

LORD AUCKLAND

AND

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

BY A BENGAL CIVILIAN.

~~~~~  
SECOND EDITION.  
~~~~~

LONDON:  
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.  
1845.

—  
*Price Two Shillings.*

LORD AUCKLAND

AND

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

BY A BENGAL CIVILIAN.

~~~~~  
SECOND EDITION.  
~~~~~

LONDON:  
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.  
1845.

—  
*Price Two Shillings.*

---

“ A SCEPTRE, SNATCH'D WITH AN UNRULY HAND,  
MUST BE AS BOISTEROUSLY MAINTAINED, AS GAINED.  
*King John.*”



LIV M 82



LORD AUCKLAND

AND

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

---

THE time has arrived for taking a deliberate view of Lord Ellenborough's Indian administration. Partizan writers, for and against, have said their say: all who are likely to read the Parliamentary papers have done so; and it might be supposed that nothing remained but to sum up, and record a verdict. This is not quite the case. Most writers on the subject have in fact only put forth one half of the evidence—a half which it is utterly impossible to appreciate, till placed in juxtaposition with the remainder. One-sided in their information as in their feelings, they have offered us their lame and impotent conclusions on Lord Ellenborough's measures in Sind, without a reference to that *preceding* policy, by a knowledge of which, our relations with the Amceers on his Lordship's arrival can alone be under-

stood; or a clue be found to the opposition he had from the first to struggle with, and eventually to quell. Our readers are therefore invited to bestow some attention on Lord Auckland's administration before they pass judgment on his successor's; and perhaps it may be found that events in '42 and '43 wear a different aspect, when viewed through the medium of '38 and '39.

We may further mention *in limine*, that, while other brochures on these topics have fairly eulogized themselves under one or other of the leading parties in the State, ours holds singly in view that not insignificant portion of British subjects who have the largest stake in the point at issue—we mean those, to whom the question of moment presented by the arrival of a new Governor-General, is not “What ministry has sent him?” but “Are we likely, in his hands, to become the agents of a large and enlightened policy, or the instruments of ignorance and oppression?” A body of public servants, whose ranks have sent forth such men as Malcolm, Munro, Metcalfe, and Elphinstone, may fairly claim that a subject like that we are entering upon should be considered with a regard to their interests.

It was in 1836, that the affairs of Sind first became implicated in our Eastern policy. Certain outrages committed by the Mazárees, “a

predatory tribe nominally subject to Sir against a few Sikh merchants and travellers given Runjeet Sing a delectable grievance who to found an invasion of that territory. Both ties were our allies;† and the Government very properly offered to mediate between them. There were, too, circumstances, in appearance trivial, with which our adroit negotiators meant to back the proposal. The old Lion of Lahore was sick; he had even asked the loan of an assistant-surgeon. Let him have one by all means, writes the Secretary, and “express to his Highness, at the same time, the great gratification derived by his Lordship in Council, from being able to meet his wishes in this instance, as the preservation of the health of so old and sincere a friend as the Maharajah must always be an object of earnest solicitude to the British Government.”‡ But what is there in all this, exclaims the English reader, but exchange of civilities nothing to the purpose? Tush! Let him open his eyes wider, and remember he is in the East. The next paragraph runs: Should the Maharajah prove o’

\* *Sind Papers*, 1836—1838, p. 1.

† The Treaty with Sind is dated April 2, 1819. By its provisions the Indus was opened to the Rindistan; and both parties bound themselves to abstain with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of the other.

—*Sind Papers*, 1838—1843, p. 2.

‡ *Sind Papers*, 1836—1838, p. 4.

tentions against Sind, you must withdraw— does the reader think? —our mediatory —our friendship? —our Resident? —no —of the kind: withdraw—*the doctor!* Shades Galen and Machiavelli! in the name of gallipots and protocols (henceforward cognate symbols), was there ever so queer a “*medicina malorum*” exhibited in a political crisis? Yes! History, impartial History, points to a parallel: “Cut off their tea!” exclaimed the Celestial Emperor, when his ports were beleaguered with hostile ships—“Cut off their tea, and the British barbarians will die of constipation!” “Cut off his physic,” cried our Governor-General, four years before, “and our *old and sincere friend* will—prove less refractory!” To whom must the laurel for enlightened statesmanship be awarded— Brother of the Moon, or the English diplomatist? We hesitate; but future historians will doubtless decide between the conflicting claims of Lord Auckland and TAOU KUANG.\*

the negotiation succeeded. The only objection was, lest the Ameers should learn too late that the danger was past, before their fears could be put to account. They were certainly coy in their attitude towards our mediation; but our offers, on their face, prejudged the case against them.

\*The word signifies “the glory of reason!” — *Davis's*

fore instructed to adopt a most conciliatory tone towards his Highness, and *by no means* to urge him to the adoption of any measure which might show undue preference to the interests of the Ameers of Sind.\* A hint is seldom lost on an Oriental; and in the present instance, both our consideration for Runjeet's sensibility, and our well-wishes for Sind, were sufficiently transparent.

To prepare our readers for the next move, we must premise, that at this period a Russo-phobia, of which it is difficult now to convey an idea,—but which, it may suffice to say, was shared by the highest personage in the realm, and his lowest minister,—this bugbear had penetrated the Government-house at Calcutta. To it are to be attributed, not only the insanity of making one Power hostile, in order to rivet the chains by which another was already linked at every point to our interests—of having ousted Dost Mahomed, the favourite of his people, who declared that he should prefer our alliance to any that could be offered him—rather than thwart the impudent pretensions of Runjeet Sing; but, to support the puppet we put forward, it was at this point, that the mask of our bungling diplomacy was thrown aside for ever in our dealings with the Ameers; and we first appeared to them, and

\* *Sind Papers*, 1836—1838, p. 32.



India at large, in the character of odious and faithless oppressors. Talleyrand's *mot*, "une crime ! c'était pire, c'était une erreur" presents itself here rather as a maxim of political morality, than the sneer of a votary of expediency: for did ever single crime lead to so thick a tissue of wickedness and misery, as *that error*—the miserable delusion that our danger from the West was so imminent as to justify our resorting to any expedients?

That, five months after Lord Auckland's hint to Captain Wade, Runjeet's claims against the Ameers should be as far as ever from being accommodated, will astonish no one. But not only had we thus stopped that pacification *in limine*, but on sending Colonel Pottinger a copy of the *Tripartite Treaty*,\* the Governor-General bade him break to the Ameers the following startling intelligence:—

1st.—That we were about to supply another occupant for the Caubul throne.

2d.—That we should revive the claims for tribute (obsolete these thirty years) which that empire used in times past to enforce against Sind.

3d.—As a corollary of the latter, that the Ameers were to defray the expenses of Shah Shuja's expedition to the tune of 20 lacs of rupees.

\* *Sind Papers*, 1828—1843, p. 8.

4th.—That, in spite of the Ameers being neutral in the Affghan contest (except in so far as their interests and *wishes* led them to favour *Dost Mahomed*), the Governor-General *commanded* them to allow a passage to Shah Shuja's troops; and so to do whatever in them lay to place him on a throne, from whence his demands against themselves could be best enforced!

It was difficult, said Sir Robert Peel, with reference to this period, to look to our Vattel or our Puffendorf, and decide, on their authority, that it was unjustifiable to claim a passage for troops through a neutral territory;—and, in good truth, when the commonest principles of justice and honesty are flagrantly outraged, it does seem like a jest to refer to the rules of inter-national law that obtain in Europe. Besides, who thinks of applying such canons to the East? Like children, who fancy that the men on the other side of the earth walk on their heads, most people are content to think, that the principles of political morality are naturally *reversed* at the Antipodes.

In effect, we betrayed one ally into the hands of another; that other being at the time, not a Power, but a helpless puppet in our own hands. Is it alleged that we looked on the Ameers as the dependent tributaries of Shah Shuja, (!) and that his permission was therefore a sufficient sanction

for the demands that were so imperiously enforced? We reply, that such a plea disavows the independence which all our previous engagements with them had acknowledged; and Lord Auckland's advocates are welcome to either horn of the dilemma.

About a month and a half after the despatch we have noticed was sent to Colonel Pottinger, the Government received a copy of an intercepted letter, from Noor Mahomed, the chief of Lower Sind, to the Shah of Persia.\* It was a flowery production, with the least possible amount of meaning;† but how bitterly must our negotiators have grieved that it had not made its

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 12.

† Anxiety not to occupy our pages with more rubbish than we can help, has prevented us from quoting any passages from this letter. But we by no means wish to slur it over. On the contrary, we would draw attention to the 12th page of the Blue Book, where it is to be found: and we propose it as an interesting problem to the budding diplomatist, to discover what it is that constitutes the rhapsody in question an Infringement of Engagements; while the Tripartite Treaty, entered into without the cognizance of the Ameers, though seriously damaging their interests, was so far from partaking of such a character as to be absolutely "a boon" (page 10). For this is the cream of the jest, that we disabled the Sindians, and then rifled their pockets, mainly, according to Lord Auckland, from a regard for their welfare!

