

Doc. 4038

Evid.

Folder 1

(269)



Berlin, den 24. März 1941.

## A u f z e i c h n u n g

Zu dem Schreiben des Ostasiatischen Vereins vom 6. März  
an Herrn Reichsaussenminister:

1) In dem Schreiben wird Klage geführt über die Behandlung, welche die deutschen Firmen in China, Japan und Mandschukuo von japanischen Regierungsstellen erfahren. In China handelt es sich um ein planmässiges Vorgehen der dortigen japanischen zivilen und militärischen Behörden mit der Absicht, unsere Wirtschaftstätigkeit auszuschalten. Dies geschieht <sup>durch</sup> Unterbindung des normalen Verkehrs und Handels, durch Zwischenschaltung von japanischen Kontrollstellen, Monopolen und Zwangsgilden mit ausschliesslich japanischer Mitgliedschaft, durch Ausschaltung der deutschen Firmen aus dem direkten Ueberseeexport, durch ihre diskriminierende Behandlung bei der Waren- und Devisenkontrolle. Alles dies führe praktisch zu einer schlechteren Behandlung deutscher Firmen gegenüber amerikanischen und sogar englischen. In Japan und Mandschukuo wirkten sich die japanischen Kontroll- und Monopolbestrebungen in gleicher Weise aus. Das Ergebnis sei eine Notlage der deutschen Firmen, die sich in von Erbitterung erfüllten und von einer beinahe verzweifelten Stimmung diktierten Berichten aussere (s. Anlagen des Schreibens) und in absehbarer Zeit zum Erliegen des deutschen Handels im Fernen Osten führen müsse.

Das Schreiben beantragt

- a) den deutschen Firmen eine grössere Hilfsstellung zu gewähren durch verstärkte Besetzung der Reichsvertretungen im Fernen Osten mit Wirtschaftsbearbeitern,
- b) eine grundsätzliche Klärung des Status der deutschen Firmen herbeizuführen, and zwar wenn möglich bei den bevorstehenden Verhandlungen der Delegation Wohlthat.

2) Die Darstellung des Ostasiatischen Vereins ist im wesentlichen zutreffend. Die Lage des deutschen Handels in China ist seit 1938 Gegenstand von Besprechungen mit der japani-

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sehen Regierung, mit bei denen wir unter Berufung auf unsere für Japan in China gebrachten Opfer (Abberufung der Militärberater, Unterbindung aller Kriegsmateriallieferungen) Gleichberechtigung mit Japan oder mindestens bevorzugte Behandlung vor 3. Ländern erstrebten. Japan wollte jedoch höchstens eine Meistbegünstigung mit 3. Ländern einräumen. Auch diese wird aber praktisch nicht gewährt. Fortgesetzte Vorstellungen unserer Botschaft hatten keinen Erfolg, auch nicht seit dem Abschluss des Dreimächtepakts.

3) Es wird eine Aufgabe der Delegation Wohlthat sein zu versuchen, eine Besserung dieses unbefriedigenden Zustandes herbeizuführen. Dabei soll eine bevorzugte Behandlung vor 3. Ländern (soweit sie nicht Mitglieder des Dreimächtepakts sind) angestrebt werden, sowie eine Zusage, dass bei Durchführung der japanischen Monopolbestrebungen auf die deutschen Firmen besondere Rücksicht genommen wird.

In der Aufzeichnung für die bevorstehenden Besprechungen mit dem japanischen Außenminister ist auf die Lage des deutschen Handels im Fernen Osten hingewiesen und gebeten worden, dass der Herr Reichsaussenminister zur Erleichterung der Wohlthat-Verhandlungen Herrn Matsuoka zum Ausdruck bringt, dass wir die Behandlung deutscher Wirtschaftsinteressen vor allem in China, aber auch in Japan und Mandschukuo, als durchaus unbefriedigend empfinden, und Herrn Matsuoka womöglich zu der Zusage einer Berücksichtigung der von der Wohlthat-Delegation vorzubringenden Wünsche veranlasst.

4) Ich schlage vor, mich mit der Beantwortung des Schreibens des Ostasiatischen Vereins etwa im folgenden Sinne zu beauftragen: Die schwierige Lage des deutschen Handels in China, Japan und Mandschukuo sei dem Herrn Reichsaussenminister wohl bekannt. Schon bisher habe das Auswärtige Amt das Mögliche getan, um im Rahmen der Wahrung der allgemeinen deutschen Belange im Fernen Osten eine Besserung zu erreichen. Die demnächst nach Tokio ausreisende Wirtschaftsdelegation sei beauftragt worden, auch diese Frage mit der japanischen Regierung aufzunehmen. Das Schreiben des Ostasiatischen Vereins mit seinen Anlagen sei der Delegation zu diesem Zweck zugeleitet worden. gez. Wiehl.

Durchdr. Sn:  
Büro AM  
St. S. *W*  
Botsch. Rittter  
Botschafter Stamer  
U. St. S. Pol.  
Ges. Schnurre  
Dg. Ha. Pol.  
Ha. Pol. VIII.

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gez. Wiehl



Berlin, den 28. März 1941.

GeheimA u f z e i c h n u n g

betreffend deutsch-japanische Wirtschaftsverhandlungen.

Staatsrat Wohlthat hat über seine bevorstehenden Wirtschaftsverhandlungen mit Japan den anliegenden Bericht gefertigt und gebeten, ihn dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister mit der Bitte um Genehmigung vorzulegen. Der Bericht enthält die Richtlinien, nach denen die Verhandlungen geführt werden sollen. Am Schluß sind unter Abschnitt V gewisse Anregungen für die hiesigen Besprechungen mit dem japanischen Außenminister Matsuoka enthalten, die ich in meine dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister für diese Besprechungen vorgelegte Aufzeichnung bereits aufgenommen hatte. Im letzten Absatz auf Seite 6 des Berichts ist ausgeführt, daß der japanische Wunsch auf Überlassung von Patenten und Lizenzen zunächst in Berlin behandelt werden soll, daß jedoch Abschlüsse über die Hergabe von wichtigen Patenten und Lizenzen erst nach Zustimmung des Herrn Reichsaußenministers erfolgen dürfen. Die ursprüngliche Absicht, diese Frage in Berlin zunächst durch die Unterkommissionen des Dreimächtepakts behandeln zu lassen, mußte fallen gelassen werden, da nach einer Weisung des Führers in diesen Unterkommissionen nur solche Fragen behandelt werden sollen, welche alle drei Mächte angehen, dagegen nicht rein deutsch-japanische Fragen.

Der

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Der Bericht ist von Staatsrat Wohlthat im Benehmen mit mir aufgestellt worden. Staatsrat Wohlthat wird vor der am Donnerstag, den 3. April, stattfindenden Ausreise der Delegation dem Herrn Reichsaußenminister noch persönlich Vortrag halten und dabei auf Wunsch über Einzelheiten weitere Auskunft geben.

Hiermit

über Herrn Staatssekretär  
Herrn Reichsaußenminister

WB 28/3.41

vorgelegt mit der Bitte um Weisung, ob ich bei dem Vortrag von Staatsrat Wohlthat zugegen sein soll.

gez. W i e h l

Durchdruck erhalten:

St.S.

Botschafter Ritter  
Botschafter Sthamer

} mit je einem Abdruck des Berichts

U.St.S.Pol

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Telegramm  
(offen)

Nr. 131  
Verschlusssache  
zu behandeln

Fuschl, den 2. März 1941 17.00 Uhr  
Ankunft: " 2. " " 18.20 Uhr

Nr. 131 vom 2.3.

Vermerk:

Am 3.3. 2.40 Uhr weiter-  
gegeben nach:

Washington unter Nr. 279  
Rio de Janeiro " " 209  
Peping " " 160

Tel.Ktr.

- 1.) Diplogerma Washington
- 2.) Diplogerma Rio de Janeiro
- 3.) Diplogerma Peping.

Geheimvermerk für Geheimsachen.

Für Missionschef persönlich.

Zur Information.

Japanischer Botschafter Oshima be-  
suchte mich 23. Februar in Fuschl. Aussprache  
verlief, wie immer, besonders freundschaftlich  
und vertrauensvoll. Sie nahm im einzelnen  
folgenden Verlauf: Ich gab einleitend Über-  
blick über allgemeine politische Lage. Nach-  
dem Krieg mit England unvermeidlich geworden,  
entschloss sich Führer zum Ausgleich mit  
Russland zwecks Vermeidung Zweifrontenkriegs.  
Ausgleich habe letzten Endes auch im japani-  
schen Interesse gelegen, das an möglichst  
raschem Sieg Deutschlands interessiert. Nach  
Abschluss deutsch-japanischen Bündnisses müs-  
se nun dessen weitere Ausgestaltung folgen.  
Für Deutschland gäbe es auf Kontinent keiner-  
lei militärische Probleme mehr. Deutschland  
würde nicht dulden, dass sich England wieder  
an irgend einer Stelle Kontinents festsetze:  
im Mittelmeer, Griechenland oder anderswo.  
Englands Hoffnung auf Blockade, Hunger und  
Unruhen sei vergeblich. England müsse  
gezwungen werden, einzusehen, dass es keine  
Aussicht auf Sieg besitze und um Frieden  
bitten müsse. Deutschland beobachte Entwick-  
lung in Frankreich scharf, sei an Besetzung  
ganzen Landes nicht interessiert, schon damit  
Französisch-Afrika nicht de Gaulle zufalle.  
Frankreichs Macht sei für alle Zeit gebrochen.  
Besetzung der okkupierten Länder sei rein  
polizeiliche

zur.  
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polizeiliche Funktion. Es herrsche dort Ruhe und kein Lebensmittelmangel. Deutschland selbst habe ausreichend Nahrungsmittel, gelegentliche Verknappung auf Rohstoffgebiet hätte praktisch nichts zu bedeuten. Im Frühjahr ständen 240 Divisionen, davon 186 erstklassige Angriffsdivisionen, zur Verfügung. Rumänien, Ungarn und Slowakei seien dem Dreierpakt bereits beigetreten. Beitritt Bulgariens stände dicht bevor. Türkisch-bulgarische Deklaration bedeute klare Distanzierung Türkei von kriegerischer Entwicklung am Balkan und von England. Weder Türkei noch Russland würden im Falle deutschen Eingreifens in Griechenland etwas unternehmen. Jugoslawische Staatsmänner hätten kürzlich durch Besuch in Deutschland ihren Friedenswillen bekundet. Jugoslawien müsse früher oder später in unser Lager übergehen. Damit befände sich Balkan in unserer Hand. Engländer müssten aus Griechenland hinaus. Italien habe Rückschläge erlitten. Griechenland sei von ihm ohne unser Wissen und militärisch schlecht vorbereitet angegriffen worden. Italienische Front in Griechenland sei aber jetzt stabil. Vordringen General Wavells in Nordafrika sei durch Tankschrecken Italiener zu erklären, die für Kampf mit Tanks nicht hinreichend geschult. Wir hätten jetzt Verband nach Lybien entsandt, um dort möglichst noch Wandel zu schaffen. Italienisches Volk stände fest hinter Duce, wir hülfe bei Rohstoffversorgung. Mit Spanien ständen wir auf gutem und vertrautem Fusse. Es würde früher oder später auch offen zu uns stossen, zögere zur Zeit noch wegen Schwierigkeiten seiner Lebensmittelversorgung. Mit Russland seien Beziehungen gut. Es würde im übrigen schon im Hinblick auf unsere militärische Stärke vermeiden, etwas gegen uns zu unternehmen. Stalin sei klüger und kühler Politiker. Deutschland betrachte Dinge im Osten mit souveräner Ruhe. Ein von uns nicht gewollter deutsch-russischer Konflikt würde gigantischen deutschen Sieg und Ende des Sowjetregimes bedeuten.

Im Krieg gegen England hätten unsere Bomber trotz schlechten Wetters schwere Zerstörungen angerichtet, die auf englische Kriegsproduktion usw. stark retardierend wirkten. Wir hofften, fortschreitend durch die Bombardierungen sehr viel mehr zu vernichten, als Amerika ersetzen könne. Von Ende März ab würde sich Einsatz der U-Boote vervielfachen. Wir würden England durch Kombination Luftwaffe und U-Boote alsdann furchtbare Schläge beibringen. Durch Versenkung müsse englische Einfuhr auf bestimmtes unter englischem Existenzminimum liegendes Niveau reduziert werden, um

Lage

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katastrophal zu gestalten. Landung in England sei vorbereitet, hänge jedoch von verschiedenen Faktoren ab. Roosevelt sei der erbittertste Gegner Deutschlands und Japans. Wir hätten jedoch Interesse, - Amerika - aus dem Kriege herauszuhalten. Wenn Amerika trotzdem in den Krieg eintrete, könne es ihn militärisch nicht führen. Die weiten Räume der zwischen uns und Amerika liegenden Ozeane machten dies unmöglich. Praktisch käme es dann nur auf die Schaffung amerikanischer Luftbasen in England heraus. Im Luftkrieg seien wir aber gegenüber England in strategisch bevorzugter Stellung. Wir seien einer Kombination der englisch-amerikanischen Luftwaffe nicht nur gewachsen, sondern jederzeit überlegen. Zahl der Piloten sei unbegrenzt, desgleichen Produktionsmöglichkeit für Flugzeuge. Riesige Materialreserven seien aufgespeichert, desgleichen Munitionsvorräte. Produktion werde auf Ubootwaffe, Flugwaffe und Flak konzentriert. Krieg sei heute militärisch wirtschaftlich und politisch gewonnen, wir wünschten aber, Krieg rasch zu beenden und England zu zwingen, bald um Frieden zu bitten. Hierbei sei - Kooperation- mit Japan von Bedeutung. Dieses sollte im eigensten Interesse so schnell als möglich eingreifen, um Schlüsselposition Englands in Ostasien zu vernichten und Japan die Stellung in Ostasien zu sichern, die es nur im Kriege erwerben könne für schnelles Handeln seien drei Gründe massgebend:

1.) Ein Eingreifen Japans bedeute entscheidenden Schlag gegen Kern britischen Imperiums.

