land hunger of Germany must be curbed so effectually that she will not appear again under her present government in the Far East.

The year 1898 seems to have appealed to Germany as a year of special opportunity. The democracy of the United States was threatening to loosen the foothold of autocracy in the Pacific. A German fleet was on the ground immediately after Dewey took Manilla. So were the fleets of several other nations, but the only fleet there that did not salute the American flag was the German fleet. It consisted of five men-of-war, besides a transport with 1400 extra men. When Admiral Dewey mildly suggested that this force was disproportionate to the German interests in the Philippines the German commander replied, "I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir." And he continued to pay little or no regard to international or naval etiquette such as distinguished the other nations there represented. Admiral Dewey had established a blockade. The German commander, disregarding it, proceeded to land supplies. Thereupon Dewey sent his flag lieutenant with his compliments to ask the meaning of "this extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse." Meantime the English fleet under Admiral Chichester anchored between the two. The Germans sent to Dewey a notably cor-

dial reply. The German fleet undoubtedly was under instructions from the Kaiser, but the time was seen to be not yet ripe.

It is now believed that if America had not taken possession of the Philippines after the Spanish War the Germans would have tried to do so, in which case England and Japan would have intervened to prevent it. It is possible that America's action at that time prevented what might have developed into a world war. As it was, Germany kept the United States from getting too much of the group containing the island of Guam, and secured for herself the Caroline and Ladronne islands by purchase from Spain.

XVII

Germany's Menace to America

German intrigue in South America first came actively to the surface during the administration of President Roosevelt. A German fleet threatened to take possession of a coveted Venezuelan port in satisfaction of alleged claims. President Roosevelt sent an ultimatum to the commander giving him forty-eight hours in which to submit his claims to arbitration. The American fleet was held in readiness to move. Trouble was averted. Commenting upon the superiority of the German colonies in South America over all other peoples on that continent and the helplessness of the rest, Prof. Otto Tannenberg writes: "In these circumstances is it not wonderful that the German people have not long since decided to take possession of this territory? For the people of the republics which have inherited the former domains of Spain and Portugal, it would be altogether a blessing to become subject to German power. They will soon be reconciled to our rule and be proud of the German name." Brazil realized this danger and her fleet acts with the Allies. Cuba, where German money recently fomented revolution, has taken a similar step. Hayti and San Domingo, where German money had done the same, have followed. The people of almost every South American state are with the Allies, and are prevented from active participation only by autocratic and pro-German influences in their governments.

In Mexican relations the "Zimmermann note" is still fresh in the minds of all. At the very moment in which Germany

was professing friendship with the United States this note was passed, dated Jan. 19, 1917, from the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Zimmermann) to the German minister in Mexico:

"On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

"If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico.

"That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

"You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

"Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months."

(Signed) "Zimmermann."

Prussianized Germany, if she had the power, would attempt to strike a mortal blow at America at the earliest opportunity. The disposition to do so has long been there. "Der Tag," we now learn, was to have been about fifteen years after the Spanish-American War. Open avowal of this fact was made at the time of that war. Count von Goetzen communicated this to Major M. A. Bailey, a United States officer, in a conversation they had one day as they traveled together from Cuba

to America, which episode Major Bailey relates as follows: "Apropos of a discussion . . . on the friction between Admiral Dewey and the German Admiral at Manila, von Goetzen said to me:

" 'I will tell you something which you had better make a note of. I am not afraid to tell you this because if you do speak of it, no one would believe you and everybody will laugh at you.

" 'About fifteen years from now my country will start her great war. She will be in Paris in about two months after the commencement of hostilities. Her move on Paris will be but a step to her real object—the crushing of England. Everything will move like clockwork. We will be prepared and others will not be prepared. I speak of this because of the connection which it will have with your own country.

" 'Some months after we finish our work in Europe, we will take New York, and probably Washington, and hold them for some time. We will put your country in its place with reference to Germany. We do not purpose to take any of your territory, but we do intend to take a billion or more dollars from New York and other places. The Monroe Doctrine will be taken charge of by us, as we will then have put you in your place, and we will take charge of South America as far as we want to.' "

In 1901 Baron von Edelsheim wrote in his book, *Operations Upon the Sea*: "The fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by invaders would not alone move the Americans to sue for peace. To accomplish this end, the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the Atlantic ports, in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet. It should be so managed that a line of land

operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize in a short time many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume the control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war-and-transport-supplies, and lastly to impose heavy indemnities . . . As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great Power which is in a position to conquer the United States."

In 1903 Weillhelm Huebbe-Schleiden wrote in a prominent German periodical: "It is the duty of every one who loves languages to see that the future language spoken in America shall be German. It is of the highest importance to keep up the German language in America, to establish German universities, improve the schools, introduce German newspapers, and to see that at American universities German professors are more capable than their English-speaking colleagues, and make their influence felt unmistakably on thought, science, art, and literature. If Germans bear this in mind and help accordingly, the goal will eventually be reached. At the present moment the center of German intellectual activity is in Germany; in the remote future it will be in America."

The fate of Americans in such an event is foreshadowed by Klaus Wagner, in his book entitled, *Krieg*, published in 1906: "By the right of war the right of strange races to migrate into Germanic settlements will be taken away. By right of war the non-Germanic population in America and Great Australia must be settled in Africa."

The ominous attitude of the Kaiser towards America, before our entrance into the war and even while we were using our best endeavor to keep out of the war, is seen in his words to the American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, reported in Mr. Gerard's book, *My Four Years in Germany*. Mr. Gerard

writes: "The Emperor was standing; so naturally I stood also; and according to his habit, which is quite Rooseveltian, he stood very close to me, and talked very earnestly . . . He showed, however, great bitterness against the United States and repeatedly said, 'America had better look out after this war;' and, 'I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war' . . . I was so fearful in reporting the dangerous part of this interview, on account of the many spies not only in my own embassy, but also in the State Department, that I sent but a very few words in a round-about way by courier direct to the President."

XVIII

“Mittel-Europa”

The progress of Germany towards realizing sufficient power to make such a stroke may be traced in her steps to gain economic and military supremacy in Middle Europe and Western Asia. Between the British all-sea route to India and the Russian Trans-Siberian railroad to the Pacific, Germany planned to build a great German railway from the German North Sea and Baltic ports to the Persian Gulf. The strategic point on the line in Europe was to be Constantinople, where the road would cross into Asia. The pivot of the Asian link was to be Bagdad, the strategic center for the region between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf controlling the larger part of the trade of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and Arabia. A spur running down into Arabia was to connect Bagdad with the shores of the Red Sea. This would bring Germany within easy striking distance of British trade through the Suez Canal and would directly cross at Constantinople the Russian trade route through the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. For the consummation of this plan the co-operation of Turkey was needed, which was secured in 1902-03.

The possibilities for Turkey of this great steel “corridor” from Berlin to the heart of Asia is stated by Karl Radek in the *Neue Zeit* for June 2, 1911, as follows: “The Bagdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English imperialism, Turkey could intrust its construction only to the German company, because she knew that Germany’s army and navy stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and Russia

inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey." A German professor (Prof. R. Mangelsdorf, 1911) points out the relation of the plan to England: "To some extent indeed, Turkey's construction of a railway system is a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part of the body of England's world empire, namely, Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility." Another professor (Dr. Paul Rohrbach) sums up Turkey's prospective gain in that "Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England."

So far as concerned the Slavic states of southeastern Europe, there was to be little ceremony. As the railway ran through Serbia, a perfect "corridor" involved the control of Serbia, and Germany entrusted this to Austria. If the Slav states were in the way, they must get out of the way. Says Professor Tannenberg, in *Gross-Deutschland* (1911): "Room! They must *make* room. The western and southern Slavs—or we! Since we are the stronger, the choice will not be difficult." This scheme contemplated no regard whatever for the principle of nationality. Racial feeling and the desire of the peoples involved were to have no consideration. A great imperial "Middle-Europe" was to be built up by German power much as the original states of the German Empire had been forced together by economic pressure and the Prussian army. The plan is set forth elaborately by Friedrich Naumann in his book entitled "Mittel-Europa," a brazen plan of violence to weld all of middle Europe, including the Balkan states and Turkey, Roumania, Greece, Holland, Belgium, and Norway and Sweden, with Germany and Austria at the center, into a vast economic unit to be exploited by Germany in the interests of German commerce and German militarism. The possession of Belgium and Holland was to make more easy the attack

on British supremacy in the English Channel and to sever England from France. Germany would thus seize England by vital parts both at the Channel and the Suez Canal.

Germany's preparation for the prosecution of this design consisted essentially in the strengthening of the Triple Alliance, the extension of her economic control over Turkey, and the increase of her army and navy.

XIX

The Triple Alliance

The Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and Italy was begun in the days of Bismarck, and had reference not to "Mittel-Europa" but to safe-guarding Germany against an attempt by France to recover Alsace and Lorraine. It is said that Bismarck was opposed to taking these provinces from France in 1871, being far-sighted enough to see the danger of thus needlessly sowing the seeds of hatred between the German and French peoples. But if so, forces which he could not control at that time prevented, and he certainly set about to guard against the consequences. A part of his plan was to secure the favor of Russia. Had it not been for Russia's attitude it is well known that he would have attacked France again, in 1875, further to crush her. He also courted the friendship of Austria. But the chronic discord in the relations between Russia and Austria compelled him finally to choose between them, which was the more easy after the Congress of Berlin (1878) in which Bismarck's position offended Russia. In 1879 he concluded a defensive treaty of alliance with Austria. In 1882 Italy, offended with France for annexing Tunis, in northern Africa (1881), joined Germany and Austria, making the Triple Alliance.

On Italy, however, the Alliance had a weak hold. Italy harbored a traditional and bitter hatred against Austria for reasons similar to those for which France hated Germany. Against Austria Italy had been an ally of France in 1859, and of Prussia in the war with Austria in 1866. When the present

war broke out in 1914 it was therefore natural that Italy, regarding the Triple Alliance as defensive only, and Germany and Austria as the attacking parties, refused to join them and became a firm adherent to the cause of the Allies. Germany and Austria remained as one. There are at present indications that the principle of nationality may assert itself in Austria and break up the Teutonic Alliance.

