

Mr. Sutton

MEMORANDUM

To: Chinese Division, IPS

6 October 1947

From: Kurt Steiner

Subj: Japanese Negotiations with Germany and ITAGAKI's attitude in regard to them.

1. In the opening statement in the individual defense of ITAGAKI, the position is taken that the negotiations with Germany and Italy were not carried out for purposes of aggression but in order to improve Japan's international position, to induce China to abandon her pro-Comintern and anti-Japanese policies, to strengthen Japan against the Soviet menace and to save continental China from chaos.

The witness YAMAWAKI states in his affidavit (Def. Doc. 2471) that regarding the question of the object of the proposed treaty some men in the Army maintained that it may be unavoidable to conclude the agreement unconditionally, but that ITAGAKI before the Five-Minister Conference of 8 August 1938 declared his adherence to the established government policy (pp. 4 and 5).

The witness KAGAWA states in his affidavit (Def. Doc. 2606) that the proposed pact was a pure defensive mutual aid pact with the object of serving in the settlement of the China Incident (p. 4). He states further that the Japanese Government was intent on limiting the "objective power" of the pact to the USSR. The period covered by these statements is August to November 1938.

In both of these affidavits no mention is made of ITAGAKI's position during the latter part of the negotiations which continued until August 1939.

ITAGAKI states in his affidavit (Def. Doc. 2555) that the aim of the negotiations was to relieve the Japanese from death by suffocation, to save continental China, to elevate the international position of Japan, to cause the Chinese Government to give up her policy of tolerance to Communism and her resistance to Japan, and at the same time to strengthen Japan's defense against the militarist and communist menace of Russia (p. 40). He further states that in reply to German requests Premier HIRANUMA sent a message to Hitler on 5 May 1939, stating that "Japan's situation was such that it could not relax the limitation regarding assistance against third powers other than Russia" (p. 41). He mentions his own position in the whole question only by stating that he ordered General MACHIJIRI on 11 August 1939 to request the German Ambassador Ott to make a concession on the part of Germany (p. 41).

2. The following documents show the progress of the negotiations and the attitude of the Japanese Navy and Army, and especially of War Minister ITAGAKI, in regard to them.

a. Regarding the Five Ministers Conference of 8 August 1938 mentioned in YAMAWAKI's and KAGESA's affidavits, see Exhibit 497, p. 6055, and interrogation of OSHIMA. OSHIMA received a telegram from the General Staff in August 1938 stating that they were more or less in accord (with the German proposals) and that the Five Ministers Conference, which included ITAGAKI, was also agreeable to the German suggestions.

b. Exhibit 502, p. 6098, is a telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott dated 26 April 1939 giving an account of the negotiations up to that time. It shows that the Japanese Army wished to conclude a general alliance in the summer of 1938 and that at that time no limitations were suggested.

c. Exhibit 780, p. 7909, is a telegram from Ott to the German State secretary and states that the Five Minister Conference had decided to negotiate with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia, that parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers, and that the Navy recommended limitation on Russia.

d. Exhibit 502 (see above) states further that the Japanese draft at the beginning of April 1939 agreed fundamentally with the German proposal but provided for a Japanese declaration after signing of the pact to the effect that England, France and the United States are not the object of the pact. The reason given for the Japanese desire for such a declaration was that "Japan for political and, in particular, for economic reasons was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opposer of the three democracies" (p. 6101).

e. IPS Document 4035, Item 2, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 27 April 1939 and shows that a Japanese agreement to conclude a military pact with Germany and Italy without limitation to Russia had been sent to OSHIMA. It furthermore shows that the alliance was not a defensive alliance by stating that the Japanese Government combines this consent with the desire that the outbreak of a war be delayed as much as possible because Japan was not at present able to render active support for military and economic reasons. This document is not in evidence.

f. IPS Document 4035, Item 4, is a telegram from Ott to the German State Secretary dated 30 April 1939. It states that the above instructions were sent by the War Minister (ITAGAKI) to OSHIMA and that the limitation of the obligation to support in the case of a war with Russia was dropped because of insistent pressure by the Army. This document is not in evidence.

g. Exhibit 503, p. 6103, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 4 May 1939 and containing HIRANUMA's declaration to Hitler. It reads in part: "As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic, and to the extent possible to her power, military assistance." The declaration makes actual military aid dependent on "a change of circumstances." (This is in contradiction to p. 41 of ITAGAKI's affidavit quoted above.)

h. Exhibit 504, p. 6108, is a telegram from Ott to the German State Secretary dated 6 May 1939. It states that HIRANUMA obtained a compromise in a conflict of the Five Ministers Conference, namely between the War Minister and the Finance Minister on one hand and the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister on the other. It shows that the Army attributed the clause in the HIRANUMA declaration which makes military aid dependent on "a change of circumstances" to the Foreign Minister.

i. IPS Document 4043, Item 20, is a telegram from Ott to the State Secretary dated 17 May 1939. It confirms the fact that while the Army worked for concessions to Germany, the Navy wanted to "reserve for itself the choice of time of attack against enemy forces." This shows that the pact was not meant as a defensive alliance as far as Japan was concerned. This document is not in evidence.

j. IPS Document 4043, Item 21, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 20 May 1939. ITAGAKI sent MACHIJIRI to Ott with a written declaration to be transmitted to Ribbentrop. The following is a summary of the declaration: "The Five Minister Conference achieved a decision regarding the military pact. The Army, in obtaining agreement within the armed forces, was able to obtain basic acceptance of their demands but conceded some changes in the wording. The Army works for signing

of the pact secretly and simultaneously with the signing of the German-Italian Pact in order to decide a priori the character of the pact as a tri-partite alliance. The Army asks Ribbentrop for confidence in their sincerity and power. The Army has decided to make the treaty effective both internally and externally. It was not able to remove completely friendly feelings for England but guarantees in her capacity as the real driving force of Japanese state policy to turn the nation gradually towards their idea of the treaty. This document is not in evidence.

k. IPS Document 4043, Item 25, is a telegram from Ott to the State Secretary dated 27 May 1939. It states that according to information received from the Army, the Army rejected the version in which ARITA had sent the Five Ministers Conference decision of 20 May to Berlin and Rome because that version did not stipulate an automatic entrance into a state of war against England and France but made it dependent on the prevailing situation. This document is not in evidence.

l. Exhibit 614, p. 6793, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 5 June 1939 and states that the Vice Minister of War confirmed to Ott that the Army and Navy had come to an understanding which was agreed to by the Premier and Foreign Minister. Japan has conceded to participate in a war against England and France, but desires to secure the right to choose a favorable time for entering the war.

m. IPS Document 4034, Item 2, is a telegram from Ott to the State Secretary dated 7 June 1939. The Army and Navy have agreed upon the solution that Japan is ready to take part automatically in any war of Germany's so long as Russia is one of the opponents of Germany. If Russia should remain neutral in a conflict Germany may have with a third power, Japan will enter the war only when there is an agreement that the entry into war will be to the common interests of the allied. This indicates that the Navy has given up its earlier reservation, according to which Japan's entrance into a war against the western powers would depend upon exclusive Japanese interests. Not in evidence.

n. IPS Document 4034, Item 7, is a memorandum from Weiszaecker to Ribbentrop dated 16 June 1939. The Italian Ambassador to Berlin has received information from SHIRATORI in Rome, according to which the Japanese proposal for the alliance includes (1) open agreement with absolutely automatic treaty obligations in all cases of war; and (2) a secret protocol whereby no automatic treaty obligation will be in effect so long as the United States and Russia are not participants in the war. This document is not in evidence.

o. IFS Document 4034, Item 9, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 20 June 1939. It shows the inter-relation of the attitude of the Army in regard to the negotiations with Germany and in regard to the Tientsin negotiations. Army sources informed Ott that a successful advance at Tientsin would strengthen the Army's hand in questions regarding the alliance. This document is not in evidence.

p. IFS Document 4047, Item 6, is a telegram from Ott dated 3 August 1939. It shows that the Army feared that an agreement with Great Britain regarding the Tientsin questions would hurt the chances for a German-Japanese military pact. The telegram also states that the War Minister urged convocation of a Five Ministers Conference and that he is willing to push the alliance even at the risk of a Cabinet crisis. This document is not in evidence.

q. IFS Document 4047, Item 10, is a telegram from German Consul Stoller at Tientsin dated 6 August 1939. It confirms the abovementioned attitude of the Army by stating that Japanese officials are the cause of the anti-British movement and that according to a good private Japanese source the Army is doing everything to wreck the negotiations. This document is not in evidence.

r. Exhibit 2198, p. 15,744, is a telegram from Ott to Ribbentrop dated 11 August 1939. It is a report about the conference between MACHIJIRI and Ott referred to in ITAGAKI's affidavit on p. 41. MACHIJIRI transmitted a communication of the War Minister, who had resumed the battle for the alliance at the Five Ministers Conference of 8 August. The purpose of the Army in striving for the alliance is to reach an early successful end of the China conflict, alleviate internal tension, and prevent a dangerous reaction in the direction of economically attempting settlement with England. The War Minister resolved to risk his resignation, which would entail resignation of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. He requests that Germany and Italy help by concessions, outlines these concessions, and maps his own actions if these concessions are given.

s. IFS Document 4047, Item 18, is a telegram from Ott dated 18 August 1939, stating that since ITAGAKI was thwarted in his attempts to make further concessions to German wishes, his resignation is believed to be inevitable. This document is not in evidence.

3. The official negotiations were interrupted by the conclusion of the German-Russo Non-Aggression Pact, 23 August 1939.

Kurt Steiner

Translation of Defense Document

2555

Sandusky 1

Title

Affidavit of ITAGAKI

3, Oct, 1947

From Section

335

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

~~Translation is free from material errors.~~

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
1	21	ruled	as prescribed
	24	after "since", insert	"about"
	5 from bottom	in the same year	Toward the end of the same year
2	5	squeezed in	squeezed into
	14	questions	unsettled cases
	18	in the fall of	Toward the end of
	23	discipline	training
	8 from bottom	delete "to it"	
	6 from bottom	influencing	influenced
	bottom	After "the Chinese Troops", insert "and"	
		After the last sentence, insert the following;	
		"Thus, the danger of a collision between the Japanese and Chinese Armies came to be felt, and the situation became very critical."	

Title _____

From Section _____

_____, 1947

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
4	1	they were under the necessity to working out	in view of the duties of the KWANTUNG Army, it became pressingly necessary to establish
	4	which might happen by	resulting from
	9	After "therefore" insert "year"	insert "since the previous year"
		the Kwantung Army mapped -	the Kwantung Army decided to map
	12	delete "since the previous year"	
	23, 24	delete, "which could be", and "to the best possible advantage."	
	9 from bottom	those	240 m.m. howitzers
	8 from bottom	needless scaling down of	useless reducing the strength of
	6 from bottom	step to make	step in making
	2 from bottom	witnessed	confirmed the

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
4	bottom	of incidents	of unfortunate incidents
5	1	After "Japanese feeling", insert "in Manchuria"	insert "in"
	4	After "maneuvers", insert "and he"	insert "and he"
	14	After "Staff Miyake", insert "who remained in Port Arthur on that day"	insert "who remained in Port Arthur on that day"
	17	ISHIWARA or me	ISHIWABA or ITAGAKI (me)
	13 from bottom	after "Liaoyan"	add "that day"
	12 from bottom	arrived, and dined with	arrived at MUKDEN, so interviewed
	10 from bottom	in the crowded he was worn	in the extremely crowded he seemed worn
	9 from bottom	since he was stay scheduled to go to Port Arthur	since he was scheduled to go to Port Arthur after staying
		there for a few days	two or three days at Mukden

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
5	7 from bottom	after "except"	insert "simply"
	4 from bottom	the business	that matter
6	2, 3	"as I was concerned with the case of NAKAMURA, Shintaro," should be deleted.	
	5	Further news	new information
	8	delete "calling the Special Service Section and"	
	9	reported	reporting
		blasting up	blasting of
	15	shots	fire
	21	railway guard	above garrison troop
7	8	by attacking	in attacking
8	6	arrange	manage
	7	delete "so it could be dealt with"	
	8	the military actions the Japanese military actions	
		delete "on the part of Japan"	
	9, 10	I explained the following in detail and asked his re-consideration.	I said that of course I would like to follow your advise, if circumstances permitted, & I explained the following in detail.

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
8	19	completing	completely
	21	they were attacking at	they were actually attacking
	7 from bottom	rearrange the situation by gaining time, making	our troops make
	bottom	light of them	light of <u>the</u> them
9	4	after "has fled,"	insert "the administration"
		after "communications"	insert "such as telegram and telephone"
10	5	services	facilities
	13	promulgated	enforced
	9	"after "quarters"	insert "at Mukden"
	10	insert "a" in front of	"In view of"
	20	insert "b" in front of	"The anti-Japanese"
	6 from bottom	insert "c" in front of	"So long as"
11	8	insert "d" in front of	"Since the Japanese"
	11	superior	superiority
	18	insert "e" in front of	"Maladministration"

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
11	9 from bottom	insert (f) before	in front of "Restoration of -"
12	1	insert g) in front of	"Independence"
		insert h) in front of the second paragraph	
		insert i) in front of the third paragraph	
		insert j) in front of the fourth paragraph	
		insert k) in front of the last paragraph	
	7 from bottom	delete "convinced, and"	
	5 from bottom	gave	has given
13	4 from bottom	report them to the military commander	offer materials for accurate judgement as to forecasting of the situation, by order of the military commander.
14	8	23rd	22nd
	9	after "the incident" September.	add, "occurred on the 18th"
	13 from bottom	the incident	the outbreak of the incident
	3 from bottom	middle	end
15	6	their opinions	their frank opinions
16	2 from bottom	military Headquarters	General Staff Headquarters
	bottom	after "I made reports" of the actual place	insert "about the situation"
	9 from bottom	desires to eternally solidify	of eternally solidifying

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
17	9	After the sentence by the theory of a	add ", and highly attracted new state.
	5 from bottom	After "manchuria"	and", insert "made"
20	6 from bottom	after "that decision"	insert "I was greatly impressed by his such unusual political skill".
22	14 from bottom	after "January"	insert "1935."
24	13 from bottom	after "favoured this"	insert, "and had had a opinion on this.
23	6 from bottom	under	including
26	4	Before "accordingly"	insert ", and it did not take any further action, such as so-called campaign."
	11	After "Division"	insert, "During that time I was never assigned to the general Staff Headquarters
	bottom.	after the end of the sentence,	add "For the sake of both countries of Japan and China, I could not ^{but} hope that it might not bring about the unfortunate situation.
27	6	delete "by railroad"	and after "Peiping" insert "by railroad"

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now readings:	Should read:
30	10	after "Italy" insert with them and "	"to promote friendly relations
		After the end of the first paragraph; "Thus I intended to bring the war to an end by the above-mentioned policies and concentrate every possible efforts upon a settlement of peace with China.	insert, add to bring the war to an end
32	16	become materials of	contribute to
33	1	1937	1938
34	16	qua now	qua non
	18	dealing with	dealing even with
35	11	After "the settlement" insert made the maximum concession"	"Thus Japan
36	end of the 2nd Paragraph	"delete" at the same time, maintain its national dignity" and insert "from point of view of its national dignity. By this Japan intended to put an end to Chinese scheme to restrain Japan, taking advantage of the League of Nation. and at the same time she intended to ask the League of Nation to reflect, by showing that the powerless League was unworthy of trust. This was delivered to the conference as the already-decided policy.	

Translation of Defense Document _____

Title _____

_____, 1947

From Section _____

To: Mr. Sandusky

Thru: Mr. Ashton

Translation is free from material errors.

Following errors are noted:

Page	Lines	Now reading:	Should read:
40	14	after "Chao-ming to" insert "rapidly"	
		after "the peace movement" insert "with the consent of the government."	
	10 from bottom	to save continental China	and to settle the chaos in Continental China.
	7 from bottom	Powers opportunities to turn China to the cause	Powers assisting Sheang Kai shek to follow the principles
44	16	January	February
	12 from bottom	after "the telegram" insert "(Exhibit No. 1973)!"	
	5 from bottom	After "in the Japan areas" add "in spite of difficulties in shipping transportation."	

