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THE NEW EUROPE

THE NEW EUROPE

A Weekly Review
of Foreign Politics

VOL. I.

19 October 1916—11 January 1917

LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD.
1917

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The New Europe

VOL. I, No. I.

October 19, 1916

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"THE NEW EUROPE" is a weekly paper devoted to the study of foreign politics and of the problems raised by this war. Its foremost aim is to further and consolidate that entente cordiale of allied publicists, which must accompany the wider political entente, if the Allies are to think and act in harmony, and to help towards the formation of a sane and well-informed body of public opinion upon all subjects affecting the future of Europe. Its highest ambition will be to provide a rallying ground for all those who see in European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the rights of minorities, and the hard facts of geography and economics, the sole guarantee against an early repetition of the horrors of the present war.

It will be our endeavour to unmask the great designs of German war policy, to provide the historical, racial and strategic background of problems too long neglected in our comfortable island, and to emphasize the need of a carefully thought-out counter-plan, as an essential condition to allied victory. After our armies have won the war, our statesmen will have to win the peace, and their task will, indeed, be difficult, unless public opinion is alert, organised and eager to support them in a clearly defined and enlightened policy.

Our attitude, then, will be constructive rather than destructive; our methods will be frankly critical and vigilant, reading the meaning of history out of the brutal logic of facts. An "integral" victory such as alone can secure to Europe permanent peace and the reduction of armaments, the fulfilment of the solemn pledges assumed by our statesmen towards our smaller allies, the vindication of national rights and public law, the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe from German and Magyar control—such must be our answer to the Pangerman project of "Central Europe" and "Berlin-Bagdad."

10th October 1916.

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Pangermanism and the Eastern Question

(CENTRAL EUROPE—BERLIN-BAGDAD—WORLD POWER)

I.

VERY often we read discussions about the importance of this or the other front ; whether this is a war of the West or a war of the East or the South, and on which front the final decision is likely to be reached. The question is not quite clear ; it may have a strategical meaning, and in that case it must be borne in mind that the importance of the respective fronts is liable to change in the course of the war. So far, however, as the political meaning is concerned, more is to be learnt from the Germans who started the war than from the Allies, who have hitherto been on the defensive. Now the Germans have stated clearly enough, both before and during hostilities, why they were looking forward to this war, and what they wish its result to be. The meaning of the present war is reflected in the voluminous political literature which propagates the Pangerman programme and the discussions which still centre round it.

Pangermanism means, in its original sense, the unification of the Germans in a Greater Germany ("*Grossdeutschland*"). The German national movement coincides with the kindred movements of the other nations of Europe in the late 18th century.

The various Austrian races, the Bohemians, Poles and South-Slavs, the Magyars, and Italians, began to feel strongly their nationality under the stress of Joseph II.'s policy of centralisation and Germanisation. In the Balkans we see the revival of the Serbs and Greeks, Italy becomes strongly national, and Russia also. In Germany the remarkable literary revival—Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, &c.—is at once the cause and the effect of German nationalism, which was soon strengthened by the war with France ; Napoleon's attempt at a continental Empire aroused the opposition of all the nations. In Germany, Fichte, Arndt, Jahn and others became the spokesmen of the national feeling, which from that time grew and developed.

It was natural that the Germans, divided into many larger and smaller states, should proclaim the unity of the

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German nation, just as did the Italians and all other divided nations. It was Herder who, in the name of the national principle, first proclaimed the nations as the natural organs of humanity, opposing thus the nation to the state, which to him was an artificial organisation. In fact, the formula of Herder is the expression of the modern national feeling and idea, which has developed since and with the Reformation, and from the 18th century became a strong political, social, and cultural force in general.

But the term "Pangermanism" was soon conceived in a wider sense, and the unification of all the Teutonic nations was spoken of, *i.e.*, also of the Scandinavians, Dutch, Anglo-Saxons; this programme stood as the ideal of a small part of the German intellectual class; it was not till late in the day that it attained practical importance, especially with regard to the question of German relations with Holland and the Flemings in Belgium.

The Germans, by their history, were confronted with the task of how to consolidate uniformly the various greater and smaller states of Germany; of the greatest importance were, of course, the relations between Austria and Prussia. Austria and Prussia were the greatest states; Austria was at the head of the German Empire, but Prussia was more German than Austria, and her policy was more national. The relations of Austria and Prussia were therefore of vital importance for the Pangerman politicians, and the attempt to regulate them lies at the root of the whole history of Germany from the 18th century up to 1870.

Next to that, from the national point of view, the question of German minorities in Russia and other neighbouring or more distant lands loomed large. Pangermanism did not limit itself to the demand for the unification of the Germans in the diaspora; its advocates soon began to demand the annexation of the neighbouring non-German lands and nations, which contained German minorities. In the first place, they proclaimed the political and economic conquest of the Slav nations, among which most of these German colonies were to be found. Thus, as time passed, the successes of the Pangerman programme, and especially the re-establishment of the German Empire under the leadership of Prussia, modified the original national programme into a political programme of the state. Pangermanism reached

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its highest point during the reign of the Emperor William II., growing into the political doctrine of German Imperialism, which proclaimed, in the first place, the need of economic and political union between Germany and Austria-Hungary, and of adding the Balkans and Turkey to this union. This plan is expressed in the watchword "Central Europe," which involves a further programme for the annexation of the Baltic and of some purely Russian provinces of Russia, and would thus provide an opportunity for reconstructing Poland under German leadership. Further, this plan enlarges Central Europe by taking in Holland and Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. The relations to be maintained between these countries and Germany are formulated in various ways by various Pangerman politicians. A kind of Customs Union is being demanded, but it is evident that, as a matter of fact, many Pangermans have in their mind also a political and military union, if not annexation pure and simple; and this applies especially to the lands in the immediate neighbourhood of Germany.

The essential point of the Pangerman "Central Europe" scheme, is of course the close union of Germany and Austria-Hungary; but this union once achieved, the Balkans and Turkey must be welcomed as intimate members of "Central Europe," which thus swells into an Union of Central Europe and the Near East. Berlin-Bagdad is merely the loudest watchword of this plan. It means that Germany, or rather Prussia, is determined to become an Asiatic power, like Russia, Britain and France. Pangermanism, at first the national plan of uniting all Germans, developed into the far-reaching scheme of a renewed German Empire, solving by its existence and organisation the old Oriental question.

II.

The earlier Pangermans proclaimed the consolidation of the German nation; their successors of to-day advocate the programme of world power. Especially since the renovation of the German Empire the Pangermans adduce so-called historical rights. The German Empire, they say, can claim the territories of the old Germano-Roman Empire, *i.e.*, not only the Bohemian lands and Austria in general, but also Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and parts of Italy and France.

But the Pangermans also demand the annexation of non-

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German territories on grounds of "Real-Politik." Germany, they argue, needs colonies, needs a hinterland. They point to the growth of population, to the great number of emigrants, which weakens the German nation; they adduce the fact that Germany, who in 1871 had only 41,000,000 inhabitants, now has 68,000,000. Anxiety concerning their daily bread forces them to extend their frontiers; Germany requires more land to cultivate, and must therefore simply take it. Hence the demands for the annexation of the sparsely populated Russian territory even as far as Odessa, for the annexation of Holland and her colonies, the necessity of possessing Antwerp, &c. "Need recognises no commandments" say not only Bethmann-Hollweg, but the other Prussian professors as well. Oversea colonies have been demanded by German politicians ever since the war against Napoleon. Lagarde pled for a German colonial policy as early as 1848, and though on many points he disapproved of Bismarck, yet he welcomed the Chancellor's inauguration of a colonial policy (1884). It is well known that Treitschke conceived German history as the history of a great colonisation.

Geography also strengthens these "real-political" arguments: Germany must have better "natural" frontiers, especially against Russia; the nature of the soil forces Germany to covet the frontier territories of Russia. On similar grounds the German geographers try to prove that Austria is a natural geographical unit; history as well as politics, according to the lore of these students and politicians, is based upon geography, geology, etc. ("Geo-politics").

The votaries of Pangermanism appeal to German inclination for war; war is positively adored, and with that goes the worship of militarism. They tell us that Germans and Teutons are naturally gifted with the necessary constructive statesmanlike ability; in the Slavs this ability, according to them, is lacking, therefore the Slav states were founded, and subsequently annexed, by the Germans. But not only the Slavs, the French and other nations also were—according to these theorists—formed by the Germans, just as even Christ Himself was of German origin. In a word, the whole world is and must be German. Pangermans do not disguise the lust of power and the greed of Imperialism; they proclaim German aristocratism, social, political, cultural,

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racial, and linguistic, and carry it mercilessly to its extreme logical results—*Imperare, Regnare*, over all the nations and lands.

This Pangerman relapse into the law of brute force was facilitated by various scientific theories. Darwinism, for instance, was utilised to argue the rights of big and powerful nations; while Nietzsche's Darwinistic "Uebermensch" (superman) and "Herrenvolk" (ruling race) were especially accepted in a Pangerman sense. The will to power was proclaimed as the will to "World-Power." Marxist historical materialism also strengthened Pangermanism, by its demand for large economic territories, and by its materialistic and purely economic conception of politics. In this war the German Socialists have accepted the Pangerman ideal.

The Pangermans became intoxicated by the successes of Germany in science, industry and finances, art and literature (take, for instance, the importance of Wagnerism), philosophy and culture in general. The superiority of German culture, became an excuse, and even a justification, for dominating less educated nations—in short, for ruling the whole world.

Beside these inducements to world-power, the Pangermans were admittedly stimulated by England's example. It was England that inspired the building of a great navy; it was England's industry and commerce which incited them to competition in the world's market; it was the British Empire which roused Germany's envy and political emulation. The example of Russia, her colonisation in the East and her progressive expansion in Asia also influenced the political imagination of the Pangermans.

In France and England the folly of regarding the Pangerman movement as Utopian is only now becoming clear. The Utopia of yesterday often happens to be the reality of to-day. In every political plan which considers the distant future there is a Utopian element; but Pangerman political literature has been evolved in close connection with German history, science, and philosophy, while modern German philosophy since the 18th century is in the main historical—a philosophical interpretation of the national development. From Herder, Fichte, Schilling, Hegel to Lagarde, Hartmann, Nietzsche, German philosophy is the philosophy of history. Kant alone is not historical. The nature of German philosophy will be understood if we remember that

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German science and German history are either Pangerman or lead up to Pangermanism. In fact, the leaders of Pangermanism build their theories upon German philosophy, history, and economics, and employ all the sciences which deal with men and society. Commercial geography, political economy, and statistics, each contributed its quota. The Germans studied very attentively the growth of their population; and the fact that it had almost doubled since the foundation of the Empire, induced not only theorists, but also statesmen to do some hard thinking, and to face facts. The systematic promotion of industry and commerce, colonial policy, the Morocco and Kiaou-Chau designs, the building of a strong navy, social legislation and social reforms, the agitation for a Customs Union of Central Europe, and a very careful scientific comparative study of other nations in all these questions (take, for instance, the historical studies of Mesopotamia, the interest shown in old Babylonia), these are the serious foundations of the Pangerman platform. German chemistry is thoroughly national, even Pangerman, and the chemical industry has been systematically developed. Even biology served direct national needs, through the study of the all-important food problem, which was treated not only as a social but also as a scientific question; while German agriculture was conducted on a purely scientific basis. In short, the Germans applied science to every department of practical life.

That German policy, in following the Pangerman scheme, was not in the least Utopian, has been amply demonstrated in the Balkans and in Turkey. A Hohenzollern was enthroned in Roumania, an Austrian vassal in Bulgaria, and German princesses went to Greece and Montenegro! List, the well-known economist, was one of the first to speak of a Central-European Customs Union—the earlier Zollvereins showing the political effectiveness of such an economic policy. List, who directed Germany to the Far East, and Moltke, are proclaimed by the Germans as the first and weightiest authorities for Berlin-Bagdad. One of the earlier propagandists of a Customs Union under the leadership of Germany, Paul Dehn, directed Germany to the East and South-East and preached the economic union not only of Germany and Austria, of the Balkans and Turkey, but also of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Dehn speaks of “Weltwirtschafts-

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politik" and "Weltpolitik," these ideas becoming the stock ideas of Pangerman policy.

William II. officially inaugurated the Pangerman imperialistic world-policy. Very soon one of his ministers, Bronsart von Schellenhof (Minister of War 1883-89), voiced the Pangerman scheme of Central Europe; the Kaiser himself rejoiced over Germany as a "Weltreich." William II. was not only a pupil of Lagarde, but of the later Pangerman philosophers and historians, notably of Houston Chamberlain; he himself went to Constantinople and to Asia Minor in order to strengthen the German financial and economic penetration of the Orient. Pangerman Central Europe was practically extended to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and the Union of Germany and Austria-Hungary was augmented by Turkey, these three states forming the real Triple Alliance long before the Dreibund was broken off. Berlin-Bagdad became under William II. the general watchword. The Germans took up the previous plans for opening up Mesopotamia by means of a railroad; English engineers had already formed such a plan in 1875, the French and Russians followed. The Germans joined in and soon acquired concessions for building railroads (the line Haidar Pasha-Angora is German). Within a year of William II.'s visit to the Sultan in 1898 the line to Bagdad was approved and the aid of the Deutsche Bank and other financial institutions secured. My present object is not, however, to tell the story of German penetration in Asia Minor, but simply to show that the Pangerman plan is anything but Utopian.

Even long before the war Pangerman imperialism dominated not only intellectual circles, but also wider classes of the population of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and supplied them with their political education. It is simply not true that only a few people participated and co-operated in Pangerman propaganda. The number of such writers is very great; Pangerman books and pamphlets had and still have to-day a very large circulation and run through many editions. The Pangerman plan of "Berlin-Bagdad" has been upheld by men like Moltke, List, Rodbertus, W. Roscher, Lassalle, Lagarde, C. Frantz, Windhorst, &c. Pangerman ideas were propagated by energetic societies and clubs, notably the Allgemeine deutsche Verband (Pangerman League), 1890, Mitteleuropaeischer Wirtschaftsverein (Central

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European Economic Union), 1904, and Vorderasien-Komitee (Asia Minor Committee), 1911; the latter was founded by Hugo Grothe, and among its Trustees are to be found such names as Ballin, von der Goltz Pasha, Karl Lamprecht, Hans Meyer, Cornelius Gurlitt, Dr. v. Jacobs (President of the German Levant Line), and R. Willing. The Pangermans expressed explicitly and in plain language what the others expressed implicitly; they have *dared* a political plan of international bearing. But they spoke in the name of all Germany, and I cannot understand how anybody can speak of men like Lagarde, not to mention Treitschke, Bernhardt, and many others, as political dreamers! And why should a Utopia be only theoretical? Can a war, or practical work not sometimes be Utopian? And is only a victorious war *non-Utopian*?

After the successes of 1870 Pangerman imperialism grew more and more chauvinistic and aggressive; at the same time a peculiar, wild mysticism gained the ascendant in the ranks of the Pangermans. I refer to the adherents of the theory of "pure Germanism," and of the inequality of the various human races—a theory which by an irony of history was worked out by the French politician and diplomatist Gobineau. The older German anti-Semitism found in Gobineau its philosophical, or quasi-philosophical, basis, and this anti-Semitism was also to a high degree mystical; mystical also was Wagner and his host of followers, who conceived Pangermanism from the standpoint of Art. But so far from Pangermanism being less effective or less political because of its mystical strain, this is, on the contrary, a positive proof of its force. Besides, it is not only mystical, but in a high degree religious. The founder of modern Pangermanism, Paul de Lagarde (of French origin!) is a very strong personality; being a theologian, he endeavoured to construe a purely national German religion. The religious tinge is also strongly noticeable in the writings of Jahn and Constantine Frantz. On the whole, modern German theology is highly national, with its devotion to Luther and its retracing of the Lutheran Reformation to German sources. As against the Poles and other Slavs Protestantism is declared to be *the* national religion, and in the same way Pangermanism in Austria has been bound up with the "Los von Rom!" movement.

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And again I must emphasize, that this mystical and religious side is far from being a weakness, considered from the political standpoint; we have to examine not only the truth and intrinsic or real value of the Pangerman scheme and movement, but also its motive power.

III.

Pangermanism is not of German origin only, it comes also from Austria, though characteristically enough its best known apostles are Prussians or at least North Germans. In fact Austria was inspired by Imperialist and Pangerman ideas at an even earlier date than "Prussia-Germany."

Austria was for centuries the head of the German Empire, and imperialism is essentially an Austrian product. Even as the Eastern March (Ostmark) against the Avars, Magyars and Turks, Austria already had an aggressive and imperialistic mission and gradually developed into a world-power, on which the sun never set. Since Rudolf of Habsburg, the monarchs of Austria with but few exceptions have been Emperors; having the largest German territory, Austria enjoyed great influence in Germany; and this influence became decisive, when Austria with Bohemia and Hungary formed a federative union in order to resist more effectually the Turkish menace to Hungary and to Vienna, the Imperial residence. Later on Austria was opposed in Germany by Prussia, whose growing ascendancy was accentuated by the Reformation, Prussia being Protestant, Austria anti-Protestant. Prussia gathered around her the other Protestant states of the North, while Austria relied on Bavaria and Catholic South Germany.

The Austrian federation (German-Austria, Bohemia, Hungary) was based on a sound idea—the union of a number of peoples of varying race and religion in one greater state; but the Habsburgs changed the original federation of independent states into an absolutist and centralised Empire. Maria Theresa completed the centralisation begun by her predecessors; but leading as it did to brutal Germanisation, this contributed materially to awakening the national feeling of the Czechs, Magyars and other nations. Nevertheless, the Habsburgs felt so confident, that they gave up the dignity of Holy Roman Emperor, assuming the new title of Emperor of Austria. Yet the Congress of Vienna created the German

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Confederation under the presidency of Austria—(in a secret treaty concluded some months before the opening of the Congress Austria joined England and France to check Prussia and Russia). This position, more effective than the abandoned imperial title, brought Austria and Prussia into close connection; and the two states led the reaction against the modern democratic and national movements throughout what is known as the "Metternich Era." This close connection strengthened Austrian imperialism and Pangermanism, and it was the Austrian Minister Schwarzenberg who formed the plan of "a seventy millions Empire." But it was this very imperialism which revived the old antagonism, until Austria, defeated by Prussia in 1866, was obliged to withdraw from Germany. Four years later her successful rival assumed the German Imperial crown.

The defeat of Königgrätz was followed by years of apparent consolidation. In 1867 the Dual System was created; in 1871 an agreement with Bohemia was attempted, and Austria seemed to be recovering her old historical foundations, as a federation of Austria proper, Hungary and Bohemia. But Francis Joseph broke his plighted word; instead of being crowned King of Bohemia, as he had promised, he reverted to the old policy. Vienna refused to learn the lesson of 1866 and 1870. Acting upon the old approved formula "Divide et Impera," Austria became Austria-Hungary: one part of the Empire was delivered over to the Germans, the other to the Magyars, and their combined influence interrupted the negotiations of Vienna with the Czechs. Austria-Hungary—no longer Austria—gave up her antagonism against Prussia, and Austro-Hungarian and German imperialism were soldered into a Pangerman Central Europe.

IV.

Bismarck, the founder of Prussian Germany, devised a very effective policy towards Austria to induce her to accept the new German Empire and its leadership. King William in 1866 would have asked from Austria a territorial indemnity; Bismarck resolutely opposed such an idea, and eventually prevailed. He understood official Austria very well, and realised that she dreads exposure above all else and is content with outward appearances.

II

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At the Congress of Berlin (1878), and still more so through the secret Dual Alliance of the following year (which in 1882 expanded into the Triple Alliance), Bismarck clearly revealed his intention of using Austria-Hungary in Germany's interests. Austria was pushed towards the Balkans, and her imperialist ambition was flattered by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bismarck declared that Germany would not sacrifice the bones of even a single Pomeranian grenadier in the Balkans. Our present purpose is not to discuss how far Bismarck's Eastern policy was genuine, but to show how he won the confidence of the ruling class in Vienna. He declared that Germany would fully respect the independence of Austria, and more than once explained his policy by the argument that Prussia, and indeed Germany, could not stand such an increase of her Catholic population as the annexation of the German provinces of Austria would involve.*

Bismarck even shook off the radical Pangermans of Austria, who demanded the annexation of Austria and organised the Los-von-Rom movement; and political naïveté might rest satisfied with such an attitude. As a matter of fact Bismarck in that way spared Francis Joseph's personal feelings; but at the same time he won over Hungary to his side through the medium of Andrassy, and Hungary's influence on the foreign policy of Austria became more and more decisive. Bismarck's "Realpolitik" was clever enough to pay with mere words and yet buy real things: and he always contrived to hide his Macchiavellian tactics by a well premeditated imitation of the truth. He secured Germany by the alliance with Austria and Italy; but he re-insured Germany at the same time by a secret treaty with Russia. He denounced the Pangermans, but he advised Austrian Pangerman students to learn Slav languages, so as to be able to dominate the non-German nations. He did not even oppose the establishment of the Czech University in Prague, calculating that Bohemia, growing reconciled to his Austrophil policy, would fail to notice his efforts to exterminate the Poles.

The Pangerman platform is not opposed to Bismarck.

* In 1910 Germany had 40,000,000 Protestants and 24,000,000 Catholics; with German-Austria the numbers of the Catholic population would be increased to upwards of 30,000,000, and in the event of the further addition of Bohemia, to more than 40,000,000.

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The spiritual father of modern Pangermanism, Lagarde, did not preach the formal annexation of Austria-Hungary. He would have been content if Austria became a colony, a hinterland of Germany, and if Trieste and the Adriatic were placed at Germany's disposal ; for Trieste secured the waterway to Constantinople, to Asia, and to Africa, while Austria as a colony assured the land route. Lagarde, being no diplomatist, revealed his plan for the non-German nations of Germany and Austria without circumlocution ; he threatened to make short work of the Czechs and Poles, and even of the Magyars. In short, to Prussia Pangermanism means above all else the possibility of squeezing the Austro-Hungarian lemon in Germany's interest.

The radical faction of Pangermans demanded the direct and formal absorption and annexation of Austria-Hungary, or at least of Austria, leaving Hungary independent for the time being. These stalwarts were mostly Austrian, and it was especially against them that Bismarck's Austrophil pronouncements were directed. Bismarck's aim was the same, but he favoured different tactics ; and it is very significant that the great war has converted them to the Bismarckian policy. One of their Austrian leaders, the Deputy Iro, proclaimed this conversion in a striking pamphlet (*Oesterreich nach dem Kriege*). In spite of the Austrian victories (!), he openly declares that " we Germans in Austria are no longer able to hold out by our own strength," and therefore Austria-Hungary must be preserved by Germany's aid and for her benefit. Herr Iro accepts Bismarck's policy as Pangerman, and argues that it is in the vital interests of Germany and of the German race to sustain Austria-Hungary as their faithful outpost.

Great Austria has always had the effectual backing of Germany, and the latter's attitude to the annexation of Bosnia in particular removed any lingering distrust which Austria might still have harboured in view of the direct rapprochement between Germany and Turkey. If Bismarck declared that the Balkans were a matter of indifference to Germany, he did so with the knowledge that Austria-Hungary was pursuing a German policy in the Balkans, but William II. soon corrected Bismarck and concluded a close, though at the time only informal, alliance with Turkey. Vienna, her suspicions allayed by the ostentatious devotion shown by

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William II. towards Francis Joseph, kept her eyes shut, and became a loyal outpost of Germany in the Orient.

Of no less importance to Germany are Trieste and the Adriatic. The purpose of the Triple alliance was to protect Austria from Italy; but this fact, which was admitted by Bismarck himself, did not prevent Germany from cultivating direct relations with Italy and pursuing an effective economic policy in the peninsula.

It is quite natural that a certain tension should survive between Prussia and Austria: Vienna cannot forget her vanished glory and the position she once occupied in Germany: while Berlin is well aware of this sensitive side of impoverished but aristocratic Austria, and realizes that Vienna still looks upon Prussia as a parvenu. But Berlin needs Vienna, and Vienna needs Berlin. Great Germany can easily afford to tolerate Great Austria, as was clearly demonstrated by the personal friendship between Francis Ferdinand, the chief exponent of the Great Austrian idea, and William II., the leader of Great Germany. This war has completely atoned for the year 1866, and to-day Vienna can already tolerate Hindenburg as the supreme commander of her army—that army, which according to Austrian politicians, and Francis Joseph himself, was the very soul and essence of Austria's defence. In a speech in the German Reichstag in 1888 Bismarck explained the origin of the Triple Alliance and the value of Austria to Germany: "without Austria" he said, "Germany would be isolated and closed in between Russia and France We cannot even imagine Europe without Austria. . . ."

V.

To-day there cannot be the slightest doubt that the present war, alike in its origin and in its development, is purely Pangerman. Germany was from the first fully aware that she must defend Austria-Hungary in her own interest. There is a decisive document proving this assertion, namely, the Memorial submitted to the German Reichstag on August 3rd, 1914, in which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg expounded the true Pangerman theory concerning Austria, and treated the anti-Austrian manœuvres of Serbia as a distinct menace to German interests. The Chancellor feared the extension

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of Russian and French help to Serbia and the Slavs in general, and argued that Germany could not allow Austria to be undermined. Germany must protect the position of the German race in Central Europe (not only in Germany!). Austria, weakened by the Slavs, would cease to count as an ally of Germany, who could not hope to hold her own against her enemies in east and west without the help of a strong and reliable Austria. This was the reason adduced by the Chancellor for giving Austria an entirely free hand, supporting her policy and treating her enemies as Germany's own. It is superfluous to assert that in this he spoke for the Kaiser, for to support and save Austria has but one meaning: *Travailler pour le roi de Prusse!*

As the war progressed, the Pangerman plans took practical form. First, Turkey, and, a year later, Bulgaria, unreservedly espoused the cause of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The occupation of Serbia and Montenegro corresponded with Great-Austrian aspirations, while the conquest of Poland, the Baltic provinces and parts of Russian territory is in accordance with the plans of Great Germany. German-Turkish attempts on Egypt are only the continuation of the Berlin-Bagdad plan. On January 16, 1916, the first express started from Berlin to Constantinople. During the war, the plan Berlin-Bagdad has been emphasised by men like Lamprecht, Franz von Liszt, Dirr, and many others. Of especial interest is Koehler's book, "The New Triple Alliance," which has been extolled in Germany as a solid, realistic, and practical plan for the future of Germany and Europe, and which has gone through a number of editions. Its author demands, for the present, the closest possible union of Germany with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; Germany, the Western Slavs (including the Ruthenians), and Islam must unite in a new Triple Alliance. Koehler's plan is, so to say, a codification of all that the Central Powers, under the leadership of Prussia, have attained as yet; the Pangerman plan Berlin-Bagdad is, in its broad lines, already a reality.

The later phases of the war confirm this diagnosis. That Germany is now fighting for Austria-Hungary is clearly shown by her efforts to arrest the second defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army by the Russians, and, still more recently, by the German thrust against Roumania. Germany,

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in defending Austria-Hungary, is defending herself and her Pangermanic Oriental plans.

Prussia-Germany is substantially a continental state, and the Pangerman plan is conceived accordingly. "Central Europe," extended to include Turkey, is aimed, in the first place, at continental Russia, alike as an European and an Asiatic power. Russia's aim, on the other hand, is Constantinople, but, just as for Russia the road to Constantinople lies through Berlin and Vienna, so for Germany and Austria it lies through Petrograd. The Pangerman politicians shaped their plans at a time when the antagonism of Russia and Britain presented the chief problem of world politics, and offered the best prospect of achieving the Pangerman plan of "Berlin-Bagdad." Russia's defeat was to be the first stage.

In the German declaration of war, in the Kaiser's speech from the throne, and in Bethmann-Hollweg's Reichstag *exposé*, the war is represented as a war against Russia, Serbia and Panslavism; and the German strategical plan corresponds to this political programme. It was only when England's declaration of war followed that the Pangerman politicians and publicists turned their rage against her. They had, it is true, for years past, proclaimed Britain as Germany's eventual enemy; but they thought that the antagonism between Britain and Russia was so strong that the former would leave free play to the economic and even political designs of Germany. England's official policy, her goodwill towards the growth of German oversea colonies, especially in Africa, and the apparent favour with which England regarded German expansion in Turkey—all this went to suggest that she saw in Germany an ally against Russia, even in Asia. And even when recently Britain came to terms with Russia, Berlin did not give the matter much thought, and went on with its policy of "Berlin-Bagdad."

As a matter of fact, Prussian designs in Turkey date as far back as Frederick the Great, but the first man to formulate them clearly was List, the economist, who was followed by W. Roscher, Rodbertus, Lassalle, Lagarde, and many others. During the last few years Germany has sunk a great deal of capital in Asia Minor, and has built numerous schools and hospitals. That the Germans seriously regarded Turkey as their inheritance is shown, not merely by the

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construction of the Bagdad railway across Asia Minor, but also by the plans for river regulation and the building of canals towards the Black Sea, which have been discussed so diligently during the war. In my opinion, the actual plan of Germany might be expressed even more fittingly by the watchword, "Berlin-Cairo." The Germans did not merely concern themselves with the Bagdad Railway, but also pushed on the Aleppo-Medina-Hodeida branch. This forms an essential part of their African policy: the Moroccan treaty, the Congo investment, their acquisition of the right of priority in the Belgian Congo for themselves against France, are clear indications that Germany wanted to consolidate her possessions in Equatorial Africa. This central colonial empire would play the same *rôle* against the North and South of Africa as Germany, by her own central position, played against the East and West of Europe. From their East African colony, too, Germans would then have a direct oversea route to Persia, India and beyond. The war has provided fresh proofs of this African plan of Germany's; and official England appears to have regarded this as more dangerous than the German plans in Mesopotamia, though in neither case did Downing Street place any obstacle in Germany's way.*

The German plan, as expounded during the course of the war, has steadily progressed in the direction indicated. The weakening of Russia and the Slavs must be the first step, but the final stage is to be the overthrow of Britain.

* In this connection reference must be made to the curious Treaty concluded on the eve of the war between Germany, England, and France. So far as I know, the first public reference to it appears to have been published by Rohrbach ("Das Grössere Deutschland," August 15, 1915). "Now that everything has changed, we can openly say that the Treaties with England, concerning the frontiers of our oversea spheres in Asia and Africa, had already been concluded and signed, and that nothing remained but to make them public. We were frankly astonished at the concessions made to us in Africa by England's policy." In Turkey, he adds, Germany was given concessions in the matter of the Bagdad railway, of Mesopotamian petroleum springs, and Tigris navigation beyond all expectations ("ueberraschend"): and altogether, England was quite willing to recognise Germany as her equal both in Africa and in Asia. In view of this treaty, Rohrbach draws the conclusion that only the Russians stood in Germany's way, and that it was necessary that they should be weakened. He believes that England frankly desired

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It is interesting to note how German politicians—notably Rohrbach, one of the foremost Pangerman writers, and Prince Bülow in the new war edition of his book on German policy—in their discussions of the future settlement, set themselves to woo and flatter France, and how they emphasise the antagonism of the West against Russia, in the fond hope of winning Britain's secret assent. These discussions generally lay stress upon the need for retaining Poland and other Russian territories. Indeed, the official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, in defending the German Chancellor against his Junker critics, insists that Russia must be pushed back beyond "the rivers," and that Germany must have shorter frontiers in the East; while, in the West, it contents itself with the demand that Belgium must be freed from foreign anti-German influence. In an interview after his nomination as Generalissimo, Hindenburg, while giving vent to his "personal" antipathy against England, spoke of the danger which threatens Germany from the East. There can be no doubt that German policy is primarily concerned with continental aims: the absorption of Austria-Hungary and the conquest of the Balkans and Turkey. With this end in view, Germany must prevent Russia from reaching Constantinople, and must weaken her to the utmost of her power. Once Germany has achieved "Central Europe," the time for a blow at Britain would soon come. Germany with Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey at her disposal, has a free path to Egypt and India, and nothing could then stop her march into Holland and Belgium and the maritime North of France, if occasion should arise. Once Berlin-Bagdad and Berlin-Cairo became a reality, the power and riches yielded by this Central Europe would perhaps even

peace. On the side of England, the treaty is briefly alluded to in M. P. Price's "Diplomatic History of the War" (Nov., 1914). Sir Harry Johnston, whom the Pangermans quite unfairly treat as the forerunner of their Berlin-Bagdad scheme, supplements his interesting article in the *Geographical Journal* for April, 1915 ("The Political Geography of Africa before and after the War"), by maps showing that the Germans, without any war, would have secured most of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and, in Africa, by the annexation of a greater part of the Belgian Congo and part of Angola, a great consolidated colony from Kamerun to East Africa. Lake Tanganyika would have formed the connecting link between Germany's western and eastern possessions.

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render the fight against Britain in Europe superfluous; moreover, the progress of aeronautics and the development of the navy would facilitate the invasion of England, if that were still required. The possession of Trieste, Salonica, and Constantinople would assure to "Central Europe" dominion over the Adriatic, Ægean and Mediterranean; Turkey would secure to Germany access to Africa and India, and Britain would collapse in pitiful isolation. States are often undone by what has made them great, and, in that case, the amphibious German would swallow up the British fish.

On the other hand, a certain section of the Pangermans, led by Count Reventlow, is sounding the trumpet against the "Vampire," and would be ready to make peace with Russia, apparently assuming that she would even give up Poland and some parts of the "German" (Baltic) and Ruthenian provinces, if she could secure Armenia, parts of Persia, and an access to the Persian Gulf.

It is interesting to observe how both the Pangermans and the official politicians and publicists have two irons in the fire, but it must suffice for the moment to have shown that the war is the logical continuation of Pangerman policy, and that Berlin is already prepared to put only the first half of the Pangerman scheme into practice.

The first decisive step in this policy, its first political achievement, out of which the final aim will follow almost logically, is the absorption of Austria, the preservation of Turkey and Constantinople, and the consequent weakening of Russia and the Slavs. If Berlin succeeds in creating "Central Europe," the aim of the war is attained, even if, at the worst, some time should elapse before the completion of the Constantinople-Bagdad and Constantinople-Cairo routes.

If successful, Prussia-Germany would become an Asiatic and African power like Russia, Britain and France: nay more, she would become the greatest World-Power. Pangermanism is a programme for the final solution of the Eastern question. The Great War is a daring attempt to organise Europe, Asia and Africa—the Old World—under the leadership of Germany.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

The Roumanians of Hungary

ROUMANIA'S entry is the crowning proof of a fact which is still too often overlooked by Western public opinion, but which, none the less, goes to the root of the whole European problem as raised by the Great War, and, even more so, of the settlement which must follow it. In a single phrase, this is not only a German War, but also a Magyar War. Nay more, it is as much a Magyar War as it is a German War: for the Magyars have done more than any other people to create that electrical atmosphere in South-Eastern Europe which produced the fatal explosion. The essential factor in Roumania's attitude, ever since she attained her own unity and independence, is that she has been forced to witness the spectacle of 3,500,000 of her kinsmen in Hungary subjected to one of the grossest tyrannies which the modern world has known, and defending themselves desperately and at great disadvantage against the systematic efforts of the Magyars to undermine and destroy their national spirit. Some years ago the distinguished Roumanian statesman, M. Take Ionescu, tersely expressed to me the feeling which is shared by all thoughtful Roumanians. "If I thought," he said, "that the Roumanians of Transylvania could ever conceivably become Magyarised, I should give up politics altogether. It would not be worth while for us Roumanians of the kingdom to go on living. We should have no future." Almost one-third of the entire race is threatened by Magyar policy, and it is obvious that no country in the world could regard such a situation with equanimity.

The history of Transylvania is, in many ways, unique in Europe. After forming the backbone of the ancient Dacia, it was fought over for centuries by tribe after tribe of barbarian invaders moving westwards. It was not till the end of the 11th century that the Magyars extended their sway to what came to be called Erdély, Ardeal, Transylvania—"The land beyond the forest." Their kings, finding the country thinly populated after the ravages of centuries, encouraged Magyar and German settlers by the grant of special charters and concessions. The Transylvanian constitution crystallised round the so-called "Brotherly Union"

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of 1437, concluded between the three privileged "nations," the Magyar nobles, the Székelys or Frontiersmen of the eastern Carpathians, and the Saxon townsmen. When Hungary was conquered by the Turks in 1525, the principality of Transylvania survived under native Magyar princes, paying periodical tribute to the Turks. Parallel with the Turks from the South came the Reformation from the German North, and Transylvania became the scene of a remarkable experiment of religious toleration at the very moment when the wars of religion were at their height in the West. In 1571 the Estates recognised the four confessions—Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran and Unitarian—as equal before the law.

Unhappily, in this seemingly ideal picture, there was one significant omission. Side by side with the three dominant races there was the silent mass of serfs, the Roumanian autochthonous population, who, in spite of their superior numbers, have never obtained recognition as a nation, and whose religion—the Orthodox or Eastern Faith—was excluded from the benefits of religious toleration. Alike during the period of Transylvanian independence (1526–1691) and the succeeding period of autonomy under Habsburg rule, the Roumanians have always occupied the position of real political helots, and have never lost an opportunity of asserting their claims of civil and religious equality. Just as in 1791 the memorable petition known as "Supplex Libellus Valachorum" was completely ignored by the Diet, so their great assembly on the "Field of Liberty" at Blaj (Blasendorf), in 1848, was a signal to the dominant race to rush through the Diet a law proclaiming the union of Transylvania with Hungary, in defiance of Roumanian and Saxon opposition. The fatal attitude of the Magyars, in refusing point blank to the Roumanians, as to the Slavs, those national rights which they claimed for themselves, ranged all the other races on the side of Austria and the Habsburgs in the terrible civil war which followed. Its evil traces still survive in memories of peasants shot and hanged wholesale without trial for their loyalty to the throne, and castles sacked and burned in revenge for centuries of oppression. When, after ten years of black reaction, constitutional government was revived in Austria in the early sixties, there was a brief interlude of honest dealing, the Roumanian nation and language being at last placed on an equal footing with the Magyar and the

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German, and the Roumanian Orthodox Church receiving a definite charter, under its own hierarchy and elective assembly. This alarmed and angered the patriots of Budapest, and among the foremost concessions extracted from the Crown, as an earnest of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867, were the dissolution of the Transylvanian Diet, the consequent annulment of its concessions to the Roumanians, and the ratification of the forced union of 1848 by a new Diet, which was specially "packed" for the purpose, and which overrode the vigorous protests of both Roumanians and Saxons.

Since 1867, then, Transylvania has been merged in Hungary, and the Roumanian population has shared in the benefits conferred by a constitution which the Magyars are never tired of comparing to the British. To the Roumanians, as to the Slavs of Hungary, the chief pledge of political liberty has been the law of 1868 guaranteeing "the Equal Rights of all Nationalities." But this law, though for years past it has been held up to the uninformed outside world as a pattern of unexampled tolerance, has all the time, as a result of the deliberate policy of the entire Magyar ruling caste, remained a dead letter in the most literal sense of the word. It would be easy to take the document, paragraph by paragraph, and, by comparison with official statistics and the admissions of leading statesmen, to prove that, in all matters of administration, justice, education, etc., its provisions have been deliberately disregarded in favour of a ruthless policy of Magyarisation. For example, there are no state schools, secondary or primary, where the language of instruction is Roumanian, and though the Roumanians have been able to maintain their own denominational schools, this has been in addition to their liability to the state, and by the almost unaided efforts of a very poor community. The scandalous Education Laws introduced in 1907 by that false prophet of constitutional liberty, Count Apponyi, were designed above all to effect the forcible Magyarisation of the denominational schools, the last stronghold of the nationalities. The Magyar point of view was brought out very well some twelve years ago during an education debate, when the well-known dramatist and newspaper proprietor, Mr. Rákosi, declared that the proper educational policy was to allow no teaching of any kind for three years

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in any of the schools attended by non-Magyars, except speaking, reciting and singing Magyar! He was followed by Bishop Firczák, who said: "A good educational policy is in the interests of the state, but its first requirement is that it should be Magyar in all its parts. The second requirement is that it should have a moral and religious basis." The order is absolutely significant and characteristic.

It is, however, on the political side that the oppression of the Roumanians has been most glaring. Thanks to the great reputation and influence at Court of Archbishop Shaguna the Roumanian Orthodox Metropolitan, their church autonomy was respected, and thus there was at least one valuable point of defence against Magyar aggression. But even Shaguna felt himself politically helpless, and after the Ausgleich coined the famous phrase, "Flere possim, sed iuvare non" (I could weep, but help I could not). His despairing followers committed the grave mistake of adopting a policy of abstention, and for years the Roumanians were unrepresented in the Hungarian Parliament.

In 1881 the irreconcilables met under the historian Baritiu, and founded the Roumanian National Party, whose chief demands were the fulfilment of the law of nationalities, the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy, and universal suffrage. They were attacked with the utmost bitterness by the Magyars inside and outside Parliament, and, as press persecution grew, their committee addressed a petition to the throne, recounting their grievances in a masterly way (1892). The Hungarian Government, in its fury, not only prevented Francis Joseph from receiving them, but actually brought the whole committee to trial for "incitement against the Magyar nation"; and Dr. Ratziu and eight others were sentenced to a total of 29 years' imprisonment. The Memorandum Trial awakened echoes throughout Europe, and especially in Roumania. Its victims, in a spirited defence, rubbed in the fact that it was not a question of law, but of mere brute force, declared themselves to have acted as mandatories of the Roumanian people, and denied that a whole people can be brought to justice. "By your spirit of mediæval intolerance," they added, "by a racial fanaticism which has not its equal in Europe, you will, if you condemn us, simply succeed in proving to the world that the Magyars are a discordant note in the concert of European nations."

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The Hungarian Government did not stop here. A month later it formally dissolved the Roumanian National Party as a disloyal institution, and denied the right of the Roumanians to form a party on national lines; and though events have rendered the literal enforcement of such a policy impracticable, it still represents the views of all representative Magyar statesmen. The present Premier, Count Tisza, in a famous speech in 1910, argued that, "at the moment when our Roumanian fellow-citizens form parties on the basis of nationality, they are already denying the political unity of the Hungarian nation." "Individual nationalities," said another Premier, the late Baron Bánffy, "have no rights, only individuals have." Of course, not everyone in Hungary is so crude or so frank as a well-known Budapest newspaper which, in commenting on the Memorandum Trial, expressed regret that the good old practice of affixing the heads of traitors to the gates could not be employed against the prisoners. But language scarcely less violent could be quoted *ad nauseam* from almost all the prominent public men of Hungary for a generation past. Count Andrassy, when Minister of the Interior eight years ago, defined the policy of the state as "kindliness and justice to the masses of the nationalities, but pitiless prosecution of the agitators who lead them"; and, next morning, a leading daily added the comment, "We, the Magyar nation and Magyar society, are not satisfied with so little. We wish to Magyarise Hungary completely." In short, in the words of Coloman Széll, one of the most moderate Premiers of modern Hungary, and the favourite pupil of the great Deák, "The unitary Magyar state is the highest aim of Hungarian policy, and every statesman must be irreconcilable in pursuing it. Hungary must first be preserved as a Magyar land, and then it must be cultivated, rich and progressive."

At the elections of 1906, the Roumanians, abandoning the old policy of abstention, managed to secure fourteen seats in Parliament, but this was only a momentary oversight on the part of the Magyars; and in 1910 their number was reduced to five, as the result of one of the most corrupt and terroristic elections of modern times. It is difficult to convey to Western readers an adequate impression of the electoral methods employed in Hungary, especially in the

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non-Magyar constituencies. Apart from an elaborate system of gerrymandering, the absence of the ballot, and the narrowness of the franchise, the whole machinery of state is set in motion to prevent the election of candidates whom the Government regards as undesirable. Cases could be cited where veterinary orders have been issued on the eve of the poll, forbidding horse traffic in the constituency; or where the only bridge over a river has been suddenly declared unsafe and closed for traffic; or where stationmasters, by order, refuse to issue tickets to Roumanian voters; or where electors have simply been shut up in an inn under lock and key till all was over; or even where a candidate has been arrested as a suspicious character, his papers taken away, and he himself detained in gaol for two days and not allowed to communicate with his friends. I know of two instances in 1910 where a "dummy" candidate has been announced by the returning officer at the last moment, bearing the same name as the opposition candidate, and where the scale has then been turned by crediting votes for the latter to his imaginary namesake! On one occasion the chief administrative official of a large constituency said to the opposition candidate, a non-Magyar friend of my own, "Even if 90 per cent. of the electors go in your favour, you still won't be elected." Doubtful constituencies are flooded with troops and gendarmes, who are used to browbeat the peasantry, and, when necessary, to isolate them from their leaders. In many cases a cordon of troops is drawn round the town or village where polling is taking place, and the opposition is kept waiting outside in the wind and rain, or in the summer heat, while the Government party has the run of the town, and of the inns, with free beer and wine and other inducements. Sometimes such treatment goads the Roumanians to fury, and they resist; then the gendarmes fire only too freely, and more than one blood bath has resulted.

In 1910 it was officially admitted by the Hungarian Government that "only" 194 battalions of infantry and 114 squadrons of cavalry were employed at the June elections to "preserve order"—in other words, to prevent the non-Magyars, and even to some extent the Magyar opposition, from exercising their just political rights. Thanks to the help of friends who knew every cellar and backdoor

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in a certain Hungarian country town, I succeeded in getting through a triple cordon of infantry, cavalry and gendarmerie, and witnessing with my own eyes such an election. On that occasion it was only the action of the non-Magyar candidate in withdrawing from the contest, that averted serious bloodshed. He had an overwhelming majority of electors marshalled on the outskirts of the town, but the cordon had strict orders not to admit them. The only exception made was for the men of two particular villages, and of them the returning officer made short work, either disqualifying them altogether or crediting their votes to the Government candidate, whose hopeless minority was thus conveniently swelled into a triumphant majority.

For even when he has reached the poll, the elector's dangers are not at an end. Magyar returning officers are capable of transferring votes to the wrong side, losing the papers, allowing Government agents to vote three or four times over or to impersonate a dead man, and, indeed disqualifying on almost any trumped-up grounds. The law of Hungary actually provides in detail for cases where the returning officer declares a candidate elected who has not received an absolute majority, or infringes the law "with the object of falsifying the result" (I quote the exact words). Such are only a few of the methods of a constitution which the Magyars are never tired of comparing with the British.

Much could be written of the systematic persecution of the Roumanian Press; of how, in twenty years, over 350 Roumanian "intellectuals" were sentenced to over 150 years of imprisonment and enormous fines for so-called "incitement against the Hungarian nation"; of how public meetings are prohibited wholesale, Roumanian societies dissolved, Roumanian school books and song books proscribed, the Roumanian colours forbidden, Roumanian funds confiscated or arbitrarily diverted to other uses, Roumanian boys expelled repeatedly and in growing numbers from schools and seminaries, simply because they refuse to submit to the ban upon their language. But enough has already been said to prove that the political system under which the Roumanians of Transylvania and Hungary have hitherto lived is one of the grossest tyrannies which modern Europe has ever known, and that it would justify our new Allies a hundred times over in seeking to set free a race whose

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deep and virile national consciousness has survived all attacks.

While Roumania's motives in joining the Entente are mainly national, Germany, on her side, has many reasons of a different kind for straining every nerve to crush Roumania. On the Lower Danube lie the stakes—the key to victory or defeat. Germany has to show her loyalty to her hard-pressed Allies, Hungary and Bulgaria, and her unlimited capacity for helping her, and, at the same time, to prove, if she can, that the Entente is incapable of saving yet another small nation from the fate of Belgium and Serbia. She hopes also to gain access to a country full of corn and oil, whose rich products would immensely ease the situation of the Central Powers. But, above all, Germany has to maintain at all cost the connections with Turkey—the great land route to the Near and Middle East. Roumania's victory means a deathblow to Hungary as the vampire battering on subject races and the end of Bulgaria's dream of Balkan hegemony—in other words, the two first essential stages towards the isolation of Germany; for that isolation can only be achieved by reducing the Austro-Magyars to submission. Roumania's defeat, on the other hand, means the consolidation of the Berlin-Bagdad line, the control of the great Danubian thoroughfare and of the Black Sea, the possibility of outflanking the Russian armies, and threatening Kiev and Odessa through Bessarabia; the indefinite postponement of a Russian land advance upon Constantinople and of the opening of the Straits; the widening still further of the gap between our Balkan front and Russia; in short, the indefinite prolongation of the war as a whole. Germany's attitude to Roumania is the best proof of what she thinks of the importance of the Near East. It is fortunate that this time the statesmen of the Entente are fully alive to the danger, and realise that their honour and credit are at stake. But if this final effort at German aggression is to be effectively crushed, our measures must be imperative and drastic; there must be no half answers or delays such as too often obscured the situation at Nish and at Athens. Belgium we could not save, Serbia we would not save, Roumania we must save.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

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Mr. Lloyd George's Interview

The interview published by Mr. Lloyd George in an American journal has had a most reassuring effect in all Allied countries, and has nipped in the bud a very dangerous agitation. It was definitely known that the Germans were preparing, in the United States, a serious peace intrigue which contemplated the capture of at least one important journal, and was timed to influence the action of the President on the eve of the presidential election. Like many happy coincidences, the actual giving of the interview was in the nature of an accident. The aptness of the moment and of the method chosen was not fully perceived until the Crown Prince's interview appeared a few days later. Interviews like those of this *soi-disant* converted militarist are like time-fuses, and are calculated to burst at a given moment. Mr. Lloyd George, by using a shorter fuse and high explosive, succeeded in completely demolishing the trenches of the enemy.

People who criticise his language obviously fail to understand the difference between the mental condition of neutrals and that of belligerents. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the huge majority of Americans thank God daily that they live far from the track of this devastating storm, and, in this detached frame of mind, they naturally understand the language of the prize-ring better than the language of the trenches.

Mr. Asquith's Speech

On 11th October the Prime Minister supplemented the Minister of War's remarks in an eloquent speech, one passage of which cannot be quoted too often:—

"The strain which the war imposes on ourselves and our Allies, the hardships which we freely admit it involves to some of those who are not directly concerned in the struggle, the upheaval of trade, the devastation of territory, the loss of irreplaceable lives, this long and sombre procession of cruelty and suffering, lighted up as it is by deathless examples of heroism and chivalry, cannot be allowed to end in some patched-up, precarious, dishonouring compromise, masquerading under the name of peace.

"No one desires to prolong for a single unnecessary day the tragical spectacle of bloodshed and destruction, but we owe it to those who have given their lives for us in the flower of their youth, in the hope and promise of the future, that their supreme sacrifice shall not be in vain. The ends of the Allies are well known; they have been frequently and precisely stated. They are not selfish ends, they are not vindictive ends; but they require that there should be adequate reparation for the past and adequate security for the future. On their achievement we, in this country, honestly believe depends the best hopes of humanity."

Only those who actually heard Mr. Asquith's speech could appreciate the fortitude and depth of feeling which underlay it. The words which appear so eloquent in print were not uttered without

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a great physical effort; for, in the last few weeks, the war has laid its rude hand heavily upon him. In such circumstances, the attacks made upon Mr. Lloyd George for expressing so forcibly, if in different language, ideas which are absolutely identical with those of his chief seem all the more uncalled for. Indeed, they suggest a desire to pay off old (or rather new) scores.

Peace Terms

In the debate which followed, one of the very few Englishmen whom German war methods has not cured of pacifist illusions urged the possibility of obtaining peace terms from Germany to-day. "Supposing," he said, "we knew that the Germans would retire from Belgium and pay an indemnity, that they would retire from France and perhaps give up some part of Lorraine, and that they would restore her independence to Serbia—what then? . . . Was there or was there not a chance of obtaining such terms?" After exaggerating strangely the anti-war feeling in Germany, he continued as follows:—"Could we be quite sure that the Allies were not continuing the war for the purpose of annexation? Were we bound, he might ask, to continue the war until Russia should be in possession of Constantinople? The House had a right to know whether we were committed to such a policy."

The speaker seems to cherish the illusion that all German Socialists, and even the Chancellor himself, are opposed to annexation, whereas Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has made it abundantly clear that he favours a drastic revision of Germany's eastern frontier, and this attitude is approved by a majority of the Socialists. Such views savour of Professor Münsterberg's campaign in favour of a drawn game; and a drawn game—as M. André Chéradame has demonstrated in his brilliant war book, "The Pan-German Plan Unmasked: or the German Trap of 'a Drawn Game,'" would, in effect, be equivalent to a German victory. Its advocacy is simply undiluted Prussianism.

An interesting contrast to the attitude of this tiny group of British pacifists is provided by the following statement issued by the American League to Enforce Peace, of which Mr. Taft is President:—

"The interview with the Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Secretary of War for Great Britain, saying that any step by the United States, or the Vatican, or any other neutral in the direction of peace would be construed by England as an unneutral and pro-German move suggests the desirability of reiterating the fact that the League to Enforce Peace has not sought, and does not seek, to end the present war. Every effort has been made by the League to have this clearly understood from the beginning."

Sir Edward Carson and German Designs

During the same debate, Sir Edward Carson, after laying stress on the dangers of the Balkan situation, spoke as follows:—

"To have the consolidated Balkan States under the heels of the Germans, and in their possession at a time when peace proposals

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may be put forward, would seem to me to add great difficulties to the acceptance for a moment of any of the proposals that may be made. I think it is right that this country should turn its attention to the fact, which is now patent and has been patent for a long time, that the aggression of the German Government is not directed merely towards Europe, but is also directed towards the Balkans, with a view to ultimate aggression in the East, where we are so deeply concerned. That is a matter which ought never to be left out of consideration for a moment in considering the various operations which we are driven to undertake."

To a German it must seem almost incomprehensible that one of our most trusted leaders should have found it necessary to remind the House of such elementary considerations. The incident illustrates what has been in the past and may again be in the future, one of the fundamental weaknesses of our political position—the failure of our parliamentarians to realise common-place principles and facts which are the intellectual stock-in-trade of the Continent. It is with the object of combating so dangerously insular an outlook that THE NEW EUROPE has been founded.

