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Vol.



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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

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November 30, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 13

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## S. Con. Res. 27

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Friday, November 30, 1945

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Counsel will proceed with General Miles.

## TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

(Resumed)

Mr. Gesell: General Miles, I understand that you have one or two matters that you wish to bring to the committee's attention by way of amendment of your testimony yesterday. Would you please do that before we get under way?

General Miles: Yes, sir. There are a few points that I note in reading the transcript in which I was not as clear as I might be.

On page 2071 of the transcript, you suggested in a question to me that the digests and estimates of the Military Intelligence Division which I had referred to as static information had little evaluation material contained therein. It was a fairly long question, and I answered, "Generally speaking, yes, sir. But we also, of course, express definite opinion as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing."

That is not wholly a complete answer. The digests and estimates on foreign countries were thoroughly evaluated. We had plenty of time generally to do that as they were static and encyclopaedic information.

Mr. Gesell: Before you go on with that, I gathered

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 from the testimony when you referred to static information,  
3 you meant background information as opposed to information  
4 requiring some immediate action. Would that be a fair  
5 statement?

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7 General Miles: That is true, sir.

8 On page 2094 of the transcript, you asked:

9 "Would it be fair to say that this magic information  
10 was the most reliable and authentic information which the  
11 War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and  
12 activities?"

13 My reply was, "Yes, sir."

14 That also is an inadequate reply. It was the most  
15 reliable and authentic information which we received as to  
16 Japanese diplomatic intentions and activities, the activi-  
17 ties, as far as we could read them, of the controlling  
18 Japanese Government. But we went much further afield in  
19 seeking information of Japanese military intentions and  
20 activities.

21 Then on page 2108, you asked, "Was any effort made" --  
22 by the Military Intelligence Division -- "to get additional  
23 manpower of this specialized type" -- S.I.S. -- "that may  
24 have been required?"

25 I replied, "I think that manpower was being provided  
as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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1  
2 very specially trained manpower."

3 That also is an inadequate answer. As a matter of  
4 fact, as I have since looked up and found, we, for many  
5 months before Pearl Harbor, were lending to S.I.S. one of  
6 our specially trained language officers. We ran through  
7 at least five whose names we can now remember, and one of  
8 them was on duty at the time of Pearl Harbor. We were not  
9 permitted by the personnel policies of the War Department  
10 to lend more than one at a time.

11 There was a limitation on actual number of officers  
12 allowed the Military Intelligence Division.

13 We also furnished the S.I.S. from time to time the  
14 names of civilians who were competent to do this work.  
15 That had to be a very special selection. In the first place  
16 telegraphic Japanese is a language within a language. There-  
17 were very few people then and there are very few people now  
18 capable of translating it into English.

19 Furthermore, we had to be particularly careful as to  
20 security. We could have probably gotten a considerable  
21 number of Nisei Japanese to do this work, but we were limited  
22 always, not only to American citizens, but to American citi-  
23 zens whom we knew, and knew all about. Specifically two  
24 young men were furnished that we can remember, to S.I.S.,  
25 whom we very carefully went over and provided.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2           Lastly, I would like to expand, if I may, my answer  
3 to your request for a general description of the opera-  
4 tions of the Military Intelligence Division, found on pages  
5 2060 and 2061 of the transcript.

6           Beginning with the Far Eastern Section of the Military  
7 Intelligence Branch, with which this committee is mostly  
8 concerned, I should like to note that the operations of  
9 that branch can perhaps be best judged summarily by a glance  
10 at the summary of Far Eastern documents which is now a  
11 part of the record before this committee, and which is  
12 supported by some 15 volumes of photostats of the actual  
13 documents gotten out and disseminated in the same way by the  
14 Far Eastern Section in the years 1937-1941.

15           Then going out from that particular section, let me  
16 note the four sections concerned in the Intelligence Divi-  
17 sion in Europe, and the Empire Section. We were still pri-  
18 marily concerned, up to November, 1941, with the European  
19 war, the outcome of that war. . We were still feverishly  
20 preparing for what we called hemispheric defense. The  
21 success of German arms was the most obvious threat to the  
22 Western Hemisphere.

23           We were lining up against the Axis with our lease-lend,  
24 and other means, but hemispheric defense was vulnerable  
25 through the bulge of Brazil.



Witness Miles

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That brings up the Latin American Section of the Military Intelligence Division, Intelligence Branch, we will say, or subsection.

A side line of all of this work was the several Army schools into which we fitted Latin American officers, arranged for their transportation to and fro, and so forth.

We also conducted two quite extensive tours for senior Latin American officers through our training camps, and war plants.

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Witness Miles

The dissemination section prepared and sent out to the Army a series of tentative lessons, special bulletings on the war then waging. We were trying desperately to furnish our own people, the expanding Army, with information as to how the new war was being waged and what developments were taking place.

What did the Air Corps want to know? What did the Ordnance want to know? The Medical Corps, and so forth. We had a New York office which eventually furnished, and it was at that time furnishing, a great deal of information, later used by the Air Forces in their bombing targets. We got this information from certain civilian concerns that had detailed information of German and even of Japanese installations of great importance.

But that was only a very small part of it. Our Counter-Intelligence branch was very extensive. We were one of the three agencies in Washington especially designated by the President to concern ourselves with all counter-intelligence activities, and we worked with two other agencies, the FBI and ONI in great detail.

The whole question of plant protection was up at that time, and the question of sabotage, strikes, labor agitation, and so forth; recommendations on the applications of aliens for employment in classified contracts, all had to be passed

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## Witness Miles

through us. We even sat on a committee with the FBI and ONI in the State Department passing on all passport controls issued by the Government at that time.

We were organizing and schooling and training a corps of intelligence police, something new that had to be put in in time of war.

We wrote the first anti-fifth column plan ever drawn up in the United States, and had considerable difficulty in writing it.

We also put into the Army a counter-subversive system by which we could gauge, I hoped we could gauge any subversive activities going in the Army itself.

We ran Army extension courses in military intelligence for the reserve officers and for newly appointed officers.

The geographic section of the Plans and Training Branch was expanding epormously. We knew the need very definitely for maps of all sort, and we were coordinating. We were the only coordinating branch for military graphic information between the various agencies of the Government then producing maps, such as the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and so forth, and our own Engineer Air Corps mapping activities.

In addition to that, of course, we ran all our own military attaches and took care of all the foreign military attaches and missions here in Washington. We ran language

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

schools in Japanese and Chinese and Russian for our own officers. We had a translation section doing an enormous amount of work in translation of various documents and magazine articles, and so forth, which were appearing of interest to the service.

We ran an office in New York which got out six foreign language dictionaries, the only ones that were in existence when we actually got into war. They were, as I remember, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and Russian.

Mr. Gesell: I think, General, that gives us an idea of the very divergent and extensive activities of the Division

General Miles: I do not want to extend it too long. Simply in the interest of the Division of which I was immensely proud, I want to get before the committee the fact that we were doing quite a number of things in those days

Mr. Gesell: I meant to ask you, in that connection, when we were discussing your military experience, whether prior to becoming G-2 you had ever had any experience in the intelligence field?

General Miles: Yes, sir, quite a lot. I first joined Military Intelligence as a young officer in 1912 when I went abroad as Military Attache for five countries, later ending up in Russia in the last war as an observer for the Russian Army. I mean the next to the last war. I served other times

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

as Military Attache. I served in the Military Division immediately after the first World War and also as an officer attached to the American Peace Commission in 1919.

Mr. Gesell: I think when we closed yesterday I had asked you whether you had anything to do with the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President under date of November 27, which is Exhibit 17 in this hearing.

General Miles: To the best of my knowledge and belief I had no hand in it.

Mr. Gesell: Now, before going on, I want to return to the intercepts for a moment to see if I can clarify one or two points.

I asked you yesterday whether any of the messages which had been intercepted and translated were sent to the overseas departments and particularly Hawaii by the Army, and you said they were not.

Now, I want to be sure we understand. I take it your testimony is that the text of the messages as intercepted was not so transmitted; is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct, and also the essential information was not generally transmitted; in fact, it was only in rare cases.

Mr. Gesell: That is the point I wanted to get at. The same considerations which you have testified to of security

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

which governed not sending the actual text of the message to Hawaii, let's say, applied equally as far as paraphrases or summaries or gists of the messages is concerned; is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct; and I would like to revert to what I said yesterday, that the heart and essence of this very important secret was the fact that we could break this code, not the message itself, and had the Japanese learned that we were transmitting, say to Hawaii, information which we could have received only by breaking their code, the secret would have been out just as clearly as if we had sent the text of the message itself.

Mr. Gesell: Now, you did state, at page 2091:

"In some cases the substance, of the messages, were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code."

Could you amplify that for us? That indicates that a summary or substance or gist of whatever you want to call it of the message was sent by the Navy, as you state, in some cases. Did the Army have anything to do with that?

General Miles: Oh, yes sir. We certainly knew that it was being sent by Navy and that was quite satisfactory to us. I remember two cases specifically when we first learned from

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

magic that orders had been issued by the Japanese to certain embassies and legations to burn their codes and I think you will find that that information was transmitted by Navy to the overseas departments, or to the Fleet, which meant the same thing.

