



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330327**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

27 March 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for  
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000556DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

#### **1. (S) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdulla
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Abdallah Muhammad Khan, Abdullah al-Uzbeki, Abdullah Hakim al-Uzbeki, Abdullah al-Afghani, Abdallah al-Turki, Abdullah Faryabi, Abd al-Latif al-Turki, Ali Uzd Amir, Ali Mustafa Muhammad
- Place of Birth: Faryab Province, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1972
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000556DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health.

#### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 19 July 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and key travel facilitator supporting senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee has additional ties to the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20330327

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(LT)<sup>1</sup> and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp, and he was identified as a front line commander. Detainee is assessed to have received basic and advanced militant training and occupied numerous extremist facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee's advanced training is assessed to have included document forgery and security and he possibly received explosives training. Detainee's ethnicity and true identity are questionable and he employs counter interrogation techniques to avoid disclosing his identity and his activities in support of extremism. Detainee was arrested with known al-Qaida member Abdul Hamid al-Suri, at a safe house in Pakistan (PK), at which several forged passports and manuals on the manufacture of explosive devices were recovered. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

**c. (S/NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added detainee's admission to weapons training
- Added detainee's aliases Abdullah Faryabi,<sup>2</sup> Abdullah Hakim al-Uzbeki,<sup>3</sup> and Ali Mustafa Muhammad<sup>4</sup>
- Highlighted detainee's written correspondence to family in Persian Farsi
- Added information to detainee's placement and access
- Added information to detainee's intelligence assessment

#### **4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

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<sup>1</sup> Analyst Note: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups that pose a clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction.

<sup>2</sup> ➤ GUAN-2006-B00573-HT, Analyst Note: In outgoing correspondence to his family, detainee used Abdullah Faryabi as his name. In incoming correspondence, detainee's father also referred to detainee by that name.

<sup>3</sup> 000493 SIR 09-Jun-2005; Analyst Note: Listed with variant spelling Abdallah Hkam al-Uzbeki

<sup>4</sup> ➤ CIR 316/15119-05; Analyst Note: A variant of Muhammad is Mahmet.

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**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee claims to be an ethnic Uzbek, born in Afghanistan, from the Khalai Turtai neighborhood, Gurzivan District, Faryab Province, AF.<sup>5</sup> In approximately 1984, detainee traveled to Turkey with Mahmud, a friend of his father, to receive an education. However, detainee was unable to attend school, and instead obtained a job weaving carpets.<sup>6</sup>

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** In 1985, detainee went to Pakistan via Iran and lived in the Babu Refugee Camp near Peshawar, PK, but was registered in the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-controlled Shamshatu Camp. A warlord named Saiaf managed the Babu Refugee Camp which was primarily populated by ethnic Uzbeks and Turkomen. At the camp, detainee stayed with his uncle Hussain.<sup>7</sup> Detainee worked odd jobs, accepting work as it became available. Detainee worked in a kitchen, and sold vegetables in a market.<sup>8</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** From 1988 through 1991, detainee served under Mullah Sufiaullah and fought against the Soviets in the vicinity of Herat, AF. In 1991 or 1992, detainee returned to the Babu Refugee Camp in Pakistan. During the time of the Taliban regime (1996-2001), detainee periodically traveled to Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Faryab, Kabul, and Khwaja Ghar, AF to sell textiles. In 2000, detainee traveled from Afghanistan to Pakistan to find work. While living in Peshawar, detainee attended the Asria-Ahli Hadis Madrassa, where he met and befriended a Syrian member of al-Qaida named Musa, aka (Abdul Hamid al-Suri), aka (Baha Bin Mustafa Muhammad Jaghal).<sup>9</sup> Detainee later moved in with Namitulah in the Hayatabad area of Peshawar. In September 2001, Pakistani authorities arrested detainee, Namitullah, and Namitullah's friend, Abdul Baki, at the house in which they lived. Detainee spent 21 days in Pakistani custody. Upon his release, detainee called Musa, who invited him to come and stay with him in Islamabad, PK. Detainee spoke with Musa about wanting to travel to Turkey to live. Musa introduced detainee to Abd al-Latif, a student of the Jamia Islami Alami Madrassa, from whom detainee purchased a forged passport. Detainee met with Abd al-Latif on five occasions before eventually paying \$500 US for the forged passport, although detainee possessed a valid

