




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HISTORY

OF THE

CAPTIVITY OF NAPOLEON

AT

ST. HELENA.

BY

GENERAL COUNT MONTHOLON,

THE EMPEROR'S COMPANION IN EXILE,

AND TESTAMENTARY EXECUTOR.

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HISTORY
OF THE
CAPTIVITY OF NAPOLEON
IN ST. HELENA.

HISTORICAL FRAGMENT ON THE CAMPAIGNS
OF AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA.

CAMPAIGN OF 1805.

IN 1805, after having taken 80,000 prisoners and all the appointments of the Austrian army, Napoleon decided on marching upon Vienna—1st, to free Italy, and fall upon the rear of the Arch-Duke Charles, who had beaten the Prince of Essling, and who had already reached the Adige; 2nd, to prevent the junction of the Austrian army with that of the Emperor Alexander; 3rd, to break up, fight with, or cut off the army of Kutusov. On entering Vienna, he learned that the Arch-Duke Charles was in full retreat from Italy; that, followed by the Prince of Essling, and his army weakened by the garrisons which he had thrown into Venice and Palma N^a and by the corps of

observation left in Carniola, he was entering Hungary with only 35,000 men; and that the Emperor Alexander was at Olmutz. He then resolved to cross the Danube at Vienna, in order to engage at Hollabrunn with Kutusov, who, having been defeated at Anstettin, had crossed the Danube at Krems; this movement had been executed whilst Prince Murat allowed himself to be amused by Prince Bagration, who, whilst talking of peace, made his escape. Napoleon hastened on during the night, and commenced the attack at the break of day, but Bagration had escaped during the eighteen hours of the armistice. On the 2nd of December, he defeated, at Austerlitz, the united armies of Russia and Austria, commanded by the Emperors of Austria and Russia; he had left the Duke of Treviso at Vienna, with 15,000 men; the Duke of Ragusa was on the Simmering, with 20,000 men, observing the movements of Prince Charles; and the Prince of Echemühl was on the borders of Hungary, with 30,000 men. The 15,000 men with the Duke of Treviso, the 20,000 with the Duke of Ragusa, the 30,000 with the Prince of Echemühl, and the 40,000 with the Prince of Essling, who had already arrived at Klagenfurt, formed, therefore, an army of more than 100,000 men, opposed to the 35,000 with the Arch-Duke Charles.

The movement upon Austerlitz to fight the Russian army, and prevent its junction with the army of Italy, was conformable to all the rules of art; it succeeded as it ought to do. The Prince of Moskova, with the

6th division, was in the Tyrol; the Duke of Castiglione was with the seventh division as a reserve, in Swabia; the Marshal St. Cyr was before Venice; the King of Bavaria had a reserve of troops in Munich; as to Prussia, we were not at war with her. The convention of Potsdam was eventual; it was necessary, previously, that the propositions which Count Haugwitz was commissioned to submit to Napoleon, should be refused; he was at head-quarters; and if we had been beaten at Austerlitz, they would have been accepted. Had this battle been lost, the immediate effect would have been to excite the jealousy of the Court of Berlin against Austria and Russia; besides, six weeks would have been required to get the Prussian army in motion.

If the Emperor of Russia had evacuated Olmutz, and penetrated into Hungary in order to join the Arch-Duke Charles without giving battle, the army which fought at Austerlitz would have been reinforced by two divisions under the Prince of Echmühl, which were not present at that engagement, and by the divisions under the Dukes of Treviso and Ragusa, and the Prince of Essling; all the advantage would have been on our side; our numbers would have been superior to the whole army of the allies.

The army had, in this campaign, three lines of operation; one upon Italy by the Simmering and Klagenfurt; another, also upon Italy, by the Simmering, Goerz, and Palma-Nova; and the third upon the Rhine, by St. Polten, Enns, Braunau, Munich, and

Augsburg. Enns was fortified, and contained great magazines of provisions and munitions of war. Braunau was a *tête-de-pont* on the Inn, and strong enough to sustain a blockade of fifteen days; General Lauriston was in command there, and had established magazines, hospitals, and stores of ammunition. Passau was a strongly-fortified town on the Inn, at its junction with the Danube. General Moulin commanded at Augsburg; he had fortified it, and taken precautions against a surprise; it was a *depôt* of considerable stores on the left bank of the Lech.

CAMPAIGN OF 1806.

The Prussian army was completely surprised; Marshal Blücher and the Duke of Weimar had entered Cassel, and were marching on the Maine, when the Duke of Brunswick became aware of Napoleon's manœuvre; he recalled those two divisions; but many days would have been required for them to re-unite, and it was now too late. On the 13th of October, the Prince of Echemühl took Naumburg and all the magazines of the Prussian army. Great anxiety was felt at Weimar, the head-quarters, and the Prussian general resolved to re-cross the Saale, to abandon the troops of General Blücher and the Duke of Weimar to their own resources, and to march upon Naumburg, in the hope of retaking his magazines, which he thought were occupied only by the leader of a party. On the night preceding the battle of Jena, the French army formed into two great divisions; one of 60,000 men occupied Naumburg, between

which place and Jena the banks of the Saale are very steep, and have only one defile, that of Dombourg, which was occupied by a corps of light troops. This body of 60,000 men was composed of the troops of Marshals Davoust and Bernadotte, and the cavalry of Prince Murat.

The other division, under the immediate command of the Emperor, consisted of 80,000 men, and was composed of his guard, of the troops of Marshals Ney, Lannes, Augereau, and Soult, and of the divisions of cuirassiers under Hautpont and Naurowty; it was posted beyond Jena, at the opening of a plain.

The 14,000 Prussians began the engagement with the third corps, at the entrance of the defile of Koesen, and not at Amsterdadt, but Napoleon had, three hours before, forced his way through the passes, and had gained the heights above Jena, with 80,000 men, driving back the army of General Russel and the Prince of Hohenlohe. The 60,000 men whom the King commanded in person, were stopped and beaten by the 30,000 men of the third corps alone; for Marshal Bernadotte, not wishing to engage in their rear, in the defile of Koesen, had made a retrograde movement of two leagues during the night, in order to pass the Saale at the bridge of Dombourg, between Jena and Naumburg; so that, on the morning of the 14th, he was in a position to fall upon the flank of the enemy.—a circumstance which caused them great uneasiness.

Undoubtedly, the Prince of **E**chmühl could not be victorious, but he could not be driven from the defile of Koesen with so fine a body of infantry as he com-

manded; 10,000 men were quite sufficient to defend the passage. Even should he lose it, the Prussian army could not cross the Saale in front of his forces; 6,000 Frenchmen and twenty-four pieces of cannon were sufficient to prevent that. So that, even had the Prince of Echemühl been driven from the defile of Koesen, and obliged to recross the Saale, that circumstance would have had no influence on the event of the battle of Jena; the loss of the Prussian army would have been thereby rendered more certain. If the Prince of Echemühl had defiled at Domsbourg, three miles from Jena, the Prussian army might have escaped, for it could have got behind the Saale. The retrograde march of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo enabled the Prince of Echemühl to cover himself with immortal glory, and to raise to the highest point the reputation of the French infantry. At all events, the victory of Jena was quite secure.

CAMPAIGN OF 1807.

After the battle of Pultusk, in December 1806, General Benigsen, commanding the Russian army, marched on the lower Vistula, in order to attack the Marshal Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who occupied Elbing. Napoleon, having left Warsaw on the 25th January, 1807, assembled his troops at Wittenberg, and marched against the left flank of the Prussians, in order to drive them into the Frische Haff. The ground was covered with snow and ice, which greatly annoyed Benigsen's troops; the French were close to his rear when some Cossacks took prisoner an officer

of the Prince of Neufchâtel's staff. His despatches discovered the plan. Benigsen, much alarmed, hastily mustered his troops at Allenstein, which he again left during the night in order to avoid a battle. He was briskly pursued. Having reached Doppen, he directed General Yorck to cross the Passarge, and to march to Wormditt. The Prince of Moskova followed him with the sixth division. Had General Yorck not been pursued, he could have attacked the left flank and the rear of the French army, which, on the evening of the 7th of February, arrived before Eylau, after several skirmishes. General Benigsen occupied the town with a considerable force, but the Duke of Dalmatia attacked him with the 4th division, and got possession of it, after an obstinate combat.

The Prince of Eckmühl had moved with the third division three leagues to the right, to attack a Russian column which was on the Alle, and to turn the left of the enemy's line. Napoleon fixed his headquarters at Eylau; the fourth division bivouacked in advance; on the left and right of the town, were the second line formed of the guards, with the third line formed of the seventh corps, and a reserve of heavy cavalry.

On the next day (8th), at break of day, the Russians began the battle; they wished to carry Eylau, but were repulsed. In fact, it would have been difficult for them to succeed in taking that town, in face of the divisions of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Castiglione, the guard, and the reserve of cavalry, when they were unable, the day before, to keep possession of it

when only opposed to one of these bodies of troops. If the battle of Eylau was a sanguinary one to us, it was much more so to the enemy. Our loss on that day amounted to 18,000 men. If we had the Prince of Moskova at several leagues distance on our left, and the Prince of Eckmühl within two leagues of us on our right, the Russian General had opposed to them detachments quite as considerable. It was not their distance from us which kept back the third division, but the resistance of the enemy to whom it was opposed. Our centre was so little broken when the battle was at its height, that the guard, the fourth and seventh corps, and the reserve of cavalry, were still there and maintained a brisk fire till night.

The Russian army began to retreat on the arrival of the third division on our right; General Benigsen did not make any alteration in his front, but the corps, which, after the action on the Alle, had retired skirmishing, naturally took up their position on his extreme left; the Russians could, therefore, only bring on a partial engagement, since their forces were not all assembled, and our detachments were all opposed by bodies of troops of equal force. The Duke of Castiglione has never been accused of not being a good tactician, or of not understanding well how to collect a body of 12,000 or 15,000 men. Besides, Napoleon was at the church of Eylau; he saw the seventh corps defile before him; he caused it to deploy, but he could not order it to advance in column in the midst of the shower of grape-shot and of balls which flew round the church and cemetery. This corps then

advanced in the best order, and took up their position, the wings of each division being sustained by a column at a short distance. The snow fell in flakes, and darkened the air for a moment; Augereau diverged a little, and his men alone suffered more than all the rest of the army put together.

CAMPAIGN OF 1809.

After the battle of Eckmühl, the French army advanced to Vienna; the Arch-Duke Maximilian held the command in that capital, which he had supplied and put into a state of defence. Lariboissière, the general of artillery, placed thirty howitzers as a battery behind one of the houses in the suburbs during the night, and set fire to the town, which then opened its gates. In the meantime, the Arch-Duke Charles was approaching by the left bank of the Danube, and Napoleon resolved to get the start of him, and to cross that great river. The position upon the right bank would only be advantageous if the army could secure a *tête-de-pont* on the left bank, as, without that, the enemy could become aware of our intentions. This consideration was of so much importance, that Napoleon would have deployed upon the Enns, if he had found it impossible to establish his position on the left bank. This was an operation of great difficulty; the Danube is five hundred toises wide—fifteen, twenty, or even thirty feet deep, and flows with immense rapidity. To cross such a river, in the immediate vicinity of a great army, required the greatest art; particularly as we could not go to any distance, for

fear that the enemy, who possessed two *équipages-de-pont*, should cross the Danube also, and fall upon Vienna. Napoleon wished to cross at two leagues above the city; he had, in 1805, observed an island of considerable extent, separated from the right bank by the principal stream of the Danube, and from the left bank by an arm of it, fifty toises wide; if he could get possession of this island, he could establish his position there, and then, instead of having a river of five hundred toises' width to cross, he would only have a stream fifty toises wide; this would be crossing the Danube according to rule. The Duke of Montebello threw 500 men into this island on the 16th of May, the army of the Arch-Duke being still one march in the rear; but, since 1805, they had constructed a jetty between the left bank and this island, so that it was in fact no longer one. General Bubna being in the neighbourhood with 6,000 men, marched against the 500, and completely destroyed them: part were taken prisoners, some tried to return under the protection of thirty twelve-pounders and howitzers.

This attempt having failed, Napoleon marched to a place two leagues below Vienna, opposite the isle of Lobau, which is 1,800 toises in extent: it is separated from the right bank by the principal stream of the Danube, 500 toises in breadth, and from the left bank by a small arm sixty toises wide. He resolved to establish himself in this isle: once there, he would be in an entrenched camp on the left bank of the

Danube; he would be a hindrance to the Arch-Duke, and if that Prince should attack Kreuche or any other point, in order to cross the Danube and cut off his line of operations, holding possession of the isle of Lobau, he could fall upon his rear and attack him in the act of doing so. Lieutenant-General Bertrand was ordered to throw a bridge of boats across the Danube; on the 20th of May, an advanced guard began to cross over, when, in the afternoon, in consequence of the rising of the Danube so much as three feet, the anchorage of the boats gave way, and the bridge was broken; but, in a few hours, the damage was repaired, and the army continued its passage to the island. Towards six o'clock, Napoleon threw a bridge across the smaller arm of the river. General Lassalle advanced towards Essling with 3,000 cavalry, he scoured the plain in all directions, heard of a division of Austrian cavalry with which he skirmished, and established himself for the night between Essling and Grosaspern. Napoleon bivouacked on the left bank, close to the little bridge. On the 21st, at break of day, he went to Essling; a battalion was posted in a species of fortified redoubt at the village of Engersdorf; a party of the cuirassiers of Spain and Naurowty passed over; but at noon the Danube had risen four feet higher—the great bridge was again carried away; the rest of the cavalry and the reserve of the artillery could not cross; twice during this day Count Bertrand repaired the bridges, and twice they were destroyed. At the moment of evacuating

Vienna, the Austrians had set fire to a great number of boats, which, being heaved up by the swelling of the river, continued to strike against the bridge of boats. At four o'clock in the afternoon, General Lassalle sent to let Napoleon know that the Arch-Duke's army was on the march. The Prince of Neufchâtel ascended the steeple of the church in Essling, and watched the movements of the Austrian army. The Arch-Duke wanted to attack Grosaspern with his right wing, Essling with his centre, Engersdorf with his left wing, forming thus a semi-circle around Essling. Napoleon gave orders to give way a little, and to re-enter the wood in advance of the little bridge; but just at that moment, General Bertrand sent word that the Danube was falling—that he had been able to fix the bridge again, and that the artillery was going over. However, it was getting late, and Napoleon resolved to retain his position; for, if the enemy should get possession of the village of Essling, the re-taking it would be a matter of remarkable difficulty and great bloodshed. At five o'clock, the skirmishers engaged, the cannonade soon became very brisk; and the cuirassiers charged several times in brilliant style. The enemy was repulsed in every attack on Grosaspern and Essling, and a body of 25,000 men, although attacked by 100,000, remained unbroken during three hours, and kept possession of the field of battle. On the approach of night, the situation of the bivouack fires of the two armies showed pretty plainly that the following day would be a decisive one.

The French army, occupying both banks of the river, was superior to that of the Arch-Duke by 20,000 men. Victory could not be doubtful; but at midnight the Danube rose to a frightful degree. The passage over the bridge was again interrupted, and could not be made available until daybreak. The guards and the Duke of Reggio's division then began their passage in all haste. The Emperor mounted on horseback, full of hope; the fate of the house of Austria was about to be sealed! Having reached Essling, he ordered the Duke of Montebello to pierce the centre of the Austrian army, and the young guard to get clear of Essling, in order to throw themselves at the decisive moment on the left flank of the enemy, which rested on Engersdorf, a little town on the branch of the Danube which forms the isle of Lobau. The Duke of Montebello deployed his troops with the skill and *sang-froid* which he had acquired in a hundred battles. The enemy were aware of the importance of preserving their line of battle unbroken, but all their efforts were in vain. Already were the young guards advancing upon their left flank, when the victorious troops had to be stopped; the bridge was again broken; all the boats were carried away by the force of the current to the distance of one or two leagues; it would be quite impossible to repair the damage for several days. The half of the cuirassiers, the Prince of Eckmühl's division, and all the reserve of artillery, were still on the right bank. This *contre-temps* was most deplorable; but the plan of

operation was so excellent and had been so profoundly calculated, that the army was in no danger, and could, at the worst, take up its position again in the isle of Lobau, where it could not be attacked; for never was there a stronger entrenched camp; it was protected by a deep fosse sixty toises wide. This vexatious intelligence arrived at seven o'clock in the morning; the Emperor sent orders to the Prince of Essling and to the Duke of Montebello to halt, and to fall back quietly on their former positions; the former rested his left flank on the village of Grosaspern, which is more than a league in length; the latter, was placed between Grosaspern and Essling, resting his right flank on the last named village. This movement was made as if it was a review. The enemy, who were dispirited and retreating, stopped in astonishment, not being able to comprehend this retrograde movement of the French; but they soon heard that their bridges were carried away, and their centre regained its first position. It was then ten o'clock in the morning, and from that time till four o'clock in the afternoon—that is to say, during six hours—100,000 Austrians and 500 pieces of cannon, attacked without gaining any advantage, 50,000 Frenchmen, who had only 100 pieces of cannon on the field, and who were obliged to be saving of their ammunition, of which they had not sufficient. .

The success of the battle depended on the possession of the village of Essling; the Arch-Duke made every possible effort to retain it: five times he led the

attack with fresh troops, and took the village twice, but five times he was driven back. At length, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the Emperor ordered his Aides-de-camp, General Rapp and the brave Count of Lobau, to put themselves at the head of the young guard, to advance in three columns, and to charge the enemy who were preparing to make a sixth attack; they were put to the rout and the victory was decided; the Arch-Duke had no longer any fresh troops, and fell back. The firing ceased at four o'clock precisely, at a season when an engagement could be continued till ten; so that, during six hours of the day, we remained masters of the field of battle.

The old guard, with the Emperor at their head, were constantly engaged within gun-shot of Essling, their right flank to the Danube, their left towards Grosaspern. At six o'clock in the evening, Lieutenant-General Darsenne, colonel of grenadiers of the old guard, sent Colonel Montholon, who was then near him, to ask permission to charge, in order to decide the fate of the day and oblige the Austrians to retreat. "No," said the Emperor, "it is fortunate that things are as they are; without bridges, without succours—certainly, we have done more than I could have expected; remain quiet." He then went to the Isle of Lobau and examined it all round; he was afraid that the enemy might throw a bridge across at the extremity of the island, and send over some battalions. He then went to look at the great bridge. Alas! every part of it had disappeared! not a boat remained! The Danube

had risen twenty-eight feet during the last three days; the lower parts of the island were inundated. He returned to the little bridge, and commanded the army to cross it at midnight and to encamp on the island. The division of the Prince of Essling slept on the field of battle, and did not cross over until the next morning at seven o'clock.

Such was the battle of Essling: as long as we were in possession of the Isle of Lobau, we had the power and means of securing Vienna, which would be no longer tenable, if we lost the island. From this entrenched camp we could act on the offensive, if the enemy approached by the left bank; for a canal of sixty toises wide would be no obstacle, especially in such a locality. General Bertrand had, in twenty days, constructed three bridges on piles, a work ten times more difficult and more expensive than the bridge which Cæsar threw over the Rhine. The Viceroy gained the victory of Raab over the Arch-Duke John; the Emperor left the isle of Lobau and gained the memorable victory of Wagram, in July.

Both at the battle of Essling, and afterwards, the Arch-Duke did everything which it was possible for him to do. On this day, fell the two Generals, the Dukes of Montebello and of Saint Hilaire; these two heroes were the best friends of Napoleon, who shed tears for their death. They were men who would never have deserted him in his misfortunes, or proved unfaithful to the glory of the French people. The Duke of Montebello was from Lectoure; when in com-

mand of a battalion he distinguished himself in Italy in the campaign of 1796; he covered himself with glory at Montebello, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Pultusk, Findland, Tudela, Saragossa, Echmühl, and at Essling, where he found a glorious death. He was wise, prudent, and courageous, and of imperturbable *sang-froid* in the presence of an enemy. He had had but little education; nature had done everything in his case. Napoleon, who had marked the progress of his intellect, testified his surprise at it. He was superior to all the other French generals for directing the manœuvres of 25,000 infantry on a field of battle. He was still young, and might have much improved in the higher tactics, which he did not well comprehend. Saint Hilaire was a general at the battle of Castiglione, in 1796; he was distinguished for his chivalric character—was good and amiable as a comrade, a brother, and a relative. He died covered with wounds. He had been attached to Napoleon since the siege of Toulon. He was called the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*, in allusion to Bayard.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

The Russians lost the battle of the Moskova, and Moscow fell; had they gained it they would have saved Moscow; 100,000 Russians—men, women, and children—would not have met a miserable death in the woods and snows of the environs; Russia would not have witnessed, in one single week, the self-destruction of that superb capital, the work of centuries, nor have

lost myriads of her people, buried under its ruins. Had it not been for the burning of Moscow, an event unprecedented in history, Alexander would have been constrained to sue for peace. The consequences of the battle of the Moskova were immense; never was it more necessary to risk a battle; it was loudly called for by the court, enraged at beholding the ravage and destruction of its provinces; by the noblesse, and by an army fatigued, weakened and discouraged by perpetually retreating.

The Russians did not voluntarily fight whilst retreating even as far as Moscow, in order to draw the French army into the interior of their country. They abandoned Wilna because they found it impossible to assemble their army before that place; they wished to rally at the entrenched camp which they had thrown across the Dwina; but Bagration, with the half of the troops, could not reach the place. The Prince of Echmühl's march towards Minsk, Borisov, and Mohilov, separated the army of Barclay de Tolly from that of Bagration, and by so doing obliged the former to go to Vitepsk, and from that to Smolensk, in order to join his forces to those of Bagration. Having accomplished this junction, he marched to Vitepsk to give battle to the French army; but Napoleon then put in practice that skilful manœuvre similar to the one which he had executed at Landshut in 1809; under cover of the forest of Babinovitchi, he turned the left wing of the Russian army, passed the Borysthenes, and marched upon Smolensk, where he arrived twenty-

four hours before the Russians, who turned back in all haste. A body of 15,000 Russians who were accidentally in Smolensk, were so fortunate as to be able to defend that place for one day, and thus enabled Barclay de Tolly to arrive there on the next.

If the French army had surprised Smolensk, they would have crossed the Borysthenes there, and attacked the rear of the Russians, which was in disorder; this great project failed; but the French general derived advantage from this manœuvre, for it brought on the battle of Smolensk, where Poniatowski and his Poles covered themselves with glory. Driven back beyond the Borysthenes, Barclay de Tolly determined to give battle. The history of the campaign in Russia can never be thoroughly known, because the Russians either do not write, or they write without any regard to truth; and as for the French, they seem to be seized with a strong passion for tarnishing their own glory, and throwing discredit on its details. The war with Russia became a necessary consequence of the continental system, from the day when the Emperor Alexander violated the conventions of Tilsit and of Erfurt; but a consideration of much greater importance influenced Napoleon, and determined his conduct. The French empire, which he had created by so many victories, would infallibly be dismembered at his death, and the sceptre of Europe would pass into the hands of a Czar, unless the Russians were driven beyond the Borysthenes, and the kingdom of Poland, the natural barrier of the French empire, were re-established. In

1812, the troops of Austria, Prussia, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, marched under the French Eagle; Napoleon had, therefore, a right to think that the moment was come for consolidating the immense edifice which he had raised, but upon the summit of which Russia would press with all the weight of its power, as long as she could, at her pleasure, throw her numerous armies on the Oder. Alexander was young and vigorous like his empire; it was to be expected that he would outlive Napoleon. This is the whole secret of the war. No personal sentiment had anything to do with it, as the reviewers have asserted. The campaign in Russia is more glorious, more difficult, and more honourable to the Gauls, than any other event of which their history, ancient or modern, makes mention.

The Russian troops are brave, and their whole army was assembled at the Moskova; they reckoned 170,000 men, including those in Moscow. Kutusov had an excellent position, and occupied it to the best advantage; everything was in his favour; superiority of infantry, of cavalry, and of artillery; a first-rate position and a great number of redoubts; and yet he was beaten. Ye intrepid heroes—Murat, Ney, Poniatowski—to you belongs the glory! What noble and brilliant actions will history have to record! She will tell how the brave cuirassiers sabred the cannoniers upon their pieces! She will tell of the devoted heroism of Montbrun, and of Caulincourt, who found death in the midst of their glory! She will

record the actions which our cannoniers performed, although in an open plain and opposed to batteries more numerous, and covered by good *epaulements*; and she will make mention also of those brave foot-soldiers, who, at the most-critical moment, instead of requiring encouragement from their general, exclaimed, "Have no fear; your soldiers have all sworn to conquer to-day, and they *will* conquer." What parallels to such glorious deeds can future ages produce? or will falsehood and calumny prevail?

The space of four hundred leagues between the Rhine and the Borysthenes was occupied by our friends and allies: from the Rhine to the Elbe by the Saxons; from thence to the Niemen by the Poles, and to the Borysthenes by the Lithuanians. The army had four lines of fortresses; those of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Vistula, and the Niemen; upon the latter river, Pilau, Wilna, Grodno, and Minsk. Until we crossed the Borysthenes at Smolensk we were in a friendly territory. From Smolensk to Moscow, there is one hundred leagues of hostile country, that is Moskova. We took Smolensk, and put it in a state of defence, and it became the central point of the advance on Moscow. We established hospitals for 8,000 men, magazines of munition of war, 25,000 cartridges for cannon, and considerable stores of clothing and provisions; 240,000 men were left between the Vistula and the Borysthenes; only 160,000 men crossed the bridge at Smolensk to go against Moscow. Of these, 40,000 remained to guard the magazines, hospitals, and

stores at Dorogobouj, Viazma, Ghjat, and Mojaisk. 100,000 men entered Moscow, 20,000 having been killed or wounded on the march, or at the great battle of the Moskova, where 50,000 Russians perished.

Not a wounded man, not a man without connexions, not a courier, not a convoy was seized in this campaign, on the march from Mayence to Moscow; not a day passed on which we did not hear news from France, nor was Paris a single day without receiving letters from the army. At the battle of Smolensk, 60,000 cannon-shots were fired, and thrice that number at the battle of the Moskova: the consumption of ammunition was considerable in the less important combats also; and yet, on leaving Moscow, each piece was provided with 350 rounds; there was such a superfluity of wagons of ammunition and provisions, that 500 were burned in the Kremlin, where we also destroyed vast quantities of powder, and 60,000 muskets. The supply of ammunition never failed, for which Generals Lariboissière and Ebla, commanding the artillery, deserve the highest praise. Never did the officers of that department serve with greater distinction, or show a greater degree of skill than in this campaign. There are as many falsehoods as there are assertions in the passage which we sub-join:

“It is an erroneous idea to think that, in Russia, the inhabitants take any interest in war; for the lords of the soil, when there appears to be any danger

of a revolt, send them to their estates in the interior of the country, pretty much in the same manner as one drives horses or herds of cattle."

The slaves were very favourable to the French, for they expected to obtain their liberty by their assistance; the *bourgeois*, or slaves who had been enfranchised, and who inhabited the little towns, were well-disposed to head the insurrection against the *noblesse*; and this was the reason why the Russians resolved to set fire to all the towns on the route of the army; an immense loss, independent of that of Moscow. They also burned down the villages, notwithstanding the opposition of the inhabitants, by means of the Cossacks, who being always at enmity with the Muskovites, felt great joy at having an opportunity to do them harm.

The march of Charles XII. was as rash and as much in opposition to the rules of art, as that of Napoleon was well weighed and in conformity to them. In the first place, Charles XII. advanced 500 leagues into the enemy's country; secondly, he lost his line of operation on the day after his departure from Smolensk; thirdly, he was a whole year without receiving news from Stockholm; and, fourthly, he had no army of reserve. But, first, Napoleon only advanced 100 leagues into the enemy's country; secondly, he always preserved his line of operations; thirdly, he received daily news and convoys from France; and, fourthly, he kept as a reserve, between the Vistula and his camp at Moscow, the three-fourths of his

army. In short, the former had 40,000 men under his command; whilst the latter had 400,000. The operations of the one were exactly the reverse of those of the other, inasmuch as the one acted in conformity to sound and recognised principles, and with means proportioned to the end in view, whilst the other had not sufficiently considered his object, and did not possess an adequate degree of knowledge of *strategy*.

The march from Smolensk to Moscow was executed in the expectation that, in order to save that capital, the enemy would give battle; that he would be beaten, and that Moscow would be taken. It was thought that Alexander, either to save the capital or to redeem it, would come to terms of peace; but if he should not, that, with the immense stores of every kind contained in that great city, with 40,000 citizens, free, and the sons of freemen or merchants, and very rich, who inhabited it, a national *nucleus* might be formed to excite the slaves to revolt, and give a mortal blow to the power of the Russian empire. The idea of setting fire to a city containing 300,000 souls, and nearly equal in extent to Paris, was never looked upon as a thing within the limits of possibility. In fact, it would have been much more reasonable to conclude a peace than to commit an act of such barbarity. The Russian army gave battle at three days' journey from Moscow; they were beaten, the French entered the town, and for forty-eight hours they were master of all its riches. The quantities of valuable

property were immense; the inhabitants had remained; the five hundred palaces of the nobility were furnished; the officers and domestics were there; even the diamonds and personal ornaments of the ladies had not been removed. The greater part of the rich proprietors, had, on quitting the town, left behind them complimentary notes to the generals who might occupy their houses, with the declaration, that in a few days, after the first confusion was over, they would return home. It was then that eight or nine hundred persons, the overseers of the police, and who had charge of the city and of the pumps, taking advantage of a violent wind which arose, set fire to the city in all quarters at once. One part of the town was built of wood, and contained a great many stores of brandy, oil, and other combustible matters. The pumps had all been carried away; the town had contained several hundred, for the service had been organized with great care. Only one pump could be found. The army endeavoured to stop the progress of the fire during some days; but it was all in vain—everything was burned. Those of the inhabitants who had remained in the town, escaped to the woods or country-houses; there remained only behind the lowest *canaille*, for the sake of pillage. This great and superb city became a sink of crime and desolation. It might have been then resolved to march to St. Petersburg; the court evidently was afraid of that, had removed to London its archives and most precious treasures, and had recalled from Podolia the

army under Admiral Tchitchagov, to defend the capital. Considering that it was as great a distance from Moscow to St. Petersburg as from Smolensk to St. Petersburg, Napoleon preferred passing the winter at Smolensk, reserving till the spring the march to St. Petersburg. He began his march towards Smolensk by attacking, and again beating, the army of Kutusov at Malojaroslavetz, and from thence he was continuing to advance without any obstacle, when the ice, the snow, and the cold, killed in one night 30,000 horses, which obliged him to abandon the wagons, and was the cause of the disasters of this march; for this ought not to be called a retreat, since the army was victorious, and might have advanced upon St. Petersburg, Kalouga, or Toula, which Kutusov would have tried in vain to cover. The army might have wintered at Smolensk if Prince Schwartzenberg had not abandoned it, and manœuvred upon Warsaw, thereby permitting Admiral Tchitchagov to advance to the Berezina, and threaten the great magazines and stores at Wilna, which contained provisions for the army for four months, clothing for 50,000 men, horses, munitions, and a division of 10,000 men to guard them. General Dombrowski, who occupied the fort of Borisov and the bridge of the Berezina, was unable to defend them. He had only 9,000 men, and was repulsed. Admiral Tchitchagov crossed the Berezina intending to advance to the Dwina, but made no attempt upon Wilna. He was met by the Duke of Reggio, who defeated him, and obliged him

to retrace his steps to the Berezina, after having taken all his baggage. In his flight, the Admiral burned the bridge of Borisov.

If, instead of being November, it had been the month of August, the army would have advanced upon St. Petersburg; it did not retire upon Smolensk because it was beaten, but in order to winter in Poland. If it had been summer, neither the army of Tchitchagov nor that of Kutusov would have ventured to approach within ten days' march of the French army, at the risk of being immediately destroyed.

The Romans at Thrasimene and at Cannes, Hannibal at Zama, Scipio at Thapsal, Sextus at Munda, Melos at Marengo, Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick at Jena, lost their armies and could not rally, although in the midst of their strong places and near their capitals.

In the Russian campaign, the magazines of the army were not on the Vistula, fifty days' march from Moscow; those of the first line were at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of the second line at Minsk and at Wilna, eight days' march from Smolensk; those of the third line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the fourth line at Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the fifth line at Dantzic, Bromberg, and Posen; those of the sixth line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. Of the 400,000 men who crossed the Niemen, 240,000 remained in reserve between that river and

the Borysthenes, and 160,000 passed Smolensk, and marched upon Moscow. Of these 160,000 men, 40,000 were posted at intervals between Smolensk and Majaisk. It was quite natural, therefore, to retreat upon Poland. No general represented to Napoleon the necessity of stopping at the Berezina; every one felt convinced, that when master of Moscow, he would terminate the war. As far as Smolensk, he manœuvred his troops in a country as well disposed towards him as France itself; the population and the authorities were in his favour; he could levy men, and collect horses and provisions; and Smolensk is a strongly fortified place.

During his march to Moscow, he never had the enemy in his rear. During the twenty days which he sojourned in that capital, not a courier or convoy of artillery was intercepted; not a house at an entrenched station (he had some at every post) was attacked; the convoys of artillery and military equipages arrived without accident. If Moscow had not been burned, the Emperor Alexander would have been constrained to conclude a peace. After the burning of Moscow, if the severe cold had not set in fifteen days earlier than usual, the army could have returned without any loss to Smolensk, where it would have had nothing to apprehend from the Russians, who had been beaten at the Moskova, and at Malojaroslavetz, and who greatly needed some repose. Every one was aware that it would be cold in December and January; but there was reason to think, from the

rising of the temperature for the last twenty years, that the thermometer would not fall more than six degrees below the freezing point in the month of November. The army did not require more than three days to finish its retreat in good order; but during those three days they lost 30,000 horses: the premature cold was equally felt by both armies.

• After the event, Napoleon might have been blamed for remaining four days too long at Moscow; but he was induced to do so by political reasons, and thought he should have sufficient time to return into Poland: the autumns are so lengthened out in the north.

When the army left Moscow, they took with them provisions for twenty days, which was more than was necessary till their arrival at Smolensk, where they could get abundance for their march to Minsk or Wilna. But all the teams of the convoys, and the greater number of the artillery and cavalry horses perished: the army was totally disorganized—it was, in fact, no longer an army; and it became quite impossible to take up a position before Wilna. The divisions of Prince Schwartzenberg and General Reynier, which were on the Vistula, instead of resting on Minsk, as they ought to have done, retired upon Warsaw, thus abandoning the army; had they advanced to Minsk, they would there have been joined by Dombrowski's division, which had not been able, alone, to defend Borisov, which was therefore occupied by Admiral Tchitchagov. It was not the intention of the Admiral to take possession of the Berezina, but to advance to

the Dwina in order to cover St. Petersburg. It was by a mere accident that the Duke of Reggio met him, and after defeating him, drove him back to the right bank of the Berezina. Tchitchagov was defeated again after crossing the Berezina; Doumère's cuirassiers took from him 1,800 men, in a single charge.

When the army was within two days' march of Wilna, and out of the reach of all danger, Napoleon considered that the exigency of affairs required his presence at Paris; *there* only could he overawe Prussia and Austria, and if he delayed his journey, the roads would perhaps be impassable. He left the army under the command of the King of Naples, and the Prince of Neufchâtel. The guard was then entire, and the army reckoned more than 80,000 fighting men, without counting the Duke of Tarento's division, which was on the Dwina. The Russian army, including all their troops, was reduced to 50,000 men.

Flour, biscuits, wine, meat, dried vegetables, and forage, were to be found in abundance at Wilna. According to the report on the situation of the provisioning department, presented to Napoleon on his going through that town, there remained there 4,000,000 of rations of flour, 3,600,000 of meat, 9,000,000 of rations of wine or brandy, and considerable magazines of goods, clothing and ammunition had also been formed. If Napoleon could have remained with the army himself, or if he had given the command of it to Prince Eugene, it would never have left Wilna. A corps of reserve was at Warsaw, and another at Koe-

nigsberg; but they suffered themselves to be frightened by some Cossacks, and evacuated Wilna, in disorder, during the night. From this time particularly must be dated the great disasters of this campaign; and one great misfortune in the circumstances arose from the obligation under which Napoleon was placed, to be, at so momentous a crisis, on the spot in Paris, and with the army at the same time. Nothing was—nothing could be, more unforeseen by him, than the mad conduct pursued at Wilna: but the first and principal cause of the disasters of this campaign was the premature and unexampled change of the season.

CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

Of the 250,000 men composing Napoleon's army in this campaign, 50,000 were Saxons, Westphalians, Bavarians, or troops from Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse, or the Duchy of Berg—very ill disposed, and who did us more harm than good. The remaining 200,000 were newly raised troops, particularly the cavalry, with the exception of the guard, the Poles, two or three regiments of light cavalry, and four or five of heavy armed cavalry. The deficiency of light cavalry prevented our having accurate information of the movements of the enemy.

We had bridges over the Elbe at Dresden, Meissen, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg. The movement upon Dresden was foreseen; everything was done to draw on the enemy. Napoleon had raised works, opened roads, and thrown bridges over the Elbe

at Koenigstein, to facilitate the communication between that place and Stolpen.

The victories of Lutzen and of Würtzen, gained on the 2nd and 21st of May, had re-established the reputation of the French arms; the King of Saxony had been brought back in triumph to his capital; the enemy had been chased from Hamburg; a division of the grand army was at the gates of Berlin, and Napoleon's head-quarters were at Breslau. The Russian and Prussian armies, quite discomfited, had nothing for it but to recross the Vistula, when Austria, intermeddling in the matter, advised France to sign a suspension of arms. Napoleon returned to Dresden, the Emperor of Austria left Vienna and went into Bohemia; the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia established themselves at Schweidnitz, and the negotiation commenced.

Prince Metternich proposed the congress of Prague, and it was accepted. But this was only a vain pretence; for the court of Vienna had already entered into engagements with Russia and Prussia, and intended to make them public in the month of May, when the unexpected successes of the French troops obliged her to proceed more cautiously. Whatever efforts she might make, her army was small, ill organized, and very unfit to enter on a campaign. Prince Metternich demanded the Illyrian provinces, a frontier on the kingdom of Italy, and the grand Duchy of Warsaw; the renunciation by Napoleon of the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Me-

diator of the Swiss Confederation, as well as the possession of the 32nd military division, and some departments of Holland. Conditions so stringent were evidently put forward first, with the idea that they would be rejected. However, the Duke of Vicenza went to the congress of Prague, and the negotiations commenced. All the means tried to induce the powers to moderate their pretensions, only produced some insignificant modifications. Napoleon consented to the following important concessions, communicating them to the Emperor of Austria by the Count Bubna, then resident at Dresden. He gave up the Illyrian provinces, and the grand Duchy of Berg; limited the Kingdom of Italy by the Isonzo; and resigned the titles of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation. As to Holland and the Hanseatic towns, Napoleon bound himself only to hold possession of them until the conclusion of peace, and as some compensation to him until the restitution by England of the French colonies.

When Count Bubna arrived at Prague, the term fixed for the duration of the armistice had expired some hours; upon this, Austria declared her adherence to the coalition, and the war re-commenced.

The brilliant victory gained at Dresden, on the 27th of August, gave a decided superiority to the French arms, notwithstanding some reverses sustained by Marshal Macdonald and General Vandamme.

In October, Napoleon left Dresden for Magdeburg, and had reached Wittenberg, when a letter from the

King of Würtemberg justified the fears entertained of the fidelity of the court of Munich, by announcing that the King of Bavaria had changed sides without any previous declaration of war, and that the Austrian and Bavarian troops had now united, and formed but one army. The letter stated that the King of Würtemberg himself, overawed by such a force, had been compelled to join, with his contingent. This unexpected news obliged Napoleon to change the whole plan of the campaign.

The two armies met on the field of battle, at Leipsig, on the 16th of October, when the French had the advantage; and they would have been victorious also on the 18th, had it not been for the defection of the Saxons, who went over to the enemy, with a battery of sixty guns, which they turned against the French line. Such an act of treachery brought ruin on the army, notwithstanding the exertions of the Emperor; however, at the close of the day, the enemy made a retrograde movement, and left the field of battle in the hands of the French.

At the battle of Leipsig, the young guard fought under the command of the Dukes of Reggio and Treviso. The troops commanded by General Curial attacked and put to flight the Austrian division under General Meerfeld, who was taken prisoner. The cavalry of the guard, headed by General Naurouty, advanced on the right, drove back the Austrian cavalry, and made a great number of prisoners. The artillery of the guard, directed by Count Drouot, was engaged

the whole of the day. The infantry of the old guard fought all day, in a tremendously exposed position, where its presence was absolutely necessary, but where it was never able to form into a square.

During the night, the French army began to move behind the Elster, in order to be in communication with Erfurt, from whence they hoped to receive supplies of ammunition, of which they were much in need, having, during the 16th and 18th, fired more than 150,000 cannon shots. The defection of the Saxons was followed by that of several German corps; an accident also happened at the bridge of Leipsig, which a serjeant sprung before he had received orders to do so. These circumstances caused the French army to suffer severely, although victorious. They crossed the Saale at Weissenfels, intending to wait there until they received munitions from Erfurt, which was abundantly supplied, when news was received that the Austro-Bavarian army had, by forced marches, arrived at the Maine. It was necessary to go to meet it. The French came up with the enemy on the 30th of October, ranged in order of battle near Hanau, and intercepted the road to Frankfort; although strong, and occupying an excellent position, they were completely routed and driven from Hanau; and the French army continued its retreat behind the Rhine, which they crossed on the 2nd of November.

During the campaign of 1813—first, our first line of fortresses and of magazines was Koenigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg;

our second line was Meissen, Leipsig, Mersebourg, Erfurt, and Würtzburg; secondly, our *têtes-de-pont* on the Saale were Mersebourg, Weissenfels, and Naumburg; thirdly, the Duke of Castiglione was in command of an army of reserve on the right bank of the Saale, and a division of reserve was at Leipsig. The position of the army was much injured by the accident to the bridge at Leipsig; but could they have reached Erfurt, they would have there found considerable stores of every kind; they could have halted there, provisioned their wagons, and after two days' rest, could manœuvre with advantage against the scattered troops of the allies. The arrival on the Maine, by forced marches, of the Austro-Bavarian army, under the command of Marshal Wrede, obliged the French troops to advance at once to Hanau, to keep open their communication with Mayence.

The disasters of the campaign in Saxony were the consequence of political events. It may be said that those political events should have been provided against; let that be granted; but still, this campaign would have had quite another termination, had it not been for the defection of the Saxon and Bavarian troops, and the change of policy which had taken place in the cabinet.

CAMPAIGN OF 1814.

In 1814, Napoleon had under his own immediate orders 40,000 efficient men, and with this handful of brave fellows he made head against the army com-

manded by Marshal Blücher, and that commanded by Prince Schwartzberg, in which were present the two Emperors and the King of Prussia. These armies amounted to 250,000 men, yet he defeated them in every engagement, and had it not been for the treachery of Marshal Marmont, the empire would have been saved! At the battle of Montmirail, the divisions of Sacken, Yorck, and Kleist, amounted to 40,000 men; they were attacked, beaten, and driven beyond the Marne, by 16,000 Frenchmen—that is to say, the infantry and cavalry of the guard, Ricard's division, consisting of 1,150 men, and a body of cuirassiers. At the same time, Marshal Blücher with 20,000 men was kept in check by Marmont's division of only 4,000 men; and Prince Schwartzberg with 100,000, by the divisions of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, amounting altogether to less than 18,000 men.

CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

It has been said, but without foundation, that the plan of the Emperor, at the commencement of this campaign, was to throw 20,000 cavalry into the midst of the cantonments of the English and Prussian armies, in order, in the first place, to destroy or put in confusion, the scattered divisions of those two armies.

Napoleon never entertained such an idea as to send forward 20,000 cavalry into the midst of the Prusso-Saxon and the Anglo-Dutch armies, in a country intersected by rivers and canals and covered by undulating hills.

Several plans for the campaign suggested themselves to his thoughts.

The first of these was, to remain on the defensive, leaving it to the allies to take upon themselves the odium of being the aggressors; to allow them to become entangled in our strong places, and himself penetrating to Paris and Lyons, commence on those lines a vigorous and decisive war. This plan had many advantages; first, the allies not being ready to enter on the campaign before the 15th of July, they could not reach Paris or Lyons until the 15th of August. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, the 4th corps of heavy-armed cavalry and the guard would be concentrated on Paris. These different corps consisted of 140,000 men under arms, on the 15th of June; by the 15th of August their numbers would amount to 240,000. The 1st corps of observation, or of the Jura, and the 7th corps, would be concentrated on Lyons; they contained on the 15th of June, 25,000 men under arms; they would be increased on the 15th of August to 60,000 men; secondly, the fortifications of Paris and of Lyons would be in complete order by the 15th of August; thirdly, by that time, we should have been able to complete the organization and arming of the forces destined for the defence of Paris and Lyons, to reduce the national guard of Paris to 8,000 men, and to quadruple the light troops of that capital, by increasing them to 60,000. These battalions, when directed by officers of the regular troops, would do good service; and when we added to them 6,000 artil-

lery men, from the troops of the line, the marine, and the national guard, and 40,000 men taken from the depôts of seventy regiments of infantry, and from the guard belonging to the division of the army under Paris, not yet accoutred, we should have a force amounting to 116,000 men to guard the entrenched camp at Paris. The garrison of Lyons consisted of 4,000 of the national guard, 12,000 light troops, 2,000 artillery men, and 7,000 men from the depôts of the infantry regiments of the army at Lyons; in all 25,000 men. Fourthly, the troops of the enemy which should approach Paris on the north and east, would be obliged to leave 150,000 men before the fortified places on those two frontiers; and supposing them to amount originally to 600,000 men, they would be reduced to 450,000 on their arrival before Paris. The allied army which should advance upon Lyons, would be under the necessity of securing ten fortified places on the frontier of the Jura and the Alps; and supposing them to amount originally to 150,000 men, scarcely 100,000 could reach Lyons. Fifthly, meantime, the affairs of the nation having reached so important a crisis, would produce an energetic movement in Normandy, Bretany, Auvergne, Berry, &c., and numerous battalions would be arriving daily round Paris; everything would tend to augment the numbers in the cause of France, and to diminish them in that of the allies. Sixthly, 240,000 men under the Emperor's own direction, manœuvring on both sides of the Seine and Marne, under the protection of a vast

entrenched camp at Paris, guarded by 116,000 stationary troops, would prove victorious over 450,000 of the enemy; 60,000 men commanded by Marshal Suchet, manœuvring on both sides of the Rhone and Soane, under the protection of Lyons, guarded by 25,000 stationary troops, would have prevailed over the enemy's forces; the sacred cause of country would have triumphed!

The second plan was to anticipate the allies, and commence hostilities before they were prepared: now, this they could not be before the 15th of July; it was, therefore, necessary to open the campaign on the 15th of June, defeat the Anglo-Dutch, and Prusso-Saxon armies, which were in Belgium, before the Russians, Austrians, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, &c., had arrived on the Rhine. By the 15th of June, we could have assembled an army of 140,000 men in Flanders, with a sufficient protection along the whole frontier line, and good garrisons in all the fortrèsses. First, if we defeated the Anglo-Dutch and Prusso-Saxon armies, Belgium would revolt, and her troops would recruit the French army. Secondly, the defeat of the English army would cause the fall of the English ministry, who would be succeeded by the friends of peace, liberty, and the independence of nations; this circumstance alone would terminate the war. Thirdly, but should this not be the case, our army, victorious in Belgium, reinforced by the 5th corps, which was in Alsace, and by the troops furnished by the depôts during the months of June and July, would advance to the Vosges

against the Russians and Austrians. Fourthly, this plan had many advantages; it was in conformity with the genius of the nation, and with the spirit and principles of the war; it would avoid the great objection to the first plan, viz., the abandonment of Flanders, Picardy, Artois, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Bourgogne, Franche-Comté, and Dauphiné, without firing a shot.

But, was it possible, with an army of 140,000 men, to defeat the two armies which covered Belgium—that is to say, the Anglo-Dutch army of 104,000 men, under arms, and the Prusso-Saxon army of 120,000 men; both together 224,000 men? The comparative strength of these two parties must not be considered solely with reference to the numbers 224,000 men to 140,000, because the army of the allies was composed of troops more or less efficient, and a French soldier would not be equal to more than one English soldier; but he would not be afraid to meet two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the confederation. The enemy's troops were cantoned under the command of two different generals, and composed of nations differing both in interest and sentiment.

On the evening of the 15th of June, the French army was put in motion. The division of General Vandamme and of Marshal Grouchy bivouacked in the wood within a quarter of a league of Fleurus. The Prince of the Moskova, after having been beaten all day, quartered his troops in France, placing videttes on Quatre Bras. It was impossible to occupy Som-

bref, because, in addition to the corps of General Zeither, the 2nd Prussian corps, under General Theilman, had arrived there from Namur. The army marched ten leagues during their first day, over cross-roads, and through a country intersected by rivers and canals. Napoleon's intention was, that his advanced guard should occupy Fleurus, concealing his troops behind the wood near that town. He was very careful not to let his army be seen, and above all, not to occupy Sombref. That alone would have interfered with all his manœuvres, for then Marshal Blücher would have been obliged to choose Wavre as the place of rendezvous for his troops. The battle of Ligny would not have taken place; the Prussian army would not have been forced to engage without being all assembled, and without being sustained by the English. The victory of Ligny was so far decisive, that it weakened the Prussians by the loss of 60,000 men. It had settled the question of where it would be best to attack the Prussians? whether by extending our line beyond their right towards St. Amand, or beyond their left towards Sombref; or, in short, by piercing their centre, getting possession of the heights of Bric, and driving back their whole wing to Charleroi, arriving before their right on the road to Quatre Bras? The point to be considered in this battle, was not the separating of the English from the Prussians: we knew that the English could not be prepared till the following day; but the point was to prevent the junction on the field of battle of a part of Blücher's third division

—which was on its way from Namur, and had not arrived at eleven o'clock in the forenoon—with the fourth division; which was coming to Ligny by Gembloux. By breaking the enemy's line at Ligny, their right at St. Amand was turned and compromised; whilst, by getting possession of St. Amand, we should have gained no advantage.

The Duke of Wellington had not studied the field of battle at Waterloo; that field of battle was bad, and his army would have been destroyed had it not been for the timely arrival of the 60,000 men under Blücher.

The Duke of Wellington was surprised in his cantonments; the French army manœuvred during three days within shot of the advanced guard; it had commenced hostilities, repulsed the Prussian army, and the Duke had not heard at his head-quarters that Napoleon had left Paris. All his troops were in full security, occupying an extent of more than twenty leagues. His infantry, his cavalry, and his artillery, were cantoned separately. His infantry only was engaged at Quatre Bras during a part of the day, and suffered there enormously, because they were obliged, in close column or formed into squares, to receive the repeated charges of our intrepid cuirassiers, sustained by fifty field pieces. This was a great error. The three great divisions of his army, not being able to act independently of each other², they should have been so disposed as to be always² able to render mutual assistance. The Duke of Wellington committed an-

other error:—he selected Quatre Bras as the rendezvous of his troops, that place being already in the hands of the French,—thus exposing them to be defeated piecemeal. His place of rendezvous should have been Waterloo. He would thus have had forty-eight hours to collect his troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and when the French had come up with him, he would have had his whole force assembled, and in position. But was it conformable to the interests of England and the allies to give battle? Certainly not. The tactics of the allies should have consisted in acting *en masse*, and carefully avoiding any partial engagement. Nothing could be more contrary to their interest, than to commit the success of the invasion of France to the chances of a single battle. If the English army had been beaten at Waterloo, what would have been the use of those numerous bodies of troops, of Prussians, Austrians, Germans, and Spaniards, which were advancing by forced marches, to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees?

After the battle of Ligny, the Duke of Wellington ought to have concentrated his army behind the forest of Soignies, recalled Marshal Blücher, defended the approaches of the forest by a rear guard, and secured his position by batteries and outworks. He should also have summoned to his aid all the garrisons in Belgium, and especially have secured the assistance of the fourteen regiments which had just landed at Ostend. Would Napoleon have ventured, with an army of 100,000 men, to traverse the forest of Soignies,

in order to attack at its extremity the English and Prussian armies, amounting to more than 200,000 men, and in position? Certainly, that would have been a manœuvre much to be desired by the enemy, and nothing could possibly happen which would be more for the interest of the allies. If, on the contrary, he had himself taken a position, and manœuvred to draw on the Anglo-Prussian army, his inaction would be fatal to him. 300,000 Russians, Austrians, and Bavarians, would in the interval have reached the Rhine, and he would have been obliged to return *on the wing* to the defence of the capital. It was then only that the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher should have advanced against Napoleon. They would no longer run any risk by so doing, and they would have been acting in conformity to the true principles of the war, and to the plan of the coalition.

The French army did not lose the morning of the 18th in making preparations for the battle—they were quite ready from day-break; but they had to wait until the ground was sufficiently dry for the cavalry and infantry to be able to manœuvre; for it had rained during the whole night. Sending a detachment of 35,000 men, under Marshal Grouchy, upon Wavre, was according to the principles of war; for, if he had come within a league of the army in passing the Dyle, he could not have gone after the Prussian army, which had just been joined, since its defeat at Ligny, by the 30,000 men under General Bulow; and which, if not pursued, might, after this

junction, have advanced from Gembloux upon Quatre-Bras, in the rear of the French army. It was not too much to give up 35,000 men, to pursue and prevent the rallying of an army, which, on the day before, had amounted to 120,000 men, and which was then reckoned 70,000, of whom 30,000 were fresh troops. If Marshal Grouchy had executed the orders he received, and had arrived before Wavre on the evening of the 17th, the battle of Mont St. Jean would have been gained by Napoleon on the 18th, before three o'clock in the afternoon. If he had reached Wavre even at eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th, the victory would have been ours; the English army would have been destroyed, or driven back in disorder to Brussels; it could not have sustained the shock of 68,000 Frenchmen during four hours, particularly after General Bulow's attack upon our right had failed; thus, therefore, the victory would have been ours.

The English General did well to order a charge of cavalry on the flank of the French infantry, whilst the squadrons of cuirassiers, who should sustain that infantry, were still in the rear. General Milhaud did still better to charge the English cavalry with his cuirassiers, and to defeat it. All Hannibal's victories were gained by his cavalry; if he had waited to employ it in giving the finish to his battles, it would never have served for any other purpose than to cover his retreat. This is having the most erroneous ideas on the subject of war, and not being at all aware of

the power of combined charges of infantry and cavalry, whether for attack or defence.

The charge of cavalry at four o'clock on the evening of the 18th, was made a little too soon; but, once made, it had to be sustained; Napoleon therefore, though against his wish, ordered Kellerman, who was in the rear on the left, to advance in quick time to support it. At this moment, Bulow's division threatened the flank and rear of the army: it was important to avoid any retrograde movement, and to maintain the position, however premature, which the cavalry had taken. It was not the intention of Napoleon that the cavalry of the Guard should go forward, for they were his reserve. When he perceived that they were following the movement of Kellerman's cuirassiers, behind whom they were placed in the second line, he sent an order to stop them. But it was too late; they were already engaged when the order arrived; and thus Napoleon found himself from five o'clock in the evening, deprived of his reserve of cavalry; that reserve which, when well employed, had so often given him the victory. These 12,000 men, the flower of the cavalry, performed wonders; they forced all the English lines, cavalry and infantry, took sixty field pieces, and several stand of colours. The enemy believed the battle lost; terror reigned in Brussels.

These brave soldiers not being supported, had to stop, and limit themselves to keeping the field of battle which they had won with so much intrepidity.

