

OFFICE **United States Senate**
THE SECRETARY

JA
DC/R

The Secretary wishes
an acknowledgment sent
immediately. If this
communication cannot be
answered in three days.

Washington, D.C.
November 23, 1945

Respectfully referred to
Hon. James Byrnes, Secretary,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.

Letter to Senator Shipstead
NOV 29 1945
BYR

with thanks for such favorable consideration as
the communication herewith submitted warrants,
and for a report thereon, to accompany return
of inclosure.

By direction of
Henrik Shipstead, S. S.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 NOV 27 PM 12 08

DC/R
RECORDS BRANCH

NOV 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF AFFAIRS

OCR NE Unit
Date
Dist.

740.00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 11-2345

CS/VJ
740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-2345

UNITED CHRISTIAN MINISTRY

TO JAPANESE AMERICANS
IN THE TWIN CITIES AREA

STAFF:

THE REV. DAN G. LONG, (Church Federation) Chairman
THE REV. DAISUKE KITAGAWA, (Episcopal) Director
THE REV. FRANCIS M. HAYASHI, Methodist
THE REV. PAUL M. NAGANO, Baptist
THE REV. SHIMPACHI KANOW, Presbyterian
MISS MARTHA AKARD, Lutheran
MRS. DAISUKE KITAGAWA
Office Secretary

November 14, 1945

OFFICE:
MINNEAPOLIS CHURCH FEDERATION
914 MARQUETTE AVENUE
MINNEAPOLIS 2, MINN.
TELEPHONE: GE. 6644

The Honorable Henrik Shipstead
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

We Japanese people, who happen to have settled in Minnesota as the result of the War Relocation Authority's program, met at the St. Paul International Institute on November 11 for a monthly social gathering.

We wish to express our sincere appreciation for the most cordial and friendly way in which the residents of this state have received us into their midst. In spite of the fact that we had to go through a great deal of affliction and material loss by the mass evacuation and life in the relocation centers, we feel we have been richly rewarded by coming to this state and finding in it a different sort of America from what we used to know on the West Coast. It is our feeling that the State of Minnesota, and the Midwest on the whole, with its population of numerous national and racial backgrounds, is the place from which real American and democratic life is developed. In view of the privilege of sharing in this magnificent experience, the hardship of the past few years can easily be forgotten.

During the course of the afternoon, our conversation turned to the subject of our homeland. We felt that the only way to save Japan and a wholesome relationship between this country and Japan is to have General MacArthur continue his present policy of occupation which has more than proved his deep understanding of not only the problems involved but the people and their needs. We are not in a position politically to raise our voices, but as people who are familiar with the situation of that country, we would like to express our wholehearted endorsement of his policy. We have written to the Secretary of State to this effect; a copy of the letter is enclosed.

Respectfully yours,

The Japanese Residents of Minnesota

By Daisuke Kitagawa
(Rev.) Daisuke Kitagawa

DK:fsk
Enc.

FILED
DEC 10 1945

That They May Be One

November 14, 1945

-COPY-

The Honorable James Byrnes
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

We Japanese people, who happen to have settled in the State of Minnesota as the result of the program conducted by the War Relocation Authority, met at the International Institute of St. Paul on November 11 for a monthly social gathering. Our conversation turned to the subject of our homeland which we had left many years previous to the war which has just ended.

Some of us have sons who are now serving in Japan as American soldiers in connection with the government of occupation, through whose letters as well as through the public press, we have learned of the excellent way in which General Douglas MacArthur, chief of the government of occupation, has been handling the most complex problems of post-war Japan. Even though we who are aliens in this country are not in a position politically to raise our voices, we feel constrained to express our heartfelt appreciation for General MacArthur's policies in regard to the occupation of Japan which show such insight, understanding, and sympathy--which to our minds is more than proving the true spirit of Americanism.

We sincerely hope that he will be able to continue in his present capacity without interference either from his fellow citizens at home or from any other nation.

If you should have the opportunity to do so, please convey this our feeling to the General and that we are wishing him Godspeed. May God bless you and give you wisdom and strength to execute your responsibilities in these difficult days.

Respectfully yours,

The Japanese Residents of Minnesota

By _____

Daisuke Kitagawa

DK:fsk

DEC 6 1945

In reply refer to
SPD 740.00119 Control (Japan)/11-2345

My dear Senator Shipstead:

I have received your letter of November 23, 1945, enclosing a letter dated November 14, 1945, from the Reverend Daisuke Kitagawa and other residents of Minnesota. Mr. Kitagawa expresses the appreciation of persons of Japanese race who are living in Minnesota for the cordial and friendly way in which they have been received by the residents of Minnesota. He also expresses the endorsement by his group of the American policy in Japan.

It is of course a pleasure to me when the residents of our country approve sincerely the policies which we develop and I am grateful to you for sending me Mr. Kitagawa's letter.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes

The Honorable
Henrik Shipstead,
United States Senate.

DEC 5 1945 P.M.

SPD:EBailey:lmv

JFA

11/30-12/5/45

Routine

F.W. 74000119 Control (Japan)/11-2345

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

103

ACTION: S
INFO: S
U
C
A-D
EUR-2
FE-3

GEM-507 -P
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War
Dated November 24, 1945
Rec'd 10:40 p.m., 23rd.

S
FE
DCR
File
KS
12-10-45

Secretary of State,
Washington.



740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2445

U.S. URGENT

3943, November 24, 1 a.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY

Following is translation of statement handed me by Molotov this evening in reply to communication I transmitted to him on November 19 in accordance with my 3903, November 20:

Moscow, November 23, 1945.

One. The Soviet Government, having considered the amendments of the United States Government concerning the control of Japan transmitted by Mr. Harriman November 19, believes it necessary to dwell upon the two chief questions raised by the United States Government.

This refers, in the first place, to the procedure for taking decisions in those important cases in which questions of principle, such as questions of changing the regime of control over Japan and changes in the composition

DEC 10 1945

FILED

SECRET

Anal.	_____
Rev.	_____
Cat.	_____
Dist.	_____

DCR - NE Unit

[Handwritten initials]

Confidential File

SECRET

-2-#3943, November 24, 1 a.m., from Moscow via War.

composition of the Japanese Government, et cetera, are decided, and in the second place to the question of interim directives.

Two. Since the United States Government expresses the desire to work out a policy which is agreed upon (soglasovannaya) in all spheres involving the control and also the future of Japan, the Soviet Government assumes that there is no ground for objection against the deciding by agreement (soglasovaniye) among the chief Allies of the above mentioned questions of principle which have important significance in the implementation of control over Japan. This is all the more true since in all other questions the Commander-in-Chief of the American occupation troops in Japan has sufficiently broad opportunities and real force for the taking of prompt measures, having the decisive voice in all these matters. Given such broad rights on the part of the Commander-in-Chief and given the factual situation in which the occupation troops all through Japan are completely subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, there is no ground for apprehension that the above mentioned principle of agreement (soglasovaniye) between the four Allies in the decision of the few questions of principle will lead to a weakening of the authority

SECRET

105

SECRET

-3-#3943, November 24, 1 a.m., from Moscow via War.

the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. The Soviet Government also sees no ground for the assumption that the above mentioned procedure would endanger the effective implementation of Allied policy in Japan since the state of agreement (soglasovannost) among the four Allies would ensure more effectiveness in the implementation of Allied policy toward Japan. Therefore, the Soviet Government believes that major questions of control over Japan should not be decided at the individual disposition of the Commander-in-Chief. The Soviet Government believes that those deciding such questions cannot limit themselves to consultations with the other representatives of the Allied Powers in the control body for Japan but that there must be assured a state of agreement (soglasovannost) in the decisions adopted among the four Allied Powers -- the United States, Great Britain, The Soviet Union and China. Otherwise, the participation of the Allied Powers in control over Japan will be only nominal and the agreement expressed by the United States Government to the principle of unanimity of the four chief Allies will have no real meaning.

Three.

SECRET

SECRET

100

-4-#3943, November 24, 1 a.m., from Moscow via War.

Three. In accordance with this the Soviet Government assumes that voting procedure in the Far Eastern Commission should ensure the realization of the principle of unanimity of the four Allied Powers not only in questions concerning basic changes in the constitutional structure or in the regime of control of Japan but also in such a question as a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, including the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the Soviet Government finds it possible that in cases of necessity the Commander-in-Chief might take decisions on the change of individual ministers of the Japanese Government after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the control body.

Four. The Soviet Government believes that, providing agreement is reached regarding the procedure of deciding questions of principle such as questions of changing the regime of control over Japan and changing the composition of the Japanese Government as a whole and so on it would also be possible to bring about agreement (soglasovaniye) of the points of view of our governments regarding the procedure of issuing interim directives on other questions.

Five. The

SECRET

SECRET

107

-5-#3943, November 24, 1 a.m., from Moscow via War.

Five. The Soviet Government assumes that the other proposals presented by the United States Government on November 19 should be considered after agreement (soglasovaniye) has been achieved of the positions of four governments on the major questions.

Six. As regards the observations made by Mr. Harriman concerning the control mechanism in Rumania and Hungary, these are not shared by the Soviet Government. It should be recalled that in connection with the conclusion of the war in Europe the Soviet Government on July 12, 1945 proposed to the Governments of the USA and Great Britain that the Allied Control Commission in Hungary should in the future conduct its work on the basis of the following statute:

"The directives of the Allied Control Commission on questions of principle shall be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement (soglasovaniye) on these directives with the British and American representatives."

A decision was adopted at the Berlin Three Power Conference to extend this procedure of work of the

Allied Control

SECRET

SECRET

108

-6-#3943, November 24, 1 a.m., from Moscow via War.

Allied Control Commission also to Rumania and Bulgaria. Thus, as evident from the above, a procedure of issuing directives on questions of principle only after agreement (soglasovaniye) of these directives with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the control body was provided for in the statute concerning the Allied Control Commission for Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

HARRIMAN

WTD



VICE
OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 24, 1945.

RESTRICTED

NO. 69

SUBJECT: Return to Japan of AOYAMA Kazuo

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 DEC 6 PM 11 19

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECORDS BRANCH

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
DEC 7 - 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Paterson
DCIR
Central Japan
11-643

Sir:

With reference to the Department's Airgram A-21 of November 6, 1945, regarding the request for transportation to Japan of AOYAMA Kazuo, I have the honor to report that it is not deemed desirable at this time to facilitate AOYAMA's travel from China to Japan until further investigation can be undertaken of his background and activities.

Certain reports in Chungking cast some doubt on AOYAMA's integrity and until these can be clarified it is suggested that decision be deferred. (See report from Embassy in Chungking written by Emmerson dated approximately January, 1945).

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Original and duplicate, with reverse carbon, to Department.

