

**GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)**  
**Description of contents**



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- (2) Folder title/number: (26) (end)  
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- (3) Date: Jan. 1946 - Sept. 1950

(4) Subject :

Classification	Type of record
340	z

(5) Item description and comment :

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(7) Film no. \_\_\_\_\_ Sheet no. \_\_\_\_\_



## INFORMAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

1. The Japanese Government desire to assure the Allied General Headquarters in the first place that they have no intention whatever to delay, still less to evade, the enforcement of the measures indicated in the Directive of January 4, on the subject of the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office and government service. It however seems doubtful whether the Directive purports to remove and exclude from such office and service all persons under the categories specified in Appendix A, no matter how innocent they may be of the sinister activities defined in Paragraph 2.

2. It is of common knowledge that a large number of persons whose names appear on the list of leading members of several objectionable organizations had actually neither part nor lot in the operations of such systems and even expressed themselves openly against militaristic nationalism and aggression. Their positions in those organizations were simply nominal and sinecure, and all reports of their movements behind the scenes in opposition to the then raging surge of irresponsible militarism were ruthlessly suppressed from the press and public record.

3. The Japanese Government wish to be enlightened on the question, (1) whether the punitive measures envisaged in the Directive are to be applied to all persons under the categories of Appendix A, without distinction between their guilt and innocence of the baneful activities specified in Paragraph 2, or (2) whether the terms of Appendix A are to be construed in the light of the provisions of Paragraph 2, so as to exonerate



the persons who have been in no way responsible for the activities named.

Should the Directive be enforced in the sense of the former alternative, it might conceivably affect approximately two hundred thousand persons in varying occupations, including ex-officers of the Army and Navy, civilian officials, Members of the Diet, non-official politicians, industrialists and business men. Even when the interpretation of the latter alternative is accepted, the number of persons involved in the charges would still be considerable. In any case, it would be extremely difficult for the Government to determine the applicability of the measures contemplated in the Directive, in such a circle of vast proportions, without the advice of a powerful consultative organ to be composed of fair and disinterested observers of the situation.

5. The Japanese Government accordingly propose to appoint an executive Commission of Inquiry, in order to determine, upon prima facie evidence, whether the careers and activities of the persons in question deserve their removal and exclusion from office within the meaning of the Directive. The Commission will soon set to work, priority being given to the more prominent and urgent cases (including those of candidature at the forthcoming General Election) and its labors will be concluded with all possible expedition. As the examination of each case comes to an end, the Government will at once notify to the person charged the findings of the Commission, and if they are satisfied of his guilt, they will proceed forthwith to his removal and exclusion from office as directed, if he has not by that time spontaneously resigned.



6. It is further to be noted that the punitive measures to be imposed upon the undesirable persons imply disfranchisement of their important civil rights, and forfeiture of pensions to which many of them are lawfully entitled. In the case of war criminals, they are to be tried and adjudged at open military courts, with the assistance of Counsel. If they are released or acquitted, they are to be exempted from the removal and exclusion categories, and their civil and pensionary rights are to remain unaffected. The undesirable persons now coming within the scope of the Directive seem to be placed at more serious disadvantages. They are to be denied of hearing or trial and of the benefit of legal defense. They will be removed and excluded from public office and government service through summary proceedings, and they will be divested of their civil and pensionary rights for good.

7. In order to mitigate such apparent inequities, the Japanese Government intend to establish a special judicial organ to to which appeals may be taken from the findings of the Commission of Inquiry either by the public procurator or by the parties concerned, for trial and adjudication in due process of law. If the parties charged are released or acquitted, all the civil and pensionary rights forfeited from them by the findings of the Commission will revert to them retrospectively and without interruption.



COPY

Transmittal of correspondence

Govt Sec

C/S

6 November 1946

1. Supplementing Memorandum for the Record, dated 25 October 1946, which summarized the status of the extension of the Purge Directive (SCAPIN 550), there is inclosed: (a) letter from the Prime Minister, dated 31 October 1946, objecting to the requirements set forth in my letter of 23 October (attached as Tab "D" to Memorandum for Record), and (b) copy of the Supreme Commander's reply to the Prime Minister, dated 1 November 1946.

2. In accordance with the penultimate paragraph of the Supreme Commander's letter of 1 November, I have communicated to the Japanese Government my conclusion and asked the date on which the local government purge extension will be promulgated, stating that it should be as soon as possible.

3. When the Prime Minister delivered to the Supreme Commander his letter of 31 October he stated that a revised economic purge plan was being prepared by the Japanese Government. The Supreme Commander informed me that he told the Prime Minister there should be no delay in submission of the revised plan to this Headquarters and instructed me to press the Prime Minister for an early submission of the revised plan. In accordance with such instructions I have asked the Prime Minister for the date on which the revised economic purge plan will be submitted. As soon as I receive his reply I will communicate it to you.

Incls: as indicated.

-----C.W.-----

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COPY

1 November 1946

Dear Mr. Prime Minister

I have carefully considered the points raised in your letter of last evening and have discussed the same at length with General Whitney.

As to your first point, since the Government's primary purpose underlying the proposed extension of the purge into the sphere of local government is to afford the people the opportunity for new local leadership, I see no adverse effect in delaying its application to officials in the national levels of government until the next general election. I understand that General Whitney holds a similar view and this seems clearly to be the intent of his memorandum.

As to your second point, I feel that the reasons given by General Whitney should control. There appears to be no justification for the exemption of local executive officials enumerated in General Whitney's memorandum from screening to determine undesirable persons within the purview of the purge.

In regard to the block heads, I am informed that General Whitney has already made it clear that although they cannot succeed themselves in office, they are eligible for any other national or local elective or appointive posts, unless they fall under other provisions of the purge. Their ineligibility to succeed themselves, of course, in itself would attach no stigma under the purge.

As to your third point, while there appears to be no valid reason for differentiating in the influential character of the several offices of local branches of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in the application of the purge, General Whitney has suggested the possibility of drawing a distinction between offices in city branches on the one hand and in town and village branches on the other, and I have asked him to explore the possibility further and to communicate to you his conclusion.

As soon as this one remaining point has been disposed of, the revised plan should promptly be made effective by the Government.

Very sincerely,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR.

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida,  
Prime Minister of Japan,  
Tokyo.



October 31st, 1946

My dear General:

Further to my letter of October 22nd enclosing copies of the Government proposals, I have received a letter dated October 23rd from General Whitney, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

Before proceeding with the points raised by the General, I would like to state some of the principles with which the Japanese Government have so far dealt with the Purge.

A. I feel that the purge should be carried out in accordance with the actual and real conditions which existed or exist today in the country. I realize fully that your Purge Directive is linked with the Potsdam Declaration and also realize that the execution of the Directive in letter and spirit, particularly the latter, is so essential in order that the country should restore the respect and friendship of the Allied Powers and be made a member of the democratic world. But at the same time, the purge should be applied where it is due and although some cases of injustice could not be helped, the Government should feel its great responsibility towards the people in trying its utmost to minimize these unjust cases.

B. I am keenly aware of the fact that the most important work before the Government today is the rehabilitation of the ruined country. Before the rehabilitation is definitely set on its smooth way, the confusion and chaotic, economic as well as social, conditions must be taken care of. In this connection, I feel that to purge a man simply because he had some connection, however remote and superficial, with the military regime, would cause uninvited antagonism and disappointment among the people, thereby increasing the difficulties of the rehabilitation, formidable as they are, by creating feeling of dissention which must inevitably follow the purge unjustly applied.

C. I believe the regimentation of the military regime had been engineered by a clique of professional soldiers, of government officials, of right wing reactionary and of some members of Zaibatsu, and the people were merely the target of their scheme of regimentation. To accuse some portion of the people, who were actually regimented to do something without having been given any chance of voicing their opinion, the refusal of which would have probably meant self destruction in some form, of regimenting other people, is not, I think, reasonable. Take the case of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. There is no doubt that some executive members of the central organization should be held responsible for misleading the people to misery and unhappiness but local "influential members" of the association shared neither "ideals" nor feeling of comradeship with the central executives. I think it is similar to the case of one accidentally helping a burglar escape from the policy pursuit by running into the police car by mistake.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,  
General Headquarters,  
Tokyo.



D. With regard to the Purge, the important thing is for the people to realize its justification. The purge should be carried out with thorough conviction of the people that "justice is being done where it is due" and when it goes beyond the limit, it is bound to cause distrust of the Government and the purge. The Government should not give a moment of doubt to the people that it might be doing the purge for the sake of doing it and not for a real and high objective.

While keenly appreciating the fact that General Whitney has studied the Government's proposal with such care and understanding, I would venture to make the following comments.

1. "That persons deemed undesirable from any public office shall be barred from all public service." The Government, in close cooperation with the Government Section, set a certain "standard" for your Purge Directive and it was applied to the Cabinet Ministers, members of the House of Peers, Officers of Chokunin Rank or higher of the Government Services, candidates for the House of Representatives and holders of other important "public offices". In other words, the interpretation of your Purge Directive was definitely arrived at and made known to the people. My original intention was to adhere to this "standard" throughout, whether central or local, and I am still of the opinion that this is the legitimate and reasonable course to adopt. But having been advised of the disapproval of my intention, the Government proposal has been altered to set another "standard" for your Purge Directive to be applicable to local "public offices" but proposed that these two "standards" should, be strictly adhered to each respective "sphere". It has now been instructed that this discrimination should not exist and any one barred from local "public office" should also be barred from all other "public offices." Supposing the instructions were taken into effect, it would mean excluding or removing quite a number of the present members of the Diet, who held some local "public office" at one time. I think the consequence would be most serious because the very question of faith and integrity of the Government would be involved. Based on your Purge Directive the Government officially approved of their "qualifications" one day and still basing on the same directive, the Government could not, on another day, disapprove of their "qualifications".

2. "That local government and quasi-government office-holders shall not be permitted to perpetuate themselves in office." The Government's proposal is to screen, on the basis of the new standard of your Purge Directive, all candidates for the mayors of cities and their deputies, town and village headmen and their deputies and leave the rest to the freely expressed will of the people and I think this is the sound and reasonable course to follow. As to the block heads (Chonakaicho and Burakukaicho), the Government proposal is to regard these positions as "public offices" and to prevent "undesirable" persons from holding these "offices". As explained officially before, these blocks are entirely voluntary organizations and have no official or legal status. Their "sphere of influence", if any, is necessarily confined to



routines of daily life of the people, such as distributing food-stuffs, advising the people of medical injection dates etc., and to accuse them of any political influences in regimenting the people towards the war is considered unreasonable. It is probably true that a few block heads, mostly Chonaikai heads, took advantage of their position and swindled some portion of food, rations during the war but most of these undesirable heads resigned on their own accord at the end of the war for their own "safety". It is also true that the Communists are agitating for their removal but I am convinced that the great majority of the people have no misconception as to the "duties" they performed during the war. I know in some districts that the block heads were "elected" in rotation as no one wanted the job which demanded a great deal of time and attention without remunerations. I am for the idea that these block heads should be elected by adult universal suffrage, but before embarking on such a course, these blocks should have legal status for which a law should be promulgated by the Diet.

3. With regard to "influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association", it seems to me that the "definition" for the "influential members" was decided by the original interpretation of your Purge Directive but in view of the opinion of the Government Section, the Government proposed to exclude those chiefs of cities, towns and villages who happened to be the local chiefs of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, ex officio, although I am still of the opinion that the part they played in dragging the country to war is almost nil, if any. But to include other local "influential members", which actually means small functionaries, under the Purge is not only unreasonable but also unjust.

I may add that I seriously question the contention that "it was on the lowest level that direct pressure in the shaping of the thoughts and actions and daily lives of the people was to be found in the gearing the country for war". As you must be aware, these people "in the lowest level" were so completely unlike the agents of the Nazi or Fascist Party and I know for fact that they had no real hand in the matter. In fact, I look to them to achieve the rehabilitation of the country, establishment of democracy and the continuation of the Emperor institution. They are the people who are now leading the country back to peace and order as they are and have always been the backbone of the peace loving people who hate and despise anarchy and chaos. Besides, to do them this injustice would be taken as injustice done to most of the healthy agricultural population and it would certainly reflect in such a way that they would be annihilated from their own government whereas they are now looking towards the Government for guidance and leadership.

No doubt you are getting many letters urging the headquarters to extend the purge and I must confess that I get many of them myself. But I feel certain that Majority of the "middle of the road" people share my views as I have stated them.



I earnestly appeal to you to let the Japanese Government handle the whole matter as we have proposed to you officially and I am sure that you will not have any chance to regret it. It is of such paramount importance to the people and the government of this country, as well as for the future of democratic and uncommunistic Japan, I take the privilege of addressing this letter of appeal to you.

Yours most sincerely,  
s/ Shigeru Yoshida.



