

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 351

PLACE: Kukuoka, Kyushu
DATE: 12 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis Division.

SUBJECT: The Japanese Air Operations in the Okinawa Campaign and in Preparation for Defense of Kyushu.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of each:

Lt. General SUGAWARA Michio — Concurrently Chief, Air Hq., Inspector General of Aviation and CG Training Air Army (Kyodo Kokugun) Aug. - Dec. 1944, CG Sixth Air Army, Dec. 1944 to Aug. 1945. Age: 68.

Also present were Maj Gen KAWASHIMA Teranosuke, CoS Sixth Air Army and formerly attached to the Inspectorate General of Aviation, Lt Col JIN , Staff Officer for Operations, Sixth Air Army and Lt. Col DOBA , Staff Officer, Sixth Air Army.

Where Interviewed: Fukuoka Base Command, FUKUOKA, KYUSHU.

Interrogator: Capt. Chalmers M. Roberts, AC


Interpreter: Lt Col Robert Spencer, AC

Allied Officers Present: Sqdn Ldr E. W. Bloxham, (RAF) MI
Capt Dow Parker, MI
Capt Kent Chandler, Jr. USMC
(G-2 Fukuoka Base Command)
1st Lt Donald Meiklejohn, MI

SUMMARY

Formation and mission of 6th Air Army in Okinawa campaign and in preparation for defense of Kyushu; relations between Navy and Army Air Forces; formation and operation of suicide units.

- ANNEXES: #1 - Schedule of JAAF sorties in "KIKUSUI" operations, prepared by Sixth Air Army Hq.
#2 - System of Command of Sixth Air Army during Okinawa Campaign, prepared by Sixth Air Army Hq.
#3 - Bomb Loads of Suicide Planes, prepared by Sixth Air Army.
#4 - Suicide sorties by Plane Types in Okinawa Campaign, prepared by Sixth Air Army.
#5 - "The Sixth Air Army and the Okinawa Operation", paper prepared by Lt Col JIN Naomichi, senior staff officer of Sixth Air Army.



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Interrogation #33

- Q. Were you the only head of the Kyodo Kokugun?
- A. That is right; I was the only head.
- Q. Why was the Kyodo Kokugun turned into the 6th Air Army?
- A. The Kyodo Kokugun was set up to train men for air service. It was directly under the Minister of War, and its chief had charge of training airmen. When the time approached for the use of these men tactically in the OKINAWA Campaign, the organization was changed to a tactical from a training organization, and I then resigned as head of the training and became head of the tactical organization.
- Q. It must have been very difficult to hold the three positions -- Commanding Air Hq., Inspectorate General of Aviation and the Kyodo Kokugun; how did you divide your efforts?
- A. When I first assumed office, the administrative work of the Air Headquarters was my chief duty and took most of my time. With the development of the war situation, it became necessary to give more and more time to the tactical side, and it finally became necessary to separate these functions.
- Q. Who assigned you to the command of the 6th Air Army?
- A. I received my assignment directly from the Emperor and not through the War Office. Men of my rank received their assignment always as a direct Imperial command.
- Q. Doesn't that mean, in effect, that the assignment went through GHQ?
- A. Of course, the deliberations in the choice of a man and the consultation regarding an appointment was done through the War Office and GHQ, but when that had been decided and approval given, the candidate, himself, appeared and was directly invested with the authority.
- Q. What was the scope of the 6th Air Army's job?
- A. When the 6th Air Army was set up, it was actually the creation of a new headquarters. The units assigned to it were taken from the First Air Army and the Kyodo Kokugun and were merely reassigned to the 6th Air Army. There were no special orders issued at that time; the units were to continue under the orders already given. At that time, there was no division of the country for defense between the two air armies. The 1st Air Army continued its work of replacement and training, and my task in the 6th Air Army was the tactical fighting end. The division into areas to be defended came later.
- Q. Just when did that division occur?
- A. The area division for defense was made at the time of the TBM Operations (Defense of Okinawa) -- in March, just before the opening of the OKINAWA Campaign.
- Q. That would be at the time of the first American carrier-plane attack against Okinawa?
- A. The 6th Air Army was deployed on this Island (KYUSHU) on the 10th of March. The American carrier strike on this Island and SHIMOKU was on the 19th. The division had not then been made but came shortly thereafter.
- Q. Was the dividing line based on the area jurisdictions of the Ground Armies?
- A. The division was made about April, but it was not based upon the Ground Army division; it was made on a new principle entirely independent of the Ground Armies. At that time (in April) the 6th Air Army was given the responsibility for KOREA, KYUSHU, and YAMAGUCHI Prefecture.