General Bulow's attack occupied the 6th corps and the greater part of the infantry of the guard. Napoleon impatiently waited for the moment when he could dispose of them, to decide the victory, by bringing them into the field. He then doubly felt the want of the division of infantry of his guard, which he had detached into La Vendée, under the orders of General Brayer. Four battalions only were disposable, and yet it was important that the twelve battalions of the guard should be engaged at the same time. The unexpected apparition, on the extreme right, of the first columns of Blücher's troops, staggered the cavalry, and obliged Napoleon to send General Friaut forward at the head of the four disposable battalions. The four battalions followed at an interval of ten minutes: the guard overthrew all which it encountered. The sun was set; the enemy seemed to be forming their rear-guard to secure their retreat—but the victory escaped us. The 4th division of the 1st corps, which occupied La Haye, abandoned that village to the Prussians after a feeble resistance. Our line was broken, and the Prussian cavalry inundated the field of battle. The confusion, augmented by the night, was frightful. If it had been daylight, and the troops could have seen Napoleon—they would have rallied. The guards retreated in good order, Napoleon with his staff remaining a long time in the midst of its squares. Those old grenadiers and *chasseurs*, models to the army in so many campaigns, gained fresh glory in the field of Waterloo. General Friaut was wounded;

Michel, Duchesne, and Ponet de Morvan, found a glorious death. Immortal honour to the brave Michel, who bequeathed to the Imperial Guard the motto, "*The Guard can die, but not surrender!*" Never did the French army fight better than on this day—it performed prodigies of valour. Had it not been for the arrival of the 1st and 2nd Prussian corps, the victory would have been ours, and 120,000 English and Prussians would have been beaten by 60,000 Frenchmen.

ON THE ARMY.

RECRUITING.

COMPULSORY service has prevailed at all times, in republics as well as in monarchies, among the ancients as well as among the moderns. The peasants being slaves in Russia and Poland, men are levied in these countries, as horses are levied elsewhere. In Germany, every village has its own lord, who fixes upon the recruits without considering for a moment either the rights or inclinations of the persons so chosen. In France the ranks of the army have always been filled by drawing lots; this was called "drawing for the militia," under Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Louis XVI.,—"levying a *requisition*," under the republic,—and "drawing for the conscription," under the Emperor. The privileged classes were exempt from being drawn for the militia, but none were exempt from the conscription. This rendered the conscription as disagreeable to the privileged classes, as the militia had been to the masses of the people. The mode of raising troops by conscription was in itself

the most just and mild, and the most advantageous to the people. Under the Empire the laws affecting this subject were rendered so perfect, as to need no subsequent change; and even the name was carefully preserved, lest a change in the name might perhaps lead to a change in the thing itself. The departments, which were detached from France in 1814, solicited and obtained as a favour, the continuance of this mode of levying troops, in order to avoid the unjust, vexatious, and arbitrary usages of the Austrian and Prussian governments. The Illyrian provinces, which had been long accustomed to the Austrian mode of recruiting, never ceased to admire the system of the French conscription; and since they have returned under the dominion of their former sovereign, they have obtained permission for the continuance of this method of levy.

During the first ten years of the revolution, the armies of the nation were recruited by *requisition*; there was neither drawing nor substitution; and all persons from eighteen to twenty-five years of age, were liable to serve; the laws of the conscription did not require young men to enter the army till they had reached their twentieth year, and they were obliged to serve only five years. This plan had the advantage of forming a greater number of soldiers, who would be ready for the service of the state on any emergency or crisis, but it had also its inconveniences. It would be for the advantage of the army to extend the period of service from five years to ten—that is, till the soldier had

reached his thirtieth year; granting furloughs and permission to return home, to those who had gone through the first five years, under an obligation to rejoin the army in time of war. From thirty to fifty is the age best suited to the military service, because man is then in his full vigour. For this reason, it is desirable by all possible means to induce the soldiers to remain in the service, which will be best effected by treating old soldiers with respect, dividing them into three classes, and with a careful attention to the wants of the troops, giving in addition to the usual pay, five sous a day to the first class, seven and half sous to the second, and ten to the third; fifteen to corporals, and thirty to sergeants. There is great injustice in not paying a veteran better than a recruit.

A million of souls would furnish seven or eight thousand conscripts every year—nearly the 135th part of the whole population; one-half is necessary for the wants of the public service, the church, and the arts,

A levy of 3,500 men a year, would give in ten years, making allowance for deaths, a force of 30,000, of whom 15,000 would form the troops of the line, and 15,000 an army of reserve.

Of the 15,000 forming the troops of the line, 6,000 should be kept under arms for twelve months, 4,000 for three months, and 5,000 for fifteen days: this would be equivalent to an average of 7,000 men for the whole year, withdrawn from agricultural labour. The 15,000 constituting the reserve would neither be

withdrawn from their occupations, nor obliged to leave their homes.

The Empire contained a population of above 40,000,000. It ought to have been divided into forty *arrondissements*, of a million each; and in each *arrondissement* a division of infantry ought to be recruited. To guard against the spirit of federalism, the officers, and the one-half of the non-commissioned officers should have been strangers to the district.

The maximum of troops which Napoleon ever had on foot, amounted to 600,000 men. The population of his Empire was more than 40,000,000 of souls; double that of France in the time of Louis XIV., who for a long time kept 400,000 men in pay. It would be a great error to suppose that all the conscriptions decreed were really enforced. The mode of proclaiming levies not raised, is a common *ruse* of war, of which nations avail themselves in order to impose upon foreigners, or to give a stronger impression of the greatness of their resources; and this custom, constantly followed in France, has led the world to suppose that the French armies were more numerous than they were in reality.

In Egypt, it was agreed upon by all the generals of division, that, in the orders of the day, the quantities of provisions, arms, clothing, &c., should all be surcharged one-third. On this ground the author of the "Military History of the Campaign of 1799," expresses his astonishment that the orders of the day, made in reference to that army, made its number

amount to 40,000 men, whereas the other authentic documents which he had collected, proved that its force was far below that number.

In the despatches and accounts of the campaigns in Italy in 1796-97, and afterwards, the same means were resorted to, in order to give an exaggerated impression of the French forces.

During the empire, no law of conscription was ever passed without being submitted to a privy council, presented to the senate by the orators of the council of state, and referred to a commission for examination; on the report of such committee, it was finally adopted by secret voting. In these deliberations there was the most complete freedom of speech; and the voting was effected by black and white balls. Almost the whole of the senators concurred in the importance and use of these levies, and this opinion was shared in by the entire nation. The people were convinced that, in the political circumstances in which they were then placed, they were called upon to be ready to make every sacrifice, as long as England refused to recognise their rights, and the freedom of the seas, to restore their colonies, and to put an end to the war.

It would be easy to prove, that of all the powers of Europe, France is that which has suffered the smallest losses since the year 1800. Spain, which has experienced so many disasters, has lost much more in proportion to its population, as will be obvious by considering the sacrifices which Arragon alone made at Saragossa. The levies of Austria in 1800 de-

stroyed at Marengo and Hohenlinden, those of 1805 destroyed at Austerlitz and Ulm, and those of 1809 destroyed at Ecmühl and Wagram, were out of all proportion to the population of the empire. In these campaigns the French were aided by Bavarian, Würtemberg, Saxon, Polish, Italian, and Russian troops, who, in fact, composed one half of the grand army; whilst the other half, under the imperial eagle, was composed, to the amount of one-third, of Dutch, Belgians, inhabitants of the four departments of the Rhine, Piedmontese, Genoese, Tuscans, Romans, and Swiss. Prussia lost the whole of its army of from 250,000 to 300,000 men, after the first campaign in 1806.

In Russia, our losses were, it is true, considerable, but by no means such as they have been represented; 400,000 men passed the Vistula, 160,000 only went beyond Smolensko, in order to attack Moscow; 240,000 men remained in reserve between the Vistula, the Borysthenes, and the Dwina: viz., the corps of the Marshals the Dukes of Tarento, Reggio, and Belluno; of Counts St. Cyr and Regnier, and that of Prince Schwartzberg. Loison's division was at Wilna, that of Dombrowsky at Borisov, and that of Durulte at Warsaw. The half of these 400,000 men consisted of Austrians, Prussians, Saxons, Poles, Bavarians, Würtembergers, Hessians, Westphalians, Spaniards, Italians, Neapolitans, and of inhabitants of the duchies of Berg, Baden, and Mecklenburg. The imperial army, properly so called, was composed, in a

large proportion, of Dutch, Belgians, Piedmontese, Genoese, Tuscan, Romans, inhabitants of the Rhine countries, of the thirty-second military division, Bremen, Hamburg, &c.—it contained scarcely 140,000 men speaking the French language. The campaign in Russia, in 1812, cost France itself less than 50,000 men. The Russian army in its retreat from Wilna to Moscow, and in the various battles, lost four times as many as the French army. The burning of Moscow cost Russia the lives of 100,000 of its people, who perished from cold and famine in the woods; and finally, in the march from Moscow to the Oder, the Russian army suffered dreadfully from the inclemency of the season. On its arrival at Wilna it numbered only 50,000 men, and at Kalitsch less than 18,000. It may safely be affirmed, that, according to all calculation, the losses of Russia in that campaign were six times as great as those of France.

What losses England has experienced in the East and West Indies, in the expeditions to Holland, to Buenos Ayres, and St. Domingo, at Flushing, in Egypt, and in America! They exceeded all that we can imagine. The generally prevailing opinion, that the English are sparing of their soldiers, is wholly unfounded; on the contrary, they are most prodigal of the lives of their troops, by continually sending them on hazardous expeditions—employing them in attacks contrary to all the principles of regular warfare, and in unhealthy colonies. It may be justly said, that England pays for the commerce of the

Indies with the purest blood of her sons. These things alone will explain the reason why the population of France has considerably increased since the year 1800. The reports propagated by false declamations, and suggested either by ignorance or hatred, in which a belief was created throughout Europe in 1814, that there were no longer either men, cattle, agriculture, or money in France, were wholly without foundation, as well as those which stated, that the people were reduced to such a degree of misery that no persons were any longer to be seen in the fields, except old men, women, and children. France was, at that very time, the richest country in the world, and possessed more ready money, than all the other countries of Europe put together.

ORGANIZATION.

The infantry of an army being represented as *one*, the cavalry will be one-fourth;—the artillery an eighth, the corps of engineers a fourteenth, the commissariat and baggage a thirteenth; this will make about thirteen-thirtieths, but it is sufficient that the cavalry should constitute one-fifth in mountainous countries.

At the general peace, Napoleon thought of organizing his army on the footing of 1,200,000 men, of which 600,000 were to form the army of the line, 200,000 that of the interior, and 400,000 the reserve. The 600,000 men composing the troops of the line, would have formed,—first, forty divisions of infantry, of twelve battalions, each battalion 910 men

strong, having a squadron of mounted pioneers with 360 horses, each four feet six inches high; a battery of eight pieces of cannon served by 260 men; a battalion of commissariat and baggage, consisting of three companies, 22 carriages and 210 men. Each division, therefore, would be composed as follows:—

Infantry, 12 battalions	10,920 men.
Mounted Pioneers	360 „
Artillery, eight pieces	280 „
Commissariat, with 22 carriages.	210 „
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Making in all	11,770 men.

Secondly, twenty-three divisions of cavalry, consisting of 3,600 men—viz., eleven of light cavalry, six of dragoons, and six of cuirassiers; thirdly, ten regiments of artillery, of 3,840 men each; fourthly, eight battalions of engineers—say, 4,000 men; and, fifthly, a regiment of 4,000 men attached to the commissariat and baggage; making in all 600,000 men, divided as follows:—

Infantry	436,800 men.
Cavalry { Pioneers for the Infantry, 14,400 }	97,200 „
{ Divisions 82,800 }	
Artillery { Batteries for Infantry . 11,200 }	49,600 „ .
{ Regiments 38,400 }	
Engineers	4,000 „
Commissariat, &c. { With the Infantry . 8,400 }	12,400 „
{ Regiments 4,000 }	
	<hr/>
Total	600,000 men.

The army of the interior, of 200,000 men, would have been composed of two hundred battalions of infantry, and four hundred companies of gunners, intended, in time of war, for the defence of the fortresses and coasts. This army would have had no persons in actual service, except the officers,—the non-commissioned officers and men being only called together every Sunday, at the chief place in the commune. The army of reserve would have had no existence except on paper, and would be subjected to a review once in three months, merely in order to certify their existence, and to rectify the descriptions. And thus, of the whole 1,200,000 men, not more than 280,000 would have been withdrawn from the ordinary occupations of life.

MORAL DISCIPLINE OF THE SOLDIER.

Discipline binds troops to their colours; it is not harangues at the moment of attack which render them brave: old soldiers dislike them, and the young forget them at the very first fire. There is not a single harangue recorded by Livy, which was ever spoken by the general of an army, because there is not one which has the characteristic of an *impromptu*. The gesture of a beloved general, esteemed and looked up to by his men, is of more value than the finest speech.

If harangues and addresses are of any use, it is during the course of the campaign, in order to dissipate false alarms, and to counteract insinuations; to

keep up a good spirit in the camp, and to furnish materials for conversation in the *bivouac*. The printed order of the day has much more influence than the harangues of the ancients ever had.

The Romans, Greeks, and Spaniards are the nations of the south; in their respective ages of glory, their armies were patient, well disciplined, indefatigable, and never dispirited. The Swedes, under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII., and the Russians under Suwarrow, were active, intelligent, and impetuous. The territorial circumstances of a country, the habits of life in a champaign or mountainous district, education and discipline, have much more influence than climate upon the character of troops.

The young soldier is naturally suspicious, and always disposed to believe that his immediate superiors impose upon his ignorance. For this reason, it is necessary for the sake of good discipline, that officers of companies should not in any respect interfere with the pay or rations of the men, except as protectors, nor in the punishments inflicted by the non-commissioned officers, except in the same way.

When Napoleon, riding through the ranks of his army, in the midst of the hottest fire, said, "The moment has at length arrived; unfurl your colours!" the gesture, action, and movement fired the French soldier with enthusiasm.

The Greeks in the service of the great king were not devoted to his cause; the Swiss in the service of France, of Spain, and of the Princes of Italy, were not

warmly interested in favour of their masters; the troops of Frederic the Great, composed in a great measure of strangers, were not enthusiastic in his service. A good general, good officers, a good organization, good instructions, and a good and severe discipline make good troops, quite independently of the cause for which they fight. It is true, however, that religious fanaticism, the love of country, and national glory, contribute to inspire young troops with feelings highly advantageous to their success.

INFANTRY.

The Romans had two kinds of foot soldiers—the light-armed, provided with a javelin, and the heavy-armed, with a short sword. After the invention of gunpowder, the division was still preserved, and consisted of arquebusiers, armed as light troops, and destined to annoy the enemy, and pikemen, who bore heavy arms. Since the time at which Vauban, 150 years ago, caused an end to be put to the use of javelins and pikes, in the whole of the European armies, by substituting the gun and bayonet, all the infantry have been armed as light troops. Since that period, there has been only one kind of infantry, and there ought not to be more. In cases in which a company of light troops (*chasseurs*) has been employed in each battalion, it was merely as opposed to the company of grenadiers. The battalion consisted of nine companies; one select company did not appear sufficient. When the Emperor Napoleon created companies of

voltigeurs armed with carbines, it was to take the place of the chasseurs. He formed three companies of men less than five feet high, in order that persons of four feet ten inches and five feet might be brought within the law of conscription, from which they had been previously exempt, and by such exemption, the burthens of the service were increased to the other classes. The formation of these companies afforded an opportunity of rewarding a great number of old soldiers, who, being less than five feet high, could not be received into the grenadier companies, and yet deserved to be admitted into select companies, on account of their valour. It was a powerful means of emulation, thus to place the pigmies and the giants in contrast with one another. Had there been in his armies men of different colours, he would have formed companies of whites and blacks; and in a country where there were cyclops and hunchbacks, a number of companies would have been formed from these parties respectively.

In 1789, the French army was composed of regiments of the line and battalions of chasseurs—viz., the chasseurs of the Cevennes, Nivernois, the Alps, Corsica, and the Pyrenees. At the revolution, these formed demi-brigades of light infantry, but there was no pretension to having two kinds of troops, because they were all trained in the same manner. The difference was that the chasseurs were recruited from the mountainous districts, or from the sons of the *garde-chasse*, which rendered them better suited to be employed on the frontiers, in the Alps, or the Pyrenees.

When they were with the armies of the north, they were selected by preference as the best parties for detached expeditions, for surprising heights, or scouring forests. On the day of battle, they occupied the place of a battalion of the line, because they used the same arms, and had the same training and education. Governments, in time of war, often raise irregular corps, under the name of volunteers, or legions recruited from foreign deserters, or of individuals who have some particular opinion, and political object to accomplish; but this does not constitute two kinds of infantry—there is only, and there can only be one.

If the apes of antiquity wished to imitate the Romans, it was not bodies of light-armed, but of heavy-armed soldiery, which they ought to have created, or battalions armed with the sword, for the whole of the infantry of Europe now does the service of light troops.

If it were only possible for infantry to send out their voltigeurs as light troops, they would soon lose the use of their guns, and would pass through whole campaigns without firing a shot; but this is not possible. When a company of voltigeurs is sent to the front, or to protect the baggage, or to cover the flanks, are the other companies of the battalion then to cease seeking for intelligence, and suffer the balls of the enemy's tirailleurs to do execution in the midst of their ranks? When a company of a battalion is detached, it must then relinquish making observations, or rather it ought to be followed by a division of the company of voltigeurs, which being only the fourth part of a

battalion could not suffice for the wants of the tirailleurs on the day of battle—nay, they would not suffice, if they formed the three-fourths. In an important battle, the whole line becomes tirailleurs, sometimes even twice; it is necessary to relieve their light advanced troops every two hours, because they become fatigued, and their guns get out of order and burst.

The voltigeurs, like the grenadiers, require so much the more training, as they are often obliged to change their front, to deploy in column, and to retreat in squares. It is not enough for them to know how to run, and leap, and to avail themselves of all the natural shelter which a country may offer to escape from the charges of the enemy's cavalry; every man must be accustomed to preserve his *sang-froid*, and not to suffer himself to be mastered by a vain fear the moment he finds himself separated from his officers, or from the line of battle. Tirailleurs should always hold themselves in readiness to assist each other, so as to flank one another, and to be able slowly to unite in parties of four, before the tirailleurs of the cavalry can reach them; to form division of eight, or sixteen before the squadron can break them; and thus to re-form without haste, and to join the reserve where the captain is, who, with one-third of the tirailleurs drawn up in order of battle, remains at the distance of a gun-shot. The company, when thus re-united, ought to form a battalion in square, to change its front, or to commence a retreat, turning to face the enemy when too closely pressed, on the word of command, half about, to the right—fire,

charge bayonets; to recommence the retreat and to rejoin the commander of the battalion, who has himself remained in reserve, with the third of his men. The battalion will then form in column, in platoons, and pursue its retreating march. At the word, halt, wheel to the right and to the left, it forms a square and repulses the charge of the pursuing cavalry. Again, at the word, retreat, it breaks up the square, forms platoons, &c. &c., and thus executes a retreat, *en échiquier*, with perfect coolness, verging to the right or left as the case may be, on the position appointed. Such is the nature of the instruction with which the voltigeur should be familiar, and could there be two descriptions of infantry, one to act as tirailleurs, and the other to remain in line, it would be necessary to choose the best disciplined men to act as tirailleurs. In fact, the company of volunteers, who act more frequently as tirailleurs than the rest, are the best manoeuvrers in the army, because they most frequently feel the necessity of regularity and discipline.

Defensive armour is insufficient to ward off cannon balls, grape, or gun-shots; it is, therefore, not only useless, but inconvenient, as it renders wounds more dangerous.

The Parthian bows were very large, and handled by robust and well trained men. Their arrows were shot with such force as to pierce the bucklers of the Roman soldiers, and even to throw the old legions into confusion; this was one of the causes of the defeat of Crassus.

Tirailleurs stand more in need of defensive armour than all the rest of the army, because they more frequently approach the enemy, and are more exposed to be sabred by cavalry; they must not, however, be overloaded, or their efficiency is altogether destroyed; and thus, even if defensive armour were useful to soldiers of the line, it could not be given, because all the men of a battalion necessarily perform, in turn, the duty of tirailleurs.

It was not a cadet just fresh from school who suggested the idea of arming the tirailleurs with double-barrelled guns; the experience of one campaign would suggest to them this improvement in the art of war.

There are five things which a soldier ought never to be without—his gun, cartridge-box, knapsack, rations for at least four days, and his pioneering instruments. His knapsack should be reduced to the smallest compass possible: let him have only one shirt, a pair of shoes, a stock, a handkerchief, a flint and steel; but let him have them always with him, for if he once lose sight of them, he will never see them again. The theory is not the practice of war. It was a custom in the Russian army, when just about to fight, to place their knapsacks on the ground. What are the advantages of this method? The ranks can stand closer together; the fire of the third rank becomes useful, the men can act more freely and are less fatigued, and the fear of losing his knapsack, in which the soldier is accustomed to carry his all, serves to bind them to maintain their position. At Austerlitz,

the knapsacks of the Russian army were found piled in array on the heights of Posoritz, where they had been abandoned on the rout of the troops. In spite of all the specious reasons which may be alleged in favour of this custom, experience has led to its abandonment in the Russian army. Horses are better employed in conveying the army chests, cartridges, and provisions, than in carrying the soldiers' knapsacks.

CAVALRY.

Ought the regulation of corps of light cavalry to depend on that of corps of infantry?—ought light cavalry to be instructed in the same tactics as cavalry of the line?—or ought they to be used for foraging parties, like the Hungarians, Mamelukes, and Cossacks? Ought they to be employed as an advanced guard without being supported by cavalry of the line?—ought dragoons to be suppressed, and heavy cavalry always kept in reserve? How many kinds of cavalry ought there to be in an army, and what proportion of each? The business of light cavalry is to keep a good look out, and to watch the movements of the enemy; it does not, therefore, belong to the infantry, but ought to be supported and protected especially by the cavalry of the line; there has been always a spirit of rivalry and emulation between infantry and cavalry. Light cavalry is necessary for the advanced guard and the rear guard and on the wings, and cannot, therefore, be attached to any particular corps of infantry, in order to follow its movements. It would

be much more natural to connect its disposition with that of the cavalry of the line, than with the infantry, with which it has no connexion; but it should, in fact, be subject to a separate regulation of its own.

Cavalry requires more officers than infantry, and ought to be better trained. It is not merely its rapidity of movement which ensures its success—but order, and unity of action, and the useful employment of its reserve. Light cavalry being necessary for advanced guards, it must be formed in squadrons, brigades, and divisions, in order to facilitate its manœuvres; for advanced and rear guards perform no other service. They advance or retire *en échiquier*, form in several lines, or contract into columns, and change their front with rapidity, in order to form a whole wing. It is by the combination of these evolutions, that an advanced or a rear guard, when inferior in number, contrives to avoid a warm action or a general engagement, and yet to retard the advance of the enemy, so as to give time for the troops to arrive—for the infantry to deploy—for the Commander-in-chief to make his arrangements, and for the baggage and the parks of artillery to file off. The art of a general in command of an advanced or a rear guard, is to restrain the enemy without compromising himself—to retard them, by obliging them to spend three or four hours in advancing a league. It is tactics alone which enable him to accomplish these great results; and a knowledge of such tactics is more necessary to the cavalry than to the infantry, to the

advanced or the rear guard, than to any other portion of the army.

The Hungarian irregular cavalry which we saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiable. If the light troops in the time of Maria Theresa rendered themselves formidable, it was by their organization, and particularly by their immense number. To suppose, however, that such troops were superior to Wurmser's hussars, Latour's dragoons, or those of the Arch-Duke John, is to entertain strange ideas of things. Neither the Hungarian irregulars nor the Cossacks were ever employed to form the advanced guard or the rear guard of the Austrian and Russian armies, for whatever troops are worthy of being so called, must be such as are capable of executing manœuvres.

The Russians regard a regiment of well disciplined Cossacks as equal to three which are wholly undisciplined. In such troops, everything is contemptible except the Cossack himself, who is a fine fellow, an active skilful horseman, capable of enduring almost any amount of fatigue. He is in the plains what the Arab is in the desert, or the chamois-hunter in the Alps; he never enters a house, never sleeps in a bed, always changes his bivouac at sunset, in order not to pass the night in a place where the enemy may have observed him. Two Mamelukes were able to make head against three Frenchmen, because they were better armed, better mounted and better drilled—they had two pair of pistols, a blunderbuss, a carabine, a helmet with a visor, and a coat of mail; they had se-

veral horses, and several attendants on foot. One hundred cuirassiers, however, were not afraid of one hundred Mamelukes—three hundred could beat an equal number, and 1,000 could easily put to the rout 1,500—so great is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Leclerc and Lasalle presented their men to the Mamelukes in several lines. When the Arabs were on the point of overwhelming the first, the second came to its assistance, on the right and left; the Mamelukes then halted and wheeled, in order to turn the wings of this new line; this moment was always seized upon to charge them, and they were uniformly broken.

The duty of an advanced or rear guard is not to advance or retreat, but to manœuvre. It must be composed of good light cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line; well disciplined battalions of infantry, and well served batteries of artillery. The troops must be well trained; the generals, officers, and soldiers, each in his sphere, be equally well acquainted with the nature of the tactics to be followed. Troops which are not well trained and well informed of their duties, are, in such cases, rather causes of embarrassment than utility.

It is well known, that to ensure facility in manœuvring, the squadron ought to consist of forty-eight files, and that each three or four squadrons ought to be under the command of a superior officer.

The whole of the cavalry of the line ought not to wear cuirasses. Dragoons, mounted on horses four

feet nine inches high, armed with a straight sword, and without a cuirass, ought to form a part of the heavy cavalry. These should be armed with the gun and bayonet of the infantry, and wear their schako; they should have half-boots, cloaks with sleeves, and *portmantéaus* so small that they could easily carry them on their backs when dismounted.

All cavalry ought to be provided with fire arms, and to know how to manœuvre on foot; 3,000 light horse, or 3,000 cuirassiers, ought not to suffer themselves to be stopped by 1,000 infantry posted in a wood, or protected by ground impracticable for horses; and 3,000 dragoons ought not to allow themselves to be held in check by 2,000 infantry, who, favoured by their position, might attempt to stop them in their advance.

Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendôme, all laid great stress on, and made great use of, their dragoons. This branch of the service covered itself with glory in Italy, in 1796 and 1797, and in Egypt; and if some prejudices were raised against it in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, it was because some divisions of dragoons were formed at Compeigne and Amiens, to be embarked, without horses, for England, and to serve on foot there, till means could be found of mounting them in the country. General Baraguay d'Hillier, their first inspector, commanded them; he caused them to wear gaiters, and incorporated among them a great number of recruits, who were only drilled in infantry manœuvres. These were, therefore, pro-

perly speaking, no longer regiments of cavalry, and they fought through the campaign of 1806 on foot, till after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on the horses taken from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were scarcely fit for service. These circumstances annoyed them; but in Spain, these very same regiments, when better disciplined, and after having had some experience in the field, during the campaigns in Germany and France, in 1813 and 1814, proved rivals to the cuirassiers. Dragoons are necessary to support the light cavalry of the advanced and rear guards, and on the wings of an army; and cuirassiers are not fitted for this service, on which they ought not to be employed, except when it is necessary to keep them in good wind, and to give them a little foretaste of battle. A division of 2,000, which advances rapidly on a point with 1,500 light cavalry horses, can dismount to defend a bridge, the head of a defile, or a height, and wait for the arrival of the infantry.

How useful this branch of the service is in a retreat! The cavalry of an army ought to be equal to one-fourth of the infantry, and comprise four kinds; two of light and two of heavy horse—that is, scouts, consisting of men five feet high, mounted on horses 4 ft. 6 in.; light cavalry, on horses of 4 ft. 7 in. or 4 ft. 8 in.; dragoons, with horses 4 ft. 9 in., and cuirassiers, mounted on horses 4 ft. 10 in.; which would take in horses of all sizes.

The scouts should be attached to the infantry, be-

cause the smallness of their horses would render them less fitted for charges of cavalry. By attaching a squadron of 360 men to each division of 9,000, they would constitute the twenty-fifth part of the infantry; they would furnish orderlies to the generals, escorts for the convoys, brigades of non-commissioned officers, supply the place of gens-d'armes in the escort of prisoners, and of police. There would still be enough left to form several divisions, to act as scouts for the legion, and to occupy an important position whenever it should be found necessary to anticipate the enemy. Drawn up in battle array behind the infantry, and constantly under the command of its generals, they would be ready to seize the favourable moment when the enemy's line was broken, to fall upon the fugitives with their lances, and to make prisoners. The smallness of their horses would never tempt the generals of cavalry.

At the moment of entering on a campaign, each regiment of infantry should furnish a company of 120 scouts, all organized, so as to be incorporated in the regiments of heavy cavalry, in the proportions of a tenth for the cuirassiers, and a fifth for the dragoons. Thus, for example, 360 cuirassiers would have thirty-six scouts, whilst a like number of dragoons would have seventy-two. They should be employed to furnish orderlies for the generals, escorts for the baggage and the prisoners; to perform the service of tirailleurs, to scour the country, and to hold the horses of the dragoons when they were dismounted. An army composed of 36,000 infantry,

should have 9,000 cavalry—viz., 2,070 scouts, of whom 1,440 should be attached to the four divisions of infantry, 420 with the dragoons, and 210 with the 2,100 cuirassiers,—making in all, 4,800 light cavalry, and 4,200 heavy.

Charges of cavalry are equally good at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, of a battle; they should, in fact, be made as often as possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter are engaged in front. All Hannibal's battles were gained by his cavalry; if he had reserved it to give the finishing blow to the battle, he would never have been able to employ it, except in covering his retreat. This would be a very false idea of war, and would show a complete ignorance of the power of combined charges of infantry and cavalry, whether for attack or defence.

ARTILLERY.

A division of artillery has been fixed by General Gribeauval, at eight pieces of the same calibre—of four, six, eight, or twelve-pounders, or six-inch howitzers; because it is necessary, 1st, that a division of artillery can be divided into two or four batteries; 2ndly, because eight pieces can be served by a company of 120 men, having in reserve a detachment at the park; 3rdly, because the carriages necessary for the service of these eight pieces can be drawn by a company of train horses; 4thly, because a good captain can oversee the working of this number of pieces; and 5thly, because the number of carriages which compose a

battery of eight pieces, would furnish sufficient work for a forge and a ropemaker, and that two additional gun-carriages would suffice. If the division was composed of fewer pieces, more would be required of all these auxiliaries, and in greater proportion.

Napoleon discontinued the use of four and eight-pounders, and substituted guns of six. The Emperor found that generals of infantry made indiscriminate use of four or eight-pounders, without regard to the effect which he wished to produce. He also put an end to the use of six-inch howitzers, and substituted those of five-in . six because two cartridges of the former weighed as much as three of the latter; and besides, because the five-in. six-l. howitzer was equal in calibre to the twenty-four pounders which are so common in our besieging trains, and in our fortresses. He formed his divisions of foot artillery of two howitzers of five-in. six-l. calibre, and of six six-pounders, or of two five-in. six-l. howitzers of long reach, and six twelve-pounders; those of the horse artillery of four six-pounders and two howitzers; but it would be better still that they should consist of the same pieces as the former,—viz., two howitzers and six six-pounders. These trains were formed, the greater part of six-pounders, and the rest of howitzers.

These changes modified M. de Gribeauval's system; but they were made in his spirit, and he would not have disavowed them. He reformed a great deal, and simplified much. The artillery, however, is still too

cumbersome, too complicated; it needs to be still further simplified, made more uniform, and reduced till the very greatest degree of simplicity has been attained.

The cartridge of a twelve-pounder weighs as much as two cartridges for six-pounders; is, then, a twelve-pounder better than two pieces of the smaller metal? In some circumstances, it is so; but, in ordinary cases, two six-pounders are preferable to one twelve-pounder. Is it better to have one howitzer than two six-pounders? A howitzer is very useful for setting fire to a village, or bombarding a redoubt; but its fire is very uncertain; and it is often of less use than even one six-pounder; it is, therefore, necessary to employ only a limited number of them. Napoleon put more of them in his trains, five-twelfths in howitzers, four-twelfths in twelve-pounders, and only three-twelfths in six-pounders, without being ignorant of the elements of the science of artillery.

A train of sixty pieces, formed on the principles of Napoleon, would consist of thirty-six six-pounders, nine twelve-pounders, and fifteen howitzers. This would form seven divisions and a half, and require thirty-two carriages with forges, and spare carriages, making the divisions, eighty-one caissons of six, forty and a half of twelve, sixty-seven and a half for howitzers, twenty-nine park carriages, three infantry, and twenty bridge equipages—in all 400 wagons, or six carriages to a piece, provided that the ammunition is for 306 shots per piece, without reckoning the smaller chest.

A train of sixty guns, organized in the proportion of five-twelfths in howitzers, four-twelfths in twelve-pounders, and three-twelfths in six-pounders, would consist of fifteen six-pounders, twenty twelve-pounders, and twenty-five howitzers; the division being five pieces, there would be twelve in all. This would require twenty-eight forges and spare carriages attached to the divisions; in all 424 wagons—that is to say, twenty-seven to each piece; and this would be sixty-four carriages more than in the former train. What an increase of embarrassment, what a heavy equipage, what an employment of men, horses, and materials! It is the twelve-pounders which cause the difficulty, because they weigh from 1,500 to 1,800 pounds each, and cannot without difficulty be drawn, except along the high roads. The imperial train has from forty-five to sixty pieces of cannon; that here proposed would only have thirty-five.

But with 424 carriages necessary for these trains, there might be seventy-two imperial pieces; that is to say, nine divisions—viz., forty-two six pounders, twelve twelve-pounders, and eighteen howitzers. The question, then, is this—Would it be better to have fifteen six-pounders, twenty twelve-pounders, and twenty-five howitzers, or fifty-two six-pounders, twelve twelve-pounders, and fifteen howitzers?

M. de Gribeauval, who served seven years in the Austrian army, and possessed a genius for artillery, established his system at the rate of four pieces to each battalion of 1,000 men, or thirty-six

guns for a division of 9,000; and a proportionate number for an army of 40,000 men. This would consist of four divisions of infantry, having a division of light cavalry, another of dragoons, and another of cuirassiers. Of the fifteen divisions of artillery, two would be attached to each division of infantry, with three in reserve, &c., four to the horse, one to the light cavalry, one to the division of dragoons, and two to the cuirassiers. These would consist of seventy-two six-pounders, eighteen twelve-pounders, and thirty howitzers, and nearly 600 carriages, comprising the pieces, double ammunition, and the caissons of the infantry.

In the imperial train, every piece, taking one with another, required for its service thirty horses and thirty-five men. In the proposed train, taking one with another, there would be required forty men and thirty-five horses. A division of eight pieces of artillery would require 272 men, and 240 horses, which is equal to two squadrons.

Those who form their ideas of modern warfare on the basis of that of the ancients, will say, that it would be better to have 3,600 horses, or 4,000 foot more in an army of 40,000 men, than 120 pieces of cannon, or only to have sixty guns, and to have 1,500 horses and 2,000 infantry more. They are, however, wrong. In an army, it is necessary to have infantry, cavalry, and artillery in just proportions; and one branch of the service cannot supply the place of an-

other. We have seen occasions on which the enemy would have gained the battle on these terms; they occupied an admirable position, with a battery of fifty or sixty guns; it would have been in vain to have made an attack with 4,000 horses and 8,000 infantry more; it was absolutely necessary to have a battery of equal force, under the protection of which the columns of attack might advance and deploy.

The proper proportion of the three armed bodies has been at all times an especial object of consideration among great generals.

It is agreed, 1st, that there should be four pieces for every 1,000 men, which gives one-eighth of the army for the service of the artillery; and 2ndly, that the cavalry should be equal to one-fourth of the infantry.

To pretend to rush upon the guns, to carry them sword in hand, or to cause the gunners to be shot by the tirailleurs, are chimerical ideas; that may be done sometimes, and there are examples of fortresses being taken by a *coup-de-main*; but as a general system, let the infantry be as brave as they may, it is impossible for them, without artillery, to advance with impunity five or six hundred toises against sixteen pieces of cannon well placed, and served by good gunners. Before having proceeded two-thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, and dispersed. Artillery has now arrived at such a precision of aim, that we cannot approve of what was said by Machiavel,

who, full of Greek and Roman ideas, expressed the wish that his artillery should fire merely one discharge, and then retire behind the line.

Good infantry is, no doubt, the sinews of the army; but if they were obliged to contend for a long time against a very superior artillery, they would soon become demoralized, and be destroyed. In the earlier campaigns of the war of the revolution, France always excelled in her artillery; and I do not know a single example in that war, in which twenty pieces of cannon, well posted, and in battery, were ever taken at the point of the bayonet.

In the affair of Valmy, at the battle of Jemappes, at those of Norlingen and Fleurus, our artillery was superior to that of the enemy, although we had often only two pieces for every 1,000 men; but our armies were very numerous.

It is possible that a general who is more skilful in manœuvring than his adversary, and who has an excellent infantry under his command, may obtain success during a part of a campaign, although his park of artillery may be inferior; but on the decisive day of a general action, he will be made cruelly sensible of his inferiority in this department.

Eighty wagons of military equipage are very insufficient for an army of 40,000 men. They can only carry 1,520 quintals—flour and brandy for two days.

Experience has proved that an army should have with it a month's provisions, those for ten days being

carried by the men and led horses, and those for twenty days in wagons: and this would require at least 480 carriages; 240 regularly organized, and 240 pressed into the service. For this purpose there should be a battalion of three companies, and military equipages for each division—each company being enabled to serve forty carriages, of which twenty should be provided and harnessed by the government, and twenty taken by requisition. This would give 120 carriages for each division, 480 for each *corps d'armée*, and 210 men for every battalion.

ENCAMPMENT.

Tents are always unhealthy; it is much better for the soldier to bivouack, because in the latter case he sleeps with his feet to the fire, and shelters himself from the wind by an erection of a few planks or some straw; the proximity of the fire soon dries the ground on which he sleeps. Tents are necessary for the general officers, who are obliged to read and consult the maps; and they should therefore be provided for commanders of battalions, colonels, and generals. General officers should never be allowed to sleep in a house; this is a ruinous abuse, and one which has led to many catastrophes.

Following the example of the French, all the nations of Europe have abandoned the use of tents; and if they are still to be found in mere camps of pleasure, it is chiefly for the sake of economy; they save the consumption of fuel, and the roofs of straw in

the villages. The shade of a tree against sun and heat, and the very worst protection against rain, are preferable to a tent. The transport of tents too, would require four horses for each battalion, a number which would be much better employed in conveying provisions. Tents furnish a means of observation for spies and traitors, and for the officers of the enemy's staff, which give them some idea of the number of the troops and the position which they occupy. They are, in fact, inconvenient at all times and on all occasions. An army arranged in two or three lines of bivouack, cannot be observed at a distance, and only exhibits the smoke from their fires, which are confounded by the enemy with the fogs of the atmosphere. It is impossible to reckon the number of fires; whereas it is easy to reckon the number of tents, and to draw the position which they occupy.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

The Roman army encamped and formed its order of battle, always in the same manner. It enclosed a square space of three or four hundred toises a-side,—spent some hours in fortifying the position so chosen, and then thought itself beyond the danger of attack. When about to give battle, the troops were drawn up in three lines, with intervals of fifty toises between each, and the cavalry placed on the wings.

The staff-officer whose duty it was to trace out the ground for the camp, or to place the men in battle array, performed nothing more than a mere mechanical

operation, which neither required quick perception; genius, nor experience. Among the moderns, on the contrary, the art of occupying a position, or selecting a battle-field, is one subject to so many considerations, that it requires all these qualities combined. It is the business of the commander-in-chief himself, because there are many modes of encamping, or of forming an order of battle, even on the same ground.

Sempronius was beaten at the Trebbia, and Varro at Cannæ, although they commanded armies more numerous than those of the enemy, because, according to the established usage amongst the Romans, they drew up their troops in three lines, whilst Hannibal arranged his in one. The Carthaginian cavalry was superior both in number and quality. The Roman armies were attacked at the same time in front, on the flank, and in the rear, and were defeated. Had the two Roman consuls chosen the order of battle best suited to the circumstances, they would not have been outflanked, but would probably have been conquerors.

Ought an army to occupy a single camp, or as many camps as it consists of corps or divisions? And at what distance ought the advanced guard and the flanking parties to encamp from the main body? What front and what depth ought the camp to have? Where ought the cavalry, the artillery, and the wagons to be placed? Ought an army to be drawn up in battle array in several lines, and what space should there be between each? Ought the cavalry to be

placed in reserve behind the infantry, or upon the wings? Ought the whole of the artillery to be brought into action from the very commencement of the battle, since each can keep up its fire for twenty-four hours, or ought one half to be kept in reserve? The solution of all these questions depends upon a variety of circumstances:—First, upon the number of the troops in general, and upon that of the infantry, artillery, and cavalry of which the army is composed; secondly, on the comparative strength of the two armies; thirdly, on their spirit and temper; fourthly, on the object proposed; fifthly, on the nature of the field of battle; sixthly, on the position occupied by the enemy's troops, and the character of the general who commands. Nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed; and there is no natural order of battle among the moderns.

The task which the commander of an army in modern times has to fulfil, is much more difficult than was that of the commanders of ancient armies. It is also true that his influence is much greater upon the results of engagements. In the armies of the ancients, the commander-in-chief was wholly out of danger, when at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy, and at the same time most conveniently situated for directing, with advantage, all the movements of the army. In modern warfare, the commander-in-chief, when at the distance of four or five hundred toises, is in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is exposed to great risks; and

at the same time he is so far removed from the scene of action, that many of the enemy's movements escape his observation. There are no actions in which he may not be obliged to advance within gun-shot.

The implements of modern warfare have the same effect, in proportion as they are advantageously placed; a battery of cannon, which is so placed as to rake the enemy's ranks, or command their position, may be the means of a victory. Modern fields of battle are much larger than those of the ancients were, which requires a more extended duty on the part of the general, and it requires much more experience and military genius to command a modern army than was necessary for the direction of an ancient one.

Since the invention of fire-arms, the manner of choosing a position for a camp, or of drawing up an army for battle, depends upon many various circumstances, and it varies with them; there are even many different ways of occupying a given position with the same army: and there are things which the quick perception, genius, and military experience of a general must decide; this is his chief duty. In a great number of cases, an army, which should take its order of battle in three lines—the first to fight, the second to support, encourage, and replace the first, and in case of need to cover its retreat, and the third as a reserve, would be beaten and routed.

If the second line were placed eighty or a hundred toises distant from the first rank, and drawn up in column, it would be destroyed by the enemy's bat-

teries more quickly than the first line, and could not, therefore, come to its aid; and if the reserve were composed of the cavalry of the line—one half of the artillery and chosen infantry, placed in column behind the centre of the lines, and out of reach of cannon-shot, the army which should thus paralyse the half of its artillery and all its heavy cavalry, during the whole of a battle, would be almost sure to be beaten.

The order in column is an order of battle, when circumstances require it: it is for that reason that our tactics enable us so rapidly to pass from narrow to deep order. Soldiers must always march (if they are afraid of an attack of cavalry) in columns, and at the distance of platoons, so as to be able to form rapidly into square battalions, by platoons to the right and left, &c.

The circumstances of the ground alone, ought not to decide the order of battle; that ought to be determined by the combination of all the circumstances.

The act of pitching a camp on a certain position, is nothing else than drawing up in a line of battle on the same ground. The whole of the projectiles should be in position and favourably placed; the position should not be commanded, or capable of being surprised, or raked; but, on the contrary, as far as possible, it should have these advantages against the enemy's position.

The fortifications of a country are always useful, and never injurious when they are well understood.

The principles of fortifying a country require to be perfected; and this part of the art of war is still susceptible of great advance. If the guns are not in redoubts, they will fall into the hands of the enemy, on some fortunate charge of cavalry. Batteries ought to be placed in the most favourable positions, and as far as possible in advance of the line of infantry and cavalry, without compromising their safety. They should command the country, by being placed on the highest ground of the plains; and they should not be so masked either on the right or left, as to obstruct them from turning their fire in all directions.

DEFENSIVE WAR.

Have the fortified towns on the frontiers of Flanders been useful or injurious? Is the new system proposed, more economical, and does it require fewer garrisons? Is it preferable to that of Vauban and of Cormantagne? In order to defend the capital of a country, ought the army of the nation to cover it by retreating upon it? Or ought it to take up a position in an entrenched camp, supported by a strongly fortified place? or ought it to manœuvre freely, and not suffer itself to be shut up either in the capital or in any fortress?

The system of the defence of the frontier of Flanders was, in a great measure, the conception of Vauban; but he was obliged to adopt places already in existence. He constructed other fortresses to cover the

sluices, to regulate the inundations, or to form means of communication between the large forests, or the mountains. There are on that frontier, fortresses of the first, second, third, and fourth rank. They might be valued at four or five hundred millions of francs; and constructed during the course of one hundred years, that would constitute an expense of four millions per annum. Fifty thousand national guards would suffice to protect them against a *coup-de-main*; and to place them beyond the threat of incendiary batteries. Lille, Valenciennes, and Charlemont could furnish a refuge for armies, as well as the entrenched camps of Maubeuge and Cambray. Vauban organized whole countries as entrenched camps, protected by rivers, inundations, fortresses, and forests; but he never pretended that those fortifications alone could form a frontier; he believed and desired that a frontier so fortified might give protection to an inferior army against one superior in force—that it would furnish it with a favourable field of operations; prevent the advance of the enemy's troops; and give opportunities of attacking them with advantage,—and, finally, that it would gain time to enable succours to arrive.

In the reverses of Louis XIV., this system of strong places saved the capital. Prince Eugene of Savoy lost a campaign in taking Lille. The siege of Landrecies furnished Villars with an opportunity of changing the fortune of the war; and, a hundred years after, in 1793, at the time of the treason of

Dumouriez, the fortified towns in Flanders saved the capital anew. The allies lost a campaign in taking Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecies; and this line of fortresses was equally useful in 1814. The allies who violated the Swiss territories, were obliged to enter the passes of the Jura, in order to avoid the fortresses; and even in turning them, they were obliged to weaken their forces, by withdrawing a number of men to blockade them, superior to the total amount of the garrisons. When Napoleon passed the Marne, and manœuvred on the rear of the enemy's army, if treason had not opened the gates of Paris, the fortresses on this frontier were about to play a distinguished part. Schwartzenberg's army would have been obliged to throw itself among them, which would have given rise to great events. In 1815, too, they would have been of great utility. The Anglo-Prussian army would not have dared to pass the Somme, till the arrival of the Austro-Russian troops upon the Marne, had not political events in the capital favoured them; and there is no doubt, that the strong places which remained faithful, produced a great influence over the conditions of the treaty, and the conduct of the allied sovereigns in 1814 and 1815.

Three lines, each formed by six strongly fortified places, would require eighteen fortified towns—each surrounded by four forts. These, being at some distance from the towns, ought to have for their protec-

tion a battalion for a garrison and twenty-five guns—and would require a degree of labour equal in value to the places themselves. These three lines would, then, require the value of thirty-six strongly fortified places; but the four isolated forts would be blockaded, besieged, and taken in the first seven days of the investment, before even the line of circumvallation was complete. They would be admirably placed in order to flank and support it; and before the trenches were opened, the garrison of the place would see the half of its *materiel*, and the *élite* of its battalions fall into the power of the enemy—a circumstance which could not but exercise a great influence on the spirit and resolution of the army.

The position which an army might be able to take among these forts, would not afford it any security; the enemy would encamp perpendicularly to one of the forts, rase it in a few days, and successively carry the others. Its regular field train, with the addition of thirty twenty-four pounders, would suffice for this operation.

In this system, the enemy would be able to force a pass between two places, at the distance of two days' march from each other, whilst according to that of Vauban, the pass could not be further off than two or three leagues from each of the fortified towns. It would also be much more easy to surprise one of the places of this new system.

But is it necessary to defend a capital by covering it directly, or by taking up a position in an entrenched

camp in the rear of the enemy? The first measure is the safest; it furnishes an opportunity of defending the passage of rivers and defiles, of even creating positions, and of obtaining reinforcements from all the troops in the interior, whilst the enemy is becoming insensibly weakened. It would be a bad plan to have recourse to an entrenched camp; for the camp would then run the risk of being forced, or, at least, of being blockaded, and the troops would be obliged to open a way for themselves sword in hand, in order to procure provisions and forage. It requires 400 or 500 wagons a day to provide supplies for an army of 100,000 men. The invading army being one-third superior in infantry, cavalry and artillery, would obstruct and prevent the arrival of the convoys, and without blockading them hermetically, as fortified towns are blockaded, would render arrivals of supplies so uncertain and difficult that there would soon be a famine in the camp.

There remains a third plan, that of manœuvring, without suffering oneself to be shut up in the capital, which one may wish to defend, or in an entrenched camp behind. For this purpose, it is necessary to have a good army, good generals, and an able commander-in-chief. The plan of covering a capital or any point whatever, by flank marches, brings with it the necessity of a detachment, and the inconveniences always attached to the separation of a force in the presence of a superior army.

After the affair of Smolensko, in 1812, the French army marched directly upon Moscow; General Kutusov

covered that city by successive movements, till he arrived at the entrenched camp of Majaisk, where he halted and accepted battle. Having been beaten, he continued his march, and traversed the capital, which immediately fell into the power of the conqueror. Had he retired in the direction of Kiow, he would have drawn the French army after him, but it would have been necessary in that case to have covered Moscow by a detachment, and nothing could have prevented the French general from causing this detachment to be followed by one of superior force, which would have compelled it to evacuate that important city.

A great capital is the country of the *élite* of the nation; all the persons of consequence have their residences and families within its walls. It is the centre of opinion, and the grand depository of everything. It is the greatest mistake and inconsistency to leave a point so important without immediate defences. On his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the Emperor often talked of, and drew up several plans for, fortifying the heights around Paris; but the fear of disturbing the minds of the inhabitants, and the events which followed each other with incredible rapidity, prevented him from carrying his design into effect. How, it will be said, can you pretend to fortify cities, 12,000 or 15,000 toises in circumference? It would require from 80 to 100 fronts, from 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers as a garrison, and a battery of 800 or a 1,000 pieces of artillery. But 60,000 soldiers make an army,

and would it not be better to employ them in the field? This objection is made in general against the fortification of all large towns; but it is unfounded, because it confounds a *soldier* with a *man*. Undoubtedly, the defence of a great capital would require from 50,000 to 60,000 men, but not from 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers. In periods of misfortune and great calamities, states may be deficient in soldiers, but they can never be without men for their internal defence; 50,000 men of whom 2,000 or 3,000 are artillerymen, will be able to defend a capital, and prevent the entrance of an army of 300,000 or 400,000 men; whilst if the same 50,000 men were in the open field, and were not soldiers trained and commanded by experienced officers, they would be thrown into inextricable confusion by a charge of 3,000 cavalry. Besides, all great capitals are susceptible of covering a part of their circumference by inundations; because all large towns are situated upon rivers, and the fosses can be filled with water, either by natural or artificial means. Places which are so considerable as to contain very numerous garrisons, have a number of positions so commanding as to render it very hazardous to enter the town without possession of these points. If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the issue of the war. General Kutusov's division would then have awaited the other divisions of the Russian Army, which had already reached Olmutz, and the army of Prince Charles which was coming from Italy. In 1809, Prince Charles, who was defeated at Eckmühl, and obliged to

retreat by the left bank of the Danube, would have had time to arrive at Vienna, and there to form a junction with General Hiller's division and the army of the Archduke John.

Had Berlin been fortified in 1806, the army beaten at Jena would have rallied there, and been rejoined by the Russian army.

Had Madrid been a fortified place in 1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommosierra, would not have marched upon that capital, leaving behind them Salamanca, Valladolid, the English army under General Moore, and the Spanish army under General Romagna. These two Anglo-Spanish armies would have formed a junction under the fortifications of Madrid with the army of Arragon and Valencia.

In 1812, the Emperor Napoleon entered Moscow; had the Russians not had recourse to the plan of burning that great city—a thing unheard of in history—and which they alone were capable of executing—the taking of Moscow would have brought with it the submission of Russia; because the conqueror would have found in Moscow—1st, Everything necessary for clothing and furnishing supplies to the army; 2ndly, flour, vegetables, wine and brandy, and everything necessary for the subsistence of a large army; 3rdly, horses to remount the cavalry; and lastly, the support of enfranchised peasants, rejoicing in such a piece of extraordinary good fortune, and extremely impatient of the yoke of the nobles, and who would have com-

municated ideas of liberty to their fellow bondsmen throughout the whole empire. This was a dreadful prospect, which would have induced the Czar to make peace, and especially as the conqueror entertained very moderate intentions. The burning of the city destroyed all the stores and shops, and dispersed the population; the tradespeople and the *tiers-état* were ruined, and that great city became a mere sink of disorder, anarchy, and crime. Had it been fortified, Kutusov would have encamped on its ramparts, and the investment of it would have been impossible.

Constantinople, a much larger city than any of our modern capitals, owed its safety wholly to its fortifications. Without them, the empire of Constantine would have fallen in 700, and would only have lasted 300 years. The successful Mussulmans would have planted the standard of the prophet on its towers, which they did in 1453, about eight centuries afterwards. This capital, therefore, owes 800 years of its existence to its walls. During this interval it was besieged fifty-three times, of which fifty-two were useless; the French and the Venetians took it, but after a very warm contest.

Paris has owed its safety ten or a dozen times to its walls. 1st, It would have been the prey of the Normans—those barbarians besieged it in vain for two years; 2ndly, in 1358, it was besieged by the Dauphin without any result; and when the inhabitants opened their gates to him some years afterwards, it was of their own accord: 3rdly, in 1359, Edward, King of England,

encamped at Montrouge, and carried his ravages to the foot of its walls, but recoiled at the sight of its fortifications, and retired to Chartres: 4thly, in 1427, Henry V. repulsed the attack of Charles VII: 5thly, in 1464, the Count de Charolais invested that great capital, but failed in all his attacks: 6thly, in 1472, it would have been taken by the Duke of Burgundy, who was obliged to be satisfied with the pillage of its suburbs: 7thly, in 1536, Charles V. master of the country, had his head-quarters at Meaux, his advanced guard approached the ramparts of the capital, which only owed its safety to its walls: 8thly and 9thly, in 1588 and 1599, Henry III. and Henry IV. recoiled from the fortifications of Paris; and when the inhabitants, at a later period, opened their gates, they opened them at their own pleasure, and in consequence of the adjuration of St. Denis: finally, in 1636, the fortifications of Paris saved it for many years. Had Paris been a strongly fortified city in 1814 and 1815, had it been capable only of offering eight days' resistance, what an influence might it not have had on the events of the world!

OFFENSIVE WAR.

Every offensive war is a war of invasion; and every war conducted according to the rules of art, is a methodical war. Plans for campaigns are infinitely modified according to the circumstances, the genius of the commander, the nature of the troops, and the topographical difficulties or facilities. There are two de-

scriptions of plans, good and bad; sometimes the good fail from fortuitous circumstances; and sometimes the bad succeed from some caprice of fortune.

The wars of Genghis Khan and of Tamerlane were methodical, because they were carried on conformably to rule, and on solid principles; and because their enterprises were proportioned to the force of their armies: the dress of a giant is not that of a pigmy.

All wars ought to be methodical; because every war ought to be conducted according to the rules and principles of the art, and with some definite object; and it ought to be carried on with a force proportioned to the obstaculès which may obstruct success. There are, then, two kinds of offensive war; that which is well conceived, and conformable to the rules of art; and that which is ill conceived, and which violates those principles. Charles XII. was defeated by the Czar, the most despotic of men, because the object which he attempted to accomplish was ill considered. Tamerlane would have been defeated by Bajazet, if his plan of war had been like that of the King of Sweden.

There should only be one army, because unity of command is of prime necessity in war; the army must be kept together, the greatest possible concentration of force must be kept on the field of battle, and advantage must be taken of every occasion. Fortune is a woman; if you miss her to-day, do not expect to find her again to-morrow.

Carry on an offensive war like Alexander, Han-

nibal, Gustavus Adólphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, and Frederick the Great; read and re-read their histories, and that of their campaigns, and model your conduct by theirs. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of winning the secret of the art. Your genius, thus enlightened, will lead you to reject such maxims as are opposed to those of these illustrious names; and above all, do not imitate the plan of the war in Hanover, in 1758 and 1763. Hasty fortifications mixed with earth, made in fifteen or twenty days, are no protection against a *coup-de-main*. How much time it would require to erect proper protection, to place the magazines of the army in a situation safe from howitzers and from bombs! Without protection for the magazines, howitzers destroy everything. These hasty *ouvrages de campagne*, unless they have the protection of inundations, require enormous garrisons, and it is much better to fortify the towns.