More Men

Sir William Robertson has hitherto maintained the silent traditions of Lord Kitchener, and what is practically his first public utterance is, therefore, all the more deserving of attention. Such a speech cannot be quoted too often. After referring to "the splendid spirit that prevails at the front," and to the complete absence of shams or of sham confidence, he went on, "I would like to add a serious note of warning. The end is not yet. We must be prepared to go on for a period of time which it is impossible to estimate. . . . We have yet a long way to go, and we must be ready to go all the way. 'Fight to a finish' is the order. There must be no slackening off. On the contrary, there must be a great tightening up. . . . We want men, more men. We want them now, and, in due course, we shall want all men who can be spared. . . . I am entitled to say that we are not justified in expecting to win this war unless the services of every man and woman in this country are utilised to the fullest possible extent."

Sir W. Robertson is one of those men—all too rare among our leaders—who really "*went to war when war broke out*," to quote the recent remark of an eminent British officer. By "going to war" he meant that, from the moment that hostilities opened, their every thought was conceived in terms of the war and of how to win it; not, as so many even in high places still conceive it, in terms of the peace that was past, and of the peace which they hoped would come with as little alteration as possible in their mental habits and outlook upon life.

Lord Bryce on the Principle of Nationality

Lord Bryce, in the course of an address on "The Church and International Relations," delivered at Birmingham, spoke as follows: "In settling the terms of peace, let us as far as possible respect the

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principles of nationality. Contentment and tranquillity are most to be expected where frontiers follow feelings. Can any international machinery be created after the war is over whereby the peoples that desire peace can league themselves to restrain aggression, and compel a reference of controversies to arbitration or conciliation? The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the First Lord of the Admiralty have already expressed the need for some such machinery, and several groups of thinkers have been working out schemes for the purpose." Such a policy can only be welcomed; but it is obvious that, before international arbitration can rest on really sure foundations, frontiers must be adjusted according to the needs and aspirations of the various peoples. Take, for example, the millions of Slavs and Latins whom the Central Powers have used so ruthlessly as "cannon-fodder" in the present war; it is obviously undesirable that their oppressors should have the sanction of the other Powers in enforcing a continuance of their sufferings.

Bulgarian Bulletins

The Bulgarians, who, some weeks ago, were heaping scurrilities upon Britain and France, and accusing our troops at Salonica of hideous atrocities against the gallant Bulgarian "Kulturträger," are now indulging in similar charges against the Roumanian army. What the gutter-press of Sofia may care to say or leave unsaid is a matter of supreme indifference. Our only object in referring to the subject is to remind those of our readers who may see occasional extracts from *Narodni Prava*, *Dnevnik* or *Kambana*, that these sheets are not to be judged by the standards of Fleet Street, but rather by those of an Oriental bazaar, where the approved method of concealing one's own misdeeds is to father them upon one's opponent.

The military information supplied by the Bulgarian General Staff is to be accepted with quite exceptional caution. It is unfortunate that the facts regarding its methods during the first and second Balkan wars have never been placed before the British public. During the former, it fed Europe with imaginary facts, and actually invented two battles which never took place—one at Kirk Kilisse and another, lasting three days, at Tchataldja, at a date when there was not a single Bulgarian soldier within 50 kilometers of the Lines. The medium employed was the well-known *Reichspost* correspondent, Hermenegild Wagner, but the facts were supplied to him, down to the minutest details, at the army headquarters. In the second war, again, the Bulgarian Staff after opening hostilities against Serbs and Greeks by the treacherous night assault of 29th June 1913, published elaborate versions of Serbian aggression against Bulgaria, and it was not until one of the original army orders was captured on a dead Bulgarian officer, and published in *facsimile* by the Serbian Government, that this attempt to falsify public opinion was abandoned.

These and many similar facts should have served as a reminder that he who sups with the Bulgarians must use a long spoon. Not for the first time in this war the Entente has discovered this to its cost in the Dobrogea campaign.

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Serbia's Sacrifices

The *Pester Lloyd*, the semi-official organ of the Hungarian Government, announces the results of a census recently taken in that portion of Serbia which is occupied by Austria-Hungary (namely, the western and central districts lying to the west of the Morava valley, the former Sandjak of Novibazar, and the plain of Kosovo and Prizren). According to this, there are, at present, 1,373,511 inhabitants, of whom only 575,643 are men. In the south, where the Albanian element is fairly strong, there are 76,000 men to 73,000 women; but in what the Austrians hold of the original kingdom of Serbia, there are only 498,715 men to 719,312 women. These figures are an eloquent proof of the Serbian tragedy. The manhood of the nation, in so far as it has survived the terrible losses of the war and the privations of the great retreat through Albania, is either in Austrian, German, and Bulgarian prisons or is fighting in the Salonica Expeditionary Force. Where all are straining every nerve, and any comparison is invidious, Serbia undoubtedly can claim to have offered more of her life's blood to the common cause than any of the Allies.

The True and the False Pacifism

The pacifists who, in their rage against Mr. Lloyd George and other would-be "war-winners," are ready to link hands with the German militarists in working for a "contaminated peace," have found a very disconcerting answer in the interview accorded by Signor Bissolati to the United Press. For years past Signor Bissolati has been known as an uncompromising Socialist, anti-monarchist and pacifist; but on the outbreak of war he adopted the same patriotic attitude as the French pacifist M. Hervé. It was only after he had served for many months at the Italian front and had been invalided home that he consented to enter the Boselli Cabinet of which he is now Vice-President and one of the leading members. "The whole germ of the war," he declares, "can only be killed by destroying Austria as a state and by depriving Germany of every illusion of predominance. It is necessary to proclaim this seriously and openly, as it has been proclaimed by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith. . . . I am convinced that their words exactly interpret the thoughts and express the firm resolve of all the Allies. The peace to which the whole world aspires after so many horrors and sacrifices must be a real and lasting peace and not a mere truce. Civilisation must be safeguarded against attempts similar to the one against which it is now reacting. . . . I therefore think that any state or states of the Entente which to-day harboured thoughts of peace would be guilty of an act of treason."

Such is the voice of democratic Italy, speaking in harmony with the sister democracies of France and Britain.

PRINTED FOR MESSRS. CONSTABLE & CO. LTD., BY EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

The New Europe

VOL. I, No. 2.

October 26, 1916

Italy and the Southern Slavs

LEAVING aside for a moment the no less vital economic and strategic problems raised by the war, we find that from a strictly national point of view the reconstruction of Europe requires the solution of four main questions:—The Southern Slav or Adriatic, the Roumanian, the Bohemian and the Polish—though, of course, each of these in turn contains economic, strategic, and even religious elements. Among them the Southern Slav stands first, if not in point of actual importance, at least in respect of its ripeness for treatment. It would be perfectly possible to-day for the statesmen of the leading allied countries, in consultation and agreement with the Southern Slav leaders and with the Serbian Government, to settle satisfactorily the broad lines of a Southern Slav or Adriatic solution, and thus to clear the ground for the consideration of other questions which depend even more completely upon the course of military events.

The Southern Slavs are divided into three main sections—in round numbers, 6,000,000 Serbs (of whom 4,000,000 are in the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro), 3,500,000 Croats and 1,500,000 Slovenes. Thus, out of a total of between eleven and twelve millions, a considerable majority is under Austro-Hungarian rule. Their situation is a striking illustration of the old conflict between history and geography. A wide territory which forms a natural geographical unit and is peopled by a homogeneous population, speaking a single language, has been split up by an unkindly fate into a large number of purely artificial fragments. Passing these fragments in brief review, we find that Croatia-Slavonia forms an autonomous kingdom under the Crown of Hungary, Dalmatia, Istria and Carniola are three provinces of the Austrian Empire, each with its separate diet and administration; the town of Fiume forms an unit of its own under a Governor appointed direct from Budapest; about half a million Serbs inhabit the three most southerly counties of Hungary

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proper: while Bosnia and Herzegovina are administered jointly by Austria and Hungary, with a provincial Government and Diet in Sarajevo. This intolerable situation has been accentuated tenfold by the economic policy of the Magyars, and above all, by the grossly oppressive political *régime* which they have maintained in Croatia for a generation past, and which has increased in severity as the national movement gathered strength among the Southern Slavs. This movement, which had stagnated during the eighties and nineties of last century under the corrupting rule of Khuen-Hédervary, has steadily gathered new force since 1903. The Serbo-Croat Coalition, formed in 1905, as the political expression of the desire for national unity, resisted all the efforts alike of Budapest and of Vienna to compromise its leaders or to sow dissension within their ranks. The gross scandals of the Agram Treason Trial and of the Friedjung Trial, with its formidable array of "documents" forged by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, cemented the union still further, and a series of corrupt elections, culminating in the arbitrary suspension of the Croatian Constitution in 1912, roused public opinion to white heat. Following closely upon this came the victories of the Balkan League against Turkey, and a wave of indescribable enthusiasm spread throughout the Southern Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary. Henceforth Serbia became the incorporation of the idea of unity, and the last lingering traces of allegiance which Austria might have retained if she had not so resolutely set her face against her Southern Slav subjects, were transferred to the victors of Kumanovo. The attack which Austria had planned upon Serbia in 1912 and again in 1913 was not actually delivered till 1914, but before it came it had already become obvious that the sands were running out, and that Austria-Hungary's persistent refusal to attempt any solution of the Southern Slav question might lead at any moment to a catastrophe. Intellectuals and peasantry alike were saturated with the national ideal to a degree which it is difficult to realize in the West. Its achievement had become as sure and inevitable as the achievement of Italian unity: all that was still in doubt was the time and method of achievement.

With the outbreak of war the great refusal of the Habsburgs became irrevocable, and the task of fulfilment passed to the Allies. A permanent solution of the Southern

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Slav question, as one result of the present conflict, represents a general European interest. It is essential that its discussion should be raised from the level of some dispute between local fanatics and placed upon broad European lines. No apology is needed for placing before our readers as full a report of the very noteworthy series of speeches which were delivered on 24th October at the Mansion House, at the inaugural meeting of the Serbian Society of Great Britain. They are the first clear manifestation of the interest which the question has aroused among prominent men in this country, and of the degree of comprehension which it has already won. The proceedings were opened by the Lord Mayor, who, in the course of his speech said :—

Since the beginning of the war the name of Serbia has become familiar to us all. The gallantry of her armies, of which the heroic remnant is even now hammering at the gates of Monastir, and the sufferings of her people, have endeared the Serbian name to the British peoples. On several occasions the City of London has associated itself with efforts made in this country to alleviate the sufferings, and to pay a tribute of recognition to the indomitable patriotism, of Serbia and her devotion to the Allied cause. But the aims which the Serbian Society has been formed to promote are somewhat different from those with which the Mansion House has hitherto been associated. They are, in the first place, educational, and, in the second place, constructively political. The Serbian Society desires to bring home to the peoples of the British Commonwealth a sense of the importance of Serbia as a "key" country in the political structure of Europe—and not only of the Serbia of the past, but still more of the united Southern Slavia of the future. It desires to work for Southern Slav union; for a friendly agreement between the Southern Slav peoples and Italy—to whom England is bound by so many affectionate traditions—and also between them and Rumania, whose strenuous efforts to stay the desperate onrush of our common foe hold so large a place in our thoughts to-day. Such a union and such an agreement would be corner-stones of the Europe of the future—the Europe which we all desire to see built up in a spirit of justice upon the sure foundations of freedom. It is, therefore, fitting that objects so praiseworthy as those of the Serbian Society should be recognised and supported in the City of London, which has done so much to strengthen the hands of our own Government, and, indeed, of all the Allied Governments, in this terrible but glorious war, and whose chief interest, when victory has been achieved, will be to see that the peace is real, lasting, and fruitful. We were unprepared for war. Let us not be unprepared for peace. Let us take counsel betimes with ourselves and our Allies, so that the end of hostilities may find us acquainted with the conditions indispensable to the prevention of further strife. Among these

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conditions the unity of the Southern Slav peoples holds a prominent place. Therefore, we should welcome the formation of this Serbian Society and give it the support it needs for the fulfilment of its task.

The Earl of Cromer, President of the Society, said :—

Some two years or more ago I registered a mental vow that, what with increasing years and failing health, I would never in any circumstances again address a public meeting. You, therefore, see before you now the melancholy spectacle of a man who is about, flagrantly and deliberately, to break his self-imposed vow. The reason I give to myself for doing so is that I break it for a very righteous cause. I make an exception in this case because I think the matter we are assembled to discuss here this afternoon is one of very special importance, and one in which I take the deepest personal interest.

The Lord Mayor has explained to you briefly the objects of the Serbian Society. I should like to supplement this explanation by some remarks of my own, and I should like also to explain not only what the Serbian Society is, but also what it is not—a point as to which there is a good deal of misapprehension.

The Serbian Society may be regarded, broadly speaking, as a humble but, I hope, not altogether useless, portion of that machinery which is now being forged over the greater part of Europe in order to resist the onslaught and machinations of the common foe. By "the common foe" I, of course, mean Germany and her handmaid, Austria, and I also include in that category King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who, in his conduct towards Russia and the Russian nation, has furnished one of the most flagrant examples of political ingratitude ever recorded in the history of the world. And I also include those poor bewildered Turks, with whom I have been a good deal associated in the course of my life, and who, in spite of the glaring defects of their Government, are, in the main—the poor amongst them particularly—a manly and virile race. When we are asked why we are making war on Germany and her allies, the usual answer which is given is that we are fighting in order to assert a principle of supreme importance. That principle is that the keystone of the political future of the world is to be Democracy and not Absolutism. That description is quite true. But (if I may be allowed for one moment to diverge from the subject immediately in hand) pray remember—and the point is one of very great importance—although we have our differences of opinion amongst ourselves occasionally, all of us here—Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, Home Rulers—we all hold our tongues about our differences as much as we can when we are brought face to face with German absolutism.

Then we are fighting for another important principle, which has often been explained by the Prime Minister, namely, that the smaller nations of the world should have "a place in the sun"—not that monopoly of the sun's rays to which the Autocrat of Berlin aspires, but a sufficient place to enable them to develop their own social and political life in such a manner and in such a time as suits

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their wishes and their proclivities. Besides those two principles, we are fighting in order to resist the far-reaching ambitions of Germany. I think that, at the beginning of the war, there was a good deal of misapprehension in this country as to what the aims of German policy really were. The Germans aimed at nothing less than World Dominion, and especially at establishing a huge empire to reach from the Persian Gulf to the Baltic. We think it is in the interests of the whole of Europe to offer the strongest possible resistance to the execution of this monstrous project. For the present, the only means of resisting is by sheer force—and we have every reason to believe that we shall succeed. I cannot believe for one moment that either the public or the Government of any Allied State will consent to sheathe the sword until such time as we are able, not only to make a patched-up peace, but to make our own terms to a vanquished foe. It is only thus that we can secure safety for ourselves, and give a pledge to posterity that they will not have to undergo the same sufferings that the present generation has undergone. As regards the future, we think that one of the best guarantees that those monstrous pretensions of the Germans will not in time be revived is to establish a solid block composed of people of non-Teutonic race, who will act as a formidable and insuperable barrier to Teutonic aggression in the future. The Southern Slavs are well adapted to form this barrier. There are some differences of opinion in respect of religion, and also in respect of language, but they are all united by a common interest and by strong racial affinities, which we hope, and believe, may be strengthened in the future. The main object of the Serbian Society, then, is to encourage the creation of a Southern Slav State.

And now a few words as to what the Serbian Society is not. I have heard it recently whispered that the Serbian Society is animated by some blatant hostility towards Italy and the Italians. It is not very difficult to conjecture as to where these calumnies come from. It is in the obvious interest of Germany to encourage dissensions amongst the Allies, and I have no doubt that, if the remarks of which I speak were traced to their sources, they would be found to emanate from some of those very active and ubiquitous agents of the German nation who have been spending millions of money lately in suborning the press of Europe and America, and in poisoning the public opinion of the whole world. I want, on behalf of the Serbian Society, to give the most positive and emphatic denial to the idea that we are animated in any degree by hostility towards Italy and the Italians. The statement is absolutely false. Let me say, on my own behalf, that one of the earliest political recollections of my youth was the time when the whole heart of England went out in sympathy to the Italians during their War of Liberation. I remember well, now more than fifty years ago, when all of us, and none more so than myself, were thrilled with admiration at the statesmanship of Cavour, one of the greatest statesmen of modern times, and the heroism of Garibaldi and his followers. Let me say very distinctly, for my own part, that, if I had the smallest suspicion that the Society was animated

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by any other feelings, or wished ill to Italy in any respect, I should have nothing to say at these proceedings. Moreover, I feel convinced that the sentiments which I have just uttered are shared by the other members of the Serbian Society. I do not deny that a moment may arise when there may be some divergence of opinion as to what are Italian and Slav interests. We believe that our action, so far from being unfriendly to Italy, is in conformity with her best interests. We think that Italy has an interest in forming that great Southern Slav barrier of which I spoke, and that her interests and Slav interests are really identical. The Italians are a free and generous nation, and they cannot do otherwise than sympathise with the wish of other nations to be free and independent. But I readily admit that politics cannot be entirely based on sentiment or idealism. It is the duty of the Italian Government and nation to look to their own security and to have an eye to their own material interests; more especially it is very natural that they should wish for maritime supremacy in the Adriatic, instead of sharing it, as at present, with another and hostile Government. That is a perfectly legitimate aspiration, and I trust that it may be gratified, and I see no reason why it should not, while, at the same time, meeting all the reasonable aspirations of the Slav nation. The Serbian Society has been formed, not with any idea of aspiring to the rôle, or thinking that England should aspire to the rôle, of being arbitrators between Serbs and Italians, but rather with a view to collecting the facts and laying them before the public, though we should welcome any occasion in which we might be of use towards smoothing over difficult culties and bringing our two friends, the Slavs and the Italians, together. That is our object. I think it is one which will commend itself to this meeting. It is one which, I hope and believe, will also meet with the sympathy of the politicians and the general public of this country; and I am even sanguine enough to hope that, when it is properly understood, it will also meet with the sympathy and support of all the best elements amongst both the Slav and the Italian races.

Mr. H. Wickham Steed, foreign editor of the *Times*, spoke as follows:—

There is one stock criticism which is often levelled against any attempt to discuss matters like the future construction of Europe. "You are selling the bear's skin," people say. "Why not wait until you have killed the bear?" The answer is simple: Unless the bear is killed, we and our Allies shall have been defeated, a contingency which none of us are prepared to contemplate. But since we are determined to kill the bear, it is surely prudent to promote some knowledge of his anatomy, so that the parts of his skin and the various joints to be cut from his body may be allotted in advance to those best entitled to them.

The work which the Serbian Society hopes to do presupposes a complete victory for the Allies. Its object is to help to crystallise complete victory into lasting form by making known, as far as the Southern Slav world is concerned, the essential requirements of a

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stable peace. At present, we are not prepared for peace. Some of our public men who have never "gone to war" in their hearts, might be disposed, if only out of ignorance, to tolerate a bad peace—a peace which an eminent Italian recently defined as "containing germs of other wars." We believe that the war will not have been won by victory in the field unless the peace that follows is, in every way, as complete and as well thought out, as the organization of military victory will have been. When the enemy attempts to sound a truce or cries "Hold; enough!" it will be too late to study the situation and discuss what the Allies require. That is why the Serbian Society appeals to you to turn your attention in time to what may seem to you strange places and little-known peoples in and around the Adriatic.

My own acquaintance with the Southern Slav question is nearly twenty years old. At the end of 1902 I was transferred, as correspondent of *The Times*, to Vienna from Rome, where I had worked for nearly six years in the same capacity. During my stay in Italy, Italian views concerning the Adriatic had become familiar to me. I had accepted them very largely, and had frequently discussed them with leading Italian statesmen like Signor Crispi, the Marquis Visconti Venosta, the Marquis di San Giuliano, and Baron Sonnino, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs. I had constantly read in the Italian Press accounts of Slav animosity towards the Italian population of the Austrian littoral, and had acquired from some acquaintance with the history of the Italian Risorgimento something akin to a distaste for the name of Croat. I fear that I then imagined the eastern shores of the Adriatic to be inhabited mainly by Italians, yearning to be freed from the Austrian yoke, and oppressed and harassed by the illwill both of the Austrian authorities and of the Slavs with whom the authorities were in league. I did not know, for instance, that the overwhelming majority of Dalmatians, both on the mainland and on the islands, are Serbo-Croatian, *i.e.*, Southern Slav by race and language. I believe that the feelings and views which I carried with me from Rome to Vienna were, roughly—and, to a great extent, still are—the feelings and views of many Italians.

Little by little, experience in Austria and in Hungary corrected my somewhat crooked perspective, and one of the first men to administer a shock to my notions was that wise old Italian patriot, the late Count Nigra, then Italian Ambassador in Vienna. In 1903 the peasants of Croatia had revolted against the harsh and oppressive Magyar rule personified by Count Khuen-Héderváry, the Hungarian Governor of Croatia. Discussing with Count Nigra the future of Croatia and of Fiume, the Hungarian seaport which, in reality, forms part of Croatia, I remarked that Fiume was "an Italian city," and ought, as such, one day to be redeemed by Italy. He shook his head and said: "Trent, yes; Trieste, I hope; but Fiume is chiefly Croatian and will be either Croatian or German—I fear German." At the time Count Nigra's meaning was not clear to me. A year later, an incident of apparently minor importance helped to open my eyes.

I received in Vienna a visit from a prominent Dalmatian-Croat

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Member of the Austrian Parliament, who spoke Italian like an Italian. He informed me that the editor of a Croatian journal, published at Fiume, had been prosecuted by the Hungarian authorities, and was threatened with two years' imprisonment, for having advocated, in a series of articles, a close agreement between the Slav and Italian inhabitants of the Austrian coast as the only protection against the danger of Germanisation and of German designs on the Adriatic, which were menacing them both. I investigated the matter and found that the facts were as stated; but, like a slow-minded Englishman, I still did not understand why the Hungarian authorities, who themselves professed to hate and fear Germanism, should prosecute an editor for having expressed anti-German views. I did not then understand that the Magyar oligarchy, which rules over and oppresses the great majority of Hungarian citizens, had pledged itself to support Austro-German political and military designs on condition that its own position and power to rule the non-Magyar races of Hungary should be bolstered up by Germanism.

The process of my enlightenment was accelerated by two events that happened in 1905. In the summer of that year Serbia and Bulgaria concluded an economic agreement which was equivalent to a Customs Union. The anger of the Austro-Hungarian Government was such that it immediately closed the frontier to all imports from Serbia, and, by diplomatic pressure, prevented the ratification of the agreement, though it had already been voted by acclamation in the Bulgarian Parliament. At that time, fully three-quarters of Serbian exports—mainly cattle, swine, plums, and agricultural produce—were sold to Austria-Hungary. The closing of the frontier was intended to bring about such a crisis in Serbia, and to bring her so near to economic ruin, as to abandon all idea of economic independence, and throw herself at the feet of Austria-Hungary. Instead of that, Serbia resisted. She sought, at great expense, new markets, and found them in Egypt, Italy and France. The latest phase of the Serbian struggle for free existence may be said to date from what was currently called the "Pig War" of 1905.

Another incident revealed equally clearly Austria's settled antagonism to Serbian independence. Up to October, 1905, the Serbs and the Croats of Austria-Hungary had been in conflict. Their differences, chiefly of a religious character, had been carefully fomented by the Austrian and the Hungarian authorities. Serbs, as you know, are Orthodox Southern Slavs, who, like the Serbians of Serbia, write their language in Cyrillic characters. Croats are chiefly Roman Catholic Southern Slavs, who write the same language in Latin characters. In 1905, the Serb and Croat leaders of Austria-Hungary realised the folly of remaining divided in this way, and of allowing the authorities to play each off against the other to the detriment of both. They therefore formed a Coalition which, by means of a temporary alliance with the Hungarian Opposition, obtained certain guarantees of better government for Croatia. The dismay of the Austrian authorities at this sign of union was extreme. There is no greater offence in the Habsburg Dominions than that of joining together those whom the

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authorities elect to keep asunder. They imagined—quite falsely—that the union had been promoted by Serbia with a view to the eventual union of the whole Southern Slav race, which includes, besides the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary. Austrians cannot conceive that any movement should be spontaneous. Steps were at once taken to counteract the ominous unitary tendency. The political persecutions that culminated in the scandalous High Treason Trial of Agram and the even more scandalous Friedjung Trial of December, 1909, were only the outstanding episodes of these persecutions. All the arts of forgery, perjury and denunciation, in which the Austrian and Hungarian Governments and their Secret Police excel, were employed to counteract the growing sense of unity among the Southern Slavs, and to reduce them again to political impotence. But, as usual, persecution strengthened faith, and when the Serbian arms triumphed in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the sense of solidarity among all branches of the Southern Slavs had become so strong that the victories of Serbia were hailed as victories for the whole Southern Slav race. "Union" became more than ever the watchword of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, like that of the Slavs of Serbia and Montenegro.

From that moment Austria-Hungary, backed and inspired by Germany, resolved to destroy Serbia by force of arms. Serbia, by herself, was a serious obstacle athwart the Germanic road to the East. A Serbia trebled by union with her Serbo-Croatian kindred might well become an insuperable barrier. Therefore, every pretext was seized to pick a quarrel with Serbia. You will remember how, in August, 1913, Austria asked Italy to join her in a "defensive" attack on Serbia. One after the other these attempts failed, until the final tragic pretext of the Sarajevo assassination was organized and used to justify a "punitive expedition," designed to conquer Serbia while the rest of Europe looked quietly on.

Let us imagine for a moment that the Austro-German design had succeeded. Let us suppose that British and French ignorance of Serbian affairs, and Russian devotion to the monarchical principle, which Austria and Germany hypocritically invoked, had induced the Powers of the Triple Entente to stand aside while the Austro-German road to the East was being opened and Serbia was reduced to bondage. What would the position of Italy have been? Penetrated—financially, commercially, politically, morally and intellectually—by Germanism as she was, unprepared by land and out-matched by sea, she would have had no choice save to become an appendix of Germanism in her turn. The clear-sighted statesmen in charge of her affairs at the outbreak of the war recognised the peril, and, by declaring neutrality, took the first courageous step on the road that led straight to war against her former allies. Her neutrality rendered inestimable service to France, England and Russia—a service that has not always been adequately realised. It helped to save Paris and France. But the service rendered to Italy by Russia, France and England in drawing the sword for Serbia, Belgium and

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the cause of European freedom, has, in its turn, not always been fully realised by Italians. It gave them time to sharpen their own sword and to use it in defence of their own freedom, the liberty of small nations, the principles on which the existence of Italy is based, and to cast off, little by little, the insidious coil in which Germany was entangling her. Who does not remember how gallantly Italy struck her blow? The fortunes of the Allies seemed then to be at a low ebb, and Italy joined them, not on the crest, but in the trough of the wave. *It was the Italian people who acted.* A serious pro-German intrigue had overthrown the Government on the eve of the declaration of war. The partisans of neutrality, who held that Italy might have got "a good deal" from Austria by keeping out of the war, and who conceived Italy's whole duty to Europe and to herself as a bargain for a little more or a little less territory, of a little lower or a little higher price for her national birthright, seemed, at the twelfth hour, to have triumphed. Then the people of Italy rose, swept away the traitors and joined in the war without counting the more or the less, but feeling instinctively that the question was whether Italy should win her spurs in the new chivalry of a new crusade or should sink into tolerated vassalage.

How gallantly Italy has fought can only be understood by those who have been privileged to see her soldiers at work in the dizzy Alps or on the burning Carso. They have endured great hardships, have suffered heavy losses, but their temper has been well expressed by the Vice-Premier, Signor Bissolati, who, speaking of peace rumours, said: "The State or States of the Entente who to-day harboured thoughts of peace would be guilty of an act of treason. Rather than accept peace contaminated with the germs of other wars, it would have been better not to have embarked upon the present war at all. But the whole germ of war can only be killed by destroying Austria as a State and by depriving Germany of every illusion of predominance."

A thorough solution of the Southern Slav question requires not only political union between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but their eventual fusion into one united people. It is not merely a question of allotting to Serbia provinces inhabited by other branches of her race and tongue, nor of handing over this district or that as "compensation." Nothing can "compensate" heroism so magnificent, and sufferings so terrible as those of Serbia, save the unification of the Southern Slav race. It is a question of giving practical application, in favour of the Southern Slav race as a whole, to the principle of nationality and the principle of equality of political and religious rights, and of securing for Serbia that seaboard of which her enemies have hitherto deprived her. It is, further, a question—and a vital question—of conciliating imperative requirements of Italian national security with the requirements of Southern Slav unity. Speaking personally, I may say that I have long been profoundly convinced that, without Southern Slav unity formed in agreement with, and with the help of, Italy, Italian national security cannot be obtained; while, without comprehension on the part of Italy of her

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own vital interest in making sure that no important section of the Southern Slav race shall be left unredeemed, Southern Slav unity will be hard to attain. There must be no crevice in the Italo-Southern Slav Block into which the Austro-German enemy can pour the corrosive acid of his inveterate intrigue.

Sir Edward Carson said:—

I do not profess to be an expert on the subject of Serbia. The few words which I have to utter to-day are rather to call us back to what we owe to, and the pledges we have made to, that gallant little country which is at present deprived of its own land. It is probably the most pathetic picture in history—the small nation that kept at bay her enemies all round, while those greater nations which were eventually to rescue her were making their preparations—then attacked for a second time, driven back and ejected from her own land, with nobody able to raise a hand to help her. My interest in this question is, indeed, a great and a sincere one, for I was a member of the Cabinet when the Bulgarians began to invade Serbia, and I remember very well the statement then made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, after having been settled solemnly by the Cabinet. "If," he said, "the Bulgarian mobilization were to result in Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side of our enemies, we are prepared to give to our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power, in the manner that will be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies, without reservation and without qualification. We are, of course, in consultation with our Allies on the situation, and I believe that the view that I express is theirs also."

But when the Bulgarian army mobilized and entered Serbia, we were not in a condition, and we were not prepared, to help them to drive back the invader; and nothing, to my mind, has ever been more pathetic than the story of the Serbian nation, waiting for the British Army which never came. I mention that, not as a criticism of the action of our own Government or of the Allies, but because I believe that those very circumstances, the encouragement we had given her to resist and the promises of help that we were unable to fulfil, cast a duty upon this country and upon this Empire never, under any conditions, to lay down our arms until Serbia is vindicated. Indeed, I think it is well from time to time to remind the country of the promise made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to Serbia: "Serbia may be assured, so far as I am able to do so—and I give her assurance on the part of the British Government to-day—that her independence is regarded by us as one of the essential objects of the Allied Powers."

Our first duty, therefore, towards Serbia is to assure to her the restoration of her independence. But I think that this war and her part in it would have been in vain if we did not make use of the victory to which we are determined to attain, for the purpose of settling far more for the Southern Slavs in the future. Recollect, you constitute your Society on the assumption that we are going to win; what, then, have we to

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prepare for, when we do win, and what is the object to be attained in the Balkan Peninsula and in the States of the Southern Slavs? Recollect, *we* shall be settling this question; and we shall be re-writing the map with Germany eliminated, Austria eliminated, Turkey eliminated, Bulgaria eliminated, and that will be a great factor when we come to determine how we are going to solve the question of this smaller nation. I think we shall solve it on the Principle of Nationality. I hope we shall be able to mould the Southern Slav population into a great united whole, whether it be of federated States or by what other form of active Government I do not know; but that they ought to be formed into a complete union no man who has read history can for a moment doubt. There are great difficulties in the way. Many of them have been alluded to by previous speakers. There are questions with Italy. But I think that, as in many other spheres, fighting as Allies will soften difficulties. And if only the men—the extreme men, may I say (I am often described as one myself!)—if only the extreme men on each side will set themselves to realize that the one great opportunity of solving this great question has come, then, just as it is by their united efforts that they will have defeated the common enemy, so it must be by their united hearts that they will map out the future for all time.

And there is the question—never let us forget it—of our smallest and one of our first Allies, Montenegro. Montenegro must not be lost sight of. How she may fit into the settlement I do not know. But this I may prophesy, that Montenegro has proved herself so brave and so independent in the past that there is no one who will ever attempt to coerce her against her will into any form of government to which she may object.

So far for the question of Serbia in relation to their own interior settlements. But do not imagine that in that great settlement we are not interested, or that the setting-up of a great United States of Jugoslavia is no concern of this country. The best “buffer” you ever had between Germany and the East would be a great united Southern Slav Empire. Some people cast their eyes often on the western frontiers, as if they were the only battlefields that we were concerned with. It may be that victory must be won there as a strategic matter; but, for myself, following these questions as well as I can, I am rather inclined to think that the real ambitions of Germany lie towards the East. Therefore, it is that while, in the first instance, our great and most potent object must be to redeem our pledges to Serbia, to take care that her liberty is restored and her position settled, we also have great and vital interests in stretching out to her the hand of friendship and helping her to become strong, because, through her strength, we ourselves will gain safety in our Eastern possessions. My Lord Mayor, with all my heart I commend the Serbian Society.

ADRIATIC IMPERIALISM

Adriatic Imperialism

The following interesting statement, which may be regarded as the programme of the Italian Reform-Socialists—the party of Signor Bissolati, was published in the *Azione Socialista* of 12th August.

THE Adriatic question is once more occupying public attention, now that the war is generally recognised as having entered upon its decisive phase. In this there is cause neither for surprise nor complaint. The Adriatic occupies so large a place in the aims of the Italian war that it cannot fail to be the main factor in the results of this war.

The Adriatic question is the subject of lively debate, because while, so far as the Trentino and in a less degree the upper Adige and even the Eastern Mediterranean are concerned, there is no pronounced conflict of opinion in the country, on the other hand, so far as concerns the future position of Italy in the Adriatic in the event of a complete victory over the Central Empires, two contradictory views are to be found, not only between the parties, but in the bosom of one and the same party.

The first of these programmes aims at reducing the Adriatic to an Italian territorial lake, by annexing to Italy not only Venetia Julia (*i.e.*, East Friuli, Trieste, Istria, the Quarnero Islands and Fiume, or a total of 80,000 sq. km., with a million inhabitants, of whom 400,000 are Italian), but also Dalmatia, with its islands and even a fragment of Albania. The other programme favours the restoration to Italy merely of those Adriatic lands which belong to it geographically (Venetia Julia), and leaving the rest to Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, or to be more exact, to the Jugoslav state which it is desired to form, and which would include, in a single political organism, the twelve million inhabitants, mainly Serbo-Croats, who live between the Save, the Danube and the Adriatic.

At bottom, this is really a discussion between the imperialist conception and the national conception of the Adriatic balance of power. It is quite beside the mark that the partisans of the former programme—at least, in so far as they belong to the democracy—repudiate with horror the bare suspicion of being imperialists, and, in the vain effort to reconcile appetite and ideals, pretend to restrict themselves to purely national reasons.

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Let us pass in review these alleged "national reasons."

I. *Geographical*.—It is contended that the natural frontiers of Italy are constituted by the chain of the Alps and run, in the words of Signor Marini, "from the Rhætian along the Carnic and Julian to the Dinaric Alps, that is, from the Brenner to Cattaro," thus embracing within these frontiers not only the Upper Adige and the Trentino, East Friuli, Trieste, Istria and Fiume, but also Dalmatia and its islands. Now that is all very well in *political* geography but certainly not in physical geography, for its elements as taught but not learnt in all the schools of the kingdom of Italy, show that the natural frontiers of Italy, determined by the line of Alpine water-sheds, extend on the east to Porto Re on the Gulf of Fiume, and that, south of the Danube-Save-Kulpa line, the Balkan Peninsula begins. Dalmatia, we believe, is *south* and not *north* of this line. We could not be convinced of the contrary by the pseudo-scientific device of examining, not the chain of the Alps, but the basin of the Adriatic, in order to affirm the geographical "Italianity" of the Dalmatian region. This device savours of Pangerman geographical methods, according to which the southern geographical frontier of the German zone is fixed, not by the watershed of the Central Alps, but by the line of the Po.

II.—Next come *historical reasons*, namely, the century-long subjection of Dalmatia to the Latin world, to Rome in antiquity, to Venice in the Middle Ages and in modern times, and the Latin characteristics imprinted on the towns and their inhabitants, who, it is alleged, received every ray of civilization from Rome and Venice. Even if we put aside the well-known historical fact that Rome herself fixed the political frontiers of Italy further west than the geographical frontiers, namely, at Cape Fianona, in Istria (thus Fiume and its surroundings would seem to be excluded from historical Italy), all this would constitute a title of nobility for Italy but not a legal right; for historic rights upon a country, just like those of parents upon their children, lose their *raison d'être* on the day upon which that country has attained a certain degree of civic maturity and of national conscience.

The further theory, so clearly imperialist in origin, which would give Italy an ideal claim to revindicate its historic rights over the entire basin of the Mediterranean from Spain to Asia Minor, and from the Danube to the cataracts

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of the Nile (for all this once belonged to the Roman Empire), may very well keep company with the German theory which aims at the resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, of which, in the mind of the Kaiser, not only Austria, with its Magyar and Balkan extensions, but also France overwhelmed, and Italy spared for the slaughter, should become simple provinces.

III.—If geographical and historical reasons seem feeble enough, they obtain a formidable support—at least, in the eyes of the advocates of Adriatic imperialism—from ethnical reasons, because the Italians—that is to say, those who speak Italian, if one takes the language as the supreme expression of nationality, without regard for the racial origin of the speakers—are the dominant element in the maritime towns of Dalmatia.

Of the ethnical "Italianità" of Dalmatia the reader, especially a socialist or democratic reader, can best judge by studying, not the artificial and lying Austrian statistics, but the most liberal calculations of our Italian geographers. According to the latter, Dalmatia is inhabited by a maximum of 60,000 Italians, scattered in several centres, and by 600,000 Serbo-Croats fully conscious of their nationality. Since, then, the national rights of one race are limited by the national rights of others, it is not permissible to sacrifice the national rights of 600,000 people to the equally national rights of 60,000, unless, by adopting once again the Hegelian theory written in letters of blood on the German standard, of the rights of the more civilized or of those who claim to be so, one proclaims (the last word of absurdity in democracy, even imperialist democracy) that the 600,000 of the less developed race have no rights at all as against the 60,000 of the more developed race.

This, of course, does not mean that the Italians of Dalmatia should be abandoned entirely to the overwhelming Serbo-Croat element; even though separated in a political sense by hard facts of geography from their parent country, they should be given the most comprehensive guarantees for autonomous national development in any new political and legal arrangements on the Adriatic coast.

The advocates of Adriatic Imperialism, when brought down to hard facts, will end by telling you that reasons of geography and ethnography, of history and of sentiment, only touch the fringe of the question; the essential point

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is that the possession of Dalmatia is necessary to the national existence of Italy, who will never be safe in the Adriatic until that labyrinth of islands and straits of the Dalmatian coast—formerly the haunt of pirates, now the base for submarines and aeroplanes—is in her hands; and that the possession of Dalmatia is necessary to Italy, from the economic as well as the military side, the (Balkan) peninsula being joined to, not separated from, the further coast, by the sea.

IV. *Military and economic reasons.*—We, however—without laying stress on the fact that we are here face to face with that historic process of Imperialism which justifies all fresh acquisitions of territory in the name of the defence of territory already acquired (and it is exactly for this reason that the Germans would wish to retain Poland, even if they relinquished Belgium and Flanders), or, if you like it better, with the even more German principle, “necessity knows no law,” which democracy had utterly condemned in the case of Belgium—we deny that the possession of Dalmatia is necessary to the defence of Italy.

This present war—as all past history, if studied without pre-conceived ideas—proves that the mastery of the Adriatic rests, not upon the possession of the Dalmatian coast, but upon naval superiority; and the barbarous incidents of the bombardment of open towns on the Adriatic by submarines and aircraft do not alter the fact that Austria is just as much blockaded in the Adriatic as is Italy, and that if the latter possessed a sufficient submarine and aerial fleet, she could, if she wished, attack the eastern coast quite as effectively as the Austrians are now attacking the western coast.

Even if, as a mere hypothesis, we admit supreme military reasons of defence in support of the Imperialistic thesis, the necessity for a political annexation of Dalmatia does not follow logically. For purposes of defence, it would be sufficient to have a guarantee that the coast and islands of Dalmatia should not be put to any military purpose, unless, indeed, the idea of the entire neutrality of the Adriatic were adopted, which would be more in accordance with the interests and ideals of a people like the Italians, who base their hopes for the future on work, and not on war. It would have been absurd to demand any such guarantee from Austria, but it might well be included among the fundamental principles of the new Serbian state.

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Even if it were to be admitted that military reasons are as important as economic, it is clear that, when it is a question of constructing those railways between the Adriatic and the Danube which Austria prevented in order to deprive Serbia of every outlet to the sea, the union of Dalmatia to the future Yugoslav kingdom is far more likely to exercise a favourable influence upon intercourse between Italy and the opposite coast than would its union with Italy.

In the event of Italy seizing hold of Dalmatia this intercourse would, in all probability, be limited to the needs of the narrow strip of the Dalmatian coastline and of the poor and lofty plateau which lies behind it; while, in the opposite event, the production, the men, and superior technical capacity of Italy would have free and even favourable access through Dalmatia to the great Serbo-Croat markets (Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia), while Serbian products would find their way to Italy in greater abundance, Serbia herself having every interest in taking advantage of the Adriatic, and thus increasing her trade, especially with the Italian peninsula. To prove the unsubstantial nature of the alleged national reasons of Adriatic Imperialism is equivalent to proving its international injustice, and to proving that it must be rejected by Italy, precisely for those historic and ideal reasons which led Italy to join in the conflict and which may be summed up as the vindication of natural rights and respect for the rights of others. In proving this, however, we have not yet proved the convenience for Italy of the opposite theory, as regards the Adriatic balance of power. In fact, the partisans of the Imperialist view could reply, with an air of triumph, in the words of Signor Marini: "Is it right for the Italians to be more Serbian than the Serbs themselves, from the moment when official Serbia, through the public declaration of its Premier, Mr. Pašić, has recognised explicitly and without reserve Italy's right to the hegemony in the Adriatic?"

Now, though the consideration of mere material gains is not a realist policy but a mere act of shortsightedness (Bismarck, who was certainly not an idealist running after clouds, was never so practical as in the days when, in 1866, he dealt with conquered Austria), it certainly is a real and permanent interest of Italy that the Reforming Socialist party, some of whose members share the responsibility of

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the government, should, without futile reticence, adopt the national programme in the Adriatic question. For purposes of clearness we give this programme here in synthetic form.

The vindication for Italy (of course, in addition to Tridentine Venetia, that is, the Trentino and, if possible, the Upper Adige) of Venetia Julia, at the very least as far as Cape Fianona, the historic and, in some respects, the linguistic frontier of Italy. Political guarantees, for the pacific and autonomous development of Italian centres in Dalmatia and in the islands. Military guarantees for the safety of Italy in the Adriatic, which would be completed by the possession of Valona, the key to that sea. Finally, the constitution of Greater Serbia, that is, of a Jugoslav kingdom from the Danube to the middle Adriatic, which, being sufficiently strong in territory, population and natural resources to follow a policy independent of Russia and Austria-Hungary, would not be dangerous to Italy, but would be linked to her by a fraternity of arms, of aims, and of interests, and might constitute a magnificent field of economic and cultural activity to the mutual benefit of both.

The possible triumph of a rival policy, of the frankly Imperialist policy which we have refuted, would give to Italy not merely half a million Slavs of Venetia Julia (mainly Slovenes, with a Serbo-Croat minority), but also the 600,000 inhabitants of Dalmatia, almost all of whom are Serbo-Croats; in other words, closely linked with the Serbs alike from an ethnical and a geographical point of view. Such a policy, without bringing any other profit save an accession of territory of inferior economic value, would have the following agreeable results for the Italian people:—

I.—The creation within our fatherland of a Serbo-Croat irredentism, all the more odious because it would be supported by the entire Slav world.

II.—Latent hostility towards the new aggrandized Slav state and a perpetual menace to the Adriatic in which Serbia—with Russia behind her, to say nothing of Hungary and Greece—would have every interest in destroying the new balance of power.

III.—The loss, or, at least, the restriction to Italy, even more for psychological than for political and geographical reasons, of that promising Serbo-Croat market which the force of circumstances would open to her across the Adriatic.

After all that we have said, it is no paradox to maintain

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that never was a policy of interest so opposed to one's interests as in the case under discussion, and that never was political Imperialism in national disguise so obviously opposed, alike to the ideals and the interests of a nation.

GENNARO MONDAINI.

This pronouncement was supplemented late in September by the following statement of Signor Bissolati, the Italian Vice-Premier, in the form of an interview in the *Matin*:—

"One of my objects in taking office," he said, "is an understanding with the Southern Slavs. People abroad sometimes fear lest we should not respect their aspirations. The Italian race has suffered too long from oppression to be an aggressor in its turn. We will not give cause for the growth of irredentism against us. We have to accomplish upon the eastern shore of the Adriatic a clear and a noble task. Austria has always stifled the desires and paralysed the trade of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. She induced Europe to allow all their outlets to be blocked. We are going to open these outlets and to put them into communication with Western life. Thus we may create a kind of moral and economic unity in Southern Europe. Our very interest, when we shall have reconquered the Italian provinces and obtained the necessary strategic guarantees, urges us to send traders into the Balkans, to appear there as educators, not as rulers. If Italy is to hold in the world of to-morrow the place which she means to take and to keep, we shall need fraternity between us and France and confidence between us and the Slavs."

But these far-sighted and moderate words evoked an impassioned protest from the Italian "*Pro-Dalmatiâ*" Committee and an onslaught in the *Secolo* by the Triestine refugee, Dr. Attilio Tamaro, upon "the impudence of Yugoslav methods," the "moral misery" and "infamy" of the Yugoslav leaders. His attempt to discredit the Serbo-Croats of the Dual Monarchy as agents of Vienna and enemies of the Entente met with a reply of studied dignity and moderation from the editor of the *Secolo*. The following extract deserves special prominence:—

"Our Nationalists assert that all the Southern Slav Committees working in Europe are instruments of an Austrophil policy. This seems to us a considerable exaggeration, if it is true that against refugee families—including, we suppose, those of Croats and Slovenes—Austria is taking unsparingly her traditional revenge. In 1859 our own people, like Alberto Mario and Rosolino Pilo, were thrown into prison as pro-Austrian; and in the eyes of certain Piedmontese they appeared to be pro-Austrian. But precisely because we possess in our own Risorgimento a history rich in such lessons we are able better than any other people to understand the true character of certain situations. We ought not, in our turn, to arm ourselves with hostile prejudice against manifestations—intemperate to the point of ingenuousness though they may be—of peoples who are awakening to new life. Rather should we smile, with a feeling of convinced superiority,

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at certain transcendental aspirations which only reveal the troubled uncertainty of a national consciousness still in process of formation."

A few days later by a curious coincidence the Chauvinist *Idea Nazionale* of Rome and the Pro-German *Stampa* (Signor Giolitti's organ) both published a similar slander, in the form of a telegram from Geneva, which alleged that the Jugoslavs, having realized the impossibility of forming an independent Jugoslav kingdom, have reverted to the idea of "Trialism" under the Habsburg Crown, and hence are to be regarded as creatures of Vienna. This suggestion, which has been energetically denied by all the Jugoslav leaders at Geneva (including M. Meštrović the sculptor), is interesting as proving the astute methods adopted by German agents in Switzerland and Italy to embroil Italians and Slavs.

One of the greatest obstacles to the spread in Italy of a knowledge of the Southern Slav Question, is the ascendancy hitherto acquired in Italy by Italian political refugees from Austria (especially from Trieste and Dalmatia), and the readiness of Italian public opinion, for obvious sentimental reasons to accept unquestioningly their statements. But *nul n'est censé juge dans sa propre cause*. The Italians of Austria, notwithstanding, and indeed because of, the vigorous struggle which they have waged against the Slavs and from time to time against the authorities themselves, are not in a position to regard the Southern Slav question as a whole on its merits, nor even to judge the interests of Italy broadly. They are, in fact, representatives of what has hitherto been an Austrian nationality, and they have suffered like other Austrian nationalities, from the exasperating and demoralising influence of Austrian rule. We should be surprised if the Italian people at large, which has had the benefit of some 50 years of freedom from Austrian interference, were to suffer their broader and serener view of the question to be influenced unduly by the passionate and necessarily one-sided claims of the Austrian-Italians. Nothing could be more reassuring than the attitude adopted by the *Azione Socialista* and the *Secolo* and approved in many influential quarters in Italy. For our part we decline to be driven from our path of settled friendship and affection for Italy by the manoeuvres of a few irresponsible fanatics.

The Assassination of Count Stürgkh

OVER two years ago a pistol shot from the Habsburg Monarchy set a light to the powder magazine of Europe, and though a specious attempt was made to cast the blame upon Serbia, no one who has studied the long policy of deliberate misrule and oppression maintained by Budapest, and in a lesser degree by Vienna, towards the Southern Slavs will be disposed to absolve the statesmen of the Monarchy from a special responsibility for the war. Last Saturday a similar crime has removed the Austrian premier who, weak and insignificant as he may have been, will go down to history as a minor accomplice of Count Tisza, Baron Konrad, Herr von Tschirschky, and Count Forgács, the four central wirepullers of Austria-Hungary. Count Stürgkh was a representative man only in the sense that he had no policy of his own, and stood for that system of half measures and "Fortwursteln" (jogging along) which has brought Austria to the abyss. The descendant of an impoverished noble family of Styria, he began his career as a Liberal in the very Austrian sense of that term, but, thanks to his connections, obtained a position in the Ministry of Education. He eventually retired with a modest pension, but was soon afterwards elected to Parliament in the interest of the great landowners, and became an outspoken Conservative. He had a fair knowledge of the administrative machine, but having no political ideas or aims, he was simply the tool of stronger men, and though personally honest, found himself implicated in many shady governmental intrigues, such as the Galician corruption scandal. His connections with journalism were distasteful to his aristocratic friends, but earned him some esteem in democratic circles. He was in no sense a statesman, but merely a devoted servant of Francis Joseph; he is not the first, and probably will not be the last, to be involved in that monarch's Œdipean tragedy.

There can be no doubt whatever that Dr. Friedrich Adler understood to the full Count Stürgkh's true position as the necessary vacuum in a complicated system of chemical retorts, and hoped that his crime would throw the whole system out of gear. The Austrian official world is already

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proclaiming Dr. Adler as insane, or, at the least, mentally irresponsible, but we need not be deluded by this transparent device. Dr. Adler, whose father is the founder of the great Austrian Social Democratic party and the proprietor of its leading organ, the *Arbeiterzeitung*, is well known in Vienna as a brilliant journalist and as the translator of Carducci's "Odi barbari" and the "Hymn to Satan." During the war he has opposed the attitude of the majority of his Socialist colleagues, and only a few days before the murder published in his monthly paper *Der Kampf* a strong denunciation of the weakness and passivity of such leaders as David and Scheidemann. Having always advocated the extreme Socialist claims of the proletariat, he was indignant at the submissive attitude of his party towards an absolutist government. Count Stürgkh had dismissed the Austrian Parliament in March 1914, and since that date it has never been allowed to meet, though not only the Hungarian and the German, but also the Bulgarian and Turkish Parliaments, have held frequent sessions during the war. This glaring contrast infuriated the minority among the Austrian Socialists, and its leader, Dr. Friedrich Adler, had recently been joined by more veteran leaders such as Mr. Pernerstorffer, in demanding the convocation of parliament. The growing unrest which this change of attitude represented would appear to have strengthened Adler's anarchic mood, and his knowledge of the political intrigues of the last few weeks in Vienna doubtless played its part. Dr. Bilinski (who, as joint Minister of Finance, was responsible for the Bosnian administration at the time of the Archduke's murder), in conjunction with Count Andrassy, the former Hungarian Minister of the Interior, and Baron Sieghart, governor of the powerful *Bodenkreditanstalt* Bank, were conspiring to force Stürgkh to convoke the Reichsrat, not from any love of parliamentary institutions, but to gratify their own personal ambitions. Andrassy, whose periodic visits to the Emperor William have been much commented upon abroad, hopes to become Foreign Minister, while Sieghart, who has already upset more than one Austrian cabinet, seeks to strengthen his hold upon the direction of affairs. Count Stürgkh's resistance was due to fear of the Czechs; yet he went so far as to negotiate with them, only to find that their demands included the release of all

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imprisoned Czech deputies (M. M. Kramař, Klofač and others), freedom of speech and permission for the press to publish all speeches in parliament and in the Delegations. As the Magyars are free to speak in their own parliament and publish full reports even of opposition speeches, it is obvious that Andrassy was working, not *pour les beaux yeux* of the Austrian Parliament, but to remove Count Stürgkh and Baron Burián, and thus eventually to isolate Count Tisza and undermine his position as Hungarian Premier. The Emperor has always yielded to firm pressure, and was preparing to accept the views of Stürgkh's opponents. While approving the convocation of parliament, he was threatening to accentuate still further the reign of terror in Bohemia, which Stürgkh would fain have modified. Dr. Adler's crime must be regarded as a desperate protest against the progressive degeneracy of Austrian public life, and against Austria's whole war policy, based as it is upon absolutism and secret intrigue. As so often in history, the failure of an organised and energetic party to achieve its political ideals for lack of adequate support has ended in a reversion to methods of anarchism. It is still too soon to prophesy whether the incompetent cooks will once more succeed in forcing down the lid upon the seething pot of Austria.

Wanted—A Policy in Greece

IN June we had a policy in Greece, a policy that depended for its success on holding a General Election. The Bulgarian invasion of Eastern and Western Macedonia has put an election out of the question. Venizelos has recognised this. Have we recognised it? Have we a policy at all?

The first point to be faced, not only by a friend of Greece, but by any who think of small nations as ends in themselves, and not as pawns in the international game, is whether it is fair to drag Greece into the war at all. We must recognise that the risks to Greece in joining us are serious, though not so serious as a year ago. If timorousness were King Constantine's only motive in holding back, it must be frankly owned that the ludicrous failure of the Entente to turn to advantage the entry of Rumania into the

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war amply justifies such timorousness. Our only claim to involve Greece is that we are voicing the wishes of the most virile and vigorous elements in Greece, of the men who saved Greece from the slough of the Turkish War of 1897, and who not only cherished a high ideal for its future, but have already done much to realise it. The party leaders of pre-Venizelish Greece, who have come to life again to back the King's policy, have not only proved themselves incompetent to carry through the ideal of a Greater Greece, but do not possess the ideal at all. Just as they felt no thrill when Venizelos aimed at gathering the Greeks of Asia Minor under the Flag, so in their heart of hearts they care not at all for securing the maritime power of Greece by alliance with England and France. If Crete, and the Islands, and Macedonia have to go, so much the easier for them to play the comfortable game of ins and outs in a parochial Athens. It is because the future of Greece lies with Venizelos, that we are justified in asking Greece to take the risk.

