

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 259 - (pages 1980-2)

21 December 1937

On the 21st, I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister said: "General Staff Headquarters wants to stop the war as soon as possible. They are very impatient saying: 'We would like to have Germany as mediator and ascertain the desires of China.' We wanted to set up our stipulations and in hopes of securing a concrete plan by liaison conferences endeavoured in various ways. The result was presented at a Cabinet meeting. They said: 'If this plan is submitted to them and isn't accepted, the Government will be placed in an embarrassing position,' The plan is to be changed to four abstract terms to cover the general situation, that is, anti-Comintern, economic collaboration, reparations and recognition of a special regional government. The plan is to be reported to the Emperor by the Premier and also by Army and Navy leaders of the Supreme Military Command office. It was decided to close the matter without holding a conference in the Imperial presence. The President of the United States who was sitting next to Ambassador SAITO at some event in Washington whispered to him: 'Isn't it one way to try to have Germany handle the matter (as intermediary)?" The Foreign Minister also stated: "I hear that Italy wants to enter into the negotiations between Japan and China to settle the situation. Concerning China geographically, I think that Shantung must be included if a Chinese government is to be set up in view of the setting on fire by the Chinese of the cotton spinning factory owned by Japanese at Tsingtao. One of the problems is what the results will be if, at the same time as the request is transmitted through Germany, Shantung is attacked. The political parties are very strong in their demands because of what they see in the atmosphere of the foreign nations. The Soviets are approaching YEN Hsi-shan and the German militarists seem to be approaching CHIANG Kai-shek."

That day I (HARADA) met KIDO. KIDO said: "The whole matter has been disorderly and I said plenty at the Cabinet meeting. I wonder if General Staff Headquarters hasn't committed various stipulations concretely through the German Military Attache in Tokyo. I feel it very dangerous to see the Army and Navy, especially the Army, or rather General Staff Headquarters so anxious to press the peace solution. If we submit many concrete stipulations and they turn it down, we are only letting them in on what we want. It will all be a loss with no gain. I am very worried wondering why they are in such a hurry. Today at the Cabinet meeting, I made a strong assertion and said: 'It is necessary that they be more abstract and cover everything. What need is there to force ourselves into asking Germany?' It is very strange that General Staff Headquarters is so eager. I am worried that Germany might put one over on us."

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EXHIBIT No. 3788-1A

Dr 3150-259A

西園寺 原田日記 第二五九回より後の抜萃

〇小から廿一日に外務大臣に会つた処が「参謀本部は
 一時早く戦争をやめたいのでドイツを中介にして
 支那側の希望を判明させたい」と言つて非常に
 あせつて居る。当方の条件も何とかがして造り度いと思つて、聯絡會議で成案を得たいと思つてい
 〇「努力した結果、閣議に出たら先方に
 〇「言つてやつて其案で纏らぬ時は、政府は後
 〇「困るから」等と言はうで、大体をかぶりするやう
 〇「は抽象的なり、即ち防共と経済提携と
 〇「賠償と特殊政權の四ヶ條に變へて、さうして
 〇「其案を一應総理から上奏し、又統帥府の陸
 〇「海軍首腦者から上奏して、さうして宰相の御
 〇「前會議は南の言いで済ませようと云ふ事に
 〇「を以てドイツにやらせて見るの、一つの方法は
 〇「いかゞと云ふ事を、ワシントンで齊藤大使に何かの
 〇「機会にアメリカの大統領が、隣りの席に居つて
 〇「齊藤大使に私語した」と云ふ事を、外務大臣は
 〇「話して居つた。尚ほ、支那と日本に対しては時局
 〇「を纏めるのに、FORBIDと云ふ事を南
 〇「で居る。自
 〇「は青島に於ける紡
 〇「績工場、FORBIDは青島に於ける紡
 〇「府力、FORBIDは青島に於ける紡
 〇「知張小東を加へなければなら

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ないやうに思へる。モ小からドイツを通じて申込むと
同時に、山東を討つとどう云ふ風な結果になるか
一つの問題である。又政黨側が條件なんか
に就てし非常に強いと云ふのは、外部の空気を
見れば、彼是して居るからである。ソヴィエトと閻錫
山が接近し、蔣介石にはドイツの軍人が接して
居るやうである」と云ふやうな事も、外務大臣は
話して居らした。
モ小から其日に木戸に会つた処が、木戸は「実はど
うしあんまりだらしがないので、自合り大いに閣
議で言てやつたが、参謀本部はある程度まで
東京に於けるドイツの駐在武官を通じて、い
んなら條件を具体的にコミットして居やしない
から思はれる。でどうし陸海軍が、特に陸軍、
尚ほ言へば参謀本部が非常に急いで平和
解決を促さうとして居るのを見ると、詢に危
険をたまたらない。で此方から具体的の条件
を澤山出して向ほが剣ぬたら、此方の肚を向
ふに見せてしまふだけで、失小処があつて得る
処はないしやあないか」と云ふ理由であつた急
ぐのであつたが、詢に心配に堪えたい。モ小で自
合は今日は閣議で、強く主張して、結局
「いつと抽象的なるのにして、さうして凡そをカ
ンヤウなるのであつた事が必要だ」と言つて、

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尚ほドイツも無理に頼む必要はないやあな
いかと云ふ事まで言つたけれど、どうも参謀
本部があの程に熱心になつて居る事は頗る
訝しい。でドイツにしてやれるのではないかと思
つて、心配して居ると云ふ事を言つて居つた。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

(95-2002)

Notice :

Exhibit 3789 A to be

Corrected in accordance with Language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record p. 37,886-7

Doc. Dov.

the 14th, he said that in His Majesty, the Premier was as he (the Foreign Minister) he first described the prog- ure peace and war policies at Chief of the Army General Staff the Naval General Staff fol- s that were decided by the uncil, HIPANUMA, expressed hat at any rate, all decisions Majesty; and that after the mperor left the hall.

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also talked about the details of the Council which was held in the presence of His Imperial Majesty.

On the 15th, at the General Staff Headquarters, China was requested, through the Foreign Minister, to give an answer by the 15th as to whether or not she accepted or disapproved of the terms of peace proposed by Japan. This being the day the answer was to arrive, it was the fervent desire of the General Staff Headquarters to settle the matter on this occasion though it may be distasteful by waiting five additional days even in the event the answer was rejected. A liaison conference was convened at the official residence of the Premier and from the morning of the 15th, the attendance of both His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Army General Staff and His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff was requested. The conference lasted from 9:30 a.m. until 8:30 p.m. of the same day.

According to the details of the conference which I received from Premier KONOYE, the Army General Staff Headquarters was out and out in favor of ending the hostilities with China even if only a day sooner and of making preparations against the Soviet, and this was its greatest desire and concern. As for the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he stated: "Even if it is said to be a council held in the presence of the Emperor, the Emperor does not make any comments. Since this is very similar to the Emperor Organ Theory, this time, I should like to have matters submitted to His Imperial Majesty's judgment before a decision is made." So saying, he /Deputy Chief of the General Staff/ reversed from the very basis, everything that had been settled up until now. Moreover, it seemed that it was his desire to deal with CHIANG Kai-shek in person and come to a peaceful settlement. The reply

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EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 260 - (pages 1995-2002)

14-17 January 1938

When I called on the Foreign Minister on the 14th, he said that in short, at the Council held in the presence of His Majesty, the Premier was charged with expediting the proceedings whereas he (the Foreign Minister) was called on to do the explaining; that after he first described the progress of our foreign policy as well as our future peace and war policies at the Council, His Highness, Prince KANIN, the Chief of the Army General Staff and His Highness, Prince FUSHIMI, the Chief of the Naval General Staff followed by giving their approval to the proposals that were decided by the government; that the President of the Privy Council, HIPANUMA, expressed himself to the effect that he also approved; that at any rate, all decisions passed without objections were reported to His Majesty; and that after the closing address was made to the Emperor, the Emperor left the hall.

I then met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and discussed various matters which had come up subsequently. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also talked about the details of the Council which was held in the presence of His Imperial Majesty.

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already received from the Chief of China's Foreign Affairs Bureau through the German Ambassador was to the effect that the terms submitted through the German Ambassador by Japan were too abstract in content and therefore difficult to comprehend, and requested that a more concrete proposal be presented.

The Foreign Minister said, "The Army General Staff Headquarters has already informed China through the German Military Attache. At any rate /China/, is generally well aware of our concrete proposals. In spite of this, however, she feigns ignorance and is saying, 'that cannot be understood.' If this is the case, there is no hope. Therefore, as has been determined at the Council held before the Emperor, there is no alternative but to proceed with our alternate plan. This is to transfer the present hostilities into a long-term warfare. It is vital that we strengthen our determination to oppose China stubbornly." The foregoing was the contention of the Foreign Minister. The Premier and his Cabinet members were of the opinion that "it is not good to be led on and on." In the end, the same arguments were being repeated but Navy Minister YONAI spoke up and said, "Does that mean that the Army General Staff Headquarters does not have confidence in the Government? If so, it means that either the Army General Staff Headquarters or the Cabinet must resign en masse as a result of opposition between the two. However" There was a recess about 7:00 o'clock. The Army General Staff retired to the General Staff Headquarters and, after a consultation there, returned again to the official residence of the Premier at 8:00 o'clock. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff remarked, "To have a change in the government at the present time is not wise. The General Staff Headquarters has confidence in the Government and will concur with the decision it makes." Therefore, soon after 8 o'clock, the debate was settled. The Cabinet meeting was again convened and at 8:30 p.m., after the meeting had ended, the Premier called at the Palace and withdrew from the presence of the Emperor after making a complete report of the proceedings to the Emperor.

Both Prince KONOYE and KIDO were saying, "The Army General Staff is justified in their ardent desire to have out and out peace. However, after causing matters to develop this far, to stop midway and be led by them and say 'how would it be to conclude peace under these terms,' by taking an attitude very similar to that of a defeated nation and purposely showing our magnanimity is not an attitude to be taken by a country which has been winning consecutive victories. Should such an action be taken, it would, after all, be said, 'Japan has weakened considerably and is she not already in a precarious situation.' In this way, her cards would be revealed. Because of this, externally, it would mean a sudden fall of the yen exchange and depreciation of government securities and we would not be able to carry on commerce and would make the buying of commodities impossible. What are we to do should there be a panic? Nevertheless, if we are going to settle matters, it should be settled logically. This is a difficult situation."

Moreover, according to KIDO's conversation on or about the evening of the 12th, "Two or three days ago, since Prince CHICHIBU said, 'come over by all means,' I called on him at his palace. Prince CHICHIBU, with opinions which made it appear as though he was representing the Army General Staff, questioned me in the following manner, 'On what grounds is the Government refraining from concluding the present hostilities even a day sooner? How much longer do they think Japan's financial strength will last?' To the above question, I explained the circumstances at length. I discussed various situations with His Highness from 8:30 till after 10:00 o'clock." "In the course of the conversation, Prince CHICHIBU remarked, 'The present hostilities differ from that of the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese War in that we are not waging war against the people but against the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Therefore, could it not be done by eliminating all friction to date and clasping hands from a broad standpoint?' To this I replied, 'Even if the present situation differs from the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese war, after Japanese troops have killed 700,000 to 800,000 soldiers of the Chinese Army, even if we look grave and say, 'Let us shake hands,' it cannot be clasped sincerely. Furthermore, is Japan a defeated nation or a victorious nation. For a victorious nation to say, 'We, by all means, would like to make peace as soon as possible,' and submit various terms and lay our cards on the table would, on the contrary, be used as propaganda if our opponent should refuse to respond to this. If they say, 'Japan's internal condition is in such a difficult situation. With these terms, Japan has expressed hopes for peace,' and spread such propaganda at home and abroad, it would result in Japan being put at a great disadvantage. For example, this would cause a so-called slump in the yen exchange and government securities as well as a loss of confidence in /Japan's/ economy and finance. If we are to pursue this course further, it would also result in the nation not being able to purchase any commodities and prices of goods will soar and there would be fear that internal administration would be thrown into confusion. Diplomacy is, of course, necessary to establish peace, but unless the settlement is made very firm, and if things are immediately handled in the manner the General Staff Headquarters desires, I shall have no end of worry for the nation.'" To this, His Highness said, 'What you say is true. Nevertheless, I think the government is incompetent.' With this, we parted."

* * * * *

I left for Okitsu on the evening of the 17th and when I spoke to the Foreign Minister by phone on the morning of the 18th, he said, "As the Chinese Government failed to accept the proposal, the Council held in the presence of the Emperor has decided on the alternative plan. . . ."

西園寺原田日記 第二六〇回 小島の拔萃

J.P.S Doc No. 3150-260c

Exhibit No. 3787 A

……十四日に自らは外務大臣を討ねたが要
するに乃方会議も首相が進行掛で先づ自分(外務大臣
を以て説明させると云ふところを以て外交の経過及び今後
の和戦両邦に対する説明も、会議の席上に於てした処
が、内院總長官伏見軍令部總長官が預りて政府の
決定した案に御賛成になり、平沼議長も同杯賛成の趣
意を述べ、兎に角凡て異議なく決定したるを奏上
して、陛下に終了の御挨拶をして、さして陛下は御退
場になられた。

それから自らは内大臣に合つて其後いろいろ平話とし
て、内大臣は御前会議の招きの手を託して帰った。
それから十五日には又参謀本部で支那に對し
十五日に外務大臣から矢張り日英から申された社
平の條件に對して、諾否の返るやを世良やうに言ふ
やうだ。其返るやがある日ホウで、其返るやが若し拒否
された場合にも尚ほ五日位は延長を以てしようとしても
参謀本部は此際嫌が應でも纏めたいと云ふのが非常
な希望であらう。さうして又聯絡會議を開き十五日
の朝、閣下總長官殿下に臨み願ふ總理
官邸で聯絡會議が朝九時半から、同日午後八時
半頃までかゝつた。

で要するに其情況と近衛總理が、
徹尾参謀本部は一時も遅く支那とつたの戦争と
中 RETINGRAN 70 ROOM 306 注意したい、

と云小が非常な希望と心配ありて参謀次
 長の姓を御前會議と言て、陛下は河原も仰るは
 ありでは全で天皇機関説のやうなもので、今度は御裁
 断で仰る事を決めたと言て今迄決めたことと
 根本から覆へてさして尚ほ蔣介石と相手にして
 和平に局を結ぶ事やり度いと云小が子でうたが
 もう既に支那からドイツ大使を通じて支那の外交
 部長が言て来た返すには、日本のドイツ大使を通じて
 申した条件と云小は餘り抽象的で分らない。も
 う少し具体的に言て見たいと云小ことであつた。
 で外務大臣は、もう既に参謀本部あたりからドイツ
 の武官を通じてなり、兎に角大體具体的に此方の
 条件をよく知り抜いて居るに拘り向小がとぼけて
 「まだあれじゃあ分らない」と云小や、分らないと言て居
 るのは、望みがない。どうして御前會議で
 決めたやうな兎に角此方は二段の策に出るより
 は却かな。結局才二段の策と云小は長期抗戦
 についで、何処にも支那に對抗して行くと言小決心
 を固めなければよくないと言小が外務大臣の主張で
 あり、同時にもし摺らしてはよくないと言小が總理
 始め閣僚の意見であつた。結局最後に同じ様な
 議論を繰り返して居るが、米内海相は、それのやう
 参謀本部は政府を信用しないと言小が。政府と
 参謀本部の対立で、参謀本部が總辞職する

