





RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

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IN CHINA

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INTRODUCTION

The Pacific is challenging the supremacy of the Atlantic. Half a century ago Baron von Humboldt and our own keen-sighted statesman, William E. Seward, both prophesied the eventful triumph of this greatest of all oceans; and today it is claimed that the center of the world's trade and commerce, which in the past has moved from the Tigris-Euphrates Valley to the Mediterranean, and then from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, bids fair, "in the life time of those now children to shift once more westward to the Pacific." As Ex-president Roosevelt expressed it, not many years ago, "The Pacific Era destined to be the greatest of all, and to bring the whole human race at last into one great comity of nations, is just at the dawn." Whether the Pacific will actually surpass the Atlantic as a center of human interest and business activity may well be doubted, but that it will very soon share with the Atlantic the unquestioned supremacy which the latter has so long enjoyed seems reasonably certain.

Already the world's political center of gravity has shifted to the Pacific. The changes which are upsetting the long-established equilibrium of the nations, which are overturning the present balance of power, are taking place primarily in the lands washed by that ocean. It has already, in the past two decades, given birth to one new world power, Japan, which in the last few years has most profoundly changed the aspect of international politics, and whose alliance with Great Britain is today the controlling political fact in Asia certainly, and possibly in Europe as well. It is this alliance, according to some critics of international politics, which has led to the realignment of the great military states in Europe itself. After Japan there comes China, soon to be a second new world power and destined still further to disturb the world's present international balance.

The population and the resources of the Pacific, which will determine the eventful importance of the ocean, compare

favorably with, and in some instances surpass those of the Atlantic. In climate, fertility of soil and ability to produce large quantities of the world's staples, there is not very much difference between them. In population, the Chinese and the Japanese alone outnumber the inhabitants of Europe, while the recent success of Japan in proving itself superior to one of Europe's military powers in a kind of competition which Europe has voluntarily chosen as the supreme test of international ability, shows the humor of regarding these Asiatic peoples as racial inferiors. It is in the supply of the great natural resources, however, coal and iron, that the Pacific has the especial advantage of the Atlantic. According to Mr. Gifford Pinchot, Mr. Andrew Carnegie, and Professor Tornebohm of Sweden, the workable deposits of coal and iron in both the United States and in Europe, provided the existing increase in the rate of consumption continues, will be used up before the end of the present century. Whether this gloomy prophesy is accepted as accurate or not, it seems evident that when the coal and iron of the Atlantic lands are exhausted, China alone will have an abundance of these raw materials which have been well called "the vital essence of our civilization."

A rapid development in the Pacific of European communities, largely Anglo-Saxon, will soon still further strengthen this ocean. Most of the lands of the temperate zone throughout the world capable of supporting great virile populations, but which are now relatively undeveloped, are situated on the Pacific. Western Canada with its thousands of miles of coast and its virgin grain fields; our own far Western states, Washington, Oregon and California, probably unsurpassed in climate and agricultural possibilities; New Zealand and Australia, a continent in extent, will all in the near future in power and in vigor of race balance many of the countries of the Atlantic.

Even a slight consideration of these possibilities of the Pacific must give some idea of the increasingly important influence which its leading countries will exert upon the nations of the West. This influence, already potent, is bound to increase rapidly in the future, especially that of

China, the greatest potential factor in the dawning Pacific Era. The strength of our own western coast as well as that of the British Pacific possessions may be measured with reasonable certainty; while both the power as well as the limitations of Japan are now understood; but the possibilities of China, when thoroughly awakened and organized on a modern basis, are almost beyond computation. The Chinese, who make up a fourth of the world's population, are one of the ablest known races, physically, mentally and morally. Their physical endurance surpasses that of Europeans and Americans, according to the testimony of foreign physicians; their mentality is proven by the standing of their students in Western schools; and their moral stamina is shown by their earnestness and their partial success at least in destroying the opium traffic. They have already left the ruts of their centuries-old civilization and begun to adopt the new customs and institutions of the West and of Japan; this is especially noticeable in their new system of scientific education. The revolution itself, considering the forces opposing it and the immensity of the country, has been carried out, notwithstanding the recent reaction, with a success which has surprised the closest students of Chinese conditions.

The outcome of the struggle to establish a stable, modern, somewhat democratic government in China is of great importance to the United States, for in the future these two countries are bound to exert a strong influence each upon the other, since they will remain, probably forever, the two most populous nations upon the opposite sides of the Pacific. We are now even closer to China than we generally realize. Worcester is today nearer in thought—by telegraph and cable—to the capital of the Republic of China than it was to Boston in the days of Washington; it is today nearer to Peking physically—it takes less time to travel there—than it was to Pittsburgh when our national government was founded.

Americans have already most profoundly effected conditions in China. The leaders of the present revolution have largely followed American ideas and ideals, and have taken

as their heroes our own national heroes of the past. American schools have laid much of the basis upon which the new China has been built. With only a little exaggeration—for the important part played by Japan must not be forgotten—one might write a history of the upheaval of the past two or three years under the title "The American Revolution in China."

When the Pacific Era shall have become an accomplished fact, the influence of the orient as a whole, and of China in particular, will be increasingly great. Even at present the majority of the vital diplomatic questions which have been before the American Government during the past decade, have been issues concerning the Pacific. But the Far East is bound to affect our country not merely in its diplomacy, but in its trade, its industry, its education and its modes of thought. The revolution in China deserves our most earnest study, not only because, if successful, this re-creation of one of the most numerous and the most able peoples of the globe will take its place in history as a world event of lasting importance, but also because it will exert a marked influence upon our own country as a neighboring Pacific power.

To consider these great changes now taking place, some thirty experts came together at Clark University, November 13-16, 1912, for a four days conference upon recent developments in China. Some of them knew the Manchu dynasty in its old days, and were decorated by the Imperial Court for distinguished service; one came into close personal touch with that almost unapproachable sovereign the Empress Dowager. Some, as teachers and missionaries, laid the foundation upon which new China is rising; one represents the modern physician in the westernizing of medical practice in China and has himself fought the plague in Manchuria with the bravery and by the methods of the West. Some, as long-time residents of China, have seen the revolution in its inception, its development, its outbreak; they have known its leaders and in some cases have taught them as students. Still others are authorities on the complicated international situation of China; some of whom have themselves taken

leading parts in one of the most important events of the past couple of years, the loan negotiations. Still others are Chinese; some of them are students, while others have held important positions in the new Republic of China, and are living evidence of the influence of America in the Chinese revolution, for they themselves are graduates of American higher institutions of learning.

The addresses delivered in this Conference have already appeared in the different numbers of the *Journal of Race Development* but, in response to many requests, the University is issuing them in a single volume. While each address deals with a distinct topic, they have been so arranged that together they give the history of nearly every aspect of the world movement now taking place across the Pacific.

To the distinguished contributors the University wishes to express its grateful appreciation. It is their willing co-operation which has made possible both the conference upon recent developments in China and the publication of these addresses.

This volume is given to the public with the earnest wish that its pages may make more intelligible the underlying causes and the general progress of the Chinese revolution, and may create a more sympathetic understanding of the gifted race which is struggling to compress the natural evolution of centuries into the span of a few years, and whose national future, as a growing Pacific power, will be closely associated with our own.

G. H. BLAKESLEE.

*Clark University,
Worcester, Massachusetts,
November 30, 1913.*

THE MEANS OF UNIFYING CHINA

By Charles W. Eliot, LL.D., President Emeritus of Harvard University

I must tell the audience first that I am not an "expert" on China. I have only spent about two months and a half there. The country is immense; and when I was there it was in a state of prodigious confusion. I did not know a word of Chinese. So that I bring you tonight just the observations on China and its present condition of one American citizen who has had, during a somewhat long life, a good deal of experience in one form of administration—educational administration—and who has been interested all his life in the social and industrial conditions of the community in which he has lived. To have been interested many years in the social and industrial conditions of one's own country, if that be a free country, is a pretty good fitting, or preparation, for a cursory inspection of industrial, social, and political conditions in another country. That was all my preparation for my visit to China. I should also say that I was in the Far East on a special errand, intrusted to me by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This was a strange year in which to be an envoy from a peace-promoting organization to study the conditions under which war breaks out or peace is maintained. I had no sooner started than the inexcusable attack of Italy on Tripoli took place. I had not been long in Ceylon before Russia invaded Persia with great violence; and Great Britain, Persia's neighbor on the south, calmly looked on. When I reached China that country was still in the throes of what had been a brief civil war, comparatively restricted in its areas, and yet a civil

war. And I had only just got home when a tremendous conflagration broke out in the Balkan States. This was, indeed, a queer year in which to be looking for the means of promoting peace in the civilized and semi-civilized world. Nevertheless, the fact that I had that special errand, and in the East, added very much to the interest of my journey; because it brought me into contact with a considerable number of educated Chinese and Japanese whose desires tended strongly towards the promotion and the maintenance of peace throughout the world, and particularly between the eastern and the western peoples.

I landed at Hong Kong, and after a short stay there went to Canton. There I had my first interview with provisional republican officials, the group then in charge of the province of Kwang-Tung, the most turbulent province in China, and that province which earliest and most ardently embraced the cause of the Republic. Having a good opportunity there to ask what is for me a fundamental question with regard to any people, I asked the then governor-general, himself a soldier by profession, and recently in command of a division of the Republican army, "Will the Chinese coolie make a good soldier, brave, obedient, and patriotic?" (You may think this was a strange question for an advocate of peace; but such was the condition of China that it seemed to me the primary question.) The governor-general reflected for a time, and then made the following answer: "The Chinese coolie will fight well, provided he knows what he is fighting for, and that thing interests him." That I thought a very good answer; and its accuracy I afterwards heard confirmed by many witnesses of the fighting which had lately taken place between the revolutionary and the imperial troops. The revolutionary armies were raw levies. An American woman of admirable qualities, who had already been twelve years in China, was at Hankow during the hard fighting that took place in and near that city; and she served for months as a Red Cross nurse in the hospitals of that vicinity. She told me that she always asked one question of the wounded who came under her care—boys most of them were, or very young men. She would ask the sufferer,

"How long have you been in the army?" And the commonest answers were, "One week," "Two weeks," "Three weeks." Brave, raw recruits fought with desperation, with dauntless courage, under the most trying conditions. They had hardly any experienced leaders, and did not know their commanders; but they were ready to die for their country.

That same day in Canton about two thousand Chinese soldiers passed me in a very narrow street, so narrow that my chair had to be jammed against the wall, and the men filed by, two and two, and no space to spare. I did not see a single man in that long line that had what we call a martial bearing. They were all fully armed, but not fully uniformed, and many of them had on the left arm a white band. I asked what these bands meant; and was told that these men all belonged to a society pledged to give their lives at any moment for the country. The answer of the governor-general of Kwang-Tung province, so far as I can judge, was an accurate one. The Chinese coolie, or peasant, or mechanic will fight bravely, even desperately, if he knows what object he is fighting for, and that object interests him. These men who made up the revolutionary armies thought they were fighting for their country, for its freedom, for the coming of a just government; and that prospect interested them. Is not that just the spirit in which American youth are prepared to fight? Is not that just the spirit in which hundreds of thousands of young men went to our Civil War. Is not that just the spirit in which our Revolutionary armies were recruited? Our youth felt in both those epochs ready to die for the country, because they believed they knew what they were fighting for, and that thing appealed to them.

The young generations in China today seem to be the legitimate successors of the earlier generations (1860-81), whose fighting and marching qualities were so enthusiastically praised by such foreign observers as Swinhoe, Gordon, Wolseley, and Hamilton (British) and Ward (American). I started in China, therefore, with the conviction that the Chinese, though peaceable in their habits, will nevertheless make courageous, hardy, resolute fighters at need. There was a great need at the moment of a trustworthy public

force; but the Republic was not competent to enlist and train that force, because it had no money. There were disorders in several parts of the country, because the troops were neither paid nor properly fed; and these suffering soldiers broke out repeatedly in riots and robbings. Gradually the revolutionary levies were disbanded, and order was restored, with the help of the provincial authorities; but the poverty of the central government prevents it from organizing an effective national army.

The next question I asked of officials in China was, "What are the means of unifying this great country?" It has enormous extent. It is divided into eighteen original provinces; and the interests of those provinces are diverse in many respects. There is a condition in China like what prevailed in our thirteen colonies when the war of the Revolution was over—very different interests in the north and the south, on the coast and in the interior. The provinces are not used to acting together; they have no common language except the literary; on the contrary, people on the opposite banks of the same river are often unable to understand each other. People in adjacent mountain valleys may be unable to understand each other; the whole people is used to provincial government, but not to feeling the pressure of any national, centralized government.

The answers to the questions, "How can this great country be tied together, how can its people be brought to maintain a strong central government, what are the means of unification?" came to me only slowly during my ten-week stay in China; and it is those answers that I propose to lay before you this evening. The means of unifying China? They are the means, with one exception, which have unified this country, and made us one people, north, south, east, and west. The first means is a common language; and that the American colonies had in the Revolutionary epoch, and have had ever since, until the recent invasion by millions of alien peoples not speaking English. The New Republic took immediate measures to remedy this great lack in China. I say, "took measures." They made projects; they wrote out on paper what they would do if they

had the means. They have not had the means; they have not had the money which the measures they proposed must necessarily cost. A common language is the first unifying means China needs to employ. It is a great undertaking. It must be done through public schools all over the country, through making education universal in its elements. There have been provincial schools in China, few but good; there have been municipal and village schools; but except during the last years of the Manchu Empire there has been no attempt at universal education; and the Manchus got but little way with the project they formed. Only slowly can this need be met. Ten, fifteen, twenty years will be needed in order to diffuse throughout China among the children and young people a common language. And yet that must be accomplished before the varied populations of China can be brought, first, to a common understanding, and next, to such intercommunication that they gradually become more and more like each other, and come to enjoy the same literature.

The next means of unification that I inquired about is one which has proved to be unifying in high degree in many nations of the world. I mean a common system of taxation. You remember that the unification of Germany, which took place shortly after 1866, was preceded by common taxation methods. Duties were made the same by agreement among the many states into which the present German Empire was then divided. Posts or mails were operated by the same semi-public agency all over Germany. The same general system of taxation needs to prevail throughout a nation in order to unify its domestic habits and its industrial habits, to make them approximately alike all over the country. The condition in China has been, and is, almost such as would prevail in the United States if duties were levied at all our state boundaries on goods in transport. China collects provincial taxes on goods moving by rail or other conveyance from province to province. An English merchant in Shanghai who has long traded in the valley of the river Yangtse told me that the goods he sent from Shanghai often paid three, four, or even five duties before they arrived

at their destination, and that he could never tell how many duties or how much *in toto* was going to be paid on a given invoice. You see how difficult communication and trade are under such conditions. You see, too, how the price of goods will be affected by the operation of these local taxes. It is impossible for the same goods to be sold at the same price in different localities. A uniform system of taxation regulated by law is an indispensable means of unifying China. When I ventured to broach this doctrine to Chinese statesmen and scholars it always aroused in their minds painful recollections, and apprehensions about centralized taxation methods for the future. There is one department in which uniform taxation exists for all China, namely, in the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. On all goods coming in by sea the customs, or tariff duties, are the same for all China. But how are they collected? By the organization established and carried on for many years by Sir Robert Hart, an admirable organization, the service perfectly performed with honesty and accuracy, and the receipts applied exactly where they should be applied in accordance with existing treaties. But what is the application? To pay the interest on bonds which represent debts China was forced by western powers to incur, in order to pay indemnities to western powers, and to pay to western powers the war expenses of those powers in carrying on war against China. No Chinese official today, or at any time within a generation in China, can bear to think of this uniform tax for all China, the customs. When I spoke to three of the members of the present government about this tax, my reference to it was received with visible impatience and dislike. They simply hate to think that they have mortgaged their entire customs revenue to pay the interest on debts and reduce the principals of debts which China incurred in consequence of wars which western powers waged against her. They encounter another great difficulty in connection with this uniform tax, which is the product of a low, sensible tariff for revenue. That difficulty relates to one result of Sir Robert Hart's administration. In all the great services of the customs, which include not only the collection of the customs, but also the

construction and maintenance of the lighthouses and day marks on the coasts and rivers of China, and many works of conservancy in Chinese harbors and rivers, not a single Chinese man has been trained to responsible administrative work of that sort or any similar sort during the entire existence of the service. No Chinese has ever been appointed to anything above a clerkship in that service; and the consequence is now that the government cannot get from that service a single man, Chinese by birth, who is fit for the public service in similar departments. How natural that a Chinese statesman should hear with impatience even the name of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service!

The next unifying influence for China, as, indeed, it has been all over the world, is the provision of the necessary means of intercourse for travelers, pedlars, and traders, and of the distribution and exchange of goods. I never before was in a country without roads. I had lately visited several parts of the Far East which are under foreign supervision, as, for instance, some British colonies in the East, and had found admirable roads in great numbers, thousands of miles of hard, smooth roads constructed in the British colonies, for example; and suddenly I came to China and found it a country without made roads. The western parts of our own country existed for some time without anything that deserved the name of roads; railroads anticipated country stoned roads, and enabled us to communicate with new settlements along lines running east and west or north and south, and even crossing the continent. The railroad often preceded the settlement of the country through which it passed. Now China has not only no well-built common roads, but it possesses to this day only an insignificant amount of railroad lines. The number of miles of railroad in China now in operation does not exceed five thousand. Many a single state in our union has much more than that. I did not see a single macadamized, well-built road in China, outside a British or other foreign concession, except one. That one ran from the winter palace in Peking out to the summer palace, and was sixteen miles long; it was constructed for the passage of the imperial household twice a year. It

is impossible for us to imagine the close limitation of intercourse and traffic caused by this absence of roads. In order to unify China it is absolutely indispensable that an immense increase should be made in the mileage of railroads in that huge country. But what does that mean? That means the borrowing of thousands of millions of dollars for purposes of construction.

A long time has lately been spent in endeavoring to effect a trifling loan of \$300,000,000 for the Republic. Nearly a year those negotiations have lasted, and still there is no end of them. But that amount will not take care of the government itself for more than eighteen months. Now China is going to need railroads, long and many, and will need them urgently; and the railroads will have to be state railroads. The corporation is not sufficiently developed in China itself, among Chinese people, to be useful for the construction of the great mileage of railroads which the country needs. The state will have to do it. "When?" we may ask. Only when China has procured and set in operation a system of taxation that will yield a stable, sure revenue for the central government. That is the first thing that needs to be done in China. To this end laws are needed, public action of all sorts is needed, and foreign advisers are needed; indeed, they are indispensable, in order that the government may obtain a stable, trustworthy national income. When that is accomplished, then all things will be possible.

Sir Robert Hart in 1904 devised a plan for providing the imperial government of that day with a stable and sufficient revenue by means of a moderate land tax. It had never possessed such a thing as a revenue in the modern sense. The imperial government exacted tribute from each of the provinces; and about half the tribute in money, rice, and silks which started from each province finally reached Peking. But that tribute was for the support of the imperial household and the Manchu clan. It was never regarded as a national revenue in our sense or in the sense of any modern government, and when the Manchus abdicated they left to the new government no established system of collecting a

national revenue. They had never studied Sir Robert Hart's admirable scheme.

There are other means of national intercourse, of intercourse between the widely separated parts of a great country, of intercourse between city and city, village and village, and between town and country—posts, telegraphs, and telephones. Sir Robert Hart devised and organized a system of posts for China, and finally made it over to the government long before his retirement; and that system exists today. It is still presided over by a foreigner, but it exists. Also there are a moderate number of telegraph lines, and in some of the cities and towns a telephone system begins to be developed; but all these means of intercourse are still imperfect and inadequate. What can you expect in the way of posts in a country where there are so few railroads, no roads, and where most of the transportation is on the backs of men and animals? Here, too, you see clearly the urgent need of an immense expenditure by the central government of China, before the proper means of intercommunication can be had for unifying the nation.

What I have already said implies that the great need of China at this moment is a strong central government. The government is provisional. The elections for permanent officers are to take place next January. Up to this moment there has been only a provisional organization. What is its nature? They call it a republic; but it is a republic in a sense in which we should not use the word. It is a republic based in the first place on a very limited suffrage. Nobody knows how many persons really took part in the election of the first assembly which met at Nanking, or in that of the body now sitting at Peking; and nobody knows accurately the process by which those selections were made. Secret societies had much to do with the selections. The president is not a republican president in our sense. It was not possible that he should be. He is a dictator under republican forms. It was necessary that it should be so. It is not to be helped. Not until the next elections have been held will it be possible for us to say of China that even the form of government is genuinely republican.

When I landed in China nobody knew what the qualifications for the suffrage were to be. I asked a dozen of the officials I first met what they thought the qualifications for the suffrage should be, and found a serious division of opinion. The majority thought that the qualifications should be only educational. The others thought that there should be, as in Japan, first an educational qualification, and secondly, a property qualification. At the same moment no decision whatever had been reached as to the division of powers between the central government and the provincial governments. You will remember that one of the most serious difficulties we encountered after the Revolutionary War was to determine the division of powers between the separate states and the federal government. We finally obtained in our constitution a strict definition of that division. Unfortunately we did not make so good a one as our neighbor Canada made not long afterward.

A strong central government is indispensable to unification. The government is not strong. No government can be strong that has no revenue; and when I asked the then premier what dependable income the Republic had, he mentioned but one item, namely, the receipts from the government monopoly of salt, and he immediately added that the government manufacture of salt was badly conducted, that the salt was dirty and impure, containing many ingredients it should not contain, and that the manufacture would have to be reformed. That reform will take at least a year, and probably more; and it might be added that salt is one of the worst sources of revenue that has ever been resorted to; for it bears as heavily on the poorest as on the richest.

Nevertheless, in spite of its poverty the republican government is gaining strength all the time. It has repressed the early disorders, opened again all existing means of communication, advanced through discussion the adoption of a permanent constitution, reorganized the government bureaus at Peking, detached the government from the ancient popular superstitions, abolished the former official ceremonials, proclaimed religious toleration, and helped to free the people

from inconvenient or injurious customs like the wearing of the queue and the binding of girls' feet. It has made a large number of projects for great improvements in the public services and in education. It cannot carry out these projects until it has a revenue. Think how little the Manchu Empire, which has been governing China for centuries, left to the Republic! No elements of a strong government were transmitted from the Empire to the new government; no army, no navy, no school system, no national system of taxation, no courts or police of national quality. Indeed, the Manchu Empire transmitted to the Republic no government organization whatever. It was not a real government in the modern sense. It has not been for centuries. If the Republic, or the revolutionary movement, had done nothing else except to rid China of the Manchus, it would have fully justified its coming into existence. The deliverance of China from the Manchus was a necessary step to the coming of China into the group of great nations. The Republic gives promise of organizing a strong government if it can have as much time as we had in our country to organize the government which has conducted our national affairs since 1789. It took us thirteen years with all our experience of local government, with all our fighting quality, with all our trading experience. It took us thirteen years with a comparatively homogeneous people, and with a common language and a common religion. China will need at least as long a period of reconstruction; and the western world ought to stand by China with patience, forbearance, and hope, while she struggles with her tremendous social, industrial, and political problems.

But you will be thinking that all the considerations I have thus far adduced, and all these means of unifying China, have a very material look. They do indeed relate to language, means of transportation, and the organization of government agencies for carrying on the business of the people; and it is quite true that nations cannot be unified by such means alone. Nations are unified, and come to be strong moral units by common sentiments, feelings, and passions; and the first of those sentiments is that of national-

ity, the feeling of belonging to one group of kindred, sympathetic, united people. You may have a small nation animated by this sentiment, or an immense nation filled with the same spirit. Within the last twenty-five years among her widespread people with little means of communication, China has developed in the educated class an intense feeling of nationality; and it has proved in the end that this sentiment of the educated class was capable of being communicated to the uneducated in numberless millions. The secret societies which developed, fostered, and brought about the Revolution found it possible to enlist over a million men in the revolutionary levies. Many of these men were coolies, mechanics, and farmers; but they were capable of feeling intensely the sentiment of nationality, which had sprung up in the breasts of the educated few. The Chinese are an Oriental race, and they have now a full sense of Oriental nationalism as distinguished from Occidental. They have been roused by the sight of another Oriental race close beside them suddenly developing a tremendous force in the broad world—West as well as East—and asserting the right to control by force Oriental regions which did not originally belong to them. In short, they have had before them the example of Japan. That example has stirred deeply all the Oriental peoples; and it is impossible to see now how far that influence is going. It is plainly to be seen in India, and far beyond.

The foreign visitor in China recognizes several types of face and figure in the population, yet does not see in these diversities any strong racial differences; but the Chinese themselves count five races in China, and have put five stripes of color into their new flag. These are, however, kindred races, closely allied in origin and history. That is a very important fact with regard to the creation of this spirit of nationality. The Orient teaches the world that the pure race is the best; that crosses between unlike races seldom turn out well; and everybody knows that the cross between any Oriental stock and any European stock is regarded as unsuccessful throughout the Orient. Japan illustrates the value of a race kept pure. Wherever the Japanese go as

colonizers they keep their race pure. No European race has done that. On the contrary, the white race transported to the East has mixed with every native race it has encountered. It is the Oriental that has demonstrated the advantages of race purity.

Not only are the Chinese people penetrated with this spirit of nationality, they have been imbued with a fervent sentiment of patriotism. This, too, has originated in China with the educated class, and particularly with the young men who in recent years have been educated in Europe, America, and Japan. It was they who started the Revolution. Older people prepared it. Older people nursed it for nearly a generation; but it was fired by the Chinese youth, educated in other countries. I have never seen anywhere better evidences of a widespread and intense sentiment of patriotism than I saw in China.

Such are the chief means of unification for China. But consider for a moment what the obstacles are which this new government, now without any adequate resources, has to overcome.

In the first place, as I have already pointed out, the Manchu Empire left nothing at all to the Republic. I suppose that example is almost, if not quite, unique in the world. We have seen in Europe many transitions from one form of government to another, from one government to another. We are ourselves used to a transition every four or eight years, when the whole structure of government, with all its powers, is transmitted from one administration to another. Here is a case where an old empire went out, was extinguished, without transmitting anything of government organization or structure to its successor. Under these circumstances the poverty of China is a terrible obstacle to be overcome. It is poor not only in the sense that the government is poor, or has no resources, but that the whole population is poor. Under despotic government no people ever lays up any capital. That is one of the uniform failures of despotic government. Neither life nor property is safe under despotic government, and never has been. In China the rich man was always liable to be "squeezed"

by any official who discovered that he was rich. The Chinese who have become rich in Singapore and Penang do not dare to take their property home. They have given most generously to the cause of the Revolution; but they dare not take their properties home, because they believe that the property acquired with pain in foreign countries will be unsafe in China. Therefore there is no considerable amount of capital in China; and in this lack of accumulated savings China must borrow from outside, borrow from the western countries where capital has accumulated in huge amounts. The poverty of the Republic is the first obstacle to be overcome.

Then comes the dependence of China on the six powers that are sitting round about her and on her, each one except the United States really longing for a piece of China. What is the defence of China against that fear, that apprehension? Just the jealousy of one power toward another, or toward all the others. We are not liable to the accusation of self-interest and jealousy, because we want nothing in China in the way of a "concession," a piece of territory, or a sphere of influence; but all the other five powers want harbors, free access to the multitudinous Chinese with the products of western factories, and free opportunities for the profitable investment of western capital. Now that dependence is a fearful trial to all Chinese statesmen, to all Chinese lovers of their country. What escape from that dependence? No escape, except the invention of a national system of taxation which will yield promptly an adequate national annual revenue. That way lies the only escape from the dependent condition of China. How can such a system be established? Not by any action of the Chinese themselves unaided. There are no men in China competent for that task; no Chinese have been trained competent to establish such a revenue for the government. Therefore, foreign advice is indispensable. It must be disinterested advice; it must not come through advisers thrust upon them by any one of the six powers. It must be advice given by foreigners employed by the Chinese government itself as its servants. One of the most difficult problems before the Chinese government

today is, how to obtain disinterested foreign advisers for its service. It is encouraging that they have found one suitable adviser, Dr. George Ernest Morrison, a great friend of the Chinese people, a liberal, open-minded British subject, long resident in China, the collector of a unique library of books on China, and himself master of the library. There is a good beginning made. It is a great puzzle for the educated Chinese themselves how they can select the expert foreign advisers they reluctantly admit to be indispensable. One of the cabinet said to me, "We Chinese cannot select the right kind of foreign adviser by looking at him and talking with him. We have difficulty in discerning the character of a western person in his face and manner. His manners are sure to be different from what we call good manners; and we cannot judge by the aspect, speech, and bearing of the foreign person whether he possesses the needed qualities of integrity and good judgment." I have heard a good many Occidental gentlemen say the same thing about judging the quality of Chinese gentlemen. We feel quite alike, Orientals and Occidentals, on that subject.

What, then, are the grounds of hope for the Republic? How many Americans, Englishmen, and Scotchmen I met in China who had no hope at all for the Republic! How many who had really regretted the departure of the Manchus? I met several eminent diplomats who until the middle of April had hoped that the Manchus might return to power, and had done everything in their power to bring about that return; it was not until the middle of April that the diplomatic corps at Peking made up their minds that the Manchus had gone forever. They were taken wholly by surprise by the outbreak of the Revolution, and for months they believed that the Manchus could head a limited monarchy with constitutional adjuncts. Now the most difficult form of government to set up and carry on is a constitutional monarchy. It is vastly more difficult than to set up a republic, or a dictatorship with republican forms. Nevertheless, a great majority of the diplomats, consuls, and foreign merchants and barristers in China believed and hoped it would be possible to create in China a constitutional monarchy

after the Manchus had abdicated. There are many foreigners now resident in China who cannot bring themselves to believe that it is possible for a republic, even with a closely restricted suffrage, to be carried on in China. What ground is there for supposing, or imagining, that a republican form of government can be set up in China and be made stable? To my thinking, there is in the quality of the Chinese people as a whole strong ground for holding to that hope. The Chinese people have come through every possible struggle with adverse nature, and every possible suffering from despotic government; they have come through recurrent floods, droughts, and famines; they have been subject without defence not only to the sweeping pestilences like small-pox, cholera, and the plague, but to all the ordinary contagious diseases, to tuberculosis, and to all the fevers. Yet here they are by unknown hundreds of millions, tough, industrious, frugal, honest, and fecund. One hears of dishonest (at least, foreigners use that word in speaking of them) officials; but one seldom hears of a common Chinese man who is dishonest. They are notoriously honest in trade, in dealing with each other, and even with foreigners. They seem not to be liable to the alcoholic temptation, and as a rule are peaceably inclined, although liable, like some other peoples, to be transported by gregarious passions, superstitions, and panics. Now these are solid moral qualities in the Chinese. Their virtues are great, and high, and deep. Moreover, they have a producing value which is wonderful. They get everything possible out of the soil of China; and as a Western-trained, refined Chinese woman physician said to me in Tientsin, a woman who has been through everything that a woman can endure, and is now practising her profession in the midst of the Chinese poverty and desolation, "Here we are, poor, suffering, but indomitable!" Here is the ground for believing that it may be possible to create a free government in China. After all, the real foundations of free government all over the world lie in the character of the people. They must deserve to be free.

For an old American who has seen a good many changes of public feeling at home, and has seen a large number of alien races come into his own country by the million, it is impossible not to sympathize profoundly with the present huge effort of the Chinese people. It is impossible for a visiting American with any experience in administration and its normal difficulties not to sympathize with these few men who have taken their lives in their hands and risked their whole careers, and are trying to build up a free government in China. Who could fail to sympathize with men in such a dangerous position, trying to do this immense service to such a people? And yet I am sorry to say that the lay representatives of the western peoples, the Occidentals living in China, diplomatic, consular, commercial, or industrial, have seldom manifested during the past year genuine sympathy with this immense effort on the part of a few hundred thousand men out of the huge population of China. It is very possible, indeed, common, for a foreign merchant to remain a whole generation in China and never make the acquaintance of a single Chinese gentleman, or indeed, of any Chinese above the grade of a house-servant, a porter, or a clerk. An English merchant, who had been conducting thirty-five years a successful, widespread business in China, told me that he did not know a single word of Chinese, or a single Chinese man except his compradore. Hundreds of foreigners in China live there for many years without making the acquaintance of a single Chinese lady or gentleman. In the middle of the city of Tientsin in the British concession is a small municipal garden. On the gates of the garden there was posted until the Revolution had been some months in progress the following notice: "No Chinese or dogs allowed." The secretary of the two municipal councils in Tientsin, an admirable Scotchman who has lived there many years, told me that that notice had been on those gates during his entire residence in Tientsin, and that the practice continued, although the notice had been withdrawn. In the clubs organized and resorted to by English, Americans, and other foreigners in

the Chinese cities, no Chinese person is eligible for membership. Think what that implies concerning the probable ignorance of the Occidental resident in China concerning the Chinese people, their qualities, their hopes, and their aspirations. The western people in China who really know something about the Chinese are the missionaries, teachers, and other foreigners who go to China, and stay there, with some philanthropic purpose, or hope of doing good. They get into real contact and friendly relations with the Chinese, both educated and uneducated. One must not be surprised, therefore, if one finds among foreign business men who have lived in China only the most superficial acquaintance with Chinese conditions and qualities. On the other hand, the great confidence which foreign merchants and bankers in China exhibit in their Chinese cashiers and agents is a strong testimony to the fidelity and honesty of that class of Chinese employees. Knowledge of the Chinese language is all-important to make intercourse between Chinese and foreigners profitable and helpful. Failing that, English is the best language to use. I have seen two Chinese gentlemen, one from the north and the other from the south, give up trying to make themselves mutually understood in Chinese, and take to English as their means of communication. There they were successful. The foreign missionaries, both clerical and medical, and the foreign teachers learn something of the Chinese language, and so win access to the Chinese mind and heart.

I believe I have put before you, ladies and gentlemen, some of the difficulties, obstacles, and apprehensions which beset the path of this wonderful Revolution. I hope I have also suggested to your minds the hopes and reasonable expectations we may cherish. My journey gave me the most interesting stay in a foreign country that I ever had, or indeed ever expect to have. I could not have arrived in China at a more interesting epoch, if I had had my choice over two thousand years; and we all are living in a time when an intelligent interest in the affairs of China will add not only to the breadth of our sympathies but to the enlargement of our hopes and expectations for mankind.

THE EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

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The Chinese people, heretofore silent and submissive, rose up so suddenly and simultaneously last year, that even careful observers were totally surprised. What was even more unexpected was the incredible brevity and unparalleled bloodlessness of the Revolution. In less than one-third of a year, they have removed a monarchical system which had been regarded as unremovable, and introduced a democratic government which has stood the test during the most dangerous period of the last eleven months. They have done all this with a moderation and sanity which have never been paralleled, thus setting a new standard in the fighting and winning of revolutions by peaceful methods.

What is going to be the effect of this upheaval upon the relations between the two largest nations on the Pacific? This question concerns us especially, for upon it largely depends the greatness of the one, the stability of the other, and the prosperity of both.

In order to ascertain this effect, we may first of all examine what this great change means. It has been repeatedly said that one of the most certain results of the Revolution will be the increase of China's foreign trade. In spite of all sorts of drawbacks, this trade has already reached the enormous proportion of 870 million taels¹ in 1910, as against 455 million ten years ago. In other words, even behind closed doors, this trade has increased almost 100 per cent during the short space of a decade. Enormous as this

¹ A tael equals about 75 cents in American money.

foreign trade may appear, it only represents two taels, or one dollar and a half per capita per year, which may easily be increased to five billion taels, if every Chinese consumes only one-half as much as each of his eastern neighbors, the Japanese. Therefore, we can see from all available signs that there is not the least doubt that this phenomenal increase of foreign trade will soon take place.

Side by side with commerce, China's industries will advance. She will bend every effort to utilize the enormous latent power of the millions and millions of her laborers for the development of her unlimited resources. When we recall that each one of these millions of the so-called coolies, who now idles his time away and proves to be a burden to society, on account of lack of productive occupation, has in him not only the power of making a comfortable living for himself and his family, but of adding a considerable share to the sum total of the wealth of the nation, if he is only given a fair chance to work, we may then have some idea of what these teeming millions mean. As the United States is gifted by nature with the inexhaustible power of Niagara and other falls, so China is no less blessed by God in having an equal, if not more precious amount of power in her immense industrious population. What China is now trying to do is to turn these millions to account, so that the misery and sufferings of which we have heard so much, may be changed into happiness and content, not by charity from outside but by making use of the worth of these sufferers themselves. The railroads—thousands and thousands of miles of them—must soon be built. Following the railway, the mines, which are not only extraordinarily rich but almost numberless, must be opened. Industries will in turn spring up. Forests will be developed and agriculture modernized. In short, China will be completely transformed.

Side by side with this material development, moral and religious advancement will also engage our attention. Indeed, from what the writer has seen and heard, he feels justified in saying that more effort will be devoted to the elevation of the moral and ethical standards of the people from now on than ever before, and that the belief in a single

Deity will be more rigorously revived, and eventually adopted as the dominating, if not the only, belief in China. This may sound impossible; but we must remember that the Chinese are a practical people, and that they are already beginning to see that there is no other religion which is more enlightening and practical than true Christianity. Moreover, true Christianity, more than any other religion, agrees with Confucianism. As a matter of fact, these two doctrines can well be moulded together so as to be mutually helpful. Christianity supplies the part which Confucius has omitted, while Confucianism, in China at least, could render Christianity not only easier to understand, but more up to date in every day life. The idea of God has been repeatedly, though vaguely, emphasized in the teachings which constitute Confucianism. Again and again, we find passages in the ancient books which refer to the Almighty as being omnipotent and omnipresent. By careful interpretation and with due notice of the difference in the religious temperament of the Chinese and in the characteristics of expression in the Far East, the true lovers of God could take advantage of the present change to Christianize China while the scientists and engineers are "materializing" her.

We said a moment ago true Christianity, because, like everything else, Christianity could be made to mean different things to suit various occasions, according to the degree of man's emotions or other circumstances. The apparently mechanical worship taking place all day and all over the streets in Russia does not seem to be the same thing as that shown by some of the reverent prayers offered in some of the churches elsewhere, and yet both are called Christianity. The heartless religious massacres of the middle ages, of which more than one sect were guilty, do not appear to be much more justifiable than the massacres recently reported to be taking place in Constantinople, and yet we understand they all were inspired by religious devotion and for Christian purposes. Therefore, we say true Christianity, for we do not need any more Christian superstitions in China than we need any other kind of superstitions. True Christianity must be that which only aims at the promotion of filial piety to God

and good fellowship among men. Anything that conflicts with this, to the writer at least, is not true Christianity. Therefore, we say true Christianity harmonizes, rather than conflicts, with Confucianism. The former attitude, harbored by some, of implacable hostility to all religions, ethics and philosophy other than Christian, and the persistent ignoring of the virtuous traditions and elevating customs which have acquired the dignity of venerable antiquity, is injurious to true Christianity itself; for such an attitude of disparaging one, deriding another and sneering at everything else that is found in the country, incurs the risk of defeating the very object which Christianity itself aims to attain. Indeed, such dogmatic efforts are liable to disintegrate the present social fabric and bring about the collapse of the existing morality without, or at least before, firmly establishing a proper substitute. Therefore, it is only by an enlightened method, that Christianity may be made to bear its proper share of fruit of blessing in the regeneration of China, while by continued dogmatism, we can only reap thorny disputes.

I have spent so much time on the question of religion for I believe that in the regeneration of China, material as well as moral and spiritual advancement must go side by side. What has saved China from disintegration during all these centuries and enabled her to stand the test of age is not material prosperity alone, much less military prowess, but her sacred inheritance of integrity in business, her unparalleled love of home and her tradition of avoiding going to extremes. In acquiring what is good in the western civilization, we shall endeavor to keep what is good in the civilization of our own.

Therefore, what we are aiming at now is to remove all defects in law or custom, to do away with all that dwarfs knowledge or stifles the freedom of thought, as well as to clean away all unworthy elements in pride of race. We want to remove all these obstructions to progress, and change the past supercilious contempt for Western learning and Western help into enthusiastic eagerness and genuine respect. In short, we want to make a complete "house-cleaning" so that we may be able to enjoy our own inheritance as well as

to contribute our share to the world. Instead of simply hearing people say it was our forefathers that first made gunpowder, invented printing, discovered the compass, and made many other useful inventions years ago, we want to do something ourselves. Many may have reasonably wondered why the Chinese should have stopped contributing to the material advancement of the world after their early and marvelous start, and some others may have even ridiculed us for being unable to keep up the record made by our forefathers, as shown by the absence of further important material contributions to civilization. We admit this failure with regret, but we must point out that it has not been due to our lack of capability but to its strangulation and wrong application. We have made little material advancement, because we have been applying our mind and energy entirely to the study of certain fossilized classics and the writing of a certain stereotyped system of essays. Think of what America could expect if she should make all her students study nothing but Shakespeare and use the ability of quoting passages from Cicero or Caesar as the criterion for selecting her officials! And yet, with few exceptions, that has been actually what China has been doing during the last one thousand years. Even our severest critics will understand why we have failed to advance materially as much as we should, when they know that we have been led by a false system to apply our intellects and energy in such a remorsefully wrong way.

Some may ask, why has China not found out earlier that she was in the wrong channel. The only excuse she can offer is that her self-sufficiency and comparatively high level of development, reached a thousand years ago, led her to feel that she could get along well without any more feverish struggles for material advancement. We are an original race, unmodified and unstrengthened during thousands of years by the introduction of any foreign blood. We have been separated and segregated from all of the growing portions of humanity during all those ages, and left to act and react upon ourselves. As a result, we have obtained a great fixedness in our own characteristics. We are said to be lacking in the faculty of true discrimination; but if we

were it is because we have long been deprived of all opportunity to compare or contrast ourselves with equals, much less with superiors. We refused to learn from others, because for centuries we had been in contact with few who could teach us. We are, you may say, too closely bred and rendered near-sighted by continually gazing upon ourselves. Our faculties have been over-developed, wrongly developed, and at the same time, perhaps, under-developed. We acknowledge all our shortcomings of the past; but we cannot yet admit that today our faculties are either too weak or too decadent. To the contrary, we have waked up and are determined to go forward and learn from all others. We may appear a little awkward in the beginning in adapting ourselves to western methods, but we feel certain that we can make progress and finally catch up. All that we need is a little time to readjust ourselves to the new order of things. With a reasonable amount of help from our friends, and taking advantage of our inheritance, we feel we shall soon be able, not only to take care of ourselves, but to contribute to the world as our forefathers did of old; and our only plea is that we may be permitted to work out our own salvation.

What China has already accomplished only proves that she is able to, and will accomplish more. Within the short space of six years, and under almost insurmountable difficulties from both economic drawbacks within, and diplomatic hindrances without, she has practically wiped out the devilish habit of opium smoking, so evil in its effects and so difficult to eradicate, that it makes all other kinds of habitual vice seem insignificant.² She has made unexpected progress in the abolition of the time-honored and universal fashion of foot-binding, and has almost completed the removal of the queue.³ Moreover, in the incredibly short time of forty-eight hours, she has accomplished the well-nigh impossible feat of changing her calendar of many hundreds of years standing. She has done all this quietly, modestly, and in a

² Consult also the author's article on "How China is Fighting Against Opium" in *The World Today* of July, 1910.

³ Also see the author's article on "The Abolition of the Queue" in the *Atlantic Monthly* of June, 1911.

business way. What China wants now is simply a chance to enable her intellectual, moral and material inheritance, which God has given to her and preserved for her during all these ages, to improve her own condition as well as to contribute the share which she owes others in solving the problems which are now disturbing the stability of mankind.

The Chinese have been known universally for their superiority as individuals and their weakness as a collective body. Writers say that the backwardness of China herself has been due to the lack of cohesion among the Chinese. Indeed, most of the struggles which China had heretofore were fought, not by China as a whole, but by three or four of her provinces. Once the Chinese millions unite, their collective strength will be increased in proportion to their individual superiority. If the recent Revolution has done nothing else, it has created a unanimity of sentiment and a feeling of oneness among the Chinese people. When the cause of the Revolution was understood, the northerner and the southerner, the man from the east as well as the man from the west, all rushed to the revolutionary camps, eager to fight shoulder to shoulder and ready to fall side by side. Indeed, as remarked by some correspondents, such united sentiment has never been seen in China before. When the time came for a compromise, these men were just as ready to lay aside all personal considerations for the safety of the country as they were ready to lay down their lives during the Revolution. The unparalleled self-denial exemplified by ex-President Sun and others in removing all misunderstanding and in bringing about a closer union between the north and the south, are but typical of the feeling of the thinking class. Indeed, it is the unprecedented oneness of sentiment of the Chinese people that has brought the Revolution to such a speedy and bloodless end; this unison of feeling is bound to grow and prove instrumental in the regeneration of the country.

Therefore, the recent change has brought China to a point where she can, and will, no longer remain the Rip Van Winkle of the Far East. During the coming generation, she will, to use the common expression, have either to make or to

break. We may see that selfishness has already led some of the powers to think that the awakening of China is not to their advantage. They believe it is to their interest that China should sleep always and remain ignorant eternally, so that they may satisfy their insatiable lust for grabbing other people's land and property. Indeed, some have already begun to take an unfair advantage of our situation to plunder, and have advanced arguments to justify their nefarious rascality in the eyes of the world. It is hardly necessary to comment seriously upon the validity of their arguments, since Satan never has any difficulty in quoting the Scripture, when he finds it handy for his devilish schemes. Therefore, we hear that Russia bases her claim to outer Mongolia upon her recent discovery, as the Russian press says, of an old document, somewhere in Siberia, which shows that Mongolia should be taken away from China.⁴ To a less degree, England also seems to think that by some divine right, she has a claim on Tibet, etc. But as said by many impartial observers and well-wishers of mankind, these arguments however plausible they may appear, and like poetry, however elegant they may seem to their authors, are not only false and unsound, but do not even contain enough substance of reason to disguise or conceal their real underlying motives of outrageous robbery.

Some of these vultures have been lurking around us for many years, and are now becoming more impatient than ever before, for they fear that now may be their last chance. On the other hand, after having emancipated themselves by both right and blood from the imperialism of the Manchu Court, the Chinese people are not likely to suffer the imperialism of the Russians or any other people. If we should inherit the foreign debts and enormous indemnities, much of which was iniquitously imposed upon the dissolved Manchu government, as the powers seem to take it for granted that we do, then by all laws of mankind, we feel we should also inherit the territories which were not only indisputably under the Manchu government, but have been rightfully inherited

⁴ See *Nineteenth Century Review* of October, 1912.

by us from time immemorial. Even filled with deliberate prejudice, the Russians themselves ought to know by conscience that Mongolia is ours, and that their argument⁵ in claiming that territory is not only untenable, but ridiculous, or even childish, when Russia herself urges that the obligations of the same Manchu government should be met by the Republic.

Here is the danger. If such greedy powers should purposely be so blind to the truth and actually take an undue advantage of our situation to plunder, and should the true friends of China be misled by some special interests to silently approve such plundering, they would only arouse the wrath of a people that may yet be able to protect and maintain what is right. The Chinese today feel and know what belongs to them, and are convinced by conditions in Siberia and elsewhere that subjugation by a foreign power only means strangulation of all possibilities of advancement, both materially and otherwise. They can tolerate anything and everything but further grabbing of their land. Therefore, by permitting or countenancing these powers to take an unfair advantage to slice territory from China, the civilized nations might drive the Chinese to revenge in such a way as to turn what is soon to become a great "hive of commerce" and prosperity into a cursed land of carnage and "Boxerism" as well as to endanger the peace of the world and paralyze the advancement of mankind, while by the exertion of a due amount of effort to maintain international justice to China during this period, they may enable the Chinese people soon to be able to take care of themselves and to contribute a great share to the promoting of honorable peace among nations as well as to the advancement of general human happiness. Today, therefore, is the time when the great nations like the United States can either make the Chinese millions a mighty instrument for promoting peace and prosperity, by helping them to make their intended progress, or else they can drive these same peace-loving

⁵ Their argument is, that as Mongolia belonged to the Manchu government, therefore it is free of China when the Manchu government is removed (see *Nineteenth Century Review* of October, 1912).

people, contrary to their will, to become bloodthirsty fiends for revenge, by countenancing the pending plunderings. Ought the Christian powers, above all the United States, to stand inert and see the vultures swoop upon China so soon after we have undergone such a serious "operation," and made a successful effort to recover and go forward? Would they drive us to desperate recklessness just at the moment when we begin to try as hard as we can to carry out the very reforms and accomplish the very ends which their own people and statesmen have been trying for more than sixty years to drag us to accomplish? By concerted action, not only China but even the strongest nation in the world could be wiped from the map! In this enlightened age of ours, should all nations show no regard for the common right of humanity, and ignore the just claims and inalienable inheritances of others? Should friendship mean words alone?

Of course we understand that nations are not benevolent institutions, and that their legitimate object is to promote the interests of the people within their charge, while the protection of the weak or the uplift of mankind are said to be only favorite expressions to suit certain occasions. But even from a purely selfish point of view, we can also see that it is of mutual and unqualified advantage that the two sister Republics should become closer and more sympathetic toward each other. Their aims, aspirations, needs, resources and many other characteristics, are extraordinarily harmonious and coöperating. All observers agree that the chief, if not the only, aim of the United States, is to develop commerce. As said Mr. John Foord, the able secretary of the Asiatic Society, the whole purpose of American diplomacy in China has been the furtherance of trade.⁶ American statesmen, business experts and veteran writers, have again and again emphasized the importance of the Chinese market. It certainly could not be of advantage to the American people as a whole, should China be Russianized or even remain weak.

On the other hand, the Chinese have made it long since clear that they welcome America's trade, and that, with

⁶ G. H. Blakeslee: *China and the Far East*, p. 114.

their own wholesome traditions and unlimited inheritance, they can certainly prove of considerable value and assistance to America, at least in this matter of commerce. Sending your first ship of trade to China in 1784, the American merchant has from the outset obtained a good footing.⁷ By leaps and bounds this trade has continued to grow until today it is second only to that of Great Britain and Japan, with a good prospect of catching up with both.

The existing trade of America, which is already approaching one hundred million taels a year, is but a small fraction of what may be expected to follow the opening up of the country. Those who know what possibilities lie in China's trade say that to increase the present figure ten times is but an easy matter, and that America should soon be able to compete even with Great Britain for the lion's share, if American merchants will only go after that trade which lies at their feet. Instead of the former closed doors which American statesmen tried so hard, for many years, to hammer through, today the whole country is ready to open. The Chinese are not only willing, but anxious to trade with America, for they know that she does not grab their land under the cover of trade or Christianity, and they also feel that the wider the sphere of mercantile relations between China and the United States, the more intimate the two countries will become. The writer is happy to say that the high type of business men of both China and the United States is going to contribute no small share to the unparalleled good relations between these two countries. The recent contact with so many leading business men of this country during the writer's tour from Boston to San Francisco impresses him vividly with their sterling worth as well as their capability and readiness to promote what is good. It is also gratifying to say that in this good effort the American business man may find in the Chinese merchant a worthy and, perhaps, helpful mate. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that as your trade with China began at the begin-

⁷ Portuguese merchants were the first to come to China in 1516; England came second in 1637; while the United States was the seventh. *China Year Book*, 1912, p. 74.

ing of your Republic, so it should take a new turn of prosperity from the beginning of our Republic, unless the United States should change her former square-deal policy.

It may also be mentioned that above all the United States is a power of the Pacific. The purchase of Alaska, the acquisition of Hawaii, the occupation of the Philippines, together with the construction of the Panama Canal, make it unmistakable that the future activity of America will largely be directed towards the Pacific Ocean. It is inevitable that it should be so, for the Pacific, as prophesied by William H. Seward half a century ago, is soon to become the center of civilization. Moreover, as it was the achievements on the Pacific in 1898 that gave the United States her place in the opinion of the world, so it will be what she accomplishes on the Pacific that upholds her position and prestige. China, in spite of her slowness, is yet able, and bound, to play an important part in determining the affairs on that ocean. The good will of that vast country, with her teeming millions, unlimited resources, and wholesome traditions, deserves not only to be maintained, but to be improved. The open door, which in reality means more than an equal opportunity to your trade and advancement,⁸ for which your statesmen have been fighting so hard, should not be slightly sacrificed and gradually closed by a silent approval of, or inert indifference toward, the land-grabbing which some of the Powers are planning. Because every foot of China Russianized or in any other way alienated, means just that much damage to American trade and prestige. The United States has so committed herself, and is so peculiarly related with China from the beginning of their intercourse, that the harm done to the one is bound to be felt by the other sooner or later. Indeed, "every blow aimed at the independence of that ancient empire," as remarked an able American writer, "is a blow at the prestige of this Republic, part of a deliberate attempt to make the position of the United States in 'the world's great hereafter' that of a second-rate power."⁹

⁸ This is perhaps why some nations prefer and actually brought about the closed door in some parts of the country.

⁹ G. H. Blakeslee, *China and the Far East*, p. 111.

Therefore, even if we cast aside the moral obligations which a strong nation owes to humanity, and change our question of what is best for China into what is best for the United States in China, or on the Pacific Ocean, we must still see that America is bound to profit by exerting substantial efforts to help China to struggle over her period of regeneration. In return China, as her traditions teach, will reciprocate a hundredfold.

There are, therefore, the strongest *a priori* reasons in favor of a closer and even more sympathetic understanding between the two great Republics in the world. China is slow, stupid, conservative, and everything else, but nevertheless, with her prodigious numbers, her vast extent, her unlimited resources, and her instinctive sense of gratitude, she can be a coadjutor in Asia of no mean value.

But, further, to judge the probability of close friendship between these two great Republics, we need only to examine the past. The relations between these countries have always been most cordial. They have never had even a quarrel, to say nothing of war. The United States is known to the Chinese as the only power which not only has never tried to seize our land, but has always endeavored to prevent others from committing such injustice. This feeling alone is enough to insure a lasting gratitude in the heart of the Chinese. The part played by John Hay in saving China from the clutches of the powers during the Boxer uprising in 1900, the unparalleled fairness of Mr. Roosevelt in influencing Congress to return to us the surplus Boxer indemnity, the recent efforts of President Taft in preventing interference during our Revolution, the unanimously carried resolution of Congress introduced by Governor-elect Sultzter for the recognition of the Chinese Republic, and the enthusiastic sympathy shown us by the best type of Americans all over the country, are but a few of the many favors from the United States which the Chinese people can never forget. Gratitude is not only an eminent virtue, as observed by many, but almost an inherited habit of the Chinese.¹⁰ As

¹⁰ Consult Herbert A. Giles's, *Civilization of China*, chapter on "Chinese and Foreigners."

soon as circumstances permit, China will, without the least doubt, demonstrate her appreciation of the favors shown her during the time when she is helpless. Indeed in a limited manner, she has already begun to show her appreciation. We still remember how the late Burlingame¹¹ was honored by China as her special ambassador to Europe in recognition of his friendly help. It was out of appreciation of America's fairness in returning the surplus Boxer indemnity that China has by her own will decided to use that money entirely for the education of her young men in the United States, the meaning of which act must be clear to every thinking American. Indeed, the feeling of gratitude of the Chinese towards the American people as a whole, and John Hay in particular, will become more profound as we progress. When China is free from obstructions of the greedy powers, and starts on her own way to progress, we can prophesy that the most majestic monument in honor of the Christian statesmanship of John Hay will not be found in the United States, but in China. For John Hay will become more beloved to the Chinese than to his own people.

Then again, the Chinese know perfectly well that America only desires greater trade facilities. As President Taft has recently declared, trade is the forerunner of peace and friendship.¹² The Chinese have always believed in this doctrine, and therefore they welcome the Americans. A trade that benefits only one side of the bargain will not last long, while that which benefits both is not going to be slighted by either. Thus as our commercial relations increase so will our friendship grow. With her geographical advantages, her enormous resources and her characteristic capacity in business enterprise, America should have the best advantage over all in distributing her commerce and disseminating her influence in the regeneration of China, which is bound to follow the Revolution.

¹¹ Consult Frederick W. Williams: *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers*, New York, 1912.

¹² Before the Fifth International Congress of Chambers of Commerce in Boston.

It must also be mentioned that America itself is directly responsible for the Revolution. Indeed some even go so far as to say that it was an American Revolution, because it was so much American. In the first place many of the leaders of the movement, such as ex-President Sun Yat-Sen, were either educated in America or lived under American influence. In every revolutionary center, there were numbers of American-educated students. Therefore as the French Revolution was inspired by America's success so China's Revolution was brought about and won by America's education.

There must be added the fact that many Americans themselves—missionaries, educators and merchants alike—were in no small measure personally responsible for what happened in China. Besides sowing the seed of the Revolution during the last sixty years, these Americans have shown unmistakable sympathy and rendered every legitimate help to the Revolution. Indeed the Christian efforts of these self-sacrificing men in leaving their own homes and coming over to China to preach the Gospel and to diffuse knowledge, as well as their help during the Revolution itself, have contributed no small share in making the Revolution so sane and bloodless. The good results of their efforts have won not only the confidence, but also the good will of the Chinese people, and there is not the slightest doubt that these Americans will exert even a greater influence in the future.

As the seed of the Revolution was sown by America thirty years ago in the hearts of our students who first came to this country, so the constructive work following the Revolution will be done under the influence of America which hundreds and hundreds of our leaders will receive. The handful of young men who received their education in this country have already done a great deal; but what may be expected of the hundreds of our students now found in every important educational institution of America cannot but be tremendous. These young men study not only American text books, but they themselves become Americanized. When they return to China they do everything they can to spread the good name of America.

Therefore, since the seed of the Revolution was sown by America, and the success and saneness of it made possible by American educated men with the help of American citizens, and since the constructive work will also be done directly under American influence as well as along principles laid down by America, we can easily see that every success China makes will mean just that much credit to the United States, while each failure she meets will no less reflect upon America.

As we realize more clearly the great influence which America has had upon this Revolution, we shall feel more grateful for our success towards her, the result of which will not only be the increase of American trade, but American ideas as well, in China. We have eight hundred students in the United States today; we shall probably have twice that number five years to come. In return, the number of your missionaries, educators, and merchants to China will increase in proportion to meet the greater demand. This exchange of goods, ideas and men between our two countries is bound to improve the understanding and mutual appreciation of each other, the result of all of which cannot but be a still closer relationship between our two nations.

We must remember, however, that there are some dangerous circumstances which might imperil our good prospects. We do not fear any political differences between our two nations, nor do we even need to mention the once possible irritation arising from the exclusion act. Concerning the difficulties arising from the latter, we believe that the best type of Americans regret the existence of such difficulties as much as we do. Moreover, we also believe in the good sense of the American people who have been endeavoring and will continue to endeavor to ameliorate all the obnoxious features until the act will no longer remain humiliating to us or unbecoming to you.

Furthermore, we also feel that we can take care of our own coolies. In the developing of our railways, mines, and manufactures, we certainly shall be in need of our own cheap labor. In addition, our uncultivated land alone will furnish employment to whatever labor we can spare, provided

Russia does not succeed in stealing too much of it from us. China proper itself is estimated, on good authority,¹³ to be sufficient to maintain a population of 650 to 700 millions. In other words, by simply developing our own provinces, we can increase our population 80 per cent, and get along comfortably for at least fifty or a hundred years, without requiring any relief by exodus. We may also venture to say that, if America keeps on increasing her population at the present rate, and with such help as Colonel Roosevelt's crusade against race suicide, and Dr. Eliot's recent preaching before the Harvard freshmen in favor of marriage, at the end of fifty years China might have to reverse the law so as to bar American emigrants. This may seem too much like a joke. Nevertheless, it is by no means impossible. At any rate, many may have already found out that the fear of the invasion of the Chinese immigrant is passing away from the hearts of even those who used to make the loudest cry, while many others are beginning to feel the need of the help of Chinese agricultural labor. As a matter of fact, China herself disfavors the unregulated emigration of her ignorant classes as much as the United States. Under such circumstances, we need not worry the least over this unpleasant question, because it will soon die its natural death.

What seems to be the real danger lies in the unduly selfish acts which may be committed by some of the financial "promoters" who hesitate sometimes neither to extract a pound of flesh for a pound of gold—to use the familiar expression—nor to sell the good will which others have won. This danger would become perilous should the governments be misled to sacrifice what is good for their people in the long run, for the immediate but short-lived gains of a few. I refer especially to the unfortunate act of the American China Development Company of some seven years ago,¹⁴

¹³ G. Curson, *Problems of the Far East*, p. 399.

¹⁴ Led by her confidence in America, China granted to the American-China Development Company the concession for the construction of the trunk line between Canton and Hankow, a distance of about one thousand miles, on the expressed condition that the controlling interest of the concession should remain in the hands of Americans. Soon after the concession was granted the American financiers sold the controlling interest

by which these promoters betrayed the confidence of China, sold the fair name of America, and incidentally brought down a widespread boycott against the innocent American people. A gigantic swindle is no word to express that near-sighted deal. Time and space forbid us to go into details of that transaction, which is regarded as unfortunate both by China and the United States. Suffice it to say that that was the only thing which has done much damage to the good feeling between the people of our two countries, and that all well-wishers of both countries should try in every way to prevent similar unfortunate acts from being repeated to mar America's fair name of the past or to damage her immense trade opportunities in the future. We call attention to dangers from such or similar sources, for it is well known that it is for such purposes that even good people may be led to misrepresent, to fabricate or to do everything else that proves expedient.

In conclusion, we may observe again that the relations between China and the United States have always been both cordial and sympathetic. As a result of the Revolution, their mutual responsibilities, as well as mutual obligations, have increased. These two great nations are bound to have a thousand times more to do with each other; and as this increased intercourse grows and multiplies, the relations between them will become more sympathetic and their friendship more intimate. Because the relationship between these two countries is not the result of mutual fear, but of mutual advantage, harmony in interest and identity of ideals.

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directly to some Belgians, but indirectly to Russia, the very thing which China tried to avoid. •As a result China was compelled to purchase back that interest at an enormous financial sacrifice, besides suffering other difficulties. Also see P. H. Kent, *Railway Enterprise in China*, 1907, pp. 96-121, and the author's article on "Why the Chinese Oppose Foreign Railway Loans" in the *American Political Science Review* of August, 1911.

THE NEW HOLY ALLIANCE FOR CHINA

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From present day amenities we turn to speak of the Holy Alliance, a subject not precisely relevant to the addresses of the morning, or likely to fit with the addresses that are to follow. I come as an amateur to speak to persons already better informed, to those who know what they are talking about. It is the peculiar province of the scholar first to appropriate the materials laboriously collected by other people; second, to generalize upon those materials, but in a spirit different from that of those who have collected them; and third, to promulgate what he hopes may be the eventual truth.

The historical criticisms of the closet scholars have ages ago attracted the attention of the great writers of an older race. One of the early Chinese classics remarks that "scholars teach men what is contrary to your laws. When they hear that an ordinance has been issued, everyone sets to discussing it with all his learning. In the court they are dissatisfied in heart; out of it they keep talking on the streets. While they make a pretence of vaunting their Master, they consider it fine to have extraordinary views of their own. And so they lead the people on to be guilty of murmuring and of evil speaking." As such a discontented scholar, I feel too much like the schoolboy who was called upon to define figure of speech, and to give an example. This was the result: "A figure of speech is when you say what you do not mean and yet mean what you say. Example: 'He blows his own horn.' That does not mean that he has a horn, but that he blows it."

In 1815 was founded by three great European powers through their sovereigns, Francis the First, Frederick William, and Alexander the First, a solemn league which they

called the Holy Alliance. In course of time all of the European powers gave it their adhesion except three—the Papacy, the Ottoman Porte, and Great Britain, though the Prince Regent, caused it to be remarked that England was in sympathy with the combination. If the Holy Alliance had only been sincere there would have been no more wars, no pestilences, no strikes, no duns—it was a great universal sedative, a mutual political insurance company. The purpose was that there never should be any more disturbances of the then existing international status.

The sovereigns held several congresses, at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818; at Troppau and Laybach in 1820 and 1821; and at Verona in 1822. They issued to the world some remarkable statements of their high moral purposes. Thus in 1820 they declared that the “Powers are exercising an incontestable right in taking common measures in respect to those states in which the overthrow of the government may result in an hostile attitude toward all continuous and legitimate government.” In the next year at Laybach they solemnly announced that “useful and necessary changes in the legislation and administration of states must emanate alone from the free will and enlightening impulse of those whom God had rendered responsible for power,” that is, from themselves. This lofty spirit reminds one of the remark of a great railroad president a few years ago, that the commercial affairs of the country should be carried on by those to whom God had given authority over the property of the country.

The Holy Alliance very soon found its opportunity when revolutions broke out in Spain, in Naples, and in Portugal, and it set itself to restore the monarchs whose faithful subjects did not appreciate them. The most striking thing about the Holy Alliance is not so much that it existed, as that its whole effort was an abject failure. To be sure Austria as the representative of the Holy Alliance crushed out the revolution in Naples; but Naples eventually became a part of the free and united Italy. France restored absolutism in 1823; but Spain, after a period of ninety years is still going through a process of protest against absolutism. A revolution broke out in Greece in 1821, and then and there

began that century-long process which through the arms of four of the Balkan Christian powers is apparently just reaching its end. The attempt to subvert free thought was absolutely hopeless. That is the Holy Alliance assumed to determine what should be the proper type of government and political thought in Europe: it absolutely failed in maintaining its cherished type of government; and it became a laughing stock for the nations.

In the year of grace 1912 we observe a combination of European powers partly operating in China, partly operating at the headquarters of their governments in Europe, which is fairly comparable to the Holy Alliance in its form, in its purposes, and, we trust, in the eventual failure of its aims. The basal idea of the combination of European powers is that six associated foreign nations can better decide than the Chinese themselves what shall be the future government and the destiny of that great empire. This principle is not a new one. I see before me people who have lived for years in China, and they can tell you better than a visitor for a few months about the general relations of diplomats and commercial men to the Chinese government and people. They will however all agree that from the time that the European powers first broke into China, which was in 1840, the Europeans have in general adhered to the idea that their presence in China was not based on advantage to the Chinese, but on their own purposes, and for their own benefit. Thus Burlingame wrote in 1868: "Yet, notwithstanding this manifest progress, there are people who will tell you that China has made no progress, that her views are retrograde, and they will tell you that it is the duty of the Western duty powers to combine for the purpose of coercing China into reforms that they may desire and which she does not desire—who undertake to state that these people have no rights which they are bound to respect. In their coarse language they say, 'Take her by the throat.' Using the tyrant's plea they say they know better what China wants than China herself does." That, you see, was many years ago, nearly half a century, in a period of impatience with China.

One reason for this attempt on the part of the Europeans to control China is an ignorance of the real character of the Chinese. Of all the people who visit China and even who spend years there, few really become sufficiently acquainted with the Chinese to put them within the possibility of understanding the conditions of the Chinese mind or the ultimate purposes of the Chinese government. It is a standing criticism upon foreign business men that they associate so little with the Chinese; that so few of them ever acquire the language, that so very few qualify themselves to give an expert opinion on what is going on in China. Many years ago an English consul said, "There is perhaps no country in the world frequented by the English-speaking race in which merchants are so lamentably ignorant of the customs and resources of the locality in which they live as they are at this moment in China, and this is entirely to be attributed to a want of familiarity with the language."

Perhaps there has been a similar ignorance on the part of the Chinese. Thus Wo Jen, grand secretary of the imperial library in 1868 wrote, "As to observing the customs of the foreigners and learning from them—their customs are nothing but lasciviousness and cunning, while their inclinations are simply fiendish and malignant." Of course that is brutally insulting for an Oriental to say of an Occidental, but when we say similar things of the Chinese it is only a needed rebuke to an inferior people.

In 1868 or thereabouts a man named Robertson wrote in an English review: "If China will assent to progress and development of her resources under a system of well-considered pressure by the foreign ministers; even if its rulers are under fear of armed compulsion if they refuse, we cannot see that the exercise of this pressure in a reasonable manner by the foreign governments is objectionable. Any improvement in China is possible only under such a system. We have no desire to be unjust or unreasonable toward the Chinese . . . but we strongly object to any assurance being given the Chinese authorities that the time and manner of their progress are left to their own discretion, and that therefore, they need no longer fear to

disregard the demands of the British minister at Peking. . . . The judgment of the Chinese themselves on the perils that beset their future course is utterly worthless."

That, of course, is exactly in line with the present attempt of foreign powers to decide the destiny of China. I quote it simply to illustrate the underlying idea held by many of the diplomats, that China exists chiefly to furnish opportunities for the application of the advanced principles of the West, that God created that people, not in order that there might be a Chinese nation, but that they might furnish a field for Chinese investment.

The European powers were a long time, three centuries in fact, in obtaining access to the Chinese ports, because of an obstinate Chinese determination not to trade with exterior nations. Under great pressure the Chinese were prevailed upon to open up a certain number of their ports as points of contact between themselves and the outside world. Then began a system of European regulation of these ports, and then the ticklish business of a European power undertaking to say, "You must make even your customs duties to suit us." We must not forget that the bottom idea of all the treaty stipulations as to extraterritoriality, customs rates and intercourse is not the welfare of the people in Asia, but the profit and ease of doing business by the people in the West, and the prestige of the governments that thus intervene.

As soon as a foothold in the treaty ports was gained, began the process of seizing territory. Most of the powers wanted to push up into the country as far as they could back of the treaty ports. They were always demanding more privileges of intercourse, and of late years have made a determined and concerted campaign for concessions from the Chinese. The Chinese are not held competent to decide on their own means of transportation. And foreigners are eager to build railroads, not because they think the Chinese need railroads, but because the European and American bankers need the profit of the railroads. The imperial government was very ill-organized to resist such pressure; at the start it was not accustomed to relations with foreign

powers: it formed the Tsung Li Yamen with great regret, and stolidly held back in all negotiations for further power and influence to foreigners.

The whole situation in China is complicated by the foreign possession of so many pieces of territory which the Chinese fondly suppose are theirs. To say nothing about Cochin-China, Hong Kong, Kowloon, Tsintau, Wei Hai Woi and Port Arthur are now in the possession of the Germans, the English and the Japanese; and the Japanese and Russians are occupying parts of Manchuria and Mongolia. That is, four of the six powers that are now engaged in the attempt to manage and control China, are at the present moment in possession of large territories, every square yard of which the Chinese look upon as filched from them.

For a long time the powers engaged in single wars with China, each on its own account, and those wars were accompanied by a ruthlessness and destruction which can hardly be supposed to be a high moral lesson to the Chinese. If a foreign army should capture New York and plunder the Metropolitan Museum of Art and sell its irreplaceable treasures to peddlers, we should hardly think it a mark of Chinese civilization! Yet that was just what happened to the winter palace in 1860. Since 1900 the European powers have usually made it a point not to ask for individual privileges, but for joint privileges; so that the experience of China was that if Russia got a concession for a railroad, the French were instantly besieging for a like favor. And if Russia seized a piece of Chinese territory the Germans thought they must have a similar piece of stolen goods. Since the expedition to Peking in 1900 there has been a common military understanding.

The Chinese have always resented this form of diplomacy. They look upon their European friends as the Russian hero looked upon the king of the sea when the sea monster said: "'Tis a long time since I have eaten fresh flesh, and lo! here it comes right into my very hands! Welcome, friend. Come here, and let me see at which end of you I shall begin!" Then the Tsarevitch began to say that among good people one behaved not so badly as to eat another up. "That is

too much,' cried the sea monster, 'he comes to force his own rules and regulations upon the homes of other people.'" Is it an exaggeration to say that the feeling of Europeans has been that any attempt of the Chinese to prevent the entry into and the commercial use of their country was regarded as an affront to Europe?

More recently has developed a common responsibility, particularly shown in the negotiations for indemnities after the Boxer outbreak. One of the interesting things about this combination is that a new European power has joined it, and that is Japan. The Japanese claim the privileges granted to Western powers—such as the right of intervention, extraterritoriality, and the right to trade on the Yangtze in subsidized vessels. They have put up a magnificent group of buildings at Hankow.

All this suggests the sublime purpose of the Holy Alliance, to do people good against their will; but the difficulty is increased by a commercial combination, the purpose of which is first of all to obtain concessions, for railroads, mines, and other needed enterprises. Anybody can see that China lacks capital, a need no more common there than on the Pacific slope of the United States, or on northwestern Canada. Such an infusion of borrowed wealth would enable the country rapidly to develop its means of transportation and its immense physical resources. The prime difficulty is that the powers conceive that they have an inherent right to invest money in China on terms which they themselves lay down; while in general the Chinese believe that the commercial agreements which they are asked to ratify are unfavorable to them. At the moment the burning question is that of loans. China has long been a borrower on not very favorable terms, and there is already a considerable national debt. The revolution has cost a lot of money and there is a demand for more loans first of all to pay off and disband troops. A group of bankers favored by the six powers have established themselves as a syndicate for this business, and propose terms on which they will place a \$300,000,000 loan.

The six-power loan under consideration in November,

1912, is practically the work of a commercial Holy Alliance formed to regulate Oriental affairs. The determination of the ministers of six great powers in consultation to push through a financial transaction which China does not like is an unseemly spectacle, not relieved by the undeniable fact that weak powers are frequently called upon to yield to stronger forces. A foreign administration of the loans is one of the conditions, though hard and humiliating—for it is urged that Orientals cannot conduct their native finances. The Japanese know better, for they have almost dispensed with foreign financial engineers and managers.

The next demand, which is at least evidently favored by the powers, is that if money is lent it shall be lent only by a combination of the bankers of the six powers. I regret that the United States should be one of the partners in such an enterprise. The American bankers are justified in looking after their own interests, and in finding a profitable investment for their money; but it is a serious business for the bankers to insist that they will lend the money only in case a foreign administrator is to follow it. For the power to supervise the expenditure of that money includes the power to control much of the finances and the public works of China. It involves an inspection and regulation of the internal financial administration of the country.

In the background the Chinese believe that they see the shadow of the armed man. A few years ago they gave Russia permission to build a railroad across Manchuria and to protect it with guards. The Russian conception of guards was an army of 50,000 men intending to stay on Chinese soil, and their descendants forever. The Chinese suspect that it is the intention of the powers, whenever they think it necessary, to send troops into the country to enforce the carrying out of conditions. In the six groups each group has its government behind it, which demands a share in the loan for its citizens as a matter of right. What is the reason for this pressure? Mainly that each group of bankers expects that the Chinese will spend at least a part of the loans for materials and supplies, and that the orders will go through the loaning bankers and to their friends and commercial connections.

I speak subject to correction by those who are better acquainted with the subject, but when I was in China in 1909 that was the point stated to me; and the negotiations for the loan now appear to turn on that issue.

Outside of finance, what is the relation of the New Holy Alliance to the Chinese republic? One reason for the present combination is undoubtedly that some of the powers are not pleased with the proposed democratic government of China. But it is no longer possible for any one European or American power seriously to affect the internal government of China, for the potential strength of that nation is coming to be more and more realized.

Of the six powers, two are themselves democracies, the United States and France. On the other hand an Asiatic republic is on the face of things repugnant to both Russia and Japan. And there is perhaps no country in the world that is so genuinely democratic as China, no country in which the affairs of the local communities are more systematically regulated by the people themselves. This distrust of democracy is combined with a feeling that the republic cannot stand; and this objection is confronted by the fact that there is no other kind of national government now in existence or in prospect in China, no royal dynasty, no acknowledged oligarchy. Granted the weakness of the present republic is stronger than any government which could be established by external influence and pressure.

The real objection is to the possibility of a permanent strong power in China which shall realize the inconvenience and national discredit through foreign domination. Any strong Chinese power will certainly address itself to the status of the concessions in the treaty ports in which the Europeans rule portions of Chinese territory.

Equally acute is the question of the government of the European colonies within the Chinese boundaries. If the Chinese government, republic or kingdom, is once aroused to the possibility of expelling the foreigners, the era of European domination is over. Hence the unwillingness to allow the low scale of import duties to be changed for it is intimately related to the trade of the treaty ports. Of

course the United States recognizes that a system of high duties on imports is inequitable to foreign powers and absolutely inconsistent with the principles of international law.

The privileges of the interior, especially those of the Yangtse Kiang, are also involved. Admiral Mahan says: "The close approach and contact of eastern and western civilization, and the resultant mutual effects, are matters which can no longer be disregarded, or postponed from any arguments derived from the propriety of non-interference, or from the conventional rights of a so-called independent state to regulate its own affairs. They have ceased to be its own in the sense of Chinese isolation—as the nations have insisted that we shall be allowed to sell and buy without pretending that the Chinese subject should be compelled to trade with us—so they will have to insist that currency be permitted to our ideas, liberty to exchange thought in Chinese territory with individual Chinamen, though equally without any compulsion." This is substantially a doctrine that western powers have an innate right to exercise benevolent compulsion on the Chinese to compel them to receive foreigners on terms dictated by the foreigners.

The immediate evidence of this spirit is the indifference to the substantial Chinese interests in Mongolia and in Manchuria. While unready or unwilling to prevent the virtual conquest of these provinces from China, the six powers pretend to make far-reaching decisions with respect to the future government of China. For if you are going to put in an administrator to superintend a loan, that means that you have a right to keep order and maintain the value of your security. You must suppress revolutions—not every revolution, of course; only such revolutions as you think are undesirable for your interests. The underlying principle of the present Holy Alliance in the East is to keep China weak politically, while trying to make her industrially strong; and to see that the results of commercial gain shall not get out of the control of those who now take responsibility for its finances.

I submit that in such an Holy Alliance the United States has no rightful part. It is contrary to a century long policy

of avoiding combinations with other powers. It is contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which was a protest against the operations of the old Holy Alliance in America. It is contrary to our policy in regard to the Panama canal: this country admitted no European partner in that great enterprise. It is contrary to our economic interest, which is for a productive China.

Nor is it necessary for the United States to dictate to China in behalf of its own money power. It is no time for us, when we are trying to curb corporations which menace the existence of democratic government in America, to go out into the Orient to use the authority of the United States in aid of the projects of similar aggregations of capital. The old Holy Alliance failed, and the New Holy Alliance is destined to a like failure, because it is unnatural and topheavy. The United States through the Monroe Doctrine precipitated the collapse of the old combination and should stand by its doctrine of the independence of nations.

It is not for us to dictate to other peoples what their government shall be; we are not entirely successful in orderly and popular government here at home. Is it likely that by joining with five other powers, not one of which is sincerely sympathetic with our idea of government, we can help the Chinese to set up a solid government? To my mind the serious question and issue of the moment is: what kind of government will be most advantageous to the Chinese? No nation, no group of nations, has a right to insist that the commercial affairs of another nation shall be regulated for the benefit of outsiders.

The whole scheme really rests upon the supposed fundamental incapacity of the Chinese. That comes with ill grace from such moderns as we are. Many of the Chinese were living in cities with an elaborate civilization when our Teutonic ancestors were pursuing the aurochs for an evening meal and had not so much as heard of the Romans. The antiquity of the Chinese is a proof that they have some power to make a government for themselves. For their isolation they have had excuse: other nations have not been kind to them. The Chinese wall, typical in our speech

of an unreasoning and hurtful barrier, is one of the world's greatest achievements because it was successful, because for centuries it did keep out those mounted neighbors that were such a scourge to China.

In the long run the six-power system is against the interests of the six powers. What will be the effect on China if this week or next the European powers are swept into a general war? If it were impossible to reinforce the present scanty European garrisons how long would Tsintau remain German or, Kowloon English, or the Shanghai concessions European? If I were a Chinese I would stand as long as I lived for the doctrine that my country is entitled to its own territory and to its own control.

So far as the ability of the Chinese to maintain a government is concerned it is not within the compass nor the province of allied nations to alter their circumstances or character. Doubtless the governmental conditions are crude, clumsy and imperfect; but they will not be improved by a six-part tutorship. The Chinese deserve to be taken on their merits, as shown by experience; upon their ability or inability to maintain a government.