What, then, is to be our policy? To acknowledge both Governments and connive at the army deserting in driblets to Venizelos, is a counsel of despair. Incessant pinpricks to the King's Government do Venizelos as little good as they do to us. Two bold lines of action are possible. One is to acknowledge formally the Government of National Defence, to remove our Legations to one of the islands, and to leave Athens and South Greece without petrol and unable to export its currants, to make up its mind whether the game is worth the candle. The other policy is to ostracise the King and 200 or more of his leading supporters for the duration of the war, and to bring the Government of National Defence to Athens under the strictly limited Regency of some member of the Royal House. If such a member can be found, this second policy would be the quickest and most effective.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

The Literature of Pangermanism (I)

IN my former article on "Pangermanism and the Eastern Question" I confined myself to an uncontroversial statement of the chief aims of the Pangerman movement and of the main lines of its historical development. A more complete treatment of the subject, however, would demand some reference to the principal writers and thinkers who have contributed to the formation and growth of that movement.

The literature of Pangermanism is one of enormous proportions. It treats of the past history and the future reorganisation of the whole world; it is tantamount to a philosophy of history and politics, a theory of nations and states, a treatise on the significance and value of man's whole evolution. When the range is so vast and all-embracing, it is not surprising to find that among the chief exponents of Pangermanism there are differences of opinion, not merely upon the details, but also upon the broad principles of policy. In my former article these differences of opinion were necessarily passed over, and only the main substance of the question was retained. The present article will be in the nature of a supplement or a bibliographical index, but only those books will be mentioned which are readily accessible to the general reader.

A general review of the doctrines laid down by the chief leaders of Pangermanism is given in Professor Charles Andler's "Les Origines du Pangermanisme (1800-1888)" and "Le Pangermanisme Continental sous Guillaume II (1888-1914)," 2nd edition, 1915. The Pangermans dealt with include Dietrich von Bülow (1757-1807), Ernst-Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), Friedrich-Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), Friedrich List (1789-1846), Hellmuth von Moltke, Bismarck, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), Paul de Lagarde (1827-1891), Constantin Frantz (1817-1891), and a number of still living writers. M. Andler's method is to give a short account of each author's life and work, and then to expound his leading ideas in detail.

M. Andler correctly begins with the history of Pangermanism in the 18th century. It is noteworthy, however,

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that he fails to mention many of the recognised authorities ; the historian, Justus Möser, for instance, and the philosophers Herder, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Krause, Schopenhauer, and, more recently, von Hartmann and Nietzsche. Richard Wagner and his followers (Herr Houston Chamberlain among them) are also omitted, although their influence in a Pangermanic direction was very strong. It is curious, too, that even in dealing with German philosophy, the author makes no mention of the nationalist school, which represents a considerable body of German philosophic thought. Nor do we find any representatives from the ranks of the more modern nationalists and political economists. The author's range will, no doubt, be extended in the further volumes of this useful series. He will then be able to include such military writers as Klein, Frobenius, and von Bernhardi, and perhaps there will be a chapter devoted to the Pangerman literature of the war.

It must be borne in mind that the authors selected by Professor Andler have not all exerted the same degree of influence upon German thought ; their reputation as political, philosophic or scientific authorities varies very greatly. The most important among them are Treitschke and Lagarde, and, to my mind, Lagarde is the more extreme of the two, and does not yield to Treitschke in influence. He was a Professor of Theology and had an established reputation as an Armenian scholar. His conception of a complete scheme of national reform, based upon a radical change in the educational system, had for its object the regeneration of the German national church. A ruthless critic of the established church, so dead and so ineffectual, he went on to attack the very idea of Protestantism itself, and especially the Pauline theology, and he showed some sympathy, or at least an understanding of Catholicism. Lagarde's style is full of pathos ; but though rugged and even harsh it often reads like a poem in prose. His "Deutsche Schriften," a collection of essays, interpret Pangermanism not only as a political doctrine but as a whole *Weltauschauung*. It may be mentioned that Lagarde's real name was Paul Anton Bötticher, which he altered into Paul de Lagarde, in view of his descent from a French aristocrat.

Treitschke's views were no less pronounced than those of Lagarde, but his thinking is more suggestive of the German

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professor, and his writings are less sensational. His ideas are conveyed by means of a systematic interpretation of German history and politics, and they may be described as the codex of Prussianism. His "German History" includes within its scope a criticism of literature and philosophy, art and science, and while treating the whole field of public life from the strictly Prussian point of view, emphasises the arguments for the complete Prussianisation of Germany.*

Treitschke's interpretation of German history is not to be summarily dismissed as a mere piece of special pleading. The whole course of German history does indeed reveal a marked Pangerman trend, as is well illustrated in Mr. Joseph McCabe's concise study, "The Evolution of Imperialism in German Literature," which appeared in "The Nineteenth Century" for June 1915. It would be no less true to say that the whole conception of geography in Germany is based upon the question of Germany's relationship to the world. A typical school devoted to the study of this Pangerman type of geography is that of C. Ritter, whose propaganda also embraces the study of ethnology, anthropology, and the kindred sciences.

In the same category with Lagarde and Treitschke must be mentioned the name of Constantin Frantz, although the latter was opposed to Bismarck, and, indeed, denounced Bismarckism as Machiavellianism. Frantz belonged to the philosophical school of Schelling. Although his Pangerman doctrines failed to exercise a very far-reaching influence, they found ready devotees in the younger literary circles, and especially among the Wagnerians. The Pangerman policy which he advocated consisted in establishing a federation of three equal groups—Austria, Prussia, and the smaller States welded together into a Central European Empire. It is noteworthy that the latest phase of the war has induced the

* Among English books on Treitschke may be mentioned: (1) *Treitschke; His Life and Work* (1914), which contains his biography by Hausrath, and some of his essays; (2) *Germany, France, Russia, and Islam* (1915); (3) *History of Germany during the Nineteenth Century*, translated by E. and C. Paul (1916); (4) *Politics*, translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, with an introduction by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour (1916); and (5) *The Political Thoughts of H. v. Treitschke*, by H. W. C. Davis (1914). But it is highly significant that Treitschke was hardly "discovered" in England till the war had actually broken out.

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well-known educationalist, Professor Fr. W. Foerster, of Munich, to revert to that policy.

Eckhardt may be mentioned as an exponent of the school of Baltic Germans, who devoted themselves to agitation against Russia. He had an extensive knowledge of Russian affairs and was in close touch with Russian opposition circles and subversive societies. But although his persistent campaign of enlightening public opinion on the Russian danger—extending, as it did, over the years 1870–1900—brought him many eager readers, his writings cannot be said to have created or merited serious attention. His propaganda is now carried on by Theodor Schiemann, Professor of History at Berlin University, whose historical works, including his editions of Russian political and literary writers, have a considerable value in spite of their propagandist trend. During the war he has published numerous articles and pamphlets of distinctly inferior quality. In Berlin he has the reputation of being the Kaiser's confidant.

Paul Dehn is worthy of attention as one of the younger Pangermans, who, in his two works, "Deutschland und Orient" (1884) and "Deutschland nach Osten" (1886–1890), directs the attention of his German public towards the importance of the Near East, while Hasse, Professor at Leipzig University till his death in 1913, in his "Deutsche Politik" (1907), undertakes a thorough and detailed investigation into the whole Pangerman scheme. In dealing with "real-political" arguments he pays especial attention to problems of over-population and emigration. Friedrich Lange, as revealed in his book "Reines Deutschtum" (Pure Germanism, 4th ed., 1904), is also a good specimen of the average Pangerman propagandist. He may be described as an adjutant on the staff of the great Pangerman army. It is the steady work of such men that contributes more than anything else to the volume and strength of the movement

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

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Peace Intrigues

The Russian Government recently issued an emphatic denial of the rumours that Russia was contemplating negotiations for peace. In view of the echo which a recent German press campaign had found in a section of the Russian press, the denial was opportune. The Allied Governments doubtless understand that the Allied peoples are not disposed to have peace made over their heads, or behind their backs, in secret. The only answer that can be given to German intrigues, which, of late, have multiplied exceedingly, is an absolute refusal to countenance them, directly or indirectly. Specious arguments, to the effect that the Allies ought not to leave to Germany the "moral prestige" that may come from being the only belligerent anxious for peace, are extremely dangerous. They reveal a strange inability to comprehend even now the true character of this war. We are fighting for a clean, sound and lasting peace. Between that and the kind of "peace" for which the Germans strive, there can be no compromise.

Rumours have for some time past been afloat in very serious quarters in Washington that the true aims of the British Government are a reversion to the *status quo ante bellum* and a league to enforce peace (the former as pernicious as the latter is admirable). Steps should therefore be taken to make it clear that the recent pronouncements of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith really represent the views of every member of the British Government, and that there is no divergence of opinion among our leaders on so capital a point.

Lord Grey's Speech

Lord Grey's speech to the Foreign Press Association on 23rd October was in reality his first war speech. It was by far his most considerable pronouncement since the speech of 3rd August, 1914, in which, while defending British intervention, he seemed at moments uncertain how the House of Commons would accept his pleading. Since then he has indicated his feelings in various forms—by interviews, authorised statements, introductory remarks at a lecture, and so on; but he has never attempted to lay bare his own mind on the question of peace. A feature common to nearly all his utterances has been his curious reluctance to get away from the diplomatic negotiations that preceded the war and to accept the war as something in itself, a struggle which must be won and settled on such lines as to preclude its recurrence. It was as though his heart were anchored in the last fortnight of July, 1914, and his mind were still seeking the ghost of its former self among the ruins of the somewhat negative abode which he had once inhabited. Last Monday's speech shows that his heart is still anchored there, but that his intelligence is breaking the hawsers which held it and beginning to comprehend, not only that we are at war, but that we must win the war and that victory must have a certain shape and consistency, if it is to be victory indeed. It may be hoped that his diplomacy will henceforth be marked by a constructive war-vigour such as it has sometimes seemed to lack in the past.

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Russian Ministerial Changes.

The appointment of M. Protopopov as Minister of the Interior, the most important post in Russia after that of Prime Minister, has roused more interest than most of the numerous changes that have taken place in the Ministry during the last few months. This is due to the fact, that not only was M. Protopopov Vice-President of the Duma, but also a member of the Progressive Bloc which since last summer has formed a solid opposition against the Government.

At first sight it would appear that the new appointment was a guarantee of an understanding between the Government and the Duma with the object of making internal disputes less acute during the coming session, which has been fixed for the middle of November. This expectation, however, is not justified, if we may judge by the reception given to M. Protopopov in the Liberal press. It is clearly pointed out by papers such as *Rieč* and *Ruskoje Slovo* that as a member of the Progressive Bloc M. Protopopov could only enter the present Cabinet on the understanding that a definite change of policy was contemplated. In other words, the Government that would enjoy the confidence and support of the *bloc* would be one that entertained the idea of internal reforms during the war, or as it is often explained in the Russian press, a Government that would adopt a "political" as opposed to a "practical" programme.

In an interview given to several press representatives soon after his appointment M. Protopopov stated that until he had returned from Headquarters he could not explain his policy in public, but at the same time he let it be clearly understood that as a member of the Government his policy would be that of the "united Government." A statement made by a prominent member of the Cadet party defines the attitude of the Liberals as follows:—"Our attitude towards the present Government has not changed in any way since M. Protopopov joined it. Now that he has become a member of the present Cabinet, the former Vice-President of the Duma has become responsible for the policy of the Government of M. Stürmer, and our attitude towards him will be exactly the same as towards his new colleagues."

Mesopotamia

The *Morning Post* and *Weekly Dispatch* are performing a valuable public service in demanding that Sir O'Moore Creagh, late Commander-in-Chief in India (till March, 1914), should be invited to give evidence before the Mesopotamian Committee, and in hinting at the widespread uneasiness which the refusal to call such important witnesses would arouse throughout the country. The following extracts from the *Weekly Dispatch* of 22nd October provide an excellent survey of the case:—

"We are confident that Sir O'Moore Creagh, so far from fearing any challenge to appear, would welcome it. We believe that the *Morning Post* does not understate the position when it declares that recommendations made by this distinguished general that would have avoided the fiasco that followed were ignored. In Indian circles it has been whispered for months that Sir O'Moore Creagh made recommendations affecting the Indian Army, root and branch.

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" He found an army starved in every department—deficient in guns, in transport, in doctors, in medical stores—and his friends say that, in a series of over a hundred recommendations, he demanded in unequivocal fashion that the deficiencies be made good, the very deficiencies the persistence of which caused so much misery and suffering to the baked troops on the Tigris.

" The inquiry is being held in secret, but the public take it that the following form the main bases of investigation :—

1. Why was the force sent to Mesopotamia inefficiently equipped?
2. Why was it sent hopelessly incapable by reason of its numbers to accomplish an imposing task which was apparently the capture of Bagdad?
3. The force being so badly equipped and so wholly dependent on unreliable river transport, and being obviously too small, why, having accomplished all that could be reasonably expected, was it sent on to Bagdad to inevitable disaster?
4. Who was responsible for the shortage of doctors, transport, hospital ships, and light railways?
5. Who made the mistake of believing that river transport was adequate?

" The Mesopotamian Committee has a great deal to find out, and a ready source of information is Sir O'Moore Creagh. He knows why, when the Indian Army artillery was expanded from four to nine divisions, the number of batteries that served for the four divisions were made to do for the nine divisions. He knows why there were no entrenching tools, and why the administrative services were allowed to sink to the lowest degree of impoverishment.

" He knows why, to be concise, the Indian Army as late as five months before the war was *starved*. Which is all the more reason why General Sir O'Moore Creagh should be summoned before the Committee without further delay."

This suggestion, if pressed in a calm and impersonal manner, is so unexceptionable, and so obviously in the public interest, that it is difficult to believe that it will not be complied with forthwith by the proper authorities.

The Old France and the New

The wonderful spirit which inspires not merely the French army but also its political leaders is reflected in the eloquent words of M. Briand, spoken in a private circle of friends and quoted by the *Westminster Gazette* of 17th October. " Not daring to think of war," he said, " we were in a state of moral disorder and anger under incessant German provocations. We were bruised, and the world did not appreciate our worth. Our attitude was not in our favour because it was not really ours. The day when France showed, by unheard-of heroism, that she meant to *shake off the obsession of defeat*, all nations recognised their mistake, and the prestige of France has again become extraordinary; in fact, it has never been greater. We have regained all our influence and all our persuasiveness. This result is definite and nothing can now affect it. It is the moral work of two years, and the consequences for all of us will be incalculable. The com-

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pletion of the work and its crowning by victory are well worth the time and patience which we must devote to it. If victory is difficult it is because of its extent, and of what we have to do against the enemy in order to make it complete; for everything henceforth depends upon it—free life, fortune, social reforms, and a republic undisputed and powerful.”

Even more significant—in view of the false hopes aroused in certain neutral quarters by German hints—is the language of the great French Socialist organ, *L'Humanité*, whose reply to the Reichstag Social Democrats has a fine ring of conviction in it: “If you wish to give France back to the French, you must begin by giving us back Alsace-Lorraine. The territories invaded forty-four years ago, as well as those invaded two years ago, must be restored; for this war has re-established the traditions interrupted by the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871. No French Socialist has forgotten the maxims laid down by the convention during the Revolution, that you cannot treat with an enemy who occupies your territory, for the pledges he holds would be trump cards in his hands. Finally, all French Socialists, while they will not consent to transforming a war of defence into a war of conquest, are fully resolved to exact from Germany every guarantee that may be required to prevent her from committing again the abomination which she has brought upon the world.”

“Serbia does not Exist”

The long series of futile Bulgarophil intrigues which have weakened the Entente's prestige and diplomatic prospects during the past year, and of which (we trust and believe) the final incident has been the tragic fiasco of the Dobrudgea, was based upon the altogether false assumption that Bulgaria's sole motive for joining the Central group was the acquisition of Macedonia. In reality she was prompted by four further aims: first, to prevent Russia from acquiring Constantinople; second, to secure a common frontier with Hungary; third, to erase Serbia from the list of the nations; and, fourth, to establish a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. An interesting sidelight was thrown upon the third of these aims when last spring the Bulgarian Premier formally took possession of the Serbian Legation in Sofia, and met the protests of the diplomatic corps with the reply that Serbia had ceased to exist. Yet another proof that this represents the settled policy of Bulgaria is supplied by the recent official answer of the Bulgarian Red Cross to the International Committee in Geneva. This answer contains a blunt refusal to recognise the existence of the Serbian Red Cross, because “the Serbs will henceforth be our subjects, whom we shall have to take care of ourselves.” Meanwhile, throughout the Serbian territory in Bulgar occupation, all young men of military age are being enrolled as recruits for the Bulgarian army. This gross violation of international law far outdoes even the methods of forced labour employed by the Germans in Belgium. But Serbia, which has survived centuries of the blood tax and the Janissary system, will also survive the passing tyranny of her apostate neighbours.

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

The New Europe

VOL. I, No. 3.

November 2, 1916

Britain and the Spirit of France

THE latest deeds of the French at Verdun have kindled anew our admiration of France. The artistic completeness of the stroke by which our Allies recovered, in an afternoon, most of the positions won by the Germans on the east bank of the Meuse in eight months of bitter fighting, appealed to our sense of fitness as no plodding, strenuous action could have done. "Wonderful fellows, the French," "The French are superb," was exclaimed on every hand. People seemed to have thought that France was losing her resilience; that the wonders worked by her soldiers in this war were at an end; that her reserves were exhausted; and that, while the British were bearing the main burden of the fighting on the Somme, France might perhaps keep pace with us, but could not be expected to rival in future the deeds of her recent past. The growth of our own military effort had perhaps led us to concentrate attention too exclusively upon it. Such a reminder as that of the latest Verdun victory helps to restore our perspective. The war has indeed changed our whole attitude towards France and the French. The reception recently given by the people of London to the band of the Garde Républicaine revealed something of the deep affection felt for France by the masses of our population; but, as a nation, we are still far from understanding the French spirit and from realising its inexhaustible potentialities.

Soon after the beginning of the war a French writer of international repute, with more than average knowledge of this country, said to me: "This terrible war has had at least one good effect. We, France and England, are now allied, bound, riveted together, I hope for ever; for we are mutually indispensable—and incomprehensible." We are mutually incomprehensible; but incomprehensibility is often the basis of faith. No effort to explain the French to the English, or, indeed, the English to the French, can ever quite succeed. A small minority in each country may perhaps understand the other thoroughly. The two peoples themselves will, perforce, have to be satisfied with admiring and respecting what

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they cannot understand. Experience and long comradeship in arms should teach each nation to open a long credit for the other, and to accumulate a reserve fund of mutual confidence. The few on each side of the Channel who know and understand must endeavour faithfully to administer the fund as the unofficial trustees of their respective peoples.

The differences between the French and British characters are at once temperamental and intellectual. In a rash attempt to achieve the impossible—that is, to render the British character intelligible to a French audience—I said, in a lecture at Paris on “England and the War,” some eighteen months ago: “The Englishman is, above all, a creature of instinct. He distrusts ideas. He has a horror of logic. Show him, by faultless reasoning, that he ought to do this or that, and he will revolt. An instinct deeper than reason tells him that life itself is not logical; that it is compounded of energy, often blind, of which the springs lie beneath what psychologists call the ‘threshold of consciousness.’ In normal times a clear vision of national needs is rare in England. On the other hand, a practical sense of individual necessities, and a yearning for activity which sometimes finds expression in a spirit of adventure, is common to most Britons. . . . Close observation shows that, in England, there is often a flagrant contradiction between the professed views of a man and his conduct. He lives in the purest inconsistency, but does not perceive it. Here we touch the bottom of the question. We are at the source of what is called British ‘hypocrisy’ or ‘perfidy.’ When an Englishman first hears his country accused of perfidy or hypocrisy, his astonishment is equalled only by his conviction that the charge is made in ignorance or bad faith. I have come to the conclusion that the great majority of my fellow-countrymen are never, or hardly ever, perfidious or hypocritical, but are almost always inconsistent. Now, inconsistency is not hypocrisy, unless it be conscious. Between the two divisions of the British mind, that which contains views or ideas and that from which fundamental impulses proceed, there is something like a watertight compartment. What an Englishman may say in a condition of normal tranquillity gives no clue to what he will do at a moment of individual or national crisis. Then it is that he reveals himself, that he finds his real temperament, that he speaks little, and acts. Now he is beginning to act.”

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I do not propose to push rashness to the point of folly by trying to find a formula wide enough to encompass the many diversities of the French character, and yet sufficiently precise to convey a general idea of its fundamental qualities. In speaking of the British spirit, or rather of the British temperament, an Englishman has always his own instinct to guide him, if he be introspective enough to have analysed his own feelings and to have defined them in words. But for an Englishman to feel like a Frenchman is well-nigh impossible. However deeply he may be saturated with French culture, however cognizant of French history and traditions, he cannot fully acquire the French instinct, which, in its way, is as profound as that of the Briton. He can only divine the direction of the French instinct by observing its outward manifestations, and by forming an average judgment upon a number of concrete instances. Thus it may be said that the French instinct tends towards symmetry, towards logic, or rather, consistency of thought and conduct. The Frenchman has a tidy mind, impatient of loose ends of sentiment or ideas. In him the distance between intellection and volition is probably shorter than in any other civilized human being. An Englishman may appreciate and mentally assent to a view, proposition or idea, but it does not, therefore, act dynamically upon him. The clutch does not work at once. With Frenchmen, thought finds much more quickly and effectively its corollary in action. Hence, in some respects, French superiority to us; hence, in other respects, their practical inferiority. They are apt, as Renan truly said of them, "to attain to clearness by defect of vision," and to act upon what they see without allowing as much margin for the unforeseen as the Englishman would do. Yet no formula or analysis can adequately describe the qualities or the defects of their spirit. Englishmen can only hope to gain knowledge of that spirit by experience; and the wider and longer the range of their experience, the more chary will they be of expressing definite conclusions.

My own experience of France dates back to 1893. I went to France from Germany, after a period of hard study in two German universities. I had "solved the problem of the universe" in accordance with the latest results of German eclectic philosophy. From Leibnitz to Schopenhauer I had culled the flowers of German thought, and felt confident that

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no moral or philosophical riddle would be too hard for me to read. Thus equipped, I plunged headlong into the vortex of French thought—formed by the most limpid intellectual stream in the world—that runs between the Sorbonne and the École Normale Supérieure of the rue d'Ulm. Not without a certain sense of ponderous superiority, I listened to and joined in the discussions of French professors and students. They seemed at first sight so superficial, so careless of the systematic schemes of thought in accordance with which the Germans map out their intellectual universe and determine their *Weltanschauung*. Then, little by little, the solid ground on which I thought I stood became less firm. My French acquaintances—whom my German concepts seemed vastly to amuse—undermined one by one the corner-stones of my solid, German-built edifice, and riddled with the shafts of their wit its formidable walls. Gradually it dawned upon me that they knew all that I knew, but knew it better; that they had seen through all the pomposities of German philosophical nomenclature; that the rays of their clear minds had penetrated every dark corner of the German mind, and dispelled the mists that lurk there. In a few months my own mind was systemless, and encumbered with *débris*.

Then began the process of reconstruction, or, rather, of growth. My French friends helped to clear the ground and to till it. Englishmen are usually silent about the deep things of life. Frenchmen often surround them with a veil of light mockery that screens quite as effectually their inward reverence for them. The hardest thing for an Englishman to understand in the French spirit is its passionate attachment to what it holds to be true and real, and, at the same time, its apparent irreverence towards things of which Englishmen speak with bated breath. As Mr. Clutton Brock, one of our clearest seers, wrote, in his admirable essay on France (which was officially translated and read aloud in all the schools in Paris), it is no accident which has, once again, made France the guardian nation and chief treasury of all which the conscious barbarism of Germany would destroy. The Germans, he added, know that while France stands unbroken, there is a spirit in her that will make their matter seem unlovely. "They know that in her, as in Athens long ago, thought remains passionate and disinterested and free. Their thought is German, and exercised

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for German ends, like their army; but hers can forget France in the universe, and, for that reason, her armies and ours will fight for it as if the universe were at stake. Many forms has that thought taken, passing through disguises and errors, mocking at itself, mocking at the holiest things; and yet there has always been the holiness of freedom in it. The French blasphemer has never blasphemed against the idea of truth, even when he mistook falsehood for it. In the Terror he said there was no God, because he believed there was none, but he never said that France was God, so that he might encourage her to conquer the world. Voltaire was an imp of destruction perhaps, but with what a divine lightning of laughter would he have struck the Teutonic Antichrist, and how the everlasting soul of France would have risen in him if he could have seen her most sacred Church, the visible sign of her Faith and her genius, ruined by the German guns. Was there ever a stupidity so worthy of his scorn as this attempt to bombard the spirit? For, though the temple is ruined, the faith remains; and, whatever war the Germans may make upon the glory of the past, it is the glory of the future that France fights for."

Compare this analysis of the French spirit with a speech delivered by the President of the French Chamber, M. Paul Deschanel, on October 25, at the annual public meeting of the Five Academies of France. Strong points of resemblance between them will be found.

"Never has the French family been more at one. Frenchmen trod different roads, but have met at the summit. Theirs was an equal devotion to the same ideal. The heroes who brave death know that before expiring, their life, a passing flame, kindles another flame, immortal. And the enemy knows not that what tore us asunder is what now unites us—a passion for the right. France of St. Louis, of Jeanne d'Arc, of St. Vincent de Paul, of Pascal; France of Rabelais, of Descartes, of Molière, of Voltaire; France of the Crusades, and France of the Revolution—all are sacred to us, and her sons are equal in our hearts as they are equal in the face of danger. . . . The same spirit must guide us in the religious question. Let us expel from the language those old words, made for old ideas: 'Intolerance,' 'tolerance.' What! are we to 'tolerate' each other, to put up with one another? Are we to give pain to each other? It is not tolerance that we need, but respect. Thought that

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respects not faith is not thought that is truly free; and beliefs that infringe liberty lose their power instead of increasing it. Whosoever despises religious forces, risks making in politics strange blunders; and whosoever attempts to impose a religion upon others alters its nature. . . . We have to undertake a new crusade, for which all our strength must be mobilized. It is a contest between the German and the French spirit, of which the one aims at dominating or absorbing national consciences, while the other seeks to ensure the free development of each national genius and regards civilization as the collective work of little peoples and of great. The German dream of spiritual dictatorship will share the fate of other dreams of universal mastery. In past centuries the greatest empires have collapsed like gigantic monuments unable to bear their own weight. Now, **once again**, the public right of Europe will be avenged. Force is to Right what the body is to the spirit. Life runs through the body, but it is thought that governs."

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to thorough sympathy with the spirit of France on the part of Englishmen is the inveterate British tendency—a relic of Puritanism—to attribute intrinsic moral value to things which in French eyes have little or none. It is this that causes Frenchmen to scoff at the sanctimonious unctuousness into which so many Englishmen unconsciously fall. It is this, in part, that has helped to gain for us our national reputation for cant. Frenchmen do not understand what they call our "Protestant prejudices." In so far as they are outwardly religious, their religion is derived mainly from the New Testament, whereas the religious concepts of the Briton are chiefly derived from the Old Testament. No Frenchman could have written Kipling's "Recessional"; few even can understand it or fathom its allusive depth. Their minds do not resound with the sonorous tones of the Hebrew Prophets. Agreement and such measure of mutual comprehension as may be attainable between France and England will spring from French readiness to recognise the sincerity of British forms of feeling and thought, and from British readiness to admit that France, though "other" than England, is no less moral and no less sincere.

This agreement is far easier to-day, and should be still easier after the war, than it was twenty, ten, or even three years ago. Before the war, we talked and wrote much of

BRITAIN AND THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE

"The New France." There was no "New France." It was the old France emerging from the depression of defeat, and revealing once more her true quality to a forgetful or ignorant world. In 1870, Germany not only inflicted upon France a military defeat, but printed the stamp of "success" upon the whole stock-in-trade of uncouth materialistic ideas which she proceeded to dump upon the world. England, in particular, became the prey of Germanism. It permeated our Court, our thought, our public life, our music and our philosophy to the exclusion of the cleaner, saner genius of France. All that is least German in us is most akin to France—but that part of our natures had been branded with the stigma of defeat and could no longer be advertised. Even in France the same process went on. After the first shock and resentment of defeat had passed, young Frenchmen were taught to look to Germany as to the source of all knowledge and the home of scientific method. Most Frenchmen of forty now realise that their youth was "une jeunesse de vaincu." Then came the reaction, or, rather, the realisation that Germany was not intrinsically superior to France, either in ideas, in science, in vigour, or necessarily in military quality. When the history of modern France is written, it may be found that developments like the introduction of the petrol motor, with its sequel in automobilism and aviation, first reminded Frenchmen of their own powers, restored their self-confidence, and began to regain for them the place in the esteem of the world of which they ought never to have been deprived. The growth of athletics and the revival of physical education followed. To those who knew France, even in the days of her dejection, these manifestations did but confirm their own faith in her. When war broke out, they knew that France would triumph or would perish utterly. They knew also that the place of England was by the side of France, and that Germanism was the implacable foe of both. They were not sure that France would not perish, but they knew she would fight as never nation had fought; that if she could not conquer, she would die nobly, and that a great light would then have been extinguished in the world.

What France has done needs no recapitulation. How her sons and daughters, of all parties and creeds, have joined in a *Union Sacrée* to repel the foe need not again be told. How she has fought and will fight needs no eulogy.

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She has suffered grievously but will yet astonish the world by her powers of recuperation. The old indomitable spirit of the Crusades is in her—that of the *Gesta Dei per Francos*. The France of to-morrow will appear other than the France the world thought it knew before the war. The difference will be not one of quality but of consciousness of strength—the difference between a convalescent singer, not quite sure whether the old notes will still sound firm and clear, and a singer whom success has taught to rely upon his fullest tones. The perpetual menace of German aggression will be removed, the fear of isolation will be gone, and yet the memory of the suffering and loss through which redemption will have been achieved, will restrain for ever any wild cult of mere glory. Nations, like men, who have fought for their lives and have come living, though scarred, out of the fray, do not easily rid themselves of the half-wondering, half-reverent thought that a false step or ill-fortune might have laid them low, and are in no mood rashly to tempt Providence. France will be pacific and resolute. Neither in France nor in England is victory likely to intoxicate. Rather should it engender a resolve never again to stray so near to the verge of the abyss. Both in England and in France, the work of reconstruction should absorb all energies; and in peace, as in war, the two nations will need to go hand in hand, learning from, helping and respecting each other. England, indeed the whole British Commonwealth, will be under a perpetual obligation to France which it can scarcely hope and will hardly wish to repay. To the gallant spirit of France and to her tenacity in withstanding a foe crushingly superior in military preparedness, we owe it that we were given time to make ready in our turn, and to lend France the aid that has averted her and our own undoing. If ever we are tempted to glory in our achievements on land and sea, let us remember what France did for us, and be thankfully humble. Among the many debts which the war will leave us, this will be the lightest and the most salutary. It will be a perennial reminder of the supremacy of the spirit over the material and a constant check upon the worship of false gods.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

French Opinion and the Austrian Question

DURING the last year French public opinion has undergone a great change. At the beginning of the present year the eyes of the French people were still fixed on Germany, in whom they saw their main enemy, and whose destruction was the first task to be accomplished. The events of the war have shown that even though, in a sense, this was true, nevertheless, it gave a wrong focus to the truth. It was demonstrated that Germany's attack was directed not so much against the West as against the East; that she crushed Serbia in order to reach Turkey, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Egypt. Furthermore, it has been shown that, in order to carry out this plan, Germany had an absolute need of Austria-Hungary, whose political control she took great pains to acquire. Gradually the conviction began to gain ground that the purpose of this war could not be the destruction, but rather the weakening, of Germany by crushing her militarism, and that this would only be possible by depriving her of the support gained from her Allies, and especially from Austria-Hungary.

The first article containing ideas of this kind was published last February in the *Matin*, and from that time it has repeatedly been pointed out in great detail how Germany, step by step, has gained control of Austria-Hungary, and how Germanization and terrorism now reign supreme. When in June 1916 Russia began her new offensive, everybody saw clearly that the defeat of Germany would come from the East, and that the more completely Austria-Hungary was crushed, the greater would be her German taskmaster's defeat. This development of French thought reached its high-water mark quite recently, when the French press openly discussed the question of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and displayed an increasing interest in the complicated problems involved. This press campaign was caused mainly by the successes of General Brusilov and by the Austro-Hungarian defeat on the Isonzo front. Rumours as to the possibility of Roumania's intervention on the side of the Allies also compelled the French press to give serious thought to the fate of Austria-Hungary. This was only natural in view of the obvious facts that the Dual Monarchy is at war with four neighbours, each of whom desires to tear off a

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considerable part of her territory, and that a decisive victory on the part of the Allied Powers will inevitably involve dismemberment. Almost all the influential French papers took part in this press discussion: the *Temps*, *Journal des Débats*, *Matin*, *Petit Parisien*, *Figaro*, *Journal*, *Petit Journal*, *Rappel*, *Radical*, *Œuvre*, *Événement*, *Information*, *Paris-Midi*, *Eveil*, *Croix*, *Echo de Paris*, *Action Française*, *Victoire*, *Dépêche de Toulouse*, *Bataille*, *Progrès de Lyon*, etc. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that in this war Austria-Hungary has always been defeated, and that it is only the help of Germany which has enabled her to carry on the struggle. From time to time reference was made to the "vitality" shown by Austria-Hungary, in complete oblivion of the notorious fact that, for more than a year, she has been politically and militarily in the hands of Prussia, and that the vitality shown was Prussian violence and militarism, not the political organism known as the Dual Monarchy.

Great stress was also laid on the fact that Austria-Hungary was the cause of this war, and had provoked it by a system of terrorism, persecution, and violence, creating a unique record in the twentieth century. France and the outside world learned almost for the first time the true meaning of the notorious Agram Treason and Friedjung trials, and of the more recent political trials of Serb and Croat leaders in Sarajevo and Banjaluka, of the Czech leader, Dr. Kramář, and of the Czech National Socialists, and, finally, of the execution of the Italian patriot, Battisti. They began to realise why the Austrian Parliament is not allowed to meet, why the Czech countries have been subjected to a veritable reign of terror, and why the Czech soldiers have surrendered in thousands, and the Czech population at home is in a state bordering upon revolt, though, of course, rendered impotent by the withdrawal of its man power.

Finally, these discussions brought the problem of "Central Europe" into due prominence. To-day, the French press fully understands the Pangerman plan, the rôle played by Austria-Hungary in German designs upon south-eastern Europe, northern Africa, Asia Minor and Central Asia, the absolute control exercised by Prussia, and the uselessness of expecting a breach between Vienna and Berlin. The rôle of the Magyars in this war was also made clear in a number of articles. They wanted war, they needed it for the fulfilment of their Chauvinistic designs. Their responsibility was

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greater than that of Austria, and, indeed, they had gained control of Vienna, and shared with Berlin the conduct of the war. The press became convinced that the Magyar opposition, led by Count Károlyi, was a manœuvre organised to delude public opinion in the Allied countries, and to prevent the disruption of their country in the event of defeat.

The direction in which French opinion has moved during the last year may be illustrated by the following quotation from the *Temps*: "We are liable to be misled by the statement that exhausted Austria should be detached from beleaguered Germany. There are people who are led astray by such a statement, but we believe them to be mistaken. If Austria's end has come, it is better to defeat her completely than to patch her up. What has become of her political independence, always a doubtful quantity, and to-day non-existent? What is the Austrian Government in reality? Is it in Berlin? To save Austria in order to strike a blow at Germany would be to deceive ourselves absolutely. To reach Germany by destroying Austria—that is the proper way." Similar sentiments were expressed by M. Joseph Reinach ("Polybe") in the *Figaro*.

It is necessary to note a fact of considerable importance in the orientation of the French public in this press campaign. On the 7th September, 1916, the Russian Cadet leader, M. Miljukov, who enjoys great popularity in French political and journalistic circles, granted an interview to the *Journal*, in which he explained the Pangerman plan and the aims of Germany regarding Central Europe, Turkey and Egypt, and concluded with the remark that the only means of destroying these plans was to put an end to Austria-Hungary and to form a series of national States on the eastern frontier of Germany. He laid particular emphasis on the fact that the German provinces of Austria might constitute, if opportunity arose, a small independent State, and that there would be no great objection if after the war that State should enter into a closer union with Germany.

This interview produced a great sensation in the French press; in particular, the successor of Jaurès, as leader of the Socialist party, M. Renaudel, who, in the official newspaper of the party, *L'Humanité*, declared emphatically that his party could not but adhere to the programme laid down by M. Miljukov, and specially welcomed his solution of the question of the German provinces of Austria. It was the

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first time that an official personage of the party had explained himself so clearly on the attitude of his party concerning the Austro-Hungarian question. We may thus regard the French Socialist party as having been gained over to the idea of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. Nor must we forget the articles of M. Stephen Pichon, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his own organ, *Le Petit Journal*, in which he expressed himself forcibly against Austria-Hungary, notably on the occasion of Battisti's execution and the sentence of death passed on the Czech deputy, Dr. Kramař. It may also be noted how materially the French-Swiss press has contributed to the elucidation of these questions. For some time past the two great papers of French Switzerland, the *Journal de Genève* and the *Gazette de Lausanne* have treated the Austro-Hungarian question in the same sense as the French press. The peculiar political position of Switzerland presents some analogies to that of Austria-Hungary, and, consequently, a certain number of Swiss advocates of the latter are to be found; but this fact only serves to emphasize the outspoken attitude of two such prominent publicists as M. Maurice Miret, of the *Gazette de Lausanne*, and M. Albert Bonnard, of the *Journal de Genève*, which, as neutral papers, have greatly gained in importance during the war.

The attitude of all the leading Italian newspapers on this question—notably *Tribuna*, *Giornale d'Italia* and *Corriere della Sera*, *Perseveranza*, *Secolo*, *Messaggero*, *Idea Nazionale*, and *Popolo d'Italia*—is also of great importance, not merely because they also accept this point of view and endeavour to bring home to their readers the meaning of the Austrian and "Central European" problems, but also because their attitude made a great impression in France. It is certainly not without significance that political writers of such distinction as André Tardieu, Joseph Reinach, A. Gauvain, Pierre Mille, G. Marsac, A. Milhaud, Jules Destrée, Paul Margueritte, G. Hervé, Louis Léger, Paul Adam, Frédéric Masson, Stephen Pichon, Edouard Herriot and many others should have openly declared themselves in favour of the disruption of Austria-Hungary.

It is interesting to note that only two French newspapers have taken up the cudgels for Austria-Hungary—the *Action*

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Française (Jacques Bainville and Charles Maurras) and the *Echo de Paris* (Jean Herbette). Their chief motive, none the less real because not openly avowed, is the belief that, in supporting Austria-Hungary they are rendering a service to the Catholic Church. The reasons which they actually put forward are *French* interests, formulated in such a way as to coincide with those expressed by non-Catholic journalists. But their whole attitude throws an interesting light upon the motives and apprehensions which tempt certain people in France to think of saving Austria-Hungary.

Foremost stands the fear of what will happen to the Austrian Germans. Their inclusion in Germany, it is argued, would involve a dangerous accession of strength, and cannot, therefore, be allowed. According to this view, Austria's fate is to depend upon that of the Austrian Germans. But the whole calculation is based upon error, for while it is perfectly true that the number of Germans in Austria amounts to 10-11 millions, it is not realised that in the provinces which would fall to Germany in the event of partition there are not more than six or at most seven million Germans.

Another objection raised by these writers is that the disruption of Austria will involve the creation of a number of small States in Central Europe which cannot hope to be strong enough to offer a successful resistance to the German "Drang nach Osten" in the future. They further express doubts as to whether these small States, and especially the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, can really be counted upon to oppose Germany. M. Herbette is of opinion that a strong Austria should be created by adding to her the south German States, this strong (Catholic) State being a good counterbalance to (Protestant) Prussia. In other words he believes in the opposition of the south Germans to the north Germans, but refuses to believe in the opposition of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs to the Germans! He does not believe that the new Bohemian State, with its 12 million inhabitants, supported by Russian Poland, would be a sufficient counterbalance to Germany. Yet Poland alone would have a population of 22 millions, and, with the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, a population of 45 millions.

But M. Herbette and those who accept his point of view have lost sight of an extremely important phase of the problem. Even if Germany were split into two halves, its

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previous economic development and its future requirements would render economic reunion and consequent political unification absolutely inevitable. Identity of interests are already rapidly destroying the old rivalry. The work of railways, canals and close financial co-operation can no longer be undone, and all that is left to Germany's opponents is to prevent an extension of the same system to Austria and Hungary. It is surprising that an exclusive attention to the supposed interests of Catholicism should have blinded journalists of such repute to the significance of the economic factors in the Austrian problem. Austria is completely dominated by two races—the Germans and the Magyars—and, in the event of Germany's victory, cannot hope to escape incorporation in the Germanic economic system. Only national States constructed on an anti-German basis could resist this economic pressure.

These are the sole arguments which have been adduced against the dismemberment of Austria, while their refutation has been accompanied by concrete proposals. "Polybe" favours the creation of a neutral Austro-German State between Italy and Germany. M. Albert Milhaud and others admit the possibility of such a solution, but hold that even the union of the 6-7 millions Austrian Germans to Germany would not be dangerous after Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish districts had been taken away from Germany.

Meanwhile a number of writers understood the real reasons underlying the defence of Austria, and did not fail to answer. The academician, M. Frédéric Masson, pointed out in *Les Annales* the baneful influence of Austria upon the Church, and the fact that the Vatican, by supporting Austria, and gaining a few millions of German Catholics, risked the loss of an infinitely greater number of Slav Catholics. It is also characteristic that the author of this answer is a regular contributor of the *Echo de Paris*, and that, in the same paper, another well-known Catholic author, M. Daudet, opposed the Magyars, and declared that it was too late to save Austria. The well-known clerical organ, *La Croix*, took part in the discussion, and, in a number of strongly worded articles, demanded the destruction of Austria; while the *Journal des Débats*, which speaks for moderate Catholicism, is fighting resolutely against Austria, and its distinguished foreign editor, M. Auguste Gauvain, in the *Revue Hebdoma-*

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daire, refuted the view that it was to the interests of the Church and Catholicism to preserve Austria.

These discussions have shown that the great majority of French journals and the leading French publicists have grasped the problem in its true international bearings, and remained entirely unimpressed by the attempts to re-kindle the flickering flame of sympathy for Austria. It is most regrettable that no attempt has hitherto been made to inform public opinion in this country as to the attitude of our Allies on what is, beyond all question, the most vital political problem of the war.

Russia and the Yugoslav Idea

Last week the Southern Slav question was dealt with from the British and Italian standpoints: but the discussion of any Slavonic problem without reference to Russian opinion resembles a performance of Hamlet without the Prince. We therefore think it well to add the following article of Mr. V. Kovalevsky, a member of the Russian Council of State, and a former Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, who as President of the Russo-Serbian Society in Petrograd is fully qualified to voice the feelings of his countrymen.

“THE present war is killing war.” This aphorism is heard on all lips—so overpowering is the impression of the suffering and horror of the epoch through which we are passing. The mind refuses to believe the evidence of facts. Millions of human lives—genius, science, art, technical achievement, wealth, cultivated soil—all has been offered up as a sacrifice to the war. Germany and her companions have perpetrated a crime without precedent; in some men’s minds it has shaken their faith in the moral perfectibility of mankind and filled them with apprehension for the future, while in others it has roused a fanatical belief that there will be no more wars, or, at least, that they will never again be waged in so barbarous a fashion.

Yet the cause of this, and of many another, war is rooted deeply in a mass of historic transgressions against intelligence and justice. The present war is merely a natural and logical consequence. It broke out upon the world like a scourge of God—like God’s own thunderstorm. The electric force in the life of nations had been stored up by the long historic process, and the present war is nothing but its most

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tragic discharge. This was not a war to be averted either by the dazzling outward form and display of proved civilisation nor by pacifist exhortations; by congresses and conferences for the prevention of war, nor by the provision and guarantees of "equilibrium." Deception and mutual distrust in international relations, the artificiality of the frontiers of empires, the oppressed condition of nations languishing under a foreign yoke, the continued existence of such preposterous empires as Austria and of Turkey, in whose possession are the Holy Places of Christendom unto this day—one more wrong among many wrongs—all these are deemed more important than the noble problem of the true pacification of the world.

Germany for her crimes, Austria-Hungary for her baseness and servility, Bulgaria for her treachery, and Turkey for her folly—all must meet with condign punishment. "The liquidation of the war" must, however, lead on to a profounder and wider problem—the removal of the possibility of a repetition of war in the future, so far as this lies within the scope of human foresight. The past has accumulated so much explosive matter, has tied so many tangled knots, that only a sanguinary conflagration could sever; and the sword may yet be invoked again if the present war should fail to eliminate, once and for all, the principal causes of armed collisions, and to do away with historic falsehoods. From this point of view the present vast and cruel war appears not only as a punishment, but also as an expiation.

At present the cry that rings through the Allied world must be: "All for the War for the sake of Victory!" But soon it will have to be replaced by that other cry: "All for Peace, and for the prevention of War"—a durable peace which will preclude the possibility of a repetition of these murderous hecatombs. But if the future map of Europe is based upon improvidence, injustice and prejudice, the peaceable dwelling side by side of the nations will soon become impossible, the hopes of the oppressed will be deceived, and thence will arise new complications and collisions.

The vast and responsible task of such a rebuilding calls for much wisdom, goodwill, moral effort and acumen from those with whom the decision will rest at the Congress of Peace. Its character will be determined by the ethical

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standard of those nations whose voice will be decisive. Of course, in their decision they will take into consideration the lessons of the past and the teachings of the war. Obviously, all efforts must be directed toward the prevention of armed conflicts. And this applies as much to their abolition or limitation as to the possibility of their recurrence or repetition.

As a Russian and Slav, I am primarily interested in what Russia and the Slav world will receive in compensation for all their sufferings and sacrifices for the common cause. For my country the war must provide satisfactory solutions for, at least, the following over-ripe political questions, viz., the possession of the Straits and Constantinople, together with the territories adjacent to both shores of the Straits; the incorporation with Russia of the Little Russian (Ruthene) population in Galicia, Hungary, and the Bukovina, and the transference of Armenia to Russian rule. Poland must be re-united and, while forming part of the Russian Empire, must enjoy an autonomous existence with privileges on the broadest possible basis.

As the fundamental and guiding principle in the programme of the Allies, the *principle of nationality* ought to be carried through strictly, without compromises and concessions to the world-famed "Realpolitik." The direct effect of this will be the complete elimination from the map of Europe of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which, at present, constitutes an even greater political, geographical and ethical anomaly than the Turkish Empire (which, after this war, must be reduced strictly to its ethnographical boundaries). The elimination of Austria-Hungary is dictated not only by the necessity for liberating and providing for the vital needs of certain oppressed nationalities (Slavs, Roumanians, Italians), but also by the necessity for weakening Germany, and as a guarantee for future peace. The Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—together with the Serbs proper and Montenegrins, must form one single, autonomous State, just as the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, with the Slovaks, must likewise constitute a new political unit.

The history of the Southern Slavs is highly instructive. It is a history of age-long struggles waged by a heroic and highly-gifted race for the right to live in freedom upon

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earth; a history of the age-long vivisection of the national body by States possessing a greater and (with the exception of the Turks) a more advanced civilization. There is not another nation which, in the name of "justice," has been treated to so much injustice and derision; no other nation has been, to an equal extent, the subject of diplomatic intrigue and political experiment. On its crushed and mutilated body treaties of peace were built up, and the evil game of "equilibrium" was played. The Congresses of Vienna and Berlin are deplorable monuments of this kind of policy. By main force Bismarck, in 1878, robbed Russia of the fruits of her victory, and only to-day the bitter consequences of that high-handed proceeding have opened the eyes of the western world to the fatal mistakes of the past.

The present war is a call to destroy these monuments and replace them by another of a different kind—by the freedom of the enslaved Slav nations—a monument worthy of the great sacrifices of the war, no less than of the splendid unanimity of the Allies. The war is not only being waged for the strangling of militarism, nor only against savage lust for the possession of seas and the territories of others; no, it is also the grim conflict of the Slav world with the German. And this time the conflict must be final.

Germany and Austria-Hungary are displaying a special hatred in their treatment of the Southern Slavs. The latter stand in Germany's direct road to World domination; they refuse to be used as fertilizers for the extension of German power and the economic bliss of Teutons and Magyars. Hence they ought to be employed as a strong counter-balance, the pledge of peace and the reversal of the old policy in the future. And this can only be achieved by forming all the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes) into one independent State, in which they will be bound together, not only by a common racial origin, common language and historic tradition, but by the strong consciousness of the advantage, nay, the necessity, of being united in one autonomous political unit.

This future State, with its homogeneous population of about fifteen million inhabitants, will, in itself, constitute a young and wholesome force. For the spiritual nature of the Southern Slav race warrants nothing less. A boundless, almost fanatical love of liberty and independence, unlimited

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courage, religious and political tolerance, democratic instincts, and moderation—these are its main characteristics. The greater part of the population has not yet emerged from the patriarchal system of a semi-pastoral age, and its life is simply that of the primitive household. The oppression of centuries has not killed, but rather strengthened, their spiritual power to wrestle for independence and the national ideal—their political and economic unification. This ideal, like a religious faith, has upheld the Southern Slav people in the time of weary trials.

The history of Serbia's struggle for her liberty and the Southern Slav idea has aroused the shuddering amazement and admiration of the whole world. Small in territory, but great in spirit, Serbia, inspired by a noble patriotism, has shown the world an example of epic virtue and valour, and in no less degree a capacity for endurance in adversity.

The Serbian people believe religiously in the justice and final triumph of the Southern Slav ideal, and, while fighting for it, they have given examples of lofty heroism and martyrdom. In their national epics, which incarnate their patriarchal life, the colour of the East, and the plastic power of Hellenic art, those martyrs and heroes live again before our eyes. A great future is the rightful heritage of such a nation. Liberated Serbia must become the focus and centre of the whole Southern Slav race. Any dismemberment or cession of Southern Slav territory would not only lack all ethnographic justification, and constitute a blow to the legitimate hopes of the race; not only would it be out of keeping with the noble purpose of the war, but it would constitute a flaw in the defence of Europe against the Teutonic "Drang nach Süden." But if the future is to be devoted to correcting violations of the principle of nationality, considerable sacrifices will be needed. Italy has painfully accomplished her unity, and is now rounding off her achievement by the acquisition of the *terre irredente* in Austria. Roumania, too, has come forward courageously for the unification of her race.

Truth has only one standard and the last word for the creation—without any curtailment—of the Southern Slav Kingdom with its natural ethnographical and economic boundaries, will rest with political wisdom and superior justice. Then the Slav world will be able to unfold its rich

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resources for the welfare of human progress, for the establishment of peace, justice and civilization.

When the time comes for solving the Southern Slav question, the Allied Powers will call to mind the deep and humane thought which is expressed by the following words of Taine: "*Plus on est puissant, plus on est tenu d'être juste, et l'honneur finit toujours par devenir la meilleure politique.*" "I have gained the greatest victory—the victory over myself." In these wise and noble words, the King of Roumania recorded his decision to take the right path. In this spirit Italy and Roumania will resign such quasi-nationalist pretensions as are contrary to the claims of the Southern Slavs and the common good and—in the long run—to their own interests, as seen in historical perspective.

The Russian people will hail the creation of "Jugoslavia" with great joy. For two centuries it has fought for the Yugoslav ideal, sacrificing itself without stint for the deliverance of its oppressed brethren. Our nation has expressed its moral standpoint in the proverb, "Truth is brighter than the Sun"—and truth must in the end prevail.

V. KOVALEVSKY.

Strategy which ignores Politics

"If the great (Balkan) game (of the Entente) had succeeded, it might have been, as we may now confess, the beginning of the end. Germany and Austria would then really have been a besieged fortress shut in on all sides."—COL. GÄDKE, in *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, 14 Oct.

If any doubts were still possible as to the true inwardness of the German war plan, recent events in Roumania must surely have dispelled them. It must at last be dawning upon even the most obtuse brain that the Germans regard the fate of South-Eastern Europe as a vital issue, and are prepared for its sake to take enormous risks. It is true that certain writers (including a distinguished retired general) do not hesitate to treat the campaigns of Mackensen and Falkenhayn as "the last throw of a gambler" whose "fast drooping spirits" are "at the lowest ebb." But the plain man who reads the daily bulletins with his atlas before him, and is not misled by the posters, whose persistent efforts to distort our mental focus have become little short of a public danger, will merely marvel at the astounding assertion that "Germany and Austria have been defeated and thrown back on every other front." That Roumania represented,

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for the moment, the line of least resistance is no valid ground for assuming that the German staff knows its "defeat" to be "irretrievable." It is merely a proof that the Germans have always understood the lesson which we have always refused to learn, that it is well to hit an enemy at his weakest rather than his strongest point. One of our greatest weaknesses in this war has been the refusal to admit awkward facts, the strange illusion that reverses must, at all costs, be minimised or explained away, and that, to admit them, is equivalent to "whimpering." The optimism of the front to which Sir W. Robertson recently paid tribute is of a very different quality. Out in France everyone realises that our main task lies before us, and the Germans—using to the full the superior mobility and uniformity of plan which interior lines and an absolute military control of their Allies secure to them—are still strong enough to dam back all the heroism of Verdun and the Somme, of the Carso and the Bzura, while they pursue those political aims for the execution of which the German military machine has been prepared with such minute, unflagging and relentless efficiency. The Balkans, we are told, are a "side-show," and events in that region can never decide, or even materially influence, the main issues of the war; and public opinion, slow and illogical as ever, does not allow itself to be dislodged from this comfortable theory by the awkward fact that the Germans have sent two of their best generals, and all the men they can spare, to that very region at what is still called the "crisis of the war." And yet it is generously admitted that the Germans know something about strategy and warfare in general. Truly criticism of the airy kind which treats the conquest of Poland as having miscarried (see a leading weekly last Saturday) is difficult to deal with.