2.) Amerika würde aus dem Kriege herausbleiben, denn es sei noch nicht aufgerüstet und würde seine Flotte westlich Hawaii nicht riskieren. Bei Respektierung amerikanischer Interessen fiele für Roosevelt auch Prestigeargument für Kriegseintritt fort. Im Falle Kriegseintritts müsste Amerika sonst auch ohnmächtig zusehen, wie Japan Philippinen fortnimmt.

3.) Japan müsste sich für kommende Neuordnung in der Welt diejenige Position sichern, die es bei Friedensschluss in der Hand zu haben wünsche. Botschafter Oshima zustimmte vollinhaltlich diesen Gedankengängen. Er erklärte, alles tun zu wollen, um diese Politik durchzusetzen. Ich ausführte weiter, dass -engste Zusammenarbeit auf allen Gebieten-, besonders im -Nachrichtendienst- und auf - Pressegebiet- erforderlich sei, wie dies bereits vorbildlich mit Italien, Rumänien, Ungarn, der Slowakei



Slowakei und Bulgarien eingerichtet sei. Botschafter beabsichtigt, mit unseren Herren Programm für Intensivierung Japanpropaganda aufzustellen. Bezüglich U S A bemerkte ich, dass ihm gegenüber zweckmässigerweise deutliche Sprache zu führen sei. Volk USA liebe Nationalsozialismus nicht, sei trotzdem gegen Kriegseintritt, um Söhne nicht zu opfern. USA-Volk fühle instinktiv, dass Roosevelt und jüdische Drahtzieher es ohne Grund in Krieg hineinreissen wollten. Daher müsse - gegenüber USA deutliche und starke aber keine aggressive Politik- getrieben werden. USA-Volk müsse wissen, dass es bei aggressiven Gelüsten eiserner Front entschlossener Völker, die praktisch ganze Welt umfasse, gegenüberstände. Den -Verdrehungsversuchen englischer Propaganda- müsste durch engste Zusammenarbeit entgegengetreten werden. Hierzu sei laufender Gedankenaustausch bei grundsätzlichen Reden und Aussprachen notwendig. Ich hinwies in diesem Zusammenhang auf kürzliche Äusserung Matsuokas über japanische Bereitschaft zur Friedensvermittlung und auf Erklärung japanischen Botschafters Nomura in Washington zur Haltung Japans im Falle eines Kriegseintritts Amerikas. Auf meinen Hinweis, dass wir bereits grossen Beitrag durch den Sieg auf dem Festlande für die Gestaltung des Lebensschicksals der Verbündeten Nationen geleistet hätten, dass wir auch in Zukunft wegen der geographischen Gegebenheiten die Hauptlast des Krieges zu tragen hätten, erwiderte Oshima, Japan sei entschlossen, seine imperiale Stellung zu behaupten.

Ich erörterte sodann - Aufgaben der Neugestaltung in Europa und Ostasien- für Mächte Dreierpakts nach dem Kriege. Überzentralisierung müsse vermieden, auf wirtschaftlichem Gebiet eine Lösung auf paritärischer Grundlage gefunden werden. Zwischen den grossen Interessensphären der europäisch-afrikanischen Machtsphäre unter der Führung Deutschlands und Italiens und der ostasiatischen Interessensphäre unter Führung Japans müsste freier Handelsaustausch nach grosszügigen Gesichtspunkten stattfinden.

Japan möge mit den selbständigen Staaten der europäischen Hemisphäre unmittelbar Handel treiben und Handelsverträge abschliessen wie bisher, Deutschland und Italien in gleicher Weise mit den in der japanischen Machtsphäre liegenden selbständigen Ländern, wie China, Thailand, Indochina usw. zwischen den beiden Wirtschaftsräumen sollte man sich Dritten gegenüber Präferenzen einräumen. Aufgabe Ministerialdirektor Wohlthats sei auf Abschluss Handelsver-

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vertrages beschränkt. Die grosse Linie der neuen Handelspolitik würde abredgemäß in Berlin durch die Wirtschaftskommission Dreimächtepakts bestimmt.

Anschliessend hinwies ich auf etwaige Notwendigkeit, auf Grund neuer Unverschämtheiten von USA gemeinsam vorgehen zu müssen, um Volk in Amerika Augen über Lage zu öffnen und vielleicht Umschwung der öffentlichen Meinung für Isolation herbeizuführen. Bezeichnete dabei Frage ausdrücklich als theoretisch und zurzeit in keiner Weise akut. Bei Vorgehen wäre gegebenenfalls gemeinsamer Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen der Partner des Dreimächtepakts mit USA zu erwägen. Von sonst berührten Einzelfragen sind hervorzuheben:

1.) Auf Frage Oshimas, ob wir mit - Russen über Beitritt zum Dreierpakt- gesprochen hätten, antwortete ich bejahend. Russen hätten grundsätzliche Bereitwilligkeit unter gewissen Vorbedingungen erklärt. Zu diesen gehöre russisches Interesse an Finnland, Schaffung engeren Verhältnisses zu Bulgarien sowie das Meerengenproblem. Gespräch schwebte noch. Wenn Balkandinge sich weiterentwickelt hätten, könne es gegebenenfalls fortgesetzt werden. Achsengarantie für Rumänien sei Russen nicht sehr sympatisch gewesen, sie hätten sich damit aber im Hinblick auf unsere starken wirtschaftlichen Interessen am Balkan, besonders am rumänischen Erdöl abgefunden. Oshima seinerseits erklärte, Russland sei bereit, mit Japan einen Pakt abzuschliessen unter der Bedingung, dass die Kordsachalin-Konzessionen zurückgegeben würden. Die Beziehungen seien im allgemeinen gut, die Russen lieferten an Tschiangkaischek verhältnismässig wenig und nur gegen Bezahlung.

2.) Oshima bemerkte hinsichtlich - China- , dass es zwei Richtungen gäbe. Die eine wolle Wangtschingwei stark machen, die andere versuche Verständigung mit Tschiangkaischek. Ich riet, vor neuen Verständigungsversuchen mit Tschiangkaischek zu warten, bis deutsche Armeen wieder in Aktion getreten, um unter Eindruck dieser Waffenerfolge mit Tschiangkaischek zu möglichst weitgehender Konsolidierung Verhältnisses zu gelangen, erklärte mich im übrigen, falls erwünscht,



erwünscht, auch zur Stärkung der Position Wangtschingwei's bereit.

3.) Botschafter bat um Unterstützung bei Vichy-Regierung zur Annahme japanischen Vermittlungsvorschlags im thailändisch-indochinesischen Konflikt-. Wunsch wurde entsprochen. Zusatz nur zu 2): Bitte vorstehenden Informationserlass mit geheimen Postchiffre umgehend mit Luftpost Chefs unserer diplomatischen Missionen in Mittel- und Südamerika zusenden.

Ribbentrop



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保信箱

錠前附書類(綴中)ニ保存セラル可キコト

Translated by Pat

Checked by T. ...

Doc. 4038-21

電報 (秘密暗號板電報)

東京ニ發信一千九百四十一年三月十日 不イ不時間 五時三十五分  
合着信着 一千九百四十一年三月十日 十五時五十五分  
電報番号 三月十日 第三七六號

電文

大橋外務次官ハ今拙者ヲ訪問シ泰國友ビ佛蘭西印度支那  
間ノ紛争ニ於ケル日本ノ調停ニ就テ 特段ニ貴重ト判且ツ効  
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獨逸外相ニ傳ヘラレ度旨要請セラレタリ

ホルツエ

SAITO, Seichi



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4038

17 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Photostats; Foreign Ministry File  
(State Secty., Japan, Vol. 2-i) of Telegrams and Memos.

Date: March 1941 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language:  
German

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)  
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA; OSHIMA; OTT

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy with  
Germany

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

1. Telegram from Doctor SCHOENE to Foreign Office  
BERLIN, for Minister Director WIEHL, and Legation Secretary  
VOSS, dated 1 March 1941, from WIESBADEN. Subject: INDO-  
CHINESE RUBBER.

The French delegation had replied to the German  
demands for modification of the Rubber Treaty. Germany  
wanted the French Govt. to transfer the annual quantity  
of 25,000 tons scheduled for America to Japan, and the  
25,000 tons scheduled for Germany and Japan together to  
Germany alone.

The French note is attached together with a  
German version. /136595-9/

2. Telegram from SCHLEIER, to Dr. SCHWARZMANN for  
the Foreign Minister, dated 1 March 1941, Paris.

Ambassador DE BRINON transmitted an appeal from  
DARLAN to the German Govt. to use its influence in TOKYO  
to ameliorate Japan's condition in the Indo-China dispute.

MATSUOKA had adopted a new attitude, in which  
he now posed as an arbitrator instead of an intermediary;

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he had given his demands the character of a formal request and added that if his ruling were not accepted, he would use other means to settle the affair. As France could not withstand these threats, the government would have to yield to these imperative demands, but requested Germany to use her influence to secure some modification in the demands. These modifications are set out.

/136600-1/

3. Telegram from OTT, dated 1 March 1941, TOKYO, re General Commission ~~Tripartite Pact?~~.

The Foreign Ministry stated that the Japanese Govt. would call upon the representatives of the armed forces or economic representatives in case of necessity.

/136602/

4. Telegram from RIBBENTROP to the German Ambassadors in WASHINGTON, RIO DE JANEIRO and PEIPING, dated 2 March 1941 from FUSCHL. (Refer to IPS Doc. No. 4037, Items 34 and 35)

A report of a conversation between Ambassador OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP in FUSCHL, 23 February, passed to the heads of missions for their information.

"The conversation was, as always, especially friendly and confidential." RIBBENTROP gave a general review of the political situation.

"ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan." Yet, it was in Germany's interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come into the war, she could not wage it in a military sense. The great extent of the Oceans made that impossible. Germany's wish was to finish the war quickly and to compel England to sue for peace soon. In this connection, cooperation with Japan was of significance. Japan should in her own interests intervene as quickly as possible in order to destroy England's key position in East Asia, and to make Japan's position in East Asia secure, which she could only obtain through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

(1) A Japanese intervention would signify a decisive blow against the kernel of the British Empire.



(2) America would remain out of the war as she was not prepared, and would not risk her fleet west of HAWAII. If American interests were respected, ROOSEVELT'S argument of prestige for entry into the war would be eliminated. In the event of her entry into war, America must observe helplessly how Japan would take away the PHILIPPINES from her.

(3) Japan must prepare that position for the coming New Order in the world, which she hoped to have at the conclusion of peace. "Ambassador OSHIMA gave his complete assent to this train of thought. He declared he wished to do everything in order to put this policy into effect." RIBBENTROP declared that the closest cooperation in all spheres, especially in news service and press, was necessary. To RIBBENTROP'S reference that Germany had fulfilled her quota through the victory on the continent and the fate of the Allied nations, and also that in the future Germany would have to bear the brunt of the account of the geographical factor, OSHIMA replied that Japan had decided to maintain her Imperial attitude.

RIBBENTROP then mentioned the new situation for the powers of the Tripartite Pact in Europe and East Asia after the war.

RIBBENTROP declared himself ready to strengthen WANG CHINGWEI'S position, if desired.

OSHIMA requested aid in advising the VICHY Govt. to accept the Japanese mediation proposal in the THAILAND-INDO-CHINA conflict. This wish was fulfilled. /136603-8/

5. Telegram from WAGNER, 3 March 1941, at HSINKING. MATSUOKA, enroute to Berlin, was expected in HSINKING on 6 March. /136609/

6. Telegram from OTT, dated 3 March 1941, TOKYO.

The Foreign Minister had informed OTT that a settlement in the Indo-China-Thailand conflict was to be expected in the next few days as a result of the French yielding /EINLENKEN/. He would, therefore, leave TOKYO on 6 March and arrive in BERLIN on 19 or 20 March. OTT would leave at the same time. /136610/

7. Telegram from OTT, dated 4 March 1941, TOKYO.



This is a report which OTT received from the head of the cabinet of the Foreign Ministry. In the Diet Session of 24 February, MATSUOKA developed his favorite theme that OCEANIA was an ideal and most acceptable area for the settlement of Japanese, Europeans and Americans. MATSUOKA distinguishes between the "Greater Asia Area" and "OCEANIA" in Japanese policy. The Netherlands East Indies and the Phillipines belonged to the "Greater East Asia Area" and "OCEANIA" includes New Guinea and the surrounding group of islands as far as New Caledonia. /136611-2/

8. Telegram from ALTENBURG, dated 5 March 1941, at FUSCHL, giving the REICH Minister's approval of OTT handing over business to BOLTZE. /See 136610/  
/136613/

9. Telegram from OTT, dated 6 March 1941, TOKYO.

The Foreign Minister had rebuked Ambassador NOMURA for not stressing Japan's treaty obligations and faith in the Tripartite Pact. /136614/

10. Telegram from OTT, 6 March 1941, Tokyo. Re: Time of MATSUOKA's trip and to be issued in connection with it. /136615-6/

11. Memo dated 7 March 1941, Berlin, stating that according to the Japanese Ambassador, MATSUOKA would definitely leave MANDSCHULI (MANCHURIA) on 10 March. /136617/

12. Telegram from OTT, dated 8 March 1941, TOKYO.

"MATSUOKA's communique about his trip.  
/136618/

13. Telegram from OTT dated 8 March 1941, TOKYO.

For the REICH Minister personally. MATSUOKA was compelled to postpone his departure from MANCHURIA until 17 March because of the final settlement of the Siamese-Indo-China negotiations. He would arrive in BERLIN about 26 March.