The most powerful member of the Triple Alliance was Germany, whose army had been for fifty years the strongest in Europe. The German army has been literally consecrated by the German people who with unreasoning devotion have rallied to its support. "The army, right or wrong" is the principle which has been inculcated in the German schools. This veneration has made the German people exceedingly sensitive to criticism directed against the army. They regard it as criticism of the German nation. They go quite to the extreme of holding that the army is the nation. A character of sanctity is given to it as a result of the thorough nationalization of the army through long years of compulsory military service of every male citizen. Their spirit was shown in 1913, when at a cost of \$300,000,000 the army was suddenly put practically on a war footing. The reason given for this was the menace of Panslavism by the newly made victories of the Slav states in the Balkan wars just ending. The spirit of unity in which the Reichstag voted this staggering increase is a most ominous index of the militaristic spirit of the German people. Probably in no constitutional nation of the world could such a measure have been passed with no more tangible danger in view than confronted Germany at that time.

XX

Germany in Southeastern Europe

The immediate incentive which spurred the German Government in southeastern Europe was to relieve Turkey, which had recently received a severe blow as a result of the Slav victories in the Balkan wars. This blow menaced Germany's great scheme of "Mittel-Europa" and the Bagdad Railway. Moreover the Slav movement was democratic and the great autocratic enemy of democracy and ally of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, must be helped to crush out any such movement. Again there was Russia, against which the Turks must be supported as an effective barrier at Constantinople. There was Austria to support in her claims against the Slavs. There were the economic interests of German capitalists at stake in Turkey. If adverse forces should gain headway, the dream of a conquered Britain and the world power of Germany would be in grave danger.

The approximate starting point of Germany's influence and power in southeastern Europe was in 1880 when Germany displaced England as the friend of Turkey. Up to that time England had supported Turkey against Russia, fearing the latter's influence in the Mediterranean and her power in case she should get control of the Dardanelles. In 1880 Gladstone became prime minister of England as leader of the Liberals. He had been aroused to bitter protest against the Turks by the "Bulgarian atrocities" in 1876, in which whole villages of Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire had been wiped out in cold blood. In impassioned appeals he had urged at

that time that England break her alliance with the "unspeakable Turk." These atrocities had precipitated the Russo-Turkish War, in which Russia had driven Turkey out of Europe; but England under Lord Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin had led in bolstering Turkey against Russia. Bismarck, who had presided at that Congress, had acted with Austria and England. Now that the Gladstone ministry, out of pure humanitarian incentive, had reversed England's policy, Bismarck stepped into England's place as Turkey's chief support.

One of the first indications of German influence in Turkey was the reorganization of the Turkish army under German management. Under General von der Goltz (1883-1895) the Turks were trained in the military school of Prussia. The army was largely officered by Germans, and young Turkish officers were sent to Germany for their technical military education.

Soon the German financial system began to take hold. In 1888 the Kaiser on his accession to the throne visited Constantinople, preliminary to the investment of German capital. In that year the Deutsche Bank, one of the most powerful of the German financial houses, took over a Turkish railroad which ran from a point opposite Constantinople out into Asia Minor, and presently an extension of privilege was secured, the precedent for other concessions which followed.

Ten years later the Kaiser visited Jerusalem and Damascus, where in two most absurd and romantic addresses he furnished a superb example of German duplicity that aroused widespread suspicion and criticism. The address at Jerusalem was concluded with these words: "From Jerusalem came the light, in the splendor of which the German nation has become great and glorious, and what the Germanic peoples have become, they become under the banner of the Cross, the emblem

of self-sacrificing Christian charity. As nearly two thousand years ago, so there shall today ring out from Jerusalem the cry voicing the ardent hope of all, 'Peace on Earth!' A few days later he declared at Damascus, "The Sultan and three hundred million Mohammedans who, scattered over all parts of the earth, venerate him as their Caliph, can ever rely upon the friendship of the German Emperor." This was only two years after Turkey had shocked the world by the Armenian massacres of 1896. The year before this had occurred the victory of the Turks over Greece of which country the queen was the Kaiser's sister. Of these Mohammedans who were to "rely upon the friendship of the German Emperor," seventy-five million were subjects of Great Britain in India, and other millions were subjects of France. The main point in this oratory was that a convenient "holy war" might be declared by England's Mohammedan subjects in India in case of a conflict with England, and that the Mohammedans in the Ottoman Empire held the most strategic points in the world for international trade, desired by the Germans.

It will be remembered it was in the year of the Kaiser's Damascus speech that the Germans seized Kiao Chau in China and passed the Navy Law of 1898 inaugurating a new era in German naval construction.

XXI

Germany in Western Asia

Within a year from this time concessions were obtained from the Sultan for a railway extension to the Persian Gulf. This was to be the central section of the great trans-continental line from the Baltic ports to India and the Orient. In 1903 was chartered the Bagdad Railway Company, and the following year there was opened for operation the first section of a line projected to extend 1400 miles to the head of the Persian Gulf. Its completion was expected in 1917, and by 1914 at the outbreak of the war \$60,000,000 of German capital had been invested therein. A feature especially favored by the Sultan was the extension of the Bagdad system into Arabia and toward Egypt, "to unite Mohammedanism." A branch line was to run down to the Mediterranean from Aleppo, to a point which would have been very convenient for a German naval station, only thirty-six hours steaming from the Suez Canal.

Taken altogether this great railway system is a typical expression of the new German "Welt-politik." Not only did it afford for the extension of German commerce with the Orient a shorter route than that of either England or Russia, but with its continuous connections for the transportation of troops from Germany to within easy striking distance of both Egypt and Siberia, the German military machine was brought to the very doors of the two empires.

England was early alive to this threatening danger. In 1901 when the Turks tried to strengthen their control over the independent sheiks in the region of the Persian Gulf, England

interfered, which the Kaiser resented as the declaration of a "British sphere of influence in that region." In 1906 the Turks set out to push their frontier nearly up to the Suez Canal, but were defeated by British initiative in Egypt. Alarmed at the formation of the Bagdad Railway Company, England sought and secured an agreement that the road from Constantinople into Western Asia should be under exclusive Turkish control. To this Germany could agree, because it would be easy enough for Germany to control Turkey. At that time Russia was handicapped with preparations for the war with Japan, but after that war, in 1907, Russia and England agreed upon the construction of a line between the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the present British system in India.

XXII

Triple Entente

While in their economic and commercial interests England and Russia were thus given a common cause in rivalry with German expansion, the danger of its developing into a coalition for war was due almost entirely to Germany's ominous haste in military and naval preparations as obviously a threat to support that expansion by force if necessary.

The first step in the drawing together of the nations against Germany had been taken by Russia and France in 1891. This was partly a reply to disturbance of the balance of power in the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. It was a direct reply to the Kaiser's tacit announcement of an independent policy, in the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890. In that year Germany refused to renew with Russia the so-called Re-insurance treaty, by which hitherto each had agreed to maintain a friendly neutrality in case the other were attacked (in Russia's mind, by Austria; in Germany's by France). The visit of the Czar to Paris in 1896 was probably intended to announce definitely the French-Russian alliance.

England's feeling for Germany in 1890 was cordial, as evidenced by her cession of Helgoland at the very doors of Germany, which, had she been contemplating hostilities, she would have fortified, or at least retained for prospective use. Her later attitude was entirely due to fundamental changes in Germany's foreign policy. Her suspicions of Germany were first definitely aroused by the Kaiser's remark at Stettin in 1895, that "our future lies on the water." In the same year

the Kaiser created a furor of popular excitement in England by violating the London Convention of 1884 respecting England's relations to the Transvaal, a neighbor of German South-west Africa. If the Kaiser's motive was good, his action was short-sighted and meddling; if designed to extend German influence with the Boers, his subsequent action made it fruitless. England's action had interfered with the dream of a Teutonic South Africa. She had aided in driving a wedge between the German spheres of control east and west. It is to be observed that the Kaiser did not rejoice over the generosity shown by England at the close of the Boer War in restoring the Boers to themselves and aiding in the formation of the South African Union, notwithstanding the Dutch and not the English were there the strongest elements. It is probable that the attitude of the German Government is fairly reflected in the annoyance voiced at that time by the German press.

England saw the trend of Germany's new foreign policy cropping out in various ways. She saw the economic and military grip of Germany tightening on Turkey, and through Turkey on Western Asia. On the heels of the South African episode followed the Kaiser's Damascus speech. The same year came the seizure of Kiao Chau in China. Next came the German Naval Law of 1900. In 1901 Turkey under German influence attempted to extend her control over the region about the Persian Gulf, and later near the Suez Canal. In 1903 was chartered the Bagdad Railway Company. Then came the successive increases in the German navy, all of which convinced England that Germany meant to challenge her naval supremacy.

England replied by alliance with France and Russia, and by increasing her navy. In 1904 she settled her African disputes with France, in a manner which recognized England's

preponderance in Egypt and France's control in Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, and left Tripoli as a buffer province to fall to Italy. In 1907 England and Russia settled their differences in Asia, and from that time the Triple Entente between England, Russia and France grew stronger. Germany claimed to regard this alliance as aggressively hostile to her "national evolution," and as disturbing the Balance of Power. But the continuance of England's pacific policy is obvious from the annual decrease in her naval construction from 1905 to 1909. It was the German Naval Law of 1908 that gave the signal for a definite contest; from this time forward mutual suspicion and antagonism between the two countries increased.

XXIII

Germany Tests the Triple Entente

Germany did not wait long to test the strength of the Triple Entente, and the method of her test is a luminous commentary on the fatal weakness Germany has consistently shown in failing to understand the psychology of other nations. In 1904-05 she approached France with a proposal for a secret alliance with her and Russia against England. The idea that France would ally with Germany in face of the crime of 1871 was of a piece with her later judgment that America was "a nation of traders and would kneel for peace at any price."

Failing in an alliance against England, Germany sought to humiliate France, by demanding a re-opening of the Moroccan question which had been settled by England and France in 1904. Seizing a convenient handle involved in certain international agreements, Germany alleged her trading interests in Morocco, which were extremely slight. The result was an international conference, held at Algeciras in Spain which left things as they were, only with international instead of merely English sanction. A significant feature of this conference, of which Germany took notice, was that Italy supported France. The cause of France in Morocco had been exhonored at the bar of Europe, and Germany, instead of France was humiliated.