Mr. Gesell: You are referring then to what were in effect joint messages which were sent by the Army and Navy when something of a special significance such as that developed; is that correct?

General Miles: Yes, sir; they were joint in the sense that we had every reason to believe, thought we had, that a message sent by Navy code would always be transmitted by them to their opposite numbers in the Army Command.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have any understanding that the Navy as a regular matter of practice was sending to Hawaii the information contained in these magic intercepts?

General Miles: I knew they were not doing so as a regular matter of practice for the reasons I have given, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I gather then from your testimony that your reference at page 2091 which I read, in some cases the substance being sent by the Navy, had to do with very special circumstances and didn't relate to a general practice of sending out that information?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: In those instances, where the Navy sent the information, was that after consultation with you or someone on your staff?

General Miles: I believe I am correct in saying it was at least, I am sure, with our knowledge.

Mr. Gesell: Were you aware of the fact that over the period up to July 1941 the Navy had been sending to their representatives in Hawaii rather detailed summaries and in some cases the actual text of intercepted magic messages?

General Miles: I believe that I must have been aware of it at that time, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Was that under any arrangement or understanding with the Army?

General Miles: That I do not remember specifically, but I do know that during all that period our liaison with the office of Naval Intelligence was such as to make me believe that it was our understanding.

Mr. Gesell: Well, were you aware of the fact that in July 1941, or thereabouts, the Navy discontinued that practice and ceased sending such detailed summaries of the intercepts to Hawaii?

General Miles: I believe, for the reasons that I have given, that is liaison, that I must have been aware of that fact at that time.



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with the question of discontinuing the sending of that information?

General Miles: I do not remember specifically being consulted but I do remember clearly that during that summer and the months preceding Pearl Harbor we were at all times progressively closing in on this secret, trying to protect the essential secret that we were breaking codes.

Mr. Gesell: Do I gather from that then that the decision to discontinue the distribution of this magic information through Navy channels, which appears to have taken effect sometime in July 1941, was a joint decision of the Army and the Navy for security reasons?

General Miles: It was certainly based on a joint policy of the Army and Navy to close in on this secret. Now, just what conferences were held I am not at this time able to recollect.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall participating in any conferences on that?

General Miles: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall any consideration being given to the question whether the discontinuance was of such a nature that the theater commanders should be advised that a change in policy was taking place?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not now recall any such

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

discussion.

Mr. Gesell: Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or General Short was advised that a more tight control of this information for security reasons was being inaugurated?

General Miles: They were not so advised to my knowledge.

Mr. Gesell: Was it your understanding that the information that the Navy was sending prior to July was information which would be passed on to the Army representatives at Hawaii?

General Miles: Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. Gesell: Did you give consideration then to advising the Army representatives at Hawaii that the information would not be sent after, say, sometime in July?

General Miles: No, not specifically. I don't think we had ever informed them that they were getting this magic. The Navy was giving them the essence of certain information we received from magic, but I do not remember that they had been informed of the source, nor was there any reason, therefore, to tell them we were discontinuing that particular source.

Mr. Gesell: Now, when I have been asking you whether that magic information was distributed by the Army to Hawaii and you have answered in the negative, your answer applies to the entire War Department, does it not, not just to G-2, since the dissemination of information was a responsibility

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

of G-2?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it I am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General Miles: It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1:00 P.M. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

Mr. Gesell: Am I correct that where the information from the intercepts was of such a nature that you felt it required some specific action by the Commanders at Hawaii, you would bring that information to the attention of the Chief of Staff so that he might take such action as he felt necessary in advising the Hawaiian officers of the information you had?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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General Miles: That is absolutely correct. G-2 had to be very careful that the information that he sent to General Short or General MacArthur didn't ipso facto practically force their hands into some definite military decision of importance. If the Chief of Staff desired such information to be sent to them, which would effect their military dispositions or inaugurate their war plans, it should definitely come through the command channels.

Hook Follows

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages, or the gist of them, or a summary of them to the theatres, it was even in the face of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the commanders at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from the intercepts?

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General Miles: That is true; and at that point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think it was the 5th of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form, so the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division Section of War, were, from then on, doing their own evaluation of the raw material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic.

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Mr. Gesell: You mean that from August on, G-2 had no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

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General Miles: No, sir, I do not mean that, but I do mean that our responsibility in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, he wanted the material itself presented, the raw material itself presented to him.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: But it was always still open to you to go to the Chief of Staff or any other officer concerned and present orally your evaluation of the circumstances?

General Miles: That is correct.

Mr. Gesell: On the other hand, the Chief of Staff and the other officers that you mentioned also had in their hands the raw material to make their own evaluation?

General Miles: That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: That is the point.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: There is another point in the record that is not quite clear on this point. I asked you whether the Army had facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating and decoding the magic material and you answered "no." You referred to a Navy intercept station at Hawaii. Do you know whether or not the Navy had facilities at Hawaii which enabled them to intercept, translate and decode the magic messages?

General Miles: I believe not, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, was that condition at Hawaii the same condition as prevailed in the other overseas departments or was it, on the contrary, the fact that in the Philippines, or in some other points, facilities were available for interception, translation and decoding of these magic

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 messages?

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4 General Miles: There were no Army facilities capable  
5 of performing all three of those functions outside of  
6 Washington.

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8 Mr. Gesell: Do you know whether there were Naval  
9 facilities at any point outside of Washington capable of  
10 performing those three functions?

11  
12 General Miles: Of that, I am not sure, sir, and  
13 would much prefer that the question be answered by the  
14 Naval witnesses who will appear before the committee.

15  
16 Mr. Gesell; We will ask Admiral Wilkerson that question  
17 when he takes the stand.

18  
19 Now, on the mechanical side --

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21 General Miles: May I make one point clear?

22  
23 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

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25 General Miles: My testimony is perhaps not quite clear.  
26 I understood, sir, that you were referring to all three of  
27 these functions when you spoke of Hawaii, and I said we had  
28 no service capable of performing all these three functions.  
29 I now know there was a monitoring station in Hawaii capable  
30 of picking the Japanese codes out of the air, but that is  
31 all they could do.

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33 Mr. Gesell: The coded messages?

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35 General Miles: Yes, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell  
Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Gesell: But they couldn't read them.

3 Mr. Keefe: That was an Army station?

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: It had no reference to the Communications  
6 Commission monitoring stations out there?

7 General Miles: As well as the FCC. I understand  
8 there was also an FCC and a Navy.

9 Mr. Keefe: I wanted to be sure what you were referring  
10 to in your testimony was the Army.

11 General Miles: That was the question I was asked, Mr.  
12 Congressman, the Army.

13 Mr. Gesell: Well, do you know whether or not the  
14 Federal Communications Commission had any facilities at  
15 Hawaii such as would make it possible for them to perform  
16 these three functions of intercepting or monitoring, trans-  
17 lating, and decoding?

18 General Miles: I know that they did not, at Hawaii  
19 or any other place.

20 Mr. Gesell: And so far as the Army is concerned, the  
21 only place where these three functions could be performed  
22 was at Washington, D.C.?

23 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Gesell: Now, we have been referring to these  
25 magic communications, and I think perhaps we ought to



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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clarify on the record just what facilities the Japanese were using for transmitting the messages. Am I correct in understanding that their messages were sent by radio in most instances?

General Miles: In most instances, I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, there were other facilities for communication available to the Japanese, were there not?

General Miles: There were.

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: They could, of course, use the mails to communicate back and forth. Was there any scrutiny of the mails?

General Miles: Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, it is also apparent, is it not, that the Japanese could have used the commercial cable system?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Were we in a position to monitor messages sent over commercial cables?

General Miles: I believe we were but I deliberately did not know anything about the details of how we got the messages from the commercial cables. It was not within my scope and I thought the less I knew about it the better.

Mr. Gesell: Would that be a subject to be considered with appropriate officers of the Signal Service?

General Miles: Yes, sir. They would know more about it than I do.

Mr. Gesell: Would your answer be the same with respect to telephonic communications?

General Miles: There was a law of Congress on the books in those days, sir, that imposed pretty heavy penalties on tapping telephone wires. So far as I know it was not done by the Army.

Mr. Gesell: Either telephone wires here or telephone

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

wires in and out of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: That applied to all American territory, sir.

Mr. Gesell: In referring to the laws you are referring to the provisions of the Federal Communications Act, are you?

General Miles: I do not remember which Act it was, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, when a message was intercepted, I gather from what you say in your previous testimony that it might have been intercepted by the Army or it might have been intercepted by the Navy?

General Miles: Yes, sir, or the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. Gesell: Now, did the Army and the Navy each receive the text of the Japanese message intercepted regardless of which branch did the actual interception?

General Miles: That is a detail of the joint operation of the S.I.S. and naval communications that I do not know, sir, but you will have witnesses before you who can answer that question.

Mr. Gesell: Now, at this time, General Miles, were there any orders in effect which required G-2 to send particular types of information to the overseas commanders?

General Miles: No, sir, only the general provisions

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

of Army Regulation 10-15 that put the responsibility for the dissemination of information, - a broad term, - in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. Gesell: What I was getting at was this: Take the position of any overseas commander such as General Short who, presumably, would be familiar with Army regulations and procedure; I was wondering whether he in such a position had under prevailing orders and regulations any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be disseminated to him as a matter of course?