LIST OF MEMORANDUM CASES

<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Date of Memorandum</u>	<u>Section</u>
ASADA, Isoichi	D	14 Apr '47	GS
DOMORI, Yoshio	D	28 Mar '47	GS
*EDAMOTO, Mikitoshi	B	15 July '46	CIS
FUJINUMA, Shohei	G	16 Jan '47	GS
FUJIWARA, Sakuhei	B	28 Mar '47	GS
FUJIWARA, Tozo	G	26 Apr '47	GS
FUTAMI, Yasusato	G	27 Mar '47	GS
GOTO, Munekazu	B	29 July '46	CIS
HAMACHI, Tatsusuke	B	29 Mar '47	GS
**HARADA, Katsumi	B	12 Mar '47	GS
HATOYAMA, Ichiro	G	3 May '46	Adjutant General
HATTORI, Kyoichi	G	9 Apr '48	GS
HINO, Yoshio	C	14 Apr '47	GS
HIRABAYASHI, Sosuke	B	29 July '46	CIS
HIRAOKA, Ryoze	D	10 June '47	GS
HOKETSU, Kota	G	20 Aug '46	CIS
HOTTA, Masaiku	G	10 June '47	GS
IDEMITSU, Sazo	G	5 Feb '47	GS
IJIMA, Manji	G	10 July '46	CIS
IIZUKA, Toshio	B	4 Feb '47	GS
IKEDA Tomoichi	D	28 Mar '47	GS
IMAMURA, Hitoshi	G	24 Apr '47	GS
INAMORI, Shigeshi	B	17 June '47	GS



<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Date of Memorandum</u>	<u>Section</u>
INATOMI, Takato	G	25 June '46	CIS
INOUE, Yonosuke	C	6 June '47	GS
IRIMAJIRI, Yoshiyasu	G	24 Apr '47	GS
ISHIBASHI, Tanzan	G	7 May '47	GS
ITO, Masaru	B	29 July '46	CIS
IWATA, Chuzo	G	20 Aug '46	CIS
KABAYAMA, Aisuke	G	19 Aug '46	CIS
*KATO, Hirotatsu	B	21 June '46	CIS
KATSUKI, Tatsuo	D	18 Dec '46	CIS
KAWAGUCHI, Hidetoyo	B	29 July '46	CIS
KAWAKAMI, Jotaro	D-G	12 May '48	GS
KAWAKAMI, Tatsukichi	G	15 Aug '46	CIS
KAWAMURA, Wakaji	D	12 June '47	GS
KEIMATSU, Shozaemon	C	15 May '47	GS
KINOSHITA, Urataro	B	29 July '46	CIS
KITA, Reikichi	G	26 May '47	GS
**KOBAYASHI, Ataru	G	18 Oct '46	CIS
KOBAYASHI, Kanae	C	20 July '46	CIS
KONDO, Katsumi	G	8 May '47	GS
KONO, Ichiro	G	25 June '46	CIS
KONO, Mitsu	G	8 July '46	CIS
MARUYAMA, Yoshiyasu	B	29 July '46	CIS
MATSUI, Haruo	G	2 July '46	CIS
*MATSUMOTO, Toshio	B	15 July '46	CIS
MATSUMURA, Giichi	G	8 June '46	Adjutant General
MEGATA, Shigeyoshi	G	17 July '47	GS



<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Date of Memorandum</u>	<u>Section</u>
**MITSUHASHI, Kikuo	D	28 Mar '47	GS
MIYAKE, Masataro	G	2 July '46	CIS
MIZUNO, Jinjiro	G	13 Nov '46	CIS
MIZUNO, Takeo	G	6 June '47	GS
MORIYA, Waro	G	18 Apr '47	GS
MURA, Misao	G	20 Nov '46	CIS
**MURAKAMI, Teiichi	G	1 Apr '47	GS
MUSHANOKOJI, Saneatsu	G.C.	27 June '46	CIS
NAGAI, Gen	C.G.	5 Feb '47	GS
NAKAYAMA, Taichi	D.C.G.	24 Oct '46	CIS
NAKAYAMA, Torao	D	19 Mar '47	GS
NAKAZAWA, Chuichi	G	27 Mar '47	GS
NOMURA, Junji	G	27 June '46	CIS
*OGAWA, Masayoshi	B	15 July '46	CIS
OGIHARA, Takeshi	B	29 July '46	CIS
OMIYA, Gosaburo	G	3 Nov '47	GS
ONO, Toshio	G	9 Apr '48	GS
OTA, Shiro	B	29 July '46	CIS
OTSUKA, Eikichi	G	11 July '46	CIS
**SAITO, Hitoshi	B	19 Dec '46	GS
SAITO, Takuma	D	12 June '47	GS
SAKAI, Heiichi	B	29 July '46	CIS
SAKAI, Kesaichi	B	29 July '46	CIS
SAKANO, Chisato	G	29 Nov '46	CIS
SAKATA, Mikita	G	20 June '47	GS



<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Date of Memorandum</u>	<u>Section</u>
SANNOMIYA, Korenobu	C	13 May '47	GS
SASAMOTO, Kazuo	D	1 Apr '47	GS
SEKI, Toyoo	F.B.	15 Aug '46	CIS
SATO, Naotake	G	27 Mar '47	GS
SHIGEMASA, Seiichi	D.G.	16 May '47	GS
SOEDA, Naonori	C	14 Apr '47	GS
SUEHIRO, Kojiro	G	12 May '47	GS
TABUCHI, Iwao	C	25 Mar '47	GS
*TAKANAKA, Yoshimi	B	15 July '46	CIS
TAKASAWA, Tetsuo	B	29 July '46	CIS
TAKEUCHI, Kisaburo		31 Jan '46	Asst. Adjutant General
TAKEUCHI, Shigeyo	D	28 Mar '47	GS
TAMURA, Bunkichi	D	13 May '47	GS
TAMAKI, Hiromitsu	B	29 July '46	CIS
TANAKA, Mitsugu	B.G.	25 June '46	CIS
TANAKA, Tokutaro	B	29 July '46	CIS
*TANAKA, Yoshimi	B	15 July '46	CIS
*TANAKA, Yoshinaga	G	2 July '46	GS
TANIKAWA, Noboru	D	6 June '47	GS
TESHIMA, Sakae	G	31 Mar '47	GS
TOKUGAWA, Nobukata	G	11 Dec '47	GS
UEKI, Toshio	B	19 Mar '47	GS
UEMURA, Kogoro	G	4 Sept '46	Adjutant General
WATANABE, Tadao	C.G.	25 June '46	CIS
*YAMAGATA, Mineyuki	B	21 June '46	CIS
YAMAUCHI, Kimiyoshi	B	29 July '46	CIS



<u>Name</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Date of Memorandum</u>	<u>Section</u>
YAMAMOTO, Naotsugu	B	29 July '46	CIS
YAMAMOTO, Sanehiko	G	10 Dec '46	GS
YAMAUCHI, Naomoto	G	31 Dec '47	GS
YAMAZAKI, Kaichiro	E	18 Dec '46	GS
YAMAZAKI, Kyosuke	B	18 Dec '46	GS
YAMAZAKI, Tsunekichi	G	17 Oct '46	CIS
YASUKAWA, Daigoro	C	4 Sept '46	Adjutant General
YASUMI, Yoshisuke		26 Sept '46	Adjutant General
YOKOYAMA, Fumitaka	B	29 July '46	CIS
YONEZAWA, Mototake	D	13 Dec '47	GS
YOSHIMATSU, Takashi	B	16 Apr '47	GS
YUZAWA, Eiji	B	29 July '46	CIS
ZEN, Keinosuke	D	28 Apr '47	GS

Remarks: \* No Memo in our file.  
CIS reports none in there file.

\*\* Reinstated.



TO : PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION, GS, GHQ, SCAP.  
FROM : Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board.  
SUBJECT : Report on Number of Appeal Cases Examined.

A.B. No. 85

13 September 1950

Submitted herewith enclosed is the table showing the number of appeal cases examined by this Board during the period from 8 February 1949 to 8 September 1950 (3rd thru 119th meeting), as classified by Categories and meetings.

Enclosure: Table as stated above.

( Y. IZUKI )  
Chief of the Secretariat,  
Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board.



TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF APPEAL CASES EXAMINED

(during the period from 8 February 1949 to 8 September 1950)

12 September 1950

Decision:	Rescission						Non-rescission						Grand Total
Category:	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	
3rd meeting	20	1	1	0	3	25	0	1	0	0	4	5	30
4th ✓	14	0	4	1	3	22	0	5	5	0	0	10	32
5th	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	12	0	5	19	21
6th	7	0	3	0	4	14	4	0	4	0	5	13	27
7th	9	0	2	0	9	20	9	0	0	0	0	9	29
8th	22	0	2	0	1	25	8	8	0	0	1	17	42
9th	7	0	6	1	7	21	23	0	4	0	7	34	55
10th	16	0	4	1	3	24	11	0	8	0	5	24	48
11th	14	0	2	1	8	25	5	0	5	1	8	19	44
12th	13	0	6	0	10	29	20	1	9	1	7	38	67
13th	10	1	5	0	13	29	20	2	4	0	11	37	66
14th	10	0	3	0	11	24	20	1	7	1	12	41	65
15th	25	0	10	0	7	42	25	0	19	0	6	50	92
16th	19	0	11	0	10	40	30	0	13	0	6	49	89
17th	20	0	8	0	19	47	30	0	4	0	7	41	88
18th	16	0	2	1	12	31	33	0	6	0	13	52	83
19th	46	0	2	1	13	62	53	0	6	0	15	74	136
20th	26	1	6	0	13	46	76	0	12	1	7	96	142
21st	20	0	9	0	8	37	28	0	14	0	10	52	89
22nd	38	0	8	1	5	52	62	0	11	1	3	77	129
23rd	20	0	9	0	6	35	30	0	14	2	10	56	91
24th	38	0	3	1	8	50	62	0	21	3	8	94	144
25th	17	0	6	0	10	33	33	0	17	1	8	59	92



Decision: Category:	Rescission						Non-rescission						Grand Total
	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	
26th meeting	44	1	10	0	7	62	55	0	20	0	8	83	145
27th meeting	11	0	2	0	8	21	38	1	21	0	12 (& F 1)	73	94
28th	30	0	4	1	8	43	70	0	19	2	11	102	145
29th	15	0	6	0	5	26	37	2	14	0	12	65	91
30th	25	0	4	0	6	35	73	2	16	0	12	103	138
31st	25	0	7	0	9	41	24	2	15	0	7	48	89
32nd	24	0	3	0	8	35	76	0	35	5	5	121	156
33rd	40	0	12	0	8	60	60	2	18	1	20	101	161
34th	40	0	3	0	10	53	58	3	19	1	17	98	151
35th	39	0	1	0	17	57	59	0	16	2	23	100	157
36th	40	0	5	0	12	57	59	0	26	5	15	105	162
37th	40	0	4	0	14	58	59	0	30	4	12	105	163
38th	40	1	10	0	9	60	60	3	24	1	17	105	165
39th	39	0	4	1	8	52	59	0	28	0	21	108	160
40th	37	0	6	0	14	57	60	0	24	2	18	104	161
41st	40	1	9	0	11	61	59	1	46	1	34	141	202
42nd	40	1	10	1	11	63	58	2	42	8	20	130	193
43rd	40	0	8	2	9	59	60	4	44	8	22	138	197
44th	40	0	4	2	10	56	58	0	48	9	22	137	193
45th	40	1	9	0	12	62	59	1	45	0	30	135	197
46th	40	0	8	0	11	59	58	4	45	0	27	134	193
47th	40	0	16	0	22	78	59	5	72	0	40	176	254
48th	40	1	23	0	28	92	59	1	65	0	44	169	261
49th	39	0	11	1	18	69	59	6	73	2	48	188	257
50th	40	2	14	2	21	79	57	2	74	3	44	180	259



Decision: Category:	Rescission						Non-rescission						Grand Total
	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	
51st meeting	35	0	16	1	19	71	63	0	71	0	51	185	256
52nd	40	0	17	0	14	71	59	0	70	0	57	186	257
53rd	35	0	14	2	30	81	62	2	77	3	36	180	261
54th	35	0	9	0	11	55	65	0	87	7	43	202	257
55th ✓	25	1	14	0	9	49	24	3	79	2	69	177	226
56th	12	1	10	5	12	40	12	4	113	1	69	199	239
57th	0	0	13	0	35	48	0	0	104	0	96	200	248
58th	0	0	25	15	24	64	0	0	98	4	86	188	252
59th	0	0	26	0	52	78	0	0	98	1	70	169	247
60th	0	0	26	0	35	61	0	0	96	0	78	174	235
61st	0	1	13	0	48	62	0	4	110	0	65	179	241
62nd	0	0	14	3	51	68	0	2	120	1	65	188	256
63rd	0	2	17	2	39	60	0	6	114	1	76	197	257
64th	0	1	20	2	36	59	0	4	115	0	80	199	258
65th	0	2	25	0	39	66	0	3	108	2	74	187	253
66th	0	0	19	0	39	58	0	5	116	0	80	201	259
67th	0	0	45	1	65	111	0	0	254	0	151	405	516
68th	0	0	28	2	81	111	0	0	265	0	134	399	510
69th	0	0	62	0	78	140	0	0	232	0	135	367	507
70th	0	0	43	3	80	126	0	0	254	2	133	389	515
71st	0	0	36	1	73	110	0	0	260	0	158	418	528
72nd	0	0	39	0	80	119	0	0	308	1	139	448	567
73rd	0	0	51	5	69	125	0	0	246	0	139	385	510
74th	0	0	50	0	89	139	0	0	288	0	175	463	602
75th	0	0	47	0	75	122	0	0	192	0	139	331	453