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- Q. That was all of KOREA?
- A. At that time there were no tactical outfits especially assigned to KOREA, but I was responsible for adding such outfits.
- Q. Did this 6th Air Army area continue until after the end of the war, or was it changed later?
- A. The area remained the same up to the close of the OKINAWA Campaign, but when the defense of JAPAN Proper became imminent, there was a re-division bringing the line up approximately from the point of the KII Peninsula, approximately due north to the JAPAN Sea, including OSAKA but not NAGOYA. On the other side, the responsibility for KOREA was at that time assigned to the 5th Air Army.
- Q. When did the 6th Air Army first begin to have close relationships with the Naval Air Force, with which it operated during the OKINA Campaign?
- A. March 20 or 22 - I am not sure which.
- Q. What, exactly, was that relationship?
- A. The idea of bringing the two Air Forces together had been very widely discussed, and the necessity of the closest kind of cooperation in the air war had been strongly felt by a good many officers, but organizational problems made the construction of a separate Air Force extremely difficult. Therefore, it was decided that since the Navy both in the air and on the water was heavily involved in the defense of OKINAWA, the 6th Air Army should be put under the command (shiki) of the Navy.
- Q. Was this in conformity with a general division of duties between the Army and Navy all during the War?
- A. Up to this time there had been no such clean division of duty. In the Philippines Campaign where the attempt was made to operate together, the results were not satisfactory. Accordingly this step was taken--of putting the 6th Air Army under the Navy--to produce a more unified strategy.
- Q. What was the title of the Naval Command to which the 6th AF was subordinated, and who was the Japanese Air Admiral with whom you worked?
- A. Adm TOYODA, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, was in general command; the 5th Air Fleet was the Naval Air Command in Kyushu.
- Q. Who was in command of the 5th Air Fleet?
- A. Vice Adm UGAKI.
- Q. Would this mean that the 6th Air Army, like the 5th Air Fleet, received its operational instructions during the OKINAWA Campaign direct from Admiral TOYODA in Tokyo?
- A. Yes, we both received orders directly from Adm TOYODA in Tokyo.
- Q. Were you given only general instructions to carry out attacks against the Americans, or were you given detailed instructions?
- A. The instructions received from Tokyo were of a general type; but the actual details of operations were arranged by consultation between myself and Vice Adm UGAKI, and I followed his plans.
- Q. We have here a schedule (Annex #1) of the KIKUSUI Operation (for attacking Allied ships at Okinawa) and the 6th Air Army participation in this operation. Was this the type of thing that was planned by you and Admiral UGAKI as to date, number of aircraft participating; didn't you get any specific instructions from Tokyo?