Doc. No. 2981

13-4-45

No. _____

Judge Hyi's visit to Mukden at a later date

10-8-47

Duplicate

From: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

To: Consul-General HIYASHI at Mukden

Head Office

Despatched 5 Sep 1931, p.m.

Telegram No. 182 (Code)

Re Control of the activities of adventurers in connection with the Nakamura Incident.

We have heard that Colonel ITAGAKI and others of the Kwantung Army at your place are exerting themselves in various activities recently with considerably ample funds and are manipulating Japanese adventurers in China and members of the "Kokusui-Kai"; and that in view of the tardy progress of the negotiation regarding the Nakamura Incident, especially, they have decided on some concrete move around the middle of this month. We hope that it is merely a rumour. However, in consideration of the appearances of excitement on the part of the despatched military authorities it would be very regrettable from the point of the general situation, if they ruin the position of the Empire by behaving rashly, therefore, please take further deliberate steps for controlling the activities of the RONIN /T.N. adventurers/ and the like.

We have conveyed the gist of this telegram to the army also.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 2981

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one page, dated 5 Sept., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 182 from Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA to Counsel General HAYASHI, dated 5 September 1931.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
29th day of Sept., 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
(Seal)
Chief, Archives, Section
Official Capacity

Witness: K. Uraby /s/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
29th day of September, 1947.

/s/ Henry Shimojima
NJE

Witness: J. G. Lambert /s/

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1767 A-1

① p4
Duplicate

Page 1

SHOWA 6/1931/ 12662 Code
Sent from Mukden a. m. 19th
Received by the Ministry a. m. 19th Sep.

To Foreign Minister, SHIDEHARA
From Consul-General, HAYASHI

No. 621

On the evening of Sep. 17th, the chief of the general affairs section of the Fushun Mine visited me at the consulate-general and made the following report:-

"On Sep. 14th, the commander of the garrison at Fushun held an emergency defence meeting and called for the attendance of the chiefs of the veterans' association, the police-station, the military police and the general affairs section of Fushun Mine and the station-masters of Fushun and Taikuantun. The garrison commander said that in view of the plan, as one of the military moves to support the negotiations in the NAKAMURA Incident, he was going to leave on the 18th at 11.30 or 11.40 p. m., to detrain at Nihnsiangtun, to ford the Hunko and to attack Chinese airplanes, he was asking the Manchurian Railway to prepare a train and that, after his departure, the defence party, consisting chiefly of veterans would attend to the defence of the Mine. He asked that the matter be kept in the strictest confidence. On the morning of the 17th, however, he reported that the matter was temporarily postponed because of the state of the negotiations."

In spite of my feeling that the matter had been planned by the local garrison out of excitement at the NAKAMURA Incident and would not be carried out, I got in touch with Director KIMURA by way of precaution and was on the alert, when unfortunately a collision occurred on the night of the 18th.

The message was relayed to Paiping and Nanking, China.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1767-A-1

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 19 Sept., 1931 and described as follows: Telegram No. 621 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947.

T. Sato /s/
Signature of Official
Staff, Archives, Section ^{SEAL}
Official Capacity

Witness: W. Suzuki /s/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Richard H. Larsh /s/
NAME
Investigator, IFS
Official Capacity

Witness: James Liu /s/

Doc. No. 1767 A-3

(2) ~~④~~
COPY

1. 4. 7 Mukden
Page 1

1931 (The Sixth Year of Showa) 12823 Code

Sent from Mukden on the morning of Sept 20th.
Received by the home office on the morning of the same day.

/To:/ Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

/From:/ Consul General HAYASHI

No. 664 (Top Secret)

I beg to inform you of the following for your information. According to director KIMURA, the Manchurian Railway Company tried to send line-men to the spot for repairs directly after the blowing up of the railway tracks, but was hindered by the army from repairing (omitted?) There were some traces that might have been caused by the blowing up of about seventy centimeters of the down track and about ten centimetres of the up-track. Only two sleepers being damaged and the total length of the part blown up being less than one metre, it was said that the repair could have been done very easily. A special service policeman of the Mukden Police was said to have overheard some soldiers saying to each other that they thought they would have a night practice again when they were ordered to get ready and wait at noon, but that it turned out to be a real battle - contrary to their expectations. And on the afternoon of the 18th, a member of my office overheard an officer from Haicheng to Mukden saying to the effect that he had come there after having taken farewell cups/in anticipation of the worst.

C E R T I F I C A T EI.P.S. No. 1767-A-3Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 20 Sept., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 664 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947.

T. Sato /s/
Signature of Official

Witness: W. Suzuki /s/

Staff, Archives, Section.
Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: James Lui

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

3

7.6

Page 1

Doc. No. 1767-A-2

COPY

1931 12688 Cipher

Sent from Mukden: on the morning of the 19th

Received by the home office: on the morning of Sept. 19th

From: Consul-General HAYASHI

To: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

#637

The South Manchurian railway lines near LIUCHAOKOW which were blown up at about 10.30 last night were completely repaired about six this morning and were re-opened to train traffic.

This has been transmitted to Peiping and Nanking in China and to various consuls in Manchuria.

CERTIFICATE

I.F.S. NO. 1767 -A - 2

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SAITO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 19 Sept. 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No.637 from HAYASHI to Foreign minister SHIDAHARA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April, 1947.

(s) T. SAITO
Signature of Official

SEAL

witness (s) W. SUZUKI

Staff Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, RICHARD H. LARSH, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April 1947.

witness (s) JAMES LIU

(S) RICHARD H. LARSH
NAME

INVESTIGATOR, IFS.
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1767-A-5

2-124

Page 1

Duplicate.

Showa 6 (1931) 12910 Code Address

Despatched from Mukden on 21 forenoon.
Received: by the Ministry on Sept 21 forenoon.

To: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA
From: Consul-General HAYASHI

No. 677

1. In view of the present situation in and around the walled city of Mukden, the Commander of the Japanese Army on Sept 20 1931 will place said area under the temporary city administration of Japanese and Chinese acting under the army in order to promote the welfare of both Japanese and Chinese inhabitants.

1. The Mukden city administration area will be limited within the walled city of Mukden and its foreign settlement quarter. The South Manchurian Railway zone will remain as before.

1. The City administration business will be conducted at the Municipal Building which will be set up in the main street of Hsiao Hsi N in the walled city.

1. The city administration business will include all matters concerning Mukden City except for cases otherwise provided for.

1. The officers of the city administration are as follows:

1. The instructions for other details will be shown separately.

Mayor: Colonel DOHIMARA
Meyoral Secretary: TOMIMURA Junichi
Chief of the General Affairs Section:
Chief of the Police Affairs Section:
Chief of the Financial Affairs Section:
Chief of the Sanitary Affairs Section:
Chief of the Public Works Section of the
Technical Section and of the
Enterprise Section:

IORIYA Makoto
TSURUOKA Eitaro
MITANI Suejiro
MORITA Fukumatsu

YOSHIKAWA Yasushi

Besides the above other Japanese or Chinese subjects will be employed to take part in the city administration in accordance with the regulations to be issued separately.

This telegram has been sent to the places mentioned in the previous message.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Page 2

I.P.S. No. 1767-A-5

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 21 Sept., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 677 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

T. Sato /s/
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: W. Suzuki /s/

Staff Archives Section.
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: James Iui

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

DOCUMENT NO. 1767-A-11

⑤

f. 15

Page 1

Copy

No. _____

From: Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden
To : Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Despatched: From Mukden 28 Oct. 1931, P.M.
Received: 28 Oct. 1931, P.M.

Telegram No. 1126-2 (cipher)

(c) In a prefecture a prefectural Autonomy Guidance Committee shall be established under the supervision of the Local Autonomy Guidance office. It shall guide and supervise the prefectural Autonomy Executive Committee and the Guidance Committee shall be actually occupied by Japanese.

(d) Furthermore, a policy was decided upon to provide separately, an autonomy inspection office for the inspection of the prefectural autonomy, and to establish an Autonomy Guidance Members' Training Center for the training of the Autonomy Guidance members. The Autonomy Guidance office is said to be comprised of youth league members in the employe of the South Manchurian Railway.

(III) On the 28th, the military called together the garrison commanders and the provost marshals of the various areas to support this policy. At this meeting, Chief of the Staff, MIYAKE, gave instructions that this enforcement of the local autonomy and the policy mentioned above shall be absolutely a matter of the internal relations, and shall never be revealed outwardly, for we are aiming at the practical effects, as since among the various prefectures, there are many which are steadily succeeding in their administration in enforcing the present autonomy system. This policy does not necessarily mean the fundamental upset of the present system or the replacement of the present members, therefore, special attention shall be given to points, and shall endeavor towards the realization of the local autonomy by making proper allowance for the local situations.

Transmitted to China, Peiping, and all the consuls in Manchuria.

C E R T I F I C A T E

9
I.P.S. No. 1767-A-11

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 28 Oct., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 1126-2 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEMARA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):
Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April, 1947

/s/ T. Sato
Signature of Official
SEAL
Staff, Archives, Section
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ W. Suzuki

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April 1947

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ James Liu

Investigator, I.P.S.
Official Capacity

6

615

11

Doc. No. 1767-A-12

Page 1

No. 4-1-264

COPY

From Consul-General HAYASHI at MUKDEN to Minister SHIDEHARA for Foreign Affairs.

MUKDEN Dispatched A. M.
Nov. 7, 1931
Received P. M.
Nov 8, 1931

Telegraph No. 1221 (Secret Code)
Referring to outgoing Telegram No. 1211

As the result of pressure being brought upon YUAN CHIN-KAI by the Army Headquarters on the night of the 6th, in the morning of the 7th the Local Peace Preservation Committee held an executives' Meeting and decided to add to the decree on acting for the regime the words that it would sever relations with the old regime of CHANG-HSUEH-LIANG and the National Government as required by the Army, and this is to be published on the 8th.

Relayed this wire to China, PEIPING and TIENTSIN

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____
IPS No. 1767-A-12

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity; Staff of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 7 Nov., 1931 and described as follows: Telegram No. 1321 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April, 1947

Witness: /s/ W. Suzuki

/s/ T. Sato
Signature of Official
SEAL
Staff, Archives, Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of Apr., 1947

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ James Liu

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1767-A-13

Duplicate

4-1-312

No.

From Acting-Consul-General MORISHIMA in Mukden to
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA.

MUKDEN Dispatched: p.m. Nov. 20, 1931.

Received: p.m. Nov. 20, 1931.

Telegram No: 1357 (Code)

Regarding telegram No. 832, addressed to your Excellency,
from SHANGHAI.

As there are indications that YUAN CHIN-KAI is complaining
to foreigners in such a way recently, it seems the Army is
watching him more strictly, and seems to be checking bad propagandas.

Request that message be relayed to SHANGHAI from CHINA.
Cable relayed to CHINA and PEIPING.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1767-A-13

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 page, dated 20 Nov., 1931, and described as follows: Telegram No. 1357 from MORISHIMA to Foreign Minister SUIDEHARA. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April 1947.

/s/ T. Sato
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ W. Suzuki

Staff, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
11th day of April 1947.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
Name

Witness: /s/ James Liu

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

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DUPLICATE

Doc. No. 1767-B
1767A-15
4-1-159

Page 1

From Consul-general HAYASHI in MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA
Dispatched, Mukden, P. M. 17, Oct., 1931.
Received, A. M. 18, Oct., 1931.

Telegram No. 1013 (Code, very secret)

According to HSIEH Chieh-Shik (he had been in TAONAN since the end of September at the request of CHANG Hai-peng) who came back to MUKDEN on the 16th from TAONAN, he says that CHANG Hai-peng telephoned his family in TAONAN from a station on TAONAN-ANGANCHI Railway on the morning of the 15th, telling them that his entry into TSITSIHAR would be a little delayed because a bridge was destroyed on the way. At an rate HSIEH said to me, "there was a condition that CHANG Hai-peng was to be supplied with 10,000 rifles, 200,000 yuan in silver, field guns and planes by a certain quarter for entering HEILUNGKIANG Province, declare the independence, and then proceed with the Restoration of the Monarchy." In reality, however, he received only 3,000 rifles and 200,000 yuan in silver. CHANG's troop strength is some 3,000 at present and although he is planning to increase it to more than 5,000, training is insufficient.

In my opinion, even if he succeeds in occupying TSITSIHAR peacefully, I cannot help but doubt that he could maintain his position since there are not a few soldiers in various parts in the province who possess troop strength. It must be said that it would be still more difficult to support Emperor HSIANTUNG for the throne. Therefore, the success or failure of CHANG Hai-peng depends wholly upon the amount of support given by a certain quarter. Chang wants me to endeavor for him since he has no able person around him, but I cannot be very enthusiastic about it. Etc."

Cable relayed to China, PEIPING, TSITSIHAR, HARBIN, CHANGCHUN, TIENTSIN, KIRIN and CHENGKIATUN.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1767 A-15

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO. Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section of Japanese Foreign Ministry

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 17 Oct, 1931, and described as follows: Telegram #1013 from HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947.

T. Sato /s/
Signature of Official
Staff, Archives Sect

Witness: W. Suzuki /s/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Richard H. Larsh /s/
NAME
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Witness: James Liu /s/

Doc. No. 1767-A-22
2-541

(4)

7.9
Richard Mayo
Page 1

Duplicate

From Consul-General HAYASHI in MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA.

MUKDEN dispatch - afternoon of 13 October 1931

Received, afternoon, October 13th, 1931.

Telegram No. 955 (Code, Top Secret)

According to reliable sources we are notified that the Municipal Administrative Office has planned the monopolization of the opium and the issue of the lottery tickets for the purpose of raising their funds, and has asked the Headquarters of the Army for their approval. We are also informed that though the Headquarters of the Army had no objections to the plans, they instructed the office to state the stipulations clearly and get the approval of the Headquarters before the plans are put in operation, and also to report the stipulations to the Consulate and the Police Station. Not only are the monopolization of opium and the issuing of the lottery tickets naturally unfavorable from the viewpoint of international relations and so forth, in general, but they are the materialization of a part of the plans of the Army, marked SECRET No. 781 of October 2nd. Therefore, regarding this matter, we ask you to call upon the top army to immediately check this movement, and in consideration of the delicate situation kindly take special care to preserve absolute secrecy from the army as to the receipt of this telegram and the contents of the above-mentioned official letter.



C E R T I F I C A T EI.F.S. No. 1767 A-22Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Takazoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff of Archives Section of Japanese Foreign Ministry

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 13 Oct, 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 955 from HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEMURA

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of Apr, 1947.

T. Sato
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: W. Suzuki

Staff of Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: James Lui

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Itagaki

1. Do you recall that in the summer of 1938 while UGAKI was Foreign Minister and you were War Minister that there was submitted to the Japanese Government a draft of a military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy which had been drawn up by OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP?
2. Is it not true that this alliance originally dealt solely with Russia but that by November, 1938, it had been extended so as to apply also against England and France as well as against Russia?
3. Is it not also true that you as War Minister wired OSHIMA that UGAKI agreed with the substance of the pact as extended against England and France?
4. What was the date of your telegram?
5. (If the date was after October 18, 1938, then ask the following question:)
At this time General OSHIMA was Ambassador to Germany, was he not?

NOTE: The above questions are based on page 2339.

6. Did not a Five Ministers Conference advocate the strengthening of the anti-Comintern Pact by concluding a military alliance with Germany and Italy, and did not this Conference decide to have this anti-Comintern program directed strictly against the Soviet Union?
7. When was this action taken at a Five Ministers Conference?
8. Did not the Emperor urge the army to advocate the application of the anti-Comintern program to the Soviet Union alone, and did not the army advise the Emperor that it was not in favor of that course of action?

NOTE: Questions 6, 7 and 8 are based on page 2439.

9. Did not Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI hold the view that the military alliance should be directed against England and France as well as against Russia?
10. Were Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI opposed to governmental directives issued on this subject?