"What spites me more than all—

*He does it under name of perfect love!"*

appearance two months earlier ;—what would it not have served to justify ! True, Colonel Pottinger ascribed no political object to the letter ; and looked on it as proceeding “solely from the bigotry of Sheeaism ;” \* but to the Government, late as it came, it proved a wonderful windfall. It “may justly be held to have forfeited for him” (Noor Mahomed), “on the part of the Governor-General, all confidence and consideration,” writes the Secretary ; † and, in pursuance of this position, the Resident was desired at once to proceed towards transferring the supremacy in Sind from the hands of the Chief to those of some other member in his family ; and to arrange for the permanent establishment of a British force in his territory. The “incidental presence” of some 5,000 troops, it is pleasantly added, would probably “insure success to your negotiations.” Milder alternatives were, indeed, suggested, in case the more stringent measures should prove impracticable ; but the Resident was admonished, that “the course first named—in the opinion of his Lordship—would alone give security for the future !” Again we say, Oh, that the rhapsodical epistle had come to light but one month and a half before ! no one could have sworn to its having any sense at all ; any might therefore have been attributed to it ! Oh, that the dates of the

\* *Sind Papers*, page 11.

† *Id.* p. 16.

Tripartite Treaty\* and Noor Mahomed's letter to the Shah† could but change places! That these natural regrets must have often affected the Governor-General, we gather from the somewhat startling phenomenon, that the succession of the two events seems to have become actually inverted in his mind. He literally desires the Head-Ameer to be told that he "would have gladly taken any step which might have insured a *friendly co-operation* in these measures" (relating to Affghanistan) "on the part of the Ameers of Sind," *but for the discovery of Noor Mahomed's letter!* There never was such an instance of the wish being father to the thought.

It is fair that Lord Auckland should now be heard in his own defence. Colonel Pottinger, in acknowledging the Instructions sent him with the Tripartite Treaty, had suggested, that the "moral effect" of an efficient force being raised "for eventual service in Sind," would go far towards counteracting other *moral effects* occasioned by our policy. For, says the cautious Resident, while "I do not, by pointing out this argument, mean for an instant to uphold its correctness, Sobdar and his party will in all probability even go so far as to declare that the demand" (of twenty-five years' arrears of tribute for Shuja)

\* June 26th, 1838.

† Aug. 13th, 1838.

“is a breach of the late agreement, on the principle that, without our assistance, Shah Shujaool-Moolk had no means of exacting one re-  
 from them; consequently that the demand may be considered our own. . . . Had our present connexion existed some years, and our Resident thereby had time, by constant kindly intercourse with the chiefs and people, to have removed *the strong and universal impression that exists throughout Sind as to our grasping policy*, the case might have been widely different; but I enter on my new duties without anything to offer, and with a proposal that will not only strengthen the above impressions (for many besides the Sindees will believe at the outset\* that we are making a mere use of Shah Shuja’s name), *but revive a claim to tribute which has long been esteemed obsolete.*”† This most posing of epistles drew forth the following remarks in justification of the policy that was being pursued.

“The Governor-General would have been disposed to attach weight to your opinion, that the mere preparation of a suitable force might have all the moral effect‡ that could be desired, had no ulterior measures been in contemplation beyond these of preventing, on the part of the Sind Government, any opposition to the accomplishment of our immediate ob-

---

\* We wonder whether the *finale* has undeceived them?

† *Sind Papers*, pp. 14, 15.

‡ What a soothing charm this often-recurring phrase seems



jects ; but it will be, at all events, necessary that a force should be stationed on the Indus, as a reserve for the advancing army. He (the Governor-General) deems it hardly necessary to remind you that, in the important crisis at which we are arrived, we cannot permit our enemies to occupy the seat of power ; the interests at stake are too great to admit of hesitation in our proceedings ; and not only they who have shown a disposition to favour our enemies, but they who display an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary undertaking in which we are engaged, must be displaced, and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we may be able implicitly to rely.”\*

We have thought it due to Lord Auckland to give these passages at full length ; it is due to public morality that their meaning should be placed before the reader in a somewhat simpler guise. Firstly, we observe therefrom, that the necessity of a reserve to the army destined for Affghanistan, and *not* the sins of the Ameers, was the reason for stationing a force in their country ; secondly, it is assumed that the danger from Russia was so imminent as to justify us in demanding from the Sindians a passage for troops, marching in support of a man they hated ; not to mention twenty lacs of rupees, in part payment of Shuja’s debt to ourselves ; and,

---

to have possessed for our diplomatists ! To the student of the Parliamentary Papers, it plays the part of

“ the warning bird,

Who bringeth him news of the storms unheard !”

\* *Sind papers*, pp. 21, 22.

thirdly, the enormous fallacy is taken for granted, that the refusal of a favour (*i. e.* some benefit not guaranteed by treaty) justifies the revolutionizing of the recusant State. The first of these positions is a sufficient comment on the tone taken up in our communications with the Ameers; the second has been proved before all the world a fearful error; and, for the third, we may be permitted to appeal to a sufficient authority. Of favours, Vattel observes, that a nation “a droit de les demander, mais non pas de les exiger. . . La nation n’a qu’un droit imparfait aux offices de l’humanité; elle ne peut contraindre une autre nation à les lui accorder.”\* What, then, remains of Lord Auckland’s defence? All that remains is, that the Russo-phobia was so strong upon him, as to warrant him, in his own eyes, in overleaping any of the sanctions and barriers of international law, by which the bugbear could be avoided. In his mind, the urgent necessity which suspends “tous les droits de propriété” existed. And there is an end. We can only say, God defend us from Power and Unwisdom combined!

The Sindians were driven frantic by our demands. At one time obsequious, at another insolent, they tried entreaty and bullying, threats and prayers, by turns, and in vain. Then they

\* *Droit des Gens*, ii. 1. §§ 8, 9.



would affect a desire to close with our offers, and endeavour, by all the lies they could invent, to detain us from actually executing our designs; while, with the impotent efforts of despair, they were making overtures to every Power, far or near, which they thought could protect them. We watched and exposed their abortive struggles; twitted them with their treachery; and proceeded to its punishment with as lofty a port, as if every crime laid to their charge had not been a natural and foreseen consequence of our own original violation of good faith.

How quietly does this passage open:—

“It occurs to the Governor-General that it might materially facilitate any negotiations which may eventually be called for, with Meer Sobdar,\* were that chief informed that we have received overtures from a descendant of the Caloree dynasty, now residing at Bikaner. His Lordship has reason to suppose that the individual in question has many powerful adherents in Sind, (!) and it is not impossible that his pretensions may be favourably regarded by the British Government, should it be found that no member of the reigning family is disposed to accede to those arrangements which are deemed absolutely indispensable to the safety and tranquillity of our Indian possessions.”†

Here, of course, the reader sees a repetition of the Affghan policy; for we have but to substitute the Barukzyes for the Talpoors, and the

\* A subordinate Ameer of Lower Sind, whom Government were at this time thinking of elevating to the chieftaincy, in Noor Mahomed's place.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 60.

Suddozye for the Calóree refugee, and we have the main plot of the Caubul drama. It is easy, indeed, to see how great a favourite this tactique was with all the actors in those scenes, from the circumstance, that, on the day previous to the date of the letter we have quoted, Sir Alexander Burnes had made exactly the same threat to the Ameers of Upper Sind, and had shaken in their faces the very parallel we have indicated.\* Did a ruler prove reluctant to forfeit every symbol of his independence,—did he, instead of simply surrendering himself to our schemes, obstinately point to treaties and engagements? Their resource was obvious. Displace him for some helpless claimant, who will be glad to accept on any terms a country which could not otherwise have fallen into his hands, and who therefore will be the last person in the world to moot the question, how it ever became ours to give him. In this system, our hardy schemers thought they had found a master-key, before which every lock was to yield, every obligation might be loosened, and Treaties themselves could be set at nought.

But Lord Auckland stopped short of territorial spoliation; and we will not deny our readers the pleasure—short-lived though it may prove—of perusing those passages in the Government despatches where it is deprecated. “The Go-

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 55.

vernor-General is hardly disposed to concur entirely in the opinion you have expressed," writes the Secretary in November 1838, to Colonel Pottinger (who had forwarded a good-sized *catalogue raisonné* of the Hyderabad Chieftain's follies and offences), "to the effect that the circumstances specified, however clearly they demonstrate the want of all honour and honesty in the character of Noor Mahomed Khan, are such as to place that chief at our mercy." And on December 13th, this opinion is reiterated: "The Governor-General would refer you for his general views to his letter of November 19th, and will only add to it, that he is not disposed to entertain any proposition having reference to territorial acquisition in Sind, or any adjacent territory, as at all advisable under the present state of things on our north-west frontier." \*

When we first came across these passages in the Blue-book, we confess we were dazzled, as at the sudden lighting of a lamp in a dark room; but will not our readers share in our subsequent disappointment, on finding that the Governor-General, as if in fear of his forbearance being attributed to a better cause, pertinaciously ascribes it in the next paragraph to his dread of "the risk of exciting the jealousy and distrust of states, hitherto either friendly or neutral, by a course which might be construed by them as indicative

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 97.

of a desire for selfish aggrandizement"? More emphatic still are his explanations to Sir John Keane: "Your Excellency will have been already in possession of my opinions as to the *inexpediency* of any acquisition of territory in Sind on the part of this government. I look upon it as highly important that British troops should *advance upon* Candahar, without the impression attending their progress that they are employed to reduce Affghanistan into the condition of a province of our Indian empire." \* An excellent reason doubtless; but there was a better at hand. However, his Lordship's extreme caution lest his forbearance should be misconstrued deserves to be respected: we conclude, therefore, in the words once applied to a just measure of CÆSAR'S, that "la politique eut plus de part à son refus que l'amour de la justice; mais enfin, *il put, en cette occasion, suivre avec justice les maximes de sa prudence.*"