The conquest of the Dobrudja is an event of capital importance in the history of the war, if considered in the light of what preceded it. The failure of the Western Powers to understand the true significance of Austria-Hungary or to seek out the gaping joints in her military and political armour had led them to neglect the lessons of General Potiorek's rout in Central Serbia. They were blind to the imperative need for holding the Danube front against invasion from the north, and thus both securing the gate which leads to the vitals of the Central Powers and cutting off the Turks from the material aid without which they could not have

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continued the struggle. Mackensen's fresh onslaught upon Serbia, in conjunction with the Bulgarians, found the Entente once more entirely unprepared. The hinterland of Salonica rapidly replaced the Danube as a barrier against the Germans and—yet another capital blunder—the inviolable Montenegrin fortress of Mount Lovčen, with all its neglected possibilities against the Austrian naval base of Cattaro, was soon afterwards allowed to fall into the enemy's hands. There followed nine months of inactivity, interspersed with intrigues of astonishing crudity and ineptitude with Bulgaria, while a fatal blend of sentimental irresolution and arrogant tactlessness drove King Constantine into the enemy's camp, and disorganised the whole Greek machine of State. The entry of Roumania in August provided the Entente with an opportunity of making good the fatal errors of the preceding autumn, of recovering a point of vantage against Austria-Hungary, and, at the same time, of co-operating with the Salonica expedition in the all-important task of cutting Germany's connection with Constantinople. But once again the Entente was without a plan, and threw away the advantages which M. Bratianu's diplomatic skill had earned. If the Russians were not ready, at the moment when the Roumanians entered Transylvania, to pour several hundred thousand men into Bulgaria, and, aided by a vigorous offensive from the Ægean, to threaten the line to the East, then it was nothing less than madness to allow the Roumanians to abandon their neutrality, and those responsible for prompting them deserve condign punishment. As a sign that a keenly observant neighbour regarded Austria-Hungary's position as irreparable, Roumania's actio was highly significant; but what made it of such immense value to the Allied cause as a whole was the fact that it at last supplied Russia with the possibility of that land advance upon Constantinople which had hitherto been denied her. In point of fact, we now know that, instead of hundreds, there were only tens of thousands; that, of these, the majority belonged to the heroic Yugoslav legions levied last spring in Odessa; that the Bulgars make short work of the pathetic Russian illusion that they would not resist the troops of the Tsar Liberator; and that Mackensen is straining every nerve to complete his conquest of the Dobrudja as far north as the delta of the Danube. It is to be hoped that the very strenuous if belated efforts of the Allies will prevent him

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from effecting a crossing and invading the rich plains of Roumania proper. But it must not be forgotten for a moment that, unless he can once more be ejected before he has time to consolidate his position, the Entente will be deprived of one of its most promising fields of strategy. Its final loss would add many months to the war, just as *à fortiori* the overrunning of Roumania would prolong it by at least a year, and, indeed, gravely compromise those prospects of final victory which depend upon the pivotal position of Constantinople. The question of the Straits may one day decide the future of the Entente and of Europe.

While, then, every effort must be made, and we believe is being made, by Russia to retrieve the Entente's grave blunders in the past two months, and save the situation in Northern and, above all, in Southern, Roumania, it is incumbent upon the Western Allies to play their part by strengthening the Salonica army by every means in their power. A year ago our authorities risked a severe crisis in the history of the Entente by their stubborn reluctance to fulfil the Balkan engagements which the French rightly held to be binding and urgent; and though, after much valuable time had been lost, we at length yielded to the insistent pressure of Paris, the official British attitude for the greater part of 1916 has borne an uncomfortable resemblance to that of Achilles sulking in his tent before Troy. It is to be hoped that the fatal old idea of starving Salonica has been finally abandoned, and that General Sarrail will receive all the necessary reinforcements before it is utterly too late. We have heard more than enough of the silly catchword that "the only thing which counts is killing Germans." But if that is really the end of military wisdom, it can be attained as easily at Monastir, in the Dobrudja, and in Transylvania as on the Somme and the Meuse.

RUBICON.

The Case of Archbishop Szeptycki

WHEN the Russians entered Lwow (Lemberg) over two years ago the Ruthene Uniate Catholic Archbishop of that city, Count Andrew Szeptycki, was removed into the interior of Russia, where he has been ever since. All enlightened Russians are agreed that the proselytizing methods adopted,

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after his removal, among his flock by the imported Russian Orthodox clergy, were as regrettable as they were foolish, and ended in lamentable failure. Since the Russians returned to Eastern Galicia these mistakes have been happily avoided, and the fanatical bishop and monks who were responsible for most of the mischief have not been allowed to renew their onslaughts upon the faith of the Uniate peasantry. It is, therefore, with all the greater regret that we learn that Archbishop Szeptycki has now been sent to the Orthodox monastery of Suzdal, which is well known in Russia as a place of detention for refractory and heretical clergy. This action is the result of a decision of the Holy Synod, which announces that the Archbishop is free to be present at Divine worship in the monastery, but is forbidden to enter its enclosure without the permission of the Prior. This permission is not very consoling to a high dignitary of the Roman Church, over whom the Holy Synod has not even a pretence at jurisdiction.

An incident of this kind is calculated to do infinite harm to the cause of the Entente. On the one hand it will cause alarm and suspicion among the millions of Catholic Slavs who are subjects of the Central Powers, and among whom Berlin, Vienna and Budapest are already exploiting it in every possible way. (It is to be remembered that five out of the six Slavonic races whose fate depends upon the issue of the war—the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Slovenes, with a total of 35,000,000—are overwhelmingly Catholic, while the western portion of the Ukraine is fervently Uniate.) On the other hand, the interference of the Holy Synod is exercising a deplorable effect upon the Vatican and upon sane Catholic opinion throughout the world, and is directly playing into the hands of those powerful Germanophil influences which surround the Pope, and which, in their alarm at the policy which such incidents seem to reveal, would prefer to see Austria-Hungary as a mere *annexe* of Germany, rather than her Slav Catholic subjects at the mercy of Orthodox proselytism. It can only do harm, not good, to pass over these facts in timid silence; and yet, with the exception of two well-known English Catholic periodicals, our entire press seems to have lacked the courage or interest to do so. It is because we have an infinitely higher opinion of our Russian Allies than many suppressors of awkward facts that we have written so frankly; and we are encouraged

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to do so by the knowledge that the Slav Society of Petrograd has taken up the cudgels for the Archbishop, and is appealing to the Russian Government for his liberation. Archbishop Szeptycki, it should be added, is not merely a member of one of the most ancient families in Galicia, but has, by his tireless energy and princely generosity, worked wonders for the education and general welfare of the Ruthene Uniate clergy, and fills, in the minds of his nation, very much the same place as that of the great Bishop Strossmayer in the cultural development of the Southern Slavs. It is all the more incumbent upon us to interest ourselves in the fate of him and his Church, because the Ruthene Uniates of Galicia form a not unimportant section of the community in Central Canada, where they have settled in thousands during the last two decades, and have become loyal and valuable British subjects.

We, of course, know very well that such action as the persecution of this distinguished Catholic dignitary does not even remotely represent the spirit of the Russian Church, least of all of those who, like the newly-appointed Metropolitan of Petrograd, are striving to promote intimate relations with the Anglican Church.

The Literature of Pangermanism (II)

COUNT REVENTLOW is well known in this country as the leader of the anti-English section of Pangermans. In spite of the limitations necessarily imposed upon the authority of all men who are dominated by a single fixed idea, his influence has been very great. Although his "History of German Foreign Policy" ("Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik," 1888-1914," 4th edition 1916) contains many obviously faulty arguments, the author is a political factor of acknowledged importance. But French and English critics are too inclined to imagine that the detection and exposure of mistakes and fallacies of which Count Reventlow has been guilty constitute a direct blow at Pangermanism itself. They do not realise that Pangermanism is not only a doctrine but a political aspiration, which derives its strength from an imaginative ambition and not from the strict logic of facts. Curiously enough Professor Andler does not

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mention Reventlow's most characteristic book, "Der Vampyr des Festlandes" (The Vampire of the Continent) (2nd edition 1915), which is the concentrated essence of Prussian hatred of Great Britain. Reventlow is one of the warmest supporters of the Kaiser's naval policy, not because he is a blind follower of the Kaiser (in his book "Kaiser Wilhelm II. und die Byzantiner," 11th ed., 1914, he is independent enough to criticise the Court) but because he hates England.

Paul Rohrbach, on the other hand, is to a certain extent Anglophil, or at least not Anglophobe. He would have liked to realise the Pangerman plans in Asia and Africa without an open fight with England. He may be classified as the leader of the younger generation of Pangermans. His work is devoted to a consideration of all the leading questions of the day, and his ambition is to compile a complete philosophical synthesis out of his various articles and essays. Chief among his lately published works are "Die Geschichte der Menschheit" (The History of Mankind) (1914), and "Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt" (The German Idea in the World) (1912), while on the subject of the war he has written "Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik" (The War and German Policy) (1915), and "Weltpolitisches Wanderbuch" (1916). Rohrbach is the editor of several Pangerman weekly papers, e.g., *Das grössere Deutschland* (Greater Germany).

Albert Wirth is a fair specimen of the Pangerman economist. A follower of List (who is not to be confused with Franz von Liszt, at present Professor of International Law in Berlin), he emphasises in his books "Der Gang der Weltgeschichte" (The Course of World-History) (1913), "Türkei, Oesterreich, Deutschland" (1912), and "Orient and Weltpolitik," the economic importance for Germany of the Near and Farther East.

Maximilian Harden may be described as a kaleidoscope of public men, among whom Bismarck shines out predominantly. In his paper *Die Zukunft* one finds articles that are from time to time Russophil, Francophil, and sometimes even Anglophil; these alternate with fierce diatribes, now against Russia, now France, now England. There is no sort of balance in Harden's views, but by very reason of his oscillations around Bismarck, and his constant change of ground, he may be taken as a representative exponent of Pangermanism. It must be borne in mind that the Pan-

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germans are politicians who in many questions of policy and expediency are still feeling their way and making experiments. This indecision is well illustrated by their behaviour during the present war. No sooner did they realise that the crushing and decisive victory which they had expected was by no means certain, than they changed the policy which was based upon that victory, without, however, modifying their ultimate object. They are now turning their attention to the creation of temporary expedients, which will meet the new situation, but which will not preclude the ultimate attainment of their Pangerman project. Concessions and compromises are proposed, whose real object is to throw dust in the eyes of their enemies. Of such a nature are the many offers that have lately been made to the Slavs—to the Poles, Czechs and Southern Slavs, and notably to the Russians themselves. In this connection, Koehler's book, "Der Neue Dreibund" (The New Triple Alliance) (1915), was mentioned in my former article. Another attempt of the same sort may be noticed in Dr. K. Noetzel's book "Der Entlarvte Panslavismus und die Grosse Aussöhnung der Slaven und Germanen" (Panslavism Unmasked and the Great Reconciliation of Slavs and Germans) (1915).

A very good companion volume to Professor Andler's collection is M. André Chéradame's "Le Plan Pangermaniste Démasqué: Le redoutable piège berlinois de la 'partie nulle'" (Paris, 1916).*

The author is one of the few Western political thinkers who has watched and written about the Pangerman movement incessantly. His well-known views on the Austrian question, which were first outlined in "L'Europe et la question d'Autriche au seuil du vingtième siècle" (1901), are, in his new book, further developed in the light of the present war. He is chiefly concerned to prove that Austria-Hungary, by reason of her place in the Pangerman scheme, constitutes one of the fundamental problems of the war. He gives a detailed analysis of the actual Pangerman scheme, which, as outlined by Tannenberg in 1911, aims at the formation under German hegemony of a Central European State, comprising 204 million inhabitants, of whom only 77 millions are German. He then goes on to show that the

* An English translation, with a preface by Lord Cromer, is about to be published by Mr. John Murray.

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absorption and control of the Dual Monarchy is one of the first essentials for the success of that project. The true significance of Austria in her relationship to Germany has been woefully misunderstood both in France and in England. M. Chéradame gives a particularly interesting account of the way in which Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest have deluded Western Europe as to their real intentions, and have thus prepared the way for the present final bid for Pangermanism, which, he believes, has been definitely engineered by the Kaiser himself. Finally, the author sounds a grave note of warning against the danger of German peace talk. Germany, he says, may well be ready to acquiesce in a "drawn game," which in the words of the sub-title to the book constitutes a "formidable trap." It would mean, indeed, a complete victory for the German cause. If Austria-Hungary and Turkey were now to be left intact, the Central Europe of Tannenberg would be an accomplished fact, and the realisation of the full programme of "Berlin-Bagdad" would be merely a question of time. Moreover, even the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by France would in that case mean nothing more than a temporary and precarious gain, and the Allies would be unable to redeem their promise of restoring Serbia to her birthright.

The coming settlement must, therefore, rest fundamentally upon the rights of nationality, and the first step in that direction must be the dismemberment of the heterogeneous conglomeration of nations which we call Austria. Among the liberated States—the embryo, as he calls them, of the United States of Europe—M. Chéradame assigns a position of supreme importance to Bohemia, the buffer State between Germany and Austria. He speaks very highly of M. Briand's statesmanship, which led him, before any other Allied statesman, to grasp the real significance of Bohemia in its relationship to Pangermanism and to the whole of Europe.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

Russia's Determination

M. Protopopov, to whose appointment as Minister of the Interior we referred briefly last week, has given a fitting answer to all German peace intrigues. After returning from Headquarters, he gave an interview to representatives of the press, and though he did not

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satisfy their curiosity about questions of internal politics, he left no doubt as to the determination of Russia to fight the war to a finish.

"You understand," he said, "that the present war must, at all costs, be brought to a victorious end. This war is like no other war that anybody can remember. If we do not finish the war, with the present political position among the States of Europe it will be repeated—possibly under less favourable conditions. At the present moment the whole Russian people is fighting, fighting with all its substance and its blood. What we need is a little patience. This is necessary for the whole country. But, thank God, our cause is prospering, and the dawn of the end of the war is already in sight. Under the present difficult conditions I base my hopes on the patience of the country and on its patriotic attitude, which has so far united all subjects of the Tsar, without distinction of religion, class or political convictions. This attitude gives us unity, and unity gives us strength. So long as it prevails we shall conquer."

Such a statement is the best possible answer to the alarmist reports recently circulated (we believe in perfect good faith) by a German-Swiss paper, the *Berner Tagwacht*, to the effect that separate peace negotiations between Germany and Russia were already in an advanced stage, and that both the Russian Premier, M. Stürmer, and the Russian Ambassador in Rome, M. Giers, were about to meet Prince Bülow in Switzerland. M. Protopopov, speaking, (as *Novoje Vremija* assures us,) as the special emissary of the Tsar, and emphasising the *Union Sacrée* of the Russian Government, gives the lie to such calumnies. It is not the first time that German agents have duped honest neutrals into spreading tales calculated to sow dissension among the Allies.

Still Wanted: A Policy in Greece

The Allies have once more temporised in Greece. Either of the two bold policies which we outlined in our last week's issue would have involved an interference with the internal affairs of Greece, but either would have ensured that, as a result of our interference, Greece would have emerged free and a force that counted in the world. By our present half-hearted policy we are not only failing to safeguard our own interests, but we are, at the same time, grossly violating the neutrality of Greece, and inflicting on it pitiable and continuous humiliation. We have seized fleet, railways, posts and telegraphs. We have dismissed Ministries and demobilised armies. Yet we fondly imagine that we are respecting Greek independence because we refrain from touching the sacred person of an autocrat. The whole weight of French opinion has expressed itself in favour of the franker course, and there is no doubt at all that popular feeling is as strong here on the point as it is in France. It has the support of every phil-Hellene, and of every member of the great Greek communities that exist outside the boundaries of the kingdom. Its only opponents are those who, for interests of their own, wish that Greece should be for ever a petty and powerless State, and those strange but, alas! influential survivals in this twentieth century who believe in the

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Divine Right of Kings. It is not surprising that our policy has been construed in Athens as a severe snub to the Venizelist movement. With supreme ineptitude we have allowed a transport taking volunteers to the Venizelist army to be submarined off the very harbour of Athens, so that those who wish to join us shall have this extra inducement, over and above the loss of their offices and pensions at the hands of our good friend the King. Those who criticise the Greek nation should remember that very few of the peoples fighting in this war have risked so much for the right as have the Venizelists, and that Greece, as a whole, would, without any doubt at all, be standing by our side if a King who is not a Greek had not stubbornly opposed it. We wonder how many people in England realise that so frankly pro-German have the Court Party become, that, at the last anti-Venizelist demonstration in Athens, placards were distributed by thousands, which bore the signature of the German General von Mackensen, and gave the comforting assurance that he would soon march down and deliver his friends from their oppressors. ١٤١٤

Enemy Influence

We welcome the formation of the "Enemy Influence Committee" under Sir Edward Carson as president. At its preliminary meeting it was suggested that the following changes should be made in the statute law relating to aliens :—

1. There should be a longer period of qualification.
2. The oath of allegiance should be taken in all cases.
3. There should be power to revoke a naturalization certificate.
4. Naturalization in this country should be accompanied by denaturalization in the country of origin.

The whole question of enemy influence in this country needs to be most carefully and deliberately investigated. It is not an easy matter to root out from the economic life of a community the methods and institutions which have been allowed in the past to become part and parcel of it. The very fact that German financial and commercial influence was so widespread in the United Kingdom indicates that many British subjects had, and probably still have, important holdings in German and other enemy concerns. Their personal interests may lead them unconsciously to attach undue weight to special pleading against drastic reform, lest it "endanger the financial position of London as the clearing-house of the world." We do not believe that the growth of international financial institutes and influences in London did, in reality, tend to strengthen the position of London in that respect. It is obvious that enemy influences cannot be rooted out overnight, and that any steps towards such an end require a long and careful preparation. The essential point is a determination to re-establish London's freedom from occult and illegitimate alien influences, while preserving its international character unimpaired.

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Unhappily there are serious grounds for believing that "enemy influence" is by no means confined to the City: that the notorious Baron Kühlmann, who did so much on the eve of war to delude and deaden British public opinion, has even to-day not lost all hold upon his dupes: and that, despite all the efforts of the authorities, there is still from time to time very serious leakage of political and other information to the enemy.

The I.L.P.'s New Policy?

The Independent Labour Party now urges that the Socialists of every nation should henceforth refuse their support to the war, and declines to make any distinction between offensive and defensive wars. In its magnanimous disregard for consequences and for the disastrous effects of such a surrender upon the situation of our working classes, the I.L.P. have travelled a long way from the views of its founders. Even Mr. Keir Hardie, who was far from being an enthusiast for the present war, took up an attitude which may fairly be described as the very antithesis of that of his successors. *Justice* has performed a useful task in culling a number of extracts from his war articles, which illustrate this point.

"A nation at war must be united, especially when its existence is at stake. In such filibustering expeditions as our own Boer War, or the recent Italian war over Tripoli, where no national danger of any kind was involved, there were many occasions for diversity of opinions, and this was given voice to by the Socialist Party of Italy and the Stop-the-War party in this country. With the boom of the enemy guns within earshot, the lads who have gone forth to fight their country's battles must not be disheartened by any discordant note at home . . . Many of them feel, as some of us do, not only that war is an evil, and that there is no real justification for our being involved in the fearful carnage which is devastating Europe, but they will none the less quit them like men wherever duty calls."—(*Merthyr Pioneer*, Aug. 14, 1914.)

"I have never said, or written, anything to dissuade our young men from enlisting. I know too well all there is at stake."—(*Merthyr Pioneer*, Nov. 27, 1914.)

"A nation once in a war of such magnitude as the present has no option but to press forward until suitable terms of peace can be reached."—(*Forward*, Jan. 1, 1915.)

"May I again revert to the I.L.P. pamphlets? None of them clamour for immediately stopping the war. That would be foolish in the extreme until, at least, the Germans have been driven back across their own frontiers."—(*Merthyr Pioneer*, Dec. 27, 1914.)

Ton for Ton

Few things are more striking than the lack of unity displayed by the British press during the war in any question where initiative is required. When one journal adopts a forward policy in any direction, the others, even if they agree, often prefer to remain silent, with

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the result that criticism tends to be sporadic and uneven up to the moment when events themselves cry aloud and force even the most undisciplined team into line.

When, last August, the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the Navy League inaugurated their "Ton for Ton" policy, the majority of its colleagues remained indifferent. We welcome the change which *The Times* leading article of 30th October seems to suggest. Apart from territorial arrangements, there is no more vital issue involved in the present war than the future of British mercantile shipping; and the Government should not waste any further time in making clear to the whole world that whatever modification the fortunes of war and the requirements of policy may introduce into the terms of peace, this country will, under no circumstances, recognise the German flag upon the seas, open its ports to German vessels, or allow coaling facilities to them "even if transferred to the flag of other nations," until the shipping, *British and neutral*, destroyed by Germany in the course of this war, has been restored "ton for ton" to the Allies as a whole, for restoration to the victims of German outrage. Only thus can we checkmate the sinister policy of Herr Ballin and the great Hamburg and Bremen shipping combines, which aims not merely at placing the world at the mercy of German shipping after the war by a wholesale destruction of available tonnage, but also at securing immunity for the convenient game of reducing the British shipping surplus, while continuing to build for the future on all the shipping yards of Germany. If such a scheme were allowed to succeed, it would little avail us even to reach the Rhine. Unless the supremacy of the British Mercantile Marine is fully upheld, we shall have lost the war.

The "Conversion" of Vorwärts

The forcible transfer of the control of *Vorwärts* from the minority to the majority group of the German Social Democratic Party is one of the clearest signs yet given us that the German Government is genuinely nervous about its own domestic situation. The columns of this great Socialist newspaper have reflected, with fairness and as much truth as the circumstances would allow, the actual opinions of the working classes of Berlin. It has more than once suffered suppression for its outspoken criticism of the annexation propaganda and the food control; but, as long as the Central Powers were winning, it was left in comparative freedom. Now that even Mackensen's Roumanian successes cannot conceal the increasing difficulties of Germany's position, the control of domestic opinion grows more strict, and the more or less open channels of protest are stopped one by one. Doubtless this serves to preserve the Government's peace of mind from rude disturbance for the moment, but it also and more certainly serves to increase the pressure beneath, which may at any moment break out in widespread disorder. The by-election now pending in the Oschatz-Grimma Division of Saxony may throw some light upon the whole situation, for there a Minority Socialist and a Conservative are disputing the seat.

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VOL. I, No. 4.

November 9, 1916

The Reorganization of Europe

THE responsible Ministers, and even the Sovereigns, of the Allies have proclaimed that the object of the war is to establish upon sure foundations the freedom of small nations and to destroy Prussian militarism. These formal declarations imply the reconstruction and reorganization of Europe as a whole. The peoples of every Allied country have accepted and applauded the definitions of the high purpose of the Allies; but, beyond making such provision as was possible for the military defeat of the enemy, they have not yet expressed in positive terms their views on the conditions of peace. In other words, they have not yet fully realized that the only means of securing a permanent realization of the ideals they sincerely profess is to work out a practical scheme for the reconstruction of Europe, and to identify victory itself with its application. Complete victory—*La Victoire Intégrale*—demands that the moral impulses which have sustained, and are sustaining, the Allied peoples and armies in this war must find concrete expression in terms of territorial readjustment. Some, though not all, of the Allied Governments have made timid efforts to draft provisional schemes of reconstruction. Hitherto, if we are rightly informed, none of them have tried to co-ordinate their ideas with those of other Allied Governments or to frame a general Allied programme for peace. Yet this work is indispensable. Allied policy—nay, the very strategy of the Allies—must depend upon it. Though it is, perhaps, too much to hope that, in the present stage of the war, the Allies should delegate representatives to work out a joint positive programme, it is not too much to expect that each Allied Government should draft, in a spirit of sober moderation and of responsibility, its own scheme of what it considers indispensable for the welfare and safety of its own people, so that the work of co-ordination may be facilitated when the progress of the Allied arms shall have brought the harmonization of these schemes within the range of practical statesmanship.

THE NEW EUROPE has been founded to provide material

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for definite schemes of reconstruction, and to suggest, both to the Allied peoples and their Governments, the broad lines upon which the Europe of the future should be built. As an initial contribution, we append the following article by a distinguished authority whose political experience, knowledge of Central Europe and high intellectual attainments are a guarantee of the substantial soundness of his views.

* * * *

The war broke out in the Balkans and for the Balkans. It is the sequel to the recent Balkan wars; it is a vital part and continuation of that historical process known to Western nations as the Eastern Question.

To historians and politicians who can conceive separate epochs as links in a long chain of historical sequences, the Eastern Question appears as a consummation of the three thousand years' development of the nations of the Old World. If we begin with the Greeks, we see how they, settled as they had been in Europe and Asia, were forced by Asiatic invasions to defend and organize Europe as it was then known, together with the then known parts of Asia and Africa. The Romans carried on the task, but, unlike the Greeks, no part of the Roman nation settled in Asia or Africa. Asia and Africa were conquered by force of arms, and, with the help of Greek culture, Rome continued the policy of Greece. In the Middle Ages the Byzantine Empire was exposed to increasing attacks from Asia, among which the Turkish invasion was the most powerful; the Turks proved able to subjugate parts of Europe, as well as considerable parts of Asia and Africa. The Crusades were attempts by a combined Europe to repel the Asiatic conqueror; but Charles the Great had already founded the "East March"—Austria—against the Avars and Huns. Later on, Austria had to protect the Holy Roman Empire against the Magyars; and, after the Christianization of the Magyars, against the Turks.

Like Byzantium and Austria, Russia, the heir of the former, the "Third Rome," had to face the Asiatic invaders. Having defeated the Mongols and other Islamic oppressors, Russia became the natural opponent of Turkey and, at the same time, the protector of the Christian nations in the Balkans, and especially of the Slavs.

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Austria may be said to have gained by the Turkish peril. The original "East March" grew in size, and, in the 16th century, formed, by "personal union" with Bohemia and Hungary, a large and potent State. Hungary, at that time, was weak, because only a small part of the kingdom could join Bohemia and Austria, the bulk of it being under Turkish rule. Only at the beginning of the 18th century was the whole of Hungary liberated; but Austria's policy towards Turkey soon changed—the foe became the friend. Austria turned against Russia and Turkey became her ally.

At the head of the German-Roman Empire, Austria, continuing the ideas of the Roman *imperium*, was an organ of the German efforts against the East; simultaneously with Austria there developed in Prussia another German political scheme—the *Drang nach Osten*. Austria and Prussia became political opponents in their rivalry to obtain the control of Germany; but, after the defeat of Austria, the two antagonists were united in a common imperialistic aim: the conquest of the East. With this end in view, Austria and Prussia joined hands against Russia.

Thus the Eastern Question assumed a new aspect—Prussianized Germany, closely allied with Austria-Hungary striving to become an Asiatic and African power. This endeavour determines the relation of both countries to Russia and to the Western Powers, especially to Great Britain.

The road from Berlin and Vienna to Constantinople leads through Petrograd; the road from Petrograd leads through Berlin and Vienna. Pangermanic "Central Europe" extends the original "Eastern March" of Austria and Prussia through Turkey as far as the Persian Gulf. By way of Turkey, too, it will be possible to extend Prusso-Austrian aims *viâ* Egypt to Africa in general. The Emperor William has promised his protection, not only to the Turks, but to the whole Moslem world; the colonial policy of Berlin is chiefly concentrated on Africa.

The German-Austrian plan is described by the watchword, "Berlin-Bagdad," or, more completely, "Hamburg-Berlin-Prague-Vienna-Budapest-Belgrade-Constantinople-Bagdad"; the other line to Bagdad goes from Berlin *viâ* Munich and Budapest or Trieste-Suez; the third line is *viâ* Berlin-Breslau-Bucarest-Constantinople; and, finally, there is the branch line, Belgrade-Salonika-Constantinople-Suez. The

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other main direction of Pangermanic efforts is that of Constantinople-Aleppo-Hodeida-Cairo. Asia and Africa are the objective.

This project of "Berlin-Bagdad" and "Berlin-Cairo" means, first of all, a close coalition of Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary. That has been completed by this war. The coalition of Germany and Austria-Hungary means a united "Central Europe" extending, as a compact mass, from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Adriatic; should this union last, the Balkan States, pressed as they are from the north by Austria-Hungary and from the south by Turkey, could not resist the German effort.

It is obvious that the Austro-Hungarian Question constitutes the centre of gravity of the situation; Austria-Hungary gives 51 million inhabitants to Berlin (more than the most populous of the Western States) and provides the direct "bridge" to Asia and Africa. The war broke out on account of Serbia, who was an obstacle to the advance of Austria as the vanguard of Germany in the East. But her efficiency as a vanguard is endangered by acute unrest among her component nationalities. Her power and her existence are menaced chiefly by the Slav races, though she is also threatened by the Italians and Roumanians. Still, the former are the more dangerous, because Russia and the Balkan Slavs are the natural support of the Slavs of Hungary and Austria, who form the majority of the population.

The question of Austria-Hungary seen in this light is a question of the Slavs—a question of the Southern Slavs (Serbo-Croats and the Slovenes); a question of the Czechs and Slovaks; a question of the Poles and Ruthenes.

The question of Austria-Hungary gains special significance from the fact that she is situated chiefly in that peculiar zone of small nations which divides the west of Europe from the east. Prussia, too, developed in this zone, and the European provinces of Turkey also belong to it. The alliance of Austria-Hungary and Turkey with Prussia-Germany was due to the fact that all these States directed their efforts of conquest against the small nations of this zone. Russia, France, Great Britain became Asiatic powers without subjugating European nations; Prusso-Austrian Pangermanism can attain its Asiatic and African aim only by subjugating and dividing European nations—a striking

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difference that must be acknowledged by those who are opposed to British, French and Russian imperialism. It is an alliance of the artificial, non-national States against the growing power of the national striving of the small nations and of all nations in general; the Pangerman plan of "Central Europe" or "Berlin-Bagdad" is an effort to maintain the political principle of the Middle Ages—the principle of a conquering, absolutist State against the modern democratic principle of nationality.

The German-Austrian Pangermans conceive the reconstruction of Europe as the establishment of a World Empire on the old basis; the Allies, on the other hand, are working for the reconstruction of Europe on an entirely new basis. Europe, according to them, is to form a whole, arising organically from the federation of free and liberated nations; while the Central Powers strive for the domination of one nation—of the Germans—over the non-German nations in the zone of small nations, and hence over the whole of Europe and the world. It is the difference between Absolutism and Democracy, between Centralism and Federation. Briefly, the Pangermans strive to preserve and enlarge the idea of Austria—a centralized, absolutist, artificial State, in which the Germans, with the help of temporary favourites (such as, at present, the Magyars, Turks and Bulgarians), would maintain their political and economic supremacy. The plan of the Customs Union is an economic supplement to that of political imperialism.

It is clear that the Allies will weaken Pangerman Prussia most effectively by depriving Germany of Austria-Hungary. That can be achieved only by dismemberment. If Austria-Hungary should survive this war, even after losing the Italian and Roumanian territories, Pangermanism will not be eradicated. The Allies will be victorious only if Austria be reduced to a State consisting solely of her German provinces. It is a matter of secondary importance whether the seven million German-Austrians remain independent or join Germany.

The Pangermans themselves believe that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary would be the most fatal blow to their hopes. Austria-Hungary, writes Winterstetten, would be replaced by Bohemia and Serbia. Germany would lose her Polish territory; in the West she would have to retire to the Rhine.

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There are, in fact, eight national questions of European concern to be solved: the Danish, French, Polish, Ruthenian, Bohemian, Roumanian, Italian and Southern Slav. The true solution of these questions involves the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the liberation of the non-German minorities of Germany or, rather, Prussia, and the removal of the Turks from Europe.

The reconstruction and reorganization of Europe, then, demand the following changes of political boundaries. In the first place, going from north to south, the Polish nation must be united. The question of the relations between Russia and Poland—reaching through centuries—will be solved in the easiest and best way if reunited Poland remains under Russia. That is the plan proposed by far-sighted Polish politicians. Provision can be made for Poland to have an outlet to the Baltic—at Danzig; as the territory around the town is Polish, it has been suggested that Danzig should be incorporated in Poland; another proposal is to secure to Poland free access to this port.

The German part of East Prussia would, in the former case, form an enclave; the northern part of this territory is Lithuanian (with a few Letts), and, therefore, the question might arise as to how this minority could be united to Russian Lithuania.

There is a fragment of a small Slav nation—the Lusatian Sorbs, in the Prussian province of Brandenburg and in Saxony—which might be annexed to Bohemia. This race is not numerically important (some 120,000); but there is a question of principle and not only a question of quantity. German-Prussian militarism developed by fighting against, domineering over and exterminating, the Slavs, who once extended as far as the Elbe and the Saale. Hamburg, Magdeburg, Regensburg, formed approximately the frontier of the Germans and the Slavs. This whole territory has been Germanized by force. If the Allies are determined to suppress, or, at least, to weaken, Prussian militarism and Prussian aggressiveness, the question of the Lusatians is one of principle, and they should be liberated. The number of French in Alsace-Lorraine (about 220,000) is not much greater, but, again, their liberation is a question of principle. Moreover, even its German population is antagonistic to Prussia-Germany.

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There is a small number of Czechs in Prussia, on the frontier of Bohemia, who can easily be given to Bohemia. The Danish territory in North Schleswig should be ceded to Denmark.

The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary will first of all facilitate the reunion of the Czechs and Slovaks and the restoration of the Bohemian State. The lands of the kingdom of Bohemia constitute the westernmost branch of the Slavs. Her position in the heart of Europe has always enabled her to play a prominent part in history. In the words of Bismarck, the master of Bohemia is the master of Europe. Austria grew powerful by means of Bohemia, who stands first economically among all her provinces. Austrian politicians still call Bohemia "the Pearl of Austria." In Pangerman literature much stress is laid on this fact. Indeed, unless Bohemia is liberated, the war will not have achieved its object. The Pangerman writer, Winterstetten, in quoting Bismarck's phrase, declares that, without Prague, Germany is lost.

The Czechs, with the Slovaks, form a direct barrier against the "Berlin-Bagdad" idea. Ever since the foundation of the Bohemian State in the 7th century the Czechs have resisted the Germans, and in this thousand years' struggle they have eminently proved their sterling qualities. An independent Czecho-Slovak State would be strengthened by its neighbours, the Poles and Russians. It would border upon Russia and thus would be protected in the east, and, for that reason, could concentrate its efforts the more effectively against the Germans and the Magyars.

Like the Bohemians, the Poles opposed the Germans, and Germany's weak point is in the East. If she has not Austria-Hungary, and through Austria-Hungary Turkey and the Balkans, at her disposal she will lose her power in the West. France and Great Britain will be threatened by Germany only as long as a possibility remains for Germany, by using Austria-Hungary, to realize the "Berlin-Bagdad" plan. The existence of Austria-Hungary is, therefore, the crucial point of this war, and of the European problem in general. The existence of Austria-Hungary means that Germany has 51 millions of population at her disposal; it means, further, that the Balkan nations (25 millions) and Turkey (21 millions) must, willy-nilly, serve the interests of Germany.

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A Turkey subservient to Germany will form a bridge to Asia and Africa, to Egypt and India, thus menacing the Caucasus and Russian Central Asia. From Egypt a railway will tap Tripoli and Algeria and the whole of Africa. It was quite natural that Italy should join the Allies!

On the other hand, a non-German Central Europe means the liberty not only of the smaller nations of the Central zone, but of all Europe. The West need not fear that Germany, being cut off from the East, will press upon the West; to be cut off from the East means a Germany becoming more moderate and living on her own resources; Germany, by herself, will not be dangerous, even though she will be, after Russia, the biggest nation in Europe.

The union and liberation of the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes) under the political leadership of Serbia will be another result of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.

The Roumanians in Bukovina and Hungary would be reunited to the kingdom of Roumania; the Magyars would form a state of their own, containing only Magyars, the northern part of Hungary, as far as it is inhabited by Ruthenes, coming under Russia, the part inhabited by the Slovaks joining Bohemia, and the Southern Slavs of Hungary becoming part of an independent Serbo-Croatian state. The Magyars proved themselves ruthless oppressors of the Slavs; though themselves a small nation (nine millions at most), they united with the Austrian and Prussian Germans to oppress the Slavs, and it was Magyar policy which instigated Vienna to carry out the violent and ruthless policy against Serbia and Croatia.

The fall of Austria will also cause the fall of Turkey; in Europe and Africa Turkey has already fallen, and her fate must be consummated in Asia also; conversely, the fall of Turkey will cause the fall of Austria. The fall of Austria will weaken Prussia-Germany. This constitutes the internal affinity of the three reactionary and aggressive States—Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Prussia-Germany: the fall of one will be followed by the weakening or fall of the others. Russia will erect the Cross on the Hagia Sophia; in Constantinople she will occupy the post of sentinel against the Turks, thus strengthening the nations in the Balkans.

GERMAN DESIGNS ON POLAND

German Designs on Poland

MILITARY exigencies have forced Germany and Austria-Hungary to seek some means of extricating themselves from the *impasse* created by their difference of outlook on the Polish question. The proclamation simultaneously issued on November 5th by the German Governor of Warsaw and the Austrian Governor of Lublin amounts in effect to a fresh partition of Poland; for Galicia is expressly excluded from the scheme, and not merely does Prussia retain her own Polish districts, but apparently intends to detach Lodz and the great industrial region of Western Poland from the new state and incorporate it in her own dominions. An hereditary monarchy and a constitution are promised, but these all-important points and the "more precise regulation of the frontiers" are still veiled in discreet silence. The central fact which has determined the new arrangement is Hindenburg's need for men, and it is calculated that a Polish army of 700,000 men can be raised for the defence of the Eastern front. The grant of independence, made after prolonged delays and obviously with extreme reluctance, is intended, as *The Times* points out, "to lend some show of legality to the conscription of Russian subjects for a war against Russia."

So momentous a decision on the part of Germany amounts to a fresh declaration of war against Russia, and is in itself the best disproof of the foolish and insulting rumours of a separate peace between Petrograd and Berlin. As the loyal allies of Russia we resent this attempt of the Central Powers to arrogate to themselves the final right to decide the fate of Poland and to ignore the Power which it most intimately concerns. We resent it all the more since we regard the Polish question as international in the fullest sense of the word—not merely because so many of the woes of modern Europe are derived from the initial crime of partition, but because without a settlement of the Polish question on equitable and natural lines there can be no durable peace in Europe. That Russian interests and Polish national aspirations should be reconciled concerns Britain and France as vitally as it concerns Russia herself, just as further south we are bound to strain every nerve to ensure a cordial understanding between Italy and the

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Jugoslavs. The attempt to fool the Poles by a bastard solution which throws unity to the winds and leaves Berlin and Vienna in possession of all save their most recent spoils is likely to end as most similar attempts to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.

The first outward sign of impending events was the withdrawal of the famous Polish Legions from the Austrian to the German sphere of influence in Poland. These Legions originally grew out of the militant wing of the Polish Socialist party in Warsaw during the Russian revolution of 1905, and were inspired by extreme Russophobe tendencies. When towards the end of 1906 the party as a whole threw over the militants, the latter withdrew to Galicia and began to organise secretly on a military basis. Gradually the Austrian Government realised the possibilities which the movement offered, and adopted an attitude which hesitated between distrust and benevolence. In 1912 the movement became general; all the Polish parties in Galicia, and the Ruthenes in imitation of them, formed their own Legions, and during the period of mobilisation caused by the Balkan war the Ministry of War in Vienna even gave out a certain limited number of rifles to them. When the present war broke out, 4,000 legionaries at once crossed over into Russian territory, in the hope of raising Russian Poland against the armies of the Tsar. Their calculation, which had been based upon the belief that the Russians would find the left bank of the Vistula untenable, were completely upset by the course of events, and the burning of the town of Kalisz and the panic and indignation which it produced throughout Poland very effectually alienated public opinion from the Central Powers. In those days, too, the manifesto of the Grand Duke influenced even the most sceptical, when they compared it with the singular silence of the Austrians and Germans on the subject of Poland. But though the Polish Legions were far less successful than they had hoped to be, their numbers had been kept between 30,000 and 50,000 men, and they have won a very considerable amount of recognition. This is very largely due to the fact that their chief, General Pilsudski, is not merely a fanatic who has suffered much in the cause of Polish liberties, and incidentally done infinite harm to the cause of Russo-Polish friendship, but also a military commander of real talent, who is known to have

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averted disaster from the Austrian arms on more than one occasion during the past two years.

On October 5th last the Polish Legions were withdrawn from the Stohod front "for a rest." This step was officially explained as part of the plan of the Austrian supreme command, while a warmly-worded army order was issued on the occasion by the commander of the 11th Bavarian Division (who last week was killed on the Transylvanian front). At the same time General Pilsudski was given "leave" and withdrew to a health resort in the Carpathians. The true explanation of this event, as the proclamation of last Saturday shows, is really much more sensational than the plentiful rumours of disarmament and internment to which it gave rise; for it represents neither more nor less than the bankruptcy of the Austrian solution of the Polish question. For the last year much has been said and written about a new form of "trialism." Before the war trialism meant a revision of the constitutional framework of the Dual Monarchy, to include the Southern Slav provinces, moulded into a single unit, as the equal of the two existing states of Austria and Hungary. In July, 1914, Austria-Hungary finally abandoned an idea which some of the leaders had occasionally played with, but never seriously thought of putting into practice. But the events of the war gave a new turn to the trialist idea, and this time Poland, consisting of Austrian Galicia and the territory conquered from Russia, but, of course, excluding the Polish districts of Prussia, was to fill the third place in the Habsburg trinity. Thus, Francis Joseph would have retrieved the territorial losses of his earlier years and might hope to die after all as "*Mehrer des Reiches*" (Augmenter of the Empire). The plan, moreover, found favour in Hungary, where it was calculated that the Poles under these altered circumstances could be exploited more effectively than ever against Russia, and that the withdrawal of Polish and Ruthene deputies from the Viennese Reichsrat would reduce the Russophil Slavs of Austria—Czechs, Croats and Slovenes—to a weak and hopeless minority. A notable advocate of this plan was Count Julius Andrassy, who not merely published several important articles and interviews on the subject in the *Neue Freie Presse* and other leading Austrian and German newspapers, but is also known to have used all his influence with the German Emperor and Chancellor, on the

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occasion of his visits to Berlin, in favour of the Austrian solution.

For a time it seemed as though this policy would win the day; but the weak and vacillating attitude of Vienna, and above all the renewal of the Austrian *débâcle* last summer, have produced a widespread conviction of Austria's impotence to uphold such a settlement even if it were once established, and of her absolute dependence upon Berlin for the maintenance, not merely of her independence, but of her very existence as a state. So glaringly obvious has this become that the Polish extremists, regretfully perhaps, and certainly without renouncing any of their traditional distrust and antipathy towards the Germans, fancy themselves forced to reckon with the "Realpolitik" of the situation, and are consequently trying to make a tolerable bargain with Berlin. Vienna's half-hearted attitude in consenting to the formation of a separate Polish auxiliary corps, but refusing to give any political pledges whatever, had created a growing discontent among the Polish parties: and the recent split in the Polish management of the "Supreme National Council" had been hastened by the growth of "independence" tendencies, even among sections which used to be openly Russophil. The changed attitude of the National Democratic party was doubtless due to their desire to discredit Trialism. Having for years past always opposed the influence of Galicia in Polish politics, they were naturally alarmed at the possibility of such a solution, however temporary, as might still further enhance the prestige and ensure the predominance of the Galician politicians. The National Democrats were therefore prepared even to risk strengthening the "Activist" section of the independence groups: and by so doing brought down upon their heads the public denunciation of the Russian Premier in a circular addressed last August to all governors of provinces and dealing with the latest phase of the Polish question.

The foremost aim of the "Activists" has been to hasten the pace in the Polish question, and to force on some kind of solution which, however inadequate or unsatisfactory, might, in its broad lines at any rate, seem to face Europe with a *fait accompli*. They therefore desired the immediate creation of a Polish state, even if it should consist of the "Kingdom of Poland" alone, that is, to the exclusion of the Austrian and Prussian Poles. They were

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thus prepared to renounce for the moment the idea of Polish unity in return for the restoration of something approaching a Polish state, and they of course calculated that such a phantom would gradually come to assume a more material form. But in return they demand from Germany, as a guarantee that she is in earnest, the immediate convocation of a Polish national assembly, whose first task would be to organize a Polish army. They argue that from the German point of view the creation of this new military machine would relieve the strain on the Eastern front, and it is naively assumed that the Germans, if they should later on attempt to repudiate the bargain, would find it difficult to disarm the new Polish army. It is not quite clear whether the "Activists" seriously expect Germany to renounce the supreme military control of such an army, or whether in that event they imagine themselves capable of holding their own against Russia. Still less is it clear how they would propose to keep such an army supplied with ammunition and high explosives in the event of a quarrel between its leaders and the German General Staff. No words can describe the folly of the "Activists," but their motives deserve attention, as revealing the point of contact between extreme Polish aspirations and Hindenburg's practical requirements.

By dealing with Berlin direct, the Polish "Activists" are transferring their allegiance to the only partner in the central alliance whom they need take seriously, and at the same time hope to force the hands of the Western Powers by creating an entirely new basis for the discussion of the Polish problem at the future peace conference. Just as it would have been difficult for France and Britain to connive at any settlement by which Russia annexed Galicia but revoked the constitutional liberties which it has so long enjoyed, so it may be argued that the liberties granted—for whatever sordid motives—by Berlin to the Polish nation, would eventually have to be confirmed by the Entente, if victory should crown its arms.

In any such arrangement the dynastic question must play a very important part, and the fact that for so long no decision could be reached as to the fate of Poland has undoubtedly been due to divergence of opinion between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. At first Poland seemed destined to become the appanage of the Emperor Francis Joseph; then for a time the candidature of his son-in-law,

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Prince Leopold of Bavaria, was favoured, as a halfway house between Potsdam and Schönbrunn. Finally, as Austria's chances receded, a new candidate arose in the person of the Archduke Charles Stephen, a cadet of the House of Habsburg, whose sympathies are quite genuinely Polish, and two of whose daughters are married to members of the highest Polish nobility, Prince Jerome Radziwill and Prince Olgerd Czartoryski. For some months past it has been rumoured that Charles Stephen would become King of Poland, not under the Habsburg crown, but as a sovereign prince of the German Empire; and it may be that his elevation to the throne will shortly follow the proclamation. Later reports treat Leopold's selection as certain.

It is, however, difficult to imagine that this makeshift settlement will satisfy the Poles themselves, or blind them to the very obvious designs for their military exploitation which underlie it. Despite the ambiguity of the Grand Duke's manifesto, despite the failure of the Russian bureaucracy to supplement its noble words by deeds, despite all the surreptitious attempts to undo its effect or to secure its revocation, despite the efforts of the Germanophil party in Petrograd to poison the mind of the Tsar himself against the Poles—despite also the scepticism of the Poles themselves, based upon the bitterness of a cruel history—we still persist in regarding that document as Poland's best guarantee for a happier future, and we do not believe that the impulsive folly of a few militant extremists will blind the leaders of the Polish people, or Polish public opinion, to the fact that complete reunion is the first essential of Polish policy, and must take precedence of political and constitutional reforms. A few highly-placed bureaucrats may like to argue that the Grand Duke's manifesto has no binding force of any kind; but we believe that the Russian nation shares the opinion so widely held in the West, that the manifesto, as a charter of Polish liberties, is morally binding, not merely upon Russia, but upon the Entente as a whole. "The future of Poland is a European question of the first magnitude, in the solution of which all the Allies are deeply concerned," and which "they are agreed . . . must be solved on Russian lines," by the achievement of a lasting accord between the two greatest Slavonic nations.

RUBICON.

NORWAY AND THE WAR

Norway and the War

WHILE the greatest of the neutral nations may be presumed to be engrossed in the election of a new president, and, therefore, for the time, too busy to uphold the rights of other neutrals, a sinister situation has arisen in the North Sea as the result of the German submarine campaign against Norway. It is quite unnecessary to dwell upon the sympathies which Norway, as the most democratic nation in northern Europe, has always displayed throughout her modern history for Britain and for France. These sympathies are in the blood, and are to be explained alike by racial affinity (though we have no desire to follow the German example in emphasizing this aspect of the case), long intercourse and exchange of ideas, and all the links which bind together two ancient seafaring peoples. During the war the Norwegian attitude has, of course, been materially affected by the fact that its chief trade was with Britain (even though German imports had, in recent years, exceeded British imports), and that Norway, as a food-importing country, is, to some extent, dependent upon the power which commands the North Sea. The restrictions which the new conditions of naval warfare imposed upon Norwegian merchants did not affect public opinion unfavourably, though it must be admitted that, on occasions, the official British attitude to Norway has not always been tactful or considerate. Fortunately, however, we seem to have erred rather in form and manner than in substance, and the dissatisfaction aroused by the British "Black List" policy has latterly been overcome by a very genuine effort on the part of the Foreign Office to remedy all reasonable Norwegian grievances, and, in particular, to give suspect firms fuller opportunities of clearing themselves. It was freely admitted in Norway that, on our side, the exercise of some form of control was an absolute necessity, and an arrangement was reached by which individual firms and groups of firms pledged themselves not to re-export goods received, while the Norwegian Government undertook to exact penalties for any breach of such a pledge. In Holland and Denmark, which are small countries, a single association has sufficed for such purposes, but Norway covers such an enormous area, that it was found necessary to

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decentralize the arrangement according to special trades, such as margarine, cotton, and tin.

The increasing harmony between Norway and Britain greatly incensed the Germans, who resent the sale of Norwegian nitrates to this country, and, still more, our success last summer in buying up the whole surplus of the cod and herring fisheries. During the first year of war the Norwegians had sold most of their fish to Germany, with the result that Britain prohibited the import of various raw materials (jute, etc.) upon which the fishing industry was absolutely dependent.* As the Germans were not in a position to supply the necessary raw material themselves, Norway had no alternative save to sell practically the whole catch to Britain, and the price agreed upon seems to have been everywhere regarded as advantageous.

The acute conflict which at present prevails between Germany and Norway is, however, not so much due to annoyance at Norwegian friendliness to the Entente as to the determination of the Germans to render sea communications between Russia and the West impossible, and thereby to produce an effect upon the military situation in Russia and Roumania. With this object in view, the German submarines find Norwegian territorial waters extremely convenient as a base of operations, and the difficulties of an effective control on so long, rugged, and thinly populated a coast are only too obvious. But a great deal of the carrying trade to Archangel and the White Sea has always been in Norwegian hands, and though the Norwegian shipping lines, by mutual agreement, have never accepted war material for Russia, they have, of course, done a specially flourishing trade since the war in all kinds of commodities which used to find their way through the Baltic or even the Dardanelles. While, in these days of "conditional" contraband, the Norwegians, true to their juridical nature, stand upon their rights and claim that only a Prize Court is entitled to decide whether cargo is contraband or not, the Germans, quite apart from the lawless nature of their sea warfare, have very obvious reasons for not attempting to convoy captured merchant vessels from the north of Norway to the Elbe. As usual, then, they have taken the law into their own hands, and for many weeks past have torpedoed Norwegian

* The annual value of the Norwegian fisheries exceeds £3,000,000.

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vessels wholesale, as though Norway were their deadliest enemy. Up to October 26th the losses of the Norwegian merchant service amounted to 147 steamers, of a total gross registered tonnage of 218,806, in addition to 56 sailing vessels, totalling over 40,000 tons. These losses represent more than 10 per cent. of Norwegian merchant tonnage. Under the state scheme of insurance they are estimated at about £5,600,000 and already 155 lives have been lost. As if this were not enough, the submarine commanders have adopted the deliberate practice of sinking at sight, and leaving Norwegian seamen to fend for themselves in open boats in the Arctic Sea. The deliberate aim of Germany is to force the Norwegians to abandon their carrying trade, and thus indirectly to embarrass this country by accentuating still further the growing shortage of tonnage.

There being no direct evidence as to the use of Norwegian fiords as German submarine bases, the prohibition issued from Christiania against any foreign submarine entering territorial waters is to be regarded as a purely precautionary measure following upon the grossest provocation. From the Norwegian point of view, it is argued that no self-respecting State can tolerate open warfare upon her own shipping by a foreign power using her own waters as a base. Moreover, continued submission to such outrages would provide Britain and France with the argument that, as Norway is incapable of protecting her own coasts, or the cargoes entrusted by them to her ships, they would be entitled to take their own measures to ensure the necessary protection.

The strongest point in Norway's case against Germany is the fact that, some months earlier, Sweden adopted precisely similar measures for the protection of her territorial waters, without any protest from the side of Germany. The Germans, it is true, contend that Swedish waters had been so consistently used by Russian, British and German submarines, that Stockholm's action was merely impartial; whereas a similar prohibition on the part of Christiania could only be directed against Germany, and not against her rivals! A few days ago, however, the Germans themselves exploded this argument by torpedoing a Norwegian steamer within her own territorial waters.