五か政府が辞めると云ふことにならぬが、と云ふこと
 であらうが、七時頃一應休憩して、参謀本部側は
 凡て一應参謀本部に引揚げてさうして参謀本部
 で相談して、再び八時頃總理官邸に歸つてまゐり
 さうして参謀次長は、今政府が変ると云ふやうな
 事けよくない。参謀本部は政府を信用して政府の
 決定に同意する」と云ふことで、結局八時過ぎに
 議は決り再び閣議が開かれ、さうして閣議後總
 理は八時半に参内して陛下に凡て其経過を申
 上げ、御前を退られた。
 参謀本部が何処までも平和の切なる希望を
 持つたけれども、然し此処迄ことを起してしまつてか
 ら中途半端にして、何でも向小に引摺り出して結局全
 て敗戦國のやなな態度で、此方から能く腹を見せ
 条件等を立てて、可いので媾和したらどうかと云ふや
 うなるのは、所謂合意連戦連勝の國の側からする
 き能く度やめたい。そんなこととすれば結局「日本
 は餘程弱く居る。もう既に危いんやないか」と云
 ふや、このことでも因を見すがさして、其爲に對外的には
 非常な日本の爲替の暴落とか、公債の下落と
 か云ふや、さうして商賣もなんとも出来なくなつて、
 島物を買はずとして、買小訳にはいかんし、パニック
 でも起るといふは、さうするのが天張るをいかに
 しても竹助の立つた纏め方で行かなければいけない。

詢に訝しな話である」とさやうらうらと不戸も近衛も
話して居た。——

X X X

——尚ほ十二日の晩ふたりに不戸の証「二三日前
に秩父宮が是非まうしてくれ」と云ふ御話で殿下
の御殿に伺ふと殿下が矢張参謀本部を
代表したやうな御意見で

「何故政府は一時も速く此戦争をやめないか。一体
日本の財力は何時迄續くと思つて居るか」

と云ふ御尋ねであり自分もそれに対して「よく殿
下になる情で盡して御話し、大分議論もしてしうく
八時半頃から十時過ぎまで御前で御話した」と云
ふことと言つて居た。

「其中に殿下の御話に

「今度の戦争は日清日露の戦争とは違つて、

国民と相手にするんでなく、要するに蔣政権と
相手にするんだ。だから大衆的見地から一切の今迄
の相剋と清算して手を握れば去まるじやないか」

と云ふやうな御話であるけれど自分も「日清
日露の戦争とは違ふにしても、兎に角日本の軍
が七八十の支那軍を殺して置き乍ら今更

開き直して「手を握らば」と言つたて心から握
れるもんではない。又一体日本は戦敗国であるん
でせうか、戦勝国であるんでせうか、戦勝国のオカシ

でせうか、戦勝国であるんでせうか、戦勝国のオカシ

『是非一ツ和平と急いでした』と言つていふ様な條件
 を出してさうして即ち自分達の賜を見せといひ
 向小がそれに應じない場合には逆に宣傳される
 『日本の内情は斯の如く困る。斯の如き條件
 で和平を望んでさうする』と言つて内外に宣傳
 されて日本の為には非常に不利な結果に陥る
 ならば假令は所謂為替の暴落とか公債の暴
 落とか、經濟、財政に不信用になつた時、愈々尚
 ほ此れが續いてやうな事になれば物は買へない物價
 は上りし所謂内政攪乱とやれる虞がある。和平を
 講ずるにしても無論外交は必要でありさういふことも
 餘程よく後の始末を手かたくしていふないと、直ちに
 今自參謀本部が望むやうなやり方は甚だ
 國家の爲には心配に堪えない』と云小即詰をしと知
 らが殿下も

ありたいから

と云小やうな事をして結局即別れした

……それから十七日、晚興津に行き、十八日、朝電話で
 外務大臣と詰しに、知が「即前會議は結局支那の
 政府が棄つて来ない爲に、オニ段の策に決定した……

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 264 - (pp. 2044-5)

14 February 1938

I saw the Vice Foreign Minister at the Foreign Ministry and he inquired: "Have you heard about the Liaison Conference of February 14th?" Therefore, I (HARADA) replied: "What about it?" To this, the Vice Minister stated: "At the Liaison Conference of February 14, the Army said: 'It is impossible to attack Canton and Hankow in the future. We shall go as far as the southern part of Shansi and up to the Yellow River but we think it is impossible to advance as far as Suchow.' The Navy is saying that it would like to advance its air base as far as Anking, but the Army is saying that it is impossible to go that far. The reason why they say it is impossible to carry out military operations as far as Anking lies in the fact that military preparations must be made against Russia. As a result the Navy is saying: 'It is not wise to continue as we are and extending the incident into one of long term hostilities. On one hand, cessation of war should be attempted through diplomatic manoeuvres and at the same time, our forces must advance without yielding an inch.' The foregoing is the Navy's stand and they say: 'Can Canton be attacked? What about Hankow, Suchow and Anking?' Even in that event, nothing can be done. The reason is due to military preparations against Russia. Therefore, the Navy requested (T.N. Prince FUSHIMI), the Chief of the Naval General Staff to inquire of (T.N. Prince KAN-IN) the Chief of the Army General Staff: 'The Army repeatedly speaks of the Soviet relationship, but are we not intending to, (against Russia) force it from our side?' Prince KAN-IN denied the foregoing saying: 'There is no such thing.'

His Majesty, the Emperor, then asked the Minister of War / 'Is it possible to put into effect a simultaneous plan for long term hostilities, military preparations against Russia and the expansion of the Navy?' The Army Minister replied: 'I shall discuss the matter with the Government and take the proper action.'

FILE COPY

RETURN TO R3314361

Exhibit No 3790-A

I. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-2645

西園寺原田日記 第二百六十四回

昭和十三年二月二十六日

トリの投華

……水から外務省で外務次官に會つた処が「二月十四日の聯絡會議の事を知つて居るか」と云ふ話であつたから「どう云ふんだ」と言つた処が「実は二月十四日の聯絡會議で陸軍は『もう此先広東も漢口も速も攻撃す、訳にはいかん、山西の南、黄河の線迄はやるべからぬ』とて徐州まで行く事は出来ないので海軍は『航空隊の基地と安慶まで進めた』と言ふべからぬ」とも陸軍は『どうも安慶まで進める事も出来ぬ』と言ふのである。

結局此軍事行動が此處まで出来ぬと云ふのは對ソ策戰の準備をする為に出るに出来ぬと云ふのである。それで海軍は結局此儘で唯在んにもしついで長期抗戰で黙つて居る各よくを。一方に外交工作で出来るを速く終熄する為にやると同時に、一方に手をゆるめたいのでやっぱり軍を進めて行くのを止めたいと云ふのが海軍の建前である。であるが海軍から今やうに『広東も出来ぬ、漢口も出来ぬ、或は徐州、或は安慶あたりどうか』と言つても速も遅も出来ぬ、水で出来ぬ理由は矢張對ソ關係と云ふのだから海軍で海軍司令部總長に参謀總長

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COPY

此方から仕掛けると果てはなにかのたうふか
 閑院宮殿下に聞かされた処が、閑院宮殿下は「そんな
 事は無い」と言つて否定して居るかと云ふ話であ
 った。それから陛下は
 『長期抗戦対し準備と海軍拡張。此三つを同時
 に成立させる事ができるか』
 と云ふ事を陸軍大臣に尋ねられた処が、陸軍大臣
 は「何れも政府と相談致しまして善処致します」と
 云ふ事を御答へした。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HATADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 27 - (pages 214-19)

16 June 1937

That afternoon, I (HARADA) met KONOYE at the Premier's official residence. He said: "This noon Foreign Minister UGAKI, Finance Minister IKEDA and I held a so-called Three Ministers Meeting while we had lunch. War Minister ITAGAKI persisted in recommending SFIRATORI as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to UGAKI. When ITAGAKI was at the front and SHIRATORI was touring through North and Central China, they talked for about four hours on various matters. It is said their opinions on foreign relations coincided very well. The ones who are still the greatest nuisance to UGAKI at present are the field grade officers of the Army. If UGAKI wants to carry out some foreign policy matter, he will have to hold them down and yet let it appear that he is cooperating with them. Otherwise, he won't be able to accomplish anything. SFIRATORI is not considered highly by his seniors in the Foreign Ministry, and his reputation outside of the Ministry is somewhat bad. However, if UGAKI were to use him, he would probably handle him appropriately. I think that using SFIRATORI would be very good politically. However, the Navy is wholly opposed to him. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO especially says that in view of SFIRATORI's personal conduct: "We cannot keep such a man for official disciplinary reasons." However, can't something be done on this occasion without saying such straitlaced things? I will not assume any responsibility in forcibly recommending SFIRATORI. However, in reality, I still think that SFIRATORI would probably be the best suited person. UGAKI told me today: "I have heard that SFIRATORI is to some extent very 'loose' with his finances. If he's acceptable to the Army, he isn't to the Navy. This is really an awkward situation."

FILE COPY
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Ex. 319-A

Doc. 3190-278A

昭和十三年六月廿日

陸軍々々 縮ト 西園寺公

第二百五七十八回ヨリノ抜萃

「ソレカラ當日ノ午後近衛ニ總理ノ官邸デ會ツタ處ガ
 「今日實ハ晝食事ヲシ乍ラ宇垣外務大臣、池田大藏大
 臣ト自分ト三人デ、所謂三相會議ヲシ乍ラ、マア話ヲ
 シタ處ガ、宇垣ハ板垣陸軍大臣カラ頻リニ白鳥ヲ外務
 次官ニシタラドウカト云フ事ヲ獎メラレタ。デ、板垣
 ハ戰線ニ居ル時ニ白鳥ガ北文中支ヲ廻ツタ時ニ、四時
 間バカリイロ々々話シテ見テ、非常ニ外交上ノ意見ガ
 一致シタト云フ話デアル。デ、近衛ノ言フノニハ「一
 番今宇垣ニ對シテ何處ガ難問ダト言ヘバ、矢張陸軍ノ
 中堅階級ガ五月蠅イ。デ、何カ宇垣ガ外交ノ事ヲシヨ
 ウト思ツテモ矢張アレヲヨク抑ヘ乍ラ又一緒ニヤツテ
 行クヤウナ形デナイト、ナンニモ出來ナイ。デ、白鳥
 ハ外務省ノ先ニモヨクナイシ多少外部ニモ悪イケレ
 ドモ、然シ宇垣ガ使ヘ又適當ナルヲウカラ、白
 鳥ヲトル事ガ一番自分

政治的
 又適當
 見テヨト思フケレ

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Kloc. 3150 - 278A

2.

ドモ、海軍ハ全面的ニ白鳥ニ反對デアル。殊ニ山本次官ハ白鳥ノ素行上ノ事デ「トテモ官紀上ア、云フモノハ置ケナイ」ト言フケレドモ、ソナ窮屈ナ事ヲ言ハナイデモ、此際何トカナラナイダラフカ。デ、自分ハ強イテ責任ヲ以テ白鳥ヲ奨メル事ハ自分トシテハシナイケレドモ、事實ハ一番白鳥ガ好インジヤナイカト思フ「ト云フ話デアツタ。サウシテ附加ヘテ近衛ノ言フノニ「今日モ宇垣ガ、白鳥ハ多少經濟ニ非常ニルズデアルト云フヤウナ事モ聞イテ居ルガ、陸軍ニヨケレバ海軍ニ悪イシ、ドウモ困ツタモンダ」ト云フ話デアツタ。」

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 280 - (page 2166)

2 July 1938

That evening, I (HARADA) went over to the Navy Minister's and met with the Navy Minister and Vice Minister and the three of us had a leisurely conversation for approximately 2 hours. It was brought out that OKAWA, Shumei recently brought a petition from the young officials of the Foreign Ministry to UGAKI, the Foreign Minister, which stated: "Appoint SHIRATORI the Vice Minister." * * *

Exhibit No. 3794-A

D.P.S. Doc No. 3150-280B

昭和十二年七月四日

西園寺、原田日記

才三官人十包トリウ振萃。

それから自分には夕刻海軍大臣。処に行つた次官と海軍大臣と三人で中々二時間ばかり話した中に最近大少司明が宇垣と云ふ処に行つた。さうして大川周明は「白鳥」次官に「さうして外務省。若し連中。連名書と頼つた行つた。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 281 - (14 July 1938)

P. 2169

"Then on the morning of the 5th, I called at the residence of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and chatted with him for about an hour. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated: 'Yesterday, the Emperor summoned the War Minister, and then the Chief of the General Staff and stated: "I think this war should be ended as soon as possible. What do you think?" The War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff both replied simply: "We will continue until CHIANG KAI SHEK falls." The Emperor was quite concerned about this matter because the Chief and the Vice Chief of the General Staff had previously told the Emperor that the Chief of the General Staff and the General Staff Headquarters had feverishly "wanted to stop this war, and, in short, make preparations against Soviet Russia." Since then nothing has happened. Therefore, the Emperor thinking that the Chief of the General Staff at least had in mind to settle the incident as soon as possible, put the question with that belief, to the Chief of the General Staff and to the War Minister.'"

* * * * *

P. 2170

"Then wishing to impart this matter to the Vice Minister of the Navy, I went to the official residence of the Naval Minister, and met the Vice Minister of the Navy. Vice Minister YAMAMOTO said: 'It seemed as if Aide-de-Camp HIRATA was here just now, but I did not meet him. Probably he came on some such matter. However, though the War Minister said: "We will continue until CHIANG KAI SHEK falls" so-called "We will fight it out," in reality it is the Army which is most troubled. Consequently, it is also the Army that desires most earnestly to quit. Therefore there is no doubt about that point.'"

FILE COPY
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西園寺原田日記一九三三年(昭和十三年)七月十四日(坂本)

それから五日朝内大臣と其松邸に訪ねて(時間ばかり
いらく話を聞くと、昨日陛下が陸軍大臣と御召になり、そ
れから参謀總長と御召になつて、

「一体此戦争は一時も速くやめなかつたやな」と思ふがどうだ
と云ふ話と遊んだ処が、陸軍大臣も總長も異口同音に
「簡單に、蒋介石が倒れるまではやりなす」と云ふ奉答であ
つたので、陛下は少くも御軫念になつた、と之を託は豫
て前から参謀總長と始め参謀本部は遮り無二に、此
戦をやりたい、さうして要するに對ソ一つクリソグエントに
備へたい。」と云ふ事と次長からも参謀總長からも陛下に申
上げて居る、其後何の要も、陛下も申上つたので、陛下も参
謀總長は少くも一時も速く事件も收拾したんだと云
ふ氣持で居ると思はれて、参謀總長官にも亦陸軍
大臣にも其つもりで御下向になつた。

それから自分は其話と一応海軍次官に話して見ようと思
つて、海軍大臣の官舎に行つて次官に會ふと次官は恰度
今平田侍從武官が来て居たよつた、それと云ふので、
自分は會はなかつた、恐らくそんな事でもあつたかも知れない
が、陸軍大臣が如何に、蒋介石が倒れる事はやはりやります、
所謂「徹底的にやる」と言ふ処で事實

一番倒るゝのは海軍が、一番倒るゝのは
矢張り陸軍が、その次は海軍が、その次は海軍が、
山本次官が、その次は海軍が、その次は海軍が、
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944
EX. 3793-A

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT DIVISION

18 January 1948

CORRECTION

1. The attached is a corrected copy of IPS Doc.
No. 3150-283A
2. Please destroy the previous copy of IPS Doc.
No. 3150-283-A, delivered to you on 12 January.