Decision: Category:	Rescission						Non-rescission						Grand Total
	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	B	C	D	E	G	Tot.	
76th meeting	0	0	54	1	89	144	0	0	244	1	171	416	560
77th	0	0	69	0	92	161	0	0	178	0	129	307	468
78th	0	0	45	1	111	157	0	0	249	0	158	407	564
79th	0	0	64	1	87	152	0	0	281	0	134	415	567
80th	0	0	72	2	106	180	0	0	424	0	167	591	771
81st	0	0	62	10	92	164	0	0	235	0	121	356	520
82nd	0	0	38	0	102	140	0	0	362	1	162	525	665
83rd	0	0	42	2	100	144	0	0	257	0	171	428	572
84th	0	0	98	0	117	215	0	0	499	0	157	656	871
85th	0	0	33	0	103	136	0	0	116	0	171	287	423
86th	0	0	83	1	105	189	0	0	413	3	158	574	763
87th	0	0	62	1	101	164	0	0	236	0	169	405	569
88th	0	0	38	0	84	122	0	0	326	0	192	518	640
89th	0	3	14	6	51	74	0	5	56	7	228	296	370
90th	83	0	4	0	80	167	20	9	6	3	164	202	369
91st	80	3	12	2	57	154	20	5	33	5	224	287	441
92nd	63	1	0	3	46	113	37	9	0	0	154	200	313
93rd	68	4	15	0	62	149	15	4	25	0	243	287	436
94th	0	0	22	8	125	155	0	8	70	1	328	407	562
95th	0	0	4	1	146	151	0	5	23	0	330	358	509
96th	0	2	145	5	27	179	0	8	23	0	28	59	238
97th	0	3	0	0	99	102	0	44	0	0	166	210	312
98th	88	0	14	0	176	278	12	34	52	0	278	376	654
99th	0	0	0	0	30	31	0	14	0	0	81	99	130
100th	226	2	14	(F 1) 0	46	288	24	12	56	(F 4) 0	84	176	464



Decision:	Rescission								Non-rescission								Grand Tot. Total
	Category: A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Tot.	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Tot.	
101st	0	167	1	15	0	5	64	252	0	7	12	5	0	0	108	132	464
102nd	1	46	12	12	1	2	32	106	0	8	7	23	0	1	118	157	263
103rd	0	40	15	6	0	3	64	128	0	217	20	11	0	100	104	352	480
104th	0	63	3	0	0	0	25	91	0	10	9	0	0	0	21	40	131
105th	0	41	0	0	1	0	21	63	0	8	0	0	0	1	24	33	96
106th	1	16	5	0	2	1	0	25	0	5	14	0	0	0	1	20	45
107th	0	0	0	14	0	0	39	53	0	0	0	10	0	0	60	70	123
108th	0	12	0	37	0	0	40	89	0	7	0	62	0	0	53	122	211
109th	0	37	0	0	0	0	21	58	0	10	0	0	1	0	13	24	82
110th	0	66	0	26	0	0	18	110	0	6	0	80	0	0	52	138	248
111th	0	1	0	36	0	0	14	51	0	9	0	61	0	0	30	100	151
112th	0	27	0	17	0	0	46	90	0	4	0	27	0	0	49	80	170
113th	0	19	10	12	0	0	22	63	0	101	24	6	0	0	48	179	242
114th	0	8	10	23	0	0	30	71	0	591	9	30	0	0	56	686	757
115th	3	121	10	12	1	0	44	191	1	21	10	6	0	0	46	84	275
116th	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	15	25
117th	0	43	0	21	0	0	32	96	0	8	1	20	0	0	30	59	155
118th	1	126	1	8	0	0	36	192	0	22	6	2	0	0	127	157	349
119th	1	115	3	16	0	0	19	154	0	21	3	7	0	0	11	42	196
Re-examination	0	26	1	15	5	0	30	77	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	84

**Total**

Category:	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Tot.
Rescission:	7	3,079	108	2,268	114	12	4,515	10,103
Non-rescission:	1	3,483	366	9,478	112	7	8,423	21,570
<b>Grand Total</b>								<u><b>31,973</b></u>



Press Translation  
Tokyo Shimbun 9 September 1950

Number of those released from the purge list to be less than 10,000?  
Final decision to be handed down within this year.  
Readjustment of the scope of purge to be studied by the Appeals  
Committee.

Since February of last year, when the Official Position Qualification Appeals Committee was established within the cabinet, more than 32,000 appeal cases have been examined by the said Committee, and with the 119th committee meeting held on the 8th, the examination was completed except for about 30 cases in which the necessary papers were still not in order. The Committee, therefore, expects that it can put all necessary documents in order and submit them to the GHQ by the end of September, and contemplates that final decision can be made at least by the end of the year.

The primary cases of appeals which were examined by the Committee were those cases of appeals by individuals who felt that they were clearly wronged in being purged in the first place, or those cases in which partiality, unfairness or prejudice played a major part in the original decision. Contrary to general expectation, however, the Committee's examination was quite stringent, and except for those specifically named individual memorandum cases such as Hatoyama, Ichiro and others, even counter evidences offered by such persons as Kazushige, Fusanosuke and Koichiro were rejected, and the total number of persons adjudged released is expected to be considerably less than 10,000 out of more than 32,000 cases of appeal.

1. With regards to those persons who had been connected with Imperial Rule Assistance Association and Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association, with appeal cases numbering more than 11,700, the examination was particularly stringent on cases involving city, town and village mayors. The reason obviously is that the tenure of office for these mayors was 4 years, and hence, they had served with the above organizations from the beginning to the end. No special consideration, therefore, could be given to them.
2. With regard to those persons in the financial and industrial circles, appeal cases numbering 1,120, special consideration was given that many of them could contribute to the economic reconstruction of Japan, and that some of them had originally been purged purely because they were members of large corporations though not engaged in war industry. For instance, in a corporation which had for a certain period of time, two presidents, 4 vice-presidents, two managing or supervising directors, one auditor, all persons below directors were released from the purge.
3. In view of the fact that the military personnel constituted about 50% of the total 200,000 persons purged, it was felt that many of them were mechanically, without thorough examination, purged initially.



Consequently, of the 6,500 appeal cases, considerable number of initial misjudgment seems to have been recognized.

The final decision, of course, will not become effective until approved by the GEC. Meanwhile, the Committee expects to study the scope and extent of the purge to exclude more purgess from the list in order to readjust some of the unbalances and inconsistencies which have come to light as a result of the recent examination.



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*Purge - General*  
*(B)*

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section**

12 August 1947

**MEMORANDUM FOR : THE CHIEF, PSQB**

**SUBJECT : Modification of Purge Policy.**

1. At this particular time two factors have combined to create a situation which, it is believed, calls for certain modifications in the implementation of the 4 Jan. Directive. These factors are the imminence of preliminary Peace Treaty discussions and the fact that the overall purge program envisaged at Potsdam and since carried forward as a major Allied objective is now drawing to a close.

a. Since the purge program has its basis in the Potsdam Declaration and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives that established the Occupation's broad policy and since the Far Eastern Commission made specific reference to the removal and exclusion program in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, (Enclosure A, III, 1) dated 20 June 1947, the subject of the purge will inevitably be discussed in considerable detail by the conferees at the Peace Table. SCAP will be requested to submit and this Section will be required to prepare the necessary reports that will form the basis of discussions on this subject.

b. Recognizing that the removal of militarists and ultra-nationalists has been effectively implemented and largely carried out by SCAP the Far Eastern Commission covered the matter in general terms, except for the statement that certain high ranking military and naval officers, leaders of proscribed organizations and "other important exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism" be interned no exception was taken to SCAP's conduct of the purge. It is, therefore, to be presumed that the peace delegates will be primarily interested, not in any drastic modification of the program but in guaranteeing that the Japanese Government follows the essential policies as formulated by SCAP and maintains the necessary machinery for administering the program after the withdrawal of Allied troops. It may well be that specific provision will be made in the treaty ordering that this be done. Such a written stipulation in itself would not, however, be sufficient to insure the continued effectiveness of the removal and exclusion program. It would be only too easy for any Japanese Government which was not in sympathy with the aims and purposes of the program to maintain the necessary ordinances "on the books" for appearances' sake while effectively nullifying those same ordinances by deliberate oversight and calculated inefficiency in their administration.



c. The problem, therefore, becomes one of convincing the Japanese that the retention of an effective removal and exclusion program will redound to their own benefit. We may assume that the cabinet which signs the Peace Treaty will already be convinced of that fact for the most part. We must assume that as soon as the Treaty is signed that cabinet will be subjected to intense political pressure from purges, from the friends and hirelings of purges and from the right-wing parties whose leaders never accepted the principles of the purge and who followed a policy of studied obstructionism when charged with its administration. In order to strengthen the position of the cabinet in the face of this inevitable attack it is essential that the opposition be deprived of the opportunity to say that there was too much injustice in the execution of the purge. If opponents of the program are able to prepare even a dozen well-documented cases of individuals who opposed to the best of their ability the militarists' aggressive policies and who were notable for their liberal tendencies prior to the war but who were nevertheless, purged under one of the broad categories, their cause will be immeasurably strengthened. Armed with such arguments they might prevail upon the government to institute so lenient a program of reexamination and appeal as to nullify effectively the principles and provisions of the purge.

2. In consideration of the facts outlined above it is thought that a reexamination program designed to correct any errors either in individual cases or in the application of certain criteria should be initiated at this time and placed in effect by the present government. A review of the record shows that such a program is not in conflict with past policies followed by this Section in its implementation of the Purge Directive.

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380/15 "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper" dated 3 Nov. 45 early established the principle that persons in the fields of industry, finance, commerce and agriculture who were presumably active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression might still be able to present evidence to the contrary and so avoid removal and exclusion from public office. Paragraph 23 of this directive states that "in the absence of evidence, satisfactory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression."

b. While the purge was still being extended it was impossible to permit the submission of such "evidence to the contrary" in determining the applicability of the purge to individual cases. These persons who have appealed have contended that they did not in effect hold purgeable positions as defined in the ordinances. They have not based their appeals upon the contention that they were not active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, despite the fact that they occupied purgeable positions. Now that the Japanese Government is faithfully executing the final major extensions of the purge we appear to be approaching a stage in the implementation of the Supreme Commander's



Directive suitable for the rectification of any injustices or errors which may have been committed. That such a time would eventually arrive was foreseen by General Whitney in his Memorandum to the Supreme Commander, Subject: Interview with Shidehara, dated 25 Jan. 1946, in which he stated "if compliance with the directive results in inequitable treatment of a few individuals, this can be remedied after compliance is completed."

c. While this Section insisted that the application of the purge by categories was the only possible way effectively to implement the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander's 4 Jan Directive, the principle that a certain amount of human error would logically occur in the administration of so extensive a program has always been recognized. In fact this Section supported the Japanese Government's proposal that an Appeals Board be established and when either deliberately or through maladministration the work of the Appeals Board was hampered and obstructed this Section insisted that adequate funds and personnel be supplied and that the accomplishment of the Board's mission be facilitated in every possible way.

3. The foregoing facts have been quoted to show:

a. That the imminence of the Peace Treaty discussions and the approaching completion of the purge program have combined to make this a propitious time for a review of the criteria and the action taken under them in order to rectify any errors or injustices which may have occurred in the implementation of the purge program.

b. That such review and rectification is not contrary to but thoroughly in accord with the Joint Chiefs' of Staff Directives and the policies of the Government Section as approved by the Supreme Commander.

4. It is believed that the review and rectification program should be undertaken in a manner comparable to that in which the purge was extended. That is, the Japanese Government should be charged with responsibility for drawing up plans for the program subject, of course, to approval and amendment by this Section. After an acceptable plan has been submitted and the Government has been authorized to place it in effect, this Section will review all action taken and make the final decisions.

a. It should be pointed out that the present government's political prestige would be considerably enhanced if it were to receive credit for formulating and carrying out such a program.

b. It is probable that the Government plan will include the setting up of a "Commission of Inquiry" similar to or perhaps identical with the present Central Screening Committee. This commission could reasonably be empowered to review cases of:



(1) Persons who have fallen under certain mandatory categories but who can negate the points against them by producing evidence of liberal convictions, opposition to war, totalitarianism, the Tojo regime and so on.

(2) Persons who were not active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression but who merely conformed to the prevailing opinion and accepted positions that were later proscribed under the Directive.

(3) Persons who fall under the extension of the purge but whose record of cooperation with the Occupation authorities prior to the time of their designation marks them as desirable influences in the democratization of Japan.