OTT would leave for BERLIN that very morning and arrive in BERLIN about 22 March, so as to confer with the Reich Foreign Minister before MATSUOKA's arrival. /136619/



14. Telegram from RINTELEN, dated 8 March 1941, at FUSCHL, giving Ambassador CLODIUS the Reich Foreign Minister's instructions with regard to Info Chinese rubber. /136620/

15. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 8 March 1941, at MOSCOW. According to the Japanese Ambassador, MATSUOKA would arrive at MOSCOW on 19 March. /136621/

16. Letter from BOLTZE, dated 8 March 1941, at TOKYO. A review of the exchange of notes between CHURCHILL and EDEN on the one hand, and MATSUOKA on the other, beginning with the note handed to the Japanese Ambassador in LONDON /SHIGEMITSU/ by British Foreign Minister EDEN, concerning the progressive deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations. /136622-3/

17. Enclosure <sup>1</sup> to the previous item, giving in English the text of the note received from the British Ambassador, giving the record of the MATSUOKA course up to March 1941. /136624-6/

18. Enclosure 2 to item 16 giving the English text of Prime Minister CHURCHILL's note of 24 February 1941. /136627-9/

19. Enclosure 3 to item 16 giving the text in English of the Japanese Foreign Minister's note of 24 February 1941, in answer to CHURCHILL's note. /136630-1/



20. Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 10 March 1941 in Tokyo mentioning a DOMEI communique on MATSUOKA's journey on 11 March. /136631 A/
21. Telegram from ALTENBURG dated 10 March 1941 in PEKING, giving gist of CHANGKING press reports on MATSUOKA's journey. /136631 B/
22. Telegram from THOMSEN dated 10 March 1941 in WASHINGTON, giving American press view on OTT and MATSUOKA going to Berlin. /136631 C/
23. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 11 March 1941, in Tokyo, corollary to Item 20, stating that MATSUOKA would leave for EUROPE on 12 March. /136631 D/
24. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 11 March 1941 in TOKYO stating that he had requested no publicity be given to the possibility of MATSUOKA visiting VICHY, which MATSUOKA would do only in agreement with the GERMAN Government. / 136631 E /
25. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 12 March 1941, in TOKYO. "Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI has just visited me and asked me to convey to the REICH Foreign Minister the gratitude of the Japanese government for the extraordinarily valuable and effective support to the Japanese mediation in the dispute between THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA." / 136632/
26. Telegram from RINTELEN, dated 12 March 1941 in FUSCHL, to German Ambassador, Tokyo, stating that FRAEULEIN MUELLER-HAUFF, secretary to COUNT JUERCKHEIM, was in contact with the British Secret Service, and requesting investigation and information. / 136633 /
27. Telegram from PONSCHAB dated 13 March in HARBIN giving information from TANIGOCHI, Japanese naval attache there, which had been given to OTT in detail as he passed through HARBIN. /136634/
28. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 13 March 1941 in TOKYO, stating that MATSUOKA had left on the previous evening, and giving details of his programme. / 136635 /
29. Telegram from MACKENSEN dated 14 March 1941 in ROME. He had been informed by Ambassador ROCCO, that, according to an intercepted telephone conversation between the DOMEI representative and another Japanese journalist, MATSUOKA would sign a non-aggression pact in MOSCOW on his way home. / 136636 /
30. Telegram from ALTENBURG, dated 14 March 1941, in PEKING, complaining about a DOMEI news item. / 136637 /
31. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 14 March 1941, TOKYO, giving details of MATSUOKA's entourage on the trip to BERLIN. / 136638-9 /
32. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 16 March 1941, in TOKYO, with reference to Item 26, stating that instructions had been carried out. / 136640 /.



33. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 17 March 1941 in TOKYO, giving further details of MATSUOKA's entourage and individual linguistic abilities. / 136641-2 /

34. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 19 March 1941, in MOSCOW, stating that according to the Japanese ambassador, MATSUOKA would arrive in MOSCOW on 23 March, see MOLOTOV on 24 March, and leave the same day for BERLIN via WARSAW. / 136643 /

35. Telegram from BOLTZE dated 19 March 1941 in TOKYO, voicing dissatisfaction with Japan's export policy towards Germany. / 136644-5 /

36. A note by WIEHL dated 19 March 1941, in BERLIN re conference with Ambassador MATSUSHIMA about co-operation of Japanese and German embassies in the MOSCOW negotiations for the reduction of the transit tariff, and transport of goods by vessels. / 136648 - 7 /

37. Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 20 March 1941, in TOKYO, which lists the presents taken by MATSUOKA for the leading German personalities. / 136648 /

38. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 23 March 1941 in MOSCOW. MATSUOKA would be accompanied from BERLIN by Consul MIKAMA who was well informed on the Soviet Union. / 136649 /

39. Note from ALLENBURG to Secretary of State dated 19 March 1941, in BERLIN, stating that the FEICH Foreign Minister wished Ambassador STAMMER to collect all necessary material for the conversations with MATSUOKA, and therefore to be given all information relative to Japan. / 136650 /

40. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 23 March 1941, in MOSCOW. According to the Japanese Embassy MATSUOKA would leave MOSCOW for WARSAW by regular train on 24 March. / 136651 /

41. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 24 March 1941, in MOSCOW, to the Admiralty SCHULENBERG had had conversations with Captain FUSHI, accompanying MATSUOKA on his journey \*\* This was necessary for those circles in Japan which challenges the Axis policy of the present government. / 136652 /

42. Note from WOERMAN, dated 25 March 1941, BERLIN re GOEBBELS proclamation /?/ on the occasion of MATSUOKA's visit. / 136653 /

43. A note by WIEHL, dated 24 March 1941, in BERLIN re: complaints of German firms in CHINA, JAPAN and MANCHUKUO about their treatment by Japanese government offices. / 136654 - 5 /

44. Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 26 March 1941, in TOKYO, re: discussion at the Foreign Ministry on the subject of transport of German nationals aboard Japanese shipping. / 136656-7 /

\*\* in which FUSHI expressed his hope that the Germans would convince of their expectation for victory.



45. Telegram from RITTER, dated 21 March 1941, to German Ambassador, TOKYO, on the subject of the transport of rubber from the Far East. The Japanese government is to use auxiliary cruisers under the Japanese Navy flag. RIBBENTROP informed OSHIMA of this instruction to OTT. / 136658-61 /
46. A note by WIEHL to the Reich Foreign Minister, dated 28 March 1941, in BERLIN, concerning German-Japanese economic negotiations, conducted by WOHLTHAT, whose report is mentioned in the following item. / 136662-3 /
47. A detailed report by WOHLTHAT, March 1941, on the economic negotiations with Japan and Manchukuo since 1936. / 136664 - 136677 /
48. Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 28 March 1941, in TOKYO, giving Japanese press comments on the reception of MATSUOKA in BERLIN, and MATSUOKA's conversations with STALIN. / 136678-9 /
49. Note from WOERMAN, dated 29 March 1941, in BERLIN, stating that he had been spoken to by various heads of missions with regard to MATSUOKA's visit, and had stressed its significance. / 136680 /
50. Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 29 March 1941, in TOKYO, giving the latest situation on the dispatch of auxiliary cruisers to Germany. / 136681-2 /
51. Memo by WIEHL, dated 31 March 1941 in BERLIN, stating that he had given to Ambassador MATSUSHIMA Germany's rubber requirements. / 136683-4 /
52. Letter from WEIZSAECKER to Reich Foreign Minister, dated 31 March 1941, stating that he had discussed with the Japanese Ambassador the possibilities of repatriating German nationals from the Netherlands East Indies by Japanese auxiliary cruiser. / 136685 /
53. In appendix to the previous item, dated 31 March 1941, in BERLIN, giving details of German nationals in the Netherlands East Indies, and suggestions as to how the Japanese could repatriate them. / 136686-7 /
54. Item 54 and the following items are entitled "MATSUOKA Visit." (Items 55, 56 57) / 136688 /
55. and 56. Items 55 and 56 deal with the formal breakfast given by HITLER for MATSUOKA.
57. Curricula vitae of MATSUOKA and his entourage. / 136692 - 5 /
58. Advice on the situation of Japan prepared for the Reich Foreign Minister by Ambassador OTT on 25 March 1941:

"According to inquiries with the Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral KONDO, the Navy is vigorously preparing for an attack on SINGAPORE. Preparations were expected to be concluded by the end of May. He expressed ~~as~~ misgivings:



- a) America guerrilla warfare by means of submarines and aircraft from the Philippine archipelago against the long route for raw materials from Netherland East Indies and the Malay States to Japan;
- b) The threat of two-fleet warfare, should the British fleet be able to transfer from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

"According to inquiries with the Chief of the General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, the Army was also making preparations for an attack. Conclusion presumably also end of May.

"A condition for the accomplishment of this is a free rear towards Russia / RUSSKIMFREIHEIT /. Ambassador SHIRATORI stressed the necessity to tie up the English fleet (Analyst's note: Comp. sub paragraph b) above where mention is made of the possibility of the British fleet being able to transfer from the MEDITERRANEAN to the PACIFIC/

"Summarising: The will to attack is present in the Army and Navy, preparations are in progress, accomplishment possible if the Army and Navy's objections could be eliminated. The military prospects favorable. Type of attack was not by a naval attack from the sea, but by creation of a base on shore, from where the air forces could smoke out SINGAPORE. In this way could a first, quick result be achieved. Then the time needed for the actual capture of the fortress would not be so important. The effectiveness of the air forces is to be enhanced by the allocation of a few experienced German divebomber specialists to the Japanese naval air forces.

"The need for her rear to be left free by Russia, plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia. The possibility of creating this free rear by other means should be hinted at to MATSUOKA. By this means, it could be avoided that possibly the decisions to an action against SINGAPORE could be put in the background, and that prominence be given to the Russian question...."

"Apart from this, it might be advisable to place German specialists for putting to work enterprises connected with war economy in conquered areas, at the disposal of Japan, in order to maintain uninterruptedly the supply of raw materials from Netherlands East Indies and the Malay States, should Japan occupy these areas." / 136696-9 /



59. Letter from WEIZSAECKER to Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March 1941, giving his notes for the MATSUOKA visit.

- "1. The most important topic is naturally the moment of Japan's entry into the war against England." To bring this about, Germany had valuable concessions.
  - a) The renunciation of claims to the Netherlands East Indies.
  - b) The renunciation of claims to former German possessions in the South Seas, including those at present under British mandate.
  - c) Increased support of Japan's policy in China (either attempts at mediation, or the recognition of WANG CHING WEI).

WEIZSAECKER had the impression that Japan's entry into the war against England depended more on further German successes against England, and that the concessions stated above would not play any great part in it.

- "2. MATSUOKA is still running on the track of an understanding with Russia and claims German encouragement for this. A clear statement, which course our relations to Russia may take is unavoidable in order to protect him from surprises, and in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey." / 136700 /



60. A note from WOERMANN to Ambassador STAHLER dated 22 March 1941 on the need of having all necessary materials and references available for the Germans during MATSUOKA's visit. /136701/

61. This item comprises the notes prepared for the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister. /136702 - 136727;.

- a. Index of the notes. /136702/
- b. Note on Japanese foreign relations, by BIDDER, Berlin, 18 March 1941.

I. Japan - U.S.A.

The coolness of the U.S. towards the "procrastinating reconciliation policy" is stressed in connection with the economic opposition carried out by U. S.

II. Japan - U.S.S.R.

The improvements in Russo-Japanese relations striven for by the KONOYE-MATSUOKA Cabinet has had some successes and the Russian attitude to Japan has changed and Russia is now ready to conclude a pact with Japan whose condition shall be the return of the North Sakhalien concessions to Russia.

III. Japan - China.

The KONOYE-MATSUOKA Cabinet has stressed the need to liquidate the China war, but without success.

In connection with the Japanese troop concentrations in HAINAN and FORMOSA, the Japanese Army chiefs have decided on considerable reductions in troops throughout occupied China.

IV. Japan - WANG CHING-WEI

In the Japanese Government there is a military group which wants the strengthening of the WANG CHING-wei Government, and a political group which considers that the Japanese-WANG CHING-wei policy would not lead to a satisfactory conclusion of the China conflict and advises reconciliation with CHIANG Kai-shek.



The Germans and Italians had made clear to the Japanese that they would support whichever policy Japan favored in the WANG CHING-wei question.

V. Japan - England.

"The troop concentrations which Japan is at present undertaking on the islands of HAINAN and FORMOSA - about 10 divisions each - the construction of fleet bases in PAKHOI and CAMRANH BAY, and lastly the extension of Japan's political influences to THAILAND, as a result of successful mediation in the THAILAND-INDOCHINA conflict, indicated that Japan is preparing a great military undertaking whose aim can be a push to the South, in the direction of HONGKONG, the PHILIPPINES, and MALACCA-SINGAPORE. The Japanese colony in SINGAPORE has begun to return to Japan since February of this year". English defence measures are cited.

VI. Japan- Indochina.

"Indochina is at present:

(1) Defence base against China. Japan has concentrated at present 10,000 troops in TONG KING.

(2) Starting position for the attack on BRITISH MALAYA and BORNEO by troop concentrations in HAINAN, and development of fleet bases in PAKHOI and CAMRANH BAY.

(3) Basis of supply, with raw materials, especially rice and rubber." /136703-7/

c. "Memo on Japanese expansion policy in East Asia; the terms Great East Asia Sphere and Oceania; and the Netherlands East Indies question", compiled by WOERMANN.

I. The political term "Great East Asia Sphere" was first recognized by treaty Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. By Article 2 of the Pact, Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan "in the creation of a new order" in this sphere.



Japan understands by this term "Great East Asia Sphere", at least Japan, Manchukuo, China, Indochina, Thailand, Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines.

The understanding arises partly from the Japanese Government's declaration and partly from the situation. The Malay States, Singapore and possibly Burma must be considered as part of the sphere. Areas which lie to the west of the States mentioned have never been considered as "East Asian". As yet, it has not been defined how far the Soviet districts in the Far East belong to this sphere.

The term "Oceania" was culled by MATSUOKA in his declaration of 24 February 1941. In the conventional sense, Oceania comprises the islands in the Pacific Ocean between the continents of America and Asia, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. MATSUOKA intentionally did not expand on this idea, but various commentaries would indicate that Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines are not considered as part of Oceania, but that New Guinea and the surrounding groups of islands as far as, and including New Caledonia, are. The press reports from American sources that MATSUOKA had demanded an exclusive right of settlement for Japanese in this area, are not true. He had said that Oceania could accommodate another 600,800 million people and that Japan had a right to settle there.

II. The Japanese claim to leadership in the Great East Asia sphere, with regard to China, is expressed in the AMAU declaration of 17 April 1934, which excludes political interference by foreign powers in China, and only permits financial and economic negotiations between a foreign power and China, insofar as such negotiations are beneficial to China and not detrimental to peace in East Asia".