Copies to: GHQ, SCAP, and Embassy, Chungking.

800

JKEmmerson:jrf

DCR NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>md</i>
Rev.	<i>md</i>
Cat.	<i>FT</i>
Dist.	

DEC 11 1945

CS/D

740.00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 11-2445

740.00119 Control
(Japan) 11-2445

	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	<p style="font-size: 2em; margin: 0;">EX 146</p> <p style="margin: 0;">CEA 4-1-52</p>
--	--	---

FORM DS-507
3-5-47

REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECTION A

TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 2951	BUILDING NS	ROOM NO. 3151
2. REQUESTER'S NAME Wilson C. Flake	DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 4834	BUILDING NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R			

SECTION B

ATTACHED
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE OF DOCUMENT
Despatch No. 69

TO: **Secretary of State** DATE
11/24/45

FROM: **George Atcheson, Jr., USPOLAD, Tokyo**

SUBJECT: **Return to Japan of Aoyama Kazuo**

PRESENT CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

SECTION C

THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.

RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION CHANGE TO:

TOP SECRET* SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).

BY AUTHORITY OF: **U. Alexis Johnson** *U. Alexis Johnson* DATE
3/24/52 OFFICE OF THE ASST SECY
FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECTION D

INSTRUCTIONS— (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.

(2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.

(3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.

(4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.

(5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).

(6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
--

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	
FORM DS-507 3-5-47		REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING	
		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	
SECTION A			
TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING	ROOM NO.
FE	2951	NS	3151
2. REQUESTER'S NAME	DIVISION	EXTENSION	BUILDING
Wilson C. Flake	FE	4834	NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD:			
DC/R, REF, PD, etc. DC/R			
SECTION B			
ATTACHED THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
TYPE OF DOCUMENT			
Despatch No. 69			
TO:			DATE
Secretary of State			11/24/45
FROM:			
George Acheson, Jr., USPOLAD, Tokyo			
SUBJECT:			
Return to Japan of Aoyama Kazuo			
PRESENT CLASSIFICATION			
RESTRICTED			
SECTION C			
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.			
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO:		
	<input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED *(If reclassified to a high classification explain on reverse side).		
BY AUTHORITY OF:	DATE	OFFICE OF THE ASST SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS	
U. Alexis Johnson	3/24/52		
SECTION D			
INSTRUCTIONS— (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate. (2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable. (3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy. (4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request. (5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA). (6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		UNCLASSIFIED	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM 109

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-EE
INFO:
S
U
C
A-D
EUR-3
FE-2

AMN-473 -C
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War
Dated November 24, 1945
Rec'd 8:35 p.m., 23rd


Handwritten notes:
S
FE
DC/A
File
K

Secretary of State
Washington

URGENT

3944, November 24, 3 a.m.

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY.



This evening I questioned Molotov (re my 3943, Nov 24, 1 a.m.) as to the precise meaning of the word "so masovaniye" and referred to the interpretation put on it by the Deputy Chairman of the Rumanian ACC. He disclaimed knowledge of the discussions in Rumania and stated that the word meant the "process of discussion through which agreement is reached". I asked specifically whether in Japan he intended that a definite agreement must be reached before action was taken by the Supreme Commander on those matters set forth in his statement. He replied in the affirmative. It is therefore perfectly clear that the translation which conveys the meaning of this word in English is in effect

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2445 Confidential File

SECRET

DCR - NE Unit
na.
Re.
Cat.
Dist.

"agreement"

DEC 10 1945

FILED

11-24

SECRET

-2- #3944, November 24, 3 a.m. from Moscow via War.

"agreement".

In reply to my request Molotov said he would look into the report of the discussion at the meeting of the ACC in Rumania on Sept 6.

Turning to his statement, I told him that I had been instructed to inform him that my govt could not (repeat not) agree to any limitation on its right to ~~issue~~ interim directives. I again pointed out the impossible situations which might arise pending agreement and also referred to our experience in the Balkan countries. He replied that mistakes had been made by both sides in these countries but these could be rectified. He maintained his position regarding Japan but did not (repeat not) do so aggressively. I finally told him I would submit his statement to my government.

HARRIMAN

JT

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

111

~~JA~~
DC/R

ACTION-JA

INFO:

S ECW-1392 -C

U

C

A-B

A-D

SA

SA/GN

SA/M-2

LE

SPA Secretary of State

FE

DC/L-C Washington

SPD-2

FC-14

OIC

OPI

PL

INI

PLAIN

Tokyo via War

Dated November 24, 1945

Rec'd 8:55 a.m. 27th

NOV 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
No action
File

Secretary of State

Washington

160, November twenty-fourth

Konoye's report on constitution was submitted to the Emperor. We are informed that it will not be made public nor opened for public discussion at this time as it is a report solely for the Emperor partly on the question whether revision is necessary a reflection of the attitude of some official Jap quarters.

In contrast of general official attitude toward constitutional revision, (this is our 160, November 27) beginning of free and quite frank press discussion of the question have recently appeared in Jap editorial comment. Yomiuri Hochi early this month carried story of discussion of democracy as its office and quoted following statement as having been made (one) by one Murobushi, local newspaperman: "The Govt and Prince Konoye it seems only plan to investigate whether it is necessary

TR 894.011

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2445

FILED
DEC 5 - 1945

8/11-24

Handwritten notes and routing information in a box, including "Rev", "Cat", "Dist" and other markings.

PLAIN

-2-November twenty-fourth, from Tokyo via War

is necessary to revise the existing constitution or not and if so, how much; but so far as item is concerned the existing constitution has gone with the Potsdam declaration; under democracy, not only Emperor but also the people have right to suggest revision of constitution; question is not how to revise existing constitution but how to set up new constitution; first thing to do is to transfer sovereignty from the Emperor to the people;" and (two) by Marquis Tokugawa: "As of August 15 old things had died; therefore establishment of new constitution is necessary rather than revision; now question is whether Imperial household should continue to exist; it is not necessary to determine the new status of the Emperor since he existed before the Meiji restoration; why not just think he is the master of a house or rather of a family?; we have done so for three thousand years."

Example of lack of flexibility in Jap official attitude toward fundamental changes in governmental administrative framework as well as ideological premises thereof is statement in NIPPON TIMES November 22 that at present Emperor will not approve wish of Prince Higashi Kuni to "descend to the status of
a common

PLAIN

-3-November twenty-fourth, from Tokyo via War

113

a common man,"according to Imperial household Minister and the President of the Board of Peerage and Heraldry; but the Emperor will "act in unison with all members of the Imperial family as long as he is permitted to do so and does not intend to allow any Imperial Prince to descend to the status of a commoner without logical reason for such action." Paper states further that contrary to public expectation the Council charged with reexamination of the peerage law will probably recommend retention of the present peerage system as "families with historical significance should be respected".

ATCHESON

EDA ..

PLAIN

114

~~BC~~

December 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM:

**TO: Assistant Chief of Staff
Operations Division
War Department**

**FROM: Director
Office of Far Eastern Affairs
State Department**

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum received by the Department from the British Embassy in regard to the desire of the British Government to augment personnel in the British Staff Section attached to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. The Department feels that the proposals of the British Government are reasonable, and approves in principle the requests set forth in the above-mentioned memorandum.

It is requested that appropriate action be taken to permit the implementation of the British Government's proposals and that the Department be notified of the results of such action in order that reply may be made to the British Embassy.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/11-2445

CS/LF

740.00119 Control
(Japan) /11-2445

*Handed to Col.
Vatcup 1/3/45
WTA*

DCB NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>mm</i>
Re.	<i>mm</i>
Cat.	<i>mm</i>
Dis.	

EUR

Enclosure.

WTA
JA:KTurner:mp

FE

107

~~BC~~

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 NOV 26 PM 4 46

Ref:G107/ 145

DCR

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have reached the conclusion that, irrespective of any Allied control arrangements which may be decided upon for Japan, an increase in the British representation there is now a matter of urgency. They feel however that the time has not yet come to appoint a political representative, as foreshadowed in Mr. Bevin's letter of the 4th October to Mr. Byrnes, and that present needs will best be served by building up the British staff already in Japan. They have therefore decided to add political, financial and other technical experts to the British Staff Section under General Gairdner, the Prime Minister's personal representative with General MacArthur, so as to constitute a liaison mission, with General Gairner as its head, organized in such a way that it can establish close liaison with the main sections of General MacArthur's Headquarters.

2. His Majesty's Government propose to appoint about ten Foreign Service officers to this mission, together with suitable clerical staff,--a total of some twenty-four persons in all. One or two of the Foreign Service Officers might be detached to Yokohama or Kobe and another perhaps to Seoul. The senior Foreign Service Officer would be Chief Political Adviser to General Gairdner. It is not intended to send the whole party out at once. It is

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

/11-2445

740.00119

740.00119 Control (Japan) /11-2445

DCR NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>md</i>
Re.	<i>md</i>
Cont.	<i>md</i>
Dist.	

/desid
DEC 19 1945
OSTIFIED

DIVISION OF JAPANESE
NOV 28 1945
Embassy 12/11/45
WST
News War 12/3/45
file

108

-2-

desired to send immediately three or four Foreign Service Officers and three or four technical experts together with some clerical assistants. The names and proposed travel schedules of these persons, who will not necessarily be travelling together, will be communicated to the State Department as soon as possible. The remainder of the mission will be sent to Japan as personnel and accommodation become available.

3. The mission will be housed in the first instance, and as far as possible, in the compound of His Majesty's Embassy in Tokyo and, in the case of the officer for Seoul, in His Majesty's Consulate General there. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hope that until other provision can be made for them they may rely on General MacArthur's Headquarters for rations and transport. It is understood that United States civilian staff attached to General MacArthur wear United States service uniform without badges of rank and it is intended that civilian members of the British mission should similarly wear British service uniform.

4. Lord Halifax hopes that the United States Government will be good enough to inform General MacArthur of these proposals and to ask him to provide the members of the mission with all possible facilities both on their arrival in Japan and subsequently in the course of their official duties. They will be instructed to work in the closest harmony and co-operation with General MacArthur and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hope that their presence in Japan will be of mutual benefit in dealing with matters affecting that country.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C., *D.*
November 24th, 1945.

109

~~BC~~

No. 514/45



AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DC/R

24th November, 1945.



Sir,

I have the honour, in the absence of the
Minister, to acknowledge receipt of your Note of
November 23, 1945 relative to the participation in
the occupation of Japan of British Commonwealth
forces in the occupation of Japan.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/11-2445

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

1945 NOV 27 AM 9 27

DC/R
RECORDS BRANCH

John Aldham
Counsellor

The Honourable
James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

CS/VJ

DCR NE Unit	
na.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Out.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dist.	