To make a long story short, the "moral effect" of Sir John Keane's appearance at Hyderabad with a stout force did not disappoint our diplomatists. On January 10th, 1839, the treaty with Roostun Khan, the Chief of Upper Sind, was concluded. On February 4th, Colonel Pottinger wrote, "I consider that our supremacy in Sind, is now finally and fully established." On the 13th, he

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 147.

forwarded to Government, the draft of a treaty to which the Hyderabad Ameers had set their seals; whereby Noor Mahomed's supremacy was abolished, and all were rendered individually responsible, on the principle of *divide et impera*. On March 11th, Lord Auckland returned it with some stringent modifications; and on July 14th, after many a wry face, they fairly drank the bitter cup to the dregs; and their independence virtually passed away from them for ever. "*The world,*" writes the Resident, "*will now acknowledge that if our power is great, our good faith and forbearance are still more to be wondered at!*"\*

Here our view of Lord Auckland's administration closes; and, as the Sindians, from this period till some time after the arrival of his successor, played a very insignificant part in Eastern politics, here too for a while closes our notice of them. It has been alleged that the people of England never give a thought to the morality of a political measure, as long as prosperity smiles on its results;—that they never trouble themselves with its criminality, till smarting under its chastisement. In contempt of so hateful a charge, we have left it to others, with keener eloquence and severer justice, to scrutinize and expose those

that have already “received their reward;” while our own remarks have been confined to those more *prosperous* measures, for which his advocates would be themselves most likely to challenge attention; and we are content to leave our readers at the very point where all his Lordship’s negotiations in Sind were crowned with success, to decide on his claims to the character of a just and high-minded Statesman.

We trust the reader may leap uninjured over the dreary chasm that intervenes between our last date and February 1842. He will light in a troubled scene. The murder of our Envoy, the massacre of the Caubul force,—not singly had these fearful disasters come; but with them,

“ruin upon ruin, rout on rout,  
Confusion worse confounded!”

*The Government of India was paralysed.* On no other supposition can we account for the fact, that with Nott and 8000 men at Candahar, and Pollock’s three brigades at Peshawur,\*—with British prisoners in the hands of barbarians, and the national honour to be retrieved,—our generals should have been told, that “no great effort for the re-occupation of Affghanistan”† was contemplated that year!

Four days after the date of this despatch, Lord

\* *Papers relating to Military Operations in Affghanistan*, 843, p. 170.

† *Id.* p. 152.

Auckland was relieved by his successor; and symptoms of reviving vigour were gladly hailed in the instructions issued by the new Governor-General on the 15th of March.\* Nott, indeed, was told to retire to India after relieving Ghuzny; but General Pollock was to push on to join General Sale; Affghans of rank were, if possible, to be seized as hostages for our captive countrymen; and even an advance on Caubul was mentioned as not improbable. It was not a vigour, however, which could withstand buffets. The "deliberate view" that saw in "the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which might make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities," an object "for which risk might be justifiably incurred," †—that *deliberate view* was, alas! so distorted by the fall of Ghuzny and Brigadier England's repulse at Hykulzye, that, on the 19th of April, Nott was ordered to retreat *at once*; ‡ and General Pollock's army,—after opening the vaunted Passes half-way to Caubul; and reinforced by the Illustrious Garrison,—were told to turn tail on their beaten foes, as soon as weather and the health of the troops would permit! §

\* *Papers, &c.*, p. 167.

‡ *Id.* p. 223.

† *Id.* p. 167.

§ *Id.* p. 224.



But to estimate better the actual importance of those reverses, let us see their effect on a man of different mould. On the 14th of March, NOTT had besought the Government to “pause before deciding on a retrograde step,” and to consider the difficulties under which we should again advance after “such an admission of weakness” as “the withdrawal from Jellálabad or Candahar.” \* *After* their occurrence, and in regretting those very reverses, he warned them against “an unnecessary alarm regarding the position of our troops, and the strength and power of the enemy;” † while on the same day he wrote to Brigadier England, “*I have not contemplated falling back.*” ‡ This last letter was that which Major Outram termed “the most refreshing draught” he “had quaffed since our reverses commenced.” § PAR NOBILE!

However, to give Lord Ellenborough his due, the fall of Ghuzny, and the repulse at Hykulzye, were heavy blows: they were only inconsiderable as compared with the Issue at stake, and the means in our hands. But if reverse was a reason for retreat, *success*, strange as it may sound, was urged as one still more cogent! Bitter, indeed, are the reproaches levelled at General Pollock, —still at his post two months after Sale’s victorious

\* *Papers, &c.*, p. 224.

† *Id.* p. 249.

‡ *Id.* p. 246.

§ *Id.* p. 250.



sally,—for not having perceived that retreat, following immediately on its heels, “would have had the appearance of a military operation successfully accomplished, and even triumphantly achieved!”\* Poor General! blinded, perhaps not unnaturally, by the past lustre of British warfare, he seemed singularly slow in appreciating the laurels he should reap, and the humiliation which would accrue to the Affghans, by quitting the country, with guns, colours, and prisoners in the hands of the enemy! Yet such were the orders issued from time to time to our Generals, *until about the middle of June*; the pith of which may thus be put: Fly, if beaten; but if victorious,—fly double-quick! We need not weary our readers with the *thirteen* several enunciations of this policy, or the remonstrances they excited; but, for the benefit of such as may desire to see for themselves how effectual a counterpoise steady national feeling, on the part of *subordinates*, can supply to vacillating Authority, the references in the note are added.†

About the middle of June, curious speculators on cause and effect have observed that the English mail, of May the 1st, arrived at Calcutta; about the same time, they have also observed,

\* *Papers, &c.*, p. 297.

† *Id.* pp. 223, 244, 251, 318, 224, 225, 290, 235, 291, 241, 242, 294, 297.

that Lord Ellenborough's instructions to retreat ceased. After allowing a fortnight for deliberation, they have not failed to notice, that the Governor-General so wonderfully swung round from the point at which he had been making, as fairly to give General Nott an option of fighting or retreating, on his (the General's) own responsibility.\* These insidious reasoners cannot be said to have received any check from such remarks as the following:—

“Each gave his own date and circumstances—out went the order from home on the 1st June, it had been confidently and pompously announced: but that would not tally with Lord Ellenborough's order to advance on the 4th August; therefore that position is no longer tenable, and the honourable gentleman prudently retreats to the 1st March. He begged pardon, the 1st April.”†

The 1st of April, indeed! This is a bit of mystification worthy of the day! The last mail that preceded Lord Ellenborough's change of policy *was not supposed* to have left England on the 1st June, but the beginning of *May*; the permission to advance was *not* sent on the 4th August, but, as all the world knows, on the *4th July*; and the hon. gentleman, who so “prudently” hesitated between the 1st March and the 1st April, might have stuck to either, or both, of his dates, with full as much

\* *Papers, &c.*, p. 327.

† Speech of Mr. Hogg, *Hansard*, lxvi. pp. 1004, 1005.

accuracy as they were assailed by the member for Beverley.—We repeat it, those casuists have still got to be controverted!

Some sympathy may be due at seeing a man of Lord Ellenborough's temperament reduced to eat his own Orders; but we confess we can never read that celebrated despatch without yielding to a smile at the pertinacious efforts of the poor Governor-General, even at the last, to keep up some show of consistency. "Nothing has occurred," he protests, to change his "first opinion," that the *retirement* of the troops must be effected. The only question now is—Shall Ghuzny and Caubul, or Quetta and Sukkur, be the "*line* of retirement?" One important distinction, he owns, characterizes the latter: "there is no enemy to oppose you." He might have added, that it was the direct route back to India, not 100 miles long; while the other, 480 miles in extent, lay right through the heart of the enemy's country, his capital, and the terrible Passes! At this rate, we suppose his Lordship considers the term *retirement* as applicable to the Duke's march from Brussels to England, *viâ* Waterloo and Paris, as if it had been simply *viâ* Ostend.

We shall not detain our readers longer with this despatch. Contrary as have been the state-

• the subject. The Marquis of Clanricarde said all that is to be said, in the following pertinent sentence :—

“I defy any man, if Nott had failed in his advance, to attribute any blame to Lord Ellenborough : and if no blame could attach to him in case of failure, surely no merit should accrue to him from success.”\*

The plain truth is, that Lord Ellenborough was incapable of facing the emergency which met him on his arrival. We mean no reproach : † *few* men could have grappled with its difficulties. But there was *one* on the spot who could, and did. Around General Nott,—verily “*justum ac tenacem propositi virum,*”—the disasters of Caubul, the revolutions in our fortunes and prestige, the faint-heartedness of authorities,—yes, even the orders to retreat, fell,—and found him undismayed,—unshaken.

“I HAVE NOT CONTEMPLATED FALLING BACK!”

He stood his ground in the heart of the enemy's country, pleading to the Government now one, now another excuse for his delay, until the memorable choice was offered him :—his

\* *Hansard*, lxvi. p. 920.

† The Duke of Wellington said that he would undertake to defend any of Lord Ellenborough's Orders to his generals. We are not dissenting from so high an authority ; for, doubtless, those Orders can be defended on the score of prudence. All we would intimate is, that *something more than prudence*

prompt resolve, and its glorious execution, need not be recorded here.