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- A. "The KIKUSUI Operation", was set up by the Navy - that is the Navy's name for it. Vice Adm UGAKI carried out the plans and set the dates, but usually after consultation with me. The number of planes assigned to each day's operations from the Army had to be settled by myself in the light of the available number.
- Q. The Army and Navy interchanged fully information on the number of planes each had available and was intending to send on each operation?
- A. The main point of consultation was with regard to the air cover from Kyushu to Okinawa. As we were always short of planes, this topic required the greatest cooperation. As to the number of Army suicide planes which went out each day, that was left entirely to the 6th Air Army and was governed by the number available.
- Q. Were there both Army and Navy suicide planes?
- A. There were Navy suicide planes in each of the Kikusui Operations, but there was no special consultation as to the number which would be sent by each of the Japanese Air Forces. That depended entirely on what was available at the time.
- Q. Does the chart presented today totalling 410 sorties (in Kikusui Operations) represent the entire number? (The reference is to Annex #1)
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there in addition to the 410 planes, other Army planes which flew out and back as cover?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Is it possible to obtain figures corresponding to those for suicide sorties?
- A. It would be impossible to supply from memory a chart of the number that went out each time. I had the 2nd and 3rd Attack Groups (Sento Tai) available to furnish cover over specified areas. (See Annex #2) During the early part of the campaign there would be perhaps 30 planes for cover in the area near Kyushu, and 50 to 60 in the area reaching as far as the Northern end of Okinawa.
- Q. An additional 50 or 60?
- A. Yes, an additional 50 or 60. The Navy would take over from that point and furnish additional cover.
- Q. Did you have a general plan for having cover for all the suicide planes that went out -- such as two planes to act as cover for each suicide plane, or any particular ratio?
- A. Ideally, that is the thing that should have been done; we should have determined from the available air cover the number of suicide planes to be sent up -- actually the situation did not allow that kind of thing -- we simply sent as many planes as we could to cover the mission.
- Q. When you say the 2nd and 3rd Attack Groups (Sento Hikotai) do you mean the 20th and 30th Sento Hikoshuden?
- A. The designation of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Attack Groups (Sento Tai) was simply my personal designation and not the official designation of the group, and as the schedule which has been presented today shows, what I call the 1st Attack Group (Sento Tai) actually was virtually all the Special Attack planes. The 2nd Sento Tai was the 100th Flying Brigade, the 47th Flying Regt and some additional Special Attack planes, and the 3rd Sento Tai included the 6th Flying Brigade, the 59th Flying Regt, the 244th Flying Regt, and also some Special Attack planes.
- Q. Were there sizeable numbers of Special Attack planes in each of the Attack Groups?

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- A. The suicide planes in the 1st and 3rd Attack Groups included various types of planes. The numbers in each of those groups were much larger than the number of suicide planes in the 2nd Attack Group, which were all of the same type as the fighter planes which covered them. The 1st Attack Group was originally located at Kikuchi, though at times it advanced as far as Kikai Island. The 2nd Attack Group was based in the neighborhood of Miyakonojo, while the 3rd was at Chiran.
- Q. All the regular units listed in the chart are fighter units, aren't they?
- A. The planes in the 2nd Attack Group were fighters, while those in the 3rd Attack Group were, in part, light attack bombers.
- Q. In addition to these suicide attacks and the cover missions which were flown with them, did the 6th Army carry out normal bombing missions against Okinawa?
- A. Yes, we carried out bombing missions with the 60th and 110th Flying Regts.
- Q. Was this also true of the Navy - did they also carry out regular bombing as well as suicide missions?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What is your estimate of the number of regular bombing missions carried out by the 6th Air Army during the eight Kikusui Operations?
- A. During the period of the Kikusui Operations, there were 240 sorties by heavy bombers. In addition to the suicide attacks shown in the chart, which are totalled at 410, there were other attacks by individual suicide planes or small groups which went out without cover whenever the weather seemed propitious. These are not included in the chart. (Annex #1)
- Q. Then in order to get an over-all maximum total of all the 6th Air Army sorties flown during the entire Okinawa Campaign, it would be necessary to add the 410, the 240, the additional occasional suicide sorties between Kikusui Operations, the fighter cover for the suicide sorties, and the reconnaissance missions?
- A. That's right.
- Q. What do you estimate that over-all total figure to be?
- A. It would be necessary to add approximately 190 to the previous total of 410 to get the total number of suicide attacks during this period. (See Annex #4) The bombing attacks totalled 240; there were approximately 750 cover sorties, and 120 reconnaissance sorties, giving us a grand total of 1890, approximately 2,000 sorties.
- Q. This total of roughly 2,000 represents, then, the 6th Air Army's full effort in the Okinawa Campaign. Could you give us a comparable figure for the Navy during the Campaign?
- A. I cannot give an estimate, but the number was greater than that of the Army. (Colonel JIN, the General's Operations Officer stated at this point that in his opinion the number was approximately the same as the Army's.)
- Q. What is your estimate of the effort of the 8th Flying Division from Formosa during the Okinawa Campaign?
- A. (The General said that he had no information on this matter, but Colonel JIN stated that the number of suicide planes which attacked from Formosa and those which attacked while going from Kyushu to Formosa, totalled something in the neighborhood of 250.)

