

Doc. 2035

(143)



Doc. # 2035



Vol. 36

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

January 5, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 6354 to 6646

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WARD & PAUL  
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)  
OFFICIAL REPORTERS  
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.  
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.



PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 35

(5th COPY)

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E R R A T A S H E E T

1 From - WARD & PAUL  
2 Official Reporters  
3 1760 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
4 Washington, D. C.

5 In re: Transcript of Report of Proceedings  
6 before the Congress of the United  
7 States Joint Committee on the Invest-  
8 gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,  
9 (S. Con. Res. 27), January 3, 1946

10 Please make the following corrections (see transcri-  
11 page 6249, January 4, 1946):

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>CORRECTION</u>
6067	11, 12	Change "2:30" to read "1:25"
	13, 14	Change "1:57" to read "1:25"
	15	Change "Shortly before 2:00" to "1:25"
	17	Change "1:57 to 2:00" to "1:25"
6068	11	Change "1:57" to read "1:25"

17 Yours very truly,

18 WARD & PAUL  
19 Official Reporters

20 Washington, D. C.,  
21 January 4, 1946.  
22 wlc  
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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

PAGE

STARK, Admiral Harold R. (resumed)

6355

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

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107-A

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Saturday, January 5, 1946.

- - -

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jules M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of  
counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

3 (resumed)

4 - - -

5 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson will resume. Do you want  
6 to make a statement, Admiral?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I have one or two things I  
8 would like to bring up.

9 The Chairman: All right, we will proceed.

10 Admiral Stark: Senator Ferguson yesterday, at page 6326  
11 of the record, called my attention to my testimony before the  
12 Roberts Commission concerning what I expected Admiral Kimmel  
13 to do, and concerning what I knew about his dispositions at  
14 the time of the attack. He read to me an extract from my tes-  
15 timony which I believe was taken from pages 1813-1814 of the  
16 Roberts Commission record. I would like to refer to this again,  
17 and also refer to my earlier testimony before this Committee.

18 In my testimony before the Roberts Commission, there ap-  
19 pears the following:

20 "The Chairman: Well, for General McNarney's pur-  
21 pose, all he wants to know is whether you expected him  
22 (Admiral Kimmel) to carry out his part of the Joint  
23 Coastal Defense Plan, whatever it was.

24 "Admiral Stark: Well, significant as to the state  
25 of readiness to be expected at Pearl Harbor were the steps



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 that he took for other than the Pearl Harbor defense  
3 plan. What we expected him to do was to get more planes  
4 and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if  
5 possible, and to send his task forces -- some task forces  
6 to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did.  
7 He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were  
8 at sea. He informed us that one was returning from hav-  
9 ing put people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had  
10 been sent to Midway and were expected to go on the 5th or  
11 6th day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the  
12 ships that were in port, and at that particular time out  
13 of the three task forces there were two scheduled to be  
14 in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in  
15 port.

16 "The Chairman: Yes.

17 "Admiral Stark: He kept the others at sea. And be-  
18 cause he had taken those measures, which looked absolutely  
19 sound, it was a safe assumption that other measures had  
20 been taken of a similar nature."

21 In passing, Senator Ferguson, I might point out that this  
22 quotation is not transcribed exactly at pages 6326-7 of Volume  
23 34 of the Committee record. The differences are minor, but I  
24 thought you would want to know that there is a difference.

25 In my testimony of Wednesday, Mr. Mitchell asked me what



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 I knew about location of ships in the Pacific Fleet. His  
3 questions and my answers appear at pages 5727-5728, and read  
4 as follows:

5 "Mr. Mitchell: You had a map in your room somewhere  
6 in the Navy Department that showed the precise location  
7 of ships in the Pacific Fleet day by day, did you not?

8 "Admiral Stark: No, sir.

9 "Mr. Mitchell: Did not you have a ship movement  
10 division there that kept track of where the Fleet was?

11 "Admiral Stark: Not in detail, sir. The ships  
12 were in the Hawaiian area, but their departures from  
13 Pearl Harbor, for example, to their target practice  
14 ground or other local maneuvers, and that sort of thing,  
15 to my best knowledge and belief we did not know. I know  
16 I did not know it. He was not required to report that.  
17 If he wanted to move the Fleet to the West Coast, for  
18 example, he would not have done it without asking our  
19 permission, but if he wanted to go 100 miles in this or  
20 that direction, or if he wanted to go out for some special  
21 maneuver or for target practice, or what not, he would  
22 not have reported that to us.

23 "Mr. Mitchell: You did not then have a system of  
24 keeping track of the daily location of ships or of the  
25 fact that ships were or were not in Pearl Harbor?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 "Admiral Stark: No, sir."

3 I believe the Senator is interested in clearing up what  
4 he considers an inconsistency in these two statements.

5 In order to clarify the matter, I wish to point out to  
6 the Committee that in my testimony before the Roberts Com-  
7 mission, which was given on January 19, 1942, I indicated  
8 that, "\*\*\* We knew it. We knew these task forces were at  
9 sea\*\*\*." I must have been referring, apparently, to the  
10 carrier force which Admiral Kimmel had sent out on the 28th  
11 of November and to the regular task force which we knew gen-  
12 erally from his quarterly operating plan was due to be at  
13 sea. I could not have referred to the carrier force which  
14 Admiral Kimmel sent out on 5 December, for I had no information  
15 as to its composition and movement.

16 Specifically, as to the task force which departed from  
17 Pearl Harbor on 28 November, and which, I later learned, in-  
18 cluded the ENTERPRISE, I stated, at page 5729 of the Commit-  
19 tee record, that "\*\*\* But the order to go at that time was his  
20 (Admiral Kimmel's) own, and as I recall, we were told, in  
21 answer to the dispatch asking him as to the advisability, and  
22 other things, about the ENTERPRISE, I believe it was, which  
23 left around the 28th."

24 Mr. Mitchell then suggested to me that the LEXINGTON  
25 left 5 December. I replied, at page 5730, " Yes. I do not



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 recall, and I recollect of no evidence of his reporting to us  
3 about the movement of the LEXINGTON which left the 5th."

4 Mr. Mitchell then inquired, "\*\*\* Did not you know that  
5 the movement was taking place right about the time that you  
6 were sending these warning messages out there?"

7 I replied, "Not until his message came in in reply to the  
8 one in which we asked his advice on the relief -- on the move-  
9 ment of certain Army troops, nor do I recall that we ever  
10 were informed about the movement of the LEXINGTON." This re-  
11 ferred to his (Admiral Kimmel's) dispatch of 28 November stat-  
12 ing in part, "TWELVE MARINE FIGHTERS LEAVE 28 NOVEMBER IN  
13 CARRIER FOR WAKE. EXPECT SEND OTHER MARINE PLANES TO MIDWAY  
14 LATER. ON DECEMBER 1 SENDING TWELVE PATROL PLANES MIDWAY TO  
15 WAKE AND REPLACING THOSE AT MIDWAY FROM PEARL.\*\*\*"

16 These patrol planes, of course, flew out there under their  
17 own power.

18 I think my statement before the Roberts Commission and my  
19 statement before this committee are correct and are essentially  
20 consistent.

21 Then, sir, there was another question raised by Senator  
22 Ferguson yesterday as to whether there was any difference  
23 between the circumstances surrounding our advance planning with  
24 the British in ABC-1 -- which covered both the Atlantic and  
25 the Pacific areas -- and our advance planning in the so-called



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 American-British-Dutch conversations concerning the Far East-  
3 ern area.

4 I am afraid my answers yesterday did not make the matter  
5 very clear.

6 You will note that ABC-1 covered not only our advance  
7 planning in case we were drawn into the war in the Atlantic,  
8 but also contained our advance planning in case we were drawn  
9 into a war in the Pacific. This is shown in Annex II and in  
10 Annex III of ABC-1, which gives considerable detail concerning  
11 the responsibility, tasks, and forces in the Atlantic and the  
12 Pacific area, including the Far East.

13 I considered it my duty as Chief of Naval Operations to  
14 be ready with plans for coordinating our efforts with the  
15 British if we should be drawn into the war in the Atlantic.  
16 Having in mind, however, that I was not empowered to commit  
17 the United States to any course of action, there was written  
18 into the agreement, that is, ABC-1, the following:

19 "\*\*\* The agreements herewith submitted are subject  
20 to confirmation by:

21 "(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States  
22 Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the  
23 Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the  
24 United Kingdom.

25 "(b) The Government of the United States and His



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom."

3 This agreement formed the basis for WPL-46, the Navy's  
4 Basic War Plan.

5 As to whether we obtained the approval of Congress before  
6 engaging in so-called overt acts in the Atlantic, I can only  
7 say, as I have already said, that the people of the United  
8 States, through the Congress, had established their policy of  
9 aid to Britain in the Lend-Lease Act passed on 10 March 1941.  
10 We considered that the Hemisphere Defense Plans, calling for  
11 the defense of the sea lanes through which any effective aid  
12 to Britain must pass, was in accordance with this policy.

13 There was no difference in the circumstances surrounding  
14 our conversations with the British and the Dutch in the Far  
15 East. In my dispatch of 15 February 1941 to Admiral Hart,  
16 directing him to have a representative participate in conver-  
17 sations with the British and Dutch at Singapore, I stated,  
18 with respect to this representative:

19 \*\*\*\*\* He will have the power to agree tentatively to  
20 a joint plan of operation of U.S., English, and Dutch  
21 forces, but he will not be empowered to make any commit-  
22 ments of a political nature. Agreements must have your  
23 and my approval. \*\*\*\*\* Strategic plans adopted should be  
24 completely realistic in nature. Due to the fact that  
25 doubt exists as to whether the Congress would declare war



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 in case of Jap aggression against any country but the  
3 United States, your representative will express my view  
4 that any strategic arrangements of the British and Dutch  
5 which depend for their efficacy upon intervention by us  
6 would not be sound.\*\*\*"

7 I am sure that Admiral Hart and his representative at the  
8 various conversations in the Far East were well aware of my  
9 injunction against any political commitments and my caution  
10 that all planning must be done subject to the will of Congress,  
11 and so far as I know, these restrictions were fully complied  
12 with.

13 There was one other point that I am not sure that I got  
14 over to the committee with regard to the difference in the At-  
15 lantic, where the hemispheric defense plan was in full oper-  
16 ation in defending our commerce and the fact that no such  
17 order was issued in the Pacific, except in the Southeast Paci-  
18 fic.

19 The reason for that is that we were at peace with Japan.  
20 Japan had not attacked any of our shipping and it had been  
21 unnecessary to call into being any such plan. The hemispheric  
22 defense plan was not a war plan in the sense that it involved  
23 offensive movements on a broad scale anywhere the enemy might  
24 be located. It was a defensive plan for the Western hemisphere  
25 and our shipping.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Now, there was one other item and one which Senator  
3 Ferguson asked me to check up and that is as to who Mr. Curtis  
4 Munson was and if I could get any further information on him.