Nursing her wounded pride Germany awaited another chance. It came in 1911. Germany had sent the cruiser "Panther" to the vicinity of French territory on the coast of Africa, in protest against alleged infractions by France of the

Algeciras agreement. France protested vigorously at this action, as being taken without cause. England warned Germany that in case of war she would support France. This was a definite intimation to Germany of England's relation to the Triple Entente. The Moroccan question was adjusted, Germany accepting compensation in Central Africa for recognition of the French protectorate over Morocco, and the crisis passed. But Germany felt deep humiliation. The German press was bitter against England. The determination strengthened in Germany to fight England. A book on German foreign policy by Albrécht Wirth, published in 1912, contains a suggestion as to the method by which the preparation and attack should be conducted: "Morocco," he says, "is easily worth a big war, or even several. At best—and even prudent Germany is getting to be convinced of this—war is only postponed and not abandoned. Is such a postponement to our advantage? They say we must wait for a better moment. Wait for the deepening of the Kiel Canal, for our navy laws to take full effect. It is not exactly diplomatic to announce publicly to one's adversaries, 'To go to war now does not tempt us, but three years hence we shall let loose a world war' . . . No; if a war is really planned, not a word of it must be spoken; one's designs must be enveloped in profound mystery; then brusquely, all of a sudden, jump on the enemy like a robber in the darkness."

England's desire to preserve peace is evidenced by the fact that in that same year she tried to come to some agreement with Germany respecting limitation of armaments. Failing this she proposed to sign the following declaration: "The two powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany.

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." But Germany would not sign a similar declaration unless England would agree to "stand aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the Continent." This meant that England should abandon the Triple Entente, so that the Triple Alliance would be free to attack France and Russia without interference.

How long war between England and Germany might have been delayed if left to develop independently is uncertain. It was destined to come about indirectly through relation to the conflict of the German "Mittel-Europa" designs with the Slav nationalistic spirit and the interests of Russia.

XXIV

The Slavs and the Turks

In the Balkan peninsula Russia had racial, religious, and economic interests. Excepting Greece and Albania, the peninsula had been early occupied by peoples of the same stock as Russia, out of which, with some intermixture of other races, have grown the modern Balkan states,—Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Roumania. Like the Russians, these people were early Christianized by missionaries of the Greek Catholic Church, from Constantinople, and thus had both racial and religious affinity with the Russians. In the fifteenth century, with the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, this population was inundated by a flood of Turkish Mohammedans, and it was only by the heroic efforts of Austria, Poland, Venice, and Russia that the intruders were prevented from overrunning all Europe. Since that time the Slavic area conquered by the Turks, which has become the Ottoman Empire in Europe with its capitol at Constantinople, has been the scene of a steady conflict between the Cross and the Crescent.

Russia's motives in these wars in so far as they were economic and political were of interest to all Europe. These motives are easy to understand. While Russia has a vast area, it lies mainly to the north, and her seaports are icebound in winter on the Baltic and the Arctic; for her commerce she needs at least one southern port, open all the year round, which is possible only on the Black Sea. The outlet from here into the Mediterranean through the straits at Constantinople is

controlled by the Turks. The removal of the Turkish hold at the straits would admit the Russian fleet, in case of war, into proximity to Italy, southern France, and the British trade route to the Orient and lead possibly to dangerous expansion of Russia, and in this nations have seen a "Slav peril." In 1736-39 France supported Turkey in a war against Russia. In the Crimean War (1853-56) England, France, and Italy joined with Turkey against her. Again, in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) the nations united to prevent Russia from realizing the fruits of a complete victory over the Turks. We shall presently see that circumstances growing out of the latter war are connected in an unbroken chain of historical sequence with the assassination of the Archduke of Austria at the capital of Bosnia in 1914.

The unfitness of Turkey to exist among modern civilized nations needs scarcely a comment. The word "autocracy" is too mild to apply to this venal military despotism, which has been ruled almost from the beginning by the worst blood-stained tyrants of history. The massacres of Christian Armenians, Syrians, Arabs, Greeks, and the Slavs of the Balkans, have made her name accursed on the earth. This political derelict has fattened its putrid bulk for some centuries on one of the most fertile areas of Europe, now the prey of the German autocracy. Its fertile soils, rich ores of iron and copper, its coal fields, its commanding positions on two seas, made it no small temptation, a fair field for the predatory instincts of Austria and Germany.

Russia's interests, while in a measure economic and political, were at bottom racial and religious. They were the interests which the Russian people had in common with the Slavic peoples of the Balkans; the bitterness of the Russians against the Turks lies largely in the treatment accorded to these

Slavs. Mohammedanism was in its nature a religion of the sword, and propagandism by violence was a virtue. Jesus commanded his followers to put up the sword; Mohammed made it a chief duty of the faithful to extend the true faith by the sword. The faithful were taught to believe that those of their number who fell in battle were admitted at once to the joys of Paradise. A religious sanction was thus given to war and the way was prepared for "Holy Wars." The eleventh and twelfth centuries are bloody testimony to the virtues of "national evolution" by war. Wherever the Turks have come into contact with other peoples this warring spirit has tended to make them like the Turks, exercising a baneful influence upon Christianity itself.

Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin

The inveterate character of Slavo-Turkish hostility is shown in a continuous series of wars from the time of Peter the Great to the present day. The determining factor in the Russo-Turkish War was the old grievance of the cruelty which the Turks inflicted upon the Slavic peoples of the Balkan peninsula. Something of the nature of these cruelties may be gathered from an English traveler, Mr. Arthur Evans, who passed through Turkey at this time and writes: "In the heat of summer men are stripped naked and tied to a tree, smeared over with honey or other sweet stuff and left to the tender mercies of the insect world. For winter extortion it is found convenient to bind people to stakes and leave them barefooted to be frost-bitten; or at other times they are shoved into a pigsty and cold water poured on them. A favorite plan is to drive a party of rayahs (peasants) up a tree or into a chamber and then smoke them with green wood. Instances are recorded of Bosnian peasants being buried up to their heads in earth and left to repent at leisure." Intolerable conditions in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria led to a revolt, whereupon the blood-thirsty Moslem soldiery and looters were poured out by the Turks upon the defenseless Christians. Whole villages were destroyed. In one of them 5,000 men, women and children after being most horribly maltreated were butchered outright.

The effect upon the Russian people was immediate. Religious impulse and emotional enthusiasm for the final libera-

tion of the Slavs swelled into a tremendous popular wave to wipe out the Turks from Europe. Serbia declared war, was joined by Montenegro, but was defeated; Russia, despite the warnings of the Powers, came to the rescue, was joined by Roumania and turned the tide completely, defeating the Turks and forcing them to sign the treaty of San Stefano (1877). Had this treaty been left undisturbed by the nations it would have removed one of the standing causes of dissension, international antagonism and bloodshed in Europe that has followed since; but instead, they demanded that it be submitted for revision to a congress of the European Powers. Austria mobilized her army as a threat to Russia. Russia, reluctant, worn from the war and suffering from internal troubles, consented, and the treaty of Berlin was arranged (1878).

A provision of the treaty relating to Serbia and Austria was of momentous consequences. The Serbians had been conquered by the Turks in 1458, against whom in blood, language and religion they had a common cause with the Russians. Russian religious societies had from early times animated their hopes of freedom by helping to foster the Serbian churches and schools and stirring the spirit of liberty. In the movement for Panslavism, which was early started, the Serbians were zealous workers, uniting in the aim to mass against the Turks all the Slavic race. Stimulated by this sense of Slav unity the nationalistic aspiration of the Serbians urged them on to the idea of a "Greater Serbia." The Kingdom of Serbia at that time included only about a third of their particular branch of the Slav race, the rest being mainly in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, and Carinthia. The insurgents in Herzegovina in 1875 had announced

solemnly their determination to fight for liberty and union with Serbia and die in a last stand rather than submit longer to the unspeakable misery inflicted by the Turks. In this idea of a "Greater Serbia" Austria perceived a new form of the "Slav peril;" and the Congress of Berlin, despite bitter protests from the Slavs, transferred the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the hands of Austria, to "occupy" temporarily until the quieting of disturbances should enable them to manage their own affairs. This was a cruel disappointment to Serbia who from this time forward bent every energy to free her kindred from the autocracy of the Hapsburgs, of which struggle a by-product was "the crime of Serajevo."

XXVI

“Drang Nach Osten”

The extension of Teutonic influence in the Balkans was a practical expression of the policy of “Drang nach Osten” (push toward the east) long pursued by Austria. Originally this policy expressed the eastward movement of the Germans from the 11th to the 15th centuries by which the Slavs were dispossessed of their lands in the region of the Baltic. A continuation of the policy was the formation of Austria-Hungary itself, whose very existence is a flagrant violation of the principle of race-nationalism—a mere agglomeration of peoples forced together by conquest and matrimonial alliances. Some thirty distinct dialects are spoken in the Empire, and the political system rests upon a sort of equilibrium of racial jealousies, maintained by opposing the interests of one nationality to the other. The popular aspirations of the Hungarians which broke out in the Revolution of 1848 were crushed by Teutonic Austria in 1849, their leader, Louis Kossuth, finding sympathy and protection in the United States. The Hungarian constitution was done away and Hungary was treated as conquered territory. But her spirit did not yield; her people adopted a policy of passive protest. The exclusion of Austria from German affairs by the Prussian war of 1866 led Austria to adopt a conciliatory policy, and since then Hungary has gained a degree of internal independence under the compromise constitution of 1867. Hungary was a historic kingdom with its boundaries, traditions, and ideals, and was practically subjugated by Germans. Its population, the Magyars, have sought in

turn to dominate over the Slav peoples within their borders. Fraud and intimidation in elections have practically deprived the Slavs of the franchise. Their language is suppressed, their schools are controlled, and their economic development so hampered that their ambition has long been towards escape from the Hungarian yoke and union with the Serbs in a Greater Serbia.

Against this aspiration stands the Teutonic "Drang nach Osten." In the Dual Monarchy it looked politically to the control of the Balkan states, especially in their foreign affairs, and economically to the control of the Danube Valley and the Vardar Valley to Saloniki for trade outlets on the Black and Aegean seas. For this purpose Austria has tried to block the progress of Serbia by keeping her from incorporating politically the kindred and neighboring Slavs and by keeping her economically dependent through lack of an independent outlet to the sea. Austria in this program has become the implacable enemy of Russia, and the pliant tool of Germany, whose own "Drang nach Osten" into European and Asiatic Turkey is of one piece with the policy of Austria-Hungary.

XXVII

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 1908 a most significant step was taken "eastward" when Austria, violating the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina outright. In this she was aided by Germany. The occasion was afforded by certain troubles of the Turkish Sultan. The Young Turks, a secret liberal party, who sought to inject new life into the Ottoman Empire had started a revolution; their chief principle was Turkish nationalism as opposed to nationalism applied to parts of the Empire. This tendency to strengthen the Ottoman Empire was in accord with German interests hence Germany supported the revolution, and the ensuing political chaos presented Austria's chance to annex the coveted Turkish provinces. No moral justification could be given, nor was any attempted. The action was typically Teutonic. The provinces were taken with utter disregard for the sentiment of the people, either Turks or Christians. Austria was now further on the way to the coveted Aegean ports, likewise further entrenched against a Greater Serbia.