The incorporation of the Netherlands East Indies in the Great East Asia Sphere was first expressed in a similar general statement on 15 April 1940 by Foreign Minister ARITA, on the occasion of reports of British troop landings in the Netherlands. The declaration does not signify a statement of territorial claims, but a warning against the infringement of the status quo. As a result, U.S.A. (in HULL's declaration of 17 April 1940) and England (BUTLER's



written answer in the House of Commons on 18 April 1940) recognized the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese Government urged Germany then to take position on this question. On 22 May 1940, Germany declared to Japan had no interest in such overseas questions. ARITA on 3 July 1940 appreciated this German answer as a friendly advance.

Japanese claims to leadership in MANCHUKUO and CHINA found concrete expression in the Franco-Japanese agreement of a limited right of occupation in Indochina, and in the Japanese mediation in the Indochina-Thailand conflict, in which Germany had given Japan considerable diplomatic support.

III. Japan's expansionist policy in the Great East Asia sphere conflicts with German interests in economics, in that Japan wants Germany to make economic negotiations with countries like China, Indochina, and the Netherlands East Indies, only through the medium of Japan. Possible points of friction are: future of Netherlands East Indies and Mandates.  
/ 136708 - 11/.

d. ARITA's declaration of 15 April 1940.

ARITA declared that Japan had close association of mutual aid with the South Seas Areas. Should the state of war in Europe extend to Holland, with repercussions on the Netherlands East Indies, the stability and well being of East Asia would be affected. Consequently, the Japanese government viewed with misgiving the developments accompanying the increase of war of Europe, which could influence the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. /Comp. IPS Doc. 4020,4026/

e. Memo on the former German colonies in the South Sea, compiled by WOERMANN. /136713 - 4/.

f. Memo on German-Japan airlines dated 22 March 41.

"According to information from the Reich Ministry for Air Transport (Counsellor SCHWARTZ), the Japanese military mission at present in Germany had given the Commander of the Luftwaffe a list of military wishes and, in this connection, mentioned casually the subject of installation of a Japan-German airline". Germany had already in early 1940 proposed the idea of a German Japan airline, when the Berlin-Moscow airline had been reopened. It is expected that the project will be brought up on the occasion of MATSUOKA's visit.

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The Japanese should be informed that Germany was greatly interested in the idea, but the practicality depended on Japanese-Soviet relations. /136715-6/

g. Memo by WIEHL, dated 21 March 1941, on Germany-Japan economic questions.

I. General. Giving a general outline of negotiations and Japanese practices since 1938.

II. Details.

(a) Rubber. Negotiations were in progress whereby Germany would receive 25,000 tons from Indochina. Japan had promised transportation to Japan and Dairen. For the Transport to Germany, blockade runners were contemplated, but it would be necessary to have the use of Japanese auxiliary cruisers which could carry valuable German supplies to Japan on the return journey.

(b) Raw materials via Japan. Germany would want to buy raw materials third powers through the medium of Japan, such as rubber and tin from Netherlands East Indies and Thailand, Wolfran from South China, and tin from Bolivia.

(c) Transport via Siberian and South Manchuria Railways. The German and Japanese embassies in Moscow had agreed on the closest cooperation in the Moscow negotiations so as to overcome difficulties of the Siberian sort (e.g. tariff questions, etc.) The sea connection between Japan and Vladivostok should be improved by Japanese shipping.

(d) German trade in China, Japan and Manchukuo.

(e) The form of post war economic relations. Economic negotiations between the European-African sphere under the control of Germany and Italy and the Great East Asia sphere under the control of Japan should be on a grand scale, with a free exchange of trade, and preference over any third power. But overcentralization was to be avoided, rather Germany and Italy should have free trade with independent states in the Great East Asia sphere, whilst Japan should do the same with independent states in the German-Italian sphere, but Japan only wanted trade with China, Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies to be negotiated through her as medium.

/136717 - 22/



h. Memo on the culture division for conversations with MATSUOKA compiled by VON THARDOWSKI, dated 21 March 1941.

1. In Japan:-- Germans were employed in Japanese high schools (Kotogakko) as teachers of German language and culture. The Japanese-German culture institute, Tokyo, and the German Research Institute in Kyoto were officially supported by Japan. In 1938-39 a culture history exhibition of "Greater Germany" had travelled around Japan and had attracted over a million visitors. A similar exhibition on behalf of Japan was being prepared in Berlin. RICHARD STRAUSS had composed a festal hymn on the occasion of the 2600 year celebrations.

II. In Germany:-- The German-Japanese Association, under Admiral FOERSTER, with branches in Cologne, Munich, Leipzig, Vienna and Breslau was active. VISCOUNT KONOYE, brother of the Prime Minister PRINCE KONOYE was a regular guest-conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra.

III. Exchange between Germany and Japan:-- The German-Japanese culture agreement of 25 November 1938 was the first international agreement which stipulated a culture exchange on the basis of respective national life.

IV. Film:-- Mutual film exchange left something to be desired.

V. Books:-- There was no arrangement for the import of German books into Japan in the Japanese plan. This prejudiced German-Japanese cultural relations.

(136723-5)

i. Memo on Radio by RUEHL, dated 22 March 1941, in Berlin. Closer relations with Japan in the field of radio were to be desired. The strengthening of the transmitter was in the interest of Japan.

j. Memo on the press, dated 21 March 1941. At that time negotiations were in progress in Tokyo on the conclusion of a press agreement with Japan and a press statute for the German-Japanese press association. A greater control of the Japanese press should be sought.

(136727)

62. Memo for information of Reich Foreign Minister on Occasion of MATSUOKA's visit concerning the documents analyzed above, the term "procrastinating-reconciliation policy" in regard to the Japanese attitude towards U. S. is erroneous. (See Item 60)



I. Political Section

1. The Japanese Government is not ready to come to an understanding with America; wished to avoid war with the U.S.A. but was preparing militarily and economically for the possibility of such a war. If Singapore was transferred to the Americans, Japan would take counter action.

2 & 3 - Japanese expansion policy in East Asia. It was suggested that Germany should not begin to discuss the topics of the Japanese expansion policy or the terms "Oceania" and "Great East Asia sphere."

4. Air line, Germany-Japan. The creation of an airline was of great importance, if it were possible for technical and political reasons.

II. Commercial Political Section

5. German-Japanese economic problems - It was in the interests of both countries to continue and elaborate on the present scheme of cooperation (German representatives in Japan, and Japanese representatives in Germany).

III. Culture Section

6. Cultural relations should be improved, and the publication of German books in Japanese was recommended.

IV. Radio Section

7. Collaboration must be increased and the strengthening of Shanghai's "Voice of Europe" was necessary to counteract English-America propaganda in China.

V. Press Section

8. Count URACH was in Japan to effect a press agreement so as to improve collaboration between German and Japanese press.  
(136728-31)

63. Memo from WEISZAECKER, dated 25 March 1941, to the Protocol. Minister FUNK requested that, owing to ill health, he be excused from official functions, and that MATSUOKA be informed about his health to avoid misunderstanding.  
(136732)

64. Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 25 March 1941, in Moscow to the Reich Foreign Minister.



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MATSUOKA had had conversation with MOLOTOV and STALIN prior to his departure that day for Berlin, with the idea of setting aside differences in the "basis questions" between Russia and Japan. Further conversations would be held on MATSUOKA's return to Moscow. MATSUOKA had received the heads of missions in Moscow (except CRIPPS) and the press and had always expressed himself positively on Japan's attitude to the Axis, and the victory of Germany and Italy.

(136733-4)

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Tregilgas, RNVR

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. *403* Date

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Photostat. Foreign Ministry file*

Date: *Mar 1941*

Original ( ) Copy (X)

Language: *GERMAN.*

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)  
Has it been photostated? Yes (X) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

DOCUMENT DIVISION.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *NUREMBERG.*

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

*MATSUOKA, OSHIMA, DTT*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

*Conspiracy with Germany.*

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1) Telegram from DOCTOR SCHOENE, to Foreign Office BERLIN, for Minister Director WIEHL, and Legation Secretary VOSS, dated 1 March 1941 from WIESBADEN. Subject: - INDO-CHINESE RUBBER.

The French delegation had replied to the German demands for modification of the Rubber treaty. Germany wanted the French government

Analyst: *S/LT. N.K. ST. CLARE - TREGILGAS. R.N.V.R*

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to transfer the annual quantity of 25,000 tons scheduled for America, to Japan, <sup>and the 25,000 scheduled for Germany and Japan together to Germany alone.</sup> ~~The French government could see its way to doing this, if Japan paid in dollars.~~

The French note is attached together with a German version [Frame 136596-9].

2). Telegram from SCHLEIER, to DOCTOR SCHWARZMANN for the Foreign Minister, dated 1 March 1941, PARIS.

Ambassador DE BRINON <sup>transmitted</sup> ~~had received from Admiral DARLAN~~ a message concerning the Japanese proposals for settlement of the Indo-China dispute, with an appeal to the German government to use its influence in TOKYO to anchorate <sup>Japan's</sup> the conditions <sup>in the Indo-China dispute.</sup> of the ~~last~~ <sup>from DARLAN</sup> paragraph.

MATSUOKA had adopted a new attitude, in which he now posed as an arbitrator instead of an intermediary; he had given his demands the character of a formal request and added that if his ruling were not accepted he would use other means to settle the affair. As France could not withstand these threats, the government would have to yield to these imperative demands, but requested Germany to use her influence to secure some modification in the demands. These modifications are



set out. [~~From~~ 136600-1]

- 3) Telegram from OTT, dated 1 March 1941. TOKYO <sup>re: General Commission</sup> <sup>Private Pact 2/</sup>  
 The Foreign Ministry stated that the Japanese government would call upon the representatives of the ~~armed forces~~ <sup>armed forces</sup> or economic representatives in case of necessity. [~~From~~ 136602]

- 4) Telegram from RIBBENTROP to the German Ambassadors in WASHINGTON, RIO DE JANEIRO and PEIPING, dated 2 March 1941 from FUSCHL. (Refer to IPS Doc 4037, Items 34 and 35)

A report of a conversation between Ambassador OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP in FUSCHL, 23 February passed to the heads of missions for their information.

"The conversation, was, as always <sup>especially</sup> friendly and confidential."

RIBBENTROP gave a general review of the political situation. ~~After war with England became inevitable the~~ ~~FUEHRER~~ decided on an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. This agreement ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ultimately also <sup>in</sup> Japan's interests, which were the quickest possible victory of Germany. Since the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, they must now develop that idea further. There were no longer any military problems for Germany on the continent, and Germany would not allow England to reestablish herself on the continent.



England's hopes of blockade, starvation, and unrest  
 on the continent were in vain. England must be  
 compelled to realize that she had no prospects of  
 victory and should sue for peace. Germany  
 was closely watching developments in France  
 although she <sup>was</sup> not interested in the occupation of the  
 entire country, so that French Africa would not  
 side with DE GAULLE. France's power had been  
 broken for all time. The occupation of the  
 occupied countries was merely a function of police  
 supervision. Peace reigned there and there was no  
 scarcity of foodstuffs. Germany herself had  
 sufficient food, and the occasional scarcities in the  
 production areas signified practically nothing.  
 In the Spring 240 divisions, of which 186  
 were first class combat divisions. ROMANIA,  
 HUNGARY and SLOVAKIA had already joined the  
 Tripartite pact, and Bulgaria would join shortly.  
 The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration signified that  
 Turkey was pulling herself at a distance from  
 developments in the Balkans and from  
 England. Neither Turkey or Russia would take any



action in the event of German intervention in Greece.

Tugoslavian statesmen had expressed their desires for peace on a recent visit to Berlin; and Tugoslavia would have to join Germany sooner or later. Thus the Balkans would be under German control. The English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had sustained reverses, she attacked Greece without German knowledge and in a poorly prepared military manner. But the Italian front in Greece was now stable. The advance of General WAVELL in North Africa could be attributed to the Italian lack of tanks, for the Italian had not been trained sufficiently in tank warfare. Germany had sent assistance to North Africa to bring about a change in the status. The Italian people stood solidly behind the Duce and Germany was supplying new materials. Germany was on a good and confidential footing with Spain, who would join Germany openly sooner or later, and was only delaying this on account of difficulties of food scarcities. Relations with Russia were good. Since Russia generally knew



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German military power, Russia would avoid any undertaking against Germany. STALIN was a clever and cool politician. Germany regarded the East with supreme peace. A war between Germany and Russia, which would not be wanted worked by Germany would mean a gigantic German victory and the end of the Soviet Regime.

German bombers had caused great destruction in England in spite of bad weather, and had produced a retarding effect upon English war production. Germany hoped to destroy more than America could replace. From the end of March, U. Boat warfare would be stepped up, and the cooperation of the LUFTWAFFE with the U-Boats would wreak great havoc. Through German sinkings English imports would be reduced to a level below that necessary for existence. Preparations were made for a landing in England. "ROOSEVELT was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan." <sup>"Met"</sup> It was in Germany's interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come into the war, she should not wage it in a military sense. ~~to~~ <sup>to be its</sup> ~~to be its~~ <sup>to be its</sup> military leader. The great extent of



The Atlantic Ocean's made that impossible. They  
 could only be the establishment of American  
 air bases in England. Germany was more powerful  
 in air warfare than a combination of England  
 and America. There was an unlimited number  
 of pilots and the possibilities of aircraft production  
 were unlimited. Great reserves of material had been  
 accumulated. Production was concentrated on V. Bombs  
 weapons, air weapons and anti-aircraft guns. The war  
 had become military, economic and political Germany's  
 wish was to finish the war quickly and to  
 compel England to sue for peace soon. <sup>In this</sup>  
~~question~~ ~~account~~ co-operation with Japan was of significance.  
 Japan should in her own interests, intervene as quickly  
 as possible in order to destroy England's key position in  
 East Asia, and to make Japan's position in East Asia  
 secure, <sup>which she</sup> ~~she~~ could only <sup>obtain</sup> be achieved through war. There  
 were three reasons for quick action:

- 1) A Japanese intervention would signify a decisive blow against the kernel of the British Empire.
- 2) America would remain out of the war as she was not prepared, and would not risk her fleet west of HAWAII. By <sup>of</sup> ~~respecting~~ American interests, <sup>were respected</sup> ROOSEVELT'S argument



of prestige for entry into the war would be ~~diminished~~, <sup>eliminated</sup>.  
 In the event of her entry into war, America must  
 observe helplessly, how Japan would take away the  
 PHILIPPINES from her.