5 On the 23rd of October the State Department sent word to  
6 us that Mr. Curtis Munson was desired by the President for a  
7 mission to study Japanese-American relations on the West Coast  
8 and in Hawaii. As a result of that request by the State De-  
9 partment on us there was a dispatch sent by OPNAV, released  
10 by Admiral Wilkinson on 24 October 1941, which reads as fol-  
11 lows:

12 "On confidential mission Mr. Curtis Munson for  
13 President of the United States to determine exact status  
14 of Japanese-American relations on West Coast and in Ter-  
15 ritory of Hawaii. Allow him access to all information  
16 on Japanese activities in files of District Intelligence  
17 offices. Mr. Munson now in California."

18 I did not have time to get further information but I  
19 learned just before coming up here that Mr. Munson made either  
20 two or three reports, I assume to the President, copies of  
21 which reports are in the files of Naval Intelligence and can  
22 be produced if the committee desires Admiral Colclough to pro-  
23 duce them.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, I would like, Admiral, to now  
25 ask counsel to get the entire files of Munson from the White



1S11

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 House or the Navy file. You have not seen those files, I take  
3 it, Admiral.

4 Admiral Stark: No, sir. They came in just as I was  
5 leaving, they are rather long reports and I did not even read  
6 the first word of them.

7 Senator Ferguson: I meant at the time that they came in.  
8 This was October what? When did he come out there, October --

9 Admiral Stark: My dispatch was October 24th. The re-  
10 quest was made on us on the 23rd and it was stated at that  
11 time he was on the West Coast.

12 Senator Ferguson: So you did not see the reports when  
13 they came in in 1941?

14 Admiral Stark: I do not recall them. I might add that  
15 I stated this dispatch was sent by Admiral Wilkinson. I did  
16 not state to whom. It was sent to the Commandants of the 11th,  
17 12th, 13th and 14th Districts, which are San Diego, San Fran-  
18 cisco, Puget Sound and Hawaiian Districts.

19 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, do I take it then that in  
20 this ABCD arrangement that we were speaking about yesterday  
21 you felt there was an implied approval of Congress as to what  
22 was done in the Atlantic because we had passed the Lend-Lease  
23 bill?

24 Admiral Stark: I felt so in that it was being done to  
25 protect what Congress had provided for and the President also



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 made it very plain to the country I think in his address of  
3 early September.

4 Senator Ferguson: But there was no difference in the  
5 plans in fact. In the Pacific you were going to do the same  
6 thing as you had done in the Atlantic if the facts required it?

7 Admiral Stark: That would be conjecture and I assume that  
8 it is a proper conjecture.

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes. In other words, this was a  
10 tentative plan. It would go into effect under certain circum-  
11 stances.

12 Admiral Stark: Well, now, I am not sure which plan you  
13 are talking about, Senator Ferguson.

14 Senator Ferguson: The one in the Pacific.

15 Admiral Stark: The broad plan was the Rainbow 5. I  
16 thought at first my answer to your question was based on the  
17 assumption that you were talking about the hemispheric defense  
18 plan. That is the one which has the so-called shooting order  
19 in it.

20 Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to get at is why we  
21 ordered three small boats out to watch for these ships going  
22 down to the British possessions, why we sent these airplanes  
23 out on December the 2nd on a specific order out scouting to  
24 see this movement to the British possessions if we did not have  
25 a tentative plan which involved a movement against England?



1913

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Admiral Stark: We did have a tentative plan but only based on if and when we got in.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2           Senator Ferguson: But if they attacked Britain and  
3 not America, why were you concerned with going over there  
4 and scouting to see whether they were going to attack  
5 Britain and not scouting to see whether or not they were  
6 going to attack our own possessions?

7           Admiral Stark: Our scouting would have given us in-  
8 formation as to where they were going, and we were very  
9 anxious to get that information, and the dispatch states  
10 that that was the purpose of the dispatch, in other words,  
11 to find out what was going to happen.

12           Senator Ferguson: Now you --

13           Admiral Stark: May I go just a little further on that,  
14 Senator Ferguson?

15           Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16           Admiral Stark: I gather -- and if I am not correct you  
17 can inform me -- that what you are getting at is the possi-  
18 bility, at least, that if Japan attacked the British or  
19 the Dutch we might automatically come in.

20           Senator Ferguson: That is exactly what I want to know,  
21 whether that was not what was in your mind, and then going  
22 further, that being true, as Churchill said in his speech,  
23 that they would not allow our Fleet to remain on their flank  
24 and therefore it should have been anticipated that they would  
25 attack at Pearl Harbor. Churchill is the one that raises



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 this question in his speech.

3 Admiral Stark: Well, now, as regards that being true,  
4 I can only reiterate that in my initial orders regarding  
5 those plans I stated specifically that no political commitment  
6 could be made; that the plans, when they first came out, I  
7 rejected. When I read the paragraph from which one might  
8 infer that we were going to do certain things if Japan attacked  
9 the British or the Dutch, I rejected the plan right there,  
10 and what I read this morning further verifies that.

11 This is all from the record, to which I tried to stick  
12 so far as I possibly could.

13 I also, in my replies to Joe Richardson as to what we  
14 would do if Japan attacked the British or the Dutch, I did  
15 not know, and I did not think there was anybody on God's  
16 green earth that could tell me. That was wide, and it was  
17 meant to be wide, and I did not know, and in the dispatch  
18 this morning I stated I did not know what the Congress would  
19 do.

20 Now to go one step further with regard to Mr. Churchill's  
21 speech, I can only reiterate what I stated yesterday in regard  
22 to that, that I do not know his background for that statement.

23 Senator Ferguson: I understand you cannot make a treaty.  
24 No one can make a treaty without the approval of Congress.  
25 But you, as the head of the Navy, had a plan that in case



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 certain things happened you would be in a position to move  
3 and to defend America.

4 I am not criticising the plan.

5 Admiral Stark: I understand that, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: I want to know whether that was in  
7 your mind, and therefore I ask the next question: That  
8 being true, did not the high officials in the Navy and Army  
9 anticipate an attack upon America?

10 Admiral Stark: We knew it to be a possibility. Later  
11 on we anticipated it, and even almost a year before it happened,  
12 in both the Atlantic and Pacific the times were fraught with  
13 that possibility, and I endeavored to be prepared for that  
14 should it eventuate. It was very much in my mind. It was  
15 my job.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, for instance, on page 12 of  
17 your memo to the committee you have struck out these words  
18 "and by the President". You were saying, "Based on the  
19 understanding arrived at in the ABC-1 the Army and Navy  
20 developed a joint basic war plan known as Rainbow 5 which  
21 was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy", and  
22 you struck out these words "and by the President".

23 Now, when you drafted this instrument you believed  
24 that the President had approved that plan, is that true?

25 Mr. Mitchell: May I interrupt?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you forgotten the exhibit that is in evidence, in which the President expressly refused?

Senator Ferguson: I have not forgotten that, but I am asking for the opinion of this gentleman.

Mr. Mitchell: Excuse me.

Senator Ferguson: I haven't forgotten that at all. I want to know, when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion personally that that had been approved by the President?

Admiral Stark: I was. I had forgotten the later document showing that he had not specifically approved it, but stated if we got in the war, as I recall the document, to then bring it back to him and he would approve it. At least that was my assumption from the memorandum, I believe, from Mr. Watson.

Senator Ferguson: Now you --

Admiral Stark: Just a second further.

Senator Ferguson: Go ahead.

Admiral Stark: I took that out because I had no documentary proof of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it, although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also from the record.



AL-7

RECYWLC

1 Witness Stark: Questions by: Senator Ferguson  
2 I think it is in my statement, and in a letter to Admiral  
3 Kimmel.

4 Senator Ferguson: I would like to have you go to your  
5 letter of April 4.

6 Admiral Stark: Of April 4?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8 Admiral Stark: I told Kimmel and told Tommy -- Admiral  
9 Hart -- that I had read to the President my official letter  
10 of 3 April and that the President had approved it and knew  
11 I was sending it out. Therefore I think it is safe to say  
12 that the President certainly approved of it. He approved  
13 my sending it out, although he had not officially approved it.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now on April 4 you said this in your  
15 letter:

16 "I made a two-week's inspection trip in the West Indies  
17 and our activities in the United States south of Washington  
18 and just about as I got back the President shoved off, so  
19 I had no close liaison with him until his return this week."

20 This is the part I want to call your attention to.

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: "I spent over 3 hours with him day  
23 before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official  
24 letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as  
25 the result of that conference. I may tell you and Hart and







Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 in that memorandum. There is nothing in it that I would not  
3 be glad to have this committee see, if I could put my hands  
4 on it.

5 I went to the White House with Ghormley. I understand  
6 that Admiral Ghormley is now in Washington, should you desire  
7 to call him. I went to the White House with Admiral Ghormley  
8 in order that he might talk to the President and the President  
9 to him prior to his going over as our Special Naval Observer  
10 in London. We talked about ABC-1, as I recall, at that  
11 time, and I particularly pointed out something that I had  
12 always stressed, and that is generally with reference to the  
13 so-called "Plan Dog" as our guiding principle and as a  
14 simplified WPL-46 regarding the principal enemy.

15 I also distinctly recall the President's warnings to  
16 Ghormley not to, by any possible chance, make any commitments  
17 or say or do anything which would lead the British to think  
18 that we were going into the war. Nevertheless, he wanted  
19 Ghormley to find out all he could with regard to the British  
20 thoughts, and he authorized me to let Ghormley sit in over  
21 there -- two Army officers were sent over at the same time --  
22 on conversations with regard to plans in case we got in.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now you --

24 Admiral Stark: Just a minute.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir. I want to get as complete



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 an analysis of that as I can, that secret memorandum that  
3 was to be burned. That is the only instrument I find that  
4 you mentioned was to be burned or destroyed.

5 Admiral Stark: In all this correspondence?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 Admiral Stark: There was one other letter which I wrote,  
8 and I think with which the committee is familiar, which I  
9 asked to be destroyed as soon as read. The letter turned up  
10 in the hearings before the Naval Court of Inquiry and has  
11 been given this committee.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, there should be a copy of this  
13 memorandum in the Navy files, should not there? You would  
14 not send the only one over there and have it burned?

15 Admiral Stark: I do not know that a copy was retained.  
16 I have given you my remembrance of it.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

18 Admiral Stark: Admiral Ghormley can give you his re-  
19 membrance of it, and I will ask that a search be made, or  
20 if counsel will ask the Department to make the search.

21 Senator Ferguson: I will now ask counsel to do that.

22 Admiral Stark: I do not have it in my personal files.

23 Senator Ferguson: I want to know, Admiral, where you  
24 kept these personal letters when you were active with the Navy.

25 Admiral Stark: They were kept in the files of the Navy



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Department. My secretary kept them.

