

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Rm 3E1079

320/4/D

Brig Gen. William L. Ritchie (W-74280)

Colonel W. Mark G. Lee^{IV} (W-2531)

Mr. Walter C. Dowling (S-623)

Commander Stephen Jurika (N-61293)

9 Dec - 1:45 PM Working Party meeting, Rm 3E1079

320

This is an
SCE file

File No. _____

No.	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
SWNCC 320 Series. - Source of Equipment for the Italian Air Force				
		8 August - 320/D		Memo from Sec JCS referred to SCE for study and recommendation.


THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

The report of the Working Party on SWNCC 320/4/D
dated 10 December 1946 is circulated for consideration
by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your con-
currence or comment hereon.


H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: John Hickman
DATE: Dec 11, 1946

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
THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
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
9 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

The report of the Working Party on SWNCC 320/4/D dated 11 December 1946 is circulated for consideration by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your concurrence or comment hereon.



H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: 
DATE: 11 December, 1946

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.


9 December 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE 

The report of the Working Party on SWNCC 320/4/D
dated _____ is circulated for consideration
by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your con-
currence or comment hereon.


H. V. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: *Laurika Combs, USN*
DATE: *6 January, 1947*

SWNCC 320/5

TOP SECRET

10 December 1946

MODERNIZATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Report by the European Subcommittee
of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine whether or not the U.S. should press for full responsibility to furnish aircraft, together with replacement aircraft, parts and spares, for the modernization program of the Italian Air Force.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. SWNCC 202/2, "Policy Concerning Provision of United States Government Military Supplies for Post-War Armed Forces of Foreign Nations", provides the following conclusion respecting Italy:

"1. United States policy favors the establishment within ^{treaty} ~~the~~ limits of ~~treaty~~ ^{in Italy} arrangements of ^{sufficiently} ~~an~~ Italian military force sufficiently strong to maintain internal order, and ^{of her borders} ~~also~~ strong enough for defense against ^{local violations and any support to Italy} ~~outside~~ encroachment. ^{should be in accord therewith.}

3. In JCS 1693 and 1693/1 and SWNCC 320/2 it was determined that there was no political reason for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to press for the adoption of a program for equipping the Italian Air Force from U.S. sources. However, it was noted that should the Italian Government request assistance in this regard there was no overriding political reason for either extending or refusing such assistance. Final decision on any such request would be based on the views of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. In reaching the above conclusions the following factors were considered:

a. The importance of the formation and maintenance of an effective (underscoring supplied) Italian Armed Force as a prerequisite to both the internal security and frontier protection of Italy.

b. Full support should be given to the efforts of the Italian Government to reorganize and equip its armed forces for the purpose in a above.

c. The availability of British sources to the Italian Air Force is presumed and the failure of the United States to undertake the equipping of that

air force will in no way hinder or limit the early or effective reorganization of the Italian Air Force.

4. During the Paris Peace Conference in September 1946 it was pointed out that the potentialities of the permitted Italian Air Force would be enhanced if the forces were made effective, by modernization of equipment and reorganization. These conversations led on the U.S. side to a recommendation by General Gerhart, the U.S. Military Air Adviser to the Council of Foreign Ministers, that serious consideration be given to the transfer of P-51 aircraft to Italy in the interest of U.S. prestige and to stimulate a badly equipped and disorganized Italian Air Force (Cm In 3604, 18 Oct 46). Mr. Dunn and Mr. Matthews concurred in General Gerhart's recommendation.

5. Meanwhile, in CCS 536/7, the U.S. and British agreed to the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, (SACMED) in NAF 1169 and sent FAN 697 (Cm Out 82773, 10 Oct 46). FAN 697 approved NAF 1169 generally but pointed out that some modifications will be necessary to ensure that the aircraft totals, both overall and by type, are within the limits agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

6. The War Department has determined that it is within the U.S. capability to assume responsibility for the modernization of the Italian Air Force. This responsibility includes, but is not limited to, the original complement of aircraft and replacement aircraft, parts and spares, for three years.

7. The State Department has recently indicated informally to the War Department increasing favor towards U.S. action to modernize the Italian Air Force in the light of the present political situation. The following represents the views of the State Department on this subject:

a. The U.S. should not further disassociate itself from the Italian armed forces or give further evidence of abandonment of U.S. interest in Italy. While no positive commitment was made it is felt that the conversations with representatives of the Italian Government in Paris regarding the increase in effectiveness of the Italian Air Force by modernization are now regarded as having created a moral obligation on the part of the U.S.

b. In light of the present state of Italian economy, the U.S. should attempt to make its aircraft available under any assistance program for a token

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consideration, whereas the British cannot be expected to make their aircraft available for such a token consideration. The Italians cannot afford the transaction at actual cost.

c. Even if the Italian Air Forces should accept a British proposal on an actual cost basis, it is believed that the present Italian Government will not permit the legislative appropriation of the funds required for payment for British aircraft.