It were rash to attempt a description of the splendid ovation prepared by Lord Ellenborough for himself and his generals, on their return to India. Believing, as we do, that his Lordship's talents are eminently adapted for getting up a spectacle of that kind, from his known facility at *coups de théâtre*, we shall not presume to criticize. It is enough for us, that "Victoria vindex" is again triumphant; and that we may bid a complacent farewell to Affghanistan.

*Revenons à nos moutons*,—the sheep that are being driven to the slaughter,—the wretched Ameers of Sind. From the moment that the treaties of 1839 were imposed upon them by Lord Auckland, the process of events which led to their final ruin was, in our opinion, as irresistible as one of Euclid's deductions from its premises. Conceive a free and barbarous people subjected to a yoke that suddenly crushed their independence; a yoke in itself intolerable, but rendered a thousand times more galling by the way in which it was imposed. Disaster darkens the prestige of their oppressors. Could ignorant Orientals pierce the future, and calculate the elastic force of our power, blinded as they were both by barbarism and fury? No; "Allah has at last avenged his honour on the micreants!"

they cried; "their day has passed: Islam has triumphed in Affghanistan; it shall triumph again in Sind!" What could have been done to undeceive them,—to avert from them the destruction they were rushing upon,—that was not done? Their plots were destroyed ere they could ripen, and then ignored; oblivion of the past was promised—in vain: when, as a last resource, Lord Ellenborough addressed to them the stern warning of **May the 6th.**\* But if the issue of this circular, at a season when our momentous struggle in the North-West had as yet been uncheered by any crowning success, did honour to the determination of his Lordship, it impaired its efficacy with the Ameers. Continued intrigues, though rendered futile by our vigilance, made it at last absolutely necessary that we should prove ourselves capable of punishing infidelity on the part of princes, who were infatuated enough to believe in November, '42, that we had been "turned out of Affghanistan;" and who naïvely anticipated that we should be so harassed by their Belooch troops, as to exclaim, "What infernal devils these are! What have we done to bring down upon us such a nest of hornets?"† We were forced to vindicate our authority; the Ameers appealed to arms, and their kingdom passed away.

Is not all this a natural sequence? Given, a

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 315.

† *Id.* pp. 464, 465, 335.

race of martial barbarians ; place them under an oppressive yoke ; let defeat at once degrade in their eyes the power of their oppressors, and render it impossible that leniency on the part of the latter should not be misinterpreted by its objects ; —and the result is clear as noonday,—inevitable as fate. What, then, is to be said of the violent outcry that was raised against the annexation of Sind by some of Lord Auckland's advocates,—nay, by the very Instrument of his unprincipled policy ? Was it for *Sir Henry Pottinger* to use such terms as these :—

“ No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it” (the annexation of Sind) “ has left on our good faith and honour ; and, as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures connected with that devoted country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment and express my sentiments on the subject.”\*

When he could use this tone in August, 1838,—

“ I shall not fail to tell them (the Ameers) distinctly that *the day on which they commit themselves with any other power will be the last of their independent authority, if not of their rule ;* for, that we have the ready power to *crush and annihilate them, and will not hesitate to call it into action,* should it appear requisite, *however remotely,* for either the safety or integrity of our empire, or its frontiers.”†

---

\* We are not aware that Sir H. Pottinger has ever disowned the letter that appeared, with his name, in the *Morning Chronicle*.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 9.



When, too, as has been pertinently remarked,\* ~~he~~ could prophesy in February, 1839, that “if ~~we~~ are ever again obliged to exert our military strength in Sind, it must be carried to subjugating this country”? † That Sir Henry did his best to mitigate the harsh measures inflicted on the Ameers, we do not wish to deny;—that he did not foresee that the result he described *must* occur, tells more for his humanity than his penetration; but *he must share its responsibility*. In statesmanship emphatically may it be said,

“This is the curse of every evil thing,  
That propagating still, it brings forth evil;”

and its guilt is coextensive with its consequences. But Sir Henry Pottinger has served his country well; and we will choose rather to associate with his name the achievements of China, than the memories of Sind.

Let us guard against misconstruction. We must not be understood to maintain, that our dealings with the Ameers, viewed as a *whole*, are otherwise than reproachful to our fair fame among the nations;—that it would not have been more glorious to have relaxed the bonds that drove them to desperation, *had it been practicable at the period* (but this we have denied);—or, that it would not *now* be as wise, as it is an

\* *A Great Country's Little Wars*, by Mr Lushington.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 152.



improbable, measure, to restore them to the possessions, which were tyrannously wrested from their hands. But, secure from the imputation of partizanship, we will affirm, that whatever firmness, humanity, and public principle could do to *avert* the final catastrophe, was done by Lord Ellenborough.

If, however, the certainty of all leniency being misinterpreted by the Ameers (and not by them alone; for many native States were slow to appreciate the glory of our last Affghan campaign) —if this was the Governor-General's sole justification in punishing their intrigues,—it follows that any abstract plea for the measures pursued must be unsound. We therefore object to Sir Charles Napier's *Essay* on the Sind question in October, 1842:\* and, as it is characterized by the gallant General's wonted pithiness, and vigour of style, an effort to detect its fallacies may not be thrown away.

We understand Sir Charles Napier to justify the stringent measures used to enforce on the Ameers an adherence to the Treaties of 1839, by the following positions:—

1st. He premises, that his arguments will be “called hard” by such “sticklers for abstract rights” as “maintain, that to prevent a man from doing mischief is to enslave him.”

2nd. He insists that the Treaties of 1839 were favourable to the interests of civilization.

3rd. That the "attempt to break such Treaties," on the part of the Amēers, showed their unfitness to govern.

4th, and lastly. That their rule was hateful to their subjects.

With regard to the first head, Sir Charles Napier has chosen a true, but most unlucky, parallel. For, that a man could be absolutely *prevented from doing mischief* by anything but a system of coercion more severe than any known code of slavery, no one,—be he a "stickler for abstract rights," or their *opponent*,—will doubt. We cannot, therefore, refrain from the General's own conclusion, that the arguments we are about to consider must "be called hard."

Secondly, we take it for granted that, *cæteris paribus*,\* the criminality of imposing an unjust treaty grows and multiplies in proportion as it is enforced; just as the guilt of a robber who disables a traveller is enhanced according to the advantage he takes of the power he has usurped. It follows, then, that what is not sufficient to justify the first step of its imposition will, *a*

---

\* A condition, be it remembered, which in our then-existing relations with Sind, did not exist. We are not attacking the actual policy that was pursued; but a rotten defence set up for it by Sir C. Napier.

*fortiori*, be inadequate to justify the ever-increasing guilt of its execution. No one, we presume, will maintain that the *interests of civilization* would excuse a strong nation in *imposing* a tyrannical treaty on a weaker; for, in the first place, a main point in civilization—the maintenance of international good faith—is thus violated; and next, if superiority in the arts of government were a sufficient plea for subjugating less favoured countries, the whole gradation of European States, from Britain to Turkey, might with perfect propriety be continually encroaching on each other! We conclude, then, that, as the interests of civilization could not justify the imposition of the tyrannical Treaties of '39, still less could they justify their rigid execution.

This would appear enough; but the fallacy we have attacked is so widely spread, so plausible, and so offensive to the first principles of international morality, that, for the further benefit of the professors of that fire - and - sword philanthropy, which, like the agent it employs, is ever “shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches,” we shall summon Vattel once more to our assistance:—

“Mais si une nation est obligée de contribuer de son mieux à la perfection des autres, elle n'a aucun droit de les contraindre à recevoir ce qu'elle veut faire dans cette vue. Ces ambitieux Européens, qui attaquoient les Nations Américaines et les soumettoient à leur avide Domination, pour les civiliser,

*disoient-ils, et pour les faire instruire dans la véritable religion; ces Usurpateurs, dis-je, se fondoient sur un prétexte également injuste et ridicule."*\*

In reply to Sir C. Napier's third position, it may suffice to observe, that what their "attempt to break the treaties" *did* evince on the part of the Ameers, was, first, a very natural desire to shake them off at the earliest opportunity; and, secondly, a hardly less natural miscalculation of our power to enforce them.

And as for the fourth, and last, plea, there is no computing the odious interference which it might cloak, and give rise to, were not some symbol considered necessary to show, that the hatred of a people for its rulers has arrived at the point where other nations may justly proffer their assistance. This symbol has generally been held to be an armed and organized resistance on the part of their subjects against the unpopular Government. Now, we should like to know—not how many Sindians were in the field before we assumed a hostile attitude; for there were none—but how many flocked to our standards *thereafter*? Could Sir Charles Napier possibly mean to recognise the suttlers and hucksters, who were attracted by the tariff of the camp-bazaar, as the representatives of the proud and martial Sindians?—No; if the measures which the gallant general was employed to execute

---

\* *Droit des Gens*, ii. 1. § 7.

rested on no better grounds than he has chosen for them, we should not have much to say in their favour. But a brave honest heart will sometimes guide a man straight in spite of his theories; and so it has been with Sir Charles.

There would be much risk of needless repetition, were we to occupy our readers, first, with the details of Lord Ellenborough's Sind policy, and next, with a refutation of the principal charges brought against it; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the latter, in the belief that it will be found to involve a tolerably complete view of the general line pursued. Those charges will be found all included in the five following counts:—

1st. That Lord Ellenborough evinced from the beginning rapacious intentions against the Ameers.