Hence it would seem in accordance with American policy to recognize the republic of China, instead of joining in embarrassing it. I do not claim that the Chinese are perfect people, or even that they are capable of maintaining a republican government; but they have become the greatest potential power in Asia. I predict that there will be a Chinese nation, a Chinese language and literature, and a Chinese influence, quite as long as there is an English or an American nation, language and literature. I believe that China is one of the prime forces in the world. It is simple morality that the United States of America should consider the interests of the Chinese in dealing with them as well as the interests of our citizens. Proper trade between any two nations is mutually profitable and hospitable. America ought to be the helpful nation to China, an uplifting and sustaining influence in the present great difficulties of that government. I believe that it is not our business to be part and parcel of a combination founded in part for the protection of Europeans

in China, but essentially based in selfishness. The commercial organization of the present Holy Alliance is at bottom a movement for making money out of the Chinese by Europeans and Americans. As a money-making enterprise the six-power financial scheme lies outside of our legitimate national interests.

A PLEA FOR FAIR PLAY AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

*By Major Louis Livingston Seaman, M.D., LL.B., F.R.G.S.,
President of the China Society of America*

The problem of the Orient is the problem of the twentieth century, and today, China is its key. The most eventful year of modern times in the life of the Chinese people has just passed into history. They have escaped from the despotism of a corrupt monarchy to the freedom of a republic. The problems which now confront them are the recognition of their government as a republic by foreign nations, and the adjustment of their finances. Unless these are arranged to the satisfaction of a powerful syndicate of bankers, backed by the diplomats of their various countries, it has been intimated that the partitioning of the country may be apprehended as a probable eventuality.

It might have been hoped that the carnival of territorial lust, which for centuries caused untold bloodshed the world over, had culminated in the partitioning of Africa—the last of the continents to be parceled off by the world's looters, who in the division of the spoils, followed, as the robber barons of feudal times.

The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can.

But look at China today—that grand old country, with its great wall which for over twenty centuries protected it from the hordes of Tartars and Mongols on the north, while its Thibetan ranges on the west, and impenetrable forests on the south, permitted it to live in peace and tranquillity thousands of years, with no fear of molestation by “foreign devils,” from land or sea. And in this time the beautiful but fallacious philosophy of Confucius, which taught the

rule of moral suasion rather than that by might, grew until its essence was expressed in the proverb, "Better have no child than one who is a soldier"—this, too, in a land where it is considered a disgrace to die childless.

And what was the natural result: A condition of insecurity, of defencelessness, of inability to enforce that first law of nature—self-protection—followed, which, when realized by the Occidental nations, resulted in their seizing great sections of her domains upon trivial excuses, and wringing most valuable concessions from her rulers.

As a direct result of this spoliation, the worm at last turned, and the Boxer uprising of 1900 followed, having for its declared purpose the forcible expulsion of all foreigners from the country, and the recovery by China of her despoiled possessions. I say, without fear of contradiction by those who are familiar with that issue (and I was there), that that uprising was one of the most splendid exhibitions of patriotism witnessed in modern times. The methods pursued by the Chinese, due to the ignorance of their misguided leaders, and the horrors that followed, have afforded the theme for many a tragic tale and numberless explanatory theories. But the plain fact cannot be gainsaid, nor too strongly emphasized, that the essential motive of that propaganda was the freeing of the land from the hated foreigners, who, in current phrase, had "robbed the people of their country."

It was then, that in reprisal and revenge, the so-called civilized world turned against them. The eight allied armies of the "great powers" marched to their capital, slaughtered their people, raped their women, looted their temples, their treasure and their habitations, committed brutalities that would have made Nero envious, and created a sentiment in China which fairly crucified Christianity, and which should redound to the shame and humiliation of the Christian nations whose forces participated in the outrages; but which, instead, secured monstrous indemnities and subjected China to the most humiliating terms of peace that were ever inflicted upon a nation, and that have kept her poverty-stricken ever since. America, however, has reasons for pride in that she waived claims to over half the indemnity, whilst

her great statesman, John Hay, succeeded temporarily in preserving the integrity of the country by his splendid policy of the "open door."

Never shall I forget that winter at Ching Wan Tao, following the war, where detachments of the allied army were gathered awaiting the fate of China. They reminded me of a pack of hungry wolves around the carcass of a dead animal—each fearing to set his fangs in the carcass, lest while so engaged his neighbor might do the same with him. And so during the long negotiations that finally led to the declaration of peace, the situation continued.

Four years later I again visited that scene, and there, in smaller numbers, were found the troops of many of the nations still waiting, ready to seize the first opportunity to partition the country and to secure their share of the spoil. But more pressing engagements were then imminent, involving the attention of some of the powers. The Russo-Japanese struggle was on, and China was given a temporary respite. From that time until the outbreak of the revolution which led to the establishment of the Republic, China paid the indemnity claims with such regularity that no opportunity was found for interference.

For more than three-quarters of a century, beginning with the unrighteous Opium War of England, down to the equally unrighteous Boxer War of 1900, and even later, China has been subjected to a series of squeezes and despoilment of her territory to an extent unequaled in history. The iniquitous indemnities wrung from her as the result of the Boxer campaign would have been reversed, and the countries now receiving them would be paying for the outrages committed, had right, instead of might, prevailed. The powerful governments and financial institutions doing business in the Orient have become obsessed with the idea that it is legitimate business to "squeeze" the country, regardless of right or justice, and in the present instance they are continuing that policy. The six-power group of bankers, backed by the diplomacy of the countries they represent, before advocating the joint recognition of the Republic, demand first, an excessive rate of interest for money advanced, and second, terms,

as to its distribution and expenditure, so humiliating that no proud nation could grant them without loss of self-respect. If these conditions are not complied with, the hidden threat is intimated that the intervention of foreign powers and dismemberment of the country may ensue.

The effect upon China of the spoliation of her territory and finances created among the leading minds of her people an appreciation of her weakness, and of the necessity for the adoption of Occidental methods for self-protection. They saw the absolute imbecility of continuing the policy of the Manchu dynasty, and the necessity for a change of government. The efforts of her scholars and statesmen were for a long time foiled by the opposition of the Empress Dowager, who never hesitated to decapitate those who presented too radical programmes for reform. But despite all opposition, the new spirit grew and spread all over the country, propagated by Dr. Sun Yat Sen and other reformers, until the revolution followed, and the Republic became a reality.

The Chinese Republic deserves formal recognition because of the character of the revolution which made it possible. It obtained the maximum of liberty with the minimum of blood-shed. It was an evolution rather than a revolution, the most potent factors of which were those of peace, and not of war. They were the results of trade with foreign nations, the importation of modern inventions, railroads, telegraphs, newspapers; the work of Christian missionaries, schools and colleges established by them; but, most of all, the influence of Chinese students who had been educated in foreign universities, and who carried back to their native land the high ideals of Occidental government. In comparison with the epoch-making wars for freedom in Occidental lands—the French Revolution, England's fight for Magna Charta, or our own great seven years' struggle for Independence—the Chinese Revolution was almost bloodless. It is stated that the total mortality of the war which secured the emancipation of 400,000,000 of people, was less than the number lost in the battle of the Wilderness, or in single conflicts in the war now raging in the Balkans.

The moderation shown by the successful leaders to their

late rulers was another striking characteristic. Instead of the guillotine or exile, they were retired with liberal pensions, and allowed to retain their empty titles. The leaders enjoined upon their followers the protection of life and property, both commercial and missionary, and these orders were strictly obeyed.

A people who carried to a successful termination such a revolution, deserve the respect and recognition of the world. There are many qualities inherent in the Chinese nature which entitle the present government to immediate recognition. The enemies of China today forget the traditions of the race—that China was old when Chaldea and Babylon were young, that she saw the rise and fall of Grecian and Roman civilization, and that she has maintained the integrity of her government and territory ever since; that her scholars discovered the compass and invented the intellectual game of chess, when our ancestors in Europe were groveling in the darkness of mediaevalism; that she produced her own science, literature, art, philosophy and religion, whose founder, Confucius, five hundred years before the birth of Christ, expounded the doctrine of Christianity in the saying: "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you." They forget that for nearly a thousand years China has been nearer a democracy in many features of its government than any other government then in existence. The fundamental unit of democracy, the foundation upon which our own government rests, is embodied in the principle of the New England town meeting. All authorities on democracy, De Tocqueville, Bryce and the *Compte de Paris*, agree in this.

In China, local government is, in practically all its features, and for centuries has been, controlled by local authorities. The officials of the central government never interfere with the local administration, except for the collection of revenues allocated to imperial requirements. It is the opinion of many authorities that the government of China has given more happiness and more individual liberty to a greater mass of humanity than any other government in the world.

The Chinese have never sought territorial aggrandizement, but have loved the paths of peace where the law of moral suasion, and not of might, ruled. They possess qualities of industry, economy, temperance and tranquillity, unsurpassed by any nation on earth. With these qualities they are in the great race of the survival of the fittest to *stay*. They are to be feared by foreign nations more for their virtues than for their vices; and in their present struggle for the maintenance of liberty, they deserve our earnest sympathy and assistance in the solution of problems, seemingly so different, but inherently so similar to our own.

The noble qualities of the race are illustrated in the leaders of the present movement. President Yuan Shih Kai is a masterful statesman who inspires confidence in all who know him. Few other men in history have had such kaleidoscopic changes of fortune, and few men have met them with greater courage or possessed the transcendent abilities that lift one so high above the common level. The resignation of the provisional presidency of the Republic by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen was "an act worthy of the finest traditions of patriotism in any land." The National Assembly in accepting it, said: "His act has afforded the world an example of purity of purpose and self-sacrifice unparalleled in history."

The Republic is an established institution of over a year's standing. An able statesman has been duly elected as president and the other machinery of its government is in operation. It has undertaken to observe all treaties, and to discharge all the international obligations of its predecessor. No one will deny that there are serious military, financial and political problems still to be solved, but they are matters of purely domestic concern. They do not alter the fact, which is involved in recognition by other nations, that China has changed her form of government, and that her representative and duly accredited agent before the world is no longer an emperor, but a president. In the analogous case of the recognition of Brazil in 1890, Senator Turpie said: "The success of a revolutionary movement is in itself a statement to the world that a majority of a nation has chosen a change of government; the following existence of

the revolutionary government, and under its authority, will come the question of the constitution, laws, statutes and ordinances of the new government, but these questions are wholly internal ones."

Many authorities on international law support the legal status of the present government. Hall says: "So long as a person or a body of persons are indisputably in possession of the required powers, foreign states treat with them as the organ of the state; but so soon as they cease to be the actual organ, foreign states cease dealing with them; and it is usual, if the change is unquestionably final, to open relations with their successors, independently of whether it has been effected constitutionally." Wheaton defines a *de facto* government as "One which is really in possession of the powers of sovereignty, although the possession may be wrongful or precarious." Phillimore states, "That the recognition of a new government should be preceded by an absolute *bona fide* possession of independence as a separate kingdom, not the enjoyment of perfect and undisturbed internal tranquillity (a test too severe for many of the oldest kingdoms), but there should be the existence of a government—acknowledged by the people over whom it is set, and ready to acknowledge and competent to discharge international obligations." The present conditions in China satisfy these definitions of a *de facto* government.

But the Republic of China is not only the *de facto* government, it is also the *de jure* government. As stated by Dr. Chao-Chu Wu, son of ex-Minister Wu Ting Fang, "the Manchu rulers were not illegally driven from the throne, but they abdicated of themselves, and with their last act legalized the Republic. The abdication edict transfers the sovereignty hitherto vested in the emperor alone, to the people; it legalizes the Republic, and, what is more to the purpose, it constitutes a recognition of the new government by the sovereign power." Hall says: "Recognition by a parent state, by implying an abandonment of all pretensions over the insurgent community, is more conclusive evidence of independence than recognition by a third power, and it removes all doubt from the minds of other governments as to the

propriety of recognition by themselves." When the fallen government of China has itself recognized the new government, what reason is there for other governments to delay?

For the reasons enumerated—the status of the present government of China, the virtues of the Chinese race, the character of the Revolution in which these virtues have found their expression in bringing about the change of government, for all these reasons, the Republic of China is deserving of immediate recognition by the nations of the world. But there are special reasons why recognition should be accorded by our government first of all.

Special obligations are laid upon us of the United States by our position in the eyes of the world as the most powerful republic in existence, and one of the oldest. The President of the United States is rightly regarded as "the champion and exponent of that form of government consecrated by the blood of our Revolutionary fathers." Our own republican principles justify China in looking to us for sympathy and support in this hour of crisis and of need.

Such an expectation is warranted by our dealings with other nations. Numerous precedents might be cited to show that it has always been the policy of the United States government to recognize the existence of a government which was capable of maintaining itself. Our relations with France illustrate this. On November 7, 1792, in reply to a letter from Gouverneur Morris, then American Minister to Paris, describing the bloody revolution which had just been effected in that capital, Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, wrote as follows: "It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared." Later he added: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded—that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."

The establishment of the Second Republic occurred on the 24th of February, 1848, and less than a week after our Minister to France, Mr. Rush, presented the formal congratulations of our government. Mr. Buchanan, in transmitting to Mr. Rush a letter of credence to the French Republic, said: "In its intercourse with foreign nations, the government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized the *de facto* governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and reform their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of its legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows." Even as late as September 8, 1900, Mr. Hill, acting Secretary of State, sent to Mr. Hart, United States Minister at Bogota, the following instructions: "The policy of the United States, announced and practiced upon occasion for more than a century, has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the *de jure* control of the executive power of a foreign state; but to base the recognition of a foreign government solely upon its *de facto* ability to hold the reins of administrative power." In withholding recognition from the Republic of China, the present administration is departing from the policy of the great founders of our nation.

There are questions in expediency and advantage as well as of principle in this matter of recognition. We may well consider what some of these results would be. First, China would be encouraged and strengthened in her efforts for reform and education. Evidences of the educational awakening are coming from every part of the land. The Canton Christian college may be taken as typical. The number of students in that institution has increased from 256 to 418 in one term, and the Chinese residents there have recently given over \$80,000 (equivalent to many times that in purchasing power here) for new buildings and equipment of the college. The new Commissioner of Education in Kwang-Tung Province has secured the appropriation of

\$100,000 gold for the education abroad of the students of the province.

A second result of recognition would be the stimulation of trade between China and the nations of the West. When the international relations of China are restored to normal condition, trade, which has already regained most of the ground lost during the disturbances, will assuredly rapidly increase. By recognizing the Republic the powers will, without distinction, confer a boon on the business communities of their respective nations. Missionaries and other representatives of western nations in China, also, would be benefited by the recognition of the Republic. Though the Revolution has been guarded from assuming any anti-foreign or anti-missionary character, until perfect order is established there must be risk for foreigners traveling in the interior. Dr. Wu states: "It is within the power of the foreign countries to reinforce the hand of the government, to extend to it moral support, and give it added prestige to hasten the complete restoration of order, and to insure the safety of their citizens and subjects throughout the vast Republic."

The greatest advantage to be gained by the speedy recognition by all nations would be the prevention of intervention on the part of some which are only waiting an opportunity to appropriate Chinese territory, just as they did with the continent of Africa some thirty years ago. The partitioning of China would be a crime even greater than the partitioning of Poland, and one fraught with far more serious consequences to the human race as a whole.

The Chinese Revolution was not a *coup d'état*, without likelihood of permanence; the old monarchy is hopelessly dead. The revolution was complete, and peace reigns throughout the land. The new government is without opposition. It is confronted with many difficulties, but they do not spring from the attachment of people to the departed monarchy. As stated by Dr. Morrison in the *London Times*, when referring to the danger of China's splitting up, "Where is the line of cleavage? Both parties

in China are equally republican. Those who allege that President Yuan is assuming a dictatorship are ignoring the facts of his career." And to the critics who charge that the President's Council is composed of hostile factions, whose quarrels threaten the continuance of the Republic, he says: "Nothing could be more misleading. These parties differ in their programmes as political parties do in all countries, but all are equally republican." To those who think it is a reproach and a danger that the new men active in the government are inexperienced, he replies, that the difference can be shown by comparing them with the "corrupt princes and degraded eunuchs who were in power under the Manchu dynasty."

Given recognition by foreign governments, freedom from overt acts of predatory powers, and the right to increase her own customs, now limited to 5 per cent—a right wrung from her by foreigners to secure their unholy indemnities—China will pay all her obligations, no matter how unrighteous. The ruling characteristic of the Chinaman is honesty. He never repudiates his financial obligations.

I hold in my hand a Chinese bank note for a thousand cash issued by the great Ming Emperor Hung Wu, in the year 1367. It is the most ancient piece of financial paper in existence, excepting some duplicates, one of which I presented to the British Museum several years ago. It is three hundred years older than a somewhat similar looking note for which the British Museum paid Pope Hennessy 500 pounds, and which, until this was discovered, was supposed to be the oldest in the world. The lower panel contains the following, as translated by Professor H. B. Morse, Commissioner of Customs and Inspectorate General of Customs of China: "The Imperial Board of Revenue, having memorialized the Throne, has received the Imperial sanction for the issue of Government notes of the Ming Empire, to circulate on the same footing as standard cash. To counterfeit is death. The informant will receive 250 taels of silver, and in addition, the entire property of the criminal.—Signed, Hung Wu." A seal in vermilion bears in character the legend: "Seal for circulating Government

Notes." It is shown as an authentic proof of the antiquity of the Chinaman's knowledge of matters financial, at a time when the ancestors of the six powers syndicate were groping in the darkness of feudalism—matters in which the Chinaman has always borne the unique distinction of being the soul of honor.

The integrity of the Chinese as a people is proverbial. Their former despotic government, despite its innate corruption, never failed to observe its financial obligations to its former creditors, however unjustly incurred. The government of the Republic has solemnly undertaken to faithfully execute all the obligations to the foreign powers, under existing treaties, notwithstanding the onerous burden entailed upon the people, and which, considering their enforced origin, might with some reason have justified repudiation. Apart from the credit for past performances, faithfully observed, and the normal revenues from trade, commerce and the usual taxes, the natural resources of the land are incalculable. Of their development, a beginning, by modern methods, has only yet been made; but where it has been, every encouragement exists for extensive exploitation to the great advantage of the people, as well as of capital involved in such industrial enterprises. The extension of railways also affords scope for large investments, which are attracting attention in all quarters, to provide means of internal commerce, now carried on by most primitive methods. These and other considerations justify recourse to the bankers of the world for assistance on equitable conditions toward their development.

With such a reputation for honor, and such tempting opportunities for the successful employment of capital in her domain, why should China be forced to accept humiliating and ignominious terms to obtain credit—terms never before demanded of any other nation? Consider Japan—that other great star of the Orient—whose natural resources are incomparably less than those of China. When her very existence as a nation was at stake in a war with one of the most powerful countries of Europe, it was my privilege as well as pleasure to appear with Count Kaneko before a syndicate of

bankers who were considering the advisability and risk of underwriting her loan—and to urge its acceptance. I had seen the Japanese army in action and believed in its final triumph, and that her people would ultimately pay her obligations. But were any such monstrous conditions demanded from her by the underwriters as are now sought by the sextuple syndicate in dealing with China? On the contrary, Japan secured the money necessary to carry on her campaign on easy terms, although her success in the titanic struggle in which she was then engaged was, at that time, by no means a certainty.

In the case of China, peace reigns, and yet, before the great financiers consent to the issuance of a loan, it is asserted that they demand the right of a close supervision of its expenditure, that it be ear-marked for purposes acceptable to them, that it shall not be available for military or naval defence, so essential for the future protection of the country; that no other loans or obligations shall be made by China without the consent of the syndicate, and that certain revenues be allotted for its security. These terms the statesmen of China refused and they have had the temerity to negotiate an independent loan for \$50,000,000 in opposition to the will of the six-power syndicate.

On the question of China's finances, the London *Times* said, after floating of the first instalment of the \$50,000,000 loan, which was half of the sum, that it "rejoices that the British people have manifested a different spirit from that of their government." It condemns the government for backing up the monopoly; it declares that the six-power group had "sought to set up a monopoly in China under the aegis of international diplomacy." It also declares that the liabilities of the country to June next, including indemnity arrears, will amount to 10,000,000 sterling and that "much is dependent upon the generosity of the foreign governments and the banking interests."

According to Dr. Morrison, the political adviser of the Chinese government, China has entered upon a new era of prosperity, and by the skill and judgment of her financiers has shaken herself free from international complications.

The London *Morning Post* (Conservative) remarks gloomily: "The prospectus of the new Chinese loan has been duly issued. . . . The British government has been roundly accused of lending itself to a plot for placing China at the mercy of a syndicate of greedy financiers, and for establishing a degrading system of foreign control over her internal affairs. The breaking off of the negotiations between the Chinese government and the six-power banking group and the conclusion of the loan agreement with the London financiers have been hailed as a destruction of the selfish monopoly which was strangling the freedom of the young Republic." The London *Daily News* continues, "It is a battle of giants, for behind the six powers there is a greedy banking monopoly which has hitherto been unchallenged, and behind this monopoly there is a complicated network of international intrigue, partly German, partly American, partly Russian and partly Japanese," and I think we may add, *largely English*.

On October 30, 1912, one of the interested powers, Russia, proposed that a joint and pre-emptory demand be made upon China for the immediate payment of arrears in the Boxer indemnity, the sum amounting to \$50,000,000. It was privately intimated, and not officially denied, that this movement, made on October 30, was intended as an emphatic rebuke to the Chinese for their temerity in contracting loans with independent bankers; disregarding the warning of the powers, and their rejection of the proposed loan by the six-power syndicate. It is stated on high authority that the powers of Europe look favorably upon this proposal. In taking the initiative in the movement to compel China to accept the proposal of the six-power syndicate, and the refusal on China's part to accept the terms, Russia, as stated in reports received on November 7, has been led to negotiate with one of China's provinces, Mongolia, a treaty, signed on November 3, by which she agrees to aid Mongolia to maintain the autonomous government which she has established, and to support her right to maintain a national army, and to exclude both the presence of Chinese troops and the colonization of her territory by the Chinese.

In this act Russia is following the lead of her ally, Great Britain, who not long ago proclaimed what amounts to a protectorate over the territory of Thibet, just as, on a recent occasion, Great Britain joined Russia in their monstrous and disgraceful treatment of Persia. It is the consummation of the policy of "squeeze" that has been carried on ever since China opened her doors, at the mouth of the cannon, to the crime of the century, the opium trade of England, and later, to so-called modern civilization.

Thus it seems that the vivisection of the sick man of the Far East may proceed merrily, without consideration for the interests or sentiments of the patient under the scalpel. This at the moment seems to be the lamentable result of the action of the six-power syndicate. It seems apparent that the famous combination has signally failed in its financial policy, despite governmental assistance, and that nothing has been gained by the delay in the recognition of the Republic. *But what has been lost?*

By formally recognizing the new government as soon as it had demonstrated its right to such recognition, America would have followed the splendid traditions of our forebears, who enunciated and practiced the laws of justice and liberty which made our country great, and from whose teachings we have departed too far. We would have had the proud distinction of being the first to welcome the Republic in its hour of trial. We would have secured the eternal friendship and respect of a nation, which, no matter what adversity it may yet have to face, is destined to be one of the greatest and grandest on earth. We would have immeasurably increased our prestige in the Orient, and possibly, by proclaiming the policy of "hands off" and the "open door" in China, averted the tragedy that now seems almost inevitable.

Is there anyone present who believes that if John Hay had been in the Department of State during the past year, the republic of China would not have been recognized long ago? Had his policy been followed directly after the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, China, in the opinion of well-informed authorities, would have escaped many of the dangers now menacing her. Time was, in the history of American diplo-

macy, when our Executive acted upon the recognition of downtrodden nations which had emancipated themselves from tyranny and established republican forms of government, without consultation or dictation from Lombard or Wall Street. The majority of our people are, and from the first have been, in sincere sympathy with China in her struggle for liberty. Is their will to be carried out or is liberty, and opportunity, to be throttled and made subservient to a group of capitalists who seek to monopolize the privilege of dictatorship?

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.

THE GENESIS OF THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION IN CHINA FROM A SOUTH CHINA STANDPOINT

By John Stuart Thomson, sometime Agent at Hong Kong, China, of the Pacific Mail and Toyo Kisen Kaisha Trans-Pacific Steamship Companies

Many have thought of, many have spoken on the Chinese revolution, but each onlooker probably sees it in slightly varying lights, as the matter has very many sides. With your permission I will add a few statements, trying to outline the genesis of the astonishing movement as it appeared to me, and selecting some salient points while the revolution was in progress. I lived longest in south China, which section has thought longest on revolution, and I will therefore speak largely as a neighbor of the southern Chinese, but I will always remember that every "National" has his inalienable right to free opinion and his opinion and personality I have hearty respect for. "A man's a man for a' that!"

A republic in place of the oldest monarchy! Preposterous. It would involve making a yellow man think as a white man, and that had never occurred. It would involve free intercourse with the whole wide world, and China had opposed such an innovation stubbornly for 400 years. It meant that the proudest and most self-contained nation should treat others as equals and interchange with them. It involved throwing 4000 years of continuous history and agglomerated pride and precedent to the winds, and humbly beginning anew as a tyro for a while. It meant the dealing with 400,000,000 kings, instead of one, and asking, "My lord! what is your will." An educational system 2000 years old to be at once forgotten! a religion 5000 years old at least, whereby every man had his own god (his father) to be made as cheap as the paltry sacrifices of wine, rice

and the painted stick of Confucianism, were in reality! The taking up of individual and national responsibility for 400,000,000 people, and entrance upon a wide path of world-influence, with its divided shame and fame. The taking and giving of blows for wrong and right. The giving up of the triple eternal Nirvana of father, self and son, in exchange for an exciting role limited to 55 crowded years in the individual. The scale of the action! A land as large as all Europe, and a people as numerous as the Caucasian race. The thunderous knock on the long-locked doors of science and medicine by 400,000,000 people, who had bowed to idol and charm alone. It shook the world. It was pregnant with Paradisial possibilities for mankind, because of the vastness of the movement, and the depth of its wellspring. The launching of this new Leviathan ship of state could not but raise a wave that would lift the already floating hulks of Europe and America, and give them added impetus, though temporary alarm. The rearrangement of commerce, manufacture, labor, finance, taxation, learning, agriculture, art, and possibly religion for the whole world. The adding of the most difficult language to the tongues and pens of men, and the call on the English speech to rise once more greater than the mighty stranger, or pale before the light of his march. The challenge to Palestine's Bible to conquer by truth and love, or retreat with half a world lost. The uprising again of the yellow ghosts of Kublai Khan, Batu, Timurlane, and the Khans of the Golden Horde. What would be the Caucasian's answer to Emperor William's question "The Yellow Peril?" It will be remembered that the brilliant Kaiser once painted a picture showing the nations of Europe gathering to defend the cross of Calvary and civilization against an incendiary Buddha lowering in the eastern sky. Would the stranger within the gates be protected, even while republican and imperialist fought out their argument? Would leadership arise, and would the great Mongolian mass be intellectualized now that it was energized? Since the vast body was suddenly displaced, would it henceforward move by mere gravity, or sympathetic volition? Could it collectivize and

not disintegrate? What would be the effect on the scores of trembling thrones, where Romanoff, Hapsburg, Savoy, Hohenzollern, Ottoman, Billiken, etc. said they ruled by "divine right," which is quite a different thing from noble England's "constitutional right." Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese republicans sent out this challenge: "Tien ming wu chang" (the divine right lasts not forever). All these questions presented themselves when the reformers startled the world with the announcement that there was to be a republic in China. It was to be a republic—not a monarchy—said even those Chinese who had been educated in Japan. Had there been no abatement of the opium habit through America's leadership of sentiment, and Britain's sacrifice of revenue from 1909 to 1911, there could have been no rebellion as early as 1911. The reform cleared the befogged heads of the nation, added a million men to agitation, and furnished a hundred million dollars directly and indirectly toward the independence of the agitators. How great a stone America and Britain set rolling in that Opium Conference of 1909 at Shanghai.

The great revolution of October, 1911, did not drop as a bolt from a clear sky. The clouds had been gathering, though many at home and abroad did not, or would not see them. In September, 1911, the Imperial Viceroy of Canton, Chang Ming Chi, sent spies along the new Canton-Hong Kong Railway to apprehend smugglers of arms. In the same month, troops under the command of Marshal Lung Chai Kwong suddenly surrounded the office of *Shat Pat Po* newspaper at Canton, and arrested several reformers, who had been blacklisted for opinion's sake. General Luk Wing Ting of Kwangsi province came down the Si Kiang (West River) in September 1911 in the gunboat *Po Pik* to Canton, and took back with him from the Canton arsenal, machine guns and ammunition to attack the "anarchists," as the Manchus persistently called all reformers. In the month previous the Ministry of Posts and Communications at Peking stopped the use of private codes, so as to censor messages to the reformers. Several viceroys, in secret sympathy with the reformers, had as early as August, 1911,

wired for gunboats, so as to disperse the fleet from the Yangtse basin, where the revolution was to strike, and the largest cruiser, the splendid *Hai Chi*, well known in New York, these viceroys suggested should be sent to King George's coronation review at Spithead. Even as far back as July, 1907, the Manchu government approached the powers, requesting that they make espionage on arms consigned to south China. Rather to our amusement, they used to arrive at Hong Kong as boxed pipes, condensers, plumber's supplies, bar iron, crockery, tracts, etc., anything but guns, but that was the humor of the freight classification which the shippers used. In December, 1906, the scholars of the Middle Class in Wuchow, Kiangsi province, at the head of navigation on the West River, decided to cut off their queues, and adopted khaki uniform, military drill and track races. They were independently preparing for strenuous times five years before the outbreak, and these boys were found in the first line of the attack in October, 1911, up at Hankow, led by Colonel Wen, who had graduated from West Point Military Academy in America in 1909. In August, 1911, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation reported that a large part of its \$9,000,000 gold note issue was being held, instead of circulated by the Chinese of Kwangtung and other southern provinces. This hoarding of safe securities always indicates lack of faith as to the business and political future.

The celebrated Manchu, Tuan Fang, Director General of Railways was ordered by the Ministry of Communications to proceed to Canton and Kung Yik, the new town of the Americanized Chinese, in August, 1911, to "pacify the people." Tuan replied that he would not go and gave as his excuse: "Canton is infested with anarchism." In the same month, the Regent, Prince Chun, asked the veteran Prince Ching to recommend an energetic general to be sent to quell disturbances in Kwangtung province, and the Tartar General, Fung Shan, was sent. Spying was not uncommon, impersonators going to a province ahead of new appointees, and reciting a record at the Yamen which seemed to identify them. In August, 1911, the Cabinet at Peking

decided to send photographs of new officials in a sealed envelope, so as to prevent this impersonating. As an indication of the new spirit which was moving among the Chinese of Canton for better things at this time, take the inception of the model town of Heungchow. Chinese returned from America, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, could not bear the municipal restraint of the old Chinese city. They chose a site ten miles up the inner harbor of Macao. Dredging and a breakwater were begun for a harbor. Broad streets, drains, fine stores, temples, police and fire stations and equipment, water works, libraries, parks, reforestation in tree denuded China, Chamber of Commerce, tramways, electricity and gas, hospitals, schools, theatres, detached homes with gardens, launch and steamship lines, and a free port, all were in the scheme. When a government permits monopoly of food, and riots result because of justice ineffectually exerted, history shows that the government is about to fall. I instance the fierce Hangchow rice riots of July, 1906, under the leadership of Hung Pang (Red Association), and the Changsha rice riots of 1910, when Yale College in China was barely saved from the conflagration, in the very district which in 1911 was swept by the high tide of the revolution. In 1906 text books were issued to the modern schools of some of the southern provinces which contained a caricature of China, not as the "Middle Kingdom" of old, but as the "Middle morsel," from which all the nations took a bite. The intent of course was to arouse resentful patriotism in place of the old inert pride. Many of these school boys enlisted in the two bravest corps of the republicans: the "Dare to Die" band, and the "Bomb Throwers" regiment. In April, 1911, the rebels, under two of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's lieutenants, Hu Wai Sang and Wu Sum, operating in Kwangtung province, issued to the world almost the identical manifesto that President Sun and Foreign Secretary Wu Ting Fang issued in January, 1912. Desperate fighting took place, and had the rebels been sufficiently supplied with money and arms, the republic would have been declared at Canton in April instead of at Wuchang and Nanking in November, 1911. The United States gun-

boat *Wilmington*, and British gunboats like the *Moorhen* were rushed to Shameen island, Canton, to protect foreigners if need should arise in the excitement. Admiral Li, who was killed in the October revolution, was barely able to conquer this April revolution in Kwantung and Fukien provinces.

Nearly all the missions were informed by Chinese students and friends many months previous to the revolution, that serious and continued disturbances would occur. The Chinese saw that individualism had arisen in America and England and was battling with the privileged. Individualism at last arose in old China, and resented in this rebellion the quietism taught by the superstition of Taoism, the resignation of Buddhism and the obedience of Confucianism. "I am not a clan; I am a man;" "Homo sum, Humani nihil a me alienum puto" said the ambitious Chinese, as he saw the new ray of hope. American diplomacy was not altogether uniformed or unprepared. The American fleet was made the largest foreign fleet in Chinese waters in the first month of the revolution, Admiral Murdock having the cruisers *Saratoga* (the converted *New York* of Spanish War fame), *Albany*, *New Orleans*, *Wilmington*, the gunboats *Helena*, *El Cano*, *Villalobos*, *Samar*, the monitor *Monterey*, and the destroyers *Barry*, *Decatur*, etc. As far back as June 3, 1910, a year and four months before the revolution, the *Shanghai News* printed the following article: "All the legations and consuls have received anonymous letters from friendly revolutionaries in Shanghai, containing the warning that an extensive anti-dynastic uprising is imminent. If they do not assist the Manchus, foreigners are *not* to be harmed." It was difficult to hold the widespread feeling in restraint. In August, 1911, a rebellion broke out at Sining in far western Kansu province. The leader was given the name "Chiu Shih Wang" (Savior of his Country). Rich men cornered the rice supply in the flooded Yang Tze valley, and food riots broke out all along the river in August, 1911. On August 23, 1911, rebels boarded a Chinese gunboat on the romantic Si Kiang (West River) near Canton, shooting the commander, and seizing the arms and ammunition. On September 1, the Navy Department

strengthened the patrol of Kwangtung province waters, so as to stop the smuggling of arms, and the Army Board required miners to get permits to import dynamite, as they feared that the "anarchists" were importing the explosive. The awful floods and famines of 1910-11 in the basins of the Yang Tze River, the Hwei River, and Grand Canal had created much criticism of the government, which failed to alleviate suffering which their neglect had caused, and the famine stricken were willing to fight, because an army has a commissariat at least! "Every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discontented, escaped to the cave of Adullam." Newspapers, such as the oldest reform journal, the "Shen Pao" of Shanghai, related horrible illegal tortures of the "third degree" used by Manchuized officials.

Tin was largely financing the propaganda, the 400,000 Chinese tin merchants and miners of Singapore, Penang, etc. in the Straits Settlements being the largest contributors. Following them came the 100,000 American Chinese, and the 50,000 Australian Chinese. Even in 1898, Li Hung Chang was known to declare at Canton that it was not impossible that the spread of the new education would overturn the Manchu dynasty, of which he, a Chinese from Hofei in Nganwhei province, had been the strongest prop among the viceroys for forty-five years. Superstition was not inactive. Halley's comet flared in the sky. It had shone when Caesar fell; when Jerusalem fell; when Italy fell before Attila; when English Harold fell before William the Conqueror; when Rome fell in England; when Quebec fell before Wolfe, and now its awful flame must surely prophesy the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Omens were recited that red snow (snow and loess) had fallen in Honan province, and that the Hangchow tidal bore had risen 20 feet, broke over the bank, and poured water into the first gallery of the famous Haining pagoda. This always meant the fall of the dynasty, for had it not happened on the night the beloved Mings fell, and when the scholarly Sung fell? As with civil servants in some other countries, the Manchuized Civil Service of mandarins acted as though they were the govern-

ors and not the servants of the people, by allotting to themselves high salaries and peculations. The year before the revolution, the land tax yielded about \$150,000,000. Only \$30,000,000 reached the government exchequer. The Chinese held the Manchus responsible for this criminal neglect of audit, for at least \$100,000,000 should have reached the imperial and provincial exchequers. That would have allowed \$50,000,000 for the expected peculation of that kind of office holders who believe that "public office is a private graft." The same peculation occurred in returning the salt gabelle of \$20,000,000. In September 1911, the month preceding the great revolution, the *Chi Feng Po*, a native paper of Peking, reported that all wages were in arrears, and that even the tea coolies had humorously pasted an anonymous sheet on the Imperial Controller's door: "Not even a shadow of our wages yet: *why; why?*" There was some grinding of teeth behind the grin; there was more than humor in this facetiousness. Taxes were increased on long-suffering Kwangtung province; the brick kilns of Kochau, the silk sheds of Namhoi, the tea houses, and even the temple keepers being assessed "all the taxed would bear." I will instance a representative revolt. On September 6, 1911, the bonze at Shek Lung, near Canton, organized a revolt among the worshippers at his temple, which was as significant as if the rector of All Saints Episcopal Church in Worcester, in disgust with conditions, gave arms to his congregation and led them against the citadel of the powers that be. The Chinese mob demolished the municipal Yamen, the police station, and government distilleries, abbatoir, and fish market. As far back as 1898, the Emperor Kwang Hsu by edict declared that the lottery at Canton should pay one-third of the up-keep of the far-away Peking University. There is a unique effigy of a kneeling figure erected in the Kwan clan temple at San Wui near Canton, which is and has been whipped by the worshippers to commemorate the defection of a member to the Manchu government's railway and tax program. There was always ill feeling between Peking and far away Kwangtung province, the Manchu and Manchuized viceroys often joking at Peking, when they were

ordered to assume charge at the Yamen at Canton: "Well, I'm off to boss Miaotszes (barbarians), which the refined and commercial Cantonese certainly were not. This superciliousness was deeply resented, in the south.

Repeated complaint had been made that an unrepresentative Manchu government gave away concessions right and left to foreigners, and that when these concessions were recalled or bought out, owing to the outraged patriotic feeling in the southern and central provinces, the foreigner in instances charged immense sums for good will and franchise in addition to his outlay and interest. I will not recite instances which I have on record, as it is the system that I am denouncing, not the persons. The Chinese rightly said, if we look at the matter charitably with his eyes, that he was not going to pay vast sums for the retrocession of his own franchise, which was in some instances coerced from, or wheedled out of an effete, governing, unrepresentative clique, the members of which never consulted the provinces which were concerned. "Taxation without representation" again. It was not like the repudiation of the bonds of the American southern States, for no money had been paid. "Compensation" and "indemnity" are two words the Chinese have learned to hate, and some day they may build an immense navy and equip a large army to interpret these words in the way the Occident interprets them, when they are synonymous with injustice and "grab." On the subject of railways, concessions, etc. the following remarks will be recalled in the American General J. H. Wilson's book *China* (1887):

The Chinese will build railways, open mines, etc. whenever they can be shown that this can be done with their own money, obtained at first by private subscription, and by their own labor, under the direction of foreign experts who will treat them fairly and honestly. They will not for the present grant concessions or subsidies to foreigners. They will not even take money from any syndicate by mortgage.

Complaint was also made that the Ming dynasty, 268 years ago, left as a heritage to the Manchu dynasty a land full of public works, bridges, roads, temples, pagodas, canals,

and that while the Manchu collected large taxes, he almost never repaired a temple, canal or road, so that China is now desolate of "the thing of beauty that is a joy forever." Objection was also made that the government shipyards, like the Kiangnan at Shanghai, were building luxurious ocean steam yachts for Prince Tsui and others of the imperial clan, an expense which the nation could not afford.

This most wonderful of revolutions seemed to break as a bolt from a clear sky on October 10, 1911, at Wuchang on the Yangtze River, in the center of the land, under the very guns of the United States gunboats *Helena* and *Villalobos*, which were steaming by. It was, as I have attempted to show, rather a carefully planned matter, the propaganda going on abroad and at home under bands and leaders, all of whose views did not stop at the same place, but whose opinion had one source in patriotic reform. Kang Yu Wei, the oldest and first of the reformers, commenced in 1897 by winning with his book *Japan's Reform* the emotional Manchu Emperor, Kwang Hsu, but when the Emperor fell in 1898 before the reactionary Dowager, Tse Hsi, Kang the Cantonese, with a Hong Kong education, was driven to British Singapore and Penang, from which places he has planned his travels and propaganda of the "Pao Huang Hwei" (Empire Reform Association), which contemplated a revolution of reform, but the retention of the Manchu dynasty as constitutional monarchs for the time being. This association was quite different from the Kao Lao Hwei, Ko Ming, Sia Hwei, and Tung Men Hwei associations of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, which aimed at a republic. In other words, Kang was a "standpatter," medium reformer, and Dr. Sun a thorough going, advanced, reformer of the progressive radical type.

Liang Chi Chao, the writer and translator, went first to the Straits Settlements and then to Kobe and Yokohama, where he edited the reform Chinese papers, the *Hsi Pao* (Western paper), and the *Ming Pao*. He too tolerated the retention of the Manchu monarchy for the time being. Dr. Macklin, an American missionary of Nanking, had translated Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* into Chinese,

and this book was in the hands of the reformers, and particularly appreciated by Sun Yat Sen. Chang Yuan Chi's *Commercial Press* of Honan Road, Shanghai, had since 1898 been translating western text books for the new Chinese schools. The American Presbyterian Press at Suchow, and at 18 Peking Road, Shanghai; the American Episcopal Press; the press of the other American and British missions and Bible Societies, had for years been issuing telling books of truth and progress in Chinese. Rich compradores of foreign houses at Hong Kong, like Ma Ying Pui, presented sums as large as \$1000 at a time to patriotic lecturing societies like the "Wan Yung." There was more than one Chinese student of the classics in America who thumbed his *Antigone*, and cogitated upon Haemon's argument with his father, King Creon, that "absolute rule was only fitted for the monarch of a desert," and not a people who numbered 400,000,000.

Yuan Shi Kai was deposed by the Manchu Regent, Prince Chun in 1909, but from his exile at Chang Te, his birthplace in Honan province, he kept in dignified touch with the formation of the new forces of opinion and arms. Yuan is a mighty man, quite on the style of Li Hung Chang, his preceptor. At Tientsin, the foreigners assisted Yuan, previous to 1909, with instruction in Occidental organization, and the best troops of the Empire in the matter of equipment, as well as the best schools, and almost the best mills, were organized by Yuan. Yuan has not been in close touch with the throbbing heart of the reform spirit in western, central or southern China, where he has never visited, nor with the foreigners of the great educational treaty ports of those sections, and of the brilliant British colony of Hong Kong in south China, which, with British and American Shanghai, has possibly done most for a reformed China. Yuan's only experience outside of China proper was when as a youth he served twelve years with the army in Korea, and in China itself he has traveled little. Yuan is practical and cold; swift in action and severe at times. An anecdote which throws a light on his mentality is the following. He jested with a Red Cross surgeon that he was taking a lot of

trouble; that while he had remade the man in sawing off his leg, he had not remade the soldier so far as he the commander was concerned; that generally in populous China, when the leg had to go, the whole man was let go. To err is human, to forgive is divine. In other countries than China, former standpatters are now enrolled as enthusiastic Progressives. A man should not always be judged by his past, for it is possible that he shall see a great light. Paul was indeed a converted Saul. Dr. Sun Yat Sen's greatest friend, Dr. Cantlie of London, who has recently issued a book, says that Yuan Shi Kai is overrated by the foreigners of north China, but Dr. Sun himself has time and again vouched for the sincerity and enthusiasm of Yuan. The future certainly is glorious with great possibilities.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen (I would like to Latinize his name as Sunyacius just as we Latinized Kung Fut Tsze into Confucius) is a Hong Kong product, and has been a revolutionist and a republican from the beginning. As a boy he was fed on thrilling stories of the Taiping rebellion by his uncle, who had served as an officer in that rebellion against the Manchus. Sunyacius was born at Fatshan, seven miles west of Canton in 1866. From 1884 to 1887 he was assisted by Dr. Kerr, of the Anglo-American mission, Canton, in whose office he studied medicine and English. He studied medicine and surgery under his greatest friend, Dr. Cantlie at what is now the medical department of Hong Kong University. In 1892 Dr. Sun became the first Chinese practicing medicine at beautiful Macao, and met with great opposition from the conservative Portugese doctors, who in 1894 drove him to Canton. His father was a Chinese Christian evangelist, a Congregationalist (London Mission) by denomination. Even two years before Kang Yu Wei's work at Peking, Dr. Sun in 1895 smuggled arms into Canton, got his revolutionary forces at work, and received his first baptism of fire. Owing to the Swatow men not meeting the Hong Kong men at Canton, Sun's plans collapsed in 1895. By the advice of Mr. Dennis, a solicitor of Hong Kong, Dr. Sun fled to Kobe, Japan; to Honolulu, to San Francisco, everywhere picking up threads of the theme of

liberty. The world is now familiar with his wanderings, disguises, privations, propaganda, through the long years, and his visits to bankers. Sun's headquarters have been at British Singapore and at Hong Kong, but he is as well known at San Francisco, Chicago, New York, London Vancouver and Yokohama. Incognito, he has walked into the dormitories of Columbia College, New York, and talked revolution and reform with some of the students under the unconscious eye of many a conservative. Dr. Sun is a scholar, propagandist, organizer and republican. His example has had much to do with the change in the styles of clothing in China. He is an author having published in 1904 in London a book on *The Chinese Question*. The Manchus kept Dr. Sun out of China during the long years, and he is therefore not yet thoroughly known to the Hupeh and Hunan province guilds, who fired the first successful shot, but he is the pick of the southern and the alien Chinese, who have largely financed reform and revolution; the Chinese of Canton, Singapore, Penang, noble Hong Kong, Macao, America, England, Japan, Australia, and brilliant Shanghai. He has never held office under the Manchus at home or abroad, and is therefore not well known to foreigners in the salons of diplomats, in the capitals of the Caucasian race, or to the masses of the Chinese in the north and west provinces, but he is a coming man. The following incident will throw a pleasing light on Dr. Sun's character. On February 22, 1912, his elder brother Sun Mei, perhaps an ordinary man in equipment, was at a time of enthusiasm almost elected governor of the great province of Kwangtung as a popular tribute to Sun Yat Sen. The latter wired from Nanking, disapproving of the choice for the province's good, and urging "brother Mei" to confine himself to business, for which he was more fitted.

Another mighty man who prepared the way for revolution and whom America knows well was the Honorable Wu Ting Fang. Not a few perhaps held their breath when it was announced in November, 1911, that this courtly gentleman had entered the strenuous arena. Wu was the first of the reformers to insist on foreign acknowledgment of the rebel

government, and he formulated the most brilliant move of the revolution, the announcement that if foreigners advanced money to the imperialists, and the republicans won, the latter would repudiate such loans. This really won the revolution, for numbers of the foreign syndicates were at first heartily in favor of the Manchu statu quo. Wu has already codified the reform and penal laws of China, and is prepared to enter upon that difficult question, extraterritoriality. Watch the Honorable Wu Ting Fang; he is not afraid to take the side of "China for the Chinese," although he is one of the most polished gentlemen in western culture of all the Chinese officials. He aims to interpret the East to the West. Wu risked vast preferment, and he will grow in power with the masses of the Chinese nation. His brother-in-law is the exceedingly able Dr. Ho Kai, Commander of the British Order of Michael and George, the Chinese member of the Legislative Council of the royal colony of Hong Kong island, a thorough legislator, a brilliant man.

There were other reformers in China and abroad at work from 1898 to 1911, although the western press gave no attention to the really astonishing matter. The bitter Hunanese republican rebel, the irrepressible Hwang Shing, was also exiled by the Empress Dowager, Tse Hsi, in 1898. He fled to Japan with a price on his head. When the psychic moment was called at Wuchang in October 1911, Hwang was soon on the ground. He was one of the republican generals who captured Nanking, and thus crowned the revolution with success, and he is now frequently at Peking, urging the views of the Yangtze provinces.

In America, the editors of the *Chung Sai Yat Po*, the *Chinese World*, and *Free Press* at San Francisco, and the *Chinese Reform News* at New York, often visited by Sun Yat Sen's American representative, Wong Man Su, ably took up the propaganda, which was carried on in their own way by a thousand newspapers which arose throughout China from 1906 onward, first in the treaty ports, and later in Chinese cities. Reference was made to the fact that while China, the largest Oriental country, was without a real Parliament, other Oriental countries had successfully overthrown despot-

ism and oligarehism, and had popular assemblies, which granted some representation in return for the privilege of taxation. Japan had a Diet; even Russia had a Duma; the Filipinos had an Assembly; Turkey had an Assembly; little Persia had a representative Mejliss; native members had at last been admitted into the Viceroy's Council in India; and Hong Kong, with its 500,000 Chinese, had long had two Chinese as brilliant members of the Legislative Council.

Viceroy Seu Ki Yu's essay of 1866, praising Washington and republicanism as ideal, was reissued and distributed, and had its influence. By 1909 and 1910 the reformers had compelled the Manchus to heed the howling of the wind, and see the shadow of a cloud, at least as big as a man's hand on the horizon of internal politics. The Manchus granted provincial and national assemblies, but they were called and considered only "Tsecheng Yuan" (advice boards) and not legislative bodies in the free and full sense of the word. The pensions of the Manchus and bannermen in the various Chinese cities were decreased somewhat and land was offered them so that they might enter the industrial body of the nation. Many Manchus rebelled, as at Chingtu city in September, 1911. Argument increased. The cloud on the horizon grew larger. Objection was made to the court's monopoly of the rich copper mines of Yunnan province, and complaint was reiterated that while the southern provinces were the least consulted, and the weakest in representation in any governmental consultations that were held at Peking, the government overdeveloped the armies and schools of the three northern provinces of Pechili, Shantung and Shansi with taxes collected, largely in the southern provinces, where the government neglected schools, police and army divisions. It was hard to get the Stuart kings to call Parliaments, and when at a belated date they did, complaint was louder than ever, for there was something to complain of, and at last a constitutional place to complain in. These Chinese assemblies gave little representation directly to the masses, a high property qualification debarring them, but the gentry of the guilds in

many cases, espoused the reform sentiment of the masses, exactly as the Stuart Parliaments did to the disgust of the Stuart kings who hoped for monarchic support, and as the barons of the "Magna Charta" did at Runnymede to the disgust of Plantagenet John of England. One provincial Assembly President we might note at this point. He is Tang Hua Lung, of the Hupeh Assembly. When Hankow was taken on October 13, 1911, Tang jumped to the front as organizer of the first republican provincial government, with headquarters at Wuchang, the ancient viceregal capital of the illustrious Viceroy Chang Chih Tung. In the mother province of reform, the most progressive province politically of all the twenty-one, Kwangtung, Wu Hon Man agitated in his assembly for reform, and when the Imperial Viceroy, Chang Ming Chi fled to Hong Kong, Wu Hon Man burst into the Yamen at Canton with the rebelling 16th and other regiments, and took charge of that great province for the republican rebels. In its Nationalization-of-Railways scheme, the Manchus partially confiscated the Kwangtung railways, promising to pay the owners only 60 per cent of their investment.

China's army was a territorial one. Troops raised in this way are hard to control in local emergencies, but they are easier to recruit, mobilize, drill and discipline at the beginning than mixed corps. Among the generals of divisions, transferred from the Navy Department, was the famous Li Yuan Heng, on whom the republicans largely fixed their hopes as the man trained and true for the real deeds of deadly arms, which make new governments possible. Propaganda and patience are all right in their places, but powder needs a special man of a stern mould, fit to deal with merciless and terrible enemies. General Li was one of these men; General Hwang was another. General Hsu, who sent in the brilliant coup de grace at Nanking, was still another. You all know the details of the training of these men and that their success was not an accident. As general of the 20th division of the northern army, camped at Lanchow, east of Peking, was General Chang Shao Tsen (we will call him Chang the first to distinguish him from two other

Generals Chang of the Manchu camp at Nanking and elsewhere in the northeastern provinces). He will come forward in a moment.

In the province where Shanghai is located, the President of the Assembly, Chang Chien, who proposes to visit American Chambers of Commerce, and who is well known as the host in China of visiting Pacific Coast Chambers of Commerce, was more than ready to declare for reform. He, with Wu Ting Fang, was insistent on the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, and the declaration of a republic. At Lhasa, in far away Tibet, was an Imperial resident who had been trained in reform at Shanghai, and in law at Yale. He was the eminent Wen Tsung Yao, destined to be the Assistant Foreign Minister of the first rebel government. For the most part however the radical reformers were new men unknown to the world, as the Manchus had naturally never given office to them. Whenever there is a movement towards liberty in Europe you generally find an English book, or an England-inspired man behind it. It will be noted that nearly all these Chinese reformers have come under American influence.

Many causes, all important, helped to precipitate the crisis. Sheng Kung Pao and others had planned to compel the provinces and the gentry of the guilds, to sell out their many little railroads, many of which were paying well, to the central government, which intended to quickly nationalize the railroads under immense foreign loans. The local gentry feared that this meant the extinction of distributed small fortunes and opportunities; concessions of mines to foreigners; heavy interest; continuation of the unscientific Likin system of customs as a security; and payment of obnoxious bonuses. The bitter complaint written in blood, of the Hunanese of Changsha city on this subject was: "When a piece of meat is in the thief's mouth, it is hard to take it out." All may not agree with the Chinese position, but it is legal and wise to listen to the argument of the defense and not shout it out of court. "Why should we, with the richest mines on earth; the richest passenger, freight and labor field; with lands plethoric of water power

and grain; and the lowest debt, if the oppressive indemnities were wiped out, pay foreigners such immense bonuses, interest and concessions, discounts and profits, to go out of our country" rang the cry, not only in Hupeh, Hunan, Szechuen, Shansi and Kwangtung provinces, but I have seen it in native papers printed under the shadow of foreign banks on the Bund at Tientsin in the north, and there was one large meeting of protest held by the Chinese of British Hong Kong in the Chui Yin hotel on September 3, 1911, delegates attending even from distant Szechuen province, where the "Railroad Protection Association" of Chingtu city in August, 1911, had issued a famous placard of protest in which the four banking nations in caricature were made to say: "The wealth of the four provinces of the Yangtze and the south is all given to us four foreign nations to swallow down at one gulp." A representative native Hankow paper wrote: "The merchants of Hupeh urge the people to take shares in their own railways; use your own money and do not go to foreigners; there is need of independence if you would preserve your liberty." Egypt was cited as the example of not following this course. You will note the Chinese believe that money, as well as hostile arms, can make slaves. Even if a foreign banker, statesman, or merchant does not fully agree with the local feeling of the Chinese, it is wise to look frankly at their side of the argument in making educational, financial and political plans in the future. There was much complaint that the Manchu princes had accumulated private hoards from the taxes levied largely in the south. Something then was brewing, especially in the southern and central provinces. Not a hair of a foreigner was to be touched. I would like to quote the written guarantee of the "Sia Hwei" (Reform Association) of Fukien province to the foreigners of Fuchau if I had time. Its sentences will forever stand as a bond of friendship between the East and the West. These Fukien people were as good as their word, for besides sending levies to the revolution, the "Hsiang lao" (head men) of the villages organized home guards for the protection of both foreigners and natives. When the revolution broke out at Wuchang, the soldiers

of the brave 30th regiment escorted the American missionaries out of the line of fire from Serpent Hill, and when the missionaries sailed on the German freighter *Belgravia* for Shanghai, the revolutionary soldiers of Generals Li and Hwang shouted a peace message that will endure: "American republicans are brothers of ours." The heavy indemnities amounting to the awful sum of \$250,000,000 have been a heavy load upon the Chinese people of the south and central provinces, who had nothing to do with the persecution of foreigners in 1900. The Chinese of the taxed south greatly appreciated therefore American and British action in returning part of the indemnities, but other nations should do likewise. The *Westminster Gazette* of London now supports this position. It is a growing wrong.

Histories of peoples, not dynasties and oligarchies, such as John Richard Green's *History of the English People*; books which helped to bring about the American revolution; the American missionary, Dr. Macklin's Chinese translation of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*; great paeans of liberty and political pain the world over, were translated and read. The book *Service* was re-read. It was written in 1897 by Tan Sze Tung, the son of a governor of Hupeh province. Tan was one of the martyrs for liberty, who were beheaded in 1898. Thomas Paine's *The Crisis*, which was good enough to be read by Washington before battle to the American regiments of 1776, was translated and read to the Chinese republicans. The preliminary dance was opened in September, 1911, by far western Szechuen province, Peking issuing this edict in the yellow *Peking Gazette*: "Whoever shall serve us by killing rebels, shall be rewarded regardless of rules;" a sort of Sicilian Mafia or Tammany Beckerism you see! The Peking government had practically confiscated the railways of the Szechuenese, as the paper which they were given in exchange, bore no guarantee of interest, and no reliance was put upon the value of the security by the provincial gentry, bankers and farmers. When provinces and states lose confidence in the sincerity of a fixed central government, which is not run by responsi-

ble parties which can be recalled, that government totters to its fall. A national anthem was given to the nation to sing.

May China be preserved!

In this time of the Manchu dynasty, we are fortunate to see real splendor;

May the heavens protect the imperial family.

The south only sang it in parodies, and in September the men of Szechuen rebelled and "fired the shot heard round the world." In a month, the soldiers of General Li's 8th division at Wuchang "fired the volley that was heard around the world." What followed rapidly lives in everyone's mind; the rushing of northern troops by railway to the triple cities at Hankow; the rolling to and fro of victory and repulse. General Li's troops, especially the "Pu Pa Tsze" (Dare to Die Brigade) of shaven round-heads, fought bravely. They were a sort of Cromwellians. When ammunition ran out, the rebel troops used the bayonet charge with daring. It was a new era in fighting in China when yellow men would charge, with only cold steel, across an area swept by fire from machine guns. The cause and not the command, had given them the new courage. Many of these men were recruited from the most famous boatmen of the world, the Szechuen trackers of the wild rapids and sublime gorges of the glorious Yang Tze River, and from the indefatigable, cheerful mountain coolies of Hupeh province. Province after province seceded until fourteen were in the fold of liberty. Reform was as hot as a prairie fire, and almost as hard to administer. On October 29, a remarkable thing occurred among the divisions being massed for an attack on the rebel's capital. The 20th division, under Chang the first, as we have called him, mustered in the Lanchou camp, formed the famous Army League, and made reform demands on the packed National Assembly at Peking, just as Caesar's immortal 13th legion, before the rebellion, sent demands to the Roman Senate, whose orders they were supposed to take. The nineteen constitutional articles were granted and are a sort of Magna Charta in China. On Novem-

ber 3 at the front, the Imperial 3rd division made a bloody name for itself in the respect of massacre of non-combatants and arson. Hankow, a prosperous city of nearly a million was reduced to the appearance of a wrecked village. On the republican right wing at glorious Nanking, General Chang Hsun (we will call him Chang the second) was the imperial commander. He led his 9th division in similar bloody massacres as those which occurred at Hankow. On November 26, 1911, the republicans under Generals Hsu and Hwang Shing attacked the strong hill forts above Nanking with determination. Dogged charges were made across the open and up the zig-zag of Purple Hill. Who will sing the feats of the new Chinese arms—yes, the Chinese who the world said would never make soldiers, even if they had a great cause at heart. The fighting was not as magnificently solid and desperate as Pickett's gray charge at Gettysburg; Thomas' impetuous charge up Missionary Ridge; the shining Cuirassiers' wild ride into the valley of death at Waterloo; Linievitch's grim defense of Putiloff Hill; the shouting sweep of Oku's Japanese up Nanshan Heights, or the silent plunge of Oyama's massive ranks into the Liaoyang valley, or against the black Mukden lines. It was as determined, daring and brilliant however as any land engagement in the South African or Spanish-American wars, and far braver and stronger than the theatrical engagements, with air ship accessories of the Italy-Tripoli war. The world's critics must now change their criterions. A strong cause will make a strong battle anywhere the world over, no matter what the color of the soldier, or the cut or tint of his battle flag. Liberty is equally proud of the children she begets, no matter what the clime. The Canton artillery sang a rugged song of Liberty. It is worth quoting, not only because it has poetical merit, but because it shows the spirit that was and is working in the souls of men:

Freedom will work on this earth,
Great as a giant rising to the skies,
Come Liberty, because of the black hell of our slavery;
Come enlighten us with a ray of thy sun.

Behold the woes of our fatherland.
Other men are becoming all kings in equality.
Can we forget what our people are suffering?
China, the widest and oldest, is now as an immense desert.

We are working to open a new age in China;
All real men are calling for a new heaven and a new earth.
May the soul of the people now rise as high as Kwangtung's
highest peak;
Spirit of Freedom, lead, protect us.

The Americans of Nanking, Messrs. Macklin, Garrett, Blackstone, Bowen, believed in the Chinese saying "Chiu Ming" (save blood). They pleaded with the victorious republican generals Hsu and Hwang Shing for the first humanitarian surrender in Chinese civil war, as a thrilling example for all time that Chinese revolutionists, like George Washington's and Oliver Cromwell's men, were patriots and gentlemen at heart, and nor mere feudists fighting under the name of a great cause. Generals Ling, Hsu, Li, Hwang, etc., and of course Foreign Minister Wu Ting Fang, rose to the high level. They agreed to a surrender with honors. The panting troops held enthusiasm in control. Behind the walls the Imperialists breathed hard as well they might, seeing what they deserved, and the great populace of shopkeepers eagerly waited. Hurrah! A shout went up that lives would be guaranteed; yes, honor too. Fling open the pounded, riddled iron "Great Peace!" The steel muzzles of the hot Armstrongs; the deadly four-point-sevens; the spitting rapid fire, the 3-inch Krupp guns on Purple, Lion and Tiger hills held their smoky breath like good hounds in leash, but straining. The generals and captains marked time; the troops craned their heads; the Cantonese artillery hitched up the limbers to the gun carriages for their work of war was over. The American missionaries thanked God, and led on the way of peace for a China that would never forget the moving scene, where forgiveness towered over revenge.

Not all of us in the Occident had moved as fast as progress moved in China. Even in December some of the American journals surprisingly opposed the republic, despite Washington's recommendation in his farewell address that

Americans should recommend their form of government to "the applause, the affection, and the *adoption* of every nation." For instance, on the very day that Dr. Sun Yat Sen was named President, the New York *Outlook* December 30, 1911, (the writer of the article was not Colonel Roosevelt) stated that a Chinese republic could, would and should not be set up at present, and further that "Americans would do well to throw all their influence on the side of a monarchy." Nine-tenths of the *Outlook's* readers doubtless thought that if Homer could sometimes nod, such surprisingly retrogressive words as these might be forgiven the generally progressive *Outlook*. Similarly in England, mother of books and sons of liberty, the large London banking house of Montagu, which has been prominent in China, issued a circular stating its "satisfaction" when the republicans lost Hankow to General Feng under atrocious circumstances of almost unforgivable massacre and monumental arson. Memoria longa; lingua brevis! So far, the strongest move in the rebellion was the declaration of Foreign Minister Wu Ting Fang at Shanghai that if Britain joined certain monarchical powers in loaning the north money, a trade boycott would be instituted in the southern and central provinces against foreign trade, of which Britain held the largest share. This won Hong Kong, and Hong Kong was able to hold British diplomacy on Downing Street, London. It was a master move, as brilliantly effective as Napoleon's Berlin decree of November 21, 1806, blockading British commerce. Whatever comes in the next few years, this cry surely is forever in the heart of Lincoln's America: "Long live the republican idea of distributed wealth and distributed liberty in good old China, America's yellow brother across the narrowing purple Pacific." The harmony which prevailed between the missionaries and the republicans was inspiring. In a village of Hupeh province (Taiping), the people insisted that Mr. Landahl of the Netherlands Mission should head the local safety league which was maintaining order, and they pushed that astonished gentleman to the head in what was novel to him, of the successful pursuit of notorious pirates. The official birth of the Chinese republic came on Lincoln's

birthday (think of it, America), February 12, 1912. On February 15 the Christian Chinese Provisional President, at Nanking, Sun Yat Sen, performed a remarkable act of self-sacrifice to win the north for republicanism, and induce doughty Yuan to join the great cause. He was also able to induce the vehement south to accept the former reactionary, Yuan. Here was the man who largely had achieved republicanism laying by all its honors at the climacteric moment in favor of the man who had most powerfully withstood republicanism. Yet Sun was happy. China was happy. Yuan was happy. With the least bloodshed ever known on a field of liberty, Sun and his cabinet had achieved the widest revolution ever known. They had established a republic of twenty-one republics four times the population of America. They will be managed by a combination of the British and American systems, as their bulk is too great in the aggregate for the strong centralization which is now becoming popular in America to correct certain evils for the time being. The provincial republics will develop largely as units, until the individual is educated sufficiently for greater cohesion. For a while, the republic may seem to work out like the Mexican system, but a dictator-president is not the final aim. Sun Yat Sen will go down to history as the greatest dreamer, prophet, organizer, altruist and political philosopher, the modern world has known; not that he is brainier than the white man, but being a yellow man, he has been able to accomplish more than any white man. His reception to the hearts of all men, at least the reception of his cause, should be enthusiastic. He stands not alone. The scores of idealists and fighters of his cabinet, made the way for the constructive men who will now take hold, and some of these men are now our guests in America. Above all, Sun converted Yuan by his self-obliteration, and Yuan converted the obstructionist north. What if the Honanese Yuan is at the head of affairs for a while instead of the Kwangtungese Sun. They are both Chinese and now both are republicans. China now has the center of the world's stage, and America has built the Panama Canal to quickly reach a front seat at the stage.

The actors will have long and strenuous parts, and the house is filling up rapidly to hear, and see, and applaud, if all is done well, as it should be. When the Assemblies succeed each other, Dr. Sun's turn as Premier or President will doubtless come. A bas with personal jealousies, antipathies, or overleaping ambitions. Surely there is room for all in twenty-one republics, which are bound as one commonwealth. As Macaulay said: "All under the flag should serve the state." It is repression of individual resentment and ambition which has made England and America so governable, and it is something that China will learn as the years of stress surge about the ship of state. The title of captain or president amounts to very little in the light of patriotism; all aboard the ship are equal when it comes to manning the pumps and shortening or letting out sail according to the winds that blow. Parties will arise like Sun's new party the Tung Men Hwei (Sworn Brother); provincial feeling will be recrudescent and assertive; leaders and their followings will clash at times, but the Chinese must learn, as we all have to learn, that the striving must be one way o' the rope, and not a tug against each other because of personal greed, low ambition, or unruliness. In hundreds of documents issued during the rebellion, the republicans held up two men, Washington and Napoleon as representing successful protest against tyrants. But Washington laid the sword by the minute statesmanship could win. Napoleon used his sword to advance himself, and crush every will except his own: the way of an egotist. If China needs a foreign model to occasionally look at, let it be that of Washington, with his eminent moderation, his unselfishness, his charity, his honor, his true republicanism which sees in every citizen (man or woman) a king equal to himself, for the ballot and tax receipt have made all men equal kings. Do not think that all the severity you hear of in disturbed China at present is unnecessary and forebodes dark days. I will instance one parallel. Before the days of direct primary nominations in America we suffered from the machine system which advanced the incompetent sometimes and sometimes debarred the eminent and efficient from service

in the state. A saloon keeper, who brought 2000 votes would demand for instance the position of Secretary of State. "But you're not fitted for it; you're a hoodlum," The ward heeler would answer: "I must have it; I have to pay my 2000 brigands the 'graft,' which we say is ours; otherwise remember our revenge next election." The parallel! One, Shek Kam Chuen, a young stone cutter and human hair hawker of Canton was very successful in smuggling arms for the revolution, and on the declaration of independence he led a following of 2000 non-descript men who did effective work in fighting. They were men who loved a fight more than liberty, not liberty more than life, like Nathan Hale. When the republic was victorious, and his troops were disbanded and paid, Shek was unsatisfied. He, a hawker, wanted high office when even President Sun turned his brother down from politics back to business in Canton, because he was not eminent for political ability. Shek made demands for himself and his men that the State could not consistently grant. He smuggled arms to take up piracy in reprisal on the harassed State. The way the governor of Canton treated Shek and his legal adviser Chang Han Hing should be engraved on tablets in every city hall of every municipality over the round world. The governor under the constitutional pressure of public opinion, captured the men at their headquarters, and under military law, or the application of the popular "recall," he had them both shot to the great rejoicing of good citizens and tax payers. That ended one instance of heelerism, bossism, packed primary, professional office holding, "public office a private graft," piracy, or whatever you like to call it, in modern China. The "popular recall" was a success, despite the cynicism of the standpatters in Canton, and one of those standpatters was Shek's wily lawyer Chang, who shared his fate much to his disgusted surprise. I am sorry William Dean Howells was not in Canton at that time to write *A Modern Instance*. At times cables may come to us that may make it seem that in troubled China Confucius has abdicated to Confusion. The solution largely lies in three things: railways, education and a real republican congress,

none of the three to be interfered with by either a riotous or office-greedy army. There can be no doubt that the action of the ninety generals of the northern army in forcing the National Assembly at Peking in July, 1912, at the sword's point, to accept certain appointments against their will, was inimical to the vitality of constitutionalism in China. Macaulay's words should be remembered forever that "a constitution however faulty, is better than the best despot." The day however is bright, and despite Tennyson's dictum a "cycle of Cathay" will be as good as any other cycle, and to add Roosevelt's homely epigram, one's nation should be made as good for all of us as it has been for some of us—Manchus! The promise that America will help the new republican China is surely written on all our hearts.

So acute a historian as Macaulay (essay on Milton) has pointed out that the destinies of the human race are sometimes staked on the same cast with the destinies of a particular people. So much the more reason why we, like all other nationals, should be keenly and warmly interested in the present and future of China, because so many American affairs (the Panama Canal and the Pacific being the bonds) are wrapt up in Chinese affairs.

THE WESTERN INFLUENCE IN CHINA

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The striking changes that have occurred within a twelve-month in the oldest, the most populous and potentially the most powerful nation of the Orient and of the world, are of profound significance to us of the West. We are in large measure responsible for what has occurred. Besides this, the political and social movements in China, which culminated last February in the abdication of the Manchu dynasty after a rule of nearly 270 years, and the inauguration of what has been characterized as the Imperial Republic of China, place upon western nations new obligations and open to them new opportunities. It is therefore fitting that the topic "Western Influence in China" should have a place upon this program.

The discussion of this paper falls into four divisions: I, What western influence has accomplished; II, What western influence should not destroy; III, Where China can learn from the West; IV, How the West can be most helpful.

There are four principal channels through which western influence has reached China. The governments of Europe and America have exerted a direct pressure upon the government of China and forced changes in its treatment of foreigners and those under their influence. For three hundred years western merchants tried to open China to foreign commerce. These efforts culminated during the nineteenth century in wars between China and the European powers, chiefly Great Britain, as a result of which China was opened to western influence as exerted by the trader and his agents. A third channel through which China has been influenced from the West may be called simply western example.

Especially in these later years, say within the last generation, a considerable number of Chinese, chiefly students and diplomatic representatives, have visited the West for longer or shorter periods, have thus become more or less familiar with western institutions and ideals, and have on their return taught many of these ideas to their friends and associates. The experiences of the Chinese who have settled in western lands, chiefly along the western shores of the American continent, and still more recently the introduction of western books and the publication in China of books and periodicals that give the facts about western life, thought and achievements, have spread the knowledge and influence of things western, especially among students and the progressive classes. To the influence of Chinese who have visited or resided in the West or who have become familiar with its life, should be added that of the personal example of the westerners who visit or live in China. This influence, though largely centered in the port cities, is by no means to be disregarded. Finally, perhaps the most important of all channels, is the Christian missionary. He has been the first to penetrate to the more remote parts of the country. He has come closest to the life of the people, and unlike many a trader or government official, has for the most part stood resolutely as the embodiment of the best elements in the life of the West. His—and I should add specifically her—quiet and pervasive personal influence has had very much to do with laying the foundations for the new regime.

Such are some of the channels through which western influence has reached China. What have been the results? The answer to this question forms our first point.

I. WHAT WESTERN INFLUENCE HAS ACCOMPLISHED

In general, the chief effects of the influence of western governments and commerce have concerned the industrial development of China. Those of western example have modified the educational and political systems of the country, while those of missionary work have affected the educational, philanthropic, and ethical ideals.

Until the middle of the last century, the Chinese government confined all its commercial relations with foreigners to the frontier. Canton was the center of the trade with Europe and America until the treaty of Nanking in 1842, which closed the so-called Opium War with Great Britain, ceded Hongkong to England and opened five treaty ports, Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai. As a result of subsequent wars or pressure otherwise exerted, the number of these ports has increased to forty-nine, located on the frontiers, along the coast, and on the navigable rivers. With the development of foreign trade came the adoption in 1854 of rules by which the collection of customs was placed in the hands of foreigners. Starting with the organization in 1861 of a department for the transmission of its own postal matter, the Customs Department began in 1876 to open its service to the public, and twenty years later the Imperial Post was organized and grafted upon the Customs. It was transferred in May, 1911, to the Chinese Board of Communications. While the government and large merchants had always had means of transmitting letters, the ordinary Chinese had none. The statistics for 1910 give the number of post-offices as 5,357, the articles transmitted 355,000,000, including 3,750,000 parcels and 25,500,000, registered articles. The money order system transported \$10,000,000. The postal routes covered 13,000 miles by railways and steamers, and 87,000 miles by regular couriers. The telegraph system, which has been independent of the customs service, has developed less rapidly, but during the year 1909 over 600 miles of new lines were constructed and twenty-two new offices opened. There are now 560 offices and 28,000 miles of telegraph lines connecting the principal cities and the neighboring countries.

Just about the time when the postal service was instituted, foreigners in 1875 opened the first railway in China from Shanghai to Wusung. Within two years the line, which had come into possession of the government, was torn up, everything, including engines and cars, dumped upon the shores of Formosa, and a temple erected upon the site of the station. Such were the unpropitious beginnings

of the attempt of foreigners to improve the transportation facilities of China. Later, under foreign stimulus, the Chinese took up the railway question again, but made little progress until the era of foreign concessions that succeeded the close of the war with Japan in 1895. So rapid was the construction that within sixteen years 5500 miles have been opened to traffic and 2800 miles of trunk lines are under construction, and these figures do not include the Japanese and Russian railways in Manchuria. The projected lines will connect all parts of the country, including even Thibet, with the political and commercial centers. The Chinese are as rapidly as possible taking over these railways and bringing them under complete Chinese control.

Added to the railways are the steamer lines along the coast and the internal waterways of the country. The Yangtse system alone furnishes 12,000 miles of water navigation, and in general there are 8000 miles of rivers in China navigable by steamers. Since 1898 the internal waters have been opened to vessels flying foreign flags. While this permission would not have been granted by a nation able to resist, it has resulted in securing for the chief river routes comfortable and speedy steamers that sail under the British German, French, Japanese and Chinese flags.

These improvements in means of communication have made possible the new China. When the unwieldy junk, the man or woman propelled river or canal boat, with a sail as auxiliary power, the sedan chair, the wheelbarrow or cart moving slowly over the egregious roads, were the swiftest means of communication, the virtual independence of the provinces was inevitable. The increasing unity of thought and action brought about by improved means of communication made it possible for the entire empire to throw off the rule of the Manchus within a few months. The effects of floods and famines can now be mitigated and speedy relief secured. On the other hand, thousands, or even millions, of river boatmen, chair coolies, carters and the like have lost their means of support. Important cities and towns situated on the old routes are losing business and population, while new towns and cities are developing at the new distributing points.

Western influence and competition are leading also to industrial changes, such as the opening of mines, the establishment of large manufacturing plants like the Hanyang Iron Works, managed by western-trained Chinese, and the growth of factories with power- or improved hand-looms. The inevitable suffering caused by industrial development is increased in the case of China by the pressure of population upon the soil, the relative immobility and conservatism of labor, and the lack of education and adaptability among the masses. It is reduced somewhat by the solidarity of the Chinese and their ability to exist upon a pitifully small income.

The millions of Chinese furnish, it is believed, an almost unlimited and unworked market, and the West is seeking to force the sale of its wares. The effect of this is not always good, even apart from the dislocation of industry.

The net increase in the importation of western liquors during the year 1909 as compared with 1908 was Taels 845,186. These threaten to take the place of opium among the wealthier classes. The western cigarette is further impoverishing the common people, the daily consumption being put at twenty millions. So serious are the consequences that certain regions have driven out the salesmen, torn down their posters, and destroyed all the cigarettes they could find. But with a courage and persistence worthy of a better cause, and aided, it has been alleged, by drugged cigarettes, the representatives of the British-American Tobacco Company are continuing their work of driving out the cheap and innocuous Chinese tobacco with this more expensive and deleterious western product.

The injection of morphia is another vice for the introduction and maintenance of which foreigners are responsible. There are no records before 1892, but during the ten years from 1892 to 1902, the importation increased from 15,761 ounces to 195,133 ounces, each ounce being good for from one to two thousand injections. In 1903 a prohibitory tax was imposed, and the imports declared to the customs at once fell off to 128 ounces in 1904 and 54 ounces in 1905. The explanation of this is smuggling.

In this realm western influence is decidedly a mixed blessing.

The chief effects of western example have been in the realms of education, political organization and administration, and social ideals.

For generations, China had an education that was based upon the study of the Chinese classics. It was remarkable for its antiquity, its democracy, and, as contact with the West revealed, its inadequacy. It did not produce men who could lead China successfully in competition with the rest of the world. Western education was introduced into China by the missionaries, Catholic and Protestant. In 1861 the Imperial Maritime Customs, which were under foreign control, started two colleges in Peking and Canton. These were taught by foreigners and were chiefly for the training of Chinese interpreters. The first systematic attempt to send Chinese students abroad for education was made in 1872, but ended in the recall of the students from the United States in 1881. After the war with Japan, 1894-95, the great Viceroy Chang Chih-tung advocated that upon the ancient Chinese education should be grafted western subjects. During the brief reform period of 1898, the late emperor by a series of decrees abolished the old literary essay as the standard for literary examination, and ordered the establishment of schools and colleges in provincial capitals, and in prefectural, departmental, and district cities, directed that existing schools should be altered into schools for practical Chinese literature and for western learning, and created the Imperial University at Peking, appointing as its head that veteran missionary, Dr. W. A. P. Martin. With the reaction that culminated in the Boxer uprising of 1900, all these changes were swept away, only to be renewed again under the late Empress Dowager during the last decade. Before the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, it was provided by a decree of January 13, 1903, that a complete educational system should be created, extending from the kindergarten up through the primary, higher primary, and middle school, to the high school (or college), the university and the post-graduate college for higher studies.

Provision was also made for the education of girls and the training of teachers. This educational system was modeled upon that of Japan, which is along German lines. It called into its service foreigners and Chinese educated abroad. While many of the schools existed only on paper and the average efficiency was low, yet there were notable exceptions, especially in the imperial province of Chihli. Whatever the quality, the numbers of the new schools and of their students rapidly increased. At the close of 1910, there were in Peking alone 252 such schools with 15,774 students, and in the provinces 42,444 schools with an enrollment of 1,284,965. Because of recognized imperfections, the Board of Education last year called together in Peking the leading scholars and educators of China, who formed themselves into the Central Education Society and proceeded to discuss educational problems, and make recommendations to the Board of Education. Under the new government the movement is along these same lines, including even the recognition of English as an official language, and the proposed abolition of the compulsory worship of the tablet of Confucius, which abolition has actually been put into effect in the Kwangtung province. So serious was the reaction against the old education that at one time mission schools had difficulty in inducing their pupils to study the Chinese classics or cultivate a beautiful literary style. If the papers may be credited, a prominent member of the new cabinet is unable to read or write in his own language. A purely western education is, of course, only one degree less to be deplored than the old discarded Chinese education.