CHIEF, DOCUMENT PROCESSING UNIT
I.P.S.

FILE COPY
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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 283 - (28 July 1938)

Emperor Chides ArmyP. 2189-2191

"Then, when I met MATSUDAIRA, he said: 'The fact is that His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, and the War Minister proceeded in company to the Imperial Palace this morning and expressed their desire "to submit some matter to the Throne". His Majesty, thinking that the War Minister was coming to make an appeal also concerning that question of the use of real force on the Soviet-Manchoukuo border and thinking that it would rather cast a reflection upon H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister if the sanction was denied to them when they had appealed directly to him, made the Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty convey his intention in advance out of his very prudent and sympathetic consideration, as follows: "Should it be the case that they are coming, by any chance, to get my sanction to use force of arms, I haven't the slightest intention of approving it. If they are coming for that, they needn't come." The message to the above effect was conveyed through the Chief Aide-de-Camp to H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. But they said: "We would like to be received in audience by His Majesty by all means." So His Majesty, at eleven o'clock, said: "If that be the case, tell them to come", and waited for them. However, the War Minister and H.I.H. Prince, Chief of the General Staff, kept His Majesty waiting for more than an hour after they had arrived at the Palace. In the meanwhile, the Chief Aide-de-Camp went to and from His Majesty and the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, and finally, close to noon, an audience was to be realized.

"Then, just as His Majesty had thought, the War Minister submitted the question of the use of force and begged his sanction. His Majesty put the question: 'How about contact with the Ministers concerned?' And the War Minister replied: 'Both the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister have agreed.' Although both Foreign Minister UGAKI and the Navy Minister had previously expressed their opinion in favor of troop dispositions, they were absolutely against the use of force. Being answered to his question to the effect that 'Both Ministers have agreed'; by the War Minister, when he had already known the particulars, His Majesty seemed to have felt that he was going to be deceived again and, with a somewhat excited countenance, admonished:

"In the first place, the actions on the part of the Army are abominable. There are frequent instances when a sneaky method was used, quite improper for my army, disobeying the orders from the central authorities and deciding on the judgment of the authorities on the spot, such as: The case of Liutiaokou in the Manchurian Incident and the actions at the Marco Polo Bridge

at the beginning of this Incident. I think it is really abominable in various ways. Nothing like that must happen this time...'

"Then, turning to the War Minister, he said: 'Hereafter, you must not move one soldier without my command!' He spoke so emphatically to the War Minister that the War Minister retreated, filled with trepidation.

"And when he returned, he said to the effect: 'I can never look into His Majesty's face again. I should by all means like to resign.'" * * * *

p. 2191

When I met KIDO later that day he said: "Why didn't the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal act in concert with the Premier and do something? It is disturbing to have the Emperor taking such pointed action."

p. 2194

- - - -"Then, a letter from Captain TAKAGI of the Navy came, which read: 'The strength of the Soviet troop at the spot where the current Soviet-Manchoukuo border problem occurred is approximately 200, and the Korean Army has dispatched one battalion to cope with them. And there are no indications of preparing for war on the part of the Soviets. And speaking of the two points, that is, the estimate of the situation made by the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, they are: (a) it is necessary to compel the Soviets to withdraw from Changkufeng. For this, the use of real force will be necessary; (b) even if we resort to the use of real force, the Soviets will not enlarge it to a serious incident. The reasons for the above are: (1) we do not see any aggravation of the situation, such as its making preparations for war and reinforcement; (2) at present there is extreme dissension between the Red Army and GPU. I suppose the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff sought an Imperial audience on the 21st because the Kwantung Army Headquarters had persistently urged the use of real force to the General Staff Headquarters.

"And the criticism of the Navy was: 'They are talking like that without taking into consideration the Soviet air force and submarines. This, however, is not very good.'"

* * * * *

西園寺 康成日記 卷之八三回 トリノ後 廿一

bn. 3793-A
J.P.S Doc No. 3150-283A

★Exhibit No.

☆ 此れから松平に会ふと、其は今朝を謀總長官と陸軍大臣と共に奏上し、何か可成り言ひ、陛下は又例の滿国境の實力行使の問題に就て、再び今度は陸軍大臣から御願に來るの事は、おと申せられ、直接面々向て御願し、それから、其処で御許しにならんと、寧ろ總長官や陸軍大臣の面目に拘ること、たかしく思召し、陛下の極めて慎重な同情ある御氣持で侍從武官長をして先に陛下の御内意を傳へしめられ、若し万一武力行使を許せと云ふやうなことで來るのならば、それは自今は何処までも許す意思は、さういふことで、まゝのなうは來りて、宜しい。

と云ふやうな意味のことも、武官長を通じて總長官及び陸軍大臣に傳へられたけれども、どうして拜謁を願はぬと云ふので、陛下は十一時に、それなら、やうに。

と言つて御待たになつて、いつしやつた、陛下が陸軍大臣と謀總長官とは、宮中においでから陛下を召んど、一時間餘りも御待たせして、さうして、其間侍從武官長が陛下と陸軍大臣や謀總長の間を往復して、遂に書近々守つて拜謁することを、いつた。

陛下は陛下は陸軍大臣から又陛下の御心つてお出でになつた通り、武力行使の問題を奏上して御許しを願つた。

陛下は陛下は陸軍大臣との連絡は、どうか。

御下問に於ては、陸軍大臣は外務大臣も
海軍大臣も賛成せず、と云ふものと奉り合はれ、
既に宇垣外務大臣も海軍大臣も其の配備に關しては
同意を表し居るけれども、其の執行すべしは純
對に反對して居た。其様子も既に陛下の御承知で
おられたに、陸軍大臣は其御下問に對して、
西大臣の賛成でございませぬと云ふことを申上られた
ので、陛下の御承知は、これは又自分を騙すのと云ふ
たのりしく、少くも御承知で

与え素陸軍のやり方は怪し、か。滿洲事變の
柳條溝の端合と言ひ、今回の事件は最初の蘆溝橋
橋のやり方と言ひ、中央の命令には全く服し、
唯去るの強硬でございませぬ、陛下の軍院にはあるま
いませぬ、御承知ある方法を用ひ、やうなことも屢々
ある。御承知に怪し、か。人語であると思ふ。この御承知
を人なやうなことをかめ、これは、か。

と云ふことになり、亦め、か。陛下(西大臣)に
こと
御承知は陛下の御承知、か。兵にも御承知、か。は
なさん

と非常な御承知、陛下の御承知、か。陸軍大臣に御承知、か。で陸軍
大臣の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。
陛下の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。
陛下の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。陛下の御承知、か。

bn.

P3

たことを言ひ……

それから其日に又木戸に会ふと、木戸は「河故内大臣が首
相と打合せ、やつてくれなかつたか。あゝ、角が立たことを陸
下やら北では困る」と言つて居つた。

x x x x x

……それから海軍の高木大佐から手紙が来て、見ると「今
度、ソ満国境に於ける問題の起る地帯の、ソウイェト
の兵方は約言、ソ朝鮮軍は此に對して一師大隊を
遣つ居る。ソ朝鮮軍は戰備を備へる氣配はな
尚ほニ果とソは即ち南東軍司令部の情況判断
とソは、(1)が是非とも張鼓峰よりソ聯側を引退
らうと云ふことを要す。ソは對して實力行使を必要とす
べし。(2)は、我々が實力行使に及ぶともソ聯側は大事事件に
狭く来らざるべし。ソは其理由として、戰備を備へ増
員せんとする如き重化の情勢を認め、(3)は現在赤
軍とソ聯とペロウーという不和甚だし、斯ういふ觀
測で南東軍司令部より頼りに參謀本部に實力
行使を奨めて来たを、結局廿一日の陸軍大臣參謀總
長の参内と云ふたらし」と云ふこと書いてある。
ソ朝鮮軍の海軍側への批判とソは「ソ聯側の空軍
及び潜水艦の事を全然考慮に置かざりて斯ういふ
ことと言つて居るけれども、此は甚だよくない」……

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 313 (7 February 1939)

ARITA Reports to Throne

P. 2438

"*** The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal then said that the Deputy Chief of Army General Staff came to him a few days ago and said: 'I strictly warned Ambassador OSHIMA (Germany) that the supreme authority of diplomacy is vested in the Emperor. I also cautioned him that it is not desirable to forget one's position and always do as Germany says by saying that he is of the same opinion. Japan has the deciding authority. The Army has thus no intention of infringing upon the diplomatic prerogative of the Emperor. Also, the Army does not pay any attention to the present-day Rightists because they are a most outrageous lot. The civil police and Kempei have been instructed to take action without hesitation.'"

FILE COPY
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Exhibit No. 3795-A

I. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-313A

西園寺原田日記 第三百十三回

よりの抜萃

それから内大臣の治に依ると、先日内大臣の処に
参謀次長が来て、頼りに「独逸の大島大使に対して
も、外交の大権は陛下にあるが、唯ドイツの
言ふがままに自介の立場を忘れて同意見をからし
と云つて従つて居ちやあいかん。決定権は日本にあるの
だから、それとよく注意して置いな。で、陸軍は決
して陛下の外交大権を干犯するやうなつもりは無
論な。又右翼と云ふものに対して、今の右翼
など、云ふものは全く怪しからぬもの。陸軍は決して
相平にしない。敬言察にも、宝器兵にも、トシク、遠慮
なくアハと云ふことと云つて居る。と云ふことと参謀
次長は話して居た。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 301

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 313 (7 February 1939)

ARITA Reports to Throne

P. 2438

" * * * The Army's desire reached the Emperor's ears. Before the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or anyone else knew, the Emperor personally decided to call the Chief Aide-de-Camp and said: 'Go to the General Staff Headquarters and say that if it is so embarrassing if KONOYE resigns, as a condition for keeping KONOYE in office, decide that question of strengthening the Anti-Comintern pact as decided at the first Five Ministers' Conference. (P. 2438) Moreover, how about eliminating those points advocated by the Army; that is, those points which are in discord with the general decisions made at the Five Ministers' Conference? Also, how about deciding to have this anti-Comintern pact directed strictly against the Soviet as it had been decided at the Five Ministers' Conference?' The Emperor had, as his idea, the foregoing transmitted to the Army, who, however, did not show any signs of submitting to the Imperial will and said: 'We are not in favor of that.'"

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

I.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-313B

Exhibit No 3795-B

西園寺原田日記 第三百十三回

よりの抜萃

その陸軍の希望が天聴にまで達した。其処で陛下は内大臣も誰と知らないうちに、陛下御自身御考で侍従武官長と呼ばれて

「兵謀本部に行つてさう言へ、そんなに近衛總理の辭めるのが困るのなう。近衛總理を引止める代りに例の防共強化の問題を、最初五相會議で決定した通り、に決つて、さうして今日陸軍が主張して居る。油断は五相會議の全般と喰違ひがあつた矣と取りやめたらどうかさうして、その五相會議の決定通り、純然たるソウイットウカに対する防共協定と云ふことにしてはどうか」と云ふ意味のことと、陛下の御考で陸軍に対して傳へしうら小たけ小ども、陸軍は「それは困ります」と言つて陛下の思召に従はうとしなかつた。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 314 (13 February 1939)

Political Wrangles in China

P. 2443

****As the Foreign Minister, I am at present reluctantly assuming an extremely strong attitude, which is indeed awkward. However, this must be done in order to see the situation through. If we fail in this, I think that our foreign policy will be a total failure. The other day, I said to the Army people: 'The Foreign Ministry does not know absolutely anything about the telegram between Ambassador OSHIMA and the General Staff Headquarters concerning the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern pact. No matter how much, and how many years the Army may have studied diplomacy, what right do they have to do such a thing without consulting the Foreign Ministry at all?' I asked for their reconsideration and the Army said they were very sorry. At any rate, such a situation is distressing but I would like you to remain for awhile with a little more patience."

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

昭和十四年二月十五日

西園寺・原田日記

才三百十四号「よりの」抜萃

……今心ならずも馬鹿に強いやうな顔をして行つて
 来るのは、実にどうも自分には外務大臣と一海に因ら
 ざることだけけれども、事實からいへば、今日も一
 つけないから、いふで失敗した。自分にも外交はあ
 目だと思ふ」と云ふ意味の話をし、又先づ陸軍
 の連中にも「一任君達」は例の防共強化の問題で
 大島大使と参謀本部との間にはどうも電報の
 了。外交上はさうな何とも知らない。陸軍の如何
 に外交上の問題を研究したからと云つて、或は河野
 等から研究したからと云つて外務省に下人にも相談
 した。そんなことが出来るといふと思ふ。と云ふ
 うなことを言つて及者を求めて見た。陸軍
 奴もそれには「海に言ひかた」と言つて居る。兎に角
 もうこんなやうな情況にや、事實に困るけれども、
 才あつた暫く我慢して見て居る。貰ひたい

FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 317 (10 March 1939)

OSHIMA and SHIRATORI Balk

P. 2468

"On my way to Tokyo on the morning of the 9th, I (HARADA) had Captain TAKAGI ride on the same coach with me from Chigasaki. When I questioned him about the situation, he was very much concerned from the standpoint of routine.

* * * * *

P. 2469

"When I met the Foreign Minister shortly after lunch, he said: "There is no problem any more from the standpoint of routine. In short, it is a pending question which, after careful discussion has already been reported to the Emperor and His Majesty, stating that it is an inevitable consequence of circumstances, has sanctioned it. Therefore, no matter what they (Ambassadors to Rome and Berlin) might say, the (Japanese) Government cannot cancel its decision. All we have to do is to change the Ambassadors if they are going to rush to conclusions and say that the decisions (of the Japanese Government) will not do. As for the transfer of Ambassadors, I would like to carry it out after the close of the present session of the Diet. In all cases, we wired back instructions to both (Ambassadors) to do as recommended by the Japanese Government." He further remarked with firm determination: "In all likelihood, the Premier is presumably of the same opinion."

