

File

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 3 PLACE TOKYO
(Obtain from G-2) DATE 2 Oct. 45. TIME 1000

Division Of Origin: M F C

SUBJECT: MANPOWER.

Personal interrogated and background of each:

KAMEYAMA, Seiji -- Vice Minister of Welfare and Head of
Labor Section since February, 1945.

Where interviewed (office): Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. O.W. De WOLF, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Otis CARY, USNR; Mr. George KIMURA, Japanese
Foreign Office.

Summary:

- (1) Labor dislocation caused by U.S. bombings.
- (2) Organization of Labor Section.
- (3) Responsibility of Labor Bureau.
- (4) Procedure of Labor Bureau.
- (5) Other Governmental Agencies Concerned with Labor.
- (6) Availability of Statistical Information.
- (7) Evaluation.

1. General: American bombing attacks caused severe dislocations in the target areas which in turn resulted in a high degree of absenteeism and a consequent slump in production, KAMEYAMA said. He estimated that in bombed areas there was a 60% decrease in production. KIMURA interpolated that this decrease lasted for two or three weeks as a result of the attacks. By-products of the bombing attacks, in addition to the actual destruction which affected labor, included the following:

(a) Decentralization of factories which in turn produced transportation difficulties; i.e., necessitated workers taking a longer time to and from work and decreased their efficiency.

(b) Contributed heavily to the inadequacy of the food supply.

(c) Produced material shortages, both through destruction of material and disruption of freight transportation, which resulted in workers idling at their posts because of no materials to work with.

To offset these difficulties, KAMEYAMA said, the Japanese government resorted to employment of students and school children and tried various methods of stimulating production and attendance at work. These included extra food, clothing, shoe and beer ration chits for factory workers together with other privileges. For example, the Division of Housing of the Labor Section concerned itself solely with aiding factory workers at the expense of non-essential civilians. Concerning the use of students (reported in the Nippon Times for 3 September 1945 to have numbered 2,274,729 mobilized) KAMEYAMA said that mobilization reached full swing in the Summer of 1943 and that their contribution was generally effective. It is worthy of note, however, that parents refused to send their children to factories as the bombings became more severe.

Because of the priority of other information required from Mr. KAMEYAMA, no attempt was made to inquire in detail as to the effects of the bombing attacks. It was felt that a general outline would suffice until such time as the field team arrived to make its searching investigation.

2. Organization of the Labor Section, Ministry of Welfare:

KAMEYAMA produced a Table of Organization in English of the Labor Section as it is presently set up. One copy of the chart, together with a brief explanation of each section's responsibilities, is attached to this memorandum as Appendix A. *

KAMEYAMA promised to have prepared other organizational charts modeled after Appendix A to show the Welfare Labor Section as it existed at the time of the China Incident, the outbreak of World War II and at other periods when important changes were made. It is expected that preparation will require approximately one week and, when completed, should give an overall picture of the Labor Section from 1936 to the present.

In the near future, KAMEYAMA expects the Division for Housing to be elevated to Bureau status, because of the critical housing situation. He also expects the Sections for Planning and Mobilization to be given a Bureau status. Both are required, he said, to meet the present emergency.

*Chart not reproduced, original may be consulted in office of Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division.

3. Responsibility of the Labor Bureau:

At the outset, KAMEYAMA pointed out that there were two types of Japanese factories -- those operated by the Military and those operated by civilians. While KAMEYAMA was responsible for mobilization of labor for both types, the actual guidance of the military-operated factories was directed by the old Munitions Ministry. KAMEYAMA was concerned with guidance of the civilian factories. Guidance in these instances was tantamount to control of labor policies.