Austria's annexations of these provinces rankled deep in the hearts of the Serbians, as an action which threatened to perpetuate for all time the political division of the Serbian people. It was in direct violation of the Treaty of Berlin, in accordance with which only the signatory nations jointly might change the political status of the provinces. The Serbians in their distress appealed to Russia; but on this Austria had counted. Russia was not yet recovered from the war with Japan and from the political effects of the accompanying

revolution, and Austria well knew that Russia would fear to take a step which might result in a general European war.

Here was Germany's chance to score a diplomatic victory, strengthen the Triple Alliance, and gain prestige with the great Powers. A conference of the Powers was held at St. Petersburg. The Kaiser "rattled his saber," and Russia yielded. The insolent concession was made that Serbia's "rights" regarding Bosnia had not been affected by Austria's action but, nevertheless, Serbia should renounce any attitude of protest and opposition and should henceforth live on "good and neighborly terms" with Austria. The popular rejoicing in Austria and the prompt official display of loyalty by this tool of German intrigue was evidence that the bond of the Austro-German alliance was strengthened mightily.

The seriousness of what they had done was fully realized by Germany and Austria. "The Serbian demands are a perilous adventure," said Chancellor von Buelow in his report to the German Reichstag. But Germany's economic and political plans in "Mittel-Europa," particularly the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad, required that Serbia should be controlled, because that road crossed Serbia.

It scarcely looks as if the Kaiser was solicitous for the peace of Europe when he would venture to take such action as this the very year after the Anglo-Russian understanding which completed the cordial relations of three powerful and potential enemies. Only a supreme egotist and irresponsible militarist, who believes that he can frighten his neighbors into submission to his will, could have been so blind to the dangers into which his policy was running the German Empire. This, it will be remembered, was the year 1908.

XXVIII

Serbia and the Balkan Wars

Serbia bided her time. Her revolutionary societies vehemently denounced the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." With Turkey also Serbia sought a day of reckoning. It came in 1912, when in alliance with Greece, Bulgaria, and Montenegro she took advantage of Turkey's weakened condition from a war she had just closed with Italy. The blow the allies struck surprised the world, and all but expelled Turkey from Europe. Serbia came out of the struggle with greatly enlarged territories, increased military prestige and intensified national feeling. The Slavs of the whole peninsula were jubilant. They had succeeded in doing over again what Russia had done in 1877. Austria and Germany were alarmed. As in 1877, so now, both had supported Turkey. Germany saw in the defeat of Turkey the eclipse of her plans for a Turkish protectorate and expansion into Asia. Both Austria and Germany feared the predominance of Russia's influence in the Balkans through the strengthening of these Slav kinsmen.

Unfortunately Bulgaria was not satisfied with terms of peace. In 1913 she treacherously attacked Serbia; but Roumania, in her rear, entered the struggle against her and she was compelled to accept conditions even less satisfactory to her than at first. As in the struggle of Serbia and her allies against Turkey, so in her struggle against Bulgaria, Austria and Germany took the opposing side. In each case

their course was consistent,—protection of their interests in the Balkans and defeat of Slav interests,—but in each they had taken the side of the losers. This was a hard blow to German prestige, and to German pride. It came at a moment when the German military party was furious over what they considered the humiliation of the Empire in the diplomatic victory of England and France in the Moroccan question. Along with Austro-German domination in the Balkans was threatened the whole “Mittel-Europa” plans and the control of Western Asia, and instead had risen the prestige of the Slavs. The German resolve hardened.

XXIX

Germany's War Measures of 1913

Serbia's success in the Balkan wars spelled her destruction. Austria had succeeded in keeping her from getting the coveted outlet on the Adriatic, but the Serbian gains in territory and prestige were substantial. So serious was the situation that a general European war seemed impending, when the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, led the way to a settlement. Austria wanted immediate war with Serbia, but Germany was not quite ready; there was probably a complete understanding between Austria and Germany, and such a settlement was likely to be temporary.

The mind of Germany seems reflected in a series of extraordinary military preparations begun in the spring of 1913. The German army was suddenly enlarged by a fifth. There was provided a corresponding increase of \$45,000,000 in the annually recurring expenditures for military purposes, with a non-recurring expenditure of \$252,000,000. To the aviation branch of the service over 1500 men were to be attached. The unity and alacrity with which this new and heavy burden was voted in the Reichstag was ominous. In addition to these preparations an enormous stock of munitions was prepared. The importation of chemicals for making explosives was greatly increased, also the importation of horses, food, and fats. Beds and hospital supplies were purchased in great number. Reservists were called in from various foreign countries. A half million of soldiers were massed on the Rhine. The construction of strategic railways to the Belgian,

French, and Russian frontiers was hastened. Fortifications at Helgoland and elsewhere were improved. The enlargement of the Kiel Canal was pushed to completion. Coaling arrangements were made for German naval vessels. Preparations were made to stir up revolt in the British Empire, especially in India among British Mohammedan subjects who might act in concert with Turkey. These activities were extended to northern Africa, to Russia, to France, and the German spy system was perfected at foreign capitals.

It began to be clear that Germany considered war inevitable. From German diplomatic documents fallen into the hands of the Allies it is revealed that the smaller states in case of war were to be either coerced or subdued. In no circumstances would Germany offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Her aim was to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. A short-term ultimatum was to be issued. "The arrangements made with this end in view," reads the document, "allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." Care was taken to prepare the minds of the German people: "We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries."

German apologists say that Germany's war measures of 1913-14 were taken in view of the hostile ring of enemies encircling her. The apology does not appear strong in the

light of conditions just at that time. All of those "enemy countries" were absorbed with serious internal problems. France was involved in labor troubles and in a serious political scandal, and French statesmen as well as the French press were deploring the inefficiency of the army. Russia, only partially recovered from the war with Japan, was known to be honeycombed with official corruption and revolutionary plots; the Russian army was not properly equipped, and her transportation facilities were anything but organized for attack. England was involved with the Irish; the disturbance had almost reached the stage of civil war in the northern part of Ireland. Had Germany been sincere in the "ring of enemies" theory she could easily have forestalled attack by entrenching her army along her frontiers, and, as the war has proved, without a single act of aggression she could easily have blocked any projected invasion of Germany. Is it reasonable to believe that the war would have taken place if she had done so? No attack upon Germany was imminent from any of these countries. On the contrary, their troubles were favorable to the plans of Germany, and such convenient afflictions to her three most powerful "enemies" might never be so happily conjoined again.

Thus far it seems clear that to achieve their aims against Serbia in behalf of the general "Mittel-Europa" policy Germany and Austria were willing to risk and actually prepared for a general European war. All of these preparations of course were made without reference to the assassination of an Austrian archduke because it had not yet occurred. In August 1913, Austria proposed to Italy, as a member of the Triple Alliance, an attack on Serbia. Italy refused, on the ground that the Alliance was defensive, whereas the proposed attack meant a war of aggression. Whether Austria had consulted

Germany is not definitely known, but it seems improbable that she would embark on such a perilous adventure without consulting her strongest ally. She knew that an attack on Serbia would be tantamount to an attack on Russia. It may well be believed that she did consult Germany, and that Germany counseled delay until her own preparations should be more nearly completed. In a general European war such preparations would partially offset Italy, which might at least be counted on to remain neutral. Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden would be likely to remain neutral. Turkey could be counted on as an ally, also Bulgaria, which had recently been foiled by Serbia. France would join Russia for a certainty, hence in any plan to strike Serbia the Austro-German forces must immediately strike Russia and France. A quick thrust through Belgium to Paris and east to Petrograd would leave the way open to crush these two states in detail. Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria could cope with the Balkan states. The "Mittel-Europa" plans could then be completed by the absorption of the smaller neutral states. England was expected to be neutral, at least for a time.

If such a plan could have been carried out, even supposing a halt to consolidate their gains, is it to be thought, from what we know of Germany today, that the Central Powers would have stopped there? Considering the temper of German militarism, the immense impulse to the greed of the Pan-Germanists, the avaricious dreams of world dominion indulged by the romantic Kaiser bulwarked by power and urged on to lead the "chosen people" to their ultimate destiny, would Germany have let England escape? This hated rival, England, the champion of democracy, the scorner of "Divine Right" monarchies, which had profited by early putting aside feudalism, developing a true nationality and extending her con-

trol over distant and immense areas inhabited by "inferior peoples" to whom the German desired to carry the gospel of *Kultur*,—this England, would she not be made to know that God is a German? With the combined navies of France and Russia added to her own we may well believe that Germany would scarcely have hesitated to challenge the British navy, and with the British navy out of the way, the seas would have been clear to America. In the light of Germany's preparations it seems reasonable to believe that previous to the assassination of the Austrian archduke Germany and Austria had determined upon a course of action which they knew would lead to a European war, from which they should emerge victors, and possibly the conquerors of the world. In the words of Senator Elihu Root: "It now appears beyond the possibility of a doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been preparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation."

XXX

The Pretext for War

The only thing lacking was a pretext. The policy of Germany had always been to initiate her aggressions in such manner that the party to be attacked would seem the aggressor. Bismarck had held that, "A war to be a success must be popular, and to be popular you must make your people believe that they have been or are about to be attacked." Germany was not insensible to the possibility of moral revulsion among even her own people. She was also conscious that international morality had reached a high point among certain nations, whose active hostility it would be inexpedient immediately to arouse, and discretion might be the better part of valor.

The desired excuse soon came to hand in the murder on June 28, 1914, of the heir to the Austrian throne at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, by an Austrian subject of Serbian race. The crime had no political significance. While Bosnia since 1908 had been a province of Austria and the assassin was a Bosnian, he was an anarchist. Serbia as a state was in no way responsible for his action. By the outside world it was presently forgotten; even the statesmen of Russia, France, and England had ceased to give it attention. Meantime a secret investigation was instituted by Austria at Serajevo, while sending out to the world quieting reports and hastening preparations for speedily carrying out against Serbia plans long cherished. Nothing more auspicious could have happened to prepare the popular mind. The people of Austria were deeply shocked at

the brutal murder of a beloved prince and his family, and ready for vengeance. Suddenly, without the slightest warning, Austria on July 23, 1914, presented to Serbia an amazing ultimatum.