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- Q. In addition, what about the attacks carried out by the 5th Air Army staging through Kyushu during the Okinawa Campaign?
- A. The planes from the 5th Air Army which staged through Kyushu to Okinawa numbered sixteen in all, and the total number of sorties was probably between 30 and 40.
- Q. To what extent did you exercise control over these missions by the 8th Flying Division and the 5th Air Army?
- A. I had no authority over the planes of the 8th Flying Div, except that the few which attacked Okinawa on the way from Kyushu were temporarily under my command. The planes of the 5th Air Army were never put under my command.
- Q. Were the sorties by these two groups ordered by Adm TOYODA during the Okinawa Campaign?
- A. Neither of the outfits was under the direct command of Adm TOYODA. Sorties of the 8th Flying Div. were ordered by the Japanese Army Command in Formosa. Sorties of the 5th FA planes were arranged by the local commanders of the airfields which they were using in conformity with my general plan, but not at my special command.
- Q. Were you kept informed of the plans of the 8th Flying Div?
- A. Yes, I was informed when they were going up.
- Q. How much of your air strength did you commit to each phase of the Kikusui Operation? Were the intervals between phases necessary for recuperation?
- A. About 60% of the available strength was committed to any one operation. The intervals between the sorties were necessary to bring up planes from the rear to replace the losses in preceding sorties. 60% of the strength at the forward bases was committed.
- Q. Did you get off as many sorties as you planned? What interfered with the sorties to prevent the scheduled number from taking off?
- A. 60% represents the number of planes which, on the average it was possible to get off the ground. In this 60% there are not included the planes which took off and returned because of defects. The reason 100% could not be sent was that the equipping of planes for this type of combat proved extremely difficult, and it was impossible to keep up with the demands.
- Q. What was the type of equipping that caused so much trouble?
- A. The first difficulty in equipment of these planes was that we were using the older planes, the engines of which were in poor condition and required a great deal of fixing up to make them effective. Secondly, because of the poor conditions of the engines, the drawing of fuel from the extra tanks was often faulty, and the planes were not able to fly the required distance. In the third place, we were using, in the early part of the operations, Naval bombs which we found extremely difficult to adapt to our Army planes.
- Q. To what extent did Allied air operations over Japan interfere with Japanese Air Force preparations for activity?
- A. During the Kikusui Operation, the losses caused in Army fields under my command by Allied effort were extremely small. The attack on Tachiarai caused some damage, but the damage from the other attacks was slight indeed.
- Q. Did the attack on Tachiarai damage the depot sufficiently to interfere with maintenance work over any extensive period of time?