NOV 28 1945

FILED

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-2445



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

115

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 26, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL - DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY

NO. 71

SUBJECT: General Headquarters Report and Press Release
on Natural Resources of Japan.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

1945 DEC 11 PM 2 26

RECORDS BRANCH

DEC 11 1945
AF

Office of
Far Eastern Affairs
DEC 13 1945
Director
Department of State

1 JA
1 FE/R
1 OSS
1 IK

JA
JK
H
W
DC/A

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit the official text of a special press release, Public Relations Office, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, which includes, and comments upon, a "Report on the Natural Resources of Japan" prepared by the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters. This press release has received wide publicity in Japanese newspapers.

It is believed that the document may be of interest to the Department for a number of reasons:

1. It raises publicly, in an official release given to the Japanese press, the question of imports to repair and re-establish Japanese industries and is susceptible of interpretation as favoring such imports.
2. It suggests, and apparently approves, the use of Japanese plant capacity thus restored, and in some specified cases supplied by imports, for the reconstruction of the liberated countries of Asia. (Although reference is made to Ambassador Pauley, his statements have not indicated that Japanese heavy industries will be permitted a capacity greater than necessary for Japanese domestic requirements and members of his staff have privately indicated strong disagreement with the thinking which seems to underlie this Headquarters release.)
3. It is an indication of the independent attitude taken by Headquarters officers and the lack of coordination among various sections which assume for themselves "exclusive jurisdiction" in their assigned fields.

Information regarding the organization of General Headquarters

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 111-2645

DCR - 1st Unit
B.G.T.

Anal. Rev. Cat. Dist.

JUL 20 1946
FILED
CS/VJ

740.00119 Control (Japan) 11-2645


116

- 2 -

740,00119 Control Japan
110-184
FE JA

Headquarters was transmitted to the Department in this Mission's despatch No. 21, October 18, 1945: it will be noted that the Natural Resources Section is separate from the Economic and Scientific Section.

Respectfully yours,


George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att. 1.*

Special Press Release;
GHQ, USAFPAC, Nov. 20, 1945:
"Report on the Natural
Resources of Japan."

850
JSService:vs

Enclosure to Despatch No. 71 of November 26, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "General Headquarters Report and Press Release on Natural Resources of Japan." 117

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Public Relations Office

20 November 1945

Special Press Release:

REPORT ON THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF JAPAN

Just what resources the Japanese may draw upon to revive an economy within their four home islands, pay the cost of an occupation force, and help rebuild the devastated areas they left behind them throughout Asia and the Pacific, have been evaluated in a preliminary report by the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters.

Speaking on the same subject, Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, President Truman's personal envoy, indicated in a press conference on November 15 that any margins for export which Japan may have will be insufficient to pay for the cost of occupation and at the same time play any considerable part in the reconstruction of devastated areas.

The report of the Natural Resources Section demonstrates that such margins which may exist in recurring amounts lie in the unpredictable future, depend upon Japan's ability to solve internal problems, or will be based on access to foreign raw materials and modern equipment. How much of these Japan may be permitted to use will depend, in turn, on what will be left of her industrial potential when her ability to make war has been destroyed.

"For the first time in history a nation's economy is being revolutionized under the supervision of a conquering army for the purpose of maintaining world peace," Lt. Col. H. G. Schenck, chief of the Natural Resources Section, GHQ, said.

"These revolutionary changes are being felt from the topmost economic levels to the lowest peasants. The Japanese once operated a closed door economy. Then, they opened up their country to the world and attempted to bring a lion's share of that world under their direct control by military and industrial expansion.

"Here we have a people who have been accustomed to draw upon the resources of a vast empire and have developed an economy based on the control of and having access to a great portion of the world's raw materials and markets. Now they must learn to return again to the day when they lived within their home islands. It is this revolutionary change which we see today."

Upon just what basis the new Japanese economy may be built, what Japan will be able to supply the world, and what it will need from other countries, is partially indicated in the report. However, Col. Schenck emphasized that the report is based on information immediately available and that it is therefore subject to continuous correction, change and revision.

Some of the highlights of the present and future of Japan's natural resources, as indicated in the report, are:

1. Milady

- 2 -

1. Milady Stateside will have to continue to wait for her silk hose and dainties until rice can be grown to feed the hungry population of Japan, but eventually silk will be a major product of Japan available to the outside world.

2. She will be accompanied in her waiting by tea drinkers who are devoted to Japanese green tea, since most of the area used in tea production is now being employed for cultivation of food crops. However, eventually Japanese tea will be available for other nations.

3. The American farmer is also on the waiting list -- for an insecticide made from a species of chrysanthemum, the acreage for which also has been taken over for food production but will be returned to the original cultivation when the food crisis eases.

4. Within six months, however, Japan can be producing cement at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons per year for the reconstruction of damaged areas in China and the Philippines, if she can provide necessary coal.

5. Fabricated products of aluminum, steel and copper can also be supplied to former victims of Japanese aggression if Japan is granted access to certain raw materials.

6. Coal can be produced for other nations at the rate of 25 million tons a year, as soon as Japan can solve her present labor and transportation difficulties and if she is permitted to modernize and reestablish her mining industry.

7. Aquatic products, such as natural and cultured pearls, seaweed and other materials, aside from seafoods, can be provided to the extent of 26 million yen value annually.

8. The Japanese can produce 100,000 tons of sulfure annually and can provide a substantial supply of materials manufactured through the use of sulphuric acid, which is plentiful in Japan.

9. Several tens of millions of dollars worth of gold, silver, and other precious materials can be provided.

On the negative side of Japan's situation as a provider of the world's goods are her complete disappearance as a factor in the world fishing industry, production of petroleum, paper products and pulp, and a greatly diminished potential in the production of lumber.

The time when Japan will again be able to furnish the world markets with silk, tea and pyrethrum (for insecticides), depends entirely on the country's ability to feed its population. At present, most of the acreage of farm lands previously devoted to the growth of mulberry leaves to feed silk worms, and to the cultivation of tea and pyrethrum has been shifted to the production of foodstuffs.

As long as the need for rice and other basic edibles continues to be critical, and the prices remain high, there is no prospect of Japan producing any of these products in quantities sufficient to exceed the

demand

- 3 -

demand within the country itself.

The present inventory of raw silk ready for export was set at 45,000 bales compared to annual pre-war exports of 521,431 bales. Present silk production will barely meet the minimum consumption needs of Japan's population. However, given an increased mulberry acreage, which is now down to about one third the pre-war area, Japan could produce about 250,000 bales of silk per year.

Present inventories of tea indicate that 3,584,000 pounds are available for export. If tea acreage again reached the 1935 figure of 96,000 acres, it is reasonable to expect the Japanese could export 50 million pounds.

Japan requires 10 million pounds of pyrethrum for its own insecticide needs. In 1935 the acreage was three times that of 1945 and 28,322,000 pounds were produced or almost three times her home needs.

Given iron ore and some Korean pig iron, plus some ferro-alloy materials, Japan has the plant capacity to supply about 6 million metric tons of steel annually, a most critical need for the reconstruction of the devastated areas of the Philippines and China.

In the same way, given access to some aluminum and copper, she can provide manufactured articles and materials now needed in areas which Japan once overran and destroyed and which now have no industries to supply their own needs.

Under the directive from the Supreme Commander which permits Japanese fishing activities in the waters around the main islands, Japanese fisheries will be able to meet home needs only. However, a number of aquatic products will probably be available for export, including natural and culture pearls and pearl shells, agar agar, other seaweed products, seed oysters and vitamin oils. Pre-war exports of these products amounted to around 26 million yen.

A brief summary of the main subjects covered in the preliminary report on the present and future potentials of Japan's natural resources, as prepared by the Natural Resources Section, General Headquarters, follows:

(Note: Ton weights indicated are metric tons)

SILK

Sericulture plays an important role in both the agricultural and the industrial economy of Japan. The raising of cocoons by farmers holds a position second only to that of rice production, and as a cash crop it was, before the war, the most important in Japan. During 1935-39, raw silk exports averaged 21 percent of the total value of exports to foreign exchange countries.

The minimum annual domestic consumer needs for the future, estimated by the Japanese government are set at approximately

35,000

- 4 -

35,000 bales. The Natural Resources Section, GHQ, believes this to be a conservative estimate when compared to normal home consumption which averaged between 1930 and 1935, 218,199 bales. One bale equals 132-133 pounds.

The annual plant capacity for production of raw silk, disregarding availability of cocoons, is estimated by the Japanese at 170,000 bales for the 1946 silk year. This figure, the Natural Resources Section feels, is too low compared to previous output. It estimates 250,000 bales per year as being more reasonable. The inventory of raw silk ready for export as of October 1, 1945 was set at 45,000 bales compared to annual pre-war exports of 521,431 bales.

The present mulberry acreage is low, amounting to only 524,000 acres as compared to 1,540,000 acre average during the 1930-35 period referred to above. (Mulberry leaves are fed to silk worms).

If the acreage devoted to mulberry production could be increased, the amount of exportable raw silk would increase proportionately. At the present time, however, the producer price of rice and other staple crops is so high that farmers are not likely to convert much of their acreage to mulberry trees until the price of cocoons becomes considerably more favorable. If and when the food crisis is relieved in Japan, silk will become an important export commodity.

TEA

Next to silk, tea is Japan's most important industrial crop. The estimated annual domestic consumption needs are 70 million pounds on the basis of consumption in 1935, taking cognizance of the fact that the population has increased one seventh since that year.

The quantity of tea on hand at the present time, available for export, is 3,584,000 pounds. The tea acreage has consistently decreased since 1940 due to the pressing demand for foodstuffs production.

If tea acreage again reached the 1935 figure of 96,000 acres, a reasonable estimate would be that Japan could export 50 million pounds of tea per year. As in the case of silk, this is not likely to occur until the food shortage is relieved.

PYRETHRUM

Pyrethrum, an important insecticide used in the form of extracts or liquid sprays, is a perennial plant of the chrysanthemum family. Until 1914, Dalmatia, later a part of Yugoslavia, was almost the only source of pyrethrum. This supply was cut off by the first World War and Japan captured the market which it has held until the beginning of World War II. Prior to the war, the United States imported approximately two thirds of Japan's total export.

Japan's

- 5 -

Japan's annual domestic consumption of the insecticide amounts to 10 million pounds. The amount being produced at present does not meet such a demand and there are no stocks available for export.

The 1945 acreage in pyrethrum was 20,053 acres as compared to the 1930-35 average annual acreage of 42,936. No pyrethrum can be expected to be available for export as long as the acreage remains at its present low figure. In 1935, the acreage was three times the 1945 figure. If the solving of the food shortage in Japan results in the acreage in pyrethrum being increased to the 1935 figure, Japan could produce approximately 28 million pounds, or nearly three times her consumption needs.