8. The Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, has reported in Cm In 795, 5 Dec 46, that a representative of the British Air Ministry presented on 2 Dec 46 to the Chief of the Italian Air Staff, a plan for the reorganization of the Italian Air Force based on NAF 1169, complete in all details and providing for original equipment plus reserves, wastages, and spares for three years at Royal Air Force peacetime rates. The Chief of the Italian Air Staff has accepted the British plan in principle but has withheld decision until informed of the details of any United States proposal. He has stated his preference for U.S. aircraft (P-51's) over British Spitfires. He desires a guarantee of spares for three years. Further implementation of the current program, under NAF 1169, has been suspended while awaiting information as to a U.S. proposal. General Lee has been advised in Cm Out 87218, 7 Dec 46, that the U.S. position on responsibility for the modernization of the Italian Air Force has not been determined but should be available by 13 Dec 46. It was stated in this message that the political consideration as to who should have this responsibility and the economic consideration as to Italian ability to pay for an assistance program are the governing factors rather than the availability of aircraft.

DISCUSSION

9. An examination of NAF 1103 and NAF 1169 reveals that even under the authorization contained in FAN 697 (CCS 536/7) the Italian Air Force will not be effective. Standardization is not provided for the permitted combat aircraft and much of the available equipment is obsolete. U.S.-furnished P-38 aircraft, which are in the obsolete category comprise the equipment for two of the seven fighter squadrons. NAF 1169 reported that only two of the five squadrons designated for equipment with Spitfires were so equipped.

10. The international political situation respecting Italy is such that if

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any assistance is to be given the Italian Government in such a program, such action must be accomplished prior to ratification of the Italian Peace Treaty. As a matter of fact, it would be desirable to complete such assistance prior to the termination of the Italian Armistice Regime by signature of Italian Peace Treaty now estimated as a possibility by early February 1947.

11. While the memorandum in the Appendix, SWNCC 320/2 (JCS 1693/2) is permissive of consideration by the U.S. Government of requests by the Italian Government for military aircraft, the memorandum is inadequate to permit the proffering of an active program by the U.S. of its own initiative to the Italian Government.

12. The programs for organization and equipment of the Italian Air Force in NAF 1103 and NAF 1169 from SACHED and FAN 697 will require reconsideration if the U.S. is to have full responsibility for the considered modernization program.

13. The adoption of a program for equipping the Italian Air Force which increased the participation of the U.S. also raises the questions of organization and training. If the majority of equipment were U.S. and a replacement program calling for U.S. equipment were adopted, a change from British to U.S. organization might be found necessary. Responsibility for training would similarly change with the responsibility for equipping the Italian Air Force and is a natural corollary to organizational responsibility.

14. Informal ~~con~~versations have been held with a representative of the British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) on the British position and their desires to assume full responsibility for the modernization of the Italian Air Force. The representative was not informed on the recent British proposal to the Italian Government but stated that:

a. The British would like to have this responsibility mainly because it would enable them to maintain their aviation industry on a scale in excess of what they might otherwise be able to maintain for the support of the Royal Air Force and such other commitments as they might have for the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Russia.

b. The British would probably want a monetary consideration approximately equalling costs of the equipment furnished. However, the British representative recognized the broad political as well as military implications involved should the Italians be forced to refuse their offer due to inability to pay.

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c. The BJSM is communicating with the British Chiefs of Staff to secure information on their present views.

15. When SWNCC 320/2 was agreed (11 Sept 46) no overriding political reason was perceived for either the extending or refusing of assistance to equip the Italian Air Force from U.S. sources. However, as a result of the Paris conversations on the modernization of the Italian Air Force the present Italian internal and external political situation and other political factors, from the U.S. view, which now appears that overriding political considerations favor the extension of such assistance to the Italian Government.

16. Advantages accruing to the U.S. in the assumption of responsibility for the equipping of the combat element of the Italian Air Forces with U.S. aircraft are as follows:

- a. Maintenance of Italians on "road to democracy" alongside the western powers.
- b. Enhance the U.S. prestige in the Mediterranean area.
- c. Establishment of a long-range replacement program involving Italian reliance on the U.S. aviation industry by indoctrinating the Italians on the high quality of U.S. equipment and maintenance procedures.
- d. Support of U.S. policy towards Italy by extension of active assistance to the Italian Government in the improvement of the effectiveness of the Italian Air Force. (This objective can be realized to a more effective degree by equipping the Italian Air Force with U.S. P-51's rather than with British Spitfires).