Similarly, in the political realm, contact with the West led the reform party in China to demand the reconstruction of government along the lines of western parliamentary institutions. Theoretically the government of the Manchus was that of an absolute monarchy but actually the provinces enjoyed a large measure of autonomy, and the local communities for the most part governed themselves. It is this democratic foundation of the empire that is one of the reasons for believing that the present political experiment of China will succeed. The graft and corruption which char-

acterized the old administration, its inefficiency and the lack of a real unity, led, with the growth of the spirit of nationalism, to a demand for political reforms. Pressure from western governments had already secured some changes that affected international relations. Such was the organization in 1861, after the capture of Peking by the French and British, of the Tsungli Yamen, changed forty years later into the Waiwu Pu, as the Board of Foreign Affairs. The great step forward was the appointment in 1905 of an Imperial Commission to study the administrative systems of foreign countries with a view to the possible establishment of a representative government in China. This appointment committed the government to a policy of reform. The commission reported the following year, and a little later a decree was issued promising the calling at some date in the future of a parliament. Administrative reforms were made, some useless offices abolished, certain boards consolidated, and new boards instituted. An attempt was made to remove the bitterness between Manchu and Chinese by abolishing some of the distinctions and depriving the Manchus of certain privileges. In August, 1908, an imperial decree laid down a nine year program for constitutional reform. From October 14 to November 23, 1909, provincial assemblies met, the first really representative bodies to be summoned by the government to have a share, but only as advisers, in the government of the empire. From that time on the government had no peace, for the demand for a demand for a responsible cabinet and the speedy summoning of a parliament was incessantly pressed. The first National Assembly met October 2, 1910, and immediately sought to arrogate to itself powers which the Crown had not dreamed of granting. The most that the Throne would concede was the promise of a cabinet the next year and a Parliament at the end of three years. This did not satisfy the people, and before the second session of the National Assembly was convened last autumn the revolution was in full swing and culminated in the abdication of the Manchus February 12, 1912. The object of the Throne in its program for constitutional reform had been to consolidate the empire,

deprive the provinces of their virtual autonomy, nationalize finance, justice and education, and, by admitting the representatives of the people to an advisory position, quiet the demand for self-government. The Throne did not propose to divest itself of its legislative, administrative and judicial prerogatives; nor was it to be required to adopt the recommendations of the assemblies. At the present time in the construction of the new government, the influence of western example is clearly evident. Republican forms are being followed for the first time in the history of the Orient. In the new National Assembly, the upper house, or Senate, is to represent the provinces, the dependencies and the Chinese abroad, and each province is to have equal representation. The lower house will be composed of one representative for each 800,000 of the population. The primary elections have been called for December 10th.

China seeks more than representative government. The extra-territoriality upon which in the past Western nations have rightly insisted is most galling to the proud and sensitive Chinese. The leaders recognize, however, that it is useless to demand any change until the judicial system has been reorganized along western lines, with a true penal code, incorruptible courts, and properly administered prisons. The movement in this direction has been going on for some time. Five years ago experts began the compilation of a new penal code, which after several revisions was adopted in 1910. In January of last year were held the first of the regular examinations in law which were to be compulsory upon all new officials in the Board of Justice. Not long after, it was decided to establish a high court of justice in each province and this was done in the progressive ones. This does not necessarily imply that these courts are yet ideal. Only other pressing events prevented the carrying into effect of proposals for the better administration of the civil courts. Almost before the revolution was complete, the provisional government in Shanghai established a modern court with three well qualified judges, two of whom were trained in Great Britain, and in this court, for the first time in China, there sat a jury drawn by lot from lists of citizens.

The outcome of this first trial, however, was such as to raise a question as to whether China is yet ready for the proper application of the jury system. The Manchu government issued edicts abolishing torture, but the experience of the mixed court in Shanghai leads to a doubt as to whether the Chinese are ready to be governed and to see justice done without the use of the bamboo to extort confession. The prisons of China have been places of horror to a westerner but these are being reformed. China was represented at the last International Congress on Prison Reform by delegates who subsequently made a study of European prisons. As long ago as 1908 I was privileged to visit in Tientsin and Paotingfu what might almost be called model prisons, in which the prisoners were well cared for under good sanitary conditions, were given instruction, and were taught useful arts. This movement is spreading wherever want of will and of money do not prevent, and a model prison has been discovered even in distant Yunnan.

In addition to these fundamental changes in education and government, the leaders of the new China are imbued with western ideals and are adopting western customs. On February 22, 1910, the government issued an edict abolishing slavery and prohibiting the buying and selling of human beings in China. No maidservants or concubines were to be sold, and concubines had their position improved. There were loop holes and it was reported a year later that there was no evidence that the edict had made any difference to the large number of farm laborers who are slaves. Some of the most radical reformers have adopted the ultra-western views regarding the position of woman and the relations of the sexes. An extreme and far from admirable new woman had appeared four years ago in certain Chinese cities like Nanking. With the advent of the new regime this has been carried still further, with disastrous consequences to many young women, who have found to their sorrow and shame that Chinese society is not yet ready for that freedom of which they had heard and which they sought to exercise apart from the restraints and limitations which are insisted upon even in the West. Educated young Chinese here and

there demand some voice at least in the choice of their future wife or husband, and a recent issue of a Chinese paper reports the case of an irate father in Canton whose feelings may be imagined when he discovered that his daughter was being courted by a young man in western fashion. There is one reform, however, affecting women that is wholly commendable. This is the natural foot movement which seeks to remove from Chinese women the incubus of suffering and disability resulting from the cruel practice of binding the feet. Begun by western ladies, missionary and civilian, resident in China, the Anti-Foot-Binding Society has been taken over by the Chinese, and this reform is now thoroughly naturalized. Western methods of salutation and western dress are being adopted, often with deplorable and ill-considered rapidity. Beyond these specific reforms, there has been noted an increasing humaneness in the public sentiment concerning various relics of a less advanced civilization than is now advocated for the new China.

There has recently come to my notice a copy of the program of the Social Reform Association, which was organized a few months ago by some of the leaders of the new China while they were on the steamer going north to take over the reigns of government. Among the leaders in the Association were the late premier Tang Shao-yi, the ministers of Navy, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, and many others. This association as reported in a Chinese paper is pledged to a list of reforms, thirty-three in number, of which I will quote a few:

2. Do not take concubines.
3. Advocate independent holding of property after coming to age.
4. Cultivate dependence on self, not on friends and on relatives.
5. Accord full equality between men and women.
6. Prohibit early marriage.
- 7-9. Advocate marriage by choice, the right of divorce and of remarriage.
11. Advocate small families.
14. Abolish kow-tow using a bow in its place.
15. Abolish foot-binding, wearing of earrings and face painting.
17. Receive no gifts while holding official positions.

20. Advocate the giving of private property to benefit the public.
24. Prohibit idols and images.
25. Prohibit geomancy, or other forms of divination.
26. Prohibit appetites that are harmful to health, such as smoking, drinking, etc.
33. Prohibit indecent advertisements.

These and the other reforms concern themselves with morality and with simplicity and purity of life. Nearly every one is in harmony with western and with Christian ideals, and strikes at some established custom or institution of China.

Another side to this question of western influence should be noted, and that is that western example is not always helpful. The evil lives of many foreigners resident in China, the fact that the worst sides of our life are often the only sides seen by the Chinese students in the West, the demoralizing example of the social evils existing in the West with which the Chinese are familiar, and the influence of our yellow press and of our pseudo-scientific and atheistic treatises, not to mention our decadent literature, are to be allowed for as counterbalancing the otherwise helpful influence of western example.

The fourth channel through which western influence has reached China has been the missionary, both Protestant and Catholic. The missionary has affected China through schools, medical work, and the publishing of books and papers, as well as by the preaching of the Christian religion with its high ethical ideals.

The number of missionaries through whom the western influence is exerted runs up into the thousands. The latest statistics indicate the presence in China of over 5000 Protestant missionaries and of nearly 50 Roman Catholic Bishops, assisted by more than 1400 European priests. Associated with them as coworkers are, for the Protestants 15,500 Chinese clergy, unordained, religious workers, medical assistants and teachers, both men and women, and for the Catholics 700 Chinese priests and an unreported number of other helpers. The diplomatic and consular officials reside in the capital and in the port cities. The representatives of western industrial life have usually resided in these same centers, though

now they travel through the provinces advertising and selling their goods. On the other hand, the missionaries are found all through China. They remain for years in the same region (one missionary in Fukien has completed thirty-five years at one city), travel widely through the country districts, and win the support of the people. Such missionaries have done much to commend things western to the Chinese. Thus, a Chinese official, who had not been favorable to missionary work and who was noted for his biting criticisms of certain prominent missionaries, nevertheless made the following statement a few years ago to a missionary in Nanking, with whom he was intimate: "Why is it that the foreigners all like to come to Nanking? It is because you missionaries came first and made a favorable impression. In Canton it was a regular hell on earth until the missionaries came and tried to make things better." A sociologist who went to China a few years since prejudiced against the missionary soon discovered that the missionary was virtually the only foreigner who got into the heart life of the people and could give the traveler the real facts. The residence in China of so many westerners, who speak the vernacular, most of whom live in their own homes and embody western ideals of culture, purity, and service has had an influence that no statistics reveal.

The missionary has been the pioneer of modern education in China. The Protestant missionaries maintain 3700 day or primary schools with 86,000 pupils and more than 500 higher schools with an enrollment of more than 31,000. Up until recently the Christian schools have been the best in the country, and even now but few government schools can compete with the best Christian schools in the grade of their teaching, especially of English and western subjects, and above all in their moral tone. The ethical influence of most government schools, it is declared, leaves much to be desired, while the Christian school seeks by moral and religious instruction and by careful supervision and discipline to develop the pupils into strong and public spirited men and women. The direct influence of this educational work has been great but its indirect influence is even greater. Not

only have these schools trained leaders for the new China, but their success has helped to awaken an interest in a westernized education, missionaries were drafted into the service of the government education, and earnest Christian teachers have been employed by the government in its own schools.

Again, the missionary has been a pioneer in the relief of physical suffering. Even today China probably is the scene of more unnecessary physical suffering than any other equal area on the globe. Every since the days of Dr. Peter Parker, who nearly eighty years ago opened a hospital in Canton and within less than two years had treated more than nineteen hundred eye patients, the medical missionary has done much to remove prejudice, to commend western science and the Christianity that is taught and lived by the missionary physician, and to open the doors to other uplifting influences. From these small beginnings the work has grown until now there are reported more than three hundred medical missionaries, of whom nearly one-third are women, who have charge of 235 hospitals and two hundred dispensaries. The number of in-patients during the last year for which we have reports was more than 50,000 and the number of out-patients one and a quarter million. Not content with this, the physician has added to his other multifarious duties that of training Chinese men,—and women too,—as nurses and physicians. The finest medical school in China, located at Peking and patronized by the government, is under missionary auspices, and there are developing in other provinces similar advanced schools. The more elementary schools are also rendering noble service and there are many Chinese physicians who are proud to advertise the fact that they studied under a beloved and honored Christian doctor. There are some six hundred Chinese thus being trained as physicians and nurses in some eighty classes or schools. In these days the number of highly trained Chinese physicians is increasing, but the number is still so small that there is great need for further enlarging the Christian medical forces connected with the missions.

The first insane asylum in China was opened by a missionary, and a hundred opium refuges, some twenty leper hospitals and asylums, and institutions for the blind are other closely allied branches of Christian service conducted by missionaries. The maintenance of orphanages and the work of famine relief exhibit to the Chinese the humanitarian aspect of our western civilization. The Chinese have been stimulated to open hospitals of their own, either with western or with Chinese medical treatment. All this has done much to increase the humaneness of Chinese life and take away the feeling of helplessness on the part of sufferers. It need hardly be added that the missionary physicians did yeoman service with the Chinese physicians during the scourge of pneumonic plague in Manchuria in the winter of 1911.

Still a third line of missionary work is that of the press. Not only have the missionaries taught western science, history, and philosophy, but they were pioneers in publishing in Chinese not only religious works but also scientific books, translated or original. Text-books for schools and colleges, up-to-date medical works and books on such subjects as economics and international law have been produced by the missionary. The great Commercial Press of Shanghai, which is the largest printing establishment in Asia, employing more than one thousand hands with a capital of \$1,000,000 and net annual profits of \$200,000 Mexican, was started by Christian Chinese, who were trained in a mission press. Their business is conducted on advanced principles with profit sharing and welfare work. This press is producing the books for the new schools of China and is printing translations of the best western works. One object of this literary activity by missionaries is to reach those who are not otherwise directly reached. This object has been behind such efforts as that of Dr. Gilbert Reid and his International Institute, of a British missionary like Mr. White-wright of Shantung and his museum, which was visited in 1909 by 215,000 people of whom more than a thousand were officials, and of the scientific work carried on by the Y. M.

C. A. in various parts of China. In these ways, those ordinarily beyond the range of foreign influence are interested in western science.

Still further, through what might be called the primary work of the missionary, viz., the gathering of Christian churches, the missionary, both directly and indirectly, is a channel through which western influence reaches the people. The Roman Catholic Church reports more than 1,350,000 Chinese Christians, while the Protestant figures show a Christian community of about 325,000, with a larger number, perhaps three-quarters of a million, under Christian influence. While no attempt is made to westernize the converts, while every effort, in fact, is made to keep them as thoroughly Chinese in the best sense as possible, yet contact with the missionary and the adoption of Christianity as a religion inevitably gives these people the western point of view in those respects in which western civilization embodies the ideals of Christianity. The Christians stand against opium and gambling, the twin curses of China, insist upon the better treatment of women and the suppression of female infanticide, once so frightfully common, and advocate and practice the unbinding of the feet. Parents often desire their daughters to be married to Christian young men because they will be sure of considerate treatment. Non-Christian Chinese have testified to the higher moral standards among Christians, and the leaders of the Christian Chinese church, pastors, teachers, and physicians, are a body of men of the highest character, combining the best elements of Chinese civilization with the best elements derived from the West. For years the requirement that officials and teachers in government schools should be present and share in periodic ceremonies which Christians felt themselves unable for conscientious reasons to countenance, excluded them from public life, but now they have come to the front. Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the first provisional president, and General Li, commander in chief of the army of the revolution and first provisional vice president of the Republic, are among the Chinese Christians who have taken the lead in establishing a new government that embodies west-

ern political ideals. When the Province of Fukien went over to the revolutionists, the government was intrusted to eight commissions, the presidents of four being Christians. The commissioner of education for Kwangtung province is a Christian professor in the Canton Christian College. It has been stated that three-fourths of the leaders of the revolution were either Christians or favorable to Christianity. While not personally a Christian, President Yuan Shih Kai is favorable to Christianity, has had his family educated in Christian schools, and took early occasion to declare that the new constitution would grant the Chinese freedom of religion and of worship. This is included in Article VI, Chapter VI of the provisional republican constitution.

These are some of the results in China of western influence. We pass now to consider more briefly the remaining points.

II. WHAT WESTERN INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT DESTROY

No nation could have gone calmly on its way as China has done while Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, and all the medieval powers waxed, waned and disappeared, unless it possessed strong characteristics. A nation that has such sources of strength must never allow itself to be deprived of them, and the West must not seek their destruction.

Note, for example, the high ethical code. Whatever may be said of the practical morality of China, there is no denying that as a system of ethics Confucianism ranks next to Christianity. Practically all the Christian precepts are found there, and, unlike western philosophers who have sought to deduce their ethical systems from some abstract conception, Confucius rested his upon the relations which each individual sustains to those about, above, and below him.

One of the fruits of Confucianism has been family solidarity. It is true that this has been carried to extremes to the partial atrophy of initiative and of the sense of personal responsibility, but this loyalty to ancestors and relatives is one of the corner stones upon which Chinese civilization

has rested. With the population pressing as it does and as it must continue to do upon the means of subsistence and with the lack of surplus land, this is an element that must be preserved. It would be a calamity if the spirit of extreme individualism that has been characteristic of the West should ever come to prevail in China.

Closely connected with this fact is another, the ability of the Chinese to cooperate. While the typical Chinese has difficulty in standing or acting alone, his capacity for working with his fellows means that large undertakings will be possible as soon as public spirit, absolute integrity, and enlightened leadership are to be found. In family, social, business, and religious affairs the Chinese are able to cooperate effectively. Note the system of markets with ramifications throughout the country, the power of guilds in commercial life and the family solidarity already alluded to, if you would understand this strong asset in Chinese character.

The Chinese, above all other peoples, have honored scholarship. It makes no difference that we smile at the old *literati* who found themselves unprepared to fit into modern China. The fact is that China accorded its highest honors only to the men who had proved by competitive examination that they were possessed of the best education that China could furnish. Change the type of training required, but preserve irrevocably the principle that only properly trained and prepared men should occupy public office, and China will have a civil service that cannot be excelled.

Finally, there is one element in the political genius of China that should never be superseded. The absolutism is doomed, but the democratic basis, which meant that local officials were practically chosen by the local communities, and that each district was governed in a manner suited to its genius and its conditions, is that upon which alone an enduring republic can be built.

The patient industry of the people, their uncomplaining endurance of conditions that are inevitable, their tenacity in holding to that which has proved itself useful, their ability to assimilate extraneous elements, and their recently

demonstrated ability to adopt and adapt new methods, are other elements of Chinese character that should not be destroyed.

III. WHERE CHINA CAN LEARN FROM THE WEST

While China has important elements that should be preserved at all hazards and can teach the West many a lesson of importance, it is equally true that in many points China can learn from the West.

It is necessary that the individual should count for more in the new China. We of the West have cultivated the individual and have lost much of family and community solidarity. China, on the other hand, has so developed corporate responsibility as to sacrifice the individual. Take this instance: A man and his wife committed the awful crime of flogging the man's mother. The result: the pair, flayed alive; the grand uncle, uncle, two elder brothers and the head of the clan, executed; the neighbors, the woman's father, the head representative of the literary degree held by the man, flogged and banished; the prefect and district ruler, degraded; and the child of the criminals, given another name. The patriarchal family keeps the sons in tutelage until they have lost initiative. The man of ability, by the help of his family, may rise, but the ordinary individual counts for little, and hundreds are permitted to perish on public works or in time of famine and flood without compunction. Slavery has prevailed among farm laborers and the sale of women and girls has excited no comment, especially during famines. Here is a point where Chinese customs may be wisely modified in western directions. Education has been provided for an increasing number of boys and girls. This must continue until all the people of China are made literate and increasingly intelligent. This applies to the women as well as to the men. Other needs are the actual abolition of slavery and such modification of the family system as shall develop in the child progressiveness, adaptability and efficiency. China has proved that it is easier to issue reform decrees than it is to secure radical

social or political changes. This can gradually be overcome through increased education and the giving of opportunity to individuals.

On the political side, China needs more public spirit and more nationalism, in contrast to provincialism. Very encouraging signs of this are appearing. Many of the reform party have exhibited just this spirit, but the rank and file of office holders have not yet risen to this point. The gradual and often rapid deterioration in public works, such as roads, canals, and even railways, not to mention temples and other public buildings, is due to a lack of public spirit that bodes ill for the future. The Chinese desire to be let alone and not be called upon to sacrifice much even for the general good. The same spirit carried into another realm leads to provincialism. The Manchus rigidly enforced the rule that an official should never serve in his native province. This was done to lessen the possibilities of disintegration—and of graft, also,—that might result from an official's being among his own people. The reported repeal of this rule by the new government raises the question as to whether the national spirit among the officials as a body is yet strong enough to justify this change.

Closely allied to this need is that of strengthening the central government. The late government made an earnest effort to stop the use of opium, which was weakening the country. As a part of this campaign it attempted to suppress the cultivation of the poppy. Its success in this endeavor far surpassed all expectations. With a change in government, however, and the weakening of control from Peking, has come a serious reaction, and fields have again blazed with the poppy where last year wheat was growing. The reform of the currency, an imperative need if China is to become a great commercial nation, is hindered by provincial jealousies and especially by the possibilities of graft and squeeze that the antiquated system, or lack of system, puts within the grasp of provincial officials. Railway construction is halted by provincial jealousy. The rivers are becoming a source of constantly increasing danger, and the canals are becoming less serviceable because there is no

strong hand to insist upon repairs. It is feasible to control the rivers and check the awful destruction of life and property which now recurs at ever shorter intervals, but it needs an efficient central government to do it.

Again, China needs a civil service equal to that of Great Britain at home and in her colonies, or even as good as that of the United States, imperfect as that is. Under the old system, graft was all but universal. Offices were bought and the officials were expected to live on impossible salaries with the understanding that all deficiencies could be wrung from the people or taken from the taxes at the expense of the central government. One of the chief causes of the revolution was this official corruption, but the habit of squeeze is so ingrained in the Chinese that it will be a hard struggle to raise the tone of the civil service to where it must be if China is to secure the funds she needs for her development. It is not only incorruptible officials that are needed, but also efficient men who can execute as well as plan. The weakness of the new system of education has been the impossibility of securing a sufficient number of well-trained teachers to man the schools. China must learn that adequate results cannot be secured from the expenditure of adequate funds, unless these are administered by well trained men. One of the encouraging things about the new régime is the appointment of competent foreign advisers, men who know the needs of the country, understand the difficulties of the problem and bring to bear upon its solution the results of generations of western experience.

Most important of all, China must be willing to learn and adopt what is best in western experience and civilization. The Chinese has every reason to be proud of his nation; no person in the world more so. The Chinese has every reason to feel sensitive because of the treatment accorded by other nations; treatment that no self-respecting nation could fail to resent. But the Chinese must recognize, as the new leaders willingly do, that times have changed and that if China is to assume the place that is hers by right of history and inherent and demonstrated capacity, she must willingly learn from her younger but more aggressive

rivals of the West. And when she seeks to learn from us, she must be quick to discern the things of real value. I have seen in Chinese schools most elaborate collections of scientific apparatus, larger than most American schools can boast, but they were useless because the teachers could not use them to advantage. Railways, factories, schools, westernized political institutions are necessary and good, but the Japanese have learned to their sorrow that the material elements of civilization are not enough, and they are now seeking to discover the secret of true greatness and permanence. China bids fair to be spared some of this disillusionment because so many of the leaders have adopted the very heart of western civilization in its ethical aspects, and have grafted it upon the old but rather fruitless stock of Confucian civilization.

This leads naturally to the last point.

IV. HOW THE WEST CAN BE MOST HELPFUL

The most fundamental thing is this. The West must be willing to treat China as an equal just as rapidly as she demonstrates her worthiness of such treatment. The attitude of the Chinese up to within a generation was one of proud superciliousness. The government regarded all the rest of the world as barbarians. It was even claimed that what civilization the West possessed was derived from China. The West resented this attitude, and rightly so, and compelled China, at the mouth of the canon, to change, and then the western nations adopted a somewhat similar attitude. They forced China to open her ports, prescribed her customs duties, secured foreign supervision of the customs, insisted that coast and inland trade might be carried on by vessels flying foreign flags, boldly plotted the dismemberment of the empire, and even now in certain quarters are seeking to prevent China from strengthening her control of her outlying territory. The pathetic thing is that many of these acts were really in the interest of China. Nor is that all. The western people have thought China a good field for exploitation and in matters of concessions have

not always played fair. The Chinese have been excluded from our country and maltreated here and elsewhere. The Chinese coolie trade while it lasted was only an improvement upon the old African slave trade. The white man almost unconsciously and automatically assumes an attitude of proud superiority to the Chinese in China or the West. A good expression of what many persons feel was the address from President Tyler to the Emperor of China, written in 1843, which was so patronizing in its tone that an American can hardly read it now without blushing for the honor of his country. As the people and nations of the West have come to know the Chinese better, their attitude has improved, but yet there is enough left to make difficult the most cordial relations between China and her western sisters, and this lack of cordiality detracts from the influence that the West might easily wield. Especially in these days, when the new government is gradually but successfully solving the almost insoluble problems which confronted it, it is time to give tangible evidence of a sympathy with the efforts of the Chinese to prepare themselves for entrance as self-respecting partners into the family of nations. The threat of territorial aggrandizement, the insistence upon very onerous conditions in financial transactions, make the task of China almost unbearably hard. It almost forces her to devote to military purposes a large sum of money, every cent of which is needed for education, the improvement of roads and waterways, the building of railways, the development of resources, and the improvement of administration. The powers should do more than merely cease their threats. One of the inducements for Japan to improve its civil and judicial administration was the desire to get into a position where it might properly demand that the foreign powers abandon the right of extra-territoriality. It was a proud day for Japan when it ceased to be an inferior state like Turkey, and could look the whole world in the face as a recognized equal of the western powers. The Chinese are likewise affronted by the fact that they have no jurisdiction over foreigners. No one can blame the powers for being unwilling to intrust their people to the old corrupt courts

of China, with their barbarous penalties, their torture, and the like. Just as soon, however, as China has proved her willingness and her ability to secure justice for all resident within her borders, then the powers should relieve China from wearing the badge of inferiority. A similar position should be taken with regard to foreign supervision of revenue and expenditure. A certain amount of supervision is probably necessary for the sake of China itself, but it should be reduced to a minimum, and should disappear as rapidly as is compatible with safety.

Another way in which western influence may be made more helpful is by improving the example that the western nations set China and the way in which the Chinese are received and treated in the West. Our civilization is often brought into disrepute by its toleration of elements that are anything but praiseworthy. Many a foreigner, including Chinese, has visited this country, seen the darker side of our civilization, and either been corrupted or disgusted thereby. Such a man returns to decry the boasted superiority of the West or to exert a positively evil influence. Aggressive and successful efforts to remove the moral and social blots upon our western civilization will do much to commend it to others. If Chinese residents and visitors are treated in a just and brotherly manner and are given the opportunity of seeing the best sides of our western life, it will do much to commend western civilization to the Chinese and will furnish both incentive and direction for improving the conditions in China.

The West can also assist China by enlarging the educational, medical, and philanthropic activities conducted by Christian agencies in that country. While the new government and the people, moved by the spirit of the new era, will do much along these lines, these are points at which the people of the West can give material assistance. Experience elsewhere proves the value even to government education of the presence and the competition of efficient, well-staffed and equipped Christian schools, which can accomplish more in the way of character building than is possible in government schools. They can train leaders,

whether avowed Christians or not, who can contribute an element of upright, disinterested and self-sacrificing service that the secular institution finds it more difficult to secure. By using a certain number of western teachers, they can give the students a sanity and breadth of view and an appreciation of the difficulty and slowness of social development, that is next to impossible in a school none of the staff of which have a background of centuries of struggle with just these problems. This means that the Christian forces should deliberately direct their energies to the training, not only of distinctly religious workers, but also of Christian leaders in the industrial, commercial, yes, and the political life of the new China. There is a chance, also, by sending out more doctors to assist the small but increasing number of well trained Chinese physicians, who for many years will be unable to overtake the physical needs of 400,000,000 people living under poor sanitary conditions. Then, too, the Christian physician can minister to the mental and spiritual needs of these people and bring to them a comfort and inspiration that is beyond the power of the non-Christian doctor, however competent he may be professionally. In the realm of Christian philanthropy there is a further opportunity. The call upon the spirit of brotherliness that arises from the poverty and squalor of millions of Chinese homes in thousands of villages is beyond the power of the present generation to meet. Experience in India and Japan abundantly testifies to the fact that while the non-Christian can imitate the activities that have been developed in the West under the inspiration of the Christian religion, there is a flavor, an atmosphere about the Christian orphanage, asylum, or settlement that is peculiarly its own, and that gives it a success beyond the reach of the non-Christian. A tree is known by its fruits, but we have not yet learned to produce the fruit apart from the tree.

This leads naturally to the declaration of my belief that one of the greatest services the West can render to the new China is by the more vigorous effort to develop a self-supporting and self-directing Chinese church. It has already been noted that a goodly proportion of the leaders of the

revolution in China are Christians and those who have adopted Christian ideals. They are seeking to make China a more righteous as well as a more powerful nation. The difficulty with China has not been the lack of a high ethical code. China has been weak, among other reasons, because of the lack of a moral dynamic to make those ideals realizable. A century of Christian work in China has proved beyond a doubt that Christianity can furnish this dynamic. It has changed the lives of thousands and sent them forth to serve their fellow countrymen. China needs many things. Without industrial development, without political reform, without a more general spread of education, the dreams of the new China cannot become actual. Nevertheless, if China gets or is given these things but fails to secure this new ethical power, they will count for little, as Japanese leaders are now coming to realize. It is at this point that the Christian West can make its most valuable contribution to the life of China and through it to the life of the world. The doors are open now; they may later be closed.

We have thus sketched the part that western influence has played in preparing the way for the radical changes that have occurred in China within a twelvemonth. We have noted some of the outstanding points of strength and of weakness in the Chinese people and some of the specific ways in which the West can be most helpful to the new China. It is all summed up in this: China needs the help of a good example and of a spirit of brotherly assistance, especially along ethical lines, as she is seeking to adapt her ancient Confucian civilization to the new environment into which she finds herself plunged, against her own wishes; to the end that the most populous as well as the oldest nation may have her share in the unified development of the human race as it struggles towards the ideal of perfect self-realization through a life of achievement and service.

CHINA'S LOAN NEGOTIATIONS

By Hon. Willard Straight, Representative of the American Banking Group

It is the purpose of this paper to explain, if possible, three things: (1) the significance of Chinese loans; (2) the importance of securing and retaining an American interest therein, and (3), the peculiar difficulties encountered in the recent loan negotiations.

Dr. Arthur H. Smith, in that able and interesting work, *Chinese Characteristics*, pointed out that those who, understanding the vernacular, walk in China's streets will hear the passersby talk of little save money. As it has been with the daily life of the people so it is today with the political life of the nation. The question of money is all important. For the last ten years, and especially in the past twelve months which witnessed China's wonderful transformation from the oldest empire to the youngest republic in the world, there has been an incessant discussion of Chinese loans.

China's loan history may be divided into four periods:

The first, immediately after the Chino-Japan War—when funds were secured from abroad to pay the indemnity exacted by Japan at its conclusion.

The second, following the so-called "leasing years" when the great powers encouraged their bankers to finance railway construction in the regions which they had marked out as their spheres of special interest, and when besides acting as the politico-financial agents of their governments, these bankers secured for the industry of their respective countries the orders for the materials required.

The third, following the Russo-Japanese War, when likin was pledged as security for loans and when a combination to

which the American group was later admitted was formed by British, German and French financiers for undertaking Chinese loans, and for sharing the orders for materials required for their construction.

The fourth, and present period, in which a combination has been effected between the four groups named above and Russian and Japanese interests, for jointly financing the reorganization of the Chinese government.

American bankers were first interested in Chinese finance in the second period, in the Hankow-Canton Railroad; for business, not for politics. Their rights were sold back to China who financed the repurchase by a loan obtained from the government of Hongkong, which thus for obvious political, because geographical, reasons, secured for British interests a preferential right to finance the construction of this road in case foreign capital should later be required.

During the third period the American group was organized and became associated with the British, German and French banking groups. The American group, moreover, greatly contributed to the successful formation of the combination which marks the fourth period, a combination which is the financial expression of John Hay's "Open Door" policy, and which makes of international finance a guarantee for the preservation, rather than an instrument for the destruction, of China's integrity.

Before discussing the most recent phase of China's loan negotiations however, and the manner in which the American group at the instance of the Department of State made its entry into this field, it is necessary briefly to review the history of the past few years, and to consider the factors in the creation of what has been called "Dollar Diplomacy."

Because of this so-called "Dollar Diplomacy," President Taft, and his Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, have been subjected to no small measure of criticism. The administration one hears has formed an unholy alliance with the Octopus; and Wall Street, the property scape-goat of our national political drama, is accused of seducing a reluctant and hitherto well-domesticated government into the maelstrom of international financial adventure.

As if this were not sufficient, sober and intelligent journals have demanded why American capital should seek foreign fields when there is so much work to be done at home. Others admitting the desirability of foreign investment and the possible necessity of diplomatic support for those who undertake it, have objected to the administration's assisting certain institutions in Wall Street instead of American bankers in general. It must be remembered, however, that the success of any association of American capitalists undertaking this business depends primarily on their being of such standing as command respect from financial groups abroad and upon their willingness and ability to bear the expense of representation through tedious and too often unremunerative negotiations. Without these qualifications American bankers are not equipped to become the instruments which our government requires to assist in the extension of our foreign trade.

Another section of the press hails each and every over-sea venture with indiscriminate enthusiasm and rhetorically preens the feathers of the Bird of Freedom, sneering at or condemning our rivals, and lauding American enterprise with an impartial disregard of the real facts.

There has been too much unjust criticism, too much unwarranted praise, and too general a lack of candid exposition and intelligent comprehension of the reasons for, and possibilities of, "Dollar Diplomacy."

"Dollar Diplomacy" is a logical manifestation of our national growth, and the rightful assumption by the United States of a more important place at the council table of nations. Our export trade is constantly increasing and foreign markets are becoming each year more and more necessary to our manufacturers. The new policy aims not only to protect those Americans already engaged in foreign trade but to promote fresh endeavor and by diplomatic action pave the way for those who have not yet been, but who will later be, obliged to sell either capital or goods abroad.

European diplomacy is engaged in solving a maze of complicated questions immediately political, ultimately commercial in character. France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria

and Japan are endeavoring to acquire fresh fields for colonization or to create preferential markets for their merchants. Great Britain with her world-wide possessions is involved directly or indirectly, in almost every international question that arises and with these powers too, diplomacy has for years been of the "Dollar" variety.

International rivalry of this character, however, is found only in those countries whose native administrations are either decrepit or which are still militarily too weak to secure that consideration, which, unfortunately, depends not upon international equity, but upon the power of self-protection. In such lands a government desiring to secure a market for its nationals must because of the pressure of its competitors either acquire territory or insist on an equality of commercial opportunity. It must either stake out its own claim, or induce other interested powers to preserve the "open door." There is no middle course. This is a statement not of benevolent theories, but of political facts.

The people of the United States do not desire fresh territory over seas. The policy of our government has been to secure for American merchants the "open door." American industry has until recently been too much engaged by our own domestic expansion seriously to set about the establishment of foreign markets. A far-seeing administration has therefore inaugurated a new policy, the alliance of diplomacy, with industry, commerce and finance.

This is "Dollar Diplomacy." It has been active in various ways. In South America it has aided our merchants and manufacturers. In Central America, politics have played a more important part, and the Department of State has attempted to bring about financial reform in these smaller republics, and to prevent the recurrence of the revolutions whose leaders have almost without exception been actuated solely by a desire to acquire control of the national revenues. In China certain very tangible results have been accomplished and it is to give a more accurate conception of this much discussed, but little understood subject, that this paper is written.

Prior to 1894, China had practically no foreign debt. In 1894-1896, however, she borrowed extensively from England, France and Germany, to finance the war with Japan, and to provide the indemnity which she was forced to pay at its conclusion. These loans were secured upon the collections of the Imperial Maritime Customs, a Chinese service under the control of that able Irishman, Sir Robert Hart. In 1898, however, China made a number of contracts for loans for railway construction, with British, German, French, Belgian and American syndicates. Under all these agreements the bankers were entitled to a certain share in the profits of the lines, which were themselves to be mortgaged as security for the loans, and provision was made in almost every case for joint foreign and Chinese management. The railway materials and rolling stock required were purchased from the manufacturers of the countries whose bankers undertook to issue these loans.

The cession of Formosa to Japan at the termination of the Chino-Japanese War, the occupation of Chinese territory by Russia, Germany, France and England, in 1897-1898 and the exchange of "diplomatic notes" between these powers regarding the protection of their respective interests in China, together with the signature of the railway agreements mentioned gave rise to a discussion throughout the European and American press of the imminent breakup of China and the partition of this ancient empire into "spheres of influence."

In China the broad significance of these events was probably appreciated by but few, even of the leading statesmen of the time, but these men, nevertheless, and the gentry and official classes throughout the provinces felt that their country was becoming dominated by the foreigner. Seaports had been wrested from them, and, not content with this, the strangers were binding their helpless motherland with rails of steel.

For some years prior to 1898, the Empress Dowager had been in comparative retirement. The attempt of the young Emperor, Kuang Hsü, however, under the advice of Kang Yu Wei, suddenly to introduce widespread reform, brought

this redoubtable lady to the front once more. Popular discontent, fomented by bigoted and ignorant officials was winked at if not encouraged by a court which feared that the extension of western influence might bring about administrative changes which would curtail their opportunities for illicit gain. The Boxer outbreak was the result, and in 1900 the reactionaries made one last attempt to sweep the foreigner into the sea. Peking was occupied by the allied troops, the Manchu court fled to Sianfu, and China was saddled with a fresh debt of about £60,000,000 to pay for her mid-summer madness. This was charged upon the Maritime Customs, upon certain likin collectorates and upon the salt gabelle.

In 1898-1899 the American Secretary of State, John Hay, anxious to prevent the partition of China and to protect the interests of general foreign trade against discrimination in the portions of Chinese territory already occupied by foreign powers, enunciated his "Open Door" policy. His proposition, favorably received at first and reaffirmed in the negotiations which followed the relief of Peking, won the adherence of other nations not because of any particular consideration for China but because of their mutual jealousy and their realization that partition would impose upon them responsibilities which they might find it difficult to bear.

They did not therefore surrender the ports which they had forcibly leased, but their acceptance of the "Open Door" doctrine nevertheless marked the beginning of a financial and commercial, rather than territorial, definition of their respective interests. The Russo-Chinese Bank had been created in 1895 as the chief instrument of Russian ambition in her Manchurian adventure. This institution and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Banque de l'Indo-Chine and the Yokohama Specie Bank, now became more and more generally recognized as indispensable financial means to the political and commercial ends of their respective governments.

In contrast to the peaceful rivalry in China proper, the situation in Manchuria became more and more threatening. Russia despite her diplomatic assurances to the contrary

did not evacuate this region occupied after the Boxer trouble. She persisted moreover in an attempt to acquire control over northern Korea as well, until Japan, avowedly the champion of China's integrity and the "Open Door" for the trade of all nations, declared war.

Relieved by the defeat of Russia Peking breathed more easily. This satisfaction, however, was short lived, for the Chinese soon became convinced that Japan not unnaturally intended to reap for herself and not assure to China, the fruits of her splendid victory. She had taken from Russia the Liaotung Peninsula, from which she had herself been ousted after the China-Japan War. More than that, she succeeded to Russia's rights in the railway running north from Port Arthur and in the coal mines at Fushun.

When His Excellency Yuan Shih Kai, now President of the Chinese Republic, went to Tientsin as Viceroy of Chihli Province, he had with him a number of officials, notably Tang Shao Yi and Liang Tun Yen, who had been recalled from America in the early 80's, but who had not after their return to China been given much share in the direction of affairs. Yuan soon found himself at the head of what might be called a "Reform" party, and these subordinates of his, able, accomplished and well versed in American and European methods greatly aided him in instilling new force and intelligence into the Peking government. Administrative reforms were demanded, the Chinese press, hitherto practically non-existent, began to assert itself, and young men educated abroad returned to direct a "rights recovery" agitation which soon developed anti-Manchu propaganda and which found its final expression in the revolution of last year.

Peking became concerned about Japan's activity in Manchuria. Their Excellencies Hsü Shih Chang and Tang Shao Yi were sent to Mukden to establish, if possible, Chinese authority throughout the Three Eastern Provinces, and to exercise the right to develop this region under Chinese auspices, assured by the Portsmouth Treaty and the so-called Komura Convention, signed between China and Japan in the autumn of 1905.

They had no intention of interfering with the treaty rights acquired by Japan, but they wished, if possible, to induce

British, German, French and American capitalists to invest in the development of this region.

In the autumn of 1907, Lord French, representing Messrs. Pauling and Company, the well known firm of English contractors signed with the Manchurian Viceroy a contract for the construction of a railroad from Hsinmintun a point on the Peking-Mukden Railway, to Fakumen, with the ultimate object of extending this line north to Tsitsihar on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Japan protested on the ground that the construction of such a road would violate the provisions of the secret protocol attached to the Komura Convention, stipulating that China should build no railway parallel to or competing with, the South Manchurian Road.

Subsequently in the summer of 1908, His Excellency Tang Shao Yi signed a Memorandum of Agreement for a loan of \$20,000,000, to be undertaken by American capitalists for the establishment of a bank which was to act as the financial agent of the Manchurian administration for development work. This marked the beginning of the negotiations which led to the organization of the American group, the signature of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway loan agreement, the conclusion of the currency loan and the formation of the present six-power group.

In May, 1908, Congress had approved President Roosevelt's recommendation that the United States return to China a portion of the Boxer indemnity. Senator Root, then Secretary of State, and His Excellency W. W. Rockhill, then American Minister to China, suggested that the remitted funds should be expended in financing the education of Chinese students in the United States.

His Excellency Tang Shao Yi was appointed Special Ambassador, ostensibly to thank the American government for its generous action. His real mission was to negotiate the Manchurian loan with American bankers. On arriving in Washington, however, he advocated a much more comprehensive scheme. He proposed to Secretary Root that China should issue a loan of \$300,000,000 to be utilized for a program of industrial development, for currency reform, and to finance the Chinese administration during the period fol-

lowing the intended abolition of likin and until the consent of all the powers to an increase in the customs tariff was obtained. Mr. Tang desired an international loan in which he wished the United States to take the lead and Mr. Root promised to support this plan. With the authority of Mr. Root and the sanction of President Roosevelt the matter was brought to the attention of American bankers, but it was necessary temporarily to abandon the project owing to the dismissal of His Excellency Yuan Shih Kai from the high office which he then held in Peking.

Following the inauguration of Mr. Taft, however, the President and Mr. Knox became keenly interested and the Department of State desired, as soon as an opportune moment should arise, to reopen the question of customs revision and likin abolition, as well as currency reform, in accordance with the stipulations of our commercial treaty with China of 1903. With a view to taking up the proposed loan at the proper time, the American bankers, who have been interested, closely followed the situation.

In May, 1909, it became known that the British, French and German financial groups were about to conclude an agreement, to be secured on provincial revenues, for the construction of the Hukuang Railways, i.e., the lines from Hankow into Szechuan and from Hankow to Canton.

The Department of State held the promise of the Chinese government that if any foreign money were required for the construction of the Hankow-Szechuan Line one-half should be secured from American and one-half from British capitalists. The fact that internal taxes, upon whose abolition the contemplated increase of the Maritime Customs tariff depended, were being pledged as security for the new railway loan, directly affected the fulfillment of the engagement which the Department of State had made to assist China in obtaining from the other powers their consent to customs revision.

In order, therefore, that the United States might be entitled to a practical, and not merely a theoretical, voice in this matter, as well as to assure to American manufacturers a share in the profits of Chinese railway construction and the

business arising therefrom, it was essential that representative American capitalists should participate in the Hukuang loan. The Department of State offered this opportunity to the bankers already interested in the loan proposed by Mr. Tang Shao Yi and the American Group was organized creating an instrument which it was hoped might enable the Administration not only to further the interests of American trade but effectively to assist China in obtaining the consent of the powers to the customs revision she so greatly desired.

In the autumn of 1909, immediately following the organization of the American Group, a preliminary agreement was entered into with the Viceroy of Manchuria, by the American group and Messrs. Pauling and Company, for the construction of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway. Much has been written regarding this subject and in Europe especially, our government has been criticised for the so-called Manchurian "Neutralization Proposals" advanced toward the close of 1909, and which were politely declined by Japan and Russia at the beginning of the following year. Although the story of the inception of this project does not perhaps fall directly within the scope of this paper, it may be well here to recite certain facts in connection therewith which, had they been known, might have given a very different complexion to journalistic comment at the time.

The scheme of bringing the Russian and Japanese railroads in Manchuria under the control of a great international company was first conceived by the late Mr. E. H. Harriman, as a factor necessary to the realization of his dream of creating a "round the world" transportation system.

At the close of the Russo-Japanese War, Mr. Harriman visited the Far East. In September, 1905, working closely with the Hon. Lloyd Griscom, then American Minister to Japan, he drew up with the late Prince Ito and Count, now Prince, Katsura then Premier of Japan, a memorandum stipulating that the portion of the Chinese Eastern R. R. from Kwangchengtze to Port Arthur and Dalny (now known as the South Manchurian Railway), which had been acquired by Japan from Russia under the provisions of the Ports-

mouth Treaty, should be financed by an American loan and operated under joint Japanese and American direction.

This project was never realized. It was blocked by the late Marquis Komura, who raised what appeared to be insuperable objections to Mr. Harriman's plan.

Mr. Harriman however did not give up his idea. Agents of the Russian government during 1906-1907 proposed to certain American bankers that they purchase from Russia the portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway which remained in Russian hands at the end of the war, i.e., the line running across northern Manchuria, with its branch from Harbin south to Kwangchengtze. The Russians stated that they were willing to sell in case Japan also could be persuaded to dispose of the South Manchurian Railway.

In this connection it should be remembered that the agreement between China and the Russo-Asiatic Bank for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, provided that China might repurchase the line after 36 years and that it would in any case revert to China at the termination of an eighty-year period.

Japan under the Komura Convention had been recognized by China as successor to the Russian rights, under this agreement, to the portion of the road acquired after the war.

It was proposed therefore that an international syndicate should anticipate the operation of this clause and repurchase the line on China's behalf, at this time, rather than later.

The scheme was discussed with Mr. Tang, during his stay in Washington, in the autumn of 1908 and he expressed the opinion that China would be glad to cooperate. An important Japanese financier who had been informally advised of the plan, however, stated that Japan would be unwilling to acquiesce therein.

Notwithstanding this fact the negotiations with Russia were continued and, in the summer of 1909, Mr. Harriman, through a leading Paris banker, approached M. Kokovtseff, then Minister of Finance, now Premier, of Russia, and was assured that on his return from a trip to Vladivostock, upon which he was about to start, M. Kokovtseff would recom-

mend the sale of the Russian Railway. This he did in a public address on his return to Moscow.

The existence of the Harriman memorandum, and the attitude of the Russian Minister of Finance aside from the broader political considerations involved, justified the American proposals. An entente had been arranged between Japan and Russia, however, in 1907. Both powers were greatly disturbed by the neutralization scheme and thanks to the understanding reached by M. Isvolsky the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Motono the Japanese Ambassador in St. Petersburg, they refused to join in Secretary Knox's plan. Russian objections to the Chinchou-Aigun project, as well as the conditions imposed by Japan as precedent to her participation therein, moreover prevented the construction of this road.

Furthermore lest there should be any further misunderstanding as to their attitude these powers in the convention of July 4, 1910, agreed jointly to safeguard their respective interests in Manchuria—an arrangement which, though undoubtedly a natural one, was not, it must be admitted, calculated to assure to China herself the right to develop this territory.

In May, 1910, an arrangement was reached with the French, German and British groups for the participation of the American group in the Hukuang loan. At this time the three groups first mentioned invited the American group to join them in the combination which they had effected the year before for undertaking Chinese loans.

This invitation was later accepted and an intergroup agreement was signed in November, 1910.

On October 27 of that year the American Group had concluded a preliminary agreement for a £10,000,000 loan, to finance China's currency reform and to undertake certain industrial enterprises in Manchuria.

When the American Group was first organized, and actively supported by the State Department, was seeking participation in the Hukuang loan, Secretary Knox had declared that the American Government believed that the interests of China and of international trade with that country could best

be served by the friendly coöperation of the great lending nations and their banking groups.

It was in pursuance of this policy that the American group entered into the combination with the other groups and admitted them to equal participation in the currency loan, the final contract for which was signed on April 15, 1911.

The final agreement for the Hukuang loan was also signed with China by the same parties on May 20 of that year.

In the present negotiations with China for the reorganization loan, as in fact in all loan negotiations during the past few years, the banking groups have found their greatest difficulty in the settlement of the question of "control." It may be well therefore before giving the story of the recent negotiations to review briefly the history of this much discussed term.

The word "control" has for some time commonly been used to denote the guarantees against improper expenditure of loan funds which the banking groups, in a greater or less degree, have insisted upon securing, to which the Chinese government has from time to time reluctantly agreed, and constantly endeavored to modify.

"Control" in the at present accepted sense of the word was first embodied in the agreement made by the Chinese government in 1898, with the British and Chinese Corporation, for a loan to the Imperial Railways of North China.

Under this agreement, and in several others concluded at about this time, the lenders, besides securing a first mortgage on the railway whose construction they financed, were entitled to a share in the profits of the line.

For this reason and also because of the inexperience of the Chinese in railway matters, the bankers required assurances that the loaned funds should be so expended that the mortgaged property would constitute a sufficient security.

They furthermore obtained a certain share in the management of these lines in order that there should be secured therefrom an adequate return (to a certain percentage of which the banks were entitled), and to prevent the administrative inefficiency and fraud which they feared if the operation of these railways were placed entirely in Chinese hands.

The original railway loan agreements embodying the provisions above described were all concluded prior to the Boxer outbreak of 1900.

The final Shanghai-Nanking and Canton-Kowloon Agreements (the Canton-Kowloon Agreement slightly modified the "Shanghai-Nanking" terms) confirming these stipulations were signed in 1904 and 1907 respectively. The Tientsin-Pukow loan agreement concluded in 1908, however, substantially altered these conditions.

Its signature marked the first recognition by the banks of the increasing efficiency of the "Young China" party. These men demanded the radical modification of the old loan terms. They considered "control" subversive of China's sovereign rights and flattered by the blandishments of rival foreign interests, they were determined to exact from the world a consideration similar to that accorded Japan after years of patriotic self-sacrifice and conscientious endeavor. The avowed purpose of these officials to weaken the hold of the foreigner on China was heartily applauded throughout the provinces. It served as a patriotic issue on which an appeal could be made to the masses and a cloak under which the provincial gentry could cover their real purpose, which was to restrict the extension of the Peking government's authority by railways built with foreign loans, or otherwise, and their determination that if foreign loans were made, the chances for speculation should not be monopolized by the metropolitan mandarins.

Under the Tientsin-Pukow contract the Chinese government, by a cash payment redeemed the right held by the banks under the original agreement signed in 1898, to a share in the profits of the railway. No mortgage on the line was given. The loan service was to be met from the earnings of the road or from certain provincial taxes; and in this agreement it was for the first time stipulated that, in case of default on the loan service, the hypothecated revenues should be administered by the Maritime Customs Service. The principle of joint management was abandoned. The banking groups, however, insisted that the Chinese government should employ foreign engineers for the con-

struction of the line, and during the life of the loan, and that requisitions on loan funds specifying the purposes for which these sums were to be applied should be signed by the director general. The construction accounts of the railway were to be open to examination by foreign auditors to be appointed by the banks. Under former loan agreements the auditors had been empowered to stop the withdrawal of funds in case the Chinese officials were found guilty of peculation. This authority was not conferred by the Tientsin-Pukow contract and the effect of this modification soon became apparent.

The so-called "Tientsin-Pukow" terms, however, did not prove to be an effective guarantee against "graft."

From the commencement of the construction of this line there have been numerous scandals, the most flagrant instance resulting in the degradation of the director general and a number of his subordinates. The cost of construction has far exceeded even the most liberal estimates, and the loan service will therefore constitute a heavy charge on the revenues of the line.

Owing to the unsatisfactory operation of the so-called "Tientsin-Pukow" terms, negotiations were conducted in the winter of 1908-1909 between the British, German and French groups and their respective governments with a view to reaching an understanding as to the degree of "control" to be demanded from China as a condition precedent to future loans.

There are different versions as to the exact course of events in China at this time. It is, however, sufficient to state that in conducting *pour-parlers* with the Chinese authorities for a loan to construct the Canton-Hankow Railway,¹ the representative of the British and Chinese Corporation at Peking refused to agree to "Tientsin-Pukow" terms and insisted on more effective "control." The representative of the German group, however, accepted these conditions and secured the contract. The diplomatic protests and recriminations amongst the bankers which followed resulted in a compro-

¹ British capital had obtained a "preference" for financing the construction of this road. (See § 3, page 2.)

mise under which the British and Chinese Corporation was subordinated to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, which with its French associates, combined with the German group, to negotiate a loan to cover not only the Hankow-Canton but the Hankow-Szechuan Railways. The agreement was initialled on the sixth of June, 1909, and the "control" provisions accepted by the banks were similar to those embodied in the Tientsin-Pukow Agreement.

The inclusion of the loan for the construction of the Hankow-Szechuan Railway in this operation entitled American interests to the participation which the American group eventually secured.

Rivalry between the British and German groups had enabled the Chinese in the original Hukuang Agreement to secure "Tientsin-Pukow" terms despite the fact that the operation thereof had demonstrated that more stringent "control" provisions were needed.

Furthermore, during the year which elapsed before an agreement was finally reached between the British, German and French groups and the American group, there was an ever-increasing "anti-loan" agitation in the provinces through which the Hukuang lines were to be constructed. Provincial railway companies² were formed and secured from the vacillating Peking government rights which violated the terms of the agreement initialled with the "Tripartite Banks," and in which the Chinese had agreed the American group should be given a participation.

The National Assembly, the forerunner of the proposed Chinese Parliament was convoked for the first time in the autumn of 1910. Its members from the outset interested themselves in the question of finance and showed a determi-

² Considerable sums, quite insufficient however to build the railways in question, were secured by popular subscription, and in Szechuan province by taxation also. Construction work was commenced, and abandoned, and in a number of well authenticated cases the funds obtained by the companies were either lost by the directors thereof, who speculated heavily in the Shanghai "Rubber Boom," or stolen by more simple and direct methods. The demonstrated inability of the provincial companies to do the work they had undertaken was used by the imperial government to justify its very sound policy of railway "nationalization."

nation to scrutinize government expenditures, which the bankers felt would serve to restrict, even though it might not prevent, official peculation.

The National Assembly, moreover, was entitled to pass upon all government loans and was known to be opposed to a foreign loan for the construction of the Hukuang railways by the central government, instead of by the provincial companies. Sheng Kung Pao, Minister of communications, was determined, however, to build the Hukuang lines, and in response to the protests of the Assembly he pointed out that in negotiating the loan in question, he was fulfilling an obligation entered into in 1909, prior to the convocation of the Assembly, by the Grand Councillor Chang Chih Tung. He was obliged therefore to adhere as strictly as possible to the terms of the original contract, and would not and could not have consented to any new "control" conditions at this time.

In this arrangement the bankers acquiesced, feeling that the punishment inflicted after the Tientsin-Pukow frauds and the surveillance of the National Assembly over the expenditure of loan funds, as well as the difficulties by which the central government was confronted, justified them in confirming the "control" provisions of the original agreement.

The Currency Loan was of a different character, coming under the head of "government" or "administrative" loans. Practically the only loans previously falling within this category had been required to pay indemnities abroad and there was no necessity therefore that the lenders should exercise "control" over their expenditure. The currency loan, however, was to carry out a definite program and not for general administrative purposes. The four banking groups now acting in harmony believed some form of supervision to be necessary, and it was thought that the "control" machinery devised for railway loans, could, with certain modifications be utilized for assuring the proper application of the borrowed funds under the currency reform program.

The Chinese had reluctantly agreed to various control provisions in railway loan agreements, but they feared

that to admit the principle of supervision over administrative expenditures would be to pave the way for foreign control over China's general finances. An arrangement was finally made, however, whereby China submitted to the groups her program of currency reform for their acceptance, and agreed to expend the loan funds only in accordance therewith, to publish quarterly reports of disbursements made, and to engage a foreign expert to assist the Bureau of Currency Reform.

The loan has not been issued but it is open to question whether this "control," in practice, would have prevented speculation, and insured the proper expenditure of loan funds, and the effective operation of the currency reform program.

Immediately following the outbreak at Wuchang, on October 11, 1911, which marked the beginning of the revolution³ in China the representatives of the four banking groups in Peking were approached regarding a loan to the imperial government. The Manchus, however, seemed unable to cope with the rapidly developing revolt and the groups were unwilling to advance funds to a government whose continued existence seemed problematical. Their governments moreover decided to observe absolute neutrality as between the contending factions and refused to approve any loans to either side. The financial history of the Revolution has been ably told by Mr. George Bronson Rea in the *Far*

³ It has been generally stated that the disturbances in Szechuan province in August and September last marked the beginning of the revolutionary movement. This is not the case except that the general unrest created thereby contributed to the rapid spread of anti-Manchu sentiment. The Szechuan agitation was directed against the "nationalization" of railways, and the banking groups therefore have been accused of being the indirect cause of the revolt. This again is not true. The agitation was not against railway "nationalization" which the most intelligent leaders of Chinese public opinion recognized as desirable, but against the manner in which it was carried into effect. Shung Kung Pao, the Minister of Communication, upon the signature of the Hukuang Loan Agreement took steps to repurchase the rights of the provincial companies in accordance with the "nationalization" plan. Incidentally, it is reported on the best authority, he bought up the major portion of some of the provincial bonds, and offered to redeem them at par. He did not acquire control of the Szechuan bonds and therefore offered only 60 per cent on the face value. Hence the riots.

Eastern Review and in this account those who are interested may read of the various negotiations, practically all of them unsuccessful, undertaken by both the imperial and republican authorities during this period.

The Prince Regent of China retired on December 6, 1911, turning over the reins of government to Yuan Shih Kai, whom he had dismissed three years before at a time when he stood out, as he does today, as the only man capable of coping with China's domestic troubles and the difficulties by which she is threatened from abroad.

The Emperor abdicated on February 12, 1912, and on March 10 Yuan Shih Kai was inaugurated as provisional president of the Chinese Republic.

The present loan negotiations with the Chinese government were commenced in the middle of February, when the acting Minister of Finance, His Excellency Chou Tzu Chi, approached the representatives of the so-called "Four Groups" (i.e., British, German, French and American) at Peking, and asked for an immediate loan.

On February 26, Mr. Tang Shao Yi, representing the republican authorities at Nanking, arrived in Peking for the purpose of arranging a coalition government. On the following day, at Mr. Tang's invitation, the representatives of the four groups discussed with him the question of the loan broached some days before.

Mr. Tang stated the immediate requirements of the Chinese government, and requested the representatives to ask their groups to finance the same. In addition he discussed the Chinese revenues available as security for a large loan to reorganize the Chinese administration, and to initiate a scheme of commercial and industrial development. He asked the representatives how much China could borrow on this security, and finally, himself suggested the figure of £60,000,000, which he wished the banks to loan in five annual instalments of £12,000,000 each.

Pursuant to Mr. Tang's request for an immediate advance, the groups on the following day paid in Shanghai the sum of Taels 2,000,000, to meet the urgent requirements of the Nanking authorities.

The four representatives had reported Mr. Tang's request to their principals in Europe and America.⁴ No reply had been received when on the night of February 29 a number of the Chinese troops quartered in Peking mutinied, looted and burned portions of the city, and openly defied the authority of the provisional government. On the following day, March 1, it was suggested to Mr. Tang that it would be desirable that he should make some statement to reassure the groups who were considering his proposition, regarding the probable effect of the outbreak, and the ability of the government to cope therewith.

Mr. Tang's explanation was unsatisfactory, and the burning and looting continued on the night of March 1. On March 2, acting under instructions from Yuan Shih Kai, the acting Minister of Finance, requested from the four groups an immediate advance of 1,015,000 taels. He stated in his letter that the President appreciated that in view of the critical state of affairs in Peking, the groups would not be prepared to lend this money without the authority of their governments, and requested the representatives to secure the necessary sanction from their ministers as soon as possible.

Though Mr. Tang in order to justify the signature of the "Belgian loan" subsequently stated that the groups had refused to render assistance when approached after the mutiny of February 29, no other requests for immediate advances other than that mentioned above was received by the groups at this time.

The seriousness of the situation at this time is shown by the fact that on the same day Mr. Tang Shao Yi had addressed a note to the British Minister stating that he feared the Peking authorities would no longer be able to control the situation, and requesting the Diplomatic Corps to take

⁴ A number of writers on this subject have stated that on February 27 the group representatives made a definite agreement to furnish certain sums. This is not true. The group representatives merely agreed to report Mr. Tang's proposition to their principals. They did, however, in view of the urgent need of funds in Nanking (it was feared that the troops might mutiny if not paid immediately) themselves assume the responsibility of making the advance of Tls. 2,000,000, referred to in the final paragraph of the preceding page.

steps to assist the Chinese in preserving order. Yuan Shi-Kai later denied having authorized Mr. Tang to take this action.

On March 9 the necessary authority having been received from the four governments, the groups advanced the sum requested under an exchange of letters, which (1) assured to the groups the firm option for furnishing "the further monthly requirements of the Chinese government for the months of March, April, May and June, and if necessary, July and August," and (2) in view of the assistance rendered the Chinese government in advancing the sums mentioned above as well as in undertaking the contemplated advances for monthly requirements and maintaining Chinese credit on the markets of the world (by paying Chinese loan interest coupon charges which the Chinese government itself had been unable to meet), the Chinese government assured to the groups the firm option on the reorganization loan (provided their terms were equally advantageous with those otherwise obtainable).

From the proceeds of this projected reorganization loan it was intended to redeem the treasury bills, which were to be issued to cover the advances.

So urgent were the needs of the Chinese government, that the four groups did not at this time arrange the terms upon which they would discount these bills, it being impossible to settle this point until after the conference in Europe of the four groups, which had been called for March 12.

The terms on which the groups were prepared to undertake this business were not, however, communicated to the Chinese authorities, for on the evening of the 14th the four representatives learned that an agreement had that morning been concluded with the so-called "Belgian group" for a loan of £1,000,000, carrying an option for a further large loan.⁵

⁵ The Belgian loan was secured on the Peking-Kalgau R. R. the earnings of which together with the earnings of other "productive enterprises" controlled by the Board of Communications, had been pledged as security for the Anglo-French loan of 1908. The British and French Ministers successfully protested against the alienation of this security. The price paid by the bankers for the Belgian loan was lower than that which the four groups were ready to give—but there were no "control" provisions in the contract.

This transaction was completed at a time when the President and Mr. Tang knew that the representatives were hourly expecting a definite reply from the four groups to the proposals made by Mr. Tang on February 27.

The signature of the "Belgian loan" was virtually the first official act involving the new administration's relations with foreigners. It was a clear breach of contract. The groups, more especially the British, French and German, had since the outbreak of the Revolution in October, been themselves advancing funds to pay interest charges on Chinese loans which they had issued. They had done this to protect the public to which they had sold Chinese bonds, and to protect the credit of China where they had very large vested interests.

Despite the chaotic conditions throughout the provinces, and the absence of any really effective authority in Peking the groups with the support of their governments had been ready to advance to China funds sufficient to put the Peking administration on its feet at a time when no public issue of Chinese bonds was possible, in order to do their part in assisting the restoration of stable conditions.

The signature of the Belgian loan, however, affected the security for the large loan which the groups had been asked to undertake—and it carried no guarantee whatsoever that the funds furnished or to be furnished would be properly expended, it increased China's liabilities without insuring any increase in the effectiveness of her administration and instead of rehabilitating, it was calculated to prejudice, her credit.

The "Belgian loan" contract had been drawn subject to ratification by the "Advisory Council" at Nanking.

Despite the protest made by the four group representatives on March 15, Mr. Tang urged, and finally persuaded, the Council to ratify this agreement, on the ground that the four groups had refused to assist China after the outbreak of February 29. There is no evidence that Mr. Tang at this time informed the Council of the assistance which the groups had rendered, and were prepared to render, or of the existence of the letters of agreement of March 9.

The British, German, French and American Ministers on March 25 formally protested against the conclusion of the "Belgian" loan. Mr. Tang Shao Yi, then prime minister in the newly organized Cabinet, nevertheless attempted to secure further funds from the "Belgian" group. This failing, the Chinese government on April 15, replied to the Minister's protest describing the signature of the "Belgian" loan—and the violation of the letters of agreement of March 9, as a "misunderstanding" and requesting the ministers to instruct the group representative to resume negotiations with the premier on his return to Peking.

The four ministers refused to accept the explanation offered, and insisted that the government should admit its breach of contract with the four groups.⁶

This condition was accepted and negotiations were resumed. During the next few weeks the groups paid over further amounts, making the total sum advanced 12,100,000 taels, or approximately £1,800,000. Agreements covering these later advances were signed on May 17, and June 12 under which, after considerable difficulty, the Chinese had been persuaded to agree to the safeguards which the groups considered essential to assure the application of the loan funds to the payment of troops and to the other purposes for which they were borrowed.

At the request of their respective governments the original four groups with the approval of Yuan Shih Kai had agreed to admit banking interests designated by the Russian and Japanese governments, to a participation in these transactions, and after protracted and most delicate negotiations an agreement was reached between the six groups on June 20, 1912, in Paris, regarding the conditions upon which they were prepared jointly to undertake the proposed reorganization loan to China.

The groups were presented with the problem of financing

⁶The "Belgian" group included the Russo-Asiatic Bank which was later designated by the Russian Government to participate in the "six power" syndicate. Under the Paris agreement of June 20, 1912, the members of the "Belgian" group were recognized by the combination as members of the "Russian" group.

the reconstruction of China on conditions which would be attractive to the bond purchasing public despite the disorganized condition of that country. To appreciate the difficulties the six groups were obliged to take into consideration, it is necessary to summarize the situation existing at this time.

They had been requested by China to furnish roughly 10,000,000 taels or £1,300,000 a month for six months and to provide other sums making the aggregate amount to be advanced 80,000,000 taels or about £10,000,000.

It would have been impossible to issue a Chinese loan at this time except at a figure so low as to prejudice the quotations for Chinese bonds already on the market, in the hands of the public not of the groups. To furnish the sums immediately required therefor the banks would have been obliged to discount treasury bills, which they would have either had to hold themselves, or dispose of to a very limited *clientele*.

These advances were required to pay the army, to finance the disbandment of superfluous troops, and to meet the current expenses of the government. The large loan was to be expended to redeem the treasury bills, to clear off arrears in China's indemnity and loan services, and to meet certain pressing outstanding obligations. Mr. Tang proposed to use the balance to make up the loss of likin, which he desired immediately to abolish, pending the consent of the powers to an increase in the customs tariff. In addition he had certain vague schemes for railway construction, afforestation, and the establishment of mills of various sorts.

For the advances and large loan requested the Chinese government proposed to pledge the salt gabelle as security. The service of the Boxer indemnity is a first charge on this revenue. It was estimated however that it now yields Taels 47,000,000 per annum—and could be increased to at least half as much again if honestly collected.⁷

⁷ Experience at Tientsin and Tsingtao has shown the enormous increase that might be obtained were this tax properly administered. In Tientsin a single station collected in six months as much revenue as the entire district had yielded in a year. At Tsingtao the collections of a station placed under foreign direction were at once increased six-fold.

The Chinese government at this time was powerless to collect the taxes which it offered as security and was unable to meet her indemnity and loan payments, to pay troops or to finance its current administrative expenses and its permanence was by no means assured.

During the course of the negotiations, from February to June, the Chinese officials had shown little appreciation of the magnitude of their financial task and had evinced little ability in dealing effectively therewith.

The groups nevertheless had advanced 12,100,000 taels in order to enable the administration to meet its most urgent needs and to prevent the disorders and mutinies which it was feared would occur unless funds, which the government could not secure from its own people, were obtained.

These advances had been made subject to certain conditions to insure their proper application to the purposes for which they were borrowed yet the Chinese officials charged with their expenditure had placed every obstacle in the way of a proper and efficient audit, to which they had agreed.

Patriotic Chinese, proud of their Republic and hopeful and confident of its future may regret the necessity of including such facts in this statement. These men, however, if they be fair minded, must admit that the banking groups, no matter how friendly they might be to China, would not have been warranted in disregarding them.

Because of these facts the groups were unwilling to undertake the business without the joint support of their respective governments. Because of these facts, moreover, they deemed it possible to proceed with advances and to undertake the reorganization loan only on certain conditions which were briefly as follows:

1. That the groups should have the right to satisfy themselves as to purposes for which funds were required.

2. That China should herself create a system of audit in which foreigners should be employed with powers not merely advisory, but also executive so as to ensure the effective expenditure of loan funds borrowed for the purposes specified.

3. That the salt taxes to be hypothecated for the service

of this loan should be administered either by the existing Maritime Customs organization or by a separate Chinese service like the customs, however, under foreign direction, thus safeguarding the proper administration of the security despite the possible continuation or recurrence of unsettled conditions in China.

4. That the groups should take the first series of the loan of £60,000,000, at a fixed price, and be assured an option on the subsequent series at a price to be based on the market quotation of the first issue, thus giving China the benefit of any improvement in her credit.

5. That to protect the quotation of bonds issued and to assure a successful marketing of subsequent series China should not borrow through other groups until the entire loan of £60,000,000 had been issued.⁸

6. That for a period of five years China should appoint the groups financial agents to assist the administration in its work of reorganization.

These conditions were submitted to the Chinese government and in reply the group representatives in Peking were informed that it would be impossible to China to accept a loan on such terms. Negotiations, however, though interrupted, were not formally broken off, and from the end of June discussions were continued between the Chinese officials and the group representatives, but without result.

The difficulty was not a question of the price at which the bankers should take the bonds. It was the question of "control." The Chinese particularly objected to placing the salt gabelle under the Maritime Customs, or any foreign directed service, and to the creation of a proper audit department to appointing the groups financial agents.

It has of late years become the fashion, particularly among officials, who like Tang Shao Yi, and Liang Tun Yen served for a short time in the Maritime Customs to criticise Sir Robert Hart and his administration. Mr. Drew will give

⁸ In the contract for the so-called "Crisp" loan of £10,000,000 China agreed to a stipulation which virtually prevented her from borrowing, except through the Crisp syndicate, for the period of one year or until the loan had been issued in entirety.

you an account of the life and work of this man, one of the truest friends China ever had.

The younger men, however, forget his splendid service—they do not realize that he did much to save their country, for them, from foreign aggression, and it galls them to admit that for years the Customs Service has been, and is today, with the exception of the Postal Service, also a creation of Sir Robert Hart, the only branch of their entire government which can, if judged by western standards, be termed efficient.

The suggestion that the salt gabelle should be put under the Maritime Customs therefore was refused, nor would the Peking authorities agree to create a similar organization to undertake this work. Chinese and many foreign critics have pointed out that the Customs Service functions at the ports—and that it would therefore be unsuitable for the collection of internal revenue. The Postal Service, also under foreign direction, however, has been successful in its work, conducted throughout China, while customs officials have shown great ability in dealing with likin collectorates and in solving customs problems in the interior of Manchuria.

The groups have not insisted upon the exact form the proposed administration should take. They have, and do, believe that the salt gabelle does not constitute, and cannot be considered, an adequate security unless by placing these taxes under a Chinese government service—but with foreign direction, inspectors, and auditors—an efficient and honest collection be assured.

In the present state of China when the Peking administration has by no means established its authority—when cabinets are formed and dissolved with kaleidoscopic rapidity, when revenues are not being collected, and when there are large bodies of armed men throughout the country, ready at any time to break into open revolt—the groups felt that before engaging to undertake so large a loan as that requested they should be able to be in a position to guide and advise China in her reorganization work, the success of which depends primarily on sound finance. It was for this reason that they asked to be appointed financial agents.

Many of the leading men in Peking have privately recognized the wisdom of the groups' conditions and the advantages to be gained should China accept them. Officially, however, these gentlemen have not dared recommend their adoption, fearing that their political opponents might make any concession to the foreigner the excuse for stirring up an agitation which they would be powerless to quell.

Hoping to obtain less onerous terms the Minister of Finance in July last proposed that the groups should continue advances to be redeemed from a loan of £10,000,000.

This sum, however, would have been scarcely sufficient to meet China's outstanding and immediate obligations. The safeguards which were suggested by the Chinese moreover were inadequate. The groups therefore were unable to negotiate on this basis. The officials then stated that as the groups would not lend on "reasonable" terms they would be obliged to secure funds from their own people. The group representatives and the foreign ministers in Peking welcomed the suggestion, and urged them to make a "popular" loan. This was attempted but without success; the "people" contributed small sums, but not enough. The government next approached certain commercial houses and secured small loans, in return for large contracts for arms and ammunition. Tramway concessions were offered in return for cash advances, and other expedients adopted to secure funds sufficient to meet the government's running expenses, all of which while relieving a temporary necessity merely increased the difficulties of an already almost hopeless financial problem.

Early in September it was reported that on August 30 the Chinese Minister in London had signed a loan agreement with Messrs. C. Birch Crisp and Company of London. Enquiry addressed to the Minister of Finance in Peking evoked the information that he, the Minister of Finance, had had nothing to do with the conclusion of the London contract which had been arranged by his predecessor acting in an informal capacity. The Minister of Finance assured the representatives that China desired to deal with the six groups as the only combination capable of furnishing withi:

the next few years the enormous sums which China would need to reorganize her administration and finance the industrial development upon which the Peking Government wished to embark. At the time this discussion took place funds advanced by Messrs. C. Birch Crisp and Company had already been transferred to China and placed to the credit of the Chinese government in a Tientsin bank. This fact became known to the representatives who brought it to the attention of the Minister of Finance. He reiterated his former declaration that China desired to deal with the six groups and as late as September 23 handed the representatives a statement of conditions which he informed them China would be ready to make the basis for the continuation of negotiations for the reorganization loan. These terms were not considered acceptable by the group representatives. The Minister of Finance thereupon informed them that since they had refused the terms proposed by China he considered that the option which the groups had held, had lapsed and that China was free to negotiate with other parties. The so-called "Crisp" loan was issued in London shortly afterward.

From the above facts it would seem that the Chinese government was prepared to repudiate the contract signed with London bankers on August 30, in case the six groups were willing to come to terms.

This incident, in connection with others mentioned above, is not cited for the purpose of impugning the good faith of the Chinese government. Those familiar with the difficulties with which the provisional government has been endeavoring to deal are not inclined to hold China too strictly to account for what her real friends will regard as mistaken and unfortunate, rather than reprehensible, efforts to solve her financial problem. At the same time, with all possible consideration for China and every sympathy for her officials in the performance of their onerous tasks, it must be recognized that such actions will, if continued, make it impossible to maintain Chinese credit.

It will be said perhaps that by concluding the so-called "Crisp" loan, China demonstrated her ability to borrow in

the markets of the world. This may be true, but the fact that China could in this case secure funds was due largely to public confidence in the stability of the Chinese administration based on the willingness of the six-power group to advance funds to the provisional government even prior to the inauguration of the President, Yuan Shih Kai, and the belief that the six groups would in the end come to an arrangement with Peking which would give value to all Chinese securities.

Many gentlemen in the United States have pointed out in discussing this subject that the American banking group in particular should remember the history of our own country and not be too exacting in its dealings with the Chinese Republic.

The argument is plausible but cannot be given too much weight when it is remembered that when our federal government was first established there was no large public debt while the resources of the young American Republic were enormous. The funds secured from abroad during our revolution, and immediately following its conclusion, had been advanced by the French government, not so much with the idea of assisting the struggling colonies as for the purpose of embarrassing Great Britain. Only when Alexander Hamilton had reorganized the finances of the country, securing the assumption by the federal government of the larger part of the debt of the states, and after he had put the administration of the Treasury Department on a sound basis, were the United States able to borrow from foreign bankers on satisfactory terms. The Ministry of Finance in Peking, however, is still operated on lines scarcely conformable to our ideas of a business administration, despite the efforts of able men like Dr. Chen Chin Tao, while the republican government has assumed the obligations of its imperial predecessor for which the revenues of China are to a very large degree already hypothecated, and for the service of which they are at the present time insufficient.

Not long ago I happened to be present when the loan question was discussed by a distinguished gentleman who had just returned from the Far East. He had been greatly

impressed by what the revolution had accomplished, was full of admiration for the Chinese people and confident of the bright future of the Republic. He felt that the bankers were mistaken in demanding terms which the Chinese considered so onerous and thought that the wiser policy for the groups would be to work for the future by now making concessions calculated to relieve the Chinese officials of their immediate embarrassments. He thought that for American merchants the fairest, and at the same time the ultimately most profitable, attitude to adopt toward China was to strive for the maintenance of the "open door" under which with a strong central government international trade would greatly prosper.

He recognized that the authority of the present Peking administration was not generally established in the provinces, that revenues were not being collected and that without money the central government could not become strong. He admitted that while he had met many officials he had seen few whom he considered competent to direct the expenditure of large sums in the manner most likely to assure the speedy restoration of normal conditions throughout the country and he believed therefore that the Chinese government should employ advisers and accept their advice.

The distinguished traveler had predicated his hope for the future on the establishment of a strong central government which would be able to collect sufficient revenue to finance its own reorganization. Unfortunately, however, this cannot be accomplished unless the Chinese government first secures from abroad money sufficient to give it the power to make these collections and pay off its pressing debts under safeguards which will protect it for the time being from external aggression.

If his conclusions as to the ability of Chinese officials now in power were warranted, and his observations correct regarding the present state of affairs in China, his recommendation that the groups "play for the future," by lending money on terms acceptable to the Chinese, would scarcely seem justified by his premises. Those who have lived in China and grown to know and admire the Chinese, however, will readily

understand this point of view. It is impossible not to sympathize with the aspirations of the young men who are now striving to do what they can for their country. At the same time American bankers would not be acting as true friends of China if they failed to look the facts of the situation in the face. They would not be "playing for" the best future for China should they lend money on conditions which might satisfy the vanity of Chinese officialdom but instead of assisting the establishment of a strong central government would encourage improvident financial methods and lead inevitably to foreign intervention.

The present financial situation in China is set forth in an article in the *North China Herald* of September 28, 1912, an abstract of which is given below:

The obligations that China is bound to liquidate are as follows. First of all, Tls. 12,000,000 advanced by the sextuple group from February to July, on the distinct understanding that the Chinese government would sign the loan with them, including this sum in the total amount for which the loan is signed. The Chinese government gave the banks treasury bills, and at the exchange fixed the total works out at £1,750,000 sterling. Secondly, there are amounts due to the shipbuilding firms in England and the United States for works executed by them on orders given by the Manchu government but completed during this year. In the list of their outstanding debts furnished by them to the sextuple group the Chinese government have £700,000 against this item.

Thirdly, there are the Hupeh and Nanking loans of about £300,000 each given by the banks to the Viceroy of the two provinces on the authority of Peking during the Manchu régime. These sums have been overdue for some time, and as the new government has undertaken responsibility for all the past obligations they must be paid the moment it obtains funds. Fourthly, there are two loans contracted at recent dates on the understanding that they would be repaid as soon as China signed the big loan. The Diederichsen loan of Mks. 5,000,000 and the Carlowitz loan of Tls. 6,000,000 come under this category. Part of these amounts was received in cash, although the major portion consisted of amounts due on arms and ammunition supplied by these firms during the revolution.

Fifthly, the Skoda loan contracted with Arnold, Karberg and Company during the revolution, the moiety of which was received in cash and the rest in the shape of arms and ammunition, amounts to about £450,000. Sixthly, as the currency loan was floated by members of the group, and as it is not likely to be floated by them if the present arrangements are continued, they will be entitled

to demand repayment of the advance of £400,000 made to the government last year in April, 1913.

In the seventh place, the amounts due on indemnities, which have been outstanding since October last will work out at over £2,500,000. The total to be paid by China on this account works out roughly at £250,000 per month. Making due allowance for last year's surplus from the customs revenue and the accumulation of native customs revenue, which Dr. Morrison referred to recently, there would still be outstanding the amounts due from January this year.

Lastly seeing that the Chinese dropped the Anglo-Belgian syndicate loan after taking an advance of £1,250,000, the syndicate will not have the least hesitation in demanding immediate payment of the amount. Besides there are a number of small Japanese loans, and small German loans, other than those we have mentioned, mostly for arms supplied during the revolution—the date of payment of which is long overdue. Everybody has been anxiously waiting for the big loan, especially as no security has been given besides the bond of the Chinese authorities.

Further, it is necessary to state in this connection that the merchants, banks and other rich Chinese who helped the new government, both during the struggle and after, now stand badly crippled from want of funds. They have been often told that their outstandings would be cleared as soon as the first loan with the foreigner was closed. Trade is badly in need of the funds spent on the revolution; and if a moiety of the debts of the government is not paid even after a foreign loan becomes an actuality, the failure may give rise to acute discontent. The amount on this score is not available, but the lowest estimate puts it at about Tls. 20,000,000.