11. Is it not true that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI overstepped the limits of their authority and advised Germany that Japan would participate in war with Germany and Italy?
12. Did not you as War Minister have a conference with the Emperor on the 11th day of April at the Emperor's Palace in which the Emperor said to you, "It is an infringement upon the supreme authority of the Emperor for the two Ambassadors to express intentions of participating in war, a matter beyond them to discuss."?
13. Did not the Emperor also say to you, "Under such circumstances I do not think it very favorable for you to take the attitude of supporting them. This also applies to your covering up for them at the Cabinet Conferences."?
14. As a matter of fact, you also covered up for Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA at the Five Ministers Conferences' didn't you?
15. After your conference with the Emperor is it not true that you went to the room of the Chief Aide-de-Camp where you asked, "Who could it be that told everything to the Emperor?" following which you indicated that you were very angry about it?
16. Do you not know that it was Foreign Minister ARITA who, in making a report to the Throne on the Five Ministers Conference, told the Emperor that Ambassadors SHIRATORI and OSHIMA stated that Japan will participate in war in the event that England and France fought with Germany and Italy?
17. Do you not also know that Foreign Minister ARITA recommended to the Emperor that the statements made by Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI should be rescinded as actions overstepping their limits as Ambassadors?

NOTE: Questions 9 through 17 are based on pages 2495 and 2496.

18. What means did Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI use to influence the policy of the Japanese Government on the question of an all-out military alliance with Germany and Italy?

19. Did they not as a last resort threaten to resign?
20. In fact, was there not placed before the Five Ministers Conference on May 25 a request from Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI for their recall?
21. Was not the recall of Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI considered to be such a serious question that it might influence ~~the~~ peace and order within the nation?
22. Was it not the view of the government that it was better to be satisfied with the results of negotiations for the military alliance whatever they may be than to risk the recall of the Ambassadors?
23. Did not the Five Ministers Conference then determine that the Premier should make a general statement directed to Hitler and Mussolini and that the Foreign Minister should present it to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo instead of using the Japanese Ambassadors stationed in Berlin and Rome?
24. Was not this governmental statement made in this manner to the German and Italian Ambassadors because of the opposition of OSHIMA and SHIRATORI to the will of the Japanese Government?
25. Will the Marshal obtain Exhibit 503 from the Clerk and present it to the witness. This exhibit, as you will note, is the declaration of Prime Minister HIRANUMA to Hitler. Was a similar statement or declaration addressed to Mussolini?
26. Were these the statements or declarations made by the Premier in compliance with the decision of the Five Ministers Conference to which we have referred?

NOTE: Questions 18 through 26 are based on pages 2506 and 2507.

27. As a matter of fact, General ITAGAKI, did not the Ministers endeavor to meet the request of Ambassadors OSHIMA and SHIRATORI without changing the basic principles of their previous decision?

NOTE: Question 27 is based on page 2476.

28. Is it not a fact that very soon after Foreign Minister ARITA delivered the HIRANUMA declaration to the German and Italian Ambassadors he received an official wire from Councillor USAMI in Berlin to the effect that Gauss, Deputy Vice Minister of the German Foreign Office, had submitted to him a proposed draft of the alliance and had inquired as to whether it would meet with the approval of the Japanese Government?

29. (If the witness answers that he knows of the receipt of this proposed draft, then ask the following question:)

Is it not also a fact that in consequence of the proposed draft revealing that it was written in a very indirect fashion with emphasis on the German demands which had previously been refused by Japan, Foreign Minister ARITA made an investigation of the origin of the draft and concluded that it was submitted to the German Foreign Office through Attaches of the Japanese Army?

30. (If the witness answers he knows nothing about the receipt of the proposed draft of the military alliance, then ask the following question:)

Let me see if I can refresh your recollection. Do you not recall that a Gauss draft of the proposed alliance was received from which it appeared on its face that it was written in a very indirect fashion with emphasis on the German demands which had previously been refused by Japan, in consequence of which Foreign Minister ARITA made an investigation of the origin of this draft and concluded that it was submitted to the German Foreign Office through the Attaches of the Japanese Army?

NOTE: Questions 27 through 30 are based on page 2514.

31. Is it not a fact, General ITAGAKI, that within a few days after the delivery of the HIRANUMA declaration, a wire was received from Ambassador OSHIMA advising that Ribbentrop had made an inquiry to the effect that if Germany should go to war against another nation and even if there is no military aid from Japan, would it be permissible to recognize Japan as being in a state of war, to which OSHIMA had replied in the affirmative?

32. At a Five Ministers Conference held on the 7th of May, 1939, did you not support the answer of OSHIMA to Ribbentrop that in the event of war between one of the contracting nations and another nation, Japan would be considered to have entered a state of war although there may not be any military support and did not Premier HIRANUMA support your opinion in this matter?

33. (If an admission of these matters is obtained from the witness, then the following question should be asked:)

Was not this action on your part and that of Premier HIRANUMA in conflict with the report that the Premier had made to the Throne that Japan would not participate in war, and did not Foreign Minister ARITA threaten to resign because of the opinions of the Prime Minister and yourself?

NOTE: Questions 31 through 33 are based on pages 2515 and 2516.

34. Is it not true that the Gauss draft of the proposed military alliance was discussed at the Five Ministers Conference of May 9 at which time it appeared that the draft did not come through legitimate channels?

35. (If the witness admits this fact, then ask the following question:)
Through what channels was the Gauss draft presented?

36. In the discussion of the Gauss draft did not the Navy Minister contend that before making a decision it was necessary to receive an official reply from Germany to the HIRANUMA declaration and that Premier HIRANUMA contended that a reply to his message was unnecessary because the matter had already been solved when Ambassador OSHIMA replied "Yes" ^{upon} when Foreign Minister Ribbentrop asked ^{him} whether it was all right to consider Japan a participant in the event of war?

NOTE: Questions 34 through 36 are based on pages 2523 and 2524.

(The witness may assert that the Prime Minister changed his views somewhat at this point. In this connection pages 2524 and 2525 should be studied carefully. It is my opinion that the action taken by HIRANUMA shows that he had not changed his position, but that he was endeavoring to bring pressure on the Navy to agree to some plan which could be advocated by the Army. I doubt that it is proper to cross-examine this witness on the conversations between HIRANUMA and the Navy Minister which were not likely known to the witness unless the witness himself gets into the question. You will note that on the top of page 2525 that the Premier construed "participation in war" as having a very broad meaning.)

37. Is it not true that the matter of Ambassador OSHIMA's reply to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's query of whether it was understood that Japan would enter into a state of war was considered again at the Five Ministers Conference held on the 30th of May, and that Foreign Minister ARITA at this time again advocated the annulment of Ambassador OSHIMA's reply while Premier HIRANUMA took the position that Ambassador OSHIMA's answer was sufficient?

NOTE: Question 37 is based on pages 2533 and 2534.

38. Did you not confer with the Emperor several days prior to the 7th day of July, 1939, at the Imperial Palace regarding the sending of General TERAUCHI to the Nazi Party conference in Germany in the course of which conference you stated to the Emperor that it was necessary to send General TERAUCHI to Germany for the purpose of strongly binding the anti-Comintern Pact spiritually, and that the Emperor replied that he did not think it very good, and, in addition, stated, "You know my opinions well."?

39. At this same conference with the Emperor did not the Emperor charge that at the conference of Supreme War Councillors you reported falsely that the Foreign Minister was in favor of the military alliance and that the Emperor followed this statement by telling you, "That is very insolent."?

NOTE: Questions 38 and 39 are based on page 2574.

40. Did you have a conversation with Prince KONOYE a few days prior to the 23rd day of July, 1939, in which you asked him if it is possible to change the Emperor's mind in regard to the military agreement, and Prince KONOYE replied to you that it is very difficult?

NOTE: This question is based on page 2588.

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Doc. No. 1767-A-19
(seal) duplicate

Page 1

To Foreign Minister YOSHIKAWA
From MORISHIMA, Acting Consul-general in MUKDEN

MUKDEN Sent, afternoon, 28 Jan, 1932
Arrived, afternoon, 28 Jan, 1932

Telegram No. 158 (in code: restricted)

secret

Concerning our telegram No. 151

According to an informal, confidential conversation with key military men, four representatives from MUKDEN, KIRIN, HEILUNG and HULUMPEIERH (JEMOL is going to join later, but it cannot join just at present because of geographical and political circumstances) will first of all make a declaration of independence under joint signature at the beginning of February, and then promulgate the constitution on the 11th or the 18th. The name of the country will be TOWAJIYUKOKU/ country of Eastern Harmony and Liberty/ and the era, will be designated as KENKUKU (national Foundation) (this may be changed as they are in the midst studying it now). They will ask Emperor HSUAN-Tung to be their President; his term of office for the time being is to be seven years. Under the president, will be established four Yuan, namely, administrative, legislative, judicial and inspection. The Administrative Yuan shall consist of seven departments—Home and Foreign Affairs, Military Administration, Industry, Communication, Justice and Finance. TSANG-Shi-e is to be recommended as the president of the administrative Yuan. Apart from this, the Councillors Yuan, the members of which will mostly be Japanese, will be established as a consultative organ for the President, and all important political matters will have to be approved by the Councillors' Yuan. It is planned that CHANG Ching-hui will be recommended as its president. We are told that the draft copy of the declaration of independence, as well as that of the constitution, have already been prepared. In connection with this matter, Colonel ITAGAKI left for Port Arthur on the 27th by plane, in order to consult with Emperor HSUAN Tsung.

This telegram has been forwarded to the Minister, PEIPING, MUKDEN, KILIN and CHICHIAERH.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Page 2

I.P.S. No. 1767-A-19

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SATO, Takegoro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Staff, Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 28 Jan., 1932, and described as follows: Telexgram #158 From Morishima at Mukden to YOSHIZAWA, Foreign Minister

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947.

T. Sato
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: W. Suzuki

Staff, Archives Section,
Foreign Office
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 11th day of April, 1947


Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: James Lia

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Grant

Sawaya ~~Harada~~ Members



Aug 38 5th conf. conf. find
conf. objectives + Russia

Wakubara

Feb 39

f. 2438-9 Okuma cautioned by Emperor

Army offered Emperor den. + have
extension of Anti-Communist Pact directed
+ Russia

Reports all over the land

f. 2339

Nov 38 referring to previous time

Itagaki wired Okuma

Apr 1939

f. 2494

report to wa minister + false

to Apr. conf. which was held about 4
meeting. "criticized Okuma's position"

was met by conf. of advisors
Okuma + Shirota

~~Very Inf~~

f. 2496



5/23/39

Apr 25, 1939

2509-11

Perme by Oshun
Shuratori

Requested their recent
discussion & language

May 2

5-4-39

Hirama - Okada
Hills

Jofan will start at 7:20

5-6-47

2515-6

Oshun's telegram
when would recognize Jofan, state / wa

| 2523

Oshun's
Hirama

May 10

May 20

2535-6

Shuratori & Oshun refuse draft
treaty

Meitsein Problem

firm resolutions from July 1
Cent Govt has no control
July 7, 1939
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
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A Policy for the Establishment of a
New Central Government

Decision made at the
Five Ministers' Conference,
June 6, 1939.

1. The constituent elements of a new central government shall be Wang, Wu, the existing regimes, and also the Chungking government - provided that it change its mind and be reformed - and, taking it up as a question rested on China, shall be established through mutual co-operation of these elements when considered proper.
2. The new central government shall design to adjust rightly the relations between Japan and China in conformity with the principles for adjusting a new relationship between these two countries, which should be previously accepted by the said elements.
3. The time of organization and establishment of the new central government shall be decided on an independent standpoint in concert with various phases of the guidance of fullscale war. For this purpose, especially fundamental actual strength as well as manpower shall be completed.
4. The future political system of China shall be formed in accordance with a policy of separate rule and national unification based on her history and actual situation, but its details shall be conformed to the plan of adjusting a new relationship between Japan and China: from the standpoint of national defence and

economy, North China shall be made an intensive combination district of the two countries (Mongolia shall be made an especially intensive anti-communistic area); the lower reaches of the Yang-tze-River shall also be another economically; a special position shall be given to specified islands along the South China coast; and moreover, the question of the system shall be in principle entrusted to China as Chinese internal affairs and intervention in it shall be avoided as much as possible, especially the intentions of statesmen shall be respected according to the form of the new central government, and at the same time how to deal with our specific relations with the existing regimes shall be deliberated.

5. As for the National Party and /Dr. Sun Yat-sen's/ Three People's Principle, if they adopt pro-Japanese-Manchurian and anti-communism policy instead of pro-communism and anti-Japanese one, they shall be permitted to remain as in the past just as other pro-Japanese and anti-communism parties are.

6. When the Chungking government gives up its anti-Japanese and pro-communism policy and accomplish the required personnel changes, and accept the above-mentioned items 1 and 2, shall be made a constituent element of the new central government, concluding that it has surrendered to us.

A Plan of Guidance for Wang's Movement

1. The Principle of Guidance.

Wang shall establish a powerful government with civil and military merits, in co-operation with Wu and the existing regimes. For this purpose, he shall make necessary preparations, and in the meantime endeavour to win those influences of the Chungking government, particularly eminent persons of that government.

2. Main Points of Guidance.

(1) Wang shall make needed preparations so that a powerful government may be established in co-operation with Wu and the existing regimes. And preparatory movements shall cover such items as the establishment of fundamental sphere /of influence/ the movements toward Chungking, the unification of existing influences, raising of funds, full equipment of armed forces, etc; and our outward interference in these movements shall be limited as much as possible.

(2) The establishment of the new central government shall be done in conformity with the phases of our independent guidance of war. In this connection, our Empire has the following conditions to require of Wang:

(a) During the period of preparations for the establishment of new central government, Wang, Wu, and the existing regime shall work together in order to make their utmost to win those influences of the Chungking government, particularly eminent persons of that government, and at the same time to establish a powerful government with civil and military merits by establishing their

their sphere of influence.

(b) The new central government shall recognize the principles for adjusting the new relations between Japan and China. The time of establishment and its details shall be settled after consultation with Japan according to the development of the above preparatory movements, especially to the completion of fundamental real power as well as personal resources. However, "ang/" shall accept the following: that the future political system of China shall be formed in accordance with a policy of separate rule and national unification; that its details shall be conformed to the plan of adjusting a new relationship between Japan and China; that from the standpoint of national defence and economy, North China shall be made an intensive combination district of the two countries (Mongolia shall be made an especially intensive anti-Communist area), and the lower reaches of the Yang-tze-River shall be another economically; that a special position shall be given to specified islands along the South China coast; and further, serious considerations shall be given to our special relationship with the existing regimes.

(c) As for the National Party and Three People's Principle, if they adopt pro-Japanese-Manchurian and anti-Communism policy instead of pro-Communism and anti-Japanese one, they shall be permitted to remain as in the past just as other pro-Japanese and anti-Communism parties are.

(d) During the Incident flags unauthorized by Japan shall not be permitted to be risen in our occupied areas.

3. The expenses needed.

Special consideration shall be given in case expenses beyond the fixed expenditure should be required for the realization of this movement.

4. Positive and internal aid necessary for this movement shall be given from the side of Japan.

(Note:) Movements shall be made to induce Wu and the existing regimes to co-operate with Wang.

(Remarks:)

Essential points in the attitude/towards Wang/.

(a) The Policy to dispose of the Incident independently shall be insisted on, and though we should make Wang yield to the essentials of our policy, he shall be given an impression of hopeful future and absolute faith by making him carry out his wishes freely on the other points.

Particularly, confidence in the establishment of a new order in East Asia or in the adjustment of the relations between Japan and China and our determination, justice, and tolerance, in the disposal of the Incident shall be chiefly clarified, and the details shall not be strictly considered.

(b) The persons who shall have an interview with Wang be the five Ministers and the former premier KONOYE.

*see
affidavit no II*

TOP SECRET - Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 1106 (seals)

KAN SAKU PEI NO. 731
ORDERS OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

Issued by Kwantung Army Headquarters
at Hsinking, Nov. 16 - 6:30 p.m.