FERTILIZERS

No surplus stocks of fertilizers are on hand. In fact, the inventory stocks for Japan's own needs show all materials practically exhausted and these have been reduced by at least 50 percent since the inventory was made as of 1 August 1945.

The soils of Japan, generally, are deficient in essential plant foods and the nation has long recognized the need of chemical fertilizers on the land.

Facilities had been developed before the war for the manufacture of nitrogenous and phosphatic types of chemical fertilizers which virtually supplied Japan's needs. To regain this level of production, however, it will be necessary for her to revive 10 ammonium sulphate plants and one calcium cyanamide plant. Superphosphate plants were not impaired by bombing but are dependent upon the import of at least 800,000 metric tons of phosphate rock.

Present stocks of fertilizer are exhausted and it is estimated that two to three years will be required to reestablish the industry to a position to meet the needs of the home islands. Unless Japan takes immediate steps this may add to the complications of her current food shortage.

FISH AND AQUATIC PRODUCTS

Under a directive from the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, Japanese fishing activities are now permitted in waters around the four main islands. Thus, Japan is denied access to the rich Russian and Korean fisheries as well as others in which she formerly engaged overseas.

The fisheries within the home area seem capable of supporting catches of around 3 million metric tons annually. This is roughly enough for the normal needs for aquatic foods in Japan Proper.

In view of this situation, it does not seem that Japan will be able to supply any fishery foods for other countries in the immediate future. It is too early in the occupation phase to determine

whether

- 6 -

whether the fishing area may be enlarged.

A number of aquatic products will likely be available for export. These include, primarily, natural and culture pearls and pearl shells, agar-agar, other seaweed products, seed oysters, and vitamin oils. The aggregate estimated value of the exports of these items before the war amounted to 26 million yen.

LUMBER

If Japan's resources are to be exploited to the fullest extent (using practices common in parts of the United States) the annual production of forest products probably could be increased to as much as 15 billion board feet. All of this could be used to rebuild Japan, or the country could be allowed its peace-time rate of consumption of 5.6 billion board feet and the balance of 9.4 billion board feet used for other countries.

Such a rapid rate of cutting would require that American machinery be provided and would soon destroy the forests of Japan to the point at which erosion would be greatly increased to the detriment of agriculture and hydro-electrical power.

War-time rates of production of 7.2 billion board feet could be continued. This would permit a small volume of lumber for other countries (allowing peace-time consumption of 5.6 billion board feet), or a gradual rebuilding of Japan if no timber were exported. Even at this rate, cutting would far exceed present timber growth.

In normal times, Japan had a large reforestation program which should be resumed, particularly if cutting is to be continued at a high level. To maintain Japan's timber cutting at war-time levels would require the replacement of much worn out machinery which probably would, for the time being at least, be available only from the United States, where it is urgently needed.

PULP AND PAPER

Japan had a paper making capacity before the bombing of 960,000 tons annually. Approximately one-third of this capacity was destroyed by bombing. In October, 1945, paper could be produced only at the rate of 336,000 tons annually.

It is believed that Japan will consume all the paper and cardboard she is permitted to produce. No appreciable stocks of paper are known to exist. Production has fallen off rapidly for several years and now is considered a mere fraction of what Japan estimates her civilian needs to be.

Paper is so scarce in Japan that an old magazine can be ex-

changed

- 7 -

changed for food in the rural areas. Paper making machinery is wearing out rapidly and is not being replaced. There is also a shortage of grinder stone and metal screen which came from Tokyo plants no longer in existence.

Paper manufacturing depended largely on pulp sources from Karafuto, Korea, and Manchuria which are now considered completely "lost". It is planned to shift production from paper to rayon as much as possible. This step is concurred in, at least in principle, for it is believed the Japanese people need clothing more urgently than paper.

MINERALS

Japan has a highly diversified mineral industry but is far from self-sufficient in raw materials. Through subsidies and the development of industries for a war economy, Japan has reached a point where she can supply a number of commodities far in excess of that required by a peace-time economy.

This situation raises the question of policy, where or not the Japanese shall be given imports so that their extractive, fabricating and manufacturing industries can be utilized fully for producing materials which are critically needed for reconstruction in the Pacific area.

On the assumption that proper control will be exerted to ensure that finished products will not be used by the Japanese for military purposes, imports of critical materials might be permitted so that full productive capacity of plants can be used to supply materials needed by countries that do not have the established industries to produce the materials themselves. This policy would involve a moderate supply of machinery and material for the repair of war damage and worn-out equipment.

Note: Statistics on minerals presented in this report are in many cases incomplete because of lack of reference works and information from Jap authorities.

Coal

The present low ebb of production of coal does not necessarily presage the future. Japan's coal industry might be able to regain at least its pre-war status if allowed to operate unhampered. The main deterrents to production now are labor troubles and lack of mine supplies.

On the basis of Japan's pre-war coal production and her war-time peak, it appears she can produce 25 million tons annually above

her

- 8 -

her pre-war level of domestic requirements. Much of the war-time production, however, was obtained by subsidizing the mines.

This rate of production could be obtained within the next year only through assistance in the form of supplies and equipment. At present, Japan's coal production is insufficient for even her own basic requirements and the needs of occupational forces. Stockpiles are likely to be quickly depleted.

Coal cannot be supplied other countries in large quantities for at least a year unless great improvement is made by the Japanese in equipment and transportation. At present production is about 1/5 the minimum figure for Japan's normal peace-time economy. This is due to shortage of labor, explosives, and other supplies.

Petroleum

A minimum of about 25 million barrels per annum of petroleum appears to be necessary for Japan's normal home consumption.

The maximum economic production from Japanese home wells is probably not more than two million barrels per annum. New fields opened during the war have small production and are not expected to increase this materially. The prospect of discovering new oil fields in Japan is not great, considering the concentrated search made during the war. It is doubtful that Japanese homeland ever will produce more than 10 to 15 percent of her petroleum needs.

Iron Ore, Pig Iron, Steel

This industry is critically dependent upon imports of iron ore and pig iron. Heavy imports of ore from Manchuria are no longer available. In time it would be possible to replace these imports by ore from the Philippines but this would take several years and a substantial amount of capital for development of Philippine mines.

The steel industry is absolutely dependent on a sound coal industry. Prior to the end of the war a balance had been established. At the present time, however, the coal industry is in a chaotic state, Japan must straighten this out before the steel industry can function.

Japan's peace-time consumption of steel was about three million metric tons and her war-time output rose to about nine million. Without ore and pig iron from Manchuria it will be extremely difficult for Japan to produce the three million metric tons for her own needs.

Steel is a most pressing need for the reconstruction of the devastated areas of the Philippines and China. Japan's ability to make any substantial contribution to this reconstruction in the form of steel is dependent on imports of iron ore and probably some Korean pig iron. Ferro-alloy materials must be imported for steel making since Japan is almost completely deficient in these.

Copper

- 9 -

Copper

Japan has a well integrated copper industry in the Home Islands, with an output approximately equal to the demands of non-military consumption at home, and she probably can continue to supply such demands for a number of years. Since there are no fabricating industries in the Philippines and China, fabricated copper or manufactured articles would be of the most use to the recipients and would make the most of Japan's ability to produce materials needed in the Pacific area.

Aluminum

There is no aluminum ore in Japan Proper. However, Japan's aluminum industry, started in 1934 with the production of a few hundred tons of aluminum, produced more than 100,000 tons annually during the war. It used bauxite from the southwest Pacific, aluminous shale from North China and Manchuria, and alunite from Korea.

Japan's contribution to manufacture was the transportation of raw materials, coal for conversion into alumina, hydro-electric power for reduction into the metallic aluminum, and the actual fabrication.

The industry was created by the Government and was heavily subsidized because of its importance in airplane manufacture. If the aluminum plants, damaged during the war, were restored they would have a processing and refining capacity far in excess of Japan's peacetime needs.

If supplied with bauxite from Palau, Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and French Indo-China, the Japanese aluminum industry could draw upon coal and water power of Japan to furnish aluminum and manufactured aluminum products to the allied nations, especially those in the Far East, which have no aluminum industry.

Cement

Cement has been an important industry in Japan since 1930. The Home Islands have abundant supplies of raw materials and modern technology has made possible sufficient production to meet home needs and provide an excess for export.

Present reserves are low, probably less than 100,000 tons. The industry is believed to be well integrated and although the extent of damage to plants is not definitely known, it is believed that most plants are still operative. Provided fuel is available, Japan should be able to produce cement at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons per year with six months.

Sulfur, Pyrite, and Sulfuric Acid

War damage to sulfuric acid plants has been substantial, but

the

- 10 -

the ability to produce raw materials is probably but little impaired. Japan should be able to furnish other nations with perhaps as much as 100,000 metric tons a year of sulfur. Large consuming centers for pyrite, mainly centers for paper manufacture, are too remote to make Japanese pyrite of value.

Due to the difficulty of shipping large quantities of sulfuric acid, the large supply available cannot be used fully by other nations. However, chemical products based on the use of sulfuric acid should be available.

Gold, Silver and Platinum

Much of the gold and silver produced in Japan is a by-product of smelting the base metals. Therefore, the future production of copper, lead and zinc will largely determine the amounts of gold and silver produced.

Probably several tens of millions of dollars worth of gold and silver will be produced yearly, much of which will be available for use by other nations. It would seem unlikely that there can be much increase over pre-war figures.

There are reports of large stocks of gold, silver, platinum and diamonds being seized by the occupation forces but the information on these is incomplete.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, November 26, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL - DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY

NO. 71

SUBJECT: General Headquarters Report and Press Release
on Natural Resources of Japan.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit the official text of a special press release, Public Relations Office, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, which includes, and comments upon, a "Report on the Natural Resources of Japan" prepared by the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters. This press release has received wide publicity in Japanese newspapers.

It is believed that the document may be of interest to the Department for a number of reasons:

1. It raises publicly, in an official release given to the Japanese press, the question of imports to repair and re-establish Japanese industries and is susceptible of interpretation as favoring such imports.
2. It suggests, and apparently approves, the use of Japanese plant capacity thus restored; and in some specified cases supplied by imports, for the reconstruction of the liberated countries of Asia. (Although reference is made to Ambassador Pauley, his statements have not indicated that Japanese heavy industries will be permitted a capacity greater than necessary for Japanese domestic requirements and members of his staff have privately indicated strong disagreement with the thinking which seems to underlie this Headquarters release.)
3. It is an indication of the independent attitude taken by Headquarters officers and the lack of coordination among various sections which assume for themselves "exclusive jurisdiction" in their assigned fields.