General Miles: I do not know that that would be covered by any orders or regulations. By the custom of the service I am sure that an officer of the experience of General Short or General MacArthur would have known that the Military Intelligence Division was supplying his command, and had been for some time, with a great deal of what we have called static information, a great deal of information on a possible enemy such as Japan, and by that the Japanese Army, and so forth, and that the War Department itself, the General Staff itself, would, one branch or another, supply him with information which would affect his military movements or instigate the war plans.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, my question is a bit more precise than that. I take it that he would from past practice have

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

a reason to feel that certain information would be sent him, but my question was, rather, whether under orders and established procedures which were in effect at that time he had any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be required to be sent to him by G-2?

General Miles: I do not want to answer vaguely but I do not know that I can make the answer any more specific than that, sir. By custom and long custom certain information was gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division to all overseas departments. That comprised a great many different types of information. I am really trying to find out just exactly what you are getting at.

Mr. Gesell: Let us come down specifically again to this Magic material. That was material which indicated diplomatic moves and to some extent contained military information of a specific character related to Hawaii.

Did the prevailing orders, regulations and procedures of the Army at that time specify that that type of information, either in summary form or evaluated form, had to be sent to General Short?

General Miles: I know of no such orders or regulations which specified anything like that, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The question of what information was sent, therefore, under the orders do I understand to have been a

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

matter within the discretion of the General Staff?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, I want to turn to a somewhat different subject but closely related to this, General, and ask you whether prior to December 7th G-2 had reached any conclusions on the question of imminence of war between Japan and the United States and, if so, what its conclusions were?

General Miles: G-2 is a term used, as you said yesterday, to describe the Military Intelligence Division. It was also a term used to describe one person at the head of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. Gesell: Let us take the Division first.

General Miles: What?

Mr. Gesell: Let us take the Division first.

General Miles: The Division first, all right.

I think it can safely be said that my Far Eastern section consistently rated higher for many, many months the probability of war with Japan than did the Intelligence branch of the Division or myself. They would have been less than human and certainly less than efficient if they had not. They were a group of men who devoted a large part of their careers to a study of the Far Eastern situation, who were concentrating their every thought on this one specific sec-

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

tor of the world. It was perfectly natural for them that they should think that their particular devil was the big devil.

I like to say that in trying to answer the question what did the Military Intelligence Division think. The estimates of the Far Eastern section, of the very able and capable men that I had there, were then processed, as I say, through the estimating section and through the head of the Intelligence branch and then they came to me.

Now, immediately they got out of the Far Eastern section they got into the much bigger picture that we were considering in those days, watching a very desperate war in Europe that seemed to hold possibilities of direct threat to the security of the United States and the whole of the activities of Latin America, and so forth, and so forth.

Now, may I speak for myself? I should say that -- I am reading some notes I have here because I knew this was one of the questions I was to be asked and to save time I put it out.

I should say that in mid-November my estimate might be summed up in this way: One thing we felt sure of was that Japan faced a crisis which would almost certainly result in radical action on her part. She had been unsuccessful in her military venture against Russia in 1939 and she had been

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

none too successful in her long and costly war against China. Her military clique was losing face, although gaining power. We were closing in on her economically in our embargoes and other measures, but her radical action might take one or more of many forms. She might give direct aid to her Axis partners by an attack on Russia. She might seek further outlet to the south by a seizure, under some camouflage, of the Dutch East Indies. She might go for the wealth of Hongking and the Federated Malay States, or Thailand, or Burma. She might further increase her war efforts against China.

I remember during the months preceding Pearl Harbor a Chinese military attache coming to me at least twice to discuss their fears that the Western powers closing in on Japan might force Japan to throw her whole effort against China to wipe her out.

Lastly, Japan might add to the enormous burden to her already strained military resources by attacking simultaneously the two great naval powers of the world. Only the latter alternative would surely involve the United States. I doubted whether, at that time, we would have gone to war in defense of the Dutch, the Siamese, or even the British in the Far East, and certainly not the Chinese or the Russians.



Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Do I gather from what you have just stated, General Miles, that prior to December 7th you personally at least had not reached the conclusion in your own mind that there was an immediate possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan?

General Miles: Oh, no, sir, that is not so. The crisis that resulted in General Marshall's telegram of November 27th certainly indicated that the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan had very much increased.

By the 3rd of December, when we knew that they were burning their codes, one would have rated that possibility, now well within the realms of probability, now even higher, so that if you are asking me on December 7th I am quite sure in saying that I would have rated quite highly the probability of an involvement immediate, or certainly in the fairly near future, of a Japanese-American war.

I remember on the 6th of December saying good-bye to an old naval friend of mine, Admiral Kincaid, who was leaving to take command of his division of cruisers, and telling him that I hoped he would hurry because I did not know whether he would make it or not.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, I would like to direct your attention for a moment to item 28 of the exhibit of estimates, which was introduced yesterday, exhibit 33. That is dated

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

December 5, 1941 and appears to be the last of these periodical estimates of the situation which was submitted prior to the attack and turning to Section 6, toward the end of that document, entitled, "The Far East Theatre", I see that you list a number of possibilities, stating that the initiative rests with Japan, as lines of action open to Japan and under none of those headings do I find any reference to the possibility of Japan being involved in war with the United States.

General Miles: Heading "E", "attack the Philippines and Hong Kong."

Mr. Gesell: Well, you felt that such an attack would precipitate the United States in war?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Am I correct in gathering from this document and from others where the estimate of Japan's course of action is made from time to time, that are also contained in this exhibit, that the various items A to I which are printed here represented throughout this period preceding the attack the estimate of the variety of courses of action which were open to Japan?

General Miles: Yes, sir. We were trying in this document to list the various possible lines of action open to Japan.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Keefe: What is that exhibit number, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: 33.

You appear to have made a similar estimate on November 2nd, another on November 27th and another on November 29th, which substantially state the same alternates of courses of action open to Japan?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, did these courses of action represent your views and the views of the Far Eastern Division?

General Miles: They did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Did the Far Eastern Division rate during this period higher than you did the possibility of United States involvement in a war through an attack on the Philippines or United States territory?

General Miles: I believe that that was so and, as I said, consistently the Far Eastern section rated that probability or possibility a little higher than I did.

Mr. Gesell: Did you at anytime prior to December 7th have any information of any nature which indicated the point at which Japan would be most likely to attack the United States?

General Miles: None that I remember, except that rumor in January that came from Tokyo, from some Latin-American ambassador, that Japan would attack Hawaii, which was dis-

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

counted both by naval and military Intelligence, and the ship information message, particularly the one you called my attention to yesterday, which as I pointed out at the time were only one of many and more so, actually, by an attack in perhaps the Philippines, Panama and other parts of the world. We had no specific information then that the attack would fall on Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell: Will you explain why the Military Intelligence Division discounted the report from Ambassador Grew of January 1941 concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: One, because it was inconceivable that any sources in the know in Japan would have communicated that to the Latin-American Ambassador, I believe the Peruvian; and, second, for a great many years we had known that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was always possible. It was inherent as a possibility in any war in which we became involved with Japan.

Perhaps at this point I should invite attention to the fact that the great fortress of Oahu, - and it was one of the great fortresses of the world, - was built solely for one purpose, the defense of that naval base against one sole enemy, Japan, the only enemy in the world that could put on a real attack against that naval base, and the Congress of

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

the United States in appropriating that money from time to time, and it was quite a bit of money, must also have had that in mind.

So that an attack on Hawaii was inherent in any war in which we might become involved with Japan. That is why we built the fortress. A surprise attack by the Japanese was inherent in view of the character of the Japanese.

Mr. Gesell: Well, you have not quite explained why you discounted the report. I would gather from what you said that that report would seem to tie in with the estimates that you had made of the situation, that Pearl Harbor was perhaps a likely point of attack and that the Japanese were likely to use surprise.

General Miles: Oh, I beg your pardon, sir. I discounted that report that came from the Peruvian Ambassador as being bona fide piece of information that he got from a responsible Japanese source. I did not at any time discount the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell: You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?

General Miles: I have already pointed out that the only reason of being for the fortress at Oahu was a defense

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

against a Japanese attack if we became involved in a war with Japan.

I have already testified that I was Operations Officer in Hawaii for three years, 1929 to 1932 and in charge of the Hawaiian War Plans Division in Washington from 1934 to 1938.

Now, during all those seven years that the defense plans were under my supervision, or certainly within my very intimate knowledge, an ~~unsubstantiated~~ attack by the Japanese on Hawaii, made with little or no warning, was a basic consideration in the defense plans.

Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war games situations on the assumption of a Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.

We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

Mr. Keefe: I did not get that last.

General Miles: We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy, with little or no warning, I had no doubt that the messages of November 27th following long months of

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

strained relations, would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Mr. Keefe: Will you read that last? I did not get that.

Mr. Gesell: Would you read the question, Mr. Reporter, and let General Miles answer the question again.

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows: "You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?")

Mr. Gesell: Proceed to finish your answer, General Miles.

General Miles: Many times I have drawn up maneuvers in war game situations under the assumption of an all out Japanese attack following a short period of strained diplomatic relations.