Undoubtedly the Germans calculated upon the support of the Swedish Government and upon Norway's surrender in

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deference to her eastern neighbour. They appear, however, to have misjudged the temperament of all three Scandinavian nations, just as they have misjudged one nation after another among their present opponents. It was Sweden which, at the first meeting of the Scandinavian kings in 1915, proposed that their three countries should take identical measures against belligerent submarines, but at that time neither Norway nor Denmark was prepared to accept the proposal. Subsequently Denmark mined her own waters, and the Belts in particular; and this year Sweden took even more elaborate precautions to ensure respect for her neutrality. It was thus hardly to be expected that Sweden would go back upon a standpoint which she was the first to uphold, and even the pro-German press in Stockholm has supported Norway in her attitude. It would, indeed, seem as though the feeling of Scandinavian solidarity had at last turned the tide of German propaganda in Sweden. The "Activists" are already on the wane. The death of Count Douglas deprived them of a capable leader; the Allied offensive for the first time shook public faith in Germany's victory; and the friction with the Western Powers which "Activist" jingoism had provoked had been reflected in commercial restrictions which caused a certain amount of loss and dislocation of trade. The gradual but steady return to tactfulness in British dealings with Sweden has coincided with increased ruthlessness on the part of Germany. The visit of an important Swedish Commission to England marks a happy turning point in our relations with Stockholm, and there is real hope that this time a complete and cordial agreement may be reached. This is all the more important because the attitude of Norway to Germany must, in the long run, depend largely upon the attitude of Sweden. It might, no doubt, suit Germany's game to create bad blood between the two sister nations and produce what would be equivalent to civil war in Scandinavia. But it is quite inconceivable that any manœuvres to that end could succeed, in view of the solemn treaty existing between the two countries and renewed at the outbreak of the present war—by which they are pledged under no circumstances to fight each other. Germany is hardly likely to provoke a situation in which Norway and Sweden presented a united front against her. The active adhesion of Norway to the

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Entente would undoubtedly ease the task of the British Navy, for her southern coast in particular would supply very useful points of observation for the Skagerrack and Kattegat. But, true to its policy of respecting the rights of small nations, the British Government has no desire to involve any of the three northern democracies in this world tragedy. If, as sometimes seems possible, Germany is bent upon forcing Norway into the war, the responsibility for so dastardly an act will be hers alone. But it is more probable that her attitude contains a considerable element of bluff, and that she has been encouraged in her policy of Arctic murder by the extraordinary indifference of President Wilson to those neutral rights which he has vindicated at great length on paper, but appears to ignore when the neutral victim is not an American.

Absolutism in Greece and our Treaty Rights

IN an article that appeared in the second number of *THE NEW EUROPE* it was argued that we had no adequate justification for interference in Greece except the wishes and the ultimate interests of the Greek people. Such a position is a sound one, both from the moral and the political point of view. None the less, to strengthen the hands of weaker brethren, whose minds cling desperately to precedent and formula, it may be useful to explain exactly how it is that we have the Treaty Right to put down Absolutism in Greece.

It is often stated that the three protecting Powers "guaranteed" constitutional government in Greece. The word "guarantee" naturally suggests the original Convention of 1832, where it is stated in Article IV that

"Greece under the sovereignty of Prince Otho of Bavaria and under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent State, according to the terms of the Protocol signed between the said Courts, on the 3rd February 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte."

There is no word here about constitutional government, and, so far as the original guarantee goes, it remains unchanged up to the present day. How is it, then, that in the treaty

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with Denmark of 1863 Article III runs as follows :—

“Greece under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts, forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional State”?

The word “constitutional” has apparently slipped into the guarantee without any formal alteration or notice. Can it be argued that the use of the word is accidental and negligible?

The answer to the question lies in the history of the relations of the protecting Powers, and especially of England, to Greece, during the intervening forty years. If there was any illusion in the minds of English statesmen that the new kingdom, once created, could go on its own way without guidance, it was soon dispelled. King Otho lacked the flexibility to adapt himself to his subjects' democratic views. Again and again Palmerston and Peel urged the king to grant a constitution, and it was the English Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, who finally succeeded in forcing him to accept one. September 3 (Old Style) is the birthday of Greek constitutional liberty, and Constitution Square, in the centre of Athens, in front of the king's palace, records it. It was mainly because King Otho refused to abide by this constitution, in spite of continued British protests, that he was deposed in 1862. “Constitutional,” in 1863, had a history of twenty years behind it, during which we had been helping the Greek people to secure the type of monarchy that we enjoyed ourselves. It was inserted in the treaty when this interference of ours in internal affairs had made us so popular in Greece that we had been asked by an overwhelming plebiscite to send one of our own princes as king. King Constantine's father was the substitute that we provided, and we marked his accession to the throne by the free and splendid gift of the Ionian Islands. It would have seemed pointless and unnecessary to alter the terms of the original guarantee and insert there also the word “constitutional.” No one in 1863 could have foreseen that a king of the Danish line would have attempted to reintroduce the absolutism for which Otho had been deposed. As we created Greece at Navarino, so we re-created it in 1863, and the letter of the original guarantee must be construed in the spirit of the Treaty of 1863, and of the interference in the internal affairs of Greece which that treaty crystallized.

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A careful study of our treaties with Greece brings out another point which seems to have escaped notice. The guarantee of 1832 was, as stated in Article IV quoted above, granted according to the terms of a Protocol of 1830. Now Article 8 of this Protocol runs as follows :—

“No troops belonging to one of the Contracting Powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the New Greek State without the consent of the two other Courts who signed the Treaty.”

It is amazing that this Article was made no use of by the Entente when they landed troops in Salonica. It cannot be maintained that the Protocol is no longer in force, for it was by Article 3 that Prince Alfred of England was prevented from accepting the throne of Greece in 1862, the three protecting Powers having imposed on themselves this self-denying ordinance in 1830. Is it possible that the reason that Article 8 was not called into play a year ago is that the White Book (C. 9088, July 15, 1898) recording “Treaties containing guarantees or engagements by Great Britain in regard to the territory or government of other countries,” which presumably is used by our Foreign Office, quotes the Protocol (pp. 24-6), with the omission of this particular clause? Is this unaccountable piece of carelessness responsible for the fact that our official justification for the landing of troops at Salonica has again and again been based on the fact that we were “invited” there by Venizelos, or, as Lord Robert Cecil now puts it (House of Commons, October 31, 1916), by the Greek Government of which Venizelos was the head?

Our landing of troops was, in fact, justified, not only by the letter of Article 8 of the Protocol of 1830, which we have just quoted, but by the spirit of the Greco-Serbian Treaty, and Monsieur Guillemin's note to the Greek Government, announcing the landing on October 2nd, did, in fact, base it entirely on the latter consideration. Venizelos himself, however, has repeatedly (*Estia*, November 27, 1915; *Kiryx*, April 23, 1916) shown that there was no invitation. There is a big difference, as we used to learn in our Latin and Greek grammars, between asking a question and asking a favour. What Venizelos did, on September 23, 1915, was to ask the English and French Ministers whether, in case Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, and Greece, standing by her treaty, asked Serbia to provide the 150,000 men stipu-

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lated for in that treaty, France and England would undertake Serbia's obligation for her. Forty-eight hours later, an answer came from France and England that they would be ready to undertake this obligation. Venizelos at once reminded Sir Francis Elliot, the British Minister, that he had only asked a question, and that the conditions under which it would become a request were not yet fulfilled. In the meantime, however, the English and French Governments proceeded with plans for the landing of troops without further ado, and, on October 2nd, announced the fact to Venizelos. Although he was, at the moment, risking his own position in support of Serbia and the Allies, Venizelos was not only surprised but annoyed by the fact that his hand had been forced, and he made a formal protest the same day. There is no doubt about the facts, and no doubt that Venizelos has more than once felt hurt that his account of the matter has not been accepted by the English Government.

Venizelos is not only the most loyal, but the most truthful of statesmen. Surely it is time that these allusions to an "invitation" should cease. The pathetic side of the matter is that, on this one occasion when we acted more quickly than Venizelos wished us to, the actual force which we saw our way to land, so far from being the needed 150,000 men, was too small either to defend Serbia, to overawe Bulgaria, or to encourage Greece.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

The Literature of Pangermanism (III)

M. ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME'S "Le Plan Pangermaniste Démasqué" has already been mentioned as a companion volume to Professor Andler's collection of Pangerman authorities.

Another Frenchman, Professor Blondel, whose books on modern Germany are well known, has also made a competent contribution to the study of Pangermanism in his volume, "La Doctrine Pangermaniste" (1915). That doctrine is represented as the extension, or rather the culmination of German philosophy, which betrays, even in its most mystic utterances, a yearning for worldly power and leadership. It is shown how both Eckhardt and Jacob Böhme, no less than Kant himself, prepared the way for Hegel and his deification of the State, and how Bismarck, by uniting

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modern Germany, revealed a truly Pangerman trend, which found fuller scope when he pursued his successful policy of drawing the Germans and Magyars of Austria-Hungary into the Pangerman net. It is also quite rightly insisted that even the famous clerical Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Lueger, in spite of his Catholicism, followed in the track of the Pangermans, and, finally, that the German Centrum is not in any way an obstacle to the doctrine of Pangermanism.

Andler's list of Pangerman authorities needs, as it stands, to be supplemented by the addition of several other modern Pangermans whose work has left its mark upon German thought. H. von Winterstetten, for instance, in his book, "Berlin-Bagdad; Neue Ziele Mitteleuropaeischer Politik" ("New Aims of Middle-European Policy"), written shortly before the war, analyses the plans for a "Central Europe" in their relation to Turkey and Asia, and his book has already gone through fourteen editions.

During the war the same author has written two books under his real name, Dr. Albrecht Ritter: "Nordkap-Bagdad. Das Polititische Program des Krieges, 1816," and "Der organische Aufbau Europas, 1916."

In these books he expresses approval of Bismarck's attitude towards Austria-Hungary, and insists on the importance of the Dual Monarchy as a necessary factor in the realisation of "Central Europe." He does not conceal his personal dislike of Austria-Hungary—he is outspoken enough, for instance, to condemn Aehrenthal's Balkan policy as charlatanism—but that does not blind him to the necessity of gaining control of Prague and Trieste as stepping-stones to the East. Bohemia, too, is shown to be of vital importance, both politically and strategically, for the German scheme, and Herr v. Winterstetten quotes Bismarck's saying that the possession of Bohemia is the only guarantee for the control of Europe.

In the pamphlets which he has written during the war, Herr v. Winterstetten has been exercised to imagine the political consequences of Germany's defeat or victory. In case of defeat, Austria-Hungary, he says, will disappear, and in her place will be found the new states of Bohemia and Serbia. Germany may possibly get the German Alpine countries, but the loss of her Slav territory in the East and North will deprive that gain of all its value. On the other hand, if Germany wins, she will consolidate her position

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against Russia. She will not, he says, annex Russian territory, for the very good reason, as he naïvely explains, that Russia would very soon take it back again; she will content herself with the preservation of Austria and of Turkey, and the establishment of an economic and strategic barrier against Russia; Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Roumania, in addition to Austria-Hungary and Turkey, will provide her with 167 million inhabitants as against Russia's 170 millions. Add to this Asia, which will be Germany's just reward for the preservation of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and the Nordkap-Bagdad dream will be an accomplished fact.

In his latest pamphlet, however, H. v. Winterstetten repents him of his leniency towards Russia, and expresses his readiness to accept the annexation of a certain amount of Russian territory, taking care to explain that the sole object is to secure better frontiers! He is against the proposal for the establishment of an independent Ukraine, because the Little Russians, he says, do not constitute a separate nation at all. Poland may possibly be restored, with the exception, of course, of the Prussian parts of it; a portion of French territory (Belfort) must be annexed as a safeguard against France and England; Austria must be given northern Venetia; and so the author's imagination runs its course.

Of the pre-war Pangerman literature only one or two more books need be mentioned. In "Deutscher Imperialismus" (2nd edition, 1914) Herr Arthur Dix gives a short and able exposition of the imperialist tendency of Pangermanism. The author had led up to this work by a series of careful and detailed studies of social and economic questions.* In his book he first of all examines the imperial record of England, Japan, U.S.A., Russia and France, and then goes on to state the case for Germany's imperial expansion. Germany must become a world power. "We have but one choice: to grow or to be stunted." Herr Dix is not satisfied with an imperial programme which embraces nothing more than "Central Europe." He holds that Germany must challenge England's position both in Asia and in Africa, although he is in doubt as to her chances of success.

* *Die Völkerwanderung von 1900; Beiträge zur deutschen Handlungspolitik, 1898; Deutschland auf den Hochstrassen des Weltwirtschaftsverkehrs, 1901; Afrikanische Verkehrspolitik, 1907; Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Zukunft in Krieg und Frieden, 1910, etc.*

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Daniel Frymann's book, "Wenn ich der Kaiser wär"—*Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* (1912; 5th ed., 1914) ("If I were Kaiser: Political Truths and Necessities"), has exerted a wide influence in Germany. It is based upon the main principles laid down by Lagarde, and it gives a detailed analysis of German domestic and foreign policy. Austria-Hungary, he contends, must inevitably form the pivot of the latter. He does not deny that Turkey is also a factor of great importance, but he makes no attempt to conceal his dislike of the young Turks, whose movement, he says, is inspired by the Jews. He is actually ashamed to contemplate a closer alliance with "such a state," and expresses the hope that it may not be more than temporary. It is interesting to note that Frymann was farsighted enough to realize that Italy could not in the long run remain an ally of Germany. On the whole the author gives a clever exposition of Bismarckian *Realpolitik*, and his advocacy of an energetic imperialist policy is obviously designed to influence the Wilhelmstrasse, and, indeed, the Kaiser himself. On that score he has every reason to feel satisfied.

Prominent among the Pangerman publicists of to-day is Professor Ernest Jaekkh, who is chiefly known for his book "Das Grössere Mitteleuropa" (1916), and for some earlier works on Turkey and the Middle East, and who is the most energetic of Rohrbach's collaborators. Shortly before the war, in April 1914, these two writers started a new weekly, entitled "*Das Grössere Deutschland; Wochenschrift für Deutsche Welt- und Kolonialpolitik*"; and since January 1916, in conjunction with Philipp Stein, they have edited another weekly, "*Deutsche Politik*," devoted to foreign policy. In these two papers the reader will find a complete review of the contemporary Pangerman movement, both of its theory and of its political application.

Special importance must be attached to the literature which deals with "Central Europe." This watchword is much in vogue in Germany to-day, and sums up the whole object of German policy. The first definite project of a "Central European" state was outlined by Friedrich List, who died as long ago as 1846. List conceived the idea of a close union with Austria, and held that Hungary could be colonised by the Germans, and thus transformed into a German vanguard in the *Drang nach Osten*.

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The establishment of an economic and political union, embracing Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey (the latter being at that time a Balkan as well as an Asiatic Power), would, he argued, be the surest means of striking a blow at Russia and France: meanwhile, Germany should make an alliance with England, her greatest ultimate danger, and concentrate upon the building of a powerful fleet. List's main proposition, the formation of a "United States of Europe" under German control, was a striking anticipation of the modern Pangerman movement. There can be no doubt that Bismarck was very greatly influenced by the ideas of List. He, too, spoke of a "Central Europe," pointing out that the Triple Alliance would re-establish the German Empire of Charles the Great. The Pangermans of to-day have also assimilated List's ideas, and have adapted them to the existing political situation. Winterstetten in particular may be said to have collated the theories of Lagarde, Bismarck, and List.

During the war the "Central Europe" propaganda has developed apace, especially in favour of a Customs Union between Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the very beginning of the war Professor von Liszt in his book "Ein Mitteleuropaeischer Staatenverband" ("A Central European Confederation") (1914), elaborated the idea of Germany and Austria-Hungary as the "compact nucleus" of that union, with Holland, the Scandinavian states, Switzerland, Italy, Poland, the Balkan states and Turkey as their adjuncts. He is even graciously pleased to include France in the scheme, on the ground that after the war that country will have ceased to be a danger to Germany. Spain and Portugal are also at liberty to join. Such a union would be able to hold its own against both Britain and the United States. Liszt only speaks of an economic union, but it must be remembered that the theory of a "compact nucleus," surrounded by subsidiary members of a Customs Union, merely represents the first stage in a process of *pénétration pacifique*, and complete Germanisation. The scheme, indeed, has found its fuller interpretation in this sense in Naumann's book "Mitteleuropa" (1915). Naumann has been translated into English, and some English critics have praised his quiet style and pacific tendencies. Closer study would have convinced them that his book contains the same elements of crude aggression which underlie all Pangerman writings.

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It is true that in his own country he has been criticised for merely advocating a Customs Union, and neglecting the political aspects of the problem (e.g., K. Eichhorn, "Mittel-europa: A Criticism of Naumann's Book"). These critics have, however, been effectively answered by Kautzky, who points out that Naumann does actually go far beyond a mere Customs Union ("Die Vereinigten Staaten Mitteleuropas," 1916), and that his political ideas are Chauvinist enough. In point of fact, Naumann's ruling idea is that of the Prussian "Oberstaat," as he himself calls it; Austria-Hungary, although closely allied with Germany, is to play second string. Incidentally it may be noticed that by proposing Prague as the capital of the new "Central Europe," Naumann seems to accept Bismarck's estimate of Bohemia's importance for Germany and the Pangerman idea.

The economic relationship of Germany and Austria-Hungary is a common topic of discussion throughout the whole literature of Pangermanism. Dr. K. Landauer, for instance, in his "Literatur zur Frage der deutsch-oesterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsannäherung" ("Literature on the Economic Rapprochement between Germany and Austria-Hungary") gives a synopsis of no less than 50 separate projects which have been put forward.

Discussion of the "Central European" project tends to become more and more specialised, and the individual countries which will make up the union are being studied in very great detail. A typical example of this kind of propaganda is afforded by a pamphlet by A. Schmid, entitled "München-Bagdad: Eine bayrische Zukunftsfrage" (1916), in which, as the title itself suggests, Bavaria is treated as the natural bridge between Germany and Asia. A new railway is to be constructed from Munich to Constantinople, and plans for Bavarian canals from the Isar to the Euphrates are discussed in all seriousness.

As evidence of the seriousness and sustained interest with which the Germans regard the proposals for an economic policy based upon a Customs Union, it may be worth recording that some new periodicals have been founded in Germany for the express purpose of educating public opinion on this subject. *Osteuropäische Zukunft* ("The Future of Eastern Europe"), first appeared in January 1916, and the *Wirtschaftszeitung der Centralmächte* ("Economic Journal of the Central Powers") on February 11th. Moreover, the

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whole press has been full of elaborate discussions of economic problems in their bearing upon the war and future reconstruction.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

The Food Crisis in Russia

The Duma is to meet on November 14, and the first question that will occupy its attention is the food crisis. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the situation is a serious one, and that, unless a solution can be found before the winter, the food difficulties may interfere with the military efficiency of our Allies. Numerous attempts have been made during the last eighteen months to solve the question by bureaucratic methods. When M. Maklakov was Minister of the Interior last year he handed over the question to the Minister of Agriculture, but when M. N. Hvostov became Minister of the Interior the chief item on his "practical" programme was the campaign against high prices. His solution was to make the local governors virtual food dictators. This led to all kinds of arbitrary action on the part of officials, which were, at the time, exposed in the Duma. The system was again changed by M. A. Hvostov during his brief administration at the Home Office, and the special powers were taken away from the local governors.

M. Protopopov, the newly-appointed Minister of the Interior, has now been called upon to find a solution. On his return from headquarters he made a statement to Moscow journalists which contains the following reference to the food question: "The question of supplying Moscow with food is very close to the heart of the Emperor, because Moscow has always been the patriotic heart of the country. The Emperor knows all the difficult circumstances through which Moscow is now passing, and he firmly believes that the patriotic attitude of the population will not give way at the present moment. I have received from the Emperor the order to seek, in the most energetic manner, a way out of the present position, and to see that the population should not suffer more than is inevitable during the war."

This statement may be supplemented by a quotation from a speech made by M. Miljukov in the Budget Committee of the Duma: "I have just returned from Moscow, and I must admit that I hardly recognised the ancient capital. To such a degree has the temper of the population changed. It is evident that Protopopov also noticed new currents, because, in his conversation with Moscow journalists, he considered it necessary to emphasize the fact that the food interests of the Empire were near to the heart of the Emperor."

All classes are united in the conviction that an immediate solution must be found. The army leaders are following the situation closely, and are ready to work hand in hand with those great public organizations, the Unions of the Towns and Zemstva. M. Protopopov's intention is to form a special food department under the Minister of the Interior. This will hardly fall in with the wishes of the Duma, but, whatever solution may be found, the one thing upon which public

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opinion is united is that the whole country must co-operate in the food question as it did in the munitions question in July, 1915. The Allies of Russia trust that the differences between the Government and the public will be bridged to enable them to work together in this vital question for the good both of Russia and of the Allied cause.

The Situation in Roumania

In *L'Indépendance Roumanie* of October 5 appeared the following significant paragraph: "M. Titu Maiorescu, ex-Prime Minister, visited, on Sunday last, the Filaret Quarter (of Bucarest), where the air-pirates have thrown the greatest number of bombs. M. Maiorescu was deeply impressed ("profondément impressionné") by all that he saw and verified there." This short paragraph may be taken as a symbol of the great wave of feeling that has swept over Roumania since the outbreak of the European War. Till then, anti-German feeling had been a luxury indulged in only by a few professors and *littérateurs*. German war methods and the revelation of German war aims opened the eyes of a large section of the population, and M. Take Ionescu and his fellow-members of the Unionist Federation rightly interpreted the menace to Roumania implied in the German war plan. But the Roumanian nation, as a whole, still clung to the idea of a limited, national war on Austria-Hungary. Germany's immediate declaration of war on Roumania and the prompt adoption of Zeppelin "frightfulness" rudely dissipated these delusions. Some hundreds of civilians and hospital patients have been killed by the "air-pirates." Poisoned bonbons have been dropped for the benefit of unsuspecting peasants and children. (Perhaps the bitterest Roumanian remark on this subject was made by the independent *Adeverul*, which had a cartoon of Mackensen holding out a packet of poisoned sweets and muttering, "Suffer little children to come unto me.") Only the other day there were disinterred from the garden of the German legation cases containing tubes of bacilli of glanders, with instructions to spread these in hay and water and infect Roumanian live stock. The language of the Roumanian press on the subject of these outrages is not lacking in vigour. Not only M. Ionescu's group of papers but the Government press and even the neutralist organs denounce these "savageries," call for vigorous reprisals, and demand the renunciation of all future relations with the country guilty of such acts. The most energetic of the Germanophil leaders, M. Marghiloman, has, within the last few days, made the following declaration to a correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*: "I have accepted the resolution of the Government and the Liberal Party, as well as of certain parties of the Opposition, and I declare that from to-morrow I will do everything for national unity. *From a partisan of peace I have become a partisan of war.* . . . My one desire now is final victory." We are probably justified in making at least three deductions from this statement. First, that he shares, or at least bows to, the national feeling which the Germans have roused against themselves by their methods. Secondly, that not even the most convinced Roumanian believer in Germany's final victory—

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and with M. Marghiloman Germanophilism was a conviction rather than a sentiment—any longer holds these views. And lastly, that he has turned his back on his policy of the past, and is qualifying for a post in any future National Government. The death of his widely-respected rival, M. Nicolas Filipescu, leaves the Conservative Party—or such parts of it as will not permanently co-operate with M. Ionescu's Conservative-Democrats—at the disposal of M. Marghiloman on the condition (which he has apparently now fulfilled) of promising unreserved support to the national policy.

The Roman Curia and Peace

The Italian Clerical Press, from the official *Osservatore Romano* to the *Corriere d'Italia*, recently broke out into a pacifist campaign. It attempted to cast upon Mr. Lloyd George and the Allies the odium of continuing the war, and claimed that since German imperialistic ambitions have not been successful, the moment had come to cease useless bloodshed and to conclude a peace in which there would be neither victors nor vanquished. In view of this campaign, considerable interest attaches to an appreciation which reaches us—through an eminent scholar of European reputation—from a highly competent neutral observer whose position has enabled him to watch the undercurrents of the war. He writes:—

“There exists a distinct understanding between the Roman Curia and international plutocracy. Three or four big groups of international banks, in which the whole of Jewish high finance is interested, are working to secure control of the resources of the world, thanks to economic organization and to the military power of Germany.

“Germany is in reality an organization for plunder, armed to the teeth and devoid of any political or religious doctrines. Yet she has succeeded in associating with her the great international forces of the Roman Curia—with whose help she invokes the support of religion and of the principle of authority—and of International Socialism, by which she hopes to guide the masses in all countries. These two forces are strengthened by the influence of a few hundred multi-millionaires who control increasingly the financial interests of the middle classes in most countries. Unless the Allies are careful, the public spirit of their peoples and its moral and economic foundations will be undermined while their armies are fighting Germany. ‘Peace’ will fall upon the world like an entangling net, or like a fog, rising one knows not whence nor how. This is the victory at which Germany now aims. She is preparing for it as she alone knows how to prepare, with the help of the Roman Curia on the one hand, and of high finance on the other, and followed by the bleating and imbecile flocks of Socialist pacifists and humanitarian pacifists. If her subtle campaign succeeds, the peoples of Europe will hardly know why they have fought.”

The writer, when he refers to the Roman Curia, obviously must not be regarded as referring to the Roman Catholic Church as a whole. There are the widest differences between the attitude of the

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Church towards the war in the various countries, and not in belligerent countries alone. In Italy the Church has been mainly neutralist or Germanophil; in Spain, Germanophil in an overwhelming majority; in Ireland, to say the least, lukewarm; in Belgium, France, England and Scotland, unhesitatingly patriotic. Its policy in Germany has been best characterised by the attitude of Cardinal Hartmann and the German hierarchy towards the Belgian Bishops. The weight of German *Kultur* and propaganda is pressing ever more and more upon the venerable structure, and, despite certain strong and well-constructed buttresses, dangerous fissures are beginning to appear, such as may ere long fatally affect its position as a universal force. The great war is a period of winnowing, and is slowly but surely deciding the fate of Catholicism, just as it will decide the fate of the dynastic principle and other institutions which lie at the very root of social life.

The Board of Trade and German Firms

We do not understand the objection of the Board of Trade to publishing the names of German firms trading in the United Kingdom. Surely such a step, which has already been taken in Australia with complete success, is of very obvious public interest; and, as has already been pointed out in the weekly press, a very comprehensive list is already in possession of the Public Trustee, so that there need be no delay in compiling one, and no additional expenditure. It is essential that the British trader, and also the man in the street, should have the means at his disposal for ascertaining whether a firm or an individual with whom he proposes to deal, is really British or foreign.

Another reform of the same kind, which it will be necessary to introduce at the end of this war, if not earlier, is the publication, in a cheap and easily accessible form, of a list of all persons who have changed their names in this country, say, during the past twenty years. At present it is far too easy for persons of German, and for that matter of other origin, to conceal their identity by the adoption of some ancient and honoured English or Scottish name. Everyone knows that there are individual cases which justify a change of name, but these are the exception and not the rule. In the vast majority of such cases the individual has grounds for concealing his origin, or is ashamed of his own father. The law ought not encourage such underhand motives.

Parliament and Foreign Policy

In the course of a short debate upon the Greek situation last week, Lord Robert Cecil raised the whole question of parliamentary control of foreign policy in an acute form; and nothing is more characteristic of the collapse of public criticism during the war than the fact that, so far as we are aware, only a single newspaper seriously challenged his point of view. "We" (*i.e.*, the members of the present Cabinet) "are perfectly conscious," he said, "of the many mistakes we make, of the many deficiencies of

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which we are guilty, but I cannot believe that anything which waters down the responsibility of the Government is likely to improve it. We must do what we think right. We must carry on the government of the country, badly I agree, but as well as we can do it, *and we cannot share that responsibility with the House of Commons or with anybody else—not during the war.* That seems to me the only position we can take up." With all respect to so distinguished a member of the Government as Lord Robert Cecil, we submit that this amounts to a claim of infallibility, and that Parliament, if it meekly submits to its assertion, must be regarded as having abandoned its claim to be the guardian of constitutional liberty in this country. As the *Manchester Guardian* points out in its leading article of November 2, the British Parliament has infinitely less control of foreign affairs than the War Committees of the French Chamber and Senate, or even the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. "All that is open to Parliament is to put questions, which if they are really pertinent are likely to meet with impertinent answers; or to initiate on the Foreign Office vote a discussion which will range over every topic under the sun that can be associated with the Foreign Secretary, and which is as ineffective as it is discursive." If Parliament's complete lack of democratic control resulted in decisions upon foreign policy being entrusted to the hands of those who are best qualified by profound knowledge and practical experience to deal with the problems involved, there might be something to be said for the present system; but it is notorious that this is not the case. The establishment of a Foreign Committee in the House of Commons, on lines similar to that which has been established in Paris, would have a beneficial result in every direction. The Foreign Secretary would tend to be a parliamentarian who had made his mark in the Committee, and at the same time its existence would tend to strengthen his hand against bureaucratic tendencies, without in any sense weakening the healthy side of the bureaucracy. Above all, Parliament as a whole will no longer neglect foreign policy, as the system of the past ten years has deliberately and consciously encouraged it to do; "debates will become correspondingly informed and effective, and knowledge and understanding will percolate through to every member of Parliament and to the nation at large." The main argument for extreme secrecy in foreign policy is that prompt and effective decisions are impossible without it. No one who knows anything of the diplomacy of the Entente during the past three years, can seriously contend that decision or effectiveness have been its main characteristics.

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

The New Europe

VOL. I, No. 5.

November 16, 1916

The Lost Provinces Alsace-Lorraine

“ Quarante ans sont passés et ce coin de la terre . . . ”

Victor Hugo.

THE unrest of Europe in the twentieth century has been ascribed to many causes, of which the legacy of 1871 is one of the chief. As far back as 1884 the *Ligue Internationale de la Paix*, meeting in congress at Geneva, declared that “ la conquête et l'annexion de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine sont le principal obstacle à la paix et la vraie cause des armements gigantesques.” The conquest and the annexation were carried through by Bismarck in the belief that the vast bulk of the population of the three French departments would rapidly return to their true German allegiance and settle down amicably as part of the great family whose scattered members he had united. Certainly, under the not too scrupulous guidance of every historical faculty in Germany, the German people were led to believe that the newly-acquired Reichsland was no new acquisition in reality, but merely an old treasure recovered. Bismarck himself was aware that, in taking Metz, he was committing theft. “ I do not like,” he said, “ so many Frenchmen being in our house against their will.” And he fought Moltke on the point, but was beaten by the latter's repeated declaration that the possession of Metz was worth 100,000 men to the German Army. As for the rest of the two provinces the problem in German eyes was merely one of time. They had been the ancient possessions of the Empire which the great military sovereigns of France had taken partly by war, partly by diplomacy; the language of a great part of the people was German; and, in French-speaking districts, the names of places and of persons bore witness to a German origin. What could be more natural than the return of such a people to the true fold! This argument was by no means

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derisory, but it failed to take account of the French Revolution, which had placed its mark deep on the political character of Alsace-Lorraine, and had given their whole political outlook a western orientation. It failed, too, in its estimate of the kind of government which Germany—fast becoming *Preussen-Deutschland*—could offer to these two provinces. The measure of this two-fold failure may be taken in a few paragraphs.

On February 16, 1871, in the National Assembly at Bordeaux, thirty-six deputies from the departments of the Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, Moselle, Meurthe and Vosges made the following declaration :—

“ I. L'Alsace et la Lorraine ne veulent pas être aliénées.

“ II. La France ne peut consentir ni signer la cession de la Lorraine et de l'Alsace.

“ III. L'Europe ne peut permettre ni ratifier l'abandon de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine.

“ En foi de quoi nous prenons nos concitoyens de France, les gouvernements et les peuples du monde entier, à témoin que nous tenons d'avance pour nuls et non avenues tous actes et traités, vote ou plébiscite, qui consentiraient abandon, en faveur de l'étranger, de tout ou de partie de nos provinces de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine.

“ Nous proclamons, par les présentes, à jamais inviolable le droit des Alsaciens et des Lorrains de rester membres de la nation française, et nous jurons, tant pour nous que pour nos commettants, nos enfants et leurs descendants, de le revendiquer éternellement et par toutes les voies enver et contre tous usurpateurs.”

Three years later, the fifteen deputies of the Reichsland—with one exception—made the same declaration in the face of an angry and contemptuous Reichstag.

Twenty years pass. Prince Hohenlohe, as Statthalter, records in his journal the discussions of his officials regarding the manner in which “ satisfaction can be provided for this insult to German nationalism,” when the elections reveal the strong French nationalism of Alsace-Lorraine. And a little later he says: “ It seems that Berlin desires to introduce . . . irritating measures with the object of reducing the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine to despair and driving them to revolt, when it will be possible to say that civil government is useless, and that martial law must be proclaimed.”

Again twenty years pass: and the German Foreign Minister complains that, in the Reichsland, the German Army is “ as though in enemy country.” The rest of the world had

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made that observation for itself at the time of the Zabern affair, and could endorse Friedrich Naumann's verdict: "Prussia took compulsion in one hand and material prosperity in the other, and demanded loyalty in exchange. She brought about much good, but found no way to the heart of the people."*

Before the war broke out the situation of Alsace-Lorraine presented three aspects: the French, the German, and the internal. For many years after 1871 the French aspect was that of *revanche*. "It remained," says Professor Guérard, "the cardinal principle of French national life—the thought left unuttered, but ever-present, according to the dictum of Gambetta, 'Let us think of it always but never speak of it.' Even Victor Hugo, the prophet of peace and of the universal republic had to confess, 'Another war, alas! Yes, it is necessary'; and of all leaders of French thought, perhaps Renan alone was strong enough to breast the tide of popular passion. But *la revanche* had to be postponed; the country had to recuperate, a permanent government had to be established, the army must be reorganised. . . . Ten years went by; the clash of parties had begun to undermine the singlemindedness of the nation; an aggressive colonial policy was embarked upon by a few energetic statesmen; and gradually it was realised that France had resumed her normal life, that she was prosperous, expanding—and still unavenged." When he saw what was happening Déroulède broke into a furious campaign, in the course of which he coined the famous phrase in a taunt flung at Jules Ferry: "Moi, j'ai perdu deux enfants: et vous, vous m'offrez vingt domestiques." But greater forces than an attractive colonial policy were at work against Déroulède and his Nationalist ideal. From the day of its foundation in 1870 to the end of the Dreyfus case in 1906 the Third Republic was almost wholly pre-occupied with the task of entrenching itself against the attacks of its domestic enemies, and was, therefore, at no time during that period free to take up the challenge of *la revanche*. Indeed, it was usually the case that the *revanchards* were the allies of its domestic enemies, Royalist and Clerical; and thus the more earnestly the average Frenchman espoused the cause of the Republic the less he liked the doctrine of revenge, for it seemed to

* "Central Europe," by F. Naumann, p. 79. (Eng. Trans.)

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him to open the gate once more to monarchical or personal rule. His sense of loss was keen; his anger at German injustice remained; the hope of *revanche* was ardently cherished; but, do what he would, he could not escape the cruel dilemma. For thirty years this conflict of feeling raged. Its most recent interpreter, M. Marcel Sembat, in "Faites un Roi, sinon, faites la Paix," has presented it to us with all his wonted fearless originality and a good deal of perverse argument; and though two years of war have practically destroyed his thesis, most Frenchmen will admit that, till 1914, there was always a conflict in their breasts between the desire for peace and their claim to the lost provinces, and that the former was steadily growing at the expense of the latter. Each year the steady growth of German military power raised the price of *la revanche*; and the slowly-changing attitude of the two provinces themselves had no small effect upon the French mind.

For the German Empire the question of the Reichsland was one of domestic politics, in which none but Germans had any voice. There were many Germans who regarded with loathing the harsh policy of the Imperial Government in Alsace-Lorraine, but were not prepared to support the only generous policy which could have won the assent of Alsatians to their German connection. At the critical moment in 1911 even the Social Democrats deserted the autonomist ideal and left the Reichsland in the lurch. The truth is that each successive failure of German Imperial policy in the annexed provinces merely inflamed Pangerman sentiment, and led to the old demand for "resolute government"; while the more moderate parties, at the best, only learned a deepened suspicion of France. After forty-four years of "acclimatisation" Berlin and the Reichsland were as far asunder as ever.

The movement for autonomy arose from the necessities of the case. Merely to protest against the German occupation was found to be a barren process, and the economic development soon forced the protesters to choose between the negative policy of holding aloof and the positive policy of taking whatever share they could in government. In the long run, the positive policy prevailed, and was coupled with an unwavering demand for true self-government. The road by which the great majority in both provinces reached this

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conclusion lay as follows: A large part of Alsace-Lorraine is, by origin and language, German, closely akin to the neighbouring peoples in the Palatinate and the Grand Duchy of Baden. Their original character was obscured, though not radically changed, by their absorption in the French Empire; *but*—and this fact few Germans have ever recognised—they remained long enough under the French flag to acquire deep-rooted French traditions, to assimilate the civilisation of the French, and finally, in the course of five generations, to learn to love France passionately, as they do who know her best. Their enthusiastic welcome of the French Revolution sealed their allegiance. Thus, by the date of the Treaty of Frankfurt, the vast majority of the people of Alsace-Lorraine had forgotten their origin, to which, nevertheless, their family names and language in multitudes of cases still bore witness. The victory of Germany came as a violent reminder of their ancient ancestry; but it came too late. It imposed upon them a repugnant type of government which only succeeded in fostering the spirit which it tried to crush. Thousands, taking the opportunity offered to them, fled westwards to France; but the majority remained behind to hold the fort of French manners, custom, freedom, laws, against the rude intrusion of the alien invader. Their success in maintaining intact the noblest traditions of French life, the higher refined civilisation of France against the massive power of Germany, can be seen in scores of "incidents." And no doubt as to their true thoughts would ever have arisen but for the compelling necessity of finding a *modus vivendi* till they should be free and French once more. If they doubted their deliverance it was because, as time went on, they could not discern in France the power—often, indeed, not the will—to deliver them. And knowing that war alone could realise their hopes, they shrank from anything which might provoke the conflict in which they must inevitably be the worst sufferers. True, for many years after 1871, they looked to France for rescue, eagerly scanning the political horizon for the least sign which could brighten their hopes. They rejoiced in the national revival that followed the war; in the swift payment of the indemnity which so staggered Bismarck, they saw a good omen of returning strength; the campaigns of Paul Déroulède raised their spirits, and in his songs and speeches their dearest

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thoughts found utterance. For one moment, when General Boulanger seemed to be mounting the seat of power, they believed that their hour had come; but the hope was speedily broken in the *débâcle* of the Boulangist movement. The tide then seemed to turn against them. After Boulanger, Panama; after Panama, Dreyfus; and their confidence in France as a deliverer began to be shaken. The great anti-clerical struggle to which the Dreyfus case gave birth showed them how deeply the French people were preoccupied with their own domestic affairs, and did more than anything else to throw Alsace and Lorraine on their own resources. Finally, for all concerned, the increasing contrast in military power between France and Germany seemed to postpone indefinitely all hope of deliverance.

Meanwhile, these negative influences were aided in their work of removing *la revanche* from the arena of practical politics by others of a positive character. Industrial development raised economic questions and created new political needs; the advance of Socialism brought a formidable rival to French nationalism into the field of politics in the Reichsland; Catholics in large numbers, especially during the anti-clerical struggle in France, gravitated towards the Centre Party; and the growth of other parties created diversions and divisions which tended to impair the strength of the French spirit. Despite all this, the Reichsland remained aloof from the rest of the Empire. France had done her work of assimilation too well, her ideals were too attractive, her democracy too congenial to Alsace-Lorraine, to be uprooted by force. Co-operation with the more democratic German parties might be said to have begun to wean the two provinces from their ideal of political incorporation in France, but it had also proved that their French character could not be destroyed. Before the war broke out, Alsace and Lorraine had clearly showed that their original refusal to enter the German Empire could only be overcome by the grant of autonomy, and that autonomy itself was a *pis-aller*. France remained the ideal.

The war has torn up the Treaty of Frankfurt, and victory will bring back her lost provinces to France. All the ingenious plans of neutralisation, federalisation with Belgium and Switzerland, and the like, fall to the ground by the fact of a French victory which will simply restore the *status quo*

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ante 1871. No more will timid journalists quote the well-worn sentence, "L'annexion de l'Alsace-Lorraine fut un crime; une guerre de revanche en serait un autre." The return of the provinces to France is no annexation but simply a restoration. It requires no plebiscite; it demands no special consultation of the people for its realisation. But, in order that it may be an enduring success, the French people must reckon in advance with certain difficulties created by a generation of German rule in the Reichsland.

The first of these lies in the very strength of the autonomy movement itself which throve on the strong particularist character of the population. Without any of the contemptible *Kleinstaatererei* of the smaller German principalities, Alsace and Lorraine claimed to represent something different even from the most genial and liberal of the South German States, just as, in former times, they stoutly maintained their local patriotism under the French flag. In a word, they were *têtes carrées*—the Scots of France—and the robustness of their character may be seen in the disproportionate number of generals and statesmen they have given to France. It was this very resoluteness and tenacity which forced the population to adopt a positive policy which could give practical results beyond the mere satisfaction of a protest against Germanisation. The *protestataires*, without knowing it, were the forerunners of the *autonomistes*: for the latter did no more than use the protesting sentiment as the motive force behind the specific and attractive political demand for autonomy. This constructive side of life in the Reichsland was largely obscured from the eyes of Europe by the deliberate falsification of news from Alsace and Lorraine in German newspapers, and by the constant emphasis laid on the past and its sorrows by French writers of the Nationalist school. In many a French novel you may see the picture of little citadels of beleaguered French patriots, aloof from the rougher ways of their conquerors, maintaining a glorious unequal conflict with the forces of barbarism. Who that has read Maurice Barrès or René Bazin can fail to share their poignant feelings in contemplating the ruthless attempt to obliterate the well-moulded habits of an old community. Who does not rejoice in the unerring aim by which the barbed shafts of M. Barrès' wit find their target in the grosser ways of the German? There are pages in "Au Service de

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l'Allemagne” and in “*Colette Baudoche*” which sharply express the contempt of the higher race for the lower, of the men of mind for the men of force. But with it all the Barrès note is a note of melancholy, of regret, in a word, of defeat. Lorraine herself had more to say than Barrès could say for her. Doubtless he made his readers realise the unconquerable strength of the French sentiment, especially in Metz; but it would be an error to accept even his masterly pictures of life in Lorraine as the whole story, for he hardly gives so much as a glimpse of the strong forces which were pushing forward the policy of autonomy before the war. Barrès is a son of Lorraine who lived in her past, and out of its toil and anguish he weaves a moving tale. He has made the Old Guard of Lorrainers, with their dear French ladies of Metz, live for us. He created a cult of Lorraine which drew all its inspiration from memory and none from a future of hope. In that respect his message always lacked a part of the truth; for, even before the war, no one with knowledge would have dared to say that the future held no hope for the two great provinces of the Rhine. Now that the war has brought the realisation of the greatest of all their hopes unexpectedly within their grasp, it may well prove that the very quality which kept the French flag dauntlessly flying in the darkest hours of past years will make the reincorporation in France no easy process. Warnings to this effect come to us from authoritative lips. Those who know their Alsace best know how tenacious the particularist spirit has been, and how, in its long conflict with Germanisation, it has gripped ever more firmly the character of the people in order to maintain its ground against the overweening power of Prussia. The French spirit was the soul of the people, the sturdy sense of independence its backbone; and now that the soul of the people is at last promised rest and freedom in the congenial air of France, the French nation must use tact, forbearance and even measures of delay in dealing with the sense of independence in the Alsatian mind. The Abbé Wetterlé writes thus on this question of assimilation:—

“ Les plus graves problèmes vont se poser, et de la solution qu'on leur donnera dépendra l'assimilation plus ou moins rapide d'une population qui, certes, a gardé pour la France la plus grande affection, mais qu'une transformation trop rapide de ses habitudes surprendrait jusqu'à la désorienter complètement dans le milieu où, pourtant, elle désirait si ardemment revivre.”

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And the brothers Lichtenberger, after adducing unimpeachable evidence of the Reichsland's love of France, declare :—

“ Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que la réintégration de l'Alsace-Lorraine dans la communauté française est une opération délicate et qui demande quelque doigté.”

France is a unitary State, Germany a federation in which an autonomous Alsace-Lorraine *might* eventually have taken a worthy place. The return to France means the end of the idea of autonomy—a fact which the leading patriots of Alsace and Lorraine fully recognise; but, in recognising it, they put in a most forcible plea for an interregnum during which some of the sharper difficulties created by German rule may be smoothed away. The form of administration which will obtain during the transition does not concern us here, but the fact of the transition itself is all-important. It will clearly be impossible for the French Chamber, with the best will in the world, and even strengthened by the elected representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, to deal adequately with the task of transforming the legislation and administration of the restored provinces. A special commission, responsible primarily to the President of the Republic and ultimately (no doubt) to the French Parliament, must take over the delicate task of preparing measures of transition in law and civil service. In a brochure entitled “ La Question d'Alsace-Lorraine,” MM. Henri and André Lichtenberger have an apposite passage on the attitude of the re-annexed man-in-the-street :—

“ Ils compareront très calmement le régime nouveau avec l'ancien et feront leur bilan. Or, l'administration allemande était dure, tracassière, dépensière. Mais elle était effective. L'ordre régnait au village. Les services publics, chemins de fer, postes, assurances sociales, etc., fonctionnaient très exactement. L'instruction était dispensée avec rudesse mais abondamment. Ce sont là des mérites que les Alsaciens reconnaissent. Un des très rares Allemands qui aient parlé des choses d'Alsace avec bons sens, M. Otto Effertz, écrivait il y a quelques années qu'il était certain que les Alsaciens consultés par plébiscite rédameraient à une énorme majorité la *nationalité* française : mais, ajoutait-il, il n'est pas tout-à-fait aussi sûr que la même majorité se trouverait en faveur de l'*administration* française. Il importe au plus haut point que nous fassions mentir cette restriction.”

One of the first measures will be to abolish the fictitious unity of the Reichsland and restore something like the old

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French departments: for it is clear that Metz and Nancy have far more in common than Metz and Strasbourg. But, in this proceeding, it will probably be found that the German subdivision of each department may profitably be maintained; though, on the other hand, the whole question will be governed by the number of suitable officials who are available. Suitability in this case is largely a question of language. When we remember that, even after five generations under French government, four-fifths of Alsace and more than one-quarter of Lorraine still spoke German dialects—a tribute, by the way, to the large tolerance of the French people!—though their political outlook and ways of thought were entirely French, it will readily be understood that the last forty years under German rule have not increased the number either of French-speaking citizens or officials. The bi-lingual official is therefore a necessity. And not only the bi-lingual official, but also the teacher in whose hands the happiness of the immediate future of the three new departments will so largely lie. Germany made the characteristic blunder of thinking that the use of French in Lorraine and in Upper Alsace could be stamped out by force: and the only result was that the elected representatives in the *Landesausschuss* at Strasbourg—no honest man could call it a Parliament—repeatedly and unanimously demanded the universal and compulsory teaching of French in the elementary schools. The French people know their kith and kin of the Rhine provinces too well to ignore their mixed culture by attempting to enforce the immediate and universal use of French.

There are many problems which do, indeed, demand *quelque doigté* in those who would solve them. Questions such as industrial insurance, adjustments of taxation, tobacco monopoly, rates of pay and salaries, regulations for practice in law, in medicine, in pharmacy, etc., touch the day-to-day life of everybody, and rude changes must be avoided. But a more formidable task still remains. The question which rent France in two for a generation and still excites a good deal of heat has never even been raised in Alsace-Lorraine; and thus the great anti-clerical Republic is faced with the task of making a habitable place in her household for two provinces still in communion with Rome. No doubt M. Briand and the partisans of *l'apaisement* have done much to prepare the public

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mind of France for that large tolerance which alone can bridge the gulf between anti-clerical and Catholic. Doubtless, too, the war has softened old asperities and evoked a new spirit. But let us cherish no hasty optimism. Nothing but the most deliberate and generous statesmanship can prevent this thorny question from causing grave trouble. Alsace and Lorraine are still under the *régime* of the Concordat of 1801. The dioceses of Strasbourg and Metz were simply detached in 1871 from the ecclesiastical province of Besançon and placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See. The religious question in politics, despite Socialist anti-clericalism, has never been acute, and the Strasbourg "Parliament," doubtless under the influence of a predominantly Catholic electorate, has more than once shown its active and benevolent interest in such questions as the adequate payment of the religious ministry. Education has largely retained its confessional character, and the great teaching and charitable Orders of the Roman Church are recognised by law. The ultimate aim of the French Republic must necessarily be the conformity of her restored provinces with the law which has disestablished religion throughout France: but even the most intransigent anti-clericals refuse to demand instant compliance. Even they are well aware that the people of Alsace and Lorraine, in Abbé Wetterlé's words, would be "littéralement désorienté si la France libératrice se montrait moins tolérante, en cette matière, que l'Allemagne tyrannique." And no Frenchman can ever forget the incomparable services of the clergy to the French cause in the Reichsland. The notable example of Monseigneur Dupont des Loges, Bishop of Metz from 1842 to 1886, was followed by the vast majority of the Roman clergy, to whom France owes not a little of the French nationalism which has survived a generation of German oppression. The recollection of such services must weigh heavily in the balance when these clergy come up for judgment before their Republican compatriots: and we cannot doubt that those who have suffered in a common cause will find a worthy solution even for so formidable a problem.

A. F. WHYTE.

Hammer and Steel : A Russian View of the War

"A HEAVY hammer shivers glass but forges steel." This verse of Russia's greatest poet, Pushkin, has become a favourite political proverb in the Russia of to-day. By it Pushkin symbolised in a picturesque manner the happy transformation of the ancient Muscovite "Rus" into the Europeanised Russia of Peter the Great—a process realised under the violent blows delivered against our country by the Swedish invader, Charles XII. Pushkin's immortal line, which has fitted every epoch of foreign onslaught upon Russia, may be regarded equally as a prophecy for our own day. The hand of William II., whom, in his turn, history will regard as a crowned adventurer, has once again struck Russia with the smashing hammer of Teutonism. It was to splinter us like glass, but, instead of that, it encountered all the integrity, solidity, elasticity and suppleness of steel ready for the furnace. And the power of energy and resistance in this mass of Russian steel increases with every smashing blow of the hammer. "It hurts the anvil, but not less the hammer," says another Russian proverb. And already one may observe the phenomenon which has marked every truly Russian war, namely, the fact that it is a war understood, accepted and conducted by the Russian people itself, a war eminently patriotic and national. The hammer is tired of beating on the steel, knows that it cannot hope to splinter it, and is already seeking to end the game by a return to the old positions. Hence all these overtures for peace, official and semi-official, direct and indirect, by which Germany, through every possible kind of medium, is never tired of assailing the representatives of the Russian Government and diplomacy, the members of the Duma, influential journalists, travelling business men and even ordinary educated Russians met by chance, above all, those who are suffering from the war. During the last six months I have not met a single Russian of any standing whatever who has visited a neutral country of Europe without bringing back with him an account of some fresh German effort to manœuvre Russia out of the war by pacific concessions.

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Moreover, these concessions are sometimes defined so generously that, if Russia had been waging an ordinary war of vulgar calculation and interest—a mere war of annexation and grab—it is certain that not even the most decisive victory could have secured her greater results. Yet, at the same time, these German emissaries of a separate peace seek to persuade us that we are the vanquished. The result is an absurd blend of tragedy and comedy. “We have conquered you, but we are generous to the point of recompensing you at all costs for our victory. Only, in the name of God, stop the game.” The reply is always firm and invariable. “Thank you; we do not require it. Kindly go on with the fighting.”

The baffled emissaries, in their discomfiture, console themselves by spreading rumours of a separate peace and of Russia's alleged eagerness for it, and seek thereby to alarm public opinion in the Allied countries, where Russia is little known and the Russian people still less. Besides, in the West one is apt to exaggerate unduly the political gossip invented by the enemy, who reckons with mistrust wherever there is ignorance. It must, however, be remembered that the Germans themselves do not know Russia well. They have proved this by the folly of the present war, against which their great oracle, Bismarck, so often warned them. And yet the Germans know Russia a good deal better than the other peoples of the West, and know how to exploit this advantage. Independent study of Russia by English and French observers is still in an embryonic stage, and, for the present, is unhappily restricted to its romantic side, which produces more illusion and prejudice than real knowledge. Those who have read Dostoevsky and Tolstoi seriously fancy that they have gained a key to the comprehension of Russia, and weave wonderful myths about the “Slav soul.” Some European writers do honour to this imaginary psychology of ours, while others, on the contrary, see in it a proof of the “Slav danger.” But, in essence, both schools agree in separating us from the rest of Europe as eccentric strangers, surrounded by a mysterious aureole, and living upon exaggerations and mystic ideals. In reality, nothing could be more erroneous than this theoretic presentment of the Russian people, imposed upon western minds by two or three writers of genius who

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happened themselves to have mystical leanings. Out of a people whose entire history is eminently realistic, the West has created in its imagination a phantom people inspired by an idealism which borders upon degeneracy, and is sometimes positively insane. Men conceive of gods and devils according to their own dreams and ideals. The same thing may be said of the manner in which Russia has been treated in western literature. In it Russia is always akin to the particular god or devil who inhabits the soul of the particular author; no one sees Russia as she really is.

So much for western theories of Russia. As for its practical knowledge of us, western Europe does not seem to be much further on—*mutatis mutandis*—than its diplomats, merchants and explorers in the eighteenth century; for throughout the nineteenth century we were isolated and fenced off from the west by a German wall. Europe is so accustomed to see Russia through German glasses that even to-day she sometimes unconsciously falls back into a habit which is equally mischievous for our country and for her Allies. The image of Russia invented by the advocates of Pangerman foreign policy, and, alas, no less by the Germans inside the Russian bureaucracy, throughout the century following the Holy Alliance, has transformed itself into a kind of gigantic phantom, whose true features can scarcely be distinguished through the folds of its mantle. The war has torn this gloomy veil, but the rents are not yet large enough to transform Russia from phantom to reality, or to convert doubt and conjecture into knowledge and certainty. For us Russians this ghostly existence is far from agreeable. Yet if humanity, accustomed to imagining that the sun revolves round the earth, persisted in its error despite the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo, how can we complain of the western habit of representing political Russia in the guise of an algebraical formula: 1 autocratic Tsar + x uncontrolled bureaucracy + y landed nobility + 185,000,000 voteless zeros, which only acquire significance when added to the figures of the three other groups.

This is not the place to discuss the vital changes wrought upon this formula (which was never entirely accurate) by the Japanese War, the Revolution of 1905, the semi-constitution of 17th October, the agrarian reforms of the revolutionary era, and, above all, the two years of the

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Great European War. An analysis and synthesis of these changes would require a whole book. I will restrict myself to a single example, already touched upon, namely, the bogey of a separate peace.

Quite recently in Italy a British diplomat said to me, "For Britain the question of peace with Germany does not exist, for the simple reason that there is no one with whom to conclude it. We cannot deal with the Hohenzollern, and Germany has, as yet, no other competent organs of international policy."

We Russians can adapt to our own situation the same proud and audacious phrase: "Germany may make what efforts she pleases for a separate peace. She may spread what rumours she likes as to our eagerness for peace. She may even find among the Russians a few unpatriotic cowards ready for a separate peace. There is one thing she cannot find in Russia: a political organ authorised to accept the proposal of a separate peace, or possessing full powers to conclude it. And that is the only thing that matters."

