

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, English, German and Italian consisting of 156 pages and entitled "Outline of the Process of Drafting Various Drafts and of the Internal Procedure Pertaining to the Tripartite pact of Japan, Germany and Italy, and Pertaining Documents is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 21st day of May 1947

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature Official

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe

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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

Secret. Foreign Office.
No. 17.

October 1940.

Outline of the Process of Drafting Various Drafts and of the Internal
Procedure Pertaining to the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy.

Treaty Department
Foreign Office.

Note:

The attached document is the corrected document and should be substituted for the corresponding document which should be destroyed.

Annex 1

Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis

(Note by the Defense: identical with "Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis", Decisions made by the Conference of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War, the Navy and Foreign Affairs on 4 September 1940, and by the Liaison Conference on 19 September 1940; Exhibit 541, Transcript pages 6307-6308)

The trend toward the strengthening of collaboration among Japan, Germany and Italy have lately become very pronounced, and it is believed that now the time is ripe for speedy initiation of conversations among the three countries on this matter. It is accordingly proposed to commence negotiations in accordance with the under-mentioned Basic Principles, with Germany, to start with.

Basic Principles

1. To make a fundamental agreement among the three countries, in order that they shall mutually cooperate by all possible means in the establishment of a New Order in Europe and in Asia.
2. To carry out consultations among the three countries in as short a period of time as possible in regard to the best means of the above-mentioned cooperation.

3. To begin with, publicity will be given, at home and abroad, to the purpose in 1 and 2 above, in the form of a joint declaration of the three countries.

Draft of Basic Principles Concerning Negotiations
for Military Alliance (Original Japanese in Red Ink)
~~Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration~~

4 September 1940 (Red Ink)
~~6 August 1940~~

Original Draft made by the Army and the Navy;
Revision (in red letters in the original document)
made by the Foreign Office.

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with "Basic Principles concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance" of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages 6310-6321)

1. Principle

1. Japan, Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of the New World Order, will arrive at ^{a mutual} ~~an~~ understanding with ^{mutually} ~~respect~~ to support for the establishment and administration of their Spheres of Living and also in regard to cooperation concerning their policies toward ^{Britain,} the Soviet Union and the United States. (See Appendix 1)

Annex 1

~~2. Details~~

~~1. A fundamental understanding will be reached at between Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy on the basis of the above Principle. (See Appendix 1)~~

Note: On the basis of this fundamental understanding such further agreements as may be necessary will be concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, or between Japan and Germany, and between Japan and Italy.

2. Japan, Germany and Italy will, along with the above-mentioned fundamental understanding speedily arrive at an understanding with respect to their mutual support and cooperation concerning the China Incident and the European War, by which they are respectively confronted. (see Appendix 2)

3. ~~The above-mentioned matter will be carried out according to the followings:~~

a) The negotiations under 1 and 2 above will be conducted in accordance with the Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration (in Appendix 3) and on the basis of the Main Principles Covering Negotiations (in Appendix 4).

~~b) The above-mentioned 1 will be carried out in Berlin and Rome.~~

~~c) The above-mentioned 2 will be proposed in Berlin and Rome, and concrete negotiations will be conducted in Tokyo.~~

4. The understanding mentioned above need not necessarily take the form of agreements, but, if Germany and Italy so desire, there is no objection to the conclusion of agreements in this connection.

Appendix 1

Terms of Political Understanding Forming the Basis for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration.

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix
(1 of Exhibit 541, Transcripts Pages)
(6310-6312)

1. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of a New World Order, for the realization of which they are presently putting forth their efforts, ~~cooperate each other for the support and improvement of an equitable world peace.~~
2. ~~Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy respectively, for the purpose of establishing New Orders, will~~

mutually respect the Japanese Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, and the German and the Italian Sphere of Living in Europa and Africa; and will cooperate by all possible means, ~~support each other~~ for the construction of New Orders in Orders in the said regions.

2.