Information regarding the organization of General

Headquarters

- 2 -

Headquarters was transmitted to the Department in this Mission's despatch No. 21, October 18, 1945: it will be noted that the Natural Resources Section is separate from the Economic and Scientific Section.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Special Press Release;
GHQ, USAFPAC, Nov. 20, 1945:
"Report on the Natural
Resources of Japan."

850
JSService:vs

Enclosure to Despatch No. 71 of November 26, 1945, from the Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "General Headquarters Report and Press Release on Natural Resources of Japan."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Public Relations Office

20 November 1945

Special Press Release:

REPORT ON THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF JAPAN

Just what resources the Japanese may draw upon to revive an economy within their four home islands, pay the cost of an occupation force, and help rebuild the devastated areas they left behind them throughout Asia and the Pacific, have been evaluated in a preliminary report by the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters.

Speaking on the same subject, Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, President Truman's personal envoy, indicated in a press conference on November 15 that any margins for export which Japan may have will be insufficient to pay for the cost of occupation and at the same time play any considerable part in the reconstruction of devastated areas.

The report of the Natural Resources Section demonstrates that such margins which may exist in recurring amounts lie in the unpredictable future, depend upon Japan's ability to solve internal problems, or will be based on access to foreign raw materials and modern equipment. How much of these Japan may be permitted to use will depend, in turn, on what will be left of her industrial potential when her ability to make war has been destroyed.

"For the first time in history a nation's economy is being revolutionized under the supervision of a conquering army for the purpose of maintaining world peace," Lt. Col. H. G. Schenck, chief of the Natural Resources Section, GHQ, said.

"These revolutionary changes are being felt from the topmost economic levels to the lowest peasants. The Japanese once operated a closed door economy. Then, they opened up their country to the world and attempted to bring a lion's share of that world under their direct control by military and industrial expansion.

"Here we have a people who have been accustomed to draw upon the resources of a vast empire and have developed an economy based on the control of and having access to a great portion of the world's raw materials and markets. Now they must learn to return again to the day when they lived within their home islands. It is this revolutionary change which we see today."

Upon just what basis the new Japanese economy may be built, what Japan will be able to supply the world, and what it will need from other countries, is partially indicated in the report. However, Col. Schenck emphasized that the report is based on information immediately available and that it is therefore subject to continuous correction, change and revision.

Some of the highlights of the present and future of Japan's natural resources, as indicated in the report, are:

1. Milady

- 2 -

1. Milady Stateside will have to continue to wait for her silk hose and dainties until rice can be grown to feed the hungry population of Japan, but eventually silk will be a major product of Japan available to the outside world.

2. She will be accompanied in her waiting by tea drinkers who are devoted to Japanese green tea, since most of the area used in tea production is now being employed for cultivation of food crops. However, eventually Japanese tea will be available for other nations.

3. The American farmer is also on the waiting list — for an insecticide made from a species of chrysanthemum, the acreage for which also has been taken over for food production but will be returned to the original cultivation when the food crisis eases.

4. Within six months, however, Japan can be producing cement at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million tons per year for the reconstruction of damaged areas in China and the Philippines, if she can provide necessary coal.

5. Fabricated products of aluminum, steel and copper can also be supplied to former victims of Japanese aggression if Japan is granted access to certain raw materials.

6. Coal can be produced for other nations at the rate of 25 million tons a year, as soon as Japan can solve her present labor and transportation difficulties and if she is permitted to modernize and reestablish her mining industry.

7. Aquatic products, such as natural and cultured pearls, seaweed and other materials, aside from seafoods, can be provided to the extent of 26 million yen value annually.

8. The Japanese can produce 100,000 tons of sulfure annually and can provide a substantial supply of materials manufactured through the use of sulphuric acid, which is plentiful in Japan.

9. Several tens of millions of dollars worth of gold, silver, and other precious materials can be provided.

On the negative side of Japan's situation as a provider of the world's goods are her complete disappearance as a factor in the world fishing industry, production of petroleum, paper products and pulp, and a greatly diminished potential in the production of lumber.

The time when Japan will again be able to furnish the world markets with silk, tea and pyrethrum (for insecticides), depends entirely on the country's ability to feed its population. At present, most of the acreage of farm lands previously devoted to the growth of mulberry leaves to feed silk worms, and to the cultivation of tea and pyrethrum has been shifted to the production of foodstuffs.

As long as the need for rice and other basic edibles continues to be critical, and the prices remain high, there is no prospect of Japan producing any of these products in quantities sufficient to exceed the

demand

- 3 -

demand within the country itself.

The present inventory of raw silk ready for export was set at 45,000 bales compared to annual pre-war exports of 521,431 bales. Present silk production will barely meet the minimum consumption needs of Japan's population. However, given an increased mulberry acreage, which is now down to about one third the pre-war area, Japan could produce about 250,000 bales of silk per year.

Present inventories of tea indicate that 3,584,000 pounds are available for export. If tea acreage again reached the 1935 figure of 96,000 acres, it is reasonable to expect the Japanese could export 50 million pounds.

Japan requires 10 million pounds of pyrethrum for its own insecticide needs. In 1935 the acreage was three times that of 1945 and 28,322,000 pounds were produced or almost three times her home needs.

Given iron ore and some Korean pig iron, plus some ferro-alloy materials, Japan has the plant capacity to supply about 6 million metric tons of steel annually, a most critical need for the reconstruction of the devastated areas of the Philippines and China.

In the same way, given access to some aluminum and copper, she can provide manufactured articles and materials now needed in areas which Japan once overran and destroyed and which now have no industries to supply their own needs.

Under the directive from the Supreme Commander which permits Japanese fishing activities in the waters around the main islands, Japanese fisheries will be able to meet home needs only. However, a number of aquatic products will probably be available for export, including natural and culture pearls and pearl shells, agar agar, other seaweed products, seed oysters and vitamin oils. Pre-war exports of these products amounted to around 26 million yen.

A brief summary of the main subjects covered in the preliminary report on the present and future potentials of Japan's natural resources, as prepared by the Natural Resources Section, General Headquarters, follows:

(Note: Ton weights indicated are metric tons)

SILK

Sericulture plays an important role in both the agricultural and the industrial economy of Japan. The raising of cocoons by farmers holds a position second only to that of rice production, and as a cash crop it was, before the war, the most important in Japan. During 1935-39, raw silk exports averaged 21 percent of the total value of exports to foreign exchange countries.

The minimum annual domestic consumer needs for the future, estimated by the Japanese government are set at approximately

35,000

- 4 -

35,000 bales. The Natural Resources Section, GHQ, believes this to be a conservative estimate when compared to normal home consumption which averaged between 1930 and 1935, 218,199 bales. One bale equals 132-133 pounds.

The annual plant capacity for production of raw silk, disregarding availability of cocoons, is estimated by the Japanese at 170,000 bales for the 1946 silk year. This figure, the Natural Resources Section feels, is too low compared to previous output. It estimates 250,000 bales per year as being more reasonable. The inventory of raw silk ready for export as of October 1, 1945 was set at 45,000 bales compared to annual pre-war exports of 521,431 bales.

The present mulberry acreage is low, amounting to only 524,000 acres as compared to 1,540,000 acre average during the 1930-35 period referred to above. (Mulberry leaves are fed to silk worms).

If the acreage devoted to mulberry production could be increased, the amount of exportable raw silk would increase proportionately. At the present time, however, the producer price of rice and other staple crops is so high that farmers are not likely to convert much of their acreage to mulberry trees until the price of cocoons becomes considerably more favorable. If and when the food crisis is relieved in Japan, silk will become an important export commodity.

TEA

Next to silk, tea is Japan's most important industrial crop. The estimated annual domestic consumption needs are 70 million pounds on the basis of consumption in 1935, taking cognizance of the fact that the population has increased one seventh since that year.

The quantity of tea on hand at the present time, available for export, is 3,584,000 pounds. The tea acreage has consistently decreased since 1940 due to the pressing demand for foodstuffs production.

If tea acreage again reached the 1935 figure of 96,000 acres, a reasonable estimate would be that Japan could export 50 million pounds of tea per year. As in the case of silk, this is not likely to occur until the food shortage is relieved.

PYRETHRUM

Pyrethrum, an important insecticide used in the form of extracts or liquid sprays, is a perennial plant of the chrysanthemum family. Until 1914, Dalmatia, later a part of Yugoslavia, was almost the only source of pyrethrum. This supply was cut off by the first World War and Japan captured the market which it has held until the beginning of World War II. Prior to the war, the United States imported approximately two thirds of Japan's total export.

Japan's

- 5 -

Japan's annual domestic consumption of the insecticide amounts to 10 million pounds. The amount being produced at present does not meet such a demand and there are no stocks available for export.

The 1945 acreage in pyrethrum was 20,053 acres as compared to the 1930-35 average annual acreage of 42,936. No pyrethrum can be expected to be available for export as long as the acreage remains at its present low figure. In 1935, the acreage was three times the 1945 figure. If the solving of the food shortage in Japan results in the acreage in pyrethrum being increased to the 1935 figure, Japan could produce approximately 28 million pounds, or nearly three times her consumption needs.

FERTILIZERS

No surplus stocks of fertilizers are on hand. In fact, the inventory stocks for Japan's own needs show all materials practically exhausted and these have been reduced by at least 50 percent since the inventory was made as of 1 August 1945.

The soils of Japan, generally, are deficient in essential plant foods and the nation has long recognized the need of chemical fertilizers on the land.

Facilities had been developed before the war for the manufacture of nitrogenous and phosphatic types of chemical fertilizers which virtually supplied Japan's needs. To regain this level of production, however, it will be necessary for her to revive 10 ammonium sulphate plants and one calcium cyanamide plant. Superphosphate plants were not impaired by bombing but are dependent upon the import of at least 800,000 metric tons of phosphate rock.

Present stocks of fertilizer are exhausted and it is estimated that two to three years will be required to reestablish the industry to a position to meet the needs of the home islands. Unless Japan takes immediate steps this may add to the complications of her current food shortage.

FISH AND AQUATIC PRODUCTS

Under a directive from the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, Japanese fishing activities are now permitted in waters around the four main islands. Thus, Japan is denied access to the rich Russian and Korean fisheries as well as others in which she formerly engaged overseas.

The fisheries within the home area seem capable of supporting catches of around 3 million metric tons annually. This is roughly enough for the normal needs for aquatic foods in Japan Proper.

In view of this situation, it does not seem that Japan will be able to supply any fishery foods for other countries in the immediate future. It is too early in the occupation phase to determine

whether

- 6 -

whether the fishing area may be enlarged.

A number of aquatic products will likely be available for export. These include, primarily, natural and culture pearls and pearl shells, agar-agar, other seaweed products, seed oysters, and vitamin oils. The aggregate estimated value of the exports of these items before the war amounted to 26 million yen.