It is difficult not to smile, when, in the year 1916, questions of so decisive, so purely national, a character for Russia are, in the west, translated into terms of this or that court intrigue, of the sympathies or antipathies of some *grande dame*, of the Germanophil or Anglophil tendencies of some bureaucrat, of the stubborn mysticism of some unbalanced fanatic, or even of the spiritistic gift of some popular charlatan. I leave aside the obvious fact, proved by over two years of evidence, that if the question of war and peace in Russia could be reduced to a personal equation, the sole individual who could hope to exercise such power—the Tsar Nicholas II.—is the most firm, loyal and active promoter of the war. A strong opponent of Prussian militarism and of the Hohenzollern idea of world hegemony, could the Russian Tsar in any case impose his own personal will? No. One is tempted to repeat the political aphorism invented by our enemies: *Und der König absolut, wenn er unsern Willen thut*. There are wars in which the rulers enlist their peoples, and there are others in which the peoples enlist their rulers. Our war against Germany to-day is not a caprice of the autocratic principle, such as that by which Nicholas I., in 1848, saved tottering Austria from the Magyars. It is not a dynastic adventure like that of

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Napoleon III., nor a colonial incident, inspired by private interests and malignant diplomacy, like the Japanese War. It is a popular war in the fullest sense of the word. In Russia it is called the "Second War for the Fatherland" (the first was in 1812); but it is far more serious and responsible than the first, not only by reason of its countless victims and the effort involved, but also by its whole political and historical psychology. Tsar Nicholas II., as chief of a popular war, occupies a far safer and more favourable position than that of his ancestors, Alexander I., who led the war for the Fatherland, and Alexander II., who led the war for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. To-day we are conducting a war for our own liberation from that German yoke which dates back to the Holy Alliance. The Germans are mistaken or consciously lying when they maintain that we were preparing for the war which broke out in 1914. Unhappily we were not. Otherwise the events of 1915 would not have plunged us in chaos and disarray. But the Germans, none the less, may claim that their methods of penetration in Russia, alike in the political, the administrative, and, above all, the economic sphere, have produced a sense of oppression so intolerable and so varied that the moral readiness for a war against Germany had become, in the younger generation of Russians, almost a fixed idea. On the other hand, the Russian bureaucracy, the pupil and creature of the Germans, had bound up its own interests in Russia with the policy of the House of Hohenzollern, and frankly proclaimed German predominance as the support of the throne, of law and order and as a guarantee of the monarchical and conservative principle. Our whole bureaucratic system is the work of the Germans; and it is only in the last two reigns that a certain disgust of the supreme power for its German tutelage and a tendency to a national direction had become noticeable. Thus our war is also a popular revolution against the parasitic plant of Germanism which had struck triumphant roots in Russian soil, and was threatening to stifle the mighty tree in its deadly embrace. This feature of the war was understood by the reactionaries of our Germanized bureaucracy; and it is no accident that the press and the representatives of the Extreme Right are openly Germanophil and fierce enemies of France and Britain. But happily their teeth are drawn, and they are absolutely insignificant in numbers. The

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Tsar displayed political understanding and a real civic virtue when, over the heads of his bureaucracy and of the reactionaries with their plutocratic interests, he held out his hand to the popular movement against Germany and accepted war. But it must be admitted that the qualities which he has shown have already received a corresponding historic reward. The date of the declaration of war against Germany is compared to the great date, February 19th, 1861, the Liberation of the Serfs. In the flames of the great popular agony of 1914-16, this date has shrivelled, if not burnt up, the gloomy memory of January 9th, 1915—the dread nightmare of the present reign.

As always, the union with popular sentiment in a great war has greatly increased the prestige of the chief of the State. An equally certain fact in historic psychology is that nothing demolishes more rapidly and decisively the popularity of a nation's idols and the prestige of dynasties than unfinished wars in which the confidence of the people has been betrayed, or treaties of peace in which the national enemy has not been reduced to that innocuous state which provides a guarantee for the future. We Russians do not love war, and when we have to wage an accidental and futile war, we wage it very badly, as our struggle with Japan has shown. But, when faced with the necessity of fighting for the national defence and for the liberation of the Fatherland, we do not ask for a compromise peace, and we do not grant it to the enemy.

“ 'Tis not for jesting, nor for laughter's sake,
That I am come against thee, traitor's son.
It is for mortal struggle that I come,
For that last strife of all . . .
For one of us the funeral mass shall sound.”

These words are placed by our great poet Lermontov in the mouth of Kalašnikov—but yesterday a peaceable and homely merchant, to-day outraged in the bosom of his family by the knightly favourite of Ivan the Terrible, and transformed into a grim combatant at a tourney which was to become a fight *à outrance*. The psychology of the merchant Kalašnikov is the psychology of Russia in the war with Germany. We, a peaceful and democratic nation of *mužiks*, would not have engaged in controversy with William II. for the mere pleasure of throwing him from his horse; but, once involved in this sanguinary game which

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he has provoked, we bid him beware lest the tourney become a feast of death.

The Tsar represents the one pole of Russian political life; let us turn towards the other. The firm resolve of the Russian people in its struggle to the end against Germany cannot be expressed more significantly than in the ardent participation of the groups of the Extreme Left. I refer not merely to the legalised opposition, but, above all, to the revolutionary forces in Russia. It was their irreconcilable attitude towards the Tsar and his Government with which the Germans undoubtedly reckoned as a strong factor in their favour in the present war. The very first day of the war revealed the absurdity of this calculation—as false as it was insulting for the revolutionaries themselves. The whole world remembers that war broke out in the midst of a colossal strike of the Russian working classes. The Germans hoped to strike at a moment of acute political crisis. But the sight of the manifestoes on the walls of the capital, announcing danger from a foreign foe, sufficed to silence immediately internal dissension. The revolutionaries, in so far, at least, as they were really Russian, at once repudiated the part assigned to them by the Germans, of selling their country. Indeed, the war provided their forces with a new opportunity of showing that they do not represent an accidental political party, but an organic part of the people, united with it by a common ideal, by common sufferings and hopes. There are a few crying exceptions to this general rule, but these are so rare and so futile that they do not deserve serious attention. It is, indeed, possible that the phenomenon, as much curious as repellent, known as the “Movement of Defeat” (*poraženčestvo*), merely exists because such splendid veterans of the Russian literary movement as Krapotkin and Plehanov pay it the undeserved honour of polemics. There are certain revolutionary decadents whose love of opposition makes them favour any notoriety, even if only that of Herostratus. But in the great mass the war has silenced all discord in the revolutionary groups, and rallied all their activities round the flag of national defence. There is not a single leader of note or reputation in the history of the Russian revolution who has not thrown in his lot with the nation in its struggle against Germany. The apostle of anarchism, Peter Krapotkin, held out his hand to his special opponent, Plehanov, the leader

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of the Social Democrats. The old heroes of the Will of the People, the former prisoners of the Schlüsselburg, Lopatin (the intimate friend of Karl Marx), Vera Figner, Lazarev; N. Tchaikovski, well known in England, which did so much for his release; V. Burzev, the famous exposé of that modern Judas, the secret agent Azev, and of his criminal conspiracy with the Russian police—all are now at one in proclaiming a war *à outrance*; while that pioneer of Russian Social Democracy, Anna Kulišov, devotes herself in Italy to combating the neutralist tendencies of the official Socialists, even in her own family. Such is the older generation of the revolutionaries. As for the younger, we need only point to the bloodstained fields of France, where, near Carency, the attack of the Czech, Polish and Russian volunteers—in other words, of the revolutionary emigrants—turned the day in favour of the Allies. There it was that Maxim Gorki's adopted son, Zinovi Peškov, lost his right arm; there fell Slietov and Zolotarev, and many others, who fought to link their cause with the great problem of European liberation. And, turning from the domain of the sword to that of the pen, I would point to the new group of revolutionary emigrants who, for the first time, have united all Russian Social Democrats round the new Parisian review—*Priziv* (The Appeal)—Alexinsky, on the one hand, and his opponents, Axentiev, Bunakov and Voronov, on the other. For this war-union, no one of them has abandoned his convictions nor accepted the least compromise. For there exist in the world great words which unite in themselves every conviction; and such are "People," "Fatherland." It is their "Appeal" which, for the time, silences all discussion and party bargaining.

Thus the German hammer, instead of shattering us into fragments of glass, is forging our old discords into finest steel, bringing together in a common national aim the most distant groups of political life and thought. And, however the anvil may groan under the blows of Germany—*à la bonne heure, Messieurs*, kindly go on with the game! We shall keep it up till your worn and useless hammer falls in splinters. Till then no true Russian can accept the idea of peace.

And what could be the basis of such a peace? Between us and Germany there are no longer artificial political frontiers. Everywhere stretches a natural and unalterable barrier, that ocean of blood and tears shed by our own people, by

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our Serb, Czech and Polish kinsmen, and by our Belgian, British, French and Italian Allies. Only when Germany shall have done penance upon the ruins of her ally Austria, only then will "peace" no longer seem an absurdity to Russian ears. To-day we are still at the commencement of the struggle. Austria, that *agent provocateur* among States, ever in the bondage of Germany, still exists, and is still strong enough to hold in her claws the Czechs, the Southern Slavs, the Italian and Roumanian Irredenta. Germany is on the shores of the Mediterranean: she commands at Constantinople, she threatens Asia and Africa. Serbia and Belgium are not yet re-established. Our promises to Poland are still not executed. The enemy still treads the soil of Russia and of France. Hundreds of English victims cry for vengeance from the seas. The German brigand still rages in our own house, and we are to make peace with him? Our Allies need not be alarmed. When our common enemies, with would-be sarcasm, tell us that England has sworn to fight "to the last Russian soldier," they do not even suspect the terrible truth which lies beneath this wretched insinuation. For "before giving your word, hold back; after giving your word, hold firm," says the Russian proverb, and it is certain that we Russians shall, to our last soldier, remain loyal to Europe's struggle for civilisation and liberty against Brute Force and the mailed fist. We are determined that no part of the historic curse which weighs upon the Central Empires shall be transferred by the peoples of Europe to our heads. Since the days of Metternich the Germans have maligned us by representing Russia as "the gendarme of Europe," and too often they have made of our bureaucracy and diplomacy real gendarmes in international policy. To-day we wash off the mud of this historic calumny, and appear as soldiers in the great struggle for European liberty, and, I may say, as soldiers of no mean order. For over two years our resolution and strength have not failed, though we have often had to meet an enemy armed to the teeth, with our hands almost empty. We shall not yield, no matter what bogey the enemy may hold before our eyes. We know that these efforts prove him to be desperate, while our muscles are still fresh and not yet strained to the utmost.

ALEXANDER AMFITEATROV.

ENEMY PORTRAITS : ENVER PASHA

Enemy Portraits : (I) Enver Pasha

THE greatness of the catastrophe which has befallen Europe is only equalled by the smallness of the men in whose hands the fate of the nations rests. With the sinister exception of William II., the reigning sovereigns have dropped into the background, and though there are many generals of high ability, no figure of commanding genius has as yet appeared on the political or even on the military horizon, either among the belligerents or among the neutrals. Mr. Briand in France, Mr. Lloyd George in England, Mr. Venizelos in Greece, and Count Tisza in Hungary, have voiced the aspirations and fired the imagination of their respective peoples; but there is no Pitt, no Cavour, no Eugene, and no Garibaldi.

Turkey stands in a class alone and cannot be judged by any outside standards. It is this which surrounds with a certain glamour the figure of Enver Pasha, and which is responsible for the profoundly false estimate of his character which still survives in the west. A strikingly handsome, not to say flashy exterior, a restless and overflowing energy, forms the façade to a nature which has always batted on secret intrigue, while revelling in the limelight. In a country where the study of genealogy is an almost hopeless task, the alleged Polish origin of Enver has never been definitely established; his knowledge of Slavonic is no proof. Entering the army in the Hamidian Era, he became aide-de-camp to Hilmi Pasha when the latter was Governor of Macedonia, and plunged with a will into the labyrinth of conspiracy and treachery which centred in the masonic lodges of Salonica. He had a greater share than any other Turkish officer in the formation of the Committee of Union and Progress, which these crypto-Jewish intrigues—with their ramifications among the *haute finance* of Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Paris and London—did so much to produce. His fellow conspirator Niazi, who raised the revolution at Monastir in 1908, perished in the Balkan War at the hands of an Albanian, who avenged upon him the murder of his kinsman, Shemsi Bey. But Enver meanwhile, rising on the wave of pseudo-Liberalism, had been sent by the triumphant Young Turks as military attaché to Berlin, whence he returned hurriedly in the spring of 1909 to join Mahmud Shevket in his march

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upon Constantinople and in the deposition of Abdul Hamid. Since then Enver, with a tiny group of colleagues, has provided most of the motive force of the Committee. As a keen soldier, he had already studied his profession hard; but his profound admiration for the military methods of Potsdam went parallel with more disjointed influences, derived from the French Revolution. His head, like that of the far abler Talaat and Djavid, is a strange jumble of Rousseau, Danton and Anacharsis Clotz: and the megalomania of which he is notoriously the prey, has earned for him the nickname of "Napoleonitcho" (*Le petit Napoléon*). The Rights of Man and the Reign of Terror had to assume a Turkish garb, to be followed in due course by the "whiff of grapeshot" and the advent of a "little Corporal." With this end in view all methods were justified, and in foreign policy Enver and his gang were ready to ally themselves with whichever Power or group of Powers displayed the greatest military and political energy and the clearest perception of "Realpolitik." His search for the most suitable ally brought him at one time to England, where he was hailed by a prominent Liberal politician at a banquet of well-meaning pacifists as the new Garibaldi. But on his return to Turkey he expressed to his intimates his supreme contempt for decadent and unmilitary England, and deigned graciously to include the women of England in his criticism. Those who have so sadly misjudged Ferdinand and his Bulgars may perhaps be excused for misreading the character of Enver at a time when the *Neue Freie Presse* and the whole Jewish Liberal press of Europe was singing in every key the praises of the Young Turks.

When the Tripolitan War broke out Enver felt that the moment had arrived for assuming the mantle of Napoleon. The army of Egypt was to find its parallel in the army of Lybia. Enver's activities at Benghazi were well advertised, and his striving after the Napoleonic touch was revealed in his substitution of the "chapeau des pyramides" for the fez. When militarism and Islam clashed, this devotee of the revolution was not to be deterred by mere religious prejudices. He, like his colleagues, glories in eating pork with Christians and drinking wine in Ramazan.

The discredit for the *débâcle* of the first Balkan War was skilfully fastened upon Nazim and others outside the inner clique of the Committee: and Enver retrieved his reputation by his splendidly stage-managed, but bloodless

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and unopposed entry into Adrianople at the head of the Turkish cavalry in August 1913, while Bulgaria was paying the penalty for her treachery and arrogance. Enver followed up this easy success, and incidentally strengthened his position at Constantinople, by his marriage with a niece of the present Sultan. Since then all power has been concentrated more and more in the hands of himself and his equally unscrupulous colleagues, and their alliance with Germany has grown more and more intimate. Not the least notable achievement of their career has been the manner in which they fooled the British Embassy and the British Government in the critical autumn of 1914, and induced us to disregard the warnings of men who had known every political current and hidden rock at the Golden Horn for many years past.

The most sinister feature of Enver and his group has still to be mentioned. The face which is turned to the West is that of a band of *illuminés* and torchbearers of western political ideas in their most advanced form. The face which is turned eastwards is that of the conspirator and the terrorist. The whole Young Turk régime has rested for the past six years upon an elaborate system of assassination and "removal." First came Shemsi, and other military adherents of the old régime in Macedonia, then a number of "Liberal" journalists and opponents of the Committee in Stambul: until the series culminated in the murder of that all-too-lukewarm Young Turk, Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the defeated army (Jan. 1913); of the Grand Vizier, Mahmud Shevket Pasha (June 1913), at the very moment when he was preparing to abandon the Committee; and, during the present war, of the Turkish Heir Apparent himself, whose growing hostility to the Committee and its German rulers was already known even outside Turkey. Mystery still surrounds these later events, but the share of Enver Pasha in the murder of Nazim has long been notorious. An authentic and highly characteristic anecdote is told of Nazim's own favourite daughter, who on the very day before the murder told her father of her fears that Enver might make away with him. "Don't worry, my dear," said the bluff old General, "he is all right; he was with me just now. He looked me straight in the face, as an assassin could never do." "Don't trust him, father," she replied, "he was only searching for the place to plant his bullet."

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Enver's stormy career can only end in blood. For some time past his success has depended upon his ability to shoot first. He and his friends have brought Turkey to the abyss, and only a crushing German victory can save them. They must act on the motto of their Prussian taskmasters, "*Ich fresse dich, oder du frisst mich.*" Enver is no Napoleon, but the stormy petrol of an era of anarchy and chaos. Like many men before him, he is powerless to dispel or to control the spirits whom he himself has invoked. Nothing can avert the final crash. "*La Révolution divorce ses enfants.*"

The Literature of Pangermanism (IV)

THIS short survey of Pangerman publications would not be complete without some reference to the special literature which has been created by the study of Turkish and Oriental affairs. The economic importance of Austria and Turkey, from the Pangerman point of view, has been explained by Dr. Albert Wirth in the book already mentioned, "*Türkei, Oesterreich, Deutschland*" (1912), which lays down what may be taken as the Pangerman programme in the Near East.

Turkish propaganda is vigorously carried on by the German-Turkish Union ("*Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung*"), whose headquarters are in Berlin; and the leader of that society, Professor Jaekch, gives some idea of the scope of its activities in his various writings, notably "*Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg*" and "*Der aufsteigende Halbmond*" ("*The Rising Crescent*").*

The literature which deals with the intricate problems connected with the Orient includes books on India, Arabia,

* Other leading authorities on Turkish affairs are: E. Bause, "*Die Türkei; Eine moderne Geographie*" (1915) (a detailed description of the whole country); K. Wiedenfeld, "*Die deutsch-türkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und ihre Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten*" (1915) ("*The Economic Relations of Germany and Turkey and their Possibilities of Development*"; a short, useful sketch); R. Tschudi, "*Der Islam und der Krieg*" (1914); Jastrow, "*Die Weltstellung Konstantinopels in ihrer historischen Entwicklung*" (1915); Fr. Delitzsch, "*Die Welt des Islams*" (1915); H. Grothe, "*Die asiatische Türkei und die deutschen Interessen*" ("*Asia Minor and German Interests*," 2nd ed., 1913); K. Mehrmann, "*Der diplomatische Krieg in Vorderasien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Bagdadbahn*" (1916) ("*The Diplomatic War in Asia Minor with Special Reference to the History of the Bagdad Railway*").

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Armenia, Egypt and German East Africa, and in all of these there is a strong anti-English undercurrent. There are also, as far as I have been able to ascertain, no less than sixteen reviews and magazines devoted to the Oriental Question (*Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Näheren Orient*; *Deutsche Levante-Zeitung-Geist des Ostens*; *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, etc.) Some of these confine their investigations to particular problems (e.g. *Palestina*, *Monatsschrift für die Erschliessung Palestinas*, *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palestinaverains*).

The range of Pangerman literature also embraces the Far East—Japan, China, the Pacific—and Africa. Particular attention is devoted to the study of England's position in the East. It is a significant fact that the literature on England has grown very rapidly since the war, whereas France and, still more, Italy have been comparatively neglected. Russia, of course, is very diligently studied in Germany, and, since the war, increased interest has been displayed in Little Russia, or the Ukraine and the Baltic Provinces.

Extensive and all-embracing as the scope of Pangerman literature has been shown to be, it will have been noticed that it centres mainly round the Austro-Hungarian question. Pangermanism may, indeed, not inaptly be described as the German programme for the solution of that question. It is a simple programme—the absorption of the Dual Monarchy and her conversion into a German bridge to the Near and Middle East. The plan is concisely explained in a pamphlet of Dr. E. Schubert called “Deutschlands Brücke zum Orient” (1915) (“Germany's Bridge to the Orient”)—a title which, in itself, summarizes the whole Pangerman movement.

What, then, has been the attitude of Austria herself to this movement? For the two decades preceding the war it is expounded by M. André Chéradame in “L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche au seuil du vingtième siècle” (1901), and by G. Weil in “Le Pangermanisme en Autriche” (1904). The latter treats of German political literature, the former of the actual political movement, showing that the Germans of Austria and of Hungary had accepted the Pangerman plan, and, indeed, that the Austrian-Germans had become its most uncompromising supporters. This fact is well illustrated by the “Los-von-Rom” movement, in which thousands of Germans left the Catholic Church and joined either the Old Catholics or the Lutheran Church, not because they believed in the doctrines of the latter, but because they

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considered it to be the truly national German church. Their motive was political, not religious, and the Austrian Government had the sense not to turn them into religious martyrs.

The Pangerman movement in Austria centred round the questions of Bohemia and Styria, which gave rise to a vehement struggle against the Czechs in the north and the Slovenes and Italians in the south. Prague and Trieste are two of the fundamental objectives of Pangermanism.

The political and strategical significance of Bohemia and of the two sister provinces of Moravia and Silesia, made of the Austrian-Germans the bitterest opponents of the Czechs and of their political aspirations. This opposition has, since the Reformation, been the chief motive power in Austrian politics. From the eighteenth century onwards, the Magyars also were the enemies of Vienna, but since the Compromise of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy, they have joined hands with the Germans in a common campaign against the Czechs. Failing in their original attempts to crush the Czechs by main force, the Germans changed their tactics and tried to accomplish their object by administrative reforms. As early as 1899 all the German parties in Austria had shaped a national programme (the so-called Whitsun programme or programme of Linz), the final aim of which was the exclusion of Galicia from Austria, with the grant of a kind of autonomy. Such a step would mean that the Poles and Ruthenes would not send deputies to the Central Parliament, and that the Germans would consequently find it easier to hold down the Czechs. This device was openly formulated by the Pangerman leader, Georg von Schoenerer, who, in his famous motion of April, 1901, demanded for Galicia and the Bukovina a position in Austria equal to that of Hungary, and, at the same time, demanded the cession of Dalmatia to Hungary. The recently-proclaimed autonomy of Galicia thus has a wider significance than that of a German settlement of Poland; it is a definite step in the Pangerman scheme.*

While the majority of the Pangermans in Austria accepted Bismarck's policy concerning their country, there was a radical minority who thought that Austria-Hungary should be broken up and annexed by Germany. Bismarck's view

* The Austrian Parliament has 516 members; the exclusion of Galicia diminishes the number of Slav deputies by 106; the Bukovina has 14, and Dalmatia 11, deputies.

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has been exposed by Dr. Friedjung, the well-known Austrian historian, in his valuable work, "Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland, 1859-1866" ("The Struggle for Predominance in Germany, 1859-1866"). In this book he explained the significance, from the German point of view, of Austria's defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866, and advocated a close union between the two countries. The same Dr. Friedjung, by the Nemesis of history, was implicated in the sordid forgeries with which the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade provided Count Aehrenthal—those forged documents which were intended to prove the existence of Serbian propaganda in Austria-Hungary, and thus to establish a case for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the war, one of the leaders of Austrian Pangermanism, the Deputy Iro, has published his programme in the pamphlet ("Oesterreich nach dem Kriege") mentioned in a previous article (No. 1). I may add here that this official conversion to Bismarckian tactics was not allowed to be discussed in the Bohemian papers. Like all Pangerman schemes, Herr Iro's plan aims, in the first instance, at crushing Bohemia as the foremost obstacle to Pangermanism.

The newest scheme, which may be described without exaggeration as the philosophy of Austrian Pangermanism, has been formulated by Robert Mueller in his books, "Was erwartet Oesterreich von seinem jungen Thronfolger?" (1915) ("What does Austria expect from her young Heir Apparent?"), and "Oesterreich und der Mensch" (1916). The author belongs to the "Jung-Oesterreich" party, and advocates the plans of Francis Ferdinand. The establishment of a "Gross Oesterreich" would create a trustworthy ally for Germany-Prussia, which would act as a vanguard in the Balkans, and which would extend its operations even as far as Asia Minor. "To the Mediterranean!" and "Gross-Oesterreich oder das Nichts!" are the foremost watchwords of the Pangerman movement in Austria. That movement aims at the absorption of all the Serbian territories, and it is doubtful if the needs of "Gross-Oesterreich" will even be satisfied with that comprehensive "Raubkampf." Müller, it may be noted, rather emphasises the differences between Austrian and Prussian mentality, but these differences can never endanger the close unity of the two Pangermanic States which are animated by the same motives. In view of this unity, it is remarkable that Müller should consider

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it necessary to apologise for the apparent faults of Austrianism, and that his sense of those faults should lead him to a violent diatribe against the typical Viennese, as a hybrid person without nationality and without character.

With regard to the "Great Austrian" movement, the reader may consult the writings of Richard von Kralik, the literary spokesman of Austrian Catholicism, whose "History of Austria" gives a fair outline of Austrian Imperialism.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

German "Peace" Intrigues

THE past week has brought two patent manifestations of the persistent "peace" intrigue in which Germany is now engaged. One is the speech by the German Imperial Chancellor to the Main Committee of the Reichstag. The other is the publication in the *Daily News* of a long contribution made to the *New York World* by Mr. Herbert Bayard Swope. Of the two, Mr. Swope's effort is probably the more insidious.

It should never be forgotten that, when Germany speaks of "peace," she means a German peace, or in other words an Allied defeat. The chief purpose of her "peace" manifestations is to convince the Allies, or, rather, Allied public opinion, that she cannot be beaten, and to gain currency for the idea—which M. Chéradame rightly terms the "redoubtable German trap"—of a drawn war. When Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg discusses in detail the question whether or not the "premature" announcement of German mobilisation by a semi-official Berlin newspaper was contradicted by the Russian Ambassador in Berlin before it could affect Russian decisions, he is striving to deflect Allied attention from the main question of German responsibility for the war. His aim is to entangle Allied statesmen in a controversy to which there can be no convincing end. Germany will always be in a position to deny or to distort the facts or, on occasion, to invent new "facts" to suit her immediate purpose.

The real responsibility of Germany for the war lies not so much in her refusal to accept a European conference at

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the last moment, or even in her silence when asked whether she would respect the neutrality of Belgium, as in the whole character of her military, financial and political preparations for war, and especially in her attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. On this latter point *The Times* leading article of November 11 contains a significant statement. "The fact," it writes, "that, as early as July 15, 1914, Allied diplomatists in Vienna had received information not only that Austria intended to attack Serbia, but also that the German Emperor had sent a communication encouraging Austria in the enterprise and promising her all sorts of support if she would undertake it, is less generally known. It is, however, upon record, though, we believe, not yet upon public record." The elucidation of this point would clear up once for all any doubt that may exist in the minds of the "impartial" as to Germany's responsibility: and we trust that the Foreign Office will lose no time in clearing it up.

Mr. Swope's contribution to the "peace" discussion is, as we have said, more insidious than that of the German Imperial Chancellor, although it includes, as the *Daily News* assures us, "a summary of the situation submitted to and passed by the German Foreign Office." Mr. Swope indicates that there are four avenues to peace: (1) Through the complete defeat of the Allies by Germany. This is now realized to be impossible. (2) Through the complete defeat of Germany by the Allies. This the Germans regard as inconceivable. (3) Through a compromise, and a return in effect to the *statu quo ante bellum*. This is thought possible if Russia can be induced to secede from the Allies. The notorious Herr von Kühlmann is believed to be intriguing at Constantinople with this end in view, but General Brusilov's declarations to Mr. Stanley Washburn that 99 out of every 100 Russians are resolved to carry through the war to complete victory, regardless of the price, seems to us weightier than any German intrigue. (4) Through the liberalization of the German Empire—which would not mean revolution or the overthrow of the Hohenzollerns.

It has long been foreseen that, in default of a better means of throwing dust in the eyes of the unwary, the Germans would make some show of "liberal" internal

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reform. In the *Edinburgh Review* of last April Mr. Wickham Steed wrote :—

“Were the Prussian Government, or even the Hohenzollern dynasty, convinced that a well-managed revolution would be the shortest path to comparative safety, they would scarcely hesitate to sanction it—with the understanding that, when once generous peace terms had been conceded by the Allies to a penitent German people, and the Allied armies had been demobilized, an equally well-managed counter-revolution would set things right again. . . . We shall need very carefully to avoid the danger of mistaking our wish that there may be a change of heart in Germany for the reality of such a change.”

One final point in Mr. Swope's article needs attention and refutation. Germany, he writes :—

“pretends to believe that France is ready to take a peace at almost any price, and yet I had it directly on the highest authority in the United States that, less than four months ago, after England had practically stood aside, willing to await developments, it was France, and France alone, that objected with all her might to any attempt being made leading towards peace discussions.”

It would be interesting to know on what authority the “highest authority in the United States” made so astounding a statement. No British statesman could take up such an attitude without deserving impeachment for high treason. Moreover, the recent speeches of Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith are on record. They should suffice for the moment to silence “peace” chatter of the kind which Mr. Swope has foisted upon the readers of the *Daily News*.

On the Italian Front

The substantial progress of the Italian armies on the Carso a fortnight ago is the subject of interesting comment in the private correspondence of a British Naval Intelligence Officer who spent his exiguous leave from duty “somewhere,” in a visit to three widely-separated sectors of the Italian front. His first and most constant remark is one of surprise at the magnitude of the obstacles which confronted General Cadorna at certain parts of his line, and of admiration at the manner in which they were overcome. One sector is typical Alpine country, peak upon peak separated by deep-cloven valleys across which Austrian answers Italian artillery. The guns are cunningly set in rough-hewn terraces and galleries, “more like Gibraltar than anything”; and here, for the first time in two years of war, this officer “laid” a gun on a visible objective—an enemy battery position on a distant hillside. Another part of the line recalls the South African veldt—scrubby, lacking water, and full of ideal snipers' cover. He reports the organisation of supply well thought out and well executed; everywhere there is evidence of intelligent

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forethought. But, most important of all, the *morale* of the troops is high; they all feel that they are masters of the situation; and even some of the southern reinforcements, about whom some doubt existed, had caught the prevailing spirit. It is an encouraging report from a competent unbiassed witness.

Viscount Grey and the *Labour Leader*

While public opinion in Parliament and in the country at large is protesting with growing violence against the activities of the tiny but mischievous group of pacifists who centre round the Union of Democratic Control and the I.L.P., their principal organ, the *Labour Leader*, has been honoured by a letter from Lord Grey himself. It is not altogether obvious why our Foreign Secretary, who, ever since he came into office, has made it a rule (and probably quite rightly) to avoid all controversy with his critics in the press, should have made an exception, at the moment of all moments, in favour of an obscure writer in the most Germanophil paper in this island. The incident is a fresh illustration of the extent to which, even after two years of war, Lord Grey's mind is still concentrated upon the events of July, 1914. And yet we believe that we shall not go far wrong in asserting that an overwhelming body of opinion in this country, friendly and unfriendly critics alike, regards Lord Grey's attitude during that critical fortnight as the greatest achievement in his career, and that history is likely to endorse this verdict, whatever it may eventually have to say of his policy, either *before* or *during* the war. It is natural that he should be sensitive on a matter which concerns so nearly his well-earned reputation for political integrity; but we confess our astonishment that, in that case he should attach such relatively slight importance to the inner history of the Austro-Serbian dispute, which, in reality, provides him with far the most damning proofs of the guilt of the Central Powers in provoking the conflict.

Lord Northcliffe and German Banks

The correspondence between Lord Northcliffe, on the one hand, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir William Plender, on the other, in respect to the position of German banks in this country, is so amazing that we are at a loss to understand why it has been so little commented upon in the press. Mr. McKenna may have excellent reasons for refusing to allow his side of the correspondence to be made public; but his refusal only serves to heighten the feeling of perplexity with which the plain man views the official attitude in this matter. The facts put forward by Lord Northcliffe do not appear to be in question. Sir W. Plender, as controller of the enemy banks, "is merely acting under the orders of the Government," and if, after twenty-seven months of war, these concerns "are still in being," the public is surely entitled to assume that "*someone* has the power to see that the business is brought to an end." As Mr. McKenna, when Home Secretary, issued the original licence and has now been head of our finances for eighteen months, he cannot complain if the responsibility for this mysterious and unwarrantable delay is laid at his door. Lord Northcliffe now offers himself as liquidator, and, if given the necessary powers, undertakes to wind up half of them by January 1st and the

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remainder by March 25th, "handing all remaining securities to the Public Trustee." This is a straight offer, and the only proper alternative to its acceptance is immediate liquidation by the existing authorities themselves before the dates indicated. The adoption of any other course will only strengthen the already widespread uneasiness, which vents itself in the sinister rumours of an "Unseen Hand," to which Mr. Handel Booth referred recently in a vigorous speech in the House of Commons. This is most emphatically a case when secretiveness breeds distrust and calumny, and should be abandoned without further delay.

The Funds of the Southern Slav Committee

The *Indépendance Belge* of November 8 publishes an opportune statement by Dr. Hinković, of the Southern Slav Committee, upon the source of the funds which enable the Committee to carry on its work for Southern Slav unity in various European capitals. The statement was elicited by a characteristic letter from Rome to the *Indépendance Belge*, in which the Southern Slav funds were alleged to be furnished by Austria through the agency of certain organizations in America. Notwithstanding its inherent folly—inasmuch as it is difficult to perceive why Austria should subsidize a propaganda directed against her own territorial integrity—this particular calumny has been constantly repeated by the Italian Nationalist press and by Italian agents in Allied countries. Dr. Hinković now explains that the propaganda of the Southern Slav Committee is supported by the voluntary gifts of over 1,000,000 Serbo-Croats who live in the two Americas and in the British Dominions. The Serbo-Croats of the United States are comparatively poor, and their contributions are naturally more modest, though not less significant, than those of the wealthy Southern Slavs of South America. At a congress of the Southern Slav organizations of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Uruguay, held at Antofagasta on January 23, 1916, the 100,000 Southern Slavs there represented passed a resolution breaking off all relations with the monarchy and dynasty of the Habsburgs and engaging themselves to supply the funds requisite for Southern Slav propaganda. These organizations undertook to send 120,000 pesetas annually (£4,800) to the Southern Slav Committee, and promised to increase this sum should it prove insufficient. Thus the Committee receives in advance every three months £1,000 from the Narodna Obrana (National Defence) of Valparaiso alone, through Lloyd's Bank. In addition, the Committee is supported by the wealthy Southern Slav industrialists and shippers of Argentina and Chile.

It is perhaps too much to hope that the *Idea Nazionale* and other Italian organs, which have sought to accredit so stupid a calumny against the Southern Slav Committee, will now inform their readers of the truth; but they may perhaps be prudent enough to moderate their campaign lest they, in their turn, arouse curiosity why they, who are ostensibly aiming at the destruction of Austria should persistently seek to sow, between Southern Slavs and Italians, discord by which Austria and Germany alone can profit.

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

The New Europe

VOL. I, No. 6.

November 23, 1916

Poland's Dilemma

"Each branch of the Slavs sees only itself and its own wrongs."—*General Fadejev.*

A FORTNIGHT ago, in commenting upon Germany's proclamation of Polish independence, we expressed the view that the pledges contained in the original manifesto of the Grand Duke Nicholas—which, be it remembered, was far the earliest war pronouncement on Poland made by any of the three partitioning Powers—were to be regarded, despite their vagueness, and despite the failure of the Russian bureaucracy to translate them into action, as a genuine charter of Polish liberties for the future, and as morally binding, not merely upon Russia, but upon the Entente as a whole. We therefore cordially welcome the telegram addressed by the French and British Premiers to their Russian colleague, based, as it is, upon this very standpoint. Their silence hitherto had been prompted by a very natural desire to respect the susceptibilities of our Russian Allies, and has only now been broken by general consent between the three Governments. In view of the repeated attempts on the part of the enemy, and of the pro-German clique inside Russia itself, to represent the Grand Duke's manifesto as a purely personal message which is in no way binding upon the Tsar himself, the emphasis laid by M. Briand and Mr. Asquith upon "the unshakable decision proclaimed more than two years ago in the name of His Majesty the Emperor," will produce all the more impression. The Tsar, whose personal feelings towards the Poles are well known, has always regarded himself as irrevocably pledged to Polish unity and autonomy, and no grosser insult to him could be imagined than the suggestion that his cousin, as Russian Commander-in-Chief, could have issued a State document of such tremendous importance without the Imperial sanction, or that the Tsar himself could have allowed him to issue it with the intention of repudiating it at a subsequent date.

The telegram of the two Premiers, then, is a warm and emphatic endorsement on the part of the Western Powers of

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a policy whose realisation they regard as "a fundamental element of the future equilibrium of Europe." Henceforth, it will be impossible to challenge the view that the future of Poland is an international problem of the very front rank.

This public expression of Entente solidarity on the Polish question followed naturally upon an official *communiqué* issued on November 15th by the Russian Government, the essence of which deserves to be quoted:—

"Russia, since the beginning of the war, has already twice expressed her views on the whole Polish question, and her intention is to create a complete Poland, embracing all Polish territories, which will enjoy the right, when the war is ended, of freely regulating their national intellectual and economic life on a basis of autonomy under the sovereignty of Russia, and of maintaining the principle of a united State. "This decision of his gracious Majesty the Emperor remains unshakable."

This represents a distinct advance, alike upon the manifesto of August, 1914, the speech of the late Premier, M. Goremkyin in the summer of 1915, and the projects of Polish autonomy adopted, though not published, by M. Sazonov when Foreign Minister, and the Cadet party. It must, however, be frankly admitted that Russia, even while defining more precisely pledges which were all too vague at the outset, is still at a considerable disadvantage towards the Central Powers in all that concerns Poland. The motive which underlies the grant of "independence" is patent enough, and does not deceive any Pole. But the fact remains that the Germans (for what sordid reasons is, for the moment, immaterial) have actually delivered goods for which Poles have been clamouring for a generation past. The Polish University of Warsaw is no mere phantom, but a highly successful and active national institution. Polish has become the language of instruction in all the schools of Russian Poland. The Municipal Council of Warsaw is in the hands of the Poles. The communal autonomy, which alone has survived the official policy of Russification, has been further extended on a Polish basis. Most remarkable of all, perhaps, regular courses for the training of Polish officials and clerks had already been opened some weeks before the decision in favour of "independence" had been taken; in other words, the Germans, on their own initiative, had voluntarily conceded an essential administrative detail

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which, not merely the Russian Government, but Russian public opinion, had always steadily opposed before the war. Thus the Poles, who do not in any way trust Germany, can, none the less, hardly be blamed for accepting whatever comes to them, and for experimenting in the dangerous game of playing off two rival suitors against each other. As the *Manchester Guardian* has aptly pointed out, "the weakness in the Tsar's proclamation is that all its pledges are for the future after the war is over." Any scheme drawn up in Russia cannot, of course, be applied until Poland is recovered, but there is no reason why such a scheme should not be drafted by the Russian Government while the war is going on, and, at any rate, its broad lines made known to representative Poles. The longer the Russians adhere to generalities while the Germans deal with practical difficulties, the greater is the risk of fresh developments such as might plunge the Polish problem, already the most complicated in all European politics, into almost inextricable confusion. There are plenty of indications that this is the deliberate aim of Germany.

The persistent silence of London and Paris on the whole Polish question since the commencement of the present war has led to an almost complete "désorientation" of public opinion, which is strikingly revealed in the comments of a large section of the Press, and still more in the arbitrary selection or omission of important news relating to Poland. Yet it is essential that we should realise the attitude of the Poles themselves towards the new situation. Their open motto is "Timeo Danaos"; but suspicion is not pushed to the extent of refusing such presents as may come their way. The only basis upon which any of the Polish leaders could be induced even to discuss matters with the Berlin Government was the promise of a Polish administrative council for the whole of Russian Poland, and the immediate convocation of a Polish Parliament. When this had been conceded in principle, a Polish deputation waited upon the German Chancellor to discuss further details. The six men of whom it was composed were all prominent in Polish national life: Mr. Lempicki, the leading Polish member of the Duma, who remained behind when the Germans occupied Warsaw; Count Adam Roniker, chairman of the Committee, a former member of the National Democratic party, but now leader of the Polish Realists; Prince Radziwill, president

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of the Municipal Police of Warsaw (a son of the late Prince Matthew, not a member of the semi-Prussianized branch, as was originally announced in *The Times*); Mr. Dzierzbicki, an influential director of the Polish Land Mortgage Society; M. Chmielewski, the Mayor of Warsaw, and a prominent educationalist, and Professor Brudzinski, the able and energetic Rector of the new university. Even without any knowledge of what is happening behind the scenes, it is possible to read between the lines of recent German and Polish pronouncements the existence of very serious divergence of opinion between Berlin and Warsaw. The deputation, as we have seen, imposed conditions preliminary to any discussion, and these were accepted. The proclamation issued simultaneously by General Beseler in Warsaw and General Kuk at Lublin, promised "an independent State with a hereditary monarchy and constitution"; but no king was proclaimed, no constitution was announced, and the regulation of the frontiers was officially reserved. Polish opinion was not satisfied with these paper pledges, and insisted upon an immediate fulfilment of the constitutional part of the bargain. After a short interval, a further proclamation was issued by General von Beseler announcing elections to a Polish Diet, on the basis of the existing municipal franchises (which, it may be observed in passing, vary very widely in the different towns of Russian Poland). This fresh promise was promptly followed by a third proclamation, informing the Poles that their "most ardent desire" is now fulfilled, and inviting them to volunteer for the new national army. "The care for our armies now standing before the enemy obliges us, for the present, to keep the administration of your new State still in our hands. We will, however, with your aid, readily give by degrees to the new Poland those public institutions which guarantee her consolidation, development and safety. Of these institutions the Polish army is the most important." *Da liegt der Hund begraben*, says the German proverb; in the present case, the Polish translation may well read, "It's your army we want." But here, again, there appears to have been some hitch, as yet unknown to the observers in foreign countries. The Poles, after a century of repeated disappointments, are not to be fobbed off with nice Polish flags and glittering ceremonies in a historic palace. But the Germans

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are in a hurry and not inclined to wait. The German Chancellor, meeting his critics at the Grand Committee of the Reichstag, was brutally frank about the whole Polish problem. Germany's promise, he declared, was only "conditional," and would not be fulfilled unless a Polish army is successfully raised. What more simple than the application to Poland of British recruiting methods! "Come, or you'll be fetched," is an admirable sentiment. If the Poles do not volunteer in sufficient numbers, compulsion will be introduced, and "the necessity that knows no law" will be invoked once more as an excuse for tearing up the latest scrap of paper. Enlistment is to begin on November 22nd, and all recruits will be compelled to swear a triple oath of allegiance—to the Polish Fatherland, to the German Emperor as the supreme War Lord of Mitteleuropa, and to the two Emperors as joint guarantors of the Polish State.

As if to emphasise the fact that Germany is acting from purely strategical and political motives, and, (in the words of the *Kölnische Zeitung*,) disclaims any taint of "idealism," the German police in Warsaw have issued elaborate instructions to the municipality with the object of overcoming what is known as "the repugnance to work," and of forcing the working classes of Poland to accept work in Germany, thereby setting free more Germans for military service. These police regulations differ only in degree from those which are being enforced at present in Belgium with such ruthless disregard of law and humanity. Thus, according to the German scheme, the male population of Poland is to become either cannon-fodder for the defence of Germany's new frontier on the east, or raw material for her own depleted industries.

Beseler's proclamation was read aloud in the old Parliament Hall of the Palace of Warsaw, in the presence of a highly-representative assembly. The speech in which the Rector of the University, Professor Brudzinsky, responded is distinctly interesting. He accepted the proclamation as a recognition of Polish independence, and expressed the hope that it will be possible for Poland to live on friendly and neighbourly terms with Germany. The Poles, he added significantly, anxiously expect the realisation of the promises made to them, namely, the nomination of a Regent and the summons of a Parliament. It is true that the Poles of Galicia

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were not present at the ceremonies of Warsaw and Lublin, but the occasion was celebrated with much ceremony at Cracow, where Mr. Jaworsky, the President of the Supreme National Council, made a curious speech, insisting that the new State would be still-born if only one of the creating Powers had a share in the direction of its future, and that the best guarantee for the future of Poland lay in the continuation of a common life with Austria-Hungary. This is only one of many indications that, though the Austrian solution has been abandoned for the time being, the Emperor Francis Joseph and the Poles who stand nearest to him still hope to leave the door open for a subsequent revision in an Austrian direction. A remarkable light is thrown upon the attitude of the Polish nobility in Galicia by the article published in the well-known Cracow *Czas* by the veteran patriot and savant, Count Stanislas Tarnowski. After a half mystical invocation of Our Lady of Czestochowa, he virtually recites a political *Nunc Dimittis*, tempered by faint regret that liberty should come from Poland's secular enemies.

Two further details are worth noting in connection with the German proclamation. The principal Jewish organ of Warsaw declares itself warmly in favour of independence, and treats the extension of Jewish rights in the new State as a certainty. Meanwhile, the *Kovnoer Zeitung*, one of the new official organs of the German conquerors, has published an obviously inspired article containing assurances that the claims of Lithuania will not be overlooked in the future settlement. This manœuvre has a double purpose. On the one hand, it is intended to inculcate moderation in the Poles by holding out the prospect of Lithuanian autonomy at the expense of Poland, and, on the other hand, by carefully avoiding any definition of the eastern frontier to convey a broad hint to Russia that a "deal" is still possible in respect of Vilna and other Lithuanian or White Russian districts. As is pointed out by a well-informed writer in the *New Statesman* of November 18th, Germany, by leaving everything concerning the future state absolutely unsettled, intends to leave room for possible concessions to Petrograd.

In a word, Germany, by proclaiming Polish independence, aims at one of two alternatives—either to secure a new army of 700,000 men in defence of a cause which she knows to be lost if her enemies can but present a united front to the bitter end, or to frighten Russia into a separate peace such

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as would inevitably reduce her Western Allies to terms. The unanimity with which the Tsar and his people have repudiated the treacherous overtures of the last two months will not, we may be sure, deter the Germans from a renewal of their intrigue. We can only hope that, in the meantime, the Polish nation will not allow itself to become the victim of so clumsy a manœuvre.

While the Poles inside Poland seem to be in danger of letting sentiment triumph over reason, the attitude of the Poles in Russia and in the West is somewhat perplexing. Three of the eight Poles who sit in the Russian Duma are actually in Petrograd at this moment, and Mr. Haruszewicz, a National Democrat and a follower of the hitherto Russophil Polish leader, Mr. Dmowski, acted as their spokesman. The action of the Central Powers, he declared, had created a new international problem and rendered some authoritative statement on the part of the Allies essential. "The Polish nation will never accept the German solution; it is in total conflict with our traditional ideals." But, he added, the inaction and silence of the Russian Government had played into the hands of the enemy, and enabled him to masquerade as the champion of Polish liberties. The Polish nation, therefore, had the right to expect a solemn assurance from the Allies that Poland would be united and would receive independent statehood. This pronouncement in the mouth of a man who, in the Duma, at an early stage of the war, openly combated the idea of Polish independence, is certainly significant of the upheaval which Germany's action has produced in Polish public opinion. Meanwhile, the Polish leaders in the West have shown greater restraint and caution. In a manifesto signed by the chief representatives abroad of the three sections of Poland (among the signatories are Mr. Dmowski, the National Democratic leader, the Russophil journalist, Mr. Pilz, Counts Zamoyski, Rostworowski, etc.) the Polish nation is declared to be "one and indivisible," the action of Germany and Austria is denounced as confirming the old crime of partition, and the possible acceptance of such a scheme is treated as a grave disaster for Poland.

The Poles find themselves to-day in a dilemma which is not of their own making, but which forces them to make a premature choice such as may mortgage their whole future.

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Our perception of the selfish military motives which underlie Germany's new Polish policy must not blind us to the fact that it opens up an attractive vista to a nation which has lived for over a century upon dreams and disappointments. We cannot help feeling that the comments of our press, while laying great and necessary stress upon the military aspect of the case, suggest an inadequate appreciation of its almost revolutionary political character. Here, as so often during the war, Germany is taking tremendous risks, and, in taking them, profits by the reluctance of the Entente to formulate a definite policy. No one can foretell the consequences of the proclamation of 5th November; but it is useless to shut our eyes to possible contingencies which the Russian press, with the full permission of the censor, is busily engaged in discussing. The *Novoje Vremja* is not alone in treating Polish independence as a possible solution, and there is wide recognition of the fact that it can never be a true Russian interest to override or neglect the wishes and interests of the Poles. For our own part, while sympathising intensely with Polish aspirations, and looking forward to a new era for Poland, we feel convinced that—the general situation and political grouping of Europe being what it is—the sole hope of a permanent solution of the Polish problem rests upon a close and cordial co-operation between Poles and Russians. The Austrian solution is hopeless, because Austria is no longer capable of solving anything. The German solution pre-supposes such a triumph of the "Central European" idea as none of the Entente Powers is, for one moment, prepared to contemplate. The purely Polish solution is the surest road to a fresh understanding between the reactionaries of Petrograd and Berlin, and to a reversion to the iniquitous principle of partition. The purely Russian solution can never satisfy a people whose pride in its historic past borders on fanaticism, and has earned for itself the title of "Messianic." Only a Russo-Polish solution, based, not upon Russification, ecclesiastical intolerance and administrative chicanery, but upon the free political, intellectual and economic development of the Polish race, can restore one of the most gifted of nations to its true rank in the world.

RUBICON.

Henryk Sienkiewicz (1845–1916)

To understand what Henryk Sienkiewicz meant to the Poles one must realise the atmosphere in which Poland lived after the collapse of the insurrection of 1863. The political situation was desperate, the country's hopes were buried, and the very existence of Polish culture was threatened. A deep pessimism took possession of the nation. A small group of men, however, did not give up all hope of Poland's resurrection. These people put forward the idea of maintaining the continuity of Polish national life in its manifold aspects by making the utmost possible of existing conditions. The economic welfare of the country and the development of science, literature and art, so they maintained, were the only accessible means for the preparation of a political revival. Foremost among these men was Sienkiewicz.

His great literary genius illumined his protest against pessimism. "The artist," he held, "ought to fortify people in life and not to discourage them; he ought to be the bearer of good, not of bad, news." Hence, for his first great work, he selected the most gloomy period of Polish history and showed how, owing to the patriotism and self-sacrifice of her sons, the country had overcome all difficulties.

As an artist, Sienkiewicz stands amongst the greatest writers, not only of Poland, but of the world; but it was this note of patriotism, love, and of hope, coming out of the depth of distress and gloom, that placed Sienkiewicz amongst the greatest Polish patriots.

His books were read with equal eagerness in the nobleman's castle and in the peasant's cottage—wherever Polish was spoken. More than that, if there were districts like Silesia, where the population, through centuries of enslavement, had forgotten the Polish language, the reading of his books in translation sufficed to awaken the national spirit and to encourage the people to learn the tongue of their forefathers. In 1900 his jubilee in Warsaw was made a national demonstration.

A nation which, like Poland, has no government to represent it must naturally look for representation to those of her sons whose talents have won them recognition abroad. A great artist by nature, Sienkiewicz never claimed to be

a politician, and felt the necessity of speaking in the name of his country as a burden. Yet, having a strong sense of duty towards his nation, which he loved above all in the world, he never declined to speak when he knew that he was defending the indisputable rights of his country to national existence. His famous protest addressed to the German Emperor against the treatment of Polish children who refused to pray in German is well known. In the present crisis, Sienkiewicz has not spoken. He was preparing a great appeal on behalf of Poland, but thought that the right time to publish it had not yet come. The writer of these lines had the privilege of seeing him ten days before his death. He said then: "When the time comes, I shall speak and demand the just revindication of our national rights." Unfortunately, it was not given to him to do so. All Polish hearts, which he filled with hope, will mourn for him.

AUGUST ZALESKI.

The Evolution of Bulgaria

DURING the generation preceding the Great War, the Bulgarians were the spoilt darlings of Western Europe, and it had become the fashion among the numerous journalists who penetrated, for a brief holiday, into the fastnesses of Balkan politics to regard them, not merely as the most enlightened and progressive of Balkan peoples, but as the only Balkan people who had any real future. Among this superficial class of writers and the well-meaning sentimentalists to whom a chance pamphlet of Mr. Gladstone was the alpha and omega of political wisdom, the Greeks were contemptuously dismissed as degenerate bastards, masquerading under the names of a great past; the Serbs, seen through the spectacles of Budapest and Vienna (no British journalist deigned to live in Belgrade), were regarded as cowardly and murderous; while the very existence of the Roumanians was almost ignored. The Bulgarian peasant—and every Bulgarian is a peasant—has sterling merits to which we would fain do justice; but, as in the case of other peasants, the uncritical adulation of strangers has not improved his character. It is not too much to say that the growth of a Bulgarian myth in France and England has been one of the most important contributory causes in that decay of

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Bulgarian public life which found its supreme expression in the espousal of the Teutonic cause.

Ever since their re-discovery in the middle of last century, the Bulgarian has been reckoned as a member of the great Slavonic race, and in such modern literature as they possess Russian influences are particularly strong. But though their language, with certain interesting peculiarities of its own, is closely related to Serbo-Croat, it is not to be forgotten that the original Bulgars were an invading Mongol tribe from Central Asia, akin to the Turks, Magyars and other now vanished non-Aryan races. The events of the present war have revived the recollection of their origin, and the Pan-Turanian theory is now industriously preached in Sofia, Budapest and Constantinople, as the natural basis of a close alliance between Magyar, Turk and Bulgar, against Panslav barbarism and the corruption of the West. The fact that this whole propaganda is inspired by obvious political motives, and may collapse if the war should take an unfavourable turn for the Central Powers, must not blind us to the seriousness with which it is being pursued; and we should be ill-advised to treat it with contempt or to ignore the fact that it is the fruit of long years of preparation by Magyar journalists, politicians and commercial houses. Before the war, those who wished to form some clear idea of contemporary happenings in Bulgaria were always certain to find in the journals of Budapest expert comment by close observers on the spot far superior to that provided for the consumption of any other foreign public.