~~3.~~ Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually effect close economic cooperation.

with this end in view, they will carry out the preferential mutual interchange of material resources existing in their Spheres of Living and the exchange of techniques, and will also accord favourable consideration to the other party's economic activities in their ^{respective} own Spheres of Living.

3.

~~4.~~ Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union and in inducing the Soviet Union to bring her policy into line with the common ground of the two contracting parties. (In addition, an understanding will also be reached with ~~at the same time, they will further consult~~ respect to consultation, as to the action to be taken in the event of a danger either Japan or Germany and Italy ~~of one of the parties~~ entering upon a state of war with the Soviet Union, if, in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy, it turns out that such desire is entertained by the two countries.)

5. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually cooperate in order not to allow the United States the Western Hemisphere and the United States possessions, to interfere in regions other than the American Continents and also in order to safeguard the political and economic interests of both contracting parties in this connection. Further, in the event of danger of either contracting party entering upon a state of war with the United States, the other contracting party will assist that party by all ~~both contracting parties will consult as to the measures to be taken~~ possible means.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will closely cooperate with respect to the action to be taken in regard to Central and South America.

Note: The present understanding will be treated as confidential.

Appendix 2

Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation of Japan and the two Countries of Germany and Italy in regard to the European War and the China Incident

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix)
(2 of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages)
(6312-6314)

1. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, in settling

the China Incident and the European War, by which the two contracting parties are respectively confronted, will effect mutual support and cooperation as follows:

Japan will

- a) accord as much facility as possible in meeting the desires of Germany and Italy in regard to the acquisition of ^{natural and} material resources existing in East Asia, including South Seas; and
- b) Cooperate as much as possible in intensifying the pressure upon British influence in East Asia, including the South Seas; and in facilitating the prosecution of war by Germany and Italy against Britain.

Germany and Italy will

- a) Cooperate as much as possible in regard to the supply of such machinery and similar articles, and in regard to such technical assistance, as may be desired by Japan; and
- b) Give as much political and economic cooperation as possible in ~~Cooperate for the settlement of the China Incident.~~

Note: The present understanding will be treated as confidential.

Appendix 3

Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of
Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix 3
of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages 6314-6320

1. Concerning Japan's Sphere of Living for the construction
Greater
of a ~~East Asia New Order~~ ^{Greater} East Asia New Order.

- a) The sphere to be envisaged in the course of negotiations
with Germany and Italy as Japan's Sphere of Living for
the construction of a ^{Greater} East Asia New Order will
comprise:

The former German Islands under Mandate, French Indo-
China and Pacific Islands, Thailand, British Malaya,
British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Anstralia, New
Zealand, India etc., with Japan, Manchuria and China as
the backbone. It is understood, however, that the South
Sea Region to be indicated by Japan in conducting the
negotiations will be the region from Burma eastward,
including the Dutch East Indies, and New Calidonia

it is further understood that India may be
northward; ~~as to Australia, New Zealand and India, our~~
recognized, for the immediate purposes as being included
~~intentions as described under (e) and (f) below will be~~
in the Sphere of Living of the Soviet Union.
reflected.

~~b) Measures will be taken to Annexed the former German Islands under Japanese Mandate to our territory; as to the former German Islands in the Pacific now under British Mandate it will be endeavoured to dispose of them so as they can be brought, as far as possible, under Japanese control in consideration of strategic necessities vis a vis the United States.~~

^b
~~c)~~ The goal in regard to the Dutch East Indies is to have it in a state of preparedness for independence, but the ^{secure recognition of Japan's position of} immediate objective will be to ~~bring them under political~~ political and economic predominance in that country. ~~influence of Japan.~~

In this connection, if German proposals should be at variance with the above proposition, recognition should still be obtained of Japan's ^{predominant position} political leadership in the Dutch East Indies through the preferential supply to ^{material and} Japan of ^{natural} resources existing in that country, through the guarantee for the continuance of the already existing German economic undertakings there, and by negotiations of a political nature on the matters in general.