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<sup>5</sup> 000556 SIR 17-Feb-2005, 000556 SIR 22-Feb-2005

<sup>6</sup> 000556 MFR 23-Oct-2002

<sup>7</sup> 000556 MFR 23-Oct-2002, Analyst Note: Hekmatyar headed the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), an NIPF Priority 2 target. A Priority 2 target is defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack U.S. persons or interests.

<sup>8</sup> 000556 ARB3 Transcript Final 25-Oct-2007

<sup>9</sup> Analyst Note: Musa was reported to be in Syrian custody in 2003. See TD-314/17904-03

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Afghanistan passport.<sup>10</sup> Detainee admitted he knows how to operate an AK-47 assault rifle, but never served in the military, never attended any military style training camp, and never received formal training on the AK-47. He did, however, attend a physical training camp in Jalalabad for six months.<sup>11</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** Detainee claimed he moved into Musa's house, located at the address Iftan Number 1, Islamabad, three days before Pakistani authorities raided it on 29 January 2002.<sup>12</sup> Pakistani authorities captured detainee and Musa during the raid. Detainee had a falsified Turkish passport at the time of his capture with the name Abd al-Latif al-Turki.<sup>13</sup> Pakistani police confiscated detainee's counterfeit passport along with numerous other false passports that detainee claimed the forger "Abd al-Latif" left at Musa's house. Pakistani authorities transferred detainee to US control no later than 21 February 2002.<sup>14</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:** None

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 17 June 2002

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Situational awareness of movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Jihad against the Russians

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee has consistently used a cover story to conceal his activities and associates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2002, when confronted with discrepancies, detainee claimed to practice Sunni and Shi'a Islam; unheard of in the Muslim world.<sup>15</sup> Detainee uses counter interrogation techniques (i.e. delaying and deflecting attention

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<sup>10</sup> 000556 MRF 23-Oct-2002, 000556 FM40 10-Dec-2002, 000556 SIR 24-Feb-2005; Analyst Note: A variant of Abd al-Latif is Abdul Latif. Detainee informed his ARB he borrowed \$1,000 US from his father and associate Namitullah. Detainee separately reported he obtained \$700 US from Abdul Aziz Nuristani, the mullah at the Asaria Mosque. See 000556 MFR 17-Sep-2002.

<sup>11</sup> > 000556 302 17-Jun-2002

<sup>12</sup> 000556 SIR 28-Feb-2005, 000556 FM40 10-DEC-2002

<sup>13</sup> 000556 SIR 24-Feb-2005; Analyst Note: For Musa's account of the raid, see TD-314/17904-03, paragraph 13.

<sup>14</sup> 000556 FM40 10-Dec-2002, 000556 Screening Doc 21-Feb-2002; Analyst Note: Detainee initially claimed he was arrested with a third individual named Abdul Rashad, however detainee later denied that Abdul Rashad was arrested with him. In a subsequent account, detainee claimed to have met Abdul Rashad at the Islamabad jail and that they were both transferred to the Kandahar jail and then to JTF-GTMO (see 000556 FM40 20-Apr-2005).

Abdul Rashad's identity is unknown.

<sup>15</sup> 000556 MFR 17-Sep-2002

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from questions) during interrogations. Detainee has also used various languages to communicate.<sup>16</sup> Despite several identifications by other detainees, detainee has not provided any information regarding his participation in forging or obtaining illegal travel documents. He repeatedly states he is not Abd al-Latif al-Turki. However, an al-Qaida member and a Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member photo identified him by that name and detainee was captured with a falsified passport with that name, which reflects his use of this alias.