35

1. In view of the subsequent situation in North China, the Army intends to gather part of its air force outside Shankaikwan.
2. The commander of the Air Forces shall order scout planes, fighters, heavy bombers, each forming two squadrons and commanded by regiment commanders to advance between Shankaikwan, Suichung and Chinchou by the twentieth of January and to make preparations for marching towards Peiping-Tientsin Area.
3. *November* The Railway Line Sector Commanders of the Kwantung Army shall dispose railway transportation service in order to facilitate the transference of the said air squadrons.
4. I am in Hsinking,

Commander of the Kwantung Army
General MINAMI

Method of transmission - Telephone to the F.M. sector and afterwards printed matters to be sent.

Addressees: - The Army Units, Organic Units in general, War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, the Tientsin Army.

MINAMI

/Page 48/

(Seals)

IPS DOC. NO. 644-B

/Army/

Division Jointly responsible for War Affairs Division.

Item 112
/Page 112/

Period of preservation: 10 years.

Designation of Approval: per authority of the Vice Minister.

Designation of Execution: USHIJIMA /seal/

/seal/ KAWAHARA on behalf of

Received by: War Ministry
No. RIKU MAN-MITSU-UKE 1120.

Office of Origin: Finance Division

Subject: Allocation of Secret Service Funds under the Manchurian Incident Expenditure.

/seals/

Minister: Entrusted

Vice Minister: FURUSHO, Senior Adjutant : USHIJIMA per KOSONOYE on behalf of

Adjutant in charge: KOSONOYE /one more seal not clear/

Bureau Chief in Charge: per OKIDO on behalf of: Chief of the Competent Division: OKIDO.

Member of the Section in Charge: SAWAMOTO

Person having prepared the draft for deliberation: YAMASHINA

Competent Bureau and Division; No. KEIMITSU-10

Joint Responsibility: Bureau Chief by MURAKAMI on behalf of:
Division Chief: MURAKAMI

Ministry's Secretariat: Received November 26 of the year ____ of SHOWA.
Finished November 30 of the year ____ of SHOWA.

Proposition directed to the Chief of the Finance Division of the Intendance Bureau.

/MANMITSU/

Secret Service Funds under the Manchurian Incident Expenditure should be disbursed as indicated below:

No. RIKUMANMITSU-340 - November 26, 1935.

/There are two undecipherable seals given here./

TO: Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army NISHIO Toshizo - ¥1,300,000

Vice Minister:

*NYI
me?*

Item 93
/Page 93/

Received War Ministry/
Finished Nov. 27

Inspected
RIKUMAN-MITSU Receipt No. 1077

Vice Minister: Finished
/Military Affairs/: Finished (seals)

/Secret/ Adjutant: /USHIJIMA/

Identical Text to Army General Staff
Headquarters No.

Deciphering of Telegram
Despatched: 5:00 pm) November 12
Received: 8:40 pm)

Addressed to: The War Minister-Sender: The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army

KWANTUNG STAFF I TELEGRAM 763

According to the object described in separate telegram, KWANTUNG-STAFF I TELEGRAM 762, we decided to concentrate a part of the forces outside the Great Wall in order to suitably cooperate with the China Garrison Army in case of need and issued orders at noon today, the 12th, to take the following measures:

The 1st Independent Infantry Regiment, one light tank company of the Third Tank Battalion one battalion of the 9th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment and the 1st Independent Engineer Company shall be placed under the command of the Commander of the First Mixed Brigade and shall be made to concentrate the forces near SHANHAIKWAN by November 15th so as to be prepared for advancing into North China. However, as to advancing to the south of SHANHAIKWAN, same shall depend on Army orders.

(End)

*Shanhai-kwan 20th 12th 1931
China*

Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 599

(seals)

Urgent General Staff, Multiple Telegram
Translation of (Sent 4:10 pm June 29
Telegram (Arrived 6:55 pm June 29

Addressed to the Vice Minister
Sender: The Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army.

KWAN SAN TEL NO. 2

Taking into consideration the situation in the North China and Mongolia Areas, it is absolutely necessary for the Army to establish Special Service Facilities in CHAHAR and SUIYAN, and therefore we hope you will take into account the opinion expressed in KWAN SAN ICHI HATSU NO. 1018, dated 3 July and immediately consider increasing and placing two required officers, that is, one field officer and one commissioned officer under the major in the present staff.

The increase of two officers, one field officer and one commissioned officer under the major, made for intelligence purposes in accordance with RIKU MAN MITSU NO. 186, is understood by this army as the necessary member for the study of North Manchuria.

(End)

TOP SECRET - Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 1181 (seals)

KWAN SAKU MEI NO. 736
ORDERS OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

4th December, noon at the Kwantung
Army Headquarters in Hsinking.

1. The conditions in NORTH CHINA are gradually becoming more serious and our Garrisons in China anticipate the use of force.

December 24 (settled)

One copy is kept in) Seal of the
this Section) Officer in Charge
December 16 :) Military Affair
Section.

General LI SHOU HSIN's troops are
expected to march toward the
northern part of KALGAN to guard
the eastern part of CHAHAR.

The troops are generally expected to begin their movements on about the 7th of December from TO LUN.

2. Our troops intend to strengthen our preparations to cooperate with the Garrisons in CHINA.

3. The commander of the 11th Independent mixed Brigade shall despatch, as soon as possible, a force under command of a regiment-commander, including an infantry battalion and a company of field-artillery (required number of wireless instruments and motor transport corps shall be attached) to TO LUN to be ready to meet any change in the situation.

He shall also despatch some powerful officer patrols to CHANG PING, SHUN I and TUNG CHOU to investigate the movements of the Chinese troops in the said Area.

4. The commander of the Air Group shall order the commander of the Temporary-Despatched-Air-Force not only to keep in close touch with the Garrisons in China but also to be ready at any moment, to cooperate with the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, keeping in touch with them.

5. The commander of the KWANTUNG Army Motor-Transport Corps shall immediately despatch a Motor-Transport Company to PING CHUAN to be placed under the command of the 11th Independent Mixed-Brigade-commander.

6. The 3rd Signal-Battalion-Commander shall immediately despatch one signal Section to PING CHUAN to be placed under the command of the 11th Independent-Mixed-Brigade-Commander.

7. The KWANTUNG Army Railway-Line Sector Commander shall handle the rail transportation of the above mentioned units.

8. I, myself am in Hsin King.

Commander of the KWANTUNG Army.
General MINAMI

Method of transmission: - Telegram to IIBS, Telephone to all others and printed matters to be sent afterwards.

Addressees:- IBS Garrisons in China after telegram to the above, all troops under any command, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.

MAN MITSU NO. 1181 Part 1

(seals)

Re CORRECTION OF ERRORS IN THE
ORDER OF 4 December KWANTUNG
ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

(Seals)

The Order No. KWAN, SAKU MEI NO. 736 issued by KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters on the 4th of December shall be read as follows:

ITEM NO. 2

now reading "The Garrisons in North China" shall read "The Garrisons in China".

Re: Interpretation of the Special
Committee on China Affairs.

Decided upon by the Five Ministers'
Conference, on July 29th Showa 13 (1938)

1. The composition of the Special Committee on
China Affairs in Art. 1.

It is understood that this is an organ with
DOIHARA, TSUDA and BENSAI as the nucleus.

2. The necessary counter-measures with regard
to China stated in Art. 1, are understood to be
political and economic and do not include those
directly connected with war operations.

3. The interpretation of Art. 2.
The local organization is understood to
exclude the supreme command. If adjustment is
necessary between the strategic services of the
supreme command and this Committee, such adjustment
should be made in accordance with the system of their
subordination as per Art. 3.

Hogaki

MATTERS DECIDED UPON AT THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
AS OF OCTOBER 31, 1938

THE 1ST SECTION OF THE EAST-ASIA BUREAU

CONTENTS

- No. 1 The Future Policy for Guiding the China Incident.
- No. 2 The Measures to be Taken in Case of Surrender of the Present Central Government of China.
- No. 3 Measures to be Taken in Case the Present Central Government of China Does Not Surrender.
- No. 4 Strategy Toward China in Conformity with the Current Situation
- No. 5 The Policy to Guide the Establishment of a New Central Government of China. (Attached Sheet) The Outline for the Internal Guidance of the Chinese Government.
- No. 6 — The Emergency Financial Measures for Central China. (Attached Sheet) The Outline of Dealing with the Emergency Financial Measures for Central China.
- No. 7 — Diplomatic Policy Toward Britain for the Time Being.
- No. 8 — Attitude Toward the Proposals of the British and the German Ambassador for Peace Mediation.
- No. 9 — Plan for Studying the Japanese-German-Italian anti-Comintern Pact.
- No. 10 — Procedure Taken in Connection with the Settlement of the Chang Ku-fang Incident.
- No. 11 — Corrections.
- No. 12 — The Special Commission on Chinese Affairs.
- No. 13 — Commentary on the Special Commission on Chinese Affairs.
- No. 14 — Regarding the Solution of the Outstanding British Question.
- No. 15 — Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee.
- No. 16 — Concerning the Setting Up of a Committee for Liaison with the Conference of the Five Ministers.
- No. 17 —
- No. 18 —

NO. 1 - THE FUTURE POLICY FOR GUIDING THE CHINA INCIDENT
(Decided 24 June 1938)

1. We must concentrate our national power and direct it to the immediate settlement of the China Incident. All the policies at home and abroad shall be directed in conformity with the assumption that the object of the war shall generally be attained within this year.
2. There is no objection to accepting friendly mediation by third Powers, depending upon its conditions.

NO. 2 - THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE CASE OF SURRENDER
OF THE PRESENT CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA
(Decided 8 July 1938)

1. The Policy

In case of surrender of the Central Government of China, Japan will regard it as one of the regimes and treat it according to the "Must be made to join the newly established Central Government of China" policy decided upon by the Imperial Conference.

2. The Outline

- I Japan shall firmly adhere to the decided policy for the solution of the Incident and shall not try to adjust the general relations between Japan and China in negotiation with the present Central Government of China.
- II In case the present Central Government of China surrenders and accepts the third condition, stated later, it shall either be considered as a friendly regime and will be permitted to join the newly established Central Government, or be made to establish another new central government in cooperation with various existing pro-Japanese regimes.

The merger with the newly established Central Government, or the establishment of a new central government shall be undertaken chiefly by the Chinese, the internal assistance to be given by Japan.

3. Conditions for the recognition of the
Surrender of the Present Central Government of China

- I The merger with or taking part in the establishment of the new Central Government of China.
- II The change of title as well as the reorganization of the former National Government following the above mentioned measure.
- III The abolition of anti-Japanese, pro-Communist policy and the adoption of pro-Japanese-Manchukuo and anti-Communist policy.
- IV Retiring from public life of CHIANG Kai-shek.

4. Suspension of Hostilities

The suspension of hostilities shall not be taken up unless we have satisfied ourselves with the facts of surrender of the present Central Government of China.

However, in the case of negotiating the cessation of hostilities, the conditions shall be considered separately.

NO. 3 - THE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE CASE WHERE THE PRESENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA DOES NOT SURRENDER
(Decided 8 July 1938)

1. The Policy

Japan shall control her national power more rigidly than ever before, and her whole strength in home administration, foreign relations, financial tactics and propaganda shall be concentrated upon bringing about the destruction or surrender of the present Central Government of China. At the same time, the various administrative measures necessary for a long term warfare shall be intensified in order to actually realize the wartime condition spiritually and materially.

2. The Outline

I Measures to be taken before occupying strategic points.

(1) We must direct positive war operations without break, with the aim to occupy strategic points for controlling the general situation of China so as to cause the self-destruction of the present Central Government of China and their abandonment of fighting spirit, because of their repeated defeats and especially the loss of their midland.

(2) In accordance with the development of war operations, the pro-Japanese and anti-Comintern influences should be fostered through strengthening tactics upon administration, finance, foreign relations and thoughts. It should be aimed to break up the interior of the anti-Japanese influence and to bring about an atmosphere desirous for peace as well as the ruin of its financial and economic basis, so that the present Central Government of China might split and collapse, or at least be reduced to a mere local regime at the earliest possible time.

The above mentioned policies shall be carried out not only by Japan herself but also by guidance of the various pro-Japanese regimes of China and others in the background.

(3) The various pro-Japanese regimes shall be enlarged and strengthened. They shall be also incorporated into one regime as early as possible. We should make it really worthy of the name of a Central Chinese Government so that it may be inevitably recognized at home and abroad as the new government de facto which will replace the present Central Government of China.

The recognition of the new Central Government of China by Japan depends solely upon the situation, but it must be done as soon as possible when the new Central Government has been completed in substance.

(4) While we will highly respect the rights and interests of the third powers, and avoid troubles with them, we should adopt powerful and straightforward measures to settle the Incident so that they may actually understand our policies toward China. Then they will be compelled to support our attitude in order to protect and increase their vested rights and interests, and consequently the present Central Government of China will be isolated.

II The measures to be taken after occupying the strategic points.

In case the present Central Government of China should not surrender even after we occupy the strategic points, we should not be impatient so as to resort to force to settle the Incident, but make efforts to enlarge and strengthen the new Central Government, and at the same time should attempt the downfall of the present Central Government of China chiefly by tactics, increasing pressure upon it by political, economic and ideological measures.

III The way for the practice of the above shall be planned and decided upon separately.

No. 4 - STRATEGY TOWARD CHINE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
CURRENT SITUATION
(Decided 8 July 1938)

1. The Policy

In order to break down the present Central Chinese Government and bring about CHIANG Kai-shek's fall from power, simultaneously with the destruction of the enemy's fighting power, the plans now being put into effect shall be strengthened, and the essentials for this purpose are as follows:

Method of Execution:

I By engaging persons of the first rank in China, we pave the way for the establishment of a new strong administrative power concurrently with the weakening of the fighting spirit of the Chinese people.

II By expediting the conciliation and submission of the irregular forces, we plan to disrupt and weaken the fighting power of the enemy.

III By utilizing and controlling the authoritative anti-CHIANG Kai-shek elements, we shall establish in our enemy's midst an anti-CHIANG Kai-shek, anti-Comintern and anti-war government.

V. By promoting the Mohammadans movement, we shall create an anti-Comintern zone operated by Mohammedans themselves in the northwestern region. (amended on 22 July)

VI. By confiscating Chinese funds abroad etc., we shall cause the present Central Chinese Government to destroy themselves financially.

VII. We shall spread the necessary under-cover propoganda to make easier the execution of all the above measures.

Note: Investigations in respect of Item V above are still in progress.

NO. 15 - THE GUIDING POLICY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.
(Decided 15 July 1938)

1. The Policy

I. The new Central Government of China shall not be confined to the mere party concerned, on the part of China, in settling the Incident, but shall be made the government of China, so that Japan and China will sweep away all the frictions in their past relationships and establish the foundation of a friendly relationship between them from a broad-minded viewpoint.

II. Though the establishment of the new Central Government of China shall be undertaken mainly by the Chinese, it shall be internally assisted by Japan. The principle of the collaboration of individual local governments shall be adopted to their government form.

2. The Plan for the Establishment

I. A Joint Commission shall be established as soon as possible through the cooperation between the Provisional Government and the Restoration Government, to be joined later by the Mongolian and Hsiang-Kiang Joint Commission. Then we should guide this regime so as to grow into a real central government by gradually absorbing various other influences or collaborating with them.

II. The new Central Government shall not be established until after the fall of Hankow, with the CHIANG Kai-shek regime reduced to a mere local government or until the reformation of the present Central Government is brought about by CHIANG Kai-shek's retirement from public office.

III. In case the split or reformation in the CHIANG Kai-shek regime does not take place even after the fall of Hankow, we should establish a new central government by putting existing governments together.

IV. In case the CHIANG Kai-shek regime is broken up or reformed, and should a pro-Japanese government turn up, we would make it a factor of the central government system and proceed to set up a central government.