17. Disadvantages if the U.S. does not assume responsibility for the modernization of the Italian Air Forces are:

- a. Completion of the disassociation of the U.S. with the Italian armed forces since the British already have such responsibility for the Italian Army and Navy. Disassociation might be considered indicative of a general lack of U.S. interest in Italy.
- b. Force the Italians to undertake a commitment for assistance to the Italian Air Force which the Italian Government cannot reasonably assume or to force the Italian Government to accept another offer which might be extended by the USSR.

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CONCLUSIONS

18. The United States ~~for political reasons~~ *now finds it politically advantageous to* press for the adoption of a program for equipping the Italian Air Force (combat element, 200 fighter aircraft plus replacements, parts and spares involved).

19. The State Department should approach the British Government to secure governmental understanding for the U.S. assumption of primary responsibility for equipping the Italian Air Force.

20. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee should now advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the above views on an aircraft assistance program for Italy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 21. Approve the conclusions contained in paragraphs 18, 19, and 20 *together with a copy of this study,*
- 22. Transmit the memorandum in the ~~enclosure~~ *Appendix* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Incl
Memo for Sec. JCS

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ENCLOSURE

10 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Modernization of the Italian Air Force

1. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has re-examined its views on the matter of the source of equipment for the Italian Air Force approved in SWNCC 320/2 and sent to Joint Chiefs of Staff in SWN-4737, 11 Sept, 46 and now *subject to the approval of the JCS,* advises that it is considered desirable, for the U.S. to press for full responsibility to furnish aircraft, together with replacement aircraft, parts and spares, for the modernization program of the Italian Air Force.

2. The State Department will take steps, *after approval by the JCS,* to effectuate an understanding with the British Government to facilitate arrangements for agreement between the U.S. and Italian Governments on the assistance program. *subject to their approval,*

3. It is requested that, *subject to their approval,* the Joint Chiefs of Staff make all necessary preliminary arrangements to implement the program. It is desirable to conclude the delivery of at least the original complement of aircraft by early February 1947.

4. The results of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 will be forwarded as soon as available.

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HWK:do

9 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig. Gen. William L. Ritchie, Steering
Member (W-74280)
Colonel William G. Lee, Jr. (W-2531)
Mr. Walter C. Dowling (S-623)
Commander Stephen Jurika (N-61293)

Subject: Appointment of a Working Party
SWNC Subcommittee for Europe

1. The State, War and Navy Departments have designated the above-named individuals as a Working Party to study and report to the European Subcommittee on SWNCC 320/4/D, as a matter of high priority.

2. To expedite the action on this paper it is requested that the Working Party members obtain the approval of the European Subcommittee members of their respective departments and forward the signed attached approval slip to the Acting Secretary, European Subcommittee, Room 2027 New War Department Building.

3. Copies of SWNCC 320/2 and SWNCC 320/4/D are enclosed herewith.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

Enclosures
Approval slip
Cy. No. of SWNCC 320/2
Cy. No. of SWNCC 320/4/D

SWNCC 320/2 & SWNCC 320/4/D
52 - Brig. Gen. Ritchie
53 - Col. Lee
54 - Mr. Dowling
55 - Cdr. Jurika

9 December 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

The report of the Working Party on BWNCC 320/4/D
dated _____ is circulated for consideration
by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your con-
currence or comment hereon.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

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SWNCC 320/4/D

9 December 1946

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE

MODERNIZATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Reference: SWNCC 320/2

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum by the War Member, SWNCC, is referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe for study and report, as a matter of high priority.

H. W. MOSELEY
W. A. SCHULGEN
V. L. LOWRANCE
Secretariat

SWNCC 320/4/D

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E N C L O S U R E

MODERNIZATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Memorandum by the War Member, SWNCC

6 December 1946

1. The War Department has understood informally for some time that the State Department is interested in the provision by the U.S. of some U.S. airplanes for the modernization of the Italian air forces. No official communication on the matter has been received from the State Department.

2. The War Department has received a message from the Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater, which states that the British have now offered to provide modern aircraft for the Italian air forces. The consideration involved in the provision of British aircraft is not known. The message further states that the Italians have some knowledge that the U.S. has considered provision of U.S. aircraft and, hence, the Italians are withholding decision on the British proposal until informed of the details of the U.S. proposal, if any.

3. The Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater, considers it urgent that the U.S. proposal, if one is to be made, be forthcoming at once.

