

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 275

PLACE: Tana Arsenal
DATE : 7 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Subject: Tana Arsenal

Personnel Interrogated and Background of each:

Lt. Colonel KUROKAWA Kaizo, Supt. of Tana Arsenal
Captain SATO Shoza

Where interviewed: Tana Arsenal

Interrogator: Colonel J.F. Rodenhauser

Interpreter: Lt. Colonel D.W. Swift

Allied Officers present: Lt. Commander W.J. McCluskey

SUMMARY:

1. The construction of this arsenal which was one of a group of six of about equal production capacity (the others: Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Okayama, Kokura) was commenced in 1939 and completed and started production in October 1941. The installation at Itabashi was moved to Tana in line with a dispersion policy based on a serious explosion at Osaka Arsenal about six years ago.

2. Tana Arsenal was capable of turning out about 50,000 grenades a day although it never actually reached this peak because of shortage of materials. In fact it concentrated on 7.3 cm. shells and averaged about 6000 per day. The powder and cases were received from other sources and assembled at Tana Arsenal. The loaded fuzes were received from Oji, Tokyo 1st Arsenal, and Osaka. There had always been a shortage of cases and fuzes but during the fall of 1943 the shortage of fuzes become much greater.

3. The plant employed about 500 workers on ammunition detail and about 500 general workers. Toward the end of the war most of the adult male workers had been mobilized so school children were used as volunteers to augment the existing force.

4. In 1943, the construction of caves for dispersion of ammunition was started. This did not interfere with the operation of the plant as the work was done by volunteer labor.

5. The only serious accident at Tana Arsenal occurred in February 1945 while unloading mine exploders from railroad cars. It destroyed two buildings that took two months to rebuild; one month to obtain the workmen and one month for construction.

6. There were no troops nor A/A units assigned for the protection of the arsenal.

7. There were no bombings carried out against the arsenal. However, commencing December 1944, planes flying over the area caused alerts that temporarily stopped operations in the plant resulting in estimated 25 to 33 per cent loss of production.

8. Copies of inventories of ammunition on hand prepared for GHQAFac were obtained. Diagram of installations, underground storage, and caves were obtained.

RESTRICTED