The Romans after the battles of Thrasimene and of Cannæ, lost their armies, and could never rally them again. A few fugitives reached Rome with difficulty; and yet, these battles were fought in the midst of fortified places, and but a few days' march from their capital. Had Hannibal suffered the same fate, it would have been said that it was because he was too distant from Carthage, from his depôts and his fortified towns; but when beaten and defeated at Zama, at the very gates of Carthage, he lost his army as the Romans had done theirs at Thrasimene and Cannæ. After the battle of Marengo, General Melas lost his

army, but there was no want of strong places; Alessandria, Tortona, Genoa, Turin, Fenestrella, and Coni, were around him in all directions. Mack's army on the Iller was in the midst of his own country; it was nevertheless obliged to lay down its arms. And that old army of Frederick, which reckoned at its head so many heroes,—Brunswick, Mullendorff, Russel, Blücher, &c., when beaten at Jena, was unable to effect a retreat; and in a few days, 250,000 men laid down their arms; and yet, they were in no want of armies of reserve; there was one at Halle, and one upon the Elbe, aided by strongly-fortified places; they were in the midst of their own country, and not far from their capital. Give yourself all the possible chances of success when you are about to fight a battle, especially if you have to do with a great captain; for if you are beaten, even should you be in the midst of your depôts, and near your strong places, woe to the conquered!

Strong places are useful in an offensive as well as a defensive war; but they alone cannot, undoubtedly, be a substitute for an army. They are the only means of retarding, drawing aside, weakening, and annoying a conquering enemy.

The garrisons of fortresses should be drawn from the population, and not from the armies on active service. This duty ought to belong to the regiments of provincial militia, and it is the noblest prerogative of the national guard. It may be that the system of Vauban is defective, but it is the best known. It is

better to centralize, unite, and bring together all the forces of war in arms and men, than to scatter them about.

Macedonia under the successors of Alexander, Asia under Mithridates, Parthia under Arsaces, Prussia under Frederick the Great, Russia and Spain in recent times, were despotic monarchies. Achaia, the star of the time of Paulus Emilius, Holland in 1786, Venice in 1797, and Switzerland in 1798, were republics. Nations, like men, have different ages;—infancy, manhood, and old age. Every government which arises and is able to maintain itself without foreign intervention, is national. Property, law, patriotism, and religion, are the bonds of every species of government.

Whenever the Russians seize upon Constantinople, they will keep there as many Mussulmans as they wish, by assuring them of the security of their property, and the toleration of their religion. The Moors in Spain submitted even to the Inquisition; and in order to drive them out, it was necessary to found the order of Ferdinand and Isabella: all indirect means failed.

There are few things more insignificant than a Turkish army at the present day; the Ottomans will neither be able to maintain themselves in Asia Minor, Syria, nor Egypt; and as soon as the Russians become masters of the Crimea and the banks of the Caspian, they will become masters of Constantinople also.

Neither the patriotism of the people, nor the policy of the courts of Europe, have sufficed to prevent the partition of Poland, or the spoliation of several na-

tions; neither will they suffice to prevent the fall of the Ottoman empire. It was with feelings of repugnance that Maria Theresa entered into the conspiracy against Poland, a nation placed on the frontiers of Europe, to defend it against irruptions from the people of the north. Fears were entertained in Vienna at the aggrandisement of Russia; yet great satisfaction was felt at seeing Austria enriched by the addition of several millions of souls to her dominions, and many millions of money to her wealth. At the present day, as it was, then, the house of Austria would feel a repugnance to the partition of Turkey, and yet would consent to it, and find it agreeable to increase her vast territories by Servia, Bosnia, and the ancient Illyrian provinces, of which Vienna was formerly the capital. What would England and France do? One of them might take Egypt, a poor compensation! A statesman of the first rank once said, "Every time I learn that the fleets navigating in the Greek seas have anchored under the walls of the seraglio, I seem to hear the premonitory cry, announcing the doom of the empire of the Crescent."

The territorial condition of Asia and Europe is very different. The deserts which envelope Asia on all sides, are inhabited by a numerous population of barbarians, who breed a vast number of horses and camels. The Scythians, the Arabs, the Tartars under the Caliphs, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, &c., emerged from these vast solitudes, and inundated the plains of Persia, the Euphrates, Asia Minor, Syria,

and Egypt, with millions of cavalry. Their conquests were rapid, because they were undertaken by the whole people of a country, of warlike habits, and accustomed to the temperate and laborious life of the desert. Europe, on the other hand, is inhabited, from north to south, from east to west, by civilized nations, and is not exposed to similar revolutions.

Defensive war does not exclude attack, nor does offensive warfare exclude defence, even though the object be to force the enemy's frontiers, and to invade his country. The principles of war are those which have regulated the conduct of those greatest generals, whose noble deeds history has handed down to us, Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, Frederick the Great.

Alexander made eight campaigns, in the course of which he conquered Asia, and a part of India; Hannibal made seventeen—one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one in Africa; Cæsar made thirteen—eight against the Gauls, five against Pompey's legions; Gustavus Adolphus made three—one in Livonia against the Russians, and two in Germany against the house of Austria; Turenne conducted eighteen—nine in France, and nine in Germany; Prince Eugene of Savoy made thirteen—two against the Turks, five in Italy against France, and six on the Rhine and in Flanders; and Frederick made eleven—in Silesia, Bohemia, and on the banks of the Elbe. The history of these eighty-three campaigns, drawn up with care, would form a complete treatise on the art of war; and the prin-

ciples which ought to be followed, both in offensive and defensive warfare, would flow from thence as from its natural source.

Alexander crossed the Dardanelles 334, B.C., with an army of about 40,000 men, of which one-eighth was cavalry; he forced the passage of the Granicus in opposition to an army under Memnon, the Greek, who commanded for Darius on the coast of Asia, and he spent the whole of the year 333 in establishing his power in Asia Minor. He was seconded by the Greek colonies, who dwelt on the borders of the Black Sea and on the Mediterranean, and in Sardis, Ephesus, Tarsus, Miletus, &c. The Kings of Persia left their provinces and towns to be governed according to their own particular laws. Their empire was a union of confederated states, and did not form one nation; this facilitated its conquest. As Alexander only wished for the throne of the Monarch, he easily effected the change, by respecting the customs, manners, and laws of the people, who experienced no change in their condition.

In the year 332, he met with Darius at the head of 60,000 men, who had taken up a position near Tarsus, on the banks of the Issus, in the province of Cilicia. He defeated him, entered Syria, took Damascus, which contained all the riches of the great king, and laid siege to Tyre. This superb metropolis of the commerce of the world detained him nine months. He took Gaza after a siege of two months; crossed the desert in seven days; entered Pelusium, and Memphis;

and founded Alexandria. He met with no obstacles, because Syria and Egypt have at all times been connected by interest with the Greeks, because the Arab population detested the Persians, against whom they entertained a religious repugnance; and finally, because the Greek troops in the service of the Satraps embraced the cause of the Macedonians. In less than two years, after two battles and four or five sieges, the coasts of the Black Sea, from Phasis to Byzantium, those of the Mediterranean, as far as Alexandria, all Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, had submitted to his arms.

In 331, he repassed the desert, encamped in Tyre, recrossed Syria, entered Damascus, passed the Euphrates and Tigris, and defeated Darius on the field of Arbela, when he was at the head of a still stronger army than that which he commanded on the Issus, and Babylon opened her gates to him. In 330, he overran Susa, and took that city, Persepolis, and Pasarga, which contained the tomb of Cyrus. In 329, he directed his course northward, entered Ecbatana, and extended his conquests to the coasts of the Caspian, punished Bessus, the cowardly assassin of Darius, penetrated into Scythia, and subdued the Scythians. It was in this campaign that he did so much dishonour to the trophies he had won, by the assassination of Parmenio. In 328, he forced the passage of the Oxus, received 16,000 recruits from Macedonia, and reduced the neighbouring people to subjection. It was in this year he killed Clitus with his own hand; and wished

to make the Macedonians worship him as a god, which they refused to do. In 327, he crossed the Indus, vanquished Porus in a pitched battle, took him prisoner, and treated him as a king. He contemplated passing the Ganges, but his army refused. He sailed down the Indus, in the year 326, with 800 vessels; having arrived at the ocean, he sent Nearchus with a fleet to run along the coasts of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, as far as the mouth of the Euphrates. In 325, he took sixty days in crossing from Gedroni, entered Caramania, returned to Pasarga, Persepolis, and Susa, and married Statira, the daughter of Darius. In 324, he marched once more to the north, passed Ecbatana, and terminated his career at Babylon, where he died of poison.

His war was methodical, and is worthy of the highest encomiums—none of his convoys were intercepted; his armies continually went on increasing; and the moment at which they were the weakest was at their *debut* on the Granicus. On the Indus they were tripled, without reckoning the bodies of troops under the orders of the governors of the conquered provinces, which were composed of invalids or worn out Macedonians, recruits sent from Greece, or drawn from the Greek corps in the service of the satraps, and finally, of levies raised by the natives of the respective countries themselves. Alexander deserves the glory which he has enjoyed for so many centuries and among all nations; but what if he had been defeated on the Issus, with the army of Darius in battle array on the line of his retreat,

with its left on the mountains and its right on the sea, whilst the Macedonians had their right on the mountains and their left on the sea, and the province of Cilicia behind them!—if he had been beaten at Arbela, having the Euphrates, the Tigris and the deserts in his rear, without any strong places of refuge, and nine hundred leagues from Macedonia!—or if he had been beaten by Porus, and driven back upon the Indus!

In the year 218, B.C., Hannibal set out from Carthage, crossed the Ebro, the Pyrenees—till that time unknown to the Carthaginians—passed the Rhone and the Alps, and in his first campaign established himself in the midst of the Cisalpine Gauls, who, being always enemies of the Roman people, sometimes conquerors, and oftener conquered, had never yet submitted. He spent five months in performing this march of four hundred leagues, and left no garrisons and no depôts in his rear. He preserved no communication with Spain nor with Carthage, with which he only communicated after the battle of Thrasimene, by means of the Adriatic. No plan more vast or more magnificent has ever been devised by man. The expedition of Alexander was much less bold, much more easy, and with many more chances of success.

This offensive war was, however, methodical. The Cisalpines of Milan and Bologna became Carthaginians for Hannibal. If he had left fortresses or depôts behind him, he would have weakened his army, and compromised the success of his operations; he would have been vulnerable everywhere. In the year 217,

he crossed the Apennines, defeated the Roman army on the field of Thrasimene, drew his armies around Rome, and marched to the lower coasts of the Adriatic, from whence he communicated with Carthage.

In the year 216, he was attacked by 30,000 Romans, whom he conquered on the field of Cannæ, and had he marched immediately afterwards, he would have reached Rome, and Carthage would have been mistress of the world! The effect of this great victory, however, was immense; Capua opened her gates, all the Greek colonies, and many of the towns of lower Italy, followed the course of fortune, and abandoned the cause of Rome. Hannibal's principle was to keep his army united, to keep no garrison except in a single place, which he considered adapted for the safe-keeping of his hostages, his great warlike machines and his prisoners of note, and his sick, abandoning himself to the fidelity of his allies. He maintained himself sixteen years in Italy, without receiving any succours from Carthage; and only evacuated it by the command of his government, to fly to the aid and defence of his country. Fortune forsook him at Zama, and Carthage ceased to exist; but had he been vanquished at Trebbia, at Thrasimene, or Cannæ, what could have happened worse than the disasters which followed Zama? Although beaten at the gates of his capital, he could not prevent his army from being entirely destroyed.

Cæsar was forty-one when he commenced his first

campaign, in the year 58 B.C., and one hundred and forty years after the time of Hannibal. The people of Helvetia, to the number of 300,000, had left their country, to form a settlement on the coasts of the ocean. They had 90,000 men under arms, and crossed Burgundy without obstruction. The people of Autun appealed to Cæsar, and called him to their aid. He set out from Vienne in the Roman province, ascended the Rhone, and passed the Saone at Chalons. He fell in with the army of the Helvetians at a day's march from Autun, and defeated them after a severely contested battle. After having compelled them to retire to their mountains, he re-crossed the Saone, seized upon Besançon, and traversed the Jura to go to fight the army of Ariovistus. He fell in with this force at some days' march from the Rhine, vanquished it, and compelled his enemies to re-enter Germany. On this field of battle he was at a distance of ninety leagues from Vienne, and at the place where he defeated the Helvetians, seventy.

During this campaign, he kept constantly together the six legions which composed his army, leaving the care of his communications to his allies, and having always a month's provisions in his camp, and a second month's in some fortified place, in which, according to the example of Hannibal, he kept his hostages and his magazines, and established his hospitals. It was on these same principles he conducted his seven other campaigns against the Gauls.

During the winter of 57, the Belgians raised an

army of 300,000 men, the command of which they confided to Galba, King of Soissons. Cæsar being warned by the people of Rheims, his allies, advanced rapidly, and encamped on the banks of the Aisne. Galba, despairing of being able to attack him in his camp, crossed the Aisne, with a view to march upon Rheims; but Cæsar anticipated that manœuvre, and the Belgians disbanded; and all the towns of that line successively submitted to the conqueror. The people of Hainault surprised him on the Sambre, in the neighbourhood of Maubeuge, so that he had no time to form his line. Of the eight legions then under his command, six were engaged in throwing up the entrenchments of the camp, and two were in the rear with the baggage. Fortune was so contrary to him on that day, that a corps of Trevisian cavalry deserted from him, and proclaimed in all directions the destruction of the Roman army; nevertheless, he triumphed.

In the year 56, he undertook an expedition against Nantes and Vannes, sending out strong detachments into Normandy and Aquitaine. The nearest point of his depôts at that time, which was Toulouse, was a hundred and thirty leagues distant, and separated from him by mountains, large rivers and forests.

In the year 55, he carried the war to the very extremity of Holland, to Zutphen, where 40,000 barbarians were about to pass the Rhine to seize upon the territories of the Gauls. He defeated them, killed a very great number, drove them back a great way, repassed the Rhine at Cologne, traversed Gaul,

embarked at Boulogne, and made a descent upon England.

In the year 54, he again crossed the Channel with five legions, and during the equinox re-entered Gaul. Towards the close of the season, having learnt that his Lieutenant Sabinus, with fifteen cohorts, had been massacred near Trèves, and that Quintus Cicero was besieged in his camp at Tongrès, he collected 8,000 or 9,000 men, and put himself at their head,—defeated Ambiorix, who advanced to meet him, and delivered Cicero.

In the year 53, he repressed the revolt of the people of Sens, Chartres, Trèves, and Liege, and passed the Rhine a second time. The Gauls already began to murmur, and an insurrection soon burst out on all sides. During the winter of 52, they rose *en masse*, and even the inhabitants of Autun, formerly so faithful, took part in the war, for the Roman yoke was become hateful to the Gauls. Cæsar was advised to retire to the Roman provinces, or to pass the Alps, but he adopted neither of these plans. He had then ten legions under his command. He crossed the Loire, besieged and took the city of Bourges, in mid-winter, and in sight of the army of Vercingatorix. After this, he laid siege to Clermont, which he failed to take; and in the meantime he lost his hostages, magazines, and spare horses, which were in depôt in Nevers, and seized upon by the inhabitants of Autun. Nothing now appeared more critical than his position. His Lieutenant Sabinus was annoyed by the people of

Paris; he recalled him and his troops, and with this combined force he laid siege to Alize, in which the army of the Gauls was shut up. He spent fifty days in fortifying his camp with a double wall of circumvallation. Gaul raised a new army more numerous than that it had just lost: the people of Rheims alone remained faithful to Rome. The Gauls presented themselves in order to compel him to raise the siege, and were zealously assisted for three days by the garrison in the town, with a view to overwhelm the Romans in their lines; but Cæsar triumphed over them all; Alize fell, and the Gauls submitted to the victor.

During this struggle, Cæsar's whole army was in his camp, and he exposed no vulnerable point to his enemies. The victory was no sooner gained than he profited by it to win back the good will of the people of Autun, in the midst of whom he passed the winter, although he made successively a number of expeditions, to the distance of a hundred leagues the one from the other, for the purpose of changing his troops. And finally, in 51, he laid siege to Cahors, in which the last of the Gauls perished. Gaul now became a Roman province, the tribute of which added eight millions annually to the riches of Rome.

In the campaigns of the civil war, Cæsar triumphed by following the same method, and adopting the same principles; but he ran many more dangers. He passed the Rubicon with only one legion—took thirty cohorts at Corfinium, and in the course of three

months drove Pompey out of Italy. What rapidity!—what promptitude!—what boldness! Whilst he was preparing the vessels necessary to enable him to cross the Adriatic and follow his rival into Greece, he passed the Alps and the Pyrenees, traversed Catalonia, at the head of 900 horse—scarcely sufficient for an escort—and arrived before Lerida, where in forty days he reduced to subjection the legions of Pompey, commanded by Afranius. He suddenly traversed the distance from the Ebro to the Sierra Morena, pacified the Andalusians, and returned to make his triumphant entry into Marseilles, which his troops had just reduced to subjection; and finally, he arrived in Rome, where he exercised the office of a Dictator for ten days, and then set out to put himself at the head of the twelve legions which Antony had collected at Brundisium.

In the year 48, he crossed the Adriatic with 25,000 men, held the whole of Pompey's forces in check for many months, till he was rejoined by Antony, who had again returned to Italy in despite of the enemy's fleets, when they marched with their combined forces upon Dyrrachium, and invested that great depôt of Pompey's stores and munitions of war. Pompey himself was encamped at a distance of some miles from the city, on the sea coast; and Cæsar, not content with investing the town, invested the camp also. He took advantage of the summits of the hills by which the camp was surrounded; constructed twenty-four forts in favourable positions, and then

established a contravallation of six leagues. Pompey, thus hemmed in on the land side, received his provisions and reinforcements by means of his fleet, which rode triumphant in the waters of the Adriatic. He took advantage of his central position, attacked and vanquished Cæsar, who lost thirty standards and many thousand soldiers, the *élite* of his army. The fortune of Cæsar appeared to waver; he had no more reinforcements to expect; the sea was closed against him, and all the advantages were on the side of Pompey. He then made a march of fifty leagues, carried the war into Thessaly, and defeated Pompey's army on the field of Pharsalia. Pompey, almost alone, though master of the sea, took to flight, and sought for refuge on the coasts of Egypt, where he was killed by a cowardly assassin.

A few days after, Cæsar arrived, following the course of his adversary, entered Alexandria, and found himself surrounded in the palace and the amphitheatre by the population of that great city and the army of Achillas; and finally, after nine months' dangers and continual contests, the loss of a single one of which would have ensured his ruin, he triumphed over the Egyptians.

During this period, Scipio, Labienus, and King Juba held undisputed dominion in Africa, with fourteen legions, the remains of Pompey's adherents; and they had always numerous squadrons, by means of which they kept the mastery of the sea. Cato, at Utica, breathed the spirit of his own hatred into all.

hearts. Cæsar embarked with a few troops, arrived safely at Adrumetum, experienced checks in several encounters, but was finally joined by his whole army, and defeated Scipio, Labienus, and Juba upon the field of Thapsus: Cato, Scipio, and Juba fell by their own hands. Neither fortresses, numerous squadrons, nor the oaths and duties of the people, were sufficient to deliver the conquered from the ascendancy and activity of the conqueror. In the year 45, the sons of Pompey, having drawn together in Spain the wrecks of Pharsalia and Thapsus, found themselves at the head of an army more numerous than that of their father. Cæsar set out from Rome, in twenty-three days arrived on the Guadalquivir, and defeated Sextus Pompey at Merida. It was on this occasion, when he was on the point of being beaten, and his old legions appeared ready to give way, that he is said to have thought of putting himself to death. Labienus remained on the field; and the head of Sextus Pompey was brought to the conqueror. Six months afterwards, on the ides of March, Cæsar was assassinated in the midst of the Roman Senate. Had he been conquered at Pharsalia, Thapsus, or Merida, he would have shared the fate of the great Pompey, of Metellus, Scipio, and Sextus Pompey.

Pompey, whom the Romans loved so dearly, whom they surnamed *The Great* when he was only twenty-four years of age, who was conqueror in eighteen campaigns, triumphed in three quarters of the world, and raised the Roman name to the highest

pitch of glory, was beaten at Pharsalia, and there terminated his destiny; although he was still master of the sea, and his rival had no fleet.

The principles of Cæsar were the same as those of Alexander and Hannibal—the concentration of his forces—to expose no vulnerable point—to move with rapidity upon important places—to have recourse to moral means, to the reputation of his arms, and to political means also to preserve the fidelity of his allies, and keep the conquered people in subjection.

Gustavus Adolphus crossed the Baltic, took the islands of Rugen and Pomerania, and carried his arms to the banks of the Vistula, the Rhine, and the Danube. He fought two battles. Having been victorious at Leipzig, he was again successful at Lutzen, where he fell. Notwithstanding the shortness of his career, it is one of great recollections, in consequence of the boldness and rapidity of his movements, and the discipline and intrepidity of his troops. Gustavus Adolphus was animated by the principles of Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar.

Turenne made five campaigns before the treaty of Westphalia, eight between that time and the treaty of the Pyrenees, and five between the time last mentioned and his death, which took place in 1675. His manœuvres and marches, during his campaigns in 1646, 48, 72, and 73, were all executed on the same principles as those adopted by Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, and Gustavus Adolphus.

In 1646, he set out from Mayence, descended the

left bank of the Rhine as far as Wesel, where he crossed that river, and ascended the right bank till he reached the Lahn; formed a junction with the Swedish army, passed the Danube and the Lech, and thus performed a march of two hundred leagues across an enemy's country. When arrived on the Lech, he had all his troops united under his own command, having, like Cæsar and Hannibal, abandoned his communications to his allies, or rather, having consented to separate himself for a time from his reserves and his communications, reserving only one place of depôt.

In 1648, he passed the Rhine at Oppenheim, formed a junction with the Swedish army at Hanau, advanced along the Rednitz, and retrograded on the Danube, which he crossed at Dillingen; defeated Montecuculi at Lusmarshausen, passed the Lech at Rain, and the Isar at Freising; the court of Bavaria became alarmed for its safety, and quitted Munich. He next fixed his head-quarters at Mühldorf, which he laid under contribution, and ravaged the whole of the electorate, to punish the elector for his insincerity.

In 1672, under the orders of Louis XIV., he directed the conquest of Holland, descended the left bank of the Rhine, to the point at which that river divides into several branches, passed it, and took sixty fortified towns: his advanced guard reached as far as Naarden. It is not known by what fatality he stopped short and did not enter Amsterdam. The Dutch having recovered from their surprise, opened the

sluices, and laid the country under water; the French army, weakened by the garrisons which it had left in the captured towns, did nothing more. The King returned to Versailles, leaving the command of the troops to Marshal Luxembourg.

Turenne passed the Rhine with a division of the army, to march to the assistance of the Bishops of Munster and Cologne, who were allies of the King of France. He re-ascended the right bank till he reached the Maine, and kept the Grand Elector's army of 40,000 men in check, till the latter was joined by the Duke of Lorraine; when Turenne was obliged to cover himself by the Rhine. This enabled the enemy to march upon Strasburg, where the Prince of Condé arrived just in time to destroy the bridge, and thus to frustrate the Elector's project. The Elector then set out for Mayence, threw a bridge across the Rhine at about the distance of a cannon-shot above the town, and inundated the left bank in that district.

During the winter, Turenne again crossed to the right bank by the bridge of Wesel, and on the 10th of April compelled the Elector to sign a separate peace with France, but all his operations were the objects of criticism by very inferior men, till they were fully justified by success.

In the campaign of 1674, Montecuculi commenced operations, and passed to the left bank of the Rhine, to make it the theatre of the war; Turenne, however, disregarded this movement—and took the lead him-

self. He passed the Rhine, and obliged Montecuculi to recross that river to the right bank.

Turenne pitched his camp at Wilstedt, in order to cover Strasburg, which was two leagues behind him, and the bridge of Ottenheim, which lay four leagues to his right. Montecuculi encamped behind the Kuitzig, at a league and a half from the French army, resting for support on the fortified town of Offenburg, in which he had a garrison. Turenne's position was bad; he ought rather to have given battle than to run the risk of losing the bridge of Ottenheim and his retreat, or the bridge of Strasburg.

Had Montecuculi employed six hours of the night in marching direct upon Ottenheim, pressing his line of operations upon Freiburg, he would have forced the bridge of Ottenheim before the French army could have come to its assistance. He did not, however, take this step—felt his way, and satisfied himself with extending his line on the left. He thought that a few demonstrations would be sufficient to determine his adversary to abandon his camp at Wilstedt, and to cover Strasburg. Turenne did not act in this way, but made his position worse by extending his line of operations on the right. At length, however, he perceived the danger to which he was exposed,—removed the bridge of Ottenheim and placed it at Altenheim,—and thus approached it within two leagues of Strasburg, and at an equal distance from his camp at Wilstedt. This was still too far from

both; it was necessary to throw it over within a league of the city.

Montecuculi changed his plan; he resolved to pass the Rhine below Strasburg; and, with this view, he commanded the inhabitants of that city, who were all sold to him, to provide him with an *équipage de pont*, and he advanced to receive it. Turenne took possession of the islands, constructed a stockade, and threw up entrenchments on the Kirchen. Montecuculi, seeing himself thus cut off from Offenburg and from Caprara's division, was obliged to relinquish his design.

Turenne committed a great fault in this campaign, which would have been attended with ruin to his army, had he been opposed by such a commander as the Prince de Condé; this was his throwing a bridge over the Rhine at four leagues from Strasburg, instead of at a distance of less than one. He showed himself, however, incomparably superior to Montecuculi:—first, by obliging him to follow his plan, and to relinquish that which he had himself formed; secondly, by compelling him to enter Strasburg; thirdly, by cutting off Montecuculi's army from Offenburg and from Caprara's division, which undoubtedly obliged him to re-pass the mountains of the Black Forest, and crowned the success of the campaign.

Prince Eugene of Savoy conquered the Turks in the campaign of 1697, in which the battle of Zanta decided the peace. In 1701, he entered Italy at the head of 30,000 men, crossed the Adige at Carpi, pe-

netrated into Brescià, and drove back Catinat behind the Oglio. At Chiari, he defeated Villeroy. In 1702, he surprised Cremona, and lost the battle of Luzzara, against Villeroy; in 1704, he commanded in Flanders, and won the battle of Hochstedt; in 1705, he carried on the campaign in Italy against Vendôme, and received a check at Cassano; in 1706, he set out from Trent, marched along the left bank of the Adige, passed the river in presence of a French army, ascended the left bank of the Po, and exposing his flank to the enemy, he passed the Tanaro in presence of the Duke of Orleans, and joined the Duke of Savoy, under the walls of Turin, where he turned all the French lines, attacked their right between the Pesio and the Stura, and forced it. This march was a master-piece of boldness.

In 1707, he penetrated into Provence, and laid siege to Toulon; in 1708, he commanded on the Rhine, fought the battle of Oudenarde, and besieged Lille for four months; in 1709, he gained the battle of Malplaquet; in 1712, he took Quesnoy, and besieged Landrecies, and Marshal Villars saved France at Dinant. The peace of 1714 put an end to this war. In the campaign of 1716, against the Turks, Prince Eugene conquered his opponents at Temesvar, besieged and took Belgrade, and forced the Porte to conclude a peace; in 1733, he made his last campaign; but his great age made him timid; he did not wish to risk his glory in an eighteenth battle, and he suffered Philippsburg to be taken in his presence by the Marshal de Berwick.

Frederick, in his invasions of Bohemia and Moravia, in his marches on the Oder, on the banks of the Elbe, and the Saale, put into practice the principles of these great captains; he placed his chief confidence in the discipline, the bravery, and the tactics of his army.

Napoleon made fourteen campaigns; two in Italy, five in Germany, two in Africa and Asia, two in Poland and Russia, one in Spain, and two in France.

In his first campaign in Italy, in 1796, he set out from Savoy, crossed the mountains at the junction of the Alps and Apennines, cut off the Austrian army from that of Sardinia, took Cherasco, a strong fortress, situated at the confluence of the Tanaro and the Stura, about twenty leagues from Savona, and there established his magazines. He forced the King of Sardinia to relinquish the fortified town of Tortona, lying twenty leagues to the east of Cherasco, on the road to Milan. Having established himself there, he passed the Po at Piacenza, seized upon Pizzighettone, a fortified town on the Adda, twenty-five leagues from Tortona. He next directed his march upon the Mincio, took Peschiera, thirty leagues from Pizzighettone, and on the line of the Adige, occupying the district and forts of Verona on the left bank of that river. This position gave him possession of the three stone bridges of that town, and of Porto Legnago, another point on that river. He remained in this position till the taking of Mantua, which he caused to be invested and besieged. Between his camp, under the walls of Verona, and Chamberry, his first military

depôt on the frontiers of France, he held possession of four strongly fortified towns *en échelon*, in which he placed his hospitals and stores, and which required only 4,000 men for their garrisons. The convalescents and conscripts were sufficient for this service. In a line of one hundred leagues, he had thus a place of *depôt* at about every four days' march. After the taking of Mantua, and on his invasion of the States of the church, Ferrara became his *depôt* on the banks of the Po, and Ancona, seven or eight marches further, at the foot of the Apennines, was his second position.

In the campaign of 1797, he passed the Piave and the Tagliamento, fortifying Palma Nova and Osopo, situated at a distance of eight days' march from Mantua. He crossed the Julian Alps, rebuilt the ancient fortifications of Klagenfurt, five days' march from Osopo, and took up his position on the Simmering, where he was eighty leagues from Mantua. On this line of operations, however, he had three fortified towns, and a *point d'appui* at the distance of every five or six days' march.

In 1798, he commenced his operations in the East, by the taking of Alexandria, fortified that large city, and made it the centre of his magazines, and of the whole organization of his army and operations. When he marched upon Cairo, he caused a fort to be erected at Ramanieh upon the Nile, twenty leagues distant from Alexandria, and armed the citadel and several forts in and around Cairo. He caused another fort to be erected at a distance of thirty leagues from that

capital, at Salahieh, at the entrance of the desert, upon the route to Gaza. The army encamped at this village, at a distance of fifteen days' march from Alexandria. On this line of operations he possessed three fortified places as *points d'appui*.

During the campaign of 1799, he crossed eighty leagues of the desert, laid siege to St. Jean d'Acre, and pushed an army of observation forward to the banks of the Jordan, two hundred and fifty leagues from Alexandria, his place of central *depôt*. He had caused a fort to be built at Catieh in the desert, twenty leagues from Salahieh; another at El-Arish, thirty leagues from Catieh; and a third at Gaza, twenty leagues from El-Arish.

On this line of operations of two hundred and fifty leagues, he occupied eight fortified places, in order to enable him to resist the enemies with whom he had to contend; and, in fact, during the whole of these four campaigns, he never had a convoy or a courier intercepted. In 1796, a few isolated men were massacred in the neighbourhood of Tortona; in Egypt some *djermes* were stopped on the Nile, on their way from Rosetta to Cairo; but this was in the very commencement of the operations. The dromedary regiments which he organized in Egypt, became so accustomed to the desert, that they always kept the communications open between Cairo and Acre, as well as between Upper and Lower Egypt. With an army of 25,000 men, he at that time occupied Egypt, Palestine, and Galilee, which covered an extent of

nearly thirty thousand square leagues, in the form of a triangle. The distance from his head-quarters before Acre to those of General Desaix, in Upper Egypt, was not less than three hundred leagues.

The campaign in 1800 was directed by the same principles. The army of Germany, when it arrived on the Inn, was mistress of the fortresses of Ulm and Ingoldstadt, which furnished two important places as *depôts*. In the armistice of Pfaffendorf, they had neglected to require the restoration of these places, which Napoleon regarded as of such great importance to the success of his operations in Germany, that he made their retention a *sine quâ non* of agreeing to a prolonged suspension of hostilities.

The Gallo-Batavian army at Nuremburg protected his left wing on the Danube, and the army of the Grisons, his right on the Inn. When the army of reserve descended from the St. Bernard, he established his first place of *depôt* at Ivrée; for even after the battle of Marengo, he did not consider Italy reconquered till all the places on this side of the Mincio were occupied by his troops. He granted Melas permission to retire under the walls of Mantua, on condition that he should put all these place into his hands.

In 1805, having taken Ulm from the Austrian army 80,000 strong, he advanced to the Lech, restored the ancient ramparts of Augsburg, armed them, and made that city, which offered to him so many resources, a place of *depôt*. He would have restored Ulm also, but the fortifications were rased, and the locality was

bad. From Augsburg, he marched upon Braunau, and by taking possession of that important place, ensured for himself a bridge and passage over the Inn; and this served as a second place of *depôt*, which enabled him to proceed as far as Vienna; the capital itself was protected against a *coup-de-main*. After this, he marched into Moravia, and took the citadel of Brünn, which was immediately armed and provisioned. This city is situated at the distance of forty leagues from Vienna, and became the *point d'appui* of his operations in Moravia. At a day's march from Brünn, he fought the battle of Austerlitz. From the field of battle, he might have retired upon Vienna, repassed the Danube there, or marched by the left bank to Lintz, and passed the river by the bridge at that city, which was protected by strong works.

In 1806, he established his head-quarters at Bamberg, and united his army on the Regnitz. The King of Prussia thought that, by marching on the Maine, he would be able to interrupt his line of operations on Mayence, and stop his movements; and he accordingly sent forward the divisions of Blücher and the Duke of Weimar. The line of operations of the French army, however, was no longer through Mayence, but extended from the fortress of Kronach, situated at the entrance to the mountains of Saxony, to Forcheim, a strong place on the Regnitz, and from thence to Strasburg. Having nothing to fear from the offensive march of the Prussians, Napoleon proceeded in three columns, his left by Coburg, under

the command of the Dukes of Montebello and Castiglione; it consisted of the fifth and seventh *corps d'armée*; the centre, where he himself was, proceeded by Kronach and Zettlitz; it was composed of the first and third corps, commanded by Marshal Bernadotte and the Prince of Echmühl, and was accompanied by the guard and the cavalry reserves; the third advanced through the district of Bayreuth; it marched by Hoff, and was composed of the 4th and 6th corps, under the Duke of Dalmatia and the Prince of Moskova.

The Prussian army between Weimar and Neustadt, already in motion towards the Maine to support its advanced guard, was stopped. Cut off from the Elbe and from Berlin, all its magazines taken, it only became fully sensible of its danger when its situation was already desperate; and although so near Magdeburg, and in the very heart of its own country, and only two days' march from the Elbe, it was completely beaten, cut off, and unable to effect a retreat. Not a man of that old army of Frederic escaped, except the king and a few squadrons of cavalry, who succeeded, with difficulty, in reaching the right bank of the Oder. More than 100,000 men, hundreds of guns and stands of colours were the trophies of that day.

In 1807, being master of Custrin, Glogau, and Stettin, he passed the Vistula at Warsaw, and caused Praga to be fortified, which was to be used for the double purpose of a *tête de pont* and a *depôt*. He created Modlin, and placed Thorn in a state of defence. The

army took up its position on the Passarge, in order to cover the siege of Dantzic, which became his place of *depôt* and his *point d'appui* in the operations that preceded the battle of Friedland, which decided the war. Had hostilities been continued, this line would have been completed by the fortress of Pilau, which would have been taken before the army crossed the Niemen.

In 1808, most of the strong places in the north of Spain—viz., St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Figueras, and Barcelona, were in the power of the French army, when it marched upon Burgos.

In 1809, the first cannon shot was fired near Ratisbon; Augsburg was his centre of operations. The Austrians having rased the works of Braunau, he chose the fortress of Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, and much more advantageous than the other, because it secured for him at the same time a passage over both rivers. He caused it to be fortified, and ensured possession of the bridge of Lintz, by strengthening it by works of great force. His army, when it arrived at Vienna, independently of this communication with Bavaria, kept open a safe communication with Italy, by means of the castle of Gratz, and the fortified town of Klagenfurt.

In 1812, Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, and Praga, were his strong places on the Vistula; Vielau, Kowno, Grodno, Wilna, and Minsk, his magazines near the Niemen; and Smolensko his great place of *depôt* in his movement on Moscow. In this operation he had a

fortified *point d'appui* at the distance of every eight days' march. The whole of the post-houses were embattled and entrenched, and were occupied each by a single company, and piece of artillery; and this gave such security to the service, that during the whole campaign, not a single estafette, or a single convoy, was intercepted; and that even in the retreat, with the exception of the four days in which Admiral Tchetchagow was driven back to the other side of the Berezina, the army had its communications with its *depôts* constantly free.

In 1813, Königstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg were his strong places on the Elbe; Merseburg, Erfurt, and Würzburg, his line of communication to reach the Rhine.

In 1814, he had strong places everywhere; and the great importance of those occupied in Flanders would have been seen, had not Paris fallen by treason; and if, even after it had fallen, the defection of the commander of the sixth corps had not prevented Napoleon from marching upon Paris, the allies would have been forced to abandon the capital; for, assuredly, their generals never would have risked a battle on the left bank of the Seine, having behind them that great city, which they had only occupied for three days. The treason of several of the ministers and civil agents favoured the entry of the enemy into Paris: but it was Marshal Marmont who prevented the momentary occupation of the capital from being ruinous to the allies.

The whole of the plans of Napoleon's fourteen campaigns are conformable to the true principles of war. His wars were bold, but they were methodical. Nothing can furnish a better proof of this than his defensive operations on the Adige, in 1796, in which the Austrians lost several armies; and that of the Passarge, in 1807, to protect the siege of Dantzic.

Should any one wish for an example of an offensive war conducted upon false principles, it is to be found in that of 1796, in Germany. The French army of the Sambre and Meuse, 50,000 strong, took possession of the citadel of Wurzburg, established itself upon the Regnitz, at the time in which the left and the centre of the army of the Rhine and Moselle were passing the Neckar, and advancing with 50,000 men to Neresheim, and the right, 20,000 strong, under the command of Ferino, were marching on the Vorarlberg, at the foot of the mountains of the Tyrol. These three corps were separated from one another by mountains and large rivers, and each of them kept a distinct line of communication with France, so that the defeat of one compromised the safety of the other two. The flanks are the weak parts of an invading army; and no means ought to be neglected to strengthen one of them at least, if not both, by a neutral country, or some great natural defence. From the total neglect of this great first principle of war, the French army, by being divided into three separate corps, created six flanks, whilst, by good manœuvring, it would have been easy to have supported the two wings strongly.

The centre column was fighting at Neresheim, its left useless, and its right was not even supported on the Danube, having neglected to take possession of Ulm, which the enemy had abandoned, and which alone could have regulated the campaign. It was thus isolated, at a distance of eighty leagues from the Rhine, without any *point d'appui*, as a place of intermediate *depôt*. The Archduke, having withdrawn the principal part of the forces which he had opposed to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to the corps of the right commanded by Ferino, marched upon Neresheim. Having failed in his attack, and been repulsed by the intrepidity of the French, he recrossed the Danube and the Lech, and, weakened by leaving 25,000 men to check the left and centre of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, which had just beaten him at Neresheim, he proceeded to overwhelm or drive the army of the Sambre and Meuse to the other side of the Rhine.

In this campaign, the general of the army of the Rhine committed another fault: he left in his rear, without blockading them, the two important fortresses of Philippsburg and Mannheim, leaving only a corps of observation of 4,000 men. He ought to have invested them closely, have cut off all communications with the Archduke, all knowledge of the passing events of the war, and all intelligence with the surrounding country. Such a blockade would have prepared the way towards the fall of those places.

He was severely punished for his imprudence. The

garrisons of those two places drove the corps of observation to the other side of the Rhine, and the peasants no sooner heard of the successes of the Archduke, than they rose *en masse* and intercepted the communications; they were very near surprising Kehl, and the bridge of Strasburg. The principles of war and of prudence were never more violated than in that campaign. The plan, as drawn up by the cabinet, was wrong, and the mode of its execution was still worse; what ought, then, to have been done? First, the three divisions ought to have been under one commander-in-chief; secondly, they ought to have marched closer together, and have had only two wings—one of them constantly supported by the Danube; thirdly, they ought to have first taken the four strong places on the Rhine from the enemy, or at least to have opened the trenches before two of them, and to have made sure of Ulm, in order to use it as their great *depôt* on the Danube, at the border of the Black Forest.

The campaign in Portugal was an offensive campaign, in which also the most important rules of the art of war were violated. The Anglo-Portuguese army was 80,000 strong, 15,000 of whom were militia, stationed as a corps of observation at Coimbra, and leaning for support on Oporto.

The French army, after having taken Ciudad-Rodrigo and Almeida, entered Portugal 72,000 strong, and attacked the enemy in position, on the heights of Busaco. The two armies were nearly equal in number, but the position of Busaco was very strong; the

attack failed, and on the next day the army changed its line, and marched upon Coimbra. The enemy then effected their retreat upon Lisbon, burning and wasting the country as they retired.

The French general followed close upon their rear, without leaving a corps of observation to hold in check the 15,000 Portuguese militia, who were in Oporto. He abandoned everything, left Coimbra behind him, and thus deprived himself of all protection on his retreat. He ought to have left 6,000 men to defend and fortify Coimbra, and to keep the corps in Oporto in check.

It is true, that if he had done so, he would not have been able to take with him more than 60,000 men to Lisbon; that number, however, would have been sufficient, had the English general intended to embark his army; if, on the contrary, as everything seemed to intimate, he wished to maintain himself in Portugal, the French ought not to have passed by Coimbra, but have taken a good position in advance of that city even several days' march, and fortified it; they ought to have reduced Oporto by a detachment, organized the country behind them, and kept open their communications with Almeida; and thus waited till Badajos was taken, and the army of Andalusia had arrived on the Tagus.

When he had arrived at the foot of the entrenchments of Lisbon, the French general failed in resolution; and yet he was well aware of the existence of those lines, since the enemy had been engaged upon

them for three months. The general opinion is, that if he had made his attack immediately on his arrival, he would have carried them; but two days afterwards that was no longer possible.

The Anglo-Portuguese army was reinforced by a great number of battalions of militia, so that, without obtaining any advantage, the French general lost 5,000 wounded or sick, and his communications were cut off in the rear. He found, when he was before Lisbon, that he was insufficiently provided with artillery, and the whole of his operations were therefore badly planned.

Another offensive campaign, conducted in a manner equally opposed to all the principles of war, was that of Charles XII., in the years 1708 and 1709. That prince set out from his camp at Altstadt, near Leipzig, in September 1707, at the head of 45,000 men, and traversed Poland; 20,000 men, under Count Lewenhaupt, disembarked at Riga; and 15,000 were in Finland. He was, therefore, in a condition to have brought together 80,000 of the best troops in the world. He left 10,000 men in Warsaw to guard King Stanislaus; and in January, 1708, arrived at Grodno, where he wintered. In June, he crossed the forest of Minsk, and presented himself before Borisov, forced the Russian army, which occupied the left bank of the Berezina, defeated 20,000 Russians who were strongly entrenched behind marshes; passed the Borysthènes at Mohilov, and vanquished a corps of 16,000 Muscovites near Smolensko, on the 22nd of September.

He was now advanced to the confines of Lithuania, and was about to enter Russia Proper: the Czar, alarmed at his approach, made him proposals of peace. Up till this time, all his movements were conformable to rule, and his communications were well secured. He was master of Poland and Riga, and only ten days' march distant from Moscow; and it is probable he would have reached that capital, had he not quitted the high road thither, and directed his steps towards the Ukraine, in order to form a junction with Mazeppa, who brought him only 6,000 men. By this movement, his line of operations, beginning at Sweden, exposed his flank to Russia for a distance of 400 leagues, and he was unable to protect it, or to receive either reinforcements or assistance. General Lewenhaupt, with 16,000 men and 8,000 wagons, crossed the Borysthenes at Mohilov twelve days after him; but had scarcely taken four days' march in the direction of the Ukraine, when he was attacked by the Czar, at the head of 40,000 men. He fought valiantly on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of October, but lost the whole of his convoy and 11,000 men, and only joined his master in the Ukraine with the small number of 5,000 troops destitute of everything. In May, 1709, the Czar having collected large magazines at Pultawa, Charles XII. laid siege to the place; but in June the Czar arrived at the head of sixty thousand men to raise the siege. Although the king had only 30,000 troops, a part of whom were Cossacks of the Ukraine, he attacked the Russian army, and was beaten: the ruin

of his army was complete; he reached Turkey with difficulty, escaping across the Dnieper with a thousand men.

Had Charles XII., wished to reach Moscow, his march was perfectly well-directed as far as Smolensko, and his line of operations with Sweden and Riga was covered by the Dwina as far as the Borysthenes, and Mohilvo; but if his design was to winter in the Ukraine, and to induce a rising among the Cossacks, he ought to have passed the Niemen at Grodno, and traversed Lithuania.

He ought to have set out from Cracow, directed his course towards the lower part of the Dnieper, and caused his convoys to be sent from Sweden behind the Oder and the Vistula, by way of Cracow; for it was impossible for him to pretend to maintain his communications with his own states by a line which, for the space of four hundred leagues, skirted the frontier of Russia, and exposed his flank to his enemy, whilst it would have been easy for him to have kept his communications open by Cracow, because he would have been covered by Lithuania, the Niemen, and the Vistula. He did not organize his war, like Hannibal, so as to relinquish all his communications with Sweden; for General Lewenhaupt, who commanded a considerable detachment, and escorted a most important convoy, followed him at a distance of twelve days' march; and he calculated therefore on his joining him.

To the first fault, which of itself was enough to have brought ruin upon his plan, he added a second,

that of attacking the Russian army at Pultawa. He was, at that time, only twelve leagues from the Borysthenes, and could have reached that river in two days' march, and put it between him and the Czar, and could have maintained himself in Volhynia and Podolia. Why should he have offered battle? Had he been conqueror at Pultawa, what could he have pretended to do with an army which did not contain more than 18,000 Swedes, and at a distance of forty days' march from Moscow? He could no longer entertain any expectation of striking a decisive blow against his enemy; and everything combined to point out to him the necessity of taking advantage of the favourable season of the year, and of the fear with which he had inspired the Muscovites, and to pass the Dnieper during the month of May, and re-enter Poland. He ought to have given battle so as to have ensured his retreat, and to have had boats and a fort twelve leagues from Pultawa, upon the Borysthenes; but his plan was not well organized; he did not, in fact, understand the art of war, and was nothing more than a brave and intrepid soldier. As soon as he quitted the high road to Moscow, he lost all communications with Sweden, and received no news of the disaster which befel General Lewenhaupt till he was informed by that general himself. It is obvious that the faults of his plan of operations did not escape the notice of several of the officers of his staff, who, in despair of being able to induce him to renounce his design of marching upon the Ukraine, long insisted

that he should wait at Smolensko for the arrival of the corps under General Lewenhaupt, and for the supplies which were absolutely necessary to his success.

After this brief notice of the campaigns of the greatest captains, we do not feel ourselves called upon to offer any observations on the various pretended systems of the art of war. Recourse was had to a great number of plans in the war in Hanover, to form a basis of operations for the French armies, which were merely thus weakened by garrisons, and which only rendered the successes of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick easier and more splendid. By fortifying their capitals, generals have at their disposal all their resources, all their wealth and all their influence. They can profit by cellars and public edifices as places of deposit for the stores of the army. Almost all such cities having formerly had fortifications; the masonry of their ramparts, and their sluices, are all useful, whilst open places are not protected from a *coup-de-main*, at least without being provided with a garrison as numerous as that which would be sufficient to occupy an entrenched camp.

What immense labour it would require to build blockhouses which would afford an adequate protection from the air, bombs, and howitzers, to the magazines of an army! If the army of reserve were composed of recruits, it would be useless, either in rallying the army, stopping its retreat in case of defeat, or in repressing movements in the country. This system

creates points vulnerable to the enemy, who in his own country has the means of changing his line of operations at pleasure.

Conquered provinces ought to be kept in a state of obedience to the conqueror by moral means, the responsibility of the communes and parishes, the mode of organization and administration ; hostages form one of the most powerful means, but in order to be so, the hostages must be numerous, chosen from among persons of the greatest influence, and the people thoroughly impressed with the belief that the death of these hostages will be the result of any violation of their fidelity.

Unity of command is the most important thing in war. Two armies ought never to be placed on the same theatre of war. Modern troops have no more need of bread and biscuit than the Romans had. Give them on the march flour, rice, or vegetables, and they will not suffer from the want of other supplies. It is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay particular attention to their magazines. It appears from Cæsar's Commentaries, that, in many of his campaigns, this subject occupied much of his attention. They had only found out the art of not being slaves to, and depending too much on, their supplies; an art which has been that of all great captains. The system followed by the French, in the campaigns in Hanover, was the plan of causing large armies to be beaten by small ones; and of doing nothing with immense means.

Commanders-in-chief are guided by their own experience or genius. Tactics, evolutions, the sciences of engineering and gunnery, may be learned in treatises, like geometry; but the knowledge of other parts of war is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the history of the wars and battles of great leaders. Can we learn from the grammar, how to compose a book of the Iliad, or a tragedy of Corneille?

CONSTITUTION DRAWN UP BY NAPOLEON.

GENERAL DISPOSITION.

THE French nation is constituted a popular monarchy, under the denomination of "THE FRENCH EMPIRE."

CHAPTER I.—OF THE SOVEREIGNTY.

Art. 1. The sovereignty dwells in the nation.

Art. 2. The nation confers on the prince whom she raises to the throne, under the title of Emperor, the exercise of the sovereign power, under the limits determined by the different chapters of the constitution of the empire. The Emperor transmits to his descendants, in the direct, legitimate, male line, and according to primogeniture, the charge which he received from the nation.

Art. 3. In case of the extinction of this line, a national congress raises to the throne a new dynasty.

Art. 4. The majority of the Emperor is fixed at eighteen years of age.

Art. 5. A council of regency governs during the minority of the Emperor.

CHAPTER II.—PUBLIC RIGHTS OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

SECTION 1.—*Of the legality of rights.*

Art. 6. Frenchmen are equals, in the eye of the law, whatever may be their social position.

Art. 7. They are all admissible to the employments, trusts, and dignities of the state.

SECTION 2.—*Of individual liberty.*

Art. 8. Individual liberty is guaranteed to all Frenchmen.

Art. 9. No man can be separated from his natural judges.

Art. 10. No man can be deprived of his liberty, except in the execution of a judicial condemnation, pronounced for criminal delinquency, with the sole exception of offences against military discipline.

Art. 11. Warrants of apprehension are abolished for civil or commercial matters.

Art. 12. The punishment of death is abolished for all other crimes, except murder or attempt to murder.

Art. 13. The punishments of hard labour, and of branding, can in no case be inflicted for political offences.

SECTION 3.—*Of the liberty of the Press.*

Art. 14. The liberty of the press is consecrated as a Frenchman's right, in all things in which it does not infringe any general or private interest.

Art. 15. The daily or weekly press can, in no case, be subjected to exceptional augmentation of stamp duty.

Every speculation as a daily or weekly publication is free, under the one sole condition, of furnishing to the government good and sufficient security for its morality and solvency.

The law is to determine those requisites of morality and solvency.

Art. 16. All publications on questions of state, or an extraordinary raising of forces, being, from their very nature, susceptible of prejudicing the social body in France, can be suspended by order of the attorney-general, who will take charge of its definitive suppression, or of its condemnation before the court of assize, as being an attempt to disturb the tranquillity or the safety of the state.

Art. 17. The prosecutions commenced in virtue of the directions of Art. 16 above mentioned, shall be the object of an admonition from the judges to the ministerial officer who has ordered the suspension of the publication, in case the court of assize shall reverse the said suspension.

Art. 18. All offences of the press against public morals, and everything which shall injure private

interests, shall be prosecuted officially, or at the suit of the party aggrieved, and punished according to law.

SECTION 4.—*Of religious liberty.*

Art. 19. Toleration of all sects is guaranteed to Frenchmen.

Art. 20. The Roman-catholic and apostolic religion, being the profession of the great majority of Frenchmen, is the established religion.

SECTION 5.—*Of the inviolability of property.*

Art. 21. All property is inviolable without distinction of title—nevertheless, the state can dispose, for the public interest, of private property, giving, however, previously a just indemnity.

Art. 22. Any difference of opinion about the value of such indemnity, must be decided by the tribunals.

Art. 23. Punishment by confiscation of goods is abolished as an absurdity.

SECTION 6.—*Of liability to taxation.*

Art. 24. Frenchmen must contribute, without distinction of rank, to the support of the government, in the proportion and under the forms prescribed by the laws relating to the safety and the defence of the empire.

Art. 25. No contribution or impost under any form or denomination whatever, nor any raising of troops, can be ordered, or take place, without a special law to that effect.

Art. 26. The expenses of the government are divided into the budget for fixed and ordinary expenses, the budget for the endowment of the civil list, and the budget for extraordinary expenses.

Art. 27. The supplies are voted by the legislative chambers. The third, in the first sitting of the legislative chambers, after the accession of the Emperor, and during the whole course of his reign.

Art. 28. The local supplies are voted by the general council of the department, and by the municipal councils, at each of their sittings.

SECTION 7.—*Of actions against what is arbitrary.*

Art. 29. Every Frenchman who, in his person or in his fortune, believes himself to be the object of arbitrary proceedings, either of the civil or military authorities, has the right, without any previous permission, to cite before the tribunals the agent of the power which has, as regards him, violated the common law.

• Art. 30. Every action so entered upon, against any agent of authority, which shall not be recognised by the tribunals as founded in law, shall be considered as an offence and calumny of the highest degree, and punished as such.

CHAPTER III.—OF THE GOVERNMENT.

SECTION 1.—*General disposition.*

Art. 31. The government is carried on under the supreme direction of the Emperor, by—

1st. The Legislative Power.

2nd. The Judicial Power.

3rd. The Executive-administrative Power.

SECTION 2.—*Of the Legislative Power.*

Art. 32. The legislative power is exercised collectively by the Emperor and the legislative body representing the great interests of the nation.

Art. 33. The legislative body is composed of two chambers; the chamber of peers—the chamber of the deputies from the departments.

Art. 34. The chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies meet annually in a legislative session convoked by the Emperor.

Art. 35. The decree of convocation determines the time and place of the holding of the session.

Art. 36. The Emperor can close or prorogue the legislative session, and dissolve the chamber of deputies, if he considers it advisable for the safety of the state.

Art. 37. The decree of the dissolution of the chamber of deputies includes always, and by an obligatory arrangement, the convocation of the electoral colleges, so that France never can be for more than twenty days with an incomplete national representation.

Art. 38. The legislative session is closed or prorogued, and the sittings terminated, at the very moment in which the chambers receive intelligence of the decree of the closing or prorogation.

Art. 39. All assembling of the chambers at any other time than that of the legislative session, legally

convoked, is null and void, except in the case foreseen by Art. 48.

Art. 40. The presentation of the laws belongs to the Emperor and to the legislative chambers.

Art. 41. The draft of the laws presented in the name of the Emperor, is conveyed to the legislative chambers by a minister or councillor of state, and is there discussed.

Art. 42. The draft of the laws presented for the government is previously submitted to the prescriptions of Art. 109, mentioned hereafter in section 4th. The draft of the laws presented by the chambers is previously submitted to the examination of their officers.

Art. 43. The chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies have an equal right to amend, in whole or in part, the draft of the laws submitted to their discussion.

Every amendment must be examined by the commission of the law to which it belongs, before it becomes the subject of a general discussion.

Art. 44. The draft of the laws concerning the finances is always taken to the chamber of deputies before being submitted for discussion in the chamber of peers.

Art. 45. Every draft of law is freely discussed and put to the vote in the legislative chambers.

Art. 46. The Emperor can withdraw the drafts of law submitted to the chambers, if he think fit, even before their legislative discussion be closed.

Art. 47. A draft of law does not become the law of the land until it has been voted by the majority of each of the legislative chambers, has received the sanction of the Emperor, and been legally proclaimed by his command.

Art. 48. In case it should happen that an army should be dispersed in the interval of the legislative session, or that the dissolution of the chamber of deputies has not been followed, conformably to Art. 37, by the convocation of the electoral colleges, the chamber of peers shall assemble, on a summons from their president, as a high court of justice, and send a requisition to the prime minister, to fulfil, under pain of high treason, the conditions of Art. 34 and 37, above.

1. *Of the Chamber of Peers.*

Art. 49. The chamber of peers is composed of peers, named and chosen by the Emperor from the most distinguished families of the empire.

Art. 50. The princes of the imperial family are by right peers of France, but they can only take their seats in the chamber in virtue of a special notification of the Emperor, forwarded each session to the chamber of peers.

Art. 51. The great dignitaries of the empire are by right hereditary peers, under the title of dukes.

Art. 52. The number of peers is unlimited.