^c
~~d)~~ The same principles as in ^b (c) above will be followed with respect to French Indo-China.

~~e). Although Australia and New Zealand are somewhat different from the other regions, Japan feels similar concern about them, and, therefore, does not desire that they be changed into territories or brought under control of countries not belonging to East Asia.~~

~~f) Approximately, the same principle as in (e) above will be followed with respect to India.~~

2. Concerning Japan-Germany-Italy economic cooperation.

a) With regard to trade, Japan will supply Germany and Italy with agricultural, forestry and aquatic products of Japan, Manchuria and China, and will also cooperate in supplying Germany and Italy with special mineral products, rubber and other articles of China, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, etc. Germany and Italy, on their part, will supply Japan with such technical assistance, aircraft, machinery, chemical products, etc., as may be required by Japan.

With regard to mutual economic activities, Japan will, especially in China and Manchuria, accord de facto preferential treatment to Germany and Italy, and enable the participation of their technique and equipment.

b) For the above-mentioned purposes, there will be separately concluded an Economic Agreement, a Trade Agreement and a Payment Agreement.

3. Concerning Japan's attitude toward Japan-Germany-Italy cooperation in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States.

Being destined to be the leader of East Asia in the postwar new order of things wherein it is anticipated that the world

will be divided into the four large fields of East Asia, the Soviet Union, Europe and the American Continents, Japan, acting in close collaboration with Germany and Italy which will constitute the guiding force of Europe, will.

a) Restrain the Soviet Union on the east, west and south, and, inducing the Soviet Union so to act as to align with the common ground of Japan, Germany and Italy.

endeavour to cause the advance of the Soviet sphere of influence to be oriented toward a direction where the advance has little direct effect upon the interests of (it being also possible that, in case of need, Soviet Japan, Germany and Italy, a direction such as Gulf of Persia advance toward India may have to be recognized).

b) While peaceful means will be adhered to as far as possible in dealing with the United States, contrive to bring about a posture of things wherein Japan can, as occasion may require, bring pressure to bear upon the United States through political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy in the East Asian and European fields, so that such posture of things can contribute toward the attainment of Japan's aspirations.

In taking these steps, Japan will keep it in mind to make the best of inducing the Soviet Union.

Further, Japan will make use of the immigrant and economic

foothold, both of importance, which Germany and Italy presently have in South America, in regard to such steps as Japan may in future take with respect to the United States.

4. Concerning Japan's attitude towards the ^{anti-British} collaboration of Japan, Germany and Italy ~~with~~ ~~is~~ ~~Great~~ ~~Britain.~~
- a) Japan will, in the construction of an East Asian New Order, take such steps as the situation may require, in order to eliminate the political ^{and economic} interests of Britain in East Asia, including the South Seas. (Such steps are intended to weaken Britain's position. Fact shows that the policy which Japan is already taking toward Britain and China is automatically producing an effective influence on the war situation in Europe).
- b) With a view to furthering her cooperation with Germany and Italy in their prosecution of war against Britain, ^{in accordance with the desires of Germany and Italy} Japan will spare no cooperative effort on her part in regard to the acquisition of natural ^{and material} resources existing ^(including the South Seas) in East Asia, ~~as desired by Germany and Italy.~~
- Further, Japan will in large measure cooperate with Germany and Italy in the war against Britain, in respect of the elimination of British interests in East Asia, ^{anti-British} ~~the collaboration in~~ demonstration and propaganda, the

the support of independence movements in the colonies
of Britain
and dependencies, and other matters.

5) Concerning the possible use of armed force against
and the United States
Britain, Japan will make decisions independently in ac-
cordance with the following principles:

(1) In the event that the China Incident has nearly been
settled, Japan will use armed force by taking as
favourable an opportunity, as may be afforded by the
situation prevailing at home and abroad.