Bulgarian history is full of extraordinary vicissitudes. During the ninth, and again during the tenth, century the Bulgars were led by rulers of signal ability—the grim and shadowy figure of Krum, of whom legend relates that he made a drinking goblet of the skull of his beaten enemy, the Emperor Nicephorus; Boris, their first Christian king, whose memory Ferdinand of Coburg invoked at the christening of his son and heir; and Samuel, who ruled from the Adriatic to the Ægean and the Black Sea, and whose long struggle with Byzantium ended in hideous tragedy at the battle of Belašica in 1014. There, within sight of the Allied lines of 1916, the Emperor Basil broke the power of the first Bulgarian Empire and sent back his 15,000 prisoners, blinded, to the camp of Samuel, every hundredth man being left with one eye

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that he might serve as guide to his helpless comrades. The memory of Basil Bulgaroktonos—"the slayer of Bulgarians"—is more alive than ever to-day in the peninsula; and it was with this name that the Athenian crowd acclaimed King Constantine after his victory over the Bulgars at Kukuš in July, 1913. Thus the feud of Greek and Bulgar dates back for ten centuries, and has assumed many varying phases, of which we have not yet seen the last.

During the closing years of the twelfth century a second Bulgarian Empire arose, this time as the result of an ill-defined combination between Bulgars and Vlachs. But, by the middle of the following century, it was already once more on the wane, and Thrace was lost to the Greeks and Macedonia to the Serbs. The year 1330 marks the culmination of the first quarrel between Serb and Bulgar. At the battle of Velbužd the Bulgarian Tsar lost his life, and his country sank to the level of a vassal. The feud led inevitably to the undoing of both races, and made possible the advance of the Turks. The desperate appeal of the Eastern Emperor was disregarded by both Serb and Bulgar, though he is said to have warned them that they would rue the day when they left him unsupported. The jealousies of the small Christian powers directly furthered the Turkish conquest, just as those of the Great Powers retarded time after time the day of deliverance, and just as, since 1912, the jealousies of the Balkan Allies, skilfully played upon from without, have restored discord, weakness and misery to the reviving peninsula. The Serbian mediæval empire perished at the memorable battle of Kosovo (1389), and that event was followed four years later by the destruction of the last fragments of Bulgarian independence. For nearly five centuries the Bulgars disappeared from the list of nations.

Turkish rule in Bulgaria did not differ in any essential feature from Turkish rule in Serbia or elsewhere, but nowhere was it so grinding and oppressive. This is of course due to the fact that it lay nearest to Stambul, and formed the inevitable route of every Turkish advance against Hungary and Central Europe. To-day history is teaching us what we did not care to learn before, that the fate of Serbia and Bulgaria has for centuries been determined by their geographical situation. The route of the Turkish armies lay through their land, and all that lay along it had to be stamped

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flat. To-day, again, Serbia lies across the route of other conquerors moving eastward, and Bulgaria has sold her soul in the vain hope of escaping her hated neighbour's fate, or, rather, in the craven desire to administer the *coup de grâce* herself.

If the Turks dug the grave of Slav nationalism in the Balkans, it was the Greeks who jealously guarded the tomb from the gaze of the outside world. All that was left of national life was concentrated in the Church, and the Church, thanks to the policy adopted by Mohammed II. when he conquered Constantinople, became the chief instrument of Hellenisation. The liturgy, the schools, the clergy alike were Greek, and, not content with this, the ecclesiastical authorities adopted a grossly reactionary and intolerant view, systematically tried to root out everything Slavonic, and wrought deliberate havoc among the monuments and, above all, the MSS. of the historic past. Under such circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that even the most celebrated scholars of the Slavonic world, the founders of Slav philology on a modern basis, knew next to nothing of Bulgaria or the Bulgarian language. This fact must serve as excuse for the complete ignorance displayed by western historians of the early nineteenth century in all that concerns Bulgaria. Even Kinglake found it possible to describe his journey through what is to-day the kingdom of Bulgaria without a single reference to the existence of the Bulgarians.

The prime reason, however, of this oblivion lay in the deathlike quiescence of the Bulgarians themselves. It is no exaggeration to say that, till the third quarter of the nineteenth century, no Balkan people had given the Turkish authorities less trouble. The repeated insurrections of Greeks and Serbs, ending in their assertion of complete or virtual independence, the revival of national consciousness in Wallachia and Moldavia, scarcely touched the mass of the Bulgarian peasantry. When at length the dry bones stirred, the breath came to them from Russia and from Serbia; there was no great national hero like Kara George or Miloš among the Serbs, like the countless outlaw chiefs of the Greek islands and mainland, or even like the Roumanian peasant leader, Vladimirescu. "The Awakener of Bulgaria" is the title which adorns the tomb of Venelin, the Slovak philologist who lived and died at Odessa, and gave the first impetus to

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the Bulgarian educational system. The early organisers of the revolutionary movement, men like Rakovski and Levski, were tireless enthusiasts, who gave their all to the cause, but not in any way the creators of a new nation.

The various risings which they organised in the early seventies were foredoomed to failure, and met with relatively little response from the population. But for external events, the ashes might have smouldered unnoticed for another generation, but, in 1875, the permanent unrest which had so long prevailed among the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia, burst into flame and spread to the neighbouring principalities of Serbia and Montenegro; and their struggle soon broadened into a veritable crusade for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke. Russia stood forward as the champion of Christianity and the Slavonic idea, while Britain, with a shortsightedness for which we are paying heavily to-day, threw her whole weight on the side of Turkish misrule and anarchy. The Treaty of San Stefano dictated to Turkey by the victorious Russians at the very gates of Constantinople was, a few months later, replaced by the settlement of Berlin, which was to form the corner-stone of European law and order for the next thirty years, especially in all matters regarding the Balkan Peninsula. Both settlements were equally unsound and inequitable. That of San Stefano was based essentially on Slav interests and neglected, or did grave injustice to, the non-Slav races of the peninsula—the Greeks, the Albanians and the Roumanians—while leaving Turkey with frontiers such as defied every law of geography, politics and commonsense. Above all, the new Bulgaria which was to be created would have been quite unduly aggrandised at the expense of all her neighbours. It is, indeed, the exaggerated programme of San Stefano which has become a fixed idea in the slow-moving but tenacious minds of the Bulgarians, and has proved directly responsible for the Prussian dreams of hegemony, in which her second generation of statesmen have indulged, and which may still prove to be the undoing of the nation. If the settlement of San Stefano was unjust to all but the Slavs, and did not draw a just line even between those Slavs themselves, the settlement of Berlin succeeded in being equally unjust to all, for it was frankly based upon force, upon the interests of the Great Powers, and upon the negation of the rights of

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small nations. The various Balkan delegates were refused representation at the Congress, and the fate of the peninsula was decided over their heads, without any serious regard for the wishes of the populations concerned.

The dream of a "Big Bulgaria" was no sooner conceived than it was dispelled by the reality of three disunited groups: the new principality, with a population at that time scarcely exceeding two millions; Eastern Roumelia, with barely a million inhabitants, under a Turkish governor; and the unredeemed Bulgarians of Thrace and Macedonia. Such a situation was too unnatural to last, and it is only remarkable that it lasted as long as it did. Russia, who had shed her blood so freely for the liberation of the youngest member of the Slav family, showed herself strangely lacking in tact when it came to consolidating her influence in the new State. The Russians organised the Bulgarian army, laid the foundation of an educational and financial system, and were even responsible for the first draft of the constitution. But its ultra-democratic form was probably intended to leave the chief power in the hands of the Prince, and it was most certainly intended that the Prince should be a mere cipher in the hands of his near kinsman the Tsar.

Alexander of Battenberg found himself in a position of extraordinary difficulty. Bulgaria was entirely lacking in political tradition. Her people was a nation of peasants, endowed with more than the usual dose of suspicion which is inherent in most peasantries, and with a natural disposition to dislike all foreigners. Her politicians were untried men, trained in half-a-dozen different schools, and each desperately jealous alike of the person and theories of his neighbour. Alexander himself was as inexperienced as the people whom he was called upon to govern, and soon tired of a constitution which seemed to him unworkable, only to find himself in the hands of the masterful Russian generals whom the heavy-handed and reactionary Alexander III. sent to maintain Bulgaria in fitting vassalage. Ere long the Prince found that his sole hope lay in a reversion to constitutional methods. But parliamentary life is a plant of slow growth, which has never flourished on Bulgarian soil; and, for many reasons, the group system has flourished there exceedingly. The new conditions threw up a number of very remarkable men—Cankov, Karavelov, and, above

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all, Stambulov, who earned the somewhat misleading title of "the Bismarck of the Balkans." It was his forceful energy that forced Alexander to identify himself with the revolution which united Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria in 1885, and to risk the displeasure alike of Sultan and of Tsar. In a thoroughly characteristic phrase the minister bluntly warned his master that if he would not advance to Phillippopolis he had better retire to Darmstadt. The union was cemented by the short war with Serbia, provoked by the jealousy and incompetence of King Milan. Dynastic and diplomatic intrigues thus revived the ancient feud between two sister peoples, who, till then, had seemed to be following the same development as England and Scotland in earlier centuries. The energy of Stambulov and the military prowess of Alexander carried the Bulgarian army to victory, but the Prince's unexpected self-assertion earned for him the hostility of the Tsar; and though the nation was undoubtedly behind him, he lost heart, placed his resignation in his cousin's hands and retired abroad, to end his days as an officer in the Austrian army. For many months the throne of Bulgaria went begging, and it seemed as though the new State must inevitably sink to a position of complete vassalage. But Stambulov devoted all his extraordinary energy to the task of shaking off foreign interference. His was a government of the "strong hand"; no scruples were allowed to interfere with the end in view, and intrigue and violence were countered by even more drastic methods. The comparison with Bismarck is not altogether inapt. If the famous Prussian Junker had been a peasant, and if his country had spent five centuries under a grinding foreign yoke, his methods, no doubt, would have been correspondingly cruder. There is a further parallel between the position of the two great ministers towards the throne. In each case a young and energetic sovereign chafed at the domineering methods and diplomatic prestige of a virtual "king-maker"; in each case the weather-beaten pilot was dismissed with abrupt indignity, and spent the remainder of his days in sulky and spiteful criticism. But here the analogy ends. Bismarck died full of years and honours at Friedrichsruh; Stambulov, after more than one abortive attempt had failed, fell a victim to the assassin's knife before he had completed his fiftieth year. The crime was committed in broad daylight

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in a thoroughfare of Sofia; the police did not lift a hand to save him from the mutilation which followed murder; and the trial of the criminals was an open and notorious farce. Six months before the murder Stambulov had published an interview in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, in which he foretold his end and openly hinted that his enemies had "the strongest support" in their designs upon his life. It was notorious that Prince Ferdinand had refused him permission to leave the country, and now public opinion openly credited him with the moral responsibility for the crime and for the manner in which it was hushed up. Many years later Ferdinand was to reveal himself, in a rash moment of candour, to an acquaintance of high diplomatic standing. "I intend to be on the side of the assassins," he said, and hitherto fate has enabled him to keep his word.

When the true history of the last thirty years comes to be written Ferdinand of Coburg will be remembered as one of the chief corruptors of his age. In him three widely divergent streams unite—the Coburg, the Bourbon, and the Koháry—and there is certainly more of the *roué* Regent of Orleans, of the cynical "Philippe Égalité" of the Revolution, and of Napoleon's unscrupulous army contractor, than of the more solid and respectable German dynasty which has given kings to so many different countries. A genuine student of ornithology and botany, a passionate collector and expert in gems, an inordinate stickler for etiquette, a physical coward, but possessed by a daring ambition that knows no bounds, a consummate master of the diplomatic game, a shrewd student of human psychology, concentrating his whole attention on the foibles and weaknesses of those around him—Ferdinand should have been a despot of the Italian Renaissance rather than the ruler of a modern peasant democracy.

For the first nine years of his reign, Ferdinand's main efforts were devoted to securing the official recognition of Russia and of the other Great Powers, who hesitated to offend the Tsar by taking the first step. This prolonged indignity has long rankled in the mind of one who sees in Nicholas II. a rival to the imperial throne and mantle which await him under the dome of Santa Sofia. The baptism of his son Boris into the Orthodox faith broke his wife's heart and provoked the resentment of the Pope, but restored him

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to the good graces of St. Petersburg. But tradition and temperament alike pointed Ferdinand to Vienna and Budapest, and, on his Hungarian estates, he could study at leisure those wholesale methods of electoral and administrative corruption by which the Magyar oligarchy maintained their political power over the unhappy helots of their country. In Budapest, too, he could investigate commercial and financial Panamism as a fine art; while the Magyar satrapy of Croatia provided him, during the twenty years' rule of Count Khuen Héderváry, with elaborate receipts for seducing the loyalty, sapping the resistance, and corrupting the soul of political parties and individuals. From Hungary, Ferdinand imported with him the specifically Magyar quality of self-advertisement in the foreign press, of throwing dust in the dazzled eyes of strangers, of concealing under the fair exterior of pretentious new buildings and patent street paving the dearth of moral achievement and intellectual resources. During the twenty-eight years of his reign material progress was enormous; the dunghill has blossomed into a rose-garden. But we are reminded at every turn of the Serbian proverb, "Too much light causes blindness, not only too much darkness." The Bulgarian has a genuine passion for education, but he lacks as yet the foundations upon which true culture must inevitably rest. With him materialist conceptions in private life are balanced by an extreme realism in politics, which borders upon megalomania; both alike lend themselves to exploitation.

No Balkan country can boast so many political parties as Bulgaria; and this fact is due, not merely to the complete absence of Parliamentary traditions, but to systematic encouragement of the group system from above. Ferdinand, in particular, has pursued a policy diametrically opposed to that of his neighbour, King Charles of Roumania, who sternly discouraged fissiparous tendencies, and did all in his power to strengthen the party system. It suited Ferdinand to have numerous parties, who made up by clamour for their lack of real control, and exhausted in personal bickerings the energies which might otherwise have turned against his own person. Foreign observers have always exaggerated the importance of the parties and underestimated the power of the Crown and its particular puppets of the moment. In reality the educated and governing classes soon

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reconciled themselves to the system of "spoils" developed by the astute "Coburger." "Enrichissez-vous" became the scarcely veiled invitation to every public man, and foreign bankers, notably those of Budapest, obligingly facilitated the process, while strengthening their own hold upon the country's resources. The secret of Ferdinand's power has lain in his skill in calculating the psychological moment for driving each batch of swine away from the trough of power, and, still more, in his policy—pursued with a relentless and uncanny mastery of detail—of supervising their diet. In other words, he has made it his business to pry into the personal activities of his ministers, and his dossier of compromising documents is the envy of every criminal investigation department in Europe. The great Stambulov himself displayed a brutal shamelessness in using his official position to acquire a private fortune; but his successors sought to veil their rapacity under a thin veneer of external rectitude. Petkov, his successor as party chief, began life as a needy journalist, but, at the time of his assassination in 1906, he had already acquired a fortune of over a million francs. Such practices became the rule rather than the exception, and more than one voice was raised in protest; but the system grew and extended its ramifications throughout Bulgarian public life, being favoured by Ferdinand for his own selfish ends. To such a pass have matters come that it has almost become the rule for ministers, after their fall from power, to be arraigned for some illegality committed in office. The list of such trials is a very long one. Foremost upon it stand the names of Mr. Radoslavov and of two members of his Cabinet, MM. Tončev and Ivančov, who, nearly twenty years ago, were prosecuted for using their official position to fill their own pockets. Similar charges were brought against all save two members of the Cabinet of General Račo Petrov, and again, against the Cabinet of Dr. Gudev. Quite recently the Stambulovist leader, M. Genadiev, who had already been condemned for speculation, has again been brought to trial and sentenced for offences committed when in office. It must, of course, be remembered that such political trials are one of King Ferdinand's most approved methods of reducing party leaders to complete subservience, and that trumped-up charges are often levelled at innocent heads. Even M. Gešov, during whose premier-

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ship the Balkan League was formed, has been the victim of judicial proceedings, based upon the charge of having tampered with a will which brought the fortune of the millionaire, M. Gergiev, into his family. The action had not been concluded when war broke out; but it is obvious that it was being treated as a convenient means of pressure upon a statesman who had always been consistently Russophil and Anglophil, and about whom no compromising documents had hitherto been obtained. In short, Ferdinand set himself to create a system by which the individual might grow rich and prosper exceedingly, so long as he remained the faithful servitor of the throne, but risked immediate disgrace and ruin if he ventured to assert his independence. Thus there was always a waiting list for the post of Premier, and whenever Ferdinand had had enough of one politician and his following, he merely had to turn to a rival group and entrust it with the "making" of an election and a majority. Not even in Hungary have such political *tours de force* been possible as in Bulgaria, where, at the magic word of the sovereign, a leader, whose party dominates the Sobranje, goes to the country and returns with a following of two or three, while another who stood almost alone returns with an overwhelming majority. It ought to be obvious that all is not gold that glitters in such a State, and that it can hardly be regarded as parliamentary in the Western sense of the word.

Most of the first decade of Ferdinand's reign was taken up in securing the recognition of Europe and entrenching his extremely insecure position. A still longer period elapsed before he secured the next goal of his ambitions—the declaration of independence and the assumption of the title of Tsar. The next stage, the conquest of Constantinople, seemed, for a brief moment, on the eve of fulfilment after the Turkish collapse at Lüle Burgas. In each case Ferdinand was playing for his own hand, and skilfully wrested concessions from Russia by his policy of mysterious coquetting with Vienna. The proclamation of Independence was made to coincide with the annexation of Bosnia by the Emperor Francis Joseph, and rested on a secret arrangement which deliberately flouted Mr. Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister of the day. The latter, anxious to retrieve his discomfiture at the hands of his successful rival, Baron

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(afterwards Count) Aehrenthal, offered Bulgaria exceptionally favourable terms for the liquidation of her debt to Turkey. When Russia thus seemed to have reasserted her influence, Ferdinand, who, meantime, had secured Parliament's consent to the complete withdrawal of foreign policy from its sphere of control, allowed his Russophil Premier to enter upon a secret engagement with Serbia and Greece, which involved contingent hostility to Austria-Hungary. But, apart from the fact that Ferdinand almost certainly had no intention of fulfilling such an obligation, and is even suspected of having betrayed its terms to Vienna, the bait of Santa Sofia out-balanced, in this instance, the ambitious schemer's natural leanings towards the Magyar-German alliance. Though this final triumph was denied him, he again extracted, by skilful overtures to Vienna at the critical moment, Russia's consent to the retention of Adrianople and Thrace by Bulgaria. Hitherto the dangerous game of playing off Russia and Austria-Hungary against each other had produced highly satisfactory results. But, at this stage, Ferdinand, infected by the megalomania of his army and people, allowed his ministers, not merely gravely to underestimate the achievement of Serbia and Greece, but to ignore contemptuously the attitude of Roumania, who, though still loyal to the Central combination of Powers, viewed with disquietude the exaggerated claims of her southern neighbour.

King Ferdinand's intimate association with Count Tarnowski, Vienna's able representative in Sofia, further betrayed him into accepting Austria's military aid against Serbia as certain. But General Savov's failure to fulfil his promise of "cutting through the Serbs like rotten cheese" led the military chiefs of the Dual Monarchy to hesitate once more until it was too late; and the unsympathetic reply of Italy to their theories of a "defensive" war against Serbia finally decided them in favour of inaction. The dream of a Bulgaria enthroned upon "the four seas" and dominating the whole peninsula was replaced by the reality of the Treaty of Bucarest, at which the other four Balkan States imposed their will upon her and left her at the mercy of the advancing Turks. Ferdinand had to "furl his glorious standards until better days." But, for good or for evil, the "Coburger" stood henceforth committed to the Central Powers; and the events of the Great War were to show that

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they alone could pretend to satisfy his soaring ambitions. At every turn Russia and her Western Allies were easily outbid by Germany. It was not merely that the Serbs held Monastir and a portion of Macedonia, which Bulgarian sentiment has long regarded as its natural birthright, and that it was more difficult for the Allies to offer the property of Serbia than for their and her enemies. This is true, but it is a mere fragment of the truth. The bait of Macedonia mobilised the Macedonian exiles, whose influence is so strong in the Bulgarian army and in the capital itself. But the real object of Ferdinand and his advisers went far beyond this. The conquest of Macedonia was to be the first step to the assertion of a Balkan hegemony. Serbia was to be reduced to complete impotence, and the ideal of Yugoslav unity was to be thwarted at all costs—at any rate, until such time as it could be achieved from Sofia rather than from Belgrade, and under Boris of Coburg rather than under Alexander Karagjorgjević. Meanwhile, Bulgaria was to extend her boundaries to march with Hungary, and thus consolidate her connection with the Great Central European State which was emerging from the ruins of Austrian incompetence and Magyar tyranny. The German Radical leader, Herr Friedrich Naumann, in his newly-published monograph on "Bulgaria and Central Europe," significantly points out that last year, when he wrote his epoch-making book on Central Europe, it was impossible to refer too openly to Bulgaria; for, "though Tsar Ferdinand and Mr. Radoslavov even then knew very well what they wanted to do, and though the leaders of German foreign policy looked with growing confidence towards Sofia, it was obviously not allowable to speak of the ripening entente. Now all secrets are revealed, and the alliance is there. . . ." This is an interesting comment on the pathetic illusions of British Bulgarophils.

Ferdinand and his people—for it is yet another illusion to suppose that Ferdinand is alone in advocating such a policy—have gravitated towards Germany and Austria-Hungary as steel to a magnet. Bulgaria's whole policy for years past has been based upon the same ideal of materialism and brute force, as that of Prussia or of Hungary. The desire for Bulgarian national unity has long since been swallowed up in a claim of racial predominance which pos-

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tulates the disappearance of Serbia from the list of nations, and the reduction to impotence of Greece and Roumania.

For Germany, on the other hand, the importance of Bulgaria is clear. While the Danube is to be the great waterway of "Central Europe," and its alluvial banks a rich field of colonisation, the route now traversed by the Balkan Express is vital and indispensable, as the gate to Constantinople and Bagdad, to Persia and Arabia, to Suez and through Egypt to Central Africa. Herr Naumann is right when he declares that the town of Niš is symbolical of a great policy. "We (Germans) and the Bulgarians likewise had to smash the hostile control of the Belgrade-Niš-Pirot line" at all costs. "A well-ordered Balkan railway is almost more than a State treaty." To every German this is as simple as the alphabet. When will it cease to be a complex algebraical problem for British minds?

Allied Portraits : (I) Eleftherios Venizelos

THE year 1864 which witnessed the first of the three wars by which Prussia secured her command of the German Empire, witnessed also the birth of the man who was to prove the most stalwart opponent of Prussianism in S.E. Europe—the man who by the curious turn of events was to find himself in conflict on this issue with the grandson of the Danish King from whom Prussia and Austria had snatched two-fifths of his dominions. From his eventful career four moments may be selected, when he stood forth as the foremost champion of Hellenism and directed on himself the attention of the civilised world.

There was that famous day of February, 1897, when, with his Cretan comrades ranged round the flag of the mother-country, the symbol of the union of the Hellenic race, he rejected the orders of the Protecting Powers, and, in the picturesque phrase of the Greek newspapers, "defied the navies of Europe." The flag fell in spite of the Cretans' protests, and it is characteristic of Venizelos that, while maintaining his plan unswervingly, he bowed to the inevitable course of events and looked for other gradual and more persuasive means of achieving what arms could not. Yet on that day Venizelos established himself in the hearts of the Greek race as a genuine *palikari*, a patriot of the type that

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still held aloft the standard of Greek independence under Turkish rule, the men of Mani and Souli.

Alternately Prime Minister and outlawed chief, Venizelos fought in Parliament and in the mountains for the cause of union with the persistence of the torrent that dashing in vain on a rocky barrier wins its way through it or round it.

His renovation of autonomous Crete made for him a Hellenic reputation, and when the Military League, sweeping away the tissue of intrigues and manœuvres that did duty for party politics in Greece from 1897 to 1909, looked round for a new leader in the new era they dreamed of, their eyes could not but fall on Venizelos. Called from Crete to Athens to purify and construct the new Greece—as the sage Epimenides 2,500 years earlier—Venizelos had his first tussle not with the defeated party leaders but with the victorious democracy that had invited him. From a balcony in Constitution Square he faced the sovereign people he had come to represent and lead. “*A Constituent Assembly*,” shouted the crowds, blindly eager for radical changes which would as by magic create a prosperous Greece. It was the man versus the mob. “*Revisionist*,” retorted Venizelos firmly; nothing could shake his resolution.

His will conquered their violence. The dynasty was saved and the course of reasoned progress secured. Conservative in his political theory, Venizelos was a radical reformer in the matter of abuses. Finances, agriculture, Army and Civil Service, railways and university were purged of corrupt and self-seeking elements and endowed with some measure of permanence and efficiency. After two years of reform Greece was able to join the Balkan League, which had been Venizelos's dream and was largely his creation, on terms of equality and respect. That the League broke down was no fault of his; but, provident for all eventualities, he was able to build again out of its ruins a new Balkan settlement which, while punishing and curbing the destroyers of the former settlement, was not coloured either by passionate resentment or Chauvinist sentiment.

And yet there was a still grander day in Venizelos's life than that of Akrotiri, of Constitution Square, or of Bucarest. He had proved himself a gallant *palikari*, a sober and resolute statesman, an astute and far-seeing diplomatist. But on October 4th, 1915, when after his second fall from

ALLIED PORTRAITS : ELEFThERIOS VENIZELoS

power he faced in the Chamber the triumphant and rancorous attacks of the five ex-Prime Ministers who had succeeded him in office, Venizelos proved himself a greater man, a truer prophet than even his friends could have believed. Comparisons with Perikles' last speech or the *De Corona* may be ridiculed as false sentimentalism. But there is much of both speeches in this crowning triumph of Venizelos in which his policy and ideals were fully expressed. The nation's honour and the future of the Balkans and of Europe were at stake. Desert Serbia? "Such a dishonour would be unworthy of Greece's history, and she is too small a nation to commit so great an infamy without incapacitating herself for accomplishing her historic mission." Every warning he uttered then has proved true. To refuse aid to Serbia must end in the Bulgarian and German domination of the Balkans and the gravest peril to Greece, estranged from her natural and historic friends, faced by those whose enmity is hereditary, political and temperamental. To shun a danger may mean a graver danger. "Gentlemen," were his closing words, "take heed that the Greece we hand over to you do not in your hands become a lesser Greece."

These are typical demonstrations of Venizelos in action. But the man is no comet, appearing at intervals to amaze and alarm. His brilliance is not meteoric but constant, and the future historian will find in his work of the first nine months of 1916, in his statement and advocacy in the *Kirix* of his constitutional and international ideas, an invigorating and instructive study. The vital qualities of Venizelos seem to us to be two. Firstly, instinctive prudence controls and directs even the torrential stream of his enthusiasm. Striking instances of this suggest themselves in the handling of two national problems—the union of Crete and the union of Northern Epirus with Greece. In both cases, in the former particularly so, the object is very dear to his heart. Yet he could refuse to admit the entrance of deputies from these lands to the Greek Chamber, and thereby offend numerous friends, because he knew that the moment was not yet ripe for it. He had not forsworn his ideal; on the contrary he delayed, only to ensure, its fulfilment. The worst champions of these Greek Irredenta were "the fools who rushed in" and gesticulated about it. Venizelos's life is dramatic, it is not theatrical.

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And, secondly, he has faith—faith which has, in fact, moved even Olympus and restored it from Turkey to Greece. He does not lightly adventure his country's safety, but he can take any risk when he knows that not to take it is more risky still. His political opponents have assailed him bitterly for joining the Balkan League without guarantees. Venizelos knew better. No preliminary arrangement was possible between Greece and Bulgaria. If there was to be an alliance at all it must be an alliance without terms. The alliance for which he was criticised doubled Greek territory, and made Greece the peer of any Balkan power. Venizelos had trusted his own foresight and his countrymen's valour. He did not fear to "put it to the touch." Since then he has twice advocated a similar great adventure—in May and in September 1915—in circumstances known to everyone. Adventure it was, but who can say it would not have been successful? Looking beyond the showy menaces of Germany, Venizelos even then descried the ultimate triumph of the Entente Powers. Putting aside the nicely calculated less and more which to his opponents is statesmanship, Venizelos saw involved in the Allies' triumph the triumph of the Hellenic cause at their side. The Sardinian troops sent by Cavour to the Crimea were small in numbers, but that act was the first proclamation of a new Italy. A Greek division on Gallipoli would have been proof and warrant of a pan-Hellenic empire, the future associate of the Great Powers.

But his opponents were thinking not in European or Hellenic but in Balkan terms. They lacked the foresight of the seer, though they had much of the prudence of the ordinary business man. They were not devoid of common sense, but they lacked Venizelos's uncommon, almost uncanny, sense—his second sight.

Venizelos is, in truth, a prophet, and a prophet is not without honour save in his own country. The true Venizelos is more visible to the Hellenes of Crete and the Ægean Islands and Salonica, and to the phil-Hellenes of Paris and London, than to the political world of Athens, of Patras, and the provinces of Old Greece. The qualities we have counted to Venizelos's credit—his passionate belief in the future of Hellenism, his phenomenal perception of the *efheria* (fitting moment) for things, and consequent adaptability of obstinately-

ALLIED PORTRAITS: ELEFThERIOS VENIZELOS

held views to force of circumstances; finally, his ruthless disregard of personal feelings and associations when they conflict with the execution of national policy—all these lie open to very varied interpretation. He is not as other men or other politicians. He brooks no rival to interfere with or red tape to delay or sentiment to hinder the swift execution of his Fatherland's need—call this, as you will, ingratitude or super-devotion. He has the "low cunning"—to our mind the infallible instinct—which teaches him the secret when and how to act, which makes him master of the Hellenic soul. His critics describe him as "blindly impulsive, womanishly illogical and hysterical": but to us he seems to have the vision of the artist and the faith of the prophet. He is not beneath logic (in speech and in print none surpasses him in clear statement of an argument)—he is beyond it. He is truly a "primitive," but this reproach in the eyes of his critics may be accounted his chief glory. He is consumed with a passion for Hellas, he sees her true place in and after this world-war, and with indefatigable energy he works for that ideal, indifferent how, so long as it be attained. He has gone to Salonica as he went to Therisson, because now it is only the *palikari* that can save Greece.

A. W. A. LEEPER.

The Death of Herr von Tschirschky

The death of Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador in Vienna, removes one of the chief diplomatic authors of the present war. Ever since his predecessor, Count Wedel, was transferred to the post of Statthalter of Alsace in 1907, he had been a focus of all Russophobe activities in the Austrian capital, and had devoted himself with equal cynicism and energy to destroying the last traces of cordiality between the houses of Habsburg and Romanov, and forging more closely the links that bound the Dual Monarchy to Berlin. His whole policy was based upon the assumption that Russia would not dare to fight, but would capitulate as in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; and he did much to inoculate his master, William II., whose ear he possessed, with this fatal doctrine. He contributed materially to stiffening the hostility of Count Aehrenthal and of his successor, Count Berchtold, to Serbia during the critical years from 1908 to 1914, and he was not without influence upon the official attitude of the Ballplatz during the scandals of the Friedjung Trial. In short, he may not unfairly be described as the *âme damnée* of Aus-

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tria, working hand-in-hand with General Konrad von Hoetzendorff and the military hotheads, and, at the same time, with the notorious Count Forgách, the official forger of the Ballplatz. In the words of a well-informed writer in *The Times* of November 17th, "there is every reason to believe that the German Emperor conveyed to the Emperor Francis Joseph, either directly or through Herr von Tschirschky, as early as July 14th, 1914, an intimation that Germany would support Austria to the full, and in every direction, if she would go ahead and attack Serbia. There is also reason to believe that the ultimatum to Serbia was approved and revised, if not actually drawn up, by Tschirschky and the German Emperor. Tschirschky's death must therefore be regarded as that of one of the most culpable authors of the war, and be regarded with a regret that he has not lived to see the full fruits of the nefarious policy with which his name will for ever be identified."

A Premature Appeal to America

The German Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag Committee has awakened, in certain British journals, further discussion regarding President Wilson's League of Peace. The studied ambiguity of the Chancellor's phrases has not deterred these organs from declaring that Germany has accepted the idea in principle. The "change of heart" thus implied leads to the further suggestion that "if Germany in form accepts the League of Peace . . . a stated object of British policy is attained"; and upon this basis of provisional agreement between the belligerents President Wilson is invited to tender his good offices as mediator. The premisses of this argument are not sound, for they consist in a complete misreading of the German mind, and they ignore the patent facts of the military map of Europe at this moment. There has been no change of heart in Germany as yet; and, until there is, the idea of the League of Peace remains a dead letter for all good Europeans. The suggestion that, since "the peace should be moderate as regards territory, and sweeping as regards the future organisation of States," America should now step in to assist in the realisation of her own idea, is utterly premature. But we go further and take up the challenge that lies in the statement that the peace must be *moderate* as regards territory. To our mind, moderation is no substitute for justice in the territorial settlement. We repudiate all motives of territorial aggrandisement whether for the British Empire or for any of our Allies; and equally do we repudiate the infringement of the true national territory of our enemies. But if we are true to our profession of faith in nationality, we must take justice and knowledge as our guides and refuse to bow down to the fetish of "moderation." We are aware that some well-meaning persons regard the disruption of Austria-Hungary as an "immoderate" territorial policy; but this is an obvious case where apparent "moderation" and justice come into conflict. With the best will in the world towards the American people, we cannot pretend that their President is a proper assistant in this matter;

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and, therefore, for the moment, we go forward without him. And we suspect that the President himself realises that the best preparation for the realisation of his idea lies in our policy of *la victoire intégrale*. Meanwhile, the best service that America can render is to sit down and think out the idea of the League of Peace, not in terms of that American sentiment which is so detached from, and therefore ignorant of, the Old World, but in terms of the hard facts of European geography and politics.

German Proposals to Russia

For months past the air has been full of rumours, purposely disseminated in accordance with the traditional habits of the German Foreign Office, of negotiations for a separate peace between Germany and Russia. It is true that Germany has made proposals, but we need hardly add that Russia rejected them with indignation. We now learn from a sure source abroad that the proposals made to Petrograd were of the following nature:—Constantinople was to remain Turkish, but all restraint upon Russia's use of the Straits was to be removed, and all fortifications on both sides to be dismantled. The whole of Armenia and Persia was to fall to Russia, who would thus secure a port upon the Indian Ocean. Russia was also to receive Eastern Galicia, the whole of Bukovina and Moldavia, the inference obviously being that the kingdom of Roumania was to be partitioned, and Wallachia to enter the Dual Monarchy. Poland was to become an independent kingdom by the union of the Russian and Austrian portions, and hints were thrown out as to the possibility of a Russian Grand Duke as its king. Finally, special rights were to be secured to the Germans in Lithuania and the Baltic provinces. When offers of this kind are made, it shows that the enemy is settling down to business; and we shall not go far wrong in connecting these sinister proposals with the mission of the notorious Baron Kühlmann in Constantinople.

From a statement published by the *Večerneje Vremja*—the evening edition of the well-known *Novoje Vremja*—we infer that the Allied Governments are about to make an announcement which will effectually put a stop to such intrigues for the present. This journal announces, from what it describes as a "very authoritative source," that the agreement arrived at between Russia and the Western Powers regarding Constantinople and the Straits will be made public in the near future. As such a statement could not have appeared without the permission of the Russian Government, we may assume that it is not altogether without foundation.

"If the Austro-Germans really desired to solve the Polish problem, they ought to have included in the new Polish Kingdom at least Western Galicia, with Cracow, which, for the Poles, is very much the same as Moscow is for the Russians."

Sir George Buchanan made the following brief statement to the Press:—

"The act published by the Germans proves that the Germans

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think that the Poles will be satisfied with a Polish State composed of the provinces of Russian Poland without Posen and without Galicia. On the other hand, we know very well that the Allies consider their object to be the complete restoration of the Polish State, including Posen and Galicia."

German Propaganda in Italy

The *Giornale d'Italia* of November 14 contains an obviously official reply to the pro-German propagandists in Italy who are attempting to discredit England. The *Giornale* writes: "Indeed, there has been noticeable in Italy for some time past a closely-woven and subtle intrigue working to incite public opinion against Great Britain." Four principal charges or "themes" are put forward:—

- (1) It is England who is prolonging the war in order to have time to exhaust Germany, without caring whether Italy, France and Russia are exhausted also.
- (2) Italy has put herself in the power of England in order to escape from the influence of Germany.
- (3) England is "exploiting" her Allies by leaving on their shoulders the whole weight of the war.
- (4) England is making usurious profits upon the money she lends and the goods she supplies to her Allies.

The *Giornale d'Italia* adds: "These are the principal themes of the subterranean anti-British campaign that is being carried on in the most diverse circles with a simultaneity and uniformity which reveal German organization. Upon this campaign are grafted other minor campaigns against France (of which the chief theme is the force of "five hundred thousand Italian soldiers whom Bissolati would like to send to fight on French soil"), and against Russia ("the Slav peril," the appearance of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean and the menace of a Greater Serbia). We have to deal with a vast system of propaganda, of which the object is to diminish faith in the Allies among the people of each Allied country. Germany places great hopes in this work of disintegration. But these hopes also will fail, provided that in all the States of the anti-German alliance eyes be kept open and these manœuvres be immediately denounced. The real danger lies in letting the absurdest legends pass from mouth to mouth without ever confuting them."

This doctrine is excellent, and the service rendered by the *Giornale d'Italia* in publishing a concise refutation of each of the four anti-British "themes" is considerable. But we fear there will be need for much watchfulness in Italy before the winter is over, not only as regards the intrigues of anti-British propagandists, but of other agents and agencies in Italy whose pro-German tendencies are becoming very marked. We should not be surprised if, before the spring, these agents and agencies were to make a determined attempt to overthrow the present Italian Government and to install themselves in its place. Germany does not always build her chief hopes upon indirect means of action.

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"The New Europe" in Parliament

In the course of the Cardiff Conference debate in the House of Commons, a Scottish Radical member below the gangway attributed to us certain views "of the state of Europe that is to follow the war," which he described as views which "no sane man interested in the future of Europe would advocate." We are not surprised that the views in question should appear almost insane in the eyes of an intelligent Scot, for they represent the jaundiced fears of a well-known contemporary Pangerman author. They are not the opinions of THE NEW EUROPE. We have never clamoured for "a kingdom of Armenia," or suggested that the German frontier must be "forced back to the Rhine." But we have proposed, and will continue to insist, that the purely artificial State of Austria-Hungary must disappear in order that its constituent races may be free. It is natural that the overburdened member of Parliament should be hasty in his perusal of the fortuitous literature that reaches him daily by post, but it is inexcusable that he should carelessly attribute to THE NEW EUROPE statements which it never made.

Some Russian Opinions on Polish Independence

Russian papers quote the statements of several leading Russian and Polish politicians on the recent declaration of Polish independence by the Germans.

In the course of a long statement made to the press, M. Milyukov spoke as follows:—

"The representatives of the Russian public, especially its progressive elements, from the moment of the publication of the appeal of the Grand Duke Nicholas, did not cease to urge the necessity of realising the promises contained in this Act without waiting until the end of the war. The Parliamentary Delegation, on its return from France and England, very definitely called the attention of Sazonov, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the necessity of a speedy solution of the Polish question. It is true that it was not independence that was contemplated, but a wide measure of autonomy. But if a wide measure of autonomy had been given to the Poles in time, the national aspirations of the Polish people would have been satisfied at that time.

"Justice compels me to say that various representatives of the Russian Government made some kind of attempt to secure a speedy solution of the Polish question, but, unfortunately, during last summer, the course of Russian foreign policy changed. What was prophesied by the representatives of the Russian public took place—we were too late.

"The object of the acts published in Warsaw and Lublin is to get a new army amounting to some hundreds of thousands of men. Besides that, the Austro-Germans, by proclaiming the independence of Poland, will get a new trump into their hands, and further counters for bargaining at the peace conference. The fact that neither Germany nor Austria has added to the territory of the new Polish

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kingdom a single inch of territory in either Galicia or Posen, and also the extremely obscure definition of the future frontiers of the kingdom, prove that the Austro-Germans do not themselves believe in the stability of the new State created by them, and are guided merely by considerations of a military and strategic character. If the Austro-Germans believed in the stability of the new Polish kingdom they would, at least, have added Cracow to it, because they know very well that the formation of a kingdom from merely one of the occupied provinces of Poland does not solve the question and does not satisfy the Poles. From the point of view of realising Polish ideals, Cracow is even dearer to the Poles than Warsaw."

The Split in the Progressive Bloc

Each time the Duma has met during the present war the cohesion of the Progressive Bloc has been called in question. Its opponents, both on the extreme Right and on the extreme Left, have ridiculed it and showered abuse on it, and any hitch that was observed was given wide publicity. But the Progressive Bloc remains, and the present session of the Duma is likely to see its influence strengthened.

At the time of its formation in September, 1915, a long list of internal reforms was included in its programme, of which the most important was the demand for a "Government enjoying the confidence of the country." This was a compromise between a responsible Government, in the English sense of the word, and a change from a bureaucratic to a Parliamentary Government that would be sufficiently Liberal to gain the support—during the war—of the majority in the Duma. This aim has not yet been realised, and it is in the attempt to define more closely the attitude of the *bloc* to the Government that a serious split has occurred. The Progressive Party, which, before the war, sat just to the Right of the Cadets, has now seceded from the *bloc* on the ground that the latter failed to include in its declaration a demand for "Parliamentary Government." The declaration, as read in the Duma, spoke merely of a "Government united by a single mind and ready to act with the support of the majority of the Duma, and to carry out its programme."

The secession of the Progressives under their leader, M. Yefremov, is not altogether surprising. Though formerly to the Right of the Cadets, they have, during the war, shown themselves more democratic and less willing to compromise than M. Milyukov's party. At the end of last year they withdrew their members from the War Industrial Committee on the ground that they were subjected to bureaucratic interference. They may now feel the need for a free hand, and may constitute themselves into a stimulating, but not unfriendly, opposition. One thing seems pretty certain: that the Duma majority will remain united in its war aims, and a power to be reckoned with. They are working more and more closely with the Zemstva and with the army, and the recent impressive scene in the Duma, when the Minister for War held out his hand to M. Milyukov, is a striking proof of the solidarity of the Russian people in its war aims.

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VOL. I, No. 7.

November 30, 1916

Austria under Francis Joseph

FRANCIS JOSEPH became Emperor of Austria on 2nd December, 1848, in his eighteenth year, and he reigned for sixty-eight years. At the beginning of his reign the whole of Europe was shaken by revolution—the inevitable result of former disturbances, and, in particular, of the great French Revolution. Turkey and Russia were the only countries to escape the full effects of that political and spiritual upheaval, although, even in Russia, it was the ideas to which it gave birth that prompted the Emperor Nicholas I. to inaugurate a *régime* of the severest repression.

Until 1848 Austria was completely under the influence of Metternich, who inspired the old Habsburg system, and, indeed, gave his name to it as a kind of label. Only once, under the Emperor Joseph II., did Austria accept the modern ideas of Western Europe. It was at the time when the Great Revolution was being evolved, when Frederick the Great and even the Empress Catherine were the leaders of the so-called "enlightened" absolutism; but the French Revolution cooled all such liberal aspirations, not only on the part of the reigning sovereigns, but of the ruling classes, aristocracy and plutocracy alike. Europe for a time restored the foundations of the old *régime*, and Austria, under the Emperor Francis, became the bulwark of the reaction.

The French Revolution strengthened the growing nationalist feeling and led to the establishment of the national principle in politics, and it was this very movement that drove Austria, in view of her many subject nationalities, to adopt an attitude rigorously anti-national and anti-democratic. She was strengthened in this resolve by the spectacle of the Turkish Empire, which was at that very time being shaken by the rising nationalist feeling of the Serbs and Greeks.

In order fully to understand the reactionary system of government which has characterised Austria-Hungary, and which one of the greatest Austrian poets has stigmatised as "the murder of the spirit," it will be necessary to bear in mind the main outline of that empire's historical development.

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Austria was originally founded as an Eastern March to protect the German Empire against the invasion of the Asiatic nomads. Austria (Ost-Reich) means literally the Eastern Empire, or, rather, the anti-Eastern Empire. Austria, as it is now, has only existed since 1526. In that year she joined with the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary to form a stronger empire against the Turks. Hungary, at that time, with the exception of a small strip of land in the west, was under Turkish rule. Austria and Bohemia were the real foundations of the Habsburg Monarchy. The new confederation was legally a Personal Union of three equally independent States, having nothing in common but the monarch; gradually, however, the Habsburgs succeeded in centralising the confederated States. In this they were aided by the constant wars with Turkey; the Joint Army was an effective tool in the cause of centralisation and Germanisation. But Austria's endeavour was strongly supported by the Church also. The Habsburgs became the leaders of the Counter-Reformation, and especially of the movement against Hussite Bohemia. This Counter-Reformation, as is well known, was led by the Jesuits, and from that time, up to to-day, Austria in her inmost soul has been Jesuitical. It was not in vain that the Habsburgs had been united with the land of the Inquisition. Bohemia revolted against Austrian Germanising Jesuitism in 1618, but the battle of the White Mountain gave the victory to Austria. The leaders of the revolution were executed, 30,000 families had to leave Bohemia, and four-fifths of the land was confiscated. In that way Bohemia was weakened, and as Hungary, exploited by the Turks, was insignificant, Austria could impose with impunity a rigid system of centralisation. It was, above all, under Maria Theresa that this was accomplished. The reaction against the revolution and the wars against Napoleon helped to consolidate that achievement. It was in the year 1804 that the Emperor Francis proclaimed himself Emperor of Austria. In the year 1806 he resigned the crown of the Holy Roman Empire. His proclamation as Emperor of Austria was a formal announcement of the success of the centralisation of Bohemia and Hungary, and the confederation of the three States was transformed into one united State. In centralising Austria the Habsburgs consciously and unconsciously acted as emperors of Ger-

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many. They used Germany for their special dynastic aims with Austria, but, on the other hand, they also served German interests. Though the Emperor resigned the German crown, he nevertheless, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, became the leader of the German Confederation; in fact, only the title was changed. Prussia opposed Austria because she also aspired to the leadership of Germany, but she completely gave way and accepted the reactionary principles of Austria. Metternich's system of repression strangled not only the Austrian nations but Prussia and Germany as well. It was this system of Metternich which was overthrown in 1848.

The revolution of Paris was the signal for the rising forces in Austria. The first revolutionary movement broke out in Bohemia. It was in Prague, on the 11th of March, that the first public meeting was held, national and democratic rights formulated, and deputies, freely chosen, sent to the Emperor. Prague was joined by Vienna and other cities of Austria. The Emperor Ferdinand, so-called "the Benevolent" (he was, in fact, weak-minded), granted the so-called Bohemian Charter on 8th April, and on the 25th the first Austrian Constitution was proclaimed. The revolution shows how superficial the Austrian absolutist centralisation was. The constituent parts of the empire fell apart; in Bohemia, a free national committee was elected, and it conducted the national movement; Vienna and the German part of Austria now became the revolutionary centre, and Hungary became almost independent under Kossuth's leadership.

Austria's position in Germany was also weakened by the revolution. The National Assembly of Frankfurt embodied the real national policy of Germany by accepting Prussia as the leader. Prussia also aspired to the domination of Austria, and invited the Austrian nationalities to join Germany. Palacky, in the name of the Bohemians, declined that invitation. It was at this time that Palacky coined the well-known phrase, that if Austria had not existed it would have had to be created. Palacky, of course, believed in Austria's sincerity in granting a constitution to Bohemia and to the Empire. But, as a counter-move to the Pangerman Parliament of Frankfurt, the Bohemians summoned to Prague a Slav congress. That ideal was, however, buried in the

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ruins of the Bohemian revolution when it was crushed by Windischgraetz.

After the Bohemian, the Viennese and the Hungarian revolutions were also crushed. Russia helped Austria against the Magyars in the name of Legitimacy; the Croats, led by Jelačić, fought for Austria on the assumption that Ban Jelačić was something more than an Austrian general; the Slovaks also were driven by Magyar oppression into joining the Austrian colours. Similarly, in Italy, Radetzky was successful in crushing the revolution. On the 5th of March, 1849, a new constitution was introduced, and this, in its turn, was succeeded by the constitution of '51. Austria was again a united and centralised empire. The system of Metternich was re-introduced under Bach. Absolutist centralism, anti-nationalism, and clericalism, were its foundations. The brilliant Bohemian publicist, Havlíček, was interned in Brixen, but the other leaders of the revolution escaped and fled to America or to England. London, for a time, became the centre of this "new Europe." No sooner was the old *régime* restored than Austria returned to her German policy; to meet Pangerman ideals, Prince Schwarzenberg, the head of the Austrian Foreign Office, tried to unite Austria; he revived the old Austrian imperialism and dreamt of an empire of 72,000,000 people. True to its foundation and spirit, Austria stipulated with Rome the Concordat, and the old mediæval *régime* seemed to be restored.

The only result of the revolution was the liberation of the peasants. The revolution of '48, no doubt, was, to a great extent, social. The old financial and economic system was overthrown; the liberation of the peasants, and with it the revival of communal and municipal liberties, became, to an extent little suspected by the official classes, the germ of future national and democratic development.

Francis Joseph began his political career as a constitutional monarch, but he soon reverted to absolutism, his person being virtually proclaimed as holy. The Concordat concluded with Rome in the fifties seemed to promise safety to this re-established absolutism. The Crimean War and its effect on autocratic Russia might have taught Francis Joseph that Europe must be re-shaped, and that Austria must yield to the new spirit; but not till 1859 did he realise that mediæval absolutism, even if sanctified by the Pope,

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could not endure any longer. Absolutism, defeated on the battlefield, had to yield ground in the internal policy of the Empire.

In 1860 Austria was forced to adopt modern constitutional principles, but, instead of accepting them sincerely, merely tried to use them as a cloak for home-grown absolutism. An advisory assembly (the *verstärkte Reichsrat*) was summoned (March, 1860), and after an interval of seven months the so-called October Diploma was proclaimed. In it the new constitution was proclaimed as a "lasting and irrevocable constitution of the Empire," but this "lasting and irrevocable" law was changed by Francis Joseph as early as 26th February, 1861! The October Diploma was founded on the federative principle, the constitution of 1861 on the centralist principle. It was Schmerling who became the leader of the centralist constitutional party of the Germans, whereas the Czechs, the Poles and the other non-German nations advocated the principle of federation. The Magyars adopted a policy of abstention and declined to attend the imperial Parliament in Vienna.

The war against Denmark in 1864 showed that Austria had her interest concentrated upon Germany, but the conflict of internal political forces in the Empire pushed towards a solution; absolutism and federalism were the two great conflicting principles exhausting the Empire. Francis Joseph, in his blindness, still clung to the former. In 1865 the constitution was suspended, and there followed what is known as the epoch of *Sistierung*, by which word the re-introduction of absolutism is designated. But the year 1866 not only forced Austria to withdraw from Germany and to acknowledge the supremacy of Prussia, but wrung from the Emperor himself the admission that the crude Metternich system could not prevail any longer, and he consented to its mitigation. By making that concession he proved himself to be not so much a strong character as a shortsighted egotist, endeavouring to meet modern exigencies by half measures; the history of the unhappy General Benedek shows with what absolute coolness he could sacrifice his most devoted servants to reckless dynastic speculation. Venice was lost, and, in that way, Austria reduced to its present boundaries. In this dangerous situation the loyal supporters of Austria advised the Emperor

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to restore harmony among the Austrian nationalities; it would have been natural that Austria, under some new form, should restore the original confederation of Germany, Bohemia and Hungary, but absolutism was too deep-rooted in the Habsburgs, and so Francis Joseph followed the old principle of *divide et impera*, and came to an agreement with the Magyars. The Dual system was introduced, and, since 1867, Austria has been Austria-Hungary; the German minority was to exercise hegemony in Austria, and the Magyar minority in Hungary. Against this disloyal plot of Vienna and Budapest the Czechs protested vigorously. In the year of the creation of Dualism, Palacky, Dr. Rieger and other Czech leaders, visited the Moscow exhibition; in fact, it was a political demonstration of Slav national policy against Habsburg absolutism. In the following year the Czechs proclaimed their famous "Declaration" of national and political rights; Vienna answered with fierce repression in the Bohemian countries, but she could not prevail against the united determination of the Czechs, and Francis Joseph was obliged to negotiate with them. Count Hohenwart was placed at the head of the Ministry of Agreement. The Emperor sent to the Diet of Prague (12th September, 1871) a "Rescript," in which he fully acknowledged the legal position of the Crown of Bohemia ("We are glad to acknowledge the rights of this kingdom, and are ready to renew this acknowledgment with our Coronation Oath"); but the influence of Berlin and Budapest frustrated this agreement, and after a lapse of some months, even weeks, Francis Joseph degraded his imperial word to a "scrap of paper." The repression in Bohemia was renewed with unprecedented fierceness, but the Czechs did not falter.

Meanwhile the effects of the revived Prusso-German Empire made themselves felt in Austria. The Austrian Germans, Vienna itself, even the "dumme Kerl" of Vienna, came to accept Pangerman ideals; the Magyars joined the Pangermans in the hope of forcing Vienna to yield to their aspirations, whereas the Czechs, true to their national and Slav programme, solemnly protested against the new German Empire and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. It was the only protest in Europe! Count Andrassy came to a complete agreement with Bismarck. Bismarck was

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shrewd enough to induce Francis Joseph to conclude a close alliance with Germany, to which Italy was added a few years later; at the same time he secured his own position by a secret agreement with Russia, but Austria-Hungary proceeded in her anti-Slav policy, which was to lead inevitably to a rupture with Russia. Austria-Hungary had not dared to attack Russia openly, but, in 1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied, and Serbia, under King Milan, forced into a policy of abject vassalage.