Art. 53. The title of peer may be conferred as hereditary or for life only.

Art. 54. The title of peer may be conferred by the

Emperor as a recompence for distinguished national services.

Art. 55. The decree of nomination prescribes the value of the endowment or pension attached to the inheritance.

Art. 56. Frenchmen who have served their country in the higher offices of the government, during at least ten years, shall be considered among the great dignitaries of the empire; as shall also be such electors as, for the size of their property, or the services which they may have rendered in their departments, are recommended to the choice of the Emperor by the electoral colleges.

Art. 57. Every nomination to the peerage mentions the title under which it is conferred.

Art. 58. The titular archbishops of the archiepiscopal sees of the empire are by right peers for life, under the title of duke.

Art. 59. No one can take his seat as a peer of France unless he has arrived at the age of thirty.

Art. 60. The peers of France are to be brought to trial for criminal offences by the chamber of peers only, and they can only be arrested by authority of a warrant from the president of the chamber of peers.

Art. 61. The Emperor shall have the nomination of the president and of the *grand référendaire* of the chamber of peers; the chamber shall elect the other officers.

Art. 62. The chamber of peers is the supreme

court of justice; 1st, to take cognisance of the crimes of high treason and attempts against the safety of the state, in cases where the courts of assize declare themselves incompetent—such as cases of rebellion, or high treason of generals of the army, governors of provinces, or bodies of sea or land forces; 2ndly, to try peers of France, or ministers and members of the council of regency, accused by the chamber of deputies, conformably to Art. 107, 108, and 123 of this constitution.

Art. 63. The chamber of peers, as supreme court of justice, shall pronounce its judgment according to the laws common to all Frenchmen.

Art. 64. The chamber of peers shall hold its deliberations publicly, except in cases where it resolves itself into a secret committee.

2. Of the Chamber of Deputies, and of the Electoral System.

Art. 65. The chamber of deputies is composed of the deputies from the departments.

Art. 66. The nation elects the members of the chamber of deputies from the departments.

Art. 67. Every Frenchman who enjoys civil and political rights, and who contributes his share to the expenses of the government, is an elector, and has a voice in the election of the deputies.

Art. 68. In order to be able to exercise his privilege as an elector, it is only necessary that the individual should prove, at the office of his electoral college, that he fulfils the conditions prescribed by

Art. 67, above mentioned, if he be not already comprised in the list of electors, drawn up and published by the administrative authorities.

Art. 69. No one can exercise the electoral functions in two colleges.

Art. 70. The right of convoking the electoral assemblies belongs to the Emperor alone.

Art. 71. The electors are to meet and form an electoral college, conformably to the arrangement of the laws, and to the decree of convocation.

Art. 72. The Emperor has the nomination of the president of the electoral colleges.

Art. 73. The electoral colleges elect their vice-presidents, secretaries, and scrutineers.

Art. 74. The police of the electoral assemblies and of the electoral colleges belong exclusively to the president.

Art. 75. The elections are decided by the majority of votes.

Art. 76. The session of the electoral assemblies cannot last more than ten days, under pain of nullifying the proceedings of such assembly or college as shall not have finished their election in that time.

Art. 77. The electoral assembly is formed by the meeting of all the electors of the communes of the canton in the principal place of such canton.

Art. 78. The electoral college is formed by the meeting of the proxies from the electoral assembly, in the principal place of the *arrondissement*.

Art. 79. In this manner, each electoral assembly

deputes ten electors, and confers upon them the power of concurring, in its name, with the electoral college, in all elections of such college.

Art. 80. Each electoral college, assembled for election to the chamber of deputies, shall, before the close of their meeting, submit to the choice of the Emperor, an elector, whom, on account of his property, or the services which he has rendered to the department, they think worthy of being raised to the dignity of a peer of France.

Art. 81. All deliberations upon matters foreign to the election are forbidden, under pain of nullifying the proceedings of the college.

Art. 82. Every administrative *arrondissement* of the principal place of the *prefecture*, of the *sub-prefecture*, or of the great towns of the empire, shall form, at least, one electoral college, on the condition that each college shall consist of at least five hundred electors.

Art. 83. Each electoral college shall elect one deputy.

Art. 84. The deputies are elected for five years, except in the case of a dissolution of the chambers, which necessitates a new election.

Art. 85. Every one is eligible as an elector in the department to which he belongs, by birth, by actual residence, by legal settlement during a year, or by property acquired by purchase for the same length of time. Doctors of medicine, licentiates, notaries, the chief officers of industrial or commercial establish-

ments, officers of the land or sea forces, on service or ready for service, or enjoying a retiring pension, are equally eligible; but on the express condition that they must belong by their birth, or by their actual residence, or legal settlement, to the electoral *arrondissement* which elects them.

Art. 86. For this purpose, the administrative authorities shall prepare and publish electoral lists of eligibility, conformably to the arrangement of Articles 67 and 85 above mentioned.

Art. 87. The lists shall be revised annually, if it is necessary: they shall remain constantly posted up in the assembly hall of the mayor of each commune.

Art. 88. Every disputed point upon the right of election, or of eligibility, shall be tried by the imperial court within the limits of which the instance shall occur.

Art. 89. No one can be elected as deputy in the department, or territorial division, in which he exercises the functions of imperial *procureur*, of prefect, or sub-prefect of a military division or sub-division.

Art. 90. The deputies must be thirty years old, at least.

Art. 91. The chamber of deputies shall be judge of the validity of elections.

Art. 92. The decease or resignation of a deputy causes a new election.

Art. 93. A deputy is considered to have resigned when he accepts any public employment.

Art. 94. The Emperor shall convoke, within thirty

days, the electoral college, whose representation has thus become incomplete through decease or resignation.

Art. 95. The Emperor nominates the president of the chamber of deputies.

Art. 96. The chamber nominates her vice-presidents and other officers.

Art. 97. The chamber of deputies shall hold its deliberations publicly, except in cases where it resolves itself into a secret committee.

SECTION 3.—*Of the Judicial Power.*

Art. 98. Judicial power is delegated by the Emperor.

1. To the chamber of peers, in the cases provided for by Art. 62, above mentioned, when it is constituted a supreme court of justice.
2. To tribunals where the judges are not removable.
3. To the courts of assize.
4. To the tribunals of commerce.
5. To justices of the peace.
6. To the council of prizes.
7. To military tribunals; but only in the case of offences committed by military men actually on duty, by land or sea.

Art. 99. No tribunal or commission, under any denomination whatever, can exist, unless established by law. No suit can be determined, or no judgment pronounced, either between the government and an in-

dividual, or between one individual and another, by any other than the ordinary tribunals.

Art. 100. As all justice emanates from the Emperor, so all sentences and warrants are issued in his name.

Art. 101. The Emperor has the prerogative of pardon, or the commutation of punishment.

Art. 102. The judicial investigations of the empire are subject to such legislative arrangements as are called for by the wants of the people. But the courts of first appeal and of cassation must remain inviolably consecrated in civil matters, as well as in sentences pronounced in criminal matters and offences of the press, with the exceptions mentioned in Art. 62 above, of the cases which come under the jurisdiction of the supreme court of peers.

Art. 103. Every law in actual operation at the time of the publication of this present constitution of the empire, which shall be in opposition to the provisions of the said constitution, is and shall be abrogated.

SECTION 4.—*Of the Executive-administrative Power.*

Art. 104. To the Emperor alone, as the supreme head of the state, belongs the executive administrative power, for the general good. He exercises it through the medium of his ministers.

Art. 105. The Emperor can, by his decree, nominate all the *employés* of the state, the election of whom is not reserved to the people; and he can also originate every measure for the public administration,

and for the defence of the empire. He has the command of the forces, both of sea and land; can proclaim war and conclude treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce, in such manner as he considers consistent with the dignity and the interest of the empire, with the reserve of the legislative sanction to all such treaties.

Art. 106. The prime minister countersigns the imperial decrees, and is responsible to the nation for all acts emanating from the imperial power, in violation of the constitution or laws of the empire.

Art. 107. The indictment is drawn up by the chamber of deputies; the sentence is pronounced by the chamber of peers, the high court of justice.

Art. 108. The indictment and the sentence are decided by a majority of two-thirds of the voters.

Art. 109. A council of state is specially entrusted, under the direction of the prime minister, with the drawing up of all projects of law, and general rules for the administration. It is divided into the committees of legislation, war, the marine, the interior, and the finances.

Art. 110. The members of the general councils of the departments, the *arrondissements*, the communes, and the municipalities, are elected for five years, by the proprietors of the departments, communes, and municipalities, assembled in electoral colleges convened by virtue of an imperial decree for the election of the general councils of the departments and *arrondissements*, and of a summons from the prefect for the election of the municipal councils.

Art. 111. Each electoral *arrondissement* elects at

least two members of the general council of the department.

Art. 112. The number of members of the general councils of the departments, the *arrondissements*, the communes, and the municipalities, is determined by a law.

CHAPTER IV.—OF THE GREAT DIGNITIES OF THE EMPIRE.

Art. 113. Six great dignities of the empire are conferred for life by the Emperor, in testimony of the national gratitude for high and important services, and are—

The lord high chancellor.

The lord treasurer.

The colonel-in-chief of the National Guards.

The constable.

The grand master of fortifications and of artillery.

The lord high-admiral.

Art. 114. The great dignitaries are princes of the empire, and chiefs according to their titles:—

The lord high chancellor, of the departmental administration and of foreign affairs.

The lord treasurer, of the administration of the finances.

The colonel-general of the National Guards, of all the National Guards of the empire.

The constable, of the corps of infantry and of cavalry.

The grand master of fortification and of artillery,
of the regiments and of the arms.

The lord high admiral, of the imperial marine.

CHAPTER V.—OF THE COUNCIL OF REGENCY.

Art. 115. The formation of a Council of Regency is, in every reign, the object of a special decree of the Emperor, sealed with his seal, notified to the legislative chambers, and deposited, sealed, in the archives.

Art. 116. The Emperor can modify, at his pleasure and according to circumstances, the contents of this decree, but always under the form prescribed by the preceding article.

Art. 117. The council of ministers exercise temporarily the powers of a regency, until the legal appointment of a council of regency; they can convoke the legislative chambers without delay, should the decease of the Emperor occur during the recess.

Art. 118. The chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies shall meet in solemn assembly, as soon as they receive information of the decease of the Emperor, in order to recognise the decree by which the regency is constituted, and to proclaim it as the law of the land.

Art. 119. The members of the council of regency shall, before the two chambers, take an oath to exercise within the limits of the constitution, and according to the laws of the empire, the power which has been temporarily committed to them until the majority of the Emperor.

Art. 120. Each member of the council of regency is individually responsible for the acts of the council.

Art. 121. Nevertheless, when the mother of the Emperor has been named president of the council of regency, she shall not be held individually responsible for the acts of the council.

Art. 122. A special law shall provide for supplying the place of any member of the council of regency, vacant by death or resignation. On this occasion, the council of regency shall propose to the legislative chambers three candidates for each vacancy, and the candidate who gains the majority of votes in the two chambers, shall be announced as the member of the council of regency.

Art. 123. The members of the council of regency are inviolable in their persons, and cannot be called to account for the acts of the council, until after the expiration of their functions, and when the Emperor has arrived at majority and taken the reins of government into his own hands.

CHAPTER VI. AND LAST.—OF COLONIES.

One Article only. Colonies are regulated by special laws.

EXTRA AND ADDITIONAL CHAPTER.

Art. 1. The chamber of peers and the chamber of deputies, such as they are constituted by the second section of the third chapter, shall meet in a legisla-

tive session within the period of thirty days from the publication of this present constitution.

Art. 2. All Frenchmen, being electors, shall enjoy their civil rights. The election of deputies is the sanction of the French people to this present constitution, a fundamental, inviolable, and sacred compact between the nation and the Emperor.

ON THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

It suddenly became known in England that a considerable force was preparing at Brest, Toulon, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia—that the Spanish squadron at Cadiz was being actively equipped—and that numerous camps were being formed on the banks of the Scheldt, and on the coasts of the Pas de Calais, of Normandy and Brittany.

Napoleon, who had been named general-in-chief of the “Army of England,” surveyed the whole shores of the ocean, pausing at each post. He had collected about him all who still lived of those naval officers who had distinguished themselves during the American war, such as Buhor, Marigny, &c., but they did not justify their reputation.

The communication that France had held with the “United Irishmen” could not be long kept a secret; so that the court of St. James at first thought that

these preparations were directed against England and Ireland, and that France was anxious to profit by the peace that had just been concluded on the Continent, and terminate a long struggle by a hand-to-hand engagement. The English cabinet imagined that the armaments being raised in Italy, were merely as a blind, and that the fleet off Toulon would pass the Straits of Gibraltar, and effect a junction with the Spanish fleet at Cadiz; that from thence the fleets would proceed together to Brest, and there take on board a large force for the invasion of both England and Ireland.

During this uncertainty, England hastily equipped a new squadron, and as soon as it was ascertained that Napoleon had set out from Toulon, Admiral Rogers was despatched with ten ships to reinforce the fleet before Cadiz, under the command of Admiral Lord St. Vincent, who, by this addition, was now in possession of from twenty-eight to thirty ships of the line: another fleet of equal force was off Brest. Admiral St. Vincent had, besides, in the Mediterranean, a small squadron of three ships, which cruised between the shores of Spain, Provence, and Sardinia, in order to collect intelligence and watch over that sea.

On the 24th of May, he despatched ten ships from Cadiz, to join those in the Mediterranean commanded by Nelson, who, by this reinforcement, had now a fleet of thirteen sail of the line: they had orders to blockade Toulon, or to follow the French squadron if it had put to sea. Lord St. Vincent remained at

Cadiz, watching the Spanish fleet, and in constant dread that the French might escape Nelson, and pass through the Straits. In the instructions sent by this Admiral to Nelson, which have since been published, it will be seen that he anticipated everything but an expedition against Egypt; whilst the probability was suggested that the French expedition might be intended either for the Brazils, the Black Sea, or Constantinople.

The encampment of more than 150,000 men on the sea coast created constant alarm throughout England.

Nelson, with the three ships sent to him by Lord St. Vincent, whilst cruising between Corsica, Provence, and Spain, on the night of the 19th of May, experienced a violent gale, which so damaged his ships, and especially the one where he personally commanded, that it was necessary to have it taken in tow. His intention had been to have anchored in the Gulf of Oristano, in Sardinia, but not being able to accomplish this, he gained the Roads of the Isle of St. Pietro, where the damaged ships were repaired. On that same night, of the 19th of May, the French squadron set sail from Toulon, and arrived at Malta, after doubling Cape Corso, and Cape Carbonara. By this time (June 1st), Nelson was again cruising off Toulon, having been joined by the ten ships of Lord St. Vincent, of which he had received the command; but he was still ignorant that the French fleet had put to sea. On the 15th, he was reconnoitring in the Roads

of Tagliamon, on the coast of Tuscany, which he supposed might be the rendezvous of the French expedition; and, on the 20th, he appeared before Naples, where he learned from the government that the French squadron had landed at Malta, and that the Ambassador from the Republic, Garat, had hinted that the expedition was destined for Egypt.

On the 22nd, Nelson was at Messina, where the news was confirmed that the French had seized upon Malta, and that they had since steered for Candia. He then immediately passed the Faro of Messina, and sailing for Alexandria, arrived there on the 28th of June.

Malta could not sustain a siege of twenty-four hours, its moral power being completely gone, although it had immense resources in physical resistance; the Knights offered no opposition to the invaders; they did not attempt what was impossible.

Few countries are more sterile than the three little adjacent islands of Malta, Gozo, and Cumino, they being barren rocks, with a slight covering of soil brought from Sicily to improve the cultivation, and form gardens. Cotton, the best in the Levant, is their chief production, which they grow to the value of many millions of francs. The population of the three islands is about 100,000; but as they cannot support above 10,000, all the necessaries of life are brought from Sicily. The port of Malta is one of the finest and safest in the Mediterranean, and its capital, Valletta, contains about 30,000 inhabitants. It has

large and handsome houses, fine streets, magnificent fountains, quays, shops, &c. The fortifications are of freestone of great extent and strength, piled one upon the other, the whole sheltered, and casemated, and bomb-proof. Caffarelli Dufalga, who commanded the attack, remarked in jest, "It is most fortunate that we found some one within to open the gates for us," alluding to the number of ditches to be crossed, as well as of scarps to be climbed over. The house of the grand master was in no way remarkable; it might, from its simplicity, have belonged to a private individual of very moderate fortune. Its principal ornaments were its orangeries; and there were a number of inferior gardens, and houses belonging to the bailiffs, governors, &c.

The Knights of Malta had large possessions in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany; and they inherited the property of the order of Templars on its suppression.

Their possessions had the same origin as those of the monks, being derived from donations of the faithful to the Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem, and to the Knights Templars, whose duty it was to escort pilgrims, and protect them from the injuries and insults of the Arabs. The intention of the donors was, that this money should be employed against the infidels; and if the order of Malta had fulfilled this intention, and employed the wealth it possessed in various Christian countries, in making war on the natives of Barbary, and in protecting the shores of the Mediter-

ranean against the pirates of Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, it would have served Christianity better than by joining the Crusades. It might have supported a squadron of from eight to ten seventy-four gun ships, and a dozen good frigates and corvettes, which would have enabled the Knights to blockade Algiers, and restrain Morocco. By these means, the Moors would have ceased their piracies, and turned their attention to commerce and the cultivation of the soil. Malta would then have been peopled with veterans whose whole lives had been passed in warfare, and with a well disciplined youth.

But, instead of this, the knights, like all other monastic bodies, imagined that their wealth had been bestowed upon them solely for their own private benefit.

Throughout all Christendom, they had their bailiffs, governors, &c., who employed a great part of the resources of the order in keeping up sumptuous establishments, where luxury reigned throughout, whilst their surplus revenues were employed in enriching their families.

The monks of other religious orders, at least say masses, preach, and administer the sacraments, and cultivate their lands, but the Knights of Malta did none of these things. Thus, this immense wealth became the property of a few individuals, or served as a provision for the younger sons of noble families. But a very small share of the revenues ever reached Malta, and the knights, who were obliged to remain two years

on the island, to perform their "caravans," usually resided at inns kept by their own countrymen, where they lived with but little comfort.

They had no fleet: four or five galleys were sent to cruise in the Mediterranean every year, anchoring in the different ports of Italy, and most carefully avoiding the Moors. These foolish expeditions, made in vessels totally unfit to contend with the frigates and large Algerine corsairs, ended in fêtes and balls that they gave in the ports of Leghorn, Naples and Sardinia. Malta possessed neither docks nor arsenal, but there was one ill-conditioned sixty-four gun ship, and two frigates that had never left the port; and the young knights made their "caravans" without having fired a gun, or seen an enemy. At the time of the French revolution, when the property of the church was confiscated, legislation spread in Italy in proportion as French administration extended, but no claim was made in behalf of this order, not even by the seaports of Genoa, Leghorn, or Malta. There were many made in favour of the Charteaux, Benedictines, and Dominicans, but none for this order of Chivalry, which rendered no service to any party.

It is difficult to understand how the popes, who were the superiors of this order, and the natural protectors and reformers of its laws, and whose interests would engage them to protect their own shores from pirates—it is difficult, we repeat, to understand how it was that they did not exert their authority over the order, and cause it to fulfil its original destination.

Nothing can indicate more clearly than this the decay into which the court of Rome itself had fallen.

The first news of the existence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean was made known to the French by a vessel they encountered off Cape Carbonara; and on the 25th of June it was confirmed, as the squadron came in sight of Candia, by the frigate, *La Justice*, which had been cruising off Naples, and which brought positive intelligence that an English fleet was in those latitudes. In consequence of this, Napoleon gave orders that, instead of steering direct for Alexandria, his fleet should manœuvre on the coast of Africa, off Cape Agni, about twenty-five leagues from Alexandria, and that it should defer appearing in that port till should have received further intelligence.

On the 29th they signaled the African coast, and Cape Agni. In the meanwhile, Nelson had arrived at Alexandria, and hearing no news of the French squadron, he steered towards Iskenderoon, and from thence repaired to Rhodes. He then surveyed the islands in the Archipelago, explored the entrance of the Adriatic, and was obliged finally to anchor, on the 18th of July, at Syracuse, to water his ships, without having acquired any information on the proceedings of Napoleon. From thence he sailed for the Morea, where, for the first time, he learned that the French army had landed a month before in Egypt, whilst he supposed that the French squadron had returned to Toulon. He then directed his course to Alexandria, in order to be able to give an exact account of the state of things to his

government, and also to leave before that place the force necessary to blockade it.

The French squadron, on its departure from Toulon, consisted of thirteen sail of the line, six frigates, and a dozen of brigs, corvettes, or advice-boats. The English had thirteen ships of the line, of which one was a fifty gun ship, and the rest were seventy-fours, but they had been hastily manned, and were in bad condition; and Nelson had no frigates. The French had one vessel of 120 guns, and three of 80. A convoy of many hundred sail was under the escort of this squadron. It was particularly under the care of two ships of sixty-four guns; four frigates of eighteen guns, of Venetian build, and a score of brigs or advice-boats. The French squadron took advantage of the great number of small craft they possessed, to obtain information from a distance, so that, as soon as the enemy came in sight, the convoy could take up a position at a convenient distance from the combat. Each ship had on board five hundred veteran soldiers, including a company of artillerymen; and during the month they had been on board, the troops had been exercised at the guns twice a day. In each man of war there were experienced generals, who had been well trained to arms. The constant subject of conversation amongst them was the probability of an engagement with the English; in which case, the naval captains were each provided with a general and standing order, to take part in the action, and protect his neighbours. Nelson's

squadron was one of the worst which England had ever sent to sea during the last century.

The French squadron received orders to enter the port of Alexandria, its presence being necessary to the army, and to the ulterior projects of the general-in-chief. But how great was the astonishment when the Turkish pilots declared, that they could not take seventy-four gun ships, much less ships of eighty guns, into the old port. Captain Barré, a very distinguished naval officer, whose duty it was to investigate the harbour, positively asserted the contrary. The sixty-fours and frigates entered without difficulty; but the admiral and many of the officers deemed it prudent to make a new survey, before hazarding the safety of the whole fleet.

As the men of war had on board the artillery and ammunition of the army, and as there was a strong breeze blowing, the admiral proposed that all the troops should land at Aboukir, which might be effected in thirty-six hours—whilst the same operation would take five or six days when their sails were set.

When Napoleon set out from Alexandria, on an expedition against the Mamelukes, he gave reiterated orders to the admiral to anchor in the port of Alexandria; but in the event of that being impossible, he was to repair to Corfu, where he would receive from Constantinople orders from the French minister, Talleyrand; and he was to go from thence to Toulon, should these orders be too long delayed. The squadron

could enter the old port of Alexandria, it having been ascertained that a vessel that drew no more than twenty-one feet of water could do so in safety. Thus, the seventy-four gun ships, that drew twenty-three feet of water, would only have to be lightened of two feet—those of eighty, drawing twenty-four and a half feet, to be lightened of three feet and a half; and, finally, the three-decked ships, that drew twenty-seven feet, would have to be lightened of six feet. This might have been easily done; and the naval officers proposed to the admiral the plan of throwing the water overboard, or diminishing the quantity of artillery. He replied, that if all the vessels had been seventy-fours, he would have had recourse to this expedient; but that having one vessel of one hundred and twenty guns, and three of eighty, he would run the risk, should he once enter the port, of being unable to leave it, and of being blockaded by eight or nine English ships, since it would be impossible for him to re-equip the three eighty gun ships and L'Orient for action, and, at the same time, to lighten them sufficiently to enable them to pass through the entrance of the port. But this difficulty in itself appeared light; the winds that prevailed in these straits rendering a close blockade impossible, and twenty-four hours would be sufficient for the squadron to refit its armament; there was, besides, a natural means—this was to construct at Alexandria four floaters, by means of which the eighty-gun ships would gain two

feet, and the hundred and twenty gun ship four feet of water.

The construction of the four floaters, to obtain so small an advantage, did not require much labour. The Rivoli, built at Venice, sailed from Malomocco fully equipped, accompanied by a floater, by the aid of which it gained seven feet, so that it did not draw more than sixteen feet of water. A few days after, she was in a condition to encounter two of the enemy's ships. The French had, at Alexandria, ships, frigates, and four hundred transports, which contained all the supplies of which they stood in need; and a company of engineers, amongst whom was Leray, whose life had been spent in dockyards.

When the commission, entrusted to investigate Captain Barré's statement, had sent in their report, it was forwarded to the general-in-chief, but it did not arrive in time to permit of a reply, all communication having been, during a month, cut off from the army, until after the taking of Cairo. If the general-in-chief had received that report, he would have repeated the order for the fleet to enter the port of Alexandria by lightening the ships; and he would then have sent further instructions for the works necessary for again leaving it. At all events, the admiral had distinct orders, if he could not make the harbour, to sail for Corfu; so that he had full powers to act on his own responsibility. At Corfu, there was a French garrison, with a depôt of biscuits and meat for

six months; he might touch at the coast of Albania, where he could take in provisions; and, finally, he might have repaired from thence to Toulon, where there were 5,000 or 6,000 men belonging to the regiments that were in Egypt; these were soldiers returned on leave, or from the hospitals, and different detachments that had joined at this place after the departure of the fleet. Brueys, however, disobeyed these instructions, and came to anchor in the roads of Aboukir, having sent to Rosetta for rice and other provisions.

Various reasons have been assigned for the admiral's remaining so obstinately in this unsafe harbour. Some have thought that when he found it impossible to enter Alexandria, he was unwilling, from his great attachment to the commander-in-chief, to set sail till assured of the taking of Cairo, and the safe position of the troops on shore, from whom all communication had been cut off, and of whose fate the most disastrous reports had been spread. Although he had ascertained the success of the battle of the Pyramids, and afterwards the triumphant entry of the French into Cairo, on the 27th of July, even then, having already lingered for a month, he wished to wait for a few days longer, apparently hoping to receive more direct information from the general-in-chief. But as the orders which the admiral had received had been positive, these motives were not sufficient to justify his conduct. Under any circumstances, he should not have taken up so insecure a position.

He might have relieved his anxiety for the fate of

the army, and at the same time discharged his duty, by cruising between Egypt and Caramania, and by sending to Damietta, or to some other place, from whence he could have news of the army.

Immediately after disembarking the artillery, and whatever he had belonging to the troops, (an affair of forty-eight hours,) it was the admiral's duty to have set sail, neither waiting for further instructions for entering Alexandria, nor for news of the army. But he entirely mistook his position, and several days were lost in scrutinizing his line of anchorage. He protected his left by the islet of Aboukir, which he considered unassailable, and placed behind it his worst vessels, the *Guerrier* and the *Conquerant*. The *Conquerant*, the oldest ship in the squadron, carried in its lower battery only eighteens, and was placed next the islet, of which he took possession, and erected a battery of two pieces of twelve-pounders. In his centre he placed his superior ships, *l'Orient*, the *Franklin*, and the *Tonnant*; and on his extreme right, the *Généreux*, one of the finest and best commanded ships in the fleet. Fearing most for his right, he supported it by the *Guillaume Tell*, his third eighty-gun ship. In this position, Admiral Brueys did not apprehend an attack on his left, which was protected by the islet. His right was weaker, but if the English should bear down upon it, they would lose the wind, in which case, the Admiral's intention would appear to have been to set sail with his centre and left. He considered this left so well sheltered from attack, that

it was unnecessary to protect it by the battery—a weak battery, erected merely to prevent the enemy from landing. If the admiral had been better acquainted with his position, he would have mounted in the islet twenty pieces of thirty-six; and eight or ten mortars, have anchored his left near it, and have recalled from Alexandria his two sixty-four gun ships, which, drawing less water than the others, could have approached much nearer to the islet, and would have made two excellent floating batteries. Finally, he would have withdrawn from Alexandria three thousand sailors belonging to the convoy, whom he would have distributed amongst these vessels to reinforce their crews. It is true, he had recourse to this expedient at the last moment, after the engagement had commenced, but they then only increased the disorder. He was, however, completely deceived respecting the strength of his line of anchorage.

After the battle of Ramanieh, the Arabs of Bahireh intercepted all communication between the fleet and the army, but they submitted, on hearing of the success of the French at the battle of the Pyramids and at Cairo.

It was not until the 29th of July, two days after that on which Napoleon entered Cairo, that he received the admiral's despatches. How great was his astonishment to learn that the squadron was still in so insecure a situation! He supposed that it was either in the port of Alexandria, or in that of Corfu, or else on its way back to Toulon; and he was now informed that it was in the roads of Aboukir, exposed

to the attacks of a superior enemy. He despatched his aide-de-camp Julien, to the admiral, to express his dissatisfaction, and to direct him immediately to set sail, and either to enter Alexandria or repair to Corfu, reminding him at the same time of his reiterated orders never to come to an engagement in open roads. Major Julien set out on the 29th, at seven o'clock in the evening, but could not possibly have arrived before the 3rd or 4th of August, and the naval engagement had taken place on the 1st or second. Having arrived at Teramneh, this brave young officer was surprised by a party of Arabs in his *djerma*, and massacred, whilst courageously defending his despatches, the importance of which he well knew.

Admiral Brueys remained inactive in the unsafe position he had taken up, when an English frigate despatched by Nelson, who was in search of him, appeared before Alexandria, entered the bay of Aboukir, and reconnoitred the whole line with impunity, whilst the entire French fleet was at anchor, without a ship, a brig, or even a frigate being under sail, although the admiral had thirty light craft, which might have scoured the Mediterranean. By the principles of war, the whole fleet should have been kept constantly under sail, whatever might be his ulterior intentions; but at any rate, a small squadron of light vessels should have been kept constantly on the look-out, to prevent the enemy from making observations, and to tell of their approach beforehand. But fate led him on.

On the 31st, July, Nelson despatched one of his

ships to observe the French line of anchorage, which was effected without molestation. On the 1st of August, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the English squadron appeared in full sail, the wind blowing in strong gusts, as is usual at that season.

Admiral Brueys was at dinner, many of his men on shore, and no preparation made to clear the decks on any of his ships. The signal to prepare immediately for action was hoisted, and an officer despatched on shore to collect the sailors belonging to the convoy; soon after, orders were issued to set sail, but the enemy's squadron bore up so rapidly, that all the preparations for action were made in the most hurried and negligent manner. Even on board *l'Orient*, the admiral's flag-ship, the cabins constructed on the poop for the military officers, had not been taken down, and were left filled with mattresses, paint-pots and tar-barrels. On board the *Guerrier* and the *Conquerant*, one battery only was fit for service, that nearest the shore being encumbered by what had been cleared out from the other; so that, when these batteries were turned round, they could not fire, which surprised the English so greatly, that they sent out to reconnoitre, seeing the French flag flying, and not a single piece discharged at the enemy. The party despatched on shore had scarcely time to return on board. The admiral judged that the enemy could not be within range of the guns before six o'clock, and that, therefore, they would not commence the attack till the following morning, especially as they had but eleven seventy-four gun

ships; the two others had been despatched to Alexandria, and did not rejoin Nelson until eight o'clock in the evening. It was thought that Brueys, not believing that the English would venture to attack him with eleven ships only, and on that day, had intended to set sail, but hesitated to give the signal for that purpose, until the sailors whom he expected from Aboukir should have embarked.

Then the cannonade had commenced, and an English vessel having run a-ground on the islet, renewed the confidence of the admiral. The men began to arrive about eight o'clock, the firing having already commenced on board several of the ships; but owing to the darkness and confusion, a great number did not embark at all.

The English admiral's plan of attack was to engage each vessel singly, each English ship dropping anchor at the stern, and placing itself across the bows of the French; but accident changed this intention. The *Culloden*, meant for the attack of the *Guerrier*, in attempting to pass between its left and the islet, grounded, and would have been captured, if the battery on the islet had been mounted with larger pieces. The *Goliath*, which followed her, manœuvred to anchor across the prow of the *Guerrier*, was carried beyond the latter by the wind and current, and obliged to tack before dropping anchor, when, perceiving that the left battery of the *Conquerant* did not fire for the above-mentioned reason, the *Goliath* placed herself alongside of her foe, and crippled her in a short time.

The Zealous, which immediately followed, anchored alongside the Guerrier, which could not return her fire, and was quickly dismasted. The Orion, the third English ship, executed the same manœuvre, but was a little retarded by an attack from a French frigate, and she anchored between the Franklin and the Peuple Souverain. The English admiral's ship, the Vanguard, cast anchor alongside the third French ship, the Spartiate. The Defence, the Bellerophon, the Majestic, and the Minotaur followed the same movement, and engaged the centre of the French line, as far as the Tonnant, the eighth vessel. Admiral Brueys, with his two consort ships, formed a line of three vessels very superior to the English; the firing was terrible; the Bellerophon was dismasted and brought to, and several other English ships were obliged to withdraw from the contest.

If, at this moment, Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, who commanded the French right wing, had cut his cables and fallen upon the English line, with the five vessels under his command, L'Heureux, the Timoléon, the Mercure, the Guillaume Tell, and the Généreux, with the frigates the Diane and the Justice, it would have been entirely destroyed. The Culloden had grounded on the sand bank of Begnières, and the Leander was engaged in endeavouring to relieve her. The Alexander, the Swiftsure, and two other English vessels, seeing that our right did not move, and that the English centre was much damaged, repaired to its assistance. The Alexander occupied the place of the

Bellerophon, and the Swiftsure attacked the Franklin; the Leander, which until now, had been assisting the Culloden, recalled by the danger menacing the centre, hastened to reinforce it.

The victory was still far from being decided; the Guerrier and the Conquerant had ceased firing, but these were the worst appointed ships in the whole squadron; and on the side of the English, the Culloden and the Bellerophon were completely disabled, whilst the centre of the French line, by the superiority of its guns, had occasioned much more damage than it had received. The English had only seventy-fours, and some vessels of small build; so that it may be presumed that if the fire had been sustained throughout the night, Admiral Villeneuve would have come at day-break, and the most happy results might have been anticipated from the reinforcements of his five able ships, which had not hitherto either fired, or received a single shot.

But at eleven o'clock l'Orient caught fire, and then blew up; which unforeseen accident decided the victory.

This terrible explosion suspended the engagement for a quarter of an hour, when the French recommenced the attack, in nowise dispirited by this sad spectacle, the Franklin, the Tonnant, the Peuple Souverain, the Spartiate, and l'Aquilon keeping up the fire until three o'clock in the morning. From that time till five o'clock, the firing slackened on both sides, when it was again renewed with redoubled impetuosity: what would it have been if l'Orient had been in ex-

istence? At noon the combat was still going on, and did not finally cease until two o'clock.

It was not till this moment that Villeneuve appeared to awake, and to perceive that a battle had been going on for the last twenty hours. He cut his cables, and stood off to sea, taking with him the *Guillaume Tell*, on board of which he himself was, the *Généreux*, and the frigates, the *Diane* and the *Justice*. The three other vessels of his wing were thrown on the coast, without having struck a blow. Thus, notwithstanding the terrible accident to *l'Orient*, and the singular inaction of Villeneuve, which prevented five vessels from firing a single shot, the loss and disorder of the English were so great, that, twenty-four hours after the battle, the tri-color flag still floated at the mast of the *Tonnant*, for Nelson had no longer any vessel in a state to attack it. Not only did the *Guillaume Tell* and the *Généreux* escape, without being pursued by any English vessel, but the enemy, in their own shattered condition, were even rejoiced to see them depart. Admiral Brueys obstinately defended the honour of the French flag; though wounded in several places, he refused to go down to the cockpit, and died on his quarter-deck, while yet giving his orders. *Casabianca*, *Thévenard*, and *Du Petit-Thouars* won glory on this disastrous day.

If we believe Nelson and the English, it was in Rear-Admiral Villeneuve's power to have decided the victory, even after the accident to *l'Orient*. Even as late as midnight, had he got under sail, and, with

the vessels belonging to his wing, taken part in the combat, he might have totally destroyed the English squadron. But he remained an inactive spectator of the contest! As Villeneuve was both a brave man and a good sailor, the question naturally occurs, what was the reason of this singular conduct? He was waiting for orders! We are assured, that the French admiral gave him orders to get under sail, but that the smoke prevented him from seeing the signals; but, need he have waited for orders to take part in the contest and assist his comrades?

L'Orient blew up at eleven o'clock at night. The battle continued to rage, with little intermission, from that hour until two o'clock. P.M.—that is to say, for more than thirteen hours. Villeneuve was then in command; why did he do nothing? His character was irresolute and without vigour.

The crews of the three vessels which had run a-ground, and of the two frigates, disembarked on the sandy beach of Aboukir. About a hundred men escaped from l'Orient; and a great number of sailors from the other vessels, taking advantage of the enemy's disorder at the moment when the victory was decided, made their escape to land. The army thus received an augmentation of 3,500 men; a strong nautical legion, containing 1,800 men, was formed, and divided into three battalions; the rest were employed to recruit the artillery, the infantry, and the cavalry. Great activity was employed in recovering goods from the sea; and, in this manner, many pieces

of artillery, much ammunition, together with masts, and other pieces of wood, were saved, and were useful in the arsenal of Alexandria.

We still had in the port the two vessels, the *Causse* and the *Dubois*, four Venetian-built frigates, three French-built frigates, all the light vessels, and all the convoy ships. Some days after the battle, Nelson got under weigh, and quitted the coast of Alexandria, leaving two ships of war to blockade the port. Forty Neapolitan convoy ships solicited and obtained from the commandant of Alexandria permission to return to their own country; the commander of the English cruiser collected them round him, emptied them of their crews, and then set fire to them. This violation of the law of nations turned to the disadvantage of the English; for the crews of the Italian and French convoy ships, seeing that they had now no resource but in the success of the French army, resolutely took their determination. Nelson was received in triumph in the port of Naples.

The loss of the battle of Aboukir had a great influence on the affairs of Egypt, and even on those of the world. Had the French fleet been saved, the Syrian expedition would have experienced no obstacle; the *equipage de siège* could have been safely and easily conveyed across the desert, and St. Jean d'Acre would not have stopped the French army. But the French fleet being destroyed, the Divan was emboldened to declare war against France. The army lost a great support; its position in Egypt was totally

altered; and Napoleon was forced to renounce the hope of finally securing and re-establishing the power of France in the west, by the results of the expedition to Egypt.

Since it has become the custom to use no vessels under seventy-four guns as ships of the line, the naval armies of France, of England, and of Spain, have not been composed of more than thirty vessels. Some of them have, however, for a time, been more considerable. A squadron of thirty ships of the line is, on sea, what an army of 120,000 men would be on land. An army of 120,000 men may be called large, although there have been armies of greater force. A squadron of thirty vessels has, at the most, about the fifth part of the number contained in an army of 120,000 men; it has five times as much artillery, and that of a very superior quality. The outfit occasions about the same expense. If we compare the cost of all the artillery for 120,000 men, the wagons, provisions, and camp hospitals, with that of equipping thirty vessels, the expenses will be found to be nearly equal. If we calculate in a land army 20,000 cavalry, and 20,000 artillery, or army retinue, the maintenance of this army will be found to be incomparably more expensive than that of the naval army.

France is able to maintain three fleets of thirty vessels each, as well as three armies, each of 120,000 men.

War on land generally destroys more men than that on sea; it is more perilous. The naval soldier,

in a squadron, fights but once in a campaign; the land soldier, on the contrary, fights daily. The naval soldier, whatever may be the fatigues and dangers of the element on which he lives, experiences much fewer hardships than the land soldier; he never suffers from hunger or thirst; he always has his lodging, his food, his hospital, and his pharmacy with him. The naval armies in the service of France and England, where discipline maintains cleanliness, and where experience has taught all the measures to be taken to preserve health, are less a prey to sickness than the land armies. Besides the peril of battle, the naval soldier has to contend with that of tempests; but art has so much diminished this latter danger, that it cannot be compared with those experienced on land, such as popular *émeutes*, private assassinations, and surprises from the light troops of the enemy.

The commander-in-chief of a naval army, and the commander-in-chief of a land army, are men who require different qualities. The qualities which fit a man to command a land army are born with him, while, on the contrary, those necessary for commanding a naval army are only to be acquired by experience.

Alexander and Condé had the faculty of command from their earliest youth. The art of war on land is an art of genius, of inspiration; but neither Alexander nor Condé would have been able, at the age of twenty-two, to command a naval army; for in the latter position nothing is derived from genius or inspiration—all is positive and the result of experience. The

naval general needs only to possess one science, that of navigation; the land general needs all sciences, or a talent equivalent to all, that of profiting by every kind of experience and knowledge. A naval general has nothing to guess at; he knows where his enemy is, and what is his force. A land general never knows anything with certainty; never sees his enemy, nor knows positively where he is. When the armies are in the presence of each other, the least accidental circumstance of ground, or the least wood, may conceal a part of the opposing troops. The most practised eye cannot decide whether it sees the whole of the enemy's force, or only three-quarters of it. It is by the eyes of the mind, by the conjunction of all his reasoning faculties, by a kind of inspiration, that the land general sees, understands, and judges. The naval general needs only to have a practised glance; no part of the enemy's force is concealed from him. The necessity of supporting so many men and animals, is a circumstance which renders the post of a land general difficult; if he allows himself to be guided by the commissariat, he will not move, and his expedition will fail. The naval general is never annoyed in this way; he carries all he wants with him. A naval general has no reconnoitring to do, no ground to examine, nor field of battle to study; the Indian sea, the Atlantic ocean, or Channel—these are always liquid plains. The only advantage possessed by the most skilful naval general over the least skilful, is in his knowledge of the winds which prevail in such and such latitudes, by a foresight

of those which are likely to prevail, or by the signs of the atmosphere; qualities which are acquired by experience, and by experience alone. The land general never knows the field of battle on which he is to conduct his movements.

His glance is that of inspiration; he has no certain guide. The means of information afforded in order to gain a knowledge of the locality are so eventual, that almost nothing is learned by experience. This faculty consists, therefore, in a facility of seizing, at a glance, the various circumstances connected with the ground, according to the nature of different countries; it is, in short, a gift which is called, a "military glance," and which great generals have received from nature. The observations which may be made on topographical charts, and the facility given by reading these charts, and by education, may, however, be of some use.

A naval commander-in-chief is more dependent on his captains than a military commander-in-chief is on his generals. The latter has the power of taking upon himself the direct command of the troops, of presenting himself at all the different points, and remedying false movements by others. The naval general has no personal influence beyond the crew of the vessel in which he is. The smoke prevents his signals from being seen; the winds change, or are not the same over the whole space covered by his line. In the naval service, therefore, subaltern officers must take more responsibility upon themselves than in any other.

The loss of our naval battles must be attributed to

three causes: firstly, to the irresolution and want of vigour of the commanders-in-chief; secondly, to the faults of tactics; and thirdly, to the deficiency of the captains in experience and naval science, and to the idea entertained by these officers that they must only act in obedience to signals. The battles of Ouessant and those of the revolution, in the ocean and the Mediterranean, in the years 1793-4, were all lost from these causes. Admiral Villaret, though personally brave, had no vigour of character, and was not even attached to the cause for which he fought. Martin was a good sailor, but was irresolute; and besides, both of these commanders were influenced by the representatives of the people, who, having no experience, authorized false operations.

The principle of making no movement unless authorized so to do by a signal from the admiral, is so much the more erroneous, as the captain of a vessel can always find reasons which will justify him for having ill executed the signals which he has received. In all the sciences relating to war, theory is useful in giving general ideas which form the mind, but its strict execution is always dangerous. It is the axis which should form the curve. Even the rules themselves oblige us to consider, in order to judge whether we ought to deviate from them.

Often, when having at command a force superior to that of the English, we have not known how to attack them, and have allowed their squadrons to escape, while we were losing our time in useless manœuvres.

The first rule of maritime tactics should be, that as soon as the admiral gives the signal of attack, each captain should make the necessary movements for attacking a vessel of the enemy, take part in the contest, and aid his comrades. This principle has been latterly adopted in English tactics; if it had been adopted by the French, Admiral Villeneuve at Aboukir would not have considered himself blameless for remaining inactive during twenty-four hours, with five or six vessels—that is to say, half the squadron, while the enemy were destroying the other wing.

The French navy ought to acquire superiority over that of England; the French understand construction better, and the French vessels, by the confession of the English themselves, are all better than their own. The French pieces of artillery are superior in calibre to the English by a fourth part. These are two great advantages.

The English have more discipline. The squadrons of Toulon and of the Scheldt had the same practices and customs as the English, and attained to as severe a discipline, with the difference necessarily arising from the characters of the two nations. The English discipline is one of slaves, the relation is that of master and serf. It is only maintained by the influence of the most frightful terror. Such a state of things would degrade and debase the French character, which requires a paternal discipline, more founded on honour and feeling.

In most of the battles which we lost against the

English, we were either inferior in number, or were joined to Spanish vessels, which being badly organized, and latterly degenerated, weakened our line instead of strengthening it; or finally, the commanders-in-chief, who had desired battle, and had hastened towards the enemy, until they came to face them, hesitated, then retreated under various pretexts, and thus compromised even the bravest.

Alexandria was built by Alexander. It increased under the Ptolemies to a degree which aroused the jealousy of Rome. It was undoubtedly the second city in the world: its population amounted to several millions. In the seventh century, in the eighteenth year of the Hegira, it was taken by Amrou, after a siege of fourteen months' duration, in which the Arabs lost 28,000 men. It was twelve miles in circumference, contained 4,000 palaces, 4,000 baths, 400 theatres, 12,000 shops, and more than 50,000 Jews. The walls were rased during the wars of the Arabs and of the Roman empire. The city has ever since been in a state of decay. The Arabs built a new wall, which still exists; it is now only 3,000 toises in circumference, which still, however, supposes a large town. The city is now entirely on the isthmus. The Pharo is no longer an island; the actual city is on the isthmus which unites the former island to the Continent. The city is shut in by a wall which bars the isthmus, and is only 600 toises in length. It has

two good ports, (the old and the new.) The old port is capable of containing and sheltering from the wind, and from an enemy superior in force, any squadrons of war-ships, however numerous. The Nile now never reaches Alexandria, except at the times of inundation; its waters are preserved in large cisterns; their appearance struck us. The former circuit of the city is now covered by the waters of Lake Mareotis, which extend as far as the Tower of the Arabs; so that an attack on Alexandria can only be made on the side of Aboukir. Lake Mareotis also leaves a part of the enclosure of the city, beyond that of the Arabs, unprotected. Pompey's column, now standing at a distance of 300 toises from the Arab enclosure, was formerly in the centre of the city.

The general-in-chief passed several days in laying down principles for the fortifications of the city. All that he prescribed was executed with the greatest intelligence by Colonel Crétin, the most skilful officer of engineering in France. The general gave orders for rebuilding the Arab enclosure; the work was not difficult. This enclosure was defended by means of occupying the triangular fort which formed its right side, and which still existed. The centre and the side, towards Aboukir were each defended by a fort. These forts were erected on hillocks of ruins and rubbish, which commanded a view of the surrounding country for about twenty toises, and of the space behind the Arab enclosure. The actual town was fortified as a redoubt, but it was overlooked in front by

one of these hillocks, on which was a fort called Caffarelli. This fort, and the enclosure of the actual town, formed a space capable of a long defence, if all the rest should be taken. Artillery, then, was necessary, in order, promptly and effectually to occupy these three heights. The planning and direction of these works were confided to Crétin.

Within a few months, and with but little labour, he rendered these three heights impregnable. He built masonry-work which presented perpendicular walls of from eighteen to twenty feet in height, thus putting the batteries entirely out of the danger of being scaled, and covered this masonry with cuttings which he made in the heights, so that it was to be seen from no side whatever.

Millions of money, and armies of men, would have been required to give these forts the same strength, had the engineer been less skilful. On the side towards the sea, the French occupied the towers of Marabut and of Pharo. Strong side-batteries were established, which produced astonishing effects every time the English presented themselves to bombard the city.

The column of Pompey strikes the imagination as being all that is sublime. Cleopatra's needle is still in its ancient position. During a search made in the tomb in which Alexander was interred, a small statue made of earthenware was discovered, ten or twelve inches high; the figure is dressed in a Grecian costume.

The hair is curled with much art, and is gathered together on the neck, behind; it, is a little *chef d'œuvre*.

There are, at Alexandria, large and beautiful mosques, Coptic convents, and some houses built in the European style, belonging to the consulate.

From Alexandria to Aboukir is a distance of four leagues. The soil is sandy and covered with palm-trees. At the extremity of the promontory of Aboukir is a stone fort; and at 600 toises from the shore lies a small island; a tower with thirty loop-holes, or so, in this island, would secure anchorage for a few vessels of war, in the same manner nearly as at the Isle of Aix.

In order to go to Rosetta, Lake Mœdia must be crossed at its *embouchure* into the sea, where it is one hundred toises in width; vessels of war, drawing eight or ten feet of water, can enter it. It is into this lake that one of the seven branches of the Nile formerly emptied itself. In order to go to Rosetta without crossing the lake, it is necessary to go round it, which increases the distance by three or four leagues.

ON THE MOTIVES OF THE EXPEDITION TO SYRIA.

THE principal object of the expedition of the French to the East was to overthrow the power of England. The army which was intended to change the destinies of India, was to set out from the Nile. Egypt was to supply the place of St. Domingo and the Antilles, and reconcile the liberty of the black population with the interests of our manufactures. The conquest of that province would bring in its train the loss of all the English settlements in America, and on the peninsula of the Ganges. Let France be once mistress of the ports of Italy, of Corfu, Malta, and Alexandria, and the Mediterranean would become a French lake.

The revolution in India was to be brought about sooner or later, according to the more or less prosperous fortunes of the war, and the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the natives of Arabia and Egypt, following the policy which would be adopted by the Porte

in its new circumstances. The sole object to which immediate attention must be directed, was the conquest of Egypt, and the establishment of a secure footing there; and the means for succeeding in this, were the only ones thought of—all the rest was considered as a necessary consequence of it.

The French squadron, after being refitted in the port of Alexandria, provisioned, and manned by well-trained crews, would suffice to over-awe Constantinople. If judged necessary, it might disembark a body of troops at Alexandretta, and thus the French would have found themselves, within the same year, masters of Egypt, of the Nile, and of the Euphrates. The happy issue of the battle of the Pyramids, the conquest of Egypt, achieved without experiencing any sensible loss, the favourable disposition of the natives, and the devotion of the chiefs of the law—all these seemed, at first, to secure the prompt execution of these great projects. But the destruction of the French squadron at Aboukir, the counter-order to the Irish expedition given by the Directory, and the influence of the enemies of France on the Porte, soon rendered everything more difficult.

In the meantime, two Turkish armies were assembling, the one at Rhodes, the other in Syria, for the purpose of attacking the French in Egypt; it appeared that they were designed to act simultaneously in the course of the month of May, the one disembarking at Aboukir, and the other crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Intelligence was received in the be-

ginning of January, that Djezzar Pacha had just been appointed seraskier of the Syrian army, and that his advanced guard, under the command of Abdallah, had already reached El-Arish, had taken possession of it, and were occupied in repairing that fort, which may be considered as the key of Egypt on the side of Syria; a train of forty pieces of artillery, served by 1,200 gunners, the only ones in the empire who had been trained in the European manner, had just been disembarked at Jaffa; considerable magazines were being formed in that town, and a great number of transports, a part of which came from Constantinople, were being employed in this service. At Gaza, they had laid in a store of leathern bottles; report said that there were enough provided to enable 60,000 men to cross the desert.

If the French remained quiet in Egypt, they would be attacked at the same time by two armies; it was moreover to be feared, that a corps of European troops would join these armies, and that the moment of attack from the exterior would coincide with intestine troubles. In that case, even should the French be victorious, it would not be possible for them to profit by the victory. By sea, they had no fleet; by land, the desert—seventy-five leagues in breadth, which separates Syria from Egypt—was not passable for an army during the season of the greatest heat.

In these circumstances, therefore, the rules of war prescribed to the French general to anticipate his enemies, to cross the great desert during the winter

season, to seize all the magazines formed by the enemy on the coasts of Syria, and to attack the troops in the surest way, according as they assembled.

According to this plan, the divisions of the army of Rhodes would be obliged to hasten to the aid of Syria, and Egypt would remain tranquil, which would permit us successively to summon the greatest part of our forces to Syria. The Mamelukes of Mourad Bey, and of Ibrahim Bey, the Arabs of the Egyptian desert, the Druses of Mount Lebanon, the Mutualis, the Christians of Syria, the whole party of the sheiks of Azor, in Syria, might join the army when it was master of that country, and the commotion would be communicated to the whole of Arabia. Those provinces of the Ottoman empire in which the Arabian language was spoken, desired a great change, and only waited for some one to bring it about. Should the fortune of war be favourable, the French might, by the middle of summer, reach the Euphrates with 100,000 auxiliaries, who would have as a reserve 25,000 veteran Frenchmen of the best troops in the world, and numerous trains of artillery. Constantinople would then be menaced; and if the French could succeed in re-establishing friendly relations with the Porte, they might cross the desert, and march upon India towards the end of autumn.

ON SYRIA.

ARABIA is like a trapezium in shape : one of its sides, that bounded by the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez, is 500 leagues in length ; that extending between the straits of Bab-el-mandeb and Cape Ras-el-Had is 450. The third, which extends along the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates, as far as the mountains which lie near Aleppo, and form the boundary of Syria, is 600 leagues in length ; it is the longest of the four ; the fourth, which is the one of least extent, is 150, from Refah on the limits of Egypt, to beyond Alexandretta and the mountains near Rosos ; it separates Arabia from Syria. The cultivated part of this latter country lies within a breadth of thirty leagues, though it extends to the length we have mentioned, and the desert, which forms a part of it, extends for the space of thirty leagues, as far as Palmÿra.

Syria is bounded on the north by Asia minor ; on the west by the Mediterranean ; on the south by

Egypt, and on the east by Arabia; it thus constitutes the completion of the latter country, and forms together with it a large island, enclosed between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates.

Syria totally differs from Egypt in population, climate and soil. Egypt consists of a single plain, formed by the valley of one of the largest rivers in the world; Syria consists of a great number of valleys. The five-sixths of the land are hills or mountains, a chain of which traverses the whole of Syria, and runs parallel with the shores of the Mediterranean, at a distance of ten leagues from them. To the right, this chain discharges its waters into two rivers, which flow in the direction which it follows itself; the Jordan and the Orontes. These rivers take their rise on Mount Lebanon, which is the centre of Syria, and the most elevated point of the chain. From thence, the Orontes takes its course between the mountains and Arabia, from south to north, and after flowing for the distance of sixty leagues, falls into the sea near the Gulf of Antioch. As this river flows very near to the foot of the mountains, it receives very few tributaries. The Jordan, which rises on Anti-Lebanon, at a distance of twenty leagues from the source of the Orontes, flows from north to south. It receives about ten tributary streams from the chain of mountains which traverses Syria; after a course of sixty leagues, it is lost in the Dead Sea.

Two small rivers take their rise near the source of the

Orontes, on the side towards Baalbec. The one called the Barada, waters the plain of Damascus, and falls into lake Bahr-el-Margi; the other, which has a course of thirty leagues, also takes its rise on the heights of Baalbec, and falls into the Mediterranean near Soor or Tyre. The district round Aleppo is bathed by several streams, which rise in Asia Minor and join the Orontes. The Koik, which runs through Aleppo, falls into a lake near that city.

There is almost as much rain in Syria as in Europe. The country is very salubrious, and offers the most agreeable sites. It is composed of valleys and low mountains, which are very favourable to pasturage, and great quantities of olives are grown there. Syria would be well fitted for the cultivation of the vine; all the Christian villages make excellent wine.