Let us suppose that the London syndicate is able to float the whole of the £10,000,000⁹ in October. The loan is expected to be floated at 95, brokerage and other expenses incident on the flotation may be put at 3 per cent, and by the time the loan is floated, if at all successfully, China would have received and spent at least £150,000. The net receipts from the loan would therefore amount to £9,050,000. The total foreign indebtedness, of which China could not in honor delay payment, amounts to £8,950,000. Thus she will have a residue of £100,000 with which to pay her unpaid troops and disband them, and begin setting the Republic in order.

If China refuses to pay all her outstanding debts at present except the indemnity instalments that have fallen in arrears—in order to save the salt gabelle from being taken over by the powers—she will have fully £6,500,000 to pay her soldiers with and begin reforms at once—so it is suggested in some quarters. In the case of an individual such refusal would mean bankruptcy;

⁹ £5,000,000 was floated in September. The bankers paid 89 for the bonds—China received not more than £4,450,000.

in the case of a nation it would mean the utter ruination of its credit in the markets of the world. And China must necessarily borrow much more than £10,000,000. There is no disguising the fact that China has no security to offer—security in the proper sense of the word. Her performances in the past have not been such as to inspire confidence. And her hidden resources need an enormous amount of capital in order that any tangible result may be got out of them.

It may be remembered that in his speech in March before the Assembly at Nanking the then Premier, Mr. Tang Shao Yi, stated that £25,000,000, besides the revenue, would be absolutely needed within the next twelve months. What he said then was substantially correct, and remains true today. The interval has only slightly added to the total needs, as the soldiers are still being kept and paid from want of funds to pay and disband them—although in the interim a number of small loans and advances have all been received and spent. It is quite interesting to note the different items for which funds are needed although our list is not identical with that supplied to the Assembly by Mr. Tang Shao Yi.

If China wishes to preserve her credit as a power, she must liquidate her pressing debts before beginning any constructive work. First and foremost is the foreign indebtedness to the tune of £9,000,000—the details of which we have mentioned above. Secondly, her merchants, bankers and gentry, who supplied funds to prosecute the revolution and carry on the new government deserve better consideration than they have received; and the sums owing to them are estimated at about Tls. 20,000,000, or roughly £3,000,000. Thirdly, she must pay the troops, who are now eating their heads off, and disband the major portion of them. It was estimated that expenditure on this score would cost £5,000,000 some four months ago. A certain number of troops have been disbanded, but the cost of getting rid of the rest of them has not greatly been lessened, owing to the delay.

Fourthly, she will have to buy back the republican bonds, on which she has to pay interest half yearly at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, while the bonds are continually depreciating. Sums received on account of the “so-called patriotic loan,” while of no practical utility to her, are depleting the resources of the trade in the provinces. These suggestions are made with the view to enable China to start with a clean slate, if she wishes to proceed with the work of reorganization without encumbrances. Thus before she begins any construction work she stands to have to pay out £19,000,000.

Now as regards sums needed for construction work and reform. The basis of all reorganization in China is currency reform, and so long as the currency is what it is there is no hope of making headway of any kind. It may be remembered that in the currency loan arrangement of 1911, £7,000,000 was set apart for currency reform; and that amount does not err on the side of extravagance. Whatsoever may be the final decision in regard to the

standard, there is no doubt that a considerable amount of silver would have to be purchased presently and coined; and one may rest assured that in working out the details in connection with bringing about a uniform currency throughout the length and breadth of the country, more funds may be needed later on.

Of equal importance is the immediate necessity for taking measures to minimize the effects of the famines and floods, which cause a perennial loss to the country and bring death and ruin to thousands, if not millions, year after year. Mr. Jameson's scheme of constructing dykes should be taken in hand immediately, and afforestation should be carried on simultaneously. An expenditure of £5,000,000 distributed during the next five years is not beyond the mark; and the loss averted during this period, judging by past experience, would be fully that amount. Of course, when a loan is arranged, it should be for the full amount, for the sooner the works are finished the more profitable they would be for the country. In so far as such expenditure would amply repay itself, it is hardly to be reckoned among China's debts. But it is a charge for which, in the first place, a large sum of ready money will be required.

The ideal of any loan to China at present should be to enable her to pay back the past and present borrowings. Of course, the basis of such an ideal are the untapped resources of China for taxation, the great industrial and agricultural possibilities of the land and the hidden resources of the country. But even to find these money is needed; to develop them much more. Development in this direction alone, under the aegis of a good government and a sound currency, would enable China to pay interest and principal of past, present and future debts. Expedients like those of the increase of the customs dues or the salt tax would prove only of temporary utility, and under certain conditions might even do harm.

The currency loan of last year included provision for £3,000,000 for Manchurian industrial development. And thrice three millions sterling for the eighteen provinces for industrial development and administrative reform would only err on the side of economy. Of course, this program does not take into account sums needed for railway construction in the country or private industrial enterprises. And in China's present financial state it would be ridiculous to dream of spending money for military or naval advancement. Thus, it would seem that if foreign loans should serve any beneficent purpose at all for China, a sum of £40,000,000 is necessary during the year ending, say, next June; and further amounts, into the details of which it is too early now to go, appear likely to be needed in the coming years.

This total of China's needs for the year is based on the supposition that the revenue of the country will meet its ordinary expenditure. Mr. Tang said there would be a deficit of Tls. 40,000,000 this year, and probably the same amount next—the obvious deduction being, of course, that borrowings will have to

be increased to this extent. Anyhow, there is no doubting that any syndicate proposing to lend money to China should be able to arrange for £40,000,000 during the next nine months, and be able to pay about £60,000,000 during the next three years. The original proposal of the sextuple group was arranged on this basis, and the total of £60,000,000 was agreed upon as necessary for the regeneration of the country.

Again it should not be forgotten that the annual payments on foreign loans by China will almost be trebled from 1916. The amortization of the railway loans starts from then, and the indemnity payments would then be more than double the present amounts. If China is not up and doing, with something in the way of reorganization she must be deeper in the mire than ever by 1916. At present everything in the way of reform needs large initial expenditure. To stop squeeze in the collection of revenue it is necessary to have good accounting, and officials with a salary which would place them above temptation. The land tax in China gives a ridiculously low yield; to increase it an effectual survey costing millions of taels is essential.

That the banks composing the sextuple group, with their respective governments at their back, would be able to supply China with this large total with more facility than any number of other syndicates is beyond question. The Chinese themselves know it, and hence their anxiety to keep on good terms with the group in spite of their latest action.

Apropos of the apparent success of the new loan we understand that already demands have been made upon Peking by several individuals and institutions in China. The funds of the Bank of China were drawn upon to further the cause of the revolution; and the bank naturally requires money to carry on its ordinary business. This bank is the best of institutions of a similar kind in China and deserves the help of the government—at least to the extent of receiving back what it paid out. But then, how far will £10,000,000 go?"

Such is the situation as seen by the Shanghai business man. The six groups because of the support of their governments, and because they believe that a loan properly safeguarded is the only means by which normal conditions can be restored in China, are willing to assist the Chinese government, in dealing with the conditions described above. They are criticised, however, because they are unwilling to loan funds except on terms which the Chinese regard as humiliating.

It has frequently been stated moreover that one of the chief Chinese objections to the "six-power" group has been the fear of any combination in which Russia and Japan is represented. Those who are familiar with Far Eastern

politics and who have considered their relation to European affairs, are aware that this grouping of the powers is a safeguard rather than a menace to China's integrity. They will realize that if this combination be maintained and China be willing to coöperate therewith, she will be able better to protect herself against the selfish designs of individuals which even though they may not be prevented will certainly be restricted by the necessities of joint action.¹⁰

Those who have criticised the attitude of the six-power group have in a measure lost sight of some of the elementary functions of a banking house which handles foreign loans. They have forgotten that it is not the bankers themselves who provide the money to finance a foreign loan, though they may for a time advance from their own resources certain preliminary payments. Bond issues, however, are sold to the public, the bankers receiving their commission on the sale and the reputation of a house of issue like that of any other commercial establishment depends upon the quality of the commodity which it sells. Bankers would not be justified in requesting their clients to take bonds on a sentimental and not a business basis any more than the president of an insurance company would be warranted in loaning funds for which he was responsible to a personal friend regarding whose solvency he had no guarantee.

The groups engaged in the present Chinese loan negotiations are institutions of the highest standing in their respective countries. The rupture in negotiations did not come because the bankers attempted to obtain an unreasonable commission but because they felt they could not afford to place upon the market a loan which they did not consider sound in the present state of China unless they obtained safeguards such as they have demanded, not to add to their own profit, but in the interest of the prospective investor.

¹⁰ Had it not been for the agreement between the six powers to take no separate and individual action during the Revolution Japan would have sent an expedition to China to keep the Manchus on the throne. She was prevented from taking this step by the representations of the British government which insisted that nothing should be done to prejudice continued joint action by all the great powers.

Fair-minded observers of recent events in the Far East recognize that the American banking group has during the past three years demonstrated its friendship for China. The American bankers personally wish for the success of the Chinese Republic. As real friends of China, however, it would be just as reprehensible for them to offer for sale bonds secured from China on terms which they did not consider calculated to restore and increase her credit, as it would be for them to issue to the public securities which they did not feel assured would constitute a sound investment.

It has been stated by men in authority in Peking that they would rather sell their country bit by bit than submit to the terms asked by the six-power group. Concessions have been offered giving to foreigners the right to construct and operate railways for forty years in return for a cash down payment of 5,000,000 taels. This indeed would be to sell the nation's birthright for a mess of pottage and to sow the dragon's teeth of financial bondage. Yet it is proposed by the very men who complain most bitterly of the conditions required by the six groups which are mild in comparison and which are calculated to build up a strong central government rather than create a nest of warring foreign interests which will cause China trouble and shame for years to come.

In these negotiations the banking groups have been charged with a very heavy responsibility. Their terms were submitted only after long and careful deliberation. China's difficulties were fully and sympathetically considered and the conditions required by the groups were prepared in her interest as well as in the interests of the groups and the prospective bondholders.

Recognizing, however, the peculiar difficulties of the present Peking government the groups have throughout been willing to consider any plan which the Chinese themselves might propose, calculated to free them from embarrassment, and at the same time carrying with it safeguards sufficient to make any loan based thereon a sound investment.

The six groups have been endeavoring to induce China to undertake real constructive work while the Peking authorities have either failed to realize the necessity therefor or

have been unwilling to assume the responsibility of undertaking a practical and comprehensive scheme. In following this course these officials are China's worst enemies for the reckless financial policy of the past few months if continued will lead to that very intervention, which in refusing the six groups' terms, these gentlemen have been avowedly trying to avoid.

The groups have not been attempting to force money, with humiliating conditions attached, on China. They have stated merely that they are willing, only upon certain conditions, to loan the money which China has requested them to furnish. The groups do not insist that China accept a loan if these conditions are unacceptable. They do say that they will not issue Chinese bonds on terms which they regard as unsatisfactory. The "six-power" groups do not constitute a monopoly but they are not willing to undertake any loan unless assured that they will be entitled to furnish on sound conditions funds to complete the transactions, the initiation of which they finance, and that they shall have a clear market until the different loan series for which they contract are sold.

For the sake of the preservation of China's integrity and the commercial "open door" it is to be hoped that some mutually satisfactory understanding may be reached between China and the "six-power" group. It is to China's interest that this combination should be maintained, and it is to the interest of China as well as of the United States, that we should retain our present position therein. China's great problem to-day is that of finance. It is to her advantage that we are entitled to a practical voice in its solution, and it is to the advantage of American trade that the United States continue to be an active party in Chinese loan negotiations.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

Although the agreement for the Reorganization Loan was on the point of signature early in February, developments since that time have caused a further postponement of the conclusion of this transaction.

The terms agreed upon by the Chinese government and the bankers are substantially those outlined in the foregoing pages. The purposes for which the money is to be expended were specified by the Chinese government and deemed satisfactory by the bankers.

Provision has been made in the loan agreement to ensure the expenditure of borrowed funds for these specified purposes. The Chinese government has itself established an Audit Department and engaged to appoint a competent foreigner to introduce an effective system of accounting, while a Bureau of Foreign Loans will also be created which will, like the Audit Department, be under the direction of a foreign employee of the Chinese government.

The proposed agreement also stipulates that the Chinese government shall appoint a foreigner who shall act jointly with the Chinese Director General of the Salt Administration and provision is made for the appointment of foreign and Chinese district inspectors, who shall have charge of the salt production, the sale of this commodity to the salt merchants and the collection of the salt revenues, which it is stipulated shall be deposited with the group banks until provision is made for the service of the loan. The loan agreement also contains a provision, which, if the six groups undertake the reorganization loan, will protect the market therefor until it has been issued in entirety.

The negotiations resulting in the preparation of the agreement outlined above were undertaken by the banks on the understanding that the Chinese government would appoint foreigners to the positions mentioned and would satisfy the six legations in Peking that these employees would be engaged under contracts which would enable them to render effective service.

The Chinese government on the night before it was expected that the loan agreement would be signed nominated a Dane for the Salt Administration, an Italian for the Audit Department, and a German for the Loan Bureau. Certain of the interested governments desired that these foreign employees should be of the nationality of the lending bankers. These points were raised at the last moment and re-

quired a month to adjust between the various governments concerned. The program agreed upon by the six governments was submitted to the Chinese government early in March and refused by the Chinese. At the time of writing, however, negotiations are still in progress and it is to be hoped that a mutually satisfactory arrangement will soon be reached.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Since Mr. Straight completed this article, the American Banking Group has definitely withdrawn from further participation in the Six Power loan negotiations, due to President's Wilson's refusal to continue the moral support of the Government. The following are the official explanations of the attitude of the Administration and of the American group respectively. President Wilson gave this statement to the press:

We are informed that, at the request of the last administration, a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the government of China (approximately \$125,000,000). Our government wished American bankers to participate along with the bankers of other nations, because it desired that the good will of the United States toward China should be exhibited in this practical way; that American capital should have access to that great country and that the United States should be in a position to share with the other powers any political responsibilities that might be associated with the development of the foreign relations of China in connection with their industrial and commercial enterprises. The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan.

The representatives of the bankers through whom the administration was approached declared that they would continue to seek their share of the loan under the proposed agreements only if expressly requested to do so by the government. The administration has declined to make such request because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself; and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible

interference in the financial, and even the political affairs of that great Oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people.

The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan, but also the administration of these taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests.

The government of the United States is not only willing, but earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their possibilities under free government is the most significant if not the most momentous event of our generation.

With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy. They certainly wish to participate and participate very generously, in opening to the Chinese and to the use of the world the almost untouched and perhaps unrivalled resources of China.

The government of the United States is earnestly desirous of promoting the most extended and intimate trade relationships between this country and the Chinese republic. The present administration will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors and engineers, the banking facilities which they now lack and without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with their industrial and commercial rivals. This is its duty. This is the main material interest of its citizens in the development of China.

Our interests are those of the open door—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter.

The following was handed to the press by the American group, March 19:

The American Group, consisting of J. P. Morgan & Co., Kuhn, Loeb & Co., The First National Bank and the National City Bank, was formed in the spring of 1909, upon the expressed desire of the Department of State that a financial group be organized to take up the participation to which American capital was entitled in the Hukuang Railway Loan Agreement, then under negotiation by the British, French and German banking groups.

This group thus became interested in Chinese Loan matters, not primarily for its own profit, but for purposes indicated by President Taft and Secretary Knox. As stated in President Taft's message to Congress of December 1909, these purposes, in effect, called for the co-operation of the bankers as the "indispensable instrumentality" which the American Government needed to enable it

"to carry out a practical and real application of the open door policy." The Department of State considered that American cooperation with the Banking Groups of the several great powers enabled the United States to exercise a practical voice in China's affairs and constituted the best guarantee for the preservation of China's integrity.

In pursuance of the policy so advocated, the American Group, with the Administration's approval, entered into an agreement with the British, French and German Groups for the purpose of rendering financial assistance to China. In February 1912 these four groups at the request of their respective Governments and with the consent of the Chinese Government, admitted Russian and Japanese financial groups to the negotiations for the Reorganization Loan, thus constituting what has since been known as the Six Power Group.

Following the revolution and despite the fact that the authority of the new Republic had not been generally accepted, the American Group joined with the other groups in making to the Provisional Government substantial advances to enable it more firmly to establish its authority and to restore normal conditions throughout the country.

Meanwhile there had been in negotiation, during a period of many months, a loan agreement which, in its general terms, appeared last month to meet the approval of the Six Governments, of their banking groups, and the Chinese Government, and to be ready for signature.

These terms were intended to cover two points. The first was to enable the Chinese Government to reorganize its administration on an effective modern basis, to pay off its large outstanding debts and build up Chinese credit. The second was to protect the interests of American and European investors. For such protection, in the judgment of the Governments and the Groups, the only method was to ensure, despite any possible recurrence of political unrest in China, the proper expenditure of the funds loaned to China and to safe-guard the handling of the revenues pledged for principle and interest of the bonds.

As announced in the statement given to the press yesterday the present Administration at Washington, with a desire to be of assistance to China and to promote American interests in the Far East, has decided that these purposes may better be served by the adoption of a different and independent policy. As the American Group had been ready to serve the Administration in the past, irrespective of the heavy risks involved, so it was disposed to serve the present Administration if so requested. But deferring to the policy now declared, the Group has withdrawn entirely from the Chinese Loan negotiations and has so advised the European and Japanese banking groups.

THE RELATION OF THE RETURNED STUDENTS TO THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

*By Y. S. Tsao, Secretary of the Chinese Students' Alliance in
America*

It is not without a considerable amount of misgiving that the writer ventures to trace the relation between the returned students and the recent revolution, as his residence in America might lead him into partial statements in favor of the returned students from this country or the underestimation of the rôle played by those from Europe or Japan. Moreover the topic called for specific treatment to the exclusion of generalizations, so it is the aim of this paper to study the returned students from a subjective standpoint at the outset, to be followed by concrete and typical illustrations of the part played by the returned students from the several countries.

It might be well, at the beginning, to divide the returned students into two main groups, namely those from Europe and America and those from Japan. It must be admitted that by far the largest part of the recent revolution, was accomplished by the returned students from Japan by virtue of their numerical strength and for other reasons to be accounted for later on. On the whole, all the returned students, wherever they hail from and whatever political views they hold are destined to play the part of leaders on account of their superior training and breadth of vision. It has been estimated that America has 5 per cent college men and they will eventually become the leaders of the nation for even if they do not all become men of great influence, they will always be looked up to in every community as leaders of public opinion for the same reasons. Only in the case of the Chinese students they have better opportunities of duplicating themselves in this rapid transitory period of China's history.

INFLUENCE OF WESTERN EDUCATION FOR REFORMATION
AND REVOLUTION

A recent writer has observed pithily that if you change the ideas of the Chinese their policy will change, which is no more and no less than granting our people with the credit for being rational. Of the many factors leading to the modification or reversal of ideas the influence of western education has achieved the most far-reaching results. The contrast between the social, economic, political and religious institutions of the West and those of the East is too obvious to escape the attention of even the most unobserving student. While much of the good in the old institutions should be conserved, every student cannot but desire to see the adoption of many modern ideas that have been slowly developed in the west. This is strictly true to the students who have left China for a stay of from five to eight years of study in a foreign land during the formative period of their lives. The experience of living in a different atmosphere is interesting and the impression correspondingly deep. In a word, they form a bridge across the broad expanse of seas, on which new learning, new ideals and new institutions are constantly conveyed to China. Fully saturated with new ideas and ideals, filled with the zeal of new ambitions and aspirations and kindled by a new sense of patriotism as a result of travel, these liberated individuals return to do and dare. From this very spirit the seed of revolution is bound to germinate. In the early seventies, some one hundred and twenty students were brought over to America by Dr. Yung Wing of Yale for a course of twelve years' training but they were recalled in 1881 being accused for harbouring revolutionary ambitions. The apprehensive Manchu government was not far from the truth.

Another important factor which helped immensely to develop the revolutionary spirit was the recent political history of China, both nationally and internationally. Ever since the China-Japan war, the country has been in a state of unrest. The reverses of that war caused a rude awakening and the late Emperor Kwang-Hsu with the assistance of

the reform party headed by Kwang Yu Wei and Liang Chi Chao decreed such a series of ultra-radical reforms that it soon resulted in the famous coup d'état. This reaction blindly led to the painful experience of 1900 but when the Manchurian leaders of the Boxers were banished from the court, the pendulum began to sweep back and the cause of reform again developed a brighter prospect. The late Empress Dowager was convinced of the necessity of reform and she had the direction of Yuan Shih Kai who as the Viceroy of Chili carried out a very successful series of reform measures. However, the pendulum reached the limit at the deaths of the Empress Dowager and the Emperor when Yuan Shih Kai and Tuan Fang, the two most promising statesmen of the day, fell. Since then, the retrogression was rapid. The people agitated for an immediate parliament but the government resisted the demand stubbornly. With this public disappointment, with the vacillating and insincere policy of the government, with the ever present economic factor of industrial revolution and non-employment, plague, famine and financial stringency, all the symptoms of a revolution were present. Added to all these, internationally, there were the constant acts of aggression in the form of wanton grabbing of territory and provoked and unprovoked military demonstrations on our frontiers. So since 1910, the bubbling cauldron of discontent and impatience was ready to boil over at any moment. Under such conditions, the returned students as representatives of advanced thought could not but ascribe such consequences to the existing political corruptions and diplomatic blunders and wishing sincerely for a better state of affairs, not a few of them raised the cry, "On to Peking!"

When the students returned from America in the early eighties, they were despised, suspected and watched by the officers of the Manchu government. For the first few years, they were given a thorough drilling in Chinese literature so as to win them over to the conservative attitude of looking at things and when sufficiently purged of their revolutionary ideas, they were left to shift for themselves for the government had no use for such "semi-foreigners." But

beginning with the reformation after the China-Japan war, a number of reformers from the old school went to court as advisers and not a few returned students from America were given appointments by high officials. However, it was not until after the Boxer uprising that a number of them through the recommendation of Yuan Shih Kai were given responsible positions in the government. Among them were the ex-secretary of state, Liang Tung Yen, the ex-premier, Tang Shao Yi, Admiral San Chen Ping, ex-minister Wu Ting Fang, Sir Liang Cheng, Railroad Director Liang Mun Ting, Chief Engineer Jeme Tien Yu, etc.

The prospect of a successful reformation was quite evident while Yuan Shih Kai remained in power with the students giving suggestions and rendering very creditable service. Modern systems of police, of popular education, of judiciary and army were organized; railway management was systematized, foreign relations improved and a constitution recommended. Several military maneuvers were held and foreign critics were actually discussing the ever-recurrent bug-bear of "Yellow-Peril." This state of affairs was too good for the Manchus for they could not follow the course of development intelligently, so ere long "the strong man of China" was degraded and with him a number of painstaking returned students. Once placed in responsible positions, they saw the hopeless way the insincere government had been hood-winking the whole nation and at once entertained revolutionary ideas to upset the whole government and build a new structure in its place.

THE EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION

The abolition of the old imperial literary examinations was succeeded by the new educational system based upon the Japanese and American institutions. It emphasized a liberal scientific education. When the many forms of schools sprang up throughout the nation like mushrooms, there was a great dearth of modern teachers. For a time the scholars of the old school attempted to supply the demand but as the curriculum was so up-to-date, they found the

desires of the students to be above their ability to satisfy. Indeed, many of these teachers devoured all forms of modern text-books and translated literature so that for the primary and middle grades they taught with fair success, but the more advanced students became uncontrollable which accounted for the innumerable strikes and lock-outs. This unsatisfactory state of affairs together with the recent successes of Japan in her war with Russia, induced the government to send thousands of students to Japan. At one time, the exodus reached 15,000 and Japan had to open special institutions to accommodate them.

In the meantime, the government demanded more up-to-date officials and following the traditional method of testing them, competitive examinations were held for the returned students. The successful candidates were conferred the same honorary degrees according to the old nomenclature of "Hanlin" (doctor of philosophy), "Chin-shih" and "Juren." This recognition of the returned students on the part of the government increased their influence and prestige throughout the whole educational world. While large numbers of the students in schools aspired to be educated abroad, the greater part had to be satisfied by being taught by the returned students whose direct influence upon this new student class proved to be a very potent factor for the revolution.

While the handful of returned students from Europe and America were busy occupying themselves with official life, teaching and engineering, a few of them translated the works of John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Spencer, Darwin, Henry George and other modern writers. "The doctrine of the survival of the fittest has been on the lips of every thinking Chinese, and its grim significance is not lost on a nation that seems to be the center of struggle in the Far East." However, the greater part of the modern ideas came from Japan through the students there who after a few months of training could easily transcribe Japanese translations of western books into Chinese. The rapid multiplication of patriotic newspapers and magazines helped immensely to disseminate modern political ideas along with scientific knowledge

throughout the length and breadth of the nation. The biographies of such statesmen as Washington, Bismark, Metternich and Gladstone, such leaders as Napoleon, Cromwell and Lincoln, such patriots as Mazzini, Garibaldi were literally devoured. The doctrines of Rousseau, Montesquieux and Voltaire were expounded and a weekly known as *The People* based upon the principles of "Young Italy" was started. It had a circulation of 150,000 before it was finally suppressed by the Japanese government upon the request of the Manchu government.

The publication of radical papers and magazines liberated the individuals and inspired a new national feeling. Patriotism developed a new significance and nationalism bred impatience and self-assertion. Constitutionalism and republicanism were keenly discussed. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity was the slogan of the day. According to a Japanese writer, "Every mother's son of the returned students from Japan is a cheerful, reckless, vociferous, flaming torch for the revolutionary movement."

Intense patriotism and the realization of political dangers at once reversed the old adage of "Good iron is not used for making nails and good men are not meant for the soldiery." Many students joined military institutions at home and several hundreds of them went to Japan and Germany for such training of their own accord and often against their parent's wishes. Many of them were supported by the Manchu government and it was the insincerity of which finally turned them against it and destroyed it.

With the revolutionary spirit in the atmosphere, the earlier reformers and revolutionaries saw their opportunities. There existed at least, three distinct parties. The first aimed to preserve the Empire which meant the restoration of Emperor Kwang Hsu's reform program; the second desired to see the early adoption of the constitutional government; and the third had their object in the overthrow of the alien dynasty. The leaders of the first two parties, Kang Yu Wei and Liang Chi Chiao obtained some funds and support from the Chinese settlers abroad but it was Dr. Sun Yat Sen who as the leader of the republican movement

captivated a large number of students in Japan by the organization of the "Tung Men Hwei."

The aim of the said "Tung Men Hwei" society was to alienate the feelings of the people and to stir up a revolution against the Manchu government. The weekly called *The People* was published by them which contained articles depicting the corruption, tyranny and impotence of the Manchus. It was a short-lived paper for the Japanese government, seeking to strengthen her friendship with China, suppressed it. Another department of the "Tung Men Hwei" was called the "Kung Ching" which undertook to send agents to the various provinces of China to convert the officers and soldiers to become revolutionaries, while others were sent to the Chinese settlements to raise funds for the same cause. They also manufactured bombs and threatened to kill those soldiers who refused to join them. Among these, Hwang Shing, Liu King and Sun Wu were the greatest leaders. In Europe and America, there were no special organizations of that character. Quite a few, however, were members of the "Tung Men Hwei."

In Europe, a revolutionary publication called *Le Nouveau Siècle* was published at Paris, but no secret organization was known to exist.

PRELIMINARY PLOTS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF STUDENTS

Previous to the revolution of October 11, 1911, several preliminary plots were attempted under returned student leadership. The earliest one on record was in 1900, directly after the Boxer uprising, when Dr. Yung Wing was elected president of a secret organization at Shanghai, consisting of leading officials, merchants and students who were exasperated at the most stupid political blunder of the Manchu government in making use of patriotic fanaticism as a means of stemming the onslaught of western nations. This plot was soon detected and ever after Dr. Yung Wing lived an exile at Hartford, Connecticut until his death last year.

In 1907, there was a plot at Ping Shang in Anhui Province; in 1909, the Governor of Anhui was assassinated at An

King; in 1910 a plot was unearthed at Canton. Many returned students and bright young men sacrificed their lives in these attempts; but repeated failure only helped to arouse the public sentiment of the people and contributed to popularise revolutionary actions.

It was generally admitted, however, that the Szechuan riot had no other signification than a movement against the nationalization of railways and that of Changsha was a protest against the rice monopoly. No one has been able to ascertain the object of the bomb thrown at the five commissioners when they started from Peking to investigate into the constitutional governments of the world. The fear that the adoption of a constitution by the Manchu government might defeat the cause of the anti-Manchu movement has been considered as the most plausible interpretation. There is no necessity for us to analyze all these preliminary plots. Suffice it to say, the ramifications of the secret societies were rapidly being extended throughout the country.

The leaders of the revolution intended to start it simultaneously in eight provinces, four months later than the actual date of the outbreak. The modus operandi and the personnel were fully prepared; proclamations for the public and badges for adherents were made; secret parties were traveling about winning sympathizers and supporters. General Hwang Shing at Hankow, General Wu Loh-tsun of the Northern Army, Liu King and Sun Wu at Wuchang and Chen Ki Mei at Shanghai were the chief leaders from Japan. General Li Yuan Hung from Japan played the most important part, but he was forced to join by the soldiery.

Very few students from Europe and America were members of the "Tung Men Hwei," and judging from their actions only Mr. C. T. Wang, Drs. Chen Hui Wang and Chintao Chen from Yale were the only possible ones, while the rest were taken by surprise.

Not counting Dr. Sun Yat Sen, Dr. Wu Ting Fang was the first returned student from England or America who joined the revolutionary cause at a critical moment, and he was supported in the revolutionary camp by many returned

students from Europe and America. Some of them joined the Red Cross Society as M. D. T. Yu of Harvard and Yang Paoling of Purdue, while twenty of them returned from America to take an active part in fighting. For example, T. S. Ma of Columbia and E. M. Ho of Chicago University.

In passing, we must not fail to mention how the success of the revolution was in a great measure due to the sympathy of foreign nations. Judging from past experiences, uprisings in China were always associated in the minds of men with imminent danger to foreign lives and property; but during the last revolution, foreigners were most scrupulously protected, which fact won for the revolutionists, the confidence of the world, as it was clear evidence of intelligent leadership and superior organization.

It will be in order, perhaps, to give a comparative estimate of the parts played by the two groups of students showing why those from Japan were more energetic and revolutionary. The charge has been made against the returned students from Europe and America of being materialistic and self-seeking, and this charge has been repeated by some of the students themselves. Why more students in America did not join in the revolutionary movement before the revolution? The answer, I believe, is better made by presenting the causes and circumstances which made the students in Japan so radically revolutionary.

First of all, the chief cause was the environment. With some 15,000 students located in the few educational centers of Japan; with a steady stream of political news from China; with numerous organizations for discussion, with lively topics furnished by the revolutionary organs as the magazine—*The New People*—published by Liang Chi Chiao and *The People* by the “Tung Men Hwei,” the revolutionary spirit was carefully nurtured. Moreover, the Chinese students could master the Japanese language in a few months, and as the curriculum was elementary, it was not too difficult for them. So that much of their time was spent discussing political questions and transcribing such views into Chinese for publication at home. Furthermore, this grouping together of a large body of young men with similar political

views made them feel the power of union, as the mob psychologist would say. That is why in California, Hawaii, Singapore and Java the like spirit is seen.

Secondly: they were mostly older students of the old school and well versed in Chinese literature. The Japanese curriculum offers courses on modern Chinese history, giving the details of the Manchurian conquest which would naturally tend to stir up anti-dynastic feelings. Moreover, the Japanese friends of China who still reverence the past history of China did advise, time and again, for the restoration of the government to the Chinese proper. During the time of the Boxer uprising, quite a number of Japanese writers counseled for the assassination of the imperial family while fleeing to Shensi. Besides, undoubtedly the ultra-radical propensities and the military atmosphere of Japan exerted a great influence upon the temperament of these earnest students. So likewise, the liberal atmosphere of France instilled revolutionary ideas and military Germany gave a martial spirit to students studying in those two countries.

Lastly: Japan's high-handed actions in Korea and Manchuria together with the general attitude of the Japanese towards the Chinese, stirred their blood to boiling point, while a study of Japan's recent history, dates their modern era of progress to the restoration of the Meiji House. Hence, their logical deduction led them to pin their faith upon a revolution for a new China. By tracing the transition of medieval Japan into modern Japan they could almost map out step by step the course China should take; but the first step according to their conception, was a change of government. Besides, a large number of them were poor and had to undergo a great deal of hardship and privation. Loving their fatherland strongly, desiring to save her from a great national calamity and having nothing to lose personally, they became a vociferous, destructive and desperately revolutionary body of men.

On the other hand, in Europe and America, the handful of students was scattered over large areas; news from home was scanty with long intervals between; the difficulties with the language and the exacting curriculum occupied much of

their time; there were no revolutionary organizations or organs to furnish exciting topics for discussion. When authentic news arrived, it was about a month old and later developments might have already changed the situation, with the result that students could only speculate as to the outcome. That was why the students in Japan sent far more telegrams to the Government advising certain courses of action on great political issues than did the students in Europe and America.

In the second place, most of the students here are younger and the technical courses taken by a large number of them in engineering, agriculture and other professional studies, are not conducive to revolutionary conceptions. The wide difference in languages and comparatively poorer scholarship in Chinese literature, make it impossible to transcribe any of our new ideas readily into Chinese for publication in China. Then, the local political conditions pursue an even tenor, the commercial spirit is transcendent, and the constructive element is based upon educational, social and religious reformation.

No professors or friends were sufficiently versed in Chinese literature and history to advise a revolution which might endanger the lives and property of all their missionary friends and other foreign residents in China. The Christian influence and missionary interest point to a goal of evolutionary development and Christian service to our country. Under such circumstances, in our more liberal students there has been built a broader and deeper personality adapted for slower constructive work.

In the last place, the cold reception of the earlier returned students given by the government and people at home, does not lead us to expect any large following upon our immediate return as any revolutionary course of action would necessitate. We would have to vindicate ourselves by deeds and action that we are not semi-foreigners but as sincerely and deeply interested in the welfare of our country and people as any others who are loud in denunciation and quick in popularising the knowledge acquired. Besides of the 800 students in America and the 400 in Europe, 250 here and

about 200 on the other side are government students and sons of influential officials who would not desire to be left stranded in distant lands by premature iconoclastic expressions which would not materially help the cause. They had too much to lose and little to gain. Quite a large percentage of them, approximately 50 per cent, received their earlier training in missionary schools and their views have been tempered by the element of service which could be performed under any circumstances. Moreover, the contrast seen between the conditions in the west and those of China is greater than that between Japan and China; consequently the problems they aim to solve are deeper rooted, and a change of government—desirable if it could be accomplished without endangering too much the status quo, is not the sine qua non for the modernization of China. That is why the students in the west would have liked to see a constitutional government through a peaceful reformation rather than a republic via a revolution.

Nevertheless, while the greater part of the destructive work was done by the larger body of students from Japan, as soon as the students from Europe and America saw the desperate situation, they all heartily joined the cause, for they saw the die was cast, the Rubicon was crossed, and no alternative was possible. Some twenty-five students returned from America and about the same number went from Europe, while Japan emptied her whole consignment into the cauldron. The students in America declared themselves for the Republic through the columns of *The Chinese Students' Monthly*, the official organ of the Students' Alliance in February of 1912 in an announcement which read in part as follows:

It might seem as if the student body here has not declared its interest in the political controversy of vast consequences early enough, but that evidently has been due to the lack of first hand information, the deliberate nature of our students, the indefiniteness of the revolutionary leaders, and more especially the one-sided statements of the newspapers in this country. However, our sympathy has always been with the revolutionaries, for they represent the progressive cause that will ultimately render it possible for China to come to her own. In the meantime, the provisional

republican government has been established and news from our fellow students, brothers and friends who are in the midst of the struggle, elucidate the actual conditions in China. Knowing them, we publicly announce the definite stand that the students are willing to make for the republic, the establishment of which will go down into history as the greatest event of the twentieth century—the political emancipation of 400,000,000 souls.

New occasions teach new duties,
Time makes ancient good uncouth,
They must UPWARD still and ONWARD,
Who would keep abreast of TRUTH.

—*Lowell.*

Again, it was estimated that no less than 75 per cent of the provisional Republican Cabinet of Dr. Sun consisted of returned students from Europe and America, while even the coalition provisional cabinet of President Yuan Shih Kai had 50 per cent of them with Tang Shao Yi as the first premier.

To say that returned students from America and Europe would not entertain revolutionary ideas on account of materialistic and selfish ambitions would be a charge too extravagant and the contention would fall by its own weight of exaggeration. For did not Dr. Yung Wing, the first student graduated in America, stake his whole life in a revolutionary attempt after four great constructive institutions, namely, the Kiangnan Arsenal, the China Merchants' Steamship Navigation Company, the National Telegraph System and the Educational Mission of the seventies. It was indeed an inspiring experience when the speaker called on this "Father of Modern Education in China" to discuss for two hours upon the comprehensive plan he was laying for the educational, industrial and military reorganization of China, when he was invited by his friend, Dr. Sun Yat Sen to give his advice after the establishment of the republic.

The ideal returned student from America is therefore not a destructive but a constructive man, and it was only when repeatedly defeated that he will adopt destructive measures as proved by Dr. Yung Wing and Dr. Sun Yat Sen, both of whom received the American and European influence of living a broader and deeper life. Nevertheless, we must give all credit to our fellow students from Japan from their intense

enthusiasm and patriotism and to the many earnest reformers among the people at home that gave such an impetus to the Revolution from the very start.

THE TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION

A cowl does not make a monk and the name alone cannot transform China into a real republic. Reality and not idealism is the sure basis of a modern state. Rabid emotion has played its part, and a mighty important part, in stirring up enthusiasm and devotion, but any continued indulgence in it, would sweep an individual or a community off its own feet, as history has proved time and again. China is no exception, and as the republic is established, it is time that enthusiasm should be superseded by discerning foresight and cool judgement, so that a strong, prosperous and centralized republic might be insured for the generations to come, as the problems yet to be surmounted are stupendous.

During the revolution, the public sentiment in China demanded the adoption of the American government as the model and since the number of students in Japan is rapidly diminishing and as more students are coming to America, the responsibility resting upon their shoulders to develop China along republican ideals is consequently increased. If they are true to their training as was Dr. Yung Wing, the first student, then "there is also a hope and promise that God means to build up in that land some strong, free and characteristic manhood which shall help the world to its completeness."

AMERICAN AND JAPANESE DIPLOMACY IN CHINA

*By Masujiro Honda, D. Litt, Tokyo, Japan; Recently Editor
of "The Oriental Review"*

From geographic and other causes, the United States of America has been comparatively independent, both politically and commercially, of the continents other than its own. This fact has enabled the Washington government occasionally to project unconventional ideas and principles into the arena of international dealings. While American diplomacy, therefore, may be a source of irritation to some nations, to others it may prove a cause for thankfulness. Whatever the result, American diplomacy bears a distinct stamp of its own, and does credit to the country of great ideals. Only when it is actuated by self-interest does this attitude defeat its own purposes and alienate the sympathy and respect of other nations.

Japan's relations with China are as vital as those of England with the continent of Europe. Tokyo diplomacy can neither be purely academic, nor ignore the claims and sentiments of the four hundred million co-racials. Just as the British Empire would be threatened by the rise of a continental rival, so Japan's safety demands that no one of her three great neighbors, Russia, China, or America, should obtain an undue share of influence in the Far East. Moreover, the fact that European powers have vested interests more firmly planted in China than has America, requires Japan to be more or less on the side of the former when Chinese problems are to be internationally settled.

Besides this fundamental difference between American and

Japanese diplomacy in China, there is another point of divergence which makes the lack of understanding more apparent than real. In the democratic country with the Monroe doctrine theoretically accepted, international dealings have naturally to be guided by popular desires and to administer to private interests. Even such a disinterested act as that of returning to China the over-received part of the Boxer indemnity was made an occasion for educating Chinese youths in American colleges, which, it was claimed, would eventually further the trade, as well as foster the friendship, between the two peoples. American diplomacy is, in this way, more a matter of home politics than an international affair, as some shrewd critics have asserted with regard to the Panama Canal toll question, the Jewish passport case, and the withdrawal from the six-power loan group. Japanese diplomacy, on the contrary, has been characterised by a bureaucratic secrecy, and a tendency to take the people into its confidence after the inevitable had been accepted. This was notably the case with the terms of the Portsmouth peace treaty and the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" to restrict Japanese immigrants to America. In fact, a few years ago an English journalist advised the Japanese neither to apologise or explain, but to carry on their plans silently and tenaciously, for the reason that the outside world would be sure to suspect, criticize, or even incriminate whatever they did, as a result of the important position which Japan had then attained in world politics. Hence, the more need of frankly telling the American public what the Japanese have seen and felt concerning America's policies in China.

The primary object of Commodore Perry's visits to Japan, sixty years ago, was to prepare an approach, an entrance to Chinese trade, which in those days was a goal of general European rivalry. This successfully accomplished, about thirty years later, General U. S. Grant, ex-President of the United States, cautioned Japan and China against the danger of becoming a common prey to foreign aggressors, which, he said, would be the result, if the two Asiatic peoples were not banded together for mutual protection. As late as the

close of the Russo-Japanese war, there had been no single sign of conflict between American and Japanese diplomacy over the Chinese situation. As soon, however, as Japan inherited a part of the Russian lease of the Manchurian railway zone, a lease which does not expire until 1938, an anti-Japanese campaign was systematically inaugurated by the occidental press, which, in a more or less disguised form, the Washington government seemed to support. Beginning with the far-famed Rooseveltian pronouncement that "America must dominate the Pacific;" Taft's (then secretary of war) speech at Shanghai in 1907, which laid stress on the application of the open-door principle to the entire territories of China; Secretary of State Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian railways by four powers, without consulting the wishes of the lawful owners of these railways; American support of a scheme to construct a new line of railway which would greatly reduce the usefulness of the Russo-Japanese line if the scheme was carried through; the newspaper agitation against the alleged Japanese rebate in Manchuria; the prominent part played by an American financier in the organization of the four-power group for Chinese loans, into which Russia and Japan were afterwards admitted with some difficulty; the recent withdrawal of the United States from the six-power group; and the independent recognition of the Chinese Republic by the Washington government in the face of an agreement among leading powers to act in unison in this matter—all these happenings seem to indicate that American diplomacy attaches more importance to China's welfare than to the interests and sympathies of other nations. Whether this attitude is attributable to a noble aspiration to help an under-dog, or to a practical desire for commercial expansion, its historical development, independently of its psychological value, is well worth our notice.

The traditional foreign policy of China was to set one strong nation to check another. It was in accordance with this principle that a triple European interference was invited at the close of her conflict with Japan. Again in the Russo-Japanese war, China hoped for a chance of recovering her

lost rights in Manchuria without fighting. Should this plan fail, the late Li Hung Chang's shrewdness foresaw the possibility of driving out the two aggressors by means of the influence of the United States. This idea is referred to in his interesting diary while being welcomed in America on his way home from Europe. Washington diplomacy, on the other hand, readily embraced the opportunity of removing the offence it had given to China through the exclusion act, and of improving American trade with her vast population through various means of befriending China or of thwarting other powers. The gallant American now found an upper-dog in Japan, who had been an under-dog with regard to China and Russia. Hence the inevitable result of America and Japan becoming at cross purposes over China's affairs.

American diplomacy has ever been welcome and successful where the abstract principles of humanity and justice are concerned, and when it has been free from the bare suspicion of self-seeking. This was notably the case in the timely declaration of the open-door policy in China and her territorial integrity—as also in inviting Russia and Japan to come to terms after their sanguinary struggle. In matters touching the practical interests of other peoples, however, American diplomacy would seem sometimes to put other nations into an attitude of mutual sympathy and common defense, and to weaken their respect toward the Monroe doctrine. For it is on the implicit understanding of America's non-interference with other continents that the continental republic is left free of outside interference. But the United States of America has now secured the necessary stepping stones (the Hawaiian Islands, Guam and the Philippines), across the Pacific Ocean to reach China and claim a due share of influence over her destinies. It is impossible to reconcile two such contradictory measures. In order to make its position tenable in world politics, American diplomacy must needs choose between the horns of an awkward dilemma. It must either sacrifice the Monroe doctrine, or restrict its application within a much smaller sphere of influence, or return to its traditional avoidance of foreign

entanglement by staying on the high plane of international morality.

Whichever general course America may eventually decide to take, it is evident to candid observers that America will not antagonize other powers out of a Platonic affection for China, that China realizes no nation but herself can work out her own salvation, and that Japan must be friendly with the teeming millions of China for commercial and other reasons. It would also be to China's advantage to utilize, at least for the present, the political and military supremacy of Japan in the Far East, as it would be Japan's wisdom to keep China always on her side. Commercial rivalry there is and will ever be, it is true; and some European or American business men, who have lost ground through German or Japanese competition in China, may continue to agitate against their rivals. But broad statesmanship discerns on the horizon unmistakable signs of a unanimous desire that all outside nations should coöperate for the peaceful consolidation of China's nationality, be it called a republic or a monarchical confederacy; and that, above all other things, America, China and Japan should work together for the preservation of tranquility on the shores washed by the Pacific waters. China with its dependencies is far more extensive in territory and far larger in population than the whole of Europe. Its social, political, economic, religious and racial differences may also be as great as those of Europe, or even greater. Its history is certainly much longer than that of Europe. It cannot, therefore, be through a recognition of this leader's republicanism, or that statesman's rule, or through the lending of money by a group of nations, or by private individuals singly, that the destiny of the four hundred million souls shall be guided from without. Each province, each dependency, each race of China is a problem by itself, which requires a life time's careful study. That person or nation who thoroughly understands China as a whole, not any one region or party, is alone entitled to a voice in the parliament of men for furthering the cause of China for the Chinese themselves.

SOME OF CHINA'S PHYSICAL PROBLEMS

By Charles K. Edmunds, Ph.D., President of the Canton Christian College and Observer in Charge of the Magnetic Survey of China Under the Auspices of the Carnegie Institution of Washington

Physical well-being is the basis of national, as well as of individual life, in all its other aspects. China today faces an almost overwhelming gamut of problems, political, economic, social, industrial and educational. Many of them demand immediate solution, or at least, immediate attack. Some of the most pressing of these are what I would call physical.

There is not time, and I would not be qualified if there were time, to give anything like a comprehensive discussion of the various physical problems that China faces. But in journeying widely throughout China during the last nine years, I have observed some of the surface aspects of several of these problems. These I shall try to present to you chiefly by means of the photographs I have secured.¹

The primaries of an individual life are food, shelter and raiment. The primaries of a national life are these for all the people plus ways of communication and transportation.

The poverty of the people is one of the most striking aspects of life in China. Yet their industriousness is almost quite as striking. For most of them it is a tremendous struggle with no leeway. This results partly from the over-emphasized necessity of producing progeny to do honor to the family ancestors, leading to the practice of early marriage and of polygamy, giving rise to over population without any disposition to migrate to less populated areas, nor indeed are there the facilities to do so or the knowledge of other parts that would invite such migration. These factors, combined

¹ The lecture was illustrated by a hundred slides mostly taken by the author.

with a ruinous policy during many centuries of using up all available timber, so that now almost everywhere the hill-sides are not only bare of trees but are literally scratched for roots each season, have so decreased the margin which the people have between a state of enough and that of utter want, that when the floods come, which they do almost annually in certain sections as a result of this ruthless deforestation, vast numbers are subject to actual famine.

The remedy is threefold: First a reduction of the birth rate as general education advances and a saner sociology prevails.

Secondly, a comprehensive system of reforestation, for from a physical point of view the primary fact about China is that she has used up her trees. Reforestation on a small scale has been begun in some parts but much more needs to be done and the need for it must be made clear and appropriate measures approved and financed.

Thirdly, improved methods of agriculture must be introduced. What is needed is more extensive farming. The Chinese farmer is altogether a gardener. He is the world's best expert in intensive farming, and we can learn from him in that line; but he seems to know little of extensive farming as we know it in the West, or of the ways of improving varieties. Modern agricultural schools are being established and some large agricultural development schemes have been formed. We may expect to see considerable progress in due time. I would commend to you the late Professor King's "Farmers of Forty Centuries," and G. W. Groff's pamphlet, "Agricultural Reciprocity between America and China."²

I believe that one of the best examples of re-forestation is given by Denmark in which in the course of twenty-five years, a considerable area has been given full-grown trees of a quick-growing variety and the rainfall has already been markedly affected. It is not likely that the same conditions exist in China so that it will be at least two or three generations before the conditions with reference to re-forestation

² Either of these can be secured from the Trustees of the Canton Christian College, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York.

can be adequately altered. There must, in the meantime, be a survey of flood-subjected areas of the rivers involved so that the adequate measures of protection may be carried out. During one of my recent trips in Anwei Province, one of the regions of chronic famine, I met the American engineer, Mr. Jameson, who had been sent by the Red Cross Society for the purpose of determining in what way such protective works might be carried out, and I have noted recently in the press that President Taft has commended Mr. Jameson's report to President Yuan Shih Kai. But this task of determining what should be done for the control of the rivers and canals is a gigantic one and needs the attention of the world's best experts.

Chief among the rivers needing such control is the Yellow River, "China's great sorrow." This is but little inferior to the Yangtze in length, being nearly 2500 miles, running from southwest to northeast. But it is one of the most unmanageable rivers in the world and of little utility. It is a characteristic river of the loess region, with a broad shallow course which is apt to change. It owes its color and name to loess sediment. During the whole known historical period, this river has frequently changed its course for the last 350 miles. These changes have swept over a fan-shaped area of 60 degrees in one of the most densely populated and highly cultivated regions in all China, and have, consequently caused great loss of life both directly by flood, and indirectly by consequent famine through destruction of standing crops as well as of stored food supplies.

Throughout its whole lower course, its waters run through the plain where it is most to be dreaded, because the mud and sand carried down by its stream have actually raised the bed of the river until it is several yards above the level of the surrounding country. Consequently there are few important towns on its banks. At its crossing with the Grand Canal, its bed is 16 feet above the level of the Canal.

In 1642, the city of Kai fung, 350 miles inland, was submerged 20 feet, and 200,000 persons are said to have perished. In 1854 the river flowed into the Yellow Sea in latitude 34 degrees N, but in that year it diverted near Kai fung fu, into

a northern bed it occupied 550 years before, and joining the Ta tsing ho, discharged into the Gulf of Chihli, several hundred miles further up the coast. In 1887 a terrible inundation occurred by the river bank giving in, and towns and villages were swept away.

To hinder its overflowing, embankments hem it in, some nearer, others farther, ranging one behind another at variable distances. In this manner, if one gives way, another prevents the inundation. In its present state, the work is still very inefficient, the dikes being weak, and constructed with materials that offer insufficient resistance.

The mud and sand which frequently obstruct the Yellow River, render it also very difficult of navigation. The only portion where it can be availed of, is to the north of Honan, and in the last 25 miles of its course. But even in this part, a shoal prevents junks except of very light draft from passing.

The flow of the Yellow River varies much with the season. It has been reckoned to be a little over 4000 cubic yards per second, in its middle portion, near Tsinan Fu (Shantung). The flow is three miles greater in the flood season. It is on the whole relatively small for such a great river, but this is partly accounted for by the waste of the water that filters through the embankments. The mud and sand, which it unceasingly deposits in the Gulf of Chihli, constantly lessen the depth of the latter, and form there new alluvial lands. Opposite the former mouth of the river (1851) one can see what great quantity of sediment was carried in its waters.

The last serious breach in its dykes occurred in September, 1902. The Chinese engineers showed great ingenuity in effecting its repair. The breach was near Liu-wang-chuang and was 1500 yards, through which most of the river flowed. It was repaired by building out from each side, dams in the form of a series of pakwerks of kaoliang stalks and sacks of clay, each pakwerk or buttress being joined to the previous one by ropes and piles.

Kaoliang is a kind of sorghum, probably identical with Barbados millet. The core of the stalk, except for a very thin and weak covering, is entirely pith, but it has a matted

bunch of fairly hard and strong roots which form its chief virtue for construction work. The stalk is about 6 feet long, $\frac{3}{4}$ inch in diameter, and the bunch of roots, 3 to 5 inches in diameter. The face of the work including the sides is composed of the roots which mat together and make a splendid surface for keeping out water.

The final opening in this breach of 1500 yards, after pakwerks were built out from each side, was reduced to 55 feet, and this, after two disastrous attempts in which the lives of many workmen were lost, was effectively closed on March 16, 1903, by letting down a huge mattress of kaoliang stalks and sacks of clay, the mattress being anchored to the side of the river by a great many 15-inch hawsers so as to prevent canting due to impact of current. Over one hundred 8-inch ropes spaced closely together were stretched across and belayed to anchor piles. On these were then placed in alternate layers the kaoliang stalks and sacks of clay. When these materials reached the level of the sides of the dam, the ropes were manned, and at a given signal were each lowered 1 foot on each side.

The rush through the opening was reduced by the construction of a deflecting groyne on the up river side of the breach, constructed similar to the pakwerk, and projecting some 120 feet into the current. The width of the river channel abreast of the breach had been 600 feet but was reduced to 300 feet by the formation of a sand bank on the opposite side of the river.

The control of the Yellow River is today one of the most pressing of China's physical problems. Experience has shown that the diking of such rivers is insufficient and almost futile. Captain William Tyler, coast inspector of the Chinese light house service, has presented a report on the Yellow River published by the inspectorate-general of customs at Shanghai in 1906, in which he proposes to control the river's lower reaches by providing for the depositing of the silt by deliberate flooding of large areas along the river, that is, to regulate its floods.

For this as well as for other rivers subject to floods, very comprehensive surveys should be made and the history of

the streams involved secured as accurately as possible. It has been surprising to me to see how often the railway engineers have erred in China, from their inadequate attention to this factor of river history, and after costly experience have had to redetermine the level of their tracks when flanking a river or lake or to rebuild their bridges crossing a stream.

Another example of Chinese engineering skill employed in protecting the land from the "misbehavior" of rivers is the great sea wall along the north side of Hangchow Bay, of which I have elsewhere given a full account,³ and is, considering the difficulties under which it was built, one of the finest pieces of such engineering to be found anywhere.

The Hangchow bore is caused chiefly by the funnel-shaped character of Hangchow Bay, combined with extensive mud and sand bars that occupy its mouth so that the tide in coming up the bay instead of gradually rising, banks up near the entrance. The difference in level is such that a great wall of water anywhere from 10 to 30 feet in height rushes up the bay and up the river at a speed which sometimes equals that of an ordinary express train. This occurs twice a day and always amounts to a considerable wave, although sometimes it is much larger than others. Of course, an exceedingly strong wall is required to keep out such a mass of rushing water from the surrounding country which, as a matter of fact, is in many places below the level of the river. Some 750,000 taels are spent each year for the upkeep of this wall. It is built of heavy granite blocks joined together with double iron wedges and besides the wall which is ordinarily 30 feet in height, there are two granite platforms or ledges each edged with a multiple series of long piles driven into the sand, constituting one of the strongest sea footings that could be secured to keep the wall from being undermined. At intervals of about half a mile for a good part of the wall, there are pakwerk buffers to deflect the current of the bore.

As if these two cases of the devastating forces to be overcome were not enough to develop resourcefulness and hardihood in the people compelled to face them, the coast of

³ *Popular Science Monthly*, February and March, 1908.

China is subject also to frequent typhoons, many of which are destructive of life and property in the extreme. I shall attempt no description of the typhoon and its origin, but wish by my pictures to call attention to the tremendous destruction caused by such storms.

In order that there may be more timely warnings, there are needed more observatories and better coördination in the work of existing observatories throughout the Orient. There are, at the present time, well-established observatories at Zikawei near Shanghai, maintained by French Jesuit missionaries; at Hong Kong, maintained by the British colonial government, and at Tsintau, the German concession on Shantung promontory. These observatories are more or less in receipt of communications from the observatories at Manila and Tokio, and there are also observations of more or less regularity at various light house stations along the China coast and at some of the ports by the harbor masters in the customs service. But, there is a great deal more than this to be done, and the whole work needs to be put upon a sound basis in its scientific work and in its administration.

One of the best things that Sir Robert Hart did in connection with the customs service was to give the China coast its needed light houses, so that today it has a chain of such that will rival those found anywhere.

The country at large needs also a weather service. While this is primarily the government's duty, missionary colleges at the present time have a real opportunity to assist China in this connection. The physics department of each of the colleges throughout the land should make adequate and systematic meteorological observations so that when the time comes when the government is able to organize a service on its own basis, there will be qualified observers available and an accumulation of valuable data upon which valid generalizations as to the meteorological forces in China may be based. All this is closely connected with re-forestation, extensive farming and the control of rivers. There should be a thorough meteorological survey as a necessary preliminary if these problems are to be adequately solved, for it will require at

least twenty years to gather the data that will render generalization valuable.

Partly as a preliminary to this, the Carnegie Institution of Washington has for over six years been carrying on magnetic observations throughout China in accordance with plans which I submitted to them to be carried out in connection with their magnetic survey of the North Pacific, and I shall treat briefly of the aims, scope and results of this magnetic survey as a distinct contribution to the solution of China's physical problems. The results of such a survey are necessary to the land surveyor and to the navigator in order that when a magnetic compass is used either to steer a ship at sea or to run the lines of a survey on land, the user may know the amount accurately by which the needle deviates from the astronomical or true north. At each station, the observer determines latitude and longitude by astronomical observations; the compass deviation or declination, the dip of the magnetic needle and the intensity of the earth's magnetic force at that place. All these elements are necessary in order to predict the way in which the magnetic declination from the north will vary with the years. The Carnegie Institution of Washington has extended its operations to China as a part of its plan to supplement the work of the constituted governments, who have not yet organized scientific services. Already fifteen of the provinces have been traversed and about a hundred stations have been occupied at intervals varying from 25 to 100 miles. The results for the years 1905-1910 are just being published and had previously in part been made available to those chiefly interested. Only three of the most western provinces and the greater part of Mongolia remain to be covered in this preliminary reconnaissance.

Connected with this matter of surveys is the whole problem of reform in weights and measures in China which are in utter confusion today. But while really a part of your topic, I shall not attempt here any discussion of this item.

During my survey trips I have of course come to appreciate very feelingly the problem that China has with reference to

roads. The pictures show you a few typical cases which will indicate what a boon good roads would be and how much railroads would relieve conditions at present so hard to bear. In the south there are no roads only footpaths. In the north the cart roads are so ancient and worn that in the loess regions they are veritable ruts—sometimes as deep as 70 feet below the level of the land on either side.

One reason why roads have been neglected is the prevalence of waterways, especially in the Yangtze and Canton deltas, and throughout the whole country great use is made of even insignificant streams by boats of very shallow draft. All these should be improved by proper conservancy methods.

Of special importance in this connection is the Grand Canal, the oldest and longest of canals. As the chief artificial waterway in China I wish to present to you something of the history and present condition of this canal, illustrating this latter aspect with a number of photographs secured a few years ago when I made a trip in a house-boat all the way from the Yellow River to the southern terminus of the canal at Hangchow, about 700 miles.

The Grand Canal, called in Chinese Yü-ho (Imperial River), Yün-ho (Transport River,) or Yunliang-ho (Tribute-bearing river), extends from Hangchow in Chekiang to T'ientsin in Chihli, a distance of about 1000 miles.

According to the most reliable accounts, it was commenced in the sixth century B.C., and finished in only A.D. 1283. The most ancient part is that which lies between the Yangtze and the Hwai-ho. The southern part, extending from Hangchow to Chinkiang, was constructed from A.D. 605 to 617. The upper part, extending from the old bed of the Hwang-ho to T'ientsin, was constructed by the Emperor Shi Tsu of the Yuen dynasty, and completed within a space of three years (A.D. 1280–1283). Shi Tsu then transferred his capital from Hangchow to Peking. As the northern provinces were not very fertile, and the trade along the seaboard unsafe, he was forced to get provisions from the southern provinces. He therefore resolved to complete the work left unfinished by his predecessors.

The southern portion, extending from Hangchow to Chinkiang, offers no difficulty as to its water supply. The slope is gentle and water is plentiful. Navigation on it is easy. Boats are sometimes retarded by bridges, but there are neither rapids nor locks to pass. The flood and tides of the Hangchow River are the only obstacles to overcome. Of the Bore Wall that does this, I have already spoken.

The central portion extending from the Yangtze to Ts'ingkiangp'oo is the most ancient. This part skirts several large lakes. It was formerly fed by the Yangtze, and its stream flowed in a northwest direction. It is fed at the present day by the waters of the Hwai-ho, as they issue from the Hungtsch lake, and the stream runs in a northerly direction. The current is fairly strong. The level of the country lying to the west of the Grand Canal and called the Shangho (above the river), is higher than the bed of the canal, while the country to the east, or Hsia-ho (below the river) is lower. Waste-weirs constructed on the eastern embankment, and opening on the Hsia-ho, discharge the surplus waters in the flood season, and thus relieve the banks and hinder injury of the works. There are few bridges in this portion of the Canal, but numerous ferry-boats facilitate passing at almost every place. This part of the Canal is far from offering the same advantages for navigation, at least, when one proceeds northward, as the southern portion. Boats, however, can easily travel on it and as on the southern section launch trains are regularly maintained.

The northern portion, extending from Ts'ingkiangp'oo to T'ientsin, is the most recent and also the most difficult for navigation, and hence the least utilized. Between the Ts'ingkiangp'oo and the Hwang-ho, the Canal is fed from the Hwai-ho and the Wen-ho. Its highest point is at its junction with the Wen-ho, just south of the Yellow River.

The current flows in a northerly direction from the junction of the Tawen-ho with the Grand Canal at Nanwang. The passage of the Hwang-ho is difficult. If the water fails to rise $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet beyond the ordinary level, junks are unable to cross it. If it rises higher, the current becomes too strong, and so travelers must at times wait a whole month before an

opportunity offers to cross it. At Lints'ing, the Canal joins the Wei-ho, borrows its channel, and is again easily navigated. From Ts'ingkiangp'oo to Lints'ing, the Canal is navigable with difficulty. Water is often lacking, and the locks or *chah* (such is the term applied to the narrows that stem the velocity of the current and establish a difference of level above and below) constructed to remedy the drawbacks, are passed with difficulty. On the up-voyage the boat must be hoisted by means of hawsers, while in the downward trip, it must be kept in check. There are numerous capstans, and hands are not wanting (about eighty or one hundred men are at work at times), nevertheless, the operation is not performed without trouble and risk of mishap.

The tribute fleet, which carried the rice to Peking, formerly followed this way, and comprised 4000 to 5000 boats divided into sixty-five sections. The voyage was performed but once annually. Of late years, the grain dispatched to Peking is largely forwarded by the sea route, through the agency of the China Merchants' Steamship Company.

As a means of communication between north and south, this part of the Canal is at present of little value, as it is defectively constructed, silted up by the mud-laden waters of the rivers crossed, and rendered ineffective through official neglect. But it could be restored to usefulness and be of considerable value.

In its southern and central portions, the Grand Canal, although badly kept up, is much more utilized, and several thousands of boats traffic on it. From Ts'ingkiangp'oo to T'ientsin, travelers frequently hire carts which jolt them on to Peking. But this is precisely the part I was most interested to traverse.

Numerous officials were formerly entrusted with the upkeep of the Grand Canal, under the control of a director-general of the grain transport, or Ts-aoyun Tsungtuh. This official was of equal rank with the viceroys. He resided at Ts'ingkiangp'oo, as well as his first assistant, who bore the title of tribute Taot'ai, or Ts'ao-Hot'ai. The office of director-general of the grain transport was abolished in January, 1905.

The pictures illustrate the details of the locks and their method of operation. They also show the dilapidated condition of the locks in certain places and the bad condition of the canal elsewhere.

The ordinary canal lock consists of heavy granite bastions, forming a gateway and carrying on their opposing faces deep grooves in which are set heavy timbers to form a dam. These timbers are raised by means of heavy stone set capstans, and by closing any one dam on the opening of the one above it, enough water may be available until the down-coming boats have been enabled to navigate the shallows between it and the upper lock. Boats of shallow draft are able to go down on the flood and to navigate the shallows below this lock by the backing up of the water in the rear of the next down-canal lock, ascending boats being tracked up against the flood.

Because of its position and the ease with which, from an engineering point of view, it could be put in a proper working condition, it seems to me very important that the Grand Canal should be improved and thus afford a cheap method of transportation for a large section of the country even in addition to what railways may in the course of time be developed. The Chinese are such natural boatmen that I think they would take easily to the handling of boats on the Canal even with modern locks and modern towing methods and machinery.

One of the most remarkable developments in the way of more rapid transportation in China has been the installation of so-called "launch trains," especially in the middle and lower sections of the Grand Canal and even more so throughout the Canton delta. For instance, in the custom house at Canton hundreds of steam launches are registered as towing between it and neighboring villages, anywhere distant from 10 to 200 miles. These launches often tow two or three passenger barges in a line and are exceedingly well patronized both for passengers and for freight. Launch building ship yards have been rapidly developed in Shanghai, Canton and elsewhere. But, for the more rapid and adequate development of that ease of communication upon which so much

depends for the binding together of China, we must look to the railways.

Railroads and other ways of transportation of commodities are related to the life of a nation in pretty much the same fashion as the circulatory or blood system of the human body is related to the life of the individual—similarly the lines of electric transmission of intelligence and the postal lines correspond pretty closely to the nervous system whose functioning is so intimately a part of our bodily life. Each of these systems, the circulatory and the nervous, has a dominating centre which has a relationship of mutual dependence with all parts of the body and all functions of its life. No part can live alone. So the development of national life in China depends necessarily largely upon the development of these two systems within her borders,—that for the easy, cheap and rapid distribution of commodities, so that the people of one region may almost instantaneously relieve the hunger or want in another region, and that for the quick and effective transmission of intelligence which will cause the thrill of the new national life to be felt in the remotest parts and by every individual.

Consequently, some indications of what has been done and what still remains to be done in the way of development of railways in China will be of interest.

At the present time there are the following main lines already in operation:

The system from Peking to Newchang and Mukden, via Tientsin and Shankaiwan which in turn is affiliated or connected with the Japanese railways in southern Manchuria and by them in turn connected with the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is of this Peking to Mukden line that Dr. C. C. Wang, who spoke to us so eloquently yesterday afternoon is an associate director. There is also the line from Peking to Kalgan and the Great Wall, constructed entirely under native direction.

Second, the Peking to Hankow line crossing the Yellow River by one of the most wonderful of bridges and over which each week a train de luxe runs that will rival the best trains in other lands, making the journey in about twenty-eight

hours. From this main line there also runs a connecting line westward to Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, traversing a region very rich in soft coal. There is also the cross line connecting Kaifeng with Honanfu.

Third, the German line in Shantung from Tsingtai to Tsinanfu where it now in turn makes connection with the most recently constructed road from Pukou to Tientsin which at its southern terminus on the Yangtze is just opposite Nanking and thus virtually connects with the railroad from Nanking to Shanghai and Hangchow.

Fourth, the French railway from Tonkin north-westerly to Yunnanfu, the capital of the Province of Yunnan, which has in my judgment been the most difficult of all to construct and the most costly in lives as well as money, and very costly to maintain on account of the frequent heavy landslides. Dear as it has cost it has, however, won for the French the domination in the trade of Yunnan. They have beaten the British who were so slow in constructing a road into Yunnan from the Burmese border. But the proposition is entirely a different one. This line from Burma would have to traverse at least two river valleys which are very difficult to cross while the French line running northwesterly has had a comparatively easy time in following up the Red River and one of its tributaries. Having seen for myself the difficulties which have been encountered in this easier route I am almost persuaded that the difficulties of the other could be taken as practically insurmountable except at most prohibitive expense.

Fifth, the British-Chinese line from Kowloon (Hongkong) to Canton, the last of the major roads which has been fully completed.

There are of course several minor roads, such as the American-built line from Canton westward to Fatshan and Samshui, the Japanese-built line from Swatow to Chowchowfu, the Shanghai-Woosung line, the Nanking City Railway, and others.

More important than these, however, are the other main trunk lines projected and in part already constructed. Most of the railroad development thus far has been confined to the

north-eastern quarter of the country. Lines connecting the north with the far south and the east with the far west are imperative and some progress is being made toward their realization.

First among these we should mention the Canton-Hankow line which with the road northward from Hankow will give an all rail connection from the metropolis of Kwangtung to the national capital. Although begun over a decade ago under the auspices of the American-China Development Company, less than a hundred miles of this road are as yet in operation. The original holding company because of their failure to keep the explicit conditions on which the concession was granted was obliged to sell out to the Chinese government, and American prestige in China suffered a severe blow. I have traversed the route of the proposed line and consider it one of the very finest propositions for the development of a coal bearing region.

Second among these projected roads, as yet but partly built, is the very important line from Hankow westward into Szechuan which will obviate the tremendous difficulties introduced by the gorges in the Yangtze.

Another important line projected is that from Yunnanfu to the Yangtze at Chungking.

There are many others but where the capital is to come from is a great problem. Most of the roads already built have been financed by foreign capital on the basis of concessions and some have already been handed over to the Chinese government for administration henceforth. Others have been joint enterprises in operation. Others are still completely foreign concessions and are operated as such. Only a small part of the development has been under entirely native auspices.

A good deal of the apparent opposition to the construction of railways in China on the part of the people has grown out of violation of the ubiquitous graves rather than from any inherent objection to the railway itself.

The people have now come fully to appreciate the advantages of railways and as we have already heard in this conference it was the imperial government's policy with refer-

ence to railway administration that was the operating factor in starting off the revolution in Szechuan. Dr. Sun Yat Sen is now devoting all his time to the promotion of railways. Doubtless there will be within a reasonably short period tremendous development of railways in China and they in turn will have a tremendous welding effect upon the country. It is necessary that within her borders there should be developed well equipped technical schools in which the Chinese may be taught the arts and sciences necessary for the construction and maintenance of railways and other works.

There is hardly time to refer in detail to the development of the postal system or telegraph lines in China, except to point out the tremendous success with which the postal system has been developed in that full-fledged post offices with the various departments are in operation all over the country and that a letter can be sent anywhere for the sum of 1 cent of our money, and that within a radius of about 60 miles from Canton for instance, it may be sent for one-quarter of an American penny.

Telegraph lines connect all provincial capitals with Peking and this system is being extended. It is not thoroughly understood as yet by all the people just how these things work and I am reminded of two instances which have come under my own observation to illustrate this.

An old man in Shantung hearing of the function of the line of wire that ran across his fields declared that men who could devise such a method for the transmission of intelligence could do anything; wherefore one of his neighbors remarked that he did not think much of it, for he himself had sat for two weeks watching that line very closely and had not yet seen anything go by.

The other instance was of Hunan carrying coolies tossing their worn-out straw sandals on the telegraph lines to secure for themselves a fleetness of foot equal to the speed of the electric message.

The telegraph and the postal system have already, in combination with the development of the public press in China, done a great deal toward unifying the people and may

confidently be counted on for a much larger effect in the future and this combined with more adequate railway facilities will surely foster a greater feeling of nationhood and of closeness of relationship between the various provinces.

We have seen something of the various physical problems which China faces. It is significant that the greatest physical feat of the ancient Chinese, the Great Wall, which was executed to shut out foreign intruders, has been broken down in all essential respects, and China is today fairly ready for foreign assistance in solving her problems, if it be friendly and not predatory.

The solution of Chinese physical problems largely depends on education; the education of the people to furnish the background of general enlightenment and the education of the native leaders upon whom must rest the responsibility for carrying out in detail such plans as may be formed for the alleviation of the conditions I have referred to. In order to determine just what remedial methods should be followed, there should be first a thorough study of present conditions by the best consulting engineers and scientists who can be secured. There is at the present time, it seem to me, a most important function for foreign experts to fill in connection with the development of China, and their work is a necessary preliminary and hence it is all important that China seek and use the assistance of such men, although it is also true that her need for such assistance will be temporary, and the application of the remedies, which they in their wisdom suggest after a study of the field, will still depend upon native talent.

The new national flag of China embodies, I believe, some significant lessons in the present connection. The sewing together of five stripes of silk to form one flag is easy, but to make a united nation of five peoples so widely separated, linguistically and geographically, in a country so greatly accidented by mountains, and so harassed by flood and famine, and so lacking the ways of quick transport and general modern education which must precede the development of resources and of ways of communication, requiring native captains of industry and native leaders of all sorts—a very

much greater task. It is just here that one of the functions of our mission colleges in China comes in—to train these leaders *in situ*, without loss of connection with China; for they need to know China as well as Western science and institutions and methods. They need to be qualified and unselfish, then the five points of the compass assumed by the Chinese may be rightly adopted—for the north, east, south and west will then all be *centered* around the common pole of service to China, and from the provinces to Peking and from Peking to the most distant provinces, the people will be united in an efficient, peaceful and helpful state, at least within the boundaries left them by their at present more powerful and predatory neighbors.

THE WESTERNIZING OF CHINESE MEDICAL PRACTICE

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Before considering the process and status of the westernizing of Chinese medical practice, it is well to be oriented as to what it is that is being changed. Briefly what is Chinese medical practice?

Let us approach this question with open mind. It is easy to ridicule what is not understood. Racial prejudice is not confined to the Chinese and if we take the trouble to study the original sources, not only much of interest will be found, but some information of real value. Often it is stated in strange terms and based on bizarre theories, but the experience of centuries is behind it and parts deserve investigation by modern methods of research.

In our glance at Chinese medicine it is to be remembered that Chinese civilization is in the stage occupied by the European nations in the middle ages. It has been in much the same condition of suspended animation for two millenniums. Thus if we get a view of Chinese medicine it will be one of that practiced by them in the times of the Greeks and Romans. More than that it is extremely interesting to note that the theories of cosmogony of the Chinese run parallel to those of the Greeks, and that the theories of pathology of each are based on those of cosmogony. To illustrate: The Greeks believed that the universe was composed of four elements, viz., earth, air, fire and water, and that consequently the human organism was composed of these primitive substances. Health was conditioned on the proper proportion or balance of these constituents; disease on the disproportion or loss of balance. These views of Empedocles (fifth century B.C.) in a modified form permeate not only the pathology of the Greeks and Romans, but of all writers up

to the eighteenth century. To this was added the so-called humoral theory, i.e., that the body fluids consist of blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile; and that to these correspond the four elements noted above, fire, air, water and earth, and the four conditions of matter, warm, cold, moist and dry. The predominance of one fluid over the others produce different temperaments, viz.; sanguine, phlegmatic, bilious or choleric and melancholic.

The Greeks, knew very little of human anatomy. They feared the dead and their religion enjoined immediate burial. Their knowledge of anatomy came from dissection of animals, including apes, and from observations during surgical operations.

The ancients did not differentiate between tendons, ligaments, and nerves. They believed that arteries contained air and conveyed it to the various organs.

While in Greece there was a well-defined medical cult, in Rome anyone who wished could declare himself a physician. There were no laws, which complied with, guaranteed the capacity of the practitioner, and medical responsibility was extremely limited.

I have taken time to enumerate these matters because of the striking similarity to Chinese theories and practices. As with the Greeks, the theory of cosmogony agreed on, pathology and treatment are perfectly rational. To the Chinese the universe is composed of five elements, metal, earth, fire, wood, water, each derived in turn from the succeeding. Corresponding to these are the five conditions cold, windy, hot, dry, moist. Health depends on the balance or correct proportion of these elements. Moreover there are added the great dual influences, the Yin and Yang, or female and male, negative and positive, dark and light. The Yin (elemental moisture) resides in the solid or semi-solid viscera, the liver, heart, lungs, spleen, and kidney. The Yang rules the contractile hollow organs, the large intestine, small intestine bladder, gall-bladder and stomach. The liver corresponds to wood, the heart to fire, the spleen to earth, the lungs to metal, and the kidneys to water. Each solid organ has a hollow viscus as its assistant or minister; thus the liver is

assisted by the gall-bladder, the heart by the small intestine, the spleen by the stomach, the lungs by the large intestine and the kidneys by the urinary bladder. The liver is the seat of the soul; the gall-bladder of strength and courage. The lungs regulate temperament, and so on.

Diagnosis rests mainly on the examination of the pulse and the inspection of the face and tongue. The pulse is palpated with greatest care and detail. The patients' wrists are felt in turn by the physician with the three fingers of the opposite hand, each finger revealing the condition of a different pair of organs. Light and heavy palpation differentiate respectively between the hollow viscera and their corresponding or governing solid organs. Fifty-one chief types of pulse are recognized. The face is minutely inspected. There are thirty-seven appearances of the tongue.

For the treatment of disease the Chinese have a very extensive materia medica. Many of their drugs are also used in the West, as calomel and other forms of mercury, arsenic, copper sulphate, iron, sulphur, sodium sulphate, alum, ammonium chloride, rhubarb, pomegranate root, camphor, aconite, cannabis indica, musk, ginger, licorice, anise, cinnamon, gentian, cardamons, peppermint, aloes, orange peel, castor oil, and digitalis. In addition there are many inert or disgusting substances, e.g., insects, snakes' skins, recent and fossil bones of animals, and faeces of men and animals. But the Chinese are not peculiar in this. The London Pharmacopoea, the first in England, was compiled by the Royal College of Physicians in 1618. It contained crabs' eyes, pearls, oyster shells, and coral, each supposed to have different qualities. It also recommended formulae containing faeces of men, dogs, mice, geese and other animals, calculi, human skull and the moss growing on it, blind puppies and earthworms. Not until 1721 were important changes made and even that edition retained dogs' excrement, earthworms, and the moss from human skulls.

Chinese prescriptions contain many ingredients, usually nine or ten, often fifty. The same was true in the West one or two hundred years ago. The ingredients of the prescrip-

tion are divided into the ruler, minister and subordinate corresponding to our basis, adjuvant and corrective.

Organotherapy is popular among the Chinese. Liver, lung and kidney of animals are given for human disease of those organs. Gall, especially of tigers, bears and notorious bandits is eaten to secure courage. Tigers' bones are considered the supreme tonic. Even human flesh is used occasionally, a son or daughter sacrificing a bit to cure a wasting disease of a parent. The ignorant have explained the strength of foreign medicines by supposing that these remedies were refined from the organs of kidnapped victims. The Tientsin massacre of 1870 grew out of the spread of such reports. It has been common rumor that foreign doctors pluck out the eyes of their patients. Personally I have known of an American physician who felt it necessary to guard the reputation of himself and his hospital by requiring the presence of a responsible friend at the operation of enucleation of an eye to receive the organ and so guard against senseless rumors.

At least since the eleventh century the Chinese have practiced inoculation against smallpox. The directions were very minute. The season and condition of the subject were taken into account. A wad of cotton moistened with the contents of a pustule from a mild case of smallpox was introduced into the nostril, or a dried pustule was powdered and rubbed into the nares.

The Chinese have never been surgeons, not from lack of handicraft but from lack of knowledge of anatomy and of methods of stopping the flow of blood. Almost their only procedures are acupuncture and counterirritation by heat variously applied, or by scraping. Acupuncture is very common. The safe spots 388 in number, are indicated on two figures prepared by imperial order in 1027 A.D. These mannikins are still in use in the T'ai I Yüan (Imperial Medical College) in Peking. The locations into which needles may be introduced include the joints, abdomen, and eye. An ancient surgeon is said to have rendered his patients anaesthetic by giving them medicine internally. The name of this drug is not given but it is supposed to have been

Indian hemp or hyocyamus. The Chinese do use the latter to induce sleep.

China has officials corresponding to our coroners. Their training is based on an official codex published in 1248 A.D.—a time at which Europe possessed nothing of the kind. Although it contains many absurd tests such as abounded in Europe a few centuries ago, it also has some shrewd methods of determining the cause or manner of death. Only the exterior of the body is examined.