4. In view of the urgency of this matter and the primary political factors involved, it is recommended that the Subcommittee for Europe prepare, as a matter of special priority, a report to be presented to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee not later than 11 December 1946. Brigadier General Wm. L. Ritchie and Colonel W. G. Lee, Jr., are designated as the War Department members of the working subcommittee on this matter.

SWNCC 320/4/D

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Enclosure

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
THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

SCE 3, dated 29 August 1946, a report by the Working Party in response to SWNCC 320/1/D, is circulated for consideration by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your comment or concurrence hereon and return to the undersigned, Room 178, State Department.


H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

I concur:
SE: mw

APPROVED: John Hickman
DATE: Aug 31, 1946


THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE ←
NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

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H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: 

ROBERT J. WOOD
COLONEL, GSC
Deputy Chief
Strategy and Policy Group, OPD

DATE: 3 Sept 46


THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.


30 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
WAR MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE
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H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: 

DATE: 30 AUG 46

Col Tatum telephone call
stated Col Wood had
cleared for ODD.

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SCE 3

29 August 1946

Pages 1 to 5, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

REORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE

- References:
- a. SWNCC 260/D
 - b. SWNCC 320/D
 - c. SWNCC 320/1/D

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a report by the Working Party in response to SWNCC 320/1/D, is circulated for consideration by the European Subcommittee.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

SCE 3

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TOP SECRETE N C L O S U R EREORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCEReport by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for EuropeTHE PROBLEM

1. To present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the comments of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from a political point of view on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 536/5. (Appendix to SWNCC 320/1/D)

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In FAN 649 dated 16 March 1946, (Annex to Appendix "B" SWNCC 260/D), the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) for the reorganization of the Italian Air Force (NAF 1103), (Appendix "A" SWNCC 260/D), requesting that a detailed plan as to the recommended equipping of the units, including aircraft types, be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval, prior to the implementing action.

3. In NAF 1169 (Appendix SWNCC 320/1/D) SACMED has submitted a detailed plan for the interim Italian Air Force.

4. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has, in SWNCC 320/2*, advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is no political reason for pressing for the equipping of the Italian Air Force from American sources.

5. In Section V, Part IV of Draft Peace Treaty with Italy dated July 18, 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers have recommended limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force, limiting the force to 200 fighter and reconnaissance types and 150 transport air-sea rescue, training (school type) and liaison types of aircraft.

*Awaiting approval by SWNCC.

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6. The British Chiefs of Staff have recommended that a message be despatched to SACMED approving his detailed plan for the reorganization of the interim Italian Air Force and pointing out that modifications of some of the proposals may well be necessary in order to ensure that totals are within limits agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The British Chiefs of Staff have recommended that SACMED arrange for necessary modifications directly with the War Department and with the Air Ministry.

DISCUSSION

7. From the political point of view, the United States Government is concerned with the early reorganization and equipping of the Italian Air Force to the extent that such reorganization contributes to the reestablishment of an effective Italian armed force capable of maintaining internal security and the security of the frontiers of Italy. In consonance with this Government's agreement to the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers contained in the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, any reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces undertaken under the guidance of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean must conform to the limitations both as to types and as to overall totals as provided in the draft treaty.

CONCLUSIONS

8. It is considered desirable to point out to SACMED the requirement that the organization of the interim Italian Air Force not exceed the ceilings, as to types as well as to overall totals, and all other limitations agreed to in the draft Treaty.

9. It is agreed that such modifications as are necessary to ensure conformity of SACMED's proposed reorganization with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers should be accomplished by SACMED, with appropriate communication directly with the War Department and with the Air Ministry, without further reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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Enclosure

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RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That the Appendix be approved and forwarded to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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A P P E N D I X

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Reorganization of the Italian Air Force.

In reply to Memorandum SM-6550 dated 20 August 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in general, the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 536/5 concerning the reorganization of the Italian Air Force are acceptable from a political point of view.

In order that the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) may fully appreciate the necessity for exact compliance with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force, as recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and to ensure that the interim Italian Air Force as organized under the guidance of SACMED will in no way exceed the ceilings agreed to by the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is recommended that the draft message to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff be modified as indicated in the enclosure. (Annex to Appendix)

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Appendix

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. We generally approve the proposals contained in NAF 1169 including in principle the increases over paragraph 5 of NAF 1103 as a basis on which the reorganization of the interim Italian Air Force may proceed to the extent the Italian Government desires within the limits set by NAF 1169, and in conformity with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Section V, Part IV, Draft Peace Treaty with Italy).