2d. That the authenticity of the two treasonable letters alleged to have been written by Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan was never proved.

3d. That their guilt, even if established, could not justify the infliction of an equal punishment on all the Ameers; such as was imposed by the Revised Treaty.

4th. That by a plot of Sir Charles Napier's, Meer Roostum was inveigled into Ali Moorád's power, in order that he might be compelled by the latter to abdicate the chieftaincy.

5th. That the destruction of Emaumghur was a wanton act of spoliation.

The best reply to the accusation we shall first consider, will be to display the state of our affairs with the Ameers on Lord Ellenborough's arrival, and to follow their progress till the period when it was resolved to enforce the Revised Treaty. Our readers may be surprised to find, that *all the most stringent provisions of that document were proposed by Major Outram*,—the reputed champion of the Ameers,—some months before it was drawn up; at a time when neither their hostility or intrigues had arrived at their subsequent pitch; and that, so far from the Governor-General having given that officer his *cue to get up a case* against the Sindians, every letter on which the insinuation has been based was elicited by the representations of the Resident, and suggested measures invariably more lenient than those proposed by the latter. The following intelligence from Major Outram must have been received by Lord Ellenborough a few days after his landing at Calcutta :—

*Feb. 22nd, 1842.*

“I shall have intrigues of some of the more restless Ameers to expose hereafter, Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad particularly, who has been especially active of late. . . . I think we ought to preserve our positions in Sind as strong as circumstances will admit, during the season when our communication is cut off, or Nusseer Khan's (of Hyderabad) intrigues have been so extensive of late, that he must see he has committed himself beyond hope of concealment, *which may make him eager to embroil others with us while our troops are occu-*

*ped at a distance.* I do not expect, however, disturbances; for I trust to counteract Nusseer's manœuvres (with which view I shall move towards Sukkur as soon as possible); but of course *it is proper to be prepared, if only for the purpose of thereby preventing outbreak.*"\*

The instructions in reply were temperate; and firm, though issued at a troubled season.

*“Fort William, March 7, 1842.*

“The Governor-General in Council has considered the circumstances brought to his notice in late communications from Sind, of the vexatious and apparently unfriendly proceedings of Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad and his subordinates, and on this subject I am directed to inform you that Government relies upon your prudence and discretion, to prevent any misunderstandings with subordinate officers of the Meer, from leading to serious discussions with himself, as long, at least, as they can be avoided; but that you will endeavour, notwithstanding, to act with such firmness and decision in all your proceedings, in which those officers are concerned, as may convince them of the steadiness of purpose with which the objects of your Government will be pursued, and of its resolution to maintain its proper authority in the territories subject to Hyderabad.”†

Unfortunately for themselves, the Ameers did not relax in their intrigues during the following month. “I intercepted the other day,” wrote Major Outram to Mr. Clerk on May the 1st, “a letter purporting to be from Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore to Shere Sing,”‡ the King of

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 314.

† *Id.* p. 314.

‡ *Id.* p. 324.



the Punjaub. He also kept the Government constantly informed of the progress of the Ameers in disaffection, by a species of testimony which, though generally to be distrusted, as coming from native informants, was, in this instance, according to Lieut. Leckie, "to be depended on."\* We shall quote a few specimens; and, first, from Lieut. Leckie himself:—

"April 13, 1842.

"Nusseer Khan is going a-head as fast as he can, and is trifling with the treaty, as far as levying duties is concerned."†

"April 28, 1842.

"I was told last night that Nusseer said, when he heard we had won the Khyber, that the Afredees and Patans were a set of donkeys, and should have thrashed us."‡

"May 1, 1842.

"Meer Nusseer Khan recommended Meer Roostum to take immediate steps with 'Suckmut,' to get possession of the fort of Bukkur, *as in the event of anything, all the fighting must be in Upper Sind,—Lower Sind being too open.*"§

With whatever amount of qualification it may be thought advisable to take the above testimony, no one will affect to doubt, that the Ameers were persevering in their suicidal efforts; or that humanity itself could have dictated anything more likely to turn them from the course by which they were rushing into our jaws, than the following stern admonition:—

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 336.

† *Id.* p. 332.

‡ *Id.* p. 332.

§ *Id.* p. 333.



“THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE AMEERS OF SIND.

“*May 6, 1842.*

“My agent in Sind will have communicated to you the circular letter addressed, by my order, on the 26th of April, to all the agents of the British Government at all the courts of India.

“You will have seen in that letter, the principles of justice and moderation by which I am resolved to regulate my conduct.

“But while I am, myself, resolved to respect treaties, and to exercise the power with which I am entrusted, for the general good of the subjects of the British Government, and of the several States of India, I am equally resolved to make others respect the engagements into which they have entered, and to exercise their power without injury to their neighbours.

“I should be most reluctant to believe that you had deviated from the course which is dictated by your engagements; I will confide in your fidelity and in your friendship, until I have proof of your faithlessness and of your hostility in my hands; but be assured that, if I should obtain such proofs, no consideration shall induce me to permit you to exercise any longer a power you will have abused. On the day on which you shall be faithless to the British Government, sovereignty will have passed from you; your dominions will be given to others; and, in your destitution, all India will see that the British Government will not pardon an injury received from one it believes to be its friend.”\*

Now, what shall we say to a writer who has not shrunk from citing the despatch, enclosed with the above circular, as the *first* insinuation of the

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 315.

guilt of the Ameers,—as *suggesting to Major Outram* the line Lord Ellenborough desired him to pursue against them? \* This is the sentence he has quoted: “The Governor-General is led to think that you may have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of some one or more of the Ameers of Sind.” † *Had* not his Lordship been led to think so, by the intelligence we have given? Nay, so far back as January, was not Major Outram making bitter complaints of their hostility to Government? ‡—However, it is for his own party to quarrel with a man who betrays their cause by such *transparent* duplicity.

On May the 8th (and therefore *before* the last-mentioned despatch could have been received), Major Outram proposed these sweeping measures against the Ameers:—

“I shall have it in my power shortly, I believe, to expose the hostile intrigues of the Ameers, to such an extent as may be deemed by his Lordship *sufficient to authorize the dictation of his own terms to the chiefs of Sind*, and to call for such measures as he deems necessary to place British power on a secure footing in these countries.

“Should it be resolved to abandon the Kelat territory entirely, *I should the more earnestly advocate the assumption, by the British Government, of the entire management of the whole of the Sukkur and Shikarpore districts, on fair terms to the Ameers.*” §

---

\* “*India and Lord Ellenborough*,” p. 87.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 315.    † *Id.* p. 308.    § *Id.* p. 316.

The Governor-General replied to this letter in a tone, which, compared with that of the Resident, was indulgence itself; but it has, nevertheless, been quoted as the crowning evidence of his Lordship's rapacity.

“It is the Governor-General's earnest desire to put an end, wherever it may be practicable, with any regard to our financial interests, to the system whereby a native State receives protection from us, in consideration of a tribute to be paid to the British Government.

“In most cases in which such a system prevails, it must be as much the real interest of the British Government to afford protection, as it is that of the native to receive it; and the payment of a tribute by the native State, however equitable it may be in principle, cannot fail to affect the otherwise friendly nature of our relations with it; to introduce much of disagreeable discussion; to occasion the frequent visits of the officers in the unpopular character of exacting creditors; and to attach to the British Government, in the eyes of the subjects of the tributary State, much of the odium of the acts of extortion by which native administration is too frequently conducted.

“It would be much more conducive to a permanent good understanding between the British Government and the protected States, if arrangements could be made whereby, either in exchange for territory, or in consideration for the abolition of duties burthensome to trade, such demand for tribute on our part might be altogether given up.

“The Governor-General would consider that it would be a most desirable arrangement, if, in lieu of all tribute payable under treaty, or otherwise, by the Amcers of Sind and of Khyrpore, such cessions of territory as may be necessary were made to us at Kurrachee, the island of Bukkur, and the town of Sukkur, and all claims to tribute payable by the Ameers to

us, or to any other power, were, after such cessions, to be cancelled, in consideration of the establishment of the perpetual freedom of trade upon the Indus, and of such other provisions for the freedom of transit through their respective territories as it might appear expedient to make.”\*

There can be no doubt that his Lordship was well aware that, though all these advantages would attend an exchange such as he contemplated, it was one which no native Power was likely to assent to of its own free-will. But, surely, it is mere cant to pretend, that, at the pass at which our affairs with the Ameers had arrived, the Governor-General could shut his eyes to the fact, that he would soon be compelled to repress their hostility : and what expedient so judicious, or humane, as the exchange in question ? As he elsewhere says, “in the first instance, the surrender of territory would be as painful † to the Ameers as the exaction of tribute ; but the latter is a grievance constantly recurring,—brought continually to the recollection by incessant applications for payment, which the debtor state continually invents excuses to evade or defer. The cession of territory is a grievance which, once submitted to, is in time almost forgotten.” ‡

Major Outram did not deliver Lord Ellenborough’s warning letter to the Ameers ; for,

*Sind Papers*, p. 318.

† More so, no doubt.