LUMBER

If Japan's resources are to be exploited to the fullest extent (using practices common in parts of the United States) the annual production of forest products probably could be increased to as much as 15 billion board feet. All of this could be used to rebuild Japan, or the country could be allowed its peace-time rate of consumption of 5.6 billion board feet and the balance of 9.4 billion board feet used for other countries.

Such a rapid rate of cutting would require that American machinery be provided and would soon destroy the forests of Japan to the point at which erosion would be greatly increased to the detriment of agriculture and hydro-electrical power.

War-time rates of production of 7.2 billion board feet could be continued. This would permit a small volume of lumber for other countries (allowing peace-time consumption of 5.6 billion board feet), or a gradual rebuilding of Japan if no timber were exported. Even at this rate, cutting would far exceed present timber growth.

In normal times, Japan had a large reforestation program which should be resumed, particularly if cutting is to be continued at a high level. To maintain Japan's timber cutting at war-time levels would require the replacement of much worn out machinery which probably would, for the time being at least, be available only from the United States, where it is urgently needed.

PULP AND PAPER

Japan had a paper making capacity before the bombing of 960,000 tons annually. Approximately one-third of this capacity was destroyed by bombing. In October, 1945, paper could be produced only at the rate of 336,000 tons annually.

It is believed that Japan will consume all the paper and cardboard she is permitted to produce. No appreciable stocks of paper are known to exist. Production has fallen off rapidly for several years and now is considered a mere fraction of what Japan estimates her civilian needs to be.

Paper is so scarce in Japan that an old magazine can be exchanged

- 7 -

changed for food in the rural areas. Paper making machinery is wearing out rapidly and is not being replaced. There is also a shortage of grinder stone and metal screen which came from Tokyo plants no longer in existence.

Paper manufacturing depended largely on pulp sources from Karafuto, Korea, and Manchuria which are now considered completely "lost". It is planned to shift production from paper to rayon as much as possible. This step is concurred in, at least in principle, for it is believed the Japanese people need clothing more urgently than paper.

MINERALS

Japan has a highly diversified mineral industry but is far from self-sufficient in raw materials. Through subsidies and the development of industries for a war economy, Japan has reached a point where she can supply a number of commodities far in excess of that required by a peace-time economy.

This situation raises the question of policy, where or not the Japanese shall be given imports so that their extractive, fabricating and manufacturing industries can be utilized fully for producing materials which are critically needed for reconstruction in the Pacific area.

On the assumption that proper control will be exerted to ensure that finished products will not be used by the Japanese for military purposes, imports of critical materials might be permitted so that full productive capacity of plants can be used to supply materials needed by countries that do not have the established industries to produce the materials themselves. This policy would involve a moderate supply of machinery and material for the repair of war damage and worn-out equipment.

Note: Statistics on minerals presented in this report are in many cases incomplete because of lack of reference works and information from Jap authorities.

Coal

The present low ebb of production of coal does not necessarily presage the future. Japan's coal industry might be able to regain at least its pre-war status if allowed to operate unhampered. The main deterrents to production now are labor troubles and lack of mine supplies.

On the basis of Japan's pre-war coal production and her war-time peak, it appears she can produce 25 million tons annually above

her

- 8 -

her pre-war level of domestic requirements. Much of the war-time production, however, was obtained by subsidizing the mines.

This rate of production could be obtained within the next year only through assistance in the form of supplies and equipment. At present, Japan's coal production is insufficient for even her own basic requirements and the needs of occupational forces. Stockpiles are likely to be quickly depleted.

Coal cannot be supplied other countries in large quantities for at least a year unless great improvement is made by the Japanese in equipment and transportation. At present production is about 1/5 the minimum figure for Japan's normal peace-time economy. This is due to shortage of labor, explosives, and other supplies.

Petroleum

A minimum of about 25 million barrels per annum of petroleum appears to be necessary for Japan's normal home consumption.

The maximum economic production from Japanese home wells is probably not more than two million barrels per annum. New fields opened during the war have small production and are not expected to increase this materially. The prospect of discovering new oil fields in Japan is not great, considering the concentrated search made during the war. It is doubtful that Japanese homeland ever will produce more than 10 to 15 percent of her petroleum needs.

Iron Ore. Pig Iron. Steel

This industry is critically dependent upon imports of iron ore and pig iron. Heavy imports of ore from Manchuria are no longer available. In time it would be possible to replace these imports by ore from the Philippines but this would take several years and a substantial amount of capital for development of Philippine mines.

The steel industry is absolutely dependent on a sound coal industry. Prior to the end of the war a balance had been established. At the present time, however, the coal industry is in a chaotic state, Japan must straighten this out before the steel industry can function.

Japan's peace-time consumption of steel was about three million metric tons and her war-time output rose to about nine million. Without ore and pig iron from Manchuria it will be extremely difficult for Japan to produce the three million metric tons for her own needs.

Steel is a most pressing need for the reconstruction of the devastated areas of the Philippines and China. Japan's ability to make any substantial contribution to this reconstruction in the form of steel is dependent on imports of iron ore and probably some Korean pig iron. Ferro-alloy materials must be imported for steel making since Japan is almost completely deficient in these.

Copper

- 9 -

Copper

Japan has a well integrated copper industry in the Home Islands, with an output approximately equal to the demands of non-military consumption at home, and she probably can continue to supply such demands for a number of years. Since there are no fabricating industries in the Philippines and China, fabricated copper or manufactured articles would be of the most use to the recipients and would make the most of Japan's ability to produce materials needed in the Pacific area.

Aluminum

There is no aluminum ore in Japan Proper. However, Japan's aluminum industry, started in 1934 with the production of a few hundred tons of aluminum, produced more than 100,000 tons annually during the war. It used bauxite from the southwest Pacific, aluminous shale from North China and Manchuria, and alunite from Korea.

Japan's contribution to manufacture was the transportation of raw materials, coal for conversion into alumina, hydro-electric power for reduction into the metallic aluminum, and the actual fabrication.

The industry was created by the Government and was heavily subsidized because of its importance in airplane manufacture. If the aluminum plants, damaged during the war, were restored they would have a processing and refining capacity far in excess of Japan's peacetime needs.

If supplied with bauxite from Palau, Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and French Indo-China, the Japanese aluminum industry could draw upon coal and water power of Japan to furnish aluminum and manufactured aluminum products to the allied nations, especially those in the Far East, which have no aluminum industry.

Cement

Cement has been an important industry in Japan since 1930. The Home Islands have abundant supplies of raw materials and modern technology has made possible sufficient production to meet home needs and provide an excess for export.

Present reserves are low, probably less than 100,000 tons. The industry is believed to be well integrated and although the extent of damage to plants is not definitely known, it is believed that most plants are still operative. Provided fuel is available, Japan should be able to produce cement at the rate of 4½ million tons per year with six months.

Sulfur, Pyrite, and Sulfuric Acid

War damage to sulfuric acid plants has been substantial, but

the

the ability to produce raw materials is probably but little impaired. Japan should be able to furnish other nations with perhaps as much as 100,000 metric tons a year of sulfur. Large consuming centers for pyrite, mainly centers for paper manufacture, are too remote to make Japanese pyrite of value.

Due to the difficulty of shipping large quantities of sulfuric acid, the large supply available cannot be used fully by other nations. However, chemical products based on the use of sulfuric acid should be available.

Gold, Silver and Platinum

Much of the gold and silver produced in Japan is a by-product of smelting the base metals. Therefore, the future production of copper, lead and zinc will largely determine the amounts of gold and silver produced.

Probably several tens of millions of dollars worth of gold and silver will be produced yearly, much of which will be available for use by other nations. It would seem unlikely that there can be much increase over pre-war figures.

There are reports of large stocks of gold, silver, platinum and diamonds being seized by the occupation forces but the information on these is incomplete.

NOV 27 1945

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

No. 21

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information
of the Acting Political Adviser copies of SWNCC papers
as listed below.

It will be noted that SFE 134/2 and 142/1 have not
been approved by the Subcommittee for the Far East, but
it is believed that they will be of interest in view of
the importance of the subjects.

By informal action the SWNCC approved making SWNCC
107/1 available to the representatives on the Far East
Advisory Commission.

DCR NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	
Cat.	
Dist.	

- Enclosures:
1. SWNCC 107/1, copy no. 55.
 2. SWNCC 214/1, copy no. 45.
 3. SFE 114/6, copy no. 23.
 4. SFE 134/2, copy no. 1.
 5. SFE 142/1, copy no. 23.
 6. Status of Papers, SFE,
20 November 1945, copy
no. 23.

A true copy of
the original origi-
nal.

NOV 27 1945

[Signature]
FE:JKPenfield:hst
11-27-45

[Signature]
JA

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2745

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM 111

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

INFO:

S AMN-742 -DP
U Paraphrase before communicating to anyone.
C


Tokyo via War

Dated November 27, 1945

Rec'd 2:55 p.m., 30th

A-D
FE
DC/L-1 SECRET
ITP
CP
PD
CS/T

Secretary of State
Washington



JA
DC/R
File
7-846

PRIORITY

163, November 27.

We have received memorandum dated Nov 26 from Acting Chief of Staff (REFDEPTEL 120, Nov 16) as follows:

"It is believed that these applications should be submitted to SCAP through the Foreign Missions which are or may be accredited here. These missions are accredited to SCAP not through the State Dept but as a matter of direct contact. To attempt to screen them through a State Dept Mission here introduces a setup which is not provided for in the Surrender Terms and which would undoubtedly arouse opposition".

ATCHESON

BB

SECRET

DCR NE Unit
Anal. _____
Rev. _____
Cat. _____
Dist. _____

JUL 8 - 1940

FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2745 Confidential File

c 5617

ENGINEERS JOINT COUNCIL

A Joint Committee of the

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
W. L. CLAYTON

NOV 28 1945 *JK*

A-C
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DC/R

Composed of the President, Junior Past-President, and Secretary of each Society

25-33 WEST THIRTY-NINTH STREET, NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

*JK - reply sent
12-5-45. JK
File*

November 27, 1945

Hon. W. L. Clayton,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Clayton:

Your letter of October eighth addressed to Mr. R. E. McConnell has been referred to me.

After careful consideration and consultation with Mr. McConnell and Colonel Proctor, it is apparent that whereas there are many U. S. engineers of high professional standing who are well posted on German industry and central European economy, we are unable to call to mind a sufficient group of engineers comparably posted as to Japan.

From fifty to sixty specialist engineers were asked to work on the various task committees of the National Engineers Committee's studies leading to its report on "Industrial Disarmament of Aggressor States (Germany)", men who, of course, would not have signed the various sections of the report without individual knowledge of the subject and of the conditions of their segment of industry in Germany.

