

Def. Doc. # 1830

Exh No. 3216 A
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: AYABE Kitsuju
(Ex. Lieut.-Gen.)
53 years of age.

Having first duly sworn an oath as an attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I. Outline of My Personal History.

1. At the end of October, 1943, I arrived at Singapore from Tokyo to take up the post of Vice-Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters of the Southern Area Army (I took charge of affairs concerning operations.)

The then Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Marshal TERAUCHI. (He was in Singapore from 1942 until he moved to Manila in June, 1944).

2. In April, 1944, the Headquarters of the 7th Area Army was newly formed at Singapore and the Malay, Java and Sumatra areas were put under its command. General DOHIHARA

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came from Tokyo as Commander of the Army.

At the same time I was attached to the 7th Area Army Headquarters. (Due to a fracture sustained on the right shin as a result of an air-accident, I had been under medical treatment in hospital since February and not assuming my duties).

3. At the end of June, 1944, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the 7th Area Army and was on duty from 1 July. At that time my wound had not yet recovered and I was not quite equal to any work which required bodily action.

4. In April, 1945, General DOHIHARA was transferred to a post in Tokyo. General ITAGAKI was appointed Commander of the Army and arrived at Singapore from Korea.

My duty remained the same up to the termination of the War.

II. Statement in Reply to Inquiries.

1.

Q. Did you have chances to inspect the condition of war-prisoner treatment and billet accommodations at the camp?

A. About November, 1943 (I do not recall the exact date), I had an opportunity to inspect the treatment of the war-prisoners and part of the camp accommodations at Changyi in Singapore. The billets I inspected were wooden barracks, but were clean and the compound looked

comfortable, with flowers and vegetables growing in the surrounding area. According to the officials there, the prisoners were on the whole content with the treatment, though some were somewhat discontented with the food, which chiefly consisted of rice. I was informed that there was no serious question in the way of treatment.

Since I sustained an injury in February, 1944, I had no chance to inspect, due to my difficulty in walking.

2.

Q. When did you make a trip to Burma, Siam, Malay?
What was your mission when you made this trip?

A. In December, 1943, I made a trip to Burma and Siam. My mission then was to establish liaison in regard to military operations with the army headquarters in Rangoon, Maymyo and Bangkok.

About October, 1944, (I do not remember the exact date), I made a trip to Taiping in Malay Peninsula and Penang Island. My mission was to study the operation-plans of the 29th Army.

About April, 1945 (My memory of the date is not certain), I made a trip to the Taiping and Kuala Lumpur districts on the Malay Peninsula. The mission was to establish liaison with the 29th Army Headquarters in

connection with operation-plans and also to inspect the troops and the topography of the spot.

3.

Q. What are the names of the Commanders of these areas when you travelled to Burma, Siam and Malay?

A. Burma: Area Army Commander Lieut.-Gen. KAWABE (Afterwards full general).

Siam: Commander of the 38th Army Lieut.-Gen. NAKAMURA.

Malaya: Commander of the 29th Army Lieut.-Gen. ISHIGURO.

Q. Did Gen. ITAGAKI ever inspect these areas? What was his mission?

A. Burma and Siam were not under the jurisdiction of Gen. ITAGAKI, and therefore he never inspected these areas.

I remember he inspected the Malay area twice, but I cannot recall the date. I think that the first inspection was made in about May, 1945. The purpose of these inspection trips was to inspect the condition of the discipline, training and preparations for operations among the Japanese troops.

About May, 1945, I recall, he inspected the war-prisoners' camp and the internment-camp for civilians in Singapore in about May, 1945.

5.

Q. Was the treatment of war-prisoners improved after Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival at his post as compared with the period prior to it?

A. Gen. ITAGAKI is really a man of justice and a friend and champion of humanity. Therefore, he endeavored to give the best treatment possible to the war-prisoners and there was marked improvement, as explained in the following.