2. We appreciate desire to point out,--however that modifications to some of these proposals may-well-be will be necessary within the general trend of your proposals in order to ensure that totals, not only as to over-all total aircraft but also as to types, are within limits agreed by Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. In particular, the scale of reserve aircraft and unit equipment for training to back the force will probably need modification in the light of experience gained by the Royal Air Force and the U. S. Army Air Forces.

3. You are therefore authorized to communicate direct with the War Department and with Air Ministry as appropriate in order to arrange matters of detail.

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SCE 3

ENCLOSUREREORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCEReport by theState-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for EuropeTHE PROBLEM

1. To present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the comments of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from a political point of view on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 536/5. (Appendix to SWNCC 320/1/D)

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In FAN 649 dated 16 March 1946 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the proposal of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) for the reorganization of the Italian Air Force (NAF 1103), requesting that a detailed plan as to the recommended equipping of the units, including aircraft types, be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval, prior to the implementing action.

3. In NAF 1169 SACMED has submitted a detailed plan for the interim Italian Air Force.

4. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has, in SWNCC 320/2*, advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is no political reason for pressing for the equipping of the Italian Air Force from American sources.

5. In Section V, Part IV of Draft Peace Treaty with Italy dated July 18, 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers have recommended limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force, limiting the force to 200 fighter and

reconnaissance

* Awaiting approval by SWNCC.

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reconnaissance types and 150 transport, air-sea rescue, training (school type) and liaison types of aircraft.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have recommended that a message be despatched to SACMED approving his detailed plan for the reorganization of the interim Italian Air Force and pointing out that modifications of some of the proposals may well be necessary in order to ensure that totals are within limits agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The British Chiefs of Staff have recommended that SACMED arrange for necessary modifications directly with the War Department and with the Air Ministry.

DISCUSSION

7. From the political point of view, the United States Government is concerned with the early reorganization and equipping of the Italian Air Force to the extent that such reorganization contributes to the reestablishment of an effective Italian armed force capable of maintaining internal security and the security of the frontiers of Italy. In consonance with this Government's agreement to the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers contained in the Draft Peace Treaty with Italy, any reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces undertaken under the guidance of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean must conform to the limitations both as to types and as to over-all totals as provided in the draft treaty.

~~8. It is presumed that, from the military point of view, the proposed reorganization of the Italian Air Force is such as will assure as effective a force as is attainable under the~~

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~~under the agreed limitations.~~CONCLUSIONS

8-0. It is considered desirable to point out to SACMED the requirement that the organization of the interim Italian Air Force ~~conform exactly to~~ ^{not exceed} the ceilings, as to types as well as to over-all totals, and all other limitations agreed to in the draft Treaty.

3-10. It is agreed that such modifications as are necessary to ensure conformity of SACMED's proposed re-organization with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers should be ~~attained~~ ^{accomplished} by SACMED, with appropriate communication directly with the War Department and with the Air Ministry, without further reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10-11. That the ~~enclosure~~ ^{Appendix} be approved and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ENCLOSUREAppendix

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Reorganization of the Italian Air Force.

In reply to Memorandum SM-6550 dated 20 August 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee informs the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in general, the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 536/5 concerning the reorganization of the Italian Air Force are acceptable from a political point of view.

In order that the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED) may fully appreciate the necessity for exact compliance with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force, as recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and to ensure that the interim Italian Air Force as organized under the guidance of SACMED will in no way exceed the ceilings agreed to by the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is recommended that the draft message to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff be modified as indicated in the enclosure. (Annex to Appendix)

Annex to Appendix

~~ENCLOSURE~~

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. We generally approve the proposals contained in NAF 1169 including in principle the increases over paragraph 5 of NAF 1103 as a basis on which the reorganization of the interim Italian Air Force may proceed to the extent the Italian Government desires within the limits set by NAF 1169, and in conformity with the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Air Force as agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers (Section V, Part IV, Draft Peace Treaty with Italy).

2. We appreciate desire to point out, however that modifications to some of these proposals may-well-be will be necessary within the general trend of your proposals in order to ensure that totals, not only as to over-all total aircraft but also as to types, are within limits agreed by Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris. In particular, the scale of reserve aircraft and unit equipment for training to back the force will probably need modification in the light of experience gained by the Royal Air Force and the U. S. Army Air Forces.

3. You are therefore authorized to communicate direct with the War Department and with Air Ministry as appropriate in order to arrange matters of detail.

TOP SECRET

21 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter G. Dowling, Steering Member,
(S-623)
Colonel John M. Reynolds, OPD (W-2273)
Captain G. A. Sinclair (N-63910)

Subject: Appointment of a Working Party,
SWNCC Subcommittee for Europe

1. The State, War and Navy Departments have designated the above-named individuals as a Working Party on SWNCC 320/D for study and recommendation.