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- A. The Tacnirai depot at that time was not under my immediate charge; but the destruction of both parts and machines used in equipping and maintenance was very serious.
- Q. Had you expected that Allied attacks would cause more damage than they did? Was the reason the effects of damage was limited the fact that the facilities were dispersed?
- A. According to my information, the loss to the Naval fields was very much heavier than it was to the Army fields, and certainly the loss to the Army fields was much less than I had anticipated. I think this was largely the result of an extremely strict policy of dispersal which I enforced on the Army fields.
- Q. Did the policy of dispersal also work the other way - did it make it necessary to take additional time to get planes in the air due to the distance to the dispersing fields?
- A. The policy of dispersal required that a great deal more time be spent in preparing for a sortie. For example, if the take-off was to be in the early morning, it was necessary to begin assembling the planes the evening before, or at least from about the middle of the night.
- Q. When was the decision made to call off the Kikusui Operations, and who made the decision?
- A. The close of the Kikusui Operations was not the result of a decision, but was the natural result of the loss of planes and the change in the strategic situation on Okinawa. The date was approximately the end of May. Isolated suicide attacks in favorable weather were carried on later and ended only when the current campaign ended.
- Q. To what extent did the gasoline situation affect operations, training, and plans in general?
- A. My field was operations, and so far as that was concerned, I was not limited on the amount of gasoline but was allowed what was necessary; beyond that, I would be unable to answer. (Captain ROBERTS: In other words, there was never a shortage of gasoline for his operations.)
- A. From Maj Gen KAWASHIMA Teranosuke, C of S, 6th Air Army) While operations were not curtailed because of lack of gasoline, training was curtailed approximately one-third for that reason.
- NOTE: On the following day Col. JIN submitted a "corrected statement" on the gasoline situation, based upon further "recollection" by Gen. SUGAWARA. That statement and the pertinent interrogation of Col. JIN follows:
Statement: There definitely was a gasoline shortage which affected the extent of operations.
- Q. What area was affected?
- A. Kyushu, Formosa and Korea.
- Q. Throughout all the Okinawa campaign?
- A. Mainly at the end of the campaign. The main trouble was that airfields such as Chiran could not be supplied, as the railroads were bombed; the basic reason was an overall shortage. Also, the quality of the gasoline began to deteriorate at the beginning of the Okinawa campaign; planes equipped to use 92-octane gasoline had to be supplied with 87-octane gasoline during the campaign, and the quality went down steadily, shortening the planes' range and decreasing efficiency in general.
- Q. Was alcohol (from pine root oil, for example) used during the Okinawa campaign?
- A. There was no use of alcohol during the Okinawa campaign.

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Q. Was alcohol used later?

A. Yes, for training.

Q. Did the use of the lower-octane gasoline and of alcohol increase maintenance problems?

A. Not much. The alcohol used in the Ketsu Operation preparations (defense against Allied invasion) did **cause** maintenance problems: a larger nozzle was required to feed alcohol into the cylinders; also the cylinders tended to rust.

Q. Was the alcohol used pure or mixed?

A. It was always used mixed.

Continuation of original interrogation.

Q. How did you ask for replacements of aircraft and personnel, and what percentage of your requests were fulfilled?

A. With regard to the suicide units, it was not my function to ask for replacements, but men and planes were supplied according to the plans of the Minister of War. For the rest, I was unable to receive all that I asked for, usually getting approximately one-half of my request at once and the remainder scattered over a period of days or weeks. (At this point Maj Gen KAWASHIMA, the Chief of Staff, added that every effort was made to keep up replacements for the combat areas, and that areas not involved in serious combat were deprived of their replacements. For example, the 3rd Air Army, Singapore, received practically no planes after the month of April.)

Q. Were replacements always employed immediately upon their arrival in Kyushu, due to the shortage of aircraft?

A. They were employed immediately upon arrival.

Q. Was the rate of serviceability of aircraft affected by lack of sufficient maintenance personnel or equipment?

A. The figure of 60% availability which I mentioned a little time ago was due in the first place to the inefficiency rather than to the lack of numbers of service crews. Further, the low quality of replacement parts, rather than the lack of quantity, caused a great deal of trouble.

Q. Were there any local shortages in the gasoline situation in Kyushu which affected operations at particular airfields?

A. Within my field of control, it was not necessary at the time of the Okinawa campaign to limit operations for lack of gasoline.

Q. And the gasoline you did have - was it always the proper octane rating?

A. The grade of gasoline used in each type of plane was settled in the higher echelons, and we were supplied the type of gasoline on which they decided. Whether failures were caused by the use of low octane gasoline, and whether the higher echelon would have preferred to use higher octane gasoline (which they probably did), I am not able to give a definite reply.

Q. To turn to a different subject - during the Okinawa Campaign, there was one Japanese air attack against Yontan Airfield. Did you conceive of that plan, or who did?