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

西園寺原田日記

第三百十七回 よりの板葺

それから自分は九日の朝東京に行く時に、芝罘の
崎の高木大佐に自分の乗る列車に乗って貰つて
様子を聞くと、事務的に見て高木大佐は非常に
心配して居った。

x x x x x x x

……自分は晝過ぎに外務大臣に会つて見ると、
大臣は「もう事務的の問題は一つもなくて、要す
るに政府は慎重の協議の結果、陛下まで既に申
上げて、陛下もまあ、己むを得ないだらう」と云い
処で承知になつたやうな懸案であるから、
あれを今向ふから何と言つて来ても、政府として取
消したりするとは出来ない。寧ろあせつて出
先に居る大使達がいけない。と云ふから、大使達
を責めなければいんだ。大使を責めるにしても此議
会が済んでからにしたい。と思つて居る。何れに
してもみんな早速此方から言つた通りやれ
と云ふ訓令を出してやつた」と云ふことで、非常
に強い決心で、「恐らく總理も同様だらう」と言
つて居った

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 321 - (18 April 1939)

P: 2496

* * * The Foreign Minister said: "The other day, on the afternoon of the 8th, to be exact, I went to the Palace with the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, was granted an audience with the Emperor, and made a confidential report on the decision to the Emperor. Furthermore, I reported: 'Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI made a clarification, which represented their own opinion only, to Germany and Italy of the Empire's intention to fight in the event that these should wage war with England and France, but they should be made to take this back considering that they acted without regard to the wishes of the central authorities and that their words and actions overstepped /their authority/. However, * * *'"

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Exhibit No. 3798-A

1. P. S. Doc. no. 3150-321B

西園寺原田日記 第三百二十一回

よりの抜萃

外務大臣の語に「先日 又は八日の午後 五相会議
の決定を以て参内し 陛下に拜謁を賜つて決定通
内奏を……尚ほ大島 白鳥兩大使は独伊に
対し 英佛と交戦の場合に参戦する。と自分限り
の意思で帝国の態を闡明したことは 中央の意
思とも顧みず超越の言動としてこれを取消さ
ざるものなるも……」

RETURN TO ROOM 361
FIVE COPY

EXCERPT FROM "SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS"

Chapter 321
(18 April 1938)Emperor Criticizes EnvoysP. 2494.

The evening paper of the 11th mentioned that the War Minister had gone to the Palace from about 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. I was worried about this, so early on the morning of the 12th, I went to the private residence of MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and asked, "What was the reason behind the War Minister's visit to the Palace yesterday?" He answered, "In regards to the visit to the Palace, unless I speak from the beginning, it cannot be understood. Day before yesterday, that is, on the 10th, when the Foreign Minister visited the Palace after the Five Ministers' Conference held a few days ago, the Emperor made an inquiry about the progress of the meeting to the Foreign Minister. Prior to this, the Emperor had learned of the opposition made to governmental instructions by both Ambassador SHIRATORI and OSPIMA. Consequently, the Emperor thought that for Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSPIMA to have expressed subsequently Japan's intention to participate in war although they had no authority, was an act overstepping their authority and extremely bad. The Emperor was also aware of the fact that the War Minister was covering up, to a certain extent, such acts committed abroad at each session of the Five Ministers' Conference. From the standpoint of the above situation, the Emperor asked the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, 'I am thinking of especially calling in the War Minister and rebuking him. What is your opinion?' The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal replied that even though various circumstances exist, since the opinions of the War, Foreign and Navy Ministers as well as other cabinet members were in agreement as a result of conferences, and since the matter was already settled, he thought that for him /the Emperor/ to make various reproaches on the matter would be rather ill-advised since it would bring about an irritation; and furthermore, that since present circumstances were entirely different from that of the case of the Changkufeng, he thought that it would be better if he /the Emperor/ did not especially call in the War Minister to rebuke him. It was because the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal felt that the matter, after all, was settled that he made the remark in the sense that it would be better to leave matters as they now stood. Thereupon, since the Emperor said, 'If that is the case, I will do so,' the idea of summoning the War Minister was abandoned.

RETURN TO ROOM 301

"On that day, however, the War Minister happened to go to the Palace on some other business and was received in audience. Thereupon, the Emperor patiently informed the War Minister of matters with which he was not pleased in regards to this question but not in the sense of rebuking him. /The Emperor's/ words were to the effect that in the first place, it was an infringement upon his supreme authority for the two ambassadors abroad to express /Japan's/ intentions of participating in war, a matter with which they were not concerned; that he was extremely displeased with the /War Minister's/ taking the attitude of supporting them under such circumstances; and that he was also very dissatisfied with the /War Minister's/ deviation /from the subject/ at each meeting of the Cabinet.

"The War Minister departed in great fear. He went to the room of the Chief Aide-de-Camp and asked, 'Who was it that told everything /to the Emperor/?' He was very angry."

Exhibit No. ^{行改} 3098-B

IPS Doc 3150-321A

西園寺原田日記

一九三九年(昭和十四年)四月十日(日)の板草

三、四九四—九六頁

二四九四頁

十一日の夕刊を見ると、陸軍大臣の二時頃から
 三時半頃まで参内して居る、と云ふことであつた。自分は一
 寸気になつたから、十一日の朝早く松平内大臣 秘書官長
 をその私邸に訪ねて、「昨日の陸相参内はどんなことだつたか、
 と言つて聞いた処で、」實はあの参内に就して前から話さ
 なければならぬけれども、昨日即ち十日陛下は内大臣に先日
 五相会議後、外務大臣が参内した時に、会議の模様
 を御下向になり、又それより以前に白鳥、大島兩大使
 から中央の訓令を反駁して来た様子も御承知で、そ
 の後續して兩大使が何等の権限なきに拘らず参戦の意
 を表示したことは、権限外の行為であつて、甚だよく及ぶと
 云ふことを思つて居られ、尚五相会議の度毎に陸軍大臣
 は虫先のかう云つた行為を或程度まで庇つて居ると云ふ
 ことも御承知になつて居るので、陛下は内大臣に以上の如
 き様子から、「陸軍大臣を特に呼んで叱言を言はふかと
 思ふがどうか」と云ふ思召であつた。内大臣は今度の場合
 例へば、^{陸軍大臣} ^の ^{結果} ^は ^{陸軍大臣}
^は ^{外務大臣} ^の ^{結果} ^は ^{陸軍大臣}
^{見が} ^改 ^{した} ^は ^{既に} ^{居る} ^で ^{ござり} ^ま
 するから、^既 ^に ^{居る} ^で ^{ござり} ^ま

REFURIA TO ROOM 361

却って刺戟をしてよくなつて存じますから、此際は張鼓
吹の場合とも全く異つて居るものでありますから、陸軍大臣
を特に御召になつてお叱言を賜ふやうなことは、あやめになつ
た方がよろしと存じます。と言つて、内大臣の気持では、
免に角結局に於て事柄は纏つた次第だから、まあ、その儘
にしてお置まされた方が好い、と云ふやうな意味で申し上げ
た處が、陛下は、

「それならさうしよう」

と云ふので、陸軍大臣を特にお召しになることは思ひ止ま
られた。

然るに偶然にも他の用件で同日陸軍大臣は参内し
て拜謁を賜つた。で、陛下はお叱言と云ふ意味ではなつて
れども、平素御自分が此問題に就て面白くなつと思召して降
おでになる所を、陸軍大臣に等々とお話しになつた。元來、出
先の兩大使が何等自分と關係なく参戦の意を表したこと
は、大元帥の権限を犯したものではなつた。斯う如き場合に
恰もこれを支援するかの如き態度を執ることは甚だ面白くな
らぬ。又閣議毎に逸脱せることを言ふが如きも甚だ面白くなつ、と
云ふやうな意味の御言甚末があつたので、

陸軍大臣は頗る恐懼して退き、武官長の室に行つて、
「一体誰が委曲を以て申上げたらうか」
と言つて憤慨して居た。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 322 (pages 2499-2501)

20 April 1939

part

On the morning of the 20th when I went to see KIDO and inquired about subsequent developments, KIDO said that he had met the Premier on the previous day and that as a result of the conversation, /found that/ since the Premier appeared to be in a dilemma between the Army and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal or the Emperor, and that since the Premier seemed to think that the Army's actions were essentially right, he wanted to settle matters according to their whims by some means; that to achieve this end, the Premier felt that he would like to have a little more understanding and cooperation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and consequently also felt that he would like to have the Emperor's understanding along this line; and that his principal object was that he wanted him (KIDO) to do something by interceding to attain this end. I could not understand KIDO's attitude in regards to this. According to KIDO, it is the opinion of the Premier and others that although the main text of the Anti-Comintern Pact had already received Imperial Sanction, the Army wants to omit the secret treaty; namely, the attached secret treaty which says that Japan interprets as the principal object of this Pact the activities of the Comintern, in other words, only Soviet Russia; that in regards to this, the Emperor will not give his permission; and that since the Army wishes to omit this /secret treaty/ and avoid being involved in the event that Germany and Italy fought against England, France, or other countries by applying only the text of this Pact, and since both the Army and Navy, especially the Army itself, say that they wish to avoid absolutely Japan's being drawn into the vortex /of war/, would it not be permissible to omit the secret treaty.

At one time or another, KIDO expressed that he, too was of the same opinion. In his talk to me, KIDO said that the Emperor is essentially a scientist, an extreme liberalist, and at the same time a pacifist; that unless we have the Emperor somewhat change his ideas, a serious gap would develop between /the Emperor/ and the Army and rightists in the future; that, like in the later year of Emperor KOMEI's reign when close officials were completely changed by the Shogunates, we cannot tell what will happen; and that in order to lead the Army while still appearing to be led by the Army, we must make it appear as though we understood the Army a little more. On my part, I listened to this remark by KIDO with an extreme feeling of surprise, and although I intended to contradict him, I remained silent because I thought that for me to argue with KIDO

now would do no good. I felt it extremely regrettable since I thought that the concern of KIDO and the like was to lead the Army or the rightist to comply as much as possible with the will of the Emperor and that it was their original mission to fulfill their responsibilities in this sense.

Therefore, I told KIDO, "You and I are the ones who best know the reasons that brought about this present situation. If I were to explain what lies at its root, it is the coarse, uncultured, and unrepresentable group among the rightists. They are broadcasting whatever they please and by creating an atmosphere in which they gave power to whomever they pleased, and against which we could do nothing, they brought about the present disunity of the Army. Although I believe that a man in your position can eliminate this root, since it can no longer be helped, I am thinking of beating to death five or six of the group who might become obstacles in the future, although this is going to great extremes on my part. Although it may cause you some trouble at that time, that is not the problem." Thereupon, KIDO said, "For you to talk of such extremes is distressing!" However, it was because I was so dissatisfied with KIDO's attitude that I made such remarks.

Just before he left, KIDO made his language somewhat vague and said, "Since I shall also think of something, do not worry.".....

Exp 3799-A

No. 87-2112 200

Doc 3150-322 A

6.04

西園寺原田日記

ROOM 361

RETURN TO ROOM 361

RETURN

按 華 語

此の文は...

と云木戸は前日總理に会して... 自身は倍々陸軍も... 何れか自陸軍は今日希望して... 何れか自陸軍は今日希望して...

此の文は...

Doc 3150-322A

No. 2

たいと言いつて居るのであるから秘密協定の部分はとつても大丈夫じゃあないか、と云ふのが總理や何かの考である。

で、木戸は、何時の間にか矢張それに同意を表明して居り、自分に対しての話に、元來今の陛下は科挙者であり、非常な自由主義な方である、同時に又平和主義の方である。で、此陛下のお考へになり方を多少変へて載かなければ、將來陸軍及び右翼と其處に非常な隔が出来ることか、
? 恰度孝明天皇の晩年の、側近をすっかり幕府に取り変へられてしまったやうな具合に、どうされるか分らない。で、陸軍に引摺られるやうな格行で居乍ら結局此方が陸軍を引張って行くと云ふことになるには、もう少し陸軍に理解を持ったやうな形をとらなければならぬ、と云ふやうなことで、自分としては非常に意外な心持もする程木戸から以上の話を聞いて、よっぽど其處で反駁しようと思つたけれども、今木戸と自分が議論をしても面白くない、と思つて黙つては居つたが、自分としては木戸あたりこそ陸軍なり右翼なりを出來ただけ陛下の御氣持に添ふやうに引張つて行くべく心掛けて、其意味で責任を盡すと云ふことが元來の使命ではなかつたのか、と云ふことを自分は思つて非常に遺憾に思つた。

それで自分から木戸に、「元來君と僕あたりが、今日に至つた情況の筋道を一番よく知つて居るので、根本に何ものがあるかと云へば下らない右翼の雜駁な、人の前にも出せないやう打連中が居つて、それ等が勝手な放送をし、勝

手な人間に力を興へるやうな空気を作って、それをどうする
ことも出来なかったと云ふことが今日の陸軍の不統制を
来たし、今日の社會の極めて面白くない情況を生み出した
んじゃないか。其根本を断ち切ることに今日の君の地位に
居て出来ないことはないと思ふが、然しもうさうなりやあ己
むを得ないから、自介としては甚だ極端ではあるけれども、
これほど思ふやうな將來邪間になるやうな連中を五六人
叩き殺してやらうかと思ふ。其時に君に幾らか迷惑をか
けるかも知らんがそんなことは問題じゃああるまい」と云つて
話した處が、木戸は「さう極端なことを言つちやあ困る」と
言つて居たが、自介はさういふことを言ふ程、実は木
戸の能心度に飽足らなく思つた。

さうして歸りかけに木戸は多少言葉を濁して、「まあ、
何とか自分も考へるから、さう心配しないでくれ」と云ふ話
で、――

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMO. S

Chapter 322 - (page 3504)

22 April 1939

...That is, from 2:00 p. m. till about 3:00 p. m. of the 22nd, it was said that KIDO conferred with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at official residence. The conversation according to KIDO's story was that he /KIDO/ said that Japan is resolved to push stubbornly ahead under the terms as they now stand; that it was still intended to make contact with Hitler through Ambassador OSHIMA instead of having the Premier do it directly; that if this method did not work, the Cabinet would resign; and that it was desired, therefore, that consideration be given to the aftermath of a change in Cabinets. In the final analysis, it meant that instead of trying to change the Emperor's mind or the attitude of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he /KIDO/ stated clearly in definite terms of "A" or "B". ~~According to the point of view, it means that through the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Emperor would be told that as long as Imperial sanction is not given, matters would be advanced as they now stand, but in the event they do not agree, the government may have to resign. Therefore, it can, after all, be taken also to mean that that remark that because Imperial sanction is not given, nothing can be done even if the government comes to the point where it resigns, is a mild, semi-threatening, though it may be improper for me to use this expression, sort of a menacing remark made through the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.~~

But, in one way of looking at it, unless to some degree, the Imperial sanction is secured through the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EX 3799-B

Doc 3150-322B

「西園寺・原田日記 第三十三回」

よりの 抜萃

即ち廿二日の午後二時から三時頃までの間に、内大臣の官邸で内大臣に會つていろいろ話をして来た、と云ふことであつたが、その内容は木戸の話に依ると、矢張今の儘の條件で日本としては何處までも押して行く覺悟である。唯矢張總理が直接ヒットラーに呼びかけるやうなことはしないで、大島大使を使って行くつもりであつて、若しそれで行つて駄目な時は内閣は辞めるのであるから内閣の後のことも多少考へて置いて置きたといふことと言つた、と云ふことである。結局陛下の頭を變へるとか、内大臣の氣持をどうするとか云ふことはやめて、はっきり甲がなければ乙と云ふことで話して来た、と云ふことであつたが、見方に依れば或程度まで内大臣を通して帝上に向つて、帝許の出ない限り此儘で押して参りますが、若し万一先方が應じない場合には、政府は辞めなければなりません。であるから結局帝許が出ない爲に政府が辞めるやうなことになるでも致し方おけません、と云ふやうな、先づ軟かい意味の半分脅迫と云つちやあ甚だ恐れ多いけれども、一種の捨てせりふみたいなことを内大臣まで通じた、と云ふことにも見られ、

RETURN TO ROOM 361

THE COPY

Excerpt From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 323 - (5 May 1939)

HIRANUMA Wants to Aid Axis

P. 2506

"***When I called on KIDO on the morning of the 24th, he seemed to have greatly changed his attitude and said: 'There is no alternative but to recall both Ambassadors /T.N. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI/ at all cost. If this should happen to influence the peace and order within the nation, I intend to control matters suitably, and I expect to suppress the Rightists myself.'