These, you understand, are hypothetical assumptions on which you base a maneuver or a war game.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: I am unable to see the witness at times and I want to know whether or not he read that answer from a memorandum, or any part of it.

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

General Miles: Senator, I am reading from rough notes that I have prepared knowing that certain questions would probably be asked me. This is the fifth time I have testified on Pearl Harbor. I did this in order to save the time of the committee, among other things. I have drawn up some notes so I could answer certain questions.

Senator Ferguson: Was that entire answer in your notes?

General Miles: No, sir. I am interpolating.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could he designate on the record what part was read from his notes?

Mr. Gesell: Well, he has not completed his answer, Senator.

The Chairman: The General has not completed his answer. The chair does not know whether, as he goes along, he can indicate what part of his language is taken from notes and what part is extemporaneous.

General Miles: These notes were made only the other day so that they are practically all the same thing. May I continue?

The Chairman: Yes.

General Miles: Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war game situations on the assumption of an all out Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.



Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic. After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy with little or no warning I had no doubt that the messages of November 27th following long months of strained relations would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Senator Lucas: What does he mean by "those messages"?

Mr. Gesell: You are referring to the message of November 27th, to the so-called warning message sent on that date, are you not, General? I want to come to that later if that is your reference.

General Miles: To that and to the one I sent to the G-2's.

Mr. Gesell: On the same date.

General Miles: On the same date.

Mr. Gesell: The committee will find those in --

Mr. Keefe: This message that he referred to that was sent on the 27th, is that the message that was sent from General Marshall?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, and there is one from General Miles also.

Mr. Keefe: To the G-2's in Hawaii?

General Miles: That is right, sir.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Keefe: And those are the two messages you are referring to?

Mr. Gesell: We will come to those two messages when we come to an examination of the first message.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: But I was interested at this time, General Miles, in getting a full understanding of the considerations which led you to feel that there was a possibility, shall we say, of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor in the event of hostilities with the United States and of that attack being made without prior warning.

I gather that while you were out there you had actually war-gamed attacks somewhat of the character which took place, is that correct?

General Miles: Somewhat of the character, yes, sir. We tried to consider all possible situations.

Mr. Gesell: Was the possibility of an attack being made on a week end or on a Sunday one of the considerations?

General Miles: I remember one war game that I got up and that we played, of an attack right straight into Honolulu harbor, landing troops early on a Sunday morning.

Mr. Gesell: Was the possibility of an air attack launched from carriers at dawn one of the factors which was considered in these war games?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

General Miles: Very definitely. I remember during the maneuvers of 1932, when the Fleet was out there, - I am not sure whether a carrier was in that Fleet or not, it was pretty early in the development of naval carriers, but I do remember that there was a great deal of discussion as to attacks by air and later on, after I left Hawaii and was here in the War Plans, there was a very considerable correspondence initiated by General Drum, then commanding the Hawaiian division, on defenses against a surprise carrier attack.

I have recently seen those papers. They are very interesting as to the different factors, as to the time factors.

Mr. Keefe: As to the what?

General Miles: As to the time factors involved, how far the Japanese would be away when they launched the planes, and so forth, and then approach by night for this dawn attack.

Mr. Gesell: I am sure the committee would be interested in seeing that correspondence. Can you indicate about what the date of it was so that we might make arrangements to get it?

General Miles: General Drum went to Hawaii, as I remember, in 1935. It would have been 1935 or 1936. I have seen that correspondence recently in the War Plans Division and I can get it for the committee if you so desire.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: I wish you would. I am sure the committee would like to have it.

Continuing on this same general line of questioning, did these plans and estimates recognize that Japan had it within her power to launch such an attack directly from Japan itself?

General Miles: Yes, sir. There was what is known as-- what we used to call the vacant sea.

Mr. Gesell: What do you mean by the "vacant sea"?

General Miles: A great stretch of that wild ocean in the Pacific which lies between the trade routes going from Honolulu to the Far East and Japan and the big circle trade route from the West Coast going all the way up via the Aleutians to Japan. There is, or we were so told at that time, an immense body of water in there in which there is very little traffic.

Mr. Gesell: The vacant sea was the course which the Japs actually followed in making the attack, is it not?

General Miles: That I do not know, sir. From what I have heard of our information I imagine that is true. I have not plotted that out or seen it plotted out.

Mr. Gesell: Well, I will get the exhibit where it is plotted out, so we may have your answer to that question.

Re ferring, General, to exhibit 6, item 18, you will

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

see on there the track of the Japanese attacking force and I ask you whether or not that attack did not take place through the area which you have indicated was sometimes called the vacant sea?

General Miles: Most of the course of the Japanese task force, as indicated on this map, lies in what we called the vacant sea. They did cross, apparently, the northern trade route where, presumably, it would have been a little broader than probably down the coast of Japan.

Mr. Gesell: Well, General, did you have any information at the time concerning the orders which were issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in October 1941 routing all American shipping southward through the Torres Straits?

General Miles: Yes, sir, I remember having such information.

Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in any way in connection with the issuance of that order?

General Miles: No, sir, I was not.

Mr. Gesell: Can you state to the committee what knowledge you have as to the facts and circumstances which led to its issuance?

General Miles: I only remember, sir, that the War and Navy Department were considerably worried about some convoys that we had at sea at that time and were attempting to route

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

them where we thought at least they would be least likely to be attacked.

Mr. Gesell: Was it recognized and discussed at that time that such an order might have as one of its effects the elimination of traffic in the area where the Japanese advanced?

General Miles: I do not think so, sir. I certainly remember no such discussion and, as a matter of fact, there was very little traffic in that vacant sea at any time.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Now, in this same connection, General, you were aware, were you not that the Island of Oahu was, if I may state it that way, particularly vulnerable to espionage activities?

General Miles: Yes, sir, I knew that very well.

Mr. Gearhart: May I inquire as to the date of the Torres Strait order?

Mr. Gesell: I think it is October 17.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, does counsel also recall whether there was one on the 25th of November?

Mr. Gesell: The first order was, I think, in October. There is another one, Senator Ferguson indicates, subsequently issued to the same effect.

Having in mind, General Miles, this possibility of the Japs launching an attack directly from Japan, the existence of a vacant sea, the vulnerability of the Island to espionage, and some of the other considerations, we have been discussing, you recognized, did you not that the defense of the Island was, in large measure, dependent upon the establishment of an adequate reconnaissance?

General Miles: I did, sir. For a great many years, I thought it was pretty clearly established there was no possible way of catching a surprise attack before it actually

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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1 I made a statement before the Army Pearl Harbor Board  
2 which was taken up in their report, intimating rather a  
3 disagreement with it, but I would like to read it, because  
4 it is perfectly true:

5 "I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought  
6 that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force  
7 or task force in Japan before it sailed, and know where it  
8 was going. That was beyond our dreams of efficiency. We  
9 simply could not do it."

10 We knew a surprise attack was possible. We knew all  
11 of the advantages which would accrue to Japan in a war with  
12 the United States if she attacked Hawaii, and all the dis-  
13 advantages which would accrue to us. There were those two  
14 vulnerable places, Hawaii and Panama, which would be essential  
15 to us in a war with Japan and essential to Japan to knock out  
16 if she possibly could. But we knew also that there was no  
17 possible way that we could see of warding off or detecting  
18 a surprise attack, except by reconnaissance from Hawaii,  
19 whether that reconnaissance was air, or surface, or sub-  
20 surface, or radar.

21 Mr. Gesell: Having in mind the need for such recon-  
22 naissance and the inability of an Intelligence service to  
23 obtain the information through its own machinery, did you



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 the attack as to whether or not a reconnaissance was in  
3 fact being conducted?

4 General Miles: I did not, sir. That was not at all  
5 within the responsibilities of military intelligence.

6 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall that matter being discussed  
7 by other officers of the General Staff during that period?

8 General Miles: I remember it was certainly brought  
9 to my attention by the inclusion of the directive for re-  
10 connaissance in General Marshall's message sent out to all  
11 overseas departments.

12 Mr. Gesell: On November 27?

13 General Miles: On November 27.

14 Mr. Gesell: Except for that instance, do you recall  
15 the matter being discussed?

16 General Miles: I do not, sir.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1 Mr. Gesell: I want to direct your attention at this  
2 point to Item 25 of Exhibit 33, a memorandum written by you  
3 to the Chief of Staff under date of November 26, 1941, in  
4 which you refer to information concerning the disposition of  
5 the Japanese Fleet, and I direct your attention to the para-  
6 graph numbered 2, reading as follows:  
7

8 "The combined Air Force has assembled in Takao,  
9 Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island.  
10 The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of  
11 Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa,  
12 from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second  
13 Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China  
14 as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines  
15 and air groups in the Marshalls."  
16

17 Now this is the part that I want to address your attention  
18 to particularly.

19 "Present location other units of this task force  
20 are not known."

21 Do you recall that memorandum?

22 General Miles: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gesell: That indicates, does it not, that on November  
24 26 you had information which was to the effect that we were  
25 not in a position to know the disposition of all of the units

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

General Miles: That is correct; but not surprising, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Had that condition occurred on earlier occasions?

General Miles: I cannot answer that question directly, but I would be very surprised to learn the Office of Naval Intelligence knew at all times the location of all the Japanese naval forces. They knew a great deal about it, and I was surprised at how much they did know.