‡ *Sind Papers*, p. 438.

said he, "if, as I have reason to believe, *almost every individual chief throughout these countries* has been more or less concerned, directly or indirectly, in treasonable plottings, all would consider themselves compromised, and in mere dread of the consequences might be driven to commit themselves openly, and together."\* This course was approved of by his Lordship in a despatch, which, while it expressed regret at the ripening hostility imputed to Meer Roostum and Nusser Khan, breathed a full determination to vindicate our authority; and the Resident's opinion was asked on the propriety of punishing Meer Roostum, by transferring a portion of his territory to the adjoining possessions of our ally, Bhawul Khan. We shall give, not only Major Outram's reply to this proposal, but the general views propounded in the three last letters of importance which he wrote, before he was relieved by Sir Charles Napier. It will be found, that the very measures that have been stigmatized as tokens of the Governor-General's shameless rapacity, emanated from a man whom partizans have delighted to describe as dissenting *in toto* from the policy pursued,—a man, whose humanity is as acknowledged as his valour. Thus, we have already seen, that if Lord Ellenborough contemplated the transfer of Subzulkote to Bhawulpore, it was not

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 320.

till Major Outram had proposed extensive cessions to *ourselves*;—if he urged an exchange of tribute for territory, it was not till the Resident had advocated “the assumption of the entire management of the whole of the Sukkur and Shikarpore districts, on fair terms to the Ameers.” Let us hear the Major’s opinion on the first of these measures :—

“From the repeated disputes between the Kardar of Subzulkote and the neighbouring authorities of Bhawulpore, regarding the infringement of their respective boundaries, I conclude that the district of Subzulkote must be conveniently situated for the contemplated transfer; and I believe *it was formerly wrested from Bhawulpore by the Sind Government, and that only since the British Government guaranteed to the latter the territory which we found the Ameers in possession of, has Bhawul Khan relinquished his claim to it*; however, of this I am not certain, having had little personal experience in Upper Sind, but have directed Lieutenant Brown to communicate the result of his inquiries on the subject.”\*

“*I consider making over Subzulkote to the Khan of Bhawulpore a most desirable arrangement in every respect, . . . as punishing an unfaithful to the benefit of a faithful ally, without the objectionable appearance of any desire for territorial acquisition on our own part; the arrangement regarding Sukkur and Kurráchee bearing the aspect merely of securing ourselves on the ground we already occupy, for, beyond the sites of the cantonments, and ground on which these towns are situated, no cession of actual territory is involved thereby.*”†

Major Outram even contemplated the possibility

\* Lieut. Brown confirmed these surmises, p. 348.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 345.



of its becoming advisable to deprive Nusseer Khan of his possessions altogether ; and thus states the *pros* and *cons* of so severe a measure. Be it remembered, too, that this was *previous* to the discovery of that chief's treasonable letter to Beebruck Boogtie, which eventually became so critical to his fate :—

“ June 26, 1842.

“ If, however, his Lordship should determine on making a more signal example of this chief, by depriving him of his possessions altogether, the other Ameers of Lower Sind would the more readily relinquish their shares of Kurráchee, the land customs of Tatta, the claim to levy tolls from their own subjects on the river, and agree to our clearing the banks thereof (the measures which in my despatch, dated 22nd ultimo, I represented as most necessary to secure, on any renewal of negotiations with the Sind Government), for shares in the forfeited territory, after assigning Subzulkote to Bhawulpore, and a sufficient provision for the support in respectability of Meer Nusseer Khan and his family, more especially if tribute is also remitted by the British Government.”\*

The general exchange of territory for tribute, proposed by Lord Ellenborough, was thus warmly seconded by the Resident :—

“ I myself consider that an open and *bonâ fide* relinquishment of all tolls on the river, for value received in the shape of remission in tribute, which would set the question at rest for ever, is *highly advisable*. I think it would be necessary to show, as a ground for requiring new arrangements, that we

---

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 346.



have of late been exposed to the inimical intrigues of some of the Ameers; that therefore we are called upon to demand such arrangements as will ensure security for the future to our power and to commerce, which, as at present situated, is liable to be interrupted.

“The evidence which I have already submitted to Government, even if deficient of legal proof, gives, I consider, sufficient data for suspecting that *intrigues were in progress to overthrow our power, and to authorize, consequently, our now taking the precautions necessary for self-preservation; and it cannot be denied that, as at present situated in Sind, our military positions are insecure, and our communications liable to be cut off.*

“These considerations would, I should suppose, justify the dictation of our terms to the Ameers, although generously, at the time relinquishing for ever, as an equivalent for what we justly assumed the right to demand, all pecuniary claims we possess on them, and even making up to such chiefs as we have no claims against, what we estimate they may sacrifice pecuniarily by the arrangement.”\*

The chiefs alluded to in the last sentence, who were exempted from paying tribute by the treaties of 1839, were the three Ameers,—Roostum, Sobdar, and Ali Moorád. The question arose, how they were to be compensated for their shares in the territory about to be ceded. The Resident thus solved the difficulty: As Meer Roostum Khan’s “hitherto uniform friendliness to the British Government may fairly entitle him to more lenient treatment for his recent infidelity

than is due either to *Meer Nusseer Khan, of Hyderabad, whose intrigues against the British Government have been unremitting from first to last*, or his namesake of Khyrpore, I would recommend that our demands on Meer Roostum Khan be confined to the cession of Bukkur and the two small islets above and below that fort (which is no pecuniary deprivation, and has already been tacitly made over to us), relinquishing the right to levy tolls from his own subjects on the river, admission of the claim of his brother, Meer Ali Moorád, to the turban, after his death, and expulsion from Sind of his minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, and his family.”\* Sobdar and Ali Moorád were to be compensated for the damage they might sustain through the new arrangements, by slices from the territory of such Ameers as would gain more by the remission of tribute than they would lose by the cessions to be demanded.

Lord Auckland's measure, on the *divide et impera* principle, of making all the Ameers of Lower Sind individually responsible, by destroying the supremacy of their Chief, had been given a tolerable trial, and proved an utter failure. Major Outram therefore now advocated a return to the old order of things. For (he wrote),

“While each Ameer remains independent, there is no general

---

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 346.

government in Lower Sind, and the British representative having to transact business with each, causes infinite trouble to all parties, and each Ameer evades doing anything by throwing the onus on his neighbour. Moreover, there being no common head, as heretofore, when one of the chiefs had the turban, the British Government is appealed to in every case of dispute among them, which ought to be settled among themselves, causing the direct interference in their affairs so obnoxious to themselves, but which nothing but a constituted head, under British guarantee of his power, can obviate.”\*

Moreover, the Resident sketched out a draft of a new Treaty, which he submitted to Lord Ellenborough. In it he distinctly specifies the following terms, to be demanded from the Ameers: 1st, Subzulkote was to be transferred to Bhawulpore; 2d, In exchange for a total remission of tribute, the fortress of Bukkur and its neighbouring islets, the site of the ancient Sukkur, and the town and harbour of Kurráchee, were to be ceded to ourselves; 3d, and last, We were to have the privilege of cutting wood within 100 cubits of the river, for the use of our steamers.

Nothing is so tedious either to write or to read as the refutation of a vague and general charge. But we hope that we ourselves have now arrived at a specific result. At the risk of prolixity, we thought the most satisfactory method of proving that Lord Ellenborough's Sind policy was just and moderate, would be to place before the reader

\* *Sind papers*, p. 347.

the strong representations which the Resident was perpetually making to Government of the hostility of the Ameers; and to draw attention to the remarkable fact, that the penalties which that officer considered<sup>c</sup> them to merit, *in June 1842*, were held by his Lordship sufficiently severe to form the basis of the *Revised Treaty*,\* which was not issued till *November*, when their unremitted crimes and intrigues had multiplied manifold, and were full-blown. The remaining charges are, happily, definite; and will not, therefore, require many words.

2. *That the authenticity of the two treasonable letters alleged to have been written by Meers Roostum and Nusseer, Khans, was never substantiated.*

This is an important accusation; for, on the evidence of these two letters, and a hostile act of Meer Roostum's minister, depended the question whether the Revised Treaty should be enforced. The earliest notice of the document attributed to that chief† is as follows:—

“ MAJOR OUTRAM TO MR. CLERK.

“ *May 1, 1842.*

“ The enclosed is a letter I intercepted the other day, pur-

\* *Sind Papers*, pp. 441, 442, 448. The only additional penalty to be found therein, is the substitution of the Company's coinage for that of the Ameers.

† *Sind Papers*, p. 370.

porting to be from Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, to Shere Sing. However, as the party through whom I obtained the information which led to the seizure, is inimical to Meer Roostum Khan, I was doubtful as to the authenticity of the letter, and sent it to Lieutenant Postans, who has seen much of the Meer's correspondence, for his opinion as to the seal, and for comparison with the writings in his office, from the Khyrpore Durbar. I enclose a copy of his reply, *which pronounces the document genuine.*"\*

"SIR C. NAPIER TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

"Nov. 23, 1842.

"I have just received from Mr. Clerk the original letters from the Ameer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, to the Maharajah. *Of their being authentic original letters, Lieutenant Brown assures me that there cannot be the slightest doubt.*"†

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

"Nov. 17, 1842.