3 Senator Ferguson: Would the file be marked "personal"  
4 so when you would leave the letters would go with you?

5 Admiral Stark: I left them in the Department under lock  
6 and key.

7 Senator Ferguson: Whose lock?

8 Admiral Stark: I say under lock and key. They are in  
9 the files which I generally kept under lock in the Chief of  
10 Naval Operations' office.

11 Senator Ferguson: They were not kept by you personally?

12 Admiral Stark: Not at the time I first went abroad.  
13 Later on I got them.

14 Senator Ferguson: Later on did you remove them from the  
15 Navy files?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, I got them to study them.

17 Senator Ferguson: You felt they were your personal  
18 correspondence?

19 Admiral Stark: They were, yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: I assume when Admiral Kimmel got a  
21 personal letter from you it did not remain in the Commander  
22 in Chief's files there so that the succeeding Commander in  
23 Chief would have access to that file, any more than your  
24 successor would have access to yours?

25 Admiral Stark: I do not know. You may recall when Kimmel



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 relieved Admiral Richardson I wrote him and asked him to  
3 read the correspondence which I had had with Admiral Richardson  
4 as affording a good background, and that in the Court of  
5 Inquiry in the summer of 1944, when I got my letters together,  
6 I also told Admiral Kimmel I had that, and if he would be  
7 lacking anything I would be glad to furnish him anything I had.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now I am going to go to some other  
9 items which will be rather disconnected, because I do not  
10 want to cover anything that has been covered. I want to try  
11 to clear up some matters in my own mind at least.

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: As the Chief of Naval Operations you  
14 were responsible for the operation of the Navy, were you not?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: And under Article 433, that is the  
17 Act of 30 March 1915, it states that you shall, "under the  
18 direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the  
19 operation of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness  
20 of plans for use in war."

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

22 Senator Ferguson: You were charged with that statutory  
23 duty?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I think some misunderstanding  
25 might naturally arise in the minds of those who might read



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 that, to think that I was actually operating the Fleet. I  
3 believe the committee, after the testimony given, would not  
4 be under that impression.

5 Senator Ferguson: But you were charged --

6 Admiral Stark: May I go a little ahead, a little further,  
7 sir?

8 Senator Ferguson: I want you to complete your answer.

9 Admiral Stark: There was what they call the Force  
(5) 10 Employment Plan, which was made out usually to cover a year,  
11 made out on a yearly basis. It gave broad directives. It  
12 showed when ships were going into the navy yard for repair;  
13 it showed the areas in which they were to operate; it would  
14 show a block when Fleet maneuvers were to be held; it showed  
15 target practice periods, - a general broad outlay which the  
16 Commanders in Chief afloat and CNO reconciled, and then issued  
17 a plan.

18 Now the details of operation under that plan, that is  
19 the operations within an area in which the Fleet was to base,  
20 that was to the Commanders in Chief.

21 Do I make myself plain, sir?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes. But you were also charged, as  
23 a matter of statutory law, with the preparedness and readiness  
24 of plans to be used in war.

25 Admiral Stark: That is quite true, and it was one of



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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the first things that I took up when I went to Washington, and I am responsible for the plans which were drawn up and which I insisted be realistic. We even drew up things as to what we might have and might not have. The plans drawn up here were --

Senator Ferguson: Who was authorized --

The Chairman: Let him finish.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon me.

Admiral Stark: The plans drawn up here were realistic. The allocation of forces was based on the forces that we actually had, and the plan was disseminated, I think, on May 26, 1941.

Senator Ferguson: Could you have ordered the Fleet to mobilize? Was that your responsibility?

Admiral Stark: Yes, I could. But the Fleet was mobilized.

Another thing that I did almost as soon as I became Chief of Naval Operations -- I would like to give the committee this background -- some of you may remember my coming on the Hill for special appropriations. My experience and my knowledge of previous wars in which we had engaged was that we entered them with a large number of ships in what we might call a reserve, and when I became Chief of Naval Operations we had a large number of ships in reserve, destroyers, submarines, some cargo vessels, some tankers. It was my



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 ambition that if we got caught there would not be a single  
3 ship left on the Navy list which would be of use to us which  
4 was not ready. I went on that basis immediately, I went to  
5 Congress, with the President's permission, to ask for special  
6 appropriations for money for getting the large number of  
7 destroyers we had in commission, and the submarines and other  
8 ships, and Congress granted the funds for that purpose. It  
9 was tough on the forces afloat in some respect, because they  
10 had to give up enough experienced men to form a nucleus around  
11 which we put recruits to get these ships going.

12 But in December of 1941 we were practically mobilized.

13 The Commander in Chief of the Pacific corroborates that  
14 in his own war plan when he states that he was virtually  
15 mobilized.

16 Senator Ferguson: You could do that on your own responsi-  
17 bility, and did it, even without consulting the President?

18 Admiral Stark: I tried to sell the President on it.  
19 I had to, on the Hill, for special appropriations for the  
20 destroyers, for example.

21 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember having any discussion  
22 with the President in 1941 about mobilizing the Fleet for war  
23 in the Pacific?

24 Admiral Stark: No, sir. The President knew that I was  
25 working on getting everything we had ready.

WLC

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: So then you take it it was an under-  
3 standing between you and the President that you were mobilizing  
4 the Fleet?

5 Admiral Stark: Perfectly, and requesting men in that  
6 connection.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, was it your duty --

8 Admiral Stark: May I add to that also?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Admiral Stark: -- That Congress knew it, because before  
11 the committees I went asking for money, it was thoroughly  
12 explained what I wanted it for, and it was to get these  
13 ships that were tied up in the Philadelphia Navy Yard and  
14 San Diego, Puget Sound, San Francisco, and elsewhere. Congress  
15 knew why I was asking for that money. I was asking for money  
16 for all sorts of purposes, for our shore bases, and I have  
17 often stated, and I would like to state publicly here, as  
18 I told President Knox --

19 Senator Ferguson: You mean Secretary Knox?

20 Admiral Stark: Secretary Knox. -- that the work done  
21 by Admiral Moreell in getting the bases ready, that Midway  
22 might not have been possible, and the great victory that  
23 turned the point we had there, had it not been for the work  
24 done on those shore bases.

25 I would like to say also that the dock, the big drydock,



WLC3

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 in Hawaii, which was available the day after Pearl Harbor,  
3 was finished months ahead of time, and I had to come up on the  
4 Hill to defend myself against having made contracts which were  
5 perhaps not quite according to Hoyle in order to push on  
6 the work, as some of you may recall, not only in connection  
7 with my endeavor to double the size of the Fleet but also to  
8 build up the shore bases to support the Fleet, and particularly  
9 in the Pacific, and not only in the Central Pacific, but in  
10 the Aleutians.

11 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, was it your duty as Chief of  
12 Naval Operations to evaluate the effect of diplomatic repre-  
13 sentations upon the countries to whom they were addressed?

14 Admiral Stark: I was necessarily interested in it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Was it your duty?

16 Admiral Stark: I would consider it my duty to keep in  
17 touch with that so far as I possibly could, and to keep the  
18 commanders in the field informed of my evaluation.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, did I understand you the other  
20 day to say that you only read part of the magic?

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Ingersoll read part?

23 Admiral Stark: I suppose it would depend a good deal on  
24 how busy he was. He might also have read only the messages  
25 which were clipped as of importance.



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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Did you read all that were clipped?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When you were away, what happened?

Admiral Stark: Well, when I was away, the duty would be carried on largely by Admiral Ingersoll, and, of course, the others who were there.

Senator Ferguson: Whose duty was it to clip the messages that you would or would not read?

Admiral Stark: That duty was performed in Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson: Who in Intelligence had the responsibility of clipping, with paper clips, I take it, what you were to read?

Admiral Stark: I think the initial clipping was done by Cramer, and McCollough was our Far Eastern officer, and he was also very much interested in it. Whether Captain Safford also clipped, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did they clip for you these so-called ship movement messages?

Admiral Stark: I do not recall specifically about the ship movement messages. I kept in touch with them generally, with War Plans.

Mr. Mitchell: He is talking about ship locations.

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about these messages in Volume 2, in the yellow book.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: You are referring to the ships at certain  
3 points?

4 Senator Ferguson: The intercepts, at certain areas.

5 Admiral Stark: I thought you were talking about the  
6 broad problem.

7 Senator Ferguson: I was talking about something different.

8 Admiral Stark: Your question is what?

9 Senator Ferguson: Did they clip for you these intercepted  
10 ship movement messages or ship location messages, as they are  
11 known as, the Japanese messages, the military installations  
12 and ship movements, and so forth, in Exhibit 2?

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Admiral Stark: I can only say with regard to the particular messages to which I believe you refer what I said previously, but I do not recall having seen those messages, and to the best of my knowledge and belief I did not see them, but I may have seen them. In any case, it was my over-all responsibility.

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Senator Ferguson: Admiral, which was of the most importance, when Japan was going to strike or where Japan was going to strike, or was there any distinction between those two points?

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Admiral Stark: I would say they were both so important as to be number one priority.

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Senator Ferguson: I am trying to get at why the same effort was not put on the translations or deciphering as to where they were going to strike as was put on the diplomatic messages.

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Admiral Stark: Senator Ferguson, that gets down into a matter of detail which I think my subordinates could give you much better than I. I can give you my own knowledge of the thing but it is very general. It is not specific and I might be in error.

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Senator Ferguson: After all, you were responsible, under the rules, for the conduct of the officials under you, were you not?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. The over-all responsibility was mine, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, without reading some of these ship messages, they have been read, I want to call your attention to some that I think have not been read.

You say it is of equal importance where they were going to strike as when they were going to strike.

The message on page 12 was read to you. I won't read that again. It has been used as indicating a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating a desire to get a plan of Pearl Harbor exactly, each part of the water, where the ships would be.

I go to the next message which is the 29th of September.

Admiral Stark: That is on page 13, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And there the message reads:

"The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:"

Indicating exactly what kind of a code will be used to tell where these ships are.

"Navy dock in the navy yard (the ten ten pier).

"Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island.

"Alongside in Ford Island: (east and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively).

"Relayed to Washington, San Francisco."

We get that on "10-10-41" indicating that the Japanese



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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have a code method of telling Tokyo exactly our plan at Pearl Harbor. Would you say that is true?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Let's take the next message.

Who was Togo in 1941?

Admiral Stark: Tojo, as I recall, was Prime Minister, and Togo was --

Senator Ferguson: Wasn't he Foreign Minister at that time?

Admiral Stark: I think he was Minister of Foreign Affairs. I thought I had them straightened out between Tojo and Togo.

Senator Ferguson: He was a high official in the Japanese military hierarchy?

Admiral Stark: I think so.

Senator Ferguson: Let's take the short message, the 15th of November. That is after we get the deadline message of the 25th. It is not translated until 12-3.

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."

Now, it is a "in harbor report".