Germany has denied that she had anything to do with the contents of this note, but in the light of certain well ascertained facts this can not be believed. It is now believed that at an Austro-German conference held at Potsdam, near Berlin, July 5, 1914, it was officially and jointly determined to use the murder of the Archduke as a pretext for war on Serbia. This was reported at the time by a Dutch journalist. The German ambassador to Constantinople who attended the conference told it to the Italian ambassador at Constantinople, and also to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to Turkey. The Italian ambassador told it to an American diplomat who recorded it in his diary. It has been since openly referred to in the German Reichstag. From what we have learned of German intrigue in America, it is entirely reasonable to believe that Germany, the master mind of the "Mittel-Europa" plans and closely allied to Austria, with common interests against Serbia and in the Balkans, was at once consulted by Austria and became the guiding hand in shaping the ultimatum that was to be sent in the common interest to Serbia.

The note was of such a character as to make war inevitable. It was in accord with Germany's idea of a "short term ultimatum," and demanded unconditional acceptance within forty-eight hours. Says the German Socialist newspaper *Vorwaerts* of July 25: "The demands of the Austrian Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized state in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war."

Though extremely humiliated, Serbia at the instigation of Russia accepted all of the demands except two, which affected her sovereignty as a nation. She even offered to submit these to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers in case her reply was not deemed satisfactory.

Austria's reply immediately made clear to the Powers that her object was to find a ground for quarrel. She found Serbia's answer "dishonest and evasive." England, France, and Russia earnestly endeavored to mediate, and at the last moment Austria consented, but Germany refused, demanding that as the affair was Austria's none of the Powers should intervene. This apparently meant that Germany was determined not to let slip the chance to begin war on Serbia. On July 29 Austria bombarded the Serbian capital, and war had begun. Maximilian Harden wrote in *Die Zukunft* August 1: "The question has been asked: 'Where was the plan of campaign elaborated—in Vienna or Berlin?' And some hasten to reply: 'In Vienna.' Why do people tolerate the propagation of such dangerous fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna."

Germany Defeats Peace Efforts of the Nations

That Harden's statement is not an exaggeration will appear from examination, in brief detail, of the diplomatic efforts made by England, France, Russia, and Italy to avert a European war. On July 27 shortly after Serbia's concession to Austria the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, proposed an international conference to consist of the German and Italian ambassadors to England as friends of Austria, and the French ambassador and himself as friends of Russia. Had such a conference come about, is there question as to a speedy and rational conclusion? There could be little question; for, observes the author of *J'Accuse*: "If it is borne in mind how problems incomparably more difficult had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." Russia, France, and Italy accepted the proposal. Austria and Germany refused. Germany desired that France bring pressure to bear on Russia, to which France replied that Germany might do the same with Austria, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit of Serbia.

Germany, as she did firmly throughout, maintained that she could not intervene in the dispute between her ally and Serbia—which would have meant peace. It is true Austria later refused Germany's proposal of direct negotiations between

Russia and Austria, but, in the light of what we now know of German intrigue, it is more than likely that this was a subterfuge arranged between the German and Austrian governments. The Kaiser's personal influence extended to urging Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen"—which would have given Austro-German movements a good headway. There is no evidence that the Kaiser or his Government addressed a single communication to Austria in the interests of peace, except the one noted, but definitely refused to assist in bringing about a conference of nations. On the other hand, the Czar of Russia sent a personal telegram to the Kaiser "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal," which undoubtedly would have led to peace. This telegram was omitted from documents which the German Government published later as its official defense to the German people and the world. The conclusion is, that the German Government knew the Czar's proposal would lead to peace, hence it was ignored; also it knew this would be obvious to the German people, hence the proposal was suppressed from the people.

Germany's cry of "wolf" from the direction of Russia and England does not prove, in the light of the fact that Russia and England were the leaders in these strenuous efforts to preserve peace. England urged that Austria express herself as satisfied with the occupation of the Serbian capital and neighboring territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement, which would allow the Powers time to mediate between Austria and Russia, and in support of this the King of England sent a personal telegram to the Kaiser's brother saying: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove

that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." It was clear, as Sir Edward Grey said, that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace."

Russia stated to Germany that if Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed the character of a question of European interest, would declare herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violated the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia would engage to stop her military preparations. On receiving reply from Germany that it was "impossible for Austria to accept this proposal," Russia proposed that, "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." To this proposal Germany made no answer. But Austria declared that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers;" upon which Sir Edward Grey commented that "things ought not be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." But Germany refused.

The Austro-German action was a direct challenge to the security of Russia. Russia had been the first to act, as most immediately concerned. Her economic life was directly at stake, and the racial sympathies of the Russian people had been lacerated. Austria's initial movements had in a need-

lessly wanton and ostentatious manner ignored Russia's right to speak in a matter concerning a vital Balkan question. This was not only insolence, it was a danger. It was clear that Austria's purpose was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassalage, as a result of which it was certain that German supremacy in the Balkans would follow and Russia's interests at the straits, vital to her life, would be undermined.

The mobilization of the Russian army was based on the measures Austria was taking, and on secret measures known to have been taken by Germany for mobilization against Russia. The author of *J'Accuse* has shown conclusively that Russian mobilization was brought about by Germany's refusal to transmit to Austria the conciliatory proposals made by Russia; that Germany had actually been mobilizing for a number of days previous to Russia's mobilization; and that in view of Austria's resumption of negotiations with Russia on August 1, Austria did not consider Russia's mobilization a cause of war. Negotiations had actually begun between Austria and Russia when suddenly came Germany's ultimatum to Russia and the declaration of war on August 1. It was not until five days afterwards (Aug. 6) that Russia and Austria were at war.

The evidence indicates that for some weeks before the war, Germany had secretly gathered and located troops in such a way that mobilization was actually long under way before the formal order was given to mobilize. When that order came the work was done with unbelievable rapidity and precision. In the words of Hermann Bahr, who was an eyewitness: "When we saw the miracle of this mobilization—all Germany's military manhood packed in railway trains rolling through the land, day by day and night after night, never a minute late and never a question for which the right answer was not

ready and waiting—when we saw all this, we were not astonished, because it was no miracle, it was nothing other than a natural result of a thousand years of work and preparation; it was the net profit of the whole of German history.” In this secret preparation and extreme readiness to bring the entire military strength of the nation to bear at a moment’s notice lurks the ever present danger of autocracy to democracy.

The moral bankruptcy of those in control of the German Government clearly appears in the whole process by which Germany began war. Their whole course shows that they had early and definitely decided to make out of the Austro-Serbian trouble a pretext for war, their only solicitude being to maneuver Russia and France into mobilization that they might use that mobilization as a cause for declaring war; in which case the Kaiser alone had power to declare war as a defense measure, without consulting any department of the Government, and to make the cry of “attack upon the Fatherland” the basis of an appeal for popular support. They had deliberately blocked a conference of the nations, refused Russia’s overtures for an understanding with Austria, and finally abruptly interrupted negotiations actually begun by Russia and Austria. They had presented to Russia an ultimatum, to be answered in twelve hours—impossible under the circumstances to accept—namely, that Russia make “complete, immediate and unconditional demobilization,” in the face of Germany’s known covert preparations to strike, and notwithstanding the Czar had personally telegraphed the Kaiser that, “It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.” Their apology for war to the German people not only suppressed the Czar’s telegram, which sought peace, but brazenly falsified

the truth in the declaration that France had violated German territory. The announcement that French airplanes had dropped bombs on the railway tracks near Nuremburg was denied by the German military commander of that district. Quite to the contrary, in order to avoid possible friction on her frontiers, France had withdrawn her troops about six miles within her own boundaries. On the other hand, German troops had repeatedly crossed into France and had killed a French soldier before the declaration of war. The effrontery and hypocrisy of denials in the program of deception practiced by these autocrats upon the German people is one of the most amazing chapters in modern history.

The Crime Against Belgium

Of a piece with this conduct is the violation of Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 2, 1914, Germany presented to the Belgium Government a most insulting ultimatum, demanding unimpeded passage for German troops to operate against France from Belgian territory. Belgium was given twelve hours in which to reply, but she did not require that time; almost immediately reply was returned, as the unanimous protest of the Belgian cabinet, that "the Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duties toward Europe." Belgium's liberty and honor were not for sale! She had given Germany no pretext whatever for claiming that Belgium had violated her neutral obligations in favor of Germany's enemies. She made no request of the Powers for military support until Germany had actually committed the crime of sending troops onto Belgian soil. On Aug 4, the blood of her citizens flowed on her frontiers, a few miles from Aix-la-Chapelle. Though the Belgians faced destruction, they refused to sacrifice honor, and laid down their lives for liberty. Their country was ravaged with fire and sword. Old men, women and children were deliberately and ruthlessly massacred. Their crops were seized, their factories destroyed, their machinery stolen, their workmen torn from their homes and sent into slavery. The famished remnant of the people languished under the heel of brutal tyranny, but their courage remained unbroken and unbreakable. In the pastoral letter of the heroic Cardinal Mercier issued to his people on Christ-

mas Day, 1914, we read: "And there where lives were not taken and there where the stones of buildings were not thrown down, what anguish unrevealed! Families hitherto living at ease, now in bitter want; all commerce at an end, all careers ruined; industry at a standstill; thousands upon thousands of workmen without employment; working women, shop girls, humble servant girls without the means of earning their bread; and poor souls forlorn on the bed of sickness and fever crying, 'O Lord, how long, how long?' . . . God will save Belgium, my brethren; you can not doubt it. Nay rather, He is saving her . . . Which of us would have the heart to cancel this page of our national history? Which of us does not exult in the brightness of the glory of this shattered nation? When in her throes she brings forth heroes, our mother country gives her own energy to the blood of those sons of hers. Let us acknowledge that we needed a lesson in patriotism . . . For down within us all is something deeper than personal interests, than personal kinships, than party feeling, and this is the need and the will to devote ourselves to that more general interest which Rome termed the public thing, *Res Publica*. And this profound will within us is patriotism."