Syria is divided into five districts, each under a pacha; that of Jerusalem, which comprehends the ancient Holy Land; and those of Acre, Tripoli, Damascus, and Aleppo. Aleppo and Damascus are incomparably the two largest towns. Along the 150 leagues of coast presented by Syria, we find—1st, the town of Gaza, situated at the distance of a league from the sea, without any trace of roads or port; a very fine platform of two leagues in circumference marks the space occupied by the town in its days of prosperity; it has now but little importance,—2ndly, Jaffa, or Joppa, which is the port nearest to Jerusalem, being at the distance of fifteen leagues from it. It is a town of 7,000 or 8,000 inhabitants, and was the appanage of

the sultana,—3rdly, Validé, which is situated at a distance of sixteen leagues from Gaza, and one league from the small river Maar, which is not fordable at the mouth. The enclosure on the side towards the land has one of the sides looking towards Gaza, the second towards the Jordan, the third towards Acre, and the fourth lies along the sea-coast in the form of a concave semi-circle. There is a port for small vessels, in bad condition, and tolerably good open roads. On the Koik is the convent of the Fathers of the Holy Land, (the Franciscans,) guardians of Nazareth, and proprietors of several other communities in Palestine. Jaffa is shut in by great walls, flanked by towers, without fosses or counterscarp. These towers were armed with artillery, but their management was ill understood, and the cannons unskilfully placed. Jaffa lies in the midst of a valley covered with gardens and orchards; there are many circumstances of the ground which unite to allow of an unperceived approach being made to within half a pistol-shot of the ramparts. At about the distance of a cannon shot from Jaffa, lies the *rideau*, which overlooks the country; the line of contravallation was thrown up there. This was the position on which the army should naturally have encamped; but it was distant from any water, and the *rideau* being quite bare, was exposed to the burning heat of the sun; they therefore established themselves in the groves of orange trees, guarding the military position by outposts.

Mount Carmel is situated on the promontory of the same name; it lies at three leagues distance from Acre, and forms the extreme left of its bay. It is precipitous on every side; at its summit there is a convent, and springs of water; and on a rock near the convent is to be seen the print of a man's foot, said by tradition to be that left by the foot of Elijah, when he ascended to heaven. Mount Carmel overlooks the whole coast, and vessels look out for it when they approach the coast of Syria. At its foot, flows the river Kison, the mouth of which is 700 or 800 toises from Caïssa. This little town, situated on the sea-shore, contains 3,000 inhabitants; it has a small port, a wall in the ancient style, with towers, and lies close under the view of Mount Carmel. In proceeding from the mouth of the Kison to Acre, the way lies along the sands of the sea-shore. After following this path for a league and a half, we come to the mouth of the Belus, a small river which takes its rise on the hills of Shefamre, and whose waters scarcely flow. It is marshy at its mouth, and falls into the sea at 1,500 toises from Acre; it passes within a gun-shot of the hill of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, which is situated on the right bank, at 600 toises from St. Jean d'Acre.

Cesarea now presents to view only ruins. Acre has an open road, but the town is insignificant; it contains 10,000 or 12,000 inhabitants. Soor or Tyre is now nothing but a village. Sayda, Bairout, and

Tripoli, are small towns. The most important point on this whole coast is the Gulf of Alexandretta, or Iskenderoon, situated at a distance of twenty leagues from Aleppo, thirty from the Euphrates, and 300 from Alexandria; there is anchorage there for large squadrons. Tyre, formerly raised by commerce to so high a degree of splendour, and which was the mother-country of Carthage, appears to have partly owed its prosperity to the Indian commerce, which was carried on by ascending the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates, passing through Palmyra to Emesa, and there taking the road either to Tyre or Antioch, according to the different epochs.

The highest point in Syria is Mount Lebanon, which is only a mountain of the third order, covered with enormous pine trees; in Palestine, Mount Tabor is the highest point. The Orontes and the Jordan, which are the largest rivers of these two countries, are both small.

Syria has been the cradle of the religion of Moses and of that of Jesus; Islamism originated in Arabia; and thus has the same corner of the earth produced the three religions which have destroyed Polytheism, and spread the knowledge of One Creating Being over the whole surface of the globe.

Syria was the field of almost all the crusades of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries; and St. Jean d'Acre, Ptolemais, Joppa, and Damascus were the principal theatres of war. The influence of the

Crusaders' arms and of their sojourn in Syria, which was prolonged for several centuries, has left traces among the population which are still to be perceived.

There are great numbers of Jews in Syria; they journey thither from all parts of the world, in order to die in the holy land of Japheth. There are also Christians to be found there, some descended from the crusaders, others, natives who did not embrace Mahometanism at the time of the conquest of Syria by the Arabs. They are confounded together, and it is no longer possible to distinguish them. Shefamre, Nazareth, Bethlehem, and a part of Jerusalem, are entirely peopled by Christians. In the districts of Acre and Jerusalem, the Christians and Jews, reckoned together, are superior in number to the Mussulmans. At the back of Mount Lebanon dwell the Druses, a nation whose religion much resembles that of the Christians. At Damascus and at Aleppo the Mahometans form the great majority; in these towns, however, there are also a great number of Syrian Christians. The Mutualis, Mahometans, and sect of Ali, who dwell on the banks of the river which flows from Lebanon towards Tyre, were formerly numerous and powerful; but at the time of the expedition of the French into Syria they were much fallen off. The cruelties and annoyances of Djezzar Pacha had destroyed a great number of them. Those who remained, however, rendered us great services, and distinguished themselves by rare intrepidity. All the traditions of ancient Egypt

which have come to our knowledge, estimate its population at a very high amount. But Syria cannot, in this respect, have risen beyond the proportions known in Europe; for there, as in the countries which we inhabit, there are rocks and uncultivated land.

At present, Syria, like the whole of the Turkish empire, offers almost nothing to view but ruins.

ON EGYPT.

THE expedition to Egypt had three objects:—first, to establish on the Nile a French colony, which might prosper without slaves, and might supply to the Republic the place of St. Domingo, and of all the sugar islands; secondly, to obtain an opening in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, for the entrance of our manufactures, and to furnish to our commerce all the productions of those vast countries; thirdly, to set out from Egypt as from a *place d'armes*, and lead an army of 60,000 men to the Indus, and arouse the Mahrattas and the oppressed people of that extensive territory: 60,000 men, half Europeans, half recruits from the burning climes of the equator and of the tropics, conveyed by 10,000 horses, and 50,000 camels, taking with them provisions for fifty or sixty days, water for five or six days, and a train of artillery of 150 field-pieces, with double supplies of ammunition, would arrive on the Indus in four months. Since vessels

have been invented, the ocean has ceased to be an obstacle; and the desert also ceases to be one to an army which has camels and dromedaries in abundance.

The two first objects had been attained, notwithstanding the destruction of Admiral Brueys' squadron at Alexandria; and the third would have been attained, in spite of the intrigues which induced Kleber to sign the convention of El-Arish, and of the disembarkation of 30,000 English troops, under the orders of Abercromby at Aboukir and Gosseir, and a French army would have arrived on the Indus in the winter of 1801-2, had not the assassination of Kleber thrown the command of the army into the hands of a man, who, though full of courage, of political talent, and of good-will, yet possessed a character entirely unfit for military command. Had Kleber lived, France would never have lost Egypt; his death was an irreparable misfortune to France and to Napoleon; he was a man endowed with the most brilliant talents, and of extraordinary bravery.

The law prescribed by the Koran is, either to exterminate idolators, or to subject them to tribute; it does not admit of the obedience and submission of an infidel power; in this it is opposed to the spirit of our religion: "Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," said Christ; "my kingdom is not of this world; obey your rulers." In the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth centuries, the Christians reigned in Syria; but religion was then the object of the war; it was a war of extermination, and Europe lost millions

of men in it. If a similar spirit had animated the Egyptians in 1798, such a struggle could not have been maintained by 25,000 or 30,000 Frenchmen, excited by no fanaticism, and already disgusted with the country.

Though masters of Alexandria and of Cairo, and victorious over the Mamelukes at the Pyramids, their conquest was not secured unless they could succeed in conciliating and attaching to their interests the Imaums, Muftis, Ulemas, and all the other ministers of the Mahometan religion. The French army, since the time of the revolution, had practised no worship; even in Italy the soldiers never went to church; the French troops were, therefore, represented to the Mussulmans as an army of catechumens, disposed to embrace Mahometanism. The Coptic, Grecian, Latin, and Syrian Christians were tolerably numerous; they endeavoured to profit by the presence of the French, in order to relieve themselves from some of the restrictions imposed on their worship. The General-in-chief opposed this, and took care to maintain religious affairs in their existing state. Every day, at sunrise, the Sheiks of the grand mosque of Gemil-el-Azar (a kind of Sorbonne) repaired to the General's levee; he lavished every mark of respect on them, and held long conversations with them on the different circumstances of the prophet's life, and on the chapters of the Koran. It was after his return from Salahieh that he proposed to them to publish a proclamation, by which they should command the people to take an

oath of obedience to the general-in-chief. At this proposal they turned pale, and became embarrassed; and after a little hesitation, the Sheik Cherkaon, a venerable old man replied: "*Why should not you and your whole army become Mussulmans? then a hundred thousand men would hasten to your standard, and, disciplined after your manner, they would enable you to re-establish the nation of the Arabs, and to subdue the East.*" The General brought forward two objections:—viz., circumcision, and the prohibition from drinking wine, which was an article necessary to the French soldier. After some discussion, it was agreed that the grand Sheiks of Gemil-el-Azar should endeavour to find means of removing these two obstacles. The discussions on the subject were warm; they lasted three weeks; but the report which spread through the whole of Egypt, that the great Sheiks were employed in converting the French army to Mahometism, filled all the faithful with joy; the French already felt the good effects of the favourable change in public opinion; they were no longer considered as idolaters. When the Ulemas had come to an agreement, the four Muftis published a proclamation, in which they declared that circumcision, being only a *perfecting*, was not indispensable to becoming a Musulman; but that, in such a case, the paradise of a future life could not be hoped for. Half the difficulty was now removed; it was not easy to make the Muftis understand that the second obstacle was not reasonable. It was the subject of six more weeks'

discussion. At length, they declared that a person might be a Mussulman and drink wine, provided he expended the fifth instead of the tenth part of his income, in works of beneficence. The general-in-chief then caused the plan of a mosque, larger than that of Gemil-el-Azar, to be traced, and declared that he would have it built, to serve as a monument of the epoch of the army's conversion. But, in fact, he only desired to gain time.

The proclamation of obedience was published by the Sheiks, and Napoleon was declared to be the friend of the prophet, and specially protected by him: the report was generally spread, that before a year was over, the whole army would wear the turban.

Such was the line of conduct always followed by Napoleon, reconciling his desire to remain in the religion in which he was born, with the necessities of his policy, and of his ambition. During the sojourn of the army in Egypt, General Menou alone became a Mussulman; this was useful, and had a good effect. When the French quitted Egypt, 500 or 600 men remained behind, enlisted in the Mamelukes, and embraced Mahometanism.

During the interview at Erfurt, the partition of Turkey was several times proposed to Napoleon by the Emperor Alexander.

Syria and Egypt would have fallen to the share of France; but great as this advantage would have been, it would not have compensated for the increase of

power which Russia would derive from the possession of Constantinople; and Napoleon rejected the offer.

The Nile rises in the mountains of Abyssinia, flows from south to north, and falls into the Mediterranean, after having traversed Abyssinia, and the deserts of Nubia, and of Egypt. Its course is eight hundred leagues in length; two hundred of which are in the territory of Egypt. It enters that country at the Isle of Philœ, or that of Elephantine, and fertilizes the deserts which it traverses. Its inundations are regular and productive; regular, because they are caused by the tropical rains; productive, because these rains, falling in torrents on the mountains of Abyssinia, which are covered with wood, bring away with them a fertilizing slime, which the Nile deposits on the ground it inundates. North winds prevail during the swelling of the river, and by a circumstance favourable to fertility, keep back its waters.

In Egypt it never rains. The ground is only rendered productive by the regular inundations of the Nile. When the river swells high, the year is abundant; when it is low, the harvest is only tolerable.

The distance between the isle of Elephantine and Cairo is one hundred and fifty leagues, and the valley of Cairo, watered by the Nile, is about five leagues in length. Beyond Cairo, this river divides itself into two branches, and forms a kind of triangle, which it

covers with its inundations; the base of this triangle, from the tower of the Arabs to Pelusa, is sixty leagues in length, and the extent from the sea to Cairo is fifty leagues; one of the arms of the Nile falls into the Mediterranean near Rosetta, the other near Damietta. In more ancient times, this river had seven mouths. It begins to rise at the summer solstice, and the inundation continues on the increase until the equinox; it is therefore between September and March that all the labour in the fields is performed. The country then looks charming; it is the time of flowers and of harvest together. The dike of the Nile is cut at Cairo, in the course of September or the beginning of October. After the month of March, the ground splits into such deep cracks and ruts that it is dangerous to cross the plains on horseback, and it can only be done with extreme fatigue on foot. A burning sun, which is never tempered either by clouds or rain, dries up all the grass and plants, except such as can be watered. It is to this cause that is attributed the purity of the stagnant waters in Egypt, which lie in the low places. In Europe, such marshes would cause death by their exhalations; in Egypt they do not even cause fever.

The valley of the Nile, such as it has just been described, is equivalent to a sixth part of ancient France; which would only suppose, in a state of prosperity, four or five millions of population. And yet the Arabian historians assure us, that at the time of its conquest by Amrou, Egypt contained twenty millions

of inhabitants, and twenty thousand cities. It is true that in this calculation they include, besides the valley of the Nile, the oases and deserts belonging to Egypt.

This assertion of the Arabian historians must not be ranked among the number of those ancient traditions which a judicious critic disavows.

A good system of government, and a numerous population, might much extend the benefits of the inundation of the Nile. Doubtless, if the valley presented a surface of the same nature as that of our land in France, it would not support more than four or five millions of individuals. But there are in France mountains, sands, heaths, and uncultivated pieces of land, while in Egypt all is productive: and to this must be added the consideration, that the valley of the Nile, fertilized by the waters, the slime, and the heat of the climate, is more fertile than even our good land, and that the two-thirds or the three-quarters of France are of little value.

We are also inclined to think that the Nile has fertilized several oases.

If we suppose that all the canals which flow from the Nile, to carry its waters over the land, were arrested or stopped up; its course would then be much more rapid, the inundation would be less extensive, a larger mass of water would reach the sea, and the cultivation of the land would be much reduced. If we suppose, on the contrary, that all the canals for irrigation were well taken care of, made as numerous, as

long, and as deep as possible, and so directed by art as to water a large extent of desert, it may be imagined that very little of the waters of the Nile would be lost in the sea, and that the inundations fertilizing a larger extent of ground, cultivation would increase in the same proportion. There is, therefore, no country where the administration has so much influence on agriculture, and consequently on the population, as in Egypt. The plains of Bauce and of the Brie are rendered fertile by the regular watering of the rains; the influence of the government on it is, therefore, nothing in that respect. But in Egypt, where the irrigation can only be very limited, if the government be good it adopts the best police regulations in reference to the direction of the water, and the repair and construction of canals for irrigation; but if bad, partial, or weak, it favours localities, or private properties to the detriment of the public interest; it cannot suppress the civil dissensions of the provinces, when there is a question about opening large canals; and in short performs its duty very ill; the result is, that the inundation is restrained, and consequently, the extent of the arable land is diminished. Under a good administration, the Nile gains on the desert; under a bad one, the desert gains on the Nile. In Egypt, the genius of good and the genius of evil, the Nile and the desert, are always in opposition; and we may say that property there consists less in the possession of a field, than in the right,

determined by the general rules of the administration, of receiving at such a time of the year, and by such a canal, the benefit of irrigation.

For a period of two hundred years, the population of Egypt has been constantly on the decrease. At the time of the French expedition, it had from 2,500,000 to 2,800,000 inhabitants. If it continues to be governed in the same manner, in fifty years more it will only have 1,500,000.

By constructing a canal which should convey the waters of the Nile to the great oasis, a vast kingdom would be gained. We may readily admit that in the time of Sesostris and Ptolemy, Egypt was able to support by means of its agriculture alone, and without the aid of its commerce, a population of from twelve to fifteen millions.

Egypt is divided into Upper, Middle, and Lower Egypt. Upper Egypt, called Saïd, consists of two provinces,—viz., Thebes and Girgeh; Middle Egypt, named Vostani, consists of four—Benisouf, Siout, Faioum, and Atfieh; and Lower Egypt, called Bahari, contains nine—Bahireh, Rosetta, Garbieh, Menouf, Damietta, Mansourah, Sharkieh, Kelioub, and Ghizeh.

Egypt also includes the great oasis, the Valley of the River without water, and the oasis of Jupiter Ammon.

The large oasis lies parellel to the Nile on the left bank, and is 150 leagues in length; its most distant points lie at sixty leagues from the river, its nearest at twenty.

The Valley of the River without water, near which lie the Natron lakes, where a commerce of some importance is carried on, is situated at fifteen leagues' distance from the Rosetta branch of the Nile. This valley was formerly fertilized by the Nile.

The oasis of Jupiter Ammon is at the distance of eighty leagues on the same side of the river.

The Egyptian territory extends towards the frontiers of Asia, as far as the hills which lie between El-Arish, and Refah, about forty leagues from Pelusium; from whence the line of demarcation traverses the desert of the Wandering, passes Suez, and runs along the Red Sea as far as Berenice. The Nile flows in a line parallel to this sea; its greatest distance from the sea is fifty leagues—its least, thirty. There is one, and only one, of its bendings which approaches within twenty-two leagues of the Red Sea, but it is separated from it by impassable mountains. The square surface of Egypt is 200 leagues in length, by 110 or 120 in breadth.

Egypt produces in abundance, corn, rice, and vegetables. It was once the granary of Rome, and is still that of Constantinople. It also produces sugar, indigo, senna, cinnamon, natron, flax, and hemp; but it has neither wood, coal, nor oil. It is also wanting in tobacco, which it procures from Syria, and in coffee, with which it is furnished by Arabia. It feeds numerous flocks, independently of those of the desert, and also great multitudes of fowls. The eggs are

hatched in furnaces, and thus immense quantities of poultry are produced.

Egypt serves as an intermediary between Africa and Asia. Caravans arrive at Cairo, like vessels on a coast, at the moment when they are least expected, and from the most distant countries. They are signalled at Ghizeh, and come out from the desert by the Pyramids. There, the place where they are to cross the Nile and that near Cairo where they are to encamp, are pointed out to them. The caravans thus signalled, are composed of pilgrims or merchants from Morocco, Fez, Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli, going to Mecca, and bringing merchandise with them, which they exchange at Cairo. There are generally several hundred camels—sometimes even several thousand, and they are escorted by armed men. Caravans also come from Abyssinia and the interior of Africa, and from the places which are in direct communication with the Cape of Good Hope and Senegal. They bring slaves, gum, gold-dust, elephants' teeth, and the other products of those countries, which they exchange for the merchandise of Europe and of the Levant. They also arrive from all parts of Arabia and Syria, bringing coals, wood, fruits, oil, coffee, to Cairo, and all the products of the interior of India. From time immemorial, Egypt has served as an entrepôt for the whole commerce of India. It was formerly carried on by the Red Sea. The merchandise was landed at Berenice, and transported on camels' backs for a distance of eighty leagues.

Having arrived at Thebes, it was embarked on the Nile, and then spread over the whole of Europe. Such was the cause of the prosperity of Thebes of the hundred gates. The merchandise also went up the Red Sea, past Kossier, as far as Suez, from whence it was carried by camels to Memphis and Pelusium, a distance of thirty leagues. In the time of Ptolemy, the canal from Suez to the Nile was opened; and from that time, the merchandise no longer had to be transported by camels—it arrived by water at Kaboub and Pelusium, on the shores of the Nile and of the Mediterranean. Independently of the Indian commerce, Egypt has some peculiar to itself.

Fifty years of French administration would greatly increase its population. It would offer an opening to our manufactures, which would bring with it a development of our industry; and we should be called upon to supply all the wants of the inhabitants of the deserts of Africa, Abyssinia, Arabia, and a great part of Syria; these nations are in want of everything; and what are St. Domingo, and all our colonies, in comparison with these vast regions? France would, in its turn, receive from Egypt corn, rice, sugar, natron, and all the productions of Africa and Asia.

Were the French once established in Egypt, it would be impossible for the English to maintain themselves long in India. Squadrons, constructed on the shores of the Red Sea, provisioned with the products of the country, and equipped and manned by the French troops stationed in Egypt, would infallibly

make us masters of India, and at a moment when England least expected it.

Even if we suppose the commerce of this country free, as it has hitherto been, between the English and the French, the former would not be in a condition to maintain their trade. The possibility of the reconstruction of the Suez canal being a solved problem, and the labour which it would require being of small importance, merchandise would arrive by that canal so rapidly and with such economy of capital, that the French might present themselves in the market with immense advantages. The commerce with India by the Ocean would thus be infallibly ruined.

Alexander did more to render his name illustrious by founding Alexandria, and conceiving the idea of making it the seat of his empire, than by achieving his most brilliant victories. This city should be the capital of the world. It lies between Asia and Africa, within reach of India and of Europe. Its port affords the only anchorage to be found along the 500 leagues of coast which extend from Tunis, or ancient Carthage, to Alexandretta, or Iskenderoon; it is situated at one of the former mouths of the Nile; all the squadrons in the world might anchor there, and in the old port would be sheltered both from the winds and from attacks of every kind. Vessels drawing twenty-one feet of water have entered it without difficulty; those drawing twenty-three feet could effect an entrance; and, by some inconsiderable labour, it might be rendered easy, even for three-deckers. The First Consul

caused twelve seventy-four gun vessels, drawing only twenty-one feet of water, after the English system, to be constructed at Toulon, and there was no reason to complain of them when they sailed in our squadrons; the only thing is that they are not very well fitted for the India service, because they can only carry a small supply of water and provisions.

The bad condition of the Nile canals prevents its waters from reaching Alexandria. They only reach it at the time of the inundations, and must be preserved in cisterns. Beside the port of this town lie the roads of Aboukir, which might be rendered safe for a few vessels. If a fort were constructed on the Isle of Aboukir, vessels might anchor there as at the Isle of Aix.

Rosetta, Boorlos, and Damietta can only receive small vessels, the water on the bars being only from six to seven feet deep; Pelusium, El Arish, and Gaza can never have had any ports; and the lakes Boorlos, and Menzaleh, which communicate with the sea, can only admit vessels drawing from six to seven feet of water.

At the time of the expedition to Egypt, three races of men existed there; the Mamelukes or Circassians, the Ottomans or janissaries and spahis, and the Arabs or natives of the country.

These three races have neither the same principles, the same manners, nor the same language. The ordinary language of the Mamelukes and of the Ottomans is Turkish; the natives speak the Arabian lan-

guage. At the time of the arrival of the French, the Mamelukes governed the country, and possessed its riches and its strength; they were headed by twenty-four Beys, independent, and equal in power; for they were only subject to the influence of the one who was enabled by his talents and bravery to gain all suffrages.

The household of a bey is composed of from 400 to 800 slaves, all mounted, and each having in his service two or three fellahs. The beys have various officers for the honorary service of their households. The katchefs are the lieutenants of the beys; they command, under them, the militia of slaves, and are lords of villages. The beys have estates in the provinces, and a house in Cairo; the principal division of the house contains their own apartments and those of their harem; around the courts are those of the slaves, guards, and domestics.

The vacant place of a bey can only be filled by a Circassian. The young Circassians are sold by their mothers, or stolen by people whose trade it is, and brought for sale to Cairo by merchants from Constantinople. Sometimes, blacks or Ottomans are admitted to the rank of bey; but these cases are rare.

The slaves who compose the household of a bey, are adopted by him and form his family. Intelligent and brave, they successively rise from rank to rank, and finally attain to that of katchef or even of bey. The Mamelukes have but few children, and those whom they have, do not live as long as the natives of

the country. A family is seldom continued beyond the third generation.

The number of Circassians in Egypt is between 60,000 and 70,000.

The Ottomans established themselves in Egypt at the time of the conquest by Selim, in the sixteenth century; they form the corps of janissaries and spahis, and have been augmented in numbers by all the Ottomans enrolled in these companies according to the custom of the empire. They are in number about 200,000, and are constantly degraded and humiliated by the Mamelukes.

The Arabs compose the mass of the population; they are ruled by the great Sheiks, the descendants of those Arabs who in the time, of the prophet, at the commencement of the Hegira, conquered Egypt.

These Sheiks are at once the heads of the nobility and the doctors of the law; they possess villages, have a great number of slaves, and always ride on mules. The mosques are under their inspection; that of Gemil-él-Azar alone has sixty great Sheiks; it is a kind of Sorbonne which pronounces judgment in all religious affairs, and even serves as a university, where the philosophy of Aristotle and the history and doctrine of the Koran are taught; it is the most celebrated school in the East.

The Sheiks are the principal men in the country; the Mamelukes fear them: the Porte itself is careful in its conduct towards them. Some of them are descended from the prophet, as the Sheik El-Behry;

others from the second wife of the prophet, as the Sheik El-Sada. If the Sultan of Constantinople happened to be at Cairo at the time of either of the great fêtes of the empire, he would celebrate it at the house of one of the Sheiks. This is a sufficient proof of the high consideration with which they are regarded; so great is it, that there is no example of an ignominious punishment having been inflicted on them. When the government considers it indispensable to condemn one of them to death, he is poisoned, and his obsequies are then performed with all the honours due to his rank, and as if his death had been natural.

All the Arabs of the desert are of the same race as the Sheiks, and hold them in great veneration. The fellahs are Arabs; not that they all came to Egypt with the army which conquered it, at the beginning of the Hegira; for it is thought that not more than 100,000 settled there after the conquest; but as at this period all the natives embraced Mahometanism, they are confounded with the Arabs, in the same way as the French are with the Gauls.

The Sheiks are the men who hold the law and religion in their hands; the Mamelukes, those who hold the power and the government. The difference between them is greater than that existing between the military class and that of the priests in France; for they are of entirely distinct family and race.

The Copts are catholics, but do not recognise the Pope; their number is estimated at 150,000; they are allowed the free exercise of their religion. They

are descended from families who preserved the Christian faith, after the conquest by the Caliphs.

The Syrian catholics are not at all numerous. Some say that they are the descendants of the crusaders; others, that they are natives of the country, who, like the Copts, were Christians at the time of the conquest, and have preserved their religion in a different creed. They form another catholic sect. There are but few Jews and Greeks. The head of the latter church is the Patriarch of Alexandria, who believes himself to be equal to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and superior to the Pope. He resides in a convent in Old Cairo, and lives in the same manner as the head of a religious order, with an income of 30,000 francs, might do in Europe. There are also but few Franks; those to be found are English, French, Spanish, or Italian families, established in Egypt for purposes of commerce; or merely as agents of European houses.

The deserts are peopled by tribes of wandering Arabs who live in tents. There are about sixty of these tribes; all dependent on Egypt, and forming a population of about 120,000 souls, which may furnish from 18,000 to 20,000 horsemen. The different tribes possess different parts of the desert, which they regard as their property, and have a great many cattle, camels, horses, and sheep. They often make war against each other, either on account of the pasturage of their flocks, or of some other subject of dissension. The desert alone could not support them; for it produces nothing. They possess oases which seem like

islands amid the desert, where sweet water, grass, and trees are to be found. These they cultivate, and dwell there at certain periods of the year. The Arabs are, however, in general, poor and miserable, and constantly need the assistance of Egypt; they come annually to cultivate the border-lands, and there sell the produce of their flocks and herds, hire out their camels for its conveyance, and employ the profit in purchasing whatever necessaries they require.

The deserts are plains of sand, without water or vegetation, whose monotonous aspect is only varied by mounds, hillocks or ridges of sand. One rarely, however, journeys twenty or twenty-four leagues across it, without finding a spring of water; but the spring is generally not copious, the water is more or less brackish, and almost always exhales an alkaline smell.

Great quantities of bones, both of men and of animals, are found in the deserts, and are used for making fires. Gazelles and flocks of ostriches are also to be met with; the latter, at a distance, look like mounted Arabs. No trace of road of any kind exists; the Arabs are accustomed from infancy to guide themselves by the windings of the hills or the ridges of sand, by the nature of the ground, or by the stars; sometimes the winds displace the hills of moving sand, and this renders the journey through the desert difficult, and often dangerous; at one place the ground is firm—at another, it sinks under the feet. Trees

are rarely met with, except round the wells, where a few palm trees are to be seen.

There are in the desert flat low places where the waters collect, and lie for a longer or shorter time; beside these marshy places grow bushes, a foot or eighteen inches in height, which serve as food for the camels; this is the richest part of the desert. Notwithstanding the very unpleasant nature of the journey across the desert, it is one which has frequently to be made in passing from the south to the north of Egypt: to follow the windings of the Nile would triple the distance.

There is a certain tribe of Arabs consisting of 1,500 or 2,000 individuals, which has 300 horsemen, 1,400 camels, and occupies 100 square leagues of ground.

Formerly the Arabs were much afraid of the Mamelukes; a single Mameluke could put ten Arabs to flight; and the reason of this was, that the Mamelukes were not only superior in a military, but also in a moral point of view.

The Arabs, besides, were obliged to take care how they behaved to them, as they were the persons to whom they sold or hired their camels, to obtain in return grain and permission to cultivate the border lands.

If the extraordinary condition of Egypt, the pros-

perity of which entirely depends on the extent of its inundations, requires a good administration, the necessity of suppressing from 20,000 to 30,000 robbers, who are out of the reach of justice, because they take refuge in the immensity of the desert, no less requires energy in the government. Latterly, these robbers carried their audacity so far as to come and pillage villages and kill fellahs, without these deeds giving rise to any regular or active retribution. One day, when Napoleon was surrounded by the divan of the grand Sheiks, he received intelligence that some Arabs of the tribe of the Ouadis had killed a fellah, and carried off some flocks; he showed great indignation, and, in an animated tone, ordered an officer of his staff immediately to proceed into Bahireh with 200 dromedaries, and 300 horsemen, to obtain reparation, and punish the culprits. The Sheik Elmodi, hearing this order, and seeing the emotion of Napoleon, said to him, with a smile, "Was this fellah your cousin, that his death makes you so indignant?" "Yes," replied Napoleon; "all those whom I command are my children." "*Taïb!*" said the Sheik; "you speak like the prophet."

Egypt has always been an object of jealousy to the nations who have ruled the world. Octavius, after the time of Antony, re-united it to the empire. He would not send a pro-consul thither, but divided it into twelve prætorships. Antony had drawn down upon himself the hatred of the Romans, because he had been suspected of having wished to make

Alexandria the capital of the republic. It is probable that Egypt, in the time of Antony, contained from 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 of inhabitants. Its riches were immense; it was the true canal of the Indian commerce, and Alexandria seemed, by its situation, to be the destined seat of the empire of the world; but various obstacles prevented that city from attaining its full development. The Romans were afraid lest the national spirit of the Arabs should make of their country a centre of revolt against the Roman empire; for they were a brave people, inured to fatigue, and who had neither the effeminacy of the people of Antioch, nor that of the natives of Asia Minor, and their immense cavalry force had given Hannibal the victory over Rome.

Selim had still more reason to fear Egypt. It was the holy land, the natural metropolis of Arabia, and the granary of Constantinople. An ambitious pacha, favoured by circumstances, and by a bold and audacious genius, might again have raised up the Arabian nation, and struck terror into the Ottomans, already increased by the immense Greek population, which principally fills Constantinople and its environs. Selim would not, therefore, confide the government of Egypt to a single pacha. He even feared that its division into several pachaliks would not be a sufficient guarantee, and sought to secure the subjection of that province by confiding its administration to twenty-four beys, who had each a household of from 400 to 800 slaves. These slaves were generally natives of

Circassia, but were never to be taken from Arabia or from Egypt itself. By this means, he created a militia composed entirely of strangers to Arabia. He established in Egypt the general system of the empire, janissaries and spahis, and placed at their head a pacha, who was to represent the Grand Seignior, with authority as viceroy over the whole province, but who, held in check by the Mamelukes, could not make any efforts to render himself independent. The Mamelukes, thus called to the government of Egypt, sought auxiliaries; they were too ignorant and too small in number to exercise the employment of tax-gatherers, but they would not confide this office to natives of the country, whom they feared, in the same spirit of jealousy which led the Sultan to fear the Arabs. They chose the Copts and Jews. The Copts are, it is true, natives of the country, but of a proscribed religion. As Christians, they are out of the protection of the Koran, and can only be protected by the sabre; they could give no umbrage to the Mamelukes. Thus this militia of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, employed as their agents, men of business, spies, &c., the 200,000 Copts inhabiting Egypt; each village had a Coptic tax-gatherer—all the responsibility, all the administration, was in the hands of the Copts.

The toleration which reigns throughout the whole of the Ottoman empire, and the kind of protection afforded to the Christians, are the results of old views of policy. The sultan and the policy of Constantinople love to defend a class of men from whom they have

nothing to fear, because these men are very much in the minority in Armenia, Syria, and the whole of Asia Minor, and because, moreover, they, being naturally opposed to the people of the country, would not in any case unite with them to re-establish the Syriac or Arabian nation. This, however, cannot apply to Greece, where the Christians form the majority. The sultans have committed a great fault in allowing so considerable a number of Christians to collect in the same country; sooner or later, this fault will bring on the fall of the Ottomans.

The moral condition resulting from the various interests of the different races who people Egypt, did not escape the notice of Napoleon, and it was upon this that he erected his system of government. The French felt little desire to administer justice in this country, and would not have been able to do so, even had they wished it. Napoleon invested the Arabs—that is to say, the Sheiks—with this power, and gave them a great preponderance in the government. Thenceforward he spoke to the people through the channel of these men, who were at the same time the nobles and the doctors of the law; he thus also interested the national spirit of the Arabs and the religion of the Koran in his government. He only made war against the Mamelukes; he pursued them constantly and with determination, and after the battle of the Pyramids, there was only a wreck of them left. By the same system of policy as that which he employed towards the Arabs, he sought to gain over

the Copts; they had an additional tie to bind them to him, that of religion, and they alone were skilled in the administration of affairs. But even had they not possessed this latter advantage, the policy of the French general would have been to give them this position, in order that he might not have to depend exclusively on the native Arabs, and to struggle, with 25,000 or 30,000 men, against the power of the national and religious spirit. The Copts, seeing the Mamelukes destroyed, had no other choice than to attach themselves to the French, and by this means our army obtained in every part of Egypt, spies, observers, controllers, and financiers, independent of, and opposed to, the natives.

As to the Janissaries and Ottomans, policy directed that in them the Grand Seignor should be respected; the standard of the sultan floated in Egypt, and Napoleon was persuaded that the minister Talleyrand had gone to Constantinople, and that negotiations concerning Egypt were opened with the Porte. The Mamelukes, besides, had endeavoured in all ways to humiliate and disorganize the body of Janissaries, who were their rivals; from the degradation of these Ottoman bodies of troops, had arisen a total disrespect of the pacha, and a contempt for the authority of the Porte; and to such a degree had this proceeded, that the Mamelukes often refused the *méry*; they would even have declared themselves totally independent, had not the opposition of the Sheiks, or doctors of the law, re-attached them to Constantinople through religious

spirit and inclination. The Sheiks and the people preferred the influence of Constantinople to that of the Mamelukes; they often addressed complaints to the sultan, and sometimes succeeded in obtaining a mitigation of the arbitrary rule of the beys; and these wars were terminated by an arrangement which left the power in the hands of the Mamelukes, with some slight modifications.

If we attentively consider the events which have occurred in Egypt during a period of two hundred years, we shall find it demonstrated that if the government, instead of being confided to 12,000 Mamelukes, had been put into the hands of a pacha, whose place, like that of the pacha of Albania, had been filled, when vacant, by a native of the country, the Arabian empire, composed of an entirely distinct nation, which has a spirit, prejudices, a history, and a language of its own, and which comprehends Egypt and a part of Africa, would have become independent, like that of Morocco.

The Christian religion is the religion of a civilized people; it is entirely spiritual. The reward which Jesus Christ promises to the elect is that they shall see God, face to face; its whole tendency is to subdue the passions—it offers nothing to excite them. The Christian religion was three or four centuries in establishing itself, and its progress has been slow. Time is requisite to destroy, by the sole influence of

words, a religion rendered sacred by time, especially when the new religion neither gratifies nor kindles any passion. The progress of Christianity was the triumph of the Greeks over the Romans. The latter had subjected all the Greek republics by force of arms; but they, in their turn, ruled their conquerors by the sciences and arts. All the schools of philosophy and eloquence, and all the *ateliers* of Rome were kept by Greeks. The Roman youths did not look upon their education as completed, until they had been to perfect themselves at Athens. Various other circumstances favoured the propagation of the Christian religion. The apotheoses of Cæsar and of Augustus were followed by those of the most abominable tyrants; this abuse of polytheism inclined people's minds to the idea of One Creating Being, the Lord of the universe. Socrates had already proclaimed this truth; the triumph of Christianity, which took it from him, was, as we have observed above, a re-action of the Greek philosophers on their conquerors. The holy fathers were almost all Greeks. The moral doctrine which they preached was that of Plato. All the subtlety which is to be remarked in Christian theology is to be attributed to the sophists of his school.

The Christians, following the example of Paganism, thought that the prospect of the rewards of a future life would not suffice to repress the disorders, the vices, and the crimes which arise from the passions; they, therefore, made an entirely *physical* hell, where corporal punishments were to be inflicted. They much

outdid their models, and indeed gave to this dogma so great a preponderance, that the religion of Christ may justly be said to be a *menace*.

Islamism is the religion of a people in its infancy; it took its rise in a country which was poor and deficient in the greatest necessities of life. Mahomet spoke to the senses; he would not have been understood by his nation had he only spoken to the mind. He promised his followers odoriferous baths, rivers of milk, fair houris with dark eyes, and the perpetual shade of groves. The Arab who was in want of water, and scorched by a burning sun, sighed for shade and freshness; he did everything in order to obtain such a reward. Thus, we may say that Mahometanism, as opposed to Christianity, is a *promise*.

Islamism especially attacks idolators; *there is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet*. This is the foundation of the Mussulman's religion; it establishes, in the most essential point, the great truth announced by Moses, and confirmed by Jesus Christ. It is known that Mahomet was instructed by Jews and Christians. The latter were, in his eyes, a kind of idolators. He but ill understood the mystery of the Trinity, and explained it to be a recognition of three Gods. However this may be, he persecuted the Christians with much less bitterness than the Pagans; the former were allowed to ransom themselves by paying a tribute. The dogma of the unity of God,

which Jesus Christ and Moses had diffused, was carried by the Koran into Arabia and Africa, and to the furthest extremity of India. Under this point of view, the religion of Mahomet has been a continuation of the two others; the three together have uprooted Paganism.

Christianity, arising among a corrupted, enslaved, and oppressed people, preached submission and obedience, in order to indemnify sovereigns. It sought to establish itself by insinuation, persuasion, and patience. Jesus Christ, a lowly preacher, exercised no power on earth; "*My kingdom is not of this world,*" said he. He preached his doctrine in the temple; he preached it in particular to his disciples; he bestowed on them the gift of tongues, performed miracles, but never revolted against the established powers, and died on a cross, between two thieves, by the sentence of a mere Pagan prætor.

The Mahometan religion, arose amidst a free and warlike nation, and preached intolerance and the destruction of unbelievers. Mahomet was quite the opposite of Jesus Christ; he was king! He declared that the whole universe was to be subjected to his dominion, and commanded the use of the sabre to annihilate idolators and unbelievers. To kill them was a meritorious work. The idolators in Arabia were soon converted or destroyed. The infidels in Asia and Egypt were attacked and conquered. As soon as

Islamism had triumphed at Mecca and Medina, it became a rallying point to the different tribes of Arabs; all men were seized with fanaticism, and a whole nation precipitated itself upon its neighbours. The successors of Mahomet reigned under the title of Caliphs. They wielded at the same time the sword and the censer. The first Caliphs preached every day in the mosque of Medina, or that of Mecca, and from thence despatched orders to their armies, which already covered a part of Africa and of Asia.

A Persian ambassador, arriving at Medina, was greatly astonished at finding the Caliph Omar sleeping in the midst of a crowd of beggars, on the threshold of the mosque. Afterwards, when Omar travelled to Jerusalem, he journeyed on a camel, which also carried his provisions, had a tent of coarse cloth, and was only distinguished from the other Mussulmans by his extreme simplicity. During the ten years of his reign, he conquered forty thousand cities, destroyed fifty thousand churches, and built two thousand mosques. The Caliph Aboubeker, who only took three pieces of gold daily from the treasury for the expenses of his household, gave five hundred pieces to each Mossen who had been with the Prophet at the battle of Bender.

The progress of the Arabs was rapid; their armies, inspired by fanaticism, attacked, at the same time, the Roman and Persian empires. The latter was soon subdued, and the Mussulmans penetrated to the frontiers of the Oxus; they gained possession of immense

treasure, destroyed the empire of Khosru, and advanced as far as China. The victories which they gained in Syria, at Aiquadie and at Dyrmonck, put Damascus, Aleppo, Emesa, Cesarea, and Jerusalem into their hands. The taking of Pelusium and Alexandria rendered them masters of Egypt. The whole of this country was Coptic, and was much alienated from Constantinople by the constant discussions concerning heresy. Kaleb, Derar, and Amrou, surnamed *the swords of the Prophet*, experienced no resistance; any such would have been unavailing. In the midst of assaults and battles, these warriors had before their eyes visions of houris, with skins of snow and beautiful blue or dark eyes, and crowned with diamonds, extending their arms to meet them; their minds were inflamed by this sight, they rushed blindly forward, and sought that death which should put these beauties into their power: it was thus that they became masters of the beautiful plains of Syria, Egypt and Persia; it was thus that they subdued the world.

There is a very general idea in existence, which, however, is refuted by history, that Mahomet was an enemy of the sciences, of art, and of literature. In reference to this, the speech of Caliph Omar, when he burned the library of Alexandria, has often been cited: "If this library contains what is to be found in the Koran, it is useless; if it contains anything else, it is dangerous." But this fact, and many others of the same nature, ought not to make us forget all that we owe to the Arabian Caliphs. They constantly ex-

tended the sphere of human knowledge, and embellished society by the charms of literature. It is, nevertheless, possible that in the infancy of Mahometanism, the successors of Mahomet did not wish the Arabs to become effeminated by the arts and sciences, which were carried to so high a degree of perfection in Egypt, Syria, and the lower Empire. They had before their eyes the decline of Constantine's empire, partly attributable to perpetual scholastic and theological discussions. Perhaps this example had prejudiced them against most of the then existing libraries, which were, in fact, generally composed of books of this nature. However this may be, the Arabs were, during a period of five centuries, the most enlightened nation in the world. It is to them that we owe our system of numeration, the invention of organs, sun-dials, clocks, and watches. Nothing can be more elegant, more ingenious, or more moral, than the Persian literature, or than the productions, generally speaking, of the literary men of Bagdad and of Bassora.

Empires are of shorter duration in Asia than in Europe; this may be attributed to its geographical circumstances. Asia is surrounded by immense deserts, from which, every three or four centuries, hordes of warlike nations pour forth and overthrow the greatest empires. It was from thence that the Ottomans came, and afterwards Tamerlane and Genghis Khan.

It would seem that the sovereign legislators of these nations have always made a point of preserving

national manners and primitive traits. It was by this means that they prevented the Janissaries of Egypt from becoming Arabs, and those of Adrianople from becoming Greeks. The principle adopted by them of opposing any sort of innovation in their customs and manners, made them proscribe the arts and sciences; but this measure must not be attributed either to the precepts of Mahomet, the religion of the Koran, or the natural disposition of the Arabs.

Mahomet restricted the number of wives which each Mussulman should be allowed to marry, to four; every Eastern legislator before him had allowed more. The question naturally occurs, why he did not entirely abolish polygamy, as the Christian religion did? For it is certain that the number of women in the East is nowhere greater than that of men. It would then be natural only to allow one, in order that each man might have a wife.

This contrast between Asia and Europe furnishes another subject of meditation. With us, legislators only allow of a single wife; Greeks and Romans, Gauls and Germans, Spaniards and Britons, all have adopted this usage. In Asia, on the contrary, polygamy has always been permitted; Jews or Assyrians, Tartars or Persians, Egyptians or Turcomans, were always allowed to have several wives.

We may, perhaps, look for the reason of this difference, in the nature of the geographical circumstances of Africa and Asia.

These countries being inhabited by men of various

colours, polygamy is the only means of preventing them from disagreeing. The legislators have considered, that in order to prevent the whites being enemies to the blacks—the blacks to the whites, and the copper-coloured race to both, it was necessary to make them all members of one family, and thus to check that common disposition of man to hate whatever is not of his own race and kind. Mahomet thought that four wives were sufficient for attaining this end, because each man could have a white wife, a black, a copper-coloured, and one of some other colour. Doubtless, it was also in the nature of a sensual religion to favour the passions of its sectaries; and thus policy, and the prophet were in accordance.

Should legislators ever desire to give liberty to the blacks in our colonies, and to establish perfect equality, they must authorize polygamy, and allow one man to have at the same time a white, a black, and a mulatto wife. Henceforward, the different races, forming parts of the same family, will regard each other as mingled together; and without this, no satisfactory results will ever be obtained; the blacks will be either more numerous or more clever and cunning, and will lord it over the whites, or *vice-versa*.

In consequence of this general principle of the equality of all colours, there was no difference between the individuals composing the households of the Mamelukes. A black slave bought by a bey from an African caravan, became a katchef, and was quite equal in rank to the handsome fair-skinned Mame-

lukes of Circassia: no idea was ever even entertained that it could be otherwise.

Slavery is not, and never has been, in the East, what it is in Europe. In this respect, Eastern manners have remained the same as those described in the Scriptures: the handmaiden marries her master.

The Jewish law supposed so little distinction between them, that it prescribes what the servant should become when she married the son of her master. Even in the present day, a Mussulman buys a slave, brings him up, and if he pleases him, unites him to his daughter and makes him heir to his fortune; and this is not in the least opposed to the customs of the country. Mourad-Bey and Ali-Bey had been sold to Beys when still very young, by merchants who had purchased them in Circassia. They at first performed the lowest duties in the houses of their masters. But their handsome faces, their skill in manly exercises, their bravery and their intelligence, gradually raised them to the highest offices. The same thing happens in the households of the pachas, the viziers, and the sultans; their slaves rise in rank as their sons would do.

In Europe, on the contrary, any one marked with the seal of slavery remained all his life in the lowest rank of the household. Among the Romans, slaves could be made free, but they always retained a low, mean character, and were never looked upon in the same light as a citizen who was born free. The

slavery of the European colonies, founded on difference of colour, is even more severe and degrading.

The results of polygamy, and the manner in which the Eastern nations regard slavery and treat their slaves, differ so materially from our customs and our ideas of slavery, that we can with difficulty conceive clear ideas on the subject. It was long before the Egyptians could be made to understand that all the French soldiers were not the slaves of Napoleon, and it was only the most enlightened among them who at length comprehended the matter.

Every father of a family in the East possesses over his wife, his children, and his slaves, an absolute power, which public authority cannot modify. Himself a slave of the Grand Seignior, he exercises within his own household the same despotism to which he is subjected when without its pale; and a Pacha, or officer of any kind, never penetrates into the interior of a family, to disturb its head in the exercise of his authority; this would be an act entirely opposed to the national customs, manners, and character; each man looks upon himself as master in his own house, and an agent of a superior power having any business with him, waits till he comes out, or sends to seek him.

The Mahometans have a great many religious ceremonies, and have great numbers of mosques, where the faithful go several times a day to pray. The religious festivals are celebrated by grand illumina-

tions of the mosques and streets, and sometimes by fireworks.

They also celebrate festivals on the occasions of births, marriages, or the circumcision of their children; the last is the one which is celebrated with the most earnestness and good will. All their ceremonies are performed with more of outward pomp than ours; their funerals are majestic, and their tombs of magnificent architecture.

At stated hours, Mussulmans repeat their prayers, wherever they may happen to be; their slaves lay down carpets for them, and they kneel with their faces turned to the east.

Charity and alms-giving are recommended in every chapter of the Koran, as deeds the most pleasing to God and the prophet. To employ part of a fortune in public foundations—above all, to dig a canal or well, or erect a fountain, are works meritorious *par excellence*. The erection of a fountain, or of a reservoir, is frequently connected with that of a mosque; wherever there is a mosque, there is water in abundance; the prophet seems to have put it under the protection of religion. It is the first want of the desert, and must, therefore, be carefully collected and preserved.

Ali has but few sectaries in Arabia, the Turkish empire, Egypt, or Syria; the Mutualis are the only followers of his who are to be found there; but the whole of Persia, as far as the Indus, belongs to his sect.

The general-in-chief went to celebrate the festival of the prophet, at the house of the Sheik El-Bekir. The ceremony began with the recital of a kind of litany, narrating the life of Mahomet from his birth to his death. About a hundred Sheiks, sitting in a circle, on carpets, with their legs crossed, recited all the verses, swaying their bodies violently backwards and forwards; this movement they all performed simultaneously.

After this, a grand dinner was served, during which the company were seated on cushions, with crossed legs. There were about twenty tables, with five or six persons at each; that appropriated to the general and the Sheik El-Bekir stood in the middle; a small flat tray, made of a precious wood, and inlaid, was raised about eighteen inches from the ground, and successively covered with a great number of dishes; rice, roast meats of various kinds, entrées, and pastry, all highly spiced. The Sheiks fed themselves with their fingers; and water, for washing the hands, was presented three times during the repast. For drink, gooseberry water, lemonade, and several other kinds of sherbet were served; and at dessert there were a great many preserves and sweetmeats. Altogether, the dinner was not disagreeable, the manner of eating was the only thing which seemed strange to us.

In the evening, the town was illuminated; after the repast, the company proceeded to the square Espekié, which was very beautifully illuminated with coloured lamps. An immense crowd of people was

assembled there; they stood in rows of from twenty to a hundred persons, all busily reciting the prayers and litanies of the Prophet, accompanied by movements which increased every moment in violence, until at the end they seemed convulsive, and some persons fell down exhausted.

During the course of the year, the general-in-chief often dined with the Sheik Sadda, the Sheik Fayoum, and other principal Sheiks. These were days of fête through the whole of the quarters. The soldiers were all served with the same magnificence and nearly in the same manner.

The Eastern women go veiled; a piece of linen covers the mouth and nose, and only allows their eyes to be seen. When the Egyptian women are accidentally surprised without their veils, and only wearing the long blue tunic which composes the dress of the fellahs, they take the lower part of this dress, and conceal their faces with it.

The general-in-chief had several opportunities of seeing some of the most distinguished women of the country, to whom he gave audiences. These were either the widows of Beys or Katchefs, or their wives, who came to implore his protection during the absence of their husbands. The richness of their dress, their noble gait, small soft hands, fine eyes, dignified and graceful bearing, and elegant manners, denoted them to be women of superior rank and education.

They always began by kissing the hand of the *Sultan Kébir*,* and then lifting it to their foreheads. Several of them made their requests with great grace, and a charming tone of voice; and developed all the talents and amenity of the most elegant European women. The propriety and modesty of their dress gave them fresh charms; and the imagination delighted to picture graces of which not even a glimpse was afforded.

Women are regarded as sacred in the East, and during times of intestine war, they are constantly treated with respect. The wives of the Mamelukes retained their houses at Cairo, while their husbands were making war against the French. Napoleon sent his step-son, Eugene, to make a complimentary visit to the wife of Mourad Bey, who had under her orders about fifty slaves, belonging to this chief and his Katchefs. They formed a sort of convent of nuns, of which she was the abbess. She received Eugene on her grand divan in the harem, which he was allowed to enter by express permission, and as being the envoy of the *Sultan Kébir*. All the women were eager to see this young and handsome Frenchman; the slaves could scarcely restrain their curiosity and impatience. The wife of Mourad Bey was a woman of about fifty years of age, and possessed of the beauty and graces befitting that age. According to the usual custom, she caused coffee and sherbet to be

* This was the name given by the Arabs to Napoleon. The word *Kébir* signifies *Great*.

served in very rich vessels, and with sumptuous attendance. She also drew from her finger a ring of the value of a thousand louis, and presented it to the young officer. She frequently addressed petitions to the general-in-chief, who often preserved her property, and constantly protected her. She was considered as a woman of distinguished merit.

The Egyptian women lose their good looks at an early age; *brunettes* are more common than *blondes*. Their complexion has generally a tinge of copper colour. The most beautiful are Greeks and Circassians, with whom the bazaars of the merchants who carry on this trade are abundantly provided. The caravans from Darfour and the interior of Africa bring a great number of beautiful black women.

Egyptian marriages are concluded without the parties having seen each other; the woman may, perhaps, have had a glimpse of the man; but the man has never seen the features of his bride.

Those of the Egyptians who had rendered services to the French, and even the Sheiks themselves, sometimes petitioned the general-in-chief to give them such and such a person, whom they indicated, for a wife. The first request of this kind was made by an Aga of the Janissaries, a sort of police-agent, who had been very useful to the French, and who desired to marry a very rich widow; the proposal seemed to Napoleon singular. "But does she love you?" asked he. "No!" was the reply. "Will she be willing to marry you?" "Yes; if you command

it." And so it proved ; for immediately on learning the will of the *Sultan Kébir*, she gave her consent, and the marriage took place. The same thing afterwards occurred frequently.

The women in Egypt have their privileges ; there are things which their husbands cannot refuse them, without being looked upon as barbarians and monsters, and raising up the public voice against them ; such, for example, as the right of going to the bath. These are vapour-baths, where the women assemble ; it is there that all intrigues, political or otherwise, are arranged ; it is there that marriages are settled. General Menou, having married a lady of Rosetta, treated her *à la Française*. He gave her his hand to conduct her to the dining-room ; the best place at table, the most delicate portions of the food, were always appropriated to her ; if her handkerchief fell, he hastened to pick it up. On hearing this lady relate these circumstances in the bath at Rosetta, the others conceived a hope of a change in manners and customs, and signed a petition to *Sultan Kébir*, entreating that their husbands might be enjoined to treat them in the same manner :

The dress of the Eastern nations has nothing in common with ours ; instead of a hat they cover their heads with a turban, a head-dress both more elegant and more convenient, and which, being susceptible of great variety in form, colour, and arrangement, permits of the various nations and races being distinguished at a glance ; the neck and all the joints are

free; an Eastern might remain for months in his clothes without feeling any fatigue from it.

The different nations and ranks are dressed in various styles; but all have in common the width of the trousers, sleeves, and other parts of their dress. In order to shelter themselves from the sun, they cover themselves with shawls. In the dresses of the men, as well as in that of the women, much use is made of silks, Indian stuffs, and cashmires. They wear no linen. The fellah's dress is simply a blue robe, confined round the waist. The Arab chiefs, who scour the desert even during the furious heat of the dog-days, are covered with shawls of all colours, which shelter them from the heat of the sun, and are drawn over their heads. Instead of shoes, the men and women of Egypt wear slippers, which, on entering a room, they leave on the edge of the carpet.

The accoutrements of their horses are extremely elegant. The whole dress of the French staff, although covered with gold, and displaying all the luxury of Europe, appeared mean and shabby when compared with theirs, and was eclipsed by the majesty of Eastern dress. Our hats, our tight-fitting trousers, and confined coats, our strangling stocks, all these were to them objects of ridicule and aversion. They do not require, as we do, to change their dress before mounting their horses; they use no spurs, and put their feet into wide stirrups, which render useless the boots and the special dress which we are obliged to put on for riding.

The Franks and Christians who live in Egypt, go about on mules or asses, unless they are persons of high rank.

The architecture of the Egyptians bears more resemblance to that of Asia than to that of Europe. The houses all have a terrace, on which the inhabitants take the air; there are even baths on some of these terraces. They have several stories. On the ground floor is a kind of parlour, where the master of the house receives strangers and offers refreshments. On the first floor is generally the harem, the only communication with which is by private staircases. In the master's apartment is a little door, which leads to one of these. Other small staircases of this kind are used for the necessary passage of servants, &c. The harem consists of a large saloon in the form of a cross; opposite to it is a corridor, from which open a great number of rooms. Round the saloon are divans, of more or less rich materials, according to the wealth of the master, and in the centre stands a small marble basin, from which a *jet d'eau* springs up. • Sometimes this basin contains rosewater, or other essences, which rise in the *jet d'eau*, and perfume the apartment. All the windows are covered by a kind of blind or trellis-work. There are no beds in the houses; the eastern nations sleep on divans or carpets. When they have no guests in the house, they take their meals, sleep, and spend all their moments of repose and leisure in their harem.

As soon as the master of the house enters the ha-

rem, the women hasten to serve him; one presents his pipe, another his cushion, &c. Everything there is for the service of the lord of the house.

The gardens have no walks; they are composed of bowers of large trees, where one can sit, take the air, and smoke. The Egyptian, like all the natives of the East, spends a great part of his day in the last-mentioned enjoyment; it is, at the same time, an occupation and a pleasure.