"With regard to the letter of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, to the Maharajah Shere Sing, there are doubts on Major Outram's mind, whether Meer Roostum Khan was privy to this letter or not. *But of its having his seal, and being written by his confidential minister, Futteh Mahomed Goree, there is no doubt. Query.* Is the doctrine to be admitted, that if a prince gives his signet and power blindly to his minister, such folly is to excuse him from the consequences? I think that your Lordship will hardly admit this. You will say that Meer Roostum must be answerable for the acts of his confidential minister."‡

His Lordship did say so; and for those who maintain an opposite opinion, we must suspect them of romance,—or dishonesty. The annexed

\* *Sind Papers*, pp. 324, 325. † *Id.* p. 457. ‡ *Id.* p. 454.

extracts, from the same despatch, will show the caution that was adopted in deciding on the authenticity of the other letter :—\*

“SIR C. NAPIER TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

“Nov. 17, 1842.

“Major Outram, Major Clibborn, Lieutenant Brown, and the confidential moonshee hitherto employed in the Political Agency, all assert that the seal is that of Nusseer Khan, of Hyderabad. In measuring with a pair of compasses the details of this seal and those of the Ameer which are in this office, I find that they do not exactly coincide in size and the distance between the letters, but they agree in all other respects ; so I am told by those who can read Persian. But the discrepancy which I have observed is accounted for by the circumstance, (said to be notorious) that the Ameers have two seals: one is used for occasions of secrecy, that if discovered they may deny it, and adduce their ordinary seal in proof, by pointing out the want of coincidence which I remarked. Now, it is one of these seals that I am trying to get hold of, and through the same people that intercepted the letter ; but they have been unable to obtain one,—a very strong presumptive proof that it is not a forgery of theirs, because the object of the first forgery would be secured by a second, and the instrument would be in their hands . . . no one here has a doubt of the authenticity of the letter. But I shall, nevertheless, endeavour to get a proof seal.”†

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

“Nov. 18, 1842.

“I have procured, not only a similar seal to that of Meer Nusseer Khan’s, but on the cover of the letter to which it is attached, is writing known to be that of Chotram, the Ameer’s

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 408.

† *Id.* p. 454.

*confidential moonshee.* I enclose both this and the treasonable letter. There now remains no question of the fact.”\*

THE SAME TO THE SAME.

“Nov. 30, 1842.

“My conviction is, that every letter was really written by the Ameers, and that *nothing is wanted but an opportunity to attack us*—I mean as regards Nusseer Khan, of Hyderabad, and Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore.”†

Now, what have we arrived at? Why, that Sir Charles Napier’s decision on the authenticity of the first letter was confirmed by the opinions of Major Outram, Lieut. Postans, and Lieut. Brown; his decision on the second, by Major Outram, Major Clibborn, and Lieut. Brown; in short, that in both cases he was supported by *all* the political officers whose local duties qualified them to pass a judgment on the matter. What have we to set against this body of testimony? The quibbling statements of a few writers and orators in this country, who have thought to mislead the public by *burking the evidence*. To proceed:—

3. *That their guilt, even if established, could not justify the infliction of an equal punishment on all the Ameers, such as was imposed by the Revised Treaty.*

The answer to this is simple. The terms of the Revised Treaty did *not* fall with equal severity on all the Ameers. There was this vast distinc-

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 455.

† *Id.* p. 462.



tion that characterized the forfeitures of Meer Roostum and Nusseer Khan,—that they were unredeemed by any compensation. The value of land to be ceded by the latter, far exceeded the tribute he was absolved from paying; while Meer Roostum had been exempted by the Treaties of '39 from paying any tribute at all; so that to him the proposed cessions were so much sheer loss.\* Furthermore, the three main charges against Meers Roostum and Nusseer, *were only critical to themselves*. These are the Governor-General's instructions to Sir Charles Napier: "The treaty proposed to be imposed on Meer Roostum, and Meer Nusseer, Khans," (the other Ameers are not alluded to) "rests for its justification upon the assumption, that the letters said to be addressed by Meer Roostum to Maharajah Shere Sing, and by Meer Nusseer Khan to Beebruck Boogtie, were really written by those chiefs respectively, and that the confidential minister of Meer Roostum did, as is alleged, con-

\* A glance at the "Table showing the interest of each Ameer in the towns and districts under discussion," (p. 445) will prove that Meer Nusseer, *of Khyrpore*, who, perhaps, suffered next in degree to the arch offenders, was to give up, in exchange for his tribute, territory to the value of 84,643 rupees; whereas the loss of Nusseer Khan (of Hyderabad) was computed at 176,914 rupees; and that of Meer Roostum. at 196,203 rupees.

trive the escape of the Syud Mahomed Shureef.”\* It is true that stipulations affecting the other Ameers were included in the Revised Treaty; and that so far, had Roostum and Nusseer, Khans, proved guiltless of the three main charges against them, that document,—the Revised Treaty *as it stands*,—could not have been enforced. But, that another would not have been framed, whereby the Ameers generally would still have been subjected to certain cessions of territory in exchange for tribute, is for our opponents to prove; and so, to convict his Lordship, not of severity, but indulgence!

4. *That by a plot of Sir Charles Napier's, Meer Roostum was inveigled into Ali Moorád's power, in order that he might be compelled by the latter to abdicate the chieftaincy.*

Sir Charles Napier's account of this transaction is the only one we have. The accusation against him, therefore, and the reply to it, if there be any, must be drawn from his own testimony. Let us hear his narrative from the beginning:—

“I had a secret message from Meer Roostum. The bearer had an open letter in the usual unmeaning style of the Durbar; but the messenger privately informed Lieutenant Brown, that Roostum could do nothing, and would escape to my camp. I did not like this, as it would have embarrassed me very much how to act; but the idea struck me at once that he

---

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 440.

might go to Ali Moorád, who might induce him (as a family arrangement) to resign the turban to him (Ali Moorád), especially as *Roostum has long been desirous of getting rid of this charge of the Talpoors.* I therefore secretly wrote to Roostum and Ali Moorád, and about one o'clock this morning I had an express from Ali Moorád, to say that his brother is safe with him. Ali Moorád is now virtually chief; for, *if Meer Roostum does not bestow the turban upon him,* he will, at all events, be guided by Ali, into whose hands he has voluntarily thrown himself."

Again, "the chief of the Talpoors, frightened at the violence of his family, and at our steady operations to coerce them, has thrown himself into his brother's power by my advice, otherwise I should believe some trick was intended."\*

The last passage we have italicized would imply, to an ordinary reader, that Sir Charles expected that Meer Roostum would at least have *the power to withhold the Turban,* however improbable it was that the poor imbecile old chief should take up any line of policy opposed to the views of his energetic kinsman. He elsewhere writes, I ventured "to promise Ali Moorád your Lordship's support in having the turban; the next step was to secure him the exercise of its *power now even during his brother's life.*" Here, too, it is clear, that, though he rejoiced at the transfer of power into abler hands, he did not reckon confidently on Ali Moorád's succeeding to the Turban *till after Roostum's death.* But, says the "Ge-

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 478..

neral, "there is one point which I do not yet understand, some trick probably, but I cannot yet clearly see it. There is an evident objection to my seeing Roostum; *why, I do not know*; but I told Ali Moorád, I must and will see his Highness."\* Two days afterwards some light was thrown on the enigma:—

"My Lord, I have to tell you that Meer Roostum has decamped yesterday morning. I met Ali Moorád the night before, and desired him to say that I would pay my respects to his Highness the next day; and the next day I heard of his flight. I can only account for this in two ways:—

"First, Meer Roostum, who is a timid man, and has all along fancied that I want to make him prisoner, believed that the time for this step had arrived, and that his brother and I were about to execute our conspiracy against him; or,

"Second, that Ali Moorád drove his brother to this step. Meer Roostum had resigned the turban to his brother Ali in the most formal manner, writing his resignation in the Koran before all the religious men collected to witness the resignation at Dejee. Ali sent the Koran to me to see it. I said that these family arrangements were their own, but that your Lordship would support the head of their family, whoever it might be; *that I personally thought it better for Roostum to keep the turban*, and let Ali Moorád act for him. Now, it strikes me that Ali Moorád may have frightened the old man into the foolish step he has taken," &c.† "I feel no confidence even in Ali Moorád. I believe he managed the flight of Meer Roostum."‡

We are confident that every one who has read

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 484.    † *Id.* p. 485.    ‡ *Id.* p. 494.

the foregoing statements, will already have acquitted Sir Charles Napier of the charge we are considering. That he should have deliberately affirmed to the Governor-General, that he was unprepared for, and undecided as to the cause of, a result which he himself planned, involves an accusation so gross, that it defeats itself. Every honourable man will scout it as unworthy of a moment's thought. It remains, then, only to see whether or no Meer Roostum's own plea for his unlooked-for flight is confirmatory of the suspicions, which the General and Major Outram entertained of Ali Moorád's violence. At the conference that took place between the Commissioner and the Ameers of Sind, one week before the battle of Meeánee, the following conversation was held:—

*Meer Roostum.* "By the General's own direction I sought refuge with Ali Moorád, (here he produced the letter directing Meer Roostum to place himself under Ali Moorád's protection, and to be guided by his advice), who placed me under restraint, and made use of my seal, and *compelled* me to do as he thought proper. Would I resign my birthright of my own free-will? I did not write that letter. Anything that I did was by Ali Moorád's *advice*, whose advice *I was directed by the General* to be guided by."

*Commissioner.* "Why did you not meet me at Khyrpore as you promised?"