V It is expected that the date for our recognition of the new Central Government would be when the reformed (split) government as in Par. II could take charge of the suspension of hostilities, or when the united government as in Par. III has grown to be a central government of real efficiency.

VI Adjustment of the relations between Japan and China in connection with our control of the establishment of the new Central Government of China, shall be done on the following basis, and its concrete matters shall be decided separately.

(1) Basic matters to be adjusted and agreed upon for setting up the new relations between Japan and China shall be generally as follows:

(A) Utilization and development of natural resources in North China.

(B) The recognition of the highly cooperative zones by Japan and China in North China and the lower Yangtze River. The establishment of a special position against the Soviet Union in Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang area. The establishment of a special position on the various islands along the coast of South China.

(C) The establishment of the general policy for the collaboration among Japan, Manchukuo and China based upon reciprocity, particularly on neighborly friendship and goodwill, anti-Comintern and joint-defense and economic cooperation. In order to attain the above objectives, Japan will give internal guidance during a certain period.

(2) The basis for the internal guidance is given on attached sheet No. 1, captioned as "The General Plan for the Internal Guidance of the Government of China."

3. The Organization and the Function of the Joint Commission

I. The organization of the Joint Commission by the Provisional and the Restoration Governments and the Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang Joint Commission (to be called "The Joint Commission" hereafter) shall be roughly as follows:

(1) The Joint Commission shall be of a plain committee system, having the representatives of the Provisional and the Restoration Governments and the Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang Joint Commission as its members, located in Peking for the time being.

(2) For the most part, the boundary of each local regime shall be left as they are at present for the time being.

(3) Each of the local regimes as North China, Central China and Mongolian-Hsing-Kiang shall be to a high grade self-governing adaptable to its special local characteristics.

(4) The limits of the authorities to be given to the Joint Commission and the local regimes shall be studied separately, based upon the principle in the preceding paragraph. Transportation, communication, postal service, finance, customs, national tax, administration over salt, and plans for thought and education, which are common to all governments, shall be administered by the local regimes under the necessary supervision by the Joint Commission.

(5) The maintenance of public peace and order shall be placed under the charge of the local governments, subject to the control of the Joint Commission.

(6) Regarding the diplomatic affairs, the Joint Commission shall be authorized to look after the common matters while the local questions shall be dealt with by the respective local regimes.

(Attached Sheet)

The General Plan for Internal Guidance of the Chinese Government.

Japan's internal guidance of the Chinese Government is directed to contribute to settle the present Incident, to promote the cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese, to establish inseparable friendly relations between Japan and Manchukuo, and at the same time to contribute to our national defense policy.

For this purpose, we should save the present situation from the current anti-Japanese sentiments even if by force. Also, we should win the hearts of the people by improving their economic conditions, establish the guiding principle through restoring Oriental culture, and with mercy and dignity stimulate the whole Han race to voluntarily cooperate with us.

Outline

I Military Affairs

(1) We will urge the surrender of the Chinese Army, conciliate them, and bring them under control. We will strive to make them support

the new government by promoting their anti-CHIANG Kai-shok and anti-Communistic consciousness, and making as many Chinese troops as possible cooperate with the Japanese Army for destruction of the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist Army, and thus guide the racial conflict toward an ideological opposition.

(2) The necessary Japanese troops will be stationed at ports, railways, waterways, etc., in the occupied areas which are strategic for communication, as well as at the locations of important resources; and in remote districts armed Chinese troops will be organized to ensure the preservation of peace. The numerical strength of the troops will be decided in accordance with the actual local situation.

(3) We will conclude an anti-Communist Military Alliance and gradually reorganize the Chinese Army to place it under the direction of the Japanese Army. When the circumstances permit, we will reduce our military strength to the minimum necessary for our national defense.

II Administration and Foreign Relations.

(1) Under the confederated commission or the new Central Government, local governments will be organized in North China, Central China, Mongolia and Hsing-Kiang, etc. to suit the peculiar characters of each regime. We will give them wide powers of self-government, and have them govern themselves separately and cooperate with each other.

(2) The officials below the level of the key officials in the various governments shall be Chinese, but according to necessity a few Japanese advisers will be placed in important positions or Japanese officials will be employed so as to facilitate the internal guidance.

(3) The local governments shall make efforts to overthrow and destroy the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist Government and especially scheme to conciliate the anti-CHIANG Kai-shok and anti-Communist elements, so as to aggravate their internal troubles.

(4) As to the foreign relations, the local governments shall, in general, follow our foreign policy and conclude an anti-Comintern Pact.

III Economy, Communication and Relief

(1) The development of the economy and communication will contribute to the establishment of the national defense of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and satisfy the development of the economy of the three countries and the welfare of its people. Japan especially will materially hold the necessary transportation. In North China the demand for national defense shall be the first consideration, and in Central and South China the interests of the people will be particularly considered.

(2) We shall carry out the development of economy following the principle of ministering to each other's wants among Japan, Manchukuo and China and advance energetically for the accomplishment of the three countries' economic sphere. However, we shall respect the rights and interests, already obtained by the third countries, and not interfere with their participation in the economic development.

(3) Railway, water transport, aviation and communication will be materially placed under Japan's power, and satisfy the accomplishment of military activities and contribute to the welfare of the people.

(4) We shall tempt the existing plutocrats with profit and have them cooperate with the local governments.

(5) /T.N. The whole text is crossed out./ Marginal Remarks: "Eliminated 22/7."

(6) We will promote agriculture, start river conservancy and civil engineering, and thus improve the living of the common people. Especially during the Incident, we will make it our emergency duty to smoothen, for the time being, the distribution of food and then carry out the necessary relief work with emphasis on the reconstruction /of China/.

IV Culture, Religion and Education.

(1) We will respect the culture proper to the Han race, especially that common to Japan and China, revise the spiritual civilization, thoroughly prohibit anti-Japanese speeches and promote Sino-Japanese cooperation.

(2) We will establish the principle on which the realization of the Sino-Japanese cooperation is to be based, in order to enable the local governments to carry out their policies, and strengthen and promote the organization of the people's various associations so as to make them hot-beds for this principle.

(3) We will reject absolutely the Communist Party. The National Party shall amend the "three-people principle" so as to make it adaptable gradually to the policy of the new government.

(4) As to religion, we will grant the freedom of belief as long as it does not disturb the promotion of the Japanese-Manchukuo-Chinese cooperation.

(5) We will conciliate scholars and protect them and encourage Confucianism.

(6) We will promote practical science so as to expedite the industrial development.

NO. 6 - EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR FINANCE OF CENTRAL CHINA
(Decision July 5, 1938)

(1) In view of the big importance of adjusting the relations with the third countries in order to make them give up their assistance to CHIANG Kai-shek, the government is ready to remove the restrictions on commercial and financial activities of foreign banks as well as foreign trading companies in the occupied districts of Central China. However, as the problem of free navigation on the Yangtze River has a great political influence on various aspects, the despatched authorities shall dispose of this problem after reporting it to the superior officials in case they touch this problem in the course of the negotiation.

(2) In view of the present drop in the value of the Chinese legal currency we will provide against its collapse by promptly establishing a bank which is practically independent from politics and will be authorized to issue new bank notes, with the object of promoting the commerce of Central China under the above mentioned preparations and cooperation of the third powers, especially Britain. When asking for the above mentioned cooperation of the third countries, we will persuade the British banks first, and if necessary, the British Government. According to circumstances, we may consider promoting it by inducing Germany and Italy. However, we will make it our policy that Japan has no fear in establishing the foundation for her development in Central China and maintain her leading position in the Central Chinese finance.

(3) We will persuade the Chinese banks and trading companies with the purport indicated in the preceding article.

REMARKS: This matter is to be carried out in accordance with the outline of the disposition mentioned on the attached sheet.

(Attached Sheet)

Outline of the Disposition of the Emergency
Measures for Finance of Central China.
(Decision July 5, 1938)

1. The Policy

When we actually take these financial measures we must be very careful so that they may cause neither the interference of the third countries nor bring troubles on the peace problem. We shall keep persistently our independent attitude and arrange the time and method of negotiations to our advantage.

2. Outline

(1) In conformity with the principle of the emergency financial measures of Central China, the government will immediately proceed to establish the concrete plan for the financial machinery of Central China under the collaboration between the authorities at home and at the actual places.

This concrete plan shall be elastic enough to be adaptable to the outcome of the negotiation.

(2) We will regard this negotiation merely as a matter of finance and will set about it, attaching importance to unofficial negotiations between our financial authorities and those of the third countries at the actual places. However, at an opportune time, we will commence gradually the negotiation between the governments. As to the time of transferring the negotiation to the Central Government/ in accordance with the necessity, it depends on another decision or direction by the Central Government/. Providing for the above, the Central Government/ makes practical preparations beforehand for disposal of this matter. For this purpose, the parties concerned at home and at the actual place should be brought into close contact in order to remove the shortcomings due to the loose control. The commercial problem concerned with this negotiation shall be very prudently dealt with not to produce an unilateral result.

(3) At this negotiation we will make efforts to first change the atmosphere of the business circles of the countries concerned at the actual places favorable to us so that their home countries (Britain, USA and others) may rightly recognize the situation. At the same time our financial circles should be guided appropriately not to make speeches unfavorable to us for this negotiation.

(4) The main object of this negotiation is Britain, but we must take every possible positive means such as to make use of USA, Germany, Italy and others as steps in the negotiation.

(5) Along with the diplomatic manœuvres against the third countries mentioned in the preceding article, we will endeavor to make the third countries change their attitude toward CHIANG Kai-shok, and try to break up the CHING Government and absorb the Chinese financial circle.

(6) It is of course necessary to take every care to keep this negotiation secret. All necessary preparations should be made for this negotiation, and there must be no failure or miscarriage in the course of the negotiation.

NO. 7 DIPLOMATIC POLICY TOWARD BRITAIN FOR THE
TIME BEING

(Decided July 8, 1938)

1. In order to cause Britain to give up her policy of aiding CHIANG, it is necessary to make her understand through facts the just attitude of the Empire.
2. As for the matters pending up to the present, we will investigate them concretely and settle same rapidly one after another according to the above mentioned plan.

NO. 8 ATTITUDE TOWARD PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH
AND THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR FOR PEACE MEDIATION

(Decided July 12, 1938)

British Ambassador:

To first decline in a roundabout way, but not sever the connection. "Because sincerity is not recognized, we will contemplate for a while."

German Ambassador:

To first hear what he says.

NO. 9 - PLAN FOR STUDYING THE JAPANESE-GERMAN-
ITALIAN ANTI-COMINTERN PACT
(Decided July 19, 1938)

To study with the policy of strengthening the Japanese-German-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact.

NO. 10 - PROCEDURE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CHANG KU-FENG INCIDENT
(Decided July 22, 1938)

Have made preparations for emergencies.

The use of the prepared military power is to be carried out by the Imperial Order after negotiation among the authorities concerned.

NO. 11 - CORRECTIONS
(Decided July 22, 1938)

1. To erase "to plan for the fall of Fa-pi" in Par. 5 in "The Strategy Toward China in Conformity with the Current Situation."
2. To erase Par. 5 regarding economy, communication and relief of No. 3 of the inner guidance principles for the Chinese political power in the separate paper of the Policy to Guide the Establishment of a New Central Government of China, and change Par. 6 to Par. 5.

NO. 12 - SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CHINESE AFFAIRS.
(Decided July 26, 1938)

- (1) The Special Commission for China belongs to the Five Ministers' Council and is an executive organ exclusively for working out important strategies against China and establishing the new Chinese Central Government in accordance with the decision of the Council.
- (2) Every organ at the actual places concerned with the above mentioned business is directed by the Special Commission for China in connection with the said business.
- (3) The Army and Navy Ministers will be in charge of the liaison between the Special Commission for China and the Imperial Headquarters.

NO. 13 - COMMENTARY ON THE SPECIAL COMMISSION
ON CHINESE AFFAIRS
(Decided July 29, 1938)

- (1) Composition of the Special Commission for China in Par. 1

The Commission is understood as an organ under the leadership of DOIHARA, TSUDA and BANZAI.

(2) The important strategems against China in Par. 1 are understood as political and economic strategies which are not directly connected with military operations.

(3) Interpretation of Par. 2.

It is understood that the Supreme Command organ is not included in the local organs. However, if there is the necessity of adjusting a certain strategem of the Supreme Command organ with that of the Commission, both will be adjusted through their channels of subordination as mentioned in Par. 3.

NO. 14 - REGARDING SETTLEMENT OF THE PENDING
MATTERS TOWARD BRITAIN

(Decided August 19, 1938)

Matters regarding the settlement of the matters pending with England decided on July 8, are to be negotiated and decided by three central ministries: the places affected are to be given instructions; and they are to be carried out promptly. To attain this a meeting of the secretaries of the three ministries is to be held immediately.

NO. 15 - OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE

(Decided September 9, 1938)

CONTENTS

- I. The Policy.
- II. Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee.
- III. The Organization and the Powers of the Joint Committee.
- IV. Outline for Guidance of the Joint Committee.

I. The Policy

To establish a Joint Committee in accordance with the Policy to Guide the Establishment of the New Central Government of China agreed upon at the Conference of the Five Ministers', 15 July 1938 /Showa 13/.

II Outline for the Establishment of the Joint Committee

1. The establishment of the Joint Committee is to be carried out mainly by China, but is to be unofficially assisted by the Japanese Government. Assistance shall be offered to China after due approval by the Central Government of a locally framed plan for the guidance in the establishment of the Joint Committee.
2. When the Japanese Government's concrete plan concerning the guidance of the establishment of the Joint Committee is completed, with the assistance of the administrative guidance organs of North China and of Central China, a Preparatory Committee meeting shall be opened in Dairon which shall make the various preparations for setting up a Federal Committee.

3. The Joint Committee shall be held in Peiping, based on the preparations made by the Preparatory Committee.

III The Organization and Powers of the Joint Committee

Basis for Chinese assistance in setting up a Federal Committee is roughly as follows:

1. The Joint Committee is to have jurisdiction over matters concerning the political affairs common to the Provisional Government and the Restoration Government, and is to facilitate the establishment of a new Central Government.
2. The organization of the Joint Committee shall be generally as follows:
 - (1) The Joint Committee is to be located in Peiping for the time being.
 - (2) The Provisional Government and the Restoration Government shall each send three members to the Joint Committee; one member of each of these groups to be permanently appointed standing members. In case the Mongolia-Sing-Kiang Committee participates, it shall send two members to the Joint Committee.
 - (3) Senior committeemen shall be selected from among the members.
 - (4) The standing committee shall consist of the senior committeemen and of the standing committeemen.
 - (5) An office (Jimukyoku) is to be set up in the Joint Committee, with one director (Jimukyoku Socho) (temporary appointment) and several personnel.
 - (6) The Senior Committee shall have jurisdiction over the committee and shall manage its affairs.
 - (7) Committee meetings are to be held at any time, and are to be proposed when the Senior Committee and both governments consider them necessary.
 - (8) When the committee is not in session, the standing committee shall take charge of joint business for the committee.
 - (9) The debates of the committee and the standing committee cannot be decided without the approval of all members of the standing committee.
 - (10) The office director (Jimukyoku Socho) controls the office staff and manages affairs concerning the Joint Committee, under orders from the Senior Committee.
 - (11) Each government bears part of the expense necessary to the Joint Committee.

3. The powers of the Joint Committee shall be as follows:

- (1) The committee is to confer concerning such matters as unofficial control of railways, communications, postal services, finance, maritime customs, consolidated tax, salt business, education, thought control, etc., of both the Provisional and the Restoration Governments.
- (2) Matters decided by the Joint Committee or Governments Committee shall be executed by either the Joint Committee or by the Governments, depending on the nature of the matter. Matters executed by either of the governments shall be reported to the Joint Committee.

IV. Outline for Guidance of the Joint Committee

(1) The North China and Central China administrative control organs are to be closely linked with the Special Committee for China in guiding the Joint Committee. Accordingly, as the occasion demands, the heads of the above mentioned administrative control organs shall open Liaison Meetings.