Mr. Gesell: I quite recognize this is a subject we will want to pay particular attention to when Admiral Wilkinson is on the stand, but in view of the reference in your memorandum to the fact that the whereabouts of the units in the task force was not known, and in view of the date of the memorandum which, as we now know, was approximately the date when the Jap task force set out for Pearl Harbor, I wondered whether there had been any discussion concerning the inability to locate the task force at that time?

General Miles: I remember no such discussion, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And the fact that the task force disposition was not known did not, I gather from your prior testimony, lead to any specific consideration of the need for conducting the reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: Well, on the following day reconnaissance was ordered by the Chief of Staff of all overseas departments

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

It was an obvious precaution.

(7) Mr. Gesell: Was the information contained in this memorandum one of the factors which led to the reference to reconnaissance in General Marshall's memorandum or warning message of November 27?

General Miles: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now I want to turn with you to these various messages and review some of them with you.

I have Exhibit 32 before me, General, entitled "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941". Have you a copy of that in your hand?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The first message I wanted you to discuss is that appearing on page 2, dated July 25, 1941, which appears to be a joint dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, calling attention to the fact that on the following day the United States proposed to impose economic sanctions against Japan; that message being sent for action to various points, including Hawaii.

Do you recall that dispatch?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Did you participate in the discussions which led to its transmission?

General Miles: I do not remember any such participation.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 and do not believe that I did participate.

3 Mr. Gesell: This dispatch was of particular interest  
4 to me, General, because it is the only dispatch which I have  
5 been able to find where the Army gave to the overseas areas  
6 advance information of what we might call contemplated diplo-  
7 matic action.

8 The Chairman: Might I ask right there, there is a word  
9 or symbol there that I do not understand, "adees". What does  
10 that signify?

11 Mr. Mitchell: Addressees.

12 The Chairman: Go ahead.

13 Mr. Gesell: Was there any particular reason why this  
14 specific diplomatic action was felt to be of such a nature  
15 as to require advance warning to the overseas area commanders?

16 General Miles: I do not know, sir. I do not believe  
17 that I had any hand in its preparation.

18 Mr. Gesell: Turning to the message on page 3, dated  
19 October 16, 1941, and to the message on page 4 dated October  
20 20, 1941, I wish to ask whether you participated in the dis-  
21 cussions leading up to the transmission of those messages?

22 In that connection, while you are getting your papers,  
23 I would like to offer for the record the memorandum dated  
24 October 18, 1941, for the Chief of Staff from Brigadier

25 General [unclear] [unclear] to the [unclear] in [unclear].

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 This will be designated as Exhibit 34, Mr. Chairman.

3 The Chairman: Very well.

4 (The document referred to was  
5 marked Exhibit 34.)

6 Senator Lucas: Will you read it into the record?

7 Mr. Gesell: "October 18, 1941

8 "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

9 "Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.

10 "1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October  
11 16. Our G-2 does not concur in the situation pictured by  
12 the Navy. War Plans Division agrees with G-2.

13 "2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a  
14 special alert. This is not true for the Army.

15 "3. Recommendation.

16 "That the Secretary of War direct that secret radio-  
17 grams, as follows, be sent to the Command General, United  
18 States Army Forces in the Far East and the Commanding  
19 General, Hawaiian Department; C. G. Western Defense Command.

20 "FOLLOWING WAR DEPARTMENT ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE  
21 SITUATION FOR YOUR INFORMATION. TENSION BETWEEN  
22 UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO  
23 REPEAT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY  
24 APPEARS IMMINENT end"

25 Do you recall this memorandum and the related messages.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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General Miles?

General Miles: Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. Gesell: Will you state your recollection of the discussions which took place at that time and the factors which led to the sending of the messages?

General Miles: I remember being consulted by General Gerow at War Plans Division as to whether or not we thought the Naval message of October 16 gave a correct picture of the situation in Japan, due to the change of Cabinet, and saying that we did not; that we thought it might turn out to be correct, but we had no indication at that time that the new Cabinet would take the lines indicated in that Naval message, that we had better wait a bit.

I do not actually remember seeing the memorandum that General Gerow sent to the Chief of Staff, but I do remember that I assisted in the preparation of the telegram that was sent out as a result.

Hook follows.

W. G. MONTGOMERY, JUDGE & CLERK

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: The November message, after referring to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, stated, did it not, among other things, as follows:

"Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers." I gather that that was the portion of the message which the Army felt at that time was too strongly stated.

General Miles: I do not think so, sir. I think the next sentence was what we particularly objected to, that the possibility at that time, based solely on the change of cabinet. the personnel of which we were not thoroughly acquainted with, or at least their views, should call for the precautions which the Navy message included. In other words, neither General Gerow nor I felt that the information which we had on the 18th of October warranted the statement contained in the 16 October message of the Navy, and particularly in the directives therein contained as to precautions and preparatory deployments, in the Navy message.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have any knowledge at that time as to the state of the alert of the Army command at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: I do not remember that I had any



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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knowledge, except that I know no alert, or message which would call for alert, had up to that point been sent by the War Department. But I do not think I knew whether the Commanding General himself had put any of that in his command.

Mr. Gesell: The feeling that you and General Gerow had, if I understand you correctly, came down to this, then, did it. that you did not feel the change of the Cabinet created a situation which justified Washington ordering a specific alert, or state of preparedness on the part of the Hawaiian Commander?

General Miles: I think that is a correct summary of it, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet and the assumption of power by Tojo; is that right, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: I take it that is the reference, yes. That is the reference, is it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir, the reference in the Navy telegram "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet is a grave situation," and so forth.

Mr. Gesell: Now, the next message, General Miles, is that on page 5.

Senator Ferguson: May I just inquire on that message

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

on page 4, who "Adams" is? I do not think that is clear.

Mr. Gesell: Adams is the Adjutant General, is he not?

General Miles: He was, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And his function was what with respect to the signing of messages of this character?

General Miles: He signed all messages for the War Department, except in the very exceptional circumstances where the Chief of Staff desired to sign his own name.

Mr. Gesell: Did Adjutant General Adams have any responsibility for the decision to send the message or to formulate the contents of the message?

General Miles: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: This, in effect then, was a message from the General Staff which was transcribed and Adams' name was signed to it and then transmitted following the customary procedure.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The next message is that on page 5, dated November 24, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the various naval posts in the Pacific and elsewhere, which again appears to be a joint message with the Army because of the instruction for the addressees to inform the senior Army officers in their areas, and the reference that shows

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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a copy of the message was sent to the War Department. That message states, in part:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful."

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, these messages are not very long. It seems to me they are important enough to read them.

Mr. Gesell: I will.

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch, concurs and requests action aedes to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately."

Do you have any recollection of having participated in any conference or discussions which led to the transmission of that message, General Miles?

General Miles: I do not.

Mr. Gesell: Do you know of any Army officers that did participate in the drafting and transmission of that

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message?

General Miles: I do not know of any officer, of my own knowledge.

Mr. Gesell: I now wish to refer to the message at page 7. This is a message dated November 27, 1941, and signed by General Marshall, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, Message No. 472.

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you should carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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minimum essential officers."

Signed, "Marshall."

Before questioning you concerning this message, I would like also to read the message signed by yourself which appears on page 10 of the same date, November 27, 1941, addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii:

"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only."

Signed "Miles."

General, do you recall having participated in negotiations and discussions concerning the transmission of these two warning messages that I have just read?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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General Miles: I do not recall having taken any part in the drafting of the first message that you read, the one signed "Marshall". The second message, as far as I remember, I drafted it myself and sent it out.

Mr. Gesell: You prepared, did you not, on January 31, 1942 a memorandum for the record on the subject of "warnings sent to Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941"?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: I would like to offer that memorandum for the record at this time in connection with General Miles' testimony, to be designated Exhibit 35.

The Chairman: That will be done.

Mr. Gesell: Copies are before the members of the committee.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 35.)

Mr. Gesell: You state in that memorandum with respect to General Marshall's message of November 27, "The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy."

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Under what circumstances did you learn of General Marshall's message?

General Miles: To the best of my recollection I learned of it verbally and of its contents from General Gerow with

2 0 POTOMAC JUDGE DRAW

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 whom I was, of course, in very close contact. I would like  
3 to point out, I would like to state here, that General Gerow  
4 has a somewhat different recollection in regard to my partici-  
5 pation in the drafting of that message.

6 Mr. Gesell: I would like to have your recollection of  
7 your participation.

8 General Miles: My recollection is very clear that I had  
9 no part in the preparation of that message. I base that  
10 negative statement on the fact that on the 30th of January  
11 in preparing, as I did prepare very carefully that memorandum  
12 for record, I stated at that time, as you have read, that I  
13 had no recollection then of having seen the draft. I also  
14 base that negative statement on the fact that my recollection  
15 is very clear even today of the part I played in the second  
16 message that you have just read and in the subsequent Arnold-  
17 Adams message of November 28, which undoubtedly will be read,  
18 and I cannot understand how my memory, defective as it may  
19 be, could have entirely failed to recall the even more im-  
20 portant Marshall message if I had had a hand in its drafting.