1). At the time of Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival there at his post, the Japanese steamer AWA-MARU, with full cargo of relief goods for allied war-prisoners came to Saigon, Singapore and Batavia from Japan. A large number of Japanese civilians unable to return home due to a tie-up then of sea-transportation between Japan and the Southern Areas were still there. With due permission, they sailed for Japan aboard the vessel. In spite of the guarantee made by the Allied Powers that the AWA-MARU would be perfectly safe, the vessel was attacked and sunk by an enemy submarine in the neighboring waters of Formosa. And when the

sad report reached there that none of the members of the crew or of the passengers was saved (I remember they numbered two thousand and several hundred), the public opinion of the Japanese there was so much excited that many of them opined that under the circumstances distribution of the said relief goods brought over by the AWA-MARU to the war-prisoners be suspended. Gen. ITAGAKI, however, attempted to allay the aroused public opinion, admonishing that "The spirit of Japanese 'Bushido' cannot permit such a thing. From the standpoint of justice and humanity, we should distribute the relief goods to them with pleasure even under these circumstances. You people must calmly display real spirit of Japanese 'Bushido'." Thus he ordered the distributions of the relief-goods without delay. I believe that the war-prisoners at that time must surely admit that this was realized.

2). Since before the arrival of Gen. ITAGAKI, our land and sea transportation capacity in the surrounding areas of the Malay Peninshula had been considerably reduced by the enemy's air and underwater attacks, and as a result towards January, 1945 the supply of rice from the Siam area had decreased to less than one-third of the total amount needed and ever since

the supply was steadily on the decrease.

Meanwhile, there was no other alternative but to decrease rations, because, on the one hand, our military strength in the Malay and Singapore areas had been gradually increased due to a change in operation-plans, making the supply of provisions all the more difficult and, on the other hand, provisions had to be reserved in order to make preparations for the new operations. Namely, in the Japanese forces, the ration of rice as staple food per head a day which used to be 700 grams was cut to 600 grams in February, 1945, and further to 500 grams in March of the same year. The rice-ration for the war-prisoners and internees was 200 grams less than that for the Japanese soldiers, but the want of rice was supplemented by potatoes rations which were obtained by self-production on the spot, and thus, with the supplementary and additional supplies of potatoes, they were allowed to get the total quantity of 700 grams of rice and potatoes.

Furthermore, as to meat and vegetables, besides their regular rations, the additional supply of these foods which were obtained by self-supporting on the spot was granted to all of them. And in this way efforts were made to prevent the decline of their

physical strength.

Gen. ITAGAKI gave special orders to his men to provide the war-prisoners, who engaged in the anti-airraid construction work since April, 1945, with the same staple-food rations as given to the Japanese soldiers, and furthermore added not only 100 grams of corn or 250 grams of Tapioca as substitutes for rice, but also such luxuries, though in small quantities, as coffee, sugar, milk, jam, oatmeal, etc. Under such circumstances, the war-prisoners were delighted to engage in this work. I heard that, when Gen. ITAGAKI visited the internment-camp in May, 1945, he specially inspected the rations provisions of the internees and desired the men in charge to increase them as much as possible.

3). In regard to labor, it was also unavoidable to make the war-prisoners work, when as mentioned before, the Japanese soldiers were all engaged in labor and even the Japanese civilians were rendering labor-service. But the labor, since Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival, was chiefly limited to the afore-mentioned anti-airraid constructions work, and, those who engaged in labor and their supervising officers as well were only chosen men who were specially healthy. Most of them

lived and worked together with the Japanese soldiers. And in regard to the supply of food and other rations, they were given the same treatment as the Japanese soldiers. Such being the case, the treatment was much improved, as compared with the previous period.

- 4). In respect to sanitation also, any medical supplies or medicine, which the Japanese Army possessed, except the special articles which were not in the possession of the Japanese, was given them immediately in compliance with their requests. No discrimination was made because they were war-prisoners. Especially, the war-prisoners who engaged in the above-mentioned work were allowed to undergo medical treatment by Japanese medical officers like the Japanese soldiers. So there was no case of airing their grievances at that time.