When we think of the problems in connection with the industrial disarmament and control of Japan, we are unable to think of any such group of engineers who have had intimate experience in Japan or in the Far East, who could develop a well considered fully reliable report.

If we are to undertake this task intelligently and scientifically, it would appear to be desirable to reorganize ENGINEERS JOINT COUNCIL'S National Engineers Committee and, in consultation with you, to select three or more engineers from the Committee to be sent by the State Department to Japan and possibly to Manchuria and Korea. This special committee could assemble all material facts upon which it and specially qualified senior engineers appointed to serve on various task committees could formulate recommendations of dependable value.

740.00119 CONTROL

(JAPAN) / 11-2745

CS/VJ

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-2745*

NOV 28 1945

*copy
DPC*
CCP NE Unit
OR
RE
Cat
Dist

ENGINEERS JOINT COUNCIL

A Joint Committee of the

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERS

Composed of the President, Junior Past-President, and Secretary of each Society

25-33 WEST THIRTY-NINTH STREET, NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

Hon. W. L. Clayton

- 2 -

Nov. 27, 1945

Colonel Proctor and I shall be in Washington on Monday, December tenth and will be glad to discuss this important matter with Mr. Edwin Martin at a mutually convenient time if you believe our suggestions should be explored in more detail before your return to your office early in the New Year. I learned by telephone from your secretary yesterday that you are taking a much needed rest over the Holidays and look forward to meeting you when you resume your heavy tasks in Washington.

Very truly yours,

Malcolm Pirnie

Malcolm Pirnie,
Chairman, Executive Committee.

MP/jd

DEC 5 1945

DEC 5 1945

In reply refer to
JK

Dear Mr. Pirnie:

In the absence of Mr. Clayton from the office, I have been asked to reply to your letter of November 27 to him.

I should be glad to discuss the question of a survey of the disarmament problem in Japan with you and Colonel Proctor at your convenience on Monday, December 10. I shall try to keep an open calendar.

Will it be possible for you to call sometime during the morning so that we can agree on a specific time?

I shall look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief
Division of Japanese and
Korean Economic Affairs

Mr. Malcolm Pirnie,
Chairman, Executive Committee,
Engineers Joint Council,
25-33 West Thirty-ninth Street,
New York 18, New York

JK:EMMartin:lmc 12-4-45

A true copy of
the signed original
enc.

DEC 5 1945
CK

DCR NE Unit	
Anal.	
Rev.	
Out.	
Dist.	

Handwritten initials: JEM, aa

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 11-2745

CS/VJ

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-2745

110

~~FE Vincent~~

EIS

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26th November, 1945.

DC/R

No. 515/45URGENT

file



Sir,

I have the honour, in the absence of the Minister, to refer to my letter to you of 24th November, 1945 relative to the participation of British Commonwealth forces in the occupation of Japan and to inform you that the Minister of State for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, and, as his alternative, the Minister of Australia, Sir Frederic Eggleston, together with Lt. General Sir John Lavarack will act as the Australian representatives in the discussions regarding the participation of the Commonwealth forces.

I have been instructed to add that it is the earnest desire of the Australian Government that the above discussions will be initiated with the utmost despatch.

I have the honour to be,

with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant

John Oldham
Counsellor

The Honourable
James F. Byrnes,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

JAN 21 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/11-2645

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE JK

INFO:

S

U

C

A-B

A-D

SA

SA/GN

SA/M-2

SPA

IS

EUR

FE

DC/L-C

ITP

LA

ESP

JK

SPD-2

FC-14

CIC

INI

OPI

PL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

JK

ME-1608 -W

PLAIN

Moscow via War

Dated November 27, 1945

Rec'd 5:15 p.m., 27th.

JK-1-4-46 file

DC/R

Secretary of State

Washington

3976, Twenty-seventh

FOR ACHESON ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER

RED FLEET November 25 editorially comments that

Jap governing circles have not abandoned hope (*) military economic bases and cadres. There are signs that Allied authorities occupying Japan are not taking decisive steps to liquidate military economic base Jap aggression. NEW YORK POST is cited as being alarmed that MacArthur's order for disbandment of Zaibatsu has not yet been carried out. Failure to dispose of Zaibatsu shows that Japan cannot be depended upon to carry out terms of unconditional surrender. Absence of proper control over implementation of surrender terms infringes on interests of peace and security in Far East.

JAN 4 - 1946
Sent Dept
FILED

PLAIN

DCR NE Unit	
Anal.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Cat.	
Dist.	

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2745

11-27

PLAIN

-2- #3976, Twenty-seventh, from Moscow via War.

Sent Dept 3976, repeated Chungking 222,
Frankfurt 429, London 601, Berlin and Tokyo.

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

JMS

(*) Correction to follow

PLAIN

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES -
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM
CORRECTION

*12-6-45:
JK no action
divided*

ACTION:JK

INFO:

S

TW

PLAIN

U

C

Moscow via Wer

A-B

Dated November 27, 1945

A-D

SA

Rec'd 5:15 p.m.

SA/GEN

SA/M-2

SPA

IS

Secretary of State,

EUR

Washington

FE

DC/L-C

3976, Twenty-seventh

ITP

LA

BSP

FOR PERSON ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER

JK

First paragraph, line two, delete "(*)" and insert

SPD-2

"of retaining their" to read "abandoned hope of retaining

FC-14

their military economic bases and cadres."

OIC

LVI

OPI

PL

TELEGRAPH SECTION

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DM

PLAIN

7.2. 740. 00119 Control (Japan) / 11-2-45

ACTION COPY

JA

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

HEC-1825

PLAIN

Yokohama via War

Dated November 27, 1945

Rec'd 10:48 a.m., 28th

DC/R

Secretary of State

Washington

26, November 27

HAB
DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
NOV 29 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Signature]

To ensure prompt delivery telegrams for this office should hereafter be addressed "CG Eighth Army for POLAD Yokohama."

JOHNSON

EDA

PLAIN

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2745

Admiral Telegraphic

DOE	<i>[Signature]</i>
Anal	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev	<i>[Signature]</i>
Cat	
Dist	

FILED
NOV 27 1945

11-27

1000

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department:

Department of State



112

SECRET

Charge to

Washington

DEC - 6 1945



185

Yf

FOR ATCHESON, ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

740.00119 Central Japan 11-2-45

Memorandum quoted URTEL 163/NOV 27 indicates HQ must have misunderstood nature of DEPT's inquiry in DEPTTEL 120 NOV 15. DEPT has no repeat no desire to QUOTE screen UNQUOTE applications for travel to Japan but was merely attempting to determine mutually convenient method of presenting applications to SCAP. In accordance with desires of HQ inquirers will when practicable be advised to present applications through appropriate liaison officer or mission in Tokyo.

Chungking TEL 2079 ^{mc} DEC 2 containing Chinese GOVT's request for augmentation staff liaison officer in Tokyo is being repeated to you separately for info. In view of fact that this request emanates from Chinese liaison officer in Tokyo who is apparently unaware of HQ position, DEPT has referred this request to War DEPT for appropriate action.

DCR - NE Unit	
Anal. <i>m</i>	<i>By...</i>
Rev. <i>m</i>	<i>(S)</i>
Cat.	<i>JAKY</i>
Dist.	<i>LA RA</i>

FE:JKPenfield:hst
12-6-45

SENT

DEC 8

740.00119 Central Japan 11-2-45
Confidential File

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 11-2-45

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Japan
Control Machinery*

Memorandum of Conversation

173

DATE: November 28, 1945

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

The Australian Foreign Minister, Dr. Herbert Evatt ✓
The Secretary of State

COPIES TO:

U, C, EUR

*XR
701.4711
747.00*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Dr. Evatt called, at his request, to see the Secretary to say goodbye. He is leaving tomorrow to return to Australia, after such a long absence, and stated that he would be very glad to get home.

They discussed briefly the resignation of Hurley. Dr. Evatt said he had just seen the President and had told him how much the Australian people think of Hurley. With regard to the situation in the Far East, Dr. Evatt stated that he feels the Allied powers should not interfere beyond the point of carrying out the terms of the Armistice.

The Secretary pointed out that in the surrender negotiations we had assured the Japanese Government the safe return of Japanese troops to their homeland, and that the troops in North China, some 3,000 of them, could not be left there on their own.

Dr. Evatt told the Secretary that he is very encouraged over the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission -- that all ten of the representatives had "practically agreed on everything, have nearly finished the work of the Commission, and have done a good job." He restated his view that MacArthur is a very able Commander and that the Advisory Commission should be subordinate to him. Dr. Evatt mentioned that the Commission will go to Tokyo in the near future, perhaps in ten days or two weeks.

Dr. Evatt urged that the Secretary take time to consider the members of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. From a list

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/ 11-2845
CS/R
740.00119
TOP SECRET

DC/R
Anal <u>31</u>
Rev _____
_____ _____ _____

FILED
3 - 1951

174

- 2 -

of ten countries six members will be selected. Dr. Evatt feels that from the standpoint of ~~view of~~ war effort, support given to the UNO, and geographical position, Australia should be one of the members. He stated he knows the U. S. had not taken a position in the matter.

The Secretary told Dr. Evatt that UNO matters are being studied in the Department and he will keep Dr. Evatt's views in mind.

Secretary

S:DHM

MARGRET

NOV 28 1945

TOP SECRET

No. *23*

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Acting Political Adviser a copy of the appendix to SWNCC 212/1, STATUS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONALS IN JAPAN. This paper was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by informal action on November 14, 1945, and it is assumed that the draft dispatch has been sent to the Supreme Commander.

There is also enclosed for the information of the Acting Political Adviser a copy of SWNCC 55/6 (revised), TREATMENT OF THE PERSON OF HIROHITO, EMPEROR OF JAPAN.

Enclosures:

- 1. Appendix to SWNCC 212/1.
- 2. SWNCC 55/6 (revised), copy no. 45.

A true copy of the signed original.

Jep

Jep

JA

OR *✓*
NOV 28 1945 P.M.

FE:JKPenfield:hst
11-27-45

TOP SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL) JAPAN(/ 11-2845

Confidential File

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

Martin *JK*

ACTION-JA
INFO:

S MEW-744 -G
U Paraphrase before com-
C municating except to
A-C Government Agencies.

Tokyo via War

Dated November 29, 1945

DC/R

FE
DC/L-1

Rec'd 3 p.m., 30th

JK status has file
Mr. Willoughby informed
W.M.

ITP
CP RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 2 - 1945

LA
ESP
ES Secretary of State
JK

Washington

173, November 29, 3 p.m.