## 7. (U) Detainee Threat:

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

**b. (S/NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger and travel facilitator supporting GZ-10016 and the Global Jihad Support Network. Detainee is also a suspected bomb maker and former commander of a special al-Qaida training camp. Detainee is assessed to have received basic and advanced militant training and occupied numerous extremist facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee's advanced training is assessed to have included document forgery and security and he possibly received explosives training. Detainee's ethnicity, and subsequently his true identity are questionable and he employs counter interrogation techniques to avoid disclosing his identity and his activities in support of extremism.

- (S/NF) Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida associated passport forger, travel facilitator, and a possible explosives expert.
  - (S/NF) Detainee is assessed to be document forger Abd al-Latif al-Turki.
    - (S/NF) Al-Qaida explosives expert Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim, aka (Abd al-Bari al-Filistini), and LIFG member Abu Hazim al-Libi, aka (Ali Abdullah Sharaf al-Din), both independently photo identified detainee as Abd al-Latif al-Turki.<sup>17</sup>
    - (S/NF) Pakistani authorities arrested detainee and Syrian national Musa at an al-Qaida affiliated safe house in Islamabad. Several forged passports belonging to detainee were also recovered.<sup>18</sup> Detainee identified himself as Abdullah Khan when he and Musa were arrested by Pakistani authorities. Detainee also noted Abd al-Latif al-Turki was the name printed on detainee's fake Turkish

<sup>16</sup> > GUAN-2006-B00573-HT, Analyst Note: Detainee communicated in writing to his family in Afghanistan in Dari/Farsi

<sup>17</sup> TD-314/03980-05, Analyst Note: Both Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim and Abu Hazim al-Libi were reported held by Libyan authorities. See TD-314-30195-05 and TD-314/70900-07. The LIFG is an NIPF Priority 1 Target.

<sup>18</sup> TD-314/17904-03, Analyst Note: Musa's aliases include Baha Bin Mustafa Muhammad Jajhal, Abdul Hamis al-Suri, and Abu Hamza. See also 000556 FM40 10-Dec-2002.

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passport.”<sup>19</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee identified Abd al-Latif as a forger, but attempted to identify al-Latif as a separate individual to hide detainee’s nefarious activities.<sup>20</sup> As detainee identified his alias as the forger, he is assessed to be the forger himself. Detainee is assessed to have obtained his forgery skills by attending advanced training such as that provided in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan.<sup>21</sup>)

- (S//NF) In addition to Abd al-Latif al-Turki, detainee is also assessed to be aka (Ali Uzdamiir), identified by Musa as the name on one of detainee’s forged passports.<sup>22</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee and Musa may have collaborated on a common cover story, creating fictional document forgers to deflect questioning from themselves in the event they were captured. Both the names Urhan Uzotork and Abd al-Latif are also associated with Abd al-Latif al-Turki, and are listed among detainee’s aliases.)

- (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitator GZ-10016 stated Abu Abdallah al-Turki (assessed to be detainee) was a unique travel facilitator who brought mujahideen from Turkey to GZ-10016’s safe house in Pakistan. Detainee was able to provide a diverse grouping of recruits ranging from college students to individuals 40 to 50 years old. Detainee sent these recruits to GZ-10016 for training at the Khaldan Camp. GZ-10016 said the last time he saw Abu Abdallah al-Turki in person was in 1998. However, GZ-10016 claimed Abu Abdallah al-Turki always contacted him on his mobile phone and detainee provided recruits from 1993 through 2001.<sup>23</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee admitted using the alias Abdallah al-Turki. GZ-10016’s comments indicate detainee was in frequent contact with GZ-10016 for some time in the years following 1998.)<sup>24</sup>

- (S//NF) Analyst Note: Detainee’s nearly decade long experience as an extremist facilitator indicates detainee would have extensive information on the recruiting and facilitation processes including recruitment facilities, methods of movement, funding, procurement and use of legitimate and falsified documents. Detainee would also have extensive information on the recruits themselves and extremist leadership they served. However, detainee’s actual area of operations has not yet been determined and was probably related to the facilitation of North African and European extremists through Turkey and possibly Syria. As such, detainee’s activities directly supported the Global Jihad Support Network.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> 000556 SIR 24-Feb-2005