A. It was my plan.

Q. What were the details of the plan - the number of aircraft and men involved, the number of units, etc?

Interrogation Contd (3)

- A. Type 97 Bombers (Sally - Twin Engine) were to be used. The plan was for twelve planes to make the sortie, but only nine finally took off, and seven reached the field; 98 personnel were involved. The unit was not part of any of the units I controlled but was a special unit of Air Headquarters. It was known as the Giretsu Kutei Tai.
- Q. Was this operation one in which the Raiding Air Regiments were employed?
- A. The personnel of the attack were from the Raiding Air Brigade (Teishin Dan), but I believe the planes came from other units.
- Q. With reference to the suicide operations during the Okinawa Campaign, whose decision was it to make general use of Army suicide aircraft?
- A. Air Headquarters.
- Q. You were merely carrying out instructions from Air Headquarters - that is, you only worked out the details?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the Philippines Campaign when suicide aircraft were first employed, many were taken from normal flying regiments; was this the case during the Okinawa Campaign, or were suicide units specially set apart?
- A. The organization of the suicide units in both the Philippines and Okinawa Campaigns was carried out by volunteers from regular air units. In the Philippines Campaign, each unit chose its own name. This also was true in the Okinawa Campaign, but the units were then known by numbers. The types of planes were designated, and generally it was decided that each unit should be composed of twelve planes. The lowest number I know of for a unit was number 18, and in the Okinawa Campaign they used units numbered in the 90's, I think, however, there were gaps in the numbering at that point.
- Q. Were these numbers assigned by Air Headquarters?
- A. No, by the War Office.
- Q. How many different numbered special attack units actually were in Kyushu under your command over the whole period?
- A. I think that there were between 50 and 60 units. Some of these remained at the end of the campaign and had not been expended.
- Q. According to the list of airplanes in the 6th Air Army on August 15 at the end of the war, there were 790 suicide planes in Kyushu, over and above the 600 expended. That total (of 1390 planes) (For this list see end of Annex #5) would be many more than 60 units; would it not?
- A. The figure of 50 to 60 units covered those units used in the Okinawa Campaign alone. Following this, a reserve of planes for the defense of the main Islands was steadily poured in including many CHURIN, giving the total which appears on the chart.
- Q. What do you mean by CHURIN?
- A. The word "Churin" refers to secondary training planes, such as the Ki-9. Between 60 and 70 units were in reserve for the defense of the Islands.
- Q. Once a unit such as Unit No. 10 was sent out on a suicide mission was it ever reconstituted with different pilots and planes, or was it simply wiped off the books?
- A. No such unit was reconstituted. There was no replacement, even when a unit had been partially expended.
- Q. Was it the practice to send all the planes of a particular numbered unit out on the same mission, as far as possible?

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A. Yes.

Q. Was there a gradual shift in types from combat types of planes to training types as the Okinawa Campaign went on?

A. ~~As plane losses~~ increased, the ranks were filled up more and more with training planes, but these were not used in the Okinawa Campaign because of their lack of range. They were being held for the defense of the Islands.

Q. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of special attack as a means of fighting an air war?

A. Special attack is an extremely difficult type of combat to carry out. If planes and trained personnel for normal types of combat were available, normal combat would be far more favorable. With the plane situation as it was and with the lack of sufficiently trained personnel, the special attack was the only means open to us.

Q. Was there, then, a deterioration in the quality of pilots as the Okinawa Campaign went on, or were they always of good caliber?

A. There was a falling off in the ability of the pilots, but no falling off in morale or in volunteering for suicide attacks.

Q. Did your suicide attacks achieve progressively less success?

A. We do not feel that there was any great falling off in the results obtained from this type of combat, and we estimate approximately 30% were successful in their attacks from beginning to end; however, we really have to ask you about the results.

Q. You mean that 30% of the 600 sorties were successful?

A. Yes.

Q. By successful, you mean a hit on any type of ship?

A. Yes, that the pilot hit his target.

Q. What were the instructions given to the pilots as to what targets to seek out and how to go about it?

A. The targets for each sortie were designated as a result of study of reconnaissance photos. As a general rule, the pilots were instructed to take the largest units which could be most efficiently damaged by the size of bomb they carried.

Q. Were the individual Kikusui Operations alerted because it was thought a fresh convoy had arrived at Okinawa, or just to destroy what shipping was found there?

A. The arrival of American convoys and task forces had more influence in the decision of when a sortie should be sent, than did the conditions of the Japanese Air Forces. Decision on the basis of Allied shipping was made chiefly by the Navy.