"\*\*\*irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Wouldn't that be of great significance? You have a deadline and here is a message going from a high official in Tokyo to Honolulu -- to Togo. They want to get their reports irregular but they want them twice a week. Wouldn't that be very impressive at that time, wouldn't it indicate something? You have a deadline. They want to get these reports twice a week.

Admiral Stark: Well, assuming that that "ships in harbor report" is not just the normal ships in port, which they were giving in ports like San Francisco and Puget Sound and in the Canal, but that it referred to the previous two dispatches, it does not say so, but assuming that it does refer to the previous two dispatches, it would be very important.

Taken of itself, without the background of the other two, I wouldn't consider it so important.

Senator Ferguson: Take it by itself, take this language:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical." Not that they want this because they are trading with America and want to know when ships are leaving, but "the relations are most critical and, therefore, we want these twice a week, in the harbor." What could any intelligence officer read in that?

Admiral Stark: It is an important dispatch.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that that was called to



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 your attention?

3 Admiral Stark: I do not. Again I say it might have  
4 been, but I have no recollection of it.

5 Senator Ferguson: On the 3rd of December, when it was  
6 translated, this most critical period, this important language,  
7 you can't now recall whether that was called to your attention,  
8 you say you cannot?

9 Admiral Stark: I do not recall it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Let's take page 14. This is from  
11 Honolulu to Tokyo. It is a message showing that they are  
12 using the one on page 12, which much stress has been put on  
13 here and many questions asked, they are using those areas  
14 and that method.

15 "Area A -- A battleship of the OKLAHOMA class entered  
16 and one tanker left port."

17 I want to go down to paragraph 3 and see whether we  
18 can analyze that. This is obtained on the 6th. It came in  
19 on November 18. That is why I asked you if it was not just  
20 as important to ascertain where they were going to attack  
21 as when they were going to attack.

22 Here we had a pilot message on the 6th indicating that  
23 a reply to ours of the 26th was going to be received. We had  
24 the message over in Berlin that they were going to break  
25 relations and anticipated war. We had all of the information.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 We have coming into the Navy this information.

3 Admiral Stark: I would like to say in regard to all  
4 that information, even if it is reiteration, bearing in mind  
5 our messages of the 24th and the 27th, and the war warning  
6 message, with all of its directions.

7 Senator Ferguson: I understand.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: Here is what they say on the 18th.  
10 This is after the deadline has been set:

11 "At ten o'clock a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8  
12 destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course  
13 was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1000 meters  
14 apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl  
15 Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to  
16 the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed  
17 course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed  
18 time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered  
19 Area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

20 "Relayed to \_\_\_\_\_."

21 Now, wouldn't that information indicate that they wanted  
22 to get the exact course, where there were no mines, so that  
23 if they wanted to use submarines, and later they did use  
24 submarines, or tried to use them, wouldn't this indicate to  
25 you that they wanted to know exactly where they could travel



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 in our harbor?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, it would, and, of itself,  
4 they probably wanted that and got it everywhere they could,  
5 just as we did on enemy harbors. If you could find out  
6 where the swept channel was it was always important to know.

7 I don't say that in mitigation of the inference from  
8 these dispatches, but I want to point out that that particular  
9 information is something that any military naval man would  
10 want to know.

11 Senator Ferguson: Knowing all these other facts, he  
12 wouldn't want to know of it just to file in his file, would he?

13 Admiral Stark: No. It might be useful to him, and  
14 it was asked in this case, in the light of hindsight, for a  
15 specific purpose.

16 Senator Ferguson: You think that specific purpose was  
17 to use it for small submarines to come in?

18 Admiral Stark: I would say, in the light of the knowledge  
19 we now have, it may very well have been for that purpose.  
20 At that time we didn't know they had the small submarines.

21 Senator Ferguson: You mean that our Intelligence was  
22 such that we didn't even know that Japan had these small  
23 submarines?

24 Admiral Stark: That is my remembrance, and I might  
25 suggest that you ask committee counsel to verify that with



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson: I certainly want to get that information.

Admiral Stark: To see if we did have any knowledge of them or not.

Senator Ferguson: We didn't know they had the last four battleships, our Intelligence was such that we didn't know that?

Admiral Stark: My appearance at hearings on the Hill will show how little knowledge we had of what the Japs had. You will recall a day or so ago my stating that when trains went by certain Japanese navy yards the curtains were pulled down so that people could not see out and also my statement that it was sometimes felt we didn't get much inside the 3-mile limit. I have covered that in previous testimony.

WLC follows

WALTON & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

LARRY(3)

WLC

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2 Senator Ferguson: Yes. We won't repeat if we can help  
3 it. We weren't getting this kind of information in the  
4 Japanese harbors, were we?

5 You say that was probably one of those things that any  
6 military agency would get but we weren't getting it because  
7 we had no idea of attacking Japan?

8 Admiral Stark: We undoubtedly had Japanese channels.  
9 I cannot recall that we had any swept channels at that time.  
10 But if we had been able to get anything of that sort and our  
11 people could have picked it up I have no doubt they would have.

12 Senator Ferguson: Here in our Intelligence Branch, at  
13 least on the 6th, we have this message.

14 Let's go to the next message. We get that the day before,  
15 on the 5th. This is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu. November  
16 18, translated on the 5th. So, we get it Friday.

17 "Please report on the following areas as to  
18 vessels anchored therein."

19 Not moving vessels. But the following areas -- they want  
20 to know what ships are anchored in them.

21 "Area N. Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, Honolulu" --  
22 "Honolulu" is written up in the margin. --"and the  
23 areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with  
24 great secrecy."

25 In other words, "Don't let America know that you are

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Togo



WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 doing this, but we want to know what ships and we want to know  
3 what is in those adjacent areas."

4 We translated that on the 5th.

5 Let's go to the next. This one comes on November 20.

6 Getting nearer this deadline.

7 "Strictly Secret." This we get on Thursday before.

8 "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet."

9 This is from Tokyo to Honolulu, from Togo, a high official.

10 "Please investigate comprehensively the fleet --

11 bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military

12 reservation."

13 Now, "military reservation" would be where the anti-aircraft  
14 was, wouldn't it? And they wanted comprehensive analysis.

15 Admiral Stark: I would say it would mean bases anywhere.  
16 Where the fleet was located, in the neighborhood of Hawaii. I  
17 don't know just why he states "military reservation" there,  
18 but I would say they wanted any information they could get.

19 Senator Ferguson: But they wanted it comprehensively.

20 Admiral Stark: They always wanted it comprehensively,  
21 whatever it was.

22 Senator Ferguson: Let's go to the next. Here is another  
23 message from Tokyo. Here are three messages from Tokyo seek-  
24 ing information on the 5th, 4th, and 6th, immediately preceding  
25 the attack on Pearl Harbor. Here is Tokyo concentrating on

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WLC3

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 getting information.

3 By the way this next message is dated November 29, which  
4 is the day before the deadline, and it would be the day before  
5 the President had indicated that there might be an attack.

6 Now, here is what they want to know.

7 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship  
8 movements, but in future will you also report even when  
9 there are no movements."

10 Indicating that they want to keep, isn't it true, they  
11 want to keep exact information on every ship in our Harbor  
12 at Pearl Harbor, not moving but in the Harbor?

13 Admiral Stark: That is not unusual. It is my recollection  
14 that I sent Admiral Hart a similar message with regard to his  
15 scouting, to report not only what he saw but to report daily if  
16 he didn't see anything. We get that from the war games also.  
17 It is simply to insure that what was sent out properly got through,  
18 they getting a message each day. I think that is the signifi-  
19 cance of it.

20 Senator Ferguson: You had no rule that this information  
21 was not to come over your desk?

22 Admiral Stark: No.

23 Senator Ferguson: As you understood it, this same  
24 information that went to the Secretary of the Navy went to  
25 the President?

D. G. MOTTINGHAM, JUNAS &amp; DRAV



WLC4

AL

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

2 Senator Ferguson: As far as the Navy was concerned?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

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5 Senator Ferguson: On the two days we get these three  
6 messages. In fact, on the three days -- on four days: 12/3,  
7 12/6, 12/5, 12/4 and 12/5 -- these five messages would normally  
8 come across your desk, and they don't strike any responsive  
9 chord at all now that you saw them?

10 Admiral Stark: They would normally come across my desk  
11 if they were evaluated as of particular significance and  
12 interest. I can only repeat what I have already said that so  
13 far as I know the significance of these messages at that time,  
14 among the great mass of information that was coming in, was  
15 not realized as we realize it now, laying them out subsequent  
16 to the event.

17 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, isn't it true that  
18 you had officials that were culling the insignificant from  
19 the significant? And here we have had delivered to us just  
20 these. I don't know how much came in that may have been con-  
21 sidered not significant. But these have been delivered to us  
22 and would normally go across your desk. I wonder whether  
23 you have ever made an investigation to point out whether  
24 they did go across your desk.

25 Admiral Stark: Well, I wouldn't make an investigation

LARRY4

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WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D.C.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 on something I didn't know had happened. Occasionally I  
3 would go through, if I had time, and I was pressed for time  
4 continuously, I might read through the entire file that came  
5 in to me. Not the entire file that was in the Navy Department.  
6 As a check-up. And my Aide, Commander Wellborne, who is a  
7 very brilliant and able young man, occasionally did that also.

8 Now, I can see exactly how this looks now. I can only  
9 say that to the best of my knowledge and belief, and from  
10 anything that I have, it was not so appreciated at that time.  
11 I can repeat in more detail what I said originally, but I  
12 can't add anything to it.

13 Senator Ferguson: But America had placed her safety in  
14 officials whose duty it was to evaluate the evidence before  
15 them in order that America might be protected; isn't that  
16 true?

17 Admiral Stark: That is true, and I will say further  
18 that they were good men, going through these dispatches daily.

19 Senator Ferguson: But you told me yesterday that on  
20 the 15th of October you changed the Intelligence Branch,  
21 had Admiral Wilkinson, who had never had any previous exper-  
22 ience in Intelligence work; isn't that a fact?

23 Admiral Stark: That is a fact, but these dispatches  
24 came to him after being looked over further down, and it  
25 required no particular, I would say, no special previous



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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experience in Intelligence to handle something of this sort. Wilkinson is a brilliant man. He is known as such. Just what happened to these dispatches, and what went on where they came in, obviously they came in to Intelligence. They couldn't get out of Intelligence. And I understand you are asking other people to testify on these. I won't add anything to what I have already stated with regard to them.

Senator Ferguson: Has there ever been any disciplinary action against anyone in the Navy, court-martial or otherwise, for either failing to translate these within a reasonable time after, or not getting them to you and not calling your attention to the significance of them?

Admiral Stark: I would say that the only man who has been censored with regard to this and other matters is myself, by the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson: I understand. But there has not been anyone down the line that was similarly acted upon for neglect of duty?