<sup>20</sup> 000556 MRF 23-Oct-2002, 000556 FM40 10-Dec-2002, 000556 SIR 24-Feb-2005

<sup>21</sup> TD-314/18017-02

<sup>22</sup> CIR 316/15119-05, TD-314/17904-03

<sup>23</sup> TD-314/58795-05

<sup>24</sup> 000556 Screening Doc 21-Feb-2002

<sup>25</sup> >Analyst Note: The GJSN is an NIPF Priority 1 Target.

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- (S//NF) Detainee is a possible explosives expert. Abd al-Latif al-Turki was reported to be a suspected bomb maker for al-Qaida.<sup>26</sup>
  - (S//NF) A compact disc containing 19 manuals was recovered during the raid on the safe house where detainee and Musa were apprehended in Islamabad. The manuals covered the manufacture of improvised explosives, improvised electric blasting caps, electrical circuits for the manufacture of electronic timers and firing devices, the modification of commercial electronic systems for use as bomb initiating mechanisms, and improvised delivery mechanisms for various poisons.<sup>27</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated when he was captured by the Pakistani authorities the second time, his hands were tested for explosive residue. The detainee stated that the test resulted in a positive reading and that the Pakistani officials confronted him about the results. The detainee claimed the Pakistani authorities stated that he was Abdul Latif al-Turki who had been fighting at Tora Bora. The detainee stated the Pakistani authorities accused him of being an explosives expert who smuggled explosives from Tora Bora when he departed the fighting and escaped through the mountains into Pakistan. The detainee argued that he could not have fought at Tora Bora due to the fact that the Pakistani authorities had previously arrested him and held him in detention at that time. The detainee claims he was released the first time after the battle of Tora Bora had ceased.<sup>28</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's claimed first arrest is possibly a cover story to prevent associating detainee with events in Tora Bora.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee was identified as the alleged commander of the Margun training Camp. The Margun Training Camp was identified as an al-Qaida camp operated by UBL. The camp provided terrorist training including production of improvised explosives devices (IED).<sup>29</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received basic and advanced militant training and occupied numerous extremist facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee was identified as a front line commander.
  - (S//NF) Al-Qaida bomb maker Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim reported he and detainee received basic training at the Khaldan Camp in Afghanistan in 1998.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> CIR-316/15119-05

<sup>27</sup> TD-314/14177-02

<sup>28</sup> 000556 SIR 27-Apr-2005

<sup>29</sup> CIR 316/00755-05, 000556 ARB3 Transcript Final 25-Oct-2007; Analyst Note: Detainee is identified with his alias Abu Abdallah al-Turki in the CIR. For additional information on the Margun Camp, see NGIC Mazar-e-Sharif Paper 1-May-2005.

<sup>30</sup> TD-314/03980-05, TD-314/49133-02, Analyst Note: The Khaldan training complex was a key training facility for extremists in Afghanistan. The emir (leader) of the camp from 1994 to 2000 was Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri, aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). At least nine terrorist attacks or attempted attacks have been linked to individuals who either trained at Khaldan or were personally trained by al-Libi,

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(Analyst Note: Basic training, as a minimum, would include physical fitness, small arms weapons training, and religious training to enhance the individual's commitment to jihad.)