From the above, it may be seen that it was unavoidable from the standpoint of the general conditions at that time, that in the treatment of war-prisoners, especially rations had to be gradually decreased. These rations were uniformly reduced among the Japanese Army forces too. But special consideration was given to those who were engaged in labor in providing them with increased rations, which were the same as given to the Japanese soldiers, and also in adding to these rations other luxuries. It is a fact that an improvement,

though in part, was achieved in the treatment of war-prisoners. All this, I believe, serves to show Gen. ITAGAKI's leadership based on his respect of humanity.

6.

Q. How were the natives treated by the Japanese forces at that time?

A. Gen. DOHIHARA Commander of the 7th-Area Army, and his successor, Gen. ITAGAKI are both men of experience in the field of civil administration in the Manchuria and China Areas. They always instructed and guided their men to educate the natives with benevolence and treat them with love. Gen. ITAGAKI established his administrative policy, paying special attention to the improvement of public welfare. The cardinal points of his policy may be outlined as follows:

1). Food Policy.

During the period from April, 1945, to the end of the war, supplying food to other areas became totally impossible among the Malay, French Indo-China, Siam, Sumatra and Java areas, and import of food from the home country was also entirely suspended. And communication between Malay, Java and Sumatra became extremely dangerous, and consequently each area was obliged to find a means of self-support with regard to

food. But on Singapore Island and the southern part of Sumatra, it was difficult to produce or obtain food for the native population. Consequently, attempts were made, in the face of great danger on the sea, to import rice from Java and Siam, and during the period between April and August rice was shipped from these areas in the following way:

From Java to Singapore ... About 20,000 metric tons.

From Java to South Sumatra ... About 5,000 metric tons.

From Siam to Malay (Singapore) ... About 23,000 metric tons

Thus public demands were met. On account of this, the reserve and supply of rice for the army forces had to be limited.

2). Policy of Dispersion for Singapore populace.

Since it was expected that with the development of the war situation ravages of war would cover Singapore, they felt the necessity of dispersing the inhabitants chiefly to the Malay Area, in order to prevent or minimize the ravages of war and the dispersion was already under way. After Gen. ITAGAKI's arrival at his post, this policy was greatly accelerated and was put into practice without delay. As mentioned before, the food situation at that time was already very serious, but they distributed to the evacuees provisions

for 3 months, and besides this gave them subsidies and thus endeavored to prevent or mitigate the disaster that might be inflicted on the people and to improve their welfare.

3). Relief Policy for the Bombed Area in Singapore.

The Japanese armed forces quickly despatched a relief party to damaged districts whenever Singapore or its vicinity was bombed and the residential districts were damaged. The relief party was in charge of fire-fighting, rescue work, medical treatment, restoring order, etc. at the spot where damage was done. The military administrative authorities did their best to relieve the citizens there, distributing special relief-food to the sufferers. The Japanese residents also volunteered to render their services in this relief work. Such being the case, the inhabitants there were very grateful for what the Japanese did over there, ever so much their kindness.

4). Treatment of the Native Laborers.

In respect to the treatment of native laborers, the Area Army paid much attention to it, since during Gen. DOHIHARA's tenure of office as commander, Gen. ITAGAKI, after his arrival at his post, also gave necessary instructions from time to time to the troops

under his command concerning their treatment. When an important construction work was to begin, he would never fail to ask that stipulations be drawn up in its plan in regard to the treatment of native workers. Moreover, he often dispatched officials to inspect and lead the construction work on the spot and helped to set up the medical relief-party, contributing much to the improvement of medical care, sanitation, or provisions. Furthermore, he tried to encourage and accelerate the improvement of the treatment, taking measures to reward the army units or associations which showed good records in the treatment of laborers. Above all, in such cases of construction of alumina works in Bintang Island and the Oil-plants in Palembang, improvement of sanitation, provisions or other welfare for the laborers concerned was under direct control of the Headquarters of the Area Army and remarkable progress was achieved in its improvement.

7.

Q. Some Chinese or Chinese soldiers (some in uniform, others in plain clothes) are said to have committed piracy or robbery, publicly imputing it to the Japanese. Do you know anything about this?

A. I heard that there were some Chinese who committed piracy

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in the South Sea area. But I don't know of any concrete fact which can be taken as an actual example.

8.

Q. Did you know Gen. MATSUI, Iwane? Did you ever hear that he was unable to direct the future operations due to his illness at Nanking?