21 Mr. Gesell: I gather from your testimony then that  
22 you believe you had no hand in its drafting, but General  
23 Gerow spoke to you about the message?

24 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

25 Mr. Gesell: Now, will you tell us what conversations you

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 had with General Gerow concerning the message and what led  
3 to the transmission of the message signed by yourself of the  
4 same date?

5 General Miles: There must have been some conversation  
6 between General Gerow and myself regarding the question of  
7 whether subversive activity was included in the Marshall  
8 message. I say there must have been because there is in ex-  
9 istence a photostatic copy of a first draft of the Marshall  
10 message in which there is such a sentence and it was scratched  
11 out by General Gerow.

12 Senator Ferguson: May I have the answer read?

13 (Answer read by the reporter)

14 Senator Ferguson: Does counsel have a first draft?

15 Mr. Gesell: It is right in front of me and I was coming  
16 to it, Senator.

17 You may go ahead, General Miles.

18 General Miles: So that I knew that subversive activities  
19 had not been included in the message. Military Intelligence  
20 was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and  
21 practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went  
22 with anti-subversive precautions and operations. That was  
23 one reason that I sent the G-2 message out.

24 Mr. Gesell: By the G-2 message you mean the one signed  
25 by yourself?



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 General Miles: Yes, sir. The other obvious reason was  
3 that I wished the G-2's of corps areas and the overseas de-  
4 partments to be particularly alerted in view of the Marshall  
5 message.

(2) 6 Mr. Gesell: I would like to have designated as Exhibit  
7 36 a photostatic copy of a draft of the Marshall message of  
8 November 27 signed by Brigadier General Gerow which contains  
9 the text of the message as sent and as printed here in Exhibit  
10 32 with the following sentence which did not appear in the  
11 message as transmitted stricken. Apparently it is stricken  
12 by General Gerow because his initial is opposite the deletion.

13 The sentence which appears immediately before the phrase  
14 "Report measures taken", reading as follows:

15 "Needed measures for protection against subversive  
16 activities should be taken immediately."

17 May that be received?

18 The Chairman: You want that first draft printed as a  
19 part of the hearings?

20 Mr. Gesell: I think as an exhibit. I have called  
21 attention to the only portion necessary.

22 The Chairman: It will be marked Exhibit 36.

23 (The document referred to was  
24 marked Exhibit No. 36.)

25 Mr. Gesell: That is the sentence that you refer to, is

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 it not, as having been stricken?

3 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that  
4 there will be reference to that by members of the committee  
5 and in view of the fact that the message as sent was put in  
6 the record, I think that this ought to be spread in the  
7 record at this point.

8 Mr. Gesell: That is perfectly all right.

9 The Chairman: That is entirely agreeable.

10 (Exhibit 36 is as follows:)

11 S E C R E T

By authority of A.C.O.F.S., WPD

12 WAR DEPARTMENT  
13 WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
14 WAR PLANS DIVISION  
WASHINGTON

15 WPD 4544-13

11/27/41  
Date

CAG  
Initials

16 November 27, 1941.

17 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (THROUGH SECRETARY,  
18 GENERAL STAFF):

19 Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

20 The Secretary of War directs that the following secret,  
21 first priority, message be dispatched by cable, radio, or  
22 telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the view-  
23 point of secrecy) to each of the following:  
24  
25

## Witness Miles

1  
2 Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

3 Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

4 \* ~~Commanding-General, Western-Defense-Command.~~

5 Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all  
6 practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the  
7 Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.  
8 Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possi-  
9 ble at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be  
10 avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first  
11 overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed  
12 as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize  
13 your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed  
14 to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem  
15 necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not,  
16 repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.  
17 ~~Needed-measures-for-protection-against-subversive-activities~~  
18 ~~should-be-taken-immediately.~~ \*\* Report measures taken. Should

19 -1-

20 SECRET

21 \* Written initials JB

22 \*\* Written initials LTG  
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Witness Miles

SECRET

hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,  
Brigadier General,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

Nov 27 1941  
Noted-Deputy Chief of Staff B  
JB

Shown to Secretary of War  
JB

NOTE: Paraphrased - information copy of radio No. 461, 11-27-41 to C.G., CDC furnished C. of S., GHQ on 12-5-41 pursuant to instructions of Major Van Sickler. ehb - 1712.

ACTION TAKEN

11-27-41 by priority radio No. 472 to C.G., Haw. Dept. & priority radio No. 461 to C.G., Crbn. Def. Cmd. ehb - 1712.

NOTE: No come-back received with this memo. ehb - 1712.

SECRET

READ & REPLY WASHINGTON D. C. NOVEMBER 27 1941

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: General, that is the sentence that you  
3 referred to as having been stricken, is it not?

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Gesell: The result of striking that from the Marshall  
6 message of November 27 was that the Marshall message did not  
7 contain any instructions to the addressees as to action to  
8 be taken concerning sabotage and subversive activities?

9 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

10 Mr. Gesell: You stated that it was a function of G-2  
11 to guard against such subversive activities and that for that  
12 reason you felt you had to specifically alert the G-2's  
13 in that regard?

14 General Miles: That was one of the reasons, sir.

15 Mr. Gesell: What did you say was the other reason?

16 General Miles: The importance of the Marshall message  
17 being brought directly to the attention of the G-2's, because  
18 of the critical situation therein exposed.

19 Mr. Gesell: Now, earlier we referred to the question  
20 of reconnaissance and I direct your attention to the fact  
21 that General Marshall's message of November 27 contains, among  
22 other things, this phrase:

23 "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed  
24 to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures  
25 as you deem necessary but these measures should be

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil  
3 population or disclose intent."

4 Did you at that time have any knowledge as to the rela-  
5 tive responsibilities of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor  
6 in respect of the conduct of such a reconnaissance?

(3) 7 General Miles: I don't think I had any detailed knowledge  
8 at that time, sir. I, of course, had general background  
9 knowledge of the war plans and the responsibilities of the two  
10 services for reconnaissance.

11 Mr. Gesell: Did you understand that the Army was in a  
12 position to institute a long range reconnaissance?

13 General Miles: I don't think at this time that I knew  
14 exactly what ships they had there. I believe I thought they  
15 had some reasonably long range ships but I knew that a thorough  
16 system of long range aerial reconnaissance by the Army was  
17 beyond its capability because of the enormous extent of the  
18 periphery which you would have to cover on a night approach  
19 of a Japanese task force.

20 Mr. Gesell: When you refer to "ships" you mean airplanes?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall any discussion at the time  
23 this message was sent as to the extent and nature of the  
24 reconnaissance which the Army was in a position to conduct,  
25 if any?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 General Miles: No, sir, I recall no such discussions.

3 Mr. Gesell: Were you familiar with the message that the  
4 Navy sent under date of November 27 to Hawaii and other points  
5 also giving a warning?

6 General Miles: I was shortly after that. I don't re-  
7 member on what day I became aware of that, but I certainly  
8 knew at the time I knew of the Army message that the Navy  
9 was sending a somewhat similar message.

10 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Gesell: Before  
11 you leave -- you may be going to cover it, I don't know --  
12 but I would like to have this witness interrogated now as to  
13 his knowledge of the agreement which had been entered into  
14 between the Army and the Navy as to this matter of reconnaissance.  
15 I understood they had a written contract or agreement.

16 General Miles: That was one of the details of the  
17 Hawaiian war plans as existed at that time that I was not  
18 familiar with, to the best of my recollection.

19 Mr. Gesell: You did not know what responsibilities  
20 the Army had and what responsibilities the Navy had at that  
21 time in respect of long range reconnaissance?

22 General Miles: The actual subdivision of that responsi-  
23 bility I do not believe that I was aware of.

24 Mr. Gesell: General Miles, when did you see General  
25 Short's report to the Marshall memorandum, Marshall message?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

General Miles: Sometime in January 1942, sir, when I was preparing that memorandum for record which you have before you.

Mr. Gesell: The message I have been referring to appears at page 12 of Exhibit 32, dated November 28, 1941, from Fort Shafter to Chief of Staff, which is signed "Short", and states:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy reured four seven two twenty-seven."

That is the message that you understood I was asking you about, is it, General?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And you say you did not see that until sometime in 1942?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: You were aware, were you not, that General Marshall's message of November 27 specifically asked the addressees to report measures taken, were you not?

General Miles: I am not sure that I was aware of that detail. I knew the general contents of that Marshall message. I may or may not have been aware of the fact that it required an answer.

Mr. Gesell: Was responsibility for examining and appraising

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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and evaluating whatever report was made a responsibility of G-2?

General Miles: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: What Division of the General Staff had that responsibility?

General Miles: The War Plans Division.

Mr. Gesell: That would be General Gerow's Division?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall having any discussion with any officer of the General Staff concerning General Short's reply at the time it was sent?

General Miles: I did not know it was sent until the following month.

Mr. Gesell: Well, I asked you when you had seen the message and I wanted to be perfectly clear that you had not only not seen the message but you did not know of its existence until January 1942; is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: You recall no discussions concerning whether or not there had been a report?

General Miles: I recall no such discussion.

Mr. Gesell: General Miles, on November 28 additional messages were sent to the Hawaiian Department concerning, among other things, the question of sabotage and subversive activities, were they not?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The messages in question appear at pages 13 and 14 of Exhibit 32; is that correct?