No scruples disturbed the German Government. Prussia had bound herself by special treaty to respect Belgium's neutrality, pledging her honor to the treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neutral state." Likewise Austria, France, England, and Russia became by that treaty "guarantors" of Belgium's neutrality. Another treaty by Prussia confirmed this in 1870. Despite these guarantees Germany laid her plans to attack France through Belgium. Why? Because, France, trusting in the sacredness of a treaty, had fortified herself least strongly on her Belgian frontier. Germany's defense of this violation of

Belgian neutrality is noteworthy. First she claimed that France "stood ready for an invasion" of Belgium; again, that France had actually invaded Belgium; and still again, that Belgium had violated her own neutrality. These claims are based on a gross distortion of facts. On the contrary, Germany had been building strategic railways to the Belgian frontier since 1906. The German Chancellor later admitted that Germany had wronged Belgium, but maintained that "the breach of international law" was justified on the grounds that "military necessity knows no law." This is the same argument that was used by Chancellor von Buelow in justification of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and urging further annexations from France. "That which appears to the French," says von Buelow, "to be the brutal harshness of the conqueror was really nothing but national necessity to the Germans." This is but another way of stating the Prussian maxim that "Might makes Right." This is the basis of the German international code, and it is in this fact that the invasion of Belgium had its deep significance for the world. As Walter Lippman has said: "Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation the crime of her violation would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an international state has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards cooperation. If it could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That is why, through three years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the basis of faith on which the world must build or perish."

XXXIII

England Forced Into the War

Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality brought Great Britain into the war. On the eve of the German invasion King Albert of Belgium telegraphed to King George of England: "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." Immediately England asked assurance from Germany that "the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." No such assurance was given and England declared war the day Belgium was invaded. Whether England would have entered the war later regardless of the violations of Belgium's neutrality can not now be known. To be sure there was the additional incentive of England's relations to France growing out of the understanding of 1904; these however did not amount to obligations. There was the forceful realization that Germany's hostility was implacable, that England must ultimately fight Germany to save her national life, and that she might as well do it now with allies as later alone. Certainly the general European situation which Germany and Austria had been gradually developing through many years was too serious a menace for England to have allowed Germany to crush Russia and France. England was conscious that Germany's *Welt-politik* made a war with

England logically inevitable, and that with Russia and France out of the way Germany probably would not wait longer than to consolidate her gains. The whole situation so far as England is concerned is summed up in a speech by Sir Edward Grey made on March 22, 1915, in which he said in part:

“We had assured Belgium that never would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected by others. I had given this pledge to Belgium long before the war. On the eve of the war we asked France and Germany to give it. When, after that, Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany with all our strength; and, if we had not done so, at the first moment, is there anyone now who believes that, when Germany attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and noncombatants, and ravaged the country in a way that violated all rules of war of recent times, and all rules of humanity for all time—is there anyone who thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on without eternal disgrace?

“Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting?

“In due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances that now exists between us and are public to the world. But one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium to her independent national life and the free possession of her territory; and reparation to her, as far as reparation is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her.

“That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies are contending, and which is this:

“We wish the nations of Europe to be free to live their independent lives working out their own forms of government for themselves and their own national development, whether they be great states or small states, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The German ideal—we have had it poured out by Ger-

man professors and publicists since the war began—is that of the Germans as a superior people; to whom all things are lawful in the securing of their own power; against whom resistance of every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down; a people establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent; imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave this Continent altogether than live in it under such conditions. After the war, we and the other nations of Europe must be free to live, not menaced by talk of Supreme War-Lords and shining armor and the sword continually rattled in the scabbard and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our national destinies and activities controlled by the military caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim for themselves, and together we will secure for Europe, the right of independent sovereignty for the different nations; the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal liberty.”

The conflagration which followed the invasion of Belgium was transmitted world-wide by international friendships and alliances built up through a century of anxious diplomacy. From the moment England entered the war Germany realized what she had on hand. “Gott strafe England!” became the popular cry, echoing the Government, and songs of hate became in order. Germany was balked of her easy prey, and she must now fight the united strength of the enemies she herself had so wantonly raised up by her ambitious policies. Her problem now, as she saw it, was to beat England to her knees, by any means whatever. Germany began to see that she had precipitated for herself a life and death struggle, and to accomplish her ends she threw off whatever vestige of a mask was left

that entitled her to the name of a civilized Government. She engaged in a Saturnalia of "frightfulness," assassination, massacre, poisoning, torturing, intriguing, burning, pillaging, committing every crime in the calendar, violating every law of nations and of humanity, and calling it war. She was yet to realize her surpassing ignorance of the real spirit of free peoples.

XXXIV

America Awakens

If America was confused at first as to the merits of the issues between the belligerents, her citizens could at least understand the meaning of German "frightfulness." These atrocities were first brought home to the soul of America by the official report of the Commission headed by Mr. James Bryce, author of *The American Commonwealth* and formerly British Ambassador to the United States, in whom Americans had learned to have confidence. The report was accompanied by the supporting documents. The Belgian horrors settled the sympathies of America; they settled the sympathies of every nation which had not lost its humanity. Germany's bungling attempts to justify her conduct only affronted the intellect and increased the growing distrust and aversion for her. When Americans began to study into the European situation, it began then to dawn upon them with what consummate Machiavellian art the whole thing had been planned and sprung "at the psychological moment." The accumulating evidence brought conviction that Germany had deliberately planned world dominion, to be achieved piecemeal as fast as her gains could be made good. But America's policy of "Isolation," and the consequent mental habit of thinking of European affairs as distant and of only general human concern for Americans, made her unready to enter into the war on either side. Again it was felt that the warring nations might have need of the United States as the one great people holding aloof from the conflict and ready to play the part of mediator. President Wilson counseled "the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned."

XXXV

Germany Flouts America's Sovereignty

In reality, America did not finally "enter into" the war; war was thrust upon her. It was Germany's flouting of the sovereignty of the United States that brought America in. Germany had killed some 250 American citizens who were traveling on the high seas under the presumed protection of their Government, exercising rights unquestioned under the law of nations. Probably never in the course of history has a greater degree of Christian forbearance been shown by any nation toward another than was shown by the United States toward Germany, and this was done even while suffering under an accumulation of injuries that might well have precipitated war two years before a state of war was officially declared to exist.

England's fleet had driven the German fleet off the seas and blockaded German ports, and when the German Government took official charge of all the food in the Empire for war purposes England listed food for Germany as contraband. Germany declared this to be a plan to starve her into submission, and in retaliation established a war zone about the British Isles within which she proceeded to destroy all vessels by submarines; no exception was made respecting neutrals. This was a direct violation of international law. Such vessels were by the law of the seas subject only to search and to seizure in case they carried contraband of war, in which case they might be taken before a prize court at the port of the capturing vessel. According to international law no merchant

vessel, not even an enemy vessel, could be destroyed at sea without provision first being made for the safety of the crew and passengers.

The reluctance of the United States to become involved in the war is clear from her whole course during the diplomatic controversies which followed Germany's violations of international law and direct attacks upon the lives of American citizens. This course was in keeping with the truth that a democracy is by principle opposed to war, and hence is not easily provoked to war; the great masses of the people desire peace, for upon them fall the burdens of war. The American Government is controlled by public opinion, and public opinion requires time to crystallize. Germany made capital of this feature of democracy, and for two years in her lawless prosecution of the blockade against England continued to kill American citizens upon the high seas.

President Wilson sent warning after warning to Germany, until in the light of Germany's insolence and repeated injuries the sending of "another note" became a subject of jest even among the American people. At the very beginning of Germany's talk about using the submarine against all vessels found in the war zone, the United States sent a solemn warning (Feb. 10, 1915) that such a course was "an indefensible violation of neutral rights," that she would hold Germany to "strict accountability," and that she would take "any steps necessary to safeguard American lives and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas." The reply to this warning was the sinking of the *Lusitania*, a harmless unarmed passenger vessel, carrying among others over 200 peaceable men, women and children who were citizens of a nation with which Germany was not at war. This wanton murder of these and other pas-

sengers was not only a violation of international law, but of the most cherished principles of civilized humanity. Again President Wilson protested and warned Germany that the United States could not recognize any right of the Imperial German Government to kill American citizens bound on peaceful errands, whether or not in a war zone. "The Government of the United States," he said, "desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government frankly admits. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."

The President further pointed out that "no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission."

At the same time a most solemn warning was conveyed in

these words: "The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

These words were unmistakable. But Germany gave little heed. On Aug. 9, 1915, near the scene of the *Lusitania* tragedy the passenger vessel *Arabic* was torpedoed and sunk with loss of three American lives. On March 24, 1916, the unarmed steamer *Sussex* was sunk in the English Channel, on which eighty persons were killed or injured, among which were two Americans. Following the sinking of the *Sussex* the United States sent to Germany an ultimatum declaring that, "If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations." To this, as to preceding demands, Germany made conditional reply. Germany agreed to suspend the unrestricted use of the submarine against merchant vessels, contingent upon England's discontinuance of her blockade

policy; to which the United States replied that it could not accept this condition; and to this Germany made no reply.

It soon became clear that Germany's whole diplomatic dallying with America was simply to gain time, until she should be able to make enough submarines to launch a campaign of ruthless destruction in spite of our warnings. On Jan. 31, 1917, Germany served formal notice on the United States that on the next day she would resume unlimited submarine warfare upon all vessels which her submarines could reach within a vast area of the sea circumscribing the British Isles, and the announcement was accompanied with a concession the nature of which amounted to little less than an insult.

This attitude of Germany towards the sovereignty of the United States is well illustrated by the newspaper notice issued by the German Embassy at Washington on the morning of the sailing of the *Lusitania*. The German Government through this official agency undertook to warn the American people that persons who sailed on the *Lusitania* would do so at their own peril; this was after the President of the United States had given them to understand they might sail on vessels of this kind. There were at that time among American citizens those who maintained that Americans ought not to jeopardize the peace of the United States by crossing the war zone. Ought American citizens to have kept off these boats? Upon this point President Wilson said in his letter to Senator Stone (Feb. 24, 1916) :

"For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation

indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile."

Whether for weal or for woe the urge of events has brought America into world relations where she does not and cannot live alone. As a member of a group of nations, America must bear her part honorably in the international questions involved in that relation. Submission to Germany's denial of American rights upon the high seas would not have ended there. It would have meant that the American Republic would have become to all nations a legitimate object of contempt. It would have been an unmistakable proof that the most solemn declarations of the United States were mere empty words. America's ability in the future to serve those ideals for which she stands would have been incalculably weakened, for thereafter the United States would neither have received nor deserved consideration in the councils of the nations.