A. I met Gen. MATSUI once or twice, but I am hardly an acquaintance of his. I remember, when Gen. MATSUI was in Nanking, I was a Colonel and was staying in Tokyo. I heard that the General was not well, suffering from consumption.

On this 6th day of February, 1947,
at Singapore.

/S/ AYABE, Kitsuju (seal)
(Lieut.-Gen.)

Sworn to and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above named AYABE, Kitsuju, at Changi, Gaol, Singapore, the 6th day of February 1947.

David W. Barsons, Capt., Inf., Investigating Officer.

陳述書

陸軍中將 綾部 橋 樹

五拾參歳

一、経歴ノ概要

一九四三年十月末兩方軍總司令部參謀副長（作戦ニ關スル事項ヲ擔當）トシテ東京ヨリ「シンガポール」ニ著任ス

當時ノ南方軍總司令部ハ寺内元帥（一九四二年ヨリ「シンガポール」ニ在リ）一九四四年六月「マニラ」ニ移ルナリ

2 一九四四年四月新ニ「シンガポール」ニ第七方面軍司令部編成セラレ「マライ」「ジャワ」「スマトラ」方面ヲ擔當セシメラルルコトトナリ

土肥原大將軍司令部トシテ東京ヨリ著任ス

同時ニ予ハ第七方面軍司令附トナル（飛行機事故ノ爲右脛部骨折ニテ二月以來入院加療中ニシテ職務ヲ執ラズ）

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3 一九四四年六月末第七方面軍參謀長ヲ命セラレ七月一日ヨリ服務ス、當時傷未ダ治療セズ身體ヲ以テスル活動十分ナラズ

々、一九四五年四月土肥原大將東京ニ轉任シ板垣大將方面軍司令官ニ任マラ

レ朝鮮ヨリ「シンガポール」ニ著任ス

予ノ職務變化ナク終戦ニ至ル

二、設問ニ對スル陳述

ノ問件等ノ取扱、收容所ノ建物ノ狀況ヲ視察スル機會アリシヤ

答一九四三年十一月頃（月日ノ記憶不確實ナリ）「シンガポール島」チ

ヤンギー」ニ於ケル俘虜ノ取扱及收容所建物ノ一部ヲ視察セルコトア

リ予ノ視察セル建物ハ木造「バラック」ナリシガ清潔ニシテ草花野菜

等ヲ周圍ニ栽培シ環境快適ナリキ職員ノ言ニ依リ俘虜ハ食糧ニツキテ

ハ米食ノミナル爲若干不平ナルモ概ネ満足シアリ、取扱ニツキテモ大

ナル問題ナキ旨ヲ承知セリ

一九四四年二月負傷以後ハ歩行不自由ナリシ爲視察ノ機會ナカリキ

2 問何時「ビルマ」「シヤム」「マライ」ニ旅行セシヤ夫レ等ノ地ニ旅行

セシトキノ任務如何

答一九四三年十二月「ビルマ」「シヤム」ニ旅行セシコトアリ任務ハラ

「メイミヨウ」 「バンコック」ニアリシ軍司令部ト作戰
上ノ連絡ヲナスニ在リキ

一九四四年十月頃（月日ノ記憶不確實） 「マライ」半島ノ「タイピ
ン」及「ベナン」島方面ニ旅行セリ任務ハ第二十九軍作戰計畫ノ研
究ヲナスニ在リ

一九四五年四月頃（月日ノ記憶不確實） 「マライ」半島ノ「タイピ
ン」 「クアランプール」方面ニ旅行セリ任務ハ第二十九軍司令部
ト作戰計畫ニ關スル連絡ヲナシ且現地ノ軍隊及地形ヲ觀察スルニ在