Admiral Stark: No, sir. These dispatches came to light a couple of years after the event. I say they came to light. That is my understanding. I do not recall having seen them until they were produced. And while it would have been, perhaps, in view of what has happened since, a good thing at the time to have gone through everything, I was busy, we had



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 the war in the Pacific on our hands, and in addition what  
3 was going on in the Atlantic, and elsewhere. But I was  
4 doubly busy right after the event and during my continued  
5 duty in Washington until I went abroad. I was thinking more  
6 of handling the job and getting on with the war than I was  
7 on possible post-mortems at that time.

(5) 8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, the action of the Secretary  
9 of the Navy as to you has been very recent, in 1945?

10 Admiral Stark: The action of what?

11 Senator Ferguson: Of the Secretary of the Navy, which  
12 you mentioned.

13 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: And prior to that you had been decorated,  
15 prior to the criticism of the Secretary of the Navy you had  
16 been decorated by the President, had you not?

17 Admiral Stark: I had been, and one of the finest --  
18 well, I don't know that I might mention it -- but I received  
19 a letter from Colonel Knox also when I left, of which I am  
20 very proud. Incidentally -- well, I won't mention it.

21 Senator Ferguson: You were decorated by the President  
22 after that?

23 Admiral Stark: I was, yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: What was the decoration?

25 Admiral Stark: I have a brief of that citation here,



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 and I also have kept in my file, ever since coming up here  
3 I have kept it with me, the letter from the Secretary of  
4 the Navy.

5 The Chairman: Suppose we have those both printed as  
6 part of the record.

7 The Vice Chairman: Read them at this time.

8 The Chairman: Read them. They are not very long?

9 Admiral Stark: They are not very long, no, sir.

10 The Chairman: Read them now.

11 Admiral Stark: The other thing which I started to mention  
12 bore on my duty abroad, from the Army.

13 Senator Ferguson: When King went back to Norway you  
14 were delegated by the President to be his representative at  
15 that ceremony, were you not?

16 Admiral Stark: The President of the United States sent  
17 me on a mission to Norway and also Denmark, rather a nice  
18 diplomatic mission. It was of no great significance. I  
19 haven't mentioned any foreign decorations. I don't imagine  
20 you would want to go into that.

21 Senator Ferguson: But they were given you --

22 Admiral Stark: The British gave me one of the highest  
23 decorations, as a result of the action by the Chiefs of Staff,  
24 that it was within their power to give. The one from Norway,  
25 by King Haakon, of whom I had seen considerable in London,



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

was the highest decoration that they could give.

The French also gave me a high decoration in connection with the Normandy invasion.

Shefner follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Shefner  
fls LaChar  
11:15 am

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 The Vice Chairman: Yes, Admiral, go ahead and read it,  
2 please.  
3

4 Admiral Stark: This letter is dated 21 March, from  
5 Colonel Knox.

6 The Vice Chairman: What year, please?

7 Admiral Stark: 1942. It reads:

8 "I have just signed the order assigning you to your  
9 new command in London. You know, of course, that you take  
10 with you from me my heartiest best wishes for success  
11 in this most responsible post, but I do not want to ter-  
12minate the relationship which has existed between us for  
13the past two years via a coldly formal letter.

14 "I came to this present task of mine with little be-  
15sides good intentions, energy and a desire to serve my  
16country in a very grave crisis. No one in the Navy has  
17been of greater assistance and help to me in my efforts  
18to be a constructive and helpful force in the Navy than  
19you. In every possible official way, you have aided me  
20and supported me. However, this is but a minor part of  
21the story. In a warmly personal way, you have been my  
22friend and counselor throughout. I can think of scores  
23of times when you have saved me from serious missteps  
24and, in everything that I have attempted, designed to pro-  
25mote efficiency in the Navy, especially in its administra-



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 tion, you have been a tower of support and strength.

3 "In all of a fairly long and busy life, I have never  
4 had a more dependable, constructive and self-effacing  
5 associate. As Chief of Naval Operations, during two and  
6 a half of the most critical years in American naval his-  
7 tory, you have discharged the duties of your high office  
8 with brilliance, single-minded devotion to the Navy and  
9 to the country and in a manner which will leave an in-  
10 delible impression on the naval establishment for many  
11 years to come.

12 "You take with you as you leave your post here for the  
13 one in London the affectionate regard and the most heart-  
14 felt good wishes of the entire establishment. May God  
15 go with you and bless you in all that you do. I shall  
16 hope to hear from you occasionally in an informal and  
17 personal way as well as officially.

18 Yours sincerely,

19 FRANK KNOX."

20 The citation from the President reads:

21 "The President of the United States takes pleasure  
22 in presenting the GOLD STAR in lieu of the Second Dis-  
23 tinguished Service Medal to

24 ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES NAVY

25 for services set forth in the following



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

## "CITATION

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility during his tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations from 1939 to 1942 when he was charged with the responsibility of building and administering the largest peacetime Navy in the history of this country.

"Due to his exceptional qualities of leadership and his outstanding ability, full reliance was placed upon his advice and counsel by the Secretary of the Navy, by the Congress and by the President of the United States as evidenced by the executive and legislative measures adopted for the Naval Service to effect a high state of training for war and the building of a 'two ocean Navy.'"

Mr. Murphy: May I have the date of that?

Senator Ferguson: What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral Stark: The date of it is April 9, 1942.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what was your assignment to London?

Admiral Stark: I was in command of the naval forces in Europe, originally less the Mediterranean and North Africa, which theater was added in 1944.

Senator Ferguson: And you stayed on that post how long?

Admiral Stark: I stayed on the post until the war was



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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over.

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4

Senator Ferguson: So you completed that assignment until the war was over?

5

6

Admiral Stark: I completed that assignment and the items of this sort, as I stated, came from the Army.

7

The Chairman: Do you mean the war in Europe?

8

9

Senator Ferguson: The war in Europe I have in mind, but when did you leave?

10

11

Admiral Stark: I left after Japan had surrendered. We had also had V-J Day.

12

13

Senator Ferguson: Thanks for the correction, Mr. Chairman.

14

15

16

Admiral Stark: I had received orders shortly before Japan surrendered but I actually did not leave until the 16th of August.

17

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Senator Ferguson: Now, Mr. Chairman, I won't touch on what is in these messages but I would ask to have printed in the record what is in this yellow book, exhibit 2, here at this place in the record from page 16 to page 29, inclusive. It is to bring to us in the printed record and at one place all of the messages that we have been handed in this book showing ship movements or harbor locations, which were the messages translated after December the 7th but I think all of them received prior to that date.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 The Chairman: They have not heretofore been printed in  
3 the record?

4 Senator Ferguson: They have not been printed in our of-  
5 ficial record as I understand it.

6 The Chairman: It will be so ordered.

7 Mr. Mitchell: They have been introduced in an exhibit  
8 but never included in the transcript, in the daily transcript.

9 Senator Ferguson: I just do that to call attention to  
10 them, because I do not want to review it with the witness --

11 The Chairman: Without objection the pages indicated will  
12 be included in the transcript at this point.

13 Senator Ferguson: To complete my sentence, - because he  
14 had not seen them because they were not translated.

15 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

17 Mr. Murphy: Have you included in that series the one  
18 about Manila, where they want the information about the air-  
19 planes and the number of fields.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, it would be in there, I am sure.

21 Well, now, Admiral, to move along, did you know --

22 Mr. Mitchell: Excuse me. You see, this exhibit 2 is  
23 divided up into groups relating to Hawaii, Panama Canal,  
24 Philippines and they are all separated and what the Senator  
25 has asked to put in is the messages relating to Hawaii which



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 were intercepted prior to December 7th and not translated  
3 until after the attack.

4 Mr. Murphy: I would like to have in addition this one  
5 particular dispatch as to Manila which seems to be more elabor-  
6 ate and in greater detail than the others.

7 Senator Ferguson: Will you point it out?

8 Mr. Murphy: I will give the stenographer a memorandum  
9 as to where it is in the record.

10 The Chairman: All right.

11 (Pages Nos. 16 to 29, inclusive, of Exhibit No. 2,  
12 are in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

(Insert) 13

WARD & PAUL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941

From: Honolulu (Kita)

To: Tokyo

November 24, 1941.

#234. (Part 1 of 2)

Re your #114<sup>a</sup>.

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.
2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.
3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
4. The manner in which the fleet moves:  
 Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

1. MOTORHAW 2. 10 3. 234



1 a - Not available.

2 ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)

3 - - -

4 From: Honolulu

5 To: Tokyo

6 November 24, 1941

7 #234 (Part 2 of 2)

8 The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their  
9 operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going  
10 to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in  
11 Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days  
12 at a stretch.

13 The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two  
14 weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their  
15 maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

16 The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wed-  
17 nesdays, and Fridays.

18 The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the prin-  
19 cipal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activi-  
20 ties in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

21 Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of \_\_\_\_\_,  
22 have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in  
23 the Manila area.

24 Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers  
25 conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.



1 ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 13/16/41 (2)

2 - - -

3 From: Tokyo (Togo)

4 To: Honolulu

5 November 28, 1941.

6 #119 Re your message #243<sup>a</sup>.

7 Secret outside the Department.

8 Intelligence of this kind which are of major import-  
9 ance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

10 1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we re-  
11 port such movement but once a week the vessels, in that inter-  
12 val, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands,  
13 but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in  
14 deciding on reports covering such movements.

15 2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital  
16 ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the  
17 time of entry into the port until the departure.

18 a - Available in code under study.

19 ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (8)

20 - - -

21 From: Honolulu

22 To: Tokyo

23 November 28, 1941.

24 #238.

25 Military report:

2 0 . NOTRE DAME JULY 4 1941



1 (1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the  
2 altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).

3 (2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: -  
4 number of shots - 12; interval of flight - 13 seconds; inter-  
5 val between shots - 2 minutes; direct hits - none.

6 (3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to rein-  
7 force the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

8 (4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters  
9 about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two de-  
10 stroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

11 ARMY 35928 JD-7212 Trans. 12-8-41 (7)

12 - - -

13 From: Honolulu (Kita).

14 To: Tokyo

15 1 December 1941

16 #241 (In 2 parts, complete).

17 Re your #119\*

18 Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

19 1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is  
20 about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

21 Direction based on;

22 (1) The direction taken when the ships start out is  
23 usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the  
24 horizon in that direction.

25 (2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for



1 the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

2 (3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs  
3 and islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice  
4 sea.

5 (4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant  
6 ship routes and official travel routes.

7 Distance based on;

8 (1) Fuel is plentyfull and long distance high speed  
9 is possible.

10 (2) Guns can not be heard here.

11 (3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers men-  
12 tioned in my message #231\*\* were for the duration of four  
13 full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864  
14 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or  
15 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical  
16 miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring on  
17 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a  
18 guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be  
19 point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

20 2. The usual schedule for departure and return of  
21 the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on  
22 Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of  
23 the following week. All ships stay in port about a period  
24 of one week.