Mr. Gesell: I would like to read the messages at this time.

The first is signed "Adams" and is dated November 28, 1941, and states:

"482 28TH CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRE-CAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT PAREN C PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE END PAREN STOP ALSO DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS COMMA PROPERTY COMMA AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE COMMA PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL

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ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE STOP THIS DOES NOT  
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AUTHORIZED STOP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE  
CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY COMMA  
AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP  
TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELE-  
GRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT  
THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBI-  
LITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS."

The second message of the same date, reads:

"COMMANDING GENERAL

"HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

"FORT SHAFTER

"ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIRFORCE PERIOD  
THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED  
TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL  
AND COMMAND IS DESIRED COLON AGAINST THOSE SUBVER-  
SIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE  
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GRAPH THREE MID SR THREE ZERO DASH FOUR FIVE PAREN  
THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL  
PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE PERIOD IT IS DESIRED  
ALSO THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE  
INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING

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COLON PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUB-  
VERSIVE PROPAGANDA COMMA PROTECTION OF ALL  
ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE COMMA AND PROTECTION  
AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT COMMAND PRO-  
PERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS PERIOD THIS DOES NOT  
REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES PERIOD  
AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTEC-  
TIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL  
TO SECURITY PERIOD PARA IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON  
OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE SUB-  
MITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS  
INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS  
PERIOD SIGNED ARNOLD

"ADAMS."

I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we might recess at  
this time.

The Chairman: Twelve o'clock having arrived, we will  
recess until two.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the committee  
recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.  
The Chairman is detained a moment or two. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES - (Resumed)

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, before you proceed, may I  
ask one question?

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy: It has been called to my attention that  
there was some reference to a top secret Army report. It is  
my information we have been furnished all of the top secret  
Army reports, but there has been something said about a top  
secret Army report that changes the previous report.

Mr. Gesell: There is no top secret Army report that  
has not been available to counsel from the outset, and been  
available to the committee.

Mr. Murphy: Counsel has been furnished with all top  
secret Army reports?

Mr. Gesell: That is my understanding, Mr. Congressman.

At the recess, General Miles, I had just completed reading  
two messages on pages 13 and 14 of Exhibit 32 which were sent,  
as far as the exhibit indicates, to the Hawaiian Department,  
concerning the question of subversive activities and sabotage.

It is my understanding, and I wish you would check me  
on this, that these two messages were also sent out at the same

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 time and in the same text to other overseas departments. Is  
3 that correct?

4 General Miles: And to the corps areas in the United  
5 States, that is correct.

6 Mr. Gesell: Now will you state to the committee what  
7 conferences and discussions you had at Washington with the  
8 other officers concerned relating to the transmission of these  
9 two sabotage messages of the 28th?

10 General Miles: I can best answer that question, sir,  
11 by referring to paragraph 4 of my memorandum prepared in  
12 January of 1942 and dated January 1, 1942.

13 Mr. Gesell: That is Exhibit 35 before the committee.

14 General Miles: Shall I read that paragraph?

15 Mr. Murphy: Yes, you may read it, please.

16 Mr. Gesell: Page 2 of Exhibit 35, is that correct?

17 General Miles: Yes, sir, paragraph 4. Do you wish me  
18 to read that paragraph?

19 Mr. Gesell: If that is your statement as to what occurred,  
20 yes.

21 General Miles: "November 28, 1941. At some time during  
22 this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told  
23 me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of  
24 planes. He stated that a number of bombers had been  
25 received from different points in one of the western

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all Air Forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's."

Mr. Gesell: Just a moment there, General. That message that you were referring to is the one we have already discussed, that was sent out by you on the 27th, which appears at page 13 of Exhibit 32; is that not correct?

General Miles: That is correct. I continue:

"He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps Commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, Chief of the Counter-Intelligence branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps, at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the Air Commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage."

I strongly objected to this message going out to Air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air

(2)

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger  
3 and that the necessary precautions should be taken,  
4 but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should  
5 be given additional warnings, or that so broad and  
6 general a directive should be given to so many differ-  
7 ent commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures  
8 against civilians which would have disastrous per-  
9 cussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff  
10 was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated  
11 in the W.P.D. warning message of November 27."

12 That was the warning message of which we have recently  
13 spoken. I continue:

14 "My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive  
15 finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th,  
16 in a Staff conference in General Bryden's office at-  
17 tended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe,  
18 General Gullion."

19 Mr. Gesell: Will you indicate the duties of the various  
20 officers mentioned there? General Bryden was Assistant Chief  
21 of Staff?

22 General Miles: General Bryden was Deputy Chief of Staff.  
23 General Gerow was Deputy, War Plans Division. General Scanlon,  
24 A-2, that is to say the Intelligence Officer on the General  
25 Staff of General Arnold, and General Gullion was Provost



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Marshall General. I continue:

3 "The result of this conference was the approval  
4 of a message drafted by me but containing also the  
5 sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft,  
6 modified, however, by a prohibition against illegal  
7 measures and a reference to the delimitation of  
8 responsibility in subversive activities as between  
9 the Army, Navy, and the FBI. This message as approved  
10 in the Staff conference was sent by the Adjutant  
11 General to the Commanding Generals of all corps  
12 areas and overseas departments."

13 Mr. Gesell: May I interrupt there and ask you which of  
14 these two messages that I read is the one that you are referring  
15 to? There were two messages on that day, appearing at pages  
16 13 and 14. Is it the one with General Arnold's name signed  
17 prior to Adams' on page 14?

18 General Miles: No, sir, it is the one on page 13. I  
19 will get to the one on page 14, signed by both Arnold and  
20 Adams, later on.

21 Mr. Gesell: Thank you.

22 General Miles: I continue:

23 "The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent  
24 at 8:37 p.m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned  
25 Staff conference, at the insistence of the Air Corps,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 that identical messages would be sent by the Air  
3 Staff to all Air Commands, and this was done. "

4 I interject here. That is the message you referred to  
5 on page 14 signed by Arnold and Adams. I continue:

6 "The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484  
7 and sent at 9:23 p.m."

8 Lecharity  
9 follows.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Well now, so I understand the situation, you sent a message, a G-2 message on the 27th, in which you said, among other things, "Subversive activities may be expected," that message being addressed to the G-2 at the Hawaiian Department, and on the 28th there were two additional messages sent to Hawaii, one that was agreed upon in the General Staff conference, which you drafted, and another which was signed by General Arnold, which was intended for the specific attention of the Hawaiian Air Force, but also addressed to the Commanding General; so that in the space of these two days, there were three messages that went to Hawaii concerning subversive activities, or sabotage; is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct, except that I would like to add that I drafted that message in the Bryden conference.

In other words, I was the one who was raising these questions about it, so I got the job of drafting the message which resulted from the compromise decision of General Bryden.

Mr. Gesell: You were not in favor of sending either of the two messages on the 28th to Hawaii; is that correct?

General Miles: No, sir, I can't say that. I was specifically charged with subversive activities so far as the General Staff was concerned. I was deeply concerned

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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with the danger, and I was certainly not in position, nor did I desire to, oppose anybody who went along with me in feeling the necessity for warnings. My objection, or whatever it amounted to, simply resulted in limiting it only to my pointing out that a general warning against subversive activities had gone out and in objecting to any other going out in drastic terms beyond the policy of the Chief of Staff and of our agreements with the FBI and ONI, and addressed only to airforce officers.

Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion or consideration given in these conferences to the question whether or not three messages concerned with sabotage being sent in such close proximity might not unduly emphasize that point in the minds of the addressee, General Short?

General Miles: I am very sure of my recollection that no such discussion was held and the idea did not enter my mind.

Mr. Gesell: Now, following the 28th, this Exhibit 32 indicates that there were no other warning messages sent to the Hawaiian Department until the message of General Marshall on the morning of the 7th, with which we are all familiar, which did not arrive in time. Is that in accord with your recollection that there were no other warning messages sent from the 28th of November to the 7th of December?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h3

General Miles: I think that is correct. You are speaking of warning messages that went directly from the War Department?

Mr. Gesell: That is correct, from the War Department to Hawaii.

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall any discussions or conferences being held in that period from November 28 to December 7, concerning the advisability of sending additional warning messages?

General Miles: I have been trying to recall those days and that specific point. I have a vague recollection of some discussion or conference with General Gerow and General Bratton and myself. I think it arose in connection with what we at the time thought might be the implementing broadcast of the winds message, but my recollection is not very specific in the matter.