The arts and sciences are in their infancy in Egypt. At Gemil-el-Azar, they teach the philosophy of Aristotle, the rules of the Arabian language, the art of writing, and a slight knowledge of arithmetic; the professors explain and discuss the different chapters of the Koran, and teach that part of the history of the Caliphs with which it is necessary to be acquainted, in order to know and judge of the various sects of Islamism. The Arabs are completely ignorant with regard to the antiquities of their country, and their ideas of geography are superficial and erroneous.

There were at Cairo some astronomers, the extent of whose knowledge only enabled them to compile an almanack.

As a consequence of this ignorance, they have but little curiosity. Curiosity only exists among nations sufficiently advanced in knowledge to be able to distinguish between what is natural and what is extraordinary. The sight of balloons had not the effect upon them which we had anticipated. The pyramids have only become interesting to them because they have

noticed the great interest taken in them by foreigners; they do not know who built them, and the whole of the people, with the exception of a few more enlightened, regard them as a production of nature; the most enlightened among them, seeing us attach so much importance to the pyramids, imagined that they had been constructed by an ancient race from whom the Franks were descended. It is thus that they explain the curiosity of Europeans. The science which would be the most useful to the Egyptians is hydraulic mechanics. They are deficient in machines: they have, however, one which is ingenious, for pouring water from a ditch or a well on a higher ground; the machine is worked either by hand or by a horse. This species of mill is the only one with which the Egyptians are acquainted; we did not find a single water mill or windmill in the whole of Egypt. The employment of the latter kind of mill, for raising water, would be a great acquisition in that country, and might produce important results. Conté established one for them.

The artizans of Cairo are very intelligent; they imitate with great exactness whatever they see done. During the revolt of this city, they cast mortars and cannons, but in a rough manner, which reminded one of those made in the thirteenth century.

The art of weaving cloth was known to them; there were even some weavers who embroidered Mecca carpets; these carpets are very sumptuous, and made with much art.

At a dinner of which the general-in-chief partook, at the house of the Sheik El Fayoum, the Koran became the subject of conversation. "All human science and knowledge are to be found in it," said the Sheiks. "Are the arts of casting cannon and making gunpowder to be learned from it?" asked Napoleon. "Yes," replied they, "but it is necessary to know how to read it"—a scholastic argument of which all religions make more or less use.

The navigation of the Nile is easy, and is actively carried on; the vessels descend with the current, and ascend with the aid of sails and of the north wind, which prevails during a certain season of the year. When the south wind prevails, the boats are frequently obliged to wait a long time before they can go up the river. The boats used on the Nile are called *djermas*; their masts and sails are higher, nearly by a third part, than those of ordinary boats; this arises from the necessity of having sails sufficiently elevated to catch the wind above the hills which enclose the valley. The Nile is constantly covered with these *djermas*; some were used for the transport of merchandise, others for the conveyance of passengers. They are of various sizes; some navigate in the great canals, others are constructed for use in the small ones. The river near Cairo is always covered by the sails of vessels ascending or descending. The officers of the French staff, who used *djermas* in going to convey orders, frequently met with accidents. The Arab tribes who were at war with us waylaid them at some bending of the

river where the wind failed them. Sometimes also, in descending the river, these boats ran aground, and the officers on board were massacred.

The caïques are small chaloupes or pinnaces, light and narrow, which are used for crossing the Nile, and for navigating, not only in the canals, but over the whole country during an inundation. The number of light vessels which cover the Nile is more considerable than on any other river in the world; and the reason of this is, that during several months of the year, communications even from one village to another can only be made by means of these boats.

There are in Egypt neither carriages nor wagons. The means of conveyance by water are so numerous and easy, that land carriages are perhaps less necessary in this country than in any other. A carriage received by Ibrahim Bey, from France, was regarded as a very remarkable thing.

Horses are used for traversing the city, except by the Sheiks and women, who ride on mules or asses, and are always surrounded by a great number of officers and servants in uniform, who carry large sticks in their hands.

For the conveyance of goods, camels are generally employed; they are also used for riding on. The smallest and lightest kind of camels, which have only one hump, are called dromedaries. The animal is trained to kneel down when his rider wishes to mount. The rider places himself on a kind of pack-saddle, with his legs crossed; and guides the dromedary by means

of a bridle attached to a ring which is passed through its nostrils. This part of the camel being very sensitive, the ring produces the same effect as the bit does on a horse. The dromedary has a very long step; its ordinary pace is a high trot, which produces the same effect on the rider as the rolling of a ship might do. A dromedary will easily get over twenty leagues in a day: a panier is generally hung at each side of the camel, in which persons sit, and which are also used for bearing loads; it is in this way that the women travel. There is no caravan of pilgrims without a great number of camels equipped in this way for their use. These animals are able to carry a weight of a thousand pounds, but usually only carry about six hundred; their milk and their flesh are both good for food.

Like the camel, the dromedary drinks but little, and can even do without drink for several days. It finds something with which to nourish itself even in the most barren parts of the desert; it is the animal of the desert.

There are in Egypt immense quantities of asses; they are large and of a fine race; at Cairo, they, in a manner, supply the place of hired vehicles; every soldier, for a few *paras* had one at his disposal for a whole day. At the time of the expedition to Syria, more than 8,000 might be reckoned in the army; they were extremely useful.

The horses of the deserts bordering on Egypt are the finest in the world, and have served to improve all the European breeds. The Arabs are extremely careful

to keep the race pure; they preserve the genealogies of their horses and mares. The great distinctions of the Arabian horse are its swiftness, and the easiness and gentleness of its paces; it only drinks once a day, rarely trots, and almost always goes either at a walk or a gallop. It can stop suddenly on its hind legs, a thing which it would be impossible to train our horses to do.

The institution of Egypt was composed of members of the institution of France, and of learned men and artists not belonging to that body. They formed themselves into a society, and included among their number several artillery and staff officers, and others who had cultivated literature and the sciences.

The institution was established in one of the palaces of the beys. The large saloon of the harem, by means of some alterations, was fitted up as a room in which the sittings were to be held; and the rest of the palace afforded apartments for the members. In front of this building lay an immense garden, opening into the country beyond, and near which a fort, named the fort of the institution, was built.

A great number of machines and instruments relating to physics, astronomy, and chemistry, had been brought from France; they were arranged in the different rooms of the institution, in which collections were also made of all the curiosities of the country, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral.

The garden was converted into a botanical garden; a chemical laboratory was established at head-quarters,

where, several times a week, Berthollet made experiments, Napoleon and a great number of officers being present. The establishment of the institution strongly excited the curiosity of the inhabitants of Cairo; when they learned that religious affairs were not the objects of these meetings, they became persuaded that the members were alchemists meeting for the purpose of discovering the means of making gold.

The simple manners of these learned men, their constant occupation, the respect shown them by the whole army, and their utility in directing the fabrication of objects of art and manufacture, by artists of the country, soon gained for them the consideration and respect of the whole population.

The members of the institution were also employed in the civil administration. Monge and Berthollet were appointed commissaries of the Grand Divan, and the mathematician, Fournier, commissary of the Divan of Cairo.

Costay was made editor of a newspaper; the astronomers Nouris and Noel travelled over and examined the principal points of Egypt, for the purpose of determining their geographical position, especially that of the ancient monuments, endeavouring by this means to reconcile ancient with modern geography.

The engineer Lepeyre was appointed to survey and make a plan of the Suez canal, and the engineer Girard, to study the system of the navigation of the Nile. One of the members of the institution had the direction of the mint at Cairo. He caused a number

of *paras*, a small copper coin, to be struck. This was a very advantageous proceeding; the treasury gained twenty per cent. by it. The *paras* were circulated not only in Egypt, but even in Africa, and the deserts of Arabia, and instead of embarrassing the circulation and injuring the exchange—an inconvenience attaching to copper money—they favoured them. Conté established several manufactories.

The ovens for hatching eggs, which Egypt has employed from time immemorial, deeply engaged the attention of the institution. In several other usages held by the Egyptians from tradition, traces were discovered, which were carefully noted, as useful in the history of the arts, and possibly affording some clue to other ancient usages, now lost in oblivion.

General Andréossy received the scientific and military commission of visiting and examining the lakes of Menzaleh, Boorlos, and Natron. Geoffroy applied himself to natural history. The draughtsmen, Dutertre and Rigolo, took drawings of everything which might afford an idea of the customs and monuments of antiquity. They took portraits of all the Egyptians who had distinguished themselves by their devotion to the general-in-chief; and who were greatly flattered by this distinction. General Caffarelli and Colonel Sukowski often read at the meetings of the Institution curious memorials drawn up by the members.

When Upper Egypt was subdued, which did not

occur till the second year, the whole body of learned men proceeded thither for the purpose of making researches for antiquities.

These various labours furnished the materials for the splendid work on Egypt, compiled and engraved during the first fifteen years of the present century, and which cost several millions of francs.

The climate throughout the whole of Egypt is healthy; but notwithstanding this, one of the first cares of the administration was the foundation of hospitals; on this point, there had been, as yet, nothing done in Egypt. The house of Ibrahim Bey, situated on the bank of the Rodah canal, at a quarter of a league from Cairo, was fixed upon for the great hospital: it was made capable of receiving five hundred patients. Instead of wooden beds, use was made of large osier baskets, on which were placed palliasses made of straw, of which there was no want, and mattresses of cotton or wool. In a short time, this hospital was abundantly furnished with everything necessary. Similar ones were established at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta; and the regimental hospitals were much enlarged.

The French army, while in Egypt, were much incommoded by disease of the eyes; more than half the soldiers were afflicted with it. This disease is said to be attributable to the following causes: the salts which are to be found in the sand and dust, and which necessarily affect the sight; and the irritation produced by defective perspiration during the

very cool nights which follow days of burning heat. Whether this explanation be the true one or not, it is at all events evident that this ophthalmia is the result of the climate. St. Louis, on his return from his expedition to the Levant, brought a great number of blind soldiers back with him, and it was this circumstance which gave rise to the establishment of the *Quinze Vingts*, at Paris.

The plague always comes from the direction of the coast, and never from Upper Egypt. Lazarettos were established at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta, and one very large one was built on the isle of Rodah; and when the plague appeared, the French put into vigorous execution the system of the sanitary laws of Marseilles. These precautions were very useful to us; they were entirely unknown to the natives, who at first submitted reluctantly to them, but afterwards felt their utility. It is during the winter that the plague is most prevalent; in the month of June it disappears entirely. The question whether this disease is endemic in Egypt, has been very frequently discussed; those who affirm that it is so, think they have remarked that it shows itself at Alexandria or on the coast of Damietta, in the years when it happens (a great exception) to rain in these countries. There is no example of its having begun at Cairo, or in Upper Egypt, where it never rains. Those who think that it comes from Constantinople or from other parts of Asia, in the same way, found their

opinion on the supposed fact that the first symptoms always manifest themselves on these coasts.

Various alterations were made in the house of Elfy Bey, in the square of Espekié, occupied by the general-in-chief, for the purpose of accommodating it to European habits. The first change made was the construction of a large staircase leading to the first story; the ground-floor being appropriated to the officers of the staff. Various changes were also made in the garden; there were no walks in it; a great number were laid out, and marble basins and *jets-d'eau* constructed. The eastern nations are not fond of walking; to walk when one can be seated, appears to them an absurdity, for which they can only account by the whimsicality of the French character. Some speculators established in the garden at Cairo a kind of Tivoli, similar to that at Paris, where fireworks and illuminations were displayed; it was also a public walk, and in the evening was the rendezvous of the army.

A road was constructed from Cairo to Boulac, which could be used at all times, even during the inundations. A theatre was built, and a great number of houses were arranged and adapted to our habits, like that of the general-in-chief; and a great bakehouse was established. At the point of the isle of Rodah, several windmills, for grinding corn, were built; and they began to be put into use for raising water and watering the ground. Several sluices had been made, and everything necessary prepared for beginning

the works of the canal of Suez; but fortifications and military buildings fully occupied the army during this first year.

Napoleon often gave dinners to the Sheiks. Although our customs differed so much from theirs, they found the chairs, forks and knives, very convenient. At the conclusion of one of these dinners, the general asked the Sheik El Modi: "What is the most useful thing I have taught you during my six months' residence here?" "The most useful thing that you have taught me," replied the Sheik, half in jest and half in earnest, "is to drink while I am eating." The custom of the Arabs is not to drink till the conclusion of a repast.

On the evening after the battle of Shebbreiss, July 13th, 1790, the French army proceeded for the night to Shaboar. This day's march was a very fatiguing one; the soldiers proceeded in order of battle and at a quick step, in the hope of cutting off some vessels of the enemy's flotilla; and the Mamelukes were in fact obliged to burn several of them. The army bivouacked at Shaboar under fine sycamore trees, and found fields full of a kind of water-melon, which is a very healthy and refreshing fruit. We met with this fruit along the whole line of march as far as Cairo, and the soldiers showed how pleasant a species of food it was to them, by naming it, after the example of the ancient Egyptians, *holy melon*.

On the next day, the army was very late setting out on its march; some provisions had been procured, and it was necessary to distribute them. We waited for our flotilla, which could not ascend against the stream until the north wind rose; this night we slept at Zounjeara.

On the following day we arrived at Alkam. There General Zayonchek received orders to land on the right bank, with all the dismounted cavalry, and to march upon Menouf and the point of the Delta. As there were no Arabs in this part of the country, he was master of his own movements, and was of great use to us in procuring provisions. He took up his position at the head of the Delta, at Batu-el-Baccara.

On the 17th, the army encamped at Abu-Neshabeh; on the 18th, at Wardan. Wardan is a large place; the troops bivouacked in an extensive forest of palm-trees. The soldiers were now beginning to know the usages of the country, and they dug up the lentils and other vegetables which the fellahs are in the habit of concealing in the ground. We made but short marches on account of the necessity of procuring subsistence, and in order to be always prepared to receive the enemy. We often encamped as early as ten o'clock A.M., and the first care of the soldiers was to bathe themselves in the Nile. Our next place of encampment after Wardan, was Om-Dinar, from whence we could see the pyramids. Every telescope was immediately directed towards these the most ancient monuments in the world; they might be taken for enormous masses of

rocks, did not the regularity of form, and straight lines of the angles, bear witness that they were the work of man. The pyramids bound the horizon of the valley on the left bank of the Nile.

We now approached Cairo, and were informed by the natives of the country, that the Mamelukes, together with the militia of Cairo, and a considerable number of Arabs, Janissaries, and Spahis, awaited us between the Nile and the Pyramids, covering Ghizeh; here they boasted that our success should come to an end.

We remained a day at Om-Dinar. This day of repose afforded time to see to our arms, and prepare ourselves for battle. Melancholy and sadness reigned in the army. As the Hebrews complained in the wilderness, and angrily demanded of Moses the onions and flesh-pots of Egypt, so the French soldiers incessantly regretted the delights of Italy. It was in vain to assure them that Egypt was the most fertile country in the world; that it was even superior in that respect to Italy; there were no means of persuading them of this; they could have neither bread nor wine. We encampèd among immense fields of corn, but there were neither mills nor ovens. The biscuit which had been brought from Alexandria was long ago consumed; the soldiers were reduced to grinding corn between two stones, and making cakes of it, which they baked under the ashes. Some of them roasted the corn in a stove, and then boiled it; this was the best way of using the grain, but it was not *bread*. Their fears

increased daily to such a degree, that many of them said there was no great city of Cairo; that the place bearing that name was like Damanhour, merely a vast collection of huts, and deficient in everything which could render life commodious and agreeable. So tormented were their imaginations by these ideas, that two dragoons threw themselves with all their clothes on into the Nile, and drowned themselves. It must be stated, however, that if they had not bread and wine, still the corn, lentils, meat, and sometimes pigeons which they were able to procure, supplied at least nourishment for them. But the evil lay in the greatness of their expectations. The officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, for the contrast was to them more striking. They did not find in Egypt the quarters, the good tables, and all the luxuries of Italy. The general-in-chief, desirous of setting a good example was in the habit of bivouacking in the midst of the army, and in the least commodious places. No one had either tents or provisions; the dinner of Napoleon and his staff consisted of a dish of lentils. The evenings of the soldiers were passed in political conversations, reasonings, and complaints. "What have we come to do here?" said some; "the Directory has banished us." "Caffarelli," said others, "is the agent who has been made use of to deceive the general-in-chief." Some having observed that wherever vestiges of antiquity were found, they were carefully examined, poured forth invectives against the learned men, who, they said, had started the idea of the expedition, in

order that they might pursue their researches. They called an ass *a learned man*, and said of Caffarelli Dufalga, in allusion to his wooden-leg: "*He does not care for all this; he has one foot in France.*" But Dufalga and the learned men soon regained the esteem of the army.

On the 21st, at one o'clock in the morning, we left Om-Dinar; we expected this day to be decisive. At the break of day we saw, for the first time since leaving Shebbreiss, a vanguard of Mamelukes, consisting of about 1,000 horsemen; they manœuvred with order, but attempted no attack—a few balls from our advanced guard kept them in awe. At ten o'clock, we came in sight of Embabeh, and saw the enemy drawn up in order of battle. Their right wing was stationed close to the Nile, on the bank of which they had thrown up a large entrenched camp, defended by forty pieces of cannon, and by about 20,000 men, composed of Janissary infantry, Spahis, and the militia of Cairo. The right wing of their line of cavalry was supported by the entrenched camp; the left extended in the direction of the pyramids, on the road towards Ghizeh; there were from 9,000 to 10,000, as well as one could judge. Thus their whole army amounted to 30,000 men, including the infantry and foot soldiers who served each horseman: 2,000 or 3,000 Arabs held the extreme left, and filled up the space between the Mamelukes and the pyramids. These arrangements were formidable. We did not know how the Janissaries and the Spahis would conduct themselves, but

we knew, and greatly dreaded, the skilful and impetuous bravery of the Mamelukes.

The French army drew up in the same order of battle as at Shebbreiss; the left wing supported by the Nile, the right by a large village. General Desaix, who commanded the right wing, required three hours to form into position and take breath. We reconnoitered the enemy's entrenched camp, and soon discovered that it was but a slight, rough piece of work, having only been begun three days before, after the battle of Shebbreiss. It was composed of long trenches, which might be of some avail against a charge of cavalry, but not against an attack of infantry. We also saw through our telescopes that their cannon were not on moveable carriages, but were heavy pieces of iron taken from vessels, and managed by the crews of the flotilla. As soon as the general-in-chief had ascertained that the artillery was not mounted, it became evident that neither it nor the infantry would leave the entrenched camp; or that even if the infantry did leave it, they would find themselves without artillery. The arrangements for battle were therefore made in accordance with this information; it was resolved to prolong our right wing, and to follow the movement of this wing with the whole army, thus passing out of the reach of the cannon in the entrenched camp. We should then only have to do with the Mamelukes and the cavalry, and should place ourselves in a position which would prevent the infantry and artillery from affording them any assistance.

Mourad Bey, the commander-in-chief of the enemy, perceived the movement in our columns, and immediately guessed our intention. Although this chief had not been accustomed to command, nature had endowed him with a vigorous character, undaunted courage, and a penetrating glance. The three affairs which we had had with the Mamelukes, had already given him experience. He saw, with a quickness which could scarcely be expected from the most skilful European general, that the fate of the day depended on his not allowing us to execute our movement, and on his making use of his numerous cavalry to attack us on our march.

He set out with the two-thirds of his horsemen (6,000 or 7,000,) leaving the rest to defend the entrenched camp, and encourage the infantry; and advancing at the head of this troop, attacked General Desaix, who was advancing on the extremity of our right wing. This was a dangerous movement. The charge was made with such rapidity, that we thought the squares were falling into confusion; General Desaix, who was at the head of the column, had got into a palm grove. The advanced guard of the Mamelukes, however, which fell upon him, was not numerous, the body of the troops did not arrive till a few minutes afterwards, and this delay sufficed for us. The squares were perfectly formed, and received the charge with coolness. General Regnier supported their left. Napoleon, who was in the square of General Dugua, immediately marched upon the chief

body of the Mamelukes, and placed himself between the Nile and Regnier. The Mamelukes were received by a shower of grape and musket shot; about thirty of the bravest of them fell near General Desaix; but the mass, by an instinct natural to the horse, turned round the squares, and the charge was a failure.

Amidst the grape-shot, balls, dust, cries, and smoke, some of the Mamelukes re-entered the entrenched camp, by a movement natural to the soldier, of making his retreat to the same place from whence he set out. Mourad Bey, and the more experienced soldiers, directed their course towards Ghizeh. This commander-in-chief thus found himself separated from his army. The divisions of Bon and Menou, which formed our left wing, now marched upon the entrenched camp, and General Pompon was dispatched with two battalions to occupy a kind of defile between Ghizeh and the camp.

The most horrible confusion prevailed at Embabeh. Our cavalry threw themselves on the enemy's infantry, who, not expecting the attack, and seeing that the Mamelukes were defeated, threw themselves into the djermas, caiques, and other boats, in order to re-cross the Nile; many swam across it; the Egyptians excel in this exercise, which is rendered necessary to them by the peculiar circumstances of their country. The forty pieces of cannon which defended the entrenched camp did not fire 200 shots. The Mamelukes who had retreated to this camp, soon perceiving their error,

endeavoured to escape to Ghizeh, but it was too late; the two battalions which were placed between the Nile and Ghizeh, supported by the other divisions, drove them back into the camp; many of them met their death there; several thousand attempted to cross the Nile and were drowned. Entrenchments, artillery, posts, baggage, everything fell into our hands. Of this army of more than 30,000 men, only 2,500, who were with Mourad-Bey, escaped, of the cavalry: and many of the infantry escaped by swimming or in boats. The number of the Mamelukes drowned in this battle is estimated at 5,000. Their numerous corpses, in a few days, carried the news of our victory along the shore to Damietta and Rosetta.

It was at the commencement of this battle that Napoleon addressed to his soldiers the words since become so celebrated: "From the summits of these pyramids, forty centuries look down upon you."

It was night when the three divisions, those of Desaix, Regnier, and Dugua, returned from Ghizeh; the general-in-chief established his head-quarters at the country house of Mourad-Bey.

The Mamelukes had, on the Nile, about sixty vessels, loaded with all their riches. Seeing the unexpected issue of the combat, and finding that our cannon were already planted on the bank of the river beyond the opening at the isle of Rodah, they gave up all hopes of saving these vessels, and set them on fire. During the whole night we could see, by the light of the flames,

the minarets and buildings of Cairo, and of the City of the Dead. The fire threw such a strong light that we could even see the pyramids.

The Arabs, according to their custom after a defeat, rallied at a distance from the field of battle, in the desert beyond the pyramids.

For several days the whole army was employed in trying to find the bodies of the Mamelukes. The value of their weapons, and the quantity of gold which they were accustomed to carry on their persons, made the soldiers very active in this search.

Our flotilla had not been able to follow the movements of the army; the wind had failed. Had we had it, the day could not have been more decisive, but we should probably have made a great number of prisoners, and taken possession of all the riches, which had, as it was, fallen a prey to the flames. The crews of the flotilla had heard our cannon, notwithstanding the north wind, which blew violently; according as the wind fell, the noise of the cannon increased, till at length it appeared to approach nearer, and the sailors thought that the battle was lost; but the number of corpses which passed them on the stream, and which were all those of Mamelukes, soon reassured them.

It was not until long after his flight that Mourad-Bey discovered that he was only followed by a part of his troops, and saw the error which his cavalry had committed in returning to the entrenched camp. He attempted several charges, in the hope of covering the way for them, but he was too late. The Mame-

lukes themselves were seized with terror, and acted without energy. Fate had decreed the destruction of these brave and intrepid troops, composed of the *élite* of Eastern cavalry. The loss of the enemy on this day may be estimated at 10,000 men, left on the field of battle or drowned—Mamelukes, Janissaries, Militia of Cairo, and slaves of the Mamelukes.

A thousand prisoners, 800 or 900 camels, and as many horses were taken.

At nine o'clock in the evening, Napoleon entered Mourad-Bey's country house at Ghizeh. These residences bear no resemblance whatever to our *châteaux*. We had a good deal of trouble in accommodating ourselves, and in understanding the arrangement of the different rooms. But the thing which most agreeably struck the officers was the great number of cushions and divans, covered with the most beautiful damask and Lyons silks, and adorned with gold fringe. There, for the first time in Egypt, we found the luxury and the arts of Europe. A part of the night was passed in exploring this singular mansion. The gardens were filled with magnificent trees, but had no walks, and bore some resemblance to the gardens of certain orders of nuns in Italy. What gave the most pleasure to the soldiers, for every one hastened to them, were the large bowers of vines, covered with the most splendid grapes. The vintage was soon gathered.

The two divisions of Bon and Menou, which had remained in the entrenched camp, were also enjoying the greatest abundance. They had found among the

baggage a number of canteens full of spices, confectionary, and sweetmeats. Every moment they came upon carpets, porcelain, and a number of articles of furniture used by the Mamelukes, which excited our curiosity. The army now began to be reconciled to Egypt, and to believe at length that Cairo was not Damanhour.

Next morning, at break of day, Napoleon proceeded to the river, and having taken possession of several boats, sent over General Vial and his division to the Isle of Rodah: they rendered themselves masters of it, after a few musket shots. From the moment that possession was taken of this isle, a battalion placed in the Mokkias, and sentinels stationed along the canal, the Nile might be considered as crossed; we were then only separated from Boulac and Old Cairo by a large canal. The general-in-chief examined the walls of Ghizeh, and works were immediately commenced for closing its gates. Ghizeh was surrounded by a wall, of extent sufficient to enclose all our posts, and strong enough to keep the Mamelukes and Arabs in check.

We awaited with impatience the arrival of the flotilla; the north wind blew as usual, and yet it did not come! The Nile was low, its waters had failed, and the vessels had run aground. Rear-Admiral Perrée sent word that we must not reckon on him, as he could not fix the day of his arrival. This disappointment was extremely vexatious; for our wish was to take possession of Cairo during the first moments of stupor, and not, by losing forty-eight hours, to give

the inhabitants time to recover from their alarm. Fortunately, however, it was not the Mamelukes alone who had been vanquished; the Janissaries of Cairo, and all the brave men which it contained, had also taken part in the battle, and were in a state of the greatest consternation. All their reports on the subject of the combat gave the French a character which approached the marvellous.

A dragoman was sent by the general-in-chief to the Pacha, and to the Cadi-sheik, the Imaum of the grand mosque, and the proclamations which Napoleon had published on entering Egypt were circulated. The pacha had already quitted Cairo, but he had left his kiaya, or lieutenant, behind. The latter thought it his duty to come to Ghizeh, since the general-in-chief declared that he was not making war against the Turks, but against the Mamelukes. He had a conference with Napoleon, who succeeded in convincing him that his best plan was to yield; in doing this, he might entertain a hope of playing an important part, and making his fortune; in refusing, he would bring on his own destruction. He, therefore, assured the general of his obedience, and promised to persuade Ibrahim Bey to withdraw, and the inhabitants of Cairo to submit. The next day, a deputation of the Sheiks of Cairo came to Ghizeh, and brought intelligence that Ibrahim Bey had already quitted the city, and was gone to encamp at Birket-el-Hadji. The Janissaries had assembled, and had determined to surrender, and the Sheik of the grand mosque of Gemil-el-Azar had been com-

missioned to despatch a deputation, for the purpose of negotiating the surrender of the town, and imploring the clemency of the victor. The deputies remained several hours at Ghizeh, where all the most efficacious means were taken to confirm them in their good dispositions, and to give them confidence. The following day, General Dupuy was sent to Cairo as commandant, and took possession of the citadel. Our troops crossed the canal and occupied Old Cairo and Boulac. The general-in-chief made his entry into Cairo on the 27th of July, at four o'clock in the afternoon. He lodged in the house of Elfy Bey, in the square Espekié, where he established his head quarters. This house stood at one extremity of the town, and the gardens communicated with the open country.

Cairo lies at the distance of half a league from the Nile; Old Cairo and Boulac are its ports; it is intersected by a canal, which is generally dry, but which becomes full at the time of the inundation, when the dyke is cut, an operation which is not performed till the Nile has reached a certain height, and which gives occasion to a public festival. The canal then pours its waters into numerous other canals, and the square Espekié, as well as most of the other squares and gardens of Cairo, are covered with water. During the inundations, all these parts of the town are traversed by means of boats.

Cairo is overlooked by a citadel, situated on a hill which commands the whole town. An aqueduct, rather a remarkable work, supplies this citadel with

water. The water which supplies the aqueduct is preserved in a reservoir, in an enormous octagon tower, in Old Cairo, into which the waters of the Nile are raised by a hydraulic machine. Joseph's Well also supplies water to the citadel, but this water is not so good as that of the Nile. The French found this fortress in a neglected state, without defences, and falling to ruin. Works were immediately commenced for its repair, and it has been since kept in good condition. Cairo is surrounded by high walls, surmounted by enormous towers built by the Arabs; these walls were in a bad state, and crumbling from age; the Mamelukes repaired nothing. The town is large; half of its circuit borders on the desert; so that on passing through the gate of Suez, or through those on the side towards Arabia, we come immediately upon the arid sands of the desert.

The population of Cairo was considerable; it was estimated to contain 210,000 inhabitants. The houses are very high, and the streets narrow, in order to be sheltered from the sun; and for this same reason, the bazaars and public markets are covered over with linen cloth or matting. The Beys have very handsome palaces of Oriental architecture, which bears more resemblance to that of India than to ours. The Sheiks have also very fine houses. The *Okels* are large square buildings with immense courts in the centre, in which dwell whole corporations of merchants. Thus, there is the Okel for rice, and that for sugar, the Okel of the Suez merchants, and that of the

Syrian merchants: all these buildings have within them, and looking upon the streets, small shops of twelve or fifteen feet square, where stands the merchant with samples of his goods.

Cairo contains a great number of mosques, which are considered the finest in the world; the minarets are rich and numerous. The mosques generally serve to receive pilgrims; among this number is Gemil-el-Azar, which is cited as the largest in the East. These mosques usually consist of courts, round which are ranged enormous columns supporting terraces; within are a number of basins or reservoirs of water, for drinking and performing ablutions.

There is one quarter of the town, called the quarter of the Franks, inhabited by some European families; there are to be seen a few houses, much like those which might belong in Europe to merchants possessing an income of 30,000 or 40,000 francs; they are furnished in the European style, with chairs and beds. In this quarter are also the Coptic churches, and a few convents of Syrian catholics.

Adjoining the city of Cairo, on the side towards the desert, is the City of the Dead; this is the place where all the families of Cairo have their tombs; it is of greater extent than Cairo itself. A multitude of mosques, tombs, minarets, and domes, preserve the memory of the great men who have been interred there, and who have had them built. Many of the tombs have keepers, who have lamps constantly burning in them, and show the interior to the curious

The families of the deceased, or public foundations, provide for these expenses. Even the tombs of the common people, which are only raised a couple of feet above the ground, are distinguished by families or quarters.

Cairo contains a great number of coffee-houses: here people take coffee, sherbets, and opium, and discuss public affairs.

All round this town, as well as near Alexandria, Rosetta, and other towns, are to be seen mounds or hillocks of considerable height; they are all formed of ruins and rubbish, and grow larger every day, because the refuse of the city is added to them; this produces a very disagreeable effect. The French established police regulations for the purpose of putting a stop to the evil; and the institution took into consideration the means of entirely abolishing it. But difficulties presented themselves. Experience had proved to the people that it was dangerous to throw this rubbish into the Nile, because it encumbered the canals, or spread itself over the country with the inundation. These ruins are the consequence of the decay of the country, traces of which are observable at every step.

The siege of St. Jean d'Acre may be divided into three periods.

First Period—It commences on the 20th of March, the day on which the trenches were opened, and

finishes on the 1st of April. During this period, our whole *équipage de siège* consisted of a battery of thirty-two cannon, which Major Lambert had obtained at Caiffa, by forcibly seizing the boat of the Tiger; but these could not be used in their present way of mounting; and we were deficient in balls. These difficulties, however, soon disappeared, and within four-and-twenty hours the cannon were newly mounted. As to balls, Sidney Smith provided us with them. From time to time a few horsemen or wagons were made to appear, and then this commodore approached the shore, and poured a rolling fire from all his batteries, and the soldiers, who got five sous for each ball which they brought to the director of the artillery, ran and picked them up. They became so accustomed to this manœuvre, that they pursued their search in the midst of the cannonade, while laughter resounded on every side. Sometimes, too, a *chaloupe* was advanced, on which a feint of constructing a battery was made. In this way, balls of twelve and thirty-two pounds were collected. We had powder, for a good deal had been brought from Cairo, besides which, some had been found at Jaffa and at Gaza. All our artillery, therefore, including the field-pieces, consisted of four twelve-pounders, provided with 200 shots each, eight howitzers, a battery of thirty-two pieces, and about thirty four-pounders.

The general of artillery, Sanson, who was commissioned to reconnoitre the town, came back with the intelligence that it had neither counterscarp nor

fosse. He said that he had, by night, reached the foot of the rampart, where he had received a musket-shot which had severely wounded him. His report was incorrect; he had indeed reached a wall, but not the rampart. Unfortunately, measures were taken in accordance with the information brought by him. The soldiers flattered themselves with a hope of taking the town in three days; "for," said they, "it is not so strong as Jaffa; its garrison only amounts to 2,000 or 3,000 men, whereas Jaffa, though a much smaller place, had a garrison of 8,000 at the time when it was taken."

On the 25th of March, in four hours' time, the battery and the four twelve-pounders made a breach in the tower, which was considered practicable. A young officer of talent, with fifteen sappers and twenty five grenadiers, was ordered to mount to the assault and clear the foot of the tower, and adjutant Laugier, who took up his position in the *place d'armes*, at the distance of 100 toises, was to throw himself into the breach the instant this was done. The sappers having come out from behind an aqueduct, had a distance of about thirty toises to pass over, but they were stopped short by a counterscarp of fifteen feet high, and a fosse of several toises in width. Five or six of them were wounded, and the rest, finding themselves exposed to a fearful volley of musketry, hastily retired to the trenches.

A miner was immediately stationed to blow up the counterscarp. This difficult operation was performed

under the fire of all the ramparts, and of a large number of mortars, which, directed by the excellent means furnished by the English mountings, poured their contents in every direction. All our eight-inch mortars and some of our best pieces, which had fallen into the hands of the enemy, assisted in the defence of the place. The mine was sprung on the 28th of March, but did not produce the intended effect; it was not sufficiently deep, and only overthrew the half of the counterscarp, leaving still eight feet. The sappers, however, asserted that there was no more left. Maily, an officer of the staff, was consequently commanded to assist, with a detachment of twenty-five grenadiers, an officer of the engineers, who was to advance against the counterscarp with six sappers. As a precautionary measure, they took with them three ladders, with which they were to descend from it. As the firing incommoded them very much, they attached the ladder to the breach, and the sappers and grenadiers preferred mounting to the assault. They caused Laugier (who was ready to second them with two battalions) to be told that they were in the fosse, that the breach was practicable, and that it was time to come to their assistance. Laugier set off in double-quick march; but just as he arrived at the counterscarp, he met the grenadiers returning; they said that the breach was too high by several feet, and that Maily and several others were killed.

When the Turks saw this young officer fixing the ladder, a panic had seized them, and they had fled to

the port; even Djezzar had embarked. But the death of Mailly produced the failure of the whole operation; the two battalions separated to reply to the cannonade; Laugier was killed, and several men were lost without any good result. This event was very unfortunate. That was the day on which the town ought to have been taken; from this time reinforcements arrived every day by sea.

Second Period.—From April 1st to April 27th.

A new mine, intended to destroy the whole counterscarp, was opened, in order that the fosse might no longer present any obstacle. What had been done was found to be useless; it was no longer easy to make a new shaft. The miners required eight days to complete the work. They succeeded perfectly in blowing up the counterscarp. On the 12th, the mine was continued under the fosse, with the aim of blowing up the whole tower; there was no longer any hope of entering it by the breach; the enemy had filled it with all kinds of fire-work makers. The mine was continued during six days; the besieged at length became aware of it, and made a sally in three columns; the centre one was headed by English; they were repulsed, and a captain of Marines was killed on the shaft of the mine. It was during this period that the battles of Canaam, Nazareth, Saffet, and Mount Tabor were fought. The first took place on the 9th, the second on the 11th; the others on the 13th and 16th. On this same day, April 16th, the miners calculated that they were under the centre of the tower. It was at this

time that Rear-Admiral Perrée arrived at Jaffa, from Alexandria, with three frigates; he had landed two mortars and six eighteen-pounders at Tortura. Two of these pieces were placed so as to overlook the small island which flanked the breach, and the others were directed against the ramparts and walls beside the tower. The intention was to enlarge, by the overthrow of the tower, the breach which it was supposed the mine would make; for it was feared that the enemy had made an inner intrenchment, and had isolated the tower, which projected beyond the rest of the fortifications. On the 25th the mine was fired; but a vault which was under the tower misled the calculations, and the side next us was the only part blown up. Two or three hundred Turks and some pieces of cannon were buried in the ruins, for they had embattled every story of the tower and occupied it. The French resolved to profit by the first moments of surprise; and thirty men attempted to take possession of the tower. Not being able entirely to succeed, they maintained their position in the lower stories, while the enemy occupied the upper ones, until the 26th, when General Veneux was wounded. They then evacuated it, in order to make use of our batteries against the now shaken building, and entirely to destroy it. On the 27th Caffarelli died.

Third Period.—From April 27th to May 30th.

During this period, the enemy felt that if they remained on the defensive, they were lost. The counter mines which they had made did not sufficiently secure

them. All the battlements of the wall were destroyed, and the pieces dismounted by our batteries. A reinforcement of three thousand men, which had entered the place, had, however, repaired all their losses.

But the imaginations of the Turkish troops were struck with terror, and they could no longer be persuaded to remain on the walls, or in the tower; they fancied that every place was undermined. Phillipeaux traced the lines of counter-attack; these lines proceeded from the palace of Djezzar, and from the right of the point of attack. He also traced two trenches, like two sides of a triangle, which took all our works in flank. The numerical superiority of the enemy, the great number of labourers in the town, and the bales of cotton of which they made demi-bastions, greatly expedited the works; in a few days they flanked the whole tower, on the right and on the left; after this the enemy erected *cavaliers*, on which they mounted some twenty-four pounders. The French several times overthrew and destroyed their counter-attack and their batteries, and spiked their cannon; but this could never be continued for any time; they were too much overlooked by the walls and the tower. Orders were given to make counter-mines, so that their sappers and ours were only separated by a few yards of ground, and were constantly approaching each other. We also made *fougades*, which afforded us the means of entering the enemy's trenches, and destroying all that were not on their guard.

It was thus that, on the 1st of May, two hours before day-break, the French gained possession, without loss, of the most projecting part of the counter-attack. At break of day, twenty valiant men attempted to occupy the tower, all the defences of which had been completely razed by our batteries; but at this moment the enemy came out in force on the right of the tower, and their balls pouring on the detachment in the rear, compelled them to retreat. The sally was energetically repulsed; from five to six hundred of the besieged were killed, and a great number driven into the sea. As there was now nothing left of the tower, we resolved to attack a portion of the rampart by means of a mine, in order to avoid the entrenchment which the enemy had constructed. The counter-scarp was blown up; the mine had already crossed the fosse, and was beginning to extend under the scarp, when, on the 6th, the enemy sallied by a sap which was covered by the fosse, surprised the mask of the mine, and filled up its shaft.

On the 7th, a reinforcement of 12,000 men arrived to the assistance of the enemy. Immediately on hearing that they were signalled, we made a calculation, and found that, with the present wind, they would not land for six hours; we consequently brought into operation a twenty-four pounder, which had been sent by Rear-Admiral Perrée; it overthrew a part of the wall to the right of the tower, which was to our left. During the night, the French threw themselves on all the enemy's works, overthrew them, killed

every one who came in their way, spiked the cannon, mounted to the assault, took possession of the tower, and entered the place; and had, in short, made themselves masters of the town, when the freshly landed troops presented themselves in formidable numbers to assist the besieged; Rambaut was killed, 150 men perished with him, or were taken; Lannes was wounded. The besieged sallied from every gate, and regained the breach; but here their success ended; the French marched upon them, and after having driven them back into the town, and having cut off several of their columns, re-established themselves on the breach. In this affair we made seven or eight hundred prisoners, armed with European bayonets; they came from Constantinople. The enemy's loss was enormous;—all our batteries poured showers of grape on them; and our success appeared so great, that on the 10th, at two in the morning, Napoleon ordered a new assault. General Bon was mortally wounded in this last action. There were 20,000 men in the town, and Djezzar's house and all the others were so filled with people, that we could not pass the breach. In such circumstances, what course was the general-in-chief to pursue? On the one hand, Rear-Admiral Perrée, who was returning from a cruise, had, for the third time, landed artillery at Tortura; we began to have enough artillery to afford us hopes of reducing the town; but, on the other hand, the prisoners announced that fresh reinforcements were preparing to leave Rhodes when they had embarked.

The reinforcements already received, or about to be received, by the enemy, might render the success of the siege doubtful; so far distant as we were both from France and from Egypt, we could not afford to suffer fresh losses. The number of our wounded, at Jaffa and in the camp, was 12,000, and the plague was in our hospitals. On the 20th, the siege was raised.

General Kleber had never served in the capacity of commander-in-chief; he had been engaged in the army of the Sambre and Meuse as a general of division, under the orders of Jourdan. Having incurred the displeasure of the Directory, he had remained in obscurity at Chaillot, until Napoleon arrived at Rastadt, in November, 1797, after having completed the conquest of Italy, dictated peace under the walls of Vienna, and captured Mayence. Kleber attached himself to him, and followed him into Egypt. He conducted himself there with as much talent as bravery; he acquired the esteem of his commander-in-chief, who considered him the best officer in his army after Desaix; he showed himself also one of the most subordinate, to the astonishment of the officers of his staff, who had been accustomed to hear him blame and criticise the movements of the army of the Sambre and Meuse; he expressed great admiration of the manœuvres at the battle of Mount Tabor, in which the general-in-chief had saved his honour and his life. Some weeks after,

he advanced at the head of his division to the siege of St. Jean d'Acre; Napoleon sent orders to him to return and join him, not wishing to expose so valuable a life on a service which could be as well performed by a brigade-major.

When the general-in-chief had come to the resolution of returning to Europe to the assistance of the republic, he had at first intended to leave the command of the Egyptian army with Desaix; then to take with him to France both Desaix and Kleber; and lastly, to take Desaix with him, and to leave Kleber in command of the troops. It is certainly an extraordinary proof of jealousy, to raise a general of division to the rank of general-in-chief! and yet we read that this was the case, and in a work of considerable authority. But why should the conqueror in so many battles be jealous? and what proofs of jealousy has he given?

The army of Egypt was able not only to maintain itself, but even to keep up its numbers without receiving any assistance from France: provisions, the various articles of dress, and everything necessary to an army, were to be had in the country in abundance. There was enough of ammunition, &c. for several campaigns; besides, Charbonnier and Conté had established powder manufactories; the army had officers for 80,000 men, and could enlist as many recruits as they chose, principally among the young Copts, Greeks, Syrians, and blacks of Darfour and Sennaar. The 21st demi-brigade enlisted 500 Copts, of whom several

afterwards became non-commissioned officers, and received the cross of the legion of honour; there are, no doubt, some of them still in France.

But what power was in a condition to attack Egypt? The Ottoman Porte? She had just lost her two armies of Syria and of Rhodes; the inhabitants of the country round the pyramids, of Mount Tabor, and of Aboukir, had betrayed the weakness of the Ottoman arms. The Grand Vizier, with his collection of Asiatic *canaille*, was no longer an object of terror to the inhabitants themselves. Russia?—This was merely a sort of bugbear, with which the army was to be terrified. The Czar wished the French army to be consolidated in Egypt; it was useful to his purposes, and was opening for him the gates of Constantinople. England then alone was left: but an army of at least 36,000 men would have been required for such an operation, and England could not then dispose of such an army. It was evident, since England had formed a second coalition, that she would conquer Egypt in Italy, in Switzerland or in France.

But, besides, the army of the east might have received reinforcements from France during the winter; nothing could have prevented

The destruction of the squadron in the bay of Aboukir was, undoubtedly, a great misfortune; but the loss of four vessels, of which three were very old, was not irreparable. From the month of August, 1799, Admiral Brueys was master of the Mediterranean, in command of forty men-of-war; if he had

wished to throw 15,000 men into Egypt, he might have done so. He did not do so, because the war upon the Continent rendered the presence of all the French troops necessary in Italy, in Switzerland, or on the banks of the Rhine. In the month of January, 1800, immediately after the 18th of Brumaire, any number of men might have been sent there, by the squadron of Brest, or that of Rochefort; but the men were wanted in France to dissolve the second coalition; it was not till after Marengo, when the state of the republic was altered, that it was thought advisable to send considerable reinforcements to this army.

Gantheaume left Brest with seven men-of-war, conveying 5,000 men; forty vessels were to set sail as soon as the first cannon-shot should be fired in the Baltic; and this obliged England to send out a reinforcement of thirty men-of-war. These forty vessels from Brest would then have ruled the Mediterranean during a part of the summer; they could have embarked at Taranto the troops destined for Egypt.

In the month of October, 1800, vessels of all sorts, both war and merchant vessels, arrived frequently in Egypt; the various productions of Europe were to be had there in abundance, and the army received news from France every month. There were no means of preventing frigates or corvettes from Toulon, Ancona, Taranto, or Brindisi, from arriving at Damietta, or Alexandria, during the months of November, December, January, February and March; the *Egyptienne* and the *Justice* arrived in the month of January, in sixteen

days from Toulon; the *Régénérée*, from Rochefort in seventeen days: we must conclude, therefore,—1st, the army of the East did not require any assistance: 2ndly, it might have remained many years without requiring new recruits: 3rdly, it might have enlisted as many recruits as were required by choosing Christians, even young Mussulmans: or, finally, by purchasing negroes from Darfour and Sennaar. Egypt is not a fortress, or a barren island; it is an immense kingdom, the coast of which is 120 leagues long. To apply to so rich and so extensive a country the principles applicable to a citadel, is a proof of strange self-deception and error.

The detailed instructions given by the general-in-chief to General Kleber, and the letter dated Aboukir, the 7th Fructidor, which is now printed, and which was written just before his departure, are sufficient to show what were his intentions respecting Egypt, his hopes of returning to complete his work, and his perfect confidence that Kleber would consolidate his colony. So long as France should be engaged in war, and the second coalition should not be dissolved, nothing could be done but to remain stationary in Egypt, and merely retain possession of the country; and for this purpose Kleber or Desaix were more than sufficient. Napoleon obeyed the voice of France which recalled him to Europe. On his departure, he had received from the Directory *carte blanche* in regard to his operations, both in Malta and Sicily, Egypt and Candia. He had full powers to conclude treaties with

Russia, the Porte, the Indian governments and princes; he was allowed to bring back the army, or to name his successor, and return at his own convenience.

When he was informed of the assassination of Kleber, and that General Menou, as the oldest general, had taken the command, he thought of recalling Menou and Regnier, and of giving the command to General Lanusse. General Menou appeared to possess all the qualities necessary for a commander; he was very well informed, a good manager, and an upright man. He had become a Mussulman, which was ridiculous enough, but very suitable to the country; his military talents were rather doubtful; it was known that he was extremely brave; he had behaved very well in La Vendée, and during the attack of Alexandria. General Regnier was more accustomed to war, but was wanting in the first quality of a chief: he was fitted to occupy the second rank, but he did not appear to be suited to the first. His character was reserved; he was fond of solitude; not capable of electrifying, ruling over, and conducting men. General Lanusse possessed much of the sacred fire; he had distinguished himself by brilliant actions in the Pyrenees and in Italy; he had the art of communicating his feelings to the two former. What, however, determined the First Consul to leave things as they were, was the fear lest the nomination of the new governor might be intercepted by some of the enemy's cruisers; and that the English might make use of it as a means of sowing division in the army, which

appeared already somewhat inclined that way. It was impossible, at the time, to foresee how exceedingly unfit Menou was to have the direction of affairs, since he had been a soldier all his life, had read much, had been present in several campaigns, and was perfectly acquainted with the country in which he was stationed.

Napoleon had no party in Egypt—he was commander-in-chief: Berthier, Desaix, Kleber, Menou, Regnier, were all his subordinate officers, and even if there had been parties, how could he have taken such little and crooked ways of arriving at his object? He whose whole administration seemed expressly intended to put down all party spirit, and whose very first act of authority was the law of the nineteenth Fructidor, and the placing such men as Portalis, Bénézech, Carnot, Dumas, Laumond, Fiévé, Barthélémy, Fontanes, Pastoret, &c., in the ministry, the council of state, and the senate? And if this is absurd, why must we find it stated in a respectable work?

Gantheaume left Brest on the 25th of January; he passed the Straits on the 6th of February, and if he had continued his course, he would have arrived at Alexandria on the 20th of February. He would have found no one there except the cruiser on that station: he would have landed the 5,000 men whom he had on board, as well as 1,000 more, the crews of three frigates or corvettes. In seventy-two hours he might have landed everything he had on board, and returned to Toulon; there was no squadron in the

Mediterranean, except that of Admiral Keith, consisting of nine vessels, which was lying in the bay of Macri, embarrassed with a convoy of 180 sail; Rear-Admiral Warren was at Gibraltar with a few vessels in course of preparation, and it would be long before he could be able to start. Admiral Calder, with seven sail, had set off in pursuit of Admiral Gantheaume, and had gone to America: so much address had been used in deceiving the spies. In fact, several officers connected with the administration of Guadaloupe and that of St. Domingo, and a large number of others, both men and women, had embarked on board the squadron at Brest, under the impression that they were about to sail for America.

The frigate, the *Régénérée*, which sailed from Rochefort, passed the Straits on the 19th of February, and arrived at Alexandria on the 1st of March—a clear proof that Admiral Gantheaume, who had passed the Straits on the 6th of February, might have arrived there before that date: and it was only on the 1st of March that Admiral Keith anchored at Aboukir, and landed the army of Abercrombie. General Friaut, who commanded at Alexandria, would have had then 8,000 men to oppose the landing of the British troops. The English would have failed, and Egypt would have been saved; the English army and fleets would have been divided by the war which was being carried on by the French and Spaniards in Portugal, and by the quadruple alliance, which required them to maintain a fleet in the Baltic. The French, having succeeded

in deceiving Admiral Calder, had nothing further to fear in the Mediterranean.

The French admiral's resolution failed him, however, and after having taken an English frigate and a corvette, he anchored, towards the middle of February, in the port of Toulon. The first consul was much displeased at this: he ordered him to set sail again; but the admiral was not ready for sea before the 19th of March. Off Sardinia, he fell in with Admiral Warren's fleet, which had been got together in Gibraltar; it was inferior to his own in numbers, but as his object was not to engage him, he bore up during the night, and avoided him by some very skilful manœuvring. Warren not seeing him at day-break, made sail for Alexandria, in order to place himself under the orders of Admiral Keith. Gantheaume ought also to have sailed in the direction of Mount Carmel, and have landed his little army at Damietta. He would have arrived there in April; we had not then evacuated Damietta, and Egypt might still have been saved. Instead of doing this, he returned a second time to Toulon: the First Consul was much displeased, and sent him orders to sail again, to disembark his army at Damietta, after coasting along Syria, or to land them at El-Baratoun, after crossing over to the African coast. El-Baratoun is a good harbour; from this place to Alexandria there is abundance of water and of food, &c.: he could have landed, with his 5,000 men, provisions for two months, and a supply of money. After five or six days' march,

these 5,000 men would have arrived at Alexandria. This third time, Gantheaume reached the coast of Egypt, on the 8th of June; this army, therefore, might have arrived on the 15th or 20th of June, at the very moment when they could have been best employed, as the reinforcements on their way from England had not then arrived. In June, General Coot had not more than 4,000 men in his camp opposite Alexandria. Hutchinson, with 5,000 men, was near Ghizeh. General Menou, with the reinforcement of Gantheaume's troops, could have attacked General Coot with 10,000 men, could have beaten him, and have despatched Belliard to Cairo; the victory would have been decisive. Three times, therefore, the French admiral might have saved Egypt; but he allowed himself to be imposed upon by false reports; if he had had the decision of Nelson, his squadron, which was light, consisting of vessels well equipped, and good sailers, might have cared nothing for Admiral Keith, not to fight him, but to escape from him. Gantheaume was perfectly acquainted with the coasts of Syria and of Egypt, and circumstances were particularly favourable. All the English fleets were required in the Baltic. A small squadron, sailing well, and well fitted out, may do almost anything. During the siege of Acre, three frigates, commanded by Rear-Admiral Perrée, swept all the seas between Rhodes and Acre, frequently came within two leagues of Sidney Smith, and intercepted several vessels coming from Rhodes to Acre; laden with provisions, cannon,

and munitions of war, for the besieged army; and, notwithstanding this, the *Alceste*, the *Courageuse*, and the *Junon*, were but very poor sailers. If the Admiral had had three frigates like the *Justice* and the *Diane*, he would have manœuvred with much greater boldness; he would even have come to blows with the *Tiger* and the *Theseus*, Sidney Smith's two eighty-gun ships.

To resume: the expedition to Egypt succeeded perfectly—Napoleon landed at Alexandria on the 1st of July, 1798, and, before the 1st of August, was master of Cairo and of the whole of Lower Egypt. By the 1st, of January, 1799, he was master of the whole of Egypt; by the 1st of July, 1799, he had destroyed the Turkish army in Syria, had taken from them the whole of their field equipage, including forty-two guns and one hundred and fifty caissons. Finally, in the month of August, he destroyed an army consisting of the *élite* of the Porte, taking from them, at Aboukir, thirty-two pieces of cannon. Kleber allowed himself to be imposed upon by the Grand Vizier; he restored to him all the fortified places, and consented to a very extraordinary convention, that of El-Arish. In the meantime, Colonel Latour Maubourg having arrived on the 1st of March, 1800, with letters for the First Consul, before Cairo had been surrendered, Kleber defeated the Grand Vizier, drove him into the desert and reconquered Egypt. In the month of March, 1801, the English landed a body of 18,000 men, without horses for their artillery or for their cavalry.

This army must have been destroyed, but Kleber had been assassinated, and by a most unfortunate fatality, the French army was commanded by a man, good in a great many respects, but miserable in respect to war. The army, conquered after six months manœuvring, landed on the coast of Provence, to the number of 24,000 men. The army of Egypt, on its arrival in Malta, in 1798, consisted of 32,000 men; it received there a reinforcement of 2,000 men, but having left a garrison of 4,000, it consisted of 30,000 on its arrival in Alexandria. Afterwards, it received an addition of 3,000 men, from the wreck of the squadron of Aboukir, making in all 33,000 men. Of these, 24,000 returned to France: 1,000 had been previously sent home, wounded or blind, on board the frigates, *Muiron* and *Carrière*, which took home Napoleon; but an equal number had been sent out by the *Justice*, the *Egyptienne*, and the *Régénérée*. The loss, then, amounted to 9,000 men; of whom 4,000 died in 1798 and 1799, and 5,000 in 1800 and 1801, either in the hospitals or on the field of battle. When Napoleon left Egypt at the end of August, the whole force of the army was 28,000 French, including the sick, the veterans, the garrisons, and the camp followers.

The English army, in 1801, consisted at first of 18,000 men; but it received, in the months of July and August, 7,000 men from London, Malta, and Mahon; and 8,000 from the Indies, who landed at Kossier, making in all 33,000. Adding to this, 25,000 Turks, the allied forces employed against Egypt would amount to something

like 60,000 men—a force which it would have been impossible to resist, if they had made a joint attack; but as they only came into action some months after each other, the French must have been victorious, had Kleber and Desaix been at the head of the army, or even any one else than Menou, who, however, had only to imitate exactly Napoleon's movements in 1799, when Mustapha Pacha landed at Aboukir. The religious fanaticism which had been regarded as the most serious obstacle to the establishment of the French in Egypt, had been done away with; all the Ulemas and great Sheiks were well disposed towards the French.

St. Louis, in 1250, landed at Damietta with 6,000 men; if he had conducted himself as the French did in 1798, he would have conquered Egypt in precisely the same way; and if Napoleon, in 1798, had acted as the Crusaders did in 1250, he would have been defeated as they were. St. Louis appeared before Damietta on the 5th of June, and landed the next day. The Mussulmans evacuated the town; he entered it on the 6th, and from that time till the 6th of December he never moved; on that day, he left Damietta, ascending the right bank of the Nile. On the 17th, he arrived on the left bank of the canal of Achmoun, opposite Mausoura, and remained there for two months; the canal being then full of water. On the 12th of February, 1251, when the waters had fallen, he crossed this arm of the Nile, and fought a battle, eight months after his arrival in Egypt.