* * * * *

"On the 25th, after the Five Ministers' Conference, ARITA told me: 'An urgent request has come from both Ambassadors /T.N. SHIRATORI and OSHIMA/ for their recall. Therefore, a discussion was held to devise necessary due counter-measures. It was decided that communication be made directly by the Premier with Hitler and Mussolini through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in Berlin and Rome.'

"I went to Okitsu that night. On the morning of the 26th, I called up Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO when he said: 'At any rate, it would be better, after doing everything possible, to assume the attitude that we are contented with whatever the result may be. The Navy Minister also said the same thing. Concerning (P.2507) this matter of doing everything possible, which has been touched on lightly before, Foreign Minister ARITA said: 'Through the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, the Premier will approach Hitler and Mussolini in general manner. The Foreign Minister will present the particulars of this problem to the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy. They will push this matter to the very end until its conclusion, but if there should be any difference to the demands of Japan, negotiations will be cut off. Even if things cannot become satisfactorily concluded, that is unavoidable. This is what was decided upon at the Five Ministers' Conference.'"

FILE COPY
RETURN TO...

西園寺・原田日記

才三百二十三頁より抜萃

廿四日の朝自合の本産を訪ねると、本産は大分少くも態度
が変り、どうしても両大使を召還するより外ない。若し
其結果が内地の治安に影響があるやうな場合には、商
に取締はやるつもりである、左習うんかには自合の抑
へるつもりだ、と言つて居た。

それから廿五日に五相会議があり、後、有田が
信に「両大使から是非召還してくれ、と云ふ要求があり
それに基づいて今後処置の協議を開いた。尚ほ此向
題は總理が東京駐劄の独伊両大使を通じ直接ヒトラ
1. アンソリーニに言つてやることにして、ベルリンローマ駐劄の
日本の大使は便はないことにして、と云ふことであつた。

その晩に興津に行つて、廿六日の朝山本次官に電
話をかけると、山本次官は「兎に角手を盡して後、何れ
なりとも善方は宜しい、と云ふ態度にあることか必要だ
と言つて居つた。で、海軍大臣も同様な話であつた。

それ下手を盡す手段としては、先刻も云つてやう
に、有田外務大臣に話して、
大臣は、東京駐劄の独伊両大使を召還する
REPAIR TO ROOM 35 總理は

12.2.

IPS DOC No. 3150-323A

總論的にヒットラー、ムソリーニに呼びかけ、外務大臣は
兩國の外務大臣に向て各論的に此問題を述べ、
最後に成立に努力をするか、若し先方がこれ
も日本の要求する処と懸隔がある場合には、此問題
をおろす。不成立になつても己をを得るべし、と云ふこと
五相会議で決つた」と云ふことであつた。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (pages 2514-5)

9 May 1939

* * * * *

Early on the morning of the 6th, I went to ARITA's residence in Mejiro and he said: "Yesterday, just after I handed the Premier's message to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, I received an official wire from Councillor USAMI in Berlin, which said that he /USAMI/ was requested by Gauss, the Deputy Vice-Minister of the German Foreign Office to meet him. He /Gauss/ asked if Japan wouldn't agree to a proposal such as this, and added that as this had not been shown to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop yet, he /Gauss/ did not know what the Foreign Minister would have to say about it, but he /Gauss/ was showing this to him /USAMI/, unofficially, as his private plan. Upon looking through the draft, though it was written in a very indirect fashion, emphasis was put on the German demands previously refused by Japan, which after all was a draft then including those demands. Then ARITA said, "I have investigated the origin of this draft and it somehow seems that it was submitted by the Japanese Army to the German Foreign Office through the attaches. This is outrageous and I won't be responsible if this sort of the conspiracy goes on." However, he /ARITA/ did not show me /HARADA/ the actual contents of the draft.

* * * * *

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

西園寺—原田日記の抜萃

I. P. S. Doc. No 3150-324A

Exhibit No. 3801-A

その日から六日の朝早く目白の有田の家に行つて話を聞
 くと、先日総理のメモリーにも、自分が東京駐劄の独伊
 兩大使に渡したのと入違ひに、ベルリン駐在の我宇佐
 美参事官から公信があつて、ドイツの外務省の外務
 次官補のガウスと云ふ人から、来てくれと云ふので
 行つた処が、斯う云ふ案ならば日本にも知してくれ
 やしなうが、此の案は未だリフヤン外務大臣に見入
 せなうが、外務大臣は果して何と云ふか、今からいけ
 ば、自分の私案として内々見せる。と言つて出し
 たもので、結局その案に依ると言葉は非常に遠
 廻しに言つて居るが、日本の拒否したドイツの欲する
 莫に言葉を置いて、結局その案を容れたい案である
 有田外務大臣の語に、此案の出所は、いさゝか調
 べて見ると、どうも日本の陸軍からアリ、ヒエを痛し
 てドイツの外務省に出して案らしい、甚だ怪し
 からん話で、自分もかう云ふ陰謀に陰謀を重ね
 ぬるやうなことを、中し責任が執りし、因つてしんだ
 と言つて居った。其案に就ては別に具體的なる内
 容は見せなかつた。

REF ID: A66159

Notice:

Exhibit 3801 B to be

Corrected in accordance with language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record 38,008.

Doc. Div.

Exhibit No. 3801-B

NJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

(page 2517)

anted to see me so I met him on the

e. We talked from about 8:30 to

and first of all KOISO said: 'The solution of the China Problem, which is so often mentioned by the Army; namely, the reaching of the conclusion of the war as soon as possible; will be impossible without a tri-partite alliance. Because the officers and men at the front are displeased with British and French aid to Chiang Kai-shek, an alliance with Germany and Italy will alleviate their feelings somewhat. It would then be in order to settle the China Problem through the offices of England and France. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to pacify the officers and men at the front.'

FILE COPY
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IPS Doc. No. 3150 - 324C

Exhibit No. 3801-B

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (page 2517)

8 May 1939

"Overseas Affairs Minister KOISO wanted to see me so I met him on the night of the 8th at my relative's house. We talked from about 8:30 to about 11:00 and first of all KOISO said: 'The solution of the China Problem, which is so often mentioned by the Army; namely, the reaching of the conclusion of the war as soon as possible; will be impossible without a tri-partite alliance. Because the officers and men at the front are displeased with British and French aid to Chiang Kai-shek, an alliance with Germany and Italy will alleviate their feelings somewhat. It would then be in order to settle the China Problem through the offices of England and France. Otherwise, it will be extremely difficult to pacify the officers and men at the front.'"

FILE COPY
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J.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-324C

3801B

Notice :

Exhibit 3801B to be

Corrected in accordance with Language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record 38008 .

Doc. Div.

西園寺原田日記中三二四回よりの抜萃

昭和十四年五月八日

小磯拓務大臣が自分に会ひたり。と云ふ話であつたから
 八日の晩自分の親戚の家で八時半頃かり十一時頃
 までいろいろ話して見ると、小磯大將は先づサイ一に
 よく陸軍の言ふニカ対支問題の打開、即ち戦争
 を早く終局に導く為には、曰独伊の同盟が出来な
 ければ駄目だ、戦線の將士は英佛の蔭を石後
 助と云ふことに非常中な不満を持つて居る、ソレも
 も独伊と一緒になつてやつた、と云ふことで、多クその意
 持が緩和され、然る後に英佛を使つて支那の問題
 を解決することほよりければ、それになつて前線の將
 士がなかく、まかなつ

1
COPY
IN TO ROOM 361

J.P.S. Doc. No. 3150-3240

Exhibit No. 3801-B

西園寺原田日記中三四回よりの抜萃

昭和十四年五月八日

小磯拓務大臣が自分に会ひたい。と云ふ話であつたから
八日の晩自分の親戚の家で八時半頃かり十一時頃
までソラソラ話して見ると、小磯大將は先づ「そら」
とよく陸軍の言ふニカ対支問題の打開、即ち戦争
を早く終局に導く為には、日独伊の同盟が出来な
ければ駄目だ、戦線の將士は英佛の蔭を介する後
助と云ふことに非常に不満を持つて居るみて、ソラソ
ラも独伊と一緒になつてやつた、と云ふことで、多クその気
持が緩和され、然る後に英佛を使って支那の問題
を解決することほよろいれどもそれではソラソラ前線將
士がなかく、きかたない

FILE COPY
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EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 324 - (9 May 1939)

/T.N. This excerpt begins where IPS Doc. No. 3150-324A ends./

P. 2515

After this, without any relation to the Premier's message, there was a wire from Ambassador OSHIMA. It mentioned that 2 or 3 days ago that Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP called up Ambassador OSHIMA at Berlin from Munich on his way to meet CIANO at Como, and questioned OSHIMA: "When a contracting nation goes to war against a third nation, and even if there is no military aid from Japan (Germany and Italy do not expect military aid from Japan. It is impossible for Japan to do so), would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war?" OSHIMA had replied in the affirmative.

Regarding this, ARITA said that it is indeed inexcusable for those abroad to propose, on their own authority, such a thing as "participation in war" and to make such an arbitrary reply. A Five Ministers Conference is scheduled for tomorrow, but this matter will be of considerable difficulty, for Premier HIRANUMA is inclined to assume a supporting attitude rather than remain neutral. I believe that such matters have already been transmitted abroad by the Army, and if such is the case, I cannot assume the responsibility for our foreign policy."

I returned home and called the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and told him of it. On the 7th, I went to Yokohama with MATSUDAIRA for dinner. In the midst of our dinner, the Foreign Minister called me and said: "I would like to see you as soon as possible." Together with MATSUDAIRA, I visited the Foreign Minister from 9:00 p.m. and asked the result of the Five Ministers' Conference. As we had expected, the Premier supported the opinion of the War Minister, and upheld OSHIMA's answer to RIBBENTROP, that in the event of war between one of the contracting nations and a third nation, Japan will be considered to have entered a state of war, although it will not give any military support.

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西園寺一原田日記の抜萃

さうすると、全然この総理のメンセイジと関係なく、大島大使から公電があつて、二三日前、リズン外務大臣がワシントンに居る、4アノに会いに行く途中、ミンヘンからベルリンの大島大使に電話を掛けて来て、締約國がオ三國と交戦状態に入つた場合に、それと同時に日本は何等の武力援助をくらし、(独伊も日本の武力援助を期待して居る)又事實日本は武力援助は出来ない、と云ふのは全く(たか)直ちに共に交戦状態に入つたと見て好い、と云ふ大島に対する質問であつた。其知で大島大使は即座に「然り」と答へたと云ふ電報であつた。

で、有田はそれと就て、前に「参戦」と云ふことを出先だけで独断で申入、又再い茲に独断で斯の如きことを答へ、と云ふことは甚だ怪しからん。兎に再明日の午后五時全議を開くことになつて居るけれども、どうも平沼首相の考へが中立でなく、何処までし支援する態度を執りたい、と云ふ氣持がある、と云ふ餘程此問題が面倒

た、~~實に困つた~~、~~言つて~~、~~斯の如きこと~~
 可成り中が、~~向ふ~~、~~言つて~~、~~斯の如きこと~~
 じ、~~斯の如きこと~~、~~言つて~~、~~斯の如きこと~~
 TURN TO ROOM 361
 責任は執小ない

困つたものだ」と云ふ有田外相の話であつた。

それから自分は歸つて電話を一應内大臣にし、
七日は自分は松平と夕刻から横浜に會事に行
つて居つたら恰度電話がかつて、外務大臣が成
さへ早く會ひたいから、来たてからと云ふので、夜九
時頃から松平と二人で外務大臣の処に行つて五
相會議の結果をいろいろ聞くと、やはり総理
は陸軍大臣の主張を支持して、日本は何処ま
でも今の大島がリスベンの質問に答へたやうに、
締約國がオ三國と交戦状態に入つては場合には
假令武力援助をしなくても、日本は交戦状態に
入つたものと見てよいと云ふ主張に賛意を初
て居る。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

"Army Reduction and Prince SAIONJI"

Chapter 325 - (16 May 1939)

P. 2523

Concerning the results of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 9th, the Navy Vice-Minister said: "The conference was opened at 2:00 p.m. First of all, the Navy Minister said. 'The Gauss draft which we have here, did not come through legitimate channels. If we are to follow the proper course, making this a problem for the Five Ministers Conference; in the first place, we have not even received an official reply from Germany to the message of the Premier. Notwithstanding the fact that to demand for an answer reply is our first problem, don't you think it very odd to attach ourselves to the Gauss draft without demanding for this reply. However, no one said anything about it and again continued discussing the Gauss draft. The Premier, in his remark, gave me the impression that a reply to his message was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA had replied "yes" when Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had asked him whether it was all right to consider Japan a participant /in the event of war/. In other words, it was agreeable for Japan to be considered as ready to participate in the event of war between England-France and Germany-Italy. * * * "

FILE COPY
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Exhibit No. 280-A

J.P.S Doc. No. 3150-325A

西園寺原田日記 第三二五回より、抜萃

……それから九日の五相会議の様を海軍次官から聞くと、「五相会議は午後二時から開かれて海軍大臣は先づさまに、此処に居るガウス安赤は、これは本筋の事ではないが、やあなりか。五相会議の問題として、いざ腕を出さなければ、第一總理大臣のメッセージに對する、いさゝか返事が来たドイツから、ついでやあないか、此返答を督促する、これが第一の問題である。此指し、此督促も、斯の如く他のが、安赤に彼は執着して居る、これは訝しな話、やあなりか」と申出たけれども、誰も何も言はずで、再び又ガウス安赤に就て彼是言つて居た。で總理は自分のメッセージに對する、いさゝか返事は要らない、もう既に大島大使がリッペン外務大臣から、交戦状態に入る、と見て好いか、と言かけた時に、然りと答へたので、凡て解決して居る。結局、歐羅巴に於て英佛と獨伊が開戦した場合には、日本は直ちに交戦状態に入ると認めたと見てよいやうな口吻であった。

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EXCERPT from SHIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 326 - (23 May 1939)

P. 2523

"Immediately the War and Navy Ministers each saw the Premier individually and gave him the story, and a Five Ministers' Conference was hurriedly held at 9 a.m. on the 20th, and this problem was settled in substance roughly as above. However, with regard to the Foreign Ministers' proposal to make Ambassador OSHIMA retract his affirmative answer to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's question as to whether it was all right to conclude that /Japan/ would enter into a state of war, the Premier was evasive and would not make him retract it. The Foreign Minister, however, cautioned the Premier that he ought to report privately to the Throne, because though it could not be said that a complete agreement in opinion had been reached between the Army and Navy /the matter/, had actually been decided and it appeared that instructions would soon be issued. - - - - -

- - - - -

P. 2524

And though the Premier was asked over and over at the Five Ministers' Conference to rescind Ambassador OSHIMA's words, he simply assumed an attitude indicating that that was all right. And so the deletion of Art. III of the above-mentioned secret understanding concerning the participant nations, etc. and the revision of the wording of the announcement to be made to the world have finally been carried out, but the statement about "entering into a state of war," etc. by Ambassador OSHIMA /in reply/ to Ribbentrop, the annulment of which was pressed for by Foreign Minister ARITA, has been left unrescinded, after all. And so this has had much to do with leaving uncorrected a source of trouble for the future.