(2) The North China Administrative Control Organ shall be responsible for control of guiding the affairs of the Joint Committee and its office.

(3) The Joint Committee and both the Provisional and newly established governments shall be guided in such a way as to get consent previously from the Administrative Control Organ of that place for such things as opening Joint Committee meetings, introducing bills, and carrying out decisions.

(4) The central authority must previously approve the important matters concerning the guidance of the Joint Committee and of its office (Jimukyoku).

NO. 16 - CONCERNING THE SETTING UP OF A COMMITTEE FOR
LIAISON WITH THE CONFERENCE ON THE FIVE MINISTERS
(Decided October 7, 1938 /Showa 13/)

1. Object of setting it up:

The committee for liaison with the Conference of the Five Ministers (temporary appointment) is established in order to accelerate the performance of matters agreed upon by the Conference of the Five Ministers in connection with disposal of the situation in China, and, in case of necessity, in order to study and investigate measures to be discussed by the Conference of the Five Ministers.

II. Organization:

This committee is a secret committee belonging to the Conference of the Five Ministers and is organized as follows:

Members: Chief of East Asia Bureau, Foreign Office
 The Chief of the First East Asia Section
 Chief of Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry.
 Chief of Foreign Affairs Section
 Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
 Chief of Military Affairs Section
 Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
 Chief of First Naval Section.

Secretaries: The Chief of the First East Asia Section, Foreign Office.
 Chief of Foreign Affairs Section, Finance Ministry.
 Chief of Military Affairs Section, War Ministry.
 The Chief of the First Naval Affairs Section, Navy Ministry.

III. Function:

- (1) This committee is to manage affairs according to the object of establishment under the above-mentioned Article I.
- (2) This committee, therefore, is to determine the outline of concrete execution of acceleration of the performance of matters decided by the Conference of the Five Ministers, and to transfer them to each government office concerned.
- (3) The agenda of the Conference of the Five Ministers agreed upon by this Committee is to be introduced to the Conference of the Five Ministers by the chairman of Conference of the Five Ministers.
- (4) When some of the affairs controlled by the Third Committee need to be presented to the Conference of the Five Ministers, they are to be introduced through this Committee from the Third Committee.
- (5) This committee is to be abolished when (Tai Shi In) China Affairs Board is established.

/Army/

Division Jointly responsible for
War Affairs Division.

Item 112
/Page 112/

Period of preservation: 10 years.

Designation of Approval: per authority of the Vice Minister.

Designation of Execution: USHIJIMA /seal/

/seal/ KAWAHARA on behalf of

Received by: War Ministry
No. RIKU MAN-MITSU-UKI 1120.

Office of Origin: Finance Division

Subject: Allocation of Secret Service Funds under the Manchurian
Incident Expenditure.

/seals/

Minister: Entrusted
Vice Minister: FURUSHO, Senior Adjutant : USHIJIMA per KOSONOYE on
behalf of

Adjutant in charge: KOSONOYE /one more seal not clear/

Bureau Chief in Charge: per OKIDO on behalf of: Chief of the
Competent Division: OKIDO.

Member of the Section in Charge: SAWAMOTO

Person having prepared the draft for deliberation: YAMASHINA

Competent Bureau and Division; No. KEIMITSU-10

Joint Responsibility: Bureau Chief by MURAKAMI on behalf of:
Division Chief: MURAKAMI

Ministry's Secretariat: Received November 26 of the year ____ of SHŌWA.
Finished November 30 of the year ____ of SHŌWA.

Proposition directed to the Chief of the Finance Division of the
Intendance Bureau.

/MANMITSU/

Secret Service Funds under the Manchurian Incident Expenditure should
be disbursed as indicated below:

No. RIKUMANMITSU-340 - November 26, 1935.

/There are two undecipherable seals given here./

TO: Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army NISHIO Toshizo - ¥1,300,000

Chief of Staff of the Garrison Army in China SAKAI Takeshi - ¥140,000
Chief of Staff of the Army in Korea OGUSHI Keikichi - ¥16,000
Chief of Staff of the Army in Formosa OGISU Tatsuei - ¥4,000
Vice War Minister FURUSHO Mikio - ¥175,250
Asst. Chief of Army General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen - ¥165,420
Military Police Commandant IWASA Rokuro - ¥8,800
/Commandant of?/ Military Police Unit detailed to Shanghai
KAWAMURA Aizo .. ¥2,500

Draft of Telegram (Code) from the Vice Minister to the Chief
of Staff of the Army in CHOSSEN. "Army MAN"

Sixteen thousand yen is granted as Secret Service Funds from the
Manchurian Incident Expenses to meet the needs of your Army from
December till March, 1936.

Army MAN. No. 683
November 26, 1935
/seal/ AMAGAYA

Item 93
/Page 93/

Inspected
Received War Ministry/ RIKUMAN-MITSU Receipt No. 1077
Finished Nov. 27

Vice Minister: Finished
/Military Affairs/: Finished (seals)

/Secret/ Adjutant: /USHIJIMA/

Identical Text to Army General Staff
Headquarters No.

Deciphering of Telegram
Despatched: 5:00 pm) November 12
Received: 8:40 pm)

Addressed to: The War Minister-Sender: The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army

KWANTUNG STAFF I TELEGRAM 763

According to the object described in separate telegram, KWANTUNG-STAFF I TELEGRAM 762, we decided to concentrate a part of the forces outside the Great Wall in order to suitably cooperate with the China Garrison Army in case of need and issued orders at noon today, the 12th, to take the following measures:

The 1st Independent Infantry Regiment, one light tank company of the Third Tank Battalion one battalion of the 9th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment and the 1st Independent Engineer Company shall be placed under the command of the Commander of the First Mixed Brigade and shall be made to concentrate the forces near SHANHAIKWAN by November 15th so as to be prepared for advancing into North China. However, as to advancing to the south of SHANHAIKWAN, same shall depend on Army orders.

(End)

Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 599

(seals)

Urgent General Staff, Multiple Telegram
Translation of (Sent 4:10 pm June 29
Telegram (Arrived 6:55 pm June 29

Addressed to the Vice Minister
Sender: The Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army.

KWAN SAN TEL NO. 2

Taking into consideration the situation in the North China and Mongolia Areas, it is absolutely necessary for the Army to establish Special Service Facilities in CHAHAR and SUIYAN, and therefore we hope you will take into account the opinion expressed in KWAN SAN ICHI HATSU

NO. 1018, dated 3 July and immediately consider increasing and placing two required officers, that is, one field officer and one commissioned officer under the major in the present staff.

The increase of two officers, one field officer and one commissioned officer under the major, made for intelligence purposes in accordance with RIKU MAN MITSU NO. 186, is understood by this army as the necessary member for the study of North Manchuria.

(End)

TOP SECRET - Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 1106 (seals)

KAN SAKU REI NO. 731
ORDERS OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

Issued by Kwantung Army Headquarters
at Hsinking, Nov. 16 - 6:30 p.m.

1. In view of the subsequent situation in North China, the Army intends to gather part of its air force outside Shanhaikwan.
2. The commander of the Air Forces shall order scout planes, fighters, heavy bombers, each forming two squadrons and commanded by regiment commanders to advance between Shanhaikwan, Suichung and Chinchou by the twentieth of January and to make preparations for marching towards Peiping-Tientsin Area.
3. The Railway Line Sector Commanders of the Kwantung Army shall dispose railway transportation service in order to facilitate the transference of the said air squadrons.
4. I am in Hsinking,

Commander of the Kwantung Army
General MINAMI

Method of transmission - Telephone to the F.M. sector and afterwards printed matters to be sent.

Addressees: - The Army Units, Organic Units in general, War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, the Tientsin Army.

/Page 48/

(Seals)

TOP SECRET - Received by War Ministry/ RIKUMAN MITSU JU NO. 1181 (seals)

KWAN SAKU MEI NO. 736
ORDERS OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY

14th December, noon at the Kwantung
Army Headquarters in Hsinking.

1. The conditions in NORTH CHINA are gradually becoming more serious and our Garrisons in China anticipate the use of force.

December 24 (settled)

One copy is kept in) Seal of the
this Section) Officer in Charge
December 16 :) Military Affair
Section.

General LI SHOU HSIN's troops are expected to march toward the northern part of KALGAN to guard the eastern part of CHAHAR.

The troops are generally expected to begin their movements on about the 7th of December from TO LUN.

2. Our troops intend to strengthen our preparations to cooperate with the Garrisons in CHINA.

3. The commander of the 11th Independent mixed Brigade shall despatch, as soon as possible, a force under command of a regiment-commander, including an infantry battalion and a company of field-artillery (required number of wireless instruments and motor transport corps shall be attached) to TO LUN to be ready to meet any change in the situation.

He shall also despatch some powerful officer patrols to CHANG PING, SHUN I and TUNG CHOU to investigate the movements of the Chinese troops in the said Area.

4. The commander of the Air Group shall order the commander of the Temporary-Despatched-Air-Force not only to keep in close touch with the Garrisons in China but also to be ready at any moment, to cooperate with the 11th Independent Mixed Brigade, keeping in touch with them.

5. The commander of the KWANTUNG Army Motor-Transport Corps shall immediately despatch a Motor-Transport Company to PING CHUAN to be placed under the command of the 11th Independent Mixed-Brigade-commander.

6. The 3rd Signal-Battalion-Commander shall immediately despatch one signal Section to PING CHUAN to be placed under the command of the 11th Independent-Mixed-Brigade-Commander.

7. The KWANTUNG Army Railway-Line Sector Commander shall handle the rail transportation of the above mentioned units.

8. I, myself am in Hsin King.

Commander of the KWANTUNG Army.
General MINAMI

Method of transmission: - Telegram to IIBS, Telephone to all others and printed matters to be sent afterwards.

Addressees:- IBS Garrisons in China after telegram to the above, all troops under any command, the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.

MAN MITSU NO. 1181 Part 1

(seals)

Re CORRECTION OF ERRORS IN THE
ORDER OF 4 December KWANTUNG
ARMY HEADQUARTERS.

(Seals)

The Order No. KWAN, SAKU MEI NO. 736 issued by KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters on the 4th of December shall be read as follows:

ITEM NO. 2

now reading "The Garrisons in North China" shall read "The Garrisons in China".

Re: Interpretation of the Special
Committee on China Affairs.

Decided upon by the Five Ministers'
Conference, on July 29th Showa 13 (1938)

1. The composition of the Special Committee on
China Affairs in Art. 1.

It is understood that this is an organ with
DOIHARA, TSUDA and BENSUI as the nucleus.

2. The necessary counter-measures with regard
to China stated in Art. 1, are understood to be
political and economic and do not include those
directly connected with war operations.

3. The interpretation of Art. 2.

The local organization is understood to
exclude the supreme command. If adjustment is
necessary between the strategic services of the
supreme command and this Committee, such adjustment
should be made in accordance with the system of their
subordination as per Art. 3.

Doc. No. 1519-B

Page 1.

Head of Telegraph Section
(sealed)

Person in charge of Sending:
(sealed)

Supervisor: Head of the Bureau
of East Asia
(sealed)

Chief Official: Chief of the 1st Section of
the Bureau of East Asia;
Chief of the 2nd Section of
Bureau of East Asia
(signed)

Drawn up: June 13, 1939.

Transmission No. 14476

Sent: 10.30 p.m., June 13, 1939.

To:

From:

Consul-General MIURA, Shanghai.

Foreign Minister ARITA.

Name of Case:

Recording Name of Case:

Re T. MURACHI (T.N. Wang) Movements.

Cipher: No. 895

(TOP SECRET)

To Councillor MORISHIMA from SHIMIZU. Isamu GOTO, Michio KIMURA, and Masaru HARA--these three persons are scheduled to start from here for your place on the 16th.

They are expected to engage continuously in thought movements by request of Lieutenant-General DOIHARA, whom you know of; and as Colonel IMAI conceives an ardent desire to give them assistance as before, after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA, it was decided to make the KAGESA Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses.

Doc. No. 1519-B

Page 1.

Head of Telegraph Section
(sealed)

Person in charge of Sending:
(sealed)

Supervisor: Head of the Bureau
of East Asia
(sealed)

Chief Official: Chief of the 1st Section of
the Bureau of East Asia;
Chief of the 2nd Section of
Bureau of East Asia
(signed)

Drawn up: June 13, 1939.

Transmission No. 14476

Sent: 10.30 p.m., June 13, 1939.

To:

From:

Consul-General MIUR., Shanghai.

Foreign Minister ARITA.

Name of Case:

Recording Name of Case:

Re T. IZUCHI (T.N. Wang) movements.

Cipher: No. 895

(TOP SECRET)

To Councillor MORISHIMA from SHIMIZU, Isamu GOTO, Michio KIHARA, and Masaru HARA--these three persons are scheduled to start from here for your place on the 16th.

They are expected to engage continuously in thought movements by request of Lieutenant-General DOHHLARA, whom you know of; and as Colonel IMAI conceives an ardent desire to give them assistance as before, after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA it was decided to make the KAGESA Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses.

cc. No. 1519-B

Head of Telegraph Section
(sealed)

Person in charge of Sending:
(sealed)

Supervisor: Head of the Bureau
of East Asia
(sealed)

Chief Official: Chief of the 1st Section of
the Bureau of East Asia;
Chief of the 2nd Section of
Bureau of East Asia
(signed)

Drawn up: June 13, 1939.

Transmission No. 14476

Sent: 10.30 p.m., June 13, 1939.

To:

From:

Consul-General MIUR., Shanghai.

Foreign Minister ARITA.

Name of Case:

Recording Name of Case:

Re TAKEUCHI (T.N. Wang) movements.

Cipher: No. 895

(TOP SECRET)

To Councillor MORISHIMA from SHIMIZU. Isamu GOTO, Michio KIHARA, and Masaru HARA--these three persons are scheduled to start from here for your place on the 16th.

They are expected to engage continuously in thought movements by request of Lieutenant-General DOHIRE, whom you know of; and as Colonel IMAI conceives an ardent desire to give them assistance as before, after deliberation with Colonel KAGESA, it was decided to make the KAGESA Organ and the Embassy help them with movement expenses; and such being the case, I hope you will give them ¥3,000 defraying it from your political movement expenses.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

2 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Lopez
SUBJECT : ITAGAKI

Hereto attached is copy of chronological summary of defense
evidence on ITAGAKI, Seishiro.

PL
Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor
for the Philippines

Attachment.

Provisional Draft

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE
ON
ITAGAKI, Seishiro

- From October 1928 to August 1932 Witness was in charge of operations as staff officer of the Kwantung Army (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,108). ITAGAKI was senior staff officer (22,114).

ITAGAKI as senior staff officer had perfect control of the staff officers headquarters; he was confident no one would dare attempt an irregular conduct (22,116).
- I was the Colonel commanding the 29th Infantry Regiment, under the 2d division, when I was dispatched in April 1931 to Manchuria (Direct examination of HIRATA, Yukihiro, p. 19,275). In Mukden the 29th Infantry Regiment was there stationed under my command (19,277).
- Col ITAGAKI and the intendants officers attached to the staff were in charge of the special fund available for expenses of intelligence work, cost of patrolling and various reception purposes (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,120). This fund was sometimes referred to as the KIMITSUHI fund. 50,000 yen was allotted to the Kwantung Army during peace time (19,121).
- At the beginning the Staff Office consisted of Staff Officer ITAGAKI, himself, the witness and others totalling six. (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,882). ITAGAKI was Chief of the General Affairs Department and witness assisted him. As staff officer he was assistant to ITAGAKI (18,930)
- Witness was attached to the Staff of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Mukden Incident, and was Major General, Commander of the 202d Division at the termination of the war (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,882).
- ITAGAKI was connected with the Kwantung Army in August 1931, as staff officer he knew of the operational plans of the Kwantung Army (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,158). There was not much going on in the Kwantung Army that Witness did not know about (22,158).