(2) In the event that the China Incident has not yet
it will be Japan's guiding principle to take action,
been settled, measures will be taken within limits
short of war. If, however, domestic and foreign
conditions take a decidedly favourable turn, ^{or if it} ~~armed~~
is deemed that, irrespective of whether our prepara-
~~force might be used.~~
tions are complete or not, the development of the
international situation permits of no further delay,
Japan will resort to armed force.

(3) The "domestic and foreign conditions" signify the
European situation, especially the state of adjust-
ment of our relations with the Soviet Union, the
United States' attitude toward us, our preparations
for war, and so forth.

Appendix 4

Main Principles Governing Negotiations

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix)
(4 of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages)
(6320-6321)

- ~~1. In order to realize the strengthening of collaboration, the present opportunity should not be missed, when Germany and Italy are concentrating their whole efforts for the defeat of Britain. Should the negotiations be commenced after the victory of Germany and Italy has become definite, the effect would very much be diminished; moreover, attitude of Germany which has considerable concern about South Seas might undergo some change.~~

~~The negotiations will be conducted with Germany and Italy separately. However, if Germany and Italy wish that negotiations be conducted among the three countries, consent could be given thereto.~~
- ~~2. Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation in regard to the European War and the China Incident will be presented together with the Basic Essentials in proposing the strengthening the collaboration with Germany and Italy, and discussions as to their contents will~~

Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), with respect to the use of armed force, i.e., participation in the war.

Germany and Italy will be enabled by such explanations to understand Japan's position, and, at the same time, efforts will be made to the end that Germany and Italy will cooperate with us in improving domestic and foreign conditions relating to Japan's entry into the war against and the United States Britain.

~~be conducted in Tokyo; however, the above-mentioned two understandings should be treated as one and indivisible.~~

1.
3. The principal purpose of the negotiations under Paragraph 2, Appendix 1, which is designed to have Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, is to obtain overall recognition of Japan's ^{position of predominance} ~~political leadership~~ in the whole of East Asia, including the South Seas.
should, however, Germany and Italy be inclined to make any reservations in regard to any designated areas, Japan will conduct negotiations on each particular matter concerning such areas in pursuance of Paragraph (1), (a), and ensuing principles of Appendix 3 (Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), and thus secure recognition of Japan's aspirations in these connections.
2.
4. In the event that Germany and Italy propounds a desire for Japanese military cooperation with and the United States ~~them against Britain~~, Japan is prepared, as a matter of guiding principle, to meet the desire. It will be explained to Germany and Italy, however, that, in view of the existing state of affairs, Japan contemplates taking the courses of action outlined under (1), (2) and (3) in Paragraph 5, Appendix 4 (Basic

Annex 20

Three Powers Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy

(Note by the Defense: Original texts in Japanese, German and Italian languages)

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent to any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technic Commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of

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them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In face thereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereto their seals.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of Showa, corresponding to the 27th September 1940, 27th September of the 18th year of the Fascist Era.

Saburo Kurusu

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ciano

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Correction

Mark the documents as follows:

- 1656 B-G - as - Annex 1
- 1656 H - as - Annex 2
- 1656 I - as - Appendix A of Annex 2
- 1656 J - as - Appendix B of Annex 2
- 1656 K - as - Annex 2
- 1656 L - as - Annex 2
- 1656 M - as - Annex 3
- 1656 N - as - Annex 4
- 1656 O - as - Annex 5
- 1656 P - as - Annex 6
- 1656 Q - as - Annex 7
- 1656 R - as - Annex 8
- 1656 S - as - Annex 9
- 1656 T - as - Annex 10
- 1656 U - as - Annex 11
- 1656 V - as - Annex 12
- 1656 W - as - Annex 13
- 1656 X - as - Annex 14
- 1656 Y - as - Annex 15
- 1656 Z_{1,2} - as - Annex 16
- 1656 AA_{1,2} - as - Annex 17
- 1656 AB - as - Annex 18
- 1656 AC_{1,2} - as - Annex 19
- 1656 AD₁₋₇ - as - Annex 20

I OUTLINE OF THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING VARIOUS DRAFTS CONCERNING THE TRIFARTITE PACT OF JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY, AND PERTAINING DOCUMENTS (MEMO BY THE CHIEF OF THE TREATY DEPARTMENT MATSUMOTO)

1. On 5 September 1940 a plan as Annex No. 1 was drafted by Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi, the Advisors Shiratori and Saito, and presented by Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Four-Minister Conference for consideration.