リ

3

問 「ビルマ」 「シヤム」 「マライ」 旅行ノ際ノ各地ノ指揮官名如何

答 「ビルマ」 方面軍司令官 川 邊 中 將（後ニ大將）

「シヤム」 第三十八軍司令官 中 村 中 將

「マライ」 第二十九軍司令官 石 黒 中 將

4

問 板垣大將ハ此等ノ方面ヲ視察セシヤ其任務如何

答 「ビルマ」 「シヤム」 ハ板垣大將ノ擔任地域ニアラズ從ツテ視察セ
シコトモナシ

「マライ」方面ハ二回視察セシコトアリト記憶スルモ月日ノ記憶ナシ一回ハ一九四五年五月頃ト思フ目的ハ何レモ日本軍隊ノ軍紀、訓練、作戦準備ノ狀況ヲ概観スルニ在リキ

「シンガポール」ニ於テ一九四五年五月頃俘虜收容所及一般人抑留所ヲ視察セシコトアリト記憶ス

5 問、板垣大將著任前ト其後ト比較シテ俘虜ノ取扱ハ改善セラレシヤ否ヤ

答、板垣大將ハ極メテ正義ノ人ニシテ又人道ヲ重ンズル人ナリ從ツテ俘虜ニ對シテハ成シ得ル限り取扱ヲ良クスルコトニ努メ確ニ改善セラレタル點アリタリ之ヲ説明スレバ左ノ如シ

(イ) 板垣大將著任ノ頃日本ヨリ聯合側ノ俘虜救恤品ヲ滿載シテ阿波丸ト云フ船カ西貢、新嘉坡及「バタビヤ」ニ來航セリ當時日本ト南方トノ航海杜絶シアリシ爲歸國シ得サリシ多敷日本一般人ガ滯留シアリシガ許可ヲ得テ乗船シテ歸途ニ就ケリ阿波丸ハ絶對安全ナリトノ聯合側ノ保證アリシニ拘ラズ臺灣近海ニテ潜水艦ノ攻撃ヲ受ケ沈セラレタリ、而シテ此等乗船者（約二千數百人ト記憶ス）

ハ一人モ助命セラレシモノナシトノ悲シムベキ情報當方面ニ傳ハルヤ日本人ノ一般輿論ハ非常ニ激昂シ此ノ如クナルニ於テハ阿波丸ノ持來リシ救恤品ヲ俘虜ニ分配スルコトヲ差止ムベシト云フモノ多キ狀況トナレリ此時ニ於テ板垣大將輿論ノ興奮ニ對シ辭力ニ之ヲ謙シ「此ノ如キハ日本武士道ノ精神ニ非ス此ノ如キ際ニ於テモ尙ホ且ツ悅シテ救恤品ヲ分配スルコソ正義人道ノ旨ニ添フモノナリ冷靜以テ日本武士道ノ眞精神ヲ發揮スベシ」ト教へ速ニ救恤品ヲ分配スヘキヲ命シタリ當時ノ俘虜タリシ人々ハ其ハ實行ヲ認メラレシコトヲ信ス

(ロ) 板垣大將ノ著任前ヨリ馬來半島周邊ノ陸海ノ交通輸送ハ空中及水中ノ攻撃ニ依リテ其ノ能力著ク低下シ「シヤム」方面ヨリノ米ノ補給ハ一九四五年一月頃ニハ所要ノ三分ノ一以下トナリ爾後逐次遞減ノ勢ニ在リキ、一方作戰計畫ノ變更ニ依リ馬來及「シンガポール」方面ノ兵力ハ逐次遞増スル狀況ニシテ糧食ノ補給ハ益々逼迫シ一面作戰準備糧食集積ノ要求モアリテ逐次食糧ノ配給ヲ減シ

少スルノ止ムナキニ至レリ。又チ日本軍ニ於テモ從來一人一日主食米七〇〇瓦ナリシヲ一九四五年二月ニハ六〇〇瓦ニ三月ニハ五〇〇瓦ニ減少セリ。俘虜及抑留者定盪ハ米ハ日本軍ノニ比シテ二〇〇瓦減ナリシモ精米減盪ニ伴フ補足トシテ現地自活ニ依リ芋類ヲ以テ精米換算七〇〇瓦迄増給ス。又肉類及野菜類ハ定盪ノ外地自活ニヨリ増加給養ヲ一般ニ許可シテ體力低下ノ防止ニ努ム。