*Meer Roostum.* "I was *advised* not to go, at Ali Moorád's

instigation, who sent three different persons to deceive me.”\*

We notice some inconsistency in these statements. The first ground taken up is, that he was compelled by force to do what Ali Moorád “thought proper.” The second, that he had only followed his *advice*; and *that* because the General had wished him to be guided by it. The third, that he refused to meet the General and the Commissioner, and so ran counter to his (the General’s) commands, at the instigation of the emissaries of a man, whose counsels were just now represented as deriving their sole weight *from being recommended to him by the General.* And, lastly, we are perplexed by remembering that the advice which could thus make him thwart the wishes of Sir Charles Napier and Major Outram, came from one, who (according to Meer Roostum’s own story), by violently dispossessing him of his seal and the Turban, had exhibited himself in the character of an open enemy!

We shall not venture to pronounce any decisive judgment on this extraordinary statement; however shrewd a guess we may make as to the fate that would attend it in a court of justice. But it may be permitted us to suggest, as a not impossible hypothesis, that Meer Roostum, who, under

\* *Sind Papers*, p. 503.

the "moral effect" of the stringent operations in '38 and '39, was our fastest friend among the Ameers—who, during our reverses in '41, was *as* pre-eminent for his hostility to our interests—that this wretched, imbecile old man, driven fairly frantic by the decisive measures of Sir Charles Napier, after twice playing the traitor to his brethren, desperately threw into his kinsman's hands an authority he could no longer sustain; and then crowned a life of cowardice and chicanery by flight and falsehood.

5. *That the destruction of Emaumghur was a wanton act of spoliation.*

This charge rests on the assertion that our ally, Ali Moorád, had no authority over the fort in question; so that the consent of that chief did not justify Sir Charles Napier in blowing it up. The following are the only passages in the General's despatches where allusions are found to the ownership of the fort. "Emaumghur, a fort belonging to Meer Mahomed Khan (but becoming the property of Ali Moorád by his election to be chief), nephew of Meer Roostum Khan."—"It was Ali Moorád's, but he gave it to one of his relations three years ago."—"It belongs to Ali Moorád, who consents to its destruction."\* These passages have been contrasted

\* *Sind Papers*, pp. 487, 493, 497.



with the repeated assertions of Major Clibborn that it was Meer Mahomed's fort, and the undisputed claim which was laid to it by that chief himself at the conference with the Commissioner. Now it must be owned that there is an air of contradiction about these statements; but let us understand the first sentence we have quoted, and whatever difficulty there is, will be solved.

It is certain that it cannot be construed to assert, that the title to Emaumghur which accrued to Ali Moorád by his becoming chief was *incompatible* with that possessed by Meer Mahomed; for Roostum was chief before Ali Moorád, and yet the fort is described as having been Meer Mahomed's at the time when the Turban was transferred. Furthermore, the use of the present participle "belonging" shows, that the parenthesis is not meant to militate with the rest of the sentence. Doubtless, Sir Charles Napier merely wished to signify that the feudal superiority over Meer Mahomed's fort, which was once held by Meer Roostum, had passed over to Ali Moorád; and thus the objection which has been raised, to the effect that, "if the possession of Emaumghur went along with the Turban, it could not have been Ali Moorád's to give away three years before," falls to the ground. For, that personal tenure of the fort, which *was* Ali Moorád's to

give away to Meer Mahomed, when he was himself a vassal of Meer Roostum's, continued to be Meer Mahomed's, now that Ali had stepped into his brother's shoes; while the supreme authority *controlling* that tenure, remained vested in, and was transferred along with, the chieftaincy.

Thus much for Ali Moorád's title. When Meer Roostum deserted the cause of the other Ameers, and abdicated in favour of his brother, all the ex-chieftain's followers fled from him, espoused the opposite cause, and took refuge in this fortress of Emaumghur. Now, let us reduce the exclusive power conveyed by the Turban to what we will:—if Ali Moorád was Chief *in any sense* over Meer Mahomed, was he not authorized to punish him for harbouring the traitors from his camp? And when, further, we find that the latter Ameer had openly joined the ranks of the hostile faction, at that very time armed and ready for battle; that his fortress was stored with grain and powder, and the munitions of war; surely no doubt can be left that Ali Moorád was justified, and more than justified, in destroying it; and, if so, in delegating its destruction to Sir Charles Napier.

Emaumghur was blown up on January the 15th, 1843. So rang the first note of that blast, before which the Empire of the Talpoors fell.

Are there among us men, who, while they shrink from taking in the whole scope of our dealings with Sind from first to last, are disposed to scrutinize sternly every minute blemish that may be discernible in the closing scenes of the drama? We would refer such men to the motto prefixed to our pages: we would remind them, again and again, that LORD AUCKLAND *snatch'd the sceptre*; and left its *maintenance* to Lord Ellenborough.

Some sticklers for consistency may indeed lament that, but a few short weeks before the deadly contest, the Governor-General should have addressed the ill-fated Ameers as his "friends,"—nay, as his "*brothers*,"—in tinted proclamations, which were variegated with every hue of the Emblem of Peace! But such repiners are inconsiderate. His Lordship may set them at defiance; and point to the proverb,—old in the days of Aristotle,—

Χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἈΔΕΛΦΩΝ.

Thus far we have thought it just to defend the measures of a policy which has been unfairly assailed. But what shall we say to the other, and not least important, half of Lord Ellenborough's Indian career,—his internal administration? We need say very little; for as many of

its mirific details as the public are capable of crediting, have already been laid before it.

With all the vanity, and more than the caprice, of a woman, Lord Ellenborough, in his treatment of subordinates, was ever reminding us of the silly partialities and petty spites of some imperious Catherine or Elizabeth;—they would move our laughter, but for the pitiless power with which they were backed and executed. The ex-Governor-General delights to be called the Friend of the Army,—and certainly the army did him good service,—but even here it is impossible not to trace a womanly foible for a red coat and a jingling sabre. Look along the list of his victims, from Lieutenant Hammersley downwards,—are they not, with one or two exceptions, all military men? But then, they had doffed awhile their regimentals for the unpretending weeds of civil employ; and *that*, we must conclude, made all the difference!

Well may Indians ask, why was this indiscreet man entrusted with power, literally *à discrétion*? Why were the interests, not of the natives only, but of a large body of English gentlemen, put into the hands of one, who thought no more of sacrificing a man or a measure to a good clap-trap, than he did of sacrificing the decencies of life to the luxury of insulting some helpless object of his

wayward antipathies? Doubtless, the "wild elephant" may have been an undesirable yoke-fellow for the home-team,—was it for this that the unruly brute was tethered on India, to break his rope, and play "such fantastic tricks before high heaven" as made "the angels weep," and laugh, by turns?

"Where was our reason sleeping, when we trusted  
 This madman with the sword, and placed such power  
 In such a hand? I tell you, *he'll refuse—*  
*Flatly refuse to obey the imperial orders.*  
 Friend, he can do 't, and what he can, he will;  
 And then the impunity of his defiance.  
 Oh! what a proclamation of our weakness!"\*

Such was the voice of wailing, and such the self-reproaches, that lately rent the mists in Leadenhall-street, while a venerable conclave was being goaded to desperation by the freaks of the most insubordinate of Subordinates. "Patience is a good nag, but she will bolt," says the adage. The Court of Directors at last made a convulsive effort, and pulled Lord Ellenborough from his high horse. If the people of India *were* delighted, the people of England were no less amazed at the feat. The Court were accused of indiscretion.

With deference to the quarter from whence it

came, we venture to pronounce this the most extraordinary charge that ever was brought against a public body. What!—poor, long-suffering, much-enduring old gentlemen,—after (in Oriental phrase) having “eaten dirt” for two long years; with hardly a wry face,—when *at last* their stomachs revolted, to be accused of indiscretion! For our own part, their conduct rather recalls to us the example of that most discreet, least rash, of mortals, who let himself be given the lie, caned, and kicked down his own stairs, *before* he turned on his assailant with a warning to proceed no further, lest he should rouse in his breast the British lion! The only difference is, that in the case of the Court the *ulterior* provocation was added,—and they were roused. But we own, we cannot help suspecting irony, when we hear them twitted with *indiscretion!*

Of Lord Ellenborough's PROCLAMATIONS,—the spawn of a bloated vanity,—we have purposely said nothing: they have amused Europe; and what is so tame as a worn-out jest?

---

Our survey of events is finished. Its object has assuredly not been to expose follies or crimes, that had better far creep into oblivion, if they can; still less have we espoused the cause of any clique, either here or abroad. No; we have simply endeavoured to force upon authorities the consideration, that no ability or private worth can atone for the absence of political principle in the ruler of a country with so many and complicated foreign relations as India; any more than its presence, though backed with a smattering of local details, such as two months' residence would give, can compensate for that common discretion, which is essential to his being the equitable controller of the internal interests of a people numbering eighty-two millions. The mass of British and Native subjects who fall under his sway, may fairly demand that common sense, political principle, and moral courage (surely no Utopian combination), shall be held indispensable attributes in a Governor-General, for which none other, however brilliant, can be substituted. Until they are so held, you may expect to hear of reckless territorial aggrandizement, followed swiftly by calamity, or the ravages of disease;—you may expect to hear of disaffection among the troops, distrust among our allies, and absurd



jealousy between Services whose interest lies in cordial co-operation :—In a word, you may expect a constant diminution in that solidity and harmony in its parts, which have been, and are, the main security of our Indian empire.