Q. How were they aware, by sources other than photo reconnaissance, that the convoys or attack forces had arrived?

A. There was reconnaissance, and there was information radiated from Okinawa and Formosa.

Q. Was the Japanese Intelligence about the arrival of American units pieced from both Army and Navy sources?

A. The intelligence seems all to have been sent to Adm Ugaki from Okinawa, Formosa, and Tokyo, and was made available to the Army through the Navy.

Interrogation Contd (35)

- Q. Do you feel that your intelligence on Allied movements was adequate for continuing these operations?
- A. No, I did not feel it was adequate.
- Q. What navigational aids were used in assisting suicide aircraft to the target?
- A. The suicide planes were not equipped with radio or similar means for navigational aid. They were shown on the charts where the target was; and they either followed down the chain of islands and oriented themselves that way, or, if the targets were well offshore, they were at times guided by a bomber which guided them merely by sight. With the exception of one or two men especially proficient in navigation, the suicide pilots were not sent on suicide night expeditions.
- Q. What was the general plan which the 6th Air Army had for defense against Allied landings in Kyushu, if the war had gone on?
- A. As you know, the home defense operations were as yet only in the stage of preparation. We were figuring on approximately 1,000 planes, special attack or suicide type. As to exactly where and how these would be used, plans had not yet been set up, although we had received general orders to defend the 6th Air Army's area which I described before.
- Q. Was it the plan to use in the end, not only the special attack planes but all other normal air units as suicide units in a final effort?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So that, according to the list* that has been submitted on the day the war ended there was in Kyushu a total of 850 regular planes and 790 suicide planes, all of which would have been available for suicide missions, plus whatever additional planes could have been brought in.
*Note: This is the list referred to above as prepared by Col JIN and included in his interrogation report.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was it the intention to continue the general relationship between the 6th Air Army and the 5th Air Fleet for the defense against the invasion?
- A. The arrangements between the Army and Navy which existed at the time of the Okinawa Operations ended with those operations. I then came under the direct command of the Air General Army. I think that the plan for Army-Navy cooperation was unified at the level of Supreme Headquarters, but as far as I was concerned, I was operating independently.
- Q. What do you think your chances were of preventing a landing in Kyushu?
- A. Due to the fact that the field of fighting would not be 600 or 700 kilometers distant, and that the Japanese pilots would be at the point of combat anywhere along the coast, I feel that if preparation had gone according to our plans, it would have been possible for us to defeat the Allied attempt to land on our shores.
- Q. We have heard the report that the Commanding Officer of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force (Adm Fukuda), was so chagrined when the war ended that he took his plane out and flew the last suicide attempt to Okinawa. Is that correct?
- A. I don't know about Adm Fukuda, but I understand that Adm Ugaki did the same thing.

ANNEX #1

SCHEDULE OF JAAF SORTIES IN "KIKUSUI" OPERATIONS.

PREPARED BY SIXTH AIR ARMY HQ.

"KIKUSUI" OPERATION

$$\begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 24 \\ \hline 60 \\ 30 \\ \hline 300 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 300 \\ 1900 \\ \hline 1800 \\ 100 \\ \hline 720 \\ 280 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 350 \\ 1900 \\ \hline 1950 \\ 150 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 8 \\ 5.6 \\ \hline 13.6 \\ 3 \\ \hline 5 days, 6 h. \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 18.5 \\ 290 \\ \hline 290 \\ 3 \\ \hline 48.0 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} Y = 711 \\ P = 78 \\ \hline 3 \end{array}$$

<u>TIME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SORTIES</u>
1	6 April 1945	60
2	12 April 1945	50
3	16 April 1945	25
4	22 April 1945	60
5	29 April 1945	80
6	Early May 1945	40
7	Middle May 1945	36
8	28 May 1945	60


TOTAL

410
(Approximately)

SYSTEM OF COMMAND OF 6TH AIR ARMY DURING OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

PREPARED BY 6TH AIR ARMY HQ.