一九四五年四月以降對空防護工事ニ從事セシ俘虜ニ對シテハ板垣大將ハ特ニ日本軍ト同一ノ主食定盪ヲ給スヘキヲ命シ更ニ精米代用品トシテ玉蜀黍一〇〇瓦又ハタビオカ芋二五〇瓦ヲ増給スルノ外「ゴヒー」砂糖「ミルク」「ジャム」「オートミル」等ノ嗜好品ヲ少量ナカラ増給セリ。此ノ如クナリシヲ以テ俘虜ハ喜ンテ此等工事ニ從事セリ。

板垣大將ハ一九四五年五月抑留所視察時ニ於テ特ニ抑留者ノ食糧ヲ點檢シ可及的手段ヲ盡シテ増給スヘキ旨注意セリトノコトヲ開ケリ。

(ハ) 勞務ノ點ニ於テモ前記ノ如ク日本軍モ全力ヲ擧ケテ勞務ニ從事
シ一般在留日本人スラ勞力奉仕ヲナシアリタルモノニシテ俘虜

ヲ勞務ニ就カシメタルハ止ムヲ得サリシモノナリ乍併板垣大將
著任後ノ勞務ハ主トシテ前記ノ對空防護工事ニシテ之ニ從事ス
ルモノハ特ニ健康者ヲ選定シ監督ノ將校以下選拔者ヲ以テ之ニ
充テ多クハ日本軍ト起居勞務ヲ共ニシ食糧モ加給品モ日本軍同
様ニ取扱ヒシモノニシテ從來ニ比シ大ニ改善セラレタルモノナ
リキ

(ニ) 衛生方面ニ於テモ衛生材料藥品ノ如キモ日本軍ニ保有セサリシ
特殊品ヲ除キ苟クモ日本軍ニ保有セシモノハ請求ニ應ジテ直ニ
補給セラレアリシモノニシテ俘虜ノ故ヲ以テ差異ヲ設ケシコト
ナシ特ニ前記工事ニ從事シタル俘虜ハ日本軍ト同様ニ日本將官
ヲシテ診療ニ任セシメ當時何等不平ヲ聞カザリシトコロナリ
以上ヲ以テ見ルトキハ俘虜ノ取扱特ニ食糧ニ於テハ一般狀勢上ヨリ
見テ逐次減少ノ止ムナキ狀況ニ在リシモ日本軍モ一律ニ減少シタル

モノニシテ止ムヲ得サリシモノナリ但シ勞務ニ從事スル者ニ對シテハ特ニ増加シ日本軍ト同一給與トシ又特ニ嗜好品ヲ増加給スル等一部ニ於テハ改善セラレタル事實アリシコトハ一ニ軍司令官板垣大將ノ人道尊重ニ基ク指導ニ依ルモノナリ

6 問

當時現地人ニ對スル日本軍ノ取扱ハ如何ナリシヤ
答 第七方面軍司令官土肥原大將、板垣大將ハ共ニ滿洲支部方面ニ

於テ民政ニ經驗豊富ナル人々ニシテ常ニ現地ノ民衆ヲ慈育愛撫スヘキコトニ就テ部下ヲ訓諭指導セラレタリ 板垣大將ハ民衆ノ福祉増進ヲ特ニ重要視シテ施策セリ重要ナルモノ左ノ如シ

(1) 食糧政策

一九四五年四月以降終戦時迄ノ間ニ於テ食糧ハ馬來

佛印、泰、「スマトラ」「ジャワ」等各地間ニ於テ他地域ヘノ補給ハ全ク不可能トナリ本國ヨリノ移入ハ皆無トナリ馬來「スマトラ」「ジャワ」「シンガポ」間ノ交通モ甚タ危険トナリ糧食ハ各地域毎ニ自給ヲ餘儀ナクセラレタリ然レトモ「シンガポ」「ル」島及「スマトラ」兩部地區ハ一般現地住民用ノ食糧ノ生