Mr. Gesell: Well, we will have occasion to call you back to the witness stand at a later date to discuss conferences concerning the winds message, as I think you know under our proposed presentation we wish to put on everything concerning that at one time. The same, of course, is true with respect to the events of the 14th part and 1 o'clock message.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Do you recall any other conference or any other discussion of a proposed message except the one you have just indicated during the period of November 28 to December 7?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Gesell: Do you remember ever having had a meeting at the Navy Department attended by Captain McCollum of the Far Eastern Branch of ONI either around the first of December or on the afternoon of the 6th of December at which there was any discussion concerning a proposed message?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Gesell: Would it be correct for us to understand that by the 27 of November when the warning message that we have been discussing, signed by General Marshall was sent out to Pearl Harbor, that G-2 had reached the conclusion that there was a possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: I think it fair to say that by that time we had reached a pretty definite conclusion that war with Japan was rating as a fairly high possibility if not probability, and as I testified this morning it was certainly in everyone's minds that inherent in a war with Japan was the strong possibility, if not probability, of a Japanese attack on Hawaii and on Panama.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell  
Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Gesell: Well, with that in mind, and having in mind your testimony of this morning, as well as your present testimony, I have been wondering why the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor was not specifically indicated in your estimates of the situation, particularly in your memorandum to the Chief of Staff of December 5, 1941, which we discussed earlier, which was sent to him and other responsible officers in the Navy.

General Miles: In that estimate and the estimates of that time we were laying down the probable lines of advance of the Japanese, if they did advance. We were strongly persuaded that, late in November, I would say, and early October we were strongly persuaded that an advance to the South was indicated, and as subsequently transpired, that was the direction of the main Japanese effort.

Mr. Keefe: Let me get those dates. Did you say late in October and early in November?

General Miles: I thought I said late in November and early in December.

The Vice Chairman: You said late in November and early in October.

Mr. Keefe: How should it be?

General Miles: Late in November and early in December.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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General Miles: It is true that Hawaii was not mentioned in those estimates, nor was it ever considered necessary, because, as I have repeatedly said, it was a fortress, built for one sole purpose, defense in a Japanese war. It was quite obvious to all experienced officers that if we did get into a war with Japan, Hawaii and the Panama Canal were factors of immense value to us in the prosecution of that war, factors of immense value to Japan to attack. We did not mention other points that were also within certainly the realms of possibility if not probability, of a Japanese attack if war came, such as, for instance, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutians.

Mr. Gesell: So that in these estimates you were emphasizing the points other than the U.S. points which you felt it was likely the Japanese might attack?

General Miles: The lines of advance, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: You wish us to understand that you always had in mind that there was a possibility of an attack against other United States points, other than those mentioned, including Pearl Harbor?

General Miles; If war came, it was inherent in the situation that Hawaii and Panama at least were extremely liable to Japanese attack.

Mr. Gesell: Now, you said, I believe, that there were



Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h7

no other warning messages sent by the War Department after November 28, until the message of December 7. I want to direct your attention to Exhibit 1 in evidence, page 195. There is a message there to Washington from Tokyo dated November 28 which was translated on the same day in which Tokyo advises the Japanese ambassadors, among other things, as follows:

"Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable."

Mr. Keefe: What is the date of that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: November 28 and translated November 28.

Mr. Keefe: The same date.

Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

I also direct your attention to a message which appears at page 204, Toyko to Berlin. This message is dated November 30th, translated December 1. There the American Ambassador at Berlin is receiving instructions concerning an interview with Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and is given this instruction:

"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms, and add that

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h8

the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Now, having those two messages in mind, General Miles, I want to ask whether any consideration was given to sending a message to Hawaii subsequent to November 28, which would have emphasized the information which you had received indicating the real possibility of some immediate action being in the offing?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

General Miles: You asked if any discussions were held?

Mr. Gesell: Any discussions concerning sending such a message.

General Miles: I remember no such discussion. The message of November 27, signed "Marshall", was I knew designed to alert the Hawaiian Department. That was a command action.

Had the Chief of Staff or his Assistant for War Plans thought that the Hawaiian Department was not sufficiently alerted, they would have, I felt sure, taken appropriate steps.

G-2 was not a command agency, nor did its responsibilities cover the alerting of major commands for war or any other implementation of war plans.

G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The information on Japanese code burning and the President's appeal to the Emperor emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis.

But these things were known in Hawaii. That Fortress, like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant.

Mr. Gesell: I want to come in a moment to the code, but

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 I want to stay on this for a second longer.

3 The two messages that I have read indicate that action  
4 by the Japanese was expected in a matter of days or very  
5 immediately. The message of November 27 referred, as you  
6 state, to a possibility of action at any moment. I merely  
7 asked you whether there was any discussion concerning sending  
8 a message which would give more information to the Hawaiian  
9 Department of the immediacy of the situation. I gather you  
10 said no as to that?

11 General Miles: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gesell: Now, with reference to the question of  
13 transmitting information concerning burning of codes, if the  
14 committee please I wish to introduce at this time, as Exhibit  
15 37, a folder which has been before the committee designated  
16 "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches".

17 These are Navy dispatches and this exhibit will be con-  
18 sidered primarily in connection with the testimony of Admiral  
19 Wilkinson.

20 The Chairman: Exhibit 37.

21 (The document referred to was  
22 marked Exhibit No. 37.)

23 Mr. Gesell: I wish to read to you from that exhibit,  
24 General Miles, two messages, the first one of December 3, 1941,  
25 which appears at page 40 of the exhibit, from the Chief of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and others,  
3 reading as follows:

4 "Highly reliable information has been received that  
5 categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday  
6 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,  
7 Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to  
8 destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to  
9 burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

10 Senator Ferguson: What page is that?

11 Mr. Gesell: Page 40.

12 Senator Ferguson: Thank you.

13 Mr. Gesell: Now, turning to page 41.

14 Senator Ferguson: Will counsel just wait until the members  
15 of the committee get the exhibit.

16 Mr. Murphy: It is the one distributed yesterday.

17 Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

18 The Chairman: Entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches".  
19 It has just been introduced as Exhibit 37.

20 Senator Ferguson: The Exhibit number is what?

21 Mr. Gesell: Thirty-seven.

22 The Chairman: The dispatch which you just read is on  
23 page 40.

24 Mr. Gesell: Page 40.

25 The Chairman: And it goes over?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: No. There is another message on page 41 which I now wish to read, of the same date, December 3, to Admiral Kimmel and others:

"Circular twenty-four forty-four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine, Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo, December 2 Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied."

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: There are other messages here concerning codes which I will not read at this time except for this message of December 6th to Admiral Stark.

The Chairman: What page is that?

Mr. Gesell: On page 46, to Admiral Stark, from "COM Fourteen" in Hawaii, stating:

"BELIEVE LOCAL CONSUL HAS DESTROYED ALL BUT ONE SYSTEM ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT INCLUDED YOUR EIGHTEEN DOUBLE FIVE OF THIRD."

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with that?

General Miles: I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. Gesell: Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General Miles: I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General Miles: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: What is the explanation of that?

General Miles: The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. Gesell: It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General Miles: That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell: And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes as we have seen, was it not?

General Miles: That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles: Any instruction to the Navy?

Mr. Gesell: To the Navy here that they should so trans-



Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

mit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them?

General Miles: No, sir, that was not considered necessary.

Mr. Gesell: May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japs were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General Miles: The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly through what was described in that message you recently read, a clash of arms.

Mr. Gesell: Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General Miles: It was, sir.

Mr. Gesell: You stated, I believe, a moment ago that the information concerning code burning was known in Hawaii. Was your reference to these messages that I have just read?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Do you have any information as to whether

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages?

General Miles: I had every reason at the time to expect that they would be transmitted to General Short or his staff.

Mr. Gesell: But do you have any specific information?

General Miles: But I have no specific information on that point. Obviously, if the Navy in Hawaii on the sixth knew that the Japanese consul there was burning his code, the Army must also have known it.

Mr. Gesell: Now, I wish to introduce at this time a message that we present in view of Senator Ferguson's questions the other day, a message signed "Miles" to the Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941. This is to be designated exhibit 38.

The Chairman: It may be so designated.

(THE DOCUMENT ABOVE REFERRED TO WAS MARKED EXHIBIT NO. 38.)

Mr. Gesell: The message reads as follows:

"Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador."

(Signed) "MILES."

Do you recall sending that message?

General Miles: I do, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Just as a matter of information, General Miles, was it a practice for the Military Attaches to use the same or different codes than the Ambassador and the diplomatic staff?

General Miles: It was, sir. We had our own Army codes.

Mr. Gesell: So this related to the Army code system of communication between you and the Military Attache at Tokyo?

General Miles: It did, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Is that offered in evidence as an exhibit now?

Mr. Gesell: Yes. It is exhibit 38 and has been so received I understand.

The Chairman: And made a part of the transcript.

Mr. Gesell: Now, there is just one further question.

In exhibit 33, General Miles, there are two items, items

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

29 and 30, being two memorandums sent by you under date of December 6th to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War in which you set forth estimates of Japanese air and ground forces and strength in Indo-China.

Could you state to the committee, please, what were the circumstances which led to the preparation of these memoranda, if you recall it?

General Miles: I do not recall specifically what those circumstances were. I do recall that in general in connection with what was commonly felt would be the main line or certainly the first line of Japanese advance to the south, that the strength of the Japanese in Indo-China was a particular factor of interest. There were also, of course, as we know now telegrams from the Chinese Generalissimo with regard to the possibility of cutting the Burma Road. That occurred some time previous to those estimates of December 6th.

Mr. Gesell: Just one final question, General Miles.

Did you know in the period from November 26th on that the Navy had lost track of the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

General Miles: I knew it about that time, sir, it was brought out by your question this morning, that a part of the Japanese fleet was not identified as to location by Navy.

Mr. Gesell: Specifically did you know that that part