FILE COPY
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西園寺原田日記 第三二六回より抜萃

「早速陸海軍大臣は各個に總理に会つてその話を聞いて
 急遽昨日の午前九時から五相會議が開かれた。大体こ
 問題は以上のやうな内容をもつたことであつたが總理はさう
 してもリッペン外相が交戦状態に入ると思つてよいかと
 言つた時に大島大使が宜しいと言つたことを外務大臣
 が取消させようと言ふのに対して言つたことを外務大臣
 せまいと云ふやうな状態であつたが兎にや陸海軍の
 間の意見も徹底的に一致したと云ふのいやないが
 一應は直ぐ訓令をあたふやうな事になりあつたから
 外務大臣は一應陛下に内奏してからでないとはい
 たらうと云ふことを總理に話して……
 で五相會議は大島大使の言は甚木の取消
 を總理に要求したけれども總理はあれで宜し
 と云ふやうな風で結局前に言つた秘密の事
 事項の第三・締結(國)……云々の削除と對外的
 に發表する場合は甚木の修らに切迫するたは
 田外相が心を押した大島大使のリッペン外相に
 対する交戦状態に入る云々のことは取消させ
 にしまつたと云ふことが根拠を残した大島大使の
 原案になつた。

RETURN TO ROOM 361
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EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 326 - (23 May 1939)

HIRANUMA Backs OSHIMA

P. 2535

Early on the morning of the 23rd I called Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO to the phone in order to learn what the latest developments were. According to what Vice-Minister YAMAMOTO said he understood that both Ambassadors, i.e. SHIRATORI and OSHIMA said that nothing could be done about that particular draft and they kicked it back. He went on to say that at the same time the Army claimed that there were some words missing /T.N. presumably in the draft/ therefore he /YAMAMOTO/ thought that /the whole business/ was scandalous.

Later I talked over the phone with Foreign Minister ARITA. He said: "We discussed the matter at the Foreign Ministry last night. It fell back in their /T.N. Germany, Italy/ demands to enter the war. The Army's contention that words were missing meant a clear-cut expression of participation in war and I cannot agree with them. Yesterday, I sent the Vice-Minister to the Premier /T.N. to ask his opinion/, but he says that it should be done the way the Army wants. It appears as if he too wishes to have it read 'participation in war'."

Then, I talked over the phone with the Navy Minister. He was very enraged and said: "It is outrageous even to mention matters such as participation in war or condition of war. In spite of the fact that the Emperor often says, 'I shall not permit it,' to the General Staff Headquarters, the War Minister and the Premier, concerning participation in war, it is very abominable for the Premier to support the Army and the Ambassadors who take action contrary to the will of the Emperor."

FILE COPY
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西園寺原田日記 第三二六回より抜粋

J.P.S Doc No. 3150-326A

Exhibit No. 3803-B

それから廿三日の朝早く山本次官に電話してその
 後の様子を知かうと思つて呼ぶたは山本次官
 の一言に「何いも両大使、即ち白鳥大使から
 あの案では取付けないと言つて断つて来たと言ふ話
 ひあつた同時に陸軍から 文内子の是りないが
 ると言つて来た言はるので甚だ怪しからんと
 思つて居ると言ふ話であつた。それから有田外務大臣に
 電話して話すと矢張り「昨晚もいろいろ外務省
 の相談したが結局向方の要求は參戰と云ふこ
 とに歸着するので陸軍から言つて来た文内子の
 是りないと言ふのは結局參戰を待つて置かせた
 と言ふので自分は仲も同意意は出来ぬ
 い昨日次官を首相の處に使いにやつたけれど
 總ては陸軍の要求通りなほし「たら好いしや
 ないかと云ふのでこれも矢張り參戰と云ふこと
 たいと言ふ氣持らしい。それから海軍大臣と
 電話して話すと海軍大臣は非常に憤慨し
 參戰が交戦状態に入ると言つたことあら甚だ
 怪しからんし。下は度々參謀本部にも陸軍
 大臣にも總理にも參戰と云ふこと
 と言つて居られるのは拘ります。又
 執る大使達や陸軍を擁護する總理の能心
 度は非常に怪しからん。この頃
 居つた。

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 332
(11 July 1939)Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

P. 2569

"In regard to the Tientsin problem, generally speaking, the Premier agrees with the views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, although they wish to make firm restrictions from the 1st of July, the Central Government has no control. Therefore, the units abroad do as they wish and this situation is very troublesome. The strong argument by the Consul in Tientsin and the comparatively strong attitude taken by Minister KATO, is somewhat regrettable. At any rate, that is the situation. The points in the Tientsin problem which Japan is considering are: first, the placing of Japanese in the Industrial Bureau; second, the placing of Kempei within the concessions; third, the demand of handing over of 45,000,000 Yuan of legal tender to the provisional government as a friendly gesture; fourth, cooperation to preserve peace and order; and fifth, the handing over of the criminals. The stupidity of the War Minister seems to be the cause for all the problems becoming extremely disorderly.

P. 2574

"Furthermore, when the Emperor asked about the Tientsin Incident, the War Minister said: 'The reason why the Army requested the surrender of the 45,000,000 Yuan in the British Concession was to maintain the currency exchange.' The Emperor asked: 'Is that sufficient?' The War Minister said: 'No, it isn't!' The Emperor was shocked and said: 'That is very bad thinking on your part,' and rebuked him. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal said: 'The Army is confused and everything is lost.' He considered it a tragedy and even lamented to the extent that the Army was going to destroy the nation."

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西園寺・原田日記

一九三九年／昭和十四年／七月十日の抜萃

二五六九頁より二五七一頁其他

二五六九頁

それから尚ほ次に天津問題に就ては、大体に於て
総理は外務大臣の言ふことに賛同してゐる。七月
七日日から検査を非常に強硬にすると言ふことが
要するに中央の統制がとれて居るに爲り、先が
勝手なことをして困る天津領事あたりの強硬
な辯又加藤公使等が比較的強硬な態度
を執つて居ることに就ては

二五七〇頁

多少遺憾に堪えなげれども、免に角さうな不情
況である。免に角一は工部局に日本人を入
れよと云ふこと、二は憲兵を租界内に入
れよと云ふこと、三は好意的に考へるやうに法幣
は現在
の有金四千五百萬元を臨時政府に渡せよと云
ふこと、四が治安維持に協力すること、五が犯人の
引渡しと云ふのが天津問題について大体日本側
が考へて居ることだ、と言つて居る。

陸軍大臣が低脳の爲に、これが原因になつて凡

この問題は紛糾の極めである。

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尚續いて天津問題なんかに就ては陛下向があつたのに対
して。

三五五頁

「陸軍は英祖界がらして居る四千五百萬元の引渡しを
要するものは結局英祖の相場を維持する為でござ
います」と申し上りた。陛下は

「そればかりで済むのか」

と陛下向になつたら「とてしそれには駄目なんだから
います」と奉答したので陛下はお怒りなまに上つて

「どうも頭が悪いのやあないか」

と言つてたしちめら小を、と云ふ様な話をし、内大

臣は「如何にもどうも陸軍は乱脈でしう件と駄目だ
と言つて非難して要するに國を七回すしうが今日

陸軍のやあないか、と云ふまでに飲つて居つて

尚ほ陛下は昨日平沼首相に對して ×××××

Excerpt From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 332 - (11 July 1939)

Emperor Berates ITAGAKI

* * * * *

P. 2574

"When I /T.N. HARADA/ met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal on the 7th, he was talking about the Emperor and the War Minister. He said: 'The War Minister suddenly went to the Imperial Palace and spoke about Gen. TERAUCHI being sent to the Nazi Party Conference. Although the Navy was planning to send Admiral OSDMI at that time, there was no actual formal notice yet from the other /T.N. German/ government, and since this is still confidential, it hasn't been reported to the Emperor, nor has the Navy reported anything concerning this matter. The Emperor already knew that at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, the War Minister reported that Foreign Minister ARITA favored the Military Alliance and he /T.N. Emperor/ thought it very distressing.

"Furthermore, in regard to the sending of Gen. TERAUCHI, the War Minister stated to the Emperor that it is necessary to send Gen. TERAUCHI even for the reason of strongly binding the Anti-Comintern Pact spiritually. The Emperor did not think it very good and said: "You /T.N. War Minister/ know my opinions well. Even before, at the conference of the Supreme War Councillors, you reported an actual falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the Military Alliance. That is very insolent.""

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西園寺原田日記才三百三十二回ヨリ、抜萃

それから七日に内大臣に会つた処が、又陛下と陸軍大臣との話をして居られて、陸軍大臣は突然参内して寺内大將のナチス大会派遣の件に就て申上げた。其時に海軍は大角大將を出すことになつて居るけれども、然し未だ實際向ふの政府から正式に言つて来た訳でもなかつた。未だ内々の話であるんだから随つて内奏もなされれば、無論海軍から一切其件に就ては申上げてなかつた。豫て陸軍大臣が軍務参議官の会議で、有田外務大臣は軍務同盟に賛成である、と報告したことを陛下は既に御承知であつて、非常に不愉快に御思ひになつて居られた。

で、尚ほ寺内大將の派遣のことに就て、陸軍大臣は防共強化を精神的に強く結合する意味に於ても、寺内大將の派遣は必要である、と云ふことを申上げたので、陛下は非常に面白くお思ひにならず。

お前は自分考をよく知つて居るじやないか。此方も軍務参議官の会議で、外務大臣は軍務同盟に賛成である、と云ふ虚構なる事実を報告して居る。誠に怪しからん話じやないか。

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EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 334 - (25 July 1939)

P. 2588

- - - - -
On the 23rd, MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and I /HARADA/ went to the home of Foreign Minister ARITA and we conversed on various matters for three or four hours as we lunched. ARITA said: "When KONOYE met the War Minister the other day, the War Minister asked KONOYE if it wasn't possible to change the Emperor's mind in regard to this military agreement, and KONOYE replied that it was very difficult."
- - - - -

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Exhibit No. 3805-A

I. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-334B

西園寺原田日記 第三百三十四回

よりの抜萃

よ小から廿三日に有田外務大臣の家は松平内大臣秘書官長と一諸に行つて、午餐を共にし乍ら三四時向いしり一話した。で、有田の話に依ると、廿日近衛外陸軍大臣に会つた時に、陸軍大臣は、此軍事協定の向題に就ては、陛下のあ考を何とか変へる訳には行かないかと云ふことを近衛に聞いたので、近衛はよ小は達も難しいだろう、と云ふ事をしたと云ふ話であつた。

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 335 - (Page 2597)

3 August 1939

..... Education Minister ARAKI said, "I am not too worried about the Rightists. If we act resolutely, they can be swayed. But the important question is, how the situation within the Army will develop and how to gradually take control of this." Next, he said, "I know quite a bit about KOISO, the Minister of Overseas Affairs. His shortcoming is that he is a man of intrigue and trickery. For instance, when the problem of legal tender arose at the recent Cabinet meeting, he boldly suggested that counterfeit currency be used. This is very distressing. There are instances when he sent the Kempei to China and Manchuria dressed in work clothes. However, at a time when Japan is trying to strive for the new order based on virtue, these acts are contradictory and I think it is extremely harmful. KOISO is a person who has power and enthusiasm, but he has not set opinions and deals only in intrigues and trickery. He is a man who can easily be swayed." It is a matter of course that he did not speak favorably about KOISO, but on the contrary, he spoke very ill of him. Therefore, although KONOYE often proposes to unite ARAKI and KOISO, I feel it utterly futile.


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Doc. 3150-335A

昭和十四年八月五日

陸軍省之縮と西園寺公



第三百五十四回
よりの披露

荒木文部大臣も、石翼子のことには私はさう心配
 はない。少し思ひ切らずやれば、彼等はどうでもなる。
 唯陸軍の中のことがどう云ふ風に行くか、これをど
 う云ふ風に統制を執るやうに段々もつて行くか、と
 云ふことが大事である」と云ふことを言つて居り、
 それから「小磯拓務大臣に就ては自分はいよく知つて
 居る。その短所は即ち権謀術数に富んで居る
 ことだ。例へば最近でも閣議で法幣の問題
 が来た時に、贋造紙幣を使ったら好いじやないかと
 臆面なく言ふに至つては甚だ面白くない。又憲法に
 法被を着せて満洲や支那に出す、と云ふやうな
 ことを曾てやったりしたこともあるが、かう云ふことは今
 日日本が徳を以て新秩序に向はふと云ふ時に、さうで
 る所自した話だ。又頗る害があると思つて居る。
 それで小磯と云ふ人は力も有り執つもあるけれども、
 定見のない権謀術数を事とする所謂担がれ屋だ
 ある」と云ふことで、小磯のことは無論よく言はな
 ぬが、非常に悪く言つて居た。それでは近衛がよく小磯と
 荒木を一緒によう、と言つたことに就ては、到底駄目
 だと感じた。

IPS Doc. No. 3150-336B

Exhibit No. 3807-AExcerpt from SAIONJI-MARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 336 - (14 August 1939)

P. 2603

"Furthermore, the /Foreign/ Minister talked about the details of the Five Ministers' Conference of the 8th: --: The Premier, to begin with, stood up and said, "Yesterday the War Minister visited me and explained the Army proposal. We have been making efforts along the pre-arranged plan simply because we have recognized the necessity of a treaty. Then /yesterday/ the War Minister said that this proposal did not deviate from the pre-arranged plan, but I, for my part, could not think so. If any of you members of the Cabinet have anything to ask, please ask questions as much as you like." These introductory remarks of the Premier were followed by various questions from the Cabinet members. To sum up, the Army's contention was that a change in the situation necessitated an offensive and defensive alliance; as the first step, however, the pre-arranged plan was to be followed; in case this could not be done, the second step was to be taken, that is to say, an offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded. The Premier then asked the War Minister what on earth the latter himself thought. The War Minister replied to the effect that he was a State Minister on the one hand and at the same time the War Minister on the other and that it was quite true that he, as a State Minister, consented to the pre-arranged plan being followed but, as a representative of the general opinion of the Army, he consented also to the second step being taken." Then, he said that in his (the Foreign Minister's) opinion, it appeared that either there was still some leeway on the unconditional alliance or that ITAGAKI would be ousted."