3). Japan must prepare that position for the coming  
 New Order in the world, which she hoped to have at the  
 conclusion of peace. "Ambassador OSHIMA gave his  
 complete assent to this train of thought. He declared  
 he wished to do everything in order to put this  
 policy into effect." RIBBENTROP declared that the  
 closest co-operation in all spheres, especially in  
 news service and press, was necessary. ~~has~~ had already  
 been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia  
 and Bulgaria. The Ambassador intended to set up  
 a programme for the intensification of Japanese  
 propaganda with the Germans. Concerning America,  
 RIBBENTROP remarked, that clear unambiguous speaking  
 was required. The people in the U.S.A. did not like  
 National Socialism, but were opposed to an entry into  
 the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The  
 Americans felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and Jewish  
 wire-pullers would bring them into war without reason.  
 Therefore a clear and decisive, but not aggressive policy.



should be directed against America. The American people must know, that if they had aggressive desires an iron front of decided people, which practically embraced the whole world, was opposed to them. The misinterpretative English propaganda must be countered by the closest co-operation. To this end an exchange of ideas in diplomatic speeches and utterances was essential. In this connection, RIBBENTROP referred to the recent statement of MATSUOKA on Japanese readiness to be a peace mediator, and the explanation of the Japanese Ambassador in WASHINGTON, NOMURA of Japan's attitude in the west of America entering the war. To RIBBENTROP's reference that Germany had fulfilled her quota through the victory on the continent, to the fate of the allied nations, and also that in the future Germany would have to bear the brunt of the war, on account of the geographical factor, OSHIMA replied that Japan had decided to ~~decide~~ <sup>maintain</sup> her imperial ~~attitude~~ <sup>attitude</sup>.

RIBBENTROP then mentioned the new situation for the powers of the Tripartite Pact in Europe and East Asia after the war. Overcentralisation was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution



on a basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the European-African sphere led by Germany and Italy and the East-Asian sphere of interest led by Japan. Japan could conduct free trade with the independent states of the European hemisphere and conclude trade agreements as before, in the same manner, Germany and Italy should be granted preference over a third power between the two economic areas with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China etc. Minister Director WOLFFMATH's activity was confined to the conclusion of trade agreements. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined according to agreement in Berlin by the Economic Commission of the Tripartite pact.

In conclusion RIBBENTROP referred to the eventual necessity for joint proceedings, so as to open the eyes of the American people to the situation, and possibly bring about a change in public opinion <sup>in favor of</sup> isolation. He indicated that the problem was purely theoretical and not in anyway acute at the time. A common rupture of diplomatic relations of the



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partners of the Tripartite pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of the proceedings.

Two particular cases are mentioned:-

1) RIBBENTROP answered OSHIMA's question as to whether Germany had spoken to the Russians about joining the Tripartite Pact, in the affirmative Russia had expressed her readiness under certain preliminary conditions. To these belonged the Russian interest in Finland, the creation of a close relationship with Bulgaria and the STRAITS Problem / MEERENGENPROBLEM. Conversations were still pending. If there were further developments in the Balkans, they could be continued as the occasion arose. The Axis guarantee for Rumania was not sympathetic to the Russian, and they had come to an understanding on Rumanian petroleum, in view of strong German economic interests in the Balkans. On his part, OSHIMA explained that Russia was ready to conclude a pact with Japan, on the condition that the NORTH SAKHALIEN concessions would be returned. Relations were generally good, and Russia was supplying CHIANAN KAI SHER with relatively little, and only on payment.



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With regard to China, ~~OSAKA~~ declared that there were two courses, either to strengthen WANG CHING WEI, or to attempt to come to an understanding with CHIANG KAI SHEK. RIBBENTROP advised waiting until the German Army was again in action before attempting a new understanding with CHIANG KAI SHEK, so that this success of arms would bring about the most comprehensive consolidation of relations. RIBBENTROP ~~also~~ declared himself ready to strengthen WANG CHING WEI's position if desired.

OSAKA requested aid in advising the VICHY government to accept <sup>the Japanese mediation ~~in~~ <sup>proposal</sup></sup> the THAILAND - INDOCHINA conflict. This <sup>wish was fulfilled.</sup> ~~was granted.~~

[FRAMES 136603-8]

5) Telegram from WAGNER, 3 MARCH 1941, at HSINKING

~~D.N.B. representative requested D.N.B. BERLIN to be informed that according to official circles, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, en route to BERLIN, was expected in HSING KING on 6 MARCH.~~

[FRAMES 136609]

6) Telegram from OTT, dated 3 MARCH 1941, TOKYO.

The Foreign Minister had informed OTT that a



settlement in the Indo China - Thailand conflict was to be expected in the next few days as a result of the French ~~yielding~~ <sup>yielding</sup> /EINLENKEN/. He would therefore leave TOKYO on 6 MARCH and arrive in BERLIN on 19 or 20 MARCH. OTT would leave at the same time. He requested approval of passing business over to Ambassador BOLTZE, and proposed that Ambassador KORDT should participate in the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to BERLIN, and then return with OTT.

[Frame 136610]

7) Telegram from OTT, dated 4 March 1941, Tokyo.

This is a report which OTT received from the head of the cabinet of the Foreign Ministry, which gave the official proceedings in the Diet Session of 24 February. After a deputy had made reference to certain shortcomings of the Japanese settlement policy in MANCHUKOU, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA developed his favourite theme that OCEANIA was an ideal and most acceptable area for the settlement of Japanese, European and Americans. MATSUOKA intentionally did not clearly define the term "OCEANIA" but he distinguished between the "Greater Asia area" and "OCEANIA" in Japanese policy. The Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines belonged to



the 'Greater East Asia Area', and 'OCEANIA' includes New Guinea, and the surrounding groups of islands as far as New Caledonia. [Frame 136611-2].

8) Telegram from ALTENBURG dated 5 MARCH 1941 at FUSCHEL, giving the REICH Minister's approval of OTT handing over business to BOLTZE / See Frame 136610 / [Frame 136613]

9) Telegram from OTT, dated 6 March 1941, TOKYO  
The Foreign Minister had rebuked Ambassador NOMURA for being unskillful in front of the Japanese press, and told her <sup>not</sup> to stress Japan's treaty obligations and faith in the Tripartite Pact. He also told NOMURA that it was not admissible for an ambassador to shelter behind the official public announcements of his Foreign Minister. [Frame 136614]

10) Telegram from OTT, 6 MARCH 1941, TOKYO. Re time of  
i) <sup>Matsuoka's trip and</sup> As the Indo China - Thailand were continuing, against the Foreign Minister's expectations, he would not be able to leave MANCHURIA before 13 March for BERLIN where he expected to arrive in or about 22 March. OTT would accompany the Foreign Minister for MANCHURIA  
ii) MATSUOKA gave OTT the text of the press communique



to be issued in connection with it.

that he would issue <sup>only</sup> on the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations. OTT protested that the communique did not stress sufficiently the high political significance of the trip. MATSUOKA said he could not alter the text and requested the German and Italian communiques harmonized with his.

III) Catchword for German Press: Since the peace negotiations at PORTSMOUTH, 1905, no Japanese Foreign Minister in Office had carried an official mission to a foreign government [Frames 136615-6]

11) ~~Memo~~ data 7 March 1941, Berlin, reveals that <sup>stating that,</sup> according to Secretary BRAUN, the Japanese Ambassador had reported that MATSUOKA would definitely leave MANDSCHURI (MANCHURIA) on 10 March. He would fly most of the way from TOKYO to MANDSCHURI by air [Frame 136617].

12) Telegram from OTT, dated 8 March 1941, Tokyo.

MATSUOKA's had decided to postpone the publication of his communique, <sup>about his trip,</sup> considering the still unpublished Thailand-Indochina communique.

[Frame 136618]

13) Telegram from OTT dated 8 March 1941, Tokyo.

For the REICH minister personally. MATSUOKA was completed



to postpone his departure from Manchuria until the 17 March, because of the final settlement of the Siam - Indo-China negotiations, he would arrive in BERLIN about 26 March.

OTT would leave for BERLIN that very morning and arrive in Berlin about 22 March, so as to confer with the Reich Foreign Minister before MATSUOKA'S arrival [Frame 136619]

14) Telegram from RINTJELIN, dated 8 MARCH 1941 at FUSCHL giving Ambassador CLODIUS the Reich Foreign Minister's instructions with regard to Indo Chinese matters.

Ambassador WERNER should understand that 10,000 tons had been promised to Japan, and Ambassador STAMMER should get information from Ambassador OSHIMA on the present situation and a positive answer ~~to~~ the promise of 7,000 tons. [Frame 136620]

15) Telegram from SCHULENBERG, dated 8 MARCH 1941 at MOSCOW.

According to the Japanese ambassador, MATSUOKA would arrive at MOSCOW on 19 MARCH [Frame 136621]

16) Letter from BOLTZE dated 8 MARCH 1941, at TOKYO.

A review of the exchange of notes between CHURCHILL and EDEN on the one hand, and MATSUOKA on the other begins.

The English note presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister



by the British Ambassador was a recapitulation of  
 with the note handed to the Japanese Ambassador in London  
 by British Foreign Minister, EDEN, concerning the  
 progressive deterioration in Anglo-Japanese relations.

[Frames 136622-3]

17) An Enclosure to the previous item, giving <sup>in English</sup> the text of  
 the note received from the British Ambassador in English,  
 giving the record of the MATSUOKA - course up to March 1941.  
 Mention is made of MATSUOKA's statement that the Japanese  
 future policy was under consideration and had given the  
 impression that he thought there was no hope of any general  
 settlement between them and that Japan's only policy  
 was to tighten the ties with the Axis powers. Mention  
 is made of the impropriety of the Minister for Foreign  
 Affairs' reference to Japanese aspirations in BUKHARA.

[Frames 136624-6]

18) An Enclosure <sup>2</sup> to item 16 giving the English text of  
 Prime Minister Churchill's note of 24 February 1941.

[Frames 136627-9]

19) An Enclosure <sup>3</sup> to item 16 giving the text in English of  
 the Japanese Foreign Minister's Note of 24 February 1941  
 in answer to CHURCHILL'S note.

[Frames 136630-1]



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- 20) Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 10 March 1941 in Tokyo mentioning a DOMEI communiqué on MATSUOKA's journey on 11 March. [~~From~~ 136631A]
- 21) Telegram from ALTENBURG dated 10 March 1941 in PEKING, giving gist of CHUNGKING press reports on MATSUOKA's journey. [~~From~~ 136631B]
- 22) Telegram from THOMSEN dated 10 March 1941 in WASHINGTON, giving American press views on OTT and MATSUOKA going to BERLIN. [~~From~~ 136631C]
- 23) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 11 MARCH 1941, in Tokyo. Supplementary to item 20, stating that MATSUOKA would leave for EUROPE on 12 MARCH. [~~From~~ 136631D]
- 24) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 11 MARCH 1941 in Tokyo, stating that he had requested no publicity be given to the possibility of MATSUOKA visiting VICHY, which Matsuoaka would do only in agreement with the German Government. [~~From~~ 136631E]
- 25) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 12 March 1941, in Tokyo. "Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI <sup>has just visited me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>his</sup> ~~lead~~ <sup>the</sup> gratitude of the Japanese government ~~to be conveyed to the Reich Foreign~~ <sup>for the extraordinarily valuable and effective</sup> ~~to the Japanese~~ <sup>to the Japanese</sup> ~~for and~~ <sup>to the Japanese</sup> ~~support in the~~ <sup>to the Japanese</sup> mediation in the dispute between THAILAND and FRENCH INDO CHINA" [~~From~~ 136632]



- 26) Telegram from RINTELEN, dated 12 March 1941 in FUSCH, to German Ambassador, TOKYO, stating that FRAULEIN MUELLER-HAUFF, secretary to COUNT DUERCKHEIM, was in contact with the British Secret Service, and requesting investigation and information [~~From~~ 136633]
- 27) Telegram from PONSCHAS dated 13 MARCH in HARBIN giving information from TANIGUCHI, Japanese naval attaché there, whose ~~brock~~ <sup>brock</sup> is attached to the Japanese embassy in ~~Beijing~~, which had been given to OTT in detail as he passed through HARBIN. [~~From~~ 136634]
- 28) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 13 March 1941 in TOKYO, stating that MATSUOKA had left on the previous evening, and giving detail of his programme. [~~From~~ 136635]
- 29) Telegram from MACKENSEN dated 14 March 1941 in ROME. He had been informed by Ambassador ROCCO, that, according to an intercepted telephone conversation between the DOMEI representative and another Japanese journalist, MATSUOKA would sign a non aggression pact in MOSCOW on his way home [~~From~~ 136636].
- 30) Telegram from ALTENBURG, dated 14 March 1941, in PEKING, complaining about a <sup>news item</sup> ~~going sent from~~ DOMEI agency of a leader in the ~~WASHINGTON STAR~~ of 12 MARCH on the BERLIN conference. [~~From~~ 136637]



- 31) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 14 MARCH 1941, TOKYO, giving detail of MATSUOKA's entourage on the trip to BERLIN. [~~From~~ 136638-9]
- 32) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 16 MARCH 1941, in TOKYO, with reference to item 26, stating that instructions had been carried out. [~~From~~ 136640]
- 33) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 17 March 1941 in Tokyo, giving further detail of MATSUOKA's entourage and individual linguistic abilities. [~~From~~ 136641-2]
- 34) Telegram from SCHULLENBERG, dated 19 March 1941, in MOSCOW, stating that according to the Japanese ambassador, MATSUOKA would arrive in MOSCOW on 23 MARCH, see MOLOTOV on 24 March, and leave the same day for BERLIN via WARSAW. [~~From~~ 136643]
- 35) Telegram from BOLTZE dated 19 March 1941 in Tokyo. <sup>Voicing dissatisfaction with Japan's export policy towards Germany</sup> Since the beginning of March, export permits for such articles as rubber tyres, copper wire, woollen yarn, tungsten steel / FERRO-WOLFRAM, molybdenum steel / FERRO-MOLIBDEN, had been refused. Exports of copra and copra oil had been prohibited from Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. German requirement would have to be shared with Japan, and Japan would do what



she could for Germany, MITSUI and MITSUBISHI exercised the control over copra and copra oil, whilst SHŌWA TSUSHŌ controlled ores and metals, and would establish an office in BERLIN. Japanese were striving for a favourable situation in the coming economic negotiations. [Frames 136644-5].