XXXVI

America's Neutrality

It was claimed by Germany, and by some in the United States, that America's neutrality had not been real; that America had favored the Allies. No doubt after the news of Germany's conduct in Belgium and France the sympathies of the great majority of the people of the United States were with the Allies, and that sympathy has continued to grow as the nature and causes of the conflict have come to be understood. But these sympathies are not germane to the question of the neutrality of the American Government. It is true we had cause for diplomatic controversy with England, over questions of blockade, contraband and interference with United States mails, but between the United States and England there existed a general arbitration treaty, which permitted all questions of dispute between the two Governments to be referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement after the war. England had destroyed no American lives. England's defense of her course was courteous and based largely upon the acts of the north during the Civil War, and American experts in international law admit that it is by no means certain an impartial court would have decided the questions at issue in favor of the United States.

The German autocracy's perverted moral sense is shown in another grievance, that the United States would not lay an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to the Allies. In the first years of the war the German Government stirred up much bitterness of feeling among the German people on

this subject. Germany could not buy because she could not get through the British fleet, and hence she did not want anyone else to buy. The fact that Germany was not in position to buy certainly could not alter the legality of the sale; on the other hand, is it to be imagined that if Germany had been in England's place she would have considered it "neutral" for the United States to have cut off these supplies from Germany? The sale of munitions to belligerents by neutrals was permitted by international law. Both Germany and Austria had practiced the same as late as the Balkan wars of 1911-13. In fact what Germany asked of us was to become her ally, and such we would have become had we yielded to her demands, for in doing so we would have acted upon no principle or recognized agreement governing the relations of nations. On the other hand, we would have denied to the Allies an international right recognized even by Germany's own practice. To have refused to sell munitions to the Allies would have been, under the circumstances, essentially an act hostile to the Allies, and would have worked powerfully toward the end of securing a German victory. Even supposing Germany to lose, it would not have ended there. If such a principle were written into international law, that neutrals should not sell munitions to warring nations, America could not consistently in a war of her own obtain munitions from neutrals. That nation which in time of peace had accumulated the largest war supplies would be assured of victory. In other words, the militarist state, the autocratic state like Germany that invested its money in reserves of munitions, would be at a fatal advantage over a free people who invested their wealth in schools. It would mean, ultimately, to hand over the world to that nation which should maintain the largest armament factories.

XXXVII

German Intrigues Among the Neutrals

While Germany was thus playing with the United States, seeking to trick her into becoming an accomplice in her program, she was illustrating further her moral breakdown by her officially promoted intrigues and conspiracies in neutral countries. Throughout 1915 and 1916 Germany carried on in the United States, in our very midst, a secret campaign to cripple us so thoroughly that even when public opinion should be aroused we would not be able to retaliate. Something of the nature, extent, and villainy of these crimes is expressed in brief summary by the national Committee on Public Information, as follows:

“Koenig, the head of the Hamburg-American secret service, who was active in passport frauds, who induced Gustave Stahl to perjure himself and declare the *Lusitania* armed, and who plotted the destruction of the Welland Canal, has, in his work as a spy, passed under 13 aliases in this country and Canada. Capts. Boy-Ed, von Papen, von Rintelen, Tauscher, and von Igel were all directly connected with the German Government itself. There is now in the possession of the United States Government a check made out to Koenig and signed by von Papen, identified by number in a secret report of the German bureau of investigation as being used to procure \$150 for the payment of a bomb maker, who was to plant explosives disguised as coal in the bunkers of the merchant vessels clearing from the port of New York. Boy-Ed, Dr. Bunz, the German ex-minister to Mexico, the German consul

at San Francisco, and officials of the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd steamship lines evaded customs regulations and coaled and victualed German raiders at sea; von Papen and von Igel supervised the making of the incendiary bombs on the *Friedrich der Grosse*, then in New York Harbor, and stowed them away on outgoing ships; von Rintelen financed Labor's National Peace Council, which tried to corrupt legislatures and labor leaders. A lesser light of this galaxy was Robert Fay, who invented an explosive contrivance which he tied to the rudder posts of vessels. By his confession, and that of his partner in murder, the money came from the German secret police."

On the same authority we have the following, respecting the operations of the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, through an agent named Wolf von Igel:

"In April, 1916, secret-service men raided the 'advertising office' of Wolf von Igel in New York. He claimed to be on German territory, because of connection with the German embassy, and defied the officers to shoot him, saying war would result. They did not shoot, but they seized his papers—damning evidences of a direct chain between the German embassy and plotters who would bomb munition ships, who would upset Ireland; checks that showed embassy payments to Teuton helpers, such as foreign-language newspaper editors; documents that convicted the Teutons of fomenting the Sir Roger Casement Irish rebellion; along with offers from Americans to do dastardly work, such as blasting munitions plants. From the von Igel papers, in the possession of the Government for a year and a half, can be pieced together a story stranger and more startling than fiction, showing that Germany through her embassy in America was concerned with: destruction of lives and property in merchant vessels on the high

seas; violation of the laws of the United States; Irish revolutionary plots against Great Britain; fomenting ill feeling against the United States in Mexico; subornation of American writers and lecturers; financing of propaganda; maintenance of a spy system under the guise of a commercial investigation bureau; subsidizing a bureau to stir up labor troubles in munitions plants; the bomb industry and other related activities."

In the words of President Wilson to Congress: "One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities, and even our offices of government, with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries, and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began, and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal directions of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States."

It became clear that even if we should give up our right to travel on the sea, and surrender to Germany's threats, Germany's activities right in our midst and among our neighbors were becoming too serious to be ignored. Hardly a year had passed since the German admiral attempted to coerce Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay in 1908 that Germany had not tried to embroil us with South America or Japan. The "Zimmermann note" is a document which Americans will not soon forget. They will remember that this note was written at a time when

Germany was officially professing cordial friendship for the United States and only three days before President Wilson addressed the United States Senate upon the subject of a league of peace to secure safety and justice to the world. It proposed that, in case the United States should not remain neutral, an alliance should be formed between Germany and Mexico for operation against the United States, in which the money should be furnished by Germany, and that Mexico should be compensated by the conquest of her "lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona." The President of Mexico was to seek the cooperation of Japan. This note, which came into the hands of the Department of State in February, 1917, and was exposed to the people soon afterward, settled for a number of Americans any remaining doubts. Citizens of German descent who mindful of the advances made in the world by German enterprise, German ingenuity, German discipline, and German efficiency had sympathized with the land of their birth, now came to see that Germany was making war not upon nations only but upon civilization, and that she meant to triumph by any means whatsoever.

XXXVIII

America Recognizes State of War

Continued loss of American lives on the high seas convinced the President and Congress that the only honorable course was to meet the challenge which Germany had made. On February 3, the President handed to Count von Bernstorff his passports and recalled Ambassador Gerard from Berlin. On April 4 in the Senate by a vote of 32 to 6, and on April 6 in the House by a vote of 373 to 50, the following declaration was adopted:

“Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed repeatedly acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.”

XXXIX

Why America Must Fight to the End

We are at war with Germany, then, in the first place, because Germany made war upon us. But there are deeper reasons for our being at war with the German Government. They lie in the spirit and character of that Government. And these deeper reasons are why we must continue to bear our part in the struggle until the essential objects are accomplished.

Entirely apart from Germany's direct attack upon us, if we had to choose war there could be no question of where that choice would lie, for our own safety and for the safety of democracy in the world. The ideals for which America stands the German Government despises. To her they are negative and weak, being inspired by Christianity, which the German Government regards as unfit for the guidance of a nation that would be strong. She would build her state "with stones from the Roman Capitol." Her conception of the state is essentially pagan. It is the apotheosis of brute force, recognizing in international relations no moral bonds, no justice, mercy or humanity. It is the survival of a brutal barbaric spirit bodied forth upon the model of the Empire of Rome. Germany compelled us to choose whether we would tacitly and cravenly support this monster of brutal force, or whether we would listen to the voice of justice crying from the unmarked graves of the sea and the nameless dead of stricken Belgium and France. Our choice of the latter was in accord with every consideration of loyalty to our national ideals and of prudence in safeguarding our national security.

For a full realization of the deadly seriousness of this crisis we have but to consider what even a partial victory for Germany would mean. It would mean, in the first place, that the German method of war would be vindicated by success. In the minds of the German people thereafter, this would be the model to be followed in future wars. Its success would commend it to other ambitious nations which might be tempted to seek national aggrandizement by war. The world would be at the mercy of the ruthless principle that "military necessity knows no law." This principle would be glorified by a German victory. Thereafter all laws and compacts between nations would have little or no force. No nation after such a shining example of the futility of such agreements could, for its own safety, afford to place reliance in them. All international obligations would be reduced to "scraps of paper" and the world become an armed camp. It must be made clear by this war, that any Government that adopts the principles and employs the methods now being espoused by the German Government, and that any people that can knowingly tolerate such a Government, will bring upon itself not merely the condemnation but the effectual opposition of all peaceful peoples who desire that among nations as among individuals respect for humanity shall be enforced and a reign of law prevail.

What Germany Means by Peace

The character of the German autocracy is strikingly revealed in its "peace offensives." The dominant note struck in these maneuvers is in keeping with the general policy of "terrorism." At the close of the year 1916, before the United States had accepted the challenge, Germany began sounding out the Allies through the neutrals. Boasts of "the glorious deeds of our armies" accompanied a thinly veiled threat that unless the neutrals brought pressure to bear on the Allies they need not expect Germany any longer to respect their rights. "Be ware of the consequences of further stirring the wrath of the Imperial German Government!" rang out at every neutral capital. One purpose of this stroke was to harden the hearts of the German people, by throwing upon the Allies the burden of responsibility for continuing the war. Germany made no mention of specific terms of peace. Not so with the Allies. When President Wilson undertook to get from both sides a statement of war aims as a possible basis for peace negotiations, the Allies replied jointly and fully that there must be complete restoration of territory, full reparation for damages, and effective guarantees of security against Prussian militarism. But Germany would name no specific terms. President Wilson then outlined terms which the United States could join in guaranteeing. His concluding words are memorable:

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its

policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competition of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

"These are American principles, American policies. We can stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."

These terms were hailed with joy by the Allies. Germany made no response. This was January 22, 1917. The Zimmermann note was dated January 16. On January 31 Germany announced to the United States that "from February 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice." Germany's reply to the voice of civilization was "frightfulness." This is the German method of arriving at peace terms. This was enlightening. It laid

Germany open in all justice to the charge, that the world must give up hope of acting in friendliness or cooperation with a Government whose ways are not amenable to the ordinary rules of decent conduct.