- (S//NF) Detainee claimed he attended a physical training camp in Jalalabad in an unspecified year for six months.<sup>31</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's Jalalabad training is probably the basic training at the Khaldan Training Camp reported by al-Qasim. Detainee continues to deny any militant training, despite reporting and analysis to the contrary.)
- (S//NF) LIFG member Abu Hazim al-Libi identified detainee from the al-Ansar guesthouse in Peshawar sometime during 1995 or 1996.<sup>32</sup>
- (S//NF) Assessed al-Qaida member Abd al-Hakim Abd al-Karim Amin Bukhari, ISN US9SA-000493DP (SA-493, transferred), claimed detainee was with him at the al-Nibras guesthouse in Kandahar during an unspecified period some time ago. SA-493 believes detainee was either Taliban or al-Qaida, and implied detainee was not of Uzbek ethnicity. SA-493 also stated detainee would pray for the murder of Americans.<sup>33</sup> (Analyst Note: The al-Qaida al-Nibras guesthouse served as a way station for recruits and fighters en route to the al-Faruq Training Camp or to Kabul guesthouses and the front lines.<sup>34</sup>)
  - (S//NF) Majid Idha Muhammad al-Subai al-Qurashi, ISN US9SA-000176DP (SA-176, transferred), reported he traveled to Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,<sup>35</sup> and served on the front lines near Kabul for approximately two and a half months in 2001 in a group commanded by Abu Abdallah al-Turki (detainee's alias).<sup>36</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's participation in direct armed hostilities against US and Coalition forces requires further investigation.)
- (S//NF) Arkan Muhammad Ghafil al-Karim, ISN US9IZ-000653DP (IZ-653), stated he saw detainee at the Khana Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse in Kabul in late 1999 or early 2000. IZ-653 identified the Khana Ghulam Bacha Guesthouse as an al-Qaida facility supporting the Taliban front lines and was managed by al-Qaida military commander Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN

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including Zaccarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid (see Khaldan Training Camp 24-FEB-1998). For information about Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim's bomb making history, see TD-314/66073-06

<sup>31</sup> 000556 302 17-Jun-2002; Analyst Note: Detainee alternately informed his ARB he attended a fitness center in Peshawar, PK.

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/03980-05

<sup>33</sup> 000493 SIR 01-Jun-2005(b)

<sup>34</sup> TD-314/39255-03, Analyst Note: Variants of Nibras include Nibras, Nipras and Nebras.

<sup>35</sup> >000176 SIR 20-Jul-2005, 000176 302 24-Apr-2002, 000176 SIR 28-Jul-2005

<sup>36</sup> >000176 SIR 11-Mar-2005



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- US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026).<sup>37</sup> (Analyst Note: IZ-653's comments indicate detainee fought on the front lines in support of al-Qaida and the Taliban.)
- (S//NF) While living in Peshawar, detainee attended the Asria Ahli Hadis Madrassa where he met and befriended his associate, Musa.<sup>38</sup>
    - (S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) The Jami Asirya Madrassa in Peshawar is assessed to detainee's claimed Asria Madrassa. The LT has used the madrassa to recruit and facilitate the movement of Islamic militants into and out of Afghanistan for training and terrorist operations. The Jamia Asirya Madrassa also distributes anti-Coalition propaganda.<sup>39</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee was probably part of the LT facilitation network, supporting al-Qaida operations, including those managed by GZ-10016.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee's ethnicity, and subsequently his true identity, is questionable.
    - (S//NF) As noted above, SA-493 implied detainee was not of Uzbek ethnicity.<sup>40</sup> IZ-653 stated detainee claimed to be an Afghan, but is probably Turkish.<sup>41</sup> Umar Abdullah, US9AF-000222DP (AF-222, transferred), stated detainee was not a native Uzbek speaker and spoke with a Turkish accent. AF-222 also stated detainee was "dangerous."<sup>42</sup>
    - (S//NF) Detainee employs counter interrogation techniques and different languages to avoid the discovery of his true identity and aliases. Detainee claims he is an ethnic Uzbek from Afghanistan, however several debriefings indicate detainee knows Turkish. Detainee uses his knowledge of Uzbek, Tajik, Farsi, and Turkish languages in his attempted deception.<sup>43</sup>
      - (S//NF) After a debriefing on 24 July 2003, the interpreter, who was a native Turkish speaker with a proficiency in Arabic and Farsi, stated the detainee could not be Afghan due to a heavy accent that sounds more Turkish than Afghan. The interpreter stated detainee uses Turkish words during his answers in Farsi to the debriefer's queries. The interpreter also noted detainee used modern Turkish words, not classic Turkish.<sup>44</sup>
      - (S//NF) After a 17 September 2003 interview, an interpreter cited several reasons to refute detainee's assertion of being an Afghan. Although detainee identified himself as an Afghan of Uzbek descent, he did not speak fluent Uzbek. Detainee has a large build, light brown hair and blue eyes, which is unusual for an