25 \*JD-1: 7158. \*\*Available, dated 23 November.



rob 6

1 JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

2 - - -

3 From: Tokyo (Togo)

4 To: Honolulu

5 December 2, 1941

6 #123

(Secret outside the department.)

7 In view of the present situation, the presence in port  
8 of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost im-  
9 portance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me  
10 know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there  
11 are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are  
12 any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me  
13 whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

14 Note: This message was received here on December 23.

15 ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese; Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

16 - - -

17 From: Honolulu (Kita)

18 To: Tokyo

19 3 December 1941

20 #247

21 Ship report.

22 2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out  
23 toward mainland.

24 3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

25 26065

JD-1: 7309 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)



1 From: Honolulu (Kita)

2 To: Tokyo

3 3 December 1941

4 #245 (In 2 parts, complete)

5 (Military secret)

6 From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military  
7 Staff Headquarters:

8 1. I wish to change my method of communicating by  
9 signals to the following:

10 I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as  
11 follows:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions : Preparing to sortie. : including scouts and : screen units	1
A number of carriers : Preparing to sortie.	2
Battleship divisions : All departed be- : tween 1st and 3rd	3
Carriers : Several departed : between 1st and 3rd.	4

S. H. MOTOHISHAW, JUAN & GRAY



WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHY

	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Signal</u>
2	Carriers : All departed be-	5
3	: tween 1st and 3rd.	
4		
5	Battleship divisions: All departed be-	6
6	: tween 4th and 6th	
7		
8	Carriers : Several departed	7
9	: between 4th and 6th	
10		
11	Carriers : All departed be-	8
12	: tween 4th and 6th.	
13		

26145

3. Signals.

I. Lanikai\* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

		<u>Signal</u>
18		
19	One light between 8 and 9 p.m.	1
20	" " " 9 and 10 p.m.	2
21	" " " 10 and 11 p.m.	3
22	" " " 11 and 12 p.m.	4
23	II.	
24	Two lights " 12 and 1 a.m.	5
25	" " " 1 and 2 a.m.	6



Signal (continued)

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Two lights between 2 and 3 a.m. 7  
" " " 3 and 4 a.m. 8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai\* Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House\*\* will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900 - 2000	3
2000 - 2100	4
2100 - 2200	5
2200 - 2300	6
2300 - 2400	7
0000 - 0100	8

V. K.G.M.G.\*\*\* Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC..CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



1           3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages  
 2 cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the  
 3 northward of Kula Sanatorium\*\*\*\* at a point halfway between  
 4 Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longi-  
 5 tude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and  
 6 southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will  
 7 be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
From 7 - 8	3 or 6
From 8 - 9	4 or 7
From 9 - 10	5 or 8

- 12 \*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
- 13 \*\*A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile north of Lanikai.
- 14 \*\*\*A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
- 15 \*\*\*\*At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

16 JD-1: 7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)

17 - - -

18 From: Honolulu (Kita).

19 To: Tokyo

20 3 December 1941

21 #248

22 Ship report.

23 December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left  
 24 port. No other movements.

25 26066

JD-1: 7310 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

D. C. NOTWITHSAW - JUAN B. ORAW



1 From: Honolulu (Kita)

2 To: Tokio

3 December 4, 1941

4 #249

5 On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat en-  
6 tered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning  
7 of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She  
8 had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft.

9  
10 Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered  
11 port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office  
12 and received some mail in return.

13 ARMY 26161

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/12/41 (2)

14  
15 From: Honolulu (Kita).

16 To: Tokyo.

17 5 December 1941

18 #252

19 (1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battle-  
20 ships mentioned in my message #239\* arrived here. They had  
21 been at sea for eight days.

22 (2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port  
23 on the same day.

24 (3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon  
25 of the 5th:



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8 battleships.

3 light cruisers.

16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class

and - - - - were in dock.

\*Available, dated 29 November.

26029

JD-1: 7280

(D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)

- - -

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Honolulu

December 6, 1941

#128

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123<sup>a</sup>  
the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

a - not available

ARMY 26158 JD 7381

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

- - -

From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

#253 Re the last part of your #123<sup>a</sup>.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began  
training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina.  
Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 it is understood that they are considering the use of these  
 2 balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as  
 3 Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in  
 4 the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up moor-  
 5 ing equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them.  
 6 Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for  
 7 the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the  
 8 present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment.  
 9 In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actual-  
 10 ly any. However, even though they have actually made pre-  
 11 parations, because they must control the air over the water  
 12 and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl  
 13 Harbor, Hickam Ford and Ewa<sup>b</sup>, there are limits to the balloon  
 14 defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability  
 15 there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for  
 16 a surprise attack against these places.

17 JD 7178

18 2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo  
 19 nets. The details are not known. I will report the results  
 20 of my investigation.

21 a - not available.

22 b - Kana, spelling.

23 ARMY 25877

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

24 - - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

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From: Honolulu

To: Tokyo

December 6, 1941

#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were --- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874

JD-7179

Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, do you have any knowledge  
3 that some time in August they stopped sending Admiral Kimmel  
4 what was known as "magio"?

5 Admiral Stark: No, I do not recall having any knowledge  
6 of that or of the fact that those messages had been sent pre-  
7 vious to that time.

8 Senator Ferguson: Was it possible that in the Navy De-  
9 partment we did not appreciate or did not recognize the value  
10 of air as an offensive weapon over ships in harbor, that this  
11 might happen?

12 Admiral Stark: I think the Navy was very much alive to  
13 that. Air power--

14 Senator Ferguson: If they were very much alive to it how  
15 do you account for it happening?

16 Admiral Stark: I do not just understand your question.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, you say they were very much  
18 alive to the weapon. Now, how do you account for that happen-  
19 ing then? How did this happen? How did we get surprised?

20 Admiral Stark: You mean how did what happen, the Japan-  
21 ese --

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes, how were you surprised then if  
23 we were fully cognizant of the ability of air power to destroy  
24 a fleet in a harbor?

25 Admiral Stark: Well, the correspondence shows how air-



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 minded we had been with regard to a possible attack on Pearl  
3 Harbor and in laying plans to prevent it. The question as to  
4 why we did not detect it or why we were not making reconnais-  
5 sance is the question which I imagine you are asking in con-  
6 nection with it?

7 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

8 Admiral Stark: Well, in Washington, as I have stated,  
9 that is in the Navy Department, we had intended to convey the  
10 critical situation and the possibility of an air attack in the  
11 messages which we had sent and we had felt, I had felt that  
12 when I sent the message starting out with, "This is a war  
13 warning", and in view of what had gone before and the subse-  
14 quent dispatches with regard to, or without regard to the sub-  
15 sequent dispatches but, certainly, reenforced by subsequent  
16 dispatches on the burning of the codes, that those in the  
17 field, in the Pacific, both in the Asiatic and in the Central  
18 Pacific would have been on the lookout for a surprise attack  
19 from any direction.

20 Senator Ferguson: In June of 1940 you said in effect,  
21 "Look out for an air raid."

22 Admiral Stark: No.

23 Senator Ferguson: Or "Look out for a raid."

24 Admiral Stark: No, I did not say, "Look out for a raid."

25 Senator Ferguson: No, no, you did not, but the order did.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: Sir?

3 Senator Ferguson: The alert did.

4 Admiral Stark: Well, I had assumed that they would be  
5 on the look-out for it from what I stated as a possibility to  
6 be guarded against even though only a possibility.

7 Senator Ferguson: This is very difficult to read but that  
8 message was:

9 "War Department directive concerning alert issued as  
10 precautionary measures after consultation with the Navy  
11 and State Department."

12 Mr. Mitchell: Apparently he is talking about the Herron  
13 alert.

14 Senator Ferguson: The Herron order.

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, I get that now. I thought you were  
16 talking about the raid which was made.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, yesterday you said that  
18 the Navy and State and the Army opposed the embargoes. What  
19 department of government or who was for them and how did they  
20 come to get that if three departments were against it?

21 Admiral Stark: With regard to your statement that I op-  
22 posed them, I pointed out whenever it was brought up to me the  
23 seriousness that such an embargo would have or might have on  
24 our relations with the Japanese. When you throttle a nation's  
25 economic life she has got to do something if she thinks she



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 can, particularly with regard to oil, which I always stressed.

3 Now, that was a military or a naval man's estimate with re-  
4 gard to it.

5 There was a political significance also in connection with  
6 that which was not within my province, except to say what I  
7 thought as regards its implications on the military so that the  
8 implication of those could only be, - the placing of such could  
9 only be by the State Department and I assume with the approval  
10 of the President.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, I understand that it is a  
12 fair conclusion to say that the political situation outweighed  
13 the military and they were put on?

14 Admiral Stark: All things were considered, must have been  
15 considered, our opinions and the political and the decision  
16 was made higher up.

17 Senator Ferguson: Were you ever consulted as to whether  
18 or not if they were put on and it meant war that we had the  
19 military might to defend our action?

20 Admiral Stark: We discussed all angles of that picture  
21 and that picture was thoroughly known by the high authorities  
22 in the government.

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes. What was your opinion in July,  
24 that we had the military might to back it up?

25 Admiral Stark: We had the military might to implement the



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2 war plan. When you say to back it up --

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, it is a layman's expression.

4

5 Admiral Stark: We knew, as I stated, again quoting from  
6 my letter, "It would be a H-- of a war, particularly to start  
7 with." I may state my sizing up of that. I think I stated it  
8 before Congress. At the first press conference, - and I did  
9 not hold one except when I had to, - in England, which was a  
10 very large conference and particularly many of our own cor-  
11 respondents to start out, occasionally, that asked me for my  
12 opinion. I stated what I felt at that time, which was what  
13 I felt earlier, that in view of the conditions then existing  
14 in 1942, the year 1942 would be a very tough year, that we  
15 would be on the defensive in the Pacific, seizing an opportu-  
16 nity which might give us a chance for attack, or creating one  
17 when we could.

18

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25

That in 1943 we would be gathering our strength and per-  
haps a limited offensive, but certainly we would be gathering  
our strength and beginning to go after the enemy and that in  
1944, which I used to state I could hardly wait to come around,  
we would then be realizing from the legislation and the earli-  
er authorizations and would be able to go all out and that  
we would win in 1945. That statement was made back in 1942.

Now, I also told Admiral Nomura, and an officer when I  
was in London pulled a memorandum on me of what I had told him,



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 which happened to be a good guess, that initially with the  
3 initiative in their hands and a readiness and a plan they  
4 probably would have a considerable initial success but that we  
5 would completely break them before we got through. It was  
6 inevitable because they could not replace their losses and  
7 that we could not only replace ours but continue to gain and  
8 it was a simple matter of arithmetic.