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西園寺原田日記第三三六回より抜萃

尚ほ大臣は八日の五相會議の模様を話して居つたが、總理は先づ立つて、昨日陸軍大臣が來らぬ陸軍案に対して説明をして行かれたが、協定の必要に就ては自分達もそれを認めて来たからこそ既定方針に依りて努力をして来た。そして陸軍大臣は、此案は既定方針を歪げたものではない、と言はれるが、自分にはさうは思へなかつた。どうか各閣僚から質すべしものがあつては充分質して貰ひたい、と言ふ總理の前置きで、それから各閣僚からいろいろ質問があり、結局陸軍の主張は、情勢の変化は攻守同盟を必要とする、然しや一段として既定方針で行く、さうして二つが出来る場合はや二段で行く、即ち攻守同盟を結ぶ、と言ふことになる。で、總理は陸軍大臣に対して、一体陸軍大臣自身はどう思ふか、と言ふことを聞いた処が、陸軍大臣は自分は一面に於て國務大臣であると同時に、他面に於ては陸軍大臣である、で、既定方針で行くと言ふことに就ては自分は國務大臣として無論賛成であるけれども、然し一面陸軍の總意を代表する音に味に於て、や二段で行くと云ふことにも自分は賛成である、と言ふことであつた。そしてどうも自分(外相)の思ふには無條件同盟には多少餘があるやうに見える、或は板垣の追出しかとも考へらるる。

言ふことを言つて居つた。

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Ex. 3808 A

Page 1

DOC NO 3150-370B

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 370 - (pages 2874-5)

20 July 1940.

When I met Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA, he said: "ANAMI and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO both came to me and said: 'The present Cabinet must amicably withdraw at any cost. Because the diplomatic relations are already going ahead satisfactorily due to the Four Ministers' Conference and various other connections, we will say nothing more about foreign policy. However, in order to realize KONOYE's new political order, we would like the Cabinet to withdraw.' When I disapproved, the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau said: 'Then, there is nothing to be done but force the eventual resignation of the War Minister.'" Saying this, they left.

On the afternoon of the same day, a Four Ministers' Conference was held. At that time, the Premier called the War Minister into a separate room and asked: "Are you aware of the circumstances surrounding the visit of the Vice Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau to Chief Secretary ISHIWATA urging mass resignation of the Cabinet?" The War Minister declared: "Yes, I know. However, you must take their opinions as their personal opinions." The Premier asked: "Then what do you personally think?" The War Minister replied: "In the long run, I think it best that the Cabinet resign. However, this is still my personal opinion ---" He had added this, but the Premier was saying that it was certainly a queer statement. I heard all this from Navy Minister YOSHIDA.

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3808A

Exhibit No.

中園 日記
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の抜萃

尚石渡書記官長に會ふと、阿南と武藤軍務局長二人で自分の處に来て、「どうして現内閣は圓滿に退き責むたい。要するに外交は既に四相會議とかいろく連絡で非常中に巧く行つてゐるから、外交のことはもう言はないけれども、要するに近衛新体制を現実にする為に引退して貰ひたい」と云ふやうなことを言つて居つた。自分は之を拒否した處が、次官と軍務局長は「それならば結高陸相を辞してゐるも道はない」と言ひ置きて歸つて行つた。

其日の午後、四相會議があつて、其時に總理は陸軍大臣を別室に呼んで「石渡書記官長の處に次官や軍務局長が来て、内閣の總辭職を奨めたがその事柄に就ては君は知つてゐるのか」と言つた處が「自分も知つて居る。然し彼等の意見は、彼等の私的意見と見てくれ」と言つて居つた。然し君自身は「どう思ふのか」と言つて聞いた處が「自分も結局内閣が辞められた方が好いと思ふ。然し之は矢張り自分の私的意見であるから……」と云ふことを附加して居つた。が如何にも訝しな話である。と總理も言つて居つたと云ふことを自分は吉田海軍大臣から聞いた。

identification only

EXCERPTS FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 373 - (pages 2892-96)

19 August 1940

Furthermore, the following was the result of the Four Ministers' Conference:

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A. In order to evolve a policy for the settlement of the China Incident, and also for dealing with the new world situation, the establishment and the strengthening of our war-time economy shall be made the basis of our domestic and foreign policy. For this purpose, the government will assume unitary leadership in all economic activities and strive to the utmost in the promotion thereof, except in cases of absolute necessity for the existence of the operating forces (military) to dispose of or assume leadership themselves.

B. World Policy

1. Corresponding to the sudden changes in the world situation, and in order quickly to establish a New Order for east Asia, we plan to strengthen the axis of Japan, Germany and Italy. The East Asiatic nations must act in concert and carry out various important policies. However, we must decide on the most opportune time in the world situation and not miss it; that is, as it concerns the method of strengthening the Axis and its time for realization.

2. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, a Non-Aggression Pact will be concluded with her by Japan, Manchukuo and Mongolia (length of effectiveness, five to ten years), and in addition to planning the immediate solution of pending questions, we will realize sufficient military preparedness to safeguard against defeat by Soviet Russia during the period of effectiveness of the Non-Aggression Pact.

3. In order to include the English, French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonies in the neighboring islands and the Orient within the substance of the New Order in the Far East, positive arrangements will be undertaken. Moreover, we will endeavor to exclude ourselves from international conferences in reference to the above.

4. Even though we will avoid unnecessary collisions with the United States, as long as it concerns the establishment of a New Order in the Far East we are firmly determined to eliminate any interference on her part by actual force, thereby assuring the realization of our policy.

The above were the items which were discussed by the Premier and the three State Ministers; MATSUOKA, YOSHIDA and TOJO, while the Cabinet was in the process of being organized. These were the fundamental policies for organizing the new Cabinet.

At the liaison meeting between the Imperial General Headquarters and the government during July, the points presented by the Imperial General Headquarters on the solution of the situation consistent with the transition of world affairs, were as set forth in the policies as follows:

The Empire, faced with the changed state of world affairs, will improve its foreign situation, accelerating the settlement of the China Incident, and together with this, it will seize the most opportune time to solve the problem of the Southern region. In case the settlement of the China Incident cannot be made as yet, the changing of our attitude by laying stress on our Southern region policy shall be decided taking into consideration the various domestic and foreign situations. The various preparations necessary for coping with the above two items will be given the utmost acceleration.

THE ESSENTIAL POINTS

Article I

In regard to the disposition of the China Incident, we will concentrate our collective strength on political and military strategy. We will especially exterminate acts of assistance by a third nation and will plan the prompt submission of the Chungking Regime by exerting all our efforts. Regarding the South Seas Islands policy, we will endeavor for its furtherance by seizing a good opportunity and utilizing the changes in the situation.

Article II

In regard to foreign policy, the objective will be to accelerate the disposition of the China Incident and to seek the solution of the South Seas Islands problem. For the most part, it will be as set forth in the following:

1. First, emphasis is to be placed on the policies towards Germany, Italy, and Russia, especially to immediately strengthen the political solidarity with Germany and Italy, and to plan on making far-reaching adjustments in our relations with Russia.

2. Toward the United States, we will maintain impartial claims and a solemn attitude. Although we will not refrain from boldly carrying out the policy deemed necessary by the Empire in spite of the inevitable and natural aggravation which will accompany it, we will always heed the actions of the United States. We must plan, even by going out of our way, to avoid the increase of friction.

3. Regarding French Indo-China and Hongkong, the following will apply:

a. Regarding French Indo-China (Kwangchow Bay included), we shall expect the complete cessation of acts of assistance to CHIANG Kai-shek, and together with this, they must supply our troops, permit the use of airfields and the passage of troops. They will also strive for the acquisition of raw materials necessary to the Empire.

b. In regard to Hongkong, hand in hand with the absolute cutting-off of the CHIANG-aid route in Burma, we must at once drive strongly ahead on various schemes for the purpose of exterminating enemy sympathizers.

c. In regard to the concessions, together with planning the extermination of enemy sympathizers, and the withdrawal of troops of belligerent countries, we will induce China to gradually take these back.

4. In regard to the Dutch East Indies, we will for the time being endeavor to secure vital resources through diplomatic measures.

5. In view of their strategic importance to our national defense, we will, if at all possible, take measures to secure the return of the former German and French territorial islands in the South Pacific through diplomatic negotiations.

6. In regard to other countries in the South Seas, we will plan through friendly negotiations to have them cooperate with our policy.

Article III

In regard to guidance within the nation, while organizing and guiding the various governmental agencies necessary to carry out the above mentioned plans, we will accelerate the completion of a defensive nation which will be able to cope with any world situation. For this purpose we will endeavor to realize the following items:

1. The realization of a powerful political structure.
2. A comprehensive movement for a general mobilization law.
3. The establishment of war-time economy.
4. The accumulation of war materials and the increase of shipping tonnage. (Putting into effect maximum advance imports, special imports, and regulations regarding consumption.)
5. Adjustments in the expansion of production as well in the repletion of armaments.
6. The lifting of the national spirit and the unification of public opinion.

The above are the particulars of our policy for coping with the present situation decided upon by the Supreme Command and the Government at the Imperial General Headquarters. Because of its supreme importance, I was told when it was handed to me to show it only to the Premier and the Genro.

西園 西園 ROOM 361 RETURN TO ROOM 361 拔草

高橋 四國會議 内外に於ては

一 支那事変ノ処理及世界新情勢ニ対応スルニ於テ我々方政策ヲ展開スルニシテ 我戰時經濟政策ノ強化確立ヲ以テ内外政策ノ根基トス。之ガため我經濟活動ハ作戰軍ガ軍ノ生存上自ら処理指導スルニシテ 絕對必要トスルモノヲ除キ一切政府ニ於テ一元化ニ指導シ極力之ヲ振作ス

二 對世界政策

(一) 世界情勢ノ急變ニ対応シ且是レカニ東亞新秩序ヲ建設スルモノ日獨伊極軸ノ強化ヲ因リ東西五ニ策定シテ諸般ノ重要政策ヲ遂行ス。但シ右極軸強化ノ方法及之ガ實現ノ時機等ニ就テハ世界情勢ニ即応シ時機宜ク失サザルヲ期ス

(二) 對ソ關係ハ之ノ日滿蒙間國境不可侵協定(有効期間

五年乃至十年)ヲ締結シ且懸案ノ急速解決ヲ因ルト共ニ右不可侵協定有効期間内ニ對シ不敗ノ準備ヲ充塞ス

三 東亞及隣接島嶼ニ於ケル英荷蘭南殖民地ノ東亞新秩序ノ内容ニ包合セシムルヲ極極的處理ヲ行ハ但右二國ニ列國會議ヲ排除スルニ努ム

四 東亞對シテハ無用ノ衝突ヲ避クルモ東亞新秩序ノ建設ニ關スル限リ彼ノ實力ヲ干渉ヲ排除スルノ固キ決意ヲ以テ我々方針實現ヲ期ス

Exhibit No. 3687

J.P.S. Doc No. 3150-373A

以上経閣途ニ松岡、吉田、東條三大臣と首相が協議
 した事項で之が所謂内閣結成の根本方針と云ふべきであ
 った。尚ほ七月中に於ける大本營と政府の聯絡會議
 に於て、大本營側より提示せられたる世界情勢の推移に
 伴ふ時局処理要綱に就しては

先づ第一にその方針としては
 帝國ハ世界情勢ノ変局ニ対処シ對外ノ情勢ヲ改善
 シ速ニ支那事變ノ解決ヲ促進スルト共ニ好機ヲ捕捉シ對南
 方問題ヲ解決ス。支那事變ノ處理未ダ終ラサル場合於テ
 對南方施策ヲ重トスル態勢轉換ニ関シテハ、内外諸般
 ノ情勢ヲ考慮シテ之ヲ定ム。右ニ取テ対処スル各般ノ準備ハ極
 カニ促進ス。

要領 第一條

支那事變處理ニ関シテハ、政戰兩略ノ綜合力ヲ之ニ
 注不中シ特ニ第三國ノ援助行爲ヲ絶滅ス等凡ル手
 段ヲ盡シテ速カニ重慶政權ノ屈服ヲ策ス。
 對南方施策ニ関シテハ情勢ノ變轉ヲ利用シ好機ヲ
 捕捉シ之ヲ推進ニ努ム。

以下次頁

第二條

對外施策ニ関シテハ支那事變處理ヲ推進スルト共ニ對南方
問題ノ解決ヲ目途トシテ概テ左記ニ依ル

一先ヲ對獨伊蘇施策ヲ重點トシ、特ニ速ニ獨伊トノ政治的結
束ヲ強化シ、對蘇國交ノ飛躍的調整ヲ圖ル

ニ米國ニ對シテハ公正ナル主張ト儼然タル態度ヲ持シ、米帝國ノ必
要トスル施策遂行ニ伴フニムラ得サル自然的惡化ハ敢テ之

ヲ辭セザルモ、常ニ其動向ニ留意シ、然ヨリ來メテ摩擦ヲ多ク
カラシムルハ之ヲ避クル知ラ施策スル

三佛印及ヒ香港等ニ對シテハ左記ニ依ル
(4)佛印(廣州湾)ヲ含シニ對シテハ、擡將行為遠斷、徹底

期スルト共ニ速クニ我軍ノ補給担任軍隊通過及ヒ飛
行場使用等ヲ承認セシム、且帝國ノ必要ナル資源ノ獲
得ニ努ム

(4)香港ニ對シテハ「ビルマ」ニ於テハ擡將「ビルマ」ノ
徹底的遠斷ヲ相俟ケ、先カ速ク敵性ヲ芟除ス

ル如ク強力ニ諸工作ヲ推進ス、

(4)祖界ニ對シテハ先ヅ敵性ノ芟除及交戰國軍隊
ノ撤退ヲ圖ルニ共ニ逐次支那側ヲシテ之ヲ回收セ

シムル如ク誘導ス、

四、蘭印ニ對シテハ暫ク外交的措置ニ依リソノ重要資源確保ニ努ム

五、南洋羣島ニ於テハ旧領及ビ佛領ノ島嶼ハ國防上ノ重大性ニ鑑ミテ得テ外交的措置ニ依リ我領有ニ歸スル如ク処理ス

六、南方ニ於テハ其他ノ諸邦ニ對シテハ如クモテ友好的措置ニ依リ我工作ニ同調セシムル如ク策ス

第三條

國內指導者ニ因リテハ以上ノ諸施策ヲ実行スル必要尤モ諸般ノ能力ヲ誘導整備シテ世界情勢ニ甚ク國防國家ノ完成ヲ促進ス之カ為持テ左ノ諸件ノ實現ヲ期ス

一、強力政治ノ實行

二、總動員法ノ適用ナル迄又動員

三、戰時經濟ノ態勢ノ確立

四、戰時資材ノ確保及ビ船隻ノ擴充(海上輸入及ビ特別輸入ノ最大限實施並ニ消費規定)

五、生産擴充及ビ軍備充實ノ調整

六、國民精神ノ昂揚及ビ國內輿論統一

以上は現任政府ノ大本營ニ於ける時局處理要綱ニシテ極メテ重要ナル要綱ナルカ故ニ總理大臣及ビ元老限リに見せてくれと云はつて渡された諸項目である

Saionji - Harada Memoirs

Chapter 378

(20 October 1940) pp 2974-7

Safeguarding of Saionji-Harada Memoirs

.....On that same day, I went to Okitsu and reported/to Prince SAIONJI/ on the latest happenings since I last saw him. I consulted the Prince about requesting Prince TAMAMATSU to keep the transcriptions /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA memoirs/ in the care of his Highness until they were delivered into the hands of the Emperor. Prince SAIONJI agreed to this and said: "If His Highness /Prince TAMAMATSU/ doesn't mind, I believe that would be a very splendid arrangement."