36.) A note by WIEHL dated 19 March 1941, in BERLIN, re conference ~~WIEHL~~ had discussed with Ambassador MATSUSHIMA about co-operation of Japanese and German embassies in the MOSCOW negotiations for the reduction of the transit <sup>and transport of goods by vessels</sup> tariffs. ~~MATSUSHIMA would inform the Japanese government and the Embassy in MOSCOW. MATSUSHIMA suggested that Russia be threatened with reprisals if she did not agree to the reduction, and Germany and Japan would utilize sea transport. WIEHL pointed out the difficulties of this, because of the English blockade and NAVICERT system, but MATSUSHIMA suggested this could be countered by the ships flying the flag of the Japanese Navy. (KRETSZMARTNE).~~ [Frames 136646-7].

37.) Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 20 March 1941, in TOKYO, which lists the presents taken by MATSUOKA for the



- leading German personalities. [Frame 136648]
- 38) Telegram from SCHULENBURG, dated 23 March 1941 in MOSCOW. MATSUOKA would be accompanied from BERLIN by Consul MIYAKAWA ~~who~~ who was well informed on the Soviet Union. [Frame 136649]
- 39) Note from ALTENBURG to Secretary of State dated 19 March 1941, in BERLIN, stating that the REICH Foreign Minister wished Ambassador STAMMER to collect all necessary material for the conversation with MATSUOKA, and therefore to be given all information relative to Japan. [Frame 136650]
- 40) Telegram from SCHULENBURG, dated 23 March 1941, in MOSCOW. According to the Japanese Embassy, MATSUOKA would leave MOSCOW for WARSAW by regular train on 24 March. [Frame 136651]
- 41) Telegram from SCHULENBURG, dated 24 March 1941, in MOSCOW, to the Admiralty. SCHULENBURG had had conversations with Captain FUSHI, accompanying MATSUOKA on his journey. ~~ANALYST'S NOTE: Captain FUSHI is presumably the FREGHATTENKAPITAN FUJII Shigeru mentioned in Frame 136639. In Stabover's note in which FUSHI expressed his hope that the Germans would convince the conversation were on sea warfare, and the Japanese~~



of their expectation for victory  
 Military attaché requested information on German  
~~successes to be given him in BERLIN. This was necessary~~  
 for those circles in Japan which challenged the  
 Axis policy of the present government.

[~~Frame~~ 136652]

42) Note from WOERMAN, dated 25 March 1941, Berlin. ~~#~~  
 re: Goebbels proclamation 12/1 on the occasion of MATSUOKA's visit  
~~statement that he had telephoned the explanation of the~~  
 Foreign Office, as no instructions had been received from  
 Vienna regarding the intended summons of GOEBBELS on  
 the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister

[~~Frame~~ 136653]

43) A note by WIEHL, dated 24 March 1941, in BERLIN.

re:  
 A summary of the letter of the East Asia section  
 (OSTASIATISCHER VEREIN) <sup>complaint of</sup> in which German firms in  
 China, Japan and Manchukuo <sup>complain</sup> of their  
 treatment at the hands of Japanese government officials, who  
 discriminate against German firms in such a way that  
 German trade in the Far East would be finished before  
 long

[~~Frames~~ 136654-5]

44) Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 26 March 1941, in  
 re:  
 Tokyo, giving the gist of a discussion at the Foreign  
 Ministry on the subject of transport of German



nationals aboard Japanese shipping.

[~~Frame~~ 136656-7]

45) Telegram from RITZER, dated 21 March 1941, to German Ambassador, Tokyo, on the subject of the transport of rubbers from the Far East. All methods ~~must be utilized and pressure brought to bear on the Japanese government~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~to use sea transport,~~ <sup>auxiliary cruisers under</sup> not only blockade runners but also Japanese ~~ships~~ <sup>auxiliary</sup> ~~ships~~ <sup>cruisers</sup> under the Japanese Navy flag. Ribbentrop informed OSHIMA of this instruction to OTT. ~~WIEGSTRASSE~~ [Frames 136658-61]

46) A note by WIENL to the Reich Foreign Minister, dated 28 March 1941, in BERLIN, concerning German-Japanese Economic Negotiations, conducted by WOHLTHAT, whose report is mentioned in the following item. [Frames 136662-3]

47) A <sup>detailed</sup> report by WOHLTHAT, ~~date illegible~~, March 1941, is Berlin on the economic negotiations with Japan and Manchukuo. <sup>since 1936.</sup> [Frames 136664-136677]

48) Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 28 March 1941, in Tokyo, giving <sup>Japanese</sup> press comments on the reception of MATSUOKA in BERLIN, and MATSUOKA's conversations with STALIN. [Frames 136678-9]



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49) Note from WOERMAN, dated 29 March 1941, in BERLIN, stating that he had been spoken to by various heads of mission with regard to MATSUOKA'S visit, and had stressed its significance  
[Frame 136680]

50) Telegram from BOLTZE, dated 29 March 1941, in Tokyo, giving the latest situation on the despatch of auxiliary <sup>cruisers</sup> ~~ships~~ ~~HELSIGER~~ to Germany. The Japanese Admiralty wished to see if ASAKA MARU returned safely, before despatching the ship, as the USA reserved its right to search the ship when passing through the PANAMA Canal, and the British Embassy would not accept a second attempt. For this reason the ship had been ~~sent via CAPE TOWN.~~ [Frame 136681-2]

51) <sup>Memo</sup> ~~note~~ by WIEHL, dated 31 March 1941 in BERLIN, stating that he had given to Ambassador MATSUSHIMA Germany's rubber requirements. MATSUSHIMA thought it would be ~~sent to Japan~~, if Germany imported ~~her own rubber.~~ [Frame 136683-4]

52) Letter from WEIZSAECKER to Reich Foreign Minister, dated 31 March 1941, stating that he had discussed



with the Japanese Ambassador the possibilities of repatriating German nationals from the Netherlands East Indies. <sup>by Japanese auxiliary cruiser</sup> The Japanese Ambassador promised to investigate the possibility of utilizing a success ship / MILFSKREUZER / for this, and that he would personally interest Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the topic. [Frame 136685]

53) An appendix to the previous item, dated 31 March 1941, in BERLIN giving details of German nationals in the Netherlands East Indies, and suggestions as to how the Japanese could repatriate them. [Frame 136686-7]

54) ~~Full translation~~ and the following stems, are entitled "MATSUOKA Visit" ~~and~~

55) ~~and 56) deal with the formal breakfast given by Hitler for Matsuoka. Note to Secretary of State, with illegible signature, which is a covering note to the next item.~~ [Frame 136688]

56) ~~List of persons to be present at breakfast with the FUERNER on Friday 28 March 1941.~~ [Frame 136689]

57) Curricula vitae ~~Details of MATSUOKA and his~~ <sup>entourage</sup>, ~~and a short life-~~ [Frame 1366899]



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~~of MATSUOKA~~ and his attendants compiled by  
BIDDER [ ~~From~~ 136692-5 ]

58) Advice on the situation of Japan prepared for  
the Reich Foreign Minister by Ambassador OTI  
~~in the train~~ on 25 March 1941.

"According to enquiries with the Chief of the <sup>Navy</sup> General Staff,  
Admiral KONDO <sup>the Navy</sup> ~~is~~ vigorously preparing for a  
~~land~~ attack on SINGAPORE. Preparations were expected  
to be concluded by the end of May. He ~~was~~  
expressed as misgivings:  
~~being~~ ~~into~~ ~~consideration~~.

a) American guerrilla warfare by the means  
of submarines and aircraft from the Philippine  
archipelago against the long route for raw  
materials from Netherlands East Indies and the  
Malay State to Japan;

b) the threat of two fleet warfare,  
should the British fleet be able to transfer  
from the Mediterranean to the Pacific

"According to enquiries with the Chief of the General Staff,  
General SUGIYAMA, the Army was <sup>also</sup> making preparations  
for an attack ~~at the same time~~, <sup>conclusion</sup> ~~which would also be~~ <sup>presumably</sup>



~~concluded by the~~ end of May.

" A condition for the accomplishment of this ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> a free <sup>towards</sup> ~~that the seas would be left free~~ by Russia (RUECKENFREIHEIT) Ambassador SHIRATORI stressed the necessity to <sup>tie up</sup> ~~engage~~ the English fleet / ANALYST'S NOTE: - <sup>Comp.</sup> In sub para b) above, <sup>where</sup> mention is made of the possibility of the British fleet being able to transfer from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Presumably SHIRATORI means that the British fleet must be given commitments elsewhere, so as to leave the Japanese free to attack SINGAPORE. The German phrase is "ENGLISCHE FLOTTE ZU BINDEN".

" Summarising: ~~Therefore,~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~attack~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~seen~~ in the Army and Navy, preparations <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ in progress, ~~and~~ ~~the~~ accomplishment ~~is~~ possible if the Army's and Navy's objections could be eliminated. The military <sup>prospects</sup> ~~view~~ <sup>is</sup> favourable. ~~The~~ Type of attack was not by a naval attack from the sea, but ~~by~~ <sup>by</sup> creation of a base on shore, from where the air force would ~~smoke out~~ SINGAPORE. Only <sup>in</sup> this way could a <sup>first,</sup> quick result be achieved. Then ~~the~~ <sup>needed</sup> ~~need~~ of time, for the actual capture of the fortress, would not be so important. The effectiveness of the air force is to be enhanced by the allocation of a few experienced <sup>German dive bomber</sup> ~~fighter~~ specialists to the Japanese



naval air forces.

"The need for the near to be left free by Russia, plays a decisive part in the Japanese considerations and was being striven for by a reconciliation with Russia. The possibility of creating this free near by other means should be limited at ~~believed MATSUOKA to indicate any other means of achieving~~ to MATSUOKA. <sup>By this means, it would be avoided that possibly the decision to an action against SINGAPORE could be put in the background, and that prominence be given to the Russian question would be avoided.</sup> Since the reconciliation with Russia is also sought in the interests of the re-creation of economic relations with Germany, the despatch of the WOLFFTHAT economic commission should be hastened, so as to show the good will of Germany in economic relationships.

"Apart from <sup>this, it might be advisable to</sup> ~~the~~ plans of German specialists <sup>for putting to work enterprises disengaged with war-recovered money in occupied areas</sup> at the disposal of the Japanese, <sup>to be recommended</sup> for keeping into working order the war economic management in the conquered areas, in order to maintain <sup>uninterruptedly</sup> the supply of raw materials from Netherlands East Indies and the Malay State, should Japan occupy these areas."

[~~From~~ 136696-9]

59) Letter from WEIZSÄCKER to Reich Foreign Minister dated 24 March 1941, giving his notes for the MATSUOKA



visit.

"1) That the most important topic ~~was~~ naturally <sup>the moment</sup> the state of Japan's entry into the war against England"

To bring this about, Germany had valuable concessions.

a) The renunciation of claims to the Netherlands East Indies

b) The renunciation of claims to former German possessions in the South Seas, including those at present under British mandate.

c) Increased support of Japan's policy in China (either attempts at mediation, or the recognition of WANG CHING WEI)

WEIZSACKER had the impression that Japan's entry into the war against England depended more ~~to~~ or ~~less~~ on further German successes against England, and that the concessions stated above would not play any great part in it.

"2) MATSUKA <sup>is still running on the track of an</sup> still ~~desired~~ <sup>understanding</sup> ~~agreement~~ with Russia and ~~desired~~ <sup>claims</sup> German encouragement for this. A clear statement, <sup>which course our relations to Russia may take</sup> ~~on the German attitude was necessary in order~~ <sup>in order</sup> ~~is unavoidable in order to protect him~~ <sup>in order</sup> ~~to defend MATSUKA from surprises, and also to control~~ <sup>him</sup> Japanese policy through MATSUKA <sup>of his</sup> European journey"

/ 136700/



~~journey~~ 11. [~~Frame~~ 136700]

60) A note from WOERMANN to Ambassador STAHLER dated 22 March 1941 on the need of having all necessary materials and references available for the German during MATSUOKA's visit [~~Frame~~ 136701]

61) This item comprises the notes prepared for the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister. [~~Frame~~ 136702 - 136727]

a) Index of the notes [~~Frame~~ 136702].

b) Note on Japanese foreign relations, by BIDDER dated 18 March 1941 BERLIN

(I) Japan - U.S.A.

The evolution of the U.S. towards the "procrastinating reconciliation policy" is stressed in connection with the economic opposition, carried out by U.S.

~~The present Japanese policy towards the U.S.A., which the KONOYE - MATSUOKA cabinet, supported by an Army of the highest potential, has pursued for a year, and which has been stressed by the recent dispatch of the conciliatory ambassador NOMURA, has been coolly received in America.~~

~~The USA has been progressing with the continued build up of her military situation in the Pacific, and the increase of the economic policy directed against Japan, and the policy of support for CHINA in the conflict with Japan.~~

~~The Japanese negotiations in BATAVIA for raw material has met with strong opposition from America and England.~~

~~The difficulties, announced by the embassy in Tokyo, are~~



confirmed by the anti-Japanese tendency encountered by the Japanese negotiator YOSHIZAWA in the rubber negotiations at BATAVIA. <sup>[Compare the comment on the phrase "procrastinating reconciliation policy" in Item 62]</sup>

### (II) Japan - U.S.S.R.

The improvements in Russo-Japanese relations stressed by the KONOYE-MATSUOKA Cabinet has had the ~~the~~ <sup>some</sup> following successes and

(i) A fishing agreement was signed in January 1941.

(ii) According to Japanese information, the economic negotiation, at present being conducted in MOSCOW should be concluded this month with agreement on the principal points.

The Russian attitude to Japan has changed and Russia is now ready to <sup>conclude</sup> ~~conclude~~ a pact with Japan whose condition shall be the return of the North SAKHALIEN concessions to Russia.