Medical practice is ranked low among the callings in China. Physicians are considered a little above priests but below diviners and school teachers. After gaining a familiarity with the medical classics, an apprenticeship with an experienced practitioner is considered necessary. If the novitiate can point back to several generations of successful physicians, his reputation will probably be greater from the start. Professional visits are made only on specific invitation and several physicians are likely to be called in rapid succession, and discarded with their treatment unless immediately successful. The bearing of this on cases that require time and careful observation and supervision can be appreciated. Fees are small and the cost of treatment is likely to be the subject of bargaining. Medical ethics it must be confessed are not very high. Probably it is this that causes physicians to be held in comparatively low esteem. A work on medical ethics published during the Ming dynasty says:

When a patient is severely ill, treat him as thou wouldest wish to be treated thyself. If thou art called to a consultation, go at once and do not delay. If he ask thee for medicine, give it to him at once and do not ask if he be rich or poor. Use thy heart always to save life and to please all; so will thine own happiness be exalted. In the midst of the darkness of the world be sure there is someone who is protecting thee. When thou art called to an acute illness and thinkest with all thy might of nothing but making money out of the patient, if thy heart be nor filled with love of thy neighbor, be sure that in the world there is someone who will punish thee.

This is good, but with it contrast the Hippocratic oath:

I swear by Apollo the physician, and Æsculapius and Hygiea and Panacea and all the gods and goddesses, that according to my ability and judgment, I will keep this oath and this stipulation

I will follow the system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to any woman a pessary to produce abortion. With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my art. . . . Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every act of mischief and corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or males, of freemen and slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not, in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such should be kept secret. While I keep this oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all men in all times! But if I should trespass and violate this oath, may the reverse be my lot!

We must remember that it is the spirit of Hippocrates that has animated the profession in the West from the earliest times and has preserved it from becoming mercenary. To elevate medicine in China to the plane it occupies with us is one of the great tasks before us.

While in China anyone may become a medical practitioner by hanging out his shingle, there are some restrictions. Section 297 of the criminal code orders that

Whenever an unskillful practitioner in administering medicine or using the puncturing needle, proceeds contrary to the established forms, and thereby causes the death of a patient, the magistrate shall call in other practitioners to examine the medicine or the wound, and if it appears that the injury done was unintentional the practitioner shall then be treated according to the statute for accidental homicides, and shall not be any longer allowed to practise medicine. But if designedly he depart from the established forms, and deceives in his attempt to cure the malady in order to obtain property, then according to its amount, he shall be treated as a thief; and if death ensue from his malpractice, then, for thus having used medicine with intent to kill, he shall be beheaded (translation in Williams' *Middle Kingdom*).

A few years ago a law was enacted requiring examination and registration of all practicing western medicine but it has not been enforced.

It is said that during the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) medical schools flourished throughout the empire but they have disappeared, the only trace being the T'ai I Yüan or

Imperial Medical College in Peking. This institution trains the court physicians and also gives other practitioners the opportunity of study. In the Imperial Court there are nine physicians, specialists in the nine classes of diseases that affect the pulse violently or feebly; viz.: those arising from cold; those from female diseases; those from cutaneous diseases; those requiring acupuncture; diseases of the eyes; diseases of the mouth and its parts; and lastly diseases of the bones (*Williams' Middle Kingdom*).

While there are no medical diplomas or licenses in China, there is a custom which answers much the same purpose. When a patient is cured he often presents to the physician, a laudatory tablet. This bears a quotation from the classics or is couched in the flowery classical language. It is a testimonial; and the front, as well as the interior of the house of the physician is hung with many of these boards. This method is that of announcing a successful career rather than licensing the trained but untried novitiate. There is some reason in the practice and it is natural that it should have grown up where there is no system of examination or licensing at the end of the preliminary training.

What has been said thus far applies to those who may be called ethical Chinese physicians. Besides these, but not sharply marked from them (as is also the case with us) is a great army of charlatans, who by vehemently affirming the excellence of their wares, or their great wisdom, by psychologically the same methods of those in the West delude the ignorant. It is this class that gives the worst name to Chinese medicine. The best is painfully inadequate, but this, like ours, is limited only by the gullibility of its dupes. To this or another class, as you choose, belongs the third group of practitioners—the priests. Many temples or shrines are sought for their reputed cures and often are hung thick with the laudatory scrolls above mentioned. Usually the suppliant drops his fee into the receptacle, and then holding burning incense in his hands, prostrates himself before the image or other object of devotion. He then draws a bamboo slip from the bundle presented by the priest. The number on the slip corresponds to that of a printed formula

on a rack nearby. This prescription is taken to any druggist who fills it. Essentially this is not greatly different from some cults that may be met in any of our own cities today, but it especially reminds us of the miracle-working shrines of Europe.

This description on Chinese medicine has been given in order that we may have some understanding of the atmosphere into which western medicine is being introduced.

The record of the early contact of China with western Asia and Europe is very imperfect and that of the introduction of western medicine still more so. The earliest account that I can find of western physicians in China is that the Persian records show that in the thirteenth century the Great Kahn had Christian physicians attached to his court. "This . . . is interesting for the Mongol history, which in one place says that Aisie (perhaps Isaiah) was a Fuh-Lin man (Frank) a linguist, astrologer and physician, actually asserts that he served Kyuk Khan and that subsequently in 1263 was chief physician and astrologer to Kublai; in 1273 he is once styled a Mussulman and his hospital at Peking was officially called the Broad Charity." (E. H. Parker's *China and Religion*, p. 181). This hospital was opened in 1272.

The records are much clearer regarding the services of certain Jesuit fathers who were attached to the court of K'ang Hsi, who reigned from 1662 to 1723. It is recorded that in 1692 they cured the emperor of an attack of fever after his life was despaired of by his own doctors. This cure was by means of quinine. The new medicine was tried on several of the courtiers before the emperor was permitted to taste it. The attempt of the same emperor "to introduce western anatomy by means of a translation of the anatomy of Pierre Dionis by the Jesuit P. Perennin, was frustrated through the opposition of the native doctors" (Neuberger's *History of Medicine*, vol. i, p. 63). In his memoirs, Father Ripa (p. 42-43) who went to Peking as an artist in the court of K'ang Hsi, tells of a lay brother who attended the twentieth son of the emperor and gave a favorable prognosis, but the boy died. He was "kicked, cuffed and beaten so

severely by the order of the emperor that he fell seriously ill." He further says, "I was acquainted with some medical men who attended one of the imperial family," and were flogged and imprisoned for unsuccessful treatment. Taught by these and many other occurrences, the Jesuits who were in the emperor's service as mathematicians, painters, watch-makers, surgeons, and in other capacities would never undertake to serve him as physicians. But he records that Father Rod accompanied the same emperor to Jehol as surgeon. Father Ripa fell from his horse and was treated by a "Tartar surgeon" (p. 67). He says, "to confess the truth, although the mode of treatment was of a barbarous description, and some of the remedies appeared useless, I was cured in a very short time." Because of fear of encroachment by the countries to which they belonged, the Roman Catholic missionaries were driven from the country. The next contact with the West began with the East India Company in Canton. In 1805 Mr. Alexander Pearson introduced vaccination at Canton and before he left in 1832 saw a large vaccine institution established. Fifteen years later, (1820), Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to China, opened a dispensary for Chinese in connection with Mr. Livingstone, surgeon to the East India Company. It was conducted by Chinese practitioners of the old school. In 1827, Mr. T. R. Colledge, also surgeon to the East India Company opened and conducted a hospital at Macao. It was supported by the Company and by private merchants. More than 6000 cases, especially diseases of the eye were treated in the five years of its existence. His greater service, perhaps, was his advocacy to the missionary societies of the use of physicians as pioneers in missionary work. All these men that have been mentioned were British, but it remained for an American Society, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to send the first medical missionary to China. This was the Rev. Peter Parker, M.D., who opened an ophthalmic hospital in December, 1834. From his work grew the Medical Missionary Society in China, founded three years later, and which still continues its good work in Canton. In 1852, Dr. Parker was appointed

United States minister to China. His successor was Dr. J. G. Kerr, of the American Presbyterian Mission, whose record of 1400 operations for cystic calculi, is second only to that of Sir William Thompson. The work of the Medical Missionary Society was not limited at that time to Canton, but was the pioneer in coöperation with British and American Missionary Societies, in locating physicians in Amoy, Ningpo Hongkong and Shanghai. In this connection, the name of the first British medical missionary should be mentioned—Dr. William Lockhart, who arrived in 1839 and began his work in Macao, later going to Hongkong, Chusan, Shanghai and eventually to Peking. In twenty years he treated over 200,000 patients. Among these early men Dr. Hobson, also of the London Missionary Society, should be noted on account of his work of translation. In 1850, he prepared a work on anatomy and physiology; one on air, light, heat and electricity, and the elements of astronomy and natural history; as well as others on the principles and practice of surgery, on mid-wifery and diseases of children, and on the practice of medicine and materia medica, the last with an English and Chinese vocabulary. With the exception of the abortive effort of Father Perennin under K'ang Hsi, these were the first attempts at the translation of western science into the Chinese language. "Shortly after the appearance of the first of the series, it was re-published by the viceroy of Canton and then by Chinese publishers." Later they were printed in Japan, then just opened to intercourse with the West, but all reference to their western origin and to the Christian religion contained were omitted (Lockhart's *Medical Missions in China*).

It is of interest to note that ether was first used as an anaesthetic in Canton in 1847, the year following its demonstration in Boston and that the report of the Medical Missionary Society for 1848-49 notes the first use of chloroform.

After the beginning of medical missionary work in Canton, new cities were opened as fast as the treaties permitted the residence of foreigners. The treaty of Tientsin in 1858 allowed missionaries to reside in any part of China and a

rapid expansion of the work followed until every province has its physicians, hospitals and dispensaries. In some places these hospitals are well equipped; in others fair work is being done under very unfavorable conditions. The efforts of medical missionaries are noted because they outnumber, many times, all the other qualified practitioners of western medicine and because they are scattered everywhere, forming, like their clerical and education colleagues, centers where the leavening of China with modern ideas has been, and is being carried on as by no other agency. The extent of their work in the aggregate may be judged from the incomplete returns from the 415 medical missionaries for the year 1910. The figures cover only 126 hospitals with about 6700 beds, representing 175 physicians. These men and women and their assistants treated 51,121 inpatients in their hospitals and 1,548,707 outpatients in the dispensaries, on tours, and in the patients' homes. The last number represents both first and return visits, the number of each being nearly the same. From these figures it can be seen what an influence these workers must be exerting in bringing a knowledge of western medicine to the masses as well as the classes of China. These hospitals and dispensaries have a further part in the same work, in the training of assistants. By this I do not mean those hospitals that are attempting to give full medical courses. From lack of sufficient medical colleges, every doctor is compelled to a large extent, to train his own helpers. Often these men stay only a few years, until they have a smattering of knowledge, and then leave to take up positions in government dispensaries or more frequently, to open drug shops and to practice western medicine on their own accounts. There is no medical practice law to prevent this. These men are often no credit to their teachers and any moderately efficient law should cut many of them off. On the other hand, some of them have very successful practices and wide reputations.

Unfortunately medical contact with the West has brought bad as well as good—not unlike our contributions in other directions. Few quacks have established themselves thus far, though several years ago the Chinese public was relieved

of considerable money by an "electric belt" fakir.¹ More to be deplored than quacks at present is the rapidly extending exploitation of patent and proprietary medicines. Williams' Pink Pills and Doan's Kidney Beans (to mention two great offenders) together with a legion of Japanese nostrums are found advertised and sold everywhere. Many Chinese reading the specious testimonials, are led to believe that these are western remedies of accepted worth and pay \$2.50 for six bottles of Williams' Pink Pills which the analyses of the British Medical Association show to consist of carbonate of iron and to cost about 10 cents. We are beginning a fight in this country against these enemies of health. It is no wonder that they turn to the countries now opening to western commerce to ply their trade where publicity and pure food laws may not trouble them for some time.

The Chinese government, national or provincial, has opened in several cities, hospitals or in more cases dispensaries. The board of the interior (Men Chêng Pu) has maintained two large dispensaries in Peking for a number of years. Some hundreds of patients are treated there daily. They may choose between the old style Chinese practise and western medicine. I am told that about three times as many choose the former as the latter, especially for medical as contrasted with surgical ailments. The fact that there are no wards for inpatients where they can receive the necessary after treatment accounts in part for the disproportion. In hospitals conducted by foreigners, the number of surgical cases is much greater than the medical among the inpatients. And this brings us to an interesting fact; namely, that while

¹ Mr. C. B. Towns, to whom Mr. Bland referred in his address as an expert in the treatment of the opium habit, belonged to the borderline of legitimate business. Without any medical knowledge, he took a secret remedy to China and tried to persuade the Chinese government to purchase it from him. I mention this because this conference should not be left with the idea that Mr. Bland evidently meant to imply, i.e., that the Chinese government was insincere in its attempts at opium reform because it would not take expert advice when offered. Further it should be said that Mr. Towns' remedy, the formula for which is now known, contains as its active agent, a drug which may be exceedingly dangerous in unskilled hands, yet this man, himself without medical training, proposed to scatter it abroad for general use in the hands of the laity.

the Chinese realize that western surgery is so infinitely superior to their own that there is no comparison, many of them, I believe it may be said most of them, as yet prefer the old Chinese school for internal diseases. The reasons for this are fairly clear. There is no Chinese surgery; no knowledge of anatomy nor pathology; no antisepsis nor asepsis, nor anaesthetics, nor means of haemostasis. It is easy to see why western surgery seems almost miraculous to them. In the case of medicine it is different. The western physician does not feel the pulse with the extreme care of his Oriental confrère. He cannot diagnose the condition of all the internal organs by this means alone. Therefore, in the eyes of most of the Chinese his skill is much inferior. Moreover, he does not use the terminology with which his patients are familiar. He does not know what diseases belong to the Yin and which to the Yang, which to the hot, cold, moist, dry and windy. He does not even know whether his remedies are contrary in nature to the disease for which they given. He does not require partial abstinence from food while under treatment as the Chinese physicians frequently do. Moreover, he uses unheard of, and sometimes repugnant methods of diagnosis and treatment; he requires the patient to expose the part of the body affected no matter what it may be; he thumps and listens to and examines the whole body. He uses cold baths in fevers—*whoever heard of such a thing!* And finally the Chinese believes that his own physicians cure as many as or more than the western doctor. Very frequently he goes to the westerner only as a last resort after all the native doctors have pronounced his case hopeless. The Chinese habit of going from one doctor to another prevents success in those diseases which require long careful watching and treatment. It is almost impossible to get a Chinese to become an inpatient when one can only promise him that after a long stay, perhaps he may be improved, but that a perfect cure is out of the question. The fact is that western methods of treatment do not produce such startling cures in medical as in surgical cases. In comparing the results of the two systems, reliable statistics are almost unobtainable. The

only ones available are those given by Jeffreys and Maxwell in their book *Diseases of China* for the Tung Wah Hospital, Hongkong for 1905. These show

General diseases

NET TOTAL TREATED	ADMISSIONS			DEATHS		
	Western treatment	Chinese treatment	Total	Western treatment	Chinese treatment	Total
Number...	1237	1209	2446	370	477	847
Per cent.....	50.6	49.4		*29.91	*39.45	

* Per cent of deaths among admissions to respective service.

The extremely high mortality in this hospital shows that either the figures cover a period of severe epidemic disease or that only extremely ill patients were admitted, for the death rate is about ten times that in most hospitals. If this is the case, the method of treatment makes much less difference than in less critical cases, for here most will die regardless of the care and wisdom of the measures taken. The main interest of the figures lies in the fact that in as thoroughly foreignized a city as Hongkong practically as many patients choose the old as the new method of treatment.

Aside from general hospitals, others have been established for the treatment of lepers, and two for the insane. Of the latter the first and best known is that opened by Dr. Kerr in Canton in 1898. The second is a government hospital in Peking entirely under Chinese control and in charge of a western trained Chinese physician. So far as I am aware, there is not a single institution devoted exclusively to the treatment of tuberculosis, though that disease is more prevalent in China than in Europe and America.

Great as has been the work of hospitals and dispensaries conducted by foreigners in the diffusion of a knowledge of the methods and benefits of western medicine, a greater part must be played by the educational institutions that will send Chinese men and women out among their own people, properly equipped to demonstrate the science and the art of healing. The evolution of medical colleges in China has been very similar to that in America. At first men trained

abroad held the field. Then they obtained their knowledge by what might be termed apprenticeship—reading with and assisting a qualified practitioner. Later schools were established, the teachers of which were practicing physicians but who gave part of their time to class instruction. Only recently in America have there been medical colleges where in subjects like physiology, anatomy and pathology, the instructors have devoted their time exclusively to teaching. All these varieties of medical instruction are found in China but very few colleges have come to the stage where a full curriculum is offered. The commonest variety of instruction is where one or two men, more than busy with the care of a hospital and dispensary, take a few students to train them as assistants. They lecture to them on anatomy, physiology and the other fundamental subjects usually translating as they go into colloquial Chinese and probably using the English term where the Chinese is lacking or unknown. Men trained in this way have the virtues and the vices of their teachers. Naturally, they know nothing first hand of the fundamental natural sciences on which modern medicine is based. Those who are gifted come to take fair histories, are good anaesthetists, fair to good operators, but usually with faulty technique, and are poor diagnosticians and prescribers. Their faults are that they do most things by imitation, and do not understand the rationale of the proceeding. They know that the master gives this drug or that mixture under what are apparently the circumstances demanding treatment. They try to learn formulas and prescriptions rather than to diagnose by careful observation and elimination. In short, they are empyrics, the result of didactic instruction. Their vices are the vices of the system or lack of system under which they are trained, and the system is the result of the stage of development of education in China.

It is easy to condemn the conditions but America has not fully emerged from them herself. Very few schools in China can measure up to the American Medical Association's definition of a medical college, i.e., an institution having "at least six professors giving their entire time to medical work,

a graded course of four full years of college grade in medicine and requiring for admission not less than the usual four years of academic or high school preparation or its equivalent in addition to pre-academic or grammar school studies." None has reached the new standard of the Council on Medical Education of the American Medical Association. Several are doing fair work and improving more or less rapidly. About ten schools established by missionary societies by generous stretching of the definition may be called medical colleges. Only one of these has a staff of ten or more teachers. Being myself a teacher in that one perhaps comparisons may be considered invidious so that I prefer to turn to the judgment of others as to the present status of medical colleges in China. In the report of Dr. Martin R. Edwards, who spied out the land for the location of the Harvard Medical School in China, and published last year, he says, "Of the schools which have been established by the missionary forces, the Union Medical School in Peking gives the greatest promise. It has a good foundation in buildings, equipment and professorial staff. In Shanghai, the St. John's University Medical School has been established, but its requirement admitting only college men of two years' standing has largely limited its work. There is now in Hankow a small school struggling along with practically no equipment as to buildings or men. Hangchow, Soochow, Foochow, and Canton have similar so-called medical schools, all working with an entirely inadequate equipment." The difficulties are two: First, the preliminary education is inadequate; and second, the staffs and equipment are usually too meagre. Both are due to the undeveloped condition of educational institutions in China. They are where America was two decades or more ago. The China Medical Missionary Association composed of the four hundred and more medical missionaries has drawn up a policy of medical education which it hopes to see carried out. It has recommended that for the present, missionary medical education be concentrated in five centers, one union college in each the north, south, east, west and central parts of the country, and that the instruction be in Chinese; that is, Mandarin,

except in Canton. Practically, this means, Peking, Canton, Nanking, Chentu and Hankow. There are such schools either in operation or under organization in each of these cities except Canton, where a union is not yet consummated. The three Wuhan cities (Hankow, Han Yang, Wuchang) have a small school conducted by the two societies in Hankow, and another across the river under the American Episcopal Church in Wuchang. This great center has been selected by the movement headed by Lord William Cecil as the site of the Oxford-Cambridge University scheme. If and when this plan materializes, an adequate medical college certainly will be a part of it. Aside from these five centers designated by the China Medical Missionary Association and those mentioned by Dr. Edwards in his report, there is a Union Medical College at Chinanfu, Shantung with three permanent instructors and two lecturers. There is one at Mukden, Manchuria, with five teachers. The only missionary schools using English as the teaching medium are St. John's in Shanghai, which has now affiliated with the Harvard Medical School in China; and the University Medical School, affiliated with the Canton Christian College. Aside from the colleges mentioned, there are others that may be noted. With characteristic German thoroughness a school has been started in Shanghai which gives a preparatory course in the German language and in the sciences and then a medical course, the whole covering seven years. This is part of a campaign to make Germany and the German language greater factors in the Far East than they are at present. In Canton the French have a school with three professors. Their lectures are interpreted into Chinese—a thoroughly unsatisfactory method. Hongkong University, a semi-official institution recently organized, will have a good medical department. Although it is in British territory, it must exert a large influence in South China. The Japanese have opened three or four schools in China, but they are purely commercial ventures and the less said about them the better. All the schools mentioned are for men. There are two missionary medical colleges for women. One is in Canton. The other, the Union Medical College for Women in Peking,

gives a six year course. The curriculum and some of the teachers are the same as in the Union Medical College (for men), Peking.

Although they have been referred to indirectly, notice is due to the marked interest that several American universities have taken in education in China. Yale University was the first, and in 1903, opened work in Changsha, Hunan, which had been selected as a site. Up to the present, although medical work has been conducted under Dr. E. H. Hume and Dr. F. C. Yen, the contemplated medical college has not yet been organized. The University of Pennsylvania, through its Young Men's Christian Association, affiliated itself with the Canton Christian College and now has three men conducting the University Medical School. Princeton University mans the whole work of the Young Men's Christian Association in Peking, but there is no medical work. Oxford and Cambridge Universities in England plan to start a University at Hankow or one of the other Wuhan cities. In this they have sought American coöperation. A medical college would be part of the scheme. The last and largest project to enter the field is Harvard University, which has now seven men in Shanghai. The medical department of St. John's University has been amalgamated with the Harvard Medical School in China. It plans to teach in English and to conduct a medical college, a training school for municipal health officers for China, a research laboratory, and post-graduate courses for foreign physicians—an ambitious program. Only a few of the institutions mentioned confer degrees. St. John's University is incorporated in the United States and consequently its degrees are foreign. The same is true of a few others. This is a part of extraterritoriality and while some new institutions contemplate following the same course it is, I believe, a wrong position and one that will be untenable within a few years when extraterritoriality of other varieties has disappeared. Only one school, the Union Medical College in Peking enjoys the recognition of the Chinese government, that is its graduates receive certificates from the board of education. By a change of policy of the republican government, the diplomas

issued by the college itself will receive the stamp of the board of education in the future.

This fairly covers what has been done for China. What has China done for herself? Very little as yet. The program laid down by the imperial edict of 1909 contemplated a hospital and medical school in every provincial capital as well as a medical department in the Imperial University in Peking. This, like many other paper reforms of the Manchu government, was never carried out. Practically the only medical education conducted by the government are the two colleges in Tientsin—the Pei Yang Medical College and the Army Medical College. The first is taught by three or four French physicians and about an equal number of Chinese graduates of the school. The medium of instruction is English. The second formerly had Japanese instructors, whose lectures in their own language were interpreted into Chinese. The textbooks were those used in Japan, i.e., written in the slightly modified Chinese classical language. Having dismissed the Japanese staff, the Army Medical College is about to use English as its teaching language. These schools train the surgeons for the army and navy, but some of their graduates, especially of the first and older institutions are now in civil and non-medical official positions.

This brings us to a consideration of the language medium in teaching western medicine in China. It is a question in which there is no unanimity. Strangely the China Medical Missionary Association representing foreigners, favors Chinese colloquial for the conversational parts of the instruction and the easy classical style for text books; while the Chinese government has decreed that all science, including medicine shall be taught in English. The board of education has been forced into this position by two factors, the lack of teachers and the lack of technical terms in the Chinese language. The instructors in the sciences as well as in many of the other higher branches in the government colleges and universities are foreigners especially English and Americans. They go out under a three-year contract, so that learning to teach in Chinese is out of the question. English

is *the* foreign language of the Orient and it is fast becoming true that no man can consider himself educated unless he knows something of it. The second factor, the matter of technical terms is also difficult. There has been a desultory work on the compilation of technical terms, but it has not reached the natural sciences and may not for a long time. By the rules of the Chinese language, it is improper to create new characters, i.e., to coin new words. It would be equivalent to making new words in a modern language without going to the dead languages for the roots. What must be done is to combine existing characters so as to give the requisite meaning, where a single ideograph does not suffice to express the thought. Thus one is confined to a choice of say forty thousand characters with their meanings which originated when the world was comparatively primitive, together with combinations of the same. The difficulty is that what would correspond to a polysyllabic word with us becomes a string of characters a definition in fact, expressed in what must be lucid Chinese. The result is sometimes weird. A short cut but worse expedient is the transliteration of the sound of the foreign word. Here the trouble is that beside having absolutely no meaning to the uninitiated the sound values of different characters vary in different parts of the country and what might be a fair imitation in one place would have little resemblance in another. In spite of what we may say about the difficulties, the modern writers on every subject under the sun go on coining new terms (not new characters) and many of them are very pat. The same will be done in medicine in time. It should be undertaken by a government commission if suitable men can be found. It is a very difficult task if well done, for it combines an extensive knowledge of Chinese characters, a thorough technical knowledge of the science whose terms are translated, e.g., medicine, and that masterly quality which uses just the right word to express each shade of meaning. Perhaps the men can be found now; perhaps we shall have to wait a few years. The Japanese met the same difficulties and solved them as far as they have been solved, as the Chinese are doing. They began by teaching technical subjects

in the language of the country which they took as their model in that particular branch. Medicine fell to German and I understand that even yet some of the most technical parts of medicine are studied in that language. The Japanese use the Chinese classical language, having derived it with much of their culture from China many centuries ago. It might be asked why the Chinese do not use the Japanese terms or even the Japanese textbooks. The answer is that the Japanese use many characters in other senses than the Chinese do, so that the meaning is not clear; they use many unusual characters; and their whole literary style is not pleasing or shall we say correct, from the Chinese standpoint. Moreover, they have used many transliterations of the sounds of foreign terms, accurate perhaps when pronounced in Japanese, but meaningless when given the Chinese sounds. And moreover, the Chinese sound values, as I have pointed out, are not the same everywhere. The China Medical Missionary Association and those who agree with their viewpoint, that a great country like China ultimately must study and write about every subject, technical or otherwise, in their own language, have taken the bull by the horns and have compiled an *English-Chinese Medical Lexicon*, covering the commoner medical terms and will add to it as new editions appear. It has some faults. Some terms are poor. Some rules of Chinese composition occasionally are broken, but it is a step in the right direction. It will be tried by fire and the good will remain.

And this brings us to the subject of modern medical literature in the Chinese language. It is not a large subject, more's the pity. I have noted the abortive attempt of a Jesuit father to translate an anatomy, and the more fruitful labors of Dr. Hobson in Canton. Dr. Kerr, of Canton, wrote several treatises, as did several others, but it is since 1900 that most has been done. The works now translated and published by the publication committee of the China Medical Missionary Association comprise twenty-three titles, including most but not all of the fundamental branches of medicine. Other books are in the press and still others are being translated. Within a few years when China

has men of her own thoroughly trained in medicine and in the other sciences, the Chinese language will be employed in the government colleges. Of that there can be no doubt. At present is is a question of whether it is better to make the student do the work of getting sufficient English to grasp the technicalities of medicine, and after he has obtained the training, be unable to transmit what he has learned to his countrymen who do not understand English, because he has no technical terms; or, to make the teacher learn Chinese and create a literature in medicine with the help, of course, of Chinese teachers, who see that the style is correct. In our own college we require the students to have some knowledge of English and to continue the study of both that and classical Chinese throughout their course unless excused for special proficiency. The aim is to make English a secondary language as students in this country have German and French for collateral reading and I believe that we are anticipating the condition that will prevail in nearly all schools a few years hence, when those who wish to study in a foreign language will seek also the greater facilities of some foreign land.

For more than fifty years Chinese have been going to the West for medical training. So far as I can find any record the first to take a degree was Dr. Wang Fen, who graduated at Edinborough in 1857. He offered his services to the London Missionary Society and was in charge of the hospital of the Medical Missionary Society in Canton for a number of years. Since then a number of Chinese have studied both in Europe and America. With the great influx of Chinese students since 1900 and especially since the migrations to America that have resulted from the return of the Boxer indemnity by the United States, the number has increased. At the present time the bureau supervising students has a record of seven now studying medicine, two sanitary engineering and one sanitary chemistry.

Finally, where does western medicine stand today in the estimate of the Chinese? That depends on the precise moment at which you speak. The change that is going on in China at present is stupendous. It is safe to say that the

officials and upper classes have come into close contact with western ideas and culture more in the last decade than in the preceding century and that the last year has meant more in progress than the preceding ten. It is needless to say that if the Chinese government had known a tithe of what it does now, the Boxer delusion would have been impossible. There are still old officials who did not learn anything from that convulsion but are wondering what all the recent fuss is about. There are others who are revising their opinions. Let me quote from the address of Hsi Liang, viceroy of Manchuria at the opening of the International Plague Conference in Mukden in April, 1911:

We Chinese have for a long time believed in an ancient system of medical practice, which the experience of centuries has found to be serviceable for many ailments, but the lessons taught by this epidemic, which until three or four months ago had been unknown in China, have been great, and have compelled several of us to revise our former ideas of this valuable branch of knowledge. We feel that the progress of medical science must go hand in hand with the advancement of learning, and that if railways, telegraphs, electric light and other modern inventions are indispensable to the material welfare of this country, we should also make use of the wonderful resources of western medicine for the benefit of the people. . . . I trust and believe too, that modern medicine and especially sanitary science will in future receive more attention in this country than it has hitherto done, and we shall be better prepared to deal with similar epidemics when they arise. My great regret is that as many as 40,000 lives have been lost in these Provinces, especially including those of some of our foreign doctors, whose unselfish devotion to duty and the welfare of our people I shall always remember.

At the first graduation exercises of the Union Medical College in Peking in April 1911, the Privy Councillor Na T'ung gave the principal address. He said in part:

There is abundant proof that neglect of the laws of sanitation and absence of proper medical care have brought about more deaths of officers and men in the fiercest of modern warfare than the destructive power of the terrible weapons of war. What is true in times of war is no less true in the times of peace. We have just had an illustration in the pneumonic plague which raged so fiercely in Manchuria. . . . In fighting against the plague—and the battle was a splendid one—the government found that it did not have a sufficient number of doctors available to do the

work and a call for volunteers was issued. Among others, several professors and students of your college responded and at once left for Harbin, where the plague was seen in its worst form. Leaving self and family out of consideration, they thought only of the good they could do, and as doctors they remembered that their duty and ambition was to fight disease and death: And it is this spirit, I believe, should inspire you throughout your lives, the spirit of service and sacrifice.

Within the year 1911, the Chinese government twice sought the coöperation of the Union Medical College in Peking when their own resources were insufficient. The first was in the case of the epidemic in pneumonic plague in Manchuria referred to by Na T'ung and the second was during the revolution. The imperial army medical corps was altogether inadequate for the task and desired the Medical College to coöperate. The reply was in the affirmative provided a Red Cross Society could be organized and that the imperial government would apply the rules of the Geneva Convention to the treatment of wounded rebels. It took a month of the time of the most active hostilities before they could be persuaded to do so, but in the end these civilized rules prevailed and three companies with nine teachers and about forty students went to the front. Aside from this and the efforts of other Red Cross Societies in China wherever there were medical missionaries their hospitals if required were filled with wounded. On the rebel side there was little army medical corps work but several organizations including the Red Cross Society in Shanghai sent companies to the scene of hostilities. The public service during these two visitations of pestilence and war has aided greatly in showing the officials in China what western medicine is by actual demonstration. After the plague one heard on every side among officials of the necessity of reform in medical education and in supervision of public health. There is no question but that the new government will move rapidly in this direction and that the institutions now at work and many others will be needed to coöperate with those that the government will establish to train physicians and public health officers for new China.

THE OPIUM ABOLITION QUESTION

By J. O. P. Bland, formerly of the Imperial Maritime Customs, Secretary to the Shanghai Municipality and "Times" Correspondent in China

I am deeply sensible, ladies and gentlemen, of the honor conferred and of my privilege in addressing so distinguished and representative an audience. I am also sensible of the fact that the opinions which I am about to lay before you in connection with the opium question in China are very different, on the whole, from those which you are accustomed to hear and to hold. The subject of opium production and smoking in China is one which many writers have discovered to be of an extremely difficult and thorny nature. Mr. H. B. Morse, an American who for many years served the Chinese government loyally and well, writing on this subject observes that he who tries to investigate the facts with no predisposition to either side is likely to find himself branded as a trimmer by the one party and a Laodicean by the other, with no opportunity to defend himself.

In bringing before you the present aspect of the opium question and the views and opinions which I and many other observers hold on this subject, I would ask you to believe that I am actuated by a feeling of sincere sympathy and regard for the Chinese people and that the views which I hold are entirely sincere, even where they differ from those advanced by the missionary bodies, the anti-opium societies and many earnest Chinese reformers in China. I am aware that one runs the risk of being misjudged in this matter, but it is a risk which must be faced by those who sincerely believe that the proceedings of the anti-opium societies, initiated with the very best of motives, are likely in the long run to aggravate the evil of opium smoking in China, even after the Indian trade has been completely abolished, and to a certain extent because of the abolition of that trade.

Speaking for myself and for many other observers whose opinions are based as much upon the political, economic and social aspects of the question as upon its high moral grounds, it seems to me a matter for sincere congratulation that Great Britain has assented to the abolition of the Indian trade, a traffic in itself highly demoralizing to the Chinese and therefore discreditable to Great Britain. Having said this much, however, it seems to me necessary that we should recognize the fact that the practical issues of the question of opium abolition as a whole have been very frequently confused by too general an acceptance of certain postulates loudly proclaimed upon high moral grounds. It seems to me that many of the philanthropists, missionaries and eminent divines who have taken a prominent part in the anti-opium movement are afflicted in their field of morals by the same persistent delusion as that which commonly afflicts reformers in the field of political economies. "They are all pervaded," as Spencer says, "by the conviction, now definitely expressed and now taken as a self evident truth, that there needs but this kind of instruction or that kind of discipline, this mode of repression or that system of culture, to bring society into a very much better state." Misled by laudable enthusiasms, blinded by benevolent hypotheses, it is a characteristic of the advocates of this good cause, that they are generally predisposed to ignore or to misinterpret those facts of the situation which militate against their own conclusions. Influenced by these enthusiasms, they fail to take into account, not only the structural character of the Chinese race in particular, but the inherent weaknesses of humanity in general.

If we turn to the history of the agitation against the Indian opium trade, we find that amongst the arguments most frequently advanced, two have been most persistent; first, the argument that Great Britain has forced the Indian trade upon China at the cannon's mouth, and secondly, that the recent anti-opium legislation introduced by the Chinese government opens up a new and particularly promising vision of reform. As regards the first of these two, the fallacy of the cannon's mouth line of argument has been so

frequently demonstrated by unbiased and competent writers that the facts are easily available. Nevertheless, it continues to figure prominently in all the activities of the anti-opium societies and is apparently not to be upset by any reiteration of historical fact. To give only one recent instance, let me quote to you from a work published a month ago, *Men and Manners of Modern China* by Dr. Macgowan.

Seventy years ago [he says] a great western power forced on China an opium treaty at the mouth of the cannon. Since then not a dead hand but a mailed fist has been held up threateningly to prevent its being evaded. Her merchants have carried on the opium traffic and her warships have patrolled the eastern seas, to see that they are not defrauded of their rights.

The years dragged slowly on for China, and during these opium was slowly weaving its web over the land, and its black fingers were fastening themselves round the hearts of countless thousands, and homes were being desolated by a curse which the government might never try to remove, for the iron fist was always on guard.

And then the great miracle took place. The passion that had been burning in the hearts of the best men in the country blazed forth with a mighty fire. The conqueror was appealed to some five years ago or so, and slowly the mailed arm was dropped.

The effect of well-meant but wholly inaccurate statements of this sort has been clearly reflected in the attitude of many Chinese promoters of the anti-opium movement and has resulted in diverting the attention of many from the real and vital issues of that question to the actually subordinate question of the Indian trade. This attitude of the Chinese was most remarkably demonstrated at the Hague Conference which took place at the close of last year. I was present, on behalf of the *London Times*, on that occasion and was struck by the fact that, although at this time the cultivation of the poppy was being rapidly reintroduced into many provinces in China, the attitude of the Chinese delegates was one of virtuous condescension and high moral superiority, so much so, that they were brought to book and rebuked on more than one occasion. At the end of 1910 when, as a result of a wave of public enthusiasm and concerted efforts, sincerely backed by the Manchu government, opium cultivation had been reduced by something approximating to twenty-five per cent of the area under poppy, the

adoption by the Chinese delegates of an attitude of moral superiority might have been condoned; but in 1911, with cultivation again in full swing it was certainly indefensible. The complete abolition line of argument, like the cannon's mouth theory, is based upon fallacies and on untruths easily disprovable. To refute the cannon's mouth legend, for instance, I may observe that amongst the events which led up to the treaty of Nanking in 1842, opium was only one factor and that the question settled by that treaty was not the question of the importation of opium (or other goods) at Canton, but the right of foreign envoys to treat directly with the Chinese government.

But be this as it may, the Indian opium trade may now be regarded as dead, England's present attitude in the matter amounting to recognition of the fact that the game is not worth the scandal, and that the abolition of a trade in which only a limited number of British merchants and bankers and a few millions of Indian agriculturists are concerned, will be politically and economically to the advantage of the British Empire, quite apart from all moral considerations. Economically, the substitution of grain cultivation for opium in India must in the end be productive of good, for the enormous increase of population in that country is already producing serious social and economic difficulties and it must be obvious that every field taken from opium and given to the production of grain will eventually afford a measure of relief to the pressing problem of the world's food supply. On the other hand, however, it must be evident that, now that as China resumes the cultivation of opium upon a large scale, the difficulties of the food supply problem in China are likely to be aggravated in the near future.

In order to gauge the future action of the Chinese Government and its people in regard to this question of opium, it is necessary before all to consider the question of the permanent sincerity of the governing class. At the Shang-Hai Conference in 1909, it was recorded as the unanimous opinion of the International delegates that they believed in the "unswerving sincerity" of the Chinese government.

The practicability of abolishing, not only the importation of the foreign drug, but the cultivation of all native opium, was from the first a question entirely dependent upon this matter of sincerity. By the opium edicts of 1906, drastic measures were introduced which, in the opinion of many observers on the spot, were construed as evidence of new and sincere intentions on the part of the Chinese government. Nevertheless, the whole history and record of that government precludes belief in the sincerity of the movement and on the other hand, contains evidence of a persistent and deliberate intention on the part of the mandarin class (as distinct from the earnest reformers) to take advantage of the enthusiastic public opinion amongst the Chinese and of the sympathy of foreign nations, to evolve, for its own ultimate benefit, a system of monopolies in the native trade, coincident with the abolition of the importation of Indian opium. That this has been the traditional policy of the Chinese government really requires but little proof; but I may cite as one remarkable piece of evidence the opinion recorded as far back as 1875, by Johannes von Gumpach. He wrote:

If the British government were to listen to the Tsungli Yamen's insidious arguments, supported though they be by ill-directed missionary zeal, and yield to the Yamen's intimidations by consenting to the prohibition of poppy culture in India, it would after all only sacrifice the legitimate interests of British commerce and the Indian industry and to what end? To the end that the government of China might, under the shading mask of its impotence, encourage the cultivation of the poppy at home; stealthily and gradually add to its salt monopoly that of the manufacture and sale of opium, and impose upon the people a deleterious drug, while excluding from the country a superior preparation.

If we turn now to the attitude of Young China toward the opium question, we find in the opinion of most observers and notably of the missionary bodies, between the years 1907 and 1910, a general consensus of opinion that a new spirit had been created, bringing with it the sure promise of better things and good hopes of the complete eradication of opium smoking throughout the country. Many observers on the spot, while accepting the opium edicts as evidence of

sincerity, still retained doubts as to the practicability of the measures proposed by the edicts of 1906. I myself was at Peking at that time and in frequent communication with Tang Shao-yi, the initiator of the opium abolition edicts and the most prominent of all the reformers. I shared with others the belief in the sincerity of the originators of this movement at the beginning, but as time went on, I was reluctantly compelled to modify my faith in that sincerity by reason of the indisputable evidence of certain facts which came to my own knowledge. For instance, one of the regulations by which the abolition of opium was to be secured within a period of ten years was that which prohibited the sale of any anti-opium remedies containing forms of opium, such as morphia pills. The manufacture and sale of pills, containing opium in any form was forbidden under strict penalties; this measure was obviously necessary if the abolition of the opium pipe was not to be replaced by something infinitely worse. At the beginning of 1907, it came to the knowledge of several observers of the movement in Peking and especially of the British Legation, which was naturally following the results of the edicts with great interest, that a large number of brands of so-called anti-opium pills was being manufactured and sold. Amongst them were many which after being analyzed in London, were found to contain a very large percentage of morphia. One pill was being sold at Peking and Tientsin under Government auspices; it was manufactured upon the prescription of a foreign-educated Chinese doctor, a Cantonese, nearly related by marriage to Mr. Tang Shao-yi. Upon ascertaining the facts, I called upon Mr. Tang and pointed out the foredoomed futility of opium regulations which could be violated in this way and the very bad impression which must be created by the fact that a person so closely related to himself should thus be making profit out of the illegal sale of these dangerous pills. No action was taken in the matter however and to this day the sale of anti-opium pills containing morphia continues practically unchecked in most parts of China, and the illicit morphia trade brings large profits to British manufacturers of the drug. A second disquieting incident occurred when the

American government, actuated by a laudable desire to assist the Chinese in their work of opium abolition, gave encouragement and letters of introduction to the Chinese authorities to an expert in the cure of drug habitués, Mr. C. B. Towns of New York. Mr. Towns came to Peking and asked to be allowed to cure Chinese opium smokers by a process of his own which he guaranteed to be effective within a reasonably short period of time. In order to test by practical experiments the nature and results of his treatment, I arranged, in consultation with the doctor of the British Legation to watch the cure in the case of a dozen confirmed opium smokers who would submit to the test. These men, all personally known to me, were treated for four days by the Towns method and after it they were certainly cured for the time being of any desire to smoke opium. For six months afterwards, during which time their movements were watched, they still remained free from the vice. Nevertheless, in spite of these and other successful experiments with private individual Chinese, no attempt was made to encourage the introduction of Mr. Towns's treatment on any wide scale and as a matter of fact, his own repeated attempts to secure premises for a hospital in Tien-Tsin city were blocked by the opposition of local Chinese officials. I mention these two cases as evidence of the traditional Mandarin attitude, many more instances of which might be cited, which effectively preclude any robust faith in the sincerity of the leaders of Young China in the national anti-opium movement.

The three years of experiment and test which, under the British opium agreement of 1907, were to demonstrate the sincerity and the ability of the Chinese government in the matter of opium abolition resulted, as I have said, in a reduction of about 25 per cent in the total cultivation of the poppy throughout the provinces. This result was very largely due to the fact that the Manchu government, regarding opium abolition as one of the things upon which Young China was keenly determined, and fearing to increase the unrest and disloyalty of the southern provinces, lent the whole weight of its authority to the movement for suppressing poppy cul-

tivation. Sir Alexander Hosie, reporting to the British government on the progress made in the suppression of cultivation in the various provinces, stated that the farmers themselves had accepted serious losses and given up planting the poppy for three causes. First, belief in the sincerity of the government intentions. This took some time to establish, but in 1910, it was widespread. Second, local influence of the *litterati* and gentry, exercised in support of the government's programme. Third, the popular recognition of the social and economic evils arising from the opium habit. There is no doubt that the good will shown by the Manchu government in this matter was of very powerful assistance to the cause which the opium reformers had at heart, and that, without it, the expression of public opinion could not have produced any such good results as were actually attained in the summer of 1910. At this stage, however, Young China, carried away by its own enthusiasms and by its impatience to achieve still more rapid results, began to agitate for the complete abolition of the Indian trade as the most important thing to be secured. At the same time, it took the question out of the plane of philanthropy and morality into that of politics. The manner in which the question was discussed by the provincial assemblies afforded conspicuous proof of the change which had taken place. The violent agitation which was commenced in England and in China at this date for the immediate abolition of the Indian trade, eventually led the British government to agree to the convention which was concluded in Peking in May, 1911. By virtue of this new treaty, a heavy additional duty was placed upon the Indian drug and it was at the same time agreed, that any province in China which was able to show a "clean slate," that is to say, to prove that it had completely abolished opium cultivation within its own borders, should, *ipso facto*, be entitled to exclude all further importations of the Indian drug. By this eminently fair arrangement, it was left for each province to make good its own pledges and to give immediate effect to the reforms for which they professed to be anxious. Nevertheless, at this time, while the Cantonese were agitating in all parts of the country and

denouncing the British government for "forcing Indian opium upon China," the lamentable fact was becoming apparent that, in those very provinces where Young China had been most active in its propaganda, the treaty with Great Britain was being violated and native opium was being cultivated for the pecuniary benefit of the local officials. At the present day, whilst the leaders of the republic, Sun Yat Sen and Li Yuan Hung, continue to press for the abrogation of the treaty of May, 1911, and to demand that no more shipments of Indian opium shall henceforth be made, they remain curiously indifferent to the fact that the cultivation of native opium has been resumed on an unprecedentedly large scale. Even in those provinces of Shensi and Szechuen which in 1910 had been reported clear of opium cultivation, it is now unfortunately true that the poppy is grown in large quantities. More than this, there is every evidence of a widespread intention in many provinces to establish official monopolies for the control of the trade in Chinese opium. The province of Chekiang, for instance, which has for sometime past been illegally and arbitrarily prohibiting all movements of Indian opium within its borders on grounds of high morality, and appealing to the moral dignity and conscience of Great Britain to support it in this line of action, has, at the same time, gathered a large harvest of opium, cultivated up to the very walls of the prefectual city. In the provinces of Canton, Yünnan and Kiangsi, the republican authorities have officially organized local monopolies for the control and sale of Chinese opium.

The effect on trade and politics of the violation of treaties, such as have recently been manifested by the republican authorities in several provinces, cannot fail to create an exceedingly bad impression abroad and thus to place further obstacles in the way of the progress and prosperity of the Chinese people. If we consider only the disorganization of trade and finances which must arise from the illegal restrictions placed by the Shanghai and Chekiang officials on the importation of Indian opium, it is evident that, where a cargo to the value of about six millions sterling is arbitrarily held up and prevented from entering into consumption, the

consequences cannot be negligible, for the Indian opium trade, like other branches of commerce in the Far East, is conducted on credit handled by native and foreign banks, and any disorganization of that credit must inevitably react far and wide, to the general disturbance of the economic situation and to the detriment of the country's future trade.

Looking at the question from another point of view; that is to say, considering it in its political aspect, the cessation of the Indian opium trade, unaccompanied by cessation of the production of the native drug, must tend to increase and accelerate the movement, already marked throughout China, towards provincial autonomy. The Import duties heretofore levied on the Indian drug formed an important item in the central government's budget of revenue. These will now be cut off, and on the other hand the provinces, under their local monopolies, will collect large sums at the disposal of the local bureaus for provincial purposes. That is to say, at a time when all British and American opinion concurs in the urgent necessity for the creation and maintenance of a strong central government, the results of the anti-opium movement, as at present indicated, will aid in placing increased revenues at the disposal of the provinces and reduce Peking's control over what were national funds.

Finally, the Chinese government's real or professed inability to control the provinces, as regards observance of the British treaty of May, 1911, cannot fail to produce results seriously prejudicial to China's credit abroad and ultimately to her borrowing capacity; for, as has been pointed out by competent critics, if China cannot prevent the maritime province of Chekiang from defying the law and from violating the central government's obligations under the treaty referred to, it is not likely that the government will be able hereafter to exercise that control of *Lekin* or supervision of the salt gabelle, which it is understood, are to form the collateral security of future loans.

If we turn now to a brief consideration of the moral aspect of the opium smoking question, it is impossible to avoid introducing the commonplace comparison or analogy between the smoking of opium by the Chinese and the con-

sumption of alcohol in European countries. The uses and abuses of opium are undoubtedly very similar in their causes and effects to those with which we are familiar in the case of alcoholic drinks. That the excessive use of opium is a vicious and degrading habit, none will deny but the actual facts are that the Chinaman's tendency to consume opium in excess have been very widely exaggerated and generally distorted. Examining the facts in the light of such dispassionate and methodical inquiry as is available, we find, in the report of the Straits Settlements Opium Commission of 1907-08, evidence of a very detailed kind which appear to afford ample justification for that Commission's conclusion that "The opium habit is comparable to the European's use of alcohol and tobacco and that it must be regarded as the expression among the Chinese of the universal tendency to some form of indulgence." In other words, if we accept this conclusion even in a limited sense and with mental reservations, it seems to me an imperative and inevitable conclusion, from all European experience, that a reasonable recognition of the limitations of human nature and human weaknesses will be more conducive in the long run to the ends of public morality, than the attempt to give effect to the impossible idea of complete abolition of opium cultivation or any other doctrine of the extremists.

The Straits Settlements report, above referred to, embodies a systematic attempt to render a complete and impartial account of the question of opium smoking, and its conclusions emphasize the important fact, which the anti-opium societies have generally ignored, that the vast majority of Chinese opium smokers are habitually moderate consumers. Says this report:

The evils arising from the use of opium, were made the subject of specific inquiry from nearly every witness, and medical witnesses were practically unanimous, with the exception of those who held views strongly opposed to opium, that opium smoking in moderation was relatively harmless. Even if carried to excess, no organic change in the body could be detected, the results being chiefly functional evils. It was also found, as would be the case with alcohol, impossible to lay down a standard consumption which could be regarded as use in moderation or use in excess, owing to the varying physiques and constitutions of smokers.

Reporting to the House of Commons in the year 1872, the opinion of a large number of medical men was recorded: "That there is a certain aptitude in the stimulant of opium to the circumstances of the Chinese people, and that the universal use of the opium pipe among the Chinese must certainly be owing to some peculiarity of their mental and nervous constitution." That this weakness, or form of indulgence, is peculiarly indicated by the physical and nervous systems of the Chinese race is proved by the fact that the Thibetan, Mohammedan and Mongolian inhabitants of Kan Suh and other centers of opium cultivation are practically immune.

The tendency to smoke opium which the Chinaman carries about with him to all parts of the world, is logically and naturally comparable with the Anglo-Saxon's tendency or predilection towards alcoholic stimulants. The comparison is a commonplace one, I admit, and two blacks do not make a white, but many years ago a dispassionate and thoroughly competent observer of the opium question, Mr. Meadows, observed that, "Although the substances are different, I can see no difference at all as to the morality of producing, selling and consuming them, while the only difference I can observe in the consequences of consumption is, that the opium smoker is not so violent, so maudlin or so disgusting as the drunkard."

The opium problem appears to reduce itself naturally under three heads. *First:* Is opium necessary to the Chinese, as alcohol is to the European? On this point the evidence of the Straits Settlements Opium Commission appears to be conclusive, and there can be no doubt that so long as opium continues to be produced and available, either by legitimate trade or by smuggling, the Chinese people will continue to smoke it.

Second: Is the total abolition of opium smoking and opium cultivation possible? In the Straits Settlements report it was recorded as a generally recognized truth that "Without an international agreement to stop the growth of the poppy, the success of any prohibitive legislation would be highly problematical." At the International Conference held at

The Hague last January, the resolutions dealing with the abolition of the opium traffic were passed upon the tacit assumption that China would continue to justify Europe's faith in her "unswerving sincerity," and in her ability to put down opium cultivation; but it was unanimously admitted and agreed that the idea of any international agreement or legislation, to control and prevent the cultivation of the poppy throughout the world, was utterly impracticable and visionary. Even the measures proposed by the American delegates for the control of the movement and sale of opium, and the British suggestions for the control of the trade in morphine, cocaine and other drugs by means of an international agreement and pharmacy laws, were regarded by the majority of the delegates as counsels of perfection, Utopian schemes, suitable for presentation at The Hague but unattainable in practice. As regards any idea of an international self-denying ordinance to remedy the production of the poppy, Turkey, one of the chief producers, declined even to be represented at the Conference, and the attitude of other powers left no doubt as to the futility of the suggestion. But even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the total abolition of opium cultivation were possible, there remains the third aspect of the problem, i.e., once opium smoking has been eradicated, by what means would it be possible to prevent a rapid increase of the more dangerous morphia habit and the adoption of alcohol as a form of stimulant by the Chinese people? Personally, I consider that all the evidence goes to show that a predisposition to opium in one form or another is indicated by the physical and nervous constitution of the Chinese as a race, and I am not therefore inclined to attach great importance to the opinions of those who, like Sir Frank Swettenham, think that alcohol is likely to take the place of opium wherever opium is unobtainable. But the dangers arising from morphine as a substitute for opium are sufficiently real and immediate to have engaged the serious attention of philanthropists and medical missionaries in China and abroad. They formed the subject of special resolutions at The Hague Conference and a vast amount of interesting information was

submitted and recorded on the subject. Without going into details it may be said that, since the morphia duty was increased in China after 1906, the smuggling of this dangerous drug has increased by leaps and bounds, and doctors all over China now testify that many opium-smokers have taken to morphia, making the last state worse than the first. China proposed to regulate the morphine trade by the inauguration of pharmacy laws applicable throughout the Empire under official supervision, but I need hardly say that for many years to come, this proposal, like that of the abolition of opium cultivation, must remain an unattainable ideal. No such laws could possibly be framed or enforced under existing conditions.

To sum up: The futility of legislation and of philanthropic attempts to attain the complete abolition of opium cultivation and opium smoking in China must be obvious to every unbiased observer of the facts. Nevertheless, I hold that if, instead of discussing unpractical schemes, the activities of philanthropists and missionaries could henceforth be directed towards the introduction of practical restrictive legislation and regulation of the opium traffic, much good might be done in China, just as in Great Britain education, philanthropy and the moral effect of the temperance movement have greatly reduced the national tendency to drunkenness within the last half century. There undoubtedly exists in China a strong force of public opinion directed against the excessive use of opium.

By practical legislation, such as that which in Scandinavia has been adopted with such excellent results under the Gothenburg system, and by means of the education of public opinion, progress can and will no doubt be made. But there can be no permanently beneficial results from impulsive and Quixotic attempts to secure the root and branch elimination of a firmly established national propensity.

AMERICA'S BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY IN CHINA

By B. Atwood Robinson

The history of trade development is the history of the world. Trade has followed the flag wherever it has gone and all too often it has been the armies of the world that have carried forward the torch of civilization and the banner of commerce. Enlightened and honorable trade relations may prove as great an influence for good as the work of the missionary or educator. From the early dawn of recorded history up to the present time trade has gone hand in hand with the advance of civilization. Beginning in Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, it traveled to Carthage, Greece and Rome. It followed the victorious armies of the South in their conquest of the barbarians of northern Europe, and the great commercial countries of Europe are the result. With Columbus it crossed the Atlantic, and the United States and all the other great countries of North and South America with their teeming trade have grown and flourished.

And now we are face to face with the last of the world's commercial conquests in the development of great and enduring trade relations with the other half of the world's population in the countries forming the western boundary of the great Pacific basin.

The history of trade between America and China has often been written and it is unnecessary to speak in detail of it here. From the time when the American ship *Empress of China* arrived at Canton from New York in 1784 to the present time, be it said to our credit, these relations have been generally satisfactory to both parties, in contra-distinction to those of China with some other countries.

"Americans are the only people who have treated us according to the Golden Rule and we want to do business with them." These words were spoken to the writer by the late Viceroy Yang Hsi Hsiang, at Tientsin in 1908.

These words formed part of the admirable address of Judge Kungpah T. King of the Supreme Court of Justice, Peking, at a dinner in his honor in Boston in 1910.

While your complete war equipment and unexcelled facilities for preparing great engines of war are very wonderful, I must say that I am most favorably impressed with your great commercial supremacy, your tremendous natural resources and your great factories which stand as monuments to your national industry. The development of commercial interests between America and China would be mutually beneficial.

America is the natural source of supply in many lines, and proper attention to the development of commercial relations will surely bring about a great increase in trade, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

These quotations may be said to be fairly representative of the sentiment of the leading men of China on this subject.

In view of all our past relations with the Chinese, America may justly claim the title of "China's best friend." American business men have been strangely indifferent to the unparalleled opportunity presented through the gateway of the great Far East. America is the one country from which China does not fear armed invasion, but cordially welcomes invasion of trade and commerce. With this record of fair dealing to our credit, it would seem the height of folly to neglect the great opportunity that confronts us for advantageous occupancy of the field. America, by virtue of her extensive Pacific Coast line is nearest neighbor to the Far East, while the opening of the Panama Canal will afford the manufacturers of the eastern states the opportunity of reaching that part of the world with their products on a very favorable basis.

In considering trade opportunities with a country, many factors must be taken into account. It is as easy to over as to underestimate the extent of these opportunities. Meagerness of information is responsible for false conceptions of conditions. It is, perhaps, not strange that ignorance of true conditions is so prevalent, in view of the vast amount of misinformation and misrepresentation that has been spread broadcast by ill-informed, narrow-minded, in-

competent or prejudiced observers. It should be borne in mind that China has been, and is still, exploited by designing men of many lands.

First of all a careful study of the country, its resources, its people and their requirements must be made. China is a country so rich in natural resources that with the opening up of railway and other modern means of communication, the development of these resources will greatly increase the purchasing power of the people by opening up to their products the markets of the world. No one who has traveled at all extensively in China can have failed to be impressed with the tremendous possibilities of development there.

The population of the various provinces, according to the last estimates by the imperial maritime customs is as follows:

Anhwei.....	36,000,000
Chihli.....	29,400,000
Chekiang.....	11,800,000
Fukien.....	20,000,000
Hunan.....	22,000,000
Hupeh.....	34,000,000
Kiangsi.....	24,534,000
Kiangsu.....	23,980,000
Kwangtung.....	32,000,000
Kwangsi.....	8,000,000
Manchuria.....	17,000,000
Shantung.....	38,000,000
Szechwan.....	78,711,000
Yunnan.....	8,000,000
Other provinces.....	55,000,000
Total.....	438,425,000

Many have considered the country overcrowded, but it is doubtful if such is the case. Indeed, Dr. Ernst Faber has predicted that this population will ultimately be doubled, without reaching the danger line of supply and demand. Be this as it may, it requires not the wisdom of a Solomon to realize something of the vastness of the opportunity presented by this great multitude of people, now fully awake after centuries of somnolence, to a realization of their needs and a great longing for western culture and mode of living, with all of the best that goes with it.

We hear much of the slowness of the Chinese, but in view of the startling rapidity of development during the past two years, who will be so rash as to say that trade development will be slow? Less than eighteen months ago Mr. C. D. Jameson, than whom few have had better opportunities of studying actual conditions from the inside, in an article published in the *Outlook*, on "The Future of China," commenced as follows: "To make clear the utter hopelessness of renaissance in the Chinese as a nation until several generations have passed, I must give a slight sketch of Chinese history." And, lo, the unexpected has happened, the oldest monarchy of the world has crumbled to dust and a republic has been firmly established, while the whole world looked on amazed.

Now some would-be prophets are predicting slow commercial development. In the light of former mistakes, these prophecies seem rather presumptuous. The natural resources of a country have a most important bearing on its commercial activity. These resources of China are almost wholly undeveloped. Her vast mineral deposits have scarcely been touched. A single province is estimated to have a world's supply of coal for a thousand years and coal exists in at least fifteen provinces. The present annual output of the mines is upwards of 10,000,000 tons. There is a great abundance of iron, and the manufacture of steel and iron products has already assumed quite large proportions. Pig iron is now being shipped to the United States in considerable quantity. The precious metals are being produced in ever-increasing quantities, adding greatly to the purchasing power of the country.

The agricultural productiveness is large and if proposed plans for a comprehensive system of protective dikes is carried out, will be greatly increased.

A trade that is largely one-sided is not likely to assume large proportions, and nations wishing to transact a large business with each other must each be prepared to give and take. As we increase our purchases of China's products, so will she buy more largely from us. In this connection it is well to point out the fact that a large proportion of the ship-

ments to this country from China are made through foreign firms and nearly all come in foreign ships. This is very detrimental to American prestige. In view of the approaching opening of the Panama Canal, it behooves Americans to awake to the importance of rehabilitating our merchant marine, not simply for the profit arising from the carrying trade, but as a means of building up our foreign commerce, especially in the Far East.

In this connection the following table giving the nationality and tonnage of the various steamers entered and cleared at Shanghai in 1910 and 1911 will prove illuminating, if not pleasing:

NATIONALITY	1910		1911	
	Number	Tons	Number	Tons
American.....	135	475,628	107	454,467
Austrian.....	48	190,120	48	192,824
British.....	3,899	7,097,783	4,112	7,311,167
Danish.....	66	81,669	80	103,096
Dutch.....	31	72,998	47	113,608
French.....	628	1,207,959	338	747,229
German.....	779	1,621,977	694	1,600,051
Japanese.....	3,962	3,453,652	3,853	3,986,523
Norwegian.....	244	237,151	307	295,551
Russian.....	142	277,988	148	266,950
Swedish.....	22	50,924	14	34,752
Chinese.....	5,352	2,910,707	5,056	3,073,254
Total.....	15,308	17,678,556	14,804	18,179,472

Again, taking the statistics of the great interior port of Hankow, the number of steamers entering the port in 1911 was 1833, with an aggregate tonnage of 2,220,402 tons. British ships led with 959,284 tons, with Japan second with 670,873 tons. German, French, Russian, Danish, American and Norwegian shipping followed in the order named. America's total was 7376 tons!

Those of us who have had the opportunity of studying the situation in European countries are only too well aware of the great preparations that are being made and the extensive work now in progress to secure for them commercial

supremacy in China. Which of the great countries of the world shall most largely profit by the increasing foreign trade of China will depend largely upon the relative activity, intelligence and perseverance of the manufacturers, exporters and business organizations of these countries at the present time and in the immediate future. What shall be the part of the American business man in this development? What, indeed, shall be the part of the great American nation therein? We hear much these days, often in derision, of "dollar diplomacy." We are really only children learning the a,b,c's of the game. For real "dollar diplomacy" let us look to Germany, the country which by intelligent study of conditions, the careful training of men, and the lavish expenditure of money has built up a great foreign commerce that is bringing to her wealth and a great world influence. Under the auspices of the German government large numbers of young men are taught the languages of foreign countries to which they are subsequently sent as missionaries of commerce. The recent activity of our government through its consular and diplomatic agents in coöperating with commercial organizations in developing and extending our trade with foreign countries is greatly to be commended.

In considering trade relations with the Chinese it should be borne in mind that they recognize as their ideal the highest standard of business honor. It is probable that of no other people is this so true, and it should prove a strong incentive to the extension of our commercial relations with them. To quote again from Mr. Jameson:

No people are commercially more honest or have a more exalted idea of the sacredness of a contract—either written, verbal, or merely implied—than the Chinese merchant, banker or contractor of any kind, unless contaminated by dealings with unreliable foreign *hongs* at the open ports. The non-official word of a Chinese is usually as good as his bond, and his bond is as good as the wealth of his family. In fifteen years of dealing with Chinese merchants and contractors of all sorts I have never found them maliciously doing work contrary to the specifications or attempting to break their contract even if it was a losing one for them.

During the past year, as was to be expected, there was a considerable decrease in the volume of foreign trade in cen-

tral and southern China, the districts most seriously affected by the revolutionary movement. Recent reports, however, indicate a present practically normal resumption of shipments. While in the Manchurian, Chihlian and Shantung ports there was a considerable increase in the volume of foreign trade, in the Yangtse ports, where the most severe fighting occurred, there was a great decrease in business. In the seventeen southern ports tributary to Hongkong, the comparative figures of 1910 and 1911 were as follows:

	YEAR	AMOUNT
Net foreign commerce.....	1910	\$97,647,378
	1911	84,439,949
Net native imports.....	1910	39,173,035
	1911	33,199,810
Exports abroad and to native ports.....	1910	83,015,314
	1911	80,424,000

The chief loss during the period accordingly came in imports of foreign goods and to a considerable extent represented cancellation of foreign orders. The more serious loss in exports later, came in January and February 1912.

In view of the recent disturbed condition of the country trade statistics do not possess the face value that they otherwise would, and need careful analysis in order that their true significance may be understood. In many lines, such for example as piece-goods, American drill, flannels, jeans, sheetings, shirtings, etc., the markets became seriously congested because of the stoppage of orders as a result of the revolutionary disturbances, but the finely organized coöperative trade guilds made it possible to carry these enormous stocks without serious resultant financial disturbance, and there is now renewed activity all along the line. The accumulated stocks having been finally disposed of there is every prospect of a resumption of trade in large volume. Recent reports indicate a rapid change in the attire of the Chinese and the adoption of western styles. So marked is this movement that it is reported that sewing machines cannot

be imported rapidly enough to satisfy the demand. There is also a lively demand for fabrics of various kinds, particularly the cheaper qualities of woollen and cotton goods.

Organization and coöperation are necessary factors in the successful introduction of American goods. As an example of the efficient and effective organization for trade in China we may cite the Standard Oil Company, with its constantly expanding trade, especially in the interior districts. A system of coöperation that would build up a similar organization to handle American cotton goods and other sundries would go far toward solving the problems of American export trade.

A comparison of the exports of cotton piece goods for the past four years from the United Kingdom and the United States to China and Hongkong follows. The British figures are for calendar years, while the American are for fiscal years ended June 30:

	1909	1910	1911	1912
United Kingdom:				
Yards.....	572,443,000	471,334,200	647,449,700	527,636,800
Value.....	\$35,593,313	\$35,383,266	\$48,027,011	\$39,445,896
United States:				
Yards.....	121,562,469	93,397,596	78,585,021	101,260,519
Value.....	\$7,057,224	\$5,696,010	\$5,183,900	\$7,192,344

With the starting of factories there is also a great demand for machinery of all kinds. With this in view what should be the attitude of the American manufacturer and exporter in the matter? How shall he proceed to take advantage of the situation and develop an export trade with China?

Comparative statements of the years 1910 and 1911 of the import and export trade of leading trade centres have recently been received through consular channels. These are too elaborate for incorporation in full in a paper of this scope, but some excerpts from them may prove interesting and enlightening.

Shanghai is, of course, far ahead of other ports in the matter of imports and exports. It is interesting to note that notwithstanding the serious effect of the revolution on trade

during the latter part of 1911, the gross value of the merchandise arriving and departing, according to the report of the national maritime customs, amounted to \$314,731,444, an increase of \$3,824,174 over 1910, and constituting a record. The following table gives the gross and net trade of Shanghai in 1910 and 1911:

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Opium, cwt.....	7,006	2,120
Cotton manufactures:		
Piece goods, pieces.....	345,268	743,847
Towels, dozen.....	34,696	8,468
Yarns and waste, cwt.....	10,124	518,451
Nankeens, cwt.....	113,505	113,030
Woolen and cotton mixtures, yards.....	44,705	31,918
Antimony and ore, cwt.....	117,083	130,317
Pig iron, cwt.....	386,976	460,765
Arms and munitions of war, value.....		\$222,301
Bags, gunny, pieces.....	1,540,518	2,954,295
Bean cake, cwt.....	1,146,441	1,711,469
Beans, cwt.....	2,152,374	2,106,737
Bran, cwt.....	455,412	474,141
Cotton, raw and waste, cwt.....	1,738,208	1,108,138
Curios, value.....	\$290,381	\$351,256
Eggs:		
Albumen and yolk, cwt.....	138,524	136,882
Fresh, pieces.....	117,833,678	88,365,977
Preserved, pieces.....	8,396,208	7,531,415
Salted, pieces.....	704,350	773,580
Fiber, ramie, cwt.....	266,490	223,026
Flour, cwt.....	1,669,017	955,270
Groundnut cake and pulp, cwt.....	471,591	470,054
Groundnuts, cwt.....	190,077	271,240
Human hair, ctw.....	16,524	10,270
Hats, number.....	4,343,581	5,028,375
Medicines, value.....	\$1,351,647	\$1,268,202
Oils		
Bean, cwt.....	154,996	214,088
Cottonseed, cwt.....	69,876	44,312
Groundnut, cwt.....	361,008	380,253
Rape, cwt.....	18,130	16,345
Sesamum, cwt.....	4,950	7,122
Tea, cwt.....	14,761	19,048
Wood, cwt.....	540,340	460,531
Pearls, real, value.....	\$4,361	\$42,959
Rice, cwt.....	2,136,285	3,624,490

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Seed:		
Cotton, cwt.....	283,070	217,980
Sesamum, cwt.....	2,846,996	2,078,476
Seedcake, cwt.....	1,550,360	1,424,332
Shoes and boots, silk and cotton, pairs....	158,942	196,094
Silk:		
Raw, spun, cocoons, waste, etc., cwt....	282,844	285,606
Piece goods, cwt.....	18,707	17,702
Pongees, cwt.....	14,472	11,958
Skins:		
Goat, pieces.....	8,894,333	7,699,309
Lamb, pieces.....	707,136	441,173
Sheep, pieces.....	320,671	235,697
Weasel, pieces.....	881,133	706,874
Straw braid, cwt.....	101,408	83,114
Sugar, cwt.....	293,187	337,690
Tea, cwt.....	628,162	636,780
Tobacco, leaf and prepared, cwt.....	216,500	162,968
Varnish, cwt.....	20,047	20,465
Wheat, cwt.....	74,894	38,308
Wool, sheeps, cwt.....	242,501	395,282

The exports from Shanghai to the United States decreased from \$14,669,206 in 1910 to \$12,878,281 in 1911.

The following table gives the value of the principal articles thus exported:

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Albumen.....	\$143,493	\$226,061
Antimony.....		3,473
Books, Chinese.....	1,699	2,520
Brass ware.....	1,233	1,086
Bristles.....	34,016	49,014
Camphor.....	47,317	
Chairs, rattan.....		2,271
Chinaware.....	4,172	27,589
Coal.....	9,773	
Coke.....	12,368	20,710
Cotton, raw.....	513,633	298,290
Cottonseed cake.....	2,324	
Curios.....	5,322	14,523
Eggs and egg yolk.....	2,096	4,205
Feathers.....	13,713	31,041
Fibers, China grass.....	5,781	12,793
Furs, dressed.....	50,599	15,468

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Hair:		
Animal.....	1,086	
Human.....	46,621	27,500
Hats:		
Raffia.....		554
Rush.....	21,685	25,080
Straw.....	2,251	26,288
Wood-shaving.....	809	39,303
Hides, cow and calf.....	288,018	65,660
Hog products.....		2,327
Household and personal effects.....	10,454	23,370
Iron, pig.....	91,788	26,471
Jade.....		20,789
Musk.....	55,516	223,021
Nuts:		
Gall.....	7,381	22,192
Ground.....	43,194	3,360
Pea.....		5,355
Walnuts.....	16,762	91,072
Oils:		
Bean.....	110,258	127,174
Cottonseed.....	144,558	169,778
Rapeseed.....	5,247	11,433
Vegetable.....	17,108	
Wood.....	16,978	39,488
Ramie.....	6,764	
Rhubarb.....	20,713	14,246
Silk:		
Cocoons, pierced.....	9,052	
Piece goods.....	457	2,038
Pongees.....	63,966	11,458
Silk:		
Raw.....	6,897,922	6,970,067
Tussah.....		14,764
Waste.....	157,810	118,431
Wild.....	548,741	373,774
Manufactures, n.e.s.....	1,127	1,260
Skins:		
Dog mats.....	42,292	71,731
Dog robes.....	36,894	7,837
Goat.....	1,633,133	1,021,187
Lamb.....	56,987	42,599
Leopard.....	13,637	663
Sheep.....		43,222
Tiger.....	10,627	
Weasel.....	131,811	18,811
Other.....	36,751	2,157

ARTICLES	1910	1911
Straw braid.....	611,575	431,225
Tallow.....	10,067	51
Tea.....	2,144,881	1,352,033
Wool.....	491,743	751,560
All other articles.....	151,754	42,346
Total.....	\$14,669,206	\$12,878,281

While the foreign trade of Hankow, passing through the maritime customs, makes this port the second in China, in direct foreign trade it stands sixth, although this classification is misleading owing to the fact that of goods shipped to Chinese ports a large share represent shipments for foreign countries.

The reports from Manchuria and ports of Tientsin, Canton, etc., are quite similar to those of Shanghai, and taken as a whole form a mighty argument for increased activity on the part of American firms.

It may be well to briefly point out some of the causes of failure on our part to fully realize our expectations in the volume of business done, and to suggest some improvements in methods. Ignorance and apathy go hand in hand as twin causes of failure to control our rightful share of China's foreign trade, import and export. A systematic study of present conditions and the adoption of methods suitable to meet these conditions is a prerequisite to success.

Ignorance of correct methods and of the fact that business may be successfully conducted without prohibitive expense or great risk, prevents many from entering what would prove a very profitable field, while the fallacy of the sufficiency of the home market for present and future absorption of products blinds many to the great opportunity awaiting them.

Consular reports are of value in furnishing statistics and general information regarding local conditions, but the appointment of special government commercial agents competent to study and report the situation in all its bearings and to make recommendations of real value to the manufacturers of the country, would be a most important and helpful move in the right direction. The great commercial

organizations of the country, its chambers of commerce, boards of trade, etc., should unite in the effort to procure for the business men of the country up-to-date information along these lines. Conditions in China have undergone a rapid and radical change and new conditions call for new methods, and the crying need of today is for a comprehensive study of the situation and the application of methods suitable to present conditions. Another important and advantageous move would be the establishment of an American chamber of commerce in one or more of the leading ports of China. This should be done under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, thus insuring the absence of any sectional or personal favoritism and guaranteeing fair and equitable treatment to all. Membership in these should be open to all reputable American business men on lines similar to those obtaining in the American Chamber of Commerce of Paris.

Perhaps in no other country has the development of trade organizations or guilds been brought to so high a point as in China. In all the leading ports her chambers of commerce are serious, helpful bodies. It is interesting to note that during the serious financial depression accompanying and following the boom and collapse in rubber securities and the failures of banks, the provincial authorities with the aid of the local chamber of commerce succeeded in relieving the situation. This indicates a spirit of coöperation highly commendatory and which we may profitably emulate in our efforts to secure our share of the trade of the country.

It must be recognized that there exist today difficulties in the way of the establishment of extensive trade relations with China that are not so marked in our commerce with other countries.

Probably the most important factor in Chinese foreign trade is the fluctuating exchange value of silver with gold, with its consequent bearing on the exports and imports of the country. A perusal of such statistics as are available clearly indicates that the import trade of China increases in ratio to the increase in the exchange value of silver and decreases in ratio to their decreased value. Without ven-

turing a positive prediction, it may safely be said that it is the general opinion of trade authorities of the world that the present high value of their coinage is but the beginning of an extended period of high exchange which cannot fail of a stimulating effect on her import trade.

Many factors enter into the exchange situation in China in its relation to imports and exports, but it is not the province of this paper to speak of them in detail. Suffice it to say that the question of a suitable currency system that shall bear such relation to the systems of the great commercial countries of the world as to insure something approaching stability and dependability in rates of exchange is being deeply studied by Chinese authorities in such matters, assisted by foreign advisers of recognized ability, and while it may be too much to hope for the speedy bringing of order out of chaos, it is reasonable to expect a continual advance in the direction of ideal conditions.

A strong effort is being made to establish a uniform system of keeping and auditing public accounts, which is sure to have a good effect in reorganizing, systematizing and bringing into being a uniform system of taxation, which is an essential to the upbuilding of a great interprovincial and international trade. One of the chief obstacles to trade extension in China is the almost absolute lack of anything resembling system in the assessment of taxes and *liken* or customs duties. In many instances goods in transit are subjected to repeated assessment en route from province to province and sometimes from town to town, in order to furnish "squeeze" for the officials. This, of course, greatly hampers and limits the extension of trade, and while it is too much to expect that this will immediately be done away with, I am in receipt of recent personal communications from high authorities giving assurance that as a result of study of the situation now being made by native and foreign experts, a change for the better is confidently looked for in the near future. I dwell thus at length on this point because of its important bearing on the foreign trade of the country. The fact that such abuses exist should not act as a deterrent to active effort for trade increases, for it is practically cer-

tain that under the new form of government, and as a result of the investigations now in progress, existing conditions will eventually give way to modern and equitable methods of taxation.

A demand for our goods must be created and this cannot be done without the expenditure of money, but a small percentage of the amount expended by the average American manufacturer in securing an outlet for his products in the home market would, if wisely applied, secure for him a foothold in the Chinese market that would have a future value far greater than would result from the expenditure of the same amount at home. If ever American exporters and manufacturers were justified in establishing the agencies which are the primary requirement of trade in China, it is at the present time.

For many reasons the ideal method is the maintenance abroad of one's own office and sales force, but excepting in the case of a few of the largest concerns, this involves prohibitive expense. Another method that is much more extensively employed, and with good results, is the sending of salesmen direct from headquarters. This method may be employed where there is a sufficiently large market for the goods offered, but the only practicable method for the average manufacturer is to place his goods before the prospective customers through the medium of some one of the large importing houses of the country.

And right here is where many of our American concerns make the initial mistake that eventually costs them dearly and not infrequently discourages them and causes them to relinquish the field. The mistake referred to is the placing of agencies with foreign individuals or firms. The usual European custom so familiar to American travelers in Europe of decrying everything American, prevails to an even greater extent amongst the foreign houses in China. They have no good word for Americans or their products, and it is a rare exception where an American is employed by any of these concerns. It is a humiliating spectacle to the American business man traveling in China to find the great majority of American concerns represented by foreigners. These for-

eigners are, if possible, more patriotic in China than at home, and it is too frequently the case the American agencies secured by them are used to advance the sale of competing lines from their own countries. Instances are not lacking where samples of American goods have been sent by these agents, with prices and full particulars, to their home countries to be reproduced there and introduced into China at the expense of the American manufacturer. Nor is this the only unfortunate feature of the practice. It is distinctly detrimental to American prestige in China. In a country where the American flag is almost never seen on the ships of commerce and where American manufacturers are so largely represented by foreign concerns, it is not difficult to understand why our country and its products suffer by comparison with those of some other nations.

There are some representative American houses in China handling American goods, but there is room for more, and American manufacturers should see that their goods are handled by Americans. Too often the eastern branches of American financial and industrial concerns are managed by foreigners or largely manned by them. This is looked upon by the Chinese as a confession of weakness and inferiority on the part of Americans and an acknowledgment of the superior business ability of the foreigner.

From patriotic, no less than business motives, Americans should speedily bring about a change in these conditions and employ Americans only in the exploitation of their goods. It will be a fortunate day for American trade with China when our manufacturers are represented by American houses employing none but Americans in their service, for it is a well-known fact that foreigners seek employment with such concerns for the sole purpose of acquiring inside knowledge of their goods, methods, etc., to be later used to the advantage of their foreign competitors.

Coöperation on the part of American manufacturers of goods in similar lines, but which do not compete, in the establishment of a house for the sale of their respective products would doubtless prove profitable if carried out on a broad scale, with able management and a complete corps of

competent salesmen. In the great interior districts nearly all the trade is in the hands of the native merchants who purchase their goods in the markets of the great ports, and are largely guided in their selections by their correspondents in these distributing centres. Here is another argument for the establishment of distinctly American houses on a scale to create and uphold American prestige. In some of the inland districts there are British, German and French firms engaged in the importation of foreign goods, but no Americans.

We must learn one thing if we are to secure our rightful share of the Chinese business, and that is that we must not be too impatient for immediate profits. Our foreign competitors are willing to plant the seed and carefully nurture the young and growing trade until it is ripe for the harvest, while too many American firms are like the amateur farmer who digs up his seed every day or two to see if they are sprouting.

Again, in order to create and maintain intimate and permanent commercial relations with China, we must acquire the eastern point of view and seek to meet their ideas of their requirements rather than to seek to foist our own upon them.