On the 19th, I returned to my home in Ciso. On the morning of the 20th, because /I learned that/ His Highness /Prince TAMAMATSU, a Navy officer/ had returned to his palace from his ship, I called him on the telephone and talked with His Highness personally over the phone. His Highness said: "Come at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon." I went to the Takawana Palace /of Prince TAMAMATSU at the appointed time/ I told His Highness: "This record /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA memoirs/ was started in 1929. The following is the reason why this was undertaken: At the time of the London Treaty/when it was a major political issue/ only false rumors about the issue prevailed; and the truth about the matter was never known /to the public/. Especially, the attitude taken by the Emperor has been, for the most part, falsely rumored. Moreover, the counsel given to the Throne and actions taken by the Genro /Prince SAIONJI/, court officials close to the Emperor, and the Cabinet Ministers on the whole, have been falsely rumored. As a direct result, this created serious perturbations in the political circles; and this was the direct cause of subsequent disturbances in the Army and Navy. The virtues and intelligent perspicacity of the Emperor were perverted almost beyond imagination by propaganda. I felt that this was an exceedingly regrettable fact. Since I /HARADA/ knew, in my capacity /as Prince SAIONJI's secretary/ the truth of the matter, I felt that there was a necessity for recording this in written form for posterity. Therefore, I consulted KOROYU, we decided to seek the assistance of /Viscountess KOROYU Yasuko/ the wife of /Viscount KOROYU/ Hidemaru, the younger brother of Prince KOROYU, and have her take it down/as I dictate it, and thus preserve it for posterity. It has now grown to 10,000 odd pages.

ALL COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

"This is the way in which these memoirs are being made. Every week, I go to see Prince SAIONJI and make a report to him; my memorandum for this report is used as the basic material and I have it taken down and kept. I then take the transcribed manuscript of the notes to SAIONJI; he reads the material personally, corrects mistakes, and adds whatever additional notes he deems necessary to the manuscript. He returns it to me the next time I go to see him. A clean copy of this is made; this is then edited and filed away.

"Nowadays, this/the fact the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs is being compiled/ has occasionally appeared in the newspapers; moreover, even the fact that this /manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs/ is deposited for protective custody in the Sumitomo Trust Co. has become known to the public. I have heard there is danger that a faction of the rightists might, under certain circumstances, destroy it/manuscript of the SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs/. Therefore, I have consulted Prince SAIONJI about this matter and have decided to request Your Highness to keep it in Your Highness' personal custody until it is completed. When it is completed, the original manuscript which has Prince SAIONJI's corrections and revisions on it will be presented to the Emperor in its original form. The edited copy will be printed and published at a suitable occasion. I think it won't be possible, in all probability, to publish the document until after 10 or 15 years have elapsed from the death of Prince SAIONJI. At any rate, the future custody of it is entrusted to MATSUDAIRA, the Chief Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal. I would like to have Your Highness consult MATSUDAIRA and make thorough arrangements so that he will be able to keep in close touch with Your Highness' steward /for preserving the manuscript in Your Highness' custody/."

His Highness /Prince TAKAMATSU/ said: "I gladly give consent. I shall give thorough instructions about the matter to YAMANEUCHI, the steward; make suitable arrangements (in regards to the manuscript) with him." I thanked His Highness for this and changed the topic of our discussion.

西園寺原山日記第三百七十八回ヨリ、抜萃

同日、無津に行き、其後の様子を報告し、尚ほ高松宮に、
速記の材料を陛下の侍手許に出すまでお預り願ふことを
侍相談した如か公爵は、

殿下へお宣しければ、それは非常に結構だらう」と同意を得たので、自分も十九日、大磯に帰り、廿日の朝、殿

下が軍艦から侍帰還になつたので、電話で直接お話した如
か、

午後四時に来い

と云ふことだつたから、高輪の侍殿に出て自分は殿下に「此
記録は昭和四年から始めたので遅いですが、始めに趣意はワン
ドン條約の当時、殆んど虚偽を放送ばかりが残つて真相が少
しき分りません。殊に陛下のお執りになつた態度或は元老、側
近、或は大臣の輔弼の状態なんか就ても殆んど嘘が多くて、その
為に政界に非常な波紋を起し、延して軍部内にも、ろんな
問題が起すやうになつたので、如何にも陛下の御徳と言ひ、英邁
な、極めて高の御見識なんか就ても殆んど想像以外に悪いご
まに宣傳されて、洵に遺憾だと思ふやうな事から、自分は、職
務上真相を知つてみた為に、之を書き残すことが必要だと思ひ
ました。で、近衛と相談をして、近衛公の弟の秀磨君の夫人を
頼んで、近衛公の御遺言を記して貰ふことに致しました。さうして今
迄に、既に一万余字を記したので、さうしますか、それは一週間に
自分が西園寺の如に参りまして報告を致します。それを後でメモ

に依つて速記に綴じて置いて貰つて、お来たものを西園寺の処
 に持て参りて、西園寺が直接見の上、間違つた処を訂正し筆
 の足りぬ処を入れ、次の機会に引取返して頂く予定です。
 それを又清書して、尚、なほして残して置く、と云ふので、現在に
 於ては、これが多少新聞なんかに出たりして、位友の信託会社
 の保護預りになつてゐると云ふことまでせ同に知れた為、右
 翼の一部では或る場合には之を破棄しようとする危険もある、と云
 ふことまで聞いたので、西園寺に相談を致しまして、凡て完成するま
 で殿下の御手許にお預りして置きて、完成した後に、西園寺
 の加算したものは現物を御手許のまゝ陛下の御手許に差し出し、修正し
 たものは活版にして或る時機に公表する、と、それは恐らく西園寺
 百年の後、十年十五年を経過しなれば出版出来居らうと存
 じますか、兎に角現在、松平内大臣秘書官長に後の管理を
 頼んで居るやうな次第でありまして、松平にも聯絡をとつて、殿
 下の処の別当あたりと緊密な関係の聯絡のとれるやうに殿下
 からよく御有つて置きて頂きたいと申し上げた処、殿下は
 「自分は喜んで承諾した、小内別当によく話して置くから、適当に
 してくわい」

と云ふ御言葉だつたので、自分は御礼を申し上げて、その話は打切
 った。

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IPS Doc. No. 3150-10B

Exhibit No. _____

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 10 - (page 61)

14 September 1931

* * * *

According to what /NINOMIYA/, Vice-Chief of the General Staff said, I received the impression that he was a frequent visitor to Baron HIRANUMA: Baron HIRANUMA seems to be a firm advocate of severing diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Moreover, it seems that he /NINOMIYA/ has been well indoctrinated with Baron HIRANUMA's condemnation of political parties. I felt that this indicated that the relationship between the Army and Kokuhon-sha /T.N. ultra-nationalistic organization, headed by Baron HIRANUMA, banned by 4 Jan 1946 SCAP directive/ was very intimate.

* * * *

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昭和六年九月十四日

陸軍々編ト西園寺公

第十回ヨリノ抜萃

「夫カラ参謀次長ノ話ニ依ルトヨク平沼男ノ處
ニハ屢々話シニ行クラシク、平沼男ノ日露斷交論
ガナカナカ強イ。又所謂政黨政治ニ對スル男ノ非
難モヨク聞カサレテ居ルラシイ。伺レニシテモ固
本社ト軍部ノ關係ハ相當ニ深イモノラシク自分ハ
感ンジタ。」

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Doc. No. 3150-13A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 13 - (pages 96-7)

About 2 October 1931

After this, according to the reports that have been received by the Overseas Affairs Ministry: "In the restoration movement to establish the Emperor HSUAN Tung /Pu-i/, people such as DEGUCHI, Wanisaburo of Omoto-kyo (T.N. religion) is active. Colonel DOIHARA is also backing the movement." There are others who advocate republicanism and are planning to organize a republican form of government. It is extremely distasteful for any Japanese to meddle with the internal affairs of China, and more so for the military. Therefore, the War Minister secretly dispatched military police (Kempei) to China to suppress these activities.

The Japanese government received reports from Manchuria to the effect that: "Former gangs of ruffians of the Tokyo area, who have escaped arrest by the Metropolitan Police, have gone to Manchuria, and are acting extremely lawlessly." The government is considerably distressed over the situation, and have been saying, 'Isn't there anything that could be done about it.'"

Accordingly to the story of MORISHIMA, Section I Chief (Asia Bureau) of the Foreign Ministry, who just returned from a mission to Mukden, he first visited Consul-General HAYASHI in Mukden. MORISHIMA told HAYASHI: "The Cabinet does not want this incident to enlarge. Therefore, I want you to bear that in mind in handling all matters." However, the Consul-General HAYASHI said: "That is utterly impossible." The situation was such that the Incident could do nothing but expand further. According to what I have heard, even the life of Consul-General HAYASHI is in great danger. The militarists there consider him an obstacle, and there was an indication of an attempted assassination. The condition was such that even the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was in a state of restriction to quarters. Three staff officers of the Kwantung Army - NISHIHARA, HANATANI and ITAGAKI - were the centre of activities in Manchuria, and since the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, MIYAKE, was not at all able to control his staff, the three were left to do as they pleased.

Whenever they drank, they always boasted that: "This plot was planned long ago. On the 25th of July, an artillery was already lined up in Mukden. Furthermore, as we have succeeded in this plan, therefore, when we return to the homeland (Japan) this time, we will carry out a coup d'etat, and do away with the political party system of government. Then we will promulgate a nation of National Socialism with the Emperor as the centre. We will do away with capitalists, Misui and Mitsubishi, and will carry out the even distribution of wealth. We are determined to do so."

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Exhibit No.

「昭和六年十月二日

西園寺・原田日記

オ十三日 上りの抜萃

其後拓務省に来る報告に依れば「宣統帝を立てようとする復辟運動には大本教の出口王仁三郎なんかも働いて居る。又工肥原大佐も其方下力を添へて居る」と云ふ。又他々軍中の共和政体が好きと云つて共和黨の組織を企てようとする者も居る。斯うかく支那の謂はく内政に入つて軍人は勿論日本に彼是とするの可願る面白くない。陸軍大臣も此切に憲兵を依りて取締らうとした。

「元来その京方面で暴カ団の檢挙を警視廳がやり逃げた連中の満州に行つて極められた暴徒を働いて居ると云ふ報告が来る。政府は其方から配して「何とかならぬい」と云つて居た。

夫より外務省の森島が課長(重細重局)の奉天に使ひに行つて歸つて来た方からの話を聞くと森島が「奉天に行つて林總領事へ逢つて「内閣には此事件を拡大しないやう」と云ふことと「サリヤスから其積り下の方事願ひたい」と云ふ話を「林總領事は「夫はもう君とでも駄目だよ」と云つた事件は益々拡大に赴くはカリの情勢であつた。

ミラーノ間く処に依れば林總領事の身也すう或る危険
 ありて日本の陸軍の先光の車中は非常に林總領事
 を邪同様に或は其生命をも奪ひをとりた形跡があった
 夫下関東軍司令官の如きは全く座敷牢にあり入れ
 たるが様子もあつて、南軍の終極の西原 花谷
 板垣と云ふ三人の参謀の活躍の中心であつた参謀長
 の三宅の如きは到底部下を統御する力もないを三人の思
 ふ儘にやうく扱はるゝ。

下関等は酒を飲めば必ず「此計画は昔から」と
 企てたが七月廿五日には奉天に砲列をよんとひいて
 置いた。ミラーノ我々は此計画に成功したから今夜は同
 地に帰らうフリーデライもやう政黨政治を打毀して所謂天
 皇を中心とする國家社会主義の國を建て、資本家の
 三井三菱をブツ倒して富の平等の分配を行はふ。必ず
 やう見せる。

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DOC. No. 3150-14B

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 14 - (pages 112-3)

8 October, 1931.

In the evening when I saw the Premier again, he told me, "Up to now I have told all the Cabinet Members, 'It is not desirable for the Army to be connected with the founding of an independent Government in Manchuria'. All the Cabinet members agreed with me but, calling the War Minister last of all I told him, 'The Present is a time /for the Army/ to look on quietly. As the Government has previously stated to the world that she has absolutely no territorial ambitions in the establishment of an independent Government in Manchuria. Since such a statement has been made therefore, to have any connection at all with the establishment of an independent Government, because it would mean a going back /on this statement/, won't do at all. In the first place, not only is it a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, but also if it is done, the whole world will become our enemy. In view of the present economic situation we would be forced to become isolated. So, as Japan's position will be endangered, at all costs Japan must act within treaty limitations and whatever is made independent, at all events the negotiations must be made in partnership with the Central Government". I explained this to the War Minister, but he said: "Then won't the situation be the same as before the incident?" and then left with the words, "Let me think it over for a day or two".

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Exhibit No.

昭和二年十月十一日

西園寺原田日記

第十四回「よりの抜萃」

夫から自分は又總理に夕刻達して見ると「自分は今迄各閣僚に向て『滿洲に獨立政府を樹てるやうなことに陸軍は關係することは面白くない』と云ふことを言つた處が比自他の閣僚は同感であつたが最後に陸軍大臣を呼んで『先づ今日は静視す可き秋である。で滿洲に獨立政府を造ることは縁で政府が中外に聲明したやうに決して領土的野心がないと云ふことを言つて居るのにも拘らず之を裏切るやうなことになるから獨立政府を造ることは少しも關係してはならぬ。第一九箇國條約に反するのみならず、さうなれば吾界を敵とすることになる。今日經濟界の状況から見ても強んじ孤立とならなければならぬ。で日本の地位を危きに導くものであるからどうしても日本とは條約の範圍内に於てやらなければならぬ。如何なるものが獨立しても兎に角交渉は中央政府を相手にも交渉しなければならぬ』と云ふことを陸軍大臣に説いたが陸軍大臣は『そんなら事変前と同様になるやないか』と言つて居る中に『まあ一兩日考へて貰ひたい』と云ふので陸軍大臣は帰つて行つた。