ITAGAKI was not fully conversant with everything in Tokyo as regards the military (22,159).
- ITAGAKI was one of the staff officers in charge of the Special Service Organ. The chief of the organ is under the direct jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,208). General DOHARA was head of this organ (22,209).
- Asked if Colonel ITAGAKI and Colonel ISHIHARA were the ones really who controlled the policies of the Kwantung Army witness replied that ITAGAKI was in charge of liaison and that Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA was in charge of operations (19,111). In the Japanese Army it was the custom of the high command not to have any officer interfere with the work of another officer in charge and not to let any other people know about the operations but the officer in charge (Cross-exam. of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,111-112).

- * Asked if ITAGAKI consulted with central authorities as to the failure of the diplomatic negotiations, Witness answered, I believe that when ITAGAKI went to Tokyo on business he did hear of it during the course of that visit (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,193). Witness stated all Japan discussed about the failure of the diplomatic negotiations.

Asked if ITAGAKI believed that an armed conflict was inevitable, Witness answered "we did not believe that an armed conflict was absolutely inevitable" (22,197). He did not give up hope until the last minute but believed the possibility of armed conflict as extremely likely (22,197-198).

Asked for the second time if ITAGAKI entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable: "I believe he did entertain such an idea" (22,198).

DOHARA was not as fully aware of the actual situation in Manchuria as ITAGAKI or myself (22,198). This inevitability was reported to the central authorities in Tokyo by ITAGAKI and all other officers of the Kwantung Army who went to Tokyo (22,199).

- * General HISHIKARI ordered the installation of the heavy guns for Mukden (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,184). ITAGAKI knew of this (22,186). The mounting of the two heavy guns was a matter that had been decided back in 1929 before ITAGAKI came (22,186).

- * Witness admits discussing with ITAGAKI the tense diplomatic situation at the time of the installation of the heavy guns (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, pp. 22,186-22,187). Witness did not know if ITAGAKI discussed it with the consul at Mukden (22,187).

- * ITAGAKI's actions on or around the 18th of September were in accordance with the policy of HONJO, especially because in the afternoon of the 18th he had completed a tour of the division to the south of Hsinking (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, by OKAMOTO, p. 22,154). It was very rational that Col ITAGAKI should understand the firm instructions of the commander-in-chief, guide Col HIRATA to take appropriate and speedy action (22,155). Witness expressed belief that even if ITAGAKI had not given HIRATA any guidance, HIRATA would have done what he did (22,155-156).

- * Witness was with HONJO on the night of September 18, 1941 at Port Arthur while ITAGAKI was in Mukden (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,215). He and HONJO had left ITAGAKI on the afternoon of September 18 (22,215). The next time he saw ITAGAKI was on the evening of September 19 (22,215). It was on the evening of September 19th ITAGAKI reported to the commander-in-chief and he was present when he made the report. He had no personal knowledge of ITAGAKI's actions (22,216). ITAGAKI reported to HONJO that General TATAKAWA asked him (ITAGAKI) if the younger officers were not excited over the Captain NAKAMURA Incident, to which ITAGAKI replied in the negative. Then ITAGAKI asked TATAKAWA for what purpose he had come to Mukden. TATAKAWA said "on hearing what you have to say on the NAKAMURA case, I am extremely relieved. Today I am very tired. Let us meet and talk about the situation tomorrow." Then ITAGAKI who had intended to have a drinking party with TATAKAWA had to leave that night without even taking a sip, at TATAKAWA's request. Therefore we were unable to find out TATAKAWA's specific purpose in coming to Manchuria. I received no other reports concerning TATAKAWA's purpose (22,218).

• Witness did not know why ITAGAKI was in Mukden that night, neither did he know that Major General TATAKAWA was there (Direct examination of HIRATA, Yukihiro, p. 19,307).

• General HONJO, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army sent Colonel ITAGAKI from Liaoyang to receive the arrival of Major General TATEKAWA at Mukden (18,903); witness showed a telegram to staff officers ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA and General HONJO and received their signature (18,923); the directions came from War Minister MINAMI (18,923). Witness personally gave the gist of the telegram to HONJO and the two other officers read the telegram (18,923). Witness reported to HONJO that the Chief of the General Staff had sent instructions that troops not be sent to Harbin (18,923). Instruction from the Prime Minister was received that it was the policy not to protect the area and that this matter had been reported to the Emperor (18,924). (Direct examination of Tadashi, KATAKURA, p. 18,903).

• Asked if it would be right to say that it was ITAGAKI who ordered him (18 Sept) and Colonel SHIMAMOTO to make these attacks the witness replied he did not believe that ITAGAKI had the authority to give direct orders (Direct examination of HIRATA, Yukihiro, p. 19,307-19,308). At this point the President asked the witness, did he give you the orders whether he had authority or not; and the witness replied that he did not give any orders (19,309). On page 19,311 the President had the witness recalled and was asked, if ITAGAKI had no authority to give orders why did you request his approval of your plan of attack; and the witness replied that he did not ask for his approval; he merely informed him of his resolve to conduct the attack and to inform the commander-in-chief of his resolution to do so (19,311). Here the President reminded the witness that on page 11 of Exhibit 2404 which is his affidavit the following appears: "I, therefore, asked ITAGAKI to approve my operational plan --," and you go on to say that you said "I request your approval of our occupying the enemy's positions as far as the west wall." He gave his approval." (19,311-312). The Witness answered that it was ITAGAKI's opinion that attacks would be carried out. (19,312). Then the President said "You cannot evade answering the question that way. You say in your affidavit you sought ITAGAKI's approval of your plan. You say here that you had no authority to direct it. How do you reconcile the two? The Witness answered because of the difference of the views of ITAGAKI and myself I merely asked that he approve of my views (19,312).

Asked by the President how he knew of ITAGAKI's opinion the witness answered he knew it when he informed ITAGAKI of his own plans (19,313). Then the President told him that: "You said you told ITAGAKI of your plan because you knew his contrary opinion before that." To this the witness replied: "That is not true". The soliloquy was cut by the President stating "we can form our own conclusions" (19,313). Note that the blunder of this witness caused defense counsel to direct a question to the subsequent witness HISASHI TAKEDA (19,320), calculated to change the meaning of the word "directions" as used in his affidavit (19,358). The President immediately

interposed by saying "Directions means directions." (19,358). When defense counsel persisted on going around the word "directions", the Prosecution objected that it was an attempt to get a witness to "explain away a part of his affidavit which happens to be inconvenient in view of what happened this morning." The President said, "we don't want the assistance of the witness on that point" (19,359).

- ITAGAKI is a man of very moderate temperament (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,210). Witness denies having stated in the direct examination that ITAGAKI was entitled to give orders (22,210). ITAGAKI did not have authority to issue orders to HIRATA (22,211). Witness insisted that Col ITAGAKI had only the authority to give guidance in line with the policy of Commander-in-Chief and that Col HIRATA was a very brave man, the attack was actually carried out without the need of guidance from Col ITAGAKI. That is the impression I gained on 19 September when I heard ITAGAKI reporting to HONJO (22,212). ITAGAKI reported to HONJO he had intended to tell the two commanders but it was not necessary as they had made their own decision (22,213).

ITAGAKI had no authority to give orders to HIRATA but he might give instructions in accordance with the commander-in-chief (22,213).

- Until the afternoon of the 18th of September 1931, ITAGAKI was on an inspection tour together with the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, and on the afternoon of the 18th was in Liaoyang (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, by OKAMOTO, p. 22,153). That same night he returned to Mukden (22,153).

- On 18 September 1931 Commander HONJO received a telegram from Chief of Staff MIYAKE at Port Arthur, requesting that staff officer ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA to stay in Mukden, as Major General TATAKAWA was arriving there from Tokyo. (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, pp. 22,117-118). ITAGAKI was ordered by General HONJO to go to Mukden also for the purpose of contacting the Mukden Military Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General concerning the NAKAMURA case (22,117-118).

ITAGAKI saw TATAKAWA who arrived late at night on the same day but left him without obtaining the details of the message under agreement that they were to meet again the next day (22,122).

- Asked if he was aware ITAGAKI instructed Regimental Commander HIRATA and commander of the garrison SHIMAMOTO that same night at Mukden, witness answered that ITAGAKI, HIRATA and SHIMAMOTO took common action (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, by OKAMOTO, p. 22,153). Witness expressed belief that great care should be exercised in using the word "guide" instead of "instruct" (22,153-154). ITAGAKI had no authority to give orders to HIRATA or SHIMAMOTO; he might guide them, conveying to them the idea of the commander-in-chief (22,154).

- * ITAGAKI gave certain directions as occasion required concerning the war situation in Mukden, as the incident took place at that very mid-night (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, p. 22,122). ITAGAKI as senior staff officer was well acquainted with Commander HONJO's intentions. He knew Commander HONJO's ideas clearly. So every step he took in coping with the incident was in conformity with the Commander HONJO's intentions, and as such was approved by the Commander as having contributed to the execution of the operation"--(22,122).
 - * Asked if he knew that the Special Service officer reported to General HONJO's headquarters that the railway had been exploded by three or four companies of Chinese regulars, witness answered that Major HANAYA was not at the Special Service office; instead Staff Officer ITAGAKI was present and therefore witness asked ITAGAKI to send a message to the commander of the 2d Division and to the commander-in-chief of witness' division to make the attack (Direct examination of HIRATA, Yukihiro, p. 19,307).
 - * General TATAKAWA arrived in Manchuria on the 18th of September (19,109) and he was sent because of various wild rumors afloat in Tokyo following the Captain NAKAMURA Incident (Cross-examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,109). On the 17th of September the Kwantung Army received a telegram from TATAKAWA stating that as he was going to Manchuria he would like to have Colonel ITAGAKI or Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA go to Mukden for purposes of liaison.(19,111)
 - * I don't believe ITAGAKI had time to order investigation as to the extent of the damage caused by the explosion caused by the Chinese Army on the Manchurian Railway (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, pp. 22,209-210). Asked if ITAGAKI was too busy ordering attacks at that moment, witness answered that ITAGAKI had no power to issue orders. Besides I believe ITAGAKI was unable to leave the office of the Special Service Organ because that was the position in which it was most convenient to contact the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and to maintain their contact with the headquarters (22,210).
 - * Asked who made the report to Tokyo that caused Col ANDO to be sent to Manchuria to investigate among others the charge that the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese in spite of the declaration of non-resistance, witness answered that it was our impression that the report was sent out by the Consulate General in Mukden when we had a discussion at the time of the investigation with the Consul General there---(Cross examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,081).
- Asked if ITAGAKI knew at the time of the outbreak that the Chinese had declared a non-resistance policy, witness answered "Not from what ITAGAKI reported to the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, or from what he spoke to the witness about." (19,102). Asked if he learned of a telegram sent from Mukden on the morning of September 19 to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that Col ITAGAKI had such information, witness replied that he should like to make a slight correction (19,102-103). Then, he stated that

on the 19th when HONJO arrived in Mukden Col ITAGAKI made a brief report on the military situation and with respect to his negotiations with the Consul-General HAYASHI and on the same day HAYASHI called on HONJO and spoke of the incident involving the company, Fushun, and also about the non-resistance matter. Then from Tokyo there came instructions that as there were very strange reports emanating from the South Manchurian Railway, and the Kwantung Administrative Office, that all matters should be thoroughly investigated (19,103).

Asked again if he learned from a telegram sent from Mukden that Col ITAGAKI knew of the Chinese proposals of non-resistance, Witness answered that such a telegram did not come (19,103). After the contents (19,105) of telegram No. 623, Exh. 181, ("In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I phoned staff officer ITAGAKI that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war, and that moreover China had declared that she would act upon the non-resistance policy, it was necessary for us to endeavor to prevent the aggravation incident unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but ITAGAKI answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the state and the army it was the army's intention to see it through thoroughly because the Chinese Army had attacked the Japanese Army"), were read to him, witness replied that the first time he knew of the purport of the telegram was when Col ANDO, Chief of the Military Service Section, arrived in Manchuria for the purpose of investigation. It was on the occasion that Witness became informed of the telegram (19,105-106). However, as to the contents of the telegram itself, Witness learned of them very briefly and simply when Col ITAGAKI reported to Commander-in-Chief HONJO (19,106).

Asked if he learned of the sending of another telegram by Consul General HAYASHI on the 15th or 16th of September, to Tokyo, in which it was said in substance that a big event was to occur soon, Witness replied affirmatively, stating that he learned that a telegram to such an effect was sent when he called at the consulate general in Mukden on the 20th of September (19,106). But later on page 19,103 Witness states that he should like to make a slight correction. "What I learned was of three telegrams which had been sent out from Mukden by the Consul General on the morning of the 19th of September."

- * He was a railroad man with the Southern Manchurian Railway following the MUKDEN INCIDENT of September 18, 1931 (Direct examination of YAMAGUCHI, Juichi, p. 18,796).
- * On 22 September 1931 ANDO, Chief of the Military Service Section, came to Manchuria, sent by the War Minister, to investigate four problems (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,930) and ANDO reported his investigation to Commanding General HONJO, Chief of Staff MIYAKE, Colonel ITAGAKI, Lt. Colonel ISHIHARA and himself the Witness (18,931). The four

questions related to (1) the guarding and patrolling of FUSHUN, (2) the report that the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese on the 18th of September notwithstanding Chinese declaration of non-resistance, (3) the use of very offensive words by certain staff officer in a telephone conversation with the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden and to investigate into the attitude taken by that office, and (4) operational matters of the Kwantung Army arising from the outbreak of the Incident (18,932).

Col ITAGAKI happened to be in Mukden at the time of the outbreak of the Incident and had learned from Consul General HAYASHI that inasmuch as the Chinese forces were taking a non-resistance stand he would like to have that considered by the Kwantung Army but in view of the fact that the fighting had already started nothing could be done about it (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,936), and Col ITAGAKI requested Col ANDO to go to the scene of the fighting and investigate into the situation himself by making inquiries from company commanders who had engaged in the fighting, to determine if the fighting had broken out despite the non-resistance of the Chinese (18,937). Witness corrected this, saying it was HONJO who told ANDO to go to the scene of fighting (18,937).

That asked to elaborate on the 3d point of ANDO's investigation concerning the arrogant attitude of a certain staff officer, witness said: "With respect to the telephone conversation in which Consul General HAYASHI spoke of the non-resistance policy of the Chinese side, ITAGAKI was said to have used such sharp words which gave -- carried an impression of the offensive character" (18,938). ITAGAKI made explanation to Col ANDO in the presence of General HONJO about the matter (18,938). NOTE: This is a good point for cross-examination of ITAGAKI, try to elicit what were the specific charges of HAYASHI, what were the words used by ITAGAKI that HAYASHI considered to be very offensive and arrogant?

Regarding the independence movement which existed in the Kirin province Witness stated that on the 22d or 23d of September Lo Chen-Tu went to Mukden and met Colonel ITAGAKI. After contacting Hsi Hsia in Kirin he returned to Mukden after a few days. He said he found that Hsi Hsia had already made preparations for independence and he desired to call Emperor Hsuan Tung to Kirin (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, pp. 18,941-18,942). Witness said that ITAGAKI told him about the conversation and he, the witness, drafted a telegram to the central authorities incorporating the gist of that conversation (18,941-18,942). In reply to it the Vice Minister of War, toward the end of September, sent telegraphic instructions saying that the Kwantung Army should not take part in any way with such movements as the monarchial restoration in Manchuria. Witness further stated that the Kwantung Army did abide by his instructions but for the purpose of obtaining intelligence reports various contacts were made (18,942). NOTE: This shows the importance of ITAGAKI in the scheme of things at the time.

Asked if it was not true that the Kwantung Army sponsored and did everything it could promote the independence movements in Manchuria, the Witness after beating around the bush answered that the assurance, given by Col ITAGAKI to prominent leaders of Manchuria in his interviews with him in various areas of that country, that Japan had no intention of occupying Manchuria nor had

she entertained any territorial designs on Manchuria, served as a suggestion to them for carrying on with the independence movement (Cross examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,061). NOTE: This shows that ITAGAKI was at the bottom of this scheme to make Manchuria a puppet state.