2. SWNCC 320/1/D has been referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe for consideration in connection with SWNCC 320/D.

3. To expedite the clearance of the draft with the members of the European Subcommittee and other interested agencies within your department, it is requested that the final draft agreed upon by the Working Party be forwarded to the undersigned for reproduction and distribution.

4. It is further requested that you furnish the names of individuals within your Department from whom clearance must be obtained, so that a copy may be furnished that office direct.

5. A copy of SWNCC 320/1/D is enclosed herewith.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary
European Subcommittee

Enclosure
SWNCC 320/1/D, Copy No. 43 (Dowling)
44 (Reynolds)
45 (Sinclair)

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 46~~TOP SECRET~~SWNCC 320/1/D21 August 1946Pages 3 - 8, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDIRECTIVEREORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCEReference: SWNCC 320/DSWNCC 260/DNote by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe for consideration in connection with the above reference.

A. D. REID

V. L. LOWRANCE

H. W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132By cx/umf JAN 18 1979

NARS, Date

SWNCC 320/1/D~~TOP SECRET~~

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ENCLOSURE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-6550
20 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Reorganization of the Italian Air Force.
Reference: SM-6472.
Enclosure: CCS 536/5, Copy No. 89.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request the comments of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from a political point of view on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in the enclosed copy of CCS 536/5 (Appendix), in connection with the Committee's consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 7 August 1946 (SM-6472) (SWNCC 320/D).

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SWNCC 320/1/D

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Enclosure

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~~TOP SECRET~~A P P E N D I X~~TOP SECRET~~C. C. S. 536/512 July 1946COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFREORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE
Reference: C. C. S. 536 SeriesMemorandum by the Representatives
of the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered NAF 1169 (Enclosure "B") from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), giving the detailed plan for the interim Italian Air Force as called for in FAN 649 (Enclosure "A" to C. C. S. 536/3). * 260 | ①
2. They are in general agreement with this plan and consider that the increases over NAF 1103 (Enclosure "B" to C. C. S. 536/3) are acceptable in principle. They would, however, wish to have some of the proposals it contains modified in detail and some small scaling down may be necessary to keep the totals within limits agreed by the Foreign Ministers in Paris.
3. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the relatively minor nature of these modifications does not warrant their being discussed at Combined Chiefs of Staff level and they suggest that SACMED should be authorized to discuss them direct with the War Department and with the Air Ministry as appropriate.
4. The approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff is therefore requested to the despatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean of the message in Enclosure "A".

CCS 536/5

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Appendix

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CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. We generally approve the proposals contained in NAF 1169 including in principle the increases over paragraph 5 of NAF 1103 as a basis on which the re-organization of the interim Italian Air Force may proceed to the extent the Italian Government desires within the limits set by NAF 1169.

2. We appreciate, however, that modifications to some of these proposals may well be necessary within the general trend of your proposals in order to ensure that totals are within limits agreed by Foreign Ministers in Paris. In particular, the scale of reserve aircraft and unit equipment for training to back the force will probably need modification in the light of experience gained by the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Forces.

3. You are therefore authorized to communicate direct with the War Department and with Air Ministry as appropriate in order to arrange matters of detail.

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Enclosure "A"

SWNCC 320/1/D

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Appendix

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ENCLOSURE "B"

From: The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
 To: Combined Chiefs of Staff
 Nr: FX 68344 NAF 1169 26 June 1946

1. I forward the following detailed plan for the interim Italian Air Force. This force to be reorganized under the Italian Air Ministry into the following:

Fighter Headquarters, Air Transport Headquarters, General Reconnaissance and Aircraft Safety Headquarters, Training Headquarters, Maintenance Headquarters, Directorate of Meteorology, Directorate of Civil Aviation which is at present under Air Ministry but may be transferred to a separate or other Ministry such as Ministry of Transport if the Italian Government so desires.

2. Fighter Headquarters to command through subordinate formations a total of 7 squadrons, 4 of these to be interceptor, 2 fighter bomber, and 1 tactical reconnaissance. The unit equipment of each squadron to be 14 aircraft. Additionally, one aircraft is established for each of the three wing leaders. Grand total 101 aircraft. Two of the interceptor squadrons to be equipped with American P-38 aircraft and the remaining five squadrons with British Spitfire 9 aircraft. A communication squadron consisting of 12 Italian light-type aircraft to be provided for communication purposes throughout the command.