2. Prior to that, Minister Stahmer, who was specially dispatched by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, left Berlin on 23 August, and via Moscow arrived in Tokyo on 7 September. On 9 September he, together with Ambassador Ott, visited Minister Matsuoka at the latter's private residence for a conference, which renewed on the following day, the 10th. The record taken at that time is attached hereto as Annex No. 2.

3. This result was reported by the German side to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who sent a counter-proposal (Annex No. 3) by telegram. This was handed at 8:30 p.m. on 14 September by Ambassador Ott and Minister Stahmer to Minister Matsuoka. This draft differed from the original one insofar as it inserted in Paragraph III a phrase "openly or in a concealed form." (We requested this phrase be stricken out), and added the Paragraph V (concerning Soviet Russia). (This draft was made the basic subject of discussion on the Extraordinary Cabinet Meeting of 16 September and on the Imperial Conference of 19 September).

4. On the basis of this draft of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop we drafted a pact; besides, we summarized the result of the conversations with Ott and Stahmer into a Secret Protocol and two notes to be exchanged (one concerns the question of German and Italian collaboration in case of a Japanese-British conflict, and the other concerns the South Sea Islands under the Mandate). These were handed on 19 September by Advisor Saito to the German Ambassador (Annex No. 4).

5. These drafts were revised on the 20th into Annex No. 5 after taking German wishes into consideration. (Paragraph VI of the draft of the Protocol was inserted upon German request, and the end of the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict was revised).

6. On 21 September the German side presented a draft of a pact as Annex No. 6 in accordance with the instruction from the home Government (Foreign Minister Ribbentrop left Berlin on 18 and conferred with Prime Minister Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano on 19th and 20th concerning this matter. It is assumed therefore that this instruction came from Rome). As the explanation for revising the Paragraph III, an excerpt from the instruction as Annex No. 7 was attached. This draft was revised into Annex No. 8 on the conference of Minister Matsuoka (Matsumoto attending), Ott and Stahmer. ((1) The words of "declaration of war" was deleted because of, among others, strong opposition of the Navy, and (2) provisions concerning the Mixed Commissions were broadened so as to enable the establishment of an Economic Commission). In addition, the German side requested to drop the Protocol and other notes because they were one-sided in the present form, and it was difficult and time-consuming to perfect them in order to get the Italian consent. Thereupon, we proposed to convert the content of the Secret Protocol into a note to be exchanged only between Japan and Germany, to exchange the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict also only between Japan and Germany, and to formulate the note concerning the Mandate so as to confirm an oral statement of the German Ambassador. As a result thereof we made a draft as Annex No. 9 and sent it to the German Embassy.

7. During the conference begun at five o'clock of that evening (Minister Matsuoka, Chief of Department Matsumoto, Ott and Stahmer) the Pact was decided as Annex No. 10; as to the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict it was decided upon German request to make it a letter and number it as Annex No. 11; concerning the Mandate it was decided as Annex No. 12 (Minister Matsuoka left the conference and was substituted by Advisor Saito). As to the draft of the note containing the content of the Secret Protocol the German side did not agree, and Ambassador Ott himself dictated to the Chief of Department Matsumoto a draft of a letter of Ott as Annex No. 13 and requested that it be studied. On the same day Stahmer had told to Advisor Shiratori that the German side wished to sign this Pact in Berlin. Minister Matsuoka therefore touched the question of the place of signing during this conference, and said that if the place of signing should be Berlin, it would be an idea to make the exchange of letters between the Minister himself and Ambassador Ott.