### (III) Japan - China.

The KONOYE-MATSUOKA cabinet has stressed the need to liquidate the China war, <sup>but without success.</sup> In the autumn of 1940, the Chinese had been ready to negotiate, but under American, English and Russian influence had stiffened their opposition. Preliminary feelers <sup>VORFOEHLER</sup> with



~~with CHIANG KAI SHEK had remained unsuccessful.~~

~~On 10 March the Chinese Political Council has decided on~~

- ~~(i) complete support of CHIANG KAI SHEK's policy of resistance.~~
- ~~(ii) acceptance of American, English and Russian aid in the continued struggle against Japan.~~
- ~~(iii) Opposition to WANG CHIN WEI to the bitter end.~~
- ~~(iv) complete agreement with the liquidation of Communist troops by disciplinary measure.~~

In connection with the Japanese troop concentrations in HAINAN and FORMOSA, the Japanese Army chiefs have decided on considerable reductions in troops throughout occupied China.

#### (IV) Japan - WANG CHINGWEI.

~~The Japanese policy towards WANG CHING WEI does not recognize the complete recognition of the NANKING government as the central Chinese government. In the Japanese government there is a military group which want the strengthening of the WANG CHING WEI government, and a political group which considers that the Japanese ~~policy~~ WANG CHING WEI~~



policy would not lead to a satisfactory conclusion of the China conflict and advises a reconciliation with CHIANG KAI SHEK

The Germans and Italians had made clear to the Japanese that they would support whatever policy Japan favoured in the WANG CHING WEI question.

(V) Japan - England.

The troop concentration <sup>(which Japan is at present undertaking on the islands of)</sup> HAINAN and FORMOSA - about 10 divisions each - <sup>and the construction of</sup> fleet bases in PAKHOI and CAMRANH BAY, and <sup>early</sup> the extension of Japan's political influence to THAILAND, as a result of the successful mediation in the THAILAND-INDOCHINA conflict, indicated that Japan is preparing a great military undertaking whose aim can be an <sup>push</sup> advance to the south, in the direction of HONGKONG, the PHILIPPINES, and MALACCA-SINGAPORE. The Japanese colony in SINGAPORE has begun to return to Japan since February <sup>(of this year)</sup> and cited.

~~The English sea taking defence measures centred on MALAYA-SINGAPORE, with the concentration of naval army and air forces from BRITISH INDIA, AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND in SINGAPORE, together with the conscription of men for the service, and large scale~~



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~~manoeuvre in Malacca etc.~~

(VI) Japan - Indochina

The situation in "Indochina" <sup>is at present:</sup> ~~about~~

(1) Defence bases against China. <sup>Japan has concentrated at present</sup> 10,000 Japanese troops concentrated in TONG KING.

(2) <sup>Starting position</sup> Preparations for the attack on BRITISH MALAYA and BORNEO, by sea troop concentrations in HAINAN, and development <sup>and construction</sup> of fleet bases in PAKHOI and CAMRANH BAY. <sup>3) Basis of supply with raw materials, especially rice and rubber</sup> 136703-7

c) "Memo on Japanese expansionist policy in East Asia; the terms ~~Groß~~ Great East Asia Sphere / ~~GROSSASIAATISCHER RAUM~~ and OCEANIA; and the Netherlands East India question," compiled by WOERMANN.

(i). The political term "Great East Asia Sphere" / ~~GROSSASIAATISCHER RAUM~~ / was first recognized by treaty Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940. By Article 2 of this pact, Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan "in the creation of a new order" in this sphere.

Japan understands by this term "Great East Asia sphere" <sup>at least</sup> Japan, Manchukuo, China, Indochina, Thailand, Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines.



This understanding arises partly from the Japanese government's declarations and partly from the situation, ~~of the land~~. The Malay States, Singapore and possibly Burma must be considered as part of the sphere. Areas which lie to the west of the states mentioned <sup>have</sup> ~~are~~ never ~~been~~ considered as "East Asian". As yet, it has not been defined how far the Soviet districts in the Far East belong to this sphere.

The term "Oceania" was coined by MATSUOKA in his declaration of 24 February 1941. In the conventional sense, Oceania comprises the islands in the Pacific Ocean between the continents of America and Asia, with the exception <sup>intentionally</sup> of Australia and New Zealand. MATSUOKA <sup>intentionally</sup> did not expand on the idea, but various commentators would indicate that Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines are not considered as part of Oceania, but that New Guinea and the surrounding groups of islands as far as, and including New Caledonia, are.

The press reports from American sources that MATSUOKA had demanded an exclusive right of settlement for Japan in this area, are <sup>not true</sup> ~~conclusion~~. He had said that Oceania could accommodate another 600-



800 million people and that Japan had a right to settle here.

(II). The Japanese claim to leadership in the Great East Asia sphere, with regard to CHINA, is expressed in the ~~Amoy~~ AMAYU declaration of 17 April 1934, which excludes political interference by foreign powers in China, and only permits financial and economic negotiations between a foreign power and China, insofar as such negotiations are beneficial to China and not detrimental to peace in East Asia."

The incorporation of the Netherlands East Indies in the Great East Asia Sphere was <sup>first</sup> expressed in a similar <sup>general</sup> statement on 15 April 1940 by Foreign Minister ARITA, on the occasion of <sup>reports of</sup> British troop landings in the Netherlands. The declaration does not signify a statement of territorial claims, but a warning against the infringement of the status quo. As a result USA (in HULL's declaration of 17 April 40) and England (BUTLER's written answer in the House of Commons on 18 April 1940) recognised the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. <sup>The Japanese government urged Germany them to take position to their question.</sup> On 22 May 1940, Germany declared that Japan had no interest in such overseas questions.



ARITA on 3 July 1940 appreciated the German answer as a friendly advance.

Japanese claim to leadership in MANCHUKUO and CHINA <sup>concern</sup> found expression in the Franco Japanese agreement of a limited right of occupation in Indo China, and in the Japanese mediation in the Indo Chinese-Thailand conflict, in which Germany had given Japan considerable diplomatic support.

(III) Japan's expansionist policy in the Great East Asia sphere conflicts with German interests in economics, in that Japan wants Germany to make economic negotiations with countries like China, Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies, only through the medium of Japan. <sup>possible points of friction are: future of NEI and Mandates.</sup> [ ~~136708~~ - 11 ]

(d) ARITA's declaration of 15 April 1940.

ARITA declared that Japan had close association of mutual aid with the South Seas Areas, ~~and~~ had other countries in East Asia. Japan, like these other lands was working for the welfare of East Asia, ~~and~~ should the state of war in Europe extend to Holland, with repercussions on the Netherlands East Indies, the stability and well being of East



Asia would be affected. Consequently the Japanese government viewed with misgiving the developments accompanying the increase of war of Europe, which could influence the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. [Comp IPS Doc. 9020, 4026]

[~~File~~ 136712]

(e) Memo on the former German colonies in the South Sea, compiled by WOERMANN

~~| Germany has expressed <sup>to Japan</sup> no renunciation of the former German archipelagos under Japanese mandate (Marianas, Carolines, and the Marshalls), although there had been unofficial feelers made a few years previously. The basis of the conversation was that the territories under Japanese mandate would be returned to Germany who would then sell them to Japan. These negotiations had not been pursued for general political reasons.~~

~~The return of the former German colonies, at present under Australian mandate (New Guinea), under New Zealand's mandate (Samoa), and under common mandate of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand (Nauru) is a question which concerns Japanese~~



interest. No decision had been reached as to whether Germany would appear again as a colonial power in the South Sea. If this were not so, the former German colonies could be an object of negotiation and compensation.

[Frame 136713-.4]

(f) Memo on German-Japan air lines dated 22 March 1941.

"According to information from the Reich Ministry for Air Transport, (<sup>Counsellor</sup> SCHWARTZ), the Japanese military mission at present in <sup>Germany</sup> Japan had given the Commander of the LUFTWAFFE a list of <sup>military</sup> ~~aviation~~ <sup>and</sup>, in this connection mentioned casually the subject of installation ~~including~~ the introduction of a Japan-German air line." The Japanese suggested that the Japanese Air Association and LUFTHANSA should make a business agreement of a co-operation for the introduction of the air line. SCHWARTZ favoured this idea, since it would be of practical value, if the Soviet Union agreed Germany had already in early 1940 proposed the idea of a German Japan air line, when the Berlin-Moscow air line had been re-opened.



In a conversation with SCHULENBERG on 26 MARCH 1940, MOLOTOV said that the Soviet government had little inclination to approach the Japanese government on the subject of an air agreement, considering the unsatisfactory progress of negotiations with Japan. <sup>It is expected that the project will be brought up on the occasion of MATSUOKA'S visit.</sup>

The Japanese should be informed that Germany was greatly interested in the idea, but the practicality depended on Japanese-Soviet relations. [~~7~~ 136715-6]

(g) Memo by WIEHL, dated 21 March 1941 on

Germany-Japan economic questions <sup>giving a general outline of negotiations and Jap. practices since 1938.</sup>

(I) General: - <sup>giving a general outline of negotiations and Jap. practices since 1938.</sup> The attitude of the Japanese government on economic questions has been satisfactory during the previous year. Efforts during 1938-9 as return service for German aid in China (recall of military advisers, and the ceasing of military supplies to China) for the maintenance of trade with occupied China at least. On a equal standing with Japan had been unsuccessful. No preference over a third country had been reached, but only a guarantee of the most favourable treatment which a third country



enjoyed. Since the outbreak Japan had not satisfied Germany's desire for preference over a third country for rubber, tin and wolfram. Germany had received increasing supplies of whale oil, chiefly she offered a better price than England. The amount of Soya beans received from Manchuria had slumped. In occupied China, British and American had received preferential treatment. Even in Japan there was a tendency to put German firms out of business, and protestations on the part of the Ambassador had been fruitless. Even with the KONOYE government, there had been no change.

At present the Japanese wanted credit loans, surrenders of licenses and patents, and also to exclude Germany from direct trade with the Far East in Japan's own favour. The WOLFFMATH delegation would travel to Tokyo in April to make agreements on the exchange of goods in wartime and to attempt to improve German trade in Japan and China as far as possible.

## (II) Details

(a) Rubber. Negotiations were in progress whereby Germany



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would receive 25000 tons from Indo China.

Japan had promised transportation to Japan and DAIKIN. For the transport to Germany, blockade runners were contemplated, but it would be necessary to have the use of Japanese <sup>auxiliary</sup> ~~rescue~~ <sup>cruisers</sup> ships which could carry valuable German supplies <sup>to Japan</sup> on the return journey.

(b) Raw materials via Japan: Germany would want to buy raw materials ~~from~~ third powers through the medium of Japan, such as rubber and tin from Netherlands East Indies and Thailand, Wolfram from South China and tin from Bolivia.

(c) Transport via Siberian and South Manchurian railways. The German and Japanese embassies in Moscow had agreed on the closest cooperation in the Moscow negotiations so as to overcome difficulties of the Siberian route (e.g. tariff questions etc). The sea connection between Japan and Vladivostok should be improved by Japanese shipping.

(d) German trade in China, Japan and Manchuria. In the South China and Yangtze ports, German firms were excluded from economic activity, as the trade was reserved for Japanese companies. In addition there were many practical limitations imposed on the



Germans, which did not apply to the Japanese, English  
 and Americans. The Japanese proposals in the  
 WOHLETRIT negotiations would only allow German trade  
 through the medium of Japan. This would mean that  
 German trade would be entirely excluded from North China.  
 In Japan and Manchukuo, also, Japanese firms had  
 monopolies over German firms, excluding them from business,  
 whilst in Germany, Japanese firms and German firms  
 were treated with equality. The WOHLETRIT mission  
 should make efforts to obtain MATSUOKA's agreement to  
 improve this situation. This would be in the Japanese  
 interests since the German economic organisation, established  
 in the Far East for decades, could take the lead in  
 German support for the establishment of the Great  
 East Asia sphere.

(e) The form  
conditions of post war economic relations.

Economic relations between the European - African sphere  
 under the control of Germany and Italy and the Great East  
 Asia sphere under the control of Japan should be on a  
 grand scale, with a free exchange of trade, and  
 preference over any third power. But a decentralisation  
 was to be avoided, rather Germany and Italy should  
 have free trade with independent states in the Great East.



Asia sphere, whilst Japan stood as the same with independent status in the German-Italian sphere.

But Japan only wanted trade with China, Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies to be negotiated through her as medium. [Frames 136717-22]

(h) Memo on the culture division for conversations with MATSUOKA compiled by VON TWARDOWSKI, dated 21 March 1941.

(I) In Japan:— Germans were employed in Japanese high schools (KŌTŌ GAKKŌ) as teachers of German language and culture. The Japanese-German culture institute, Tokyo and the German Research Institute in Kyoto were <sup>officially supported</sup> ~~financed with~~ <sup>by Japan</sup> official Japanese requests. Baron MITSUI and the HARADA establishment had endowed a fund for the reconstruction of the institute. In 1938-9 a cultural history exhibition of "Greater Germany" had travelled round Japan and had attracted over a million visitors. A similar exhibition on behalf of Japan was being prepared in Berlin. RICHARD STRAUSS had composed a festival hymn on the occasion of the 2600 year celebrations, which Professor FELLNER had performed for the first time. This was a special honour for STRAUSS, as the Emperor had personally attended.

(II) In Germany:— The German Japanese Association, under



Admiral FOERSTER, with branches in COLOGNE, MUNICH, LEIPZIG, VIENNA and BRÉSIAU was active. In 1940 there had been an exhibition of Japanese traditional furniture in several German towns. The DESSAU Chamber Orchestra had introduced modern Japanese music at concerts in BERLIN, DESSAU and elsewhere. VISCOUNT KONOYE, brother of the Prime Minister PRINCE KONOYE was a regular guest conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra.

(III) Exchange between Germany and Japan - The German-Japanese culture agreement of 25 November 1938 was the first international agreement which stipulated a culture exchange on the basis of respective national life. The German-Japanese cultural exchange in Berlin and Tokyo consisted of five Germans and five Japanese. The Germans were enthusiastic over the appointment of Ambassador SAKUMA to deal with cultural affairs in Berlin where he had many friends. Ambassador was the President of the Berlin committee. The exchange of students continued, and had recently been increased to eight students. 50,000 Reich Marks had been set aside annually since October 1940 for the exchange of lecturers.