**RECOMMENDATION:** In consideration of the facts enumerated it is recommended that the Japanese Government be instructed to submit to this Section plans for the reinstatement of persons falling within certain categories which should include but need not be limited to those outlined under subparagraphs (1) through (3) above. These plans should also include provision for any investigative organization secretariat, sub-committee or similar agency necessary for the effective implementation of the review and rectification program.

GUY A. WIGGINS



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREMACY COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section

25 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Public Administration Division

SUBJECT: Record of Conference with Officials of The Central  
Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee  
with Regard to Proposed Purge Cases.

Members Present:

Mr. Ohta, Chief of Central Screening Committee Secretariat.      Mr. Tsukahara, PAD  
Mr. Kuriyama, Cabinet Secretary.      Lt. Baerwald, PAD  
Mr. Murai, Central Liaison Office

*Extra copy*  
First part of the conference was taken up in discussion of cases that members of this Division felt should be purged.

The following cases are definitely purgees and informal instructions were issued to the representatives of the Imperial Japanese Government for them to transmit:

1. NAKAYAMA, Torao, Chief, Toyokawa Mura Branch Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association (subject has a possible appeal case as he held position for only one month.
2. UEKI, Toshio, Chokunin rank official with the War Ministry.
3. TABUCHI, Iwao, one of the founders of the Suma Branch of the Great Japan True-Hearted Society (Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai).
4. HOZUMI, Shichiro, a founder and member of the Executive Committee of the Kodo Yousan Seinen Renmei. Informal instructions were given:
  - A. To purge HOZUMI, Shichiro.
  - B. To bring in by Monday, March 24, reasons why Hozumi should not be prosecuted for having made entries in his questionnaire lacking full and complete disclosure.

The following case is to be held in obedience until the Japanese Government submits required information: IKEDA, Tomochi, member Shiba Prefectural Branch, Council for establishing Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure (Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyogikai). The representatives of the Central Screening Committee and

~~43~~ 43 ✓



25 March

Mr. Murai from the Central Liaison Office balked at this interpretation of the ordinances because Ikeda was a member of the Prefectural and not a member of the National Council. It was decided that the case would be held in obedience until Monday, 24 March, at which time, unless specific information was presented proving that only members of the National and not members of the Prefectural Council should be purged this provision of the ordinance would be interpreted that all members regardless of whether the Prefectural or National level would be found to fall within the scope of its meaning (the ordinances are not specific on this provisions Paragraph 5 of Category 4 of Appendix II of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, which reads: "member of Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kakuriksu Kyogikai - Council for Establishing the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure).

MATSUURA, Tosuke, Director, Greater East Asia Association of Yamagata Prefecture. The Greater East Asia Association (Dai Toa Kyokai) is on the list of ultra-nationalist organizations, (Paragraph 3 of Appendix I of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947). However, the officials of the Central Screening Committee claimed that the National Greater East Asia Association and the Greater East Asia Association of Yamagata Prefecture were two entirely different organizations. It was decided that the case should be held in obedience until Friday, 28 March by which time information would be available approving or disapproving their point.

The following cases will have to be passed for the reasons given respectively:

NISHIKAWA, Ichitaro was to be purged for having been Commander of the First Military Police Company from 30 August, 1945 to 19 September, 1945. It has been the policy of GHQ in the past to make special dispensation in cases of persons who were appointed to important positions with the Kempetai after August 25, 1945.

SEKIYA, Katsutoshi was to be purged for serving as Chief of a Gun Branch of the Imperial Ex-Servicemen's Association (Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin Kai). However, subject was not Chief but Vice-Chief of that organization. The case was one of mistranslation.

SHINOHARA, Nichio was to be purged for having served as Chief of the Fukuyama City Branch Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association. His position in that organization was "Honbueho", which translates literally "Chief of Headquarters". However, in the organization chart of city branches of Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association it was shown that directly underneath the chief and deputy chief of the branch was a person acting as a combination executive and administrative officer whose official title was "Honbueho". Shinohara held this



25 Mar 1947

position in the Fukuyama Branch of the Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association and as such, not purgeable within the purview of the ordinances.

DOI, Isami was to be purged for having been Manager of the Shanghai Branch of the Central China Water Works and Electricity Company Ltd. The term used to describe his official position was "Shuji", which translates either manager or secretary. Mr. Ohta explained that the position of "Shuji" in an economic organization. The hierarchy in a branch of an economic organization is as follows:

- A. Branch chief (Shibucho) or manager.
- B. Section chief (Kyokueho) or director.
- C. Division chief (Kasho).
- D. Branch chief (Kakaricho or Shuji).

These positions are listed in the order of their importance.

It was decided that due to the relative unimportance of the position of "Shuji", Doi could not be purged for having held that position. Mr. Ohta also stated that the interpretation of branch managers in Japanese occupied territory having to hold commensurate positions with those listed in Paragraph 6 of the interpretation of Category G by the Japanese Government was not clear.

CHIBA, Itaro was to be purged for having held the position of Manager of the Peking Branch of the Mitsui Trading Company Ltd. However, he was only an acting branch manager of this organization. Acting branch chiefs of an economic organization are not quite what the name implies in that underneath the chief and the deputy chief of an economic organization are to be found several so-called acting managers numbering anywhere from 5 to 15. It was decided that Chiba's position was not important enough for him to be purged.

No instructions with regard to the five cases last mentioned were given to the Imperial Japanese Government.

HANS H. BAERWALD,  
2nd Lt Inf  
Public Administration Division



COPY

Tokyo, Japan.  
26 December '46.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have carefully read your letter of December 21st and feel that you have misunderstood the purpose and effect of the proposed family article of the Imperial Ordinance implementing the extension of the purge under the Memorandum of 4 January 1946, (SCAPIN 550).

The article in question is not punitive; no one is adjudged guilty of any offense, nor is it intended that anyone be punished thereunder. The article simply bars one member of a family from succeeding to the power from which another member of the family has been removed.

Any realistic program for removing the influence of individuals purged from influential economic posts must meet effectively the vital and irrepressible issue of collusion. The provisions in the proposed Imperial Ordinance quoted on the second page of your letter recognize the existence of this problem by prohibiting the maintenance of continuity of influence. It is self-evident that such influence would be continued if a father, son, uncle, or nephew, etc. succeeded to the power of a purged individual. The provision merely sets up mechanics which will give fair assurance that the purge will not become a mockery through the device of "dummies". It does strike at that dangerous concentration of economic and political power which resides in the traditional family system.

The presumption of collusion among members of the same family is not novel. It exists in many nations. For example, in computing income tax, the United States internal revenue code allows no deduction in respect of losses from sales or exchanges of property, directly or indirectly, between members of a family. Similarly, in determining ownership of a foreign personal holding company, the law provides that an individual shall be considered as owning the stock held, directly or indirectly, by or for his family. Taking into consideration the nature of the Japanese family institution, the inclusion within the proposed ban of the third degree of consanguinity, whether by blood, marriage or adoption, affords a reasonable safeguard, even though under Japanese law the fourth degree of relationship is considered the range of family solidarity. Thus, Article 186 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure recognizes the right of relatives within this degree to refuse to give testimony against an accused relative. This provision would in itself make it impossible as a practical matter to convict any relative of colluding to perpetuate influence.

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Other provisions in the Japanese law make it strikingly evident that members of a family, as such, are subject to different standards of conduct than those outside, and are considered as having a strong community of interest. A relative who harbors a criminal member of the family is not punishable under Article 105 of the Japanese Penal Code. Similarly, qualified exemptions from punishment are provided by the Penal Code when the crimes of theft, embezzlement, fraud and blackmail are committed against a relative.

As you know, the problem of providing an untainted leadership in Japanese political and economic life has caused considerable concern among the Allied Powers. Misgivings have been expressed in the press, in official circles, and on the floor of the British Parliament, that relatives of those persons exercising control prior to the occupation and now deemed undesirable will circumvent allied requirements by continuing to exert the same influence. I firmly believe that anything you can do to eliminate such concern and to prevent any continuance of past controlling influences will prove most healthy for Japan. It will establish unequivocally the purpose of the Japanese people to entrust the future of the nation to a leadership, political and economic, which has not been an influential or controlling part of either the private socialism of concentrated economic power or the totalitarianism of an authoritarian government. Both endanger democratic government by affording exclusive opportunity to a favored few. The proposed family article by insuring the diffusion of power and responsibility would tend to achieve this purpose in a manner consistent with our established aims.

Very sincerely,

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR.

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida,  
Prime Minister of Japan.  
Tokyo.



COPY

"With the publication of the Far Eastern Commission's Post-Surrender Policy for Japan which provides confirmation by the eleven Allied Powers comprising that body, of the basic directive issued by the United States Government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon the inception of the occupation, I believe it to be in the public interest briefly to discuss that portion of the directive which deals with the removal and exclusion of undesirable persons from the political, economic and social life of Japan."

"The pertinent parts of the basic United States directive which have heretofore guided the Supreme Commander in the formulation of policy governing this phase of the occupation task provided as follows:

".....in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or in any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of the other organizations enumerated below, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation.

"Throughout Japan you will assure the dissolution of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai), their affiliates and agencies or any successor organizations, and all Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates.

"The following will be arrested as rapidly as practicable and held as suspected war criminals, pending further instructions concerning their dispositions:

All members of the Supreme Military Council, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Imperial General Headquarters, and the Army and Navy General Staffs;

All commissioned officers of the Gendarmerie (Kempei), and all officers of the Army and Navy who have been important exponents of militant nationalism and aggression;

All key members of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies.

"All persons who have played an active and dominant governmental, economic, financial or other significant part in the formulation or execution of Japan's program of aggression and all high officials of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and their agencies and affiliates or successor organizations will be interned pending further disposition. You may intern other civilians as necessary for the achievement of your mission.

"You will prohibit the retention or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, of those who have actively participated in the organizations enumerated in this directive, and

PREPARED  
By Gen. WHITNEY  
but not released



of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends. (In the absence of evidence, satisfactory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression).

'You will remove and exclude from positions of important responsibility or influence in all public and private financial institutions, agencies or organizations all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression or who actively participated in the organizations enumerated in this directive. It may be generally assumed in absence of evidence to the contrary that any person who have held key positions in any such institutions, agencies, or organizations are active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. You will also prevent the retention in or selection for places of importance in the financial field of individuals who do not direct future financial effort solely towards peaceful ends.'

"Recognizing that this policy has been implemented and largely carried out by the Supreme Commander within the framework of the United States directive as above quoted, the policy statement of the Far Eastern Commission on this phase covers the matter in general terms, limiting itself to the following:

'High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken in to custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-Nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

\*\*\* It shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends.'

"While both the United States directive and the Far Eastern Commission's policy statement envisage the apprehension and detention with a view to appropriate punitive action of persons considered subject to the purge, the Supreme Commander has consistently refrained from the employment of such drastic measures. He has, instead, acted on the premise that the fundamental objective of the purge was to bring about the emergence in the political, economic and social life of Japan of a new leadership untainted by war responsibility and capable of creating in Japan a truly free state where democratic growth is possible. This does not, of course, mean that punitive measures are arbitrarily rejected, as it is conceivable that action in more drastic form might have to be taken in individual cases should influences which the purge program seeks to suppress continue to be exerted in defiance of governmental injunctions implementing the Supreme Commander's directives.



"As will be seen from the basic directives, the purge program is a requirement of the Allied Powers but it no less serves the interests and the protection of the Japanese people who are thereby rid of the past false leadership which carried Japan into war and destruction, and who are thus enabled to choose new leaders who can chart the course to a hopeful future.

"True, there are a few voices raised in defense of those who contributed to shaping the course which led Japan into the late war of aggression and conquest which shook and threatened to destroy modern civilization. Unmindful of the human and material resources which were forfeited because such evil influences had their day of expression and power, these voices, either from stupidity or because themselves under the same evil influences, raise meretricious allegations of liberalism, pacifism, and friendship for the United States, in defense of the persons they seek to protect. They offer no concrete facts in support of these fanciful theories of liberalism, pacifism and friendship, nor indeed could they, for the record is bare of such facts.

"The latest occasion for outcry was the purge of one Tanzan ISHIBASHI, whose cause these critics have espoused as the cause celebre on which to rest their case. But the record of this man discloses that in the years leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, he, as Managing Director, Chief Editor and President of the Oriental Economist, Japan's leading financial journal, and as writer, often writing under his own by-line, proclaimed to the leaders of Japanese commerce, industry and finance, and to the Japanese people, a propaganda which consistently supported the policies of militarism and aggression abroad, and totalitarianism and the suppression of civil liberties at home. Here is what that record shows:

1 August 1937 - Branded China as Aggressor:

'.....one prominent cause of this turn of events (the outbreak of the "Incident" on 7 July 1937) was China's over-confidence in force.....China had become dangerously aggressive toward Japan....'

7 August 1937 - Suggested Puppet Government in North China:

'The first possibility is the establishment of a sort of half independent government which is of a pro-Japanese nature in North China and to carry on the administration of North China without regard whatsoever to the attitude of the Nanking Government....In this present North China Incident, we can no longer put a stop to the military campaign by our Army'.  
(This was just one month after hostilities began.)