740.00119 Control Japan
JK A-A

Please see your No. 134 of 20 November. The schedule
calls for the departure of Willoughby from Tokyo on or about 2
December via ATC. It is requested that his family be advised.

ATCHESON

RB

RESTRICTED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-2945

DEC 5 - 1945

FILED

DCF	NE Unit
nal <i>ml</i>	DCR Per. Unit
nal <i>ml</i>	
Cal	
Dist	
ist	

740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 11-2945

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*9-10-45
File*
TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS TOP SECRET
CORRESPONDENCE PER PARAS 44 g and 53 a, AR 380-5.

Joint Chiefs of Staff CSP
2405 WD ext 77500 Col C R
Peck Inf

29 November 1945

CINCPAC Advance, Tokyo Japan

CINCPAC Command, Manila PI

Number: WARX 85811

TOPSEC to MacArthur from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. The following, received from the State, War and Navy Departments, refers to the person of Hirohito, and not to the Emperor Institution as such.

2. As you know, the subject of whether Hirohito is eventually to be tried as a War Criminal is of great interest to the United States. The United States Government's position is that Hirohito is not immune from arrest, trial and punishment as a War Criminal. It may be assumed that when it appears that the occupation can proceed satisfactorily without him, the question of his trial will be raised. It may also be assumed that if such a proposal will serve a purpose, it may be raised by one or more of our Allies.

3. It therefore appears clear that in any event we must not delay collecting the evidence, working always under adequate security arrangements. This evidence would appear necessary whether he is eventually to be tried or not, since any decision not to try him should be made in the light of all available facts.

4. The effect which decision in this matter may have on the accomplishment of your mission is fully appreciated here. Hence your comments on any aspect of the question will be most welcome.

CM-OUT-85811

(Nov 45)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NND 750162

By *CRP* NARS, Date

APR 24 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAY 3 - 1948

FILED

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

894.001 HIROHITO/11-2945

~~TOP SECRET~~
7/11/745

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Number: WARX 85811 Page 2 29 November 1945

5. Meanwhile, it is desired that the assembly of evidence be conducted with strict security safeguards to avoid disclosure either of the evidence itself or of the fact that such evidence is being assembled. The evidence will then be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. In due course you will be asked to recommend as to conditions which may warrant or permit proceedings against Hirohito as a War Criminal.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell;
Adm King; C of S

CM-OUT-85811

(Nov 45)

DTG: 291522Z mh

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO.

8

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24

113

OPF
JH

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

SECRET

Charge Department: XX

SECRET
Washington

Charge to

(For distribution to S, U, C,
FE and EUR only)

December 1, 1945

6pm

AMEMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

2432

U.S. URGENT.

SECRET.

It is not my present intention to send you a final statement of our position regarding the Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission for presentation to the Soviet Government but rather to leave the matter open pending further developments in the matter referred to in the first paragraph of your 40022/ of November 30.

filed in Rm. 480

Meanwhile we are taking steps to clarify the position of the Chinese and British Governments in regard to these two documents. These two ^{original} documents were communicated to the British and Chinese Governments in the same form in which they were sent to you in our telegrams 2234 and 2235, both of October 27. Both Governments have been kept informed from time to time of the course of our discussions with the Soviet Government. Neither Government however has given us an official expression of ^{its} their agreement or disagreement with either the original documents or the various suggestions and changes which have been made during the course of your

SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-3045

Confidential
11-30

na
Dist
Dat
Unit
11-30

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Department of State

Charge Department:

Washington

114

SECRET

Charge to

-2-

negotiations in Moscow. Accordingly we have now submitted to both the British and Chinese Ambassadors revised drafts of these two documents in the form in which they are being sent to you ^{the next two} in following telegrams. We have stated that the changes made have been made for the purpose of meeting so far as possible the position of the Soviet Government. We have also explained the other positions taken by the Soviet Government which we have not been able to meet. We have asked the two Ambassadors to consult their Governments and to inform us as soon as possible whether they would find it possible to concur in the revised drafts and, if not, what changes they severally propose. It has seemed necessary to do this before this Government is in a position to take a final attitude upon these papers.

Since this is the first time that you have had a complete revision of both documents, the Department desires that you call attention to any point where ^{either} ~~it~~ may fail to give effect to your discussions, and for any other comments which you may have.

Ad

*Byans
DA*

U:DA:GES

*FE
TAV*

*JDA
EUR*

EE

25

OPS
J.H.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

115

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Siglon
~~OTP~~

Collect

Department of State

Charge Department: XX

Washington

Charge to

NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY
secret

December 1, 1945

6 P.M.

AMEMBASSY,
MOSCOW.

2433

U.S. URGENT.

There follows the text of the revised tentative draft of the Allied Council, referred to in my telegram No. 2432.

QUOTE One. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers PAREN or his Deputy END PAREN for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, occupation and control of Japan and of directives supplementary thereto.

Two. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander PAREN or his Deputy END PAREN, who shall be Chairman and United States member; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member; Chinese member; and a British Commonwealth of Nations member. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff, the size of which shall be fixed in agreement with the Chairman of the Council.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-3045 Confidential File

DOE
Dist
U.S.

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

OTP

Charge Department:

Department of State

Charge to

Washington

116

-2-

Three. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

Four. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto. He will consult and advise with the Council upon orders involving questions of principle in advance of their issuance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decision upon all matters shall be controlling. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers within the area of his command.

Five. Action to modify the agreed regime of allied ~~control~~ control for Japan or to approve revisions or modifications of the Japanese Constitution will be taken only in accordance with decisions of the Far Eastern Commission. UNQUOTE.

Byrnes
DD

U:DA:GES

JCV.

EDWARD O. McCOWEN
6TH DISTRICT OHIO

HOME ADDRESS:
WHEELERSBURG, OHIO

COMMITTEES:

EDUCATION
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
FLOOD CONTROL



November 30, 1945

Honorable Dean Acheson
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

*Am'd
EE: E. B. ... BB
12-345*
UNDER SECRETARY
DEC 1 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
file

Dear Mr. Acheson:

I called for you the other day but you were out and I left a call for you but in some way it mis-fired.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 3 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

I am giving regular broadcasts in my district and questions submitted are sometimes quite involved. I am submitting the following for answers and/or opinions of the Department of State, if in your opinion you desire to answer these questions. I desire to answer all questions that are presented so far as I can and particularly to answer correctly.

*VR 740.00119 Central
1 Germany*

It is important that I have the answers to these questions not later than Tuesday noon December 4th, if I am to use them.

In any event, your prompt reply, whether you give answers in all or in part or no answers at all will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Edward O. McCowen

EDWARD O. McCOWEN, M. C. DCR - NE Unit

EOMcC:aa
Enclosure

Anal.	<i>7/2/45</i>
Rev.	<i>7/2/45</i>
Col.	<i>1/28</i>
Dis.	

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-3045
CS / LF
FILED
DEC 5 - 1945
*740.00119 Central
11-3045*

C O P Y

WPAY QUESTIONS TO E. O. McCOWEN

What progress, if any, is being made in the matter of adjusting differences of opinion between Russia and the United States in the method of administering affairs in Japan?

1. Is the State Department justified in leading our people to believe that our armed forces are in China to aid China to be freed of the Japanese army and then to reveal that our forces are there as a matter of pledge to Japan last August to see that their soldiers get back home? The reading public seems to be confused.
2. Will this arrangement with Japan have some direct bearing upon present complications in North China, in which our forces have become entangled with certain Chinese military groups?

Reports indicate that in at least some United Sections of occupied Germany the citizenship has begun to show particular disrespect for the occupation forces, with apparent willingness to attempt to refrain from fullest obedience to present regulations. Would there be any danger of German rebellion when the major portion of our troops have been withdrawn, or will the occupation army be of sufficient proportion to guarantee certain peace and definite order?

DC/R

DEC - 4 1945

My dear Mr. McCowen:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 30, 1945 with which you submit three questions regarding our policy in Japan and Germany.

I hope that the following discussions of the questions you raised will be helpful to you:

Although the Soviet Government shortly after V-J Day accepted the United States proposal to take part in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, the Soviet authorities at the time of the London Conference altered their position by requesting that a decision for the establishment of a Control Council in Japan should precede the convocation of an Advisory Commission in Washington. Since it is the desire of the United States Government that the Soviet Union and all other interested Governments which took part in the war against Japan have a voice in the formulation of a policy regarding Japan, negotiations are still in progress for the purpose of working out a mutually satisfactory formula for the control of Japan which will allow other governments to have a voice in the formulation of policy regarding that country but which will at the same time assure an effective administration of Japan. It is the hope of the United States Government that a satisfactory solution of this problem will be worked out.

The two questions concerning troops in China were in effect answered by Secretary Byrnes in a press conference on November 21, in response to a question on the matter. The substance of his remarks on these questions was as follows:

So far as the marines are concerned, the marines are there as a result of the Japanese surrender and the implementation of that surrender by the Supreme Commander. As far back as August 16, in response to an inquiry by the Government of Japan, we advised the

Japanese

DCR NE UNIT

Anal *MSL*

Re *MSH*

MSH

The Honorable
Edward O. McCowen,
House of Representatives.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 11-3045

CS/LF
196.00119 Control (Japan) / 11-3045

Japanese Government that, in carrying out the Potsdam Declaration, the Supreme Commander would see to it that the surrender was accomplished and that the Japanese soldiers were returned to the mainland (of Japan). Following that, we have been seeing to it that they are sent back to Japan from the Philippines, from the various islands and areas they occupied. It is our duty through Chiang Kai-shek's forces to bring about the surrender, the disarmament of the Japanese and their return to the mainland. That is the mission of our troops there and, while we hope to have our marines removed at an early date, it is dependent entirely upon the accomplishment of that purpose to which this Government is committed.

Thus, the primary purpose of American troops in China now is to assist in the elimination of a threat to peace and stability in that area, a purpose which is consistent with the position we have taken that Japanese soldiers would be returned to Japan.

There exists no opportunity for the German people to launch a rebellion supported by armed force. They have been completely disarmed and are prevented by the occupying forces from rearming. The United States is committed by the joint statements of the governments of the four powers on control machinery and zones of occupation in Germany (June, 1945) to maintain military forces in that country while it is "carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender". The United States is accordingly obligated to retain forces of such size as will insure the keeping of peace and order in its zone of occupation. It is anticipated that these forces will be kept in Germany until the occupying powers are agreed that Germany is prepared without further Allied military control to assume whatever responsibilities and requirements they may impose as guarantees of its peaceful intentions toward its neighbors.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Under Secretary

CR
DEC 3 1945

CE:HC Vedeler
EE:EDurbrow/BB

12-3-45

A true copy of the signed original.
10

Handwritten signatures and initials:
 Clearidge
 Hechinger
 EUR-H FE
 JW