8. In the afternoon of 23 September, the Chief of Treaty Department Matsumoto handed upon instruction of the Foreign Minister a document as Annex No. 14 to Ott and Stahmer at the German Embassy, and requested that it be sent to Berlin by telegram. On the following day, the 24th Councillor Boltze of the German Embassy visited Matsumoto and said concerning Annex No. 14 that the following telegraphic instruction was received: As to the item (1), the German Government sincerely hopes to sign in Berlin; as to the item (2), it was being considered by the German and Italian Governments; as to the item (3), it could not be accepted because it would take time to make the letter perfect as its content was one-sided.

9. At five o'clock in the evening of 24 September Minister Matsuoka (Matsumoto attending) met Ott and Stahmer. First, the Pact was decided as Annex No. 15. Next, the letter concerning the Japanese-British conflict was decided as Annex No. 16, and the letter concerning the Mandate was decided as Annex No. 17, after substituting "in a way" for "adequately" (the German side explained that the compensation was a matter of principle and can in fact be only nominal, and that, for instance, 6 sacks of coffee would be sufficient). As to the letter originating from the draft of a Secret Protocol Minister Matsuoka presented a draft as Annex No. 18; the German side thereupon presented a revised draft of Annex No. 13; after combining the both proposals a document as Annex No. 19 was drafted, which was sent to the German Embassy on the following 25th and made final.

10. At eleven o'clock a.m. of 25 September Councillor Boltze of the German Embassy visited Matsumoto to tell that the following telegram was received by the Ambassador from the German Foreign Office:

- (1) The German Government accepts the text of the Pact (in English).
- (2) The German Government is convinced that the Italian Government also will accept the text. The German Foreign Office requested that the Italian Foreign Office instruct the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to state formally to Minister Matsuoka the acceptance of the Pact.
- (3) (a) The German Government agrees to sign the English text as a temporary measure.
(b) That fact shall be kept absolutely secret.
(c) About two weeks afterwards Japanese, German and the Italian texts will be secretly substituted for the English text and signed.

(d) The Letter of Credence for Ambassador Kurusu will be deposited with the German Embassy in Tokyo, and that fact will be telegraphed from the Ambassador to the German Foreign Office (concerning this point the Chief of Treaty Department said that, because in case of a treaty as this without ratification clause no formal Letter of Credence would be issued, the Foreign Minister would inform the German Ambassador in Tokyo that the Imperial Sanction was given for Ambassador Kurusu to conclude the Pact. Councillor Boltze answered that that would be sufficient).

(5) If possible, to sign the Pact on Thursday (Matsumoto said that that was practically impossible). Besides, the Ambassador desires that the draft of the Premier Minister's statement be cabled to Ambassador Kurusu and presented to the German Foreign Minister for consultation, and that the three letters be absolutely not referred to when Minister Matsuoka should see the Italian Ambassador (it was agreed in addition that of the three letters those from the Minister to the Ambassador should be in Japanese with English translation, and those from the Ambassador to the Minister should be in German with English translation).

11. The Italian Ambassador in Tokyo, Indelli, visited Minister Matsuoka at 11:30 a.m. of 25 September and stated formally that the Italian Government agreed to this Pact.

12. In the afternoon of that day Matsumoto visited Minister Stahmer at the German Embassy and stated that the signing would be possible on 27th as it was decided to present the draft of the Pact to the Privy Council on 26th. After consultation it was agreed temporarily to sign the English text at noon of 27th (Berlin time), and to telegraph this agreement to Berlin.

13. According to a telephone call from the German Embassy the signing took place at 1:15 p.m., instead of at noon, Berlin time (at 7:00 p.m. Tokyo time), as it had been agreed, because of a delay of the aeroplane of the Italian Foreign Minister.

14. After the signing at 9:30 o'clock of that evening Matsumoto carried out the exchange of the three letters with Ambassador Ott (Stahmer attending) at the German Embassy (Annex No. 20).