In this connection it is of extreme importance to note that the Japanese froze labor in "vital" industries only such as, for example, iron and steel and aircraft manufacture. Skilled labor was the primary concern of the Labor Bureau and the impression was left that the remaining classes of labor, while used in non-military pursuits under the cognizance of the Bureau, were given secondary consideration. Apparently employment of such labor was left up to private concerns and control association. Further exploration will be undertaken along this line to attempt to determine the line of demarcation, if any, and where data on the "unfrozen" labor. KAMEYAMA has promised to furnish a list of the so-called "vital" industries and additional information regarding the utilization of skilled labor is expected from a Japanese chart which he furnished. This requires translation.

Of interest here is a statement by KIMURA that home factories virtually disappeared during the war. Prior to the war Japan was noted for its plethora of home industries, or family factory units. During the war those with sufficient skill were placed in factories where it was felt that their talents could be better utilized.

4. Procedure of the Bureau of Labor:

As explained by the two Japanese, orders issued by the Bureau of Labor, or transmitted by them, went to the prefectural governments and thence to the various police sections. Police Departments included a Mobilization Section and a Factory Administration Section. Further exploration of this procedure is necessary.

5. Other Governmental Agencies Concerned with Labor:

As stated previously in the memorandum, the former Munitions Ministry was also concerned with various aspects of Japanese wartime manpower allocation. Among other things, all mining and all Military factories (arsenals, etc.) were directly under the Ministry of Munitions. Steps are being taken to interview a Mr. OKAMATSU, of the Munitions Ministry for a definition of the Ministry's responsibilities, its organizational structure and data available.

KAMEYAMA and KIMURA indicated that the war and Navy Departments had considerable authority in manpower allocation, which they used. Both men appeared reticent to talk about the Military in any respect and a separate line of investigation will be established. KAMEYAMA did say, however, that along about the middle of the war, military authorities started to give much more consideration to deferment of workers with special or technical skills.

6. Availability of Statistical Information:

It is still a matter of conjecture as to how much statistical information will be available. It was pointed out that the Welfare Ministry Building burned down prior to the war with a consequent loss of records. During the war, the Ministry moved from one building to another and destroyed all records which officials considered non-essential. Since April, 1944,

KAMEYAMA said, the ministry has virtually stopped getting out statistics because of inability to get information, poor communications and the necessity for eliminating paper work.

7. Evaluation:

Mr. KAMEYAMA appeared cooperative, intelligent and friendly. At the conclusion of the conversation he made a point of saying that he would be glad to receive the interviewers at any time at his reception room at the Ministry. He came prepared with certain information of value and readily assented to securing such additional information as was asked for. He voluntarily offered the services of any of his experts at any time and understands that both he and his subordinates will be called upon later for more detailed information.

A P P E N D I X "A"

DIVISION OF PLANNING:

Responsible for planning for the mobilization of all types of workers, including industrial, agricultural and Koreans.

DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION:

Responsible for the investigating demands for workers and recommending re-allocations.

DIVISION OF MOBILIZATION:

In conjunction with the Ministry of Munitions, responsible for decisions as to various requirements for manpower and making the necessary allocations.

DIVISION OF LABOR MANAGEMENT:

Responsible for discipline of workers, factory rules relating to hours of work, etc.

DIVISION OF PAYMENT:

Responsible for determining the wages for the various classes of workers. Also responsible for issuance of extra rations and methods of stimulating production.

DIVISION OF HOUSING:

Responsible for housing for the entire nation. However, because of extreme paucity of material toward the end of the war, the Division necessarily confined its efforts to aiding essential factory workers only.

THE BUREAU FOR SOCIAL INSURANCE:

This bureau and its various Divisions was not explored in view of the other matters concerning labor which had to be covered during the limited time of the interview.

A P P E N D I X "C"

Publications from the Ministry of Welfare
furnished by Mr. KAMEYAMA: (all require translation)

Rules for Mobilization

Rules Regarding Payment

Rules Regarding Management

Comparative Table of Old and New
Registrants Differentiated by
Industry and Prefectures.