China purchases each year from foreign countries more than 250 varieties of goods. The United States participates in less than half of these, and ranks third or higher in only 27. This can hardly be said to represent our fair proportion of the trade. It may not be practicable for us to compete with other countries in all these lines, but there are doubtless some in which we do not now participate in which we could secure a portion of the trade, and in the lines in which we are already represented, increased sales would doubtless follow the adoption of vigorous selling methods.

Among the articles which are enjoying an increased demand, with every promise of a rapid and continued increase for many years, may be mentioned the following: Clothing, boots and shoes, cotton and woolen goods, bicycles, clocks and watches, hats, caps, gloves, hosiery, haberdashery and underwear, phonographs, photographic and optical

supplies, lamps, machinery, railway and electrical appliances, automobiles, hardware and building material.

The importance of adequate American banking facilities in China cannot be overestimated. The coöperation of leading financial interests with large business concerns, with branches in Peking, Shanghai, and other large business centres, for the purpose of financing great industrial undertakings, as well as furnishing all material, engineering and construction, is one of the great needs of the day, and one in which Americans are sadly behind their British and German competitors, who have far superior organizations in China, and make a more careful study of the requirements of the market. In Germany, in particular, the banks and manufacturers combine their interests and are thus prepared to secure profitable business by granting longer credits than it is possible for American concerns, to give under existing conditions.

This question of credits enters very vitally into our trade relations with China. It is of the utmost importance that we develop as speedily as possible this coöperation between our financial and industrial concerns, if we are to maintain our rightful position in connection with China's foreign trade.

In connection with railway construction and equipment, electrical and mechanical installations and general construction work, it is of the utmost importance that the representatives on the spot be competent to give intelligent information, specifications and quotations without delay. Many a good contract has been lost to a foreign competitor because of the absence of these requirements on the part of the American representative.

Illustrated catalogues printed in the Chinese language are a necessity in the introduction of many lines of goods, and where prices are quoted, they should always be c.i.f. Shanghai or some other Chinese port, as the people there have no way of ascertaining the cost of transportation from interior cities of the United States.

There should be established at Shanghai and possibly other important trade centres, permanent exhibitions of

American goods, in order to acquaint the people with our products.

I have only been able to touch briefly on a few of the most salient features bearing on successful commercial relations with China, and now to sum up:

1. China has a population of upwards of 400,000,000 people who are rapidly developing along western lines of living, with all the increasing demand for our goods consequent thereon.

2. The country has enormous natural resources which are being opened up to the markets of the world by rapid progress of railway construction, thus greatly increasing the purchasing power of the people.

3. Having this great population with ever-increasing requirements for foreign goods, it must be recognized that China will in the future furnish a great outlet for our surplus products. Now, therefore, is the time to secure a firm foothold and establish commercial relations that will gain for us the confidence and respect of the Chinese against the time of their great commercial activity.

4. We must make a careful study of conditions and requirements and acquire an intimate knowledge of the demands of the native trade.

5. We must not expect immediately profitable results, but by acquiring a better understanding of good export methods gradually lay the foundations of the great business that is sure to follow.

6. Establish adequate banking facilities, and put none but American representatives in the field, backed by sincere and genuinely interested producers.

7. Above all let us remember that American prestige is at stake. Not merely for the sake of financial gain, although this is sure to follow, but as patriotic Americans let us strive to attain and maintain our rightful position in China's commercial relations with the world, a position which shall not only prove financially profitable to all concerned, but shall, by bringing these two great nations into close and harmonious commercial relations, materially assist in hastening the day of universal and permanent peace amongst the nations of the earth.

THE INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF SHANSI PROVINCE

By Rev. Paul L. Corbin of Shansi Province

The province of Shansi is in the northern tier of the original eighteen provinces of China, and lies between Latitude 35° and 41° North and Longitude 111° to 114° East. The province is bounded on the north by Mongolia, on the east by Chihli, the metropolitan province, on the south and west by the Yellow River, separating it from Honan and Shensi provinces respectively. The area of the province, not including the districts lying to the north of the Great Wall, is about 56,000 square miles. Its population has been variously estimated from 9,500,000 to 12,000,000.

The importance of the province from an industrial viewpoint lies in two facts: first, it has vast deposits of mineral wealth; second, it is, in a sense, the gateway to the northwest of China and the heart of Asia. Certain lines of travel across the province have long indicated that one of its problems when the awakening to the touch of western civilization comes will be the problem of transportation. The chief problem in its industrial development, however, concerns its mineral wealth.

Before discussing either of these problems it may be well to describe the general topography of the province. Rising from the low plain which covers the greater portion of Chihli Province are ranges of hills extending from north to south. Shansi lies amid these hills. It is made up of successive ranges, bisected by water-courses, and with three elevated plains, or basins. The greater number of streams in the mountains are, naturally, tributary to the Yellow River: the river of chief importance among these is the Fên, which drains the central, largest, and most important of the three plateaus. The lower ranges of hills are of the wonderful *loess* formation, and are tillable. The higher ranges approach to the dignity of mountains, and are, for the most part,

rocky and with scant vegetation. Broadly speaking, the ranges diminish in altitude as one travels from the north to the south.

The first investigator into the mineral resources of Shansi was a German scholar, Baron von Richthofen. In connection with extensive journeys through all China to determine the industrial possibilities, this indefatigable explorer traveled across Shansi in 1870, approaching from the south and following the great central highway of the province from Pingyangfu to Jaiyuanfu, the provincial capital. He returned some months later for a second visit, reaching on that occasion the northern districts of the province. It is certain that he did not see a great part of the bituminous coal field of Shansi, but he saw the best-known portions of the anthracite field. He also investigated some of the districts where iron is produced. He concluded that the eastern half of the province over-lay a vast bed of anthracite, while in the western half there were extensive bituminous formations, the two fields being separated by the basin of the Fên River. However, the writer has found bituminous mines in the very center of what von Richthofen described as the anthracite field, and there are other indications that the respective fields may not be as regular in outline as he thought. It is probably true, too, that von Richthofen under-estimated rather than overestimated the bituminous fields. Certain very rich districts he did not visit at all. But he was evidently very greatly impressed by what he saw, and wrote that "there is coal enough in Shansi to last the world for thousands of years at the present rate of consumption." A recent writer has said that the anthracite deposits of Shansi alone are equal to all the anthracite deposits of the United States.

The information von Richthofen gave naturally drew some attention to the mineral wealth of Shansi. For a long time, however, no effort was made either by the foreigners or by the Chinese themselves, aside from the crude methods already in vogue, to exploit this mineral wealth. The conditions of transportation, the lack of markets in north China, and the fact that China was still a sealed land, made it

impossible to act upon the information von Richthofen gave for many years. The year 1898 saw far-reaching changes imminent in north China, following the reform program of the Emperor Kuang Hsü. In that year a mining concession in Shansi was granted to the Peking Syndicate. The overthrow of the reform party, and the reactionary policy of the government which followed, culminating in the so-called "Boxer rebellion" in 1900, kept the Syndicate from beginning the development of its concession. Later, however, as the railway from Chêngtingfu to Taiyuanfu penetrated the eastern ranges of Shansi, so affording an outlet by rail to Peking and Tientsin, the Syndicate began to open up its field. Experts were sent in to make careful investigations, especially in the department of Pingting. A base was established in that department and houses erected for the foreign staff.

About this time the Chinese themselves awoke to the possibilities of the concession they had given. The terms of the concession were manifestly not liberal to the Chinese. They made it practically impossible for the native mine-owners to work their mines by modern methods, or for native capital to open up new mines. An agitation against the Syndicate was begun, given some dramatic touches by the students in the provincial capital, and carried to an issue that the people of Shansi esteemed successful when, in 1907, the Syndicate was ousted from the province. The concession was given up, but the people of the province indemnified the Peking Syndicate to the amount of 2,750,000 taels. Every sincere wellwisher of China must regret that this outcome was necessary. Had the terms of the concession been fair and liberal to the Chinese, the Peking Syndicate might today be in possession of its concession, at work in that magnificent field, and paying regular dividends to satisfied and happy stockholders.

Prior to the ousting of the Peking Syndicate the Chinese themselves had organized a company, called, the "Pao Chin Kung Ssu," i.e., the "Corporation for the Protection of Shansi," *Chin* being an ancient name of Shansi. This company took over the buildings erected by the Peking

Syndicate in the Pingting department and endeavored to supersede that corporation in its program for that field. It employed as its foreign engineer a young man whose chief qualifications for the office were that he had lived a good many years in China and spoke the Chinese language. That he knew nothing of mining engineering was, evidently, not considered a disability. Under the guidance of this expert (?) the corporation did not make any great progress, at least in adopting modern methods of working. The engineer traveled extensively throughout the district, but left neither maps of his journeys nor memoranda of his investigations. The company bought coal delivered by pack-animals at the railway stations, and sold it in yards opened in Peking and Tientsin. That is the method being followed today. The area from which the coal is drawn is comparatively limited, and the methods of mining employed are still of the crudest.

In the district of Hsiao-yi, 80 miles southwest of the provincial capital, a company of Chinese has installed modern machinery for pumping and hoisting. The cost of transporting the machinery from the coast was enormous and installing it was a long and expensive process. The German engineers sent to supervise the installation of the machinery were far from being experts in that line of work. In due time they turned the mines over to the Chinese again and with a result as inevitable as it was deplorable. Success in hoisting unheard of quantities of coal led to experiments in the lower levels of the mine. Props gave way, fifty or sixty lives were crushed out, the mine was flooded, and a lot of expensive machinery is rusting in and about that pit.

The natives have both surface and pit mines in Shansi. In the latter the coal is hoisted with a windlass, turned by animal power or by hand. In one mine I have visited, the only light possible in the pit is from lighted sticks of punk, giving an illumination considerably less than the glowing tip of a cigar. Labor under such conditions must be extremely difficult. In this mine the men were paid a wage 20 per cent in advance of the cost of other lines of manual labor in that region, yet an excellent quality of soft coal sold at the pit's mouth at the equivalent of 90 cents a ton. When the

competition was keener the price had been as low as 60 cents a ton.

The chief iron producing districts of the province are the prefecture of Tsêhchow in the southwest, and the department of Pingting in the east, the latter tapped by the narrow-gauge Chêng-ting-Taiyuan railway. Other iron deposits are in the Yungning and Ninghsiang districts in the west of the province, where some pig-iron of poor quality is produced, and used locally, and in the Ningwu prefecture in the north of the province. The Tsêhchow and Pingting fields have been quite extensively worked in the crude native fashion; it must be, however, that they are capable of great development under improved methods.

While speaking of the mineral wealth of the province we must not neglect the saline deposits. In the southwest near the walled town of Yün-chêng is a salt lake, farmed out to a large number of native companies, and from which the government derives so considerable a revenue that an official staff is stationed there to care for it. There is also a deposit of gypsum in this neighborhood. In the central plain of the province in the Taiyuan prefecture, the natives have opened numerous salt wells. The salt from these wells is very bitter and decidedly inferior in quality to that from the Yün-chêng lake. There are saline deposits, also, in Suiyuan in the extreme north of the province on the Mongolian border, and in Fêngchên in the northeast, the latter district also producing some soda.

From the above it will be seen that the mineral resources of the province are rich, especially in coal and iron. The problem is, to develop these resources by improvements in the methods and by putting them in touch with the markets. This leads us naturally to consider the problem of transportation.

In the palmy days of the Manchu dynasty Shansi reached a high degree of affluence, but it was not through the development of the natural resources of the province. Great fortunes were made by bankers and pawn-shop men in the four corners of the empire and the fruits of those fortunes were escorted into Shansi over almost impassable trails to the

accompaniment of tinkling donkey-bells. All about the mineral riches of the province nature had thrown an almost insurmountable mountain barrier. The perseverance of men has, however, succeeded in throwing roadways or trails over range after range of mountains, and in maintaining a great number of carriers upon these road-ways. It would be profitable indeed, did time permit, to describe these ancient thoroughfares. They have a charm and a romance all their own. It is more to the point, however, to consider the efforts of modern engineers to penetrate Shansi's mountain fastnesses. There is but one completed railway line into Shansi. A narrow-gauge road, with its eastern terminus at Shih Chia Chuang, near Chêngtingfu, on the Peking Hankow line in Chihli Province, runs almost due west to Taiyuanfu. The road is very crooked and the engineering difficulties have been considerable. The total length is about 151 miles. In that distance there are eighteen tunnels and a large number of bridges and culverts. It is to be regretted that the road is narrow-gauge, but such is the character of the country traversed that to have constructed a standard-gauge road would have multiplied the cost four-fold.

One other road into Shansi is under construction, namely, an extension of the Peking-Kalgan line to Suiyuan and Kweihuating, important commercial centers, on the Mongolian border. Inside the province a railway line is under construction, the so-called Jung-Pu Railway, the ultimate termini of which are to be Tatungfu in the north and Puchowfu in the southwest, on the Yellow River, at the gateway to Shensi Province. At the northern terminus the road is to connect with the extension of the Peking-Kalgan line. It will run through Taiyuanfu and will follow in a general way, the great central highway that has for centuries been the connecting link between Taiyuanfu and Sianfu. Thus far grading has been done between Yützu, on the Cheng-ting-Taiyuan line, and Taiku, 25 miles to the south and west. The outbreak of the revolution in the autumn of 1911 stopped work upon this section of the road shortly before the laying of rails would have been begun.

The old trade routes followed the lines of least physical resistance through the mountain ranges, usually in or near the beds of water courses. The railways thus far constructed or under construction have, with certain modifications, followed the old trade routes. Generally speaking, this will probably be advisable in future railway construction, though thorough scientific investigation may open up some new fields for industrial development that even the ingenious Chinese have not yet discovered.

It is practically certain that with the development of Shansi's mineral wealth and industrial possibilities one narrow-gauge railway will be entirely inadequate to care for the traffic. Other outlets must, therefore, be sought. The central trunk line connecting with the extension of the Peking Kalgan line will, to a certain extent, relieve the pressure. Further than that, it will doubtless be necessary to construct a line from the rich central plain in a southeasterly direction to northern Honan, following a well-known and important trade-route, and the coal and iron fields of Luan and Tsechow might well find an outlet to Shuntêfu or Changtêfu to the east. Moreover, for the fullest industrial development it will be necessary to build a number of branch lines or "spurs," especially to tap the richer coal fields.

The Yellow River, which forms the western and southern boundaries of Shansi, cannot be considered an asset in any solution of the provinces transportation problem. Some cargo boats go down the river, but, at any rate along those reaches, none return up-stream. When the boats reach the northern border of Honan they are broken up and the lumber sold. Within the province itself there are no navigable streams. Occasionally small scows appear in the Fên, the largest of these streams, for the transport of flour and coal; but the river is frequently drained of its entire stream to supply the irrigating ditches of the fertile mid-Shansi plain. In summing up our consideration of this transportation problem we should say that the most hopeful suggestion for the industrial future of Shansi lies in the extension of the railway system.

The question of afforestation should receive some atten-

tion. It is probable that more than three-fourths of the area of the province was at one time covered with forest. The desiccation of the province in recent periods owing to deforestation has been marked, and this was to a large extent responsible for the terrible famine of 1877-78 which claimed the lives of between five and six million people in Shansi alone. Edwards of Taiyuanfu computed the rainfall for an entire year at sixteen inches. The average is probably a little higher than that. Atwood projected a theory that the rainfall increases and diminishes in a cycle covering twenty-four years, perhaps gathering data to support an idea he received from native sources. This, however, has nothing to do with the question of afforestation. An arboretum at Taikuhsien contains about twenty varieties of forest trees than can be successfully cultivated in Shansi soil. In the roofs of temples and other large buildings are found timbers that indicate something of the size and distribution of the forests in the past; while in the back blocks in both the eastern and western ranges of hills are yet to be found the disappearing remnants of the former extensive woodlands. Early and careful attention to the work of reforestation would provide needed building material for the future and would, at the same time, affect favorably the rainfall and so bear upon the problem of developing the agricultural resources. In the last years of the late dynasty certain governors of the province gave this question their attention, but the measures they proposed were never carried out.

An important problem in the industrial future of Shansi is the development of agricultural resources. In soil, climate and diversity of products the province has been singularly favored by nature. The wonderful loess formation covers the entire province, and because of that fact many of the hills are cultivable to their very summits. The climate while similar to that of the same latitude in America, is not subject to such extremes. But it is in diversity of products that Shansi's claim to agricultural wealth and importance lies. The following are some of them: field products; wheat (both spring and winter), millet (4 or 5 varieties), Kaoling, oats (both summer and autumn), rice, buckwheat,

barley, maize, and beans. Other field products are hemp, cotton, flax (in the extreme northeast), indigo, tobacco, and willows for basket weaving. The hills, especially in the northwest, yield large quantities of licorice and ginger, and a crude silk is produced in the districts bordering the Yellow River. Among the products of the gardens are potatoes (superior quality), yams, sweet potatoes, peppers, onions, melons (4 or 5 varieties), and practically all the products of American and European gardens. Among the fruits produced are apples, pears, persimmons, grapes (some six varieties), peaches, plums, dates, mulberries, cherries, walnuts (the finest in China), and strawberries, the last named introduced by foreigners.

The most important cereals produced in Shansi are wheat and millet. The normal land valuation is probably determined by wheat, just as it is fixed by rice in south China. The agricultural problem is made acute just now in Shansi by the necessity of finding the best substitute for the poppy formerly so extensively cultivated. The poppy demanded the richest irrigable lands and sapped the vitality of the soil. In the four years since its cultivation was prohibited much of the land has returned to wheat as the spring crop and millet as the autumn crop, with the result not only that the price of flour has fallen in the wheat-producing districts, but also that millions of bushels of both the above mentioned cereals have been shipped via the Chengting-Taiyuan railway to supply the markets of Chihli and Honan. Though opium is the most profitable crop, financially, the farmer of North China has ever grown, its contribution to general prosperity was negligible, and it has been interesting to observe that since the prohibition of its cultivation and the substitution of wheat and millet as staple crops, though the immediate financial return for them is much less the general prosperity, as gauged by two excellent criteria, the amount of building and repairing done, and the number of theatrical performances held in the villages, is much greater. Opium, because immediately a more profitable crop gave to the land a fictitious valuation. This was from 30 to 60 per cent above the normal valuation as fixed by wheat. The economic

readjustment necessary now that opium may no longer be produced constitutes the crux of the agricultural problem in Shansi. Careful study must be given to the question of the best substitute for the poppy.

Shansi was formerly one of the leading provinces in the production of opium. The easily irrigated fields alongside the watercourses, and where the mountain streams flowed out upon the plains, were covered with patches of poppy. The local markets cared for much of it, but a good deal was shipped out to Peking and Tientsin, or over the Luanfu road to Honan. In 1909 the edict calling for the gradual cessation of poppy growing took effect in Shansi. In the spring of that year I traveled several hundred miles in central Shansi, in five separate prefectures or departments, and along mountain streams where the year before the poppy had been extensively grown. Everywhere I made careful investigations, and I found that no opium was being planted anywhere. In the following spring, 1910, in the Chiao-Ch'êng and Wên-Shui districts, the former in the Taiyuan, the latter in the Fênchow prefectures, near the market-town of K'ai-Chia-Chên, the farmers attempted to resume the cultivation of the poppy. The then governor of the province, His Excellency Ting Pao-ch'üan, finding that the local officials were powerless to cope with the situation, sent a wellknown scholar and orator to plead with the people. This amicable method was unsuccessful, and the eloquent advocate was hustled out of the district. Then the governor sent troops to uproot the poppy plants and repress the rebellion of the people. A sharp fight followed in which about twenty farmers were killed, a good many others wounded, and several soldiers suffered severe wounds. However, the authorities triumphed, and the farmers abandoned the attempt to grow the poppy. This test case had been followed with keen interest throughout the entire province and its outcome had a salutary influence everywhere. For the sternness of his repressive measures Governor Ting lost his official head, a result that he himself probably anticipated. He has since been living in retirement in the city of Shanghai.

The influence of the K'ai-Chia-Chên affair was carried

over into the next year, 1911. The impression has been given in an earlier address in this conference (Hon. J. O. P. Bland, "The Suppression of the Opium Traffic") that the Chinese did not fully keep their agreement with Great Britain in the matter of opium growing in 1911. I can speak only for Shansi, but my personal observation there includes the valleys of the Fên, Hsaio, K'ai, Wu-na, Liu Chih, and Yü Tao Rivers, as well as the district surrounding the great spring at Chin Ssu and the fertile valleys of the Pei Chwan in the extreme west of the province. All these were districts where formerly the poppy was extensively cultivated. No poppies were grown there in 1911. Careful inquiry in all sections of the province has elicited the information that everywhere the edict was enforced in 1911 as it had been in 1909 and 1910.

In the spring of this year, 1912, the people of Shansi took advantage of disturbed conditions in the country at large and sought to recoup themselves for the losses of the past three years by extensively planting the poppy. When I left the province about the first of May the poppy plants were just pushing their way through the surface of the ground. The province has, since the first of November 1911, been under a military government, headed by a Tutuh, Yen Hsi-shan. This provisional government will continue until after the general elections in January 1913. Early in the year General Yen put out a mandate forbidding the planting of the poppy, and threatening with punishment according to military law those who disregarded the mandate. This manifesto was in some districts preceded, in other districts accompanied or followed by strong proclamations on the part of the local officials. The people, however, disregarded the military governor's orders and continued to water their poppy fields. In June, just before the poppy could yield its harvest, General Yen sent a special deputy, with military escort, into the Chiao-Ch'êng district, not far from where the rioting had occurred in 1910. The farmers attacked this deputy, killed him, and wounded many members of his escort, at the same time burning the deputy's official residence. Troops were sent by Governor Yen, the

incipient rebellion was crushed with some loss of life, and the fields of poppies were destroyed. It is to be regretted that in other sections of the province the crop was allowed to come to harvest. But those who best understand the purposes of the new government are most certain that this backset in the opium reform in Shansi can be but temporary. For we should remember that General Yen's strong measures were employed at a time when the republic was not firmly established, and when his own position and the position of the central government at Peking was precarious. That he was willing to take such risks at such a time is surely an earnest of the purpose of the new government to fulfil with Great Britain the compact of the old government.

After living for eight years in Shansi and carefully observing the economic, physiological, and moral results of the cultivation and use of opium, I am prepared to say without any reservations that it is an evil and only an evil so far as the Chinese are concerned. A speaker in this conference quoted certain authorities (and in the quoting left the impression that he endorsed their views) as saying that opium-smoking indicates a racial tendency of the Chinese. As we consider this statement let us briefly review the history of opium in China.

Previous to the famous T'ang dynasty the poppy was unknown to the Chinese. It is first mentioned in Chinese literature in the first half of the eighth century. At that time China had had intercourse with Arabia for about one hundred years. Its second mention in the literature of the country was by Kuo, a Shensi man, toward the end of the eighth century. The poet Yung Tao, a Szechuen man, about 900-906 wrote a poem describing the poppies growing near his home. I have mentioned the localities of these two writers because the provinces of Shensi and Szechuen later extensively cultivated the poppy.

At first the Chinese used only the seeds, but four medical writers, probably of the twelfth century, refer to the use of the seed-pods, or capsules. In the thirteenth century three and in the fourteenth century one writer on medicine tell of a drug made from the capsule. When the petals have

fallen away from the seed-pod, and before the latter begins to harden, incisions are made in the pod with some sharp instrument, and the dark, viscous juice that oozes out is carefully gathered. That is the raw opium. Cutting the capsule in this way was first described by Wang Hsi, who died in 1488. He was governor of Kansuh Province for many years. There he saw a great many Mohammedans and learned from them of Arabia. By the end of the fifteenth century the method of preparing opium was introduced to China by the Arabs. Li Ting in the middle of the sixteenth century gives an exact account of the preparation of the opium under the name *a-fu-yung*. (The Arabs took the Greek name, ὄπιον, and called it *afyun*. In China's coast provinces this was changed to *ya-p'ien*. But in Yunnan Province it is still referred to by officials as *fu-yung*, which is *a-fu-yung* without the prefix.)

All this while opium was known only as a medicine. As such it is extremely valuable and has a place in the pharmacopeia of every civilized nation. We are dealing, however, with its misuse or abuse. Early in the seventeenth century the Spaniards introduced tobacco smoking to the Chinese. About the middle of the seventeenth century the use of opium mingled with tobacco was introduced by the Dutch. Opium was first smoked by itself (by the Chinese) probably near the end of the eighteenth century. The first edict forbidding the smoking of opium was issued by the Emperor Yung Chêng in 1729. Foreign opium (the prepared drug) was first introduced by the Portuguese at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The illicit trade in the drug was taken up by the British before the end of that century. In line with the Chinese resistance before and after that date the Emperor Chia Ch'ing in 1796 put forth an edict prohibiting the importation of the foreign drug. That the shameless smuggling continued, championed at last by Great Britain, is a matter of common understanding. So China learned of the poppy from the Arabs, was given the pipe by the Spaniards, was taught to mingle opium with tobacco in the bowl of the pipe by the Dutch, had the foreign drug brought to her by the Portuguese, and had the business

in opium forced upon her by the British. Strange that so much foreign assistance should have been necessary in the discovery of a "racial tendency" in the Chinese!

To recapitulate: the Chinese have known of the poppy for twelve centuries, have used opium as a medicine for nine centuries, have known of the method of securing raw opium from the capsule, or seed-pod, for six centuries, and have known of and practised smoking for considerably less than three centuries. China is an old country. She points with pride to an unbroken history of four thousand six hundred years. For three thousand four hundred years of that time she existed in blissful ignorance of the fact that there was any such thing as opium. For more than four thousand three hundred years she failed utterly to reveal what Mr. Bland would have us believe is a "racial tendency." Surely in the light of such facts we may at least assume an attitude of what that gentleman describes as "suspended judgment" before accepting the suggestion that opium smoking indicates a "racial tendency" of the Chinese.

Other lines along which help is needed are, instruction in seed selection, and in the problem of irrigation. The spring-fed mountain streams reaching the plains are diverted into ingenious and truly admirable systems of irrigating ditches. However, the mountains denuded of their forests frequently allow these streams to become, in the time of the summer rains, uncontrollable torrents that carry destruction instead of blessing to the villages of the plains. Reforestation will help in this matter, but there should also be an improvement in the system of irrigating canals, possibly through the construction of reservoirs, that will conserve the gifts of the summer rains and not allow them to rush into the lower reaches of the Yellow River carrying a wealth of loess soil as they go and leaving destruction in their train. Improvements are possible in the crops now produced in Shansi, both in kind and quality. There should be an extension of sericulture, for thousands of acres in the hills bordering the Yellow River are adapted to the production of the mulberry. The hemp, potatoes, and walnuts of the province should find ready markets at the coast were the problems of transporta-

tion not so great. The fundamental question, therefore, in the development of agriculture as of mineral resources is one of transportation.

We take up now the manufacturing possibilities of the province. They may be suggested as we recapitulate some products of the region and mention a few others that have not yet been named. The existence of iron and coal fields side by side suggests the development of iron and steel foundries. Cotton and silk are both produced, and are now woven in primitive fashion in the homes of the peasants. Cotton mills and silk filatures are a possibility of the future. A large amount of excellent earthen and stone ware is turned out in simple kilns in several districts. This industry is capable of great expansion as the markets of the coast are brought nearer through improvements in transportation. The uplands, with their excellent oat straw, suggest possibilities in braid and paper, especially since there is an abundance of water power available. In Tan Ts'un in the Taiyuan prefecture are kilns where glass is produced, some bottles of small size being blown, but the chief products being fragile toys and flimsy ornaments. With modern machinery and methods this industry should be capable of development to commercial importance. Crude presses in many sections produce bean and hemp oil. Sheep and goat-skins and other hides are shipped in large quantities to America and Europe, especially France, but it surely will be possible, in the presence of a plentiful coal supply, abundant water power and cheap labor, to handle this raw product at home and export the manufactured article. Cordage, and willow and wicker ware, now manufactured in crude fashion and for local markets, give promise of great expansion, as there is an abundance of raw material and efficient labor. The vineyards of the Taiyuan prefecture already produce an excellent quality of wine and this industry is capable of great growth as it shall receive intelligent and adequate attention. Other possible lines of manufacture will readily occur to one who is acquainted with the raw products of the province. We have not mentioned flour-milling, nor a score of other industries now carried on by the Chinese. After all, we must

hark back to the question of transportation. Without cheap and adequate transportation none of these industries can be developed much beyond the point demanded by the necessities of the people of Shansi itself. With cheap and adequate transportation the possibilities stagger the imagination.

In closing a word should be said as to the possibilities in water-power in the mountains of the province. Numerous sparkling, spring-fed brooks and rivers of good volume invite the attention of the expert in hydraulics and suggest possibilities of industrial development even in districts where the coal supply is inadequate or inconvenient. This, in common, with the other possibilities mentioned above, sounds a challenge to the engineer, native and foreign, whose spirit of adventure responds to nature's call to unlock the doors of her treasure-houses and release the pent-up forces of her hills and valleys.

SIR ROBERT HART AND HIS LIFE WORK IN CHINA

By Edward B. Drew, A.M., Commissioner of Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, retired.

I propose to set before you, as best I may, the life work of Sir Robert Hart—a career which Professor Williams of Yale in his recent book on the Burlingame Mission pronounces “the most remarkable and creditable of any European, perhaps, in Asia during the (nineteenth) century.”

To this China-loving company I would present my late chief as one who served China with a life-time’s unflagging devotedness; and to this body of students I offer his achievements as a convincing example of that wholesome terrestrial kind of genius which is said to consist “in days’ works.”

Robert Hart was born in Portadown, County Armagh, in the north of Ireland, on February 20, 1835. He was the oldest of twelve children. His father Henry Hart was fairly well to do and a stern Wesleyan; his mother, a daughter of Mr. John Edgar, was a tender woman who ever held the affections of her children. Not long after Robert’s birth the family moved to Hillsborough where he attended his first school, and where the family home long remained. At the age of eleven he was sent for a year to a Wesleyan school in Taunton, England; his father taking him there in person. At Taunton he began the study of Latin; and Latin he delighted in and read to the end of his life, it being his daily custom to read some classic author while taking his morning tea. His next move was to the Wesleyan Connexional School at Dublin. Here he was graduated at the top of his class at the age of fifteen, with a reputation for love of mischief, as well as for studiousness and a brilliant mind. His solicitous father elected to send him to the new Queen’s

University at Belfast, rather than to Trinity College, Dublin—preferring to keep his son near home where he might watch closely over his conduct and where pious influences should guard his character.

In 1853, at the age of eighteen, young Hart received his B.A. degree. He had also taken scholarships and medals in literature and in logic, and had won the distinction of Senior Scholar. It was in this part of his career that he became a favorite student of McCosh, afterwards president of Princeton; and both Dr. McCosh and Sir Robert Hart ever recalled with pleasure their relations at this period, if indeed they did not actually correspond by letter so long as they lived.

Before determining his choice of a profession, Hart began studying for the master's degree; but while he was thus engaged, an opportunity offered itself for competing for a junior post in the British government's consular service in China. He entered as a candidate; but so distinguished had been his university career that he was given the appointment at once without examination. He arrived in China in 1854, and continued for five years in the British consular service, gradually acquiring the Chinese language while serving at Hongkong, Ningpo and Canton, and becoming familiar with both the British and Chinese side of international relations.

His early official experience was gained from the British governor of Hongkong, Sir John Bowring (well known by his noble hymns) and under such able consuls as Alcock, Thomas Taylor Meadows, and Parkes. For most of this period Hart's post was at Ningpo—near enough to the scene of the momentous events then enacting in China to excite the intensest interest of an observant, thoughtful and ambitious young man. The Taiping rebellion was in full career; the rebel leader had already been established at Nanking as his capital for a full year when Hart reached China; and from Ningpo he could observe the Taiping expeditions against Peking. In the study of these stirring times he must have found a stimulating example in his senior, Consul Meadows, who sympathised with the Taipings and in 1856 produced

that still famous book *The Chinese and their Rebellions*. The period of his residence at Ningpo also covered for the most part the events at the neighboring treaty port, not 200 miles away, when from 1853 to 1855, the "Small Swords," (an offshoot of the Taipings) seized and held the Chinese city of Shanghai. There and then were sown the seeds destined to produce but a few years later the "foreign" customs service so-called, with Hart himself presently as the chief—the guiding hand and the farseeing eye. At this period, too, occurred the Lorcha "Arrow" incident at Canton, followed by the quarrel between China and Britain, which developed in 1857-58 into the Lord Elgin mission, the seizure of Canton, the naval expedition to Tientsin, and the great treaties of Tientsin of June, 1858. When Canton was taken by the British and French on New Year's day 1858, and the foreign allied commission was created to govern it, Hart was transferred from Ningpo, and made secretary to this commission. This gave him a new kind of training, and a rare opportunity to gain experience of Chinese life and thought and the principles of the Chinese government. His efficiency and promise at this time is exemplified by his memorandum (cited by Morse in *International Relations*¹), written early in 1859, while he was still interpreter to the British consulate at Canton, warning his chief, the British minister, Mr. Bruce, of the hostile preparations which the Chinese were then making to resist the expected British visit to Peking to exchange the ratifications of the treaty of the year before. Morse gives the details of this document, pronouncing it perhaps the most accurate forecast of the disastrous repulse of the British at the Taku forts which followed in June (1859).

We have now reached the moment when Hart was about to enter upon what was to become the career of a long, devoted, and indefatigable life—as the builder and director of one of the most efficient administrative organisms, and perhaps altogether the most unique and peculiar—known to history. What he had gained, up to this time, was an equip-

¹ *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* by Hosea Ballou Morse, Longmans Green and Company, 1910, p. 575.

ment of varied China knowledge, office experience and official caution; what he had always possessed was unusual intellectual gifts, a fine memory, and a rare power of concentration. He had learned by competition with others that his abilities were considerable and that his acquired knowledge and powers of observation were exceptional. In manner he was shy, unobtrusive, almost unsocial among strangers. He lacked the bearing of the self-confident leader; yet he surely knew that he had more "brains" than most men, and need not distrust his powers. He had ambition, and, I doubt not, he had fully resolved within his own breast even now when only twenty-four that he could and would make a great career.

The most definite accounts of the beginnings of the Chinese foreign customs service are those given by Morse in his *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, chapter xii, and by Hart himself in a memorandum written in 1864, which is to be found in the British *China Blue Book* of 1865.

In the fifties of the last century the European and American trade and shipping in China were restricted by the government of that country, theoretically though not altogether in fact, to five cities on or near the coast. One of these "open ports" or "treaty ports" so called, was Canton, another was Shanghai—and there were three minor places, Ningpo, Foochow, and Amoy. Here, naturally, were Chinese custom houses, managed by native officials commissioned from Peking, who were aided by staffs of Chinese clerks, interpreters, duty calculators, goods examiners, watchmen, etc. Nominally the tariff rates were identical at all these places, for there existed a published tariff (on imports and on exports also); and nominally the methods of doing custom house business were identical in details at all the open ports. In practice, however, there was infinite variety, laxity, caprice and even corruption. Bribery or bullying of the Chinese customs officials was pretty common among the foreign merchants. These conditions made it impossible for the would-be honorable importer or exporter to compete with his less scrupulous rivals in trade without stooping to malpractices which he despised. This state of things, for which I find the nearest parallel of our own

place and day in our dishonest system of taxation, is well depicted in Hart's memorandum of 1864 cited above. I remember that a reputable English merchant once described to me how in those lax times he had contrived, by means of bribes shrewdly distributed, to clear without charges a ship laden full of dutiable tea—reporting her at the customs as departing in ballast! Many did this—*must* do it; though the foregoing case was an extreme one. Thus the customs officers got rich; while their government received far less revenue than it was entitled to. The demoralization was general, and the government seemed helpless to correct it.

Now happened a sudden, rather trivial, event at a single Chinese port, which was destined within half a dozen years to bring about a reform hitherto undreamt of, and to produce momentous and far-reaching consequences.

The Taiping rebellion was in full career in central China, though it had not reached Shanghai. But one morning in 1853, a secret sect of malcontents called the "Small Swords" surprised and captured the walled native town of Shanghai. The custom house naturally fell into their hands; whereupon the collector, called the Taotai, took refuge with his staff and underlings outside the city in the suburb specially occupied by the European and American merchants, consuls and traders. No recognition or sympathy was accorded to the "Small Swords," nor were they permitted to enter the European settlement. It was then agreed between the consuls and the dispossessed Taotai that trade should not stop, nor should customs duties cease to be collected.

In order to check the tendency towards collapse of the customs functions, and to safeguard the Chinese revenue, for which indeed the consuls felt themselves in a degree responsible—it seemed best that the Taotai should be sustained and reinforced in the discharge of his duty by a few foreigners of good standing, to be called inspectors and paid by him. Thus was born the foreign Inspectorate of customs—at Shanghai, in June, 1854. One of the first inspectors was Captain Wade, well known twenty years after as Sir Thomas Wade, the British minister. Within about a year Wade was succeeded by Mr. H. N. Lay, till then a British

consular official. From 1855 Mr. Lay directed and developed the new organization for several years. Hart was yet to come. The foreign inspectorate, be it noted, was first established at Shanghai alone—not elsewhere. There it introduced a general reform of customs procedure. All the merchants were compelled to pay duty strictly according to tariff; and while some of them would have preferred the old game of risk and fraud, it was evident that with the new organization lay the path of honesty and self-respect. At the same time the Chinese government for their part began to get a sure and steadily increasing revenue, with the foreigners' qualities of organization, vigilance, and probity in control. The result was that towards the close of 1858, when the new and permanent commercial treaties were adopted under the lead of Lord Elgin, it was in set terms stipulated that the Chinese government might appoint of their own independent choice any foreigners (European or American) whom they wished, to assist them in the collection of their revenue, and that the new system—the foreign inspectorate—should be extended beyond Shanghai and made uniform at all the treaty ports. Laurence Oliphant, Lord Elgin's private secretary, in his delightful book *Lord Elgin's Mission*,² justly anticipated that this stipulation might prove the most important of the new trade regulations. A few months after, viz., late in the spring of 1859, came the first step towards extension of the Shanghai system. The famous and ancient customs port of Canton was to receive a semi-foreign administration on the Shanghai model; and the Chinese viceroy there, who knew young Hart favorably as the interpreter in the British consulate, invited him to initiate the service. Thereupon, the British government's consent have been obtained, Hart resigned the consular service and accepted the post of deputy commissioner (in America termed collector) in the Chinese imperial maritime customs at Canton—a Chinese office, under Chinese control represented by Mr. Lay as the chief; and from that time till the day of his death in London in 1910—a period of fifty-one

² *Lord Elgin's Mission to China and Japan*, by Laurence Oliphant, Harper, 1860, p. 484.

years—Robert Hart remained the devoted and loyal employee of the government of China. It is interesting to recall here what Miss Juliet Bredon points out in her book *The Romance of a Great Career* (written while its subject was still living): In accepting his resignation from the consular service in 1859 the British government cautioned young Hart that should he once leave its employ it would be vain for him to petition to reënter it, if he should subsequently desire to do so. Twenty-six years later the position was reversed when that government of its own accord offered to Sir Robert Hart the post of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Peking!

In May, 1861, Mr. Lay went to England on leave of absence, and Hart was promoted to fill his place as acting inspector general. Mr. Fitzroy, the commissioner of customs at Shanghai, was to act conjointly with Hart, but as he was unacquainted with the Chinese language, the leadership fell inevitably into Hart's hands. The first thing to be done was to open customs offices according to the new model at those other treaty ports in which the old purely Chinese system had hitherto remained unchanged. Canton had been reformed in 1859, as I have already said; and in 1860 the new form of office had been opened also at Swatow—the only one that year. Meanwhile the allies (British and French) were invading north China, taking Peking, and completing by a supplementary treaty there the re-adjustment of their relations with China, which they mistakenly supposed they had finally accomplished two years before. After 1860 a long peace ensued with improved mutual understanding. The foreign legations now established at the capital began by turning over a new leaf and taking a conciliatory, sympathetic, helpful, friendly attitude towards the Chinese government. The ministers, Bruce and Burlingame, maintained this policy with all their influence. China had had castigation enough; let her now practice the new lesson; grant her time to recuperate and patiently help her to accept and get used to the new conditions—to recover from the violent wrench away from many time honored but evil traditions and methods to which she had been so harshly subjected.

It was to be an era of good feeling, of leading, of hope, of economic revival. Now France and Britain even aided the imperial government in suppressing the Taipings in the region of Shanghai, Soochow and Nanking; and most justly too, for the "coolie Kings" had sunk to the level of bandits and plunderers, and had quite forfeited the first expectations of a pure and honest régime for the peasantry of the Middle Kingdom. With Ward and Gordon as their lieutenants, and enjoying too the open sympathy of the British and French commanders in China, the leaders of the imperialist armies, Tsêng and Li, restored the authority of the government between 1861 and 1863; and the great rebellion ended in July, 1864, with the recovery of Nanking, the Taipings' last stronghold. Hart fully shared the aims of all these leaders; he coöperated with them in the purpose of a pacific and patient re-construction; he aided actively in persuading Gordon to take the field again after he had withdrawn in disgust when the rebel chiefs were executed at Soochow; and most of all he threw himself earnestly into his own special task of creating in the mixed (foreign and Chinese) service now to be developed an institution which China should perceive made for stability of government, encouragement of trade, increase of financial resources, and good will between native and foreigner. Early in 1861 the new customs institutions were opened at Chinkiang, Ningpo and Tientsin. The same year Hart opened offices at Foochow, and also at Hankow and Kiukiang on the Yangtze. In 1862 he opened Amoy; in 1863 Chefoo and two ports in Formosa, and lastly Newchwang (in Manchuria) in 1864. The tale of open treaty ports for foreign trade was now complete, with a custom house of cosmopolitan personnel in Chinese pay at each place. What was done in these formative years was Hart's work. Lay was absent from China between May, 1861 and May, 1863; and when he returned he remained only a few months. He was dismissed in November in consequence of the Lay-Osborn fleet dispute. He represented a dictatorial era which had expired, and even his own legation did not regret his departure.

With his head office established in Peking, Hart threw

himself unsparingly into the task of developing and perfecting the service but recently planted at the 14 ports of trade. He set himself to improving on the *personnel* engaged at the outset, educating all concerned to a better knowledge of their work, raising the general morale, and unifying the methods of procedure at the custom houses. The foreigners (by which term is meant Europeans and Americans) first employed had in some instances been emergency men picked up locally haphazard; some were even adventurers; some were too old to learn new duties, and to acquire the Chinese language; and a few were inferior socially and in education to the other foreigners about them occupied in commerce or in official life. A service thus partly manned with inferior material was regarded with disdain by the public, and Hart at once took steps to change all this. He sent to Europe and to America and secured young men of good birth and university education; these men he trained; he required them to learn Chinese; and he exacted absolute accuracy and efficiency in their office routine. Men who satisfied him he advanced rapidly in those early days, so that within half a dozen years the customs employees rose to a footing of social equality—or even better—with the men about them. At the same time Hart was unfailingly considerate in his treatment of deserving employees who could not attain to his standard for the highest posts. None were discharged because they were old; and to those of mediocre capacity were assigned posts where the work was what they were competent to do.

The service was cosmopolitan; its strength lay partly in the fact that subjects of all the great powers were distributed through every grade. For example, in the custom house at Foochow, when under my charge some years ago, the commissioner was American, his senior deputy was French, and in the successive junior ranks were Germans, Scandinavians, British and Japanese. Of course, in every office by far the largest number of employees were Chinese. The official languages were English and Chinese; in a few departments only one of these, while in most departments, e.g., duty accounts and returns, statistics, expenditures, published

reports on the trade, correspondence, etc., both English and Chinese were used. There was no fixed proportion of employees determined for each nationality, but the patronage was based roughly on each country's commercial interest in the China trade. Britain had the largest share; America, Germany and France came next; and the service contained a lesser number of Danes, Italians, Japanese, Russians, etc. In the highest appointments, called commissionerships, and deputy commissionerships, of which there were in the sixties some 20 and 12 respectively, nearly all these nationalities were represented,—though not in equal proportion; in 1907 when the number of commissioners and deputy commissioners had risen, with the increased number of treaty or open ports, to so many as 37 and 25 respectively these posts were thus distributed, viz., Of the 62 commissioners and deputy commissioners, 37 were British, 5 were American, 5 were French, 5 were German, 3 were Russian, 1 was Danish, 1 was Japanese, 1 was Italian, 1 was Dutch, 1 was Belgian, and 2 were Norwegian.

Hart never lost sight of the practical fact that the service must be cosmopolitan, and that there could be no favoritism as towards one nation or another. He was obliged to satisfy the Chinese foreign office—whose authority was the only superior he must recognize—that his selection of men, and distribution of appointments were just and could withstand the possible complaint or displeasure of each and every Legation. The Chinese foreign office gave Hart absolute control of the service; he would brook no interference with his power and responsibility. The foreign ministers sometimes tried to interfere, or sometimes complained; certainly this happened in an exasperating form in the early years of Hart's career, before his prestige had been established—when it was hard for him to maintain his ground. But as time went on his confidence and authority grew greater; and while he had always to be circumspect and to have sound reasons for his selections and promotions, he took his own way and the foreign ministers preferred to leave these things to his fairness and judgment. It is true to say that in his official acts, and from his official viewpoint Hart was first and fore-

most a Chinese official, second cosmopolitan, and never partial towards his own nationality. Nor do I think that with the vast patronage which he exercised—was *compelled* to exercise—for nearly fifty years, he was ever influenced against, or in favor of a man by prejudice due to nationality.

The organizing work done by Hart in the decades of the sixties and seventies was as immense in amount and importance as it was varied in nature. And then, as subsequently, he did most of it himself alone. Before 1864, i.e., while he was instituting the offices from Canton in the south to Newchwang in the north, he visited in person the places concerned, became acquainted with his men—chiefs and juniors—and arranged matters by personal interviews with the local Chinese officials. These officials naturally had but a dim comprehension of his purposes, or of their correct relation to the new “*foreign*” customs, as they termed it; while they were amply equipped with anti-foreign distrust, far from unwarranted. Hart had to meet and overcome this feeling, as best he might; and he had also to impress upon his European staffs and their native territorial colleagues what their relative powers, duties, and responsibilities were, and what mutual relations they would be expected to cultivate. Indeed, he had to depend on his own thinking and foreseeing brain for his plans and opinions, and then to teach subordinates to act accordingly. Before him at the outset was only a clean slate—a new institution of vast potential development to be reared, its future uncertain and himself alone the architect. But he had imagination, confidence, vision,—and he went forward, seldom hesitating or looking back.

In 1864 he made Peking his permanent headquarters, directing and organising the distant offices by correspondence from the capital, while in close personal touch with the Chinese foreign office and with the legations. The new system, not obstructive to trade, but managed simply and without corruption, brought in a yearly growing revenue which in amount surprised as well as rejoiced the Peking exchequer,—and made the service and its head *persona grata* with the central government, however inwardly ill-disposed were the native local officials at the ports, whose time-honored “rake

off" it had strangled. By 1866, the indemnities for the war of 1858-60 had been paid off—and from the customs revenues; whereupon the Chinese foreign office announced its satisfaction with the service and its purpose to prolong it indefinitely. The tariff was very low—a basis of only 5 per cent, levied at specific rates both on imports and exports. China was precluded by the foreign powers from raising it; indeed it has been changed but little down to this day. Yet, with the increase which has taken place in the number of open ports of trade, and the natural growth of China's commerce, the annual collection has risen from 8,500,000 taels in 1864 to 35,500,000 taels in 1910.³ This gain is due in part to the addition of new departments of customs collecting work handed over to Hart from time to time;—indeed even a part of China's *internal revenue* both from opium and from general commodities has been entrusted to the foreign customs for management, for several years. China was never niggard with the inspector general in the grant of funds for the cost of collection; on the other hand he rendered accurate quarterly and annual accounts of what was spent. The government did not criticise the rates Hart fixed for salaries and wages, nor the allowances he chose to issue for rent, travel, leaves of absence, etc. All these things down to the wages of the lowest office messengers and boatmen were determined absolutely by regulations which he himself made—as one of the many features of his organization. A professional accountant was engaged from the treasury in London, who came to China, studied the conditions, drafted a complete system of accounts-keeping rules, and made a tour of all the ports instructing the commissioners and clerks in details, and opening the books. The system then established continues in force—with but few changes—today. Hart himself, with characteristic sense of responsibility and capacity for detail, maintained a fixed custom of requiring the books in which the service general accounts were summarised and kept up to date in the audit department at Peking, to be brought to him every Saturday for

³ One tael equals about 66 cents, United States currency, 1910.

examination. It was amazing his grasp of details, and the time and minute personal attention he freely gave to every branch of the service affairs. The undying tale that the Chinese government gave him an allowance of so much with which he was to run the service—keeping the unspent balance for himself—is not true. He accounted for all he spent, and as for himself he received a fixed salary—probably the same as that of his predecessor, Mr. Lay, which Mr. Andrew Wilson, author of the *Ever Victorious Army* tells us was £8000. If this was Hart's salary, every penny of it was well earned. There never was higher loyalty, completer self devotion, or more splendid ability placed at the service of an employer—or with better results. As the customs grew in variety of functions, extent of field, amount of collections, and number of personnel, Chinese and foreign, the annual grant from the government for its maintenance was increased at intervals. The story is told that some native official once memorialised the government to the effect that the service was costing too much under Hart's régime and that he himself, the memorialist, would undertake to carry it on with a far smaller appropriation. This memorial was passed on by the foreign office to Hart for his answer. He replied by declaring, that so far from admitting that the present grant was too great, he must point out that it had become too small, and concluded his despatch by soliciting an increase of so and so much in the annual allowance! The result was what he had expected: the grant was increased!

I have mentioned the thoroughness—reaching to all details—with which his early organizing work was done. One aim was to create *uniformity* at all the offices. Calling for lists of the employees of every description from every port, he classified, ranked, and graded them—fixing the pay of each grade. Then was published the first service list, to be followed yearly by a fresh list showing the enrollment, rank, nationality and station of every man—the series affording a history not merely of each man's career but of the growth of the organization as the years rolled by. A system, a piece of machinery like this, once instituted was

never dropped or permitted to deteriorate in quality or accuracy or in the variety and fulness of records it afforded. On the other hand it was modified and steadily improved as circumstances demanded changes. At present the list is issued in both English and Chinese. The natural requirements of a large constituency of intelligent merchants were met by the publication quarterly of statistics of the separate imports and exports of trade at each and all the ports, of the movement of treasure, and of shipping. Annually, complete volumes of similar, but more elaborate, statistics are issued,—accompanied by reports on the trade of each port written by the local commissioners, and by a general report on the trade of China as a whole, drawn up by the statistical secretary. In point of clearness, completeness and typography, these annual volumes leave little to be desired. They are published both in English and in Chinese,—and may be found in several of the great libraries of our own country as well as of Europe. And, what is more valuable to the general student, and deserves to be known better than it is known, Hart caused to be published at the close of each decade beginning with the period 1881–1890 a collective volume of *Decennial Reports*, embracing each port and its surrounding district, prepared by the several commissioners, detailing—according to a systematized arrangement drafted by Hart himself—the history and development during the decennium, of the port's industries, trade, governmental affairs, productions, etc., and recording all important events, improvements, and the like, accompanied by maps, and as a whole constituting an invaluable record for the student of the modern and modernising Middle Kingdom.

Little escaped Hart's indefatigable hand—little that could enhance the value of the customs service to China or to the public. Concise books of instructions in their duties were drawn up and distributed to the employees; instructions for the commissioners and their assistants, instructions for the heads of the outdoor department, for the examiners of goods, and for the watchers of shipping—all aiming to teach each man how to perform his work, what he should and what he should not do. These instructions improved the discipline

and efficiency of the staffs, and ensured a liberal, courteous, and helpful attitude on the part of custom clerks and examiners in dealing with travellers and with the stationary commercial public who had duties to pay. It was a fixed principle with Hart—understood by every man in the service, high or low—that each employee ought to be enabled to know clearly what was expected of him; and, with this known, men must be held strictly to doing it. Those who fell short were sure to hear of it promptly and emphatically; those who did well, even the humblest, were rewarded with promotion when the right time and place came; while such as showed exceptional fitness were culled out and advanced to the most responsible posts. A system of semi-annual confidential reports on the personnel was instituted in 1868, and always maintained; indeed Hart never revoked an ordinance which he had once instituted—he would modify after trial and experience, but he never repealed.

The service steadily grew larger, as international crises arising from time to time were settled by the opening of new ports so-called, i.e., new points of trade and contact, many of them at interior or at land frontier towns. But the service was never too big for Hart to manage. The Chefoo convention of 1876 with Britain, which settled the Margary murder, provided for the opening of Wenchow, Pakhoi, Wuhu, and Ichang (and of Chungking later) on the Upper Yangtze. The Tongking imbroglio with France in 1884–85 was followed by the opening of Lungchow, and Mengtsz in remote Kwangsi and in Yunnan on China's southern frontier. The defeat of China by Japan in 1895 led to the opening of the large cities of Soochow and Hangchow. The war between Japan and Russia in 1905 had for one of its results the opening of Harbin, Antung, Mukden, etc., in the three provinces—still Chinese—of Manchuria. The enlargement of customs work thus entailed, of staffs and correspondence, and the increased distances from Peking, were not too formidable for Hart's organization to cope with; he seemed always to have spare men of all grades ready to go out and begin work on the well known lines at new points. The trained men required, he always had; and vacant

places at the older ports were speedily replenished with recruits from his waiting list—a list kept close at hand and from which he could draw by a telegram to London. Here was a special agency of the Chinese customs, efficiently and loyally directed by Mr. James Duncan Campbell—who had been in China in the service, than whom a more competent man could not have been found. All candidates of whatever nationality had to pass Campbell's tests and personal scrutiny before they could obtain enrollment as suitable. Similar care was also taken in China in selecting the large number of native recruits who filled the clerkships. Thus, when new demands arose, even suddenly, the service was elastic enough to meet them.

There is one other feature of the organization which I may not fail to mention—the practice of transferring clerks, assistants, commissioners, and even examiners and inspectors (i.e., the “out-door men”) from one port to another every few years. These transfers took place in considerable number each spring; so that every man after ten or fifteen years would have served at several ports in different parts of China, and, with the exception of the commissioners alone, would have worked under a variety of chiefs, and in a variety of climates. The advantages of this practice were many. It was only fair to men who had lived three or four years in the enervating south, that they should be given a change to the north, or that men who had endured the rather solitary existence of a small out of the way place in mid-China should be enabled to exchange the hardships of social stagnation for the joys of a bustling community like Shanghai or Hankow. Further, it was just to all under a system by which (as I have said above) every employee's merits and deficiencies were semi-annually reported confidentially to the inspector general, that the employee should be reported upon by a succession of different chiefs; so that the inspector general might form his judgment of a man upon the estimates of several commissioners and not on the opinion of only one or two. The practice of frequent transfers increased the men's experience, maintained their interest in their work, and tended to unify procedure at all the ports; while affording

an easy path for removing quietly men who could not work with certain colleagues or who were unsuitable to the local community. Referring to my own experience I may say that my life in China was far more pleasant, and my work was done with more zest, in that I served for three or four or five years, not longer, at *each* of eight different stations—from Peking to Canton, and from Shanghai to Kiukiang.

One feature of the customs organization was the statistical department, established at the central port of Shanghai. This establishment combined the two functions of (1) publication *plus* printing, and (2) the assembling and compilation of trade statistics and reports. Under a chief possessing Hart's imagination and incapable of finding any kind of work deary or uninviting, the statistical department was a most interesting field—by no means what our American name "Government Printing Office" somehow signifies to me. The head manager, known as the statistical secretary, not merely printed and distributed the regular returns and reports to the mercantile and official public; it was one of his tasks to receive and inspect the ports' quarterly official statements of revenue collected, and of expenditures. These documents had to be drawn up four-fold in both English and Chinese—a set from each port—and were passed on to the Chinese treasury and to the foreign office. They were elaborate and detailed; and Hart would not tolerate the least flaw, or error, untidiness or carelessness of form in the preparation of a single one of them. These documents if not correct and perfect in form were invariably returned swiftly to the office of issue, to be replaced by fresh ones. Hart never accepted less by a hair than what he had required. The result was that the Chinese foreign office received from him nothing that was ill-done; and the Chinese principle is—in theory at least—that a careless report made to a superior office is a breach of propriety, a want of respect. The published *Yellow Books* from the statistical department are models of care, taste, completeness and good workmanship; because Hart would accept nothing less. More than this: he encouraged such of his subordinates as might choose to write monographs on China subjects, to do so, and these

if meritorious were published for sale or for distribution. A paper on Chinese music, a collection of Chinese terms and phrases gathered by some ambitious employee in a wide and patient reading of the native literature, or a minute and accurate descriptive list of the thousand and one articles which comprise China's trade: many such useful works Hart published, as a credit to their authors and a distinction to the service. He also published volumes of special reports, for example, one on silk, another on tea, others on opium, etc.; or again a collection of China's treaties giving all the texts in which they were drawn up, taken from the official copies. Many successive volumes of medical reports on diseases in China, made semi-annually by European physicians practising in different parts of that country were issued by his direction. A broad minded man he furthered everything of value to China, which came within the scope of his control.

The provision of aids to navigation such as lighthouses, lightships, buoys, beacons, etc., for the benefit of China's sea, riverine and harbor shipping was early placed by the Chinese government in his hands with full powers. Engaging expert engineers, and consulting the navigators themselves familiar with the coast of China, he first drew up a lighthouse building program extending through a series of years. Only the best illuminating methods of their time were introduced. And to this day the dangerous China coast is so well lighted and marked that—as Hart once expressed it—“navigation has been made as easy as walking down Regent Street when the gas is lit.” He seemed to lose sight of no detail during the years when this work was being done; among other things insisting that wherever possible the materials used on a lighthouse, the workmen, and such current supplies as food and boats should be those to be obtained on the spot,—the aim being to convert the naturally suspicious, prejudiced or even hostile sea-coast population to a feeling of confidence and good will. In 1908 when Sir Robert Hart left China, the customs service was maintaining 132 lighthouses and lightships, not to mention many buoys and beacons or the steamers required to visit, inspect

and supply them. In these matters, as in everything he touched Hart was thorough, studying and directing details himself, and taking a deep interest of a personal kind in all that he had to do. He selected the lightkeepers, he chose the officers of the lightships and light-tending steamers—taking infinite pains to appoint just the men who would be contented with their billets and would by nature suit the work best. On one occasion, for instance, on a tour of the light houses he observed that a certain lightkeeper had given much attention to breeding and keeping a variety of domestic animals for the love of it, whereupon he transferred the man to a post on a large island—where he might keep bigger flocks and more poultry and teach the islanders how to rear and care for them.

Beyond these varied activities which belonged to his recognized duties and responsibilities as head of the customs many others of an extraneous kind were imposed upon him and upon the customs service by the Chinese government. A commission of enquiry was sent to Cuba and Peru to report on the condition and treatment of Chinese coolie laborers in those countries. Two commissioners of customs accompanied and guided this mission; with the beneficent result that the condition of these wretched beings was permanently alleviated by diplomatic action. The work of assembling Chinese products and manufactures and the exhibition of them as the Chinese government's displays at the successive world's fairs, Vienna in 1873, Philadelphia in 1876, Paris in 1878 and 1900, Berlin (fisheries) in 1880, and New Orleans (cotton) in 1883, these tasks were assigned to Hart to be managed by the customs service. Other special missions and frontier delimitation, were also entrusted to Hart and his subordinates.

Besides these extraordinary occasions of international duty to be performed, there were international gales to be weathered, or opportunities to be improved. Here Hart's advice was sometimes sought by the Chinese ministers, owing to his confidential relations with them. This was a special kind of service, quite outside the limits of his office as inspector general; and it must have been fraught with no

slight anxieties and perplexities. It was not Hart's nature, indeed it would have been most unwise, unasked to volunteer suggestions beyond his recognised functions. But he was not infrequently consulted in critical entanglements; and for negotiation he possessed taste and skill. One would have thought his regular work as much as one man could do—especially with his high standard of quality; but Hart aspired to lead China into the path of progress, to help her in the way of safety, to shield her from aggression and from the perils of partition which repeatedly threatened in consequence of her blind conservatism, or obstructiveness, or weakness, or fatuous blunders. Early in the sixties he was overjoyed by her seeming advance towards Occidental education promised by the creation of the Tung Wen Kuan Colleges at Peking and at Canton. But through ill causes which Hart could not stem, these institutions lapsed into discouraging stagnation and uselessness; and yet, as I know from my own correspondence with him when I was stationed at Canton, he refused to accept my belief that the college there was beyond hope. As Mr. Ku Hung-ming declared, "The great man is always an optimist;" and Hart based his unconquerable hope for the future of these schools on the slender fact that they had indeed turned out in three decades two or three able men whom he was proud to name. He lived on the tiptoe of expectation that some miracle would occur or some heaven-sent prophet would arise to fling wide the doors of reform. He was delighted in 1866 with the appointment of the humble secretary of the foreign office, Mr. Pin, to accompany him as a semi-official envoy to Europe; he hoped that even this might be the "dawn," though indeed it was not much "like thunder." The times were not ripe for China's awakening, but this event—come when it might—could never have surprised him; and for my part I would fain have witnessed his content when at last after the Boxer fanaticism came the deep and sincere reaction, the popular regeneration in favor of modern education, followed—after the Russo-Japanese war—by genuine reforms in government, police, military affairs, the press, and opium abolition, in a word a new national birth.

I well recall, for I witnessed it, the joyous hope which animated him, when the Burlingame mission was sent forth in 1868; nor indeed was that enterprise without lasting advantage for hard-pressed China. She needed time, sympathy and consideration from western powers—and this respite from relentless pressure Anson Burlingame gained for her in Europe, while Hart then and later clung to the same policy in Peking.

History, I think, will give to him a share of the credit for preventing war with Britain in 1876, after the Margary murder, at the very last moment—when hostilities seemed inevitable; and nine years later it was his resourcefulness, his boldness, his unfaltering perseverance, even his ingenuity, that brought to an abrupt and surprising end the wearisome and exhausting hostilities of 1884–85 known as the Tongking imbroglio. The tale is a dramatic one, but it is too long and the plot is too complex to be related here. The seizure by the French admiral of the little steamer *Feihoo* of the Chinese customs was Hart's opportunity. Miss Bredon tells the story, thought too superficially; but Hart was still living when her book appeared. Through the French minister Hart tried to get the steamer released. The minister was lukewarm; only the admiral could return the steamer—better apply in Paris. Then the drama secretly developed. Hart had caught from M. Patenôtre and Admiral Courbet an extremely slender thread. But it was Ariadne's thread—he seized it silently, instantly, and in a few months he led both China and France out of a labyrinth from which they longed (France no less than China) to be freed—yet within whose intricacies both had become hopelessly lost. To Paris he sent the customs' London secretary, the cautious loyal Campbell, who had much shrewdness of his own and possessed an abounding faith in Hart. Secretly Campbell applied to Monsieur Ferry for the rendition of the insignificant little steamer—and presently he drew from his pocket no less mysteriously some telegrams from his Peking chief—proposing terms for a protocol of peace. Ferry trusted them—he knew the reputation of Sir Robert Hart and the influence he wielded at the Chinese court. Hart was act-

ing with the support of the foreign office. Ferry accepted the terms, but before they were formally signed came a sudden Chinese success in arms at Langson. This threw things once more into confusion; Ferry's ministry fell in a tumult; "France must reinforce, continue the war, and recover her prestige," cried everybody; while the war party in China again grew aggressive and confident. Hart's unsuspected negotiations hung trembling in the balance. There was a brief interval of anxiety, but for him never despair. Presently, he triumphed; the peace protocol was signed. France had receded from her demand for an indemnity, the chief point worth China's fighting; while China dropped her claim—morally just (though shadowy to all practical purposes)—to the suzerainty of Tonking. This one achievement was worth to China many times what Hart and his liberally endowed customs service—had they done nothing else—ever cost her. As a spice of personal revenge on the French minister and admiral for their cavalier pettiness in this *Feihoo* matter—it must have been sweet to the inspector general, while it was free of vindictiveness and did a great service to both countries. The minister knew nothing of what was going on till he was startled by the news that peace had been signed by Mr. Campbell and a French official in Paris!⁴

The year 1885 was one of the most momentous and most glorious of Hart's career. While the French negotiation filled his thoughts, he was startled by a telegram from the foreign office in London tendering him the appointment of British minister. It came from the Liberal Granville cabinet; and when, immediately after, the Conservatives came in into power, the offer was renewed by Lord Salisbury. To the public it seemed inexplicable that the British government should choose as the guardian of its interests a man who had become the exponent of the Chinese view of political questions at Peking. But there are some who declare that

⁴ It is to be regretted that in her attractive book already referred to Miss Bredon should have permitted herself to put an insulting slur upon the memory and the services of Mr. Campbell in her account of this dramatic negotiation. Sir Robert Hart himself would have been the very last to countenance an act of this kind.

the British government's general instructions to its ministers—perhaps from about this time—used to contain for their final injunction the advice,—“When in doubt, consult Sir Robert Hart.”

At first Hart accepted the appointment; it must have seemed to him to promise a fine culmination of his career, the summit of his ambition. But after a few weeks he determined to decline the proffered honor, and to remain as he had so long been, the inspector general or “I. G.”—the head of the imperial customs. Exactly why he chose this course I can only conjecture. He may have foreseen his liability to be forced into an attitude of hostility towards the Chinese government, whom he had so long sympathetically served. Perhaps he apprehended the possible coldness or unfriendliness of the British consuls, whom he would have to direct and on whose assistance he must depend. But I do not believe that these were the reasons which determined his decision. I think he shrunk from abandoning a post for which he knew he was well fitted—from ceasing his efforts to *lead* and help China as her employee and adviser; and further that he could not endure to see the great service which he had so industriously built up out of his own brain, and with such unremitting toil, devotion and hope, fall into hands perhaps less devoted and less capable than his own. At all events the announcement that he had decided to continue to be their inspector general, was welcomed enthusiastically by the customs men everywhere. An address of congratulation was presented to him by the service.

There yet lay before him almost a quarter of a century which Hart was destined still to devote to China. The first great measure to demand his attention was the transference of the collection of the internal revenue tax (or “Likin”) on opium from the native inland collectorates to the foreign customs offices. It was purely an administrative customs business, but the problem was intricate, the revenue at stake amounted to millions, and the change must be made at all places on the same fixed day, close at hand. A single error in the instructions given to the customs offices might entail troublesome complaints from Chinese officials, or

outery and "claims" from opium importers; it might produce irremediable confusion. Here was precisely the kind of operation that the inspector general delighted to undertake. The procedure was complicated; the readjustment radical. Of the opium affected the new customs treatment had to be differentiated according to the precise stage of taxation which each several lot had reached on the crucial day. At the same time a fresh system had to be devised and set in motion, which should be applied in future to all opium arriving. Written instructions—there was barely time to circulate them to the ports before they must be acted on. But like all Hart's directions these were orderly, clear, precise; by telegraph from Peking he dealt no less promptly and clearly with such special difficulties as arose here and there, and in a day the changed system was in calm operation. The new opium Likin scheme was a masterpiece of able administration.

Next followed the Tibetan or Sikkim question, involving negotiations between Peking and the Indian government. These were conducted chiefly by Sir Robert Hart by telegraph, in addition of course to his regular work, which of itself was onerous enough. He now purposed returning to England, and began the necessary preparations. Yet the moment seemed never to come when he could safely leave his post. The Chinese-Japanese war broke out in 1894-95; of course he would not ask leave of absence at such a juncture. Next came the opening of the West River to trade; and after that the strife for concessions among the European legations in Peking became most menacing—the actual partition of China was begun. The coup-d'état of 1898 followed—and Hart was still in Peking, no possibility of leaving China at so critical a time! In this way year followed year, with the faithful inspector general still at his desk striving to save what he could of China's tattered sovereignty, and at all events successfully holding her invaluable revenue service steady and unshaken on its course. Lady Hart with her children had returned from Peking to England in 1882; but how could the inspector general hope to join them while China was in such dire straits?

So far from dropping his task, Hart even took on in 1897 a new enterprise of mammoth proportions—the creation of a postal service to be gradually extended over the entire empire. The foreign office memorialized the throne in advocacy of this proposal; the emperor issued an edict of approval. On Hart's confident and willing—if overburdened—shoulders was laid this immense task. He was made inspector general of posts. Up to this time China had no conception of a national post office functioning everywhere. The Chinese had known hitherto only petty express agencies, private letter-carrying “shops,” operating on a few main routes, for comparatively high charges. Vested interests must be handled tenderly, else popular hostility would be aroused, and the new scheme would instantly forfeit the support of a timid government and of a luke-warm public opinion. At the outset there was to be expected little or no financial aid from the impoverished indemnity-ridden Chinese exchequer. And a staff of postal men must be organized—Chinese and European—and the many novices taught their work. The appropriations devoted to the customs establishments were made to bear the new expenditures—being treated in the accounts as advances to be refunded when the postal service after some years should have become a success, and should have obtained fiscal appropriations of its own. Customs men, customs buildings, customs funds everywhere were most liberally and fully devoted to the new development—in addition to their time honored regular uses. There was no other way. That quality of elasticity to which, as I have said before, Hart had early habituated the service which he had built up, was now subjected to its severest tension. But Hart could generally command a loyalty akin to his own, and he never hesitated to exact obedience. He had always required his foreign employees to study the Chinese language and customs; and besides these the service possessed within its ranks very many native clerks of thorough office training and of no small acquaintance with English. Upon this loyalty and fitness Hart drew copiously. Within a few years the coasting and riverine steamers, and the few railways had become China's contract mail carriers.

From every open port radiated mail routes into the interior, served according to local conditions by boats, by mules, by couriers on foot. Gradually the great interior provinces were covered with a net work of postal routes. The largest offices were placed in charge of such men as had demonstrated most interest, ability, and general fitness for their work. Hart's watchfulness and that of his chief lieutenants at headquarters was never relaxed. At length the central and the provincial governments became full converts and sincere supporters of the national post office, and grants in aid where necessary were made. Today China regards the postal service as no less essential to the life and business of the nation than it is elsewhere over the globe. It is no longer dependent on the mother service, but has its own separate existence. In 1912 there were over 6000 postal establishments, with 127,000 miles of courier connections, and the service dealt with 421,000,000 of postal articles.⁵

How shall one speak adequately of that cruel summer of 1900 when China's so loyal helper was suddenly entrapped, together with the entire Peking foreign community in the onrushing tempest of the Boxer fanaticism? True, Hart foresaw the approach of peril but he misjudged the time of the outburst. He had taken steps to prepare his Peking staff for sending away wives and children as the danger increased, but he was too late! The German minister was murdered. Behold the Boxers within the city gates, sweeping all before them—burning and slaughtering. The little community was at bay fighting for life. Like all others, Hart left his house and his invaluable papers, the offices with their archives of fifty years, and sought refuge in the legation

⁵ It may be taken as probable that Hart's success in creating and more especially in extending the postal service by gradual steps until it covered the empire, led directly to the conviction in his own mind that the sorely needed reorganization, reform and purification of the national land tax might be accomplished in a similar way. And it is not at all unlikely that his published *Land Tax Proposals*, though negatived when they were made, will yet be adopted in principle if and when the present Chinese government feels itself strong enough to grapple with the subject. But it requires almost "the gestation of a thousand years" to produce a man of Hart's experience, devotedness, and energy—fit to achieve so Herculean a task.

area. He took with him only a small roll of blankets, and a few clothes. Strangely enough, he believed that the customs premises would be spared because they belonged to the government! In fact, they were speedily with their contents burned to the ground. At the beginning of the siege Hart had little hope that the foreigners could be saved. To me at Tientsin he sent by a trusty coolie, who took his life in his hand to bring the note, this desperate touching message written in ink on a small scrap of paper; what volumes it speaks!

Legations ordered to leave Peking in 24 hours!!!—R. H.

19 June, 1900. 4 p. m. Good bye!

Pay bearer Tls. 100.—R. H.

Drew,
Customs,
Tientsin.

I need not dwell on the thrilling tale of the eight weeks that followed. For the hard pressed Europeans it is a story of suffering, of horror, of death, of wondrous fortitude, of unflinching tenacity and courage. The world's history affords few examples of equal heroism displayed by women and by men. Sir Robert, then in his sixty-sixth year, was too old to take his place rifle in hand in the muddy trenches or behind the sand bags; but his confidence, his Irish good humor were conspicuous among the besieged; and the spectacle of his serenity, sympathy and helpfulness, as he moved about, fortified both the timorous and the brave. Needless to say, he shared privations and faced dangers on an equal footing with the humblest around him. At the mess table, when horse meat was served for the first time, on being asked how he liked it, he smacked his lips and replied, "Now I have discovered what it was that my cook used to serve for my dinner parties, when I had charged him to spare no pains to get a specially fine piece of mutton!"

During those desperate weeks his thoughts must have striven to forecast the political outcome for China, if the armies of the allied powers should reach Peking and raise

the siege and inaugurate the day of reckoning. What would be the fate of the empire, and what the fate of the great service which he had spent forty tireless years in building up? Would it still be permitted to endure? Could the new postal service hope to be saved from wreck and allowed to continue its growth?

No sooner was the siege over than the inspector general gallantly took up his work. The city—all round about the legations—he found to be naught but bare walls of brick amid heaps of ruins. He did not forget to telegraph to London—to his one and only tailor—for suits of heavy clothes; winter was drawing near. He discovered two vacant rooms in the rear of Mr. Kierulff's shop in the legation quarter; these now became the head office of the inspectorate general! Here I found him at Christmas four months later with a few of the best men in the service by his side—gathering up the tangled threads and restoring the disordered fabric.

Hart's first step when safe once more, was to cast about him for the former head of the Chinese foreign office, Prince Ch'ing, in order to bring China again into official relations with the ministers of the foreign powers. Obviously the main thing to be done was to open negotiations, to arrange preliminary terms of peace, to get the foreign troops called in from the country around Peking, and so spare the afflicted peasantry. Government all over north China had become demoralized and order must replace the threatened chaos. Prince Ch'ing was soon found by Sir Robert and was easily induced to begin peace making. This was a service of incalculable value to the future of China. Hart then wrote that series of seasonable articles which appeared rapidly in various magazines, while public attention was still intent on the Chinese question, pointing out to Europe and to America the causes of the Boxer fury and the consequences to be expected in the future of injustice perpetrated by the great powers against the integrity and the rights of China. These essays, collected and published with the title *These from the Land of Sinim*, still stand as a warning to the leaders of world politics and dollar diplomacy. It is a marvellous instance

of Hart's fidelity to China and devotion to duty, that even after his bitter experience of cruel indifference and ingratitude, he harbored no personal resentment. He took no holiday, no respite for recuperation after the siege. His capacity and inclination for work seemed as unerring and as strong as ever; he soon had the reins in his controlling hands, and the customs and postal services kept on their steady way. It is needless to say that during the lawless autumn of 1900, when looting and loot buying was a fashionable orgy in Peking, Hart with a quiet scorn would have no part in it. He did not even permit himself to walk through the palaces of the Forbidden City, then abandoned by the court and guarded by the troops of the allies.⁶

The empress dowager, on her return to Peking, summoned him to private audience. As he entered the presence chamber she covered her face and expressed her shame and mortification for the treatment he had suffered.

Sir Robert remained at his post more than seven years after the events of 1900. He stayed long enough to behold the beginnings of the changing China. The education reform, the Japanese-Russian war, the miraculous crusade against opium, the pledges of a new constitution with parliaments and a limited monarchy; these great events marked his closing period in China. No wonder it seemed that he could not find the moment when he might leave Peking and go once more to England. He had been "home" but twice since his first arrival in the East in 1854, namely, in 1866 when he was married, and in 1878 when he was special commissioner for China at the Paris Exposition. Lady Hart now came back herself to Peking, in 1906, and induced him to take leave of absence. The state of his health—at last—re-inforced her persuasions. He left China in 1908, and arriving in London entered for the first time the house where had been for twenty years the home of his wife and children.

⁶ In July, 1900, false telegrams from China reported that the besieged inmates of the legations had been overpowered and massacred. These were too widely credited, and a few weeks afterwards Hart—as well as a number of others—had the satisfaction of reading in the *London Times* of July 17 long notices of their own careers with candid criticisms of their deficiencies and their public services!

He was an old man of seventy-three. Many and great honors were now conferred upon him in his own country by cities and universities.

China now witnessed momentous changes; the statesman Chang Chih-tung died, the emperor and the Dowager empress "ascended to be guests on high." A weak regency followed. The regent, to satisfy a foolish revenge, took the fatal step of dismissing China's wisest minister Yuan Shih-kai. Repeated messages from the Peking foreign office appealed to Sir Robert to return to China. His answer was, "Yes, so soon as my health will permit." But, alas, this was not to be. Robert Hart had finished his course, a worn out man at last! Early in the autumn of 1910 he died of pneumonia, in the country near London. He was buried at Bisham Church not far from Marlow. He had not lived to witness the great events of 1911; but the revolution could not have surprised him. Years before he had pointed to the impending fate of the decadent Tsings—the once illustrious House of Kang Hsi and Kien Lung.

Of Sir Robert Hart's personal characteristics there is no time here to speak at length. His daily life was a fixed routine from which it greatly irked him to be diverted. After morning tea with Virgil or Horace as his companion, he devoted an hour to the violin—for he delighted in music. Nine o'clock found him in his office, where he worked standing at his desk—with an old railway rug strapped round him in winter. At ten he received his secretaries, heard their reports and gave directions. This routine being despatched, he settled down to his own tasks alone. In doing business he was stern, brief, exact and exacting. His directions to his staff, short and unmistakable, were issued in writing; and no one ventured to question them unless sure of strong grounds for objection or criticism. Usually the inspector general would be found to be possessed of fuller information and to have thought deeper than the objector, and discomfiture followed. At noon he left his office for a walk in the garden around the house. This was the practice hour for his band—Chinese musicians led by a European. At this time children (of whom he was a merry companion) walked and gossiped with him. After lunch, usually eaten alone,

and a short nap, he was again in his office where he wrote till dark or even later. In the afternoon he did not permit himself to be disturbed. Work over, he walked again, frequently alone, in the garden. After dinner he read, first something serious, philosophy, biography or poetry,—then finishing the evening with a novel. History, strange to say, did not attract him. He was abstemious in a general sense, though he did not refrain entirely from wine or tobacco. He was by no means unsocial, as a member of the Peking community; he made calls, he dined out, and himself gave a dinner party weekly through the winter season, followed by a dance. Nor was he ever too old to share in the quadrille and the lancers. But these evening festivities were confined within those bounds of time which the morrow's work demanded; when eleven o'clock came, the band struck up a staid march—the signal, familiar to every guest, to say "Good night" and go home. His Christmas trees year after year, who that were children in Peking can ever forget them! Such generosity, such an effort (sometimes pathetically mistaken) that each gift should exactly suit the receiver! Each parcel had been selected, done up, and marked by Sir Robert's own hand! But also such a rigid injunction to disperse promptly when the hour struck! Though to many persons Hart's life would seem an inflexible slavery to routine, yet he was one of the most interesting of men. There was nothing in the wide world far or near to which he was indifferent. He was full of imagination, with a deep vein of superstition even. Coincidences, signs, telepathy had the greatest attraction for him, he was always looking out for them and found them everywhere. When the protocol of the treaty with France in 1885 was at last agreed to—a welcome release from a protracted strain of suspense—he telegraphed even from far Peking to Paris, "Don't sign on the first April!"⁷

⁷ An excellent account of Sir Robert Hart's personality, of his relations to the members of the customs service, and of his work, may be found in chapter xvi of Sir Henry Norman's *The Peoples and Politics of the Far East*, Scribner, 1895.

See also chapter on the "Inspectorate of Customs" in H. B. Morse's *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*.

The only institutions of government in China today which have stood firm through the revolution's storm and stress and which seem certain to be permanent, are the two great organizations founded and built up by Robert Hart—the customs, China's one stable source of known revenue, and the postal service, which is spreading new ideas and stimulating popular intelligence throughout the land. These services afford careers to perhaps 20,000 Chinese.