21 August 1937 - Lauded Hitler's Nazi System:

'When Hitler came to power, a change for the better was soon made noticeable. The German people seemed suddenly awakened with new hopes. It was as if the sun had suddenly risen to the sky. Even the faces of the unemployed on the street looked cheerful.'



1 September 1937 - Urged Japanese Exploitation of North China:

'Under the existing conditions in North China, however, Japan would have to assume the chief responsibility for peace. Subsequently, in the field of economic development, combination of Japanese capital and technical talent with Chinese labor and resources should be worked out without any opposition.'

4 September 1937 - Approved 'Crush China' Policy:

Commenting on Konoye's statement that, 'there is no other way but to suppress and rid China of her will to fight', the Economist stated, 'We are heartily in accord with his statement'.

14 January 1939 - Flaunted Contempt for International Morality:

'Even if Japan does have designs for territorial acquisitions, which country, aside from making protests on moral grounds, can prevent her from attaining this end in this present international situation?'

18 February 1939 - Justified Japan's Southward Conquest:

'.....it was not enough to stop at Canton. It was necessary to advance Southward to secure key positions whereby pressure could be applied in a wide area.

'Moreover, the matter which cannot be overlooked is a check against the activities of England, America and France. .... Therefore, if our troops are stationed at strategic places on the Hainan Island, it is possible to put up an adequate check against the forces mentioned above.'

11 March 1939 - Urged Suppression of Academic Freedom:

'The screening at Tokyo Imperial University has been generally completed. Instructors connected with the economic department were dismissed or resigned and the greater portion of the assistant instructors and assistants remain. ....it is evident that the problems of the University were not solved through the resignation of some instructors. ....it is most necessary to reform the University system which has been a problem hitherto.' (This editorial referred to the dismissal of liberals from the faculty and urged "reform" to insure a firmer governmental control over education).

21 September 1940 - Forecast Struggle with United States: 'Although the wolf at the front door, Britain, has a tendency to retreat, we will have to confront the United States, the lion at the back door.'

1 October 1940 - Advocated Advance into Dutch East Indies:

'An American economic oppression increases, in any case, whether Japan likes it or not the only way is but to advance into the Dutch East Indies, there is no alternative but war with America. With this significance, it cannot be forecast when war will happen'.



1 October 1940 - Called War with America "Inevitable".

'As long as America sticks to the policy of cooperating with Britain in applying ever-increasing pressure on Japan, war is inevitable sooner or later'. (This was fourteen months before Pearl Harbor).

18 January 1941 - Accused United States of Waging Undeclared War:

'It is also clear that the American Fleet is being disposed for any eventuality....In this manner the United States is carrying on a war against Germany without a declaration of war. This attitude toward Germany is likewise directed against Japan automatically because of her tie with Germany.....

1 February 1941 - Decried Appeasement Policy:

'It is essential for Japan to make up her mind to aid Germany and Italy to the fullest extent and fight the war to a finish. The situation has now become so critical that nothing could be gained now from a mere appeasement policy.

'.....we propose that Japan go to the aid of Germany and Italy no matter what the cost, so that they may emerge victorious in the coming struggle.' (Still ten months before Pearl Harbor).

8 February 1941 - Predicted Japanese Naval Victory Over United States:

'The world knows that if the Japanese Navy and the American Navy fight in the Pacific, victory will definitely fall in the hands of the Japanese.....'

1 August 1941 - Indorsed Suppression of Trade Unionism:

'This prosperity in the Patriotic Industrial labor movement coupled with the growing tension of international relations led to the voluntary wind-up in July 1940 of the labor union based upon class consciousness. ...' Thus ended in Japan that product of liberalistic ideology, trade unionism.'

2 August 1941 - Justified Japanese Control of Indo-China as a Defensive Measure.

'The joint defense agreement between Japan, French Indo-Chind was nothing more than a counter-measure to the anti-Japanese encirclement policy taken by America and England.'

9 August 1941 - Appealed for Intensified Armament Production:

'We must maintain a high level of production of industries which are directly connected with national defense. If possible, we must endeavor to elevate this level so that we will not lose the balance between America's expansion of armament and ours.'

23 August 1941 - Branded Atlantic Charter as Empty and Deceitful:

'The Anglo-American powers, which possess the bulk of the wealth in



the world, were the real destructive powers of world peace ...  
In reviving the old ideals of peace ten years ago, now after  
such a long period lies the deceit and emptiness of the cooperative  
declaration'.

13 September 1941 - Urged Permanent Totalitarian Structure:

'It is felt most urgent that a totalitarian structure in peace  
time as well as in war be planned and put into effect'.

1 November 1941 - Indorsed Tojo Cabinet and Policies:

'The Tojo Cabinet is the most powerful one that can be desired ...  
of all the Cabinets in the past, this one under General Tojo is  
well qualified to handle deftly the disposition of the China  
Incident, general foreign relations, international affairs, financial  
and economic matters.'

"The statements quoted have not been wrenched from an otherwise innocuous  
context but are representative of the entire tenor of the articles from which  
taken by means of which ISHIBASHI, over a period of years, supported Japanese  
aggression in Asia, advocated Japan's adherence to the Axis, prepared the  
Japanese for war against the Western Powers, and urged the imposition of  
totalitarian controls over the Japanese people. A strange manifestation of  
liberalism, pacifism, and friendship for the United States. To absolve such  
a man, and others tainted with the same guilt, of responsibility for the  
actions to which the record clearly attests, on the ground of their so-called  
liberalism and pacifism and friendship for the United States would be a  
travesty on right and justice, and a mockery of the memory of those dead  
whose blood was the price exacted so that arrogance and irresponsibility  
might not rule over the lives of men and the destinies of nations.

"With the Japanese Government's ordinances just promulgated dealing  
with the public information media phase, the overall purge program envisaged  
at Potsdam and since carried forward as a major Allied objective is now  
drawing to a close. Despite dire predictions to the contrary by those out  
of sympathy with its underlying philosophy, the political, economic and social  
leadership of Japan as a result of its application is today far stronger than  
at any time during the occupation and offers hope of accelerated future progress."



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Category B  
para (1)-a.  
Reservists

FEC 017/21 para 13 orders the purge of persons (including reservists) who were:

- a. Generals, Admirals, and all other senior officers.....
- b. Officers of Army, Navy, Gendarmerie, if this employment (in public office) would harm the cause of peace and security.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A  
Para B.1 lists as purgees (whether reserve or not) members of: Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals, Supreme Military Council, Imperial General Headquarters, Army and Navy General Staffs, Supreme Council for Direction of War.

Para B.2 lists as purgees members of the Special Volunteer Reserve.

Para B.3 lists as purgees (whether or not reserve) all persons who served in or with the military or naval police or other special, secret, intelligence or military or naval police organizations.

-para (1)-b.  
Short-Term Active  
Officers

FEC 017/21 para 13 orders the purge of "Japanese militarism persons who have at one time fallen...."  
(There is no authority for not purging short-term officers.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A,  
Para B -"Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions: "

B-1 (as above)

B-2 (as above)

B-3 (as above)

B-4 "Ministry of War  
(unless appointed since  
2 Sep 45)

Minister  
Permanent Vice-Min.  
Parliamentary " "  
Parliamentary Councillor  
Chief Secretary



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IN 550, Appendix A  
B.1 lists as pur-  
(whether reserve  
t) members of:  
of Fleet Admirals  
Field Marshals,  
me Military Council,  
ial General Head-  
ters,  
and Navy General  
fs,  
me Council for Di-  
ion of War.

B.2 lists as pur-  
members of the  
al Volunteer Re-

B.3 lists as pur-  
(whether or not  
ve) all persons who  
d in or with the  
ary or naval police  
her special, secret,  
ligence or military  
val police organiza-

Imp.Ord.I, II,Appendix I, II  
para 3, lists as purgees:  
reservists who completed  
course for KAMBU KOHOSEI  
(Reserve Officer's Cadet)  
or SOJU KOHOSEI (Reserve  
Pilot's Cadet),were ap-  
pointed reserve officers,  
and volunteered for active  
duty under Imp.Ord.731 of  
1939; and

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I,  
II-5 lists as purgees  
reservists who are "Naval  
Special Volunteer Reserve  
Officers" -- volunteered  
under "Special Regulations  
for the Appointment of  
Naval Officers from Naval  
Reserve and other matters"  
or Imp.Ord.No.173 of 1934,  
and under provisions of  
Art 2 of "The Naval Offi-  
cers Service Provisional  
Special Ordinance."

Two hundred forty-  
eight cases of re-  
serve officers were  
reinstated by the  
Prime Minister's Of-  
fice between 11 May 48  
and 25 Jul 49, thereby  
establishing a pre-  
cedent.

N 550, Appendix A,  
B -"Any person who  
t any time held any  
e following posi-  
:"

as above)

as above)

as above)

Ministry of War  
as appointed since  
(45)  
nister  
ermanent Vice-Min.  
rliamentary " "  
rliamentary Coun-  
cillor  
ief Secretary

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I,  
para II purges "Any per-  
son who has at any time  
held any of the follow-  
ing positions:" and  
lists


..."2. Commissioned Offi-  
cers in the Regular Army.."

..."4. Commissioned Offi-  
cers in the Regular Navy"

of active service and does  
not limit duration of said  
status.

Six hundred seventy-  
nine cases of offi-  
cers who served less  
than two years were  
reinstated by the  
Prime Minister's Of-  
fice between 11 May 48  
and 25 Jul 49, thereby  
establishing a pre-  
cedent.

(For (1)d below: - only -  
\*Memorandum, subj:  
Purge Appeals, dated  
23 Jul 49 -- "Purgees  
reinstated upon peti-  
tion to the Prime  
Minister's Office be-  
fore dissolution of  
the Appeals Board fall  
generally into the fol-  
lowing categories....B..  
ASTP trained type regular  
officers commissioned dur-



Tab D



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Imp.Ord.I, II, Appendix I, II para 3, lists as purgees: reservists who completed course for KAMBU KOHOSEI (Reserve Officer's Cadet) or SOJU KOHOSEI (Reserve Pilot's Cadet), were appointed reserve officers, and volunteered for active duty under Imp.Ord.731 of 1939; and

Two hundred forty-eight cases of reserve officers were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I, II-5 lists as purgees reservists who are "Naval Special Volunteer Reserve Officers" -- volunteered under "Special Regulations for the Appointment of Naval Officers from Naval Reserve and other matters" or Imp.Ord.No.173 of 1934, and under provisions of Art 2 of "The Naval Officers Service Provisional Special Ordinance."

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I, para II purges "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:" and lists

..."2. Commissioned Officers in the Regular Army.."

..."4. Commissioned Officers in the Regular Navy"

of active service and does not limit duration of said status.

Six hundred seventy-nine cases of officers who served less than two years were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

(For (1)d below: - only -

\*Memorandum, subj: Purge Appeals, dated 23 Jul 49 -- "Purgees reinstated upon petition to the Prime Minister's Office before dissolution of the Appeals Board fall generally into the following categories....B.. ASTP trained type regular officers commissioned dur-

Tab D



-para (1)-c.  
Those who were transferred from the status of Civil Officials to that of Military Officers.

(There is no authority for making an exception in the case of these persons. They must be considered under the general policy of FEC 017/21 para 13.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, Para B - "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:"

B-1 (as above)

B-2 (as above)

B-3 (as above)

B-4 (as above)

-para (1)-d.  
Active Officers in each Department of the Armed Service who are graduates of colleges or higher institutions and who were commissioned on or after 8 Dec 41.

(There is no authority for giving special consideration in these cases. The persons concerned must be judged according to the standards outlined in FEC 017/21, para 13, which sets no time limit.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, Para B-2 provides that any person who has at any time held position of "Commissioned officer in the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or in the Special Volunteer Reserve."

-para (1)-e.  
Musical Officers

(Same as above)

Musical Officers are covered in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 as above.

-para (1)-f.  
Medical Officers who were de-activated in or before 1920.

(Same as above)

Medical Officers are likewise covered as above in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2.



Essentially into the following categories... ASTP trained by the Imperial Japanese Army during the war...

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, Para B - "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:"

- B-1 (as above)
- B-2 (as above)
- B-3 (as above)
- B-4 (as above)

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I, para II purges "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:" and lists various positions of military or other related positions; and in the case of those enumerated positions of the Ministry of War and Ministry of the Navy, those appointed since 2 Sep 45 are not to be purged for this reason.

Twenty such cases (most of them technicians) were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, Para B-2 provides that any person who has at any time held position of "Commissioned officer in the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy or in the Special Volunteer Reserve."

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I, para II purges "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions" and lists military positions and positions related to the military and makes no exception for active officers of this category.

Six hundred twenty-five such cases were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

Applicable to this group:  
\*(See Memo reference inserted in (1)-b above.)

Musical Officers are covered in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 as above.

Same as above, and Musical Officers are not excepted in any of the enumerated positions.