SYSTEM OF COMMAND
(OKINAWA)



*NOTE: This phase by the Japanese refers to training or "instruction" of TOKKO TAI - suicide units - at rear bases.

ANNEX #3

BOMB LOADS OF SUICIDE PLANES

BOMB OF TOKKO

<u>PLANE</u>	<u>BOMB (kg)</u>
Ki 67	800
Ki 46	5 - 800
Ki 36, 51, 84, 61, 43, 21	250

ANNEX #4: SUICIDE SORTIES BY PLANE TYPES IN OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

SORTIES OF "TOKKO" PLANES (OKINAWA)

Ki 67	5
46	6
36	60
51	110
84	60
61	60
43	120
21	150
45	30
<hr/>	
TOTAL	600 (Approximately)

ANNEX #5: "THE SIXTH AIR ARMY AND THE OKINAWA OPERATION"

(Paper prepared by Lt Col JIN Naomichi, senior staff officer of Sixth Air Army on 30 October 1945.)

(NOTE by Lt Col JIN: Because all documents were burned at the time of the termination of war, this report was written with inaccurate data mainly based on memory.)

I. CHAIN OF COMMAND

The GF was under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet, and executed the combined operation with the Fifth Navy Air Fleet:

Combined Fleet (GF) - 6 FA (Army)
5 AF (Navy)

II. TARGET OF ATTACK

With merchant vessels the main target, the 6 FA was instructed to destroy them on the sea, although to meet the request of the 32nd Army, the dropping of supplies by a part of the Heavy Bomber Unit was also executed.

III. NATURE OF THE ATTACKS

1. The attacks were planned to use as large a massed plane strength as possible. But this did not always materialize because of the problem of preparing the aircraft and ammunition, etc., during and after the concentration, and also because of weather conditions. At times surprise attacks by a small unit were intentionally executed.

2. The heavy bomber unit (60 FR, 110 FR) made 240 sorties; 25 planes did not return.

3. The torpedo unit (7 FR, 98 FR) fought under the command of the Navy's 5th Air Fleet.

4. The attack regiments (Shugeki Sentai) (65 FR, 66 FR) executed 100 sorties in attacking vessels.

5. In cooperating with the sorties of suicide planes, regular combat units escorted them as far as the vicinity of the northern part of Okinawa. In cases of mass suicide attacks, the average regular combat strength was about 50 planes and total cover sorties were approximately 750.

6. The reconnaissance unit observed the movements of American vessels, which was their main duty. Their sorties totaled approximately 120.

7. The GIRETSU glider unit prepared initially 12 planes; and out of 9 sorties 7 reached the objective (Okinawa); number of personnel was 98. This glider operation was not a success, however, because of the failure of suicide units to follow up the next day, due to weather conditions.

IV. STATEMENT OF PLANES - PILOTS - LOSSES IN 6TH AIR ARMY.

	1 April (a)	30 June (b)	15 August	Notes	
General	PLANES	260	950	850	1. (a) Figures include only units in Kyushu. (b) Figures include 11 FD and 51 KD. 2. Not including units in Kanto District.
	PILOTS	A 80	A 280	A 350	
		B 150	B 410	B 450	
		C 120	C 510	C 550	
	<u>350</u>	<u>1200</u>	<u>1350</u>		
Suicide	PLANES	310	410	790	
	PILOTS	A 50	A 20	A 410	
		B 150	B 370	B 230	
		C 50	C 40	C 150	
	<u>250</u>	<u>430</u>	<u>790</u>		
Suicide and General	1 Apr to 30 June		1 July to 15 Aug		
	LOSSES	930	150		
Suicide and General	<u>Causes of Losses in per cent</u>				
	1. At airfields 10%.				
	2. In flight 40%. (Due to Allied fighters and to weather.)				
	3. After approach:				
a. Due to allied fighters and ships' AA, 25%.					
b. During actual attack against targets, 25%.					
Ability of Pilots	A. Capable of night flight (Flying hours			General 500 hours and over)	
				Suicide 250 hours and over)	
	B. Capable of dawn flight (Flying hours - in between A and C)				
C. Capable of daylight flight only (Flying hours - 150 hrs or less)					