Germany showed a similar spirit of noncommittal evasion when in August 1917 the question of peace terms was opened by his Holiness Benedictus XV, who thought "to expedite the end of these calamities by endeavoring to bring the peoples and their rulers to more moderate resolutions." America was then in the War, and President Wilson, while expressing appreciation of the generous motives of the Pope's appeal, stated the case thus, for America :

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the newborn Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

"Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all

things in this War, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.”

It is instructive to read in this connection the words of President Lincoln, in his annual message to Congress in December 1864, bearing upon his view of how to initiate terms of peace, in which he says :

“The manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On careful consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the Union, precisely what we will not and can not give. . . . Between him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue which can only be tried by war and decided by victory. If we yield we are beaten; if the Southern people fail him he is beaten. Either way it would be the victory and defeat following war. . . . They can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national authority. . . . The war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.”

When the war began to look dark for Germany in the days following the Battle of the Somme, the cry began to be heard in some quarters, especially among the German Socialists, of peace with “no annexations, no indemnities.” Since then the Russians have learned that the “o’s” in the “no’s” were the mouths of cannon. Under false leadership they have fallen an easy prey to this German masked battery.

But even assuming the restoration by Germany of all conquered areas, the damage which Germany has done to them has crippled them for generations of the future. Moreover, what reason have we to suppose that Germany would honor her plighted word, and keep the peace? As President Wilson said in reply to the Pope:

“We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace.”

Until that time when Germany shall be stripped of her power for harm, no lasting peace for the world is possible. It must be realized that “Mittel-Europa” is in 1918 an accomplished fact, so far as Germany’s military operations are concerned. If peace were made today, Germany would emerge from this war the political and economic master over territory extending from the Baltic and North seas well into Russia and Western Asia. Her conquered territory alone on all sides of her makes an area equal to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. In this area she has scientifically enslaved over fifty million people, a population sixteen times as great as that of Michigan. In this area she has taken

possession not only of the public utilities, improvements and resources, but the personal property of the inhabitants, even to their tapestries, rugs, pictures, jewels, and clothing. Her system of loans to her allies Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey has brought them absolutely under control of Germany. This control if peace could be secured would mean for her bankers, manufacturers and land-owners a monopoly of the exploitation of all these resources. No war in history has ever brought to one people such boundless material gain as this war has brought to Germany if she can secure a peace which will permit her to retain her conquests. Even peace without indemnities and annexations would secure to her the economic control of Middle Europe and Western Asia.

Germany in her efforts to gain peace may be regarded as much in the position of a bandit who has attacked our home, robbed our vault, outraged our women, murdered our children, set fire to the house, and retreated. Suppose now the sheriff, who has organized a posse, with us as members, and chased the robber to his den, should receive from him a message, saying: "You see the power I have. You had better come to my terms, or I may do it again. I am a man of peace, but I have not room to expand, as I want to. All I ask is that you give me what I want. You should do so, because I am convinced, despite your protests, that I am more fit than you are. Now I am tired of being chased by you, and you had better return home before I am provoked to do my worst. If you will agree not to molest me further, I will even give you back some of the goods." Would a man of honor talk peace terms with a desperado? Yet this is not far from what Germany has asked the Allies to do. And the Allies have declared for no peace without reparation, restoration, and security. Germany must be punished, then the world can talk peace with honor.

A peace without either such a defeat of Germany as will weaken the German power and influence over Central Europe, or else work a radical transformation of the temper as well as the form of the German Government, would mean that all Europe must continue to be menaced by the most formidable and heartless political and military combination the world has seen. The German people, expanding in the national pride of success, would be confirmed in the belief in the profitability of aggression, and bitter would be their hostility to the democracies which had recently opposed them. It would be impossible that the world should be "safe for democracy," or that there should be any lasting peace.

A victorious German autocracy, wielding such an increase of power, prestige, and influence, with ambitions unsatiated, and with a special grievance against the United States as opposed to her ideals and aggressions, would make this country a special object of her intrigue and ultimate attack. These many years the British navy and the French army have stood between German aggression and the New World. With these bulwarks removed or impaired by a German victory, the Monroe Doctrine would be in grave danger. If Germany should only partially destroy the power of England and France, this would be but a first step, to be followed by consolidation of gains and further attack, with their ultimate defeat as a goal, and with America always "within the scope of the German policy." If England and France were decisively beaten and compelled to accept terms dictated by Germany, that Germany would demand concessions of land to the north of us in Canada and to the south of us in South America, where she would be within easy striking distance of the United States. How then could we escape the burden of military preparation to meet

this attack such as Germany has forced upon France for generations?

The object of this war should be, if possible, to end war. But the success of Germany would cause the shadow of war to rest for generations upon mankind. Unless that power is put down, the affairs of the entire globe will be dominated by a vast Power contemptuous of other peoples, without regard for its plighted word, alien to the spirit of kindness and fraternity, looking upon force and sinister intrigue as the only means for the adjustment of relations between states, and hostile to the ideals of free government.

XLI

Our German American Friends

In behalf of the German people as distinguished from the German Government, let us recall these words of President Wilson in the war message to Congress: "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering the War. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools."

And for emphasis, again he says in the same message: "We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, however hard it may be for them for the time being to believe that this is spoken from our hearts."

In July, 1914, when war threatened, there was a strong peace party in Germany. Earnest protests were made against war. In Berlin on one day, 28 mass meetings were held to denounce the war, and one of them is said to have been attended by 70,000 people. That was before war began; but how is it now? The German press, German speakers, every source of knowledge for the people has been absolutely controlled by the German Government since the beginning of the war. It has sys-

tematically molded public opinion, and the public will. It has falsified the aims of the Allies, and glorified the "achievements" of the armies of the Fatherland. It can say, with near truth, No enemy has yet set foot on German soil,—and it can point to substantial conquests of enemy lands, still in their hands. Not only have they filled the German mind with pride of conquest, but they have fired the ambition of the German people to believe that "with God's aid" the German nation is to conquer the world and to rule supreme as God's chosen people. The German people have tolerated a Government which stands for such doctrine, and for the ideals that make possible the atrocities of the German army; the most physically fit of the German people are now in the German army; the German army is the weapon of the German Government; is there doubt in the mind of any true American about his own duty or the duty of the American soldier?

Otto Kahn, one of the most prominent of German Americans, speaking June 1, 1917, said:

"Speaking as one born of German parents, I do not hesitate to state it as my deep conviction that the greatest service which men of German birth or antecedents can render to the country of their origin is to proclaim and to stand up for those great and fine ideals and national qualities and traditions which they inherited from their ancestors, and to set their faces like flint against the monstrous doctrines and acts of a rulership which have robbed them of the Germany which they loved and in which they took just pride, the Germany which had the good will, respect and admiration of the world.

"I do not hesitate to state it as my solemn conviction that the more unmistakably and whole-heartedly Americans of German origin throw themselves into the struggle which this country has entered in order to rescue Germany, no less than

America and the rest of the world, from those sinister forces that are, in President Wilson's language, the enemy of all mankind, the better they protect and serve the repute of the old German name and the true advantage of the German people."

XLII

The People's War to End War

What then is being settled on the battle fields of Europe? Is it not the character of the coming world order? Shall it be established in the spirit of the Imperial German autocracy, or in the spirit of the immortal Declaration, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

Why is America in the war? "We are in the war," says Secretary Lane, "because we could not keep out. The world of Christ—a neglected, but not rejected, Christ—has come again face to face with the world of Mohammed, who willed to win by force. We are fighting Germany because she sought to terrorize us and then to fool us. We could not believe that Germany would do what she said she would do upon the seas. We believed Germany's promise that she would respect the neutral flag and the rights of neutrals, and we held our anger in check. But now we see that she was holding us off with fair promises until she could build her huge fleet of submarines. We are fighting Germany because she violated our confidence.

Paid German spies filled our cities. Officials of her government received as the guests of this nation lived with us to bribe and to terrorize, defying our law and the law of nations. We are fighting Germany because while we were yet her friends, the only great power that still held hands off—she sent the Zimmermann note calling to her aid Mexico, our southern neighbor, and hoping to lure Japan, our western neighbor, into war against this nation of peace. The nation that would do these things proclaims the gospel that Government has no conscience. And this doctrine can not live, or else democracy must die.”

This is America’s war, the people’s war. Every citizen of America, which includes every boy and girl in the schools, must pledge undying devotion to the cause upon which America has entered. He who is not with America today, heart and soul, is against her—there is no middle ground. And unity of purpose means solidarity of service. Truly the President has said, “It is not an army that we must shape and train for war. It is a whole nation. The whole nation must be a team in which each must play the part for which he is best fitted.”

XLIII

“Carry On!”

We have now reached a crisis in the Great War. With Russia in the throes of revolution and helpless, with Italy in extremities of need, with France hard driven in her almost superhuman endurance, with England crippled by the submarine, and with Germany and her allies in military possession of all central Europe and large areas of Western Asia, if the danger of this situation does not appeal to the intelligence, the heart and the will of a united America, the cause of government of the people, by the people and for the people, may perish from the earth. Behind our troops, behind our battle fleet, behind our great industrial army must stand the mighty army of the American people. Will they make unflinchingly the personal sacrifices involved in their decision! For the boys and girls of Michigan's schools, into whose hands is to come the future keeping of this State and of this Nation, there can be but one answer.

In the words of an eloquent pleader in this great cause for America and humanity: “If you love the women of your family, there can be but one answer. If you respect womanhood, there can be but one answer. If you honor the country which has cherished you and given you an independence unparalleled, there is but one answer. If you believe that the United States should not bend its neck to any yoke, there is but one answer. If you hold that the peoples of the world are entitled to work out their destinies as freemen, there is but one answer. Unless you believe that there is no aspira-

tion of man so noble as to justify him in risking his life for its attainment, unless you believe that it matters not how a man lives so long as he holds on to life, there is but one answer. Twenty-four hundred years ago at the end of a desolating war Greece at Plataea won a decisive victory over her Persian invaders and drove them finally and forever from her land. To her soldiers who fell in battle she erected a monument. For that monument her great poet, Simonides, wrote the epitaph. In that epitaph he made the dead heroes speak, and this is what they said: 'If to die nobly is the chief part of excellence, to us out of all men Fortune gave this lot: For hastening to set a crown of freedom on Hellas, we lie possessed of praise that grows not old.' By so much as the freedom of the world today is of greater moment than the freedom of Greece of old, in that large measure does this epitaph in all its truth, simplicity, and grandeur befit and belong to those of whom may be demanded the supreme sacrifice, for you will lie possessed of 'praise that grows not old.'"



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