3. Air transport headquarters to command two squadrons of aircraft each of 16 U.E. These to be: S.M. 79s, S.M. 82s, S.M. 95s or similar types. An Air Ministry communication squadron of 25 aircraft of Italian type to include multi-engine and light passenger-carrying aircraft is also necessary. A meteorological flight of six single-engine aircraft of Italian type is required.

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Enclosure "B"

SWNCC 320/1/D

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Appendix

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4. General reconnaissance and aircraft safety headquarters to command two squadrons of aircraft each of 15 U.E. One squadron to be equipped with Catalina or similar type aircraft and one with Italian multi-engine seaplanes. A communication flight of three Italian light type aircraft is also required.

5. Training headquarters to command the following flying units comprising a flying training school. Elementary squadron equipped with 12 Moth or Magister or similar type aircraft. An advanced squadron comprising one single-engine flight equipped with 15 Italian type G.55 or similar type aircraft and one twin-engine flight equipped with 15 Oxford or similar type aircraft. A navigator and wireless operators training flight consisting of six Baltimore or similar Italian-type aircraft. Additionally a communication flight of four Italian light aircraft will be required to serve the needs of the training headquarters as a whole.

6. Ground training units commanded by training headquarters will comprise: cadet college, recruit depot, technical training school, flying control training flight.

7. Maintenance headquarters will require a communication flight comprising eight U.E. aircraft of Italian type. Four of these to be SM 82s or similar type and four light-type Italian aircraft.

8. Aircraft requirements in connection with the directorate of meteorology are listed in paragraph three above.

9. Italian civil aviation requirements are not covered in this signal as the Italian Government's intentions have not yet been made known to me.

10. Although not covered by my recommendations in NAF 1103 the following are now considered essential: A target towing flight consisting of eight Martinet aircraft. An A.O.P. squadron consisting of 14 U.E. Italian light aircraft (L.M. 5 or similar type).

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Enclosure "B"

SWNCC 320/1/D

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Appendix

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11. All figures for numbers of aircraft quoted above are without consideration to reserves. These to be made available on the following scales and are listed below as a percentage wastage of unit equipment per month:

Single-engine fighter	14
Transport	2
General reconnaissance	1
Training aircraft	4
Communication aircraft	1

12. It is requested that authority may be given for the procurement of sufficient modern radar and VHF equipment to equip two static and one mobile sections and their associated aircraft.

13. Authority is further requested for the procurement of all ancillary equipment and spares including bombs and ammunition to a scale commensurate with the role of the interim Italian Air Force.

14. It is confirmed that I have made it clear to the Italian Air Ministry that the ceiling approval for the interim Italian Air Force is permissive and that it is not obligatory to them to reorganize their force up to this ceiling.

End

CM-IN-5779 (27 Jun 46)

CCS 536/5

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Enclosure "B"

SWNCC 320/1/D

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Appendix

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
THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

The attached report by the Working Party in response to SWNCC 320/D is circulated for consideration by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your comment and concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.



H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: ✓ h.c.

DATE: 8/27/46

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 19, 1946

SWNCC:HWM

EUR - Mr. Hickerson:

As Acting Chairman of the European Subcommittee, will you please indicate if you approve the attached draft of the Working Group. Mr. Dowling has indicated his approval.

OK

JWA

The substance of the paper is set forth on the fourth page in the memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff which states that there appears to be no political reason for the JCS to press for the adoption of a program to equip the Italian Air Force from American sources.

HWM

Harold W. Moseley

SWNCC:HWM:nla

Col. Wood approved for War by Telephone
18 Aug 46



THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVY MEMBER, EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE

The attached report by the Working Party in response to SWNCC 320/D is circulated for consideration by the European Subcommittee.

It is requested that you indicate your comment and concurrence hereon and return to the Secretariat, SWNCC.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary
European Subcommittee

APPROVED: _____

DATE: _____

SECRETSOURCE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCEReport by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for EuropeReference: SWNCC 260/D
SWNCC 320/D
THE PROBLEMAK
cowdery

1. To prepare a reply to the query of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whether, for political reasons, it should be United States policy to:

- a. Press for equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment, or,
- b. Assist in equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment if the Government of Italy should so request, (SWNCC 320/D).

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It has been agreed to equip the Italian Navy and the Italian ground forces from British sources and latest reports indicate a trend toward equipping the Italian Air Force from British sources.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the desirability of equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment and have come to the conclusion that, from a military point of view, no appreciable advantage would accrue to the United States by such action.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the possibility that there may be political reasons why it would be to the advantage of the United States Government if the Italian Air Force were equipped from United States

sources

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sources and have requested the views of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in that regard. In the event that there are political reasons for adopting the proposal, arrangements must be made to make the necessary equipment available to the Italian Government and forestall disposal of that equipment in other ways.