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<sup>37</sup> IIR 6 034 1328 03, 000653 FM40 13-Sep-2003

<sup>38</sup> 000556 MFR 23-Oct-2002

<sup>39</sup> TD-314/16265-02, DA DPM 20 MAR 06, Analyst Note: In 000556 MFR 17-Sep-2002, detainee identified the mosque as the Jamia-i-Asaria Mosque.

<sup>40</sup> 000493 SIR 01-Jun-2005

<sup>41</sup> IIR 6 034 1328 03

<sup>42</sup> 000222 SIR 27-Dec-2006

<sup>43</sup> 000556 MFR 24-Jul-2003

<sup>44</sup> 000556 MFR 24-Jul-2003

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Afghan. Detainee would speak a mix of languages, often starting in one language, such as Tajik. At times, detainee finished in a completely different language, such as Turkish.<sup>45</sup>

▪ (S//NF) It was observed during various debriefings detainee would speak around almost every answer rather than simply answer the question. Detainee would ramble on for several minutes even in response to direct questions that required one word replies.<sup>46</sup> (Analyst Note: This probably indicates detainee was trained to delay, conceal, and deflect attention from questions during interrogations.)

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 26 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 31 July 2007, when he was reported attempting an assault on the guard force. He has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, damage to government property, attempted assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of nine Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** JTF-GTMO determined detainee is of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 27 December 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee attendance and tenure at al-Qaida associated training and lodging facilities provided him with access to information on training curriculum, attendees, and security procedures. Detainee's assessed long-term role as a facilitator and passport forger for Islamic extremists placed him in contact with, and provided him knowledge of, transient jihadists, forgery operations, illegal document markets, and jihadist travel routes in support of the Global Jihad Support Network. Compact discs containing information on explosive devices and components, found at an al-Qaida affiliated safe house where detainee was staying, as well as his association with another bomb maker, reflect probable knowledge of bomb making. (Analyst Note: See SCI supplement.)

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida affiliated travel facilitator and passport/document forger who assisted in the travel of Islamic extremists throughout the region. Detainee should be able to provide information on GZ-

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<sup>45</sup> 000556 MFR 17-Sep-2002

<sup>46</sup> 000556 MFR 24-Jul-2003

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10016, al-Qaida safe houses, the use and procurement of illegal passports and other documents, and bomb making. Detainee should also be able to provide information on extremist facilitation in Turkey, and training and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Detainee is assessed to have historical information on the Khaldan Camp operations in Afghanistan. Detainee has knowledge of counter interrogation techniques, and has covered up his own identity and nationality, using various languages. Multiple reports identified him as being Turkish, and not Uzbek as he claims. Nonetheless, in his correspondence to his father in Afghanistan, detainee communicates in Farsi, a language common in Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Information on travel facilitation for al-Qaida and other extremist organizations in Central Asia
  - Recruiting and facilitation processes including recruitment facilities, methods of movement, funding, procurement and use of legitimate and falsified documents
  - Counterfeiting operations, materials and personnel
  - GZ-10016
- Other extremist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan
  - Personnel, facilities, operations and coordination
  - LT
  - LIFG
- Al-Qaida safe houses in Pakistan and Afghanistan
  - Abdul Hamid al-Suri, aka (Musa), aka (Baha Bin Mustafa Muhammad Jaghal), aka (Abu Hamza)
- Khaldan Training Camp
- Terrorist biographical and psychological information
- Radicalization factors
- Terrorist operations in the CENTCOM AOR


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<sup>47</sup> > GUAN-2006-B00573-HT

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 15 December 2004 and he remains an enemy combatant.



MARK H. BUZBY  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.