(IV) Film: Mutual film exchange left something to be desired.



German films were only distributed in Japan by the MANE-1 (Manchurian Film Monopoly Association). An agreement on film exchange and distribution was required.

(V) Books: There was no arrangement for the import of Germans books into Japan, in the Japanese plan. This prejudiced German-Japanese cultural relations.

[~~Form~~ 136723-5]

(c) Memo on Radio by RUEHLE, dated 22 March 1941 in Berlin.

Close relations with Japan in the field of radio were to be desired. On the basis of the cultural cooperation agreement signed in November 1938, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has been given a plan of a radio agreement in June 1940. The Japanese have taken no action. The result of such an agreement would be that there would be greater co-operation with Germany in the foreign political broadcasts from Japan, the Japanese would cooperate with the German Ambassador in Tokyo, so as to strengthen the Tripartite Pact by these broadcasts. For a few years the German colony in Shanghai had had a transmitter under the name of "The Voice of Europe". It was planned to increase its transmission power so as to impress the U.S.A. in particular, by propaganda. The strengthening of the transmitter was in the interest of Japan.



since it would counter English American propaganda in China, and strengthen the political power of the Tripartite pact.

[~~File~~ 136726]

(j) Memo on the Press by BRAUN von STUFPENBERG dated 21 March 1941.

At that time negotiations were in progress <sup>in course</sup> for the conclusion of a press agreement with Japan and a press statute for the German-Japanese press association. Both of them were intended to increase German-Japanese press relations and to control the press on the continent of Germany and Japan. At present in Japan the press was not so strictly controlled as in Germany, and enemy press reports were inserted in influential Japanese papers without commentary. Even DOKAI agency used these press reports in its world radio service. Certain financial and economic circles in Japan were taking to an extreme Anglo-American press opinions to undermine the Tripartite Pact policy. A greater control of the Japanese press should be sought. [~~File~~ 136727]

(2) Memo, with illegible signature for information of Reich Foreign Ministry on occasion of MATSUOKA's visit, with no date, concerning the documents analyzed above.

(I) Political Section. (1) The Japanese government ~~is~~ not

to the Jap. attitude towards U.S. is erroneous. (See Item 60)



ready to come to an understanding with America, ~~with~~ ~~was~~ ~~wished~~ to avoid war with the USA, but was preparing militarily and economically for the possibility of such a war. If SINGAPORE was transferred to the Americans, Japan would take counter action.

(2) and (3) Japanese expansion policy in East Asia. It was suggested that Germany should not <sup>begin to discuss the topics of</sup> ~~interfer~~ with the Japanese expansion policy in the terms 'Oceania' and 'Great East Asia sphere'. ~~with~~.

(a) ~~Germany, on 22 May 1940, had declared to Japan~~  
her disinterestedness in such problems.

(b) ~~There was no reason to deal with these matters.~~

(4) Air line, Germany-Japan. The creation of an air line was of great importance, if it were possible for technical and political reasons.

(II) Commercial political section.

(5) German-Japanese economic problems

~~With reference to the matters from Indo-China, the telegram from Ambassador SCHNURRE of 22 March 1941 was enclosed.~~

~~It must be indicated to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the monopoly against German firms in Japan and occupied China, must be stopped, by means devised by the Japanese government. It was in the interests of both~~



countries to continue and elaborate on the present scheme of cooperation (German representatives in Japan, and Japanese representatives in Germany)

(III) Culture section.

(6) Cultural relations should be improved, and the publication of German books in Japanese was recommended.

(IV) Race Section: (7) Collaboration must be increased, and the strengthening of SHANG HAI's "Voice of Europe" was necessary to counteract English-American propaganda in China.

(V) Press section:

(8) Count URACH was in Japan to effect a press agreement so as to improve collaboration between German and Japanese press. ~~The financial and economic circles which recapitulated Anglo-American press opinions, were employing the "ADVERTISER" to this end. The "Advertiser" was published in English. Japanese vernacular papers had improved~~

[Frames 136728-31]

(63) Memo from WEIZSAECKER dated 25 MARCH 1941 16th Protocol. Minister FUNK requested that, owing to ill health, he be excused from official functions, and that MATSUOKA be informed about his health to avoid misunderstanding.

[Frame 136722]



(4). Telegram from SCHULENBURG dated 25 March 1941, in Moscow to the Reich Foreign Minister.

MATSUOKA had had conversations with MOLOTOV and STALIN prior to his departure for Berlin, with the idea of setting aside differences in the "basic questions" / ~~GRUNDSAETZLICHE FRAGEN~~ between Russia and Japan. Further conversations would be held on MATSUOKA's return to Moscow. MATSUOKA had received the heads of missions in Moscow (except CRIPPS) <sup>and the press.</sup> and had already expressed herself positively on Japan's attitude to the Axis, and the <sup>victory</sup> ~~unity~~ of Germany and Italy. [7 ~~7~~ 136733-4]



Note

23 August, 1946

The following items and frames have  
been extracted from this file for  
evidence and presentation in  
Court.

Items: 4038-A, -B, -C,

Frames: 136632, 136696, 136700

Jonishige



(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

DOCL NO. 4038  
Item No. 25

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 12 March 1941 - 5.25 S hours  
Arrival, 12 March 1941 - 15.55 hours

No. 376 of March 12

Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI just visited me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily valuable and effective support of the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

BOLTZE

/136632/



~~Item 25~~

(ROUGH TRANSLATION)

DOC. NO. 4038

ITEM NO 25

1

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 12 March 1941 - 5.25<sup>5</sup> hours

Arrival, " " " - 15.55<sup>5</sup> hours

No. 376 of March 12

Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI just visited me and

asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the <sup>great</sup> ~~gr~~ =

titude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily

valuable and effective support ~~to~~ the Japanese mediation

in the dispute between THAILAND and FRENCH-

INDO-CHINA.

BOLTZE

(136632)



DOCUMENT 4038 A

EXHIBIT NO. 566

To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 12 March 1941 - 5.25 S hours  
Arrival, 12 March 1941 - 15.55 hours

No. 376 of March 12

Foreign Vice Minister OHASHI just visited me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily valuable and effective support of the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

BCLTZE

**FILE COPY**  
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AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
\_\_\_\_\_  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



EXHIBIT NO. 566

Doc 4038A

鍵ト錠ヲカケテ保管スベシ

電報(秘密暗号法)

東京 一千九百四十一年三月十二日五時二十五分発  
着 一千九百四十一年三月十二日十五時五十五分  
三月十二日附カニ三七六號

大橋外務次官ハ只今拙著ヲ訪問シ泰国及ビ佛  
蘭西領印度支那間ノ紛争ニ於ケル日本ノ調停  
ニ就テ特ニ貴重且ツ効果的ナル支持ニ対シ日本  
政府ノ眞摯ナル感謝ヲ独逸外相ニ傳ヘラレ度旨  
要請セラレタリ

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供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管轄ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事



四 余ノ此供進書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、函達セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ附シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接複製寫眞ノ層本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接複製寫眞層本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、管保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢同覽ニ費スル知クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞層本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣稱ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官兼書記

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



4038B

Ex 576

オット大使

獨逸外務大臣宛

日本ノ情勢ニ關スル手記

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海軍々令部長代理近藤提督ニ質シタル處ニヨレバ、海軍ハ強力ニシンガポール攻撃ヲ準備中デアアル。準備ハ五月末迄ニハ恐ラク終了スルデアラウ。彼ハ次ノ點ニツキ燒燬アル旨ヲ述ベタ。

(A) 蘭領東印度及マレー聯邦ヨリ日本ニ至ル原料（橡送）ノ長大ナ航路ニ對シテ、フィリッピン群島ヨリノ潜水艦、航空機ニヨル米國ノゲリラ戰。

(B) 英國艦隊ガ地中海ヨリ太平洋ニ通航可能ナル場合ノ二艦隊ノ差迫ル戰闘。

陸軍大將杉山參謀總長ニ質シタル處ニヨレバ、陸軍モ亦攻撃ノ準備中デアアル。準備終了ハ恐ラク之亦五月末デアラウ。

コレガ遂行ノ爲メノ條件ハロシヤニ對スル背後ノ自由/Rücklings Freiheit /デアアル。

白鳥大使モ亦英國艦隊ヲ束縛スル必要ヲ力説シタ。

概要

陸海軍ニ攻撃ノ意志存ス。攻撃ノ準備ハ進行中デアアル。陸海軍ノ反對ガ除カレ得ルナラバ遂行ハ可能



テアル。軍事の見込ハ有望。攻撃ノ形式ハ海上ヨリノ海軍ニ依ルモノデハナク、海岸ニ基地ヲ創設シ、其處カラ航空機ガシンガポールヲ攻メ立テル事ガ出來ルデアラウ。此方法デ最初ノ敏捷ナル効果ヲ成就シ得ル。ソレテ要塞ヲ現安ニ奪取スルニ要スル時間ハ左程重要ナ役割ヲ演ズルモノデハアルマイ。空軍力ノ有効性ハ若干ノ經驗アル御逸急降下爆撃機専門家ヲ日本海軍空軍ニ配屬セシメルコトニヨツテ高メラレル必要ガアル。ロシアニ對シ背後ヲ自由ニシテ置クコトハ日本ノ考慮ニ決定的ナ働きヲナシテキル、ソシテロシアトノ接近ニヨツテソレハ努力サレツツアル。他ノ方途ニヨルコノ背後ノ自由ヲ創ル可能性ヲ松岡ニ暗示スル要ガアル。コノ事ニ依ツテ万が一、事態發生ノ場合ニモ、對シンガポール行動ノ決意ガ後方ニ置カレ、ロシア問題ガ前面ニ出テクル（專断）ヲ避ケ得ラレルコト、ナル。獨逸トノ通商關係新設ノ爲メニモロシアトノ近接ガ又求メラレテキルノデアルカラ、經濟關係ニ對スル獨逸ノ好意ヲ示サンガ爲メ、ウオールタツト經濟使節團ノ派遣ヲ至急實施アリタシ。

加之、占領地域内ノ戰爭經濟ニ關セル企業ヲ、運営セシメンガ爲万一、日本ガ該地域ヲ占領スルヤウナ際、蘭領東印度及マレイ聯邦カラノ原料物資ノ



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供給ヲ妨害ヲ受ケルコトナク維持セシメンガ爲メ、  
獨逸軍門家ヲ日本ノ自由ニサセルコトヲ期メ得ラレ  
ルデアラウ。

一九四一年三月二十五日

於 列 車 中



供 述 書

余、W. P. P. Cummins  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル國務獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ直接取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部管轄ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該國務獨逸外務省集積文書並文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事



四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接複製寫眞ノ謄本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接複製寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、管理ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢同覽ニ費スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

G. H. Garde

高級副官兼書記

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



4038C-1

親 展

松岡ノ訪問ニ關スル覺書ニ就テ余ハ左ノ通り註記ス  
(一) 最も重要ナル問題ハ勿論日本ノ對英戰爭加入ノ時機ナリ。該決定ヲ進捗セシムル爲メ我等ハ今尙貴重ナル讓歩ヲ當方側ニ保有ス「即チ左ノ如シ」

(イ) 和南領東印度ニ對アル我國ノ讓要求權ノ拋棄

(ロ) 英國委任統治下ニ在ル分ヲ含ム我國ノ南洋羣領地ニ對スル讓要求權ノ拋棄

(ハ) 中國ニ於ケル日本ノ政策ヲ一層支持スルコト  
(調停ノ企圖又ハ結局汪精衛政権ノ承認)

「然レドモ余ハ日本ノ對英戰參加ガ根本的ニ對英戰ニ於ケル我國ノ一層ノ成功ニ懸ルモノナルコト並ビニ以上舉グルトコロノ讓歩ハ該參戰ニ何等大ナル役割ヲ爲サザルベシトノ印象ヲ抱ケリ」

松岡ハ今尙藤野トノ間ニ了解ヲ達セントシ、之ニ對スル獨逸ノ激勵ヲ求ム。我國ノ對英關係ガ如何ナル針路ヲ取ルベキカニ就テハ彼「松岡」ヲシテ驚

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得セシメサル爲メ且彼ノ訪歐後彼ヲ迎シテ行ハル可  
キ日本ノ政策ヲ調節スル爲メ明瞭ナル陳述ヲ爲シ置  
クコト不可缺ナリ。其他此ノ問題ニ關スル日本側ト  
ノ私的會談ハ延期セラルベキナリ。

署名

ワイツセツカー

獨逸外相宛

一千九百四十一年三月二十四日



供 述 書

余、W. M. P. Cumming  
W. M. P. Cumming  
カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
證言ス

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ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
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供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング

(W. P. Cunningham)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

申佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

Cf. H. Gardle

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部



伯林 一九四一年、昭和十六年、三月二十一日

覚書

日本外務大臣トノ会談ニ対スル日独経済  
問題ニ関シテ

二、(b) 日本經由ノ原料購入  
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我々ノ為ガサルヲ得ナイモノハ原料ヲ第三國カラ日本ヲ經由シテ  
購入シ而シテ独逸ニ入手スルヲデアル。例ハハ蘭印並ニ泰國カラ  
生ゴム並ニ錫ヲ華南カラ、タンクスレンヲ、ウオリウイアカラ  
錫ヲ入手スルヲデアル。我マハソレニ対シテ日本ニ外國ヲ替テ  
自由ニ供スル用意ガアル。日本ハ從來、英國及ビ米國ヲ顧慮  
シテ自己ノ供給状態噸類ノ不足云々ノ為ニコノ方向ニ於テ為  
ス所ツナカツ。然シテガラソヤウナ根據ノ存在シナカツ所  
ニ於テモ亦官僚主義的諸障害並ニ煩雜ナ手續規定ハ諸  
困難並ニ遷延ヲ招来シテ、松岡ノ同意ニ基キ「ホルタート」  
代表ハヒラヲ東京ニ於テ改正ヲ達成シ得ルデアラウ。  
カ、ル原料ノ独逸ヘノ輸送ニ対シテハ、又同様ニ我々ハ封鎖線  
出入船並ニ補助巡洋艦ニヨル日本ノ援助ヲ与ニシテ平ル

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