Of late, some of the new leaders among the Chinese have expressed keen resentment because Hart did not train their native fellow countrymen to fill the highest posts in the customs. Rather than display this resentment, these critics might render more useful aid to their country at this crisis by devoting their energies to imitating in other departments of administration the efficient and incorruptible public service which Hart built up. Here is their best field of present reform! Let them imitate the example ready to their hands! It is true that Hart did not train up Chinese to become commissioners of customs at the treaty ports. In the sixties he announced publicly his purpose to do so through the Tung Wen Kwan Colleges at Peking and Canton. That nothing came of this purpose is the fault of the native officials, who degraded those colleges into mere sinecures for permanent, idle (but salaried) "students" so called! Prior to the revolution, there were no cadets to be found of the social standing and birth requisite to make responsible and incorruptible chiefs of the customs offices. Such Chinese young men as chose to come forward did not possess the inherent qualities or the native education to enable them to acquire the prestige necessary for dealing with Chinese official colleagues of the old school, or to exercise due authority over their staffs or among native and foreign merchants at the ports of trade. Besides, the customs service was legally in its nature and origin, a mixed institution, to be conducted under foreigners and in foreign methods. And as with time loans to China were made, the lenders even stipulated that the customs revenues which were pledged as security must be administered according to the existing system and without organic change. In a word Chinese

official ideals of integrity must first be raised, as they will be; and when that time comes, the customs service will require no foreign stiffening.⁸ Sun Yat Sen has taken a juster view of Hart's achievements than some others of his native critics.⁹

The key of Hart's life of patience and loyalty with the Chinese and of his fidelity to duty, was a simple one. To me he wrote in 1867, thinking of slow China, early in his career:

We have not wings, we cannot soar,
But we have feet to scale and climb
By slow degrees, by more and more.
Therefore, learn to labor and *to wait*.

And on the pad on his office desk, Miss Bredon tells us, not long before quitting China he had left these characteristic lines:

If thou hast yesterday thy duty done,
And thereby cleared firm footing for today,
Whatever clouds may dark tomorrow's sun,
Thou shalt not miss thy solitary way!

⁸ Further and plainer language on this topic may be found in Bland's *Recent Events and Present Policies*, p. 209.

⁹ *Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China*, by Dr. James Cantlie, p. 248, Dr. Sun calls Hart "the most trusted as he was the most influential of 'Chinese.'"

A PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF THE CHARACTER OF
THE LATE EMPRESS DOWAGER, TZE-HSI

*By Katharine A. Carl, Painter of the Portrait of the Late
Empress Dowager*

I must first apologize for giving you but a gossipy talk, reminiscent of the dynasty that has passed and not touching upon things of import to China of today. Though the object of this conference, to which Clarke University has convened us, is to bring us to a better knowledge and appreciation of the Chinese, while we thrill at the recital of the struggles of the young republic to make itself worthy, I think all who are interested in China of today, even the ardent young republicans themselves, cannot fail to find some interest, to feel some pride in the great Empress Tze-Hsi who so long presided over the destinies of China, who, Manchu as she was, loving her own and full of the prejudices of her race. I found a patriotic Chinese, really loving and fully conscious of her great responsibilities toward China, deeply imbued with the idea of China's integrity, her right to retain her national entity at all costs and her power to work out her own salvation.

I had the honor of painting her majesty's portraits and of living with her during the eleven months necessary for the work. I was, during this time, brought into the close and quasi-intimate association that generally exists between the painter and his sitter, however august, and I learned to admire the Empress Dowager sincerely. I found her a charming woman ever fascinating and elusive, a perfect hostess, always thoughtful and considerate, a witty conversationalist, a clever painter, a womanly woman full of intelligence and charm; besides admiring in her those qualities of statesmanship, that executive power which the world at large has acknowledged.

Interesting as she was from the artist's standpoint, with her well poised head, her flashing eye, her noble nose, her regal bearing enhanced by imperial vestments and splendid jewels: her character, her vivid personality soon charmed me more than her exterior, and psychologically she was as interesting a study as she was artistically.

As the first question I am invariably asked about my experience in China is "How did you come to paint the Empress Dowager's portrait?" I will leave the interesting personality of my august sitter for the moment, and begin by telling you all I know about this. I visited Peking a few days after my arrival in China and at a dinner my first evening there, a secretary of the French legation in Peking (whom I had known in Paris) from his place at table, some distance from mine, asked me if I was not going "to paint the portrait of the Empress Dowager while I was in Peking." I laughingly replied I was perfectly willing to do so, but feared "willingness" would not carry me far towards its accomplishment, that my ambition at that time had not soared higher than hoping to have the opportunity of *seeing* the great woman! He insisted that being a *woman* and a painter of some little reputation were "qualifications" and that it was not so improbable. He then appealed to Sir Robert Hart asking him if it were not "probable." Sir Robert seemed more annoyed than interested and put a stop to the conversation by saying, "Miss Carl has not come to China to paint anyone's portrait." Later in the evening when I was alone with him, Sir Robert referred to the conversation by saying. "It seems strange Monsieur ——— who has been in China ten years doesn't know Chinese emperors and empresses are never painted from life. After their deaths a more or less imaginary likeness from memory is made of them, but should the Empress Dowager set aside all traditions, as she is capable of doing, it would never be in favor of a foreigner." As he was so earnest about it I laughingly assured him I had no intention of taking Monsieur ——— *au serieux*, that I should not pursue the Empress Dowager into the mysterious fastnesses of the forbidden city and demand to paint her portrait, nor should I even

attack the Foreign Office, backed by my government, and insist on painting her majesty or having an indemnity.

Four months later I was in Chefoo. There I received a letter from Mrs. Conger wife of our then minister to China. She wrote, "There is a question of the Empress Dowager having her portrait painted. Mr. Conger and I are very anxious to have it sent to the St. Louis Exposition. We should like to know, if it should be brought about, if you would be willing to come to Peking and undertake it." I hastened to assure Mrs. Conger not only of my "willingness" but of my great desire to do it. And immediately the memory of my first night in Peking and the dinner conversation recurred to me and I realized, from what Sir Robert had told me, how improbable such a thing was. While feeling duly grateful to Mr. and Mrs. Conger for their interest, I spoke of the letter to no one but my brother and soon put it out of my mind.

Five months later I was in Shanghai when I received a second letter from Mrs. Conger saying she thought the portrait was "imminent," that they expected word from the palace any day as to when it was to be begun. Needless to say I was amazed and overjoyed at the thought of the "impossible" becoming the probable, and in a few days I had the third letter from Mrs. Conger containing a copy of the official message her majesty had sent through the Wai-Wu-Pu to the American legation thus worded, "H. I. M. The Empress Dowager of Great China requests her Excellency Mrs. Conger to present the American artist at the palace on Friday August 5, for the purpose of painting her majesty's portrait."

On arrival in Peking I went to the American legation as guest of our Minister and Mrs. Conger. Soon after my arrival there the Empress Dowager's interpreters came to inquire on the part of her majesty if I had made a comfortable voyage and to hope that I was not too fatigued thereby to begin her majesty's portrait on the day I was to be presented. "The augurs and astrologers had naturally been consulted on so momentous an event as the painting of her majesty's first portrait and had found that the day on which

I was to be presented was a most auspicious day for beginning." I immediately agreed to begin on the "auspicious day," saying I would make a small sketch on that day. I was told her majesty did not wish a "small sketch" but "a very large portrait." I assured them that the small sketch would serve as a basis for as large a portrait as her majesty desired, but I found this could not be done; as, to carry out the instructions of the augurs and astrologers, the final large picture must be begun, if only by a line, on the day chosen! Thus not knowing anything of her majesty, whether she would require a wide or narrow canvas, I stretched one, three by six feet, and on the appointed day Mrs. Conger, her interpreter and myself, with all my paraphernalia, canvas, easel, charcoal and paints set out for the summer palace, sixteen-miles from Peking.

On arrival at the gates a young official from the Wai-Wu-Pu (foreign office) came out to receive us. The foreign office has its own building at the gates of the summer palace as at the winter palace in Peking, for the Empress Dowager unlike European potentates, transacted business of state even when she was in villegiature. This young official, while assisting us to alight, told us her majesty was in a most gracious mood and had decided to give me "two sittings for the portrait" that I was to remain in the summer palace for the night and have a sitting the next day! Had I been able to begin by a preparatory small canvas, these two sittings would have delighted me, but two sittings for a canvas three feet by six was not encouraging! However, though I knew two sittings would be almost useless on such a canvas, I enjoyed the thought of being able to see the Great Empress and study her two days in succession.

The palace eunuchs awaited us in the court of the foreign office with the red palace chairs. We were soon seated in them and lifted from the ground and borne swiftly by the eunuch bearers through the outer gates of the palace, past beautiful yellow roofed buildings through wonderful flower-filled courts until we finally reached the largest of these last on the banks of the lake. Tall flag staffs painted in blue and white with the imperial pennants waving in the breeze, flanked

a white marble-stepped landing place. Growing shrubs and fragrant flowers filled this court, over which was stretched a silken awning. On the side opposite the lake, in front of a great yellow-tiled building with its roof's upturned corners supported by vermilion columns, our chairs were set down—the great plate glass doors, emblazoned with her majesty's favorite character in vermilion and gold, were thrown open and we entered the throne room.

A group of ladies stood waiting to receive us. The young Empress (wife of the Emperor) surrounded by the princesses of the blood and her majesty's interpreters (one German and three English and French). Neither the Empress Dowager nor the Emperor were present. The English and French interpreters were the Lady Yu Keng and her daughters; Yu Keng, a Manchu had been minister to France and there the daughters had learned French. While Lady Yu Keng spoke English. I was talking with them when I noticed a lull, and on looking around saw a young and charming looking person, who was so different from my preconceived idea of the Empress Dowager that I asked who it was. "Her majesty." She entered, followed by the Emperor, who looked young and shy. Mrs. Conger first paid her respects and immediately the Empress Dowager asked "Where is the artist," and I was brought up and began to make a reverence which she stopped by holding out her hands and saying "Ceremony is waived between artists," referring to herself as an artist which she was. After enquiring if I did not feel too tired to begin at the appointed time she withdrew to prepare herself for the sitting—as she had received us in quite simple dress. She soon returned clothed in all the splendour of her imperial attire, her hair dressed in Manchu fashion and bedecked with brilliant flowers and curious jewels, her face bright and animated, she was truly an interesting subject for an artist. She asked if there was any change I should like made in the disposition of the furniture and when I suggested that the Dragon Throne be moved nearer the great plate-glass doors (the only place where the light was good enough to work) the princesses and eunuchs looked as if the ceiling should fall upon my unworthy

head for such a suggestion but her majesty immediately ordered the throne moved, and when it was in place and my easel set up in front of it, she mounted the dais and said the hour for beginning was soon to sound and before she had finished speaking the eighty-six clocks in this throne-room began to strike the auspicious hour! Her majesty fixed her wonderful, penetrating eyes upon me and held up her hand for me to begin—and there I stood with the princesses in a row behind me and behind them a crowd of palace eunuchs, all watching me! I simply could not raise the charcoal to the canvas for a few seconds. I was ignominiously afraid; but I soon got some mastery over myself and began. It seemed to me I had drawn but a few moments when her majesty held up her hand and said the sitting was over. Aided by the princesses and eunuchs she descended from the dais and came to look at the portrait. I too looked at it; now with eyes that saw, and I realized how far I had fallen short of what I should have done. After looking at it for some time, though I am sure as fully conscious as myself of its shortcomings, she pronounced herself as satisfied with the beginning; and then turning to me said, “How would you like to stop in the palace and paint this at your leisure and my convenience?” I hastened to accept this most unexpected invitation and thus began my eleven months in the different palaces of the Empress Dowager, and my delightful experiences as a member of her household; not quite as a member of her household, for though I had a day domicile within the precincts, she installed me in the palace of the Emperor’s father near the summer palace. My domicile had beautiful grounds, numerous pavilions, lakes, summer houses and its own theater, she gave me a retinue of servants (three hundred, I learned later) also carts, horses, outriders: in short, entertained me in quite royal fashion.

What most impressed me at first in the Empress Dowager was her extreme simplicity. I had always thought of her as the central figure in a continuous pageant, as never laying aside formality, as always rigid in the traditions of her old and conservative court; and I found her simple, womanly, and human in the best sense, interested in all that surrounded

her, in nature, in people and in art. Her passion for flowers was extraordinary, and her dogs were great favorites, and she loved to amuse herself with them in her leisure moments. She was an early riser, and as all Chinese court functions are held before mid-day, she was early to bed as well. She rose at half past five and had her tea, then the young Empress and the ladies came and assisted at her levée. On entering her bedroom they knelt and said together the usual greeting, "Lao-tze-tseng chee-siang." "May the Holy mother be happy," and unless they were dismissed, all remained during her morning toilette which was the most elaborate of the day, as she dressed then for the audience or for any ceremony there happened to be. After the toilette was completed the Emperor came in and paid his respects. Then the two, in their imperial robes of state, went to the audience chamber followed by a large retinue of their respective attendants.

The audience hall was in another building, for the Chinese palaces, instead of being one great building as in Europe, consist of a number of pavilions divided by courts and connected by covered archways. The Emperor had his own pavilion and his own throne room quite apart from the Empress Dowager's in all the imperial palaces. The audience hall was in common. There they held their joint audiences. On their approach to the audience hall a band of Chinese musicians dressed in gala robes of red played a minor air on their curious instruments in the rhythm of a Gregorian chant. I called this the imperial hymn for it was always played when their majesties passed for a ceremony or to hold audience! The government in China under the Empress Dowager and the old régime was a complicated affair. Every Province had its own and every city a number of boards, and the heads of all these departments reported to their majesties' grand council at Peking several times a year, and their majesties received the members of the council or some officials everyday in audience. Audiences were held whether at the summer, sea, or winter palaces. I was, of course, never present in the hall while audience was being held. During the audience the young Empress and

the Princesses and ladies who had accompanied the Empress Dowager to the door, sat outside on the verandah, smoked cigarettes, and gossiped, and I sometimes made one of that frivolous throng. After the audience their majesties took their respective ways followed by their respective suites to their own quarters. On arrival in her throne room the Empress Dowager had her robes of state removed, her imperial head dress with its flowers and jewels was taken off and she was then clothed in a simple gown and her hair arranged quite simply, close to her head with a single flower or one jewelled ornament. After this she sat down to rest and talk with the ladies. Then she would pose an hour for her portrait. I painted the first portrait in her throne room where she sat when her meals were served and out of which opened her bedroom and boudoir. During these sittings for the portrait she would sip tea from time to time or eat candied fruits, and now and then smoke cigarettes held in a jewelled mouthpiece. After an hour's sitting she would tire and say we must rest and when I protested I was not tired and could easily go on for an hour she would insist that if she were tired sitting, doing nothing, I must be, standing and working, that if she needed rest, I did also. Thus for the first three months I was not allowed to work except when she could sit, as the Throne room where I had to paint was her sitting room. When the sitting was finished the eunuchs removed the "holy picture" as the portrait was called; my brushes and palette were taken away to be cleaned, my easel removed and the throne room resumed its usual aspect, save for the throne which kept the place near the door where I had asked to have it moved that first day, and the great yellow covered box which had been made, at the Empress Dowager's order, to hold my brushes, palette, oils, etc.

After the sitting the Empress Dowager sometimes took a walk before ordering the luncheon or "early rice." For this, a long table was set with its one cover at the end for her majesty, for she took it alone. The table was loaded with yellow dishes, filled with the different meats, fish, soups and vegetables, and covered with curiously chased pyramidal

silver covers which were removed by an army of eunuchs when her majesty took her seat at the head. The meal, though the table was so bountifully set, was soon finished, for though she had a normal appetite the Empress Dowager was not a great eater. After the meal her golden rince-bouche was brought, then a great silver basin with silken towels when she washed her hands.

After luncheon she took her siesta and was read to, when that was over there was a promenade through the grounds accompanied by the eunuchs bearing chairs, so that, if fatigued her majesty and the ladies could be carried over the rest of the ground. Sometimes she would be rowed on the lake in the imperial barge for the afternoon exercise. There was quite a fleet on the lake when she elected to go in her barge. This, with her throne chair covered with yellow, in the center of the raised platform, was drawn by two other boats of twenty-four standing rowers! The army of eunuchs who always accompanied the Empress Dowager and Emperor on their walks or when they went on the lake, stood in six or seven other boats which followed the imperial barge. She sat in her throne chair, the ladies sitting or reclining on cushions on the platform of the barge. When the Emperor elected to accompany her majesty, which he often did, he sat quite simply at her left on a cushion with no more ceremony than was accorded the ladies, the only difference being that his cushion was yellow, while the ladies had red ones. His and the Empress Dowager's chief eunuchs stood behind them on the barge. These often served tea or sweets while we were gliding over the waters of the lake. We sometimes landed at one of the landing places far from the throne room court, and the chairs met us and we were carried back. Sometimes the barge would be brought to the imperial landing place flanked by the great painted columns bearing the imperial pennants, and we would disembark in front of the throne room. On our return from the promenade Wahn Fahn or late rice was served in her majesty's throne room. This, the dinner, was no more elaborate than luncheon. It could not be! There was the same long table laden with the yellow porcelain silver-covered dishes, filled with the

same rare and tempting food. Bird's nest soup, shark's fins, preserved eggs, white shrimps, boneless capons and ducks, bamboo shoots, salads and all the wonderful dishes that make the Chinese menu the most recherché and elaborate in the world. It seemed a strange anomaly to call these repasts, worthy of Lucullus, by such simple names as early and late rice!

After dinner (rarely later than six o'clock) when her majesty made the sign, I bade her good-night and, accompanied by the Ladies Yu Keng and the eunuchs set aside for our service while in the palace, we were carried in our chairs to the outer gates, thence to our palace in our own carts and chairs.

The Empress Dowager was a great purist as to language. She had a fine musical ear and detected at once and deplored any misuse of words or misplacing of the tonic accent, so important in speaking Chinese. It was a beautiful language as spoken by her, with her silvery voice and clear intonation. She bemoaned the fact of so many dialects being spoken in China. Even Mandarin (official) Chinese is marred by the many and varied accents of the different provinces; some of which were very trying to the ears of the Empress Dowager. She longed to have one language for China, spoken as well as written, and she would have welcomed with delight the reform the Republic is instituting, in the unification of spoken Chinese.

Thinking my stay in the palace would be short I decided I would not try to learn Chinese as there were three good interpreters always ready to translate. The Empress Dowager, probably dreading another shock to her sensitive ear, did not encourage my learning. She said the foreigners studied it for a lifetime and then rarely spoke it well and it would be better if I tried Manchu as that was more analogous to a European language as it has an alphabet. But after I had learned a few phrases of greeting in Chinese with an accent not too offensive she thought I might try to learn it and asked if the foreigners had not some simple books for beginners, I got two. One compiled by the missionaries for the use of novices for household needs; naturally

expressed in anything but court-language, this was the first I gave her majesty to look at, she turned the first few pages slowly and then more and more quickly, and finally hurled it from her saying, "It was impossible, I mustn't touch it." Then she looked at Giles' book for beginners in Chinese and though this did not meet her approval she decided I might study that, but said the young Empress would teach me to "speak properly." My efforts were a source of amusement to the princesses and even the eunuchs, and the ladies did not hesitate to burst into merry peals of laughter at my mistakes; all but the graciously-sweet young Empress. Even the Empress Dowager would sometimes share the general hilarity, for her sense of humor was strong, but she would soon check herself and the others by saying Chinese was so difficult that very few of the princesses spoke it properly as I would see when I learned more!

So simple is the construction of spoken Chinese I soon learned enough to understand what was said to me. When the Empress Dowager spoke it was so slowly and clearly her words being supplemented by eloquent gesture, I soon understood all she said. I have already alluded to her great love of flowers and this was not confined only to flowers, but to plants and the bettering of certain species. This was the same with her dogs, she was very careful about their breeding.

When her eyes were stronger she had embroidered a great deal, she drew and painted and was a famous writer of the great characters. She did not disdain to interest herself in humbler duties, and she overlooked the smallest details of the imperial household. One day when she expected to receive some ladies of the legation and the throne room had been arranged for their reception, and her majesty and the princesses were already assembled, she, like some careful New England housewife, looking around to see that all was "proper" noticed some dust upon a piece of furniture and promptly ordered a silken cloth brought to her, with which she herself proceeded to dust, not only that piece but several others saying, "the best way to have a thing done well is to do it oneself!" No one despises labor in China. There it has a dignity of its own.

Agriculture, one of the most important features of Chinese industry, has its own temple where the Emperor himself officiates. In the early spring of every year his celestial majesty himself plowed the first furrow of the year! It was one of the great court ceremonies! The plough drawn by an ox kept in the palace grounds whose toil of the year was confined to this imperial furrow, with the Emperor dressed in his robes of state between the handles of the plough guiding it with all seriousness and seeing that the furrow was straight and properly deep. The imperial princes and highest officials of China clothed in their official robes following his majesty's footsteps! And I can say I never saw the Emperor more interested than the day I accidentally saw this ceremony, which takes place in the palace park the day before the public ploughing in the grounds of the temple of agriculture! This ploughing by the Emperor was to show the agriculturists of China the nobility of their work, great enough for the Son of Heaven himself to perform! The manufacture of silk, the rearing of the cocoons is another great industry of China, and the title of Guardian of the Cocoons was a coveted honor, bestowed only upon the princesses of the imperial clan. Singing and dancing which we indulge in for our own amusement is relegated in China, to a class who do nothing else. The Empress Dowager having received a new grand piano while I was in the palace had me and the Misses Yu Keng try it for her one day, and when I played a waltz she asked to see it danced. When the Misses Yu Keng danced it and she found it was a regular practice among the Europeans, to do their own dancing she wondered why they couldn't get dancers to do it for them!

Music is a part of most of the great ceremonies in China, and they enjoy the singing of actresses and musicians, but well bred people consider it undignified to sing, however, musical they may be. One glorious afternoon when we were out in the barge, drawn by the two boats of rowers, over the lake, all abloom with gorgeous pink lotus, past beautiful bridges and the quaintly carved marble quays, the radiance of the setting sun glinting with added gold the upturned yellow roofs on the shore, the Empress Dowager

sat drinking in the beauty of the scene; and then, to the soft accompaniment of the rippling water and the swish of the oars against the lotus leaves, she began to sing, in a low, but perfectly placed voice, a soft minor song so charmingly and with such artistic grace, I could not help murmuring "beautiful" in Chinese, she started and said, "I forgot myself. It is most unbecoming for an Empress of China to sing," and placing her hand upon my hair with one of her graceful half-caressing gestures she continued. "*Never* mention my singing to any one, if the Shanghai papers knew it there would be a pretty row."

Eight months later we were again at the summer palace. One lovely evening in the late spring, again floating in the imperial barge on the lake—I was sitting near the empress Dowager as before, and I dared ask her to sing again, and she did! the same sweet minor song, like some sweet crooning lullaby! It was charming.

The too generally accepted idea that the Empress Dowager was of mean origin is now, thanks to the larger knowledge we have of things Chinese, quite exploded. She was descended in direct line from Nur-ha-chu the great warrior prince, whose splendid strategic feats led to the conquest of China and the founding of the Manchu dynasty. There were three other Empresses Dowager in her family. Her cousin was the first wife of Hsien-Fong of whom the late Empress Dowager became the fifth wife. She belonged to the powerful White banner clan.

When I was in the palace I heard of an old Manchu prophecy dating from the conquest of China, that when "one of the White banner-clan attained to imperial power in China it would be the end dynasty." Strange to say the late Empress Dowager, the first of the White banner to wield imperial power, *was* virtually the last of the dynasty! I have often thought of this prophecy during the past year.

As I have said before, the Empress Dowager seemed to me really a Chinese patriot, she loved China as did few of the Chinese themselves, with a real devotion. I used to say when I was in the palace, before Chinese patriotism had been fully awakened, that she was the only Chinese patriot

I had met! She believed in China, she cherished the noble deeds of the rulers of all its other dynasties, she gloried in China's accomplishments in the past, she longed to bring back its brilliant epochs. She was profoundly discouraged at her powerlessness to check the inroads of the foreigners, at her inability to infuse new life and greater effort into the Manchus. She hoped by inaugurating a representative government to increase China's power, to put new life into the governing element, to check the gangrene of official greed which was sapping the life of the government.

Though she would have fought to the last to retain her power and assure the supremacy of her clan for the future, I believe, had she lived to see this pacific revolution, the noble generosity of the republicans to the imperial family, the more than justice they have shown the Manchus in general; if she could have felt, as I firmly believe her broad mind and real patriotism was capable of feeling, that the republic, brought about by this extraordinary revolution was what China needed to shake her from her long lethargy; I think the Empress Dowager would have accepted it as a happy solution of the great problem of keeping China's entity intact, and establishing a nation united and strong.

However, *I* cannot but rejoice that she was borne aloft in the Dragon chariot before the revolution was accomplished!

THE MANCHU CONQUEST OF CHINA

By F. W. Williams, Assistant Professor of Modern Oriental History, Yale University

The expulsion of the Tartar dynasty which ruled China for two centuries and a half has excited the sympathetic approval of the civilized world. That dynasty had been tried in the balance and found wanting; under its rule the largest and potentially the richest homogenous empire in the world had been reduced to impotence by foreign powers, its resources neglected, its people mistreated. A summary of their shortcomings does not, however, set forth the meaning of the Manchu conquest of China, or explain the remarkable nature of their achievement. To estimate their place in history fairly it is necessary to review the course of that conquest and consider its effect upon the welfare of the people whom the Manchus inadvertently rescued from a condition bordering upon anarchy. A brief account of the conquest and settlement of this northern race is all that this paper contemplates. The expansion of China under their rule, and the revived prestige of a mighty nation acquired from the exercise of a higher sense of racial control than the Chinese themselves were capable of, are subjects belonging to another chapter of this story. The decadence of the Manchus—apparently an inevitable result of their contact with a higher culture—should not blind us to the extraordinary success of their great performance.

Nurhachu, the founder of the high fortune of this clan, was born in 1559 in Hutuala, the capital of a small principality among the Great White Mountains, north of the Korean border. Here his ancestors of the Aisin Gioro (Golden Dynasty) had ruled for two centuries from the time of their founders, one of the "Kings" of the Nüjen Tartars. The relationship of these peoples to the Kin and other Tartar conquerors of northern China in the Sung

period is somewhat obscure, but they belong to the same race that had been driven from China by the Mongols in the thirteenth century and relapsed more or less into barbarism in the wooded mountains between the Yalu and Sungari Rivers. China under the Mings had been fairly successful in holding them to the east of the Liao Valley while protecting her own settlers in Laiotung by garrisons in a line of border fortresses, but this fertile region was often harassed by bands of Tartar robbers. It was in pursuance of the characteristic policy of setting these predatory gangs upon one another that the empire finally engendered the genius of one of the great fighting chiefs of Asiatic history and ultimately brought about its conquest by his successors.

A khan of one of these tiny septs secured the help of the Chinese frontier guard in laying siege to a town ruled by a man who had married the granddaughter of Hüen, chieftain of Hutuala, Nurhachu's grandfather. The old man hastened with his son and heir to assist the princess, but being decoyed outside of the walls by a ruse of the Chinese captain, both were slain together with most of the garrison. Nurhachu thus became the head of his house at the age of twenty-four. The Chinese officer appears to have exceeded his instructions by embroiling the Bai, or Imperial Frontier Count, in the murder of these clansmen, and Nurhachu received the bodies of his father and grandsire as well as presents of considerable value, together with investiture in his chieftainship and the title of *Tu tuh*—the same as that now given to the military governors of the provinces. Instead, however, of surrendering the murderer of his father the Chinese made him lord of all the Manchu clans, which placed the young chief in a position of extreme danger and caused him to devote his energies to attacking his enemy and revenging himself upon the treacherous Chinese. Three years later, by drilling and improving his forces, he had so strengthened his position that the Chinese thought it wise to deliver up his enemy Nikan for execution, and to make a treaty that opened better trading facilities to his people. Next year, in 1587, he built Laocheng

a few miles from his ancestral capital, with a palace and court after the Chinese manner, and governed so wisely as to bring the five Manchu clans in a few years to recognize him as king.

From this time to the end of his reign his career was one long succession of raids and conflicts brought about by the jealousy of his neighbors and his own determination to create an army that might become an instrument of his vengeance upon the Chinese. As a fighting chieftain he developed all those traits of *élan*, endurance and personal bravery that are common enough in history to excite no special surprise. He had the qualities of a Sivaji or a Skanderbeg, and these alone are sufficient to account for his ultimate conquest of people of his own kind in the vast wilderness between the Pacific, the Amur and the Mongolian steppe, roughly half a million square miles. What arrests attention, however, is the extraordinary capacity revealed in this Berserker fighter for the administration of his conquests and the assimilation of the sundry tribes within the region. The prestige of his victories attracted the soldiers of conquered tribes, who learned under a severe but generous leader the advantages of discipline and union. By 1606 he had even aroused the admiration of the Mongols beyond the Lao, whose Beiras sent him a complimentary embassy. Ten years later he had assumed the style of *Tienming* in his new capital at Hingking, and ruled his domain with the panoply and circumstance of a Chinese emperor. The assumption of this state was inevitably regarded as a challenge by the Chinese, whose policy it had always been to prevent the border tribes from uniting, and to recognize no titles among them that were not bestowed by the Ming suzerain. But Nurhachu revealed in his daring plans the political genius which has been a characteristic of his race in all ages, and which European observers have too often ignored. That race under various names has impressed us with its fighting powers, its endurance and its brutality; we have not recognized, however, its ability to assimilate and control its conquered subjects by methods which, barbarous and imperfect as they may some-

times appear, have, during the period of the Christian era wrenched the government of every civilized Asiatic state from its own people and governed them on the whole with advantage. As Parthians, Mamluks, Mongols, Seljuk and Ottoman Turks, to leave the lesser breeds unnamed, the distant congeners of the Manchus have not only invaded but repeatedly controlled all the civilized nations of the continent. The history of China cannot be properly understood unless due notice is taken of the impact of her northern neighbors from the period of the great Ch'in to recent times, nor can we afford to neglect the fact that her own great dynasties and governing element have come from those northern provinces which are chiefly peopled by descendants of a Tartar-Chinese intermixture.

Nurhachu, though he never entered China, stands as an exponent of the highest qualities of his race, a creative genius not only in strategy but in politics, the founder of a great tradition capably maintained for two centuries by his descendants, the establisher of a line of monarchs which have been surpassed by no other ruling house during an equal period in China.

The Chinese had reason for serious apprehension if Nurhachu succeeded in his purpose of reducing all the Tartar clans to his way. He had left them in no doubt as to his intention, when this was accomplished, of driving them behind the Great Wall, and in 1617 he published an open defiance to them by drawing up and burning with sacrificial ceremonies a document known as the "Seven Hates," including amongst the charges their murder of his parents, their interference with Manchu autonomy, their assistance rendered to his enemies, their assassination of an envoy and harassing of his farmers—"for all of which," he concludes, "I hate you with an intense hatred and now make war against you." They took him at his word, for while engaged, in 1619, in a war with the last of the Nüjen states that continued to resist him, a Chinese army of 200,000 was assembled at Mukden and marched in four divisions against the little state of Hingking. With only 60,000 men he proceeded, by the same tactics that Napoleon employed,

to attack each of these divisions with his whole force before assistance could be got from the others. The result of the five days' battle, known as that of Sahu, was a complete and extraordinary victory for the Manchus and the annihilation of the Chinese army, with a loss of 45,000 men slain on the field. Yet, though his success secured for him unquestioned authority over the Nüjen tribes that had held out against him, the Chinese troops soon recovered their *morale* under an able general, who fortified the towns of Liaotung so successfully that for two years Nurhachu did not venture to attack him. The bravery of the Chinese is noticeable throughout these campaigns. What defeated them ultimately was the removal of energetic generals and the unconscionable turpitude of the eunuch control under which the Peking government had fallen. In 1621 Mukden and Liaoyang with seventy walled cities were captured and the Manchus for the first time established in control of the whole territory which foreigners have ever since called by their name. The Chinese never gave up the contest, but they were badly led by dull and cowardly generals sent by the palace politicians. Nevertheless the resistance was always determined. They lost the country west of the Liao down to the Great Wall, but regained most of it within four years under a competent leader called Sun Chengtsung, who fortified Shanhai kwan and Ningyuen. It was in 1625, during this period when his military advance was checked, that Nurhachu removed his palace from Liaoyang to Mukden—his sixth capital—and built the imperial headquarters which the dynasty has ever since regarded as its home. The transfer of the administration from the original tribal valley to this thickly settled Chinese plain was attended by a fuller adjustment of his government to the Chinese system and by an imitation of Ming ceremonial at his court. It was as natural for the princes to be educated in Chinese letters as it was for the Frankish princes to write Latin. Chinese culture was the only culture known to their world, and it was impossible for a sovereign in eastern Asia to set up his rule upon any other model or to hope for acceptance by civilized subjects unless he adopted their

institutions. The Mongols had done so, and before the Mongols every northern conqueror in China since China began to be.

But what the Mongols learned of Chinese methods during a half century of conflict, the Manchu acquired in pursuing Nurhachu's sensible policy of providing several millions of Chinese settlers in the Liao Valley with the government to which they were accustomed, and habituating their own clansmen to the language and order of a finer culture than their own. It was this policy and their consistent recognition of a superior system that enabled the Manchus to retain their hold upon China after they had effected their conquest. The conquest itself, it will be observed, was a long struggle carried on chiefly through the agency of Chinese against Chinese until the country was too exhausted to offer further resistance to the forces that stood for order. At no time did the conquerors show superior generalship or valor; in numbers their own fighting men were always vastly inferior to the Chinese; in intellectual power they were never their equals. Yet they succeeded through sheer force of character, as the Ottomans have succeeded during a much longer period in western Asia, in dominating a people that were superior to them in every important quality except that of leadership.

Nurhachu met his first and only serious check in attempting the capture of Ningyuen, which was defended by a good general and by cannon cast by Jesuit missionaries. He died soon after this, in September, 1626, and was buried in the great tomb outside of Mukden, which is still shown to travelers. In accordance with Chinese custom his personal name had been replaced by the reign title of *Tien-ming* in 1616, when he assumed the dignity of emperor. After the accession of his grandson to the throne in Peking he was given the title of Taitsu, or Great Ancestor, by which he is known in imperial histories.

His successor, a fourth son known as Taitsung, appears to have been loyally supported by numerous brothers in taking up the arduous work of carving out a kingdom and pressing down upon China. The defense of the lower Liao

was, however, maintained with much persistence by the Chinese, despite the corruption and divided councils of the Ming government, that his way to the capital remained closed, owing chiefly to the obstinate resistance of the two strong fortresses of Ningyuen and Shanhai kwan. While he cannot be granted the supreme place in the fortunes of his family that belongs to Nurhachu, the task bequeathed to him of advancing those fortunes beyond the ancestral domain was hardly less difficult than that of winning its independence. His first achievement, the conquest of northern Korea, whose loyalty to the Ming suzerain necessitated its punishment to secure his southern frontier, was completed in 1627. His other neighbors, the Mongols, presented a far more serious problem, but within ten years, between 1626 and 1636, by a series of expeditions and negotiations, he had succeeded in practically incorporating Kortsin into his own domain and obtaining the suzerainty and tribute of all inner Mongolia. Besides the obvious strategic necessity of thus solidifying his own boundaries the control of Mongolia permitted him to raid the whole northern tier of Chinese provinces across that vast border which has ever been a source of their apprehension since the beginning of recorded history. A great excursion in force was made in 1629 to the city of Peking itself, where the terrified court was besieged for some weeks and the country around laid waste, but the Chinese general with his army brought down from Shanhai kwan was able to prevent an assault and the capital was saved.

Taitsung died at the age of fifty-two in September, 1643, and was succeeded by his ninth son, a child of five, while the control of the Manchu dynasty passed into the hands of the boy's uncle Dorgun. It was a critical moment in the career of that dynasty, for dissension amongst the many able and aspiring sons of Nurhachu would have involved its ruin had a struggle amongst them for the succession begun. By continuing the line in accordance with prescribed Chinese custom, in the person of a heir of the next generation, the internal peace of the warlike band was preserved while their activity found ample scope in the sudden

and enormous expansion of their emprise in the conquest of China.

Meanwhile the internal condition of the Chinese empire had become desperate under a long series of famines and rebellions which had utterly paralyzed its economic resources and brought about a general anarchy. It is impossible to decide whether under such loosely organized agencies as that of China the general prevalence of distress is a cause or a consequence of political disturbance. When thickly populous agricultural communities are reduced to starvation the people will inevitably break up into robber bands and prey upon each other to the confusion of all civil administration. No government can reduce the disorder unless provisions can be obtained to satisfy the needs of those made desperate by want; but a bad government may by its inefficiency aggravate the starving people and succumb to the forces of disruption thus let loose. It is notable that in the history of China no great upheaval has occurred without its concomitant of famine. In the third decade of the seventeenth century the northern provinces were visited by an unusually severe drought which was so badly met by venal officials that multitudes took to the mountains and attacked the roads and villages. In addition to these natural causes weakening authority in an imperfectly articulated domain, increased taxation and recurring levies of troops to meet the Manchus began in 1621 to arouse angry opposition in the western provinces. Revolts broke out which were painfully and only partly subdued. By 1631 the robber bands throughout all the inland provinces had swelled to great armies under redoubtable captains, whose successes encouraged the able-bodied to enlist under their banners and live upon the spoil of captured cities. At the end of another decade Li Tsu-cheng, a Shansi leader, after many vicissitudes, had become the greatest of them all, and with an army composed of nearly a million needy adventurers he was swarming, in 1641, over the famine-stricken province of Honan toward Peking. Despite the impotence of the imperial government in this score of years of carnage it is remarkable that the various rebel armies

met with obstinate resistance in many cities. There was no systematic opposition, yet owing to the indomitable spirit in defending their own which characterizes the Chinese people, as well as to the lack of organization among the rebels, the agony was long continued. The contrast between the Chinese rebel Li and the Manchu Nurhachu is suggestive as typical of the differing genius of the two races. It has often been said that the Chinese were conquered because they were unwarlike. They showed, on the contrary, a persistent fighting eagerness both before and after the Manchu irruption that ranks them among the martial people of the world. They failed both in rebellion and in defense because they could produce no leader capable of consolidating and fixing an orderly system of control. The Manchus succeeded, though they had to borrow and adapt the system of their enemy, because they know how to make themselves obeyed.

Peking was surrounded by the rebel host in February, 1644, and fell through sheer cowardice on the part of its defenders, lost to all sense of loyalty and shame through generations of eunuch control. The last of the Ming emperors, incapable to the end of any resolute action, committed suicide as the rebels poured over the deserted walls, and the city and palace—perhaps the richest storehouse of valuables at that time in the world—was given over to slaughter and pillage. Li put on the imperial yellow and reigned for one day in the palace, when he was called away to the north by a sudden and unexpected danger. Wu San-kwei, the ablest Chinese general that the herculean struggle against the Tartars had produced, preferring a Manchu *Hwangti* to a rebel upstart, called upon Dorgun to join him in avenging his dead sovereign. The Manchu army was hurried down to Shanhai kwan, Wu and his army were constrained to shave the forehead and adopt the Tartar queue, and preparations made for an advance upon the capital. But Li, who knew the value of keeping the aggressive, was upon them with his great host ere their forces had left the Wall. His defeat in the terrific battle that ensued before Shanhai kwan was due, it would appear, to

his carelessness in scouting, for, unaware of the Manchus drawn up among the hills on his flank, the rebels were disconcerted by their sudden advance just as they were wearing out Wu's troops by mere weight of numbers. Their route was followed up by Wu, while Dorgun and his soldiers hurried on to the dismantled capital. He placed his nephew the Emperor Shunchih upon the Dragon Throne, removing the seat of his government from Mukden as soon as the devastation of the rebel Li could be repaired.

But possession of the capital was far from giving the new dynasty control of the empire. China continued for nearly a score of years in armed revolt against her foreign conquerors, whose unity and steadfast policy, rather than any proficiency in arms, at length brought them victory. At the outset of this obstinate struggle the odds were enormously against them. The resources of the natives in men and materials were greatly superior to their own; their base, the Yellow River basin and the Great Plain, had been ravaged by years of famine and rebellion from which the southern provinces had suffered but little; loyalty to the Ming dynasty, despite its abuses, still inspired the educated class everywhere; and finally, the elements of disorder long since set loose under the robber rebellion gave free vent to that centrifugal tendency within the vast empire which has ever disposed its various provinces to fall apart, when opportunities offered, into separate governments under local adventurers. Had the fallen dynasty produced one resolute master of men capable of choosing and controlling his ministers it could at least have held the land south of the Yangtse and divided China into two kingdoms as in the days of the Sung. But China seemed to be impotent in begetting a single administrator worthy of the name; she fell at last under the domination of an inferior race because the genius of her people was unable to meet the first requirement of a true national life. Whether this failure was due to deterioration of moral fiber, the result of a civilization grown too old to revive, the future alone will show.

The Manchu regent found his first great work at hand in setting up the machinery of government in Peking and

restoring order in two of the "home provinces," Shansi and Honan; the other, Shantung, dispersed Li's rebel officials but remained for some time loyal to the Ming claimant. Li Tsu-cheng himself had to be pursued by Wu San-kwei and defeated in eight great battles during eighteen months before he ended his own life, a discredited fugitive in Hupeh. Dorgun very shrewdly proclaimed amnesty to all who would acknowledge his authority, and their old titles and emoluments to members of the old imperial household, even restoring the Ming tombs west of Peking and sacrificing to the manes of their former emperors. Many accepted his terms, but the family was large and produced a succession of futile aspirants to the throne—names to conjure with amongst a proud and loyal people, but all alike cowardly and trivial, unworthy even of sympathy in the disasters which infallibly crowned their recalcitrance. Five of these deserve mention for the trouble they created. A grandson of the famous old Emperor Wanli, known by his title of Fu Wang, was promptly recognized as emperor in the Yangtse and coast provinces, and established in Nanking, the original capital of his dynasty. A victim of the weakness which marked all the degenerates of that dynasty, he gave his days to dancing girls and the business of restoring its fortune to one Ma Shu-ying, perhaps the most rapacious and unprincipled monster of these distressful times, ignoring the advice and devotion of his minister Shu Ko-fa, a noble contrast to the favorite. Shantung, deserted by Ming incompetency, was promptly subdued, and Nanking capitulated after the flight and surrender of the pretender. About the same time another army conquered Hupeh province, and Manchu supremacy obtained throughout the country north of the Yangtse. Had it not involved the compulsory change of head-dress to the plaited queue, that supremacy might have been supported with less contumacy on the part of the Chinese. The ordinance was enforced with vigor, presumably because the Manchus found it necessary amid frequent defections to insist upon some visible sign of submission among the natives, but the imposition of such a test upon a vain and self-sufficient people like the

Chinese reveals their incapacity to understand the mind of a more subtle race when its *amour propre* is concerned.

The second pretender, called the Tang Wang, once a Ming prince of Nanyang, found temporary support in Kiangsi and Fuhkien, but it melted away through the perfidy and incompetence of his generals. His brother Yü Ngao established the imperial pageant in Canton after his destruction in December, 1646, but the city was soon captured by a surprise and he killed himself in the presence of the Chinese traitor who made him prisoner. A fourth Ming, known as the Lu Wang, had ere this set up as an opposition emperor in Chehkiang, where, partly through the assistance of pirates, he regained all of Fuhkien between 1648 and 1650; but he fell foul of Koxinga's ambitions and was drowned in 1653 at Amoy. The last aspirant for Ming leadership, Yowliang the Kwei Wang, a great-grandson of Wanli, was proclaimed emperor in Kwangsi as a rival of Yü Ngao. He was utterly worthless, like the rest, but the strength of Chinese hostility to the Manchus was revealed in 1648, when after being chased into Yunnan, a sudden resurgence of opposition throughout the whole of China swept the seven southern provinces and Szchuen under his allegiance, and the Regent was confronted with the task of reconquering the greater portion of the empire. To add to his difficulties a famine again exhausted the north, the Mongols got out of hand and raided over the Wall, the Mohammedans rose in Kansuh, and bandits swarmed in every province. In this new crisis of their affairs the dauntless Wu San-kwei was given the chief command, and very slowly the Ming supporters were pushed back by their own countrymen until the cowardly Kwei Wang fled over the Yunnan border into Burma, to be surrendered in 1661 by the Burmese and die by his own hand a captive of the great general.

The year 1661 marks the first lull in the secular resistance of China to the imposition of foreign rule. The country was conquered but not convinced. In the general wreckage of seventeen years of war it had exhausted its resources without developing a commander fit to excite an

enduring loyalty or unite the diverse desires of different sections. Under the apathy that ensued after this bitter experience the Manchus very prudently encouraged reconstruction by appointing Chinese officials chosen according to the ancient tests throughout the empire, and China returned sensibly though sullenly to her age-old life of toil under her new masters. Ten years before this date Dorgun the Regent had died, leaving Shunchi to direct the imperial policy in person at the age of twelve. We do not hear much of his intellectual endowments, but he had been nurtured in a household of sturdy kinsmen and he must have matured early to have employed his talents successfully at this age. He did in 1661 in his twenty-fourth year, leaving the empire to a son eight years old whose reign name Kanghsi is one of the most brilliant in Chinese history.

The Manchus were not ungrateful to the Chinese generals who had enabled them to win an empire. Wu San-kwei, whose pursuit of the Kwei Wang had completed the crowning performance of that great conquest, was given the title of prince and made absolute lord of the two provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow, with his own army and entire control of the civil appointments and revenues of the territory. Two other generals, both Liaotung men, were in like manner created princes of the maritime provinces of Kwangtung and Fuhkien, from which, as from Wu's domain, all the Manchu soldiery was withdrawn. Judged by the event this method of rewarding their services seems imprudent, but amid the multitude of traitors that must have made China appear to these Tartars as infected with perjury, these men had resisted the temptations to which others had succumbed and remained loyal to the end. Their honors were awarded in proportion to the magnitude of their efforts. But Prince Wu, either because he wearied of his sovereign state in a remote province, or because he was apprehensive of the imperial plans to reduce his army, after accumulating stores and revenues revolted in 1674, soon after the young Kanghsi had assumed control of the government. With him arose also the Prince Kung of Fuhkien;

and in a few weeks the empire was once more ablaze with insurrection, officials everywhere surrendering their cities and the people gladly removing their queues. Six provinces turned against their Manchu masters; a seventh, Kwangtung, remained neutral because its old Prince, Shang Ko-si was loyal, but his son Chu-sin, a drunkard, accepted the title of Great Commander from Wu, assumed the old Chinese headdress and made his aged father a prisoner. The latter died in 1676, and Chu-sin, rather alarmed at Wu's attitude toward him, made his peace with Kanghsi. The other rebel prince (of Fuhkien) after some serious fighting, was pardoned and re-employed by the Manchus in 1677, but was subsequently executed in Peking, a fitting end for his cruelty and crimes. The defection of these coast provinces, though badly led, was heartily endorsed by their inhabitants whose hatred of the Manchus has never much abated, and a considerable Manchu army had to be employed in bringing them to order. Wu San-kwei raged up and down the western provinces, where his armies at one time had possession of Shensi and even threatened Peking. So long as he lived there seemed to be a magic in the old warrior's name that paralyzed the troops brought against him. All his campaigning was carried on in the enemy's country, and though he was presently driven out of Shensi and the two Kwang, he died holding his own in Hunan, while none dared to attack his base in the southwest. During four years this indefatigable fighter had wrenched nearly half of China from Manchu control and maintained his upstart government upon the resources of the least productive portion of the empire. Kanghsi, who inherited the physical vigor of his great ancestors, was with difficulty dissuaded from taking charge of the campaign against this formidable rival in person. His counsellors were probably justified in their fears of losing Peking in an émeute if he left the capital, but his resolution in the crisis and the resources at his command—chiefly in the better fighting qualities of the Mongols and northern Chinese troops—eventually achieved a hard-earned victory over all his foes in 1681. Wu had succumbed to an illness in 1678; his grandson and

successor, Shu-fan, was beheaded upon the fall of his capital Yunnan, and his head hung upon one of the city gates of Peking. The rebellion had failed, and the emperor could congratulate himself that he had accomplished what was necessary for establishing his autocracy, the disarming of the vassal princes. So long as they retained their hereditary powers the Manchu was little more than the feudal suzerain of China. Their revolt was a declaration of the right of the Chinese to rule themselves, and in this sense these eight years were the concluding act in the bloody drama begun in 1644. To insure the future Kanghsi abolished the title of *Wang* except as bestowed upon members of the imperial clan, nor was it made hereditary even amongst these.

In the settlement of the country Manchu troops were quartered in permanent garrisons in a score of the more important cities of the empire. These "bannermen" were forbidden to intermarry with the Chinese or to engage in any occupation except that of arms. So long as these warriors were regularly exercised in their profession under the great military emperors, chasing bandits or campaigning in Central Asia, they remained a valid defence to the throne. But they never constituted an important element in the forces of the empire.¹ In later times, becoming utterly demoralized through inaction, compelled to remain aliens in spirit as well as in race to the industrious Chinese who surrounded them and to whom they represented the yoke of a foreign master, they sank into forlorn and useless drones whose descendants were the first victims of the Chinese revolution of 1911. This was Kanghsi's reply to the *intransigents* of China. He was logical, perhaps, but time, a profounder logician, proved it to be fallacious. The conquest had not in reality been effected by Manchu braves or even by Manchu wisdom, nor could the Manchus ever retain their hold upon China merely by the valor of their men. Their at-

¹ In Chienlung's reign there were 45,500 Manchu bannermen disposed in twenty towns of China Proper, 8,750 near Peking and 15,000 in eight garrisons in Turkestan, besides about 100,000 guarding the imperial palace. The total Chinese army was 662,000, besides 700,000 provincial troops.

tack was begun at an opportune moment, when a long period of Ming misrule and her reduced vitality had so distracted China as to admit of her capital being taken by a *coup de main*. The importance of Nurhachu's work of training and preparation was fully revealed in this initial success and in the admirable temper of his successors, as they employed all the factors in their favor while pushing the conquest through to an end. But these factors were for the most part Chinese: the hopeless incapacity of the Ming pretenders, the willingness of the Chinese to fight for the foreigners, the schisms that separated north from south, faction from faction, province from province, the indomitable fortitude of a courageous people when once enlisted in their cause. It was the Chinese themselves who completed the conquest of China for the Manchus; it was the Chinese who suffered them to rule because they adopted their culture and institutions and took the natives into partnership in the management of the empire. No disposition of Manchu garrisons at strategic centers could have long upheld that rule or prevented insurrections had the Tartars departed from their policy and managed their great estate selfishly. And who shall say that those who, for fear or favor, cast their lot with the Manchus decided unwisely for their country? The sovereigns of China never had a broader sense of empire or a clearer idea of the physical confines and defences of that empire than under Kanghsi, the greatest of her modern emperors, whose expansion of her boundaries and increase of her prestige made her a greater power than ever before and strong enough to save her from subjugation by the predatory states of a newly awakened Europe.

SOME EXPERIENCES AT THE SIEGE OF NANKING DURING THE REVOLUTION

By C. Voonping Yui, M.D., of the Chinese Red Cross Society

It affords me great pleasure to relate my experiences in Nanking last year while I was doing Red Cross work. The outbreak of the revolution started at Wuchang in the central part of China on the tenth of October, 1911. In a short period of time, Hankow, Hangyang and Wuchang came into the possession of the revolutionists. But when the attack was directed against Nanking, much resistance was encountered and the city was not captured until many lives had been sacrificed.

There are two reasons to account for the difficulty in subduing Nanking. First, Nanking is a strongly fortified city; it has the advantage of being protected by a deep and wide moat and by a number of high hills which encircle it. Unlike ordinary city-walls in China, this wall around Nanking follows the course of the surrounding hills and is built of stones as well as of bricks. Such a solid construction naturally hinders opponents from coming in or near the city. The top of this massive structure, where I walked, is wide enough to accommodate six horses trotting abreast. The city of Nanking (literally South Capital), had been twice the capital of the Empire. It was the headquarters for the Taiping rebellion, another anti-Manchu outbreak of the country in 1850. The imperial army then besieged the city for over a year without success. At last, a subterranean tunnel was dug under the center of the city and then exploded by the imperialists. By this means was the city subdued. This happened about sixty years ago, and the Manchu government did not forget the painstaking work of conquering Nanking rebels. Consequently, the Tartar regiment of that city had been especially well organized and fully equipped with modern instruments of war. This is

one of the reasons why the revolutionists encountered hard bloody battles before success finally came.

Second, the city has a Tartar general and a Chinese general, namely Tieh Lian and Chang Shun. Both were as loyal and submissive to the Manchus as their slaves, and also as cruel and brutal as tyrants. It was reported that even the slightest suspicion of helping the revolutionists would result in decapitation through the order of these enthusiasts. During the revolution many helpless and innocent persons thus lost their lives in the city without specification of their crimes or discrimination of right from wrong according to law. When the country was everywhere teeming with revolutionary spirit, Chang Shun and his fellow officials still foolishly exerted their utmost energy to drill the army and the artillery and prepared to resist the invincible forces of the people. The imperial officers thus invited strong opposition.

For these two reasons, the people had to fight with all their might in order to bring back the laurels of triumph.

How did I happen to witness a part of the bloody scene? I was connected with Nanyang College, Shanghai, as a resident physician. I was then teaching a class in first aid. As soon as the revolution began in Shanghai, I organized a first aid corps, comprising twenty-four persons, some were my students, others my friends, and one was my brother. All aimed to carry on Red Cross work and all were volunteers supplying their own funds. Although my companions and I lacked experience in such work, we were enthusiastic. When the bad news of the recapture of Hankow by the imperialists reached Shanghai, we intended to start for that city. As many Red Cross members had done splendid work there, we found our services were more needed in Nanking where merciless fighting had already taken place. So we started for Nanking November 28, 1911, and met Bishop F. R. Graves, Dr. Geo. Deval, and Dr. Gaynor on our way. Besides the ordinary equipment such as dressings, blankets, stretchers, splints, hypodermics, etc., we brought along with us four big bales of clothing, consisting of underwear, coats and trousers which afterward proved

most useful. When a helpless soldier bled through his shirt and uniform, he was encountering, first, the dangers of the hemorrhage and second, the shock from the cold and wet coat in the winter. The clumsy packages of clothing were very serviceable after dressings for wounds were fixed up.

We were not allowed to enter Nanking. We stayed near the revolutionary headquarters in a village called Marchin. For a couple of days we treated many wounded soldiers in that village. Serious cases, after temporary dressings were applied by us, had to be sent to the nearest improvised hospitals. The injured patriots we met then, were chiefly the fighters and survivors of the battles fought at Yu Hwa Dai and Tse Ching Shan, the two well-known hills where the imperialists treacherously hoisted white flags signifying their surrender. When the revolutionists marched forward to shake hands with them, they proved treacherous fighters. The unexpected opposition nevertheless acted as a stimulant, adding more energy and spirit to the revolutionists.

In the midnight of November 30, the battle of Tien Pao Chen was fought. The field was rather distant from our lodging, only cannonading could be heard. We did not attempt to go out at night as the officers near our hut advised us not to travel in the dark. We slept on hay and straw over night and marched to Tien Pao Chen next day. We met hundreds of wounded soldiers on the way and rendered our assistance wherever needed. In the beginning of our work, we had a registrar to note down the names of the injured soldiers, the character of the wound and the regiment to which they belonged. But later we found we had no time to waste on this unimportant registration, so we devoted our energy along more serviceable lines. We dispensed with the recording. Every one in our party had come to be an active member.

I asked the veterans why they fought at midnight, an awkward hour for us to rescue efficiently. They said that Tien Pao Chen was a fortified hill and that an attack to be effective must necessarily be done at night, not in the day. Most of the bullet wounds I saw, were wounds made by

bullets having passed entirely through the body. As I learned, those bullets must be made of steel else they would not have such penetrative powers.

One of the soldiers had a bullet wound in the front of his right chest about one inch outside the nipple with an exit wound on the back about three inches away from the spinal column. I thought it must have penetrated the pleura and the right lung. But to my surprise, the bullet had run along the line of the fifth rib and come out without leaving any injury to the organ of respiration.

Lucky men lived and survived even though they sustained severe wounds. Unlucky ones died on the spot when they thought themselves safe. There was a merchant unintentionally shot by a revolutionist during the fighting. The bullet went into the middle of his thigh, fractured the femur as it hit against the bone, and a second wound was made on the inner side of the thigh; continuing its course the bullet struck against the other thigh and penetrated through the muscles—a total of four wounds with a compound fracture resulting from a single bullet. I first saw him after he had been wounded four days. Septic inflammation set in. The man refused any treatment whatever, and only said that he wanted to go home and die on his bed.

When we were walking across a field, there were two persons far ahead of us; one was an old farmer and the other a small lad, possibly his grandson. It was so sad to see a cannon ball from a distant place fall like a shooting star on this poor couple and explode. When we reached the spot, there remained only the dead child, the old man had disappeared, probably cremated alive.

On December 1, we were directed to the Tiger Hill, which we reached after a six hours' walk. We visited the revolutionary general Li Tien Chan, who was very hospitable and kind to us; after a moment's rest, he ordered his subordinate to accompany us to the soldiers' quarters, where the sick and the injured were lying, groaning in pain and suffering untold agony. We treated the urgent cases first and then one by one we tried our best to minister to

the others. The suffering men appreciated our work although we could not relieve them at once.

When we got through our cases, we walked back to General Li's residence. This occupied forty-five minutes. Although it was a short journey, it was nevertheless a trying one and required much courage. The revolutionary and the imperial artillerymen were exchanging their shrapnel and shells from the Lion Hill to the Tiger Hill and vice versa. The sky above our heads was like a realm of meteors and shooting stars. We saw the shells striking the valley explode with loud noise and furious conflagration. I ordered my companions to walk far apart each, leaving an interval of fifteen to twenty feet and told my much scared brother that death was not so terrible as it was imagined, and that there should be no fear of cannon balls. Fortunately they struck only against the rocks and none of them hurt any of us.

We passed the night at the foot of the hill and we slept in the room next to General Li. The beds and bedding that he provided for us, were much nicer than the straw and hay beds of the previous nights. As the residence was erected under the castle, every cannonade gave us a violent shake. The windows, the doors, the beds, the tables, in fact all the articles of furniture were in a jerky motion throughout the night, and the lamps on account of incessant jarring could not give light as desired.

When we were sitting in the parlor, a soldier, panting as he entered the room, reported information which he had discovered and handed to the General a package of things obtained from the imperialists. He was warmly welcomed by his superior and was rewarded with a sum of three dollars for his skillful spying.

General Li, as I learned from the veterans and the survivors, captured this Tiger Hill with an infantry of two hundred men. Since then, he had to enlist every day a crowd of new comers from the imperial side as the ill-treatment of the Tartar general could not be tolerated even by his own people. They came to seek for refuge and to fight for liberty. The number of General Li's soldiers was increased to over 2000 when we were there.

In the city of Nanking terror prevailed. Rumors reigned in the streets. Suspicions grew every now and then. Slaughters were reported daily. Unmerciful tyrants wielded their power in such an abusive manner that no human being would side with the imperialists. Chang Shun was especially faithful to the Manchu government. His faithfulness came to an end when Nanking fell.

Here is another instance that is worth mentioning. Though the guards of the castle on the Lion Hill were under the jurisdiction of Chang Shun, none of the gunners there would venture to attack their own countrymen on the Tiger Hill which was only about four miles distant. They knew that General Li had made his headquarters there, and that a large number of soldiers camped in the plains of the Tiger Hill. They understood their principle of love of brethren better than did their commanders. Consequently when an order was given to bombard their sister hill, the gunners purposely aimed in a slightly different direction, so that the cannon-balls merely hit the impenetrable cliff or flew high up in the sky. They never intended to harm their brethren on the Tiger Hill.

The imperial general learned their dissimulations and had two of them beheaded for disloyalty. But the rest of the gunners grew even more patriotic; they claimed that they would rather lose their heads than fire against their brethren. So another two were killed. Then the general supervised the cannonading and found that his men would never aim directly at the enemy, so a third pair of patriots were decapitated. A noble sacrifice of six lives saved thousands of others simply for love of brothers.

Action speaks louder than words and is always appreciated. The revolutionary gunners on the opposite side never tried to shower their shells on the Tiger Hill. Their shrapnel, on the contrary, were all directed to the Tartar town in the center of the city. Unless the Manchus surrendered with their ammunitions, the people would not cease their cannonading.

Such was the mutual understanding of the gunners on both sides. The Lion and the Tiger had secretly come to

an alliance. So a week of bombarding elapsed and the two hills, although but a short distance apart, had not injured each other's castles nor camps.

December 2 was a bright and clear winter morning. The sky looked smiling. The sun sent down its golden rays as if to congratulate and console the hard fighting patriots. To our surprise and unexpected joy, a white flag of surrender was hoisted at 6 o'clock in the morning high up on the Lion Hill on the imperial side, with a three colored flag attached signifying welcome. In addition to the hoisting of the flags, the Lion Hill gunners fired two shells to open a part of the wall of the city and a third to the center of the Tartar town and a fourth to Pukow on the other side of the Yantze River where the imperial generals hid themselves in the last days of the siege.

With triumphant joy, the revolutionists took the possession of this old capital and made the Nanyang Exhibition Buildings the Administrative Halls. Peace began to reign and order followed gradually. When we walked into the city, we met a band of Amazon corps, wearing long unique uniforms, holding a newly designed banner, and marching into the Wai Feng Gate. Splendid work, as reported, was done by these masculine ladies, especially in throwing bombs and close fights.

Our company, losing its way, did not visit the Tartar town, as we intended. We learned afterwards that it was fortunate that we did not visit this hazardous place, for the Manchus, before surrendering to us, had laid a number of bomb-chests, which were all exploded one by one, when unlucky folks stepped accidentally on them.

We went, on December 4, to Pukow where Chang Shun and his five hundred foot-soldiers took the train at the Tien Tsin Pukow Railway station and fled to the north early in the morning of December 2. There we attended about two score of wounded soldiers. Two days after we returned home, our bodies emaciated on account of the deprivation of nutritive food and the lack of sufficient sleep, as we had been compelled to live for several days on turnips and crackers and had to retire on uncomfortable beds.

But the soldiers were much more exhausted, as proper nutrition and rest were far beyond the possibility of their reach. The triumphant joys of those who had suffered for the Republic compensated them for hardships better than any material reward.

The fall of Nanking was the beginning of the new government. During the truce between the revolutionists and the imperialists the latter had made thorough preparations and obtained new equipment. When it expired, they were able to take possession of the cities of Hankow and Hangyang. Had the revolutionists failed in the siege of Nanking, it would have meant their end. The most critical hours were when my companions and myself were doing our work in the suburb of the city. Soon after the triumph, Sun Yat Sen took up his residence in this provincial capital, and the provisional republican form of government was for the first time in the Far East inaugurated with representatives from the different provinces of the country.

As the fighting was carried on by troops from different sections of the nation, naturally the field of operations was extended to a vast area; and what I have related is only a fractional part of the occurrences and incidences of the whole campaign. I do not attempt to dwell on topics concerning happenings that I did not see for fear of misrepresentation or misinterpretation.

To an observer of this revolution, it is interesting to notice that the spirit of the people of every corner of the nation favored the revolutionists. It may be said that every citizen was a revolutionist. It was most wonderfully impressed upon the minds of the whole populace that the old government had to lose and the revolutionists had to win; that the question of success or failure was a question of the life or death of the country at large, not a question of individual interest. On hearing the firing of rifles or the cannonading of guns, even the ignorant country folks would yell from the bottom of their hearts "Woe to the government!" or "Hail for the people!"

How the Chinese, numbering one quarter of the human race, have been able to agree unanimously on the over-

throw of the Manchurian yoke; how the revolution has been completed in so vast a country in so short a space of time with comparatively so small a cost of life is really a mystery that no one can yet fully explain.

Here I shall mention briefly some factors, which seem to me to be causes of the revolution. In tracing the remote causes, I must say that the general awakening of the conservative Chinese began in the year 1894 when China was defeated in the Chino-Japan war. The second period of awakening began in 1900 when the allied troops besieged the capital of the empire. Since then, the tide of new learning has rushed in with full speed until the minds of the scholars have been saturated with the translations from works of Montesquieu and of Rousseau, their brains have been permeated with the accounts of the lives of Peter the Great and of George Washington. It is the education that pushes the people ahead. Corruption of the government, however, was not a small contributing factor of this gigantic revolt. Everywhere the people realized the weakness and pessimism of the government which could never be trusted and would never raise the standard of the nation's prestige. Favoritism and bribery were almighty. The sluggish, selfish and oppressive nature of the Manchu government had led us to overthrow it entirely, after gentle appealings were unsuccessfully and ineffectively resorted to. One of the immediate causes was the railway riot in Szechuan. The government attempted to buy the people's bonds with the loans from foreign nations. The shareholders rejected this. The government applied force and oppression. Troops were summoned to fight against the disobedient people. This aggravated the revolutionary idea. Soon after, the revolution started in Wuchang.

One of the factors last mentioned, although by no means of least importance, was the activity of the newspapers. They preached political sermons, awakened the people and informed them of the aggressiveness of some nations against our country, and encouraged the revolution from the beginning to the end.

In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to the

fact that the Manchus, although our enemies for awhile, yet as soon as they gave up their arms, have been looked upon as our own countrymen, having the same privileges and rights as enjoyed by the Chinese. In addition to the royal pension and that for the imperial clan, we are supporting them individually with regular monthly allowances, as was done previously, until they are able to earn their livings. So it is manifest that one-eighth of the whole population of China is living parasitically at the expense of the rest. It has been calculated that this enormous sum of money would be sufficient to pay the indemnities of the past years, if we simply abolish this imperial clan payment. This is a matter of generosity and love of brethren which has simplified the revolution and shortened its course.

As to the future of China, no observer has any doubt that the recent revolution marks the dawn of a new era. It would be only too natural that the country must take some time to recover peace and order. Soon a firm and responsible government will be established, the people united, integrity promoted, education enforced, natural wealth developed, industry improved and commerce facilitated—every possible reform will be gradually carried out, and our relations with other nations will be more intimate and friendly, especially with the sympathizing Americans, who assist and understand us better than other nations. Like American citizens and patriots of one hundred and thirty-seven years ago, we fought for freedom, liberty, and self-government. May the Coasts of the Pacific Ocean be the regions of the two Republics everlasting! May we join our hands closer and closer to keep the world at peace to encourage arbitration and to do away with war!

THE EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION UPON THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF CHINA

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In describing China's early attempts to introduce modern education a certain writer compared her to "an infant sea-bather in the act of taking his first plunge, touching the water and then running away, wading out and then tearing back. He did not dare to succumb to the allurements of the fascinating element and though the sight of adult bathers frolicking and playing 'hide and seek' with waves shot an arrow of envy through him, he never undertook the attempt." This attitude, no matter how true it was at the beginning, was certainly not true at the dawn of the revolution. At that time China's attitude toward modern education was not the attitude of the timid sea-bather. She had taken her first plunge, also the second, and even the third, and had fully determined to make modern education accessible to her people at any cost. Evidences of this attitude were seen on every hand. It was seen in the earnestness with which the government carried out its educational policy and in the marvelous development of the modern educational system since its inception in 1905. It was seen in the rapid growth of popular interest toward education shown in the numerous gifts and benefactions given by the wealthy as well as the poor for the extension of educational privileges through the establishment of schools and colleges. It was seen in the presence of an increasingly large number of men and women who were willing to devote their time and talent to the advancement of modern education. These are but a few of the signs which clearly indicate that at the dawn of the revolution the attitude of China toward improving her educational system in modern lines was not at all equivocal and that modern edu-

education had come to China to stay and to exercise its influence over the life of the nation as well as that of the people.

In order to appreciate fully the effect of the revolution upon the educational system of China, it is necessary to examine first the status of education at the dawn of the revolution. According to the third annual report of the ministry of education, published in 1911, there were in China during 1910, 52,650 schools of different types, including normal, vocational and technical schools, with a student body numbering 1,625,534, a teaching corps numbering 89,766, and a corps of administrative officers numbering 95,800. Aside from the schools there also existed during that year 69 boards of education, 722 local, provincial, and national educational associations, 1558 educational exhorting societies, and 3867 public lecture halls. The total income for educational purposes during that year was Taels 23,331,171, and the expenditure for the same year was Taels 24,444,309. The educational property possessed by the government was valued at Taels 70,367,882.

Some idea as to the quality of the work done in the schools of that period may be gained from many of the educational exhibits that were given in different parts of the country. At the Nanking Industrial Exhibition held in 1910, more than 34,000 pieces of articles, including apparatus, textbooks, charts, drawings, hand-writings, etc., all products of schools, were collected and exhibited, and the list of prizes awarded to the articles at the exhibition shows that no less than 966 prizes, which is about half of the total number of prizes given out, were awarded to articles in the educational exhibit. Much highly favorable comment was also received from educators of the west who visited the exhibit. A similar but smaller collection of educational articles was sent to the exhibition not long ago held in Italy, and there again many prizes were received owing to the high standard reached both in skill and in thought content.

The status of education before the revolution is perhaps best seen in the influence which modern education had exerted upon the intellectual or thought life of the people. It is the opinion of many who are in a position to judge that

the schools and colleges of China contributed a great share to the revolutionary movement. Education evidently had created in the life of the students, both young and old, an intense dissatisfaction with things as they were and an earnest desire to better the condition of their country both socially and politically. Indeed, it has been repeatedly declared by Sun Yat-sen and others prominent in the revolutionary cause, that education was the chief factor in the successful overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic.

The revolution naturally caused a temporary cessation of educational activity. Much or all of the funds intended for the maintenance of educational institutions had to be used for the support of the armies. In consequence, the activities of a large number of schools and colleges were either suspended or seriously crippled, especially those situated near the centers of disturbance such as Chentu, Hankow, Wuchang, Nanking, Canton, and Peking. During the days of storm and stress, many of the school buildings were used as soldiers' quarters, and in not a few cases the entire schools were destroyed, with their books and apparatus looted and scattered. A large number of students volunteered for service in the field, either by forming themselves into new regiments, or by joining the regular army. Some of them even became influential leaders of the revolution. An equally large number of students organized associations for securing contributions of money toward the war fund. It was reported that the students of one college in south China alone in one campaign collected more than \$40,000 toward the maintenance of the republican army. Still others volunteered to give lectures in public with a view to supply the people with the facts of the revolution and to instruct them in the principles of a republic, as well as the duties of their new citizenship. Thus during the short revolutionary period the cause of education received a hard blow from which it has not yet fully recovered.

As soon as the provisional government was established in Nanking, the matter of education received its serious attention. Tsai Yuan-pei, for five years a student in the

University of Leipsic, and a man recognized as one who had much ability and experience in educational affairs, was appointed as the first minister of education. While the Shanghai Peace Conference was still in session and the ultimate fate of the country was still weighing in the balance, the new minister of education issued a circular to the republican governors urging them the importance of the resumption of educational work. He outlined a set of temporary regulations for the guidance of the educators of the nation, the most important of which stipulate: (1) In the first grade of elementary education boys and girls are to be allowed to attend the same schools. (2) Classical studies are to be abrogated in elementary education. (3) Elementary handicraft departments shall have especial attention. This same Tsai Yuan-pei later became the minister of education on the first cabinet of Yuan Shih-kai after the latter was elected provisional president of the new republic; but as a consequence of the resignation of Premier Tang Shao-yi, he was soon obliged to resign from his office. The vacancy left by him was filled by Fan Yuan Lien, who was then serving as vice-minister of education. Fan is a native of Hunan and a returned student from Japan. He was known as a man who was most familiar with the work of the ministry of education, having served the ministry under the Manchu dynasty in the capacity of a secretary. He was therefore not ill prepared to perform the task which fell upon him, namely, to reorganize the educational system of the country.

One of the first tasks in the reconstruction of the educational system has been the reorganization of the central administrative organ, namely, the ministry of education in Peking. The ministry as now reconstructed differs from the one in existence before the revolution in that it is less complex and less highly centralized. The ministry has at its head the minister of education, who has general charge of all matters relating to education and to the general supervision of all the schools of the country, together with all public buildings under the immediate control of the ministry. The minister is assisted by many officers. Aside from those

officers that are common in all ministries, there are provided 16 inspectors and 10 experts in art and science (2 chief and 8 regular experts). The inspectors are appointed by the president of the republic at the nomination of the minister, and the experts are appointed by the minister himself. The work of the ministry is apportioned to one general council and three bureaus, instead of five bureaus as was the case before the revolution. The general council has special charge of all matters relating to schools under the direct control of the ministry, teachers in public schools, educational associations, investigations and compilations, school hygiene, repair and building of school library, school museum, and educational exhibits. The three bureaus are as follows: (1) general education: (2) technical or professional education; and (3) social education. The bureau of general education is in charge of all matters relating to normal school, middle school, primary school, kindergarten, and schools for all forms of defectives, including the deaf and the blind. It is also in charge of matters relating to children's attendance at school and the selection and certification of teachers. The bureau of technical or professional education has charge of all affairs relating to university and college, higher technical school, the sending of students abroad, the national observatory and the preparation of the governmental almanac, the society of doctors of philosophy, the association for the unification of the mother tongue, the association of examiners of medical doctors and pharmacists. In addition, this bureau has control of all matters relating to societies of arts and science and the conferring of degrees. The bureau of social education is in charge of all affairs relating to correction of public ceremonies, museums, libraries, zoological and botanical gardens, fine arts museums and exhibits, music, literature and the stage, the investigation and collection of relics, popular education and public lecture bureaus, public and circulating libraries, and last of all the compilation, the investigation, and the planning of popular education.

With the reorganization of the ministry there has taken place a change in the educational system itself. In the

course of a few months the ministry drew up one after another four different schemes. The final one which was submitted to the Central Educational Conference for discussion, provides the following: Primary elementary school, four years, ages 6-9; higher elementary school, three years, ages 10-12; middle school, four years, ages 14-16; college preparatory, three years, ages 17-19; and college proper, three or four years, according to the nature of the course, ages 20-22 or 23. It also provides two types of normal schools, the normal school with a course of four years, and one year of preparatory course, ages 13-17; and the higher normal having a course of three years and one year of preparatory course, ages 17-20. Two kinds of industrial schools are also specified, each having a course of three years, ages 10-12 and 13-15. Of the technical schools there are provided one preparatory course of one year, age 17, and the technical course proper lasting three or four years according to the nature of the course, ages 18-20 or 21. The scheme given received the endorsement of the Central Educational Association with the exception of the college preparatory course which the conference urged to have shortened from three years to one year. For one reason or another this recommendation of the conference was not accepted and the plan as given above has since been officially made the new educational scheme for the republic. It is to be noticed here that according to this new plan the length of time required to go through this entire educational system from primary school up through the university will be shortened to fifteen or sixteen years from that of twenty-three years which was the period required under the system existing before the revolution.

The next step of importance taken by the ministry was the promulgation of the aim of education, which shows a fundamental change from the one upheld for centuries by the old conception, which was to make royal subjects of those who go to school and to inculcate in them ideas of loyalty to the emperor, honor for Confucius, high estimation for the warlike, and respect for that which is practical. Education is now to be conceived as a means of cultivating virtuous

or moral character in the young. This moral training is to be supplemented by an industrial and military education and rounded out by an asthetic education. The chief emphasis is then placed on the cultivation of a moral or virtuous character (tao teh). Just what is meant by "tao teh" one is left to interpret for himself, but it is sufficiently clear that it refers to public morality or virtues, for the center of interest in providing such an education is said to be for the welfare of the state, so long that education does not impede the progress of the world and interfere with the development of the individual. In broader terms, "the general education aims at spreading modern knowledge to all young nationals in order that they may be qualified for citizenship. The higher education is directed toward cultivating the habit of regarding learning as sacred." This conception of education found its echo in the three personal messages of the minister issued to the educational administrative officers, teachers, and students of the country.

As a result of this change of spirit and aim of education, many interesting problems have arisen. All reference books and text books relating to the Manchu reign, containing sentiments and ideas which are in any way inconsistent with the spirit of republican form of government, have either to be discarded or modified. Enterprising publishers and text-book writers are not slow to recognize the fresh avenues of profit and are busy preparing new text-books of a new kind to meet the new demand. Already many of these so-called republican readers have been placed on the market and are enjoying a popularity unexcelled by any other text books. In Kuangtung and several other provinces even the use of the old governmental almanacs had been prohibited for the reason that they contain much material that is superstitious and is therefore not fitted for the citizens of the republic. This objection, together with the fact that the western calendar has been adopted in place of the old one, has necessitated the preparation and publication of a new kind of official almanac for use among the people.

Since the organization of the new ministry of education,

it has been making attempts to restore the status of education in China. Among other activities, it sent a deputy to Japan to study the method adopted there for recognizing the work of mission schools. During the summer of 1912 it arranged and conducted a series of lectures in the capital for the benefit of students and others who were inclined to study and had spare time at their disposal. It also ordered the provincial educational authorities to start half day summer schools for the same purpose. During the early part of the summer of the same year this ministry of education summoned a conference generally known as the Central Educational Conference to meet in Peking, July 10, to August 10. This conference was called for the purpose of obtaining the knowledge, experience, and result of deliberation of the educators of the country with a view to promote the cause of education, hasten its progress, and help the government to adopt a sound educational policy. In order to insure the highest efficiency and best result from the conference, every effort was made to secure fully qualified men, including graduates of normal schools in China or abroad, who have had at least three years of experience in teaching, and educators of national renown. The delegation of the conference was chosen according to the following manner: Two from each of the twenty-two provinces and also from Mongolia and Tibet; one representing Chinese residing abroad; fifteen from teachers and administrative officers of schools under the direct control of the ministry of education; ten from the ministries of interior, finance, agriculture, commerce, and industry, army and navy; and others specially invited by the ministry of education. The conference was conducted under the direction of the minister. Among the problems presented for discussion were the following: School government; division between central control and local control of schools; education of Mongolians, Turkestans, and Tibetans; the giving of special privileges to elementary school teachers and the certification of elementary school teachers; the worshipping of Confucius, the adoption of a national anthem, and the organization of higher school educational conference. In all, ninety-two problems were submitted to

the conference for solution, but during the nineteen regular meetings that were held, only twenty-three more important ones of these were satisfactorily settled and recommended to the ministry of education. Although the body of educators forming the delegation of the conference were invested with no legislative power, nevertheless, the suggestions and recommendations made to the ministry after careful deliberation exerted a strong influence over the educational policy of the country, as could easily be seen by comparing the resolutions of the conference with the measures of reorganizing the educational system put into force after the closing of the conference through the various educational ordinances made public.

Before passing from the Central Educational Conference, it is interesting to note a controversy which came before the conference for settlement. Early in the summer it was noised abroad that Mr. Chung Wing Kwong, commissioner of education in the Kwangtung province, was sending an official delegate to the Central Educational Conference charged with the task of urging the conference to endorse the idea that in the future the public schools of China should not permit the worshipping of Confucius on the ground that all religions should be excluded from the schools; for this is the trend of the leading republican nations, and more and more the governments of these enlightened countries are excluding religion from the sphere of national education and priests from interfering therein. The suggestion, which is but a sign of the new movement toward general reform, that the government authorities have been pushing forward with great rapidity, proved to be too radical not only to the conservative Chinese, but also to some of the more cautious of the progressives. Immediately protests were raised from all directions. Many sent appeals to Chung Wing Kwong pointing out the mistake which, in their opinion, he was making in advocating not to permit Confucius to be worshipped by the students. These protests, however, were but the opening shots in the warfare. In Canton, the matter was brought before a large gathering of the members of the assembly, who apparently were united in their wish

that such a course should be resisted. At this meeting it was agreed that as Confucianism is not a religion, therefore it is wrong to class Confucius with the founders of religion, and that it is an insult to class Confucianism with these religions, for Confucius had nothing to do with inducing men to worship the gods. His influence was all on the side of virtue and knowledge; therefore his influence should be extolled and the sphere of his influence enlarged. In spite of these protests, the matter was duly brought before the Central Educational Conference, and, contrary to the expectation of many, the conference strongly endorsed the suggestion made by the commissioner of education in Canton, and recommended that the clause providing for the worship of Confucius in public schools be omitted from the new school law. That this recommendation has been accepted is shown by the fact that in the educational ordinance regarding rites and ceremonies used in school, a very significant injunction occurs, namely, that in the observance of anniversaries of any kind, no worshipping and religious ceremony of any kind are to be used.