Fourteen such cases were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

Medical Officers are likewise covered as above in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2.

Same as above, and Medical Officers deactivated in or before 1920 are not excepted in any of the enumerated positions.

Officers in this status were reinstated by the first Appeals Board and a precedent was thereby established.



Category B (Cont.)

-para (1)-g.

Those who were commissioned as Sub-Lieutenants after being Sub-Lieutenant candidates who were of the 25th Class or the 26th Class.

(There is no authority for giving special consideration in these cases. The persons concerned must be judged according to the standards outlined in FEC 017/21, para 13, which sets no time limit.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 covers all commissioned officers as above, at any time.

-para (1)-h.

Those who were commissioned after the termination of hostilities.

(Same as above)

Those commissioned after termination of hostilities are covered in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 which does not give any time limits.

-para (1)-i.

Officers in each Department of the Manchukuo Armed Service.

(No specific mention of these cases; therefore are purgeable--as above--if the Manchukuo Armed Services is considered a part of the Japanese Army and Navy.)

Same as above. Para B-2 makes no exception to where commissioned officers served. (Providing Manchukuo Armed Services are considered a part of the Japanese military services.)

-para (1)-j.

Temporary Military Policemen.

FEC 017/21, para 13 lists as purgees "...those who have at one time fallen within any of the following categories..."

"a....all career officers of the...Gendarmerie,  
.b..Other officers of the ....Gendarmerie" if this employment would harm the cause of peace and security. (The directive specifies no time limits.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-3 - Any person who has at any time held positions of "Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee" in or with the Military Police (Kempeitai) or naval police will be purged.



SCAPINIMPLEMENTING ORDINANCEOTHERREMARKS

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 covers all commissioned officers as above, at any time.

Imp.Ord.I,II,Appendix I, parasII,2 and -5 purge "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions" and lists commissioned officers of Army and Navy and make no exception of this Category of officers from being purged.

Ninety-nine such cases were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

Those commissioned after termination of hostilities are covered in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 which does not give any time limits.

(Same as above)

The following cases of officers commissioned after the termination of the war were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49: SASAKAWA Nesaburo; WAMANE Kazuo; HONGO Iwai.

Same as above. Para B-2 makes no exception to where commissioned officers served. (Providing Manchukuo Armed Services are considered a part of the Japanese military services.)

Same as above, providing Manchukuo Armed Services are considered a part of the Japanese military services.

Between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, the Prime Minister's Office reinstated one Manchurian regular officer. He was a pharmacologist.

The Manchurian Armed Services was a puppet army controlled by Commander of the Kwantung Expeditionary Force. It was partly supported by appropriation of Japanese Diet, and officered by both Japanese and Manchurians.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-3 - Any person who has at any time held positions of "Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee" in or with the Military Police (Kempeitai) or naval police will be purged.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para II-6 reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions" and lists: "Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with Military Police (Kempeitai), the Tokume Kikan, Kaigun Tokumubu or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations." No exception is made for reason that person in such position was permanent or temporary.

Eight such cases were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent. Checknote GS to C/S, subj: Status of Ex-Temporary Kempeitai under SCAPIN 550, dated 26 Jul 46, Para 2 states: "the following is the opinion of G2/CIS on this matter: 'temporary KEMPEI were ordinary line and service soldiers who were pressed into service to maintain order and discipline for the period of ten days to two weeks immediately following the surrender.'" For purposes of SCAPIN 550 they are not deemed members of KEMPEI TAI. Para 3, GS concurs in the above opinion of G2/CIS.



-para (1)-k.  
Military Policemen  
Prior to 1920.

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para (2)-a.  
Those who, owing to  
the stoppage of the  
means of communica-  
tion, were not made  
aware of their having  
been commissioned as  
Sub-Lieutenants, and  
who thus served as Non-  
Commissioned Officers  
up to the termination  
of hostilities.

(No reference to this  
in FEC directives.)  
Subject to FEC 017/21,  
para 13, if it is con-  
sidered that these per-  
sons are officers.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A,  
para B-2 - Any person  
who has at any time  
held position as commis-  
sioned officer in Imperi-  
al Japanese Regular Army  
or Navy or in Special  
Volunteer Reserve is  
purged.

-para (2)-b.  
Those who, shortly  
before the termina-  
tion of hostilities,  
entered an institute  
for education as Mili-  
tary Policemen, but  
whose required edu-  
cation had not been  
completed before the  
hostilities termi-  
nated.

(No reference to this  
in FEC directives--un-  
less they are considered  
officers of the Gendar-  
merie, in which case the  
same provision as in "j"  
above applies.)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A,  
para B-3 applicable  
here (same as above).



above)

Same as above, as Ordinance reads: "Any person who has at any time" held such position.

Thirteen such cases were reinstated by the Prime Minister's Office between 11 May 48 and 25 Jul 49, thereby establishing a precedent.

50, Appendix A,  
- Any person  
at any time  
tion as commis-  
officer in Imperi-  
se Regular Army  
or in Special  
Reserve is

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, paras II-2 and -4, Commissioned Officers in Army and Navy, does not state that such officer must have knowledge of his commission. These paras read: "Any person who was commissioned active service officer..."

According to a Memo of Supervision Section, PMO, November 1948, GS approved informally the reinstatement of such cases. GS has no memo to this effect, and records retained in files fail to reveal any of these cases actually reinstated.

50, Appendix A,  
applicable  
as above).

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para II reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:" and lists (para II-6) "Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with the Military Police (Kempei Tai)..." No exception made for those in school as M.P.



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
Category B (Cont.)

-para (2)-c.

Those who were commissioned only nominally, and who did not perform the actual duties attaching to the post concerned.

(FEC makes no exception for these cases. Normally, they should be considered under the provisions of FEC 017/21 para 13.)

These cases should be considered as coming under SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 (as above).





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These cases should be considered as coming under SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para B-2 (as above).

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para II, reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:" and lists (para II-6) "Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with the Military Police (Kempei Tai)..."  
No exception made for position whether nominal or otherwise.



Category C

In the case of organizations of a particularly vicious character, almost all persons who had any connection at all with them, even if nominally, are to be denied special remission. Special remission is to be granted only to those who had a wholly nominal connection with organizations of a comparatively moderate character.

FEC 014/10, Part III, para 1, states:  
 "...leaders of ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office...."

FEC 017/21, para 13 lists as purgees those "...persons who have at one time fallen under any of the following categories...:

"c. Officials of.... para-military associations and of other bodies closely associated with the army...."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para C covers this category -- Any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder, officer or director of; or
2. Occupied any post of authority in; or
3. Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or
4. Made substantial voluntary contributions to any of the organizations or their branches, subsidiaries, agencies or affiliates described in the Memorandum to the Japanese Government on "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations and Societies," AG 091(4 Jan 46) GS (SCAPIN 548).

SCAPIN 548, para 4 --  
 "You will enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of this Memorandum and to prevent further activities contrary to its terms..."



SCAPINIMPLEMENTING ORDINANCEOTHERREMARKS

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para C covers this category -- Any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder, officer or director of; or

2. Occupied any post of authority in; or

3. Been an editor of publication or organ of; or

4. Made substantial voluntary contributions to any of the organizations or their branches, subsidiaries, agencies or affiliates described in the Memorandum to the Japanese Government "Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations and Societies," AG 091(4 Jan 46) (SCAPIN 548).

SCAPIN 548, para 4 -- "You will enact appropriate laws or ordinances to carry out the terms of this Memorandum to prevent further activities contrary to its terms..."

Imp.Ord.1, Appendix I, para III, Influential Members of Ultra-Nationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies -  
"Any person who has at any time:

1. Been a founder, officer or director of; or

2. Occupied any post of authority in; or

3. Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or

4. Made substantial voluntary contributions  
....."

shall be purged.

Imp.Ord.101, Article 5, para 3 - Any person connected after 11 May 48 as:

1. Founder, Officer or Director;

2. Holder of important office;

3. Compiler of all publications or the organ magazine or paper;

4. Voluntary contributor of a large sum of money to organization designated or dissolved under this Ordinance shall be removed from public office as those persons applicable to Imperial Ord.I.

Imp.Ord.101, Article 5, paras 4 and 5 set up machinery to remove above described persons from public offices.

Cabinet Order 64, Article 11-  
"Any person who had such con-

Memo to Supreme Commander fr General Whitney, subject: Interview with Shidehara, dated 25 Jan 46, para 2: "...all 'persons included in the categories listed in Appendix A shall be removed from public office as provided in paragraphs 8 and 10 and shall thereafter be excluded from government service.' (See paragraph 9 of directive). And this must be done without inquiry into whether the individuals were influential in the outlawed societies through true conviction or merely held 'nominal and sinecure' positions."



Cabinet Order 64, Article 11-  
"Any person who had such connection as coming under any of the following items regardless of the length of period, with any of the head office or other subordinate organs of the organizations dissolved after 11 May 48 in accordance with provisions of Article 4 and has been designated by the Attorney General shall be removed from public office...." in accordance with Imp.Ord.ICF--

1. Founder, officer or director;
2. Holder of important office;
3. Compiler of all publications;
4. Voluntary contributor of a large sum of money.



STANDARD

FEC

JCS

SCAPIN

Category D

-para (1).

The general principles of examination are to be applied with particular strictness in deciding upon the cases of officials and staff-members of the Central Headquarters, and on the Prefectural level, of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and of the Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association; and also in deciding upon the cases of officials and staff-members of the organizations allied with them, such as the Koa So Hombu (Asia Development General Headquarters), the Dai Nippon Koa Domei (Asia Development Alliance of Great Japan), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, and the Political Association of Great Japan. Special remission is to be granted only to such persons as those whose appointment was wholly nominal, or who were in office immediately before the dissolution of these organizations and did nothing more than disposing of the matters connected with the implementation of the dissolution.

FEC 014/10, Part III, 1-states "Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office..."

FEC 017/21, para 13 - lists as purgees ".... persons who have at one time fallen within any of the categories..:

"c. ...officials of ....para-military associations and of other bodies closely associated with the army..."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A listing categories for purge enumerates:

"D. Persons Influential in the Activities of IRAA, IRAPS, and the Political Association of Great Japan"

and states that "Any person who has at any time" been

1) Founder or national officer, a national director, national committee chairman, or a leading official of a Prefecture or Metropolitan subdivision of or

2) Editor of any publication or organ of  
a) IRAA and affiliates,  
b) IRAPS and affiliates,  
c) Political Association of Great Japan.



SCAPIN

IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE

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SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, listing categories for large enumerates:

"D. Persons Influential in the Activities of IRAA, IRAPS, and the Political Association of Great Japan"

and states that "Any person who has at any time" been

Founder or national officer, a national director, national committee chairman, or a leading official of a prefecture or Metropolitan subdivision of,

- Editor of any publication or organ of
- a) IRAA and affiliates,
  - b) IRAPS and affiliates,
  - c) Political Association of Great Japan.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para IV listing persons influential in activities of IRAA, IRAPS, and the Political Association of Great Japan, states: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following or commensurate positions..." and enumerates positions.

No exception is made for persons purportedly holding only nominal positions or for persons holding position during the closing days of subject organization.

Memo to Supreme Commander fr General Whitney, subject: Interview with Shidehara, dated 25 Jan 46, para 2: "...all 'persons included in the categories listed in Appendix A shall be removed from public office as provided in paragraphs 8 and 10 and shall thereafter be excluded from government service.' (See paragraph 9 of directive). And this must be done without inquiry into whether the individuals were influential in the outlawed societies through true conviction or merely held 'nominal and sinecure' positions."



-para (2).  
The Chiefs of County,  
City, Ward, Town and  
Village Branches of the  
Imperial Rule Assistance  
Association and of the  
Imperial Rule Assistance  
Youth Association being  
considered to have been  
of comparatively slight  
responsibilities, spe-  
cial remission is to be  
granted in cases such as  
the following:

(Same as above)

-a. Those who were  
in office for short  
periods (with about  
a half-year as the  
general dividing- line),  
and who in the absence  
of contrary facts, are  
regarded as having con-  
ducted no positive ac-  
tivity.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix  
para D, listing posi-  
states "...a prefect  
or metropolitan subdi-  
sion of" which inclu-  
County, City, Ward,  
and Village Branches  
It further states:  
person who has at any  
been..."--enumerating  
various positions and  
makes no exception as  
duration of term or  
relative degree of ac-  
tivity while in such  
sition.

-para (2)b.  
Those who were in of-  
fice for longer periods,  
but who were Branch  
Chiefs in name only,  
owing to such factors  
as lack of regular re-  
siding in the place  
concerned, incapacity  
for activity on account  
of illness, greatly-  
advanced age and decrepitude,  
or the presence of other  
persons who performed ac-  
tual activities in their  
stead.

(Same as above)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix  
para D reads: "Any  
person who has at any  
time been..." enu-  
merating the positions  
which include Branch  
Chiefs. No exception  
is made whether said  
person held position  
nominaly or otherwise



SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D, listing positions states "...a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of" which includes County, City, Ward, Town and Village Branches. It further states: "Any person who has at any time been..."--enumerating the various positions and makes no exception as to duration of term or the relative degree of activity while in such position.