- Witness on (29 September 1931) offered the opinion that the three groups -- stockholders, employees and railway guards -- should jointly run and operate the railroads autonomously (Direct examination of YAMAGUCHI, Juichi, p. 18,819). He stated his views to the mayor then Colonel DOIHARA. He went to the headquarters of the KWANTUNG ARMY and met Colonel ITAGAKI who was then the Senior Staff Officer. ITAGAKI said he had no objections whatever to an autonomous operation of the railway by the Manchurians. He received ITAGAKI's approval (pp. 18,813-18,819).
- In connection with the restoration committee called "A Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order", (Cross-examination of YAMAGUCHI, Juichi, p. 18,875). Witness went to see ITAGAKI. ITAGAKI only expressed agreement on plan of establishment of Committee, but did not participate in the drawing up of the plan. DOIHARA participated and supervised the establishment (p. 18,876). The Committee was formed on the 2d of October 1931 (p. 18,875-76).
- He knew a Manchurian by the name of Yu Chung-han, one of the foremost and leading civil officials in Manchuria, together with Wang Yung-chiang and Yuan Chin-Kai. (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,953). Visited General HONJO on the 3d of November 1931. Asked if he attended the meeting between Yu Chung-han and General HONJO, Witness answered in the negative but said he heard of what transpired from Colonel ITAGAKI and saw the document tendered by Yu-Chung-han at the time (18,953).
- Regarding the organization of the Self Government Guidance Board, see pages (Cross-examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, pp. 22,246-247). It was set up (according to Manchurian Year Book on 9 Nov 1931) for the local Self-Government headed by the Manchurian YU CHUNG-HAN. It was not controlled by the KWANTUNG ARMY (p. 22,246). Asked if the activities of the Board were sanctioned by the KWANTUNG ARMY Witness answered: "I believe it would naturally get in touch with the KWANTUNG Army as far as questions concerning the preservation of order -- peace and order were concerned, but it was the policy of the army not to interfere with the functions of this Board as much as possible (p. 22,247). ITAGAKI had almost no connection with this Board (p. 22,249). Several times ITAGAKI told me of his dissatisfaction at the attempt of the Self-Government Guidance Board to interfere with the functions of TSANG SHIH-YI (p. 22,249).

I do not think ITAGAKI was the political advisor to the Board. Neither was he connected with YU-CHUNG-HAN. Then witness was confronted with question concerning a conversation that he had with Mr. Norton at the Tokyo Teishin Hospital, 25 April 1946, where witness stated that the Board came under the command of the KWANTUNG Army (p. 22,250-251); that anything the Board did had to be sanctioned by the army; and that ITAGAKI, the political advisor, should be able to give a complete report (p. 22,251); and that ITAGAKI was not connected with YU CHUNG-HAN until after the incident (p. 22,252). This conversation with Mr. Norton was confirmed by the witness (p. 22,253).

- * Toward the end of November 1931 Ma Chan-shan, as a result of a military clash with the Japanese army, was defeated in the field and retreated to the north of Harbin to a place called Hailun (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,950). Col ITAGAKI went to Hailun and there obtained an interview with Ma Chan-shan. After Col ITAGAKI explained to Ma Chan-shan the real and true intentions of the Japanese. Han Yun-chieh and Chao Chung-jen persuaded him to accept the position as provisional governor of Heilungkiang (18,950). NOTE: This shows that ITAGAKI was not only a soldier but also a politician and propagandist.
- * Asked with reference to the meeting of Col ITAGAKI with Ma Chan-shan in Hailun, the witness answered that there were two attitudes regarding this question: In the case of Col ITAGAKI meeting Ma Chan-shan in Hailun as Staff officer of the Kwantung Army, it being a very important question, he would do so at the directions and instructions of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. On lesser matters the staff officer may on his own, for purposes of collecting and gathering intelligence and other data, do so at his personal discretion (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 19,063).
- * Witness was not present when ITAGAKI persuaded Ma Chan-shan to become war minister of the new state (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,930, 19,121)
- * In January 1932 there were discussions made between the central Japanese authorities and the Kwantung Army (Direct examination of KATAKURA, Tadashi, p. 18,997) and at the request of the general staff office in Tokyo the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army had Colonel ITAGAKI make a trip to Tokyo (18,997-998). The purpose of ITAGAKI's trip was to try and explain the conditions in the Kwantung Army, the situation developing in various parts of Manchuria and to impress on the central authorities determination and will of General HONJO (18,998). HONJO's determination was that in the light of the independence movements then developing in Manchuria there was no way out to settle the Manchurian

issues other than to settle them in accordance with this independence movement as it gained maturity (18,998). This determination was the result of conversations which HONJO had with Yu-Chun-Han and the investigation tours made by ITAGAKI in various areas in Manchuria to listen to the views and opinions entertained by leading Manchurians; the people of Manchuria knew from these the Kwantung Army had no intention to occupy Manchuria and did not entertain any territorial designs on Manchuria (19,000-001). Witness was present at a staff meeting called by General HONJO where ITAGAKI made a report of his trip to Tokyo. ITAGAKI stated that both the war minister and general staff office understood the situation prevailing in Manchuria but there was no establishment of an independent state. The war minister and general staff authorities understood that the Chang regime could not return to Manchuria nor that the Nanking authority could be established there. It was the intention of the central authorities in Tokyo of maintaining the Kwantung Army on the spot by keeping close contact with the various local regimes to keep, revive and preserve law and order in various parts of Manchuria (19,002-03).

- Juichi YAMAGUCHI maintained that ITAGAKI was not a member of the committee for the organization of the Concordia Society, as military officers did not participate in its establishment (Cross examination of YAMAGUCHI, Juichi, 18,851-52). Note that the witness on page 18,853 later said that the commanding general of the Kwantung Army was honorary advisor of the Society. Confronted with the 3d paragraph from the beginning on page 1, Exh 731 which read "In April 1932 in Mukden a special committee was the foundation of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was formed. The Committee was composed of: Colonel ITAGAKI, Captain KATAKURA", witness was asked if he still persisted in answering that ITAGAKI was not a member of the organization committee Concordia Society, witness replied "Yes". (18,852)
- Witness was Interpreter, first class, at the Japanese Embassy in China in 1934; in the summer of 1936 he was moved to Nanking and remained there until the end of the war in 1945. (Direct examination of Tozo SHIMIZU, 22,254, 22,260).
- Japanese Counsel T. OKAMOTO on behalf of the accused KIDO asked witness if he met Premier KONOYE in January 1938 and when the witness answered in the affirmative he was asked again if Premier KONOYE did not talk with witness on whether he did or did not plan to ask General ITAGAKI to become war minister. Witness said no. (Direct examination of ISHIHARA, Kanji, pp. 22,150-152).
- I am a retired General in the Imperial Army. I became Foreign Minister in the first KONOYE Cabinet in May 1938, succeeded HIROTA, Koki, and was Foreign Minister until I resigned in September 1938. When I was

- Foreign Minister, General ITAGAKI was War Minister and SHIGEMITSU was Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Direct examination of Kazuo UGAKI - 23,859; 23,868)
- Witness was an ex-Lieutenant General, served as Chief of the Chinese Section of the General Staff Office from August 1937, was appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in June 1938, assisted Mr. Wang Ching-wei in moving from Shanghai, and helped him continuously in his movement of establishing a central government (Direct examination of Sadaaki KAGESA - 23,970; 23,976)
- After meeting Premier HIRANUMA, Wang Ching Wei had an interview with Minister of War ITAGAKI on the 11th of June and Witness interpreted again. According to Witness, ITAGAKI gave various explanations from the Army's standpoint but the important point of his explanation was that Japan did not have any aggressive intention towards China, but took military action for the purpose of destroying anti-Japanese Army elements organized in collaboration with Nationalist and Communist parties; that Japan never regarded the Chinese people as enemies although she was opposed to Communism. (Direct Examination, Toso SHIMIZU, 22,254; 22,264-65).

After this interview, Mr. Wang met again Minister of War ITAGAKI, and again the Witness was interpreter. They exchanged opinions concerning "Concrete Measures for Saving the Situation" which was previously handed to Mr. ITAGAKI by Mr. Wang. The proceedings concerning the establishment of the Central Government were primarily based on this document (22,265).

The document contained among others, all the Peoples Representatives Temporary Conference to be held with Mr. Wang as Chief of the Nationalist Party; the Assembly; the resolution for the return of the Central Government to the former seat of the government; the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag to be used as the national flag; the government to include men of all parties and groups. (22,266)

ITAGAKI asked various questions and took a standpoint of cross-examining Mr. Wang to test the feasibility of realizing his desire (22,266). ITAGAKI said he agreed with those complete measures but insofar as the use of the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag was concerned, which at that time was used by the Anti-Japanese Government, he suggested that it might cause difficulty in distinguishing one government from the other and so he requested that steps be taken to devise a means of distinguishing them. (22,267)

During his stay in Tokyo, Mr. Wang submitted a document to the War Minister entitled "Desire towards Japan concerning the realization of the principle of respecting China's sovereignty." The document called Japan's attention to the independence and autonomy of China's domestic administration. (22,267)

- He was a Witness to the interview between Mr. Wang Ching-wei and War Minister ITAGAKI in the morning of 15 June 1939. Acting in the capacity as proxy for Premier HIRANUMA, War Minister ITAGAKI stated just what was expected by Japan and exchanged opinions. He observed that the War Minister was specially careful in the choice of his words so as to avoid giving any impression to Mr. Wang of interfering with the internal policy of China. Gist of the conversation: ITAGAKI asked Wang what was his opinion concerning the liquidation of past affairs arising out of the - 11 -

doctrine of "one nation, one party." Wang answered he held the same opinion and had the desire to live up to the Minister's expectations. The ITAGAKI said if Wang had any opinion as to the adjustment and promotion of Sino-Japanese cooperation and anti-Communism; Mr. Wang replied he was of the same opinion. ITAGAKI also pointed out to Wang that the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag denotes anti-Japanism and in actual military actions it could be misunderstood. Mr. Wang promised to plan a method of distinguishing between the Nanking and Chungking flags. Likewise the Minister sought Wang's opinion on the recognition of Manchukuo. (Pp. 23,972; 23,984; Direct examination of Sadaaki KAGESA).

Knowing that the staff officers were against the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag, ITAGAKI summoned them to Tokyo for a conference. Here they were persuaded by ITAGAKI to follow his will. ITAGAKI informed the Five Ministers Conference of these happenings and it was decided to respect, without reservations, the desires of Mr. Wang (23,895-96)

- Answering a direct examination of Japanese Counsel YAMADA on behalf of the accused ITAGAKI, Witness stated that on June 11, during the first meeting between ITAGAKI and WANG CHING-WEI, ITAGAKI stated that the war aims of the Japanese Army were not to regard the Chinese people as enemy but to fight against the Communists and other troops that were working in collusion with them. (Direct Examination of Sadaaki KAGESA, p. 24,005-6).

- On 13 July 1938 we received telegraphic report from the Korean Army that forty Soviet troops had crossed the frontier near Changchi on July 11 and had occupied Changkufeng. The Supreme Command thought that it was only a small conflict and decided not to have the incident aggravated, decided to order the Korean Army to adopt a cautious attitude and settle the affairs through regular diplomatic channels. This policy was telegraphed to the Korean Army and at the same time the War Ministry proposed to the Foreign Office the negotiations of the affair. (Direct examination of Gun HASHIMOTO - 22,575; 22,586-87)

- Asked if ITAGAKI told him that he wanted to use force and attack the Russians in their position, Witness answered that he did not hear of such a thing (Changkufeng Incident, July 1938) (Cross examination of Kazushige UGAKI - 23,884-85).

Asked if it was his opinion that no attack should be made on the Russians, Witness answered in the affirmative and that he also recollected that ITAGAKI held the same opinion (23,886)

Asked if he and Admiral YONAI went to express their opinion to the Emperor, the Witness replied that he went to the Emperor to report on another matter concerning foreign affairs. On that occasion, Witness

reported to the Emperor that the Soviets might take an offensive and cross the border in which eventuality the Army must be prepared to cope with the situation. (23,886-87). In that eventuality the War Minister would consult with me before taking any action. The above is what the War Minister told me and it is what I reported to the Emperor as the War Minister's words (23,887).

Asked if ITAGAKI threatened to resign shortly after the outbreak of the Changkufeng Incident, Witness said he never heard of such a thing. (23,887) Witness stated he did not know that the Chief of Staff threatened to resign (23,887)

Asked if ITAGAKI and the Chief of Staff had been together to see the Emperor, Witness said he did not remember such details (23,808).

Asked if they asked permission to use force against the Russians in this Incident, Witness said that might have happened. Since this is a matter that concerned the use of the Army, he believed it was but natural that they should ask his permission. (23,808)

At this point, Witness reiterated his former statement that War Minister told that the Russians might cross the border and in that eventuality, the Army was to be prepared. (23,888)

Asked if he knew that the Emperor asked ITAGAKI whether he had obtained the agreement of other Ministers concerned to the proposal to attack the Russians by force, Witness stated "no". (23,889)

Asked that ITAGAKI replied that Witness and Admiral YONAI had agreed, Witness answered that the point in which he agreed with ITAGAKI was that the Army must be prepared for any eventuality. (23,889)

Confronted with the suggestion that ITAGAKI said the exact opposite, the Witness stated he did not hear of such a thing. (23,889)

Asked if He didn't hear that the Emperor had told ITAGAKI that Witness and Admiral YONAI had told the Emperor the exact opposite of what ITAGAKI said, Witness stated he did not know (23,889)

Asked if the Emperor accused ITAGAKI of trying to deceive him, Witness replied that he did not know (23,890)

Asked if he didn't know that the Emperor said that this was as bad as the Manchukuo and Marco Polo Bridge cases where there was no obedience to central orders, Witness replied he did not know. (23,890)

Asked if he did not hear that the Emperor told ITAGAKI he must not move one soldier without his express command, Witness replied "No."

Confronted with the suggestion that it was for that reason that ITAGAKI and the Chief of Staff both threatened to resign, Witness replied he never heard of knew of such a thing. (23,890)

Asked if it did not come to his knowledge that ITAGAKI and the Chief of Staff said that it was the Witness who had deceived the Emperor, Witness said he did not hear of such a thing at all.

Asked if there was not considerable trouble until finally ITAGAKI agreed to remain on and try and carry out the Emperor's orders, Witness replied he did not hear of such a thing. (23,890)

Asked if Witness were not unpopular with some of his old colleagues in the Army because back in 1928 he was responsible for reducing the Army by four divisions, Witness replied "Yes." (23,891)

Asked if his colleagues had pursued Witness on through his political life, Witness answered he did not think "pursued" would be the right word but it was true that some of them did obstruct his efforts to form a cabinet. (23,891)

Asked if he knew that on several occasions their opposition prevented him from being recommended as Prime Minister, Witness answered he did not remember although it may have occurred. (23,891)

Confronted with the suggestion that at the time of the Changkufeng Incident, some of his old Army colleagues seized it as the occasion for further attacks upon him because of this dispute between him and ITAGAKI as to what Witness had said to the Emperor, Witness replied that he had never heard of such occurrence.

Asked if it had come to his knowledge that the Japanese attacked the Russians at the second hill and that the Commander on the spot had given the excuse of the Emperor's order that no attack would be made only applied to the Changkufeng Hill, Witness replied he did not remember the small details. (23,893) When told that in fairness to ITAGAKI he did admonish the Army for it, Witness replied it was only natural. (23,893)

Asked if he did hand Wang Ching Wei letters at Hanoi (April 1939), from Foreign Minister ARITA, from War Minister ITAGAKI and SUZUKI of the KO-A-DAI, Witness replied "Yes" and also a letter entrusted to him from the Navy Minister YONAI. (Cross-examination of Sadaaki KAGESA - 24,008; 24,054)

Witness replied the order to him was issued by the War Minister after consultation by the War Minister of the Prime Minister's cabinet. (Cross-examination of Sadaaki KAGESA - 24,008-11,010)