The educational activity of the ministry of education has been, to a great extent, curtailed or handicapped by the financial stress of the central government. According to the budget prepared for the new republic, an annual sum of Taels 12,801,468 was provided for the ordinary expenditure in educational affairs. In addition, a sum of Taels 3,348,061 was specified to cover the necessary provisional expenditure. Considering the gigantic task that is before the ministry, the allowance made for education is by no means liberal, and even the fund thus specified has been thus far slow in coming during the present period of readjustment. For this reason the ministry of education has been somewhat slow in carrying out what it proposes to do. Meanwhile it has been devising means not only to eliminate as much waste as possible, either by abolishing institutions that have outlived their usefulness or by combining forces, but also to exercise the strictest economy in the administration of educational funds. Thus the Hanlin Academy in Peking, once the center of literary activity and the chief

seat of the educational system of China, has been recently abolished. No students from the Tsing-hua College were sent abroad during the past year. The ministry, however, is doing its best, so far as its financial condition would allow, to restore the institutions which come under its direct control. The Peking University has been reopened. This is also true with the Tsing-hua College in Peking, and competitive examinations were held last summer with a view to selecting a number of students to be trained before sending them to America to study. The central government has also been able to send abroad twenty-five of the revolutionary leaders to receive a western education; fourteen of these have come to America.

In the provinces the financial stress is less stringent than the central government, and efforts for the extension of educational privileges and facilities have been pushing forward with considerable rapidity. Provincial as well as local educational associations are showing great activity. During the month of August 1912, examinations were held in Tsinanfu, Shantung province, for students who are desirous of being sent to the United States for college education. The Kwangtung province, in spite of its financial stress, managed to send during the past summer 100 students abroad, 20 to America, 10 to Europe, and 70 to Japan. The Kiangsi provincial government has recently sent 60 students abroad for advanced study. Of this number, 16 were sent to America, 1 to England, 1 to Germany, 2 to France, 2 to Belgium, and the rest to Japan. Early in the year of 1912, the Commercial Press in Shanghai undertook to supply a Chinese educational exhibit for the Teachers' College of Columbia University. An announcement of the fact was made by the said press, and within the course of two or three months, some six hundred schools responded and over seven thousand articles were sent in. Before the exhibit was sent from Shanghai, an opportunity was given to the public to visit it, and in the course of three days over ten thousand people availed themselves of the opportunity, showing something of the enthusiasm of the people toward things educational. These and other facts which might be

mentioned, indicate clearly that the provincial authorities, as well as the people, fully realize the importance of education in the national life of the new republic and are exerting every effort to develop the system of education both extensively and intensively.

At present the government and the people show a strong tendency to emphasize primary education. Some adjustments and combinations are being planned in higher education, and the money thus saved will be devoted to the establishment of more primary schools of both grades in order to hasten universal education, which is the goal of the new educational policy and is a problem which has loomed large in the minds of the Chinese statesmen and educators since the establishment of the republic. The charge has often been made to the effect that in introducing modern educational institutions, China made the mistake of starting at the top and building downwards, and in her anxiety for universities, high schools, and middle schools, she overlooked the importance of the primary schools. Assuming this charge to have been true, the mistake is now being remedied and primary education is now receiving the attention which it deserves.

One more important tendency remains to be noted. The statesmen and educators of China, realizing that manifold difficulties are still standing in the way to make education accessible to all, and that the stability of the republic is largely dependent upon the intelligence of its citizens, are now emphasizing the importance of popularizing education through means other than the school, such as newspapers, art galleries, theatres, public gardens, museums, libraries, zoölogical and botanical gardens, public lectures, and moving pictures. It is their belief that these quasi-educational institutions will be able to exert a strong influence of educational value to the uneducated men and women as well as those children who are unable to go to school, and that through these institutions a mighty social revolution could be effected. Already movements to put these ideas into practice have been reported. Early in the spring of last year, the formation of the Social Reform Association

was announced. Among the organizers of that association are such distinguished men as Premier Tang; minister of navy, Liu; minister of education, Tsai; minister of agriculture and forestry, Sung; and others equally prominent in the political and educational life of the new republic. In an article announcing the formation of the said association, some thirty-six different social problems were given as reforms which, in the opinion of the association, should be vigorously advanced. In Kwangtung and several other provinces, the provincial educational authorities have appointed through competitive examination, a number of lecturers to give popular lectures on topics such as self-government, education, hygiene, and philanthropy. Attention has already been called to the fact that the present ministry of education has a bureau, known as the bureau of social education, the duty of which is to advance the whole movement, namely, to popularize education through quasi-educational institutions.

This treatment of the educational situation created by the revolution is necessarily incomplete. Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the fact that the work of reconstruction in education, as in other phases of China's national life, has already well begun and begun with a great determination to win. The problem of supplying educational facilities to China's millions is so gigantic in its scope and so complicated in its character, that it calls for not only the highest professional skill, but a great deal of enthusiasm, patriotism, and altruism for its successful solution. The system existing today, being still in its infancy, is naturally full of imperfections and has plenty of room for improvement, especially when it is compared with the systems of other enlightened nations, most of which have taken centuries of adjustment and toil before reaching their present stage of excellence, and even they still have some room for improvement. New China, however, is confident that given sufficient time she will be able to work out her own salvation in spite of the fact that the problem is fraught with difficulties. For the present she needs time to regain her breath from the shock which she experienced in the transition from monarchy

into republic. She needs time to consider what are the best elements in western education which could be utilized to her best interests, and what are the best elements in her own system which have proved best for China through the centuries of her history and which should be preserved with all vigor and tenacity. In short, she needs time to readjust herself to the new conditions which now surround her. Meanwhile, young China believes that help and coöperation from the educators of the West are not only highly desirable but in a way indispensable to a speedy success. For this reason she favors and welcomes every effort put forth by all well-wishers of China toward the solution of the problem and the attainment of the high ideal which she has set before her. From the teachers and educators of the West China expects to find sympathy and encouragement which come with the consciousness of a common purpose, and to gain, in no small measure, the inspiration of their highest ideals.

MORAL AND SPIRITUAL ELEMENTS IN THE
CHINESE REVOLUTION AND IN THE
PRESENT OUTLOOK

By Rev. Charles L. Storrs, Shaowu, China, Foochow Mission

Two or three years before the outbreak of the Revolution a non-Christian editor in one of his leaders on "China's Needs" in the *Chung Wai Jih Pao* wrote: "Many are talking of revolution Has it been considered that we in China have had far more revolutions than they in Europe? Europe has always gained by its revolutions, but we have gained no national uplift from ours. Why? Because of the absence of what has characterized European revolutions—moral and spiritual forces." It is the object of this address to show that such elements have not been absent from the overturning of the past twelvemonth among that remarkable people. If what this Chinese editor says is true, then the events of 1911 and 1912 stand out unique not only among the fifty-three attempts which since the first in 1646 engineered by the "Heaven and Earth Society" have aimed to depose the now abdicated Ta Ching dynasty, but unique in the long history of 4906 years—the date under which the republicans in their enthusiasms issued their first proclamations.

There will be no attempt to separate moral from spiritual forces. Indeed spiritual or religious elements as such do not seem to have entered into the stream of events. Neither is it thought to show how the whole movement has been undergirt with certain great moral laws and that the outcome has been a logical consequence of them. Sufficient for our purpose if from the kaleidoscopic rush of events, we can seize hold here and there of a few of those golden strands of human activity that give life its true significance, untwist some of the more important ones to reveal more clearly their component ethical threads, and so come to realize that it

is these that have held the whole together. In this way the conviction will come to us that the significance of the Revolution in China lies not in the immense number of people involved, not in the magnitude nor richness of the territory, not in the uniqueness nor swiftness of its outward accomplishment, but in the coming into this great complex world of men and things in which we live of a new factor, the greatest, the most bewildering of any that have yet entered in. That factor is the Chinese people setting their feet in the paths that the eternal laws of moral development have laid down for human destiny.

1. First then among the more apparent moral and spiritual elements of the Chinese Revolution must be mentioned enlightenment, coming primarily through western education. Diplomacy and trade would claim but a small share in this contribution. The part that western education has played fostered first and foremost by Christian missions, and since 1905 an objective to which both government and people have given themselves unstintedly, will be adequately treated in other addresses of this conference. It needs to be given a logical and strong emphasis here because, just as the conscience and personality of an individual can receive no large or true development aside from increasing intelligence, no more the ethical and national ideals of a people. Yet fascinating as is the theme, I yield it the more readily remembering that enlightenment as the equipment of the young Turk party seems not to have fulfilled the promise of their brilliant constitutional movement, and Japan, with an average of school attendance that outdoes some states of our own loved America, felt constrained by the ethical wabbliness of its modern society last February to call a meeting of the leaders of its three great religions to see if the moral foundations might not be made more secure. Still it is not without significance that the overturning in China is often spoken of as a students' revolution.

Aside from the part that modern education has played in thus enlightening the Chinese people there ought to be mentioned right here the tremendous influence of the periodicals and books of the Christian Literature Society and in a lesser

measure the various tract societies. Put with these the hundreds of Chinese newspapers, good and bad, and it becomes less difficult to understand how new ideas permeated the whole country. Kang Yy Wei, who after the imprisonment of his master, the former emperor, Kuang Hsu, from Japan directed the fortunes of the so-called "Reform" party, had newspapers in nearly every treaty port and although harried by the officials, found haven in the foreign concessions or in Hongkong and continued his propaganda, almost as revolutionary as that of the republicans themselves, up to the commencement of the struggle.

The revolutionaries had the keenest appreciation of the moral value of publicity. From the first they took not only the people but foreign powers into their confidence. A first move of their provisional government was to appoint one of their cleverest, best informed men, Wu Ting Fang, former minister at Washington, as their minister of foreign affairs. To him and another of their best leaders, Wen Tsung Iao, they gave the task of keeping the outside world informed as to the inwardness from the revolutionary view point of each event or complication. In the most critical hour of the struggle when, with the utmost good will for Yuan Shi Kai and his cause, the powers hesitated to let him receive any financial backing, these men checkmated every move that Peking made by the sympathy for their cause in the world at large, and by showing the courts and cabinets abroad just what grip they had on the south and the Yantse valley with all the commercial interest of foreigners involved. A little of it may have been what Americans call "bluff," but the game was not played in the dark, so far as they were concerned, and the forces of light with their concomitants of sympathy and trust seemed predestined to win.

2. After enlightenment as a moral element in the Chinese Revolution must be mentioned a new stirring and vigor of moral conscience.

It is rather startling to find that of the ten shortcomings for which Dr. Sun Yat Sen specifically arraigned the Ta Ching dynasty eight are distinct charges of moral failure. Even the other two the second,—“they have opposed our

intellectual and material progress;”—and the sixth,—“they suppress liberty of speech”—are at no great remove from the moral realm. The avariciousness of the imperial clan was so great that even in their hour of supreme distress when Yuan Shi Kai had exhausted every resource to obtain money absolutely necessary to prevent the government from falling into anarchy with an unpaid soldiery, it did not occur to any of them to offer help from their immense accumulation of treasure. Yuan had to go personally and beg a paltry 6,000,000 taels, enough at best to tide things over less than a month. Yet when the comptroller of the household made his report after the death of Tze Hsi, the old dowager empress, the privy treasure was 12,000,000 taels gold, and 990,000,000 taels silver. It is said also that the princes had deposits in foreign banks amounting to \$65,000,000. However that may be, it is certain that Duke Tasi Tao, brother of the regent, whom he had placed over the war office, grew fabulously rich through his sales of commissions in less than three years. So extreme did the evil become that the revolutionaries were able before the struggle to put their generals in command of the most important divisions and brigades of the army. The fact that, when the crisis came and some of the princes were still for fighting it out, forty-six generals of the northern army sent a telegram demanding the abdication of the throne and the setting up of a republican form of government, shows that many of those generals still held their commissions, as well as suggests a suspicion that Yuan had come to the place where he could play on the winning side.

From top to bottom official life in China was unthinkably corrupt. Sir Robert Hart, than whom no westerner better knew the inside of officialdom, said that if the revenues of China were honestly collected and honestly administered they would go six times as far as they did.

Personally I feel very certain that the splendid sweep of the anti-opium movement through the length and breadth of the land had very much to do with this quickening of the moral conscience against the 267 years of misrule which the Manchus had given China. That great reform, already

four-fifths made good, and accomplishing more in its five years of agitation than we in America have with a hundred years of our toying with the liquor evil, surprised not only the western world; it surprised the Chinese people themselves. It revealed reserves of moral power of which they had not been conscious.

It was hardly a fair indictment of the Manchus made by Ma Soo, secretary to Dr. Sun when president of the provisional government, to say at a great republican rally regarding the new compact with Great Britain, signed May 8, 1911, "The opportunity (to free China) came, but they (the Manchus) would not take it. They sold their people for an increased revenue of 350 taels per chest of opium;" for from the beginning the throne had shown earnestness and sincerity in this great reform. It was rather the scorn and unfaith of Great Britain that the revolutionaries should have pointed to.

"Heaven hears through the ears of the people" was a quotation from their most ancient philosopher, Shun, that the Chinese often had thrust at them during those months and years of waking moral consciousness. They were but living up to their highest and noblest traditions when, with the plain evidences of hopeless misrule on everyhand and blind and stubborn opposition to all sound progress clearly manifest, they came to realize that "heaven had withdrawn its favor" from their rulers, and accordingly prepared their vials of wrath.

Mr. Yung Wing, so intimately connected with Chinese student life in America since its inception in 1872, in a letter to a friend shortly before his death in Hartford, Connecticut, April 12, 1912, wrote,—“The late political revolution in its sweep over eighteen provinces has accomplished two wonderful historical facts of the century, one the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, the other the rising up of the Chung Hua Republic; neither of which can be possible without our full recognition of God in human history. The laws which govern the rise and fall of principalities and empires have been foreordained by the Deity himself; and when a dynasty like the Manchu was swept away like chaff

before the whirlwind, we may be sure that the dynasty has violated some of the fundamental principles of the moral universe. Upon investigation we will find that the Manchu Dynasty since its supremacy over the Chinese Empire for nearly three centuries have not observed *justice* to the people, *nor righteousness, nor equality, nor truth*. If the Manchus had been scrupulous in maintaining the cardinal virtues in their administrative system as taught by Confucius and the sages of old, they would never have been allowed to abdicate." From words like these it is easy to see how such a roused moral consciousness as we have been noting rises clearly into the spiritual realm.

From what has been said it must not be concluded that the revolution was a great white crusade. There were plenty of rascals who simply went on following their own fortunes with the new turn of the tide, and there was a great deal of blind and foolish enthusiasm that the country had found the panacea for all its woes and weaknesses; but despite this we must not fail to note that the great moral motive firing the energies of most of the leaders and the best spirits was fundamentally sound and high, much more so than the commercial, land hungry diplomacy of the representatives of the powers encamped in Peking.

3. A third moral and spiritual element for us to note was a new, almost intoxicating *selfconsciousness* among the Chinese people. This is in marked contrast with the inchoate spirit of old China. That led us to regard the nation as a mere congeries of land grubbing people. Just as the new Chinaman has come to a higher and clearer sense of personality than he has before known, so the whole country in its liveliest stratum of society showed that it had come to a higher plane of national consciousness. The very fact that the revolution aimed simply at getting rid of the dynasty and not at setting up some great hero or deliverer on the throne is witness of this. China aimed to set herself in the chair of sovereignty, and that so large and able and representative a proportion of the people could and did respond to the ideal has startled the world.

A new sense of unity then is one of the first things that

rivet our attention in this element of self-consciousness. Of course plenty of provincial jealousies and section differences were brought into play but the fact that eventually they were successfully subordinated to the common ideal is the outstanding fact. Among the first pronouncements of the new government was one that a foremost aim should be the consolidation of the five races of which the inhabitants of this tremendous land with some reason have regarded themselves composed, making of the Hans, the Manchus, the Mongolians, the Mohammedans, and the Tibetans one great homogeneous nation. They proclaimed the fact to the world in the stripes of their new flag. Even the vanquished Manchus were included without resentment in the new democratic ideal.

In the early weeks of the revolution, the break-up of the country into small provincial republics seemed like a contradiction of this spirit of unity. That view was due less to local ambitions, than to the misunderstandings by the outsiders of the real program of the revolutionaries which was not to sweep the country with fire and sword, but only to seize those positions of government and armed force which it was necessary for them to hold until such times as the success of the movement made the consolidation of the whole swift and sure.

It is interesting to note that this new spirit of unity has none of the old exclusiveness or anti-foreign feeling in it. Indeed that element, heretofore thought undeniably characteristic of the Chinese is maintained to be wholly an accretion of Manchu misrule. Dr. Sun says in a recent article called "My Reminiscences:" "People in Europe think that the Chinese wish to keep themselves apart from foreign nations, and that the Chinese ports could be opened only at the point of the bayonet. That is all wrong. History furnishes us with many proofs that, before the arrival of the Manchus, the Chinese were in close relations with the neighboring countries, and that they showed no dislike toward foreign traders and missionaries. Foreign merchants were allowed to travel freely through the Empire. During the Ming dynasty there was no anti-foreign spirit."

The *Republican Advocate* one of the journals of the new day says in its first issue: "The spirit which China has shown in her great struggle for political liberty has been appreciated by the West, and the friendly attitude of the western nations towards China has been equally appreciated. Our mission therefore is clear. Our policy is *not antagonism but coöperation*. China desires to be a free independent nation not in the old sense of isolation and exclusion, but in the more rational sense of unobstructed individual development on the basis of coöperation and reciprocity; and if we succeed in attaining this objective we shall have realized our cherished ambition."

The world is still wondering that so soon after the cataclysm of 1900, so great and portentous a struggle as this revolution could be carried through by the same people with hardly any hurt of foreign life or property. If with the queue and the kowtow the Chinese can shake off the Manchu bred dislike of the foreigner, and forget the foreigner's abominable ill treatment of more than a century, he is showing us moral stamina of no mean order.

Another element in this new self consciousness of the nation has been its rousing spirit of patriotism. That peculiar attachment of the heart for one's native land as superlatively his own unexpectedly flowered forth in wide profusion. "Give us mountains and rivers" was a slogan constantly used against the hated Manchus and their corrupting grip on the whole inmost life of the land. The patience, persistence, and undaunted faith of the revolutionaries baffled in seventeen unsuccessful attempts to launch their program, but for fifteen years holding steadily and cannily to their course, and motivated as the event has proved with much less of self-interest than similar upturnings in the world's history reveal, have shown a quality of patriotism in the Chinese of which the West little dreamed. Dr. Sun tells of a nameless Chinese laundryman who one evening after the great revolutionist had been addressing his fellow countrymen in Philadelphia, "called at my hotel, and thrusting a linen bag upon me went away without a word. It contained his entire savings for twenty years." As I

came away from China last December and touched at the various ports of the southeast coast, I found scores of well-to-do Chinese flocking back from the Straits Settlements, Saigon, Rangoon, Java, and the Philippines with their entire fortunes turned into available cash, ready to throw it and themselves into the struggle. Some of course were hotheads, some were chagrined to find the seats of the mighty already occupied, but the spirit of genuine patriotism which as a class they manifested made those of us in the south know that the end of the Manchu south of the Yangtse had already come.

Something like the spirit of the crusades seemed to get hold of the students of government and mission institutions alike. Volunteer regiments were largely recruited from them and faster than they could be supplied with arms and equipment. President Edmunds showed us at breakfast this morning a photo print of a group of Canton Christian College students who in two weeks time raised \$55,000, for relief of the government in its dire financial straits. School girls eluded their teachers and ran away to join uniformed Red Cross corps. The splendid heroism of some of the raw troops, who scarcely knew which was the firing end of their rifles, before the thoroughly drilled imperialists with their 1911 German machine guns at Hankow is one of the most stirring things in war story. It is said that some battalions whose arms had not yet arrived actually went out upon the shell swept field as they were, so determined were they to die for their country. Never again will the West accuse the Chinaman of lack of patriotism. He has always had it, I think, but expressed in terms which we could not understand. Now it has been translated into our own speech.

Another element in this new self consciousness of the Chinese is an aroused imagination. No one but a westerner who has come to know how the thought of a Chinese seems inexorably to flow in the mold made for it by the centuries, can feel what a tremendous moral asset is here. Many things have been contributing to it. I will mention only one, the use of English. English is the commercial and diplomatic

language of the Far East, and, as a remarkable edict some two years ago informed the startled world, the language of all higher education and research work for China. It would be interesting to follow up this line of thought. Enough here to remark that everyone engaged in school work in China will testify to the wonderful awakening effect that even a smattering of English seems to have on the mind of a Chinese boy or girl. A fine Chinese scholar, a Christian, who had received a thorough western education abroad, was asked by a missionary friend did he enjoy reading his bible the more in English or in his own language. His instant reply was "My English Bible." "Why?" "Because it is more spiritual," was the answer.

A striking instance of this aroused imagination among the Chinese people is found in that picturesque scene at the old Ming tombs near Nanking. There on the 18th of February, the New Year's Day of the old calendar, with his minister of war, General Huang Hsin, and the governor-general of the province, Dr. Sun escorted by a brilliant military parade made his way to the dilapidated mausoleum temple of old Emperor Hung Wu under the shadow of the Purple Mountain. To the spirits of the Ming dynasty—Emperor Hung Wu's remains had been lying in 500 years of neglect—he solemnly announced the end of the usurping dynasty and the restoration of the rights of the people to the nation. Then he turned and in an address of characteristic modesty and frankness he told the multitude his reasons for laying down the presidency of the provisional republic. Here were the choicest, the leading spirits of the Revolution, linking up the best that was to be found in the traditions of the past with their ideals and ambitions for the future. It means much for a people when the power of an aroused creative imagination can do that. The boom of the saluting guns at the close taken up in succession down the long avenue of approach and away into the distant city seemed to be a promise that the applause and devotion of his auditors for these ideals should extend out into the life of all the people. The occasion had something of the character of a sacrament

in it, but Dr. Sun, fearing that his Christian friends might be disquieted, hastened to assure them that it had no religious significance whatever.

This power of the creative imagination in New China seems also to have impressed the outside nations of the world. George Bronson Rea in his illuminating article on the revolution in the April issue of the *Far Eastern Review* tells us how in the thickest of the fight and during the greatest of the uncertainty, especially in Peking, the example of China as a republic was felt would be tremendous throughout the East. "It was urged that if China had reached the stage where it could take its place among the great republics of the world, and her millions of ignorant, benighted people were competent to assume the duties and burdens of a great republic, then Great Britain's policy in India was doomed to failure. The establishment and recognition of a Chinese Republic would increase the unrest in India, and the demand of the natives for a larger share in their own government would sooner or later break out into open revolt, and Britain would pay in India the price in blood and treasure for her vacillating policy in China. And by the same logic America would be called to modify her policy in the Philippines. "Of course all such generalizations overlook the essential differences in the types of civilizations and national characteristics involved, but it is certain that the events of the past twelve months in China have made every ruling house of Europe more thoughtful as to their own positions and duties.

4. I hasten to a fourth and last moral and spiritual element in the situation closely allied to this aroused self-consciousness of which we have been thinking,—namely self-control. This in some aspects is an immemorial characteristic of the race but during the Revolution it found new and appealing expression. Dr. Fong F. Sec, writing in the *Mission Year Book* of 1912 says: "The self-control shown was superb, and contrasted strangely with the behavior of the allied troops in 1900—looting, ravaging, and shooting down of non-combatants. This has raised China in the estimation of the world and has raised the self-respect of the Chinese

people." Despite the yellow journalism of America everyone now knows that this is true. Practically the only excesses were committed by the imperial troops in the taking of Hankow, and by the revolted bands of northern soldiery later on. It was an entirely new experience to astonished Chinese farmer folk to find that a great brigade of revolutionary soldiers could pass through their towns and by their fields and leave them practically as before. I live in an inland prefectural city where wide spaces and crumbling ruins both within and without the city walls are yet eloquent of the ferocity of the Tai Pings who swept off two-thirds of the innocent population of that region in the fifties. It is no wonder that the ill-informed people of that city remembering the horrors of that earlier rebellion, before it was clear whether there was to be a battle with the Keh Ming Dangs (revolutionaries) for the possession of the city or not, removed nine out of ten of all their women folks to quieter places among the mountains and country villages. But it was a needless fear. Their only foes were their own neighbors who might take such an occasion to pay off old grudges, Chinese fashion.

History I think does not show a parallel when so tremendous an overturn took place with so brief and bloodless a contest. In all the battles of the revolution put together fewer men lost their lives than in any one battle of our great civil war. The revolutionaries were not after the blood of their enemies but after political control of the country. The post and telegraph service all through the south was left in undisturbed imperial administration long after complete military control had been established. In Foochow it did not seem to occur to the new authorities even to tinker with the names until more than a month after the two days' battle which put them in command. In many cases, as at Canton, the revolutionary leaders after recruiting their forces and amassing their supplies, had only to take deputies of the incredulous and astounded officials on a tour of inspection, to persuade those officials to sign over the surrender papers, pack their trunks hastily and depart. It was their reliance on pacific methods that led the southern

forces at Wuchang and Hankow even when flushed with victory of arms to make the sorry strategic blunder of not severing the railroad connection from Peking. They could not conceive that those northern armies would actually fight their own brothers for the support of the detested Manchus.

This quality of self control not rarely rose into real magnanimity. The banner men of the Tartar city in Foochow after the brief unequal struggle, and their disarmament and registration, actually had their old pensions paid to them out of the precarious income of their victors, until such time as they might be able to become self-supporting at trades and handicrafts. Contrast that with the extermination traditionally meted out to the vanquished in Chinese history. In the final adjustment with the abdicated throne, generous pensions were apportioned to all members of the ruling house, and the baby emperor was even allowed to retain his title. The greatest single instance of this magnanimity of spirit, one that will forever shine in the pages of modern history was of course the resignation of his high office by Sun Wen (the name by which Dr. Sun Yat Sen is known in China) when at the height of his popularity and successful endeavors, that the breach with the north might be healed and his loved country give itself without delay to the tremendous problems of reconstruction that faced it. His conduct during all these months since that notable event, when by becoming less he became truly great, his remarkable success in allaying suspicion and creating enthusiasm by his visit to Yuan Shi Kai at Peking during a period of momentous uncertainty, all his counsel to the people, all his leadership show him a man qualified to live up to a lasting world reputation.

Turning now briefly to the other part of our subject what shall be said regarding these moral and spiritual elements in the outlook for the future?

1. First it is certain that the spread of enlightenment is to go on apace. All the railway, telegraph, and wireless communication schemes that are being strenuously pushed mean the linking up of the country into a great whole so that all

shall know what concerns the welfare of any section. Newspapers and books in increasing numbers are having a wider and more eager public than ever before. It is a tremendous task that the country has undertaken, for only one in four hundred of her population is going to school at present; but the state and the provinces are giving themselves resolutely to the enterprize as of foremost importance. Here in education, in which missions now hold the lead, is the most strategic, most vital opportunity that the church has faced since the year 1. I hope that the addresses on education will not fail forcefully to impress this fact upon us. I could wish that that great mother of the churches, the oldest and most efficiently organized of them all, the Roman Catholic Church would enter this field more widely and practically than she has. She would find it much more rewarding than the political maneuvering that frequently mars and obstructs her spiritual advance.

2. Of the distinctively moral elements in the present outlook it is more difficult to speak incisively. Of course it is a different thing to rouse moral enthusiasm against the faults of others than patiently take one's self in hand; and the republicans are finding that the Ethiopian does not change his skin nor the leopard his spots. It is all a question whether there are honest, selfsacrificing, efficient men in sufficient numbers to carry the day. I believe that there are. They are to be found from top to bottom of the new régime, and they are not unaware of what faces them. Premier Lu, who speaks both English and French fluently is described in a recent letter from Peking as "returning with the fixed determination to sacrifice himself for his country." The assembly man who represents my prefecture in the Fukien provincial assembly, a Christian and a scholar, is fighting with likeminded spirits to give real effectiveness to the early assurance of the new government of absolute religious liberty; for in Fukien it is proposed to disqualify for the franchise all heads of religious orders, in the hot-headed enthusiasm to have done with all the superstitions and benightedness of Taoism and Buddhism. Think of untried Chinese Christian statesmen having to fight their

battles for the Buddhist priest and the Taoist geomancer.

Young China is beginning to query about the moral issues of life both in himself and in society at large; the why's and the whither's begin to present themselves to him for the first time. Rev. G. A. Bunbury in south China tells of opportunities "to speak to students who are beginning to reflect on the cause of moral evil and to find the ethical theory of the Chinese classics unsatisfactory because inadequate." Here lies another great challenge to the Christian Church to take hold of its supreme task in China with redoubled energy.

On the whole and in the large China seems to be facing its future with fine moral enthusiasm. One of the first official acts of President Yuan Shi Kai was to appoint Shao Ying special commissioner to give his full time to the opium reform aiming to complete that reform in a year's time. The board of the interior gave official support to the program in a bulletin of March 20.

But when we turn to view the moral temper with which the powers are meeting China there is no cause for congratulation. Take this instance for example. On September 16 last, a consignment of seven chests of opium valued at 20,000 taels, the property of a Chinese purchaser who had paid full customs charges at Shanghai for it, transported to Anking, not a treaty port, in a vessel of the China merchants service, and stored in a Chinese-owned hulk, was seized by the order of the provincial Tutuh (governor) and publicly burned by the police. Here was a matter that from beginning to end was certainly wholly the affair of the Chinese both as to the legality of the seizure and of any claims for damages. Yet Great Britain in the person of its senior consul-general Sir Everard Fraser must needs proceed in an armed British gunboat, overriding the proper channels for such inquiry through Peking, to that same non-treaty port and demand an explanation of the Tutuh, the outcome of which is yet to be known. It looks as if some British were determined to put the "foreign dirt" into the very pipes of the Chinese and watch them while they smoked it. The transaction reminds

me of the action of the British consul in Foochow in 1911, who under pressure of the wholesalers who found their stock accumulating with no Chinese retail buyers because of the stringency of the administration of the reform measures, wrote as follows to the head of the bureau of foreign affairs—"I have to request your excellency kindly send telegraphic instruction to all local authorities that they issue an explicit proclamation for the general information of the public with a view to promoting the sale of this drug."

The *National Review* published in Shanghai says of this last Anking affair in a leader entitled "A New Opium War:" "We can imagine no act short of actual war more unfriendly to the Chinese government than this, which is so malign in its effect that it might almost have been calculated deliberately with a view to initiating an insidious attempt to wreck the Republic. Such a result would highly delight Great Britain's ally, but would it in the least degree benefit Great Britain?"

One is tempted to agree with an American banker's view of the situation. Mr. Warner M. Van Norden of New York, is reported in a recent interview, speaking of the foreign forces at work in China and rating them in order of efficiency of organization, to put first, "a small but brainy coterie of Britishers who with the aid of certain British government representatives are working to nullify the popular anti-opium movement, and firmly to establish again their nefarious traffic. In point of ability displayed in their tactics, and in the money involved in the outcome, no project in China is worthy to be compared with it."

Put with this front of the West toward China in one of its greatest moral struggles, the dollar diplomacy of the powers which for so many months has obscured and obstructed the course of real statesmanship, and we have very little of which to be proud in the moral clothes that we seem to be wearing in the eyes of New China. The *National Review* rejoicing in the break of the grip of the sextuple syndicate by the successful loan negotiated through the International Financial Syndicate says; "The whole conduct of this fight has demonstrated that what the six powers desire in this

country is not an open door, or an equal opportunity for all, but a door closed to all but their favorites, and no opportunity whatever for anybody else."

3. Turning again to the more hopeful Chinese aspect of the outlook we find the element of self consciousness or developing nationality presenting many grounds for cheer. One sees it especially in the enthusiasm and independence of the Protestant Christian Church, its sense of responsibility for the future of its own country. A growing spirit of unity also is most easily discernible here. Another half hour could be profitably spent on this inspiring theme. It is another side of the marvelous challenge which China is presenting to Christian Missions today.

Patriotism too, of a personal, selfdevoting sort is not to be sought even in times of peace in vain. General Chang Kuei-Ti was charged with disciplining the troops concerned in the mutinous outbreak at Tung Chow. Among those court-martialed and condemned to death was a young lieutenant, a so-called "grandson" of the general of whom the older man was very fond. The general himself signed the death warrant and then went into mourning for several days so that an unfounded rumor became rife that he had committed suicide. One who knows the grip of the family and the clan feeling in China cannot but wonder when he sees the sense of loyalty to one's country looming larger in a Chinese conscience.

4. Of self-control, the fourth element in our review, the Chinese are showing large measures as they grapple with the stupendous tasks before them. Of course some of it is close to the oriental feeling of fatalism. "We must eat three meals a day. What's the difference?" But to New China it does make a difference; and if she can keep herself from becoming heady and bombastic she will do well and keep the sympathy of all her friends. The leaders certainly have not shown any of these distinctively student tendencies. Their spirit is reflected in the words of a high official to a representative of a London journal recently. "China does not ask Europe for mercy; she asks for justice and a little patience. . . . We are in a little disarray it is true,

because the principle of authority is being restated in a new and strange language. We only ask what Europe cannot gainsay, namely time to set our house in order. Remember we have many mansions and there is much to do."

A last element in this selfcontrol or poise of the present day Chinese is something that he shares with the Chinese of all ages—his faith in "Li." "Li" is the conforming of one's individual conduct, or the ordering of social action in accord with the great moral laws of the universe. With the most ordinary coolie or boatman you can "kiang li," that is, "talk li," get at the reasonable moral conformity of any particular act or event. To the inmost rational moral nature of the universe; the highest affairs of state are administered with the same moral faith. The oughtness of things is with the Confucian an articulate living reality. That is why the present leaders and statesmen of China, although they know that the western governments do not pretend in international affairs to live up to their own highest ethical standards, and though they know they are faced by a dubious future, seem unperturbed. They feel that their own conduct of affairs, their programs and ambitions, have "li." The ultimate outcome is assured, "the stars in their courses" are fighting on their side. Their concern is only to make sure that they do not transgress "li." It is a moral faith that is unmatched in the non-Christian world.

From these glimpses of the splendid moral stamina in the Chinese people are we surprised to find that not a few of the old Confucians who have thrown in their fortunes energetically with the new day, intelligent, keen eyed men, with a knowledge of the world of affairs, regard the present as a mere episode in their nation's history. They still hold the westerners as their ethical inferiors—moral barbarians. For a time they will give themselves to learning western military science, western industry, western political science, modern science and modern education; and having made herself secure through these, by which the west has gained its mastery, China will resume its throne among the nations of the world, and rule not only its own affairs but in the affairs of the nations according to the supreme moral laws

of the universe. It is for us, peoples of a more advanced civilization and a more fundamental religious faith, to show them that the ethical bases for such a society and such a position in the brotherhood of nations must rest on deeper foundations than any in Confucius' noble system, and bring them to discover for themselves the one foundation that has been laid, Jesus Christ, the Righteous.

ORGANIZATION AND RECENT WORK OF THE CATHOLIC MISSIONS IN CHINA

*By Rev. Father Leo Desmet, for Thirteen Years a Missionary
in Mongolia*

The Chinese Empire is divided into five ecclesiastical regions, and each region is subdivided into vicariates apostolic corresponding to our American dioceses.

Vicariates are presided over by vicars apostolic, who bear the title of bishop, but are directly dependent on the Congregation of the Propaganda in Rome.

The vicars apostolic of each region meet together every five years, to discuss the problems of administration, education and propaganda, and to ensure uniformity of method and discipline in the different vicariates. The result of their deliberations is sent to the Congregation of the Propaganda which appoints a commission to examine the proposed regulations. When approved the rules suggested become law for the missions represented.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VICARIATES

Generally speaking the central organization of each vicariate is at the bishop's residence about which are grouped, as in the early ages, the higher educational institutions, namely the high school, the training school, the seminary.

In these schools the teachers aim to give the pupils a thorough knowledge of Chinese literature so that they may compare favorably with those of the public schools. Through the adoption of modern methods and text books, the pupils learn now-a-days as much Chinese in one year as they formerly did in three.

Outside the Chinese literature the course embraces bible history, church history, apologetics, history of China, geography, mathematics, physics, chemistry, Latin and

French or English. Mathematics, physics and chemistry appeal most strongly to the positive mind of the Chinese, and no punishment is so much dreaded by the pupils, as exclusion from these classes.¹

The best disposed and most intelligent among the students become priests. The others who wish to stay in the service of the mission are sent to the training school where they are educated to be teachers or catechists.

The eloquence, resourcefulness and wit of these catechists is astonishing. Traveling with the missionaries, they were asked questions at night in the inns, concerning the missions, their scope and the reasons of Christian belief. It was a real delight to us to listen to their explanations, with their peculiar Chinese arguments and comparisons. The foundation of numerous conversions was laid by these familiar conversations which often were protracted late into the night.

Candidates for the priesthood have to spend two years on philosophical and three years on theological studies. Before being ordained, they have to work as catechists for one year under the direction of a missionary.

I remember that one day, when the doctor of the French legation in Peking came to my residence to study the bubonic plague, as he did not speak Chinese he held a long conversation in Latin with one of our Chinese priests. He was surprised at the ease with which the latter used that language.

Formerly no school instruction was provided for Chinese girls, except in some wealthy families who hired private teachers. If I am not mistaken the Catholic missionaries were the first to open schools for them. Although instruction was rather elementary, it enabled them to read in their difficult idiom the prayer book, the catechism of Christian doctrine, the bible history and other religious books.

¹ I find in the *Calendrier annuaire* of the Observatory of Zikawei (Shang Hai) twenty pages devoted to the meteorological observations made by the seminarians of Sung shu tsui, tze, East Mongolia: Wind, temperature, atmospheric pressure, rainfall and some special phenomena as rain and snow by clear weather, yellow wind were observed with great accuracy for three years.

To spread that instruction, the bishops have organized training schools for young women where they are taught something of the Chinese classics, and drilled in the principles of Christianity and the methods of presenting it. A great number of these young students become nuns and devote themselves to the care of the orphans, the teaching in girls schools, and the instruction of the new converts of their own sex.

ORGANIZATION INTO DISTRICTS

Each vicariate is divided into districts, at the head of which is one of the more experienced missionaries. He is a consultor of the bishop and inspector of the different parishes; he makes up the statistics, distributes the money for the different works and takes care of the relations with the Chinese authorities. Very often he has to interfere in law suits. By the treaties, the Christians are free from local taxes imposed for purposes of the pagan religion such as building and repairing of pagodas, and holding theatrical performances in thanksgiving to the gods. Around old Christian centers, the non-Christians know and respect this exemption, but in the newer missions they often force the converts to pay these assessments. Should the latter refuse they are subjected to a thousand petty persecutions. The missionary tries first to settle the trouble on the spot, but this is often impossible, and then he must appear in court. On account of the many law-suits thus initiated the dean of the district is alone allowed by the bishop to have official relations with the mandarins. He generally knows the Chinese character well, and is not easily deceived by false reports.

PARISHES

Subdivisions of the district are known as parishes. In these are located a residence for one or more missionaries, a church, a school for boys, one for girls and often an orphanage. In Mongolia the parishes covered a large territory. Mine had an extension of 600 square miles: there lived

scattered among the pagans a Christian population of 1400 in 21 hamlets. The missionaries visit each village three times every year. The most important of these visits is in winter when the people are unemployed. According as the number and needs of our flock demanded, we remained in a village from four days to three weeks, holding service every morning and evening and preaching at each service.

In some hamlets is a chapel, with adjoining room for the priest to lodge in. Generally however we held services in some Christian home. Every traveler in Mongolia knows these Chinese houses: floor of clay, straw thatched roof, walls of mud mixed with straw, small square window set with paper instead of glass. No bed is in the room, but instead a k'ang that is a sort of oven or platform 2 feet high, underneath which passes the smoke from the kitchen fire on its way to the chimney. In winter with the k'ang as heating apparatus, with a sheep-skin coat, a fur cap and felt boots one could manage not to freeze. Life was pretty hard on these visits, especially on account of the uncleanness of the people, and we generally got acquainted with more than one kind of vermin.

During the day each Christian came to the priest to be examined on Christian doctrine and practice. After the evening service many Christians and pagans came to converse with the priest. The conversation covered such matters as Chinese customs of interest to us, and of western topics of interest to them. They asked questions about the different countries, the forms of government, the administration of the laws, the condition of the people, the charitable institutions, and the modern inventions; railroads, steamers, electric light, telephone, telegraph, etc.

Time spent in answering their sometimes childish questions was not lost: the people were made to feel more at home with the priest, their curiosity to learn of far off lands and happenings gave him a chance to explain the worth of Christian civilization. The close contact with his Christians, the personal interest he takes in each one of them (he knows them all by name) account for the attachment of the converts to their missionaries.

CONVERSIONS

A pagan comes to visit a Christian friend; the first thing he remarks is the absence of all images of idols. He hears the family sing their night prayers, is impressed and asks questions. His friend explains his belief and perhaps gives him a book to read. As his interest increases, he requests a more thorough knowledge of the strange religion. A catechist is sent to his home. Attracted by curiosity the men of the village flock around and every evening the teacher has a fair audience. The women in turn become interested, and want to learn more about Christianity. Two Chinese nuns (for they go by two's) are sent to instruct them.

Finally some families decide to embrace the new religion. They study the Christian doctrine and every night led by the teachers sing their prayers. When the instruction is well advanced, the missionary comes, completes the work of the catechists, and confers baptism on the catechumens. In many vicariates it is the rule to test these for two years before admitting them to baptism.

Conversions are also often effected through contact with a Christian family moving into a remote village, where the people never heard much about the Christian religion. They are attracted by the example of Christian life. In such way, a movement of conversions is often started in a region where the Christian religion was hitherto unknown, and brings into the church several thousand souls.

ORPHANAGES

The Chinese do not like female children. The baby girl is often deprived of the mother's milk in favor of an older brother. In the mission where I labored, the pagans did not throw the infant girls away, except in famine years, but poor people often sold them. Husbands in great need even sold their wives. The buyer of the baby girl brings her up to be a wife for his son, when he and she would be of age. Those children have a very hard life, being treated harshly and burdened with work above their strength.

Some parents knowing their little ones would be better treated in the orphanage bring them to the priest's residence. Under the care of Chinese nuns those innocent beings are well cared for, receive a good Christian education, learn cooking, sewing, and clothes-making, and in due time marry Christian young men. A great number of blind and cripple children are saved from abandonment through Christian charity. Strange calumnies are circulated about the orphanages, as for instance that the eyes and the heart of the children are pulled out and sent to Europe to make drugs. I know at least of one instance in which on account of that calumny, the parents starved slowly to death their girl of eight years of age, rather than bring her to the orphanage.

During prosperous years, few children are received, but when the harvest fails, they are brought in great numbers. Two years before my arrival, a great famine occurred in northern Mongolia. There had been no harvest for two years; on every road people lay dying of starvation. That year 250 children were received in one orphanage, and saved from starvation. When the missionary told me of the anguish he had passed through, not having the resources to save more people, I did not wonder that his face had become wrinkled and his hair white.²

QUALITY OF THE CONVERSIONS

The converts retain after their conversion some of their racial defects, but they acquire a greater sense of freedom, they favor western civilization, they understand the deficiency of their own culture; they have a strong faith, a great love of their religion, and are loyally attached to the missionaries.

During the Boxer uprising, in my parish, forty-two women and children were burned alive in a chapel, rather than give up their faith.

² A certain superstition prevents the parents from letting the children die in the house. A little before death they take them outside. Neither do they bury the small children. They wrap them in a piece of mat and leave them in a secluded place outside the village. Many times I saw a dog or a pig eating the tiny corpses. It is to be hoped that the new ideas will rapidly change this and other strange customs.

Forty more of my people surrounded by the boxers were asked to deny their faith, and on their refusal, were slaughtered in cool blood.

While we were besieged, during an armistice, the Boxers promised immunity to the Christians, if they would only deliver to them the two European priests. I told my men that if they thought it would do them any good, we were ready to die. They answered: Father, we promised to stay with you for life or death, we will stand by what we said and the battle went on.

A review of the Catholic missions would not be complete without statistics:

The latest I could find about the Catholic schools, was Krose's *Katolischen Missionen statistik* which gives in 1907 4857 schools with 118,013 pupils male and female.

In 1909 there were in China, 1,210,054 Catholics, 45 bishops, 1424 European and 631 native priests, 1215 seminarians, 229 European and 130 native lay brothers, 558 European sisters and several thousand Chinese nuns, 13,000 mission places, 8500 churches, chapels and oratories, 400 orphanages with about 24,000 pupils, and 600 dispensaries, hospitals and homes for old people (Cf. *Herder's Konversation lexikon*: Supplement 1911.) The *Calendrier annuaire* of the Observatory of Zi-ka-wei (Shanghai), 1912, gives for 1910-11: Number of bishops, 49; European priests, 1426; native priests, 627; number of Catholics, 1,363,697. That publication is very reliable.

RESOURCES

Considering the small resources of the Catholic missions this seems a satisfactory result. In east Mongolia in 1906 we received from the Society of the Propagation of the Faith about 14,000 francs not quite \$3000. If we assume that the missionaries receive \$3000 more through their friends and relatives, that would make \$6000 to provide for 48 priests, 3 boarding schools, 15 residences, 66 schools, and a number of catechists. The Christians being generally poor, contribute very little. The possibility of keeping up these various works, can only be explained by the fact

that the cost of living is very low and that the missionaries not only receive no salary, but contribute to the work all the gifts made to them personally.

The great need of the day in China are higher educational institutions. The lack of resources alone prevents their foundation in every vicariate. Catholic high schools or colleges are established in Zi-Ka-wei; Shang-hai, Canton, Hong-kong, Tien-tsin, Peking, Nan-kin, and even in Mongolia, for Christians and non-Christians, but they are too few. The Protestant missions are far ahead in that line of equipment. They have five modern educational institutions to every Catholic one. These schools are the best means of injecting some Christian spirit into the reform movement that pervades China.

The need of that spirit is apparent to all students of Chinese history. That great nation whose people are sturdy, intelligent, laborious, sober and patient and have so many great qualities, was ever held together by fear and torture. It passed through more bloody revolutions than any other country, and a spirit of anarchy is latent among the people, ready to explode any time. Indeed during the nineteenth century, I count thirteen uprisings and rebellions in comparison with which the revolutions of Christian nations look like child's play, in which more lives were lost than was the entire population of Europe in 1870. During the Taiping rebellion 20,000,000 people perished in the one province of Kiang-su. During the Tch'ang-mao-tze rebellion, Marshall Seng after crushing the rebels on the battlefield, pacified the south of the province of Cheh-lih by beheading 100,000 men. Piracy and robbery are always practiced on a great scale, and the idea the people have of their morality is rather strange.

To put it in Chinese terms: Robbery for them is a very good business giving easy and big interest, but done with a big principal! One's head is the principal. In 1901 in a small town of Mongolia 280 robbers lost that principal in one row, after first seeing their chief ironed to death with red-hot flat irons.

Those facts should give some matter for reflection to those who exalt the Chinese civilization, without seeing its shortcomings, and deny the need of missionary work among them.

Viewing that work merely from the political and utilitarian standpoint, may we not reasonably conjecture that if ever, as seems quite possible, the yellow race should put his myriads against the armies of the white man, the Christian spirit infused even in the non-Christians by the work of the missionaries will serve to allay inter-racial bitterness, and the Chinese Christians will easily induce their fellow countrymen to trust the Christian nations, and enter into friendly relations with them. Is it not quite possible that the work of the missionaries may some day preserve from torture and slaughter the grandchildren of their critics?

This view partly answers the question sometimes asked: Is the vast expenditure of money and energy for the conversion of the Chinese really worth the while?

Looking at it from a religious standpoint, the Catholic believes that the saving of one soul would more than compensate for the entire outlay by Catholics and Protestants alike.

Progress in the work has been slow, first on account of the natural apathy of the Chinese people towards religious questions; Secondly on account of the frequent persecutions against the Christians, and the destruction of their lives and property in political disturbances and rebellions; thirdly on account of the prejudices aroused against the Christian religion by the greed of the western nations for Chinese territory and resources, the missionaries being much against their will implicated by some of the powers, and so being regarded as agents of the foreign aggressors; fourthly on account of the divisions of christendom, which the Chinese are not slow to note.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the outlook is fairly bright. Since the Boxer uprising, the conversions have enormously increased, and now that the educated among the Chinese are all eager for western methods and western culture, now that the spirit of civil and religious freedom

has conquered China, the missionaries will try to reap a big harvest of souls, and to instill into the nation at least a leaven of Catholicism. It is true, as long as the Catholics in China depend on foreign countries for their priests and resources, Catholicism cannot expect to take hold of any large part of the Chinese people, but it is the earnest desire of all concerned to see as soon as possible the Catholic Church in China presided over by native bishops ministered to by native priests and sustained by her own resources.

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION IN CHINA

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Christian education in China during the past few years has made notable progress. Like the century plant, which spends many years in spreading its roots, elaborating its stout stem and fleshy leaves, and storing material, then, with startling suddenness elevates its "mast," unfolds its flowers, and matures its fruit; so Christian education has had a protracted season of diffused and experimental ministry in China. This has been of great value, and was preliminary to its fuller development.

It is rapidly passing from the sporadic, individualistic, empiric, and competitive stage of its early history. Its problems are being defined, its work organized, its methods standardized, and leading educators and missionary societies are coöperating in spirit and effort to elaborate and establish a thoroughly articulated system of Christian education, covering the whole range from kindergarten to university. This has assumed the proportions of a widely extending movement. Its spirit and motive are inseparable from Christianity, but were greatly quickened by the findings and influence of the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh.

Many have thought that Conference the greatest ecclesiastical gathering since Pentecost. It had the work of all previous gatherings to build upon. It registered a wider range and greater variety of Christian experience than any previous one. It interpreted larger achievements of grace and more varied and more insistent opportunities for the transforming and constructive ministries of evangelical Christianity than ever before. Its personnel was more typi-

cal of the universal church than the synod, council, assembly, or conference of any branch of the church could be. Its basis of assigning, and hearty coöperation in selecting the delegates made it more representative of the churches of Christendom than any previous Interdenominational gathering.

It differed from the church councils of the early centuries of the Christian era in that their *motive* was self-preservation; their *objective* to develop the self-consciousness of the church; their *effort* to differentiate, define, and delimit the church in regard to the subtle philosophical heresies, insistent traditions, and assertive customs which threatened to subvert its fundamental principles or destroy its ethical standards; but the *motive* of the Edinburgh Conference was the world's conquest for Christ; its *objective* to develop self-interpretation without waste of resource in energy, time or opportunity; its *effort* to emphasize the unities of Christian teaching and experience, to subordinate all peculiarities which are not vital to its deepest life, and to conserve every agency which might broaden or enrich its influence.

While the Conference persistently sought to develop the unity of the Spirit, and the practice of intercession, its most distinctive characteristic was its effort to secure, as nearly as might be, a scientific study and statement of vital missionary problems.

In order to do this, eight commissions, each consisting of about twenty experts, were appointed several months in advance to gather information from all lands, and consult those exceptionally wise concerning specially assigned subjects.

Commission III, which had to deal with "Education in Relation to the Christianization of National Life," received answers, some of more than one hundred typewritten pages, to its special inquiries, from about three hundred leading missionaries and representative educators.

These were referred to subcommittees to digest and formulate; then considered and edited by the Eastern Section, and revised by the Western Section of the Commission; afterward, reconsidered by the Joint Commission, and mailed in galley proof for criticism, emendation or additions to several

hundred personally interested in the subjects; their suggestions were carefully considered and the report thus elaborated was submitted to the Edinburgh Conference, which spent a day in its discussion, and adopted it, together with such recommendations as carried its unanimous judgment. Never before had there been such a comprehensive preview and painstaking discussion of missionary problems.

This report, thus prepared, in its section dealing with "Christian Education in China," sets forth among other conclusions and suggestions, that

The present moment is one of unsurpassed importance and opportunity for the Christian church; unparalleled in the world today, and rarely, if ever, equaled in past history. The facts demand, not only of missionary educators in China, but actually of the whole Christian world, thorough and constant study of the situation from a distinctively educational as well as from a general missionary point of view.

Organization for coöperative work.

A specific educational policy and system of Christian education for China, including educational associations, assemblies, superintendents, and supervision for provinces, large areas, and the nation, with a sufficient number of schools and colleges to serve as examples of the highest type of education in which intellectual excellence is combined with the character-forming power of Christian training.

The appointment of thoroughly trained Christian educators with practical experience before being sent out. The appointees to be selected with a view to promoting the greatest efficiency in conducting schools of every grade, and their service to be of as permanent a nature as possible.

With regard to the important problem of university education in China, the Commission records its conviction that the extent of the Chinese Empire makes it impracticable that one central Christian university should permanently serve all parts of China. It looks rather to the eventual founding of several such institutions in different parts of the Empire. But at only a very limited number of points should the attempt be made at present to develop work of a distinctively university calibre. It is of the opinion also that when in any of the great divisions of the Empire the time is ripe for the development of university education, all the Christian forces in that region should unite in the development of one institution of Christian learning. Secondary education, and to a less extent, college education, must be provided for in the more populous and educationally advanced regions, at more than one point, but the duplication of higher work in any great division of the Empire at an early date is to be deprecated as uneconomical and

as tending to inefficiency and to the alienation of the support of those from whom such support must be expected.

The Edinburgh Conference appointed a Continuation Committee of Thirty-five.

To carry out, on the lines of the Conference itself, which are Interdenominational, the ideas of coördinating missionary work, laying sound lines for its future development, and evoking and claiming by coöperative action fresh stores of spiritual forces for the evangelizing of the world.

To place its services at the disposal of the home boards in any steps which they may be led to take towards closer mutual council and practical coöperation.

To take such steps as may seem desirable to carry out, by the formation of special committees or otherwise, any practical suggestions made in the reports of the Commissions.

In accordance with these provisions, the Continuation Committee has appointed a number of special committees to deal severally with designated subjects, among which is a

Committee on Christian Education in the Mission Field with a special purpose of continuing the study of the educational situation with reference to particular mission fields, and of considering the means of fostering coöperation and coördination in missionary educational work; the committee to work in two coöperating sections; the European Section to consider especially the educational situation in India and Africa, and the American Section to give special attention to the educational situation in Japan, China, and the Levant.

The Committee on Christian Education in the Mission Field held a three days' session at Baltimore as soon after the Edinburgh Conference as it could be convened, tabulated its functions, defined the objects of its endeavor, and determined upon its method of procedure, and has held regular meetings at stated intervals to further its work.

Its chairman spent eight months, September, 1910 to May, 1911, in the Far East; visited Japan and Korea, and nearly all the leading centers of education in China. He carefully looked into the condition of many of the Christian and state schools; met with the missionary and government educators, singly and in groups; sat with committees, boards of education, and educational associations; spoke more than one hundred times on various problems related to the development of a

system of Christian education; and secured the appointment of joint committees at various strategic centers on the standardizing and coördinating of primary and middle schools, and on coöperation in the development of colleges, technical schools and universities.

The secretary, Dr. T. H. P. Sayler, has visited Egypt and Syria in the interests of the work of the Committee on Christian Education, and both chairman and secretary have attended meetings of the European Section of the Committee.

The American Section of the Committee on Christian Education has opened an office in New York, in charge of a statistician who, under the direction of a committee of three, is gathering, tabulating, and digesting comprehensive and detailed information concerning education in China and other lands, at home and abroad. The Committee includes a number of experts who generously give of their time as required to considering the problems which emerge and demand solution. As our card catalogues, charts and diagrams become more complete, we hope to be able to place at the service of any educational organization in the field or missionary board at home practical suggestions based upon a thoroughly scientific consideration of any problem it may submit.

The Educational Association of China, the object of which, as defined by Article II of its Constitution, is "The promotion of educational interests in China and the fraternal coöperation of all engaged in teaching," was organized by the General Missionary Conference held in Shanghai, May, 1890, and is actively engaged in prosecuting the work for which it was created.

Dr. Frank D. Gamewell, for many years a professor in the Peking University, whose reliance upon God, unconquerable devotion, persistent activity, and constructive ability, planned, directed the construction and maintained the orderly and successful defense of the Compound in Peking, where missionaries, native Christians, and members of the various legations were besieged during the anti-foreign Boxer insurrection till the armies of the nations raised the siege, was called in 1908 to supervise the educational work of

the Methodist Episcopal Church in China, and further its organization into a consistent system.

After detailed visitation of national and Christian schools throughout the empire; careful comparative study of the various curricula, existing conditions and problems involved; frequent consultations with educators, conference and local boards, educational associations, and recognized leaders from the home lands, he prepared an elaborate report, accompanied by charts, diagrams, and a well digested statement and display of the facts, together with specific recommendations which were laid before the Central Conference of China of the Methodist Episcopal Church, December, 1911. This report was adopted with practical unanimity, and embodies the educational policy of that branch of the Christian church in China for all its five Conferences. These Conferences are represented by 557 schools of various grades, 894 instructors, 15,823 students, not including its representatives in the great Interdenominational institutions. This policy provides for:

1. A General Board of Education, elected by the General Conference for all the educational work of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China.

This Board shall have authority in all matters pertaining to the standardization and articulation of curricula, and in the coördination of education with the other work of missions, and in the general advancement of education interests.

2. A Conference Board of Education, there are five of these, to have:

General supervision of all educational work within its bounds, and special supervision of the high schools and intermediate schools: to decide their location, determine the qualification of their teachers and set examinations.

3. A District Board of Education, elected by the Conferences of the District, to have supervision of the day schools within its bounds. Its duties shall be:

To decide where schools shall be located; to provide well lighted and sanitary buildings, properly equipped; to examine and engage teachers; to set uniform examinations.

Dr. Gamewell is continued as general educational superintendent for the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China, and the Educational Association of China has invited him to become superintendent of the Christian educational work of the entire republic, which position he has accepted.

I have referred to these three agencies working for coördination and coöperation in the Christian educational work of China. One interdenominational, the Committee on Christian Education in the Mission Field, created by the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh. One national, the Educational Association of China, and one denominational. There are many others, interdenominational, denominational, and geographical, too numerous to mention at this time, such as: The General Education Committee of China, appointed by the Centennial Conference held at Shanghai, 1907; various educational associations for two, three or four provinces, or a considerable area, larger than one province; and there is scarcely a province without a similar association working for similar results; while other associations are studying the problems, and furthering the interests of united effort in smaller areas about important centers. The three organizations referred to somewhat in detail are typical and reveal the trend which others only accentuate.

The churches in the home lands are showing a similar synthetic spirit.

The Presbyterian Church in the United States in its General Assembly, 1900, approved a report of its Standing Committee on Foreign Missions, in which along other things, the statement is made:

The object of the foreign missionary enterprise is not to perpetuate on mission fields the denominational distinctions of Christendom, but to build up on Scriptural lines and according to Scriptural methods and principles the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The American Baptist Foreign Mission Society has adopted the following principle as the policy of its operations abroad:

That to the utmost practical extent there should be coöperation with other Christian bodies working in the same fields. Such coöperation is of special importance in the department of higher education, where students are relatively few and education expensive.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions has repeatedly committed itself to any and every practical plan of coöperation which was within the limits of its financial resources, believing that its work in Asia and Africa is not to build up a church according to any set model, but that it is to coöperate with other Christian workers in the establishment of the living Church of Jesus Christ as the center of power and life and redemption for all men.

Other missionary and denominational assemblies have repeatedly expressed themselves as in favor of the closest coöperation with other societies and communions in promoting the cause of foreign missions.

There has never been a period since the beginning of modern missions when denominational differences were so minimized and the great fundamental truths of our blessed religion were so universally emphasized.

The consensus of judgment as held by many of the leading Christian educators, representative missionaries, and strongest mission boards, points towards several well defined conclusions. Among these, the following seem to be included:

The education of the Chinese is not the problem of the mission boards; the education of the Chinese is China's problem.

The problem of the Christian Church is:

1. To furnish China with a thoroughly standardized and coördinated system of Christian education, emphasizing quality rather than quantity.

a. To provide educated leadership in the various professions and vocations of life, such as preachers, teachers, doctors, statesmen, engineers, manufacturers, merchants, financiers, and the like.

b. To provide an intelligent and reasonably educated membership and dependable citizenship which shall be able to appreciate the teachings of God's Word, support the aggressive agencies of Christianity, and constructively influence their community life.

c. To serve as a challenge and corrective to the national schools of similar grade.

d. To furnish the republic an example of education at its best, which undoubtedly would be largely imitated.

This is necessary that China may be enabled and induced to provide for the proper education of the Chinese.

2. Such a system will require:

a. Schools ranging all the way from the kindergarten to the university.

b. That each school shall be true to its grade name, with its courses of study and work carefully adjusted to the other schools of the system, the ability of the young people who attend, and the preparation needful to make the most out of their probable environment.

c. Teachers specially prepared, of tried efficiency, carefully adjusted, and adequately supported, with special and comprehensive revision for training native teachers, and supplying them with thorough supervision.

3. As necessary to the development and maintenance of such a system of Christian education, it seems necessary that:

a. The primary schools should be denominational, the middle schools usually so, and the colleges not infrequently so.

b. Usually the colleges, and possibly in almost every case the universities, should be interdenominational.

c. The Christian schools of higher grade should not be unduly multiplied, nor near enough to compete with each other; say four, five, or six Christian universities located at the great strategic centers would be as many as should be attempted; each central to a large constituency, supplemented by a sufficient number of strong denominational or interdenominational colleges to supply it with thoroughly prepared students for its technical schools and graduate work.

d. Each college should have its preparatory schools closely affiliated, of adequate number and quality to supply it with thoroughly prepared students, and each of the preparatory schools should be similarly related to a number of primary schools.

If, out of every two hundred who enter our primary schools, in the United States, only one on the average graduates from a first-class college, we may not expect a much larger proportion, for some time at least, in China, and it will require a

comprehensive and well organized system of primary and preparatory schools to supply proper patronage for the colleges and universities.

This statement is neither academic nor wholly idealistic. A consideration of the development of Christian education as recorded in China during the past three or four years, will make it clear that the dominating trend is toward great, interdenominational universities, located at a few strategic centers, having denominational or interdenominational colleges, preparatory schools, and primary schools within a definite area, closely articulated; with interdenominational educational associations, and adequate supervision to maintain the standards and coördinations; to council, and in some cases, regulate and determine the location, grades, and efficiency of the schools.

It means much that the problems are being so carefully studied and clearly defined; that all movements seem to be synthetic, and that overlapping, harmful competition, and wasteful, undirected experimentation is being limited.

The constructive results are also noteworthy, and the future is radiant with hope.

The West China Union University is a recent development of Christian education in China and registers its trend. It is situated at Chengtu, a city of about 450,000 inhabitants, the capital of Szechwan, the largest, most populous, most productive province in China, with about the same area and twice the population of France. Chengtu is one of the six most important cities in the republic, a great literary, educational, and military center; and is strategically located to the three great provinces of west China which are geographically separated from the rest of the republic and contain about one-fourth of China's area and population.

In November, 1905, representatives of the eight missions engaged in educational work in west China were called together and they started plans which in October, 1906, resulted in the organization of the West China Christian Educational Union. This association is a compact and efficient body, which outlines the curricula, conducts the examinations, confers the certificates, and in general oversees the primary

and secondary educational work of all the Protestant missions in west China.

It was natural for those who were unitedly doing such thorough and systematic primary and preparatory work to desire enlarged and advanced opportunities, and during the Centennial Conference held at Shanghai in 1907 the missionaries in attendance from west China held three meetings to discuss plans for the extension of their educational system.

In 1908, a representative committee was appointed and reported in favor of establishing a union university for west China, under interdenominational control, and the proposition had the endorsement of practically all the missionaries in that field. When referred to the home boards for their approval, four boards—The Friends' Foreign Missionary Society of Great Britain and Ireland, the General Board of Missions of the Methodist Church of Canada, the American Baptist Foreign Missionary Society, and the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States of America—endorsed the project, "provided a plan of coöperation can be devised which will be acceptable to the coöperating bodies." Two other mission boards commended the project, but felt they could not financially coöperate.

After much consultation and correspondence the establishment of the university was unanimously authorized, under conditions satisfactory alike to the home boards and the missionaries in the field. It is thus international and interdenominational.

For some time about one hundred students had been studying at the Union Preparatory School, a number of whom were ready for college work.

So eager were the missionaries to meet the urgent demand and so confident were they that what should be done could and would be done that the West China Union University was begun and a class of ten students received for college grade work on Chinese New Year, March 11, 1910, though the joint committee of the four bodies which have coöperated in establishing the university did not meet to draft the constitution in its final shape until June, 1910, when they con-

vened in London, England, just after the Edinburgh Conference.

The control on the educational side of the university is vested in a senate composed largely of instructors, together with other representatives of the coöperating bodies. The senate determines the curricula, conducts the examinations, grants degrees, and has general charge of all university affairs in the field.

The ultimate control is vested in a board of governors resident in the home lands and composed of three representatives of each of the coöperating mission boards, and others, not exceeding eight, selected by these. The board of governors holds and controls all the real estate, funded capital, and other property of the university.

The revolution which resulted in the establishment of the republic temporarily interrupted the work of the university. All foreigners were required to leave Chengtu and were not able to return for several months, but the institution reopened in good shape in September last with the first two classes of college grade.

The medical department is in process of organization and will include three general hospitals, two of which have recently been completed, and \$25,000, gold, is in hand for the building of the third; \$25,000, gold, has been provided for the medical school building and one of the coöperating boards has set apart two instructors for that work.

The Union Theological School for the four coöperating missions, though not an organic part of the university as yet, is doing successful work and is closely related to it.

The normal department has held a prominent place in the purpose and work of the university plans from its inception. The China Emergency Appeal Committee, of London, has made a grant of \$4500, gold, for this department, and drawings are being prepared for the normal building. Five missions have been represented in its student body.

Two university men familiar with the language and having successful experience in educational work in west China have been at home for special training, are under appointment

and will sail within a few weeks to strengthen the educational department.

Plans are being projected to increase the two regular summer schools for teachers to five, to be held annually at convenient centers. The university extension courses, with lantern slides, will be enlarged. The development of the normal school for primary teachers, and the opening of a teachers' college for secondary teachers are provided for.

The superintendent of the primary and middle schools is to sail in January. He is also secretary of the West China Educational Union, and a member of the faculty of the teachers' department, and his influence in these various relations will greatly strengthen the unity of the work.

There are 7000 students in the 240 primary and middle schools connected with the various missions under the 355 missionaries in west China. These are included in the system and closely articulated through the West China Educational Union. They are following the same curricula, carefully graded and arranged as far as possible in harmony with the government courses of study, but including religious instruction; taking the same examinations conducted by the Educational Union; and passed from grade to grade by certificates issued by that body; and they are under the strong Christian influence of men and women who have gone out from home primarily to teach the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, and whose lives are a daily witness to the power of their message. This comprehensive system of unified activities will secure the supply of students for the Colleges, Technical Schools, and graduate work of the university, and assure a demand for their graduates.

FINANCIAL

The four participating missions support ten foreigners, graduates of western colleges and universities, who are teaching in the departments of the university as members of the faculty (at an average salary of, say, \$1250), \$12,250; an educational secretary whose work is a part of the normal department of the university is supported at an annual cost, including traveling expenses, of \$1750; last year each of the

four mission boards contributed \$1250 for running expenses, making \$5000; this makes a total annual contribution from the boards of \$19,000.

It is assumed that at least this amount will be contributed annually for the future, and the guarantee of the mission boards is not inferior as security to railroad or industrial stocks or bonds. This sum, capitalized at 5 per cent, may be considered as representing an endowment of \$380,000.

In addition to the above annual contributions, the four boards have already invested in the purchase of 51 acres of land for the university site, erection of buildings and equipment, all costing \$70,000.

Each of the four coöperating mission boards is under agreement to erect at least one college building, with dormitory for its students and residence for its member or members of the faculty. Based upon appropriations already made, these may be valued for the four boards at not less than \$125,000.

Money is in hand to secure about 50 acres more land, so as to square out the tract, and make ample provision for the future, say \$25,000.

The total value of the above assets is about \$600,000.

The board of governors are engaged in a campaign to secure \$500,000 for buildings and endowments, part of which has been pledged, and the outlook is very hopeful.

It is expected that the Woman's Union Normal College will be built near by, and it has \$10,500, gold, in hand for that purpose.

The actual university work which the university is doing is as yet limited, but its high and clearly defined ideals, the completeness of its organization, its spirit of harmony, the quality of its work, and its substantial growth are such as to commend it most favorably to the Chinese.

The government educational authorities have officially recognized and registered its middle school.

The Commissioner of Education has asked Dr. J. L. Stewart, vice-president of the university, to serve upon the Board of Advisors of the Government System of Education, and has made him a monthly grant for expenses.

The government representatives have requested the Union

University professors to assist in their educational work by lectures and in other ways, and have given other significant evidences of their appreciation.

This is the most thoroughly organized piece of educational work in the Republic of China.

The University of Nanking is another recent development. It is situated at Nanking in the lower Yangtze Valley. Nanking is the transportation, literary, and educational center, and an ancient capital of China, and many think that in the near future it will become the permanent capital of the republic. It is central to 105,000,000 people speaking the Wu dialect in the four provinces immediately about it; and, when the system of railroads which is being constructed is completed, it will be the most accessible city in all China.

After three or four years of discussion, a basis of union acceptable to the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Disciples of Christ, and the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, was agreed upon, and the union of the school supported by these boards in and about Nanking went into effect as an Interdenominational University, February 1910.

CONTROL

There is a Board of Trustees in America, composed of three from each of the coöperating mission boards, who perform the usual duties of such officers.

There is on the field a Board of Twelve Managers, four from each mission, who control and manage the affairs of the university, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees.

For immediate control there is a Local Executive Committee of the Board of Managers, as well as a University Council representing the faculty.

April 19, 1911, the Regents of the University of the State of New York granted a charter to the University of Nanking and in August, 1912, advanced to the degree of bachelor of arts the first class to graduate from the University of Nanking. Last year it had 501 students in attendance.

DEPARTMENTS

Its Preparatory School and its College are well developed, determining the standards of requirement, and other schools of similar grades are being developed and affiliated with it.

It is enlarging its Teachers' College and Training School, the latter for primary school teachers and the former for teachers of more advanced schools.

Twenty-eight mission boards and societies requested the university to open a language school, where young missionaries could spend their first year under the most favorable conditions to study the language. This school opened October 15 with about 30 per cent more students than it had announced it would receive the first year, and arrangements have been made to house and permanently care for the students who are applying from distant parts of the republic.

The Central China Medical School, representing seven denominations has become an organic part of the university.

The theological school, in which five denominations are united and seven others are coöperating, is closely affiliated with the university with the prospect of organic union in the near future.

The agricultural department is engaged in practical work along with its regular instruction. The government and the people of Nanking have turned over to the university 1000 acres of ground on the side of Purple Mountain, about two miles from the university site, and have offered 1000 acres more about thirty miles distant, but the latter is too far away to be handled at present. This gives opportunity to introduce a form of agriculture not dependent upon irrigation, which is recognized as an exceedingly valuable economic contribution to China.

Dr. Balie, one of the professors of the university, has direction of the department and is colonizing farmers who have been driven from their homes by flood and famine. During last winter and spring this department set out 100,000 forest trees, 4000 fruit trees, 2000 of which were imported from California, and 5000 mulberry trees, and a man trained in Japan according to the most approved methods of the Japan-

ese government, is teaching the care of the silk worm. It is also introducing the cultivation of potatoes, strawberries, other small fruits, and a number of cereals.

STAFF

The president is Dr. A. J. Bowen.

In the preparatory and college work are fifteen graduates of American institutions.

In the theological department are Dr. J. C. Garret, and four other university men, all with fine command of the Chinese language.

In the medical school are seven men, trained in American medical schools, making twenty-eight specially trained foreigners. There are also on the staff of the university thirty Chinese teachers, some of whom are scholars of great distinction, making a total of fifty-eight, and this does not include the agricultural department and only one from the language school.

EQUIPMENT

There are 63 acres of land and walls worth \$34,800 and money is in hand to purchase about 40 acres more; nine dwellings valued at \$23,750; three lecture halls, one scientific building, three dormitories (accommodating 500); one chapel, one Y. M. C. A. building, \$62,500; equipment, \$14,150; the total value of all equipment is \$134,200.

FINANCES

The 63 acres of ground, 18 buildings and equipment, are worth \$134,200. The three coöperating missions supply 12 professors at an average of \$1500 each; this totals \$18,000. Each mission gives \$3000 annually for current expense; this makes \$9000. The treasurer and accountant receives \$1000. There is an annual contribution of \$28,000. All of the above capitalized at 5 per cent represents \$560,000.

The university has recently received for land, buildings and endowment through its \$500,000 campaign, \$270,000.

The theological department has five professors at \$1500 each, making \$7500, which capitalized at 5 per cent is \$150,-

000; twenty acres of land and buildings valued at \$31,000; these two items total \$181,000.

The medical department has seven professors at \$1500 each which capitalized at 5 per cent is \$210,000; equipment valued at \$14,000; seven residences valued at \$21,000; \$300 on current expense account annually from each of the seven coöperating missions \$2100, capitalized at 5 per cent is \$42,000; totals \$287,000.

The grand total is \$1,432,200.

The canvass for \$500,000 is progressing very successfully; \$380,000 have been added to the assets of the university within a year, and there are promises of assistance sufficient to make the total assets equivalent to about \$1,500,000.

Three other denominations are completing their arrangements to unite with the university, which will further increase its assets and efficiency.

Christian primary and secondary education throughout the region covered by the affiliated and coöperating missions, including more than one hundred schools, is being standardized and coördinated under the supervision and direction of the university and the Central China Educational Commission.

This commission consists of two representatives from each of the missions in the Wu dialect-speaking districts, having educational work. Its purpose is to discuss the educational work in these four provinces, and unite all the work into a system, no matter where it relegates any present school.

The university is prospering, and has the heartiest endorsement of the Chinese. Its patronage is growing rapidly, and broadening. The highest officials patronize the university, honor its faculty, attend its public functions, and speak in highest commendation of its work.

Its agricultural department has had a notable recognition.

The China Famine Relief Commission granted \$3000 (Mexican) to aid its work. The Chamber of Commerce of Nanking has made a large grant to assist in its development, and so has the Silk Merchants' Guild.

An exceptional endorsement has been given it, signed by Sun Wen, the provisional president, Yuan Shih K'ai, the

president, Li Yuan Hing, the vice-president, every member of the cabinet of the republic, many leading generals, others high in civil service, representative merchants and influential financiers.

The University of Nanking has had the most phenomenal development of any educational work in China.

These two interdenominational universities, strategically located, in the Yangtze Valley, 1800 miles or five weeks' journey apart, each easily accessible to one-fourth of China's immense population, are coöperating in organized effort to realize the same ideals and are registering, even at this early stage of their development, an immense constructive influence which suggests the possibilities and benefits of a system of Christian Education which shall reach the entire republic.

A similar interdenominational movement is in progress about Peking. A representative committee of thirty-seven, the Union Educational Committee has been constituted, and has "sub-committees at work preparing courses of study for the primary and intermediate grade schools for the Chili province, a similar committee for the academic grades, another for summer conferences, and a Provisional Committee on Union Educational Work in North China," and they report considerable progress.

The Union Medical College of Peking—international and interdenominational—receives an annual grant of 10,000 taels from the Chinese government for current expenses, and has had notable recognition from the Chinese authorities.

Wherever other institutions may emerge in the future, the interdenominational universities at the great centers of Nanking, Chengtu, Peking and Canton, each with one-fourth of China's population accessible, must exert a constructive and immeasurable influence upon the 100,000,000 people to whom they are respectively central.

The Woman's Boards of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, established a Woman's Union Medical College at Peking in 1907, and it will graduate its first class in 1913. Its students come from

Foo Chow, Chengtu, Nanking, and Shanghai, as well as from Peking.

The Woman's College of Peking is an interdenominational institution, founded by the union of four denominational boards, and has graduated two classes.

There is an interesting and promising interdenominational movement in the Fukien province, which has made substantial progress toward standardizing the primary and middle schools, and is working upon a plan for an interdenominational university.

The Shangtung Christian University is another interdenominational institution which should be mentioned with considerable detail had we the time. It includes the American Presbyterian, English Baptist and Anglican mission boards.

There are some thirty different higher educational institutions in China that are interdenominational in their control, their faculties, and their students, and are serving all the missionary societies that join in their support and management with economy and increased efficiency. These institutions include universities, theological schools, medical schools, colleges, normal schools, schools for missionaries' children, and, in fact, educational institutions above the primary and intermediate grade, of every character, and some of the kindergarten training schools for the preparation of kindergarten teachers are supported and controlled by interdenominational bodies. This method of training and administration has passed its experimental stage, and reached a position where it commands the confidence of those who participate.

The Canton Christian College has been making decided progress the last few years, and has 418 students. Practically all the Protestant denominations at work in Canton—British as well as American—are united in the work of the University Medical School affiliated with the college, and the spirit of unity is on the increase.

The Canton Missionary Conference has organized an Interdenominational Board of Coöperation, which is operat-

ing as a unifying factor among the missions, churches and schools.

The South China Educational Association, "the membership of which is available to all, whether Chinese or foreigners who may be engaged in, or in any way connected with or interested in educational work," has established a Unification Committee, with a Unification Secretary, and is working successfully to secure uniform schedules and coördination in the schools associated. It issues a monthly bulletin, has monthly meetings, and many of the present problems of school management and of larger policy have had much light thrown upon them by the discussions before the association.

There are some denominational schools of high grade which are making excellent growth, such as St. John's University at Shanghai, Boone University at Woo Chow, and others. But the most notable developments are in the interdenominational institutions, and the trend of Christian education in China is decidedly towards the interdenominational university, with denominational and interdenominational technical schools and colleges, organically related or closely affiliated, strengthening the local administration, but keeping the determination of the larger policies and problems in the hands of the interdenominational boards in the home lands. There seem to be abundant reasons to justify this.

It eliminates overlapping, duplication, and harmful competition.

It secures coöperation, specialization of workers and work, economy of administration, and increased efficiency.

It broadens the field of activity for the institution, enlarges the constituency from which to draw students, multiplies the facilities for graduates to find employment, and gives increased opportunities.

It appeals to the loyalty and liberality of Christians in the home lands and makes possible the establishment, maintenance, and development of great Christian institutions; it secures to them the ability to maintain the highest standards of efficiency; it enables them to compare most favorably with the government schools in the breadth, variety, and

thoroughness of work offered; it guarantees the continuance of their Christian character; and simplifies the problems of governmental approach and recognition.

Business men desire that their investments shall have two qualities in particular, security and productiveness. Interdenominational institutions furnish both of these in large measure, and react with blessed influence upon the supporting Churches in the home land, reflecting the prayer of Our Lord for His disciples that they all may be one.

It has been a matter of astonishment to many that China, the oldest, largest, most conservative nation on earth, should have remained to the present time so slightly influenced by Christianity.

May it not be because Christianity has had neither the vision nor the spirit to properly undertake the mighty task? Christ took a little child and set him in the midst of His disciples as the hope and responsibility of the Church, and called His disciples to be laborers, to be laborers together, to be "laborers together with Him." When they recognize the possibilities of Christian education to so influence the children as to lay adequate foundations for the Kingdom of Christ, and possess the Spirit to undertake the programme with united effort, He will honor their labor with assured success.

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