産及取得困難ナル爲特ニ重大ナル海上ノ危険ヲ冒シテ「ジャワ」
及「シヤム」ヨリ精米ノ移入ニ努メ四月乃至八月ノ間ニ

「ジャワ」―「シンガポール」間ニ 精米約二〇、〇〇〇噸

「ジャワ」―「スマトラ」間ニ 〃 五、〇〇〇噸

「シヤム」―「マライ」(シンガポール)間ニ 〃 二三、〇〇〇噸

ヲ移送シテ民需ニ應セシメタリ之カ爲ニ軍需米ノ集積補給ヲ制
限セラルヲ得サリシ狀況ニ在リ

(ロ)

「シンガポール」疎開政策 戦局ノ進展ニ伴ヒ「シンガポール」

ニ戦禍ノ及ブコトヲ豫想セラレシヲ以テ現住民ニ與フル惨害ヲ

極力防止又ハ減少スル爲住民ノ疎開ヲナスノ要ヲ認メ主トシテ

馬來地區ニ疎開セシムルコトトシ既ニ著手シアリシガ坂垣大將

著任後ハ急速ニ之ヲ推進シ著々之ヲ實行ニ移スコト、セリ當時

既述ノ如ク食糧事情逼迫セル際ナリシモ疎開者ニハ三ヶ月分ノ

食糧ヲ配給シ其他補助金ヲ給ヘル等民衆ノ禍害防止、制限及福

祉増進ニ大ニ努力セリ

(ハ) 「シンガポール」附近爆撃救援対策

「シンガポール」附近ノ

被爆ニ際シ民衆居住地區ニ被害アリシ際ニハ其ノ速度速ニ日本軍ニテ救援隊ヲ派遣赴援セシメ罹災現場ノ消火、救助、治療、整理等ニ當ラシムルノ外軍政當局ハ罹災民ノ救恤食糧特配等ヲ行ヒ現地市民ノ救援ニ力ヲ用ヒ在留日本市民モ進ンテ之等ノ救援作業ニ奉仕シタリ此ノ如クナリシヲ以テ現地民衆モ大ニ感謝シアリシ事實アリ

(ニ) 現地人勞務者ノ取扱

現地人勞務者ニ對スル取扱ニ關シテハ土

肥原軍司令官ノ在任中ヨリ方面軍ノ大ニ意ヲ用ヒタルトコロニシテ板垣大將著任後モ隸下軍隊ニ對シ屢々所要ノ指令ヲ與ヘ特ニ重要ナル建設ニ方リテハ其計畫中ニ必ス現地勞務者ノ取扱ニ關シ規定セシメ且ツ屢々所要ノ職員ヲ派遣シテ現場視察指導ヲナサシムルノ外治療救援班ヲ編成援助スル等治療衛生、食糧ノ改善ヲ行ハシメタリ 又勞務者ノ取扱良好ナル部隊、團體ヲ表

彰スル等ノ方法ニ依リ之カ改善ヲ奨励促進セリ特ニ「ピンタン」島「アルミナ」建設及「バレンバン」石油施設關係ノ勞務者ノ衛生、食糧其他ノ福祉改善ニハ方面軍司令部直接之ニ指導ヲ加ヘテ改善ノ跡顯著ナルモノアリタリ

7 問

支那人又ハ支那兵（軍服ヲ着用シ又ハ便衣ヲ着用ス）ガ海賊行爲ヲナシ又ハ強盜ヲナシ之ヲ日本人ガナシタリト揚言シタルコトアリトノコトナルガ之ニ就テ知ルコトナキヤ

答

南海方面ニ支那人ノ海賊行爲ヲナス者アリト云フコトハ聞キシコトアルモ其ノ實例ニツキ具體的事實ヲ承知セズ

8 問

松井石根大將ヲ知レリヤ同大將カ南京ニテ病ノ爲ニ爾後ノ作戰指導ヲナシ得サリシトノコトアリシヲ聞キタルコトアリヤ

答

松井大將ニハ二度會ヒシコトアルモ知已ト云フ程度ニアラス松井大將ノ南京ニ在リシ頃ハ予ハ大佐ニテ東京ニ在リシト記憶ス同大將カ肺病ニテ健康勝レズトノコトヲ聞キシコトアリ

西紀一九四七年二月六日

於「シンガポール」

陸軍中將

綾部 楠 樹