Imp.Ord.I, Appendix I, para IV (1) lists to be purged:  
"Chief (Shibucho), Sec-General (Jimu Kyokucho), or Chief of a Section (Bucho) of a municipal branch of Tokyo, Kyoto, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe and Nagoya cities.  
"Chief (Shibucho) or Secretary General (Jimucho) of a Gun, City....or Ward Branch."

During the period 11 May 48 to 25 Jul 49, the Prime Minister's Office reinstated several cases in this category, including the following: ENDO Yoji (in office two months); SATO Riusuke (in office three months); ICHIKAWA Rikichi (in office two months).

Para IV reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following or commensurate positions" enumerating the positions such as above, including:  
"Chief (Shibucho) of a Town or Village Branch", and makes no exception for duration or relative degree of activity while in such position.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D reads: "Any person who has at any time been..." enumerating the positions which include Branch Chiefs. No exception is made whether said person held position nominally or otherwise.

Imp.Ord.I, Appendix I, para IV reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following or commensurate positions" which include branch chiefs. No exception is made whether said person held position nominally or otherwise.



Category D (Cont.)

-para (2)c.

Those who were the Chiefs of Branches in such places as isolated islands or secluded spots among the mountains, where, with no easy means of access and with no facility for the implementation of directives issued by the Association Headquarters, practically no activity could be conducted, and who are consequently regarded as having been Branch Chiefs in name only, as under b immediately above.

(Same as para (1) of Category D above)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D reads: "Any person who has at any time" been in positions enumerated which include Branch Chiefs. No exception made for geographical location and resulting effects therefrom.

-para (2)d.

Those who, though nominally Branch Chiefs, were actually opposed to militarism and ultranationalism and were conspicuously liberal, democratic or pacifistic in thought and action.

(Same as above)

(Same as 2b above)

-para (3).

With regard to the Chairmen of the Prefecture, County, City, Ward, Town and Village Cooperation Conferences of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and to the constituent members of the local chapters of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure Establishment Council, decisions are to be guided by their attendance or otherwise at

(Same as above)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D reads: "Any person who has at any time" been "a leading official of a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of... subject organizations, and makes no qualification as to amount of activity engaged during tenure of such positions



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SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D reads: "Any person who has at any time" been in positions enumerated which include Branch Chiefs. No exception made for geographical location and resulting effects therefrom.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para IV reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following or commensurate positions" which include Branch Chiefs. No exceptions made for geographical location and resulting effects therefrom.

(Same as 2b above)

(Same as 2b above)

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para D reads: "Any person who has at any time" been "a leading official of a prefectural or metropolitan subdivision of.." subject organizations, and makes no qualification as to amount of activity engaged during tenure of such positions.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para IV reads: "Any person who has at any time held any of the following or commensurate positions" and lists:

(para IV(1))  
"Chairman of a Prefectural Cooperation Conference...  
"Chairman of a Gun, City or Ward Cooperation Conference...  
"Chairman of a town or village branch Cooperation Confer-



meetings and their state  
of activity, regardless  
of the length of their  
terms of office.

-para (4).

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

Those who were Business  
Chiefs of the County  
Branches of the Imper-  
al Rule Assistance Asso-  
ciation, which posts, it  
is considered, were of  
the lowest and carried  
very slight responsibili-  
ties, and who were in of-  
fice for less than one  
year are, as a general  
rule, to be granted  
special remission.  
Even in the case of such  
persons, however, spe-  
cial remission is not  
to be granted to those  
who also had in their  
careers many other con-  
nections with the Imper-  
al Rule Assistance Asso-  
ciation.



ence."

(para IV(5))

"Member of Yokusan  
Saiji Taisei Kakuritsu  
Kyogikai (Council for  
Establishing the Imperi-  
al Rule Assistance Polit-  
ical Structure, including  
the local branches thereof).

---

(Same as above)

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I,  
para IV(1) reads:  
"Chief (Shibucho) or  
Secretary-General  
(Jimucho) of a Gun,  
City.....or Ward Branch"  
and no exception is  
made as to tenure of  
office or importance  
or otherwise of office  
or positions.

---



Category E

These cases are to be examined in line with, but on a stricter basis than, the standards of examination for economic activities (under G-1) below:

1) Character of Companies. Officers of the following companies are, as a general rule, to be granted special remission, unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions: Companies engaged in spinning, aquatic industry, privately-owned railway service, electricity generation and transmission, gas, supply, bonds and securities business, insurance, and warehousing. These companies have the attributes of the so-called "peace industry". They had no direct connection with the war, and their responsibility for the war is considered light.

2) Position of Officers. With regard to companies other than those mentioned under (1) above, persons who held the following positions are considered to have had comparatively light responsibilities, and are, as a general rule, to be granted special remission, unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions:

a. Factory chief or branch chief.

These persons did no more than acting mechanically under the directions and orders of the head office.

b. Persons who took charge

FEC 014/10, Part IV para 2 -- "...it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic fields of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be entrusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends...."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix para E reads: "Any person who has at any time between 7 Jul 37 and 2 Sep 45 occupied any of the positions listed below:

"Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor or Auditor of any of the following organizations in territory occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces since 7 Jul 37, manager of a branch of any bank, company, etc., and any other bank, department company or insurance company whose foremost purpose has been the financing of Japanese colonialization and development activities in any Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by mobilization or control of the financial resources of any colonial or Japanese-occupied territories."

STANDARD (Cont.)

## 4) Trends of Thought.

In regard to all companies and all officers, special remission is to be granted to those who can prove that they were particularly conspicuous for their pacifistic and demo-



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SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para E reads: "Any person who has at any time between 7 Jul 37 and 2 Sep 45 occupied any of the positions listed below:

"Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor or Auditor of any of the following or, in territory occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces since 7 Jul 37, manager of a branch of", lists 20 companies, etc., and adds "any other bank, development company or institution whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories."

Imp.Ord.I, Appendix I, para V(1) and (2) read: "Any person who has at any time between 7 Jul 37 and 2 Sep 45 occupied the position of chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Directors, Advisor, or Auditor of any of the following or, manager of a controlling branch or a branch commensurate thereto of the following in Japanese Colonial Possession or any territory occupied by the Japanese Army since July 7, 1937."

and lists the 20 companies, etc. listed in SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, and in addition, 10 other institutions. Said para further states:

"Any other bank, development company or institution whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories."

"2. Any person who has held the position of the manager of a branch, or agency or a representative in the territory occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces of the Bank of Japan at any time between July 7, 1937 and September 2, 1945."

No exception is made for



unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions:

- a. Factory chief or branch chief.

These persons did no more than acting mechanically under the directions and orders of the head office.

- b. Persons who took charge of technical matters only.

They participated only in technical matters under the orders of persons responsible for the management of companies, and their responsibility is light. Moreover, many of them are of immediate usefulness to the future economic rehabilitation of the country.

- c. Most of Auditors.

It is customary for almost all Auditors in Japan, unlike their counterparts in the United States, not to express any opinion on important matters of company management.

- d. Persons in Zaibatsu and similar companies, who, having risen from employees, had no actual voice in important matters of company management.

In Zaibatsu companies, the right of decision on important matters was confined to the family members and a limited number of Directors. Those who had served for many years as employees and had been made Directors as a token of honor had, in most cases, no voice in actual practice.

- e. Managing Directors and Standing Directors who did not participate in important matters of company management.

### 3). Length of the Term of Office.

With reference to all companies and all officers, it may be assumed, as a general rule, that those who held office for a short period of time had little room for activity, and that their responsibility is consequently light. Unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions, their cases are to be examined under the principle of granting special remission to

- a. Those who held office for not more than six months; and to
- b. Those who, though holding office for from six to 12 months, had other sufficiently favorable countervailing circumstances to their credit.

## STANDARD (Cont.)

### 4) Trends of Thought.

In regard to all companies and all officers, special remission is to be granted to those who can prove that they were particularly conspicuous for their pacifistic and democratic thoughts and actions.

### 5) Viewpoint of Economic Rehabilitation.

Special remission is to be granted exceptionally to a limited number of those who are capable of specially contributing to Japan's economic rehabilitation, unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions.

### 6) Persons Barred from Special Remission.

Notwithstanding the preceding paras, no special remission is to be granted to any person who falls under either of the following items:

- a. Those who were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions.
- b. Those who favored and instigated the outbreak of the war.



manager of a branch, or  
agency or a representative  
in the territory occupied  
by the Japanese Armed  
Forces of the Bank of  
Japan at any time between  
July 7, 1937 and Septem-  
ber 2, 1945."

No exception is made for  
any reasons.



Category G-1

The examination of these cases is to be conducted by taking into consideration the following points:

1) Character of Companies.

Officers of the following companies are, as a general rule, to be granted special remission, unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions:

Companies engaged in spinning, aquatic industry, privately-owned railway service, electricity generation and transmission, gas, supply, bonds and securities business, insurance and warehousing. These companies have the attributes of the so-called "peace industry". They had no direct connection with the war, and their responsibility for the war is considered light.

FEC 014/10, Part IV, para 2 reads "....it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends...."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para G, "Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists" reads:

"1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

"2. Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

"3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."



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SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para G, "Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists" reads:

"1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

"2. Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

"3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para VII reads identically as the provision of SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para G, quoted in preceding column.

In addition the ordinance reads:

"Whether a person will fall under Paragraph G titled 'Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists' will be determined by inquiring into his past records. However, general criteria for such decision will be as follows:

"....2. Any person who held between July 7, and September 3, 1945, one of the following positions and about whom there has been conspicuous evidence as a person falling under the provisions of para G.

"....B. Others.

"a) President or Vice-President of the Bank of Japan

"b) Manager of a branch or agency or representative within the territories occupied by the Japanese Armed Forces of any of the banks, corporations and other organizations listed below.

"Any special bank other than those falling under the provisions of Paragraph E.

"Any ordinary bank, trust company, savings banks, insurance company or any other financial institutions, whose main office is located in Japan proper (excluding those...



(including those pre-  
scribed in paragraph 6  
below).

"Any special company.

"Any Eidan.

"Any control asso-  
ciation (Tosei Kai).

"Any control company  
(Tosei Kaisha).

"Any corporation in  
which the Government or  
its agency, a special  
bank or special company  
is the largest stock-  
holder.

"c) Japanese advisor,  
representative or execu-  
tive personnel of Bank  
of Indo China and Franco-  
Japanese Bank.

"d) Any person who held  
a position of Advisor to  
a Foreign Government in-  
cluding its local organs  
within the territories  
occupied by the Japanese  
Armed Forces other than  
those persons falling  
under the provisions of  
Paragraph F.

Note: The term 'con-  
spicuous evidence as a  
person falling under the  
provisions of Paragraph G'  
as mentioned in Paragraph  
2 above, will mean and  
include, the following:

....."(3) Facts that a  
person in question  
played an important role  
in concluding economic  
agreements with, or in  
extending credits to  
countries in the sphere  
occupied by the Japanese  
armed forces.

"(4) Facts that a person  
in question played an im-  
portant part in the fi-  
nancial or production  
program for Japanese mili-  
tary activities.

".....5.e. Business Men.

Any person who during the  
war was engaged in vari-  
ous enterprises and who  
falls under one of the  
following categories:

1) Representative of any  
enterprise which was  
designated as a responsi-  
ble enterprise by the  
Army or Navy, and which



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Category G-1 (Cont.)



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as such engaged in the economic exploitation or other activities in the occupied areas; or person responsible for such an enterprise on the spot.

2) Representative of any enterprise which in close cooperation with the Army or Navy was engaged in such flagrant and unwarranted activities as fall within the scope under paragraph G of Appendix 'A' to the Memorandum (SCAPIN 550); or person responsible for such an enterprise on the spot.

"6. Any person who held between 7 Jul 37 and 2 September 1945 a position of chairman (Kaicho), vice-chairman (Fuku Kaicho), President (Shacho), Vice-President (Fuku Shacho), Managing Director (Senmu Torishimari Yaku), Standing Director (Jomu Torishimari Yaku), Standing Auditors (Jonin Kansa Yaku), Active Advisor (Komon) or Councillor (Sodan Yaku), principal stockholder who owned 10 per cent or more of capital stocks or who exercised, directly or indirectly, controlling influences in the management of the company or any other official, regardless of his title, including branch managers in any Japanese-occupied territory, Axis or Axis-occupied country, who in fact exercised authority or influence commensu-



-para (2).

Position of Officers.  
With regard to companies other than those mentioned under (1) above, persons who held the following positions are considered to have had comparatively light responsibilities, and are, as a general rule, to be granted special remission, unless they were guilty of militaristic

FEC 014/10, Part IV, para 2 reads "...it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

"a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted

SCAPIN 550, Appendix G, "Additional Militarists and Nationalists"

"1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the activities of opponents of militaristic rule

"2. Any person who has instigated or participated in an act of violence against



rate with that of any of the positions listed above in any of the following companies which are listed specifically in paragraph 11 of Appendix II of the Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No.1 of 1947.