If, on the 8th of June, 1250, St. Louis had ma-

nœuvred as the French did in 1798, he would have arrived at Mausoura on the 12th of June, having crossed the canal of Achmoun without wetting his feet, as this would have been the season when the Nile is lowest; he would have arrived at Cairo on the 26th of June, and would have conquered Lower Egypt in the month of his arrival. When the first pigeon brought to Cairo the news of the landing of the infidels at Damietta, the consternation was general—there were no means of resisting them; the faithful filled the mosques, and passed the day and night in prayer; they were resigned, and awaited the army of the French. But in eight months, the true believers had had time to prepare to resist them. Upper Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, sent assistance; and St. Louis, defeated and disgraced, was made prisoner. If Napoleon had acted in 1798 as St. Louis did in 1250, and had passed the months of July, August, September, October, November and December at Alexandria, he would have encountered insurmountable obstacles in January and February. Damanhour, Ramanieh, and Rosetta would have been fortified; Ghizeh and Cairo would have been intrenched, covered with cannon, and filled with troops; 12,000 Mamelukes, 20,000 Arabs, 50,000 Arab-Janissaries, assisted by the armies of Arabia, and of the Pachaliks of Damascus, Acre, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, would have advanced to protect the key of the holy Caaba, and would have rendered all the efforts of the French army useless, and compelled them at last to return. In 1250, Egypt was still

less able to defend itself; but St. Louis was not able to profit by its weakness. He spent eight months deliberating with the pope's legates, and praying; time which he might have employed better in conquering the country.

LETTER FROM GENERAL KLEBER
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

*Head-quarters at Cairo,
4th of Vendemiaire, year 8.
(Sept. 26th, 1799.)*

CITIZEN DIRECTORS,

(A) THE Commander-in-chief, Bonaparte, left this for France, on the morning of the 6th Fructidor, without telling anyone of his intention: he had appointed to meet me at Rosetta on the 7th, but I only found despatches from him there. Not being certain of the General's safe arrival, I think it my duty to send you copies both of the letter in which he deputed to me the command of the army, and of that which he addressed to the Grand Vizier at Constantinople, although he knew perfectly well that the pacha had already gone to Damascus.

OBSERVATIONS OF NAPOLEON
ON
THE LETTER
OF
GENERAL KLEBER.

(A) In the latter end of August, the Grand Vizier was at Erivan, in Upper Armenia, having with him only 5,000 men: it was not known in Egypt on the 22nd of August, that the prime minister had left Constantinople; and if it had been known, very little importance would have been attached to the information. When this letter was written, on the 26th of September, the Grand Vizier was neither at Damascus nor Aleppo; he was beyond the Taurus.

(B) My first care has been to investigate minutely the actual situation of the army.

You can easily find means, Citizen Directors, of ascertaining the state of his troops at the time of his arrival in Egypt; they are reduced to half their original number, and we occupy all the principal points of the triangle from the Cataracts to El Arish, thence to Alexandria, and from Alexandria to the Cataracts.

(B) The French army was 30,000 strong at the moment of its landing in Egypt in 1798; General Kleber declares that it was reduced one half on the 26th of September, 1799; it would, therefore, consist of 15,000 men. But this is evidently a falsehood, since the reports of the chiefs of division, sent to the minister of war on the 1st of September, gave the number of the army at 28,500 men, exclusive of the natives of the country: the report of the Intendant Daure represented the consumption of provisions as for 35,000, which number included the artillery, auxiliaries, double rations, the women and the children; and the report of the paymaster Estève, which he sent to the treasurer, represented the number of the army as at 28,500 men. How, then, it may be said, did the conquest of Upper Egypt and of Syria, did the plague and other maladies cause only the loss of 1,500 men? Not so: we lost 4,500 men; but after their landing, our troops received an augmentation of 3,000 men, the remains of the squadron of Admiral Brueys.

Do you require another proof equally strong? it is to be found in the fact that in the months of October and November, 1801, two years afterwards, 27,500 men landed in France, from Egypt, of whom 24,000 belonged to the army; the rest were sailors, Mamelukes, or natives of the country. Now, the army had received no reinforcements except 1,000 men, who were brought by the three frigates, the *Justice*, the *Egyptienne*, and the *Régénérée*; and a dozen of *corvettes* or *advice-boats* which arrived in that interval.

In 1800 and 1801, the army lost 4,800 men, either by sickness, the campaign against the Grand Vizier in 1800, or that against the English in 1801. Besides these, 2,300 men were taken prisoners, some in the forts of *Aboukir*, *Julien*, and *Rahmanieh*, some in the desert with Colonel *Cavalier*, and others conveying the *Djermas*, or at *Marabut*: these troops, however, having been sent back to France, are included in the 27,500 who effected their return.

It is evident, therefore, from this second proof, that in the month of September, 1799, the army amounted to 28,500 men,

(C) However, the question is not now, as it was formerly, a mere struggle against some hordes of frightened Mamelukes; we must fight against and resist the united efforts of three great powers—viz: the Porte, the English, and the Russians.

The complete want of arms, gunpowder, cannon-balls, and musket bullets, presents a picture quite as alarming as the great and sudden diminution in the number of the men, of which I have just spoken. The attempts in foundry have not succeeded at all; the manufactory of gunpowder, established at Rodah, has not yet justified, and probably never will justify, the expectations entertained about it. In a word, the repairing of the fire-arms is a slow process, and the rendering it effective, would require funds and means which we do not possess.

(D) The troops are almost naked, and this deficiency of clothing is the more to be lamented as it is well known that in this country it is one of the

including the maimed, the veterans, and those in the hospitals.

(C) Muskets were not wanting any more than men: the reports of the chiefs of division, in September 1799, show that there were in the depôts 7,000 muskets and 11,000 sabres; and the reports of the artillery officers state that there were 5,000 new muskets, besides 3,000 spare ones at the park, making 15,000.

Neither were we deficient in guns; it was incontrovertibly proved by the artillery reports, that there were 1,426 guns, of which 180 were field-pieces; there were 225,000 projectiles, 1,100 cwt. of powder, 3,000,000 of infantry cartridges, and 27,000 cannon charges in preparation; and the correctness of these reports is proved by the fact that, two years afterwards, the English found 1,375 guns, 190,000 projectiles, and 900 cwt. of gunpowder.

(D) We had no deficiency of cloth any more than of munitions; the report on the state of the stores of the divisions showed that there was cloth in the depôts,

principal causes of dysentery and of ophthalmia, diseases constantly prevalent; the former, particularly, has this year had fatal influence upon the men, who were exhausted by fatigue.

The officers of health remark, and constantly report, that although the army is so considerably diminished in numbers, they have a much greater proportion of invalids this year than they had last year at the same season.

(E) General Bonaparte had, in fact, given orders before his departure for clothing the troops in cloth; but, on this subject, as on many others, he contented himself with issuing orders; the lowness of the finances, which is a new obstacle to have to combat with, no doubt compelled him to postpone the execution of this useful project: we must make some remarks on this want of funds.

The general exhausted all the extraordinary resources during the first few months after our arrival; he then levied, for the expenses of the war, as much as the country could possibly afford; and, therefore, for us to have recourse to those means now, when we are surrounded

and that the clothing was being prepared; and in fact, in the month of October the army was newly clothed. Besides, how could clothing be wanting in a country which can clothe 3,000,000 of inhabitants? The population of Africa and Arabia fabricate cotton and woollen cloth in great quantities.

(E) For a long time, the soldiers' pay was regularly paid; there was a debt of fifteen thousand francs, but that was of long standing: the contributions due amounted to sixteen millions of francs, as could be proved by the statement of the Paymaster Estève, dated the 1st of September.

by enemies abroad, would be to prepare a revolt against us on the first favourable opportunity.

Bonaparte did not leave a *sou* in the treasury when he left Egypt, nor any property worth one; on the contrary, he left a debt of nearly twelve millions of francs—that is to say, more than a year's income in the actual state of things: the pay due to the whole army amounts itself to four millions.

(F) The inundation renders it impossible just now to recover what is due for the year which has now closed, a sum hardly sufficient for the expenses of a month: we cannot take any steps towards collecting this money till the month of Frimaire, and then, there is every reason to believe that we cannot pay attention to it, as we shall be obliged to be fighting.

In fact, as the Nile has this year risen very little, many of the provinces, for want of being inundated, have nothing of any value, and it is incumbent on us to consider this, and be sparing of them.

Everything which I here state, I can prove, Citizen Directors, both by verbal affirmation, and

(F) The conduct of this people during the war in Syria, left no doubt about their good dispositions towards us; but they should not be made uneasy on the subject of religion, and their Ultras ought to be conciliated.

by the written reports certified by the different official persons.

Although Egypt is apparently tranquil, it is very far from being subjected to us : the people are uneasy, and whatever line of conduct we may pursue, they only regard us as the enemies of their property; their hearts constantly beat with the hope of some favourable change.

(G) The Mamelukes are dispersed, but they are not destroyed; Mourad Bey remains constantly in Upper Egypt, at the head of a body of troops sufficiently large to employ a part of our forces : if we should lose sight of him for a moment, his followers would rapidly increase, and he would assuredly disturb us even in the capital, which, notwithstanding a very strict *surveillance*, has never ceased, even to this day, to furnish him with supplies of arms and money.

Ibrahim is at Gaza with about 2,000 Mamelukes, and I am informed that the army of the Grand Vizier and of Djezzar Pacha, to the amount of 30,000 men, has already arrived there.

(G) Mourad Bey had taken refuge in the Oasis, for he no longer possessed a single point in the valley; he had no magazines, not a barque, nor a cannon; he had no followers except some of his most faithful slaves. Ibrahim Bey was at Gaza with 450 Mamelukes; how could he possibly have 2,000, since he never had more than 950, and he had sustained some losses in the battles in Syria?

At the end of the month of September, there was not a single man left of the army of the Grand Vizier; on the contrary, Djezzar Pacha had drawn away all his own troops from Gaza, in order to concentrate them upon Acre. There were no troops at Gaza except the 400 Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey.

(H) The Grand Vizier set out for Damascus about twenty days ago; he is actually encamped near Acre.

(I) Such is, Citizen Directors, the situation in which General Bonaparte has consigned to me the enormous charge of the army of the East; he saw the approach of the fatal crisis: it is true, your orders did not permit him to surmount it. That this crisis exists, is proved by his letters, his instructions, and his half opened negotiation; it is of public notoriety, and is as well known to our enemies, as to the Frenchmen who are in Egypt.

“If this year,” said General Bonaparte to me, “notwithstanding every precaution, the plague should be in Egypt, and that you should lose more than 1,500 soldiers, a considerable loss, since it would be in addition to that which the events of the war would occasion daily; I say, in that case you ought not to run the risk of carrying on the next campaign; and you are authorized to conclude a peace with the Ottoman Porte, even though the evacuation of Egypt should be its principal condition.” This

(H) The Grand Vizier was not in Syria on the 26th of September; he was neither at Damascus nor Aleppo; he was beyond Mount Taurus.

(I) This *fatal crisis* existed only in the general's imagination, and was the work of certain persons who wished to urge him to leave the country,

Napoleon had opened negotiations with Constantinople, on the second day after his arrival at Alexandria, and he continued them in Syria: he had several ends in view; to hinder the Porte from declaring war; to get it to disarm, or at least to render its hostile feelings less active; and to find out what was going on, by means of the goings and comings of the Turkish and French agents, who supplied him with news of the events of Europe.

Where was the *fatal crisis*? The Russian army was said to have arrived at the Dardanelles; that was the first phantom; the English army, which had already passed through the Straits, was the second; lastly, the Grand Vizier was still far distant from Egypt at the end of September. Even if he should pass Mount Taurus and the Jordan, he would have

passage of the letter of the 5th Fructidor is abridged.

I wish you to remark this passage, Citizen Directors, because it is characteristic under more than one point of view, and that it plainly indicates the critical situation in which I am placed.

Of what importance can 1,500 men be, more or less, in the immense extent of territory which I have to defend, and having to fight every day besides?

to encounter the jealousy of Djezzar; he had with him only 5,000 men; he would be obliged to collect his army in Asia, and could, perhaps, bring together forty or fifty thousand men, who had never seen service, and who were as little to be feared as the army of Mount Tabor; this was in reality, a third phantom.

The troops of Mustapha Pacha were the flower of the Ottoman army, and they occupied a formidable position at Aboukir; yet they had offered no resistance. The Grand Vizier would never venture to cross the desert in face of the French army; or if he did so venture, it would have been very easy to defeat him.

Egypt was in no danger, except from the bad spirit which had begun to manifest itself amongst the officers of the staff.

The plague, which had afflicted the army in 1799, carried off 700 men: if its visitation in 1800 should carry off 1,500, it would be of two-fold malignity. In these circumstances, the general, before setting out, wished to provide against the only dangers which threatened the army, and to diminish the responsibility of his successor; he, therefore, authorized him to open a treaty,

if he did not receive news from the government before the month of May, 1800, on the condition that the French army should remain in Egypt till the general peace. But the case provided for had not occurred; it was not yet the month of May; it was only the month of September. There was, therefore, the whole of the winter to pass, during which time it was probable that news would be received from France; and to conclude, the plague did not attack the army either in 1800 or 1801.

(L) The General also says, "Alexandria and El-Arish are the two keys of Egypt."

El-Arish is a bad fort, four days' journey in the desert; the great difficulty of being able to victual it, does not permit of keeping a larger garrison than 250 men; 600 Mamelukes can intercept the communication with Katieh at any time when they feel so disposed; and as, at the time of Bonaparte's departure, the garrison had not provisions for fifteen days, no more time than that was necessary to oblige them to surrender without striking a blow.

The Arabs alone can endure

(L) The fort of El-Arish, which can contain a garrison of five or six hundred men, is built of good masonry; it commands the springs and the forest of palm-trees in the oasis of the same name. It is a watch-tower close to Syria, and the only way by which a hostile army can approach Egypt by land. The locality presents many difficulties to a besieging force; and it may, therefore, be justly styled one of the keys of the desert.

the fatigue of conducting convoys through these burning deserts; but on the one hand, they have been so often deceived by us, that far from offering us any assistance, they get out of the way, and conceal themselves; and on the other, the arrival of the Grand Vizier, who inflames their fanaticism, and gives them many presents, contributes to encourage them to abandon our interests.

(M) Alexandria is not a fortress; it is a vast entrenched camp; it was, indeed, pretty well defended by several pieces of artillery: but we lost that artillery in the disastrous campaign in Syria: On General Bonaparte's departure, he took away the guns of the shipping, in order to complete the arming of the two frigates which he took with him; this camp, therefore, would now only be able to make a weak resistance.

(N) General Bonaparte had, in short, deceived himself as to the effect likely to be produced by his success over the troops of Mustapha, at Aboukir; it is true, he had destroyed, almost totally, the Turks who had

(M) There were at Alexandria 450 guns, of two calibres: the twenty-four pieces lost in Syria belonged to the *équipage de siège*, and were never destined to the defence of that place. In 1801, the English found at Alexandria more than 400 pieces of cannon, independent of the guns on board the frigates and other vessels.

(N) The army of Mustapha, the Pacha of Rumelia, which landed at Aboukir, consisted of 18,000 men; they were the *élite* of the troops of the Porte, and had been engaged in the war against Russia. They were

landed; but what signifies so small a loss as that, to a great nation which has been robbed of one of the finest portions of her dominions, and which religion, honour, and interest equally impel to take revenge, and to recover that of which she has been deprived? Thus, then, this victory did not retard for one instant either the preparations or the march of the Grand Vizier.

(P) In this situation of affairs what can I do?—what ought I to do?—My own opinion is, Citizen Directors, that I ought to continue the negotiations begun by Bonaparte; for even although they should produce no other result than that of gaining time, I should have reason to be satisfied. I send you, with this letter, one which, under this impression, I have written to the Grand Vizier, to send to him with a copy of that of Bonaparte. Should the minister meet my advances, I shall propose to him the restitution of Egypt on the following conditions:—

“The Grand Seignior shall nominate its pacha, as in time past, and he shall again have the

incomparably superior to the army of Mount Tabor, and to all the Asiatic troops of whom the Grand Vizier’s army was composed.

The Grand Vizier only received the news of the defeat at Aboukir, on reaching Eriyan, in Armenia, near the Caspian sea.

(P) This project was well conceived, but badly executed; there is a great difference between it and the capitulation of El-Arish.

Any treaty with the Porte would be good, which should have these two results; its agreeing to disarm, and the continuation of the French troops in Egypt.

right to the *myré*, which the Porte has always claimed, but never, in fact, received.

“Trade shall be free, both as regards customs and other dues, until the government has made peace with England.”

If these preliminary and summary conditions are accepted, I think I shall have done more for the advantage of the country than if I had gained the most brilliant victory; but I much doubt whether they will listen to these proposals. If the pride of the Turks is not opposed to them, I shall have to struggle against English influence; but in every case, I must be guided by circumstances.

(Q) I know all the importance of Egypt as a position; I have said in Europe that it is the *point d'appui* by which France could influence the commercial system of the four quarters of the globe; but, in order to effect that, it would be requisite to have some power as a *lever*; this lever is the marine; our marine did once exist, but since that time everything is altered; and it is only by concluding peace with the Porte, as it seems to me, that we can

(Q) The destruction of eleven ships of war, three of which were unfit for service, did not in any way change the situation of the republic, which was as inferior in power on the sea in 1800, as it had been in 1798. Had we been masters of the sea, we should have marched direct upon London, Dublin, and Calcutta at the same time. It was with the view of acquiring this naval superiority that the republic wished to possess Egypt. It possessed, however, a sufficient

open for ourselves an honourable retreat from an enterprise which has no longer any chance of attaining the object once proposed.

I shall not enter, Citizen Directors, into a detail of all the diplomatic combinations which the actual situation of Europe offers; that is not my province. In the difficulties which surround me, and being so far removed from the scene of business, it is as much as I can do to watch over the safety and honour of the army which I command; and happy shall I be if, with all my care, I can succeed in fulfilling your intentions! If I were once more near you, I should consider it my greatest glory to obey you.

I subjoin, Citizen Directors, an exact account of what we most require for the artillery, and a summary view of the debt contracted and left unpaid by Bonaparte.

(Signed) KLEBER.

(R) P. S. At the moment of my sending you this letter, Citizen Directors, fourteen or fifteen Turkish sail have cast anchor off Damietta, whilst waiting for the fleet of the Capitan-Pacha,

number of vessels to be able to send reinforcements into Egypt, when that should become necessary. At the time when the general wrote this letter, Admiral Bruix, with forty-six ships, was master of the Mediterranean; and he would have succoured the army of the East, if his troops had not been required in Italy, in Switzerland, and on the Rhine.

(R) This postscript shows the state of agitation in which General Kleber was; he had served eight years as an officer in an Austrian regiment; had been engaged in the campaigns of

which is anchored off Jaffa, and which is reported to have on board from 15,000 to 20,000 men; 15,000 are already assembled at Gaza, and the Grand Vizier is on his way from Damascus; he sent back to us within these few days, a soldier of the 25th demi-brigade, who had been taken prisoner at the fort of El-Arish, having previously made him go through all the camp, and desired him to tell his comrades what he had seen, and to tell his general *to tremble*. This seems to show that the Grand Vizier has great confidence in his forces, or else that he wishes to make some advances. With regard to my own situation, it would be utterly impossible for me to bring together more than 5,000 men fit for immediate service; but notwithstanding that, I shall try my fortune, if I cannot succeed in gaining time by negotiation.

Joseph the Second, who had allowed himself to be beaten by the Ottomans, and Kleber entertained an exaggerated opinion of the prowess of the Turkish troops.

Sir Sidney Smith, who had already been the cause of the Porte's losing the army of Mustapha, the Pacha of Rumelia, which he had landed at Aboukir, now came to Damietta with sixty transports, in which were embarked 7,000 Janissaries, very good troops; they were the rear of the army of Mustapha Pacha. On the 1st of November, they landed on the beach at Damietta; the intrepid General Verdier marched against them with 1,000 men, and either killed, took prisoners, or drove into the sea, the whole number; getting possession of six pieces of cannon as trophies.

The Capitan-Pacha was not at Jaffa; the Grand Vizier had not even entered Syria; there were not, then, 30,000 men at Gaza. The Russian and English armies had not even thought of attacking Egypt.

This letter, then, is full of false assertions. It was thought that Napoleon would not arrive in France; it was decided to

evacuate Egypt, and reasons were sought for, to justify that evacuation. When the letter reached Paris (the 12th of January), General Berthier laid it before the First Consul; it was accompanied by reports and accounts from the Intendant Daure and the Paymaster Estève, and by twenty-eight other reports from the colonels, and the chiefs of the divisions of artillery, infantry, cavalry, dromedaries, &c., &c. Extracts from all these reports, drawn up by the minister of war, shewed a state of things which quite contradicted the account given by the general-in-chief. But fortunately for Egypt, a copy of this letter fell into the hands of Admiral Keith, who immediately sent it to London. The English minister instantly forwarded instructions, that no capitulation should be entered into having as a condition the sending back of the army of Egypt to France; or, should it have already embarked, it was to be captured and brought into the Thames.

Another fortunate circumstance was, that Colonel Latour Maubourg, who set out from France at the end of January, as the bearer of the news of

Napoleon's arrival there, of the events of the 18th of Brumaire, the constitution of the year 8, and the letter from the minister of war, of the 12th of January, in reply to that of Kleber, given above, arrived at Cairo on the 4th of May, ten days before the term fixed upon for delivering up that capital to the Grand Vizier. Kleber now saw that he must either conquer or die. He had only to march forward; the undisciplined mob called the "army of the Grand Vizier," were driven beyond the desert without making any resistance. The French troops did not lose 100 men in killed and wounded, whilst they killed 15,000 of the Turks, and took all their tents, baggage, and artillery. Kleber then entirely changed his plan; he applied himself seriously to the work of ameliorating the condition of the army and of the country; but, on the 14th of June, 1800, he perished by the poniard of a miserable fanatic.

Had he been alive when, in the following campaign, the English army landed at Aboukir, it would have been destroyed; but few of the English would have escaped, and Egypt would belong to France.

Napoleon returned to France: 1stly, Because he was authorized by his instructions to do so if he chose; he had *carte blanche* as to his conduct: 2ndly, Because his presence there was necessary for the cause of the republic: 3rdly, Because the army of the East, victorious and numerous, was not likely to have any enemies to contend with for a long time, and because the first object of the expedition had been attained, and the second could never be so, as long as the republic was menaced on its frontiers, and a prey to anarchy. The army of the East had been victorious over the two Turkish armies which had been opposed to it during the campaign—viz., that of Syria, which had been defeated at El-Arish, at Gaza, at Jaffa, at Acre, and at Mount Tabor, with the loss of its park of artillery, consisting of forty field pieces, and of all its magazines: and that of Rhodes, which was beaten at Acre and at Aboukir, where it had lost thirty-four field pieces, and its general-in-chief, the Pacha of three tails, Mustapha. The army of the East was numerous; it amounted to 25,000 fighting men, of whom 3,500 were cavalry; it had 100 mounted field pieces, and 1,400 guns of different calibre, well served. It has been stated that Napoleon left his army in a bad condition, without artillery, without clothing, without provisions, and with numbers diminished to 8000 fighting men. These false reports deceived the English minister; on the 17th of December, 1799, he decided upon breaking the capitulation of El-Arish, and ordered the Admiral then in command in the Mediterranean not to permit the execution

of any agreement which should allow the army of the East to return to France; to seize the vessels on which the troops might have embarked, and conduct them to England. Kleber then clearly understood his position; he threw off the yoke of intrigue, recovered his presence of mind, marched upon the Ottoman army, and defeated it at Heliopolis.

After so shameful a violation of the law of nations, the cabinet of St. James perceived its error, and sent into Egypt 34,000 Englishmen under the command of Abercrombie, which troops being joined by the 26,000 Turks, under the Grand Vizier and the Capitan-Pacha, succeeded in making themselves masters of that important colony, in September, 1801, twenty-seven months after the departure of Napoleon, but not until after a very active campaign of six months' duration, which would have ended in the discomfiture of the English, if Kleber had not been assassinated, and if Menou (than whom no man more unfit ever had the command of an army) had not been placed at the head of the troops. This campaign of 1801, however, cost the English government many millions sterling, 10,000 chosen men, and their general-in-chief.

General Belliaux, at Cairo, on the 27th of June, 1801, and Menou, at Alexandria, on the 2nd of September, 1801, obtained the same capitulation which intrigues had managed to get signed by Kleber at El-Arish, twenty months before, on the 24th of January, 1800—viz., That the French troops should be taken back to France at the expense of the English, with all

their arms, artillery, baggage, and standards, and without being considered prisoners of war. The official reports issued on their arrival at the lazarettos of Marseilles and Toulon state their numbers at 24,000 Frenchmen, their losses in 1800 and 1801 having amounted to 4,000. When Napoleon left Kleber in command of the army, it consisted of 28,000 men, of which there were 25,000 fit for service; it is well known that when he left Egypt, in the month of August, 1799, he believed the possession of that country to be secured to France, and hoped that he should be able, one day, to accomplish the second object of the expedition. As to his opinions upon the state of France at that time, he communicated them to Menou, who often repeated—"He planned the events of the 18th of Brumaire."

EXHUMATION AND TRANSPORT
OF
NAPOLEON'S REMAINS
FROM ST. HELENA TO FRANCE.

It has appeared to the Editor, that the preceding notices and documents concerning the life, actions, and captivity of Napoleon Bonaparte, would be incomplete without some account of the negotiations which subsequently took place between the governments of France and England, with a view to the removal of his remains from St. Helena to Paris, and of the actual removal of these relics from St. Helena to the banks of the Seine. During the period of the Restoration, this question was, of course, not mooted; but on the accession of Louis Philippe, and during the contests which arose amongst rival statesmen and parties in France for the possession of the helm of affairs, the idea of restoring Bonaparte to France was suggested as a measure of popularity, both for the King and his ministers. All danger of the revival of a powerful Bonapartist party was at an end—and this

act of grace was, no doubt, calculated to gratify all those whose recollections were bound up with the military glories of the empire and its illustrious chief. Monsieur Thiers, at the head of a new French ministry, opened negotiations for this purpose with the English government. Lord Palmerston, who was at that time intent upon working out his views in the East, opposed no difficulty whatever, but readily conceded the permission desired—a permission which it would have been absurd to refuse, whilst its concession, and, above all, the manner of its concession, was a proper respect to the King and Government of a powerful ally and neighbour. In consequence of the determination of the French government, Monsieur Guizot addressed the following official note to Lord Palmerston, the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs:

“The undersigned, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of his Majesty the King of the French, has the honour, conformably to instructions received from his government, to inform his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs to her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, that the King ardently desires that the mortal remains of Napoleon may be deposited in a tomb in France, in the country which he defended and rendered illustrious, and which proudly preserves the ashes of thousands of his companions in arms, officers and soldiers, devoted with him to the service of their country. The

undersigned is convinced that her Britannic Majesty's government will only see in this desire of his Majesty the King of the French a just and pious feeling, and will give the orders necessary to the removal of any obstacle to the transfer of Napoleon's remains from St. Helena to France."

This application was seconded by a letter from Earl Granville, the British ambassador in Paris, addressed to Lord Palmerston, in which he states the views and wishes of Monsieur Thiers and the government of France. The letter was as follows:—

"Paris, May 4th, 1840.

"MY LORD,—The French government have been requested, in several petitions addressed to the Chambers, to take the necessary steps with regard to the government of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, in order to obtain an authorization for removing to Paris the ashes of the Emperor Napoleon. These petitions were favourably received by the Chambers, who transmitted them to the President of the Council, and to the other ministers, his colleagues. The ministers having deliberated on this point, and the King having given his consent to the measures necessary to meet the object of the petitioners, M. Thiers yesterday announced to me officially the desire of the French government, that her Majesty's government would grant the necessary authority, to enable them to remove the remains of the Emperor Napoleon

from St. Helena to Paris. M. Thiers also calls my attention to the fact, that the consent of the British government to the projected measure would be one of the most efficacious means of cementing the union of the two countries, and of producing a friendly feeling between France and England.

(Signed) "GRANVILLE."

To this communication, Lord Palmerston, in the course of a few days, transmitted to Earl Granville the following reply:—

"Foreign Office, May 9th, 1840.

"MY LORD,—Her Majesty's government having taken into consideration the request made by the French government for an authorization to remove the remains of the Emperor Napoleon from St. Helena to France, you are instructed to inform M. Thiers, that her Majesty's government will with pleasure accede to the request. Her Majesty's government entertains hopes, that its readiness to comply with the wish expressed will be regarded in France as a proof of her Majesty's desire to efface every trace of those national animosities which, during the life of the Emperor, engaged the two nations in war. Her Majesty's government feels pleasure in believing that such sentiments, if they still exist, will be buried for ever in the tomb destined to receive the mortal remains of Napoleon. Her Majesty's government, in

concert with that of France, will arrange the measures necessary for effecting the removal.

(Signed) "PALMERSTON."

This answer from the British government was no sooner received in Paris, than the King, who was always watchful never to lose any opportunity of increasing his own popularity, and of gaining the affections of the French people for his family, conferred on his son, the Prince de Joinville, the command of the expedition destined to convey the glorious remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to Europe. The necessary steps were taken to provide funds—the necessary arrangements were made; and in reply to the subject matter of the petitions, and the well-known wishes of the majority of the Chambers, the following document was laid before the Chambers by the government of the King of the French; at once signifying his anxious desire to co-operate in the design, and to obtain the acquiescence of the Chambers, by providing the necessary means:—

"May the 12th, 1840.

"GENTLEMEN,—The King has commanded his Royal Highness Prince Joinville to repair with his frigate to the island of St. Helena, there to receive the mortal remains of the Emperor Napoleon.

"The frigate containing the remains of Napoleon will present itself, on its return, at the mouth of the

Seine; another vessel will convey them to Paris; they will be deposited in the hospital of the Invalides. Solemn ceremonies, both religious and military, will inaugurate the tomb which is to retain them for ever.

“It is of importance, gentlemen, to the majesty of such a memorial, that this august sepulture should not be exposed on a public place, amidst a noisy and unheeding crowd. The remains must be placed in a silent and sacred spot, where all those who respect glory and genius, greatness and misfortune, may visit them in reverential tranquillity.

“He was an Emperor and a King; he was the legitimate sovereign of our country; and under this title, might be interred at St. Denis; but the ordinary sepulture of kings must not be accorded to Napoleon; he must still reign and command on the spot where the soldiers of France find a resting-place, and where those who are called upon to defend her will always seek for inspiration. His sword will be deposited on his tomb.

“Beneath the dome of the temple consecrated by religion to the God of armies, a tomb worthy, if possible, of the name destined to be graven on it, will be erected. The study of the artist should be to give to this monument a simple beauty, a noble form, and that aspect of immoveable solidity which shall appear to brave all the efforts of time. Napoleon must have a monument durable as his memory.

“The grant for which we have applied to the

Chambers is to be employed in the removal of the remains to the Invalides, the funeral obsequies, and the construction of the tomb.

“ We doubt not, gentlemen, that the Chamber will concur with patriotic emotion, in the royal project which we have laid before them. Henceforth France, and France alone, will possess all that remains of Napoleon; his tomb, like his fame, will belong solely to his country.

“ The monarchy of 1830 is, in fact, the sole and legitimate heir of all the recollections in which France prides itself. It has remained for this monarchy, which was the first to rally all the strength, and conciliate all the wishes, of the French Revolution, to erect and to honour without fear the statue and the tomb of a popular hero; for there is one thing, and one alone, which does not dread a comparison with glory—and that is Liberty!”*

The enthusiasm with which this beautiful appeal was received throughout the whole of France is well known. The Chambers, by voting a provisional grant of a million, responded worthily to the noble idea of the King.

Immediately on the voting of the grant by the Chambers, the government hastened to make preparations for the voyage. M. Baudouin, director of funeral ceremonies, was charged with the completion

* We are indebted for these details to the official accounts published at the time by the French government.

of the new coffin, and of the imperial pall destined to cover it.

The coffin, which in its simple and severe form resembled the ancient sarcophagi, was entirely without ornament, surmounted only by an entablature and mouldings; in length, it measured 2 metres 56 centimetres—in breadth 1 metre 5 centimetres, in height 76 centimetres. The material was massive ebony, of so jet a black, and of such brilliant polish, that it resembled marble. On the lid there was inscribed in letters of gold—NAPOLEON. In the centre of each side there was placed, in a circular medallion, the letter N, in relief, of bronze gilt. Round the sides and end were disposed six strong bronze rings, made to turn in their sockets, so as to afford a means of carrying the coffin at the time of the ceremony. The lower corners were finished with bronze ornaments. In front was a lock, concealed by a golden star, which was made to turn, and allow the entrance of the key. The wards of the key were of iron, the handle of bronze gilt; the ring represented an N, surmounted by a crown. The ebony sarcophagus contained a leaden coffin, on the lid of which was the following inscription, surrounded by laurel branches and arabesques:

“NAPOLÉON,
EMPEREUR ET ROI.
Mort à Sainte-Hélène.
LE V. MAI,
MDCCCXXI.”

The funeral pall was made of purple velvet, trimmed with ermine. The outer border was composed of arabesques in gold; the inner border of palm leaves; in the four corners were medallions of the imperial eagle. The Emperor's cipher was repeated eight times in the circumference of the pall, which was embroidered with bees, striped with silver, and finished at the corners by four large golden tassels.

On the 2nd of July, Prince Joinville quitted Paris; on the 6th, arrived at Toulon, and went on board the frigate "Bellepoule," which had already been fitted up in the following manner for its pious office:

Between decks, a *chappelle ardente*, hung with black velvet embroidered with silver, contained the imperial cenotaph. This cenotaph, made in the form of the Roman sarcophagi, was painted in black and white, and presented on the front and back two allegorical bas-reliefs, History and Justice; on the ends, the cross of the Legion of Honour, and a figure of Religion; at the corners, four eagles; and surmounting the pediment, the imperial crown.

On the 7th of July, at half-past 7 in the evening, the frigate "Bellepoule," accompanied by the corvette "Favorite," commanded by M. Guyet, set sail from Toulon.

Prince Joinville was accompanied in the "Bellepoule" by Captain Hernoux, his aide-de-camp; Ensign Touchard, his officer of ordnance; Count Rohan-Chabot, commissary of the King; Baron Las Cases, member of the Chamber of Deputies; General Gour-

gaud, aide-de-camp to the King; General Count Bertrand; M. l'Abbé Coquereau, almoner to the expedition; and the four former servants of Napoleon—Saint-Denis and Noverray, valets-de-chambre; Pieron, officer of the kitchen; and Archambaud, butler. M. Marchand, one of the executors of Napoleon, and of whom he said, "The services which he has rendered me are those of a friend," took his passage on board the "Favorite."

After the despatch sent by Prince Joinville, announcing his touching at the Brazils, in the beginning of September, the government for some time received no news of the expedition; at length, on the 30th of November, intelligence was received that the vessels had anchored at Cherbourg, on the same morning at 5 o'clock, after a good passage. Next day, December 1st, the following reports were received:—

*Report of Prince Joinville to the Minister of
Marine.*

"Cherbourg Roads, Nov. 30th, 1840.

"SIR,—As I have already had the honour of informing you, I quitted the bay of All Saints on the 14th of September; I then followed the coast of Brazil with easterly winds, which, on hauling N.E. by N. enabled me speedily to reach the meridian of St. Helena, without being obliged to pass the line of 28 degrees south. After reaching this meridian, calms and gales caused me some delay. On the 8th

of October, I came to anchor in the roads of James Town.

“The brig ‘Oreste,’ dispatched by Vice-Admiral Mackau to bring a pilot from the channel to the ‘Bellepoule,’ had arrived the evening before. As this vessel brought me no fresh instructions, I proceeded to the fulfilment of those which I had previously received.

“My first care was to put M. de Chabot, the King’s commissary, in communication with General Middlemore, governor of the island. These gentlemen were to arrange, in accordance with their respective instructions, the manner in which the exhumation of the Emperor’s remains, and their removal on board the ‘Bellepoule,’ was to be effected. The execution of the arrangements determined upon was fixed for the 15th October.

“The governor took upon himself the direction of the exhumation, and of all the ceremonies which were to take place on the English territory. I regulated the honours to be rendered on the 15th and 16th, by the division placed under my orders. The French merchant ships, the ‘Bonne-Aimée,’ Captain Gallet, and the ‘Indian,’ Captain Truquetil, eagerly associated in our proceedings.

“On the 15th, at midnight, the exhumation was begun, in presence of the French and English Commissioners, M. de Chabot and Captain Alexander, R.E. The latter directed the operations. As M. Chabot gives the government a circumstantial account

of these proceedings, of which he was a witness, I shall not enter into details, but will only state, that at ten o'clock in the morning, the coffin was discovered in the grave. After having taken it out perfectly entire, they proceeded to open it, and the body was found in a state of preservation exceeding our hopes. At this solemn moment, at the sight of the remains, so easily to be recognised, of him who did so much for the glory of France, the emotion of those present was profound and unanimous.

“ At half-past three, the cannon of the ports announced to the vessels in the Roads that the funeral procession was setting out for James Town. The militia and garrison troops preceded the car, which was covered by a pall, the corners of which were borne by Generals Bertrand and Gourgaud, MM. Las Cases and Marchand; the authorities and inhabitants of the island followed in great numbers. In the Roads, the cannon of the frigate had replied to those of the forts, and continued to fire minute guns; since the morning the rigging had been a-peak, the flags hauled down to half-mast, and all the vessels then in the roads, both French and others, had assumed these signs of mourning. When the procession appeared on the quay, the English troops fell into two lines, and the car advanced slowly between them towards the shore.

“ On the shore, at the point where the English lines ceased, I had collected around myself the officers of the French division. In deep mourning and with uncovered heads, we awaited the approach of the car;

at twenty paces from us it stood still, and the governor, advancing to me, delivered the remains of the Emperor Napoleon, in the name of his government, into my hands.

“ The coffin was immediately lowered into the frigate’s cutter, which lay ready to receive it; and here again our emotion was deep and solemn; the desire of the dying Emperor was beginning to be fulfilled; his ashes reposed under the national flag.

“ Every sign of mourning was from that moment abandoned; the same honours which the Emperor would have received in his life-time were rendered to his remains; and amidst salvos from all the vessels, now dressed with flags and with their yards manned, the cutter, escorted by all the ships’ boats, slowly took its course towards the frigate.

“ Arrived on board, the coffin was received between two ranks of officers under arms, and carried to the poop, which was arranged as a *chapelle ardente*. According to my instructions, a guard of sixty men, commanded by the oldest lieutenant of the frigate, performed the honours. Although it was already late, the absolution was pronounced, and the coffin remained exposed during the night. M. L’Abbé Coquereau and an officer kept watch beside it.

“ On the 16th, at ten o’clock in the morning, the officers and crews of the French ships of war and merchant ships being assembled on board the frigate, a solemn funeral service was celebrated; after which

the coffin was lowered between decks, where a *chapelle ardente* had been prepared for its reception.

“ At noon, all was finished and the frigate ready to sail; but the drawing-up of the minute and reports required two days, and it was not until the morning of the 18th, that the ‘ Bellepoule ’ and the ‘ Favorite,’ were able to set sail. The ‘ Oreste ’ left for its destination at the same time.

“ After an easy and fortunate passage, I came to anchor, at 5 o'clock in the morning, in the roads of Cherbourg.

“ Accept, Admiral, the assurances of my respect.

(Signed) “ F. D'ORLÉANS.

“ Captain of the ‘ Bellepoule.’ ”

Report of the Exhumation and Removal of the Remains of Napoléon.

“ We the undersigned, Philippe Ferdinand Auguste de Rohan-Chabot, Knight of the Royal Order of the Legion of Honour, Secretary of the Embassy, and Royal Commissioner, in virtue of powers received from His Majesty the King of the French, to preside, in the name of France, at the exhumation and removal of the mortal remains of the Emperor Napoleon, buried in the Island of St. Helena, and at the transfer of the said remains by England to France, in accordance with the decisions of the two governments, on the one part: and Charles Corsan Alexander, captain of the

royal corps in garrison at St. Helena, deputed by his Excellency Major-General Middlemore, Knight Companion of the Bath, Governor and Commander-in-chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty at St. Helena, to preside, in the name of his Excellency, at the said exhumation, on the other part: "Having previously communicated to each other our respective powers, and verified the same, repaired this day, the 15th of the present month of October, in the year 1840, to the place of interment of the Emperor Napoleon, for the purpose of overseeing and directing in person the operations of exhumation and removal.

"Having arrived at the valley called the Valley of Napoleon, we found the tomb guarded, according to the orders of his Excellency the governor, by a detachment of the 91st regiment of English infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Barney, which had been charged to prevent the approach to the tomb of any person who should not have been indicated by one of us as destined to assist in the ceremony, or take part in the operations.

"The following persons then entered the space thus reserved around the tomb:—

"On the part of France:

"Baron Las Cases, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, Councillor of State; Baron Gourgaud, Lieutenant-General, Aide-de-camp to the King; M. Marchand, one of the Emperor's executors; Count Bertrand, Lieutenant-General, accompanied by M. Arthur Bertrand, his son; M. L'Abbé Félix Coquereau,

almoner of the frigate 'Bellepoule,' accompanied by two choristers; MM. Saint-Denis, Noverray, Archambaud and Pierron, former servants of the Emperor; Captain Guyet, commanding the corvette 'Favorite;' M. Charnet, second in command of the frigate 'Bellepoule;' M. Doret, commanding the brig 'Oreste;' Dr. Guillard, surgeon-major of the frigate 'Bellepoule;' and M. Leroux, plumber.

“ And on the part of England,—

“ The Hon. William Wilde, judge, member of the colonial council of the island of St. Helena; the Hon. Hamelin Trelawney, lieutenant-colonel, commander of the artillery, and member of the council; the Hon. Colonel Hobson, member of the council; Mr. H. Seale, colonial secretary of the government of St. Helena, and lieutenant-colonel of the militia; Mr. Edward Littlehales, lieutenant in the royal navy, commanding his Britannic Majesty's schooner the 'Dolphin,' representing the navy; and Mr. Darling, who had been present at and directed the Emperor's interment.

“ The persons intended to direct and execute the necessary works were afterwards admitted.

“ Then, in our presence, and in that of the persons above-mentioned, it was ascertained that the tomb was entirely uninjured in any way, and the works were begun in the most profound silence, between midnight and one in the morning.

“ We first caused the iron railing which surrounded the tomb, together with the strong stone work into

which they were fastened, to be removed; we then came to the exterior covering of the grave, which, occupying a space of 3 metres, 46 centimetres (11 feet six inches English) in length, and 2 metres, 46 centimetres (8 feet 1 inch) in breadth, was composed of three slabs of stone, 15 centimetres (6 inches) thick, enclosed in a second border of masonry. At half-past one this first covering was entirely removed.

“On its removal, we discovered a rectangular wall, forming, as we afterwards ascertained, the four sides of a vault, 3 metres, 30 centimetres (11 feet) in depth, 1 metre, 40 centimetres (4 feet 8 inches) in breadth, and 2 metres, 40 centimetres (8 feet) in length. This vault was entirely filled with earth to the depth of about 15 centimetres (6 inches) from the slabs of stone which had been removed. After having removed the earth, the workmen, at a depth of 2 metres 5 centimetres (6 feet 10 inches), encountered a horizontal layer of Roman cement, extending over the whole space enclosed within the walls, to which it adhered hermetically. This layer having been, at 3 o'clock, entirely laid bare, the undersigned commissioners descended into the vault, and ascertained that it was perfectly entire, and undamaged in any way. The above-mentioned layer of cement having been broken, another layer was discovered beneath it, 27 centimetres (10 inches) thick, formed of rough hewn stones; attached together by iron tenons; it required four hours and a half of labour to remove this layer.

“The extreme difficulty of this operation induced the undersigned English commissary to cause a trench to be dug on the left side of the vault, for the purpose of throwing down the wall on that side, and thus effecting an opening to the coffin, in case the horizontal layer should offer too strong a resistance to the efforts simultaneously made to break through it. But the workmen having succeeded, towards 8 o'clock in the morning, in entirely removing this layer, the works of the trench, which had reached a depth of 1 metre, 50 centimetres (5 feet) were abandoned. Immediately below the layer thus removed, we found a strong slab, 1 metre, 98 centimetres (6 feet 7½ inches) long, 90 centimetres (3 feet) broad, and 12 centimetres (5 inches) thick, forming, as we afterwards ascertained, the lid of the interior sarcophagus, of cut stone, which contained the coffin. This slab, which was perfectly entire, was enclosed in a border of rough hewn stones and Roman cement, strongly attached to the walls of the vault. This border having been carefully removed, and two rings fixed to the lid, at half-past nine everything was ready for the opening of the sarcophagus. Dr. Guillard then purified the tomb, by sprinkling it with chloride, and the slab was raised by order of the undersigned English commissary, by means of a crab, and laid on the edge of the grave. As soon as the coffin was discovered, all present uncovered their heads, and M. l'Abbé Coquereau sprinkled holy water upon it, and recited the ‘De profundis.’

“ The undersigned commissaries then descended to examine the coffin, which they found in good preservation, excepting a small portion of the lower part, which, although it stood on a strong slab, supported on cut-stone, was slightly injured. Some sanitary precautions having been again taken by Dr. Guillard, an express was sent to his excellency the governor, to inform him of the progress of the operations, and the coffin was raised out of the vault by means of hooks and straps, and carefully removed to a tent prepared for its reception. At this moment, M. l'Abbé, in accordance with the rites of the catholic church, read the service used on the taking up of a corpse.

“ The undersigned commissaries then descended into the sarcophagus, which they ascertained to be in perfect preservation, and exactly corresponding with the official descriptions of the interment.

“ About eleven o'clock, the undersigned French commissary had previously ascertained that his excellency the governor had authorized the opening of the coffins. Conformably to arrangements previously decided on, we caused the first coffin to be carefully removed; we then found a leaden coffin, in good condition, which we placed in that sent from France. His excellency the governor, accompanied by his staff, Lieutenant Middlemore, aide-de-camp and military secretary, and Captain Barnes, entered the tent, to be present at the opening of the inner coffins. The lid of the leaden coffin was then cut and raised with the greatest care, and within was discovered another coffin of wood, in

very good preservation, and corresponding with the descriptions given at the time of the interment, and with the recollections of the persons present at it. The lid of the third coffin having been raised, a tin coffin, slightly oxydated, was discovered; the lid of this being cut and drawn back, a white satin sheet was discovered; this sheet was raised with the greatest precaution by the doctor, and presented to view the body of Napoleon. The features had suffered so little as to be immediately recognisable. The different articles contained in the coffin were found exactly in the positions in which they had been placed; the hands singularly well preserved, the uniform, the orders, the hat, all but very little injured; the whole person, in short, seemed to indicate a recent interment. The body did not remain exposed to the air more than two minutes at most; this time was necessary to the surgeon, for the purpose of taking the measures prescribed in his instructions, and of preserving the body from any ulterior change.

“The tin coffin and that of wood were immediately reclosed, as well as the leaden one containing them. This again was re-soldered with the greatest care, under the direction of Dr. Guillard, and strongly fastened by the corners into the new leaden coffin sent from Paris, which was hermetically soldered. The new ebony coffin was then locked, and the key delivered to the undersigned French commissary.

“The undersigned English commissary then declared to the French commissary, that, the exhumation

being now terminated, he was authorized by his excellency the governor to inform him, that the coffin containing, as had been duly ascertained, the mortal remains of Napoleon, would be considered as at the disposal of the French government the moment it should reach the place of embarkation, to which it was about to be conveyed, under the personal orders of his excellency the governor.

“ The undersigned French commissary replied, that he was commissioned to accept the coffin in the name of his government, and that he, as well as all the persons composing the French mission, was ready to accompany it to the quay at James Town, where his Royal Highness Prince Joinville, chief in command of the expedition, purposed to present himself, in order to receive it from his excellency the governor, and solemnly to convey it to the frigate ‘ Bellepoule,’ commissioned to convey it to France.

“ The coffin, covered by a pall presented by the undersigned French commissary, was placed on a funeral car; and at half past three in the afternoon, the procession set out in the following order, under the command of his excellency the governor, whom indisposition had prevented from being present at the operations of the previous night:—

“ The militia-regiment of St. Helena, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Leake.

“ A detachment of the 91st regiment of infantry, commanded by Capt. Blackwell.

“ The band of the militia.

“ M. l'Abbé Coquereau, with the two choristers.

“ The car, escorted by a detachment of royal artillery; the corners of the pall borne by Lieutenant-General Count Bertrand, Lieutenant-General Baron Gourgaud, Baron Las Cases, and M. Marchand.

“ MM. Saint Denis, Noverray, Archambaud, and Pierron.

“ The undersigned French commissary, heading the mourners, and having beside him Captains Guyet and Charner.

“ M. Arthur Bertrand, followed by M. Coursot, a former servant of the Emperor, Capt. Doret, and Dr. Guillard.

“ The civil, naval, and military authorities of the island, arranged according to rank.

“ His Excellency the Governor, accompanied by the worshipful Chief Judge, and by Col. Hobson, member of the council.

“ A company of royal artillery.

“ The principal inhabitants of the island, all in deep mourning.

“ During the whole time of the procession, the forts fired minute guns.

“ The procession having reached James Town, the car slowly proceeded between two ranks of soldiers belonging to the garrison, with their arms reversed, which extended from the entrance to the town to the place of embarkation.

“ At half-past 5, the procession reached the extremity of the quay. Here his Royal Highness Prince

Joinville, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Hernoux, member of the Chamber of Deputies, and surrounded by the staffs of the three French ships of war, the 'Bellepoule,' the 'Favorite,' and the 'Oreste,' received from his Excellency the Governor the imperial coffin, which was immediately lowered into the ship's boat, previously prepared for this ceremony, and solemnly conveyed by the Prince on board the 'Bellepoule,' with all the honours due to sovereigns.

"In attestation of which, we, the undersigned commissioners, have drawn up the present report, and attached thereto our seals with our arms.

"Drawn up by us at St. Helena, on the 15th day of the month of October, in the year of grace 1840.

"(Confirmed) (LS.) ROHAN-CHABOT,
(LS.) ALEXANDER MIDDLEMORE."

*Report of the Chief Surgeon of the Frigate
"Bellepoule."*

"I, the undersigned, Remi-Jullien Guillard, doctor of medicine, chief surgeon of the frigate 'Bellepoule,' having repaired, in compliance with the instructions of Count Rohan-Chabot, commissary of the King, on the night between the 14th and 15th of October, 1840, to the Valley of the Tomb, island of St. Helena, in order to assist at the exhumation of the remains of the Emperor Napoleon, have drawn up the present minute of the proceedings:—

“ During the first operations, no sanitary precautions were taken; no mephitic exhalation proceeded either from the ground or from the vault when opened.

“ The vault having been opened, I descended into it; in the bottom was the coffin of the Emperor; it rested on a large slab, which was supported on large stones. The mahogany planks of which the coffin was composed, still retained their colour and hardness; except those forming the bottom, on which the velvet exhibited some slight injuries. No body, either solid or liquid, was to be seen anywhere round the coffin. The walls of the vault exhibited not the slightest injury; a few traces of damp alone were to be seen on them.

“ The King’s commissary having requested me to open the inner coffins, I first subjected them to some sanitary measures; and then immediately proceeded to open them. The exterior coffin was fastened by long screws; these we were obliged to cut in order to take off the lid. We then came to a leaden coffin, closely fastened up on all sides; this contained a mahogany coffin, entirely uninjured; and this again a tin coffin, the lid of which was soldered to the sides. The soldering was slowly cut, and the lid cautiously raised; I then perceived a white covering, which concealed the interior of the coffin, and hid the body from view; it was of wadded satin, with which the coffin was also lined. I raised the covering by one end, and rolling it up from the feet to the head, there was presented

to view the body of Napoleon, which I immediately recognised, so well was the corpse preserved, and so much truth of expression did the head possess.

“Something white, which seemed to have detached itself from the satin, like a light gauze, covered all that the coffin contained. The head and forehead, which adhered strongly to the satin, were very much covered with it; but little was to be seen on the lower part of the face, the hands or toes. The body of the Emperor lay in an easy position, the same in which it had been placed in the coffin; the upper limbs laid at their length—the left hand and lower part of the arm resting on the left thigh—the lower limbs slightly bent. The head, a little raised, reposed on a cushion; the capacious skull, the lofty and broad forehead, were covered with yellowish integuments, hard and strongly adhering. The same was the case round the eyes, above which the eyebrows still remained. Beneath the eyelids were to be seen the eyeballs, which had lost but little of their fulness and form. The eyelids, completely closed, adhered to the cheek, and were hard when pressed with the finger; a few eyelashes still remained on the iredges. The bones of the nose, and the integuments which covered them, were well preserved; the tube and the nostrils alone had suffered. The cheeks were swollen, the integuments of this part of the face were remarkable for their soft and flexible feeling, and their white colour; those of the chin were slightly blueish; they had acquired this tint from the beard, which appeared to have grown after death.

The chin itself had suffered no change, and still preserved the type peculiar to the face of Napoleon. The lips, which had become thinner, were parted; three incisor teeth of extreme whiteness appeared under the upper lip, which was a little raised at the left side. The hands left nothing to desire, they were not altered in the slightest degree; though the muscles had lost their power of motion, the skin seemed to have preserved that peculiar colour which belongs only to life; the nails were long, adherent, and very white. The legs were inclosed in boots, but the sewing of the feet had burst, and the four smaller toes of each foot were visible. The skin of these toes was of a dull white; the nails preserved. The anterior region of the thorax was much fallen in the middle, the sides of the stomach sunken and hard. The limbs appeared to have preserved their form beneath the clothes that covered them; I pressed the left arm, and found it hard and diminished in size. The clothes themselves had preserved their colour; thus the uniform of the *chasseurs à cheval* was perfectly to be recognised by the dark green of the coat, and the bright red of the facings; the grand cord of the Legion of Honour crossing the waistcoat, and the white pantaloons partly concealed by the small hat which rested on the thighs. The epaulettes, the gold work, and the two orders on the breast, had lost their brilliancy, and were blackened, with the exception of the crown surmounting the cross of an officer of the Legion of Honour, which preserved its colour. Some silver vases lay between the legs; one surmounted by

an eagle, between the knees; I found it uninjured and closed. As these vases adhered rather strongly to the adjoining parts of the body, by which they were partially covered, the King's commissary thought it better not to displace them for nearer examination.

“Such are the only details which an examination lasting only for two minutes, has allowed me to draw up concerning the mortal remains of the Emperor Napoleon. They are doubtless incomplete, but they will serve to attest a state of preservation more perfect than I had any grounds to expect, after the known circumstances of the autöpsy and interment. This is not the place to examine into the numerous causes which may have contributed to arrest at this point the decomposition of the muscles, but there is no doubt that the extreme solidity of the masonry of the grave, and the care employed in the manufacture and soldering of the metal coffins, were very efficient in the production of this result. However this may be, I feared the effect of contact with the air upon the corpse; and, convinced that the best means of preserving it was to withdraw it from its destructive action, I eagerly complied with the request of the King's commissary, who desired that the coffins might be reclosed.

“I replaced the wadded satin, after having slightly rubbed it with creosöte; I caused the wooden coffins to be hermetically sealed, and the metal coffins to be soldered with the greatest care.

“The remains of the Emperor Napoleon are at present contained in six coffins:

“1. A tin coffin. 2. A mahogany coffin. 3. A leaden coffin. 4. A second leaden coffin, separated from the previous one by saw-dust and wooden corners. 5. An ebony coffin. 6. An oak coffin, to preserve that of ebony from injury.

“Drawn up at the island of St. Helena, the 15th of the month of October, 1840.

“(Signed) REMI GUILLARD,
Doctor of Medicine.

“(Signed) PH. DE ROHAN-CHABOT,
Commissary of the King.”

The reports which we have just given were accompanied by private letters, from which we take the following details.

On the poop of the frigate, and on the platform erected for the helm, an altar and *chappelle ardente* had been arranged. On the 17th, divine service was celebrated at this altar, in presence of the crews of the three French vessels; during the whole ceremony they kept their flags half-mast high, and their rigging a-peak, and fired minute guns. At the head of the main-mast of the frigate floated a silken flag, covered with black crape, which had been presented by the ladies of James-Town. After the ceremony, the body was lowered into the funereal chapel between decks, which we have described above.