9 I said, "Therefore, if you attack us you insure the de-  
10 struction of the Japanese empire." I am inclined to think that  
11 he agreed with me but I could not state so. That was my  
12 feeling of the situation. I did not feel that we were then  
13 ready to go all out and finish the thing up, I knew we could  
14 not, but I felt we were strong enough to hold until we could  
15 go all out and win.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral, were you one of those  
17 in the Navy that felt that we would lose the Philippines if  
18 we went to war in the fall of 1941? We have had testimony  
19 here by other men that that was true.

20 Admiral Stark: Well, my hope was to put up a good,  
21 stiff fight. I would not say that I would have thought that  
22 we could have held them with what we had at that time, and  
23 you will recall that I stated almost in my first meeting in  
24 the White House, I can remember it, to the President, with  
25 Marshall, recounting the fact -- and this goes back to 1939, -



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 that always in war plans, which had been going on for many  
3 years, we conceded that we would lose the Philippines and that  
4 how much easier it would be if we could hold them rather than  
5 to lose them and fight to get them back and in the hope that  
6 we could strengthen them, which we had not been able to. We  
7 did not have the material.

8 Senator Ferguson: You did discuss it with the President?

9 Admiral Stark: I did, yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: That we would lose them?

11 Admiral Stark: He was thoroughly familiar with the pic-  
12 ture and so was Marshall. I remember in that conversation  
13 Marshall recounting what we could do.

14 Senator Ferguson: And that was not considering the  
15 possibility that we would lose the fleet we had waiting in  
16 Pearl Harbor, the Pearl Harbor fleet. Your view was without  
17 losing the fleet, so it was much worse when we lost our fleet.

18 Admiral Stark: It was tougher because of the vessels we  
19 lost and I think perhaps there may be some surprise over the  
20 fact that of the 112 vessels in Pearl Harbor as I recall --

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes, you explained that yesterday,  
22 how many were lost.

23 Admiral Stark: That a great number were not touched.

24 Senator Ferguson: That leads me to this question. In  
25 your letter of November the 25th, the last page -- would



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 counsel show it to the Admiral? The postscript. I will read  
3 it because I want to ask you some questions about it:

4 "I held this up pending" -- this is the 25th, just  
5 four days before the dead line, the last dead line, which  
6 they said they meant and they even said what time it would  
7 end.

8 "I held this up pending a meeting with the Presi-  
9 dent and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch  
10 with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him  
11 that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing  
12 the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in  
13 today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be  
14 surprised over a Japanese surprise attack."

15 Now, this is the question I want to ask you:

16 "From many angles an attack on the Philippines  
17 would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to  
18 us."

19 What were you talking about there?

20 Admiral Stark: I was thinking that we might lose them.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you talk with the President about  
22 that on that day?

23 Admiral Stark: We had talked with the President -- I  
24 don't know about that day. Probably. We had talked over that  
25 situation many times.



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Now, indicating a change -- this is a  
3 letter which was modified because it went to him after; at  
4 least it reached him after he got the cables.

5 Admiral Stark: It reached him-- I believe I was asked  
6 when it reached him and I believe they reached him on 3 De-  
7 cember, some six days after the message of the 27th and nine  
8 days after the message of the 24th.

9 Senator Ferguson: But it says:

10 "I still do. Also I still rather look for an ad-  
11 vance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the  
12 most likely."

13 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

14 Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't that be misleading to him?  
15 You have got possibilities and probabilities and now we come  
16 to the words "most likely".

17 Admiral Stark: Well, I did not think so. I was giving  
18 him the evidence I had and which had been given in the dis-  
19 patch, or which he had. I think it was in the dispatch of the  
20 24th.

21 Senator Ferguson: I am not quite clear on this:

22 "From many angles an attack on the Philippines would  
23 be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us."

24 Suppose they took Wake, suppose they took Guam or -- or  
25 I mean suppose they attacked Wake? Suppose they attacked at



Witness Stark

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Guam or at Pearl Harbor? That wouldn't be embarrassing to us?

3 Admiral Stark: Any one of them would have been embar-  
4 rassing to us. The Philippines was on the flank. To lose  
5 the Philippines was costly. The probability of their loss was  
6 recognized due to their insufficient state of preparedness.  
7 Therefore, if that was correct and we did lose them we knew  
8 it was a big fight to get them back; also it left the Japan-  
9 ese flank secure from that attack on the continual support of  
10 their movement south.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do you disagree with Churchill that  
12 the fleet at Hawaii was on the flank also?

13 Admiral Stark: Well, there is some four thousand miles  
14 or three thousand miles difference in the flank and with no  
15 places to go after you go out there to support you. We had  
16 to build a chain of bases up all the way across before we  
17 could go out there and we had to build a train which could  
18 support the fleet after they got out there. The fleet in  
19 Hawaii was not, except for submarine work, and they did  
20 wonderful work as you know, was not in position to seriously  
21 threaten Japanese communications going south until it was  
22 strong enough to go out there itself. Raids occasionally under  
23 auspicious circumstances, yes, but not continued pressure.

24 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, wasn't the only deterrent in  
25 the Pacific as far as Japan was concerned the fleet at Hawaii?



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Admiral Stark: Yes, I think that is a fair statement.  
3 The United States Fleet, but sitting as a threat on the flank  
4 Hawaii was a long ways away.

5 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, on the 25th of February 1941  
6 you spoke about sending four cruisers, nine destroyers and some  
7 carriers to the Philippine Islands by the southern route and  
8 let it leak out that they were going out there. I found that  
9 in your book. Had you ever discussed that with the President?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, and the President backed me up --

11 Senator Ferguson: What was that?

12 Admiral Stark. If I may just finish.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Admiral Stark: And the President backed me up in my  
15 recommendation not to send a detachment to the Philippines.  
16 You will recall a day or two ago my reading a memorandum to  
17 the President opposing the sending of a detachment to the  
18 Philippines and the President accepted that memorandum. The  
19 proposal was from the State Department.

20 I noted that one paper in the press took that memorandum  
21 as though I were opposed to the President's desire to send  
22 them out there --

23 Senator Ferguson: You were opposing the State Department.

24 Admiral Stark: (Continuing) and it stated so. I was  
25 giving that to the President backing me up, to back me up in



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 my arguments against those who wanted to send them out there  
3 and the President was with me. He was not for it.

4 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, why did the State  
5 Department want to send this fleet, a part of the fleet, to  
6 the Philippines?

7 Admiral Stark: I think they thought that it might have a  
8 further deterrent effect on Japan. That could have been, in my  
9 opinion, their only reason for such a request.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Was there anything said about sending  
3 a much smaller one so in case you lost the loss would not be  
4 so heavy?

5 Admiral Stark: I think so. We might have sent something  
6 light out there. My reaction to all that was: Get them  
7 out there. Then you would be divided up still further  
8 if attacked at sea, or you might lose what you had, or if  
9 you started to pull them back, then there might an argument  
10 against weakness.

11 Senator Ferguson: Had not you heard from Grew that there  
12 might be war?

13 Admiral Stark: I quoted a part of Grew's letter in my  
14 previous testimony, in my memorandum to the President, and  
15 in it Grew agreed with me. You will recall I stated to the  
16 President --

17 Senator Ferguson: On February 7.

18 Admiral Stark: -- that I was obviously quoting that part  
19 of Grew's letter which supported me.

20 Senator Ferguson: On February 7. Could I ask counsel  
21 whether they know whether that is in the White Papers, that  
22 memo from Grew?

23 It is as follows: "I have just read a telegram on the  
24 7th of February from the American Embassy at Tokyo which the  
25 State Department has furnished. In it appears the following:



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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East, and it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factors which such risk constitutes. The risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

Even Grew was notifying the State Department, and were they still insisting on sending this out there even though it meant war?

Admiral Stark: Well, it was at the State Department's request. I was delighted to have it from Grew.

Senator Ferguson: Did that help you in keeping them from going out there?

Admiral Stark: The President decided not to do it. I am inclined to think he would agree with me even though he had not seen the Grew memorandum. That, however, is conjecture.

Senator Ferguson: Then, on April 19, 1941, you said:

"I wrote about the Australian detachment. The President said, incidentally, 'When I open to you that way I do not expect you to quote the President and I know there is nobody who can keep a thing secret better than you can.' Just as soon as those ships come back from Australia or New Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out."

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

have



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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 You are quoting the President as wanting to send some  
3 more out.

4 "I just want to keep them popping up here and  
5 there and to keep the Japs guessing. This, of course,  
6 is right down the State Department's alley. I might  
7 say a lot of State Department suggestions and recommend-  
8 ations are no less than childish. Don't quote me, as  
9 I have practically said so in so many words in the  
10 presence of all concerned, but after 13 months they  
11 finally got it going. Of course, I recognize some merits,  
12 if exercised with some discretion, and that is where the  
13 Navy has to count on FDR for reserves. So we did have  
14 to send ships into Singapore, and we did keep them on  
15 a flank, to be in a position to go to work or to retire  
16 if something broke."

17 At that time did not you consider Hawaii the flank?

18 Admiral Stark: I considered Hawaii more of a central  
19 covering position for the United States, the Canal  
20 and the Aleutians. You can look at it as the flank, I have  
21 no objection to it. But when I sent ships further to the  
22 westward, much further, I did not want them to get into what  
23 might be called a central hole like the Philippines, but  
24 felt if they were well down on the flank away from Japan,  
25 where they could retire or perhaps take care of themselves in

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



WLC4

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 case of emergency, that I could see some merit in it, and  
3 that is what the President approved. But as to sending them  
4 beyond and into Singapore, I always opposed it.

5  
6 Senator Ferguson: Counsel has just advised me that he  
7 searched widely and has not found the February 7 message.

8 Mr. Mitchell: That Grew message?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 Mr. Mitchell: We asked the State Department for that  
11 on the day that Admiral Stark furnished us his statement  
12 and they have not reported yet.

13 Senator Ferguson: All right.

14 Now, this was popping you. You were going to have the  
15 ships around the various places, and the State Department  
16 was very active to have that done. I want to read what you  
17 said on the next page.

18 "Now, when the question of popping up everywhere  
19 came and having in mind keeping on the flank, I said to  
20 the President, 'How about going north?' He said, 'Yes,  
21 you can keep any position you like and go anywhere.' There  
22 was a little method in my madness as to the northern  
23 cruise. I thought for once, if I could, I would give  
24 the State Department a shock which might make them  
25 hold back. Incidentally, that northwest cruise may  
have many good points. It still conforms to the

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 flank and a detachment on an occasional sortie or in  
2 an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if  
3 you ever want to make such a cruise yourself of your  
4 own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of course you  
5 can see what a strinking force on the position I gave  
6 you and known to the Japs would mean to them in view  
7 of their unholy fear of bombing, and a striking detach-  
8 ment would have been right in position for most anything.  
9 I had a broad awkward smile when the State Department  
10 in effect said, 'Please, Mr. President, don't let him  
11 do it,' or words to that effect. It was a little too  
12 much for them."

13  
14 What did you have in mind there?