"(1) Conspicuously influential companies which have manufactured finished aircraft or arms or munitions or strategic or critical materials essential to the constructions or operations thereof.

"(2) Conspicuously monopolistic companies which have engaged in production of basic productive materials or business of communication or transportation.

"(3) Conspicuously monopolistic companies which have engaged in domestic or foreign trade.

"(4) Holding companies designated or to be designated hereafter by the SCAP memoranda and influential companies closely associated with the above.

"(5) Companies which have the authorized capitalization exceeding one hundred million yen.

"(6) Any other companies or financial institutions which have commanded excessive economic power."

---

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para G, "Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists" reads:

(Same as above)

"1. Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

"2. Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents



Category G-1 (Cont.)

-para (2)-continued...

or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions:

a. Factory chief or branch chief.

These persons did no more than acting mechanically under the directions and orders of the head office.

to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends..."

of the militaristic regime.

"3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

-para (2)b.

Persons who took charge of technical matters only.

They participated only in technical matters under the orders of persons responsible for the management of companies, and their responsibility is light. Moreover, many of them are of immediate usefulness to the future economic rehabilitation of the country.

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para (2)c.

Most of Auditors.

It is customary for almost all Auditors in Japan, unlike their counterparts in the United States, not to express any opinion on important matters of company management.

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para (2)d.

Persons in Zaibatsu

(Same as above).  
(Zaibatsu companies are

(Same as above)



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IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE

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of the militaristic regime.

"3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



and similar companies, who, having risen from employees, had no actual voice in important matters of company management.

In Zaibatsu companies, the right of decision on important matters was confined to the family members and a limited number of Directors. Those who had served for many years as employees and had been made Directors as a token of honor had, in most cases, no voice in actual practice.

fically, therefore Zaibatsu firms should not be given special consideration.)

-para (2)e.

Managing Directors and Standing Directors who did not participate in important matters of company management.

(Same as (2)a above)

(Same as above)

-para (3).

Length of the Term of Office.

With reference to all companies and all officers, it may be assumed, as a general rule, that those who held office for a short period of time had little room for activity and that their responsibility is consequently light. Unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions, their cases are to be examined under the principle of granting special remission to:

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

a. Those who held office for not more than six months;



(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



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Category G-1 (Cont.)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para (3)b.

Those who, though holding office for from six to 12 months, had other sufficiently favorable countervailing circumstances to their credit.

-para (4).

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

Trends of Thought.

In regard to all companies and all officers, special remission is to be granted to those who can prove that they were particularly conspicuous for their pacifistic and democratic thoughts and actions.

-para (5).

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

Viewpoint of Economic Rehabilitation.

Special remission is to be granted exceptionally to a limited number of those who are capable of specially contributing to Japan's economic rehabilitation, unless they were guilty of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic thoughts and actions.







Category G-2

-para (1) Special remission is to be granted to those who were officials or staff-members of the under-mentioned organizations, and who had no particular inclinations militaristic or ultra-nationalistic:

a. Newspapers with a small circulation and with little social influence.

b. Companies publishing books and other publications on a small scale.

c. Companies engaged in the production of motion pictures or in the performance of theatricals.

-para (2)

Of the officials and staff-members of newspapers, those mentioned below are regarded as having had comparatively slight responsibilities and are to be granted special remission:

a. Officials and staff-members who were not concerned with editing.

b. i. Deputy Chiefs of Editorial Bureaus.

ii. Chairmen of Editorial Committees, and Chief Editorial Writers, ranking below Chiefs of Editorial Bureaus.

-para (3)

The cases of those who were officials or staff members of broadcasting agencies or of press control organizations are to be examined under standards similar to those set forth in (2) immediately above.

FEC 014/10, Part III, para 1 reads: "Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and aggression will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility."

FEC Directives make no differentiation between those "active exponents" who had particular inclinations and those who had "no particular inclinations."

FEC Directives do not provide that special consideration should be given an "active exponent" of militarism because his sphere of influence was limited; nor do they provide that special consideration be given "active exponents" in any particular field of activity--i.e. motion picture, theatrical, radio or press control fields.

SCAPIN 550, Appendix para G "Additional Militarists and Ultra Nationalists" rec "....3. Any person who has played an active part in the Japanese program of aggression, who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militarism and aggression."



SCAPIN 550, Appendix A,  
para G "Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists" reads:

"....3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing, or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

Imp.Ord.No.I,Appendix I,  
para VII reads:

"....3. Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

"REMARKS: Whether a person will fall under Paragraph G titled 'Additional Militarists and Ultra-Nationalists' will be determined by inquiring into his past records. However, general criteria for such decisions will be as follows:

"....5. Any person who has been in any of the following positions or professions and who has been positive in activities such as mentioned in Paragraph G.

"a. Government official (other than those who fall under Paragraphs 1 to 4).

"1.) Any person who during all these past years of war -- namely from July 7, 1937 to September 3, 1945 - took part in the planning or execution of important war-time policies of the Government pertaining to the following matters (except those whose tenure of office was especially short);

a. Propaganda or dissemination of news for the purpose of instigating war, suppressing opponents of jingoism or advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultranationalism.

b. Guidance or control of thought or speech for the same purpose."

Persons who conducted control and censor of press, thought or public information who held any of the following positions between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945, with those



STANDARD

FEC

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SCAPIN

Category G-2 (Cont.)

IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE  
(continued)

shall be exempted....  
AND--list of positions  
of newspaper companies



SCAPIN

IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE

OTHER

REMARKS

who can produce satisfactory evidence to the contrary to be excepted.  
"2.) Any person who actively engaged by writing, speech or action in instigating war, suppressing opponents of jingoism, or advocating dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultra-nationalism regardless of whether or not it was his official obligation to do so.

"b. Member of the House of Peers or of House of Representatives. Any person who in or outside the Diet was conspicuously active by writing, speech or action for the following purposes: Instigation or direction of War, Suppression of opponents of jingoism, or Inspiring of dictatorship, totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern, militarism or ultra-nationalism.

"c. Man of letters or artist. Any person who in the capacity as scholar, journalist, member of a newspaper editorial staff, reviewer or writer for magazines or other publications, or in any other similar capacity, comes under one of the following categories because of his writing, lecture, speech, articles, news report, etc.  
1) Person who advocated aggression of militant nationalism, or actively contributed to such propaganda, or who through his political or philosophic doctrine laid down

IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE  
(continued)

exempted....  
of positions  
per companies



and news agencies, books and magazine publishers, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations, broadcasting corporations,

AND--"appended list" has the names of organizations considered.

ii. Between 7 Jul 37 and 2 Sep 45 those who sponsored or controlled the dissemination of information specified in para 5 of the "appended list". However, there shall be exemptions where satisfactory evidence to the contrary is produced.



and news agencies, books and magazine publishers, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations, broadcasting corporations, AND--"appended list" has the names of organizations considered.

ii. Between 7 Jul 37 and 2 Sep 45 those who sponsored or controlled the dissemination of information specified in para 5 of the "appended list". However, there shall be exemptions where satisfactory evidence to the contrary is produced.

an ideological basis for the policies for the Greater East Asia, or New Order in the East Asia or policies of similar nature, or the Manchuria Incident, China Incident or the Pacific War.

2) Person who advocated dictatorship or totalitarianism of the Nazi or Fascist pattern.

3) Person who advocated the supremacy of the Japanese nation to be a leader of other nations or who cooperated actively with propaganda to the above effect.

4) Person who persecuted or denounced liberals or anti-militarists for their liberal or anti-militaristic ideologies.

5) Person who in any other way advocated or championed militarism or ultra-nationalism.

"d. Official or personnel of newspaper companies, magazine or other publishing companies, broadcasting corporations, companies producing motion pictures or theatrical presentations or any other media of public information or organization which sponsored or controlled the dissemination of information through the above media.

i. Between 7 July 37 4 Dec 41 engaged actively as mentioned in subpara c above or as prescribed in para 1, Art. 1 of Imp.Ord.101 of 1946, and exercised wide influence as specified in paras 1 to 4 of the Appended list: "List of Organizations of Public Information to be Defined as Falling Under Category G Under the Provisions of Imp.Ord.I of 1947."

BUT, companies or organizations and persons that can produce satisfactory evidence to the contrary



Category G-4

These cases are to be examined under the same standards as those mentioned with respect to the Chiefs of County, City, Ward, Town and Village Branches of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, under Category D (2) above, i.e.

"a. Those who were in office for short periods (with about a half-year as the general dividing-line), and who in the absence of contrary facts, are regarded as having conducted no positive activity."

FEC 014/10, Part III, para 1: "Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office...."

FEC 017/21, Para 13 lists as purgees those "....persons who have at any time fallen within any of the categories ....c. Officials of ex-officers' and other military and para-military associations and of bodies closely associated with the Armed Forces..."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix para G-1 reads: "Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime."

-para G-3 reads: "Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression"

The above makes no exceptions as to term, nominal members, or chiefs of isolated areas.

-para "b. Those who were in office for longer periods, but who were Branch Chiefs in name only, owing to such factors as lack of regular residing in the place concerned, incapacity for activity on account of illness, greatly-advanced age and decrepitude, or the presence of other persons who performed actual activities in their stead."

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para "c. Those who were the Chiefs of Branches in such places as isolated islands or secluded spots among the mountains, where, with no easy means of access and with no facility for the implementation of directives issued by the Associa-

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



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SCAPIN 550, Appendix A, para G-1 reads: "Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime."

-para G-3 reads: "Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

The above makes no exceptions as to term, nominal members, or chiefs of isolated areas.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para 7 "Remarks"(9) states that "Any person who held between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 any one of the following positions: Chief of Metropolitan, City, Ward, Town or Village federation of branches or Chief of City, Ward, Town or Village branch of the Imperial Ex-Servicemen's Association (Zaizo Gunjin Kai)."

The above makes no exceptions as to term, nominal members, chiefs of isolated areas.

During the period 11 May 48 to 25 Jul 49, the Prime Minister's Office reinstated several cases in this category, including the following: KIMURA Shin (two months in office); HATAYAMA Taichi (one month in office); ISHIGURO Takao (one month in office).

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



-para "c. Those who were the Chiefs of Branches in such places as isolated islands or secluded spots among the mountains, where, with no easy means of access and with no facility for the implementation of directives issued by the Association Headquarters, practically no activity could be conducted, and who are consequently regarded as having been Branch Chiefs in name only, as under b /immediately above."

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

-para "d. Those who, though nominally Branch Chiefs, were actually opposed to militarism and ultra-nationalism and were conspicuously liberal, democratic or pacifistic in thought and action."

Same as above, except FEC 017/21, para 13, states:

(Same as above)

"The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may authorize the nomination or employment of a person coming within categories....c. if his record shows that he has been an opponent of Japanese expansionism and totalitarianism."



(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



Category G-5

(1) In view of the fact that the Chiefs of Butoku Kai Branches who were in office for less than one year have been excluded from designation, the Appeal Board proposes to grant special remission to those who were Branch Chiefs for a period shorter than one year and a half and who had no militaristic or ultra-nationalistic inclinations. However, even in the case of those who were in office for a short period, no special remission is to be granted to those who had a long career (with five years as the general dividing-line) with the Special High Police.

FEC 014/10, Part III, para 1 reads:

"....Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility...."

FEC 017/21, Para 13 lists as purgees those ".... persons who have at one time fallen within any of the following categories....c. Officials of ex-officers' and other military and para-military associations and of bodies closely associated with the Armed Forces... "

FEC Directives authorize no special consideration for those who were "active exponents" or officials in associations referred to in c above for a short term. However, FEC 017/21 para 13 reads:

"....The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may authorize the nomination or employment of a person coming within categories .....c. if his record shows that he has been an opponent of Japanese expansionism and totalitarianism."

SCAPIN 550, Appendix para G-1 -- Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

-para G-3 --Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

The above provisions would include "any one in the category under question.

-para (2).

Those who had no police career but who were enrolled with the Butoku Kai simply because of their being experts in archery, fencing or judo are, as a general rule, to be granted special remission.

(Same as above)

(Same as above)



SCAPINIMPLEMENTING ORDINANCEOTHERREMARKS

SCAPIN 550, Appendix A para G-1 -- Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

-para G-3 --Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression.

The above provisions would include "any one" in the category under question.

Imp.Ord.I,Appendix I, para 7 "REMARKS" (10) states that:  
"Persons who held the following offices in the Great Japan Military Virtue Association (Dai Nippon Butoku Kai) between 22 Mar 42 and 2 Sep 45, with exception of those who can give satisfactory proof to the contrary."

The above provisions do not specify length of service but rather tenure between two dates.

In screening questionnaires, Supervision Section, PMO has (with tacit acquiescence of GS) generally applied the rule that Branch Chiefs who were in office less than one year and who had shown no inclination towards militarism or militaristic nationalism were excluded from the purge.

(Same as above)

(Same as above)  
The above provisions do not make any exceptions as to "persons".