5. The Italian Government has not at this date requested United States assistance in the equipping of the Italian Air Force.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

6. It is recognized that certain political implications would be involved in the adoption of a program which would continue United States association jointly with the British military in the affairs of the Italian armed forces. Consideration has also been given to the possible political effect of American dissociation with the Italian armed forces -- a relationship which has existed throughout the period of Italy's co-belligerency and continues to the present time through American participation in the Allied Commission -- while, at the same time, the British continue their relationship and possibly expand their influence with the Italian forces. The importance of the political effect of these factors is not considered to be such as to determine the solution of this problem.

7. It is possible that the undertaking of the
equipping

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equipping of the Italian Air Force with United States equipment and the resultant close association between American and Italian military organizations might afford a valuable opportunity for intelligence liaison. The questionable advantage of this possibility is not considered to be of decisive importance.

8. In the event that the Italian Government should request American assistance in the equipping of the Italian Air Force the reply of this Government would necessarily be based at least partially on political conditions existing at the time. It is not possible to evaluate at this time the political significance to be attached to such a proposal in the future, however, it is believed that there would be no overriding purely political reasons for either extending or refusing assistance.

9. The policy of the United States Government toward Italy recognizes the importance of the formation and maintenance of an effective Italian armed force as a prerequisite to both the internal security and the security of the frontiers of Italy. Full support should be given to the efforts of the Italian Government to reorganize and equip its armed forces for this purpose. It is presumed that British sources will be available to the Italian Air Force and that the failure of the United States to undertake the equipping of that force will in no way hinder or limit its early and effective reorganization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

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RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That the ^{Memorandum in the Appendix} enclosure be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reply to SWNCC 320/D.

SECRETENCLOSURE

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ^{Secretary} JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Source of Equipment for the Italian Air Force.

In reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum SM-6472 dated August 7, 1946 concerning the proposal to equip the Italian Air Force from American sources, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has determined that there is no political reason for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to press for the adoption of such a program. Should the Italian Government request the United States Government to assist in the equipping of the Italian Air Force with American equipment, there is at the present time no overriding political reason for either extending or refusing such assistance. In view of the fact that the final decision on such a request would be based at least partially on the political conditions existing at the time, the views of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee should be requested before any action is taken on any request for assistance which the Italian Government might in the future present.

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12 August 1946

Sales?

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter C. Dowling, Steering Member,
(S-623)
Colonel John M. Reynolds, OPD (W-2273)
Commander H. E. Billingsley (N-63910)
Captain G.A. Sinclair

Subject: Appointment of a Working Party,
SWNC Subcommittee for Europe.

1. The State, War and Navy Departments have designated the above-named individuals as a Working Party on SWNCC 320/D for study and recommendation.
2. To expedite the clearance of the draft with the members of the European Subcommittee and other interested agencies within your department, it is requested that the final draft agreed upon by the Working Party be forwarded to the undersigned for reproduction and distribution.
3. It is further requested that you furnish the names of individuals within your Department from whom clearance must be obtained, so that a copy may be furnished that office direct.
4. A copy of SWNCC 320/D is enclosed herewith.

H. W. KARBEL,
Acting Secretary,
European Subcommittee

Enclosures:
SWNCC 320/D, Copy No. 43 (Dowling)
44 (Reynolds)
45 (Billingsley)

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S E C R E T

COPY NO. 42

SWNCC 320/D

8 August 1946

Pages 1 and 2

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE

SOURCE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe for study and recommendation.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

HAROLD W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

SWNCC 320/D

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

E N C L O S U R E

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-6472
7 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Source of Equipment for the Italian Air Force

The policy of equipping the Italian Navy from British sources was approved some time ago. A recent agreement has been made to equip the Italian ground forces from British sources, and a still more recent report indicates a trend toward equipping the Italian Air Force from British sources.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the desirability of equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment and have come to the conclusion that, from a military point of view, no appreciable advantage would accrue to the United States by such action. They realize, however, that there may be political reasons why it would be to the advantage of the United States Government if the Italian Air Force were equipped from United States sources. If there are political reasons for this action, it is essential that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed as soon as possible so that the necessary equipment may be made available to the Italian Government and not disposed of in other ways, and also so that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make a prompt proposal to this effect to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, request that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee notify them as to whether, for political reasons, it should be United States policy to:

SWNCC 320/D

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Enclosure

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- a. Press for equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment, or,
- b. Assist in equipping the Italian Air Force with United States equipment if the Government of Italy should so request.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary.

SWNCC 320/D

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Enclosure

S E C R E T