15 Admiral Stark: Well, I had in mind what I produced,  
16 but, as I stated, it also had some merit, and there was  
17 some merit in ships popping up here and there, provided we  
18 still maintained them in a position where we could concentrate  
19 where necessary, and not isolate them from the rest of the  
20 Fleet. My recollection of that is that I suggested we  
21 might take a carrier, probably accompanied by the usual  
22 support of four fast cruisers and destroyers and send them  
23 well to the northwestward or that we might send a couple of  
24 ships on in advance, or on either flank, and let them start  
25 some radio work first one place and then another one a thousand



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 miles to the southward, all in connection with this, and that  
3 they would be in a position to withdraw, but at the same time  
4 it was in line with keeping the Japs guessing.

5 Senator Ferguson: Is this a fair evaluation of this  
6 situation about the ships popping up, that the State Depart-  
7 ment wanted to use the United States Navy in a diplomatic way  
8 as a deterrent to Japan, or a threat to Japan? Is that a fair  
9 estimate?

10 Admiral Stark: In supporting diplomacy in a way in which  
11 they thought would be effective, and to a degree, as regards  
12 exposed positions, I interposed the strongest objections I  
13 knew how.

14 Senator Ferguson: Were we doing this very thing? Were  
15 we using the United States Navy in November or early December  
16 as a weapon with our diplomacy, or had we got away from that  
17 because of your victory on that point?

18 Admiral Stark: The Fleet was then all in Hawaiian  
19 waters, except for one or two cruisers doing escort duty,  
20 and which of course they have to pick up as soon as war  
21 began or beforehand, if it was deemed advisable, and it was,  
22 and also for those vessels in the Asiatic Fleet.

23 Senator Ferguson: When did you last use the Navy  
24 for popping up purposes in aid to diplomacy?

25 Admiral Stark: The best of my recollection is that



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 cruise to Australia was the last and the only move we made  
3 of that kind. Well, I would say it was the only one of  
4 that kind, unless you would consider the movement of the  
5 Fleet under secret orders and radio silence when it went out  
6 in June, I believe it was, in 1940 for a specific purpose  
7 and was kept absent for a week.

8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, on June 10, 1941, did not  
9 you say, in one of these instruments for the Secretary of the  
10 Navy, or memo for the Secretary of the Navy, that it was  
11 apparent to Japan that the U. S. Pacific Fleet was no longer  
12 strong enough to be a threat? How do you reconcile that  
13 with some of the other testimony about our Fleet?

14 Admiral Stark: That would be a threat in the Far East,  
15 and which I have mentioned this morning we were not strong  
16 enough, nor did we have the facilities in the Far East to  
17 keep the Fleet there as a threat, as an effective threat,  
18 or strong enough to interpose against a southern movement.

19 Senator Ferguson: On December 2, 1941 a message went  
20 out --

21 Admiral Stark: What date was that, sir?

22 Senator Ferguson: December 2. It was from CINCAF to  
23 OPNAV.

24 Admiral Stark: That is from Hart to me.

25 Senator Ferguson: From Hart to Stark?







1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 more subs. Now, he had the same message at that time that  
3 Kimmel had?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: What was he speaking of, or do you  
6 know? He said, "When it is considered called for will  
7 increase air patrols" -- that is reconnaissance?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: -- "and send out more subs."

10 Now, if you had a war warning out, I am wondering what  
11 he had in mind there and what he was asking you to do.

12 Admiral Stark: That meant that when in his judgment  
13 further vessels should be sent out he would do so. The  
14 record will show what he had out. The Army was scouting  
15 over there, and he was scouting over there. He had submarines  
16 out. I am not sure just where his destroyers were at that  
17 time. He had sent some ships to the southward. He had  
18 kept in Manila Bay ready for further scouting, if necessary,  
19 or for attack in case we were attacked, a certain number  
20 of submarines.

21 Senator Ferguson: Don't mind me now, Admiral, for  
22 just a moment.

23 Mr. Chairman, I ask to put in the record this message,  
24 because it is not in the record yet.

25 The Chairman: Which one is that?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: The one dated December 2, 1941 from  
CINCAF for action, OPNAV.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 It starts out:

3 "MY VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE JAP MOVEMENT DOWN THE  
4 INDO-CHINESE COAST IS ALREADY DEFINED BUT IT REMAINS TO BE  
5 SEEN WHETHER AIMED AGAINST THE MALAY PENINSULA, BORNEO, OR  
6 BOTH. THAT THE BRITISH CAN MEET THEIR COMMITMENT TO GUARD  
7 AS FAR AS CAPE PADARAN AND WE SHOULD USE WHAT HAVE LEFT  
8 AFTER GUARDING AGAINST DESCENT ON LUZON IN WATCHING FOR ONE  
9 ON BORNEO."

10 What could he be there talking about? That the British  
11 can meet their commitment to guard as far as Cape Padaran?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: AND WE SHOULD USE WHAT HAVE LEFT  
14 AFTER GUARDING AGAINST DESCENT ON LUZON IN WATCHING FOR ONE  
15 ON BORNEO. AM RECALLING ISABEL FROM CURRENT MISSION AND  
16 SENDING TOWARD PADARAN. SHE IS TOO SHORT RADIUS TO ACCOMPLISH  
17 MUCH AND SINCE WE HAVE FEW FAST SHIPS HER LOSS WOULD BE  
18 SERIOUS. THEREFORE HAVE TO RECOMMEND AGAINST CARRYING OUT  
19 ISABEL'S MOVEMENT THOUGH IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT CAN START  
20 ANY CHARTERED CRAFT WITHIN TWO DAYS."

21 It is improbable, he said. That is the one that the  
22 President had ordered, I take it.

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: "AM SEARCHING FOR VESSELS FOR CHARTER  
25 THAT ARE SUITABLE BUT CANNOT YET ESTIMATE TIME REQUIRED TO



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 OBTAIN AND EQUIP WITH RADIO

3 "ARMY PLANES ARE RECONNOITERING SECTOR NORTHERLY FROM  
4 LUZON AND EASTWARD FROM SANBERNARDINO. NAVY PLANES  
5 NORTHWESTERLY FROM LUZON, ALSO COVERING BALABAC STRAIT  
6 AND JOINING UP WITH DUTCH TO COVER MINDANAO -HALMAHERA LINE,  
7 EFFECTIVENESS IS PROBLEMATICAL BUT AS GREAT EFFORT AS  
8 AVAILABLE FORCES CAN SUSTAIN CONTINUOUSLY. TWO CRUISERS,  
9 TWO DESDIVS" -- what is that?

10 Admiral Stark: Destroyer Divisions.

11 Senator Ferguson: " -- TWO DESDIVS ARE DEPLOYED WELL  
12 SOUTH, REMAINDER SURFACE FORCES ON LOCAL MISSIONS OR REPAIRING.

13 "HAVE FIVE SUBMARINES OUT NOW, REMAINDER EITHER PLACED  
14 IN READINESS FOR DEFENSIVE MISSIONS OR HELD HERE PREPARED  
15 FOR OFFENSIVE TASKS. WHEN IT IS CONSIDERED CALLED FOR  
16 WILL INCREASE AIR PATROLS AND SEND OUT MORE SUBS."

17 Now that gave you a definite statement as to what  
18 Admiral Hart was doing?

19 Admiral Stark: That was a very comprehensive picture.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now was not he operating on a plan  
21 with the British and Dutch even though the attack would not  
22 have been on America?

23 Admiral Stark: The dispatch shows that he was, to some  
24 extend, dovetailing where he was searching. It states there,  
25 I believe, that he was covering up to a certain point, and



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 then the Dutch were covering, and in a previous dispatch  
3 you may recall I had told him where the British were searching.

4 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, we can assume that  
5 the Japanese knew what we were doing as far as these ships  
6 were concerned on December 2, 1941?

7 Admiral Stark: I think we could not assume that they  
8 knew where his submarines were.

9 Senator Ferguson: Outside of the subs.

10 Admiral Stark: Outside of the submarines I dare say  
11 they had the picture.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And therefore, to all intent  
13 and purposes, on the surface it would look as if the British,  
14 the Dutch and the United States had one plan in relation  
15 to an attack on the Kra Peninsula?

16 Admiral Stark: Their searches were made in coordination.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now that being true, was it  
18 not also apparent to America that if the Japs were going to  
19 attack one it meant war with all?

20 Admiral Stark: I can only repeat what I have said  
21 before, that I did not know, and I do not know now, if Japan  
22 had attacked one or two and left us out --

23 Senator Ferguson: (Interposing) That was not my  
24 question. My question was from the Japanese viewpoint.

25 Admiral Stark: What is that, sir?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: From the Japanese viewpoint of what was going on with this plan, would not it be apparent to the Japanese, in what we were going to do, apparent to the Japanese that if they attacked the British it would mean war with all three?

Admiral Stark: I think that would depend a good deal on how they had sized up the situation, and the opinions of the American people and a political estimate as to what our Congress might do, and I would say that would have been a tall order. I do not know.

Gibson  
Flows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Shack

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Witness Stark.

2 Senator Ferguson: On the 23rd of September, 1941, you  
3 wrote to Kimmel --

4 Admiral Stark: What date was that?

5 Senator Ferguson: The 23rd of September, 1941.

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: On the second page of that letter you  
8 said this:

9 "The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to  
10 be considered separately from the operations of the  
11 Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the  
12 Far East."

13 Now, that is just what we were doing on the 2nd of December,  
14 1941, isn't that true?

15 Admiral Stark: That is true, and that is what we were  
16 planning. We had to know what our possible allies would do  
17 if we were to get in.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, Admiral Stark, did it become  
19 aware to you, in the meetings with the President, the Secretary  
20 of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and  
21 the Chief of Staff, that Japan's stand was that if the American-  
22 Japanese negotiations fell, the result would be war in the  
23 Pacific?

24 Admiral Stark: If the Japanese negotiations fell there  
25 would be war in the Pacific?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Stark.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

3 Admiral Stark: It was likely. He stated, I believe, in  
4 one letter, it might possibly mean a breaking up of negotia-  
5 tions. After the destruction of codes, it looked definitely  
6 like Japan would attack all three, and we took no chance even  
7 before that, but that she might.

8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral, in December, 1941, were we  
9 breaking the Jap navy code?

10 Admiral Stark: December, 1941?

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Admiral Stark: We were breaking some of their codes,  
13 but not all of them. We had broken, as I recall -- I would  
14 be glad if you would verify this, but one of the codes that  
15 we had not broken and which had been assigned to the unit in  
16 Hawaii was the Japanese naval code. I think that was not  
17 broken at that time. What other codes were not broken, I do  
18 not know. We did not break them all.

19 Senator Ferguson: Was the movement into the Kra Penin-  
20 sula a rejection of the note of the 17th of August, or was it  
21 a rejection of the note of the 26th of November?

22 Admiral Stark: Well, I would say it was a rejection of  
23 what they knew we were opposed to. It was further military  
24 extension by Japan, something to which they knew we were  
25 opposed.