On Sunday the 18th, at eight in the morning, the expedition set sail for France. Thus Napoleon quitted

St. Helena exactly twenty-five years after his arrival in that land of exile, (October 15th, 1815.)

Among the historic *souvenirs* which Prince Joinville took on board with him were the slabs of stone which had covered the grave.

During the first five days, the passage afforded no remarkable incident; but on Saturday, October 31st, Prince Joinville heard from the merchant vessel the "Hamburg," coming from the port of that name, the first report of a probable rupture between France and England.

On Monday, November 2nd, the Dutch vessel, the "Egmont," confirmed this news, and gave circumstantial details of the affairs of Europe till October the 5th.

Prince Joinville immediately summoned the officers of the two other vessels on board the "Bellepoule," to deliberate on an event as serious as it was unexpected. This council of war came to the resolution that preparations for an energetic defence should at all events be made, and measures were in consequence taken for placing in battery all the guns which the frigate could bring to bear against an enemy. The store-chambers were demolished, and the partitions, as well as all the elegant furniture which decorated these rooms, thrown into the sea. Prince Joinville himself was foremost in activity, and the frigate soon had six or eight pieces added to her guns in position. The quarter of the ship occupied by these chambers was

called *Lacedæmon*—luxury was banished, to be replaced by utility.

In this place, we may appropriately speak of the unanimous testimony of all the persons who, in any capacity whatever, formed part of the mission of St. Helena, to the worthy manner in which Prince Joinville acquitted himself of his great and honourable commission. They all affirm that, as chief of the expedition, he not only did at St. Helena all that it was his duty as a Frenchman to do, to the end that the memory of the Emperor might receive all the honours due to it, but fulfilled his mission with the solemn mien, the pious and severe dignity which a son of the Emperor, in fulfilling such a mission, might have displayed. As commander, he felt that the Emperor's remains must not fall into the hands of foreigners, and having resolved rather to sink his ship than to abandon his precious charge, knew how to inspire all around him with his own energetic resolves against an extreme case. After these preparations, the "Bellepoule" separated from the "Favorite," whose slower progress delayed her, and continued her course towards France, constantly attending to all the precautions usual in time of war; for during the twenty-eight days of the passage no vessel approached her so nearly that she could hail her, and obtain intelligence of the state of affairs.

On Sunday, November 29th, at six in the evening, the frigate came in sight of the port-fires and lights of

the town of Cherbourg. The absence of any English cruiser, and the security which reigned, sufficiently indicated that the peace was not disturbed, and that all the preparations for combat had been unnecessary.

On Monday, November 30th, the steam-vessel "Normandie" advanced to meet the "Bellepoule," in order to tow her, if necessary; but a breeze having sprung up, the frigate reached the roads without assistance; and at ten minutes past five in the morning, forty-two days from her departure from St. Helena, the ship entered the great basin of the port, saluted by all the artillery of the ramparts, to which, in the distance, Fort Royal, Fort Hommet, and Fort Querqueville replied.

The solemn entry of Napoleon's remains into Paris having been fixed for the 15th of December, the government took every measure for hastening the preparations for this important ceremony.

The authorities and people of the departments which the cortège was about to traverse, were enthusiastic in their endeavours worthily to honour the passage of the immortal exile. Three steam-vessels, the "Normandie," the "Veloce," and the "Courrier," composing the flotilla, which was destined to make the first part of the progress, had repaired to Cherbourg some days before the arrival of the "Bellepoule." Immediately on her appearance, they ranged themselves around her, as if to form a guard of honour.

On Tuesday, December 8th, the day fixed upon for leaving Cherbourg, mass was celebrated on board the

frigate, in presence of all the civil and military authorities. The service being terminated, the Emperor's coffin was removed from the *chapelle ardente* and conveyed on board the "Normandie." At this moment, all the cannon of the fort and ramparts saluted the passage of the corpse with a salvo of a thousand guns; it was immediately placed under a cenotaph, which had been erected in the middle of the poop. This cenotaph, was composed of a low dome, supported by twelve columns, hung with velvet fringed with silver, surmounted by tripods, and surrounded with lighted lamps; at the head, a gilt cross; at the foot, a gilt lamp; behind, an altar hung with black, having a silver eagle at each corner.

The removal of the corpse being completed, Prince Joinville, the persons belonging to the mission, and the officers of the "Bellepoule," went on board the "Normandie." Four hundred sailors, chosen from among those of the "Bellepoule," were divided among the steamers; a hundred on the "Normandie," with the band of the frigate, a hundred on the "Courrier," and two hundred on the "Veloce." All the arrangements having been at length made, and the signal given for getting under weigh, the mayor of Cherbourg approached the cenotaph, and, in the name of the city, laid a golden laurel branch on the coffin. All the guests then retired, and the convoy began its route at mid-day. It soon passed the eastern passage and doubled Fort Royal, amidst the salutes simultaneously poured from all the batteries of the

forts and breakwaters. The little squadron advanced rapidly eastward in the channel, but without standing out to sea, or losing sight of the coast of France. And never, at any time, was a spectacle equal to the one now presented to be seen. It seemed as if Napoleon, on re-entering his empire, was reviewing the inhabitants of ancient Normandy! Here the fishermen of La Hougue, those of the isles of St. Marcou, and of the rocks of Calvados—there the graziers of Isigny poured down to the mouth of the Vire; farther on, the citizens of Caeh stationing themselves at the mouth of the Orne; and nearly at the gates of Havre, but at the other side of the bay, the inhabitants of Dyve, Touques, and Trouville. All these, pouring down upon the strand, seemed to descend with the waves, in order to approach nearer to the imperial flotilla. Raising their hands and waving their hats at its passage, with loud acclamations, they followed it with their gestures and with their voices long after it had disappeared in the shadows of evening.

At the time of leaving Cherbourg, the weather had given indications of storm, and there was reason to fear a tedious and adverse passage; but the flotilla had scarcely put to sea when the wind fell, the billows became smooth, and the moon rose in all its brilliancy, as if to cast its melancholy light on the course of the funeral convoy.

At half-past nine in the evening, the flotilla came in sight of the harbour of Havre, but, after having approached near enough to be clearly seen, stood out

again toward Cape La Hève, where it passed the night. The day before, the prefect of Havre had addressed the following proclamation to the inhabitants of the department of Seine-Inferieure:—

“The department of Seine-Inferieure will be the first traversed by the funeral cortège which is proceeding, under the conduct of his Royal Highness Prince Joinville, to the capital of the kingdom, where memorable solemnities will be performed, amidst the great bodies of the state, and heightened by all the prodigies of contemporary art and ingenuity.

“There is, perhaps, no event in history which shines forth with such a character of grandeur as accompanies this unhopèd for return of the mortal remains of the Emperor Napoleon.

“When the vessel bearing these revered remains advances slowly up the river, you will receive it with the religious feeling and profound emotions which always arise at the remembrance of the misfortunes of our country, of her triumphs, and of her glory.

“You will render the last honours to this great man with the calm dignity becoming a population which has so often felt the blessings of his protecting power and of his especial benevolence.”

On Wednesday, December 9, about five in the morning, the drums were beaten in the streets of Havre, summoning the national guard to arms. The guard of Montivillers was already drawn up in order of

battle on the *Place de Provence*; these worthy and zealous patriots had marched all night, braving the bad state of the roads, in order not to lose this opportunity of testifying their respect to the remains of the Emperor. The population of Havre, mixed as it is, travellers and sailors from the four corners of the earth, now crowding to the edge of the basins and jetties, seemed to form one great deputation from all civilized nations, coming in the name of repentant Europe to make the first *amende honorable* to the man of the century.

For a long time every eye was fixed on the gaily dressed masts which, faintly seen amidst the mists of the horizon, beyond the "Veloce," anchored in the roads, indicated the presence of the floating cenotaph. The flotilla did not stand out till about half-past six.

The first rays of daylight which now began to disperse the darkness, enabled the gazers to distinguish all the vessels of the convoy; the "Normandie" led the van, bearing the national colours, having the royal flag at the main, and all the other flags hoisted on the rigging; after her came the "Seine," which had been sent from the port to meet the expedition; then the "Veloce" and the "Courrier," which closed the convoy.

Towards seven o'clock, the little squadron turned their prows straight upon the tower, and steered so as to pass at a short distance from the jetties.

The "Normandie," then presented three-quarters

of her side to the shore, but, having approached within two cables' lengths of the jetties, she turned a little to starboard, in order to enter the Seine, and the picture which then presented itself awakened in every heart those various sentiments which could not fail to be inspired by the solemn act which was being performed, and the immortal recollections which it evoked.

On the poop, surrounded by four burning lamps, the bright light of which mingled with the dawning brilliancy of day and the last beams of the moon, lay the narrow coffin which enclosed the greatest man that France had ever produced.

Little by little, the vessel, with its glorious burden, was borne on the waves away from the deeply-moved multitude, whose solemn silence was only broken by the first cannon, announcing that the mortal remains of the Emperor had entered a French river, that Seine whose shores he had chosen for his resting-place.

At the same moment, and, as it were at the signal given by the artillery, the sun rose, pure and brilliant, above the hills which bound the river, and his golden rays, falling on the *chapelle ardente*, made it glitter as if with thousands of sparks.

The coffin seemed surrounded by a luminous atmosphere, of which the rays of the golden crown that rested on the pall were the centre. This was not a *prestige*; Napoleon re-entered France encircled by a glory—the Sun of Austerlitz saluted the return of the hero.

As the funeral convoy now began to ascend the

Seine, the banks of this river became crowded with multitudes of spectators, rendered almost invisible by distance, and whose presence was only attested by shots fired as a salute by aged peasants, become soldiers again in order to present arms to the corpse of their general.

From the summits of the hills; from the valleys, from every point, were it ever so distant, from which the "Normandie" could be seen, signals of all kinds were constantly made, indicating crowds of citizens rejoicing at having caught a glimpse of the remains of the popular hero.

At Quillebœuf, where the convoy was to coast along the shore, an ovation was prepared. On the quay of this town were assembled as if by enchantment the national guards of Pont-Audemer, St. Aubin, and Sainte-Opportune, of all the neighbouring places, and even those of the most distant towns of Lower Normandy, as far as Granville. On the other shore, and notwithstanding their distance, were to be perceived the citizens of Lillebonne under arms, drawn up on the strand; and such was the intensity of the sentiment which animated these brave people, that though separated from the convoy by the whole width of the Seine, they advanced even into the water in order to be somewhat nearer to the imperial remains.

As the convoy defiled along the quays of Quillebœuf, it was saluted by repeated volleys of musketry and salvos of artillery; the standards were lowered, the troops saluted, and the vessels in the harbour, which

exhibited all the signs of mourning, lowered their flags; then cries of enthusiasm burst forth, and the convoy continued its triumphant course.

On the evening of the 9th, the flotilla anchored at Val de la Haye, three leagues below Rouen. Next morning, the flotilla of Haute-Seine, sent from Rouen the day before to replace the "Normandie" and the "Seine," appeared at Val de la Haye. At half-past nine in the morning, the change of vessels was effected, and the coffin, transferred on board the "Dorade," No. 3, was there placed under a cenotaph dressed with purple velvet, surrounded by forty tri-color flags, and bordered with garlands of oak and cypress. This cenotaph, erected on the prow of the vessel, was itself covered by a canopy hung with black velvet, relieved by cords and tassels of silver; masses of black plumes floated above the canopy.

Prince de Joinville, and all the other persons belonging to the expedition, having embarked on board the new boats, they immediately set out, in the following order:—The steam-vessel "Parisienne," on board which were the inspectors of the navigation; the "Zampa," conveying the Prince's band; the "Dorade," No. 3, Captain Garay, having on board the mortal remains of the Emperor, Prince de Joinville, and the 1st company of the "Bellepoule," serving as a guard of honour; the "Etoile," No. 2, conveying M. de Rohan-Chabot, the King's commissary, Count Bertrand, grand marshal of the palace, General Baron Gourgaud, and the Emperor's household.

On the "Etoile," No. 4, were embarked the 2nd company of the "Bellepoule;" on the "Etoile," No. 1, the 3rd company of the "Bellepoule;" on the "Dorade," No. 2, Captain Pagès, the 4th company of the "Favorite;" the rest of the assistants were conveyed by the "Dorade," No. 1, and the "Montereau."

Thus marshalled, a distance of about three lengths being kept between the boats, the flotilla advanced up the river; the weather was fine, though a little cold and hazy.

At a quarter past eleven, the flotilla reached Rouen.

Here great preparations had been made for its reception. The central arch of the suspension bridge formed an immense arch of triumph; the decoration of this bridge and of those parts of the shore which it touched had been performed exclusively by the old wounded legionary officers and the soldiers of the Empire. Trophies and pyramids covered with purple velvet, embroidered with bees, and bearing the names of the Emperor's most glorious victories, were erected on both banks of the river, and on the Orleans bridge. The public monuments, all the vessels in the harbour, and a great number of private houses displayed the national flag; an oriflamme surrounded by banners floated on the magnificent spire of the cathedral. At ten o'clock, the Cardinal Archbishop of Rouen, at the head of his clergy, went in procession to the quay Saint-Sever, from whence he pronounced the prayers

of the church over the coffin as it passed. At the same hour the municipal body joined the other authorities. The national guard of Rouen, in admirable order, those of the surrounding communes, the troops of the garrison, and multitudes of people, lined the quays on both sides of the river, and made the air ring with enthusiastic cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The artillery of the National Guard crowned the heights on the St. Catharine side, and the vessels in the harbour fired salutes at intervals of a minute, until the conclusion of the funeral service; and were answered by the guns of the "Dorade," No. 3, which bore the mortal remains of the Emperor.

On the arrival of the flotilla at Rouen, the "Parisienne" and the "Zampa" took up their stations, in front of the stone bridge; the rest of the boats forming the convoy remained in front of the suspension bridge; and the vessel bearing the cenotaph remained alone between the two bridges.

After the absolution, which was performed by the Cardinal Archbishop, assisted by more than two hundred priests, a salvo of a hundred cannon announced that henceforth the ceremony would assume a triumphal character. The bells rang forth their peals, all the signs of mourning disappeared, the troops presented arms, the drums beat the march, and the military bands played airs of victory. A last salvo of a hundred and one guns announced the departure of the convoy; the flotilla began to move, and when the vessel bearing the imperial coffin passed

under the triumphal arch, the veterans, drawn up on the bridge, showered down upon it wreaths of everlasting and branches of laurel which they held in their hands.

Never had so imposing a concourse been seen at Rouen. All the neighbouring communes, all the rural national guards, half-organised, mingled their compact masses with a numerous clergy, whose enthusiasm surpassed that of all others, and seized every opportunity of manifesting itself. Never had the capital of Normandy witnessed a similar solemnity; never was a national hero so universally celebrated.

Elbeuf, which the flotilla passed while it was yet broad daylight, surpassed Rouen, if possible, in enthusiasm; the whole of the manufacturing population, men and women, seemed to have but one voice to honour Napoleon. Some old soldiers of the empire, in full uniform, were mingled with the national guard; they waved their arms and their standards, and shed tears of emotion.

On the same day, at five in the afternoon, the imperial convoy passed Pont-de-l'Arche, where the national guards of Louviers, and the surrounding communes, awaited it, and rested for the night at half a league above this town.

On the morning of the 11th, the flotilla was again put in motion; but in pursuance of fresh instructions received, it now proceeded with such rapidity, that the ovations which had been arranged at different places on its course, could only take place at a few of

them. That same evening, it passed the town of Vernon, and instead of passing the night there, as had been announced, lay to before Roche-Guyon.

On the 12th, at ten in the morning, it passed Mantes, where it was nevertheless received by the sub-prefect, the mayor, the municipal council, the clergy, and the national guard, which presented arms and saluted it with volleys of musketry. In the evening, it anchored before the bridge of Poissy.

As soon as intelligence of its arrival at Poissy reached Paris, the people of the river districts were joined by numbers of the inhabitants of the capital. The offices of the St. Germain railway were literally besieged, and the roads leading to St. Denis, Clichy, Asnières, and Courbevoie, were crowded with foot passengers and equipages of every kind, from that of the modest tapestry-maker to carriages covered with armorial bearings.

At Poissy, where mass was celebrated on the morning of the 13th, on the deck of the vessel which bore the cenotaph, the national guard and the troops of the line were under arms. At several places women and children, and even men, knelt down, while the vessel bearing the holy cross at its prow passed by. During the whole voyage, Prince de Joinville stood behind the coffin, and in front of him General Bertrand, General Gourgaud, and M. Marchand, valet-de-chambre of the Emperor; this latter wore the uniform of an officer of the second legion of the Parisian national guard.

His Royal Highness Prince de Joinville, wishing to give to the "Dorade," No. 3, which bore the coffin, an appearance befitting such a solemn office, had had all the decorations which adorned the poop removed. The vessel was painted black, and one object alone attracted all eyes and every one's attention, the *imperial coffin*, surrounded by wax-lights, covered with the imperial pall, and shaded by a group of standards.

In the meantime, three new steam-vessels had been dispatched from Paris to meet the imperial convoy; one of them carried the band of the military gymnasium; which was to execute funeral marches during the whole voyage from Poissy to Paris; the two others towed a funereal boat, which had been constructed expressly for the ceremony. On the deck of this boat was erected a funeral temple made of bronzed wood and hung with drapery; the ceiling of this temple, entirely covered with white satin, was adorned with embroidery in gold; the carpet, of purple velvet, was worked with bees in gold; and four gilt caryatides adorned the entrance of the temple.

Besides this temple, the boat was further ornamented in the following manner:—

At the stern behind the temple, was a trophy of banners, on which were inscribed the names of Napoleon's most famous victories.

Along the sides, long garlands of laurels and everlastings, entwined along the whole length of the boat.

All around, tripods of ancient form, destined for burning incense and perfumes.

And, finally, an immense golden eagle, placed on the prow of the ship, which seemed to be bringing back its glorious master in triumph.

Unfortunately, however, this funereal boat, which would have formed one of the most beautiful ornaments of the ceremony, did not completely answer the intentions of the managers of the fête; notwithstanding the efforts of the powerful vessels which towed it, it advanced so slowly, that it was decided to leave it at Argenteuil.

When the flotilla was preparing to leave Poissy, Prince de Joinville did not consider it prudent to risk his precious charge on a conveyance which seemed to offer but little security; he therefore only gave orders that the funereal boat should make part of the convoy, as one of the most brilliant ornaments of the ceremony.

On the morning of the 14th, the flotilla, now composed of ten steam vessels, leaving Maisons, arrived at Pont du Pecq (below the terrace of St. Germain) at ten o'clock. The national guards of the surrounding communes rendered military honours to it; a considerable orchestra, composed of the bands of different regiments, performed funeral symphonies, interrupted every five minutes by salvos of artillery.

At half-past twelve, the flotilla arrived at Chatou, where it received the same honours as at Pont du Pecq.

Leaving Chatou at one o'clock, at half-past two it came in sight of St. Denis. The national guards of

Épinay, Pierrefitte, Stains, and other neighbouring communes, had repaired very early to the ground, headed by their banners and music; they were in very complete order, and well marshalled. Their line extended from the port of Isle St. Denis, to the hamlet of La Briche. The 35th and 67th battalions of the line were placed to the left of the bridge, on the St. Omer side. A tent had been raised facing Isle St. Denis, for the civil and military authorities and clergy.

At half-past one, M. Lucien Mechin, sub-prefect of the department, M. Brisson, mayor of the town, and the members of the municipal council, preceded by the clergy of the Royal Church of St. Denis, and by all the members of the chapter, headed by M. Rey, former bishop of Dijon, and escorted by the *Gendarmerie* of the department, the 3rd garrison regiment and the national guard, repaired to the raised platform which had been prepared for their reception. A deputation of the young ladies of the Legion of Honour, headed by the lady-superintendent, and dressed in deep mourning, occupied a reserved gallery.

Both banks of the Seine were covered with an immense multitude, drawn together from all the neighbouring communes, and even from the capital. At two o'clock, a gun announced the approach of the imperial convoy; and a few minutes afterwards, the national colours which floated on the "Dorade" and its suite, were to be seen across the island, having reached Epinay. The "Parisienne" soon advanced,

preceding the "Dorade" by about 120 feet, and followed by eight other steam-vessels, serving as an escort. At this moment, the national guard saluted the precious freight. Several salvos of artillery were fired by the gunners of the national guard, and responded to first by the guns of the "Parisienne," and then by those of the "Dorade." When the flotilla arrived opposite the tent erected for the authorities, it fell into the following order:

In the first line, the "Dorade," bearing the Emperor's coffin, and the "Parisienne." On the prow of the "Dorade," between the cross and the coffin, stood Prince de Joinville, in the full uniform of commander of a vessel. At the head of the coffin stood Generals Bertrand and Gourgand, and behind them, M. l'Abbé Coquereau, in his sacerdotal robes.

Immediately behind the "Dorade" was a steam-vessel, on which was the band, executing funeral symphonies at intervals; the rear-guard was formed by the other vessels, conveying the crews of the "Belle-poule" and "Favorite." As soon as the "Dorade," though without quitting the middle of the river, or being approached by a boat of any kind, had arrived opposite the funereal temple, the Prince ordered a short halt; Archbishop Rey, assisted by all the clergy, read the absolution, and the flotilla continued its course. Here again an immense multitude assisted with profound awe at the religious ceremony; but as soon as it was terminated, acclamations in honour of the Emperor burst forth on all sides, and were repeated

along the shores of the river, on which the crowds became greater the nearer the convoy approached Courbevoie.

At St. Ouen, Clichy, and Asnières, the multitudes were wonderful. It was in vain that, at the last mentioned place, endeavours were made to keep the people back from the bridge; the barriers were not respected, and wreaths of everlastings were showered upon the "Dorade" as it passed under the arches. The Queen, whose carriage was stationed near the bridge, here saw her son for the first time, for Prince de Joinville, although he had for two days been within a few leagues of his family, had never left his charge since he entered the Seine; the only members of his family whom he had seen were the Dukes d'Aumale and d'Orleans, who had met him at Poissy and Maisons. The Queen and the Princesses who accompanied her were in deep mourning; they set out on their return to Paris immediately after the passing of the flotilla, which continued to advance without stopping, though slowly, drawing an immense concourse in its train. The funereal boat brought up the rear of the convoy, towed by one of the steamers; about a dozen sailors had been put on board it as a crew.

The arrival of the flotilla at Courbevoie was a magnificent sight. It was scarcely four o'clock; the sun was setting radiantly behind Mount Valérien, amidst luminous clouds; on one side were to be seen the picturesque islands of Neuilly, and the triumphal arch in the distance; on the other, the hills of Courbevoie; in

front, the bridge, crowded with spectators, the national guards, the troops of the line, and the artillery pouring forth their salutes, to which the flotilla replied; and soon after, the deep cannon of the Invalides, repeating in their turn the signal of the arrival of the great man, after twenty-five years of exile.

The flotilla anchored below the bridge, opposite a funereal temple which had been erected to receive the body. Bivouac fires burning on the shores indicated the presence of the national guards of Neuilly, and of an immense concourse of citizens, prepared to pass the night in the open air, notwithstanding the intensity of a rigorous frost. The funereal boat and the flotilla, illuminated and surrounded by numerous boats filled with persons coming to obtain a nearer view of them, gave to this evening a most brilliant and animated aspect.

It was on the landing place of Courbevoie that the body of Napoleon first touched the soil of France.

According to all calculations, the St. Helena expedition was not expected to reach France on its return till about the 15th or 20th of December; it was therefore supposed that the ceremony would not take place till about the 25th; but the arrival of the "Bellepoule" in the end of November disturbed all the previous calculations, and the artists and workmen were obliged, in consequence of the shortened time allowed them, to redouble their efforts and activity.

It was a very curious sight to see all these work-

men, spread along the whole line which the cortège was to traverse, always at work, notwithstanding the inclemency of the season and the rigour of the cold, and continuing their labours, even through the night, by the light of torches; it was easy to perceive that a feeling of patriotism ruled in all hearts, that every one thought it an honour to labour at the apotheosis of Napoleon.

We shall now describe these various preparations, following the order indicated for the progress of the cortège.

At Courbevoie, on the banks of the Seine, and immediately below the bridge, there was a large funereal temple, of Greek form, and with four pediments, adorned with pilasters, garlands of oak, escutcheons, eagles, and draperies, and decorated with paintings and symbols, descriptive of the event. In front of the temple, a landing-place, the pillars of which were washed by the river, surmounted by a triumphal arch; on the bridge of Neuilly, a rostral column, forty-five metres in height, surmounted by a golden eagle; and in front of this column, a statue representing *Notre Dâme de Grâce*, the patroness of sailors.

Around the triumphal arch, erected at the "Etoile des Champs Elysées," were twelve masts, bearing shields, trophies of arms, and tri-color banners. On these banners were inscribed the names of the principal armies of the Republic and of the Empire:—*Army of Holland*, of the *Sambre et Meuse*, of the *Rhine and Moselle*, of the *Shores of the Ocean*, of Ca-

talonia, of Arragon, of Andalusia, of Italy, of Rome, of Naples, Grande Armée, and Armée de Réserve.

On the platform, and covering this arch, was the apotheosis of Napoleon, composed as follows:—

In the centre, the Emperor, in his imperial robes, as he appeared on the day of his coronation, standing in front of his throne, and supported by two allegorical figures, the Genius of Peace and that of War. At each angle of the platform, an enormous antique tripod, emitting coloured flames; at each side of the attic, a Fame on horseback, one representing Glory, the other Greatness.

From the top of the arch to the basement, long hanging garlands of flowers and laurel.

At intervals along the Champs Elysées, from the "Etoile" to the Place de la Concorde, triumphal arches, adorned with standards, eagles, and other emblems of the empire; and between the arches, on each side of the road, twelve allegorical statues, representing victories.

At each corner of the Pont de la Concorde, a fluted triumphal column, of octagonal shape, with allegorical figures on the pedestal; above the capital, a golden eagle; and round the basement, scrolls bearing the names of victories.

On the bridge, eight statues:—Wisdom, by M. Ramus; Strength, by M. Gourdel; Justice, by M. Bion; War, by M. Calmels; Agriculture, by M. Thérasse; Eloquence, by M. Fauginet; the Fine Arts, by M. Merlieux; Commerce, by M. Dantan, jun.

In front of the Palace of the Chamber of Deputies, Immortality, a colossal statue by M. Cortot.

On the Esplanade des Invalides, thirty-two statues of the kings and great captains who have shed glory on France:—Clovis, by M. Bosio; Charles Martel, by M. Debay; Philippe-Auguste, by M. Étex; Charles V., by M. Dantan, sen.; Jeanne d'Arc, by M. Debay; Louis XII., by M. Lanneau; Bayard, by M. Guillot; Louis XIV., by M. Robinet; Turenne, by M. Tous-saint; Duguay-Trouin, by M. Bion; Hoche, by M. Sarnet; La Tour d'Auvergne, by M. Cavelier; Kellermann, by M. Brun; Ney, by M. Garreau; Jourdan, by M. Duseigneur; Lobau, by M. Schez; Charlemagne, by M. Maindron; Hugues-Capet, by M. Étex; Louis IX., by M. Dantan, sen.; Charles VII., by M. Bion; Du Guesclin, by M. Husson; François I., by M. Lanneau; Henri IV., by M. Auvray; Condé, by M. Daumas; Vauban, by M. Callouet; Marceau, by M. Lévêque; Desaix, by M. Jouffroy; Kleber, by M. Simard; Lannes, by M. Klagman; Masséna, by M. Brian; Mortier, by M. Millet; Macdonald, by M. Bosio.

Between these statues, tripods emitting flames.

On the right and left sides of the esplanade, immense platforms, calculated to hold thirty-six thousand spectators, and extending as far as the gate of the Invalides.

At this gate, a black tenting, relieved by ornaments of gold and silver, and supported by two triumphal columns, and by numerous ornamented

fascēs of lances; the columns crowned by large tripods, and serving to support two large covered porches, reserved for the pensioners.

In the first court of the Invalides, a series of candelabra and tripods, casting forth bright flames.

In the court of honour, two platforms, arranged to furnish sitting room for six thousand persons.

All the pillars of the covered galleries of this court were converted into trophies of arms, and surmounted by eagles. Between the pillars, at the height of the arches, escutcheons, some representing the Imperial cipher, others the cross of the Legion of Honour. Between each arch, a double festoon of laurel.

At the height of the roofs of the galleries, all round the frieze, the names, in letters of gold, of the Frenchmen who have distinguished themselves in battle since 1793.

Extending round the whole of this triumphal frieze, there ran a triple cord of garlands and wreaths of everlastings. Above, following the line of the roofs, a broad ribbon of the Legion of Honour. Lastly, in the centre of the court, and supported against the platforms, a series of ornamented masts, surmounted by a gigantic golden star.

In front of the portico of the church, and destined to receive the Emperor's body on its arrival, there stood a funeral temple, of square form, supported by four quadrangular pillars, with an architrave on each side, surmounted by a pediment emblazoned with the imperial arms. Above the façade, a figure of *Notre*

Dâme de Grâce, supported by two allegorical figures. On the architraves, the portraits of the marshals of the empire; below, the names of the battles in which they distinguished themselves.

The porch of the church was formed into a vault, hung with black, and lighted by sepulchral lamps. At the entrance of the nave, at an equal height with the organs, an immense gallery, hung with black, and destined for the orchestra.

On each side of the nave, a funeral platform: the one on the right reserved for the different deputations convoked to the ceremony; that on the left for the crews of the "Bellepoule" and "Favorite."

Behind the pillars of the two side galleries, other platforms, completing, with the upper galleries, the accommodations destined for those invited to the ceremony.

On the pillars of the nave, funeral escutcheons, surmounted by trophies of arms in gold, and shaded at the two corners by standards.

On these escutcheons, the names of the celebrated marshals and generals of the empire, with the names of their victories. These escutcheons were in the following order, beginning from ~~the~~ the chief entrance to the church:

Pillars on the right side:—

Ney, Prince of Moscow.—Elchingen, Hohenlinden, Amskerdoff, Ciudad-Rodrigo, Smolensk, Valentina, Moscow, Lutzen, Champ-Aubert and Montmirail.

Mortier, Duke of Treviso.—Hondschette, Fleurus,

Altenkirchen, Dierstein, Moscow, Lutzen, Dresden and Montmirail.

Kléber.—Fleurus, Altenkirchen, El-Arish, Chasah, Jaffa, Mount Tabor, Heliopolis and Cairo.

Duroc, Duke of Friuli.—Jaffa, St. Jean d'Acre, Aboukir, Austerlitz and Wagram.

Monton, Count Lobau.—Novi, Genoa, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, Isle of Lobau, Moscow and Lutzen.

Bessières, Duke of Istria.—Rivoli, Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, Medina and Lutzen.

Pillars on the left side:—

Jourdan.—American War, Hondschette, Watignies, Maubeuge, Fleurus, Maestricht and Rollembourg.

Count d'Hautpoul-Saletto.—Maubeuge, Nimeguen, Wallbruck, Altenkirchen, Hohenlinden, Austerlitz, Jena and Eylau.

Desaix.—Offenburg, Kehl, Chebreiss, Samanhout, El-Gunaim and Marengo.

Count De Lariboisière.—Mayence, Austerlitz, Eylau, Dantzig, Friedland, Wagram, Smolensk, and Moscow.

Count Serrurier.—Hanover, St. Michael, Vigo, Mantua and Verona.

Baraguay d'Hilliers.—Mayence, Rivalla, Elchingen, Ulm, Réal, and Figuières.

Lannes, Duke of Montebello.—Lodi, Castiglione, Montebello, Pyramids, Mount St. Bernard, Marengo, Austerlitz, Friedland, Saragossa, and Essling.

Between the arches of the arcades, rich curtains of

black velvet, laced with silver; above, a deep girdle of black velvet, fringed and embroidered with silver, in front of which hung long garlands supporting crowns of laurel. In the centre of these crowns, escutcheons inscribed with the civil glories of the empire; on the entablature of the balustrades, a representation of the imperial crown, supported by the sceptre and eagle crossed.

The large upper windows of the dome closed by purple curtains, adorned in the centre with a golden eagle; above these windows a broad purple girdle, painted with the imperial arms, and embroidered with golden bees and ciphers; below, a range of wax torches, supported by a cornice of gilt sculpture.

Round this cornice, twenty-four tri-color banners, bearing the names of the Emperor's most splendid victories.

Below this, round the great arches of the dome, garlands of laurel.

Above the entablature of the first order, a second range of wax torches, encircling the whole dome. From this entablature down to the ground, draperies of purple cloth and velvet, glittering with golden arabesques, bees, eagles, and ciphers.

Lastly, three large banners bearing the arms of the King of France, floating above this brilliant decoration.

At the entrance of the dome, galleries destined for the officers of the army and navy, and of the national

guards, the council of the department of the Seine, and various other constituent bodies.

Beneath the centre of the dome, and on the spot where the tomb of Napoleon was ulteriorly to be erected, a magnificent cenotaph, sixteen metres in height, and composed of two basements adorned with bas-reliefs; the first basement decorated at each corner with a statue 3 metres 50 centimetres in height, representing a Victory, with one hand supporting palm branches, with the other resting on a shield; each statue leaning against a trophy surmounted by an eagle; the trophy composed of a fasces of arms belonging to all the conquered nations; the second basement supporting four columns of the Corinthian order, on which rested the upper part of the cenotaph, formed by a brilliant dome-shaped cupola, decorated on the inside with white satin, entirely gilt, and surrounded on the outside by groups of standards; and immediately below this cupola, an exact representation of the coffin which contains the remains of Napoleon. (The lower part of the cenotaph had been arranged for receiving the real coffin, after the presentation.)

Lastly, an immense golden eagle, measuring 3 metres 30 centimetres between the wings, hovering above the cenotaph.

To the right and left, above the tombs of Turenne and Vauban, galleries hung with black velvet, destined for the Chambers of Peers and Deputies, the Council of State, the Court of Cassation, the Royal Court, &c.

Behind the cenotaph, various galleries for the ladies invited.

Close to the grand entrance, an altar for the celebration of the service; the drapery of the altar composed of black velvet covered with *appliqué* gold lace.

To the right of the altar, the King's gallery, hung with purple velvet, embroidered with palm-leaves in gold, and covered with a canopy of scarlet velvet surmounting the royal throne.

And lastly, a purple carpet, embroidered with silver bees, and covering the whole extent of the nave and of the church, and even the spot where the altar had stood, this altar having been removed, in order that it might not interrupt the *coup d'œil*, and to give a view, even from the nave, of the effect of the dome and of the whole ceremony.

Tuesday, December 15th, will take its place among the national festivals of France, and will remain as one of the most memorable in its history. On the night of the 14th, the great city went to rest in a state of unusual agitation and feverish excitement. In the morning, as early as five o'clock, while it was still perfectly dark, and intensely cold, the beating of the drums and the cannon of the Invalides, aroused its inhabitants, and they seemed joyously to arise like one man. In a few moments lights appeared in every window, and noise, movement and life filled the streets. Had the shops at this moment taken down their shutters, and the counters displayed their rich

wares, one might have imagined it to be just night-fall, when the Exchange closes and the theatres open.

An hour after the beating of the reveillé, a crowd of idle persons rushed into the streets, the national guard formed, the regiments quitted their barracks, and the whole mass directed its course towards the west of Paris; so that in a few minutes certain parts of the town offered the silent aspect of a desert, while others, invaded by the popular flood, seemed too small to contain this mass of living creatures. More than seven hundred thousand souls, braving the northern blast, which became still more bitter as dawn approached, pressed to the Champs Elysées, the Invalides, and the road from Neuilly to Courbevoie.

When the rising sun began to shed its purple beams in the east, all Paris was awake.

At break of day, detachments of troops of the line, and the national guard of Courbevoie, stationed themselves in front of the bridge of Neuilly, and at the sides of the landing-place, and two pieces of artillery brought from Vincennes were placed on the bank of the river.

The bridge was exclusively occupied by the armed force; the crowd was ranged behind the military lines, and all the windows were literally filled with human heads; groups of spectators seemed hanging to the trees, to the posts, to the cornices of the houses: the roofs were completely hidden by crowds of eager lookers-on.

An innumerable multitude, pouring forth from

Paris to Courbevoie, was repulsed on reaching the bridge; it then spread itself along the opposite bank, and invaded *L'Isle Royale* by the assistance of the numerous boats which row on the river.

All anxiously awaited the imposing scene, one which could never be repeated, the disembarkation of the mortal remains of the Emperor on the soil of France.

At nine o'clock, the imperial car arrived.

This car was composed of five very distinct parts: 1. The basement; 2. The pedestal; 3. The Caryatides; 4. The shield; 5. The cenotaph.

The basement, resting on four massive gilt wheels, was of an oblong shape, with a semi-circular platform in the front; on this platform was a group of cherubs, supporting the crown of Charlemagne; at the four corners of the basement four other cherubs in bas-relief, with one hand supporting garlands—with the other, holding trumpets to their mouths.

Above were fasces; in the centre, eagles and the cipher of the Emperor encircled by crowns. This basement and all these ornaments were in frosted gold. The pedestal was hung with purple, embroidered in gold with the cipher and arms of the Emperor, and decorated at each corner with fasces; long purple draperies, relieved by embroidered bees, fell from the top of this pedestal to the ground. A long garland extended on each side from corner to corner. It was surmounted by an ornamented cornice and four eagles.

On this pedestal stood fourteen gilt figures, larger than life. These statues represented Victories, tri-

umphantly bringing back the cenotaph, which was supported on a large shield; six stood at each side, and one at each end.

The shield, entirely of gold, was in form a long oval, and bore fasces of javelins.

The cenotaph was a faithful imitation of Napoleon's coffin; it was veiled by a large piece of purple crape, embroidered with golden bees. At the back of the car was a trophy of standards, palm branches and laurels, on which were inscribed the names of Napoleon's most splendid victories. On the cenotaph were laid the imperial crown, the sceptre and the sword of justice, in gold, adorned with precious stones.

The car was drawn by sixteen black horses, arranged four abreast. These horses were adorned with white plumes, with manes of waving white feathers, and entirely covered by caparisons in cloth of gold. Each housing had the imperial arms embroidered on it, and was bordered with eagles, ciphers, and laurel-branches. Sixteen *piqueurs*, wearing the imperial livery, led the horses; two mounted *piqueurs* preceded them.

Total height of the car, ten metres; breadth, four metres, eighty centimetres; length, ten metres; weight, 13,000 killograms.

Immediately after its arrival, the imperial car was stationed beneath the triumphal arch erected on the landing-place, and Prince de Joinville gave orders for the disembarkation.

At half-past nine, the "Dorade," No. 3, moored beside the quay, with its right side touching the land-

ing-place; the cannon sent forth its salutes, and the sailors of the "Bellepoule," raising the body of the Emperor, solemnly carried it to the imperial car, and placed it in the interior, where a place had been reserved for the real coffin, its apparent place on the shield being occupied by the cenotaph above described.

A unanimous cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" was heard on all sides, and many of the spectators of this great national reparation for the moment felt themselves thirty years younger.

The sun at that moment shone as on the most beautiful day in May; and its rays, gilding the temple, the car, the horses, the troops and the multitude of citizens on the left bank of the river, offered to the spectators on the island an enchanting picture of poetry and majesty, on which the waning moon, by a singular accident, sought also to throw her last pale rays.

In the meantime, the national guard of Paris and of its precincts, and several bodies of troops, arrived in close columns on the avenue of Neuilly and the Champs Elysées. At ten o'clock, the troops stationed themselves on the ground assigned to them by the order of the day.

The national guard lined both sides of the avenue of Neuilly, from the bridge to the barrier of the "Etoile;" it then extended along the right side of the road, as far as the Esplanade des Invalides, where it again formed a double line up to the great gate. The line formed by the regular troops extended from the

barrier of the "Etoile" to the Quay d'Orsay, at the corner of the Rue d'Austèrlitz, thus lining the left side of the road, while the national guard occupied the right. The regiments were drawn up according to the numbers of their brigades; two batteries of artillery were stationed at Neuilly.

Two other batteries were placed beside the triumphal arch at the "Etoile," on the left side, separating the national guard and the troops of the line.

At half-past ten, the cannon at Neuilly announced the departure of the car; a little before, the sky had become overcast, the snow fell in flakes and covered the road; but at the moment in which the funeral procession set out, the sun penetrated the clouds, and shone with the greatest brilliancy.

The procession now slowly advanced along the Neuilly road; and although the concourse drawn together to witness this pious solemnity was incalculable, the religious silence was only broken by the spontaneous cry, "Vive l'Empereur!"

At half-past eleven, the car arrived beneath the triumphal arch, and the transports of the multitude burst forth afresh; a salvo of twenty-one guns announced its arrival, and, after a short halt, it at length entered Paris, through the barrier of the "Etoile," the gates of which had been removed.

The procession advanced in the following order:

The *gendarmèrie* of the department of the Seine, headed by their colonel, and preceded by trumpeters.

The mounted municipal guard, (two squadrons,) headed by the colonel, and accompanied by standards and trumpeters.

A squadron of the 7th Lancers.

Lieutenant-General Darriule, commandant of Paris, and his staff, followed by the officers on furlough.

A battalion of the 66th regiment of the line, preceded by a standard, sappers, drums and trumpets, and headed by the colonel.

The infantry of the municipal guard, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

The Sapper-firemen, with a standard and drums, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

Two squadrons of the 7th Lancers, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

Two squadrons of the 5th Cuirassiers, with standards and band, headed by the colonel.

Lieutenant-General Pajol, commandant of the military division, accompanied by his staff.

200 officers of various ranks, employed at Paris, in the Ministry or War Office.

The Military School of St. Cyr, carrying their muskets under their left arms, headed by their staff.

The Polytechnic School, headed by its staff.

A battalion of the 10th Light Infantry, with sappers, drums and trumpets, headed by their colonel. (The sight of the standard of this regiment, blackened by smoke, and almost in rags, caused lively emotion).

Two batteries of the 3rd and 4th artillery regiments.

A detachment of the 1st battalion of *Chasseurs-à-pied*.

The seven garrison companies cantoned in the department of the Seine, forming a battalion under the command of a captain.

The four companies of veteran sub-officers. These brave men marched with a front of at least five-and-twenty; the first rank all wore orders.

Two squadrons of the 5th Cuirassiers, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

Two squadrons of the mounted national guard, with standard and band.

Marshal Gérard, commander-in-chief of the National Guards, accompanied by Lieutenant-General Jacqueminot, and followed by the whole staff of the national guard.

The second legion of the national guards of the precincts, with drums and trumpets, headed by the colonel.

The first legion of the national guards of Paris.

Two squadrons of the mounted national guards.

A black carriage, relieved with silver embroidery, containing M. l'Abbé Coquereau, almoner to the St. Helena expedition.

Some generals and about fifty officers belonging to the squadron of reserve or retreat, all mounted.

Some superior officers of the royal navy.

The funeral band of music,

The Emperor's war-horse, with the saddle and trappings used by Napoleon when First Consul.

This saddle, which is kept in the wardrobe of the crown, is of purple velvet broidered with gold; the housing and holsters are embroidered with the same richness; the housing is bordered with the emblems of commerce, arts, sciences, and war, worked in coloured silk. The bit and stirrups are of silver gilt, and chased; the eyes of the stirrups are surmounted by two eagles, added under the empire. The horse was covered by a veil of purple crape, embroidered with bees, and led by a servant in the livery of the Emperor.

A company of twenty-four officers wearing orders, selected from the mounted national guard, the corps of cavalry and artillery of the line, and the municipal guard, commanded by a captain belonging to the general staff of the infantry of the national guard. Eighty-seven mounted sub-officers, carrying standards on which were inscribed the names of the 86 departments and of Algeria; each standard surmounted by an eagle with spread wings; this detachment was under the orders of a commander of a squadron.

His Royal Highness Prince Joinville, on horseback, wearing the uniform of a captain of the navy.

His sun-burnt complexion and military appearance attracted all eyes. He was saluted by numerous *Vivats*, with which were mingled cries of "Vive la marine!" "Vivent les marins de la 'Bellepoule!'"

The prince's staff.

The four hundred sailors belonging to the frigate "Bellepoule," in regular sailors' dress—blue trousers

and waistcoats, and a small round leather hat, carrying their sabres in their hands. This detachment surrounded the funeral car, marching in two files.

The imperial car.

On the right and left of the car, the Duke of Reggio, Marshal Molitor, Admiral Roussin, and General Bertrand, holding the four corners of the imperial pall.

The former aides-de-camp and civil and military officers of the Emperor's household.

The prefects of the Seine and of the police, the members of the general council, and the mayors and joint commissioners of Paris and of the rural communes, to the number of about a hundred.

A deputation of veterans of all ranks, who had formerly belonged to the imperial armies, in the uniforms of grenadiers and *chasseurs* of the Old Guard, Empress's dragoons, *hussards de la mort*, *chamborans*, *vélites*, guides, red lancers, &c. &c.

The legions of the national guard of Paris and the precincts, which, after having formed the line, successively wheeled into the procession after it had defiled.

The procession was closed by—

A squadron of the 1st dragoons, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

Lieutenant-General Schneider, commander of the division in the environs of Paris, accompanied by his staff.

Camp-marshal Hecquet, commanding the 4th infantry brigade in the environs of Paris.

A battalion of the 35th regiment of the line, with standard, sappers and music, headed by the colonel.

The two battalions of artillery which had been stationed at Neuilly.

A battalion of the 35th regiment of the line, headed by the lieutenant-colonel.

Camp-marshal Lawöestine, commanding the cavalry brigade.

And lastly, two squadrons of dragoons, with standards and music, headed by the colonel.

The procession advanced majestically into Paris, along the Champs Elysées, where more than four hundred thousand spectators crowded to greet it; the numerous platforms erected along the whole way were covered with well-dressed ladies; the houses and windows filled to overflowing; from the "Etoile" to the obelisk, not a spot was unoccupied. Everywhere in its passage the same cries of enthusiasm, the same homage to the memory of the Emperor, made the air ring; on the Place de la Concorde they were redoubled. At half-past one, the procession reached the Esplanade des Invalides; at the same moment the steam vessels composing the flotilla which had conveyed the remains of the Emperor from Rouen to Courbevoie, reached the Pont des Invalides, towing after them the funereal boat, and there anchored. The cannon announced the arrival of the car at the gate of the Invalides, and the coffin was soon borne from sight by the robust arms of the sailors; but not till the eager eyes bent upon it had caught a glimpse,

from beneath the imperial pall, of the ebony which enclosed the body of the great man. Tears fell from the eyes of some old warriors, while the young pupils of the military schools waved their hats and made the air ring with their "*vivats*," and the crowd gave back their acclamations.

As early as seven o'clock in the morning, the vast amphitheatres constructed on both sides of the esplanade had begun to be covered with spectators, who were not intimidated by the certainty of having to wait there for eight hours at least, in a temperature of ten degrees of cold (Reaumur).

A long file of persons, dressed in mourning, formed along the fosse to the right of the gate, and extended to the Rue de Bourgogne; and numbers of invited persons, eager to behold such a spectacle, pressed to other places. At eleven o'clock the gates of the Invalides were opened; all efforts to restrain the crowd were vain, and the galleries, especially in the interior of the church, were soon invaded.

Towards half-past eleven, the Chamber of Deputies arrived, with their president at their head; it had been preceded by the different members of the judicial order. The Chamber of Peers did not arrive till later.

Although protected by the armed force, the great bodies of the state had considerable difficulty in penetrating to the church, so compact and dense was the crowd without. A way being once made, they were soon followed by the civil and military deputations, and the

functionaries of all ranks, who took their places in the following order:—

At the bottom of the dome behind the cenotaph and in front of the altar, the archbishop and clergy; in front of the royal gallery, and a little below it, the ministers; on the other side, the marshals and admirals of France. In front of the ministers, the governor of the Invalides, the venerable Marshal Moncey, who had had himself rolled in a chair to the foot of the altar, to render solemn homage to the memory of his glorious Emperor. To the right of the cenotaph, the peers; a little above them, the council of state. To the left of the cenotaph, the deputies.

At the entrance to the dome, the court of cassation, the Court of exchequer, the royal council of public instruction, the institute, the college of France, the deans of the faculties, the royal court, the general officers of the army and navy, &c. &c.

In the nave, the officers of the imperial army, the staff of the Invalides, the polytechnic school, &c.

About two o'clock, the cannon announced that the procession had reached the gate of honour.

The archbishop of Paris, followed by all his clergy, immediately descended in procession to receive the body under the porch.

A moment of religious silence followed the departure of the clergy; in a few minutes they were seen to return in the same order, followed by the imperial cortège.

His Royal Highness Prince Joinville walked first,

in the uniform of a captain of the navy, and holding his sabre in his hand; he was followed by his staff and a detachment of his crew, also holding their sabres in their hands.

Behind them came the members of the St. Helena mission; then the imperial coffin, borne by twenty-four sub-officers of the National Guard, and the same number of sub-officers of the army.

The four corners of the pall were held, as in the procession, by Marshal Molitor, the Duke of Reggio, General Bertrand, and Admiral Roussin.

After the coffin came the superior officers of the army, the prefects of the Seine, and of the police, the general council of the town of Paris, the mayors, and the veteran generals of the empire; four hundred sailors of the "Bellepoule" closed the procession.

On the appearance of the cortège, the King descended from his throne, and advanced to the entrance of the dome to meet it. Here Prince Joinville said to him: "*Sire, I present to you the body of Napoleon, which, in accordance with your commands, I have brought back to France.*"—"I receive it in the name of France," replied the King, raising his voice. General Athalin bore on a cushion the sword of the Emperor; he now gave it to Marshal Soult, who presented it to the King. His Majesty then turned to General Bertrand, and said, "General, I commission you to place the glorious sword of the Emperor on his coffin." The King then returned to his throne, and the coffin was placed in the interior of the cenotaph in

a place prepared for it in the lower part of the pedestal and facing the nave. The general officers who had carried the imperial pall seated themselves at the corners of the cenotaph; the mission of St. Helena took their places in front.

The funeral mass now commenced; the orchestra, placed in front of the organs, was directed by M. Habeneck, and composed of more than three hundred musicians. The solos were sung by Duprez, Rubini, Lablache, Tamburini, Levasseur, Chollet, and Mesdames Grisi, Stoltz, Persiani, Damoreau, Garcia, Dorus, &c.

The grand *Requiem* of Mozart especially produced an effect difficult to describe; the sanctity of the spot alone prevented the expressions of transport from bursting forth.

At half-past three, the clergy approached the coffin and sprinkled it with holy water.

The archbishop having then presented the brush to the King, his Majesty fulfilled this last duty and retired.

The ceremony being now concluded, the multitude dispersed in pious silence.

One of the finest moments of this solemnity, as regarded the effect of the decorations, was that when the green and red flames sprang up in the funeral tripods, extending from the organ to the cenotaph. The light which they threw round the whole church gave it a truly funereal aspect.

For eight days, from the 16th to the 24th of Decem-

ber, the church, illuminated exactly as it had been on the day of the ceremony, remained open to the public.

The concourse of visitors was so great that we do not think it was ever equalled, in any time or place; more than two hundred thousand persons daily crowded to the Invalides; the ranks extended on one side to the Champ-de-Mars, and on the other to the square of the Chamber of Deputies. The greater part of this multitude, after having passed the day exposed to the severest cold, to snow, and to the north wind, returned home without having been able to procure an entrance, but all were ready to try their fortune again the next day. And not only were the inhabitants of the capital attracted by this imposing spectacle, but even those of the most distant towns. On the eighth day, when the government ordered the church to be closed, the press of people, far from being diminished, seemed to be increasing. Had the lying-in-state been prolonged, crowds would have hastened from all parts of the world to render this brilliant homage to the remains of the great Emperor.

This imposing funeral ceremony surpassed anything which has ever been exhibited in similar circumstances; it was worthy of the solemnity demanded by the great name of the Emperor.

It was ordered by the Minister of the Interior, and directed by M. Cavé, director of the fine arts. M. Charles Baudouin was especially charged by govern-

ment with all the arrangements relative to the coffin. The execution of the imperial car, of the ornaments of the imperial funereal-boat, and of all the draperies, embroideries and decorations of the Invalides, was confided to the administration of funeral pomps.

Lastly, the *ensemble* of the ceremony was executed after the designs of Messrs. Blouet, Labrouste, Visconti, and Félix Martin, architects.

“ *Chapelle Ardente.*”

On Saturday, February 6th, at noon, the coffin of Napoleon, which had lain, since the ceremony of the 15th of December, in the imperial cenotaph, was removed to a *chapelle ardente* arranged in one of the chapels—that of St. Jerome, to the right of the altar. This removal took place in presence of Marshal Moncey, governor of the Invalides, of General Petit, commandant, the staff of the Hôtel, the division of officers, and the thirteen divisions of sub-officers and soldiers. The number of persons invited was very limited: General Bertrand, General Gourgaud, M. de Las Cases, jun., M. Cavé, director of the fine arts, M. Marchand, and the other members of the St. Helena mission, were all the strangers admitted to the ceremony.

Four superior officers held the four corners of the imperial pall.

The mass for the dead was celebrated by the Abbé Ancelin, *curé* of the Invalides, assisted by his clergy.

After the mass, the coffin, decorated as on the day of its entry into Paris, with the imperial crown at the head, and the sword and small hat at the feet, was taken from its place in the cenotaph, and set on an inclined plane covered with black drapery. Once placed upon this plane, it glided down, with wonderful facility, to a basement prepared for its reception. This operation being terminated, Marshal Moncey and the other guests were introduced into the chapel; a "De Profundis" was then chanted by the clergy and choir, and holy water was again sprinkled on the coffin by all those assisting at the ceremony; after which the gates of the chapel were closed in their presence.

The principal decorations of this chapel, where the coffin was to remain until the completion of the mausoleum, were as follow:—

The capitals and bases of the columns were gilt, the feet richly draped in silk and gold; between the columns extended draperies of purple violet, deeply bordered with gold, and embroidered with bees. In the centre of these draperies hung trophies of antique arms, in damascened brass of beautiful workmanship; in the centre of the shields were inscribed the names of Marengo, Wagram, Austerlitz, and Jena.

Above the draperies ran a girdle of purple velvet, richly embroidered with the Emperor's cipher, surrounded by laurels. Between the two columns opposite the entrance of the chapel, was a basement, 1 metre 70 centimetres in height, entirely draped with purple

velvet and adorned with gold embroidery and gilt mouldings. On this basement stood the Emperor's coffin covered with the same imperial pall which had been used after the exhumation at St. Helena, and during the voyage. On the coffin lay—1. The imperial crown. 2. The Emperor's sword, presented to the King by General Bertrand. 3. The hat which Napoleon wore at Eylau, and which he had himself given to the celebrated Gros, when he ordered him to paint that memorable battle.

Behind, and overshadowing the coffin, waved the standards taken at Austerlitz. In the midst of these standards appeared a golden eagle with extended wings, measuring 3 inches across, hovering majestically over the coffin. Purple curtains, embroidered with the imperial arms, were hung across the windows, and thus preserved a solemn obscurity in the whole chapel. A gas chandelier, suspended from the dome, burned night and day. It was ordered that antique candelabra should be lighted in the chapel, on all the anniversaries connected with the history of Napoleon; the 20th of March, 5th of May, 15th of August, &c. Behind the coffin, the wall of the chapel was hung with a drapery forming the back of an altar, which was decorated with a cross, arabesques, and the imperial arms embroidered in gold. The chapel was closed by gates of iron gilt, which, although they prevented the approach of visitors, allowed a view to be had of the whole arrangement of the chapel. Curtains of transparent material were arranged so as to cover the

gates, and the entrance to the chapel on ordinary days. Four pensioners, with naked sabres, kept guard day and night at the gates of the chapel.

Preparations were soon after commenced for completing the tomb, which, according to the terms of the law, was to be erected in the midst of the church of the Invalides.

After such a variety of fortune, the Emperor at length reposes in his last and unchangeable resting-place. The immense drama of his marvellous destiny has closed with the gates of his tomb; but this glorious tomb itself will remain as an abiding lesson to the whole family of man; it will always remain to recal to the world the vanity of all earthly greatness and splendour. There sleeps the Emperor, together with the passions and animosities of which he was the object or the originator.

REQUIESCAT IN PACE.

THE END.



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