A P P E N D I X "B"

Persons suggested by Mr. KAMEYAMA as useful contacts for further information about Japanese manpower included:

Mr. OKAMATSU	Chief of Commercial Affairs Commerce & Industry Ministry
Mr. Gantaro SUEHIRO	Professor Imperial University (possibly foremost academic authority on Labor)
Mr. Keinoshin NAKANURA	Former Vice-Minister of Welfare
Mr. Yoshio MOCHIMARU	Governor, Yogo Prefecture and former Welfare Vice-Minister (reportedly an excellent source).

File

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 13
(Obtain from G-2)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 8 Oct. 45 TIME 1000

Division of Origin: M.F.C.

SUBJECT: MANPOWER

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

SUEHIRO, GANTARO - Imperial University Law Professor,
labor specialist and member of
Board of Wage Control.

Where interviewed (Office): Imperial University.

Interrogator: Lt. Commander O. W. DeWolf, U.S.N.R.

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary, U.S.N.R.

Allied Officers Present: None

Summary:

- a) Board of Wage Control
- b) Black Market Labor
- c) Shortage of Labor
- d) Labor Unions and their Suppression
- e) General Notes

INTERROGATION

1. Board of Wage Control: This Board was described by Prof. SUEHIRO as a rather ineffective body established in October 1940 to obtain civilian advice on wage problems. The Board was composed of approximately 20 members; businessmen, scholars, and one high-ranking officer from each the Army and Navy. There were no representatives of labor on the Board. According to SUEHIRO, the Board would meet from time to time and examine wage scales drawn up by the Ministry of Welfare experts. Inasmuch as the scales were virtually "fait accompli", SUEHIRO said, the Board did little more than rubber stamp them. No records or minutes of meetings were kept and no documents or reports were prepared. SUEHIRO said that he and other members of the Board protested repeatedly against black market labor conditions at the Board meetings and pointed out that the Army and Navy were the worst offenders. He added that although many promises were made to remedy conditions, little if anything was ever accomplished. The Board, which held its last meeting in February 1945, is still theoretically in existence. In view of these facts it is not considered necessary to investigate the Board further.

2. Black Market Labor: Prof. SUEHIRO said that black market labor contributed heavily to the confusion existing in Japan's wartime economy. Curiously enough, the market existed for unskilled rather than for skilled labor. SUEHIRO explained this by saying that skilled labor was highly controlled by the government whereas unskilled, which far outnumbered skilled, was not. This black market appeared to be an individual matter in some respects and a group matter in others. From an individual standpoint, it worked somewhat along this line: A laborer working for 10 yen a day would learn that another contractor was offering 15 yen a day for the same type of work. Therefore he would feign illness or arrange some other excuse to absent himself from his regular job for periods ranging from a day to several weeks and go to work for the contractor offering the higher wages. This practice was apparently quite widespread.

According to Lieut. Cary there is no counterpart in American economy for the manner in which the group black market worked. For example an individual, self-named and self-perpetuating, controlled a body of unskilled labor which he would market at the best available price. He could and did shift his group of workers from one contractor to another leaving unfinished work behind. Obviously, he was subject to bribery and flattery.

As mentioned previously, the Army and Navy were reportedly the worst offenders in black labor market. As explained by SUEHIRO, an Army officer or contractor would be given instructions to build an airfield, to cost say ¥700,000 within 90 days. If he encountered a scarcity of labor, he would completely disregard existing Welfare Ministry wage scales for the classes of labor he needed and pay enough to attract sufficient workers. Because it was a military project, authorities would ignore his wage scales and approve the cost which usually far exceeded the original appropriations. This practice, common in both Army and Navy circles inflated wages far out of proportion to what non-military contractors could afford to pay and disrupted the entire unskilled labor set-up.

SUEHIRO said that the public generally winked at the Army and Navy labor practices. However, when the Metropolitan Government of Tokyo offered ¥ 70 a day for common labor to build fire-breaks, it caused a national scandal. The only explanation on the part of Tokyo officials was that the job had to be done in a hurry.