In internal policy Vienna had to yield to some extent to Bohemia. Count Taaffe, who was of Irish descent, came to an agreement with the Czechs, as a result of which they abandoned their so-called "passive policy," which had consisted in boycotting the central Parliament of Vienna. In the year 1879 the Czechs took their seats in Parliament, and since that time Vienna, by small concessions, has tried to win the Bohemian nation. This endeavour seemed the more necessary, as in Vienna itself the Clerical leader, Dr. Lueger, had found many adherents in his opposition to Magyar predominance. Hungary, it must be remembered, when united with Austria and Bohemia in 1526, had fallen into Turkish hands, and it was only at the end of the seventeenth century that she was liberated by their joint efforts. By the middle of the nineteenth century, when her influence began to grow, Austria and Bohemia had become industrialised, and Hungary served as their granary. Hungary's economic strength first became manifest in the revolution of 1848. The introduction of Dualism, and their subservience to Berlin and its Pangerman policy, strengthened the Magyars; Dr. Lueger opposed Hungary by adopting the old centralist programme of a united and therefore "Greater Austria." In Bohemia the party of the Old Czechs, who had concluded the agreement with Taaffe, was repudiated by the nation at the elections in 1889 to the Diet of Prague, and in 1891 to the Viennese Parliament. The Young Czech party, with whom victory rested, were the representatives of the more radical national and democratic Bohemian movement, which was to culminate in the truly Austrian policy of martial law. The Emperor tried to win over Bohemia, and it was the Pole, Count Badeni, who issued a decree restoring to some extent the rights of the Czech language. The Germans began in Parliament their policy of obstruction, and Badeni had soon

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to be discarded; four Cabinets followed in quick succession, and under the last, that of Dr. von Koerber (to-day again Austrian Premier), the Emperor capitulated before the Germans; piece by piece Badeni's decree has been plucked to pieces and finally abolished altogether.

The Emperor and his counsellors found a new expedient to evade the solution of the national and, above all, of the Bohemian problems; political attention was diverted to social problems, and it was calculated that the working classes would make short work of the national movement. The Russian revolution had a strong repercussion in Bohemia and Austria, whose growing industrialisation brought to the front a strong socialist party, and Vienna advised the introduction of universal suffrage, hoping that social antagonism would supersede national antagonism. But apart from the fact that universal suffrage in Austria was very artificial, securing to the German minority its artificial majority in the Parliament, the national dissensions could not be weakened; not only in Austria but in Hungary also the absolutist rule of the minority caused a collapse of constitutionalism. Francis Joseph thought that universal suffrage would weaken Magyar absolutism and appease the Slavs; Kristófy promised to introduce universal suffrage in Hungary, but it was not the first time that an imperial promise had not been kept. After the long and futile interlude of the Coalition, the reckless Count Tisza became the dictator of Hungary.

Being weakened at home, Austria-Hungary tried to gain some prestige by her foreign policy. The occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, with an entire disregard of the stipulations of the Berlin Congress. In order to convince Europe of the necessity for so high-handed an act, and to alarm her with a trumped-up story of a revolutionary Panslav movement among the Southern Slavs, documents were forged at the legation of Belgrade; but the Friedjung trial exposed Austria's Machiavellian methods in the face of all Europe. An Austrophil historian of the Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary—Theodor von Sosnosky—is bound to accept the English view of Mr. Seton-Watson that, in any other country, Count Aehrenthal would not have remained at his post twenty-four hours after these forgeries had been publicly disclosed in the Austrian Delegation. But

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Francis Joseph created Baron Aehrenthal Count, and insisted upon his retaining office. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was soon followed by the Balkan War, and Turkey, the *protégé* and ally of Austria and Germany, defeated. The war of 1914 is the continuation of the Balkan wars. Germany, through her Austro-Hungarian vanguard, is trying to become an Asiatic Power, and to secure the land route to Africa. Francis Joseph accepted this Prussian policy, lulled by the personal cajolery of William, who pretended to venerate him as the wise leader, not only of Austria-Hungary and Germany, but of all Europe (one recalls, for instance, the theatrical presentation of the German Confederate Princes in the Hofburg on the Emperor's name-day). Francis Joseph, ever since his accession, has been blinded by the inveterate imperialism of the House of Habsburg, and this infatuation makes him responsible for the present war. Defeated twice by the Russians, and even by the despised Serbians, the army of Francis Joseph surrendered to the Prussian generals, and he himself became the mere vassal of Berlin.

It would have required a man of strong and manly character on the Austro-Hungarian throne to inaugurate a sound national and democratic policy such as would secure the free development of the nations composing Austria-Hungary. Austria had a function, a *raison d'être* as a European vanguard against the Turks; as soon as the Turks became innocuous Austria would have acquired a fresh right to existence if she had honestly tried to be the leader of the various nations. Austria could have anticipated the future of Europe, being, indeed, with her motley nationalities, a kind of miniature Europe. That would have involved acting according to that golden rule of princes, affixed in bronze to a statue which Francis Joseph daily could read from the windows of his palace: *Justitia regnorum fundamentum!* But Francis Joseph had no plan of positive leadership; he was not just; drift, not mastery, was his essential characteristic as Emperor and as man. In spite of his passivity, Austria-Hungary, since 1848, had been progressing; but this progress was due to the growth of the population and to the economic changes caused by close interdependence with Western Europe; the growing army and navy and the exigencies of a complicated administration involved heavy taxation, and

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Francis Joseph was clever enough not to check the economic development. His passivity sometimes made it possible for some abler men in the Government to create institutions and to pass laws which, in themselves, were reasonable and good, and thus the Austrian constitution contains some good and progressive elements, but a brutal and regardless administration frustrated the best laws, and a Governmental decree could circumvent both law and legal custom. Owing to this absence of all positive or constructive rule, Austria and Hungary under Francis Joseph degenerated into a system of conscious violence, securing to the German and Magyar minorities an outrageous domination. Upon this ruling minority, as upon its master, lies the responsibility for this war, abhorred and detested by the other nations. A neutral diplomatist in Rome is credited with the assertion that, since the beginning of the war, more than 80,000 persons—civilians and military—have been executed in Austria and Hungary, in Bohemia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and in the Trentino, in Serbia and Montenegro. It is to be hoped that the true figures have been exaggerated; but, even at the best, the war is not only a war against the Allies but against the majority of their own nations. Francis Joseph was neither kind nor generous, nor was he ever noble, reliable, or true, however the paid eulogist may insist upon such qualities. Since the execution of the Hungarian generals in Arad (the carrying out of the sentence was actually postponed to the 6th of October in order to avenge the death of Count Latour, whom the mob had hanged on the same day of the previous year), Francis Joseph sanctioned many political acts of brutal vengeance and flagrant injustice; the condemnation and sentence to death of the Bohemian leaders during the war were merely the latest deed of this kind. Francis Joseph is a warning example of the perils of monarchism—of the gross immorality of unrestricted absolutism masquerading under modern constitutional and parliamentary forms in order to hide its own nakedness. Francis Joseph's numerous adulators extol his aristocratic nature; but he was only an aristocrat in the sense of Mickiewicz's dictum, that Austria is an East Indian Company exploited by two hundred families. The rigid rule of Spanish etiquette was the only law which was accepted by the Austrian Emperor. He abhorred democracy, for democracy means publicity,

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and publicity was not tolerated in Vienna—though, of course, the Viennese *bourgeoisie* and the Bourse rejoiced in court gossip. Francis Joseph dreaded, above all, *éclat*; when Baron Dumba and his officials had to leave Washington because of his alleged dishonest plots and intrigues, Austria-Hungary urged the United States to put forward illness as its official explanation of the change. That is the true Austria-Hungary of Francis Joseph. Outward appearance, not intrinsic virtue and reality, was, and is, the aim of all Austro-Hungarian policy.

Of the man, the husband, the father, the head of a great family, I do not speak. Not even the pungent phrases of a Tacitus could do justice to the theme of Habsburg degeneration.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

Francis Joseph: An Elusive Personality

THOSE whose business it has been to watch close at hand, year in year out, the doings of the late Emperor Francis Joseph must have read with lively interest the obituary notices and "appreciations" published at his death. Conceived, for the most part, as panegyrics and prepared long in advance, these "memoirs" retained, despite the war, obvious traces of their origin, notwithstanding the efforts of authors and editors to adjust old material to a changed perspective. The memory of my own adventures in search of a reliable estimate of Francis Joseph's character is, however, too keen to inspire in me aught but sympathy with writers striving to do justice to his memory.

Some fourteen years ago my residence was changed from Rome to Vienna. My view of Francis Joseph was then probably the view held by the great majority of ordinary Europeans—that he was a wise and venerable ruler much tried by unmerited misfortune, a pillar of European peace, and the only remaining influence that could restrain his "mosaic of peoples" from resolving itself into its component parts and bringing on a European conflagration in the process.

That winter (1902-03) Francis Joseph caught on: of his many colds. Sinister rumours spread. The great catastrophe seemed to be at hand. What estimate of the Emperor's

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character could I fairly form? The dilemma was all the greater in that I had hardly heard a good word said of him, either in Austria or in Hungary, since entering his dominions. Austrian Germans, Czechs, Poles and Italians all criticised him bitterly from their own points of view. The Magyars of all parties were even less favourable. Things seemed to be going badly. "It is all the Emperor's fault," said the Austrians. "He lacks energy, he lets the Magyars have everything their own way; he cares nothing for anything; he is too old—in fact he has been Emperor far too long." "The King is not only badly advised, but he is German at heart," said the Magyars. "He is old, and though we may put up with him while he lives, we will not stand his successor. After all, we have nothing to expect from the Habsburgs, who have always betrayed us, and always will. Francis Joseph is no exception to the rule."

Amid these various but uniformly unfavourable opinions of Francis Joseph's personality I thought I saw—as an impartial outsider responsible for the representation of Austro-Hungarian affairs to an important section of the British public—a way to make known the truth without appearing to judge too harshly, at the moment of his demise, the venerable sovereign who, wrongly as it appeared, enjoyed the respect and esteem of the civilised world. I would ask each of the leading Austrian and Hungarian writers and public men who had spoken to me thus frankly of their ruler to write, under the seal of secrecy and in return for generous remuneration, a reasoned account of the Emperor Francis Joseph's personality and political record from the point of view of their own nationality or party. The understanding would be that these statements should only be published anonymously after the Emperor's death. Thus *The Times* would be able to supplement its usual "memoir" with a series of reasoned judgments carefully passed upon the late monarch by representative men among his own subjects. If the effect of these judgments were to destroy his reputation for exalted wisdom and mature statemanship, so much the worse for the reputation and so much the better for the truth!

Filled with this idea, I applied to leading politicians and writers of all the principal races of Austria and all the chief parties of Hungary. Not one refused my offer. Each was asked to complete his contribution within six months.

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When at the end of nine months no single contribution had come in, I reminded the prospective authors of their promise and visited some of them personally. They explained that the work was much harder than they had imagined it would be ; that it was almost impossible to find facts in support of convictions which they knew to be well founded, but that, if I would bear with them yet awhile, they would assuredly not disappoint me.

I extended the time limit. When another year had passed my chief contributor-elect, an historian of European reputation, frankly begged to be excused. He could not do the work, he said, and alleged in support of his incapacity various sentimental reasons that had not occurred to him before.

One by one the other contributors also pleaded inability. The burden of their complaint was that they could find no facts to substantiate their opinions. In short, not a single reasoned article on Francis Joseph could I obtain throughout the length and breadth of his realms, though verbal criticisms of him and his works continued to be thick as wheat stalks on the Hungarian plain.

The strangeness of this phenomenon whetted my curiosity and led me to study Francis Joseph for myself. Could it be that in Austria-Hungary, as in Ireland, there are " no facts " ? The Emperor had surely lived long enough for some of the events of his life and reign to belong to the domain of history. With the help of these and other ascertainable facts it ought surely to be possible to build up something like an accurate opinion of the man. By the time I had read some 17,000 pages of histories, official documents, records, and biographies, I had come to the conclusion that there are, indeed, some facts in Austria, but that to express them in any approximately intelligible form is akin to high treason. In proof whereof I may cite the passage which caused the seizure of my own book, " The Habsburg Monarchy," in Austria-Hungary for " insult to Majesty " :—

" The attitude frequently taken up by Francis Joseph towards the administrative oppression of various sections of his subjects constitutes a hard psychological problem. While personally unselfish, generous and just, ever ready to redress a private injury or to alleviate private distress, Francis Joseph as a ruler has often seemed callous to the point of cynicism

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and 'constitutional' to the point of injustice. Provided that a minister obtained for him the 'necessities of the State' in the form of money and recruits he appeared to care little how heavily the policy of the minister might press in other respects upon whole sections of loyal subjects. Indeed, the bearing of Francis Joseph has sometimes resembled that of the landlord who ignores the petty tyranny exercised by his estate agent and dismisses the agent only when revenue falls off or disturbances occur. Francis Joseph has rarely borrowed trouble or insisted that the political action of his ministers must conform to private ethical standards."

These are "facts" which no fair-minded student of Habsburg affairs will gainsay. But they are facts which no Austrian or Hungarian with any public position or political ambition would have cared openly to express during Francis Joseph's lifetime. All, or almost all, public references to the monarch while he lived were perforce eulogistic. People abroad seem to have taken these eulogies at their face value, and to have had no thought for the conditions from which they arose. It was not until Francis Joseph committed the irreparable act which plunged Europe into war that the men and women of our generation remembered the estimate their fathers and grandfathers had formed of him, and began to wonder whether he had changed much after all.

He had not changed. Long experience had taught him that some things were difficult, some impossible, and some feasible if sufficient administrative pressure were applied or sufficient corruption employed. He remained throughout life the supreme opportunist, as regards method, in the service of an unchanging dynastic idea. He knew that to oppose Germany would be to court destruction; and though he sometimes restrained, he never opposed her or gave the Hohenzollerns a chance of tearing from him his German possessions. Deep in his heart lay a semi-fatalistic, semi-religious belief that the hour of the Habsburgs would strike once again and that they would once more hold sway in the lands of the German tongue. In order that the opportunity when it came might not be missed, he sold to the Magyars the non-Magyar half of Hungary, handed over to their tender mercies his loyal Croats, and refused justice to Bohemia. The support of the Poles he purchased by giving the *Szlachta*, or gentry, a free hand in Galicia, and resorted to a thousand

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expedients in order to maintain substantially intact the army, which he regarded always as the main prop of the dynasty and the chief school of dynastic sentiment. The secret of whatever success he attained in his long reign lay in his own devotion to the idea to which he pitilessly sacrificed others—the idea of the divine nature of the Habsburg dynasty and of the divine mission of its head. Around this idea the whole Habsburg Monarchy is built up. Will Francis Joseph have been its last servant?

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

Who provoked the War?

EVER since the first days of the war official Germany has been protesting, with remarkable insistence, that her conscience is clear. It was proclaimed on 4th August, 1914, both in the speech from the throne and in the Chancellor's speech, that the war had been forced upon Germany by Russia. Since then the Emperor William has many times protested his personal innocence. On 1st August of last year, the anniversary of the German official mobilisation, he solemnly declared: "I swear before God and history that my conscience is clear; I did not will the war." And in an interview which he granted to a neutral in the same month he is reported to have said (*Daily News*, August 15th, 1915): "I do not envy the man who has the responsibility for the war upon his conscience. I, at least, am not that man." The answer of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to Viscount Grey's recent speech is cast in the same mould. The Chancellor seized with alacrity upon that part of the speech which dealt with the *Lokalanzeiger* incident. It will be remembered that this paper published a special edition on July 30th, 1914, containing the Emperor's order for mobilisation. Lord Grey is represented as having adduced this fact as a proof that Russia's mobilisation, ordered on the night of July 30-31, was the inevitable answer to that of Germany, but, argues the Chancellor, the sale of this edition of the *Lokalanzeiger* was stopped at once, the available copies were seized, and the Foreign Secretary hastened to inform the Russian Ambassador, as well as all the other Ambassadors, that the news it contained

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was false. The Russian Ambassador, who had already telegraphed the news to his Government, at once sent a second telegram cancelling the first. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg therefore maintains that the Russian Government could not have been under a misapprehension as to Germany's mobilisation for more than a few minutes, and he further recalls the fact that the Russian Government itself has never made use of the *Lokalanzeiger* incident as a justification for her own mobilisation. In short, it was Russia, he says, who began the war, and Germany's mobilisation was the result of the Russian.

A refutation of the Chancellor's argument on this particular point does not necessarily involve the endorsement of Lord Grey's whole policy. In his speech at the Foreign Press Association, Lord Grey did not, as a matter of fact, dwell on the *Lokalanzeiger* affair in the manner represented by the German Chancellor. "Russia," he said, "never made the mobilisation of which Germany complained until after Germany had refused the conference, and she never made it until after a report had appeared in Germany that Germany had ordered mobilisation, and that report had been telegraphed to Petrograd." From this statement it is obvious that the British Foreign Secretary laid stress, in the first instance, on the rejection of the Russian proposal for a conference, and attached only secondary importance to the special edition of the *Lokalanzeiger*. The German Chancellor misrepresents Lord Grey's argument by singling out one point which he thought could be easily refuted. But he fails even in that. He admits that the Russian Government might for some time have been under the influence of the news sent by its Ambassador in Berlin. The fact that Russia has never made use of that news as evidence does not prove that the impression which it made was negligible; it only shows that she has had the courtesy to respect the German disclaimer. The *Lokalanzeiger* was the organ of the military party, and the publication of the special edition referred to was at least proof that influential and responsible circles in Berlin had made up their minds for war.

Moreover, it was not only the *Lokalanzeiger* that published the news. In the pamphlet of *Junius Alter* we read: "On Thursday, July 30th, the afternoon police papers and the

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Berliner Lokalanzeiger recorded the fact of the mobilisation." Apparently, then, the official police gazette also helped to spread the alarm, though the Chancellor is silent on this point.

We need not insist on this fact; our only concern is to show that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has, at least, failed to substantiate Germany's original allegations against Russia. It must be admitted that the final verdict in this matter cannot be delivered with complete certainty until all the facts have been sifted with scrupulous care. It would be a considerable undertaking to weigh even the evidence which is actually available (Orange Book, Yellow Book, etc.), and as, moreover, this has partially been done by various authors, we will confine ourselves to a concise statement of the salient features of the problem.

It would be difficult, nay, almost impossible, to decide the question of guilt by weighing and dissecting the mere diplomatic correspondence which preceded the outbreak of the war; the question can only be decided by an objective historical analysis of the whole European situation. The attempt to settle this intricate world-question by picking out one single incident only confirms the growing conviction as to the smallness of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and his Parliamentary audience. Our view of German responsibility is, we are glad to state, already shared by German politicians and publicists. The German Socialists, as is well known, have split on this very question of guilt; the minority has taken the view that Germany and Austria made war for aggressive purposes, and that the war has not been forced upon Germany. The author of "J'Accuse" shows that very convincingly, but now Liebknecht, Haase and others express the same conviction. Nor are Herr v. Bethmann-Hollweg's charges against Russia accepted even by non-Socialist politicians. Professor Hoetzsch, the foreign editor of the *Kreuzzeitung*, denied this allegation soon after the beginning of the war; in a pamphlet, "Russland als Gegner Deutschlands" (1914), he argues that not Russia but England is the real motive cause of the war, and he repeats this view in a newly-issued collection of essays, "Politik im Weltkrieg" (1916).

There are many things which force thinking men to distrust Germany and her leaders. We recollect, for instance, the assertion that French airmen dropped bombs on Nürnberg

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on August 2, 1914, prior to any declaration of war. Now we know that this assertion was false, as were other kindred charges, such as that the French and Russians violated the German frontiers. German diplomacy cannot be trusted. Bebel, in his autobiography, admits that Bismarck tried to fix upon Napoleon the responsibility for the war of 1870 by driving him into a position in which he had no alternative save to declare war. The followers of Bismarck are no better; Harden, therefore, deserves to be respected for the candid and emphatic declaration which he made soon after the outbreak of the war (November, 1914): "We wished this war!" Even the Kaiser has been strikingly ambiguous in the matter; in the above-mentioned speech from the throne he accused Russia of being the real cause of the war, whereas in one of his latest speeches to the German soldiers on the Somme (reported in the press on 25th July 1916) he assigned that responsibility to English diplomacy. Lord Grey, speaking in the House on May 24, referred to Herr v. Bethmann-Hollweg's statement about the Bosnian crisis as "a first-class lie"; and it really is impossible to believe the German politicians. Take, for instance, the late Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, who, as a private man, could acknowledge to the Belgian Minister that Belgium was right in the course she took, while in his public capacity he had no right to express that opinion (Waxweiler, "La Belgique neutre et loyale," p. 65).

In any discussion of Germany's guilt her relations with Austria-Hungary must obviously play a conspicuous part. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, and thus produced a world-wide conflagration. The assassination of the Archduke was not a sufficient reason for hostilities, quite apart from the fact that neither the nations of the Monarchy nor the ruling circles were specially attached to his person. The murder was committed by an Austrian, not a Serbian subject; the complicity of the Serbian Government has in no way been proved, and only this complicity would be a sufficient reason for exacting full satisfaction from Serbia. That the assassination was only a pretext was evident from more than one fact. The behaviour of the ruling circles of Vienna was very suspicious; for weeks the Ballplatz negotiated and parleyed with Serbia, without giving any indication of the gravity of the situation until the very last moment.

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Serbia accepted almost all the humiliating demands of Vienna, which so eminent a German lawyer as Professor von Liszt declared to be unusual and contrary to international law. At the very least, such far-reaching concessions on the part of Serbia ought to have served as a basis for further negotiations. But Austria-Hungary wished for war. Austria-Hungary, during the previous five years (on the occasion of the Bosnian crisis and the Balkan war) had already twice mobilised against Serbia. The whole policy of Vienna and Budapest has long been hostile to the Serbs and Croats, and to the Southern Slavs in general. Since Signor Giolitti's revelation, which shows that Austria-Hungary had tried to induce Italy to sanction an attack upon Serbia in the summer of 1913, nobody can doubt her ill-will. No one who recalls the history of the counterfeit "documents" in the Agram and Friedjung trials can accept the Austrian statements as to the complicity of the Serbian Government in the Sarajevo murder without critical investigation.

The Serbian Government denied the indictments of Vienna, but no time was left to Serbia to conduct a regular trial of the persons denounced by Austria-Hungary. To those who stand by the old formula, *audiatur et altera pars*, a trial in Sarajevo was obviously not sufficient; the Serbian authorities should also have been given full opportunity to conduct a similar trial. The Serbian Government had no share in the Sarajevo murder; the indictment of Vienna is but a sequel to the former forgeries. And the wrongful and dishonourable proceedings of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy had already been shown by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, involving, as it did, a wilful violation of the treaty of Berlin without due respect for the other signatories.*

Again, the manner of the declaration of war showed that Vienna used the murder of the Archduke as a pretext for the war which had long been in preparation. The Emperor

* In the press of Austria-Hungary and Germany reports have appeared from time to time that in the occupied area of Serbia documentary evidence has been found of the complicity of the Serbian Government in the Sarajevo murder; among the latest may be noted the report of the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger*, quoted in the London Press on July 17, 1916. If such incriminating documents had really existed their publication would have been authorised long ago! These unfounded reports only furnish fresh evidence of the bad conscience of Berlin and Vienna.

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and the small circle of his German and Magyar advisers declared war in accordance with purely absolutist methods. It is true that he was entitled to do so by the constitution, but he might have been expected to summon Parliament, as every other State in Europe did. This lack of confidence in the majority of the nations, especially in the Slavs, throws an intensive light upon the outbreak of the war.

Attention has not been drawn as yet to the fact that the constitution of Germany entitles the Emperor to declare only a *defensive* war, whereas the constitution of Austria gives the Emperor the right to declare war in general; it will be understood, therefore, why the German Government so continually strives to prove the war's defensive character.

Berlin was implicated in this wrongful and dishonourable proceeding of Austria-Hungary. Even the orthodox German critics, such as, for instance, the Socialist David (a member of the majority!) accused the Berlin Government of giving *carte blanche* to Vienna. David concedes so much during the war; but the organ of the German Social Democrats, *Vorwärts*, two days after the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, issued a "strong warning" (July 25) against Austro-Hungarian imperialism, as calculated to provoke universal war. "We condemn the agitation of the Great-Serbian Nationalists, but the frivolous provocation of the war by the Austro-Hungarian Government calls for our liveliest protest. For the demands of this Government are more brutal than any that have ever been addressed, in the whole course of history, to an independent State, and they can only be intended to provoke war forthwith. The *conscious* proletariat of Germany, in the name of humanity and culture, raises its burning protest against this criminal agitation. . . . Not a single drop of the blood of a German soldier is to be sacrificed to the desire of power and to the imperialistic greed of the Austrian despots."

The diagnosis of the *Vorwärts* is quite right, and expresses the general feeling not only of Germany, but of Austria-Hungary as well. Nobody in Vienna or Berlin has ever doubted that their rulers desired and prepared the war. And Germany supported Austria-Hungary. The revelation of *The Times*, to the effect that the Emperor William knew of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and is therefore re-

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sponsible for it, reveals also the chief point in the indictment against Germany—that she accepted, unreservedly and uncritically, Vienna's false and futile Serbophobe policy. Germany accepted the statement of Vienna that Serbia endangered the existence of Austria-Hungary—a Power of 51 millions endangered by a State of 4½ millions! This ridiculous argument is the best proof that the real aims of Vienna and Berlin in this war were very different. The deliberately superficial attitude of Germany showed that she also made full use of such an opportunity as the murder of Francis Ferdinand to further plans which had taken shape long before.

Berlin and Vienna were aware that the declaration of war on Serbia would, under given circumstances, be extended also to include Russia; the more so as Russia had advised Serbia to accept Austria's hard conditions. But the two ruling races in Austria-Hungary (viz., the Germans and the Magyars) have long been systematically incited by Vienna and Budapest against Russia; long before the Sarajevo murder Polish legions were formed in Galicia with the connivance of the Austrian Government. Official Germany struck an anti-Russian attitude, and the Emperor William himself made an inflammatory speech against Russia as early as August 1, 1914, though the text of the speech was subsequently modified and softened down.

Kjellén, the strongly Germanophil Swedish historian, confesses ("Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, 1916") that Austria-Hungary could have solved the Serbian question in a peaceful way, and that the war was not necessary; the obvious inference is that Vienna and Berlin had no good intentions. Even the Russian mobilisation, if it had occurred exactly as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would have us believe, was no sufficient reason for war; mobilisation, as has been pointed out, does not necessarily mean war.

In an interview with the political editor of the Moscow journal, *Ruskoje Slovo* (June 27, 1916), M. Sazonov, then still Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained the endeavour of Bethmann-Hollweg to throw upon others the responsibility for the present war. He, too, alludes to the fact that the ultimatum to Serbia was submitted to William II. for his approval, and then continues: "The present war is exclusively due to the canker of Pangermanism, which has preyed upon Germany for twenty years, and which has

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now reached her vital organs." The facts adduced in Professor Masaryk's article on Pangermanism, published in the first number of THE NEW EUROPE, fully corroborate this view. Germany and Austria-Hungary have not only been systematically prepared, but educated for this war; and those politicians and historians who followed the evolution of Pangermanism, expected the war, and, indeed, virtually predicted it. German politicians must acknowledge the fact. A member of the Reichstag, the historian Gothein, as early as November 17, 1914, in the *Berliner Tagblatt*, tried to answer the question whether the Germans wished the war, and he was driven to the following admission: "It cannot be denied that certain *irresponsible circles* played with the thought (that the German Government brought about the war deliberately)." Are General von Bernhardi (now one of the most prominent commanders on the Eastern front) and similar writers mere "irresponsible" personages? Herr Friedrich Naumann in one of the latest numbers of *Die Hilfe* (August 17) explains why the German people no longer believe the war to be defensive. "People can no longer rightly believe that the present battles are inevitable battles of defence. They have rather the gloomy suspicion that a policy of conquest, over and above what is necessary, is being pursued. And here a positively disastrous effect is produced by certain publications in which powerful societies and private individuals give expression to the lust of conquest. Only general ideas of their contents reach the great mass of the people; but, to the best of our belief, their existence is well known in every barracks, in every workshop, and in every village inn. The consequence of this literature of conquest is the disappearance of simple faith in the defensive war." These admissions and confessions of leading German politicians are all the more interesting as serving to explain that the Chancellor, in replying to Lord Grey, was defending his own and the Emperor's position against a growing scepticism in Germany itself.

Enemy Portraits : (II) Simeon Radev

EVERY diplomatic service has its jackals, but while in the West they rarely attain to eminence, the less conventional atmosphere of the Balkans, with its sudden and dizzy turns of fortune, provides them with their opportunity. Here, too, diplomacy has tended to fall into the hands of a somewhat narrow class; intrusions from the outside have been discouraged and are consequently of rare occurrence. But there are always exceptions to every rule, and of these exceptions Simeon Radev is one of the most remarkable.

Some forty years ago a son was born to a poor family named Traičev, in one of the Bulgarian villages between Monastir and Ohrida. As he reached manhood, the boy followed the example of thousands of other Macedonians and found his way to Sofia as a pupil of the Bulgarian propaganda. His education was completed at a Constantinople *lycée* and at the University of Geneva. In both places he established relations with the Young Turks and with the Armenians, which were to be useful to him at a later stage in his career. When still a student in needy circumstances he entered the service of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee in Sofia, which was then led by the famous komitadji Boris Sarafov. It was his function to travel for the Committee abroad and to place its cause in a favourable light before foreign public opinion through lectures and in the press. Unfortunately he became involved in the sordid "affair" of an insurance company which had been created for the benefit of komitadjis fighting in Macedonia, and which batted on their hard-earned money when they were killed. The case caused considerable scandal when it came before the courts of Sofia; and Simeon Traičev found it expedient to change his name to Radev.

Like many other Macedonian adventurers, Radev naturally attached himself to the party of Mr. Genadiev, himself a native of Monastir. He set himself with considerable success to win favour at Court. From the first he had been in close relation with the agents of Austria and Germany in Sofia, and followed a pronouncedly Russophobe policy. He strengthened his position still further both with King Ferdinand and with Vienna by publishing two large volumes of Bulgarian contemporary history under the title "The

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Creators of Bulgaria" (Stroitelite na Blgaria), the main purpose of which was to discredit Russia's achievements and to spread the absurd myth that the Bulgarian people owed its liberation mainly to its own exertions. At the time of its publication it evoked more than one lively protest, notably from General Parensov, Bulgaria's first native Minister of War; and, indeed a number of its illustrative documents appear to have been seriously garbled. When Mr. Genadiev rose again to power, in conjunction with the present Premier, Mr. Radoslavov, during the disastrous second Balkan War, Radev rose with him, and was one of the Bulgarian delegates at the Peace Conference in Bulgaria (August 1913). When peace was restored he remained as Bulgarian Minister in Roumania, though he had not previously filled any diplomatic post. Mr. Radev, strengthened by his success in Bucarest, has now been appointed Bulgarian Minister in Berne; and his activities will henceforth concern us more nearly than ever. Switzerland has already been mapped out by Bulgarian emissaries, whose aim it is to supplement the work of countless German spies and secret agents, to co-operate with Turk, Ukrainian, Albanian, and every imaginable adventurer, to feed so far as is still possible the Entente press with Bulgarian stories, and, above all, to work against the Serbian and other Southern Slav refugees and to sow distrust between them and Italy. His entire lack of scruple and his intimate knowledge of all the most approved methods of Oriental intrigues and calumny, render Mr. Radev peculiarly fitted for such a task; and we are not surprised that the *Echo de Bulgarie* (the official French organ of the Bulgarian Government) and the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* attach such great importance to the appointment. We trust, however, that his activities will be very carefully and closely watched by the Entente, and that any cryptic attempts on his part to spy out the land in Paris or in London, by employing those Bulgarian diplomatists whom the Allied Governments have left (perhaps quite wisely) undisturbed in our midst, will be sternly discouraged.

THE BRITISH AGREEMENT WITH ICELAND

The British Agreement with Iceland

IN May, 1916, the British Government and the Government of Iceland concluded a commercial agreement, of which the following regulations show the tenour.

Iceland secures supplies of coal, salt, petrol, fishing gear, &c., from Great Britain and in return undertakes to restrict her trade in various ways. Every ship loading at an Icelandic port must give a binding obligation to call at an English port, failing which it will not get clearing papers. Iceland undertakes not to send Icelandic produce, mutton, fish, wool, sheepskins, &c., to Germany or to the neutral countries bordering on the North Sea or the Baltic, except with the permission of the British Consul at Reykjavik. Since that time no licences for the importation of Icelandic mutton and fish into Denmark have been granted by the British Government, owing to the fear that this food will be passed on to Germany. The British Consul at Reykjavik will have the option to buy all goods not disposed of to neutrals other than the excluded or excepted countries. Denmark is thus, commercially, treated on the same footing as, e.g., Sweden and Holland, neutral countries not united with Iceland. After more than seven months Denmark has, so far, raised no objection nor made any protest that the said Agreement was *ultra vires* for Iceland.

The mind travels back to the war between England and Denmark, 1807 to 1814, when Sir Joseph Banks, the President of the Royal Society, persuaded the British Government to issue an Order in Council excluding Iceland from the war. Iceland was then cut off from all supplies, and this action saved her from famine. Geographically and geologically Iceland is part of the British Isles, and her relations with Britain have always been close and mutually satisfactory.

At present British men-of-war are guarding Iceland from the depredations of German submarines.

When, after four centuries of existence, the Icelandic Republic joined Norway, of her own free will, in a personal Union, in 1262, she did not surrender her sovereignty. Denmark subsequently took the place of Norway in the Union, and she has given Iceland the fullest self-government compatible with a union of the two countries.

JON STEFANSSON.

The Three Forces in Russia

EVENTS in Russia seem to have reached a climax. The Russian people is again rousing itself to one of those efforts that show its immense powers of recovery and reveal the real forces in the nation. One's thoughts are inevitably carried back to two other dramatic periods in the history of Russian life since the war. The first period was the outbreak of the war with the spontaneous enthusiasm it evoked from the whole nation ; the second the summer of 1915, after the German victories in Poland. May we not regard the present moment as the beginning of a third period of equal importance and still greater promise for the future ?

The Russian people is above all things spontaneous ; so spontaneous that we in the West may sometimes draw back at such lack of restraint. But it is a spontaneity capable of tremendous achievements, that could at one stroke abolish the whole drink question that had for years burdened the country ; and it is spontaneity that can recover from a situation which to outsiders appears hopeless. In July, 1914, Russian society was threatened with a labour upheaval on a larger scale than had hitherto been known ; a gigantic strike had brought the workmen into the streets in S. Petersburg in thousands, and the unrest was rapidly spreading. Then came Germany's mobilisation and the sudden menace of war. Thoughts of class war were thrown aside, the Duma was summoned, and the people rallied to the support of the governing bureaucracy. On that memorable day in July people, army and bureaucracy were at one.

A year passed ; Poland had been evacuated and Russia herself was threatened with invasion. When the Duma met in August the German armies were still advancing, refugees were flocking into the interior provinces, the railways were disorganised and munitions were well-nigh exhausted. But in the Duma there was no note of despair. With the motto " All for the war " Liberals and Conservatives united and the Progressive Bloc was formed from six parties in the Duma. A new Minister for War was appointed and the questions of supplies and munitions were taken in hand. On this occasion it was the voice of the people that was heard ; the bureaucracy had failed and it was the people that rallied round the army.

THE THREE FORCES IN RUSSIA

Again more than a year passed. The armies in the field were larger, they were well supplied with guns and munitions, and the feeding and sanitary arrangements at the front had improved by leaps and bounds. Moreover, a big offensive had been carried through during the summer and great successes had been won. But all was not well behind the armies in the field. A year ago the cry had been for organisation at the front, now it was for "organisation of the rear."

Since the summer of this year the food crisis had grown rapidly more acute. No systematic plan had been evolved and the numerous bureaucratic committees that had been set working had only complicated matters. There was need of a strong directing hand that would co-ordinate the work of officials and "representatives of the public."

The people of Russia have suffered and are still suffering from food difficulties. In the provinces remote from the war economic distress damps the ardour of the masses, and war weariness is strangely infectious. But the army is not blind to the sufferings of the people, for with the nation under arms the army is the people. Generals at the front have sent representatives to Petrograd and Moscow to inquire how the army could help in providing for the needs of the civil population, while the leaders of the Unions of the Towns and Zemstva have kept in touch with the army leaders. General Alexeiev has frequently praised the work of the Zemstva and the Towns, and the latter have been the intermediaries between the army at the front and the people in the rear.

It is in these circumstances that the Duma has now met. It would have met earlier if its own request had been granted. But the pent-up feelings of the people have now found even stronger expression. More than ever before in this war is it clear that the army and the people are at one. It is as though the army were repaying the debt of gratitude it owed for the support given by the Duma in the critical summer of 1915. Together they are stronger now than they were a year ago. Victorious generals in the field are names to conjure with and the Unions of the Towns and Zemstva have by their work gained immense prestige in the country. The strength of the army gives redoubled strength to Tsar and people alike, and strong in this support Russia can face the future with confidence.

RURIK.

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Reviews

Seven Years in Vienna (1907-1914) : A Record of Intrigue. (Constable & Co., Ltd.) 6s. net.

To those who are interested in the borderland between court scandal and high politics this anonymous volume may be recommended as distinctly superior to most of its class. It is curious that while the court of Berlin—as a rule, strikingly unsensational, despite the nauseous Eulenburg affair—has been the subject of innumerable books of cheap scandal, the much more promising field of Vienna has hitherto been left almost fallow, save for the inevitable yarns, one more doubtful than the other, about the fate of the late Crown Prince Rudolf. And yet the House of Habsburg offers an almost inexhaustible supply to the would-be chronicler of personal intrigue in high places. The book is well written and interesting, but not always accurate even in its gossip. For instance, the notorious story of the Archduke who jumped his horse over the hearse in a funeral procession is put down to Francis Ferdinand (who was far too devout ever to have done such a thing), instead of his degenerate brother Otto, the father of the new Emperor. To take another example, the author is entirely wrong in his facts about the interview with Sir Fairfax Cartwright, out of which the *Neue Freie Presse* made so much spiteful capital some six years ago. He is an adept at skilful combinations, but far too fond of jumping to unproved conclusions. His treatment of the Sarajevo assassinations is characteristic of this habit. He roundly asserts, with the slightest attempt at proof, that the driver of the Archduke's car was in the plot, that the assassin knew the Archduke to be wearing armour, and therefore fired at his head instead of his breast, and even that he "had definite instructions to murder the Duchess of Hohenberg." There are a hundred suspicious circumstances about the murder, and many indications that "motives of personal hatred" were involved; but we are still a long way from the truth, and sensational statements, asserted so categorically, can only do harm. On the whole, however, the book follows right lines, and most of its portraits are pretty accurate. The persistent references to the "Young Slavs" instead of the Jugoslavs, and to "Count Tchirsky" instead of Herr von Tschirschky, may be merely printers' errors: but it is, of course, quite inaccurate to treat the "few Mohammedans of Bosnia" (there are really over 600,000) as "Albanians"; they are, in reality, of purest Serbo-Croat race.

R. W. S.-W.

France To-day: Laurence Jerrold. (John Murray.) 7s. 6d. net.

Mr. Jerrold has written a timely book which, if it is not literature, is at least first-rate journalism. Out of a long experience of France and her baffling ways he has drawn conclusions which cannot fail to assist the ordinary Briton in his effort to understand the French. Not that he suggests for one moment that the effort to understand will ever be completely successful, for he agrees with Mr. Steed's witty friend who said that French and English are mutually indispensable—and incomprehensible! The Entente is like wedlock. Based upon a close kinship of political interest and arising out of the

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avowed attraction of opposites, it is likely to prove a fruitful and enduring alliance if only each partner will remember that the other is not his *replica* but his essential complement. But Mr. Jerrold is at his best when affirming that the resolute, solid, high-hearted French of the war are the same as those of the days of peace. Rightly he will have nothing to do with the idea that out of frivolities and corruptions France suddenly emerged, a heroine under the stress of war. It cannot be too often repeated that all the strikes, anti-militarism, *caillautisme*, and political instability, were but foam on the surface of a steady current which has never, in our memory, been deflected from its true course; and that the essential sanity and soundness of French life has been the backbone of France in peace as in war. This view Mr. Jerrold—like the present writer—has stoutly maintained for many years at the price of being dismissed as a mere coiner of paradoxes; and it must now be a peculiar pleasure to find his true opinion prevail over the false. In regions other than politics and war, Mr. Jerrold pays an indispensable tribute to the supremacy of the French mind, which is the true source of the perennial power of France. By her appetite for ideas, by her discriminating hospitality to the philosophers of all nations, she has acquired the hegemony of intellect. She is the clearing house of European thought; and if it be true, as the saying has it, that all good Americans go to Paris when they die, it is still truer that all ideas must go there if they wish to live.

A. F. W.

A History of the Modern World (1815-1910): Oscar Browning. New edition, 1916. (Cassell & Co.) 12s. 6d. net.

This survey of modern history, which is based not merely upon a study of available sources, but also on the author's personal recollections and acquaintance with many of the public men concerned, may safely be recommended to popular attention. Mr. Browning's central argument is the necessity of a close alliance between Russia and England. He shows that the British policy of opposing Russia and supporting Turkey was a serious national blunder; that Russia's expansion towards the Mediterranean is natural and inevitable, and that she is the legitimate heir of the Byzantine Empire. He elaborates the interesting proposition that, if Constantinople had become Russian a hundred years ago, it would have been better for Great Britain and for the world. This standpoint is very vividly depicted in his narrative of the Berlin Congress. Mr. Browning tries to show that the Treaty of Berlin was a failure, and that the Treaty of San Stefano would have been better. He argues that Russia was not, in this treaty, egotistical in creating a Big Bulgaria, and he shows all the superficiality of Beaconsfield's policy, his ignorance of the Balkans, and its deplorable effect upon British policy in the Near East. Various stories of falsified maps at the Berlin Congress are quoted as showing how little knowledge and wisdom are necessary in an official statesman. This war Mr. Browning regards as a confirmation of his views on Russia and a condemnation of British foreign policy of a generation ago. The only sound solution in the Near East is the final application to the Turks of Mr. Gladstone's "bag and baggage" policy.

T. G. M.

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The Conquest of Wallachia

It is perfectly useless to ignore the extreme gravity of the Roumanian situation. Mackensen's push across the Danube has turned the flank of the Roumanian defensive positions on the Olt, and only a miracle can now save the whole of Wallachia from being overrun. The fall of Bucarest, if it occurs, will provide the Germans and Bulgarians with splendid opportunities of plunder; and the acquisition of the rich Wallachian wheat areas and the oilfields of Campina will immensely ease the economic situation of the Central Powers. During the last year the agricultural resources of Serbia have been increased by forty per cent. beyond their previous capacity, as the result of Austrian efforts. It is easy to imagine, then, that Germany, when once in occupation of Wallachia, will rapidly eclipse this record and exploit to the full the agricultural possibilities of one of the granaries of Europe. The effect of this in prolonging the war is too obvious to require further emphasis. But Germany's aim is even more strategical than economic. Our ostrich Press, in its leading articles, tells us that "It has yet to be seen whether, if the enemy obtains the fullest measure of success, he will not, on the balance, be worse off for all the major purposes of the war than he was at the beginning." How Hindenburg, Falkenhayn, and Mackensen must chuckle if they ever hear of these glib attempts to create a fool's paradise in the British Press! They know well enough that the possession of Wallachia is of enormous importance to the Central Powers, and will enable them to strengthen their hold almost indefinitely upon that corridor to the East upon which their main hopes in this war have long been centred.

Germany's success in Roumania represents the bankruptcy of the policy of placing all our eggs in one basket, and of assuming that nothing but "killing Germans" counts. To-day even the man in the street realises that six months of magnificent heroism on the Somme have not availed to prevent a most formidable concentration of German troops on the Lower Danube. We are left hammering at the front door while the enemy does what he pleases in the stables and farm buildings. Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, are full of German troops, and there are plenty of chances of "killing Germans" in any of those three countries. And yet theories continue to be propounded which, if pursued to their logical conclusion, can only mean that the Germans are tirs in the science of war, and that their repeated successes in the Balkans are an act of supreme folly, while our repeated failures are the last word in political wisdom. The facts of the situation are once more too brutal to be ignored; and we note with interest that those who have hitherto been foremost in ignoring the significance of the Balkans are at last admitting that, "in the treatment of the Roumanian problem, there has plainly been the same want of co-ordination between strategy and politics which has been the blight of all the Allied operations in the Near East." We can only hope that the lesson will not have been learnt too late.

NOTES

Britain, Italy, and the Southern Slavs

We desire to offer a most cordial welcome to the British-Italian League which has recently been formed under the presidency of Lord Lytton, and whose inaugural meeting at the Mansion House was attended by two British and two Italian Cabinet Ministers. Britain and Italy are linked together by ancient ties of sympathy, based upon common traditions and ideals, and no effort should be spared to strengthen them still further.

It is a happy augury for the future activities of the League that, at the Mansion House, both Lord Lytton and Lord Robert Cecil expressed themselves in favour of Italo-Slav friendship. The former, while expressing sympathy with "the legitimate aspirations of Italy," declared that in the struggle against Austria, "it is our hope and determination that there shall be liberation for all"—Slavs and Roumanians as well as Italians. He formally accepted the standpoint of Lord Cromer in his speech at the inaugural meeting of the Serbian Society a month earlier as a proof that its members are in no way inspired by anti-Italian sentiments, and finally declared that there is nothing inconsistent in the aims of the two societies. Lord Robert Cecil referred to the efforts to create bad blood between the Jugoslavs and Italians, denied that there was any real conflict between the two, and insisted that all that was needed was "a clear understanding on both sides."

In striking contrast to the admirable sentiments and intentions of the British-Italian League is the campaign which has been initiated in the Italian Press against the Serbian Society and the Southern Slavs in general. No good purpose could be served by entering into controversy with the promoters of this campaign; but as THE NEW EUROPE has come in for its share of abuse and misrepresentation, we cannot ignore the matter altogether.

The campaign has reached its height in a series of four long articles, published by Signor Franco Caburi, a former Italian correspondent in Vienna, in the *Giornale d'Italia* of November 11, 14, 16 and 19. Under the titles, "The Serbian Society of London," "The Cossacks of Austria," "The Pretorians of the Habsburgs," and "Scotus Viator and the Commis-Voyageurs of Jugoslavia," he devotes nine columns to attacks equally venomous and unfounded upon the Croats, the whole Jugoslav movement, the Serbian Society, and, in particular, Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton-Watson, whose writings he takes a special pleasure in grossly distorting. Incidentally, his assertion that THE NEW EUROPE has been initiated by the Serbian Society is entirely false; there is no connection between the two.

We deplore the fact that so able a journalist as Signor Caburi should have sunk so low; but, in times like these, we should have preserved a contemptuous silence were it not for the fact that Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, is understood to have a considerable proprietary interest in the *Giornale d'Italia*, though we do not for a moment imagine that he countenances such outbursts. While they leave their ostensible objects unmoved, they cannot.

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as every thoughtful Italian must readily perceive, fail greatly to comfort the enemy. The effect of such articles as those of Signor Caburi upon Croatia, Dalmatia and the other Southern Slav provinces may be imagined when, as is certain to have been the case, they are collected by Austrian agents in Switzerland and reproduced with due comment in the whole Austrian semi-official Press. In this respect Signor Caburi's effusions are anti-Italian also, and constitute what Italians would call "*un reato di lesa-patria.*"

Mr. Jacob Schiff and *La Partie Nulle.*

Many good Europeans have expressed a benevolent interest in the American League to Enforce Peace on the ground that it is professedly based upon a sense of international solidarity and holds out some hope of a better world to come. As we stated last week, the progress of this idea in Europe will depend upon the success with which its American authors contrive to translate it into a workable plan. We have hitherto understood that the League aimed only at a drastic international reorganisation *after* the war; but Mr. Jacob Schiff's speech at the League's banquet in New York last Friday puts a different complexion upon it. Mr. Schiff proposed that the League should enter the field *now*, with the intention of bringing the war to a speedy end, and so playing the German game of a "draw." Mr. Schiff's antecedents do not suggest that he is a partisan of *la victoire intégrale*, but they do suggest that his proposal may carry great weight in certain distinguished circles in America. That his action is welcome in Berlin is certain. Mr. Schiff is a friend of Herr Ballin. He dislikes Russia. He was a power in the White House when Mr. Taft was President, and his association with Mr. Taft in the League to Enforce Peace is quite the most ominous thing that we have heard about the whole movement. If the League is to be yoked with German-American propaganda in favour of an inconclusive peace it is doomed to sterility. But we cannot believe that Mr. Taft is so little aware of the true issues at stake in Europe as to accept responsibility for Mr. Jacob Schiff's intrigue.

The Control of Wireless in War

A question was lately addressed, in the House, to the Postmaster-General with regard to the relations between the Marconi and the Telefunken Companies, which control respectively the British and German systems of wireless telegraphy. The Minister replied that he "was not in a position at the present moment to ask the (Marconi) company to give information of a confidential character with respect to arrangements between the two systems." We share the amazement of the *Pall Mall Gazette* at "the idea of any portion of the affairs of a wireless system being 'confidential' as against the Government in time of war."

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

The New Europe

VOL. I, No. 8.

December 7, 1916

“Westernism”: A French Opinion

[The following article is from the pen of an extremely competent French writer, who has devoted years to the study of modern history, and has had quite exceptional opportunities of observing the course of events since the outbreak of war.]

NOTHING emphasizes more strikingly the vital importance of the Eastern problem for all the Allies than the attention which it receives in France. Not one of the great nations of the Entente would have had more excuse than France for refusing to interest itself in anything save the struggle on the Western front. For that struggle is being fought out upon its own invaded territory and for its very existence. Even in times of peace the idea of war has for the French been bound up with that of national defence. M. Clémenceau, when, in his disapproval of the Salonica Expedition, he repeated day after day: “The Germans are still at Noyon,” was merely reverting to the speeches of thirty years before, when, in opposing French enterprises in Egypt and in Indo-China, he cried: “Look towards the Vosges,” (*Regardez du côté des Vosges*). On the other hand, France’s interests in the East, even if one considers the ancient relations, fortified by the ties of religion, which link her with the Lebanon, are not to be compared with those of other allied nations. For a century past she has neglected the future which seemed to open before her in that part of the Mediterranean where her language is still so widely spoken, in order to concentrate her efforts upon the Western basin, where, opposite her own coasts and at a day’s journey from her ports, there opens the wide perspective of a North African Empire.

And yet it is no longer a secret that if the Entente to-day has an army in the Balkans, it is due to the initiative and insistence of France. Britain followed her, not without some hesitation, after the sacrifices and disappointments caused by the ill-starred experiment of Gallipoli. Russia did not decide to send important forces to Roumania until she saw that country dangerously menaced. Italy, though a near neighbour of the Balkan Peninsula, and not without her ambitions in Asia Minor, has not hitherto felt

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herself bound to make any great effort in the direction of Macedonia. Even in France Westernism, if we may employ the word, has its adherents, some of whom are in a specially good position to enforce their views, or to delay the execution of contrary views. But it was always the privilege, and sometimes the misfortune, of the French to love general ideas, and having once grasped them, to follow them to their logical conclusions. Confronted by a complex situation, they insist upon looking at it from an angle which permits them to treat it as a whole; in considering an event they endeavour to forecast its extreme consequences. Moreover, they have certain habits of criticism which prevent them from stopping short at the first objection which may arise. When they are told that the military problem is distinct from the political problem, they agree, but they remember an axiom which our enemies have not forgotten, and which was expressed by Clausewitz in these terms: "War is the pursuit of a political object by other means." To the dictum that bad strategy cannot be good politics, they are ready with the reply that the soundest policy may be sacrificed to the most questionable strategy; and there are some who, if they could speak, could quote some fine examples of this truth. They have broken too many idols to allow themselves to be intimidated by mere words. Strategy is not a science, but an art, and few are its masters. What is most essential for the conduct alike of military and political affairs is common sense.

The origin of the conflict, no less than its development, reveal to us the Eastern problem as lying at the very heart of the great problem of the war. It matters very little that it was France whom Germany first attacked. Germany made war because of Serbia. It was a question of consolidating, by the final subjugation of the Southern Slavs, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as the instrument of German ambitions. But also, and above all, Serbia, thanks to her geographical position, was an obstacle to the expansion of Germanism through the Balkans, towards the Mediterranean and the Levant. Serbia held the key of the routes which diverge from Nish to Salonica and Constantinople. Serbia was to disappear, and by forcing Europe to choose between a consent which would have reduced her to slavery and a struggle which they hoped would end in a crushing victory,

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the Germans and their Magyar accomplices reckoned upon securing, by a single stroke, possession of the Balkan Peninsula, the whole East, and the hegemony of the world.

The resistance of Europe and the victory of the Marne threw their whole plan out of gear. But each phase of the campaign shows them in obstinate pursuit of the same objective. Viewed from this angle, the march of events from the day on which the Goeben and the Breslau took refuge off the Golden Horn, assumes a magnificent simplicity. After the attack *à fond* on France, which was to crush her swiftly to the earth, but which only succeeded in immobilising her; after the attack *à fond* on Russia which, though it failed to annihilate her military power, drove her back beyond the Niemen into the marshes of Podlesia, Germany, protected on her two flanks by two powerfully entrenched barriers, advanced through the Balkan peninsula, crushed Serbia, and, joining hands with the Bulgarians, reached Constantinople. At this moment she seemed to have attained her aim; but it remained for her to force the Powers of the Entente to accept such a peace as she sought to dictate to them. The operations of the last year have no other meaning, and they have to a certain extent reproduced the alternating movement of the two first campaigns. After having tried a second time to overwhelm France and having made a feint against the Italian plains, Germany, checked at Verdun and menaced on the Somme, and Austria, repulsed in the Trentino and invaded in Galicia and Transylvania, have, on the advice of Hindenburg, the man of the Eastern front, sought their revenge in the East. The imprudent intervention of Roumania gave them their opportunity, and by her destruction they hope at one and the same time to assert their mastery of the Balkans and to force Russia to accept it.

If Germany were to attain her ends, we do not know how far her ambitions would go, either in the Baltic provinces, or in Belgium and France. But we cannot have the slightest doubt as to her intentions in the East. She has sketched out in advance the direction of her Eastern policy by constructing the Bagdad railway, whose completion she has tirelessly pursued even in the midst of a world-war. With the aid of the enslaved peoples of Austria-Hungary, reduced finally to the position of her pioneers and soldiers,

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she would reign from the North Sea to the Red Sea, and from the Gulf of Riga to the Persian Gulf. And what would be the consequences for the Allies of France, and for France herself? One must have the courage to face even the most disagreeable eventualities, even when one has the firm hope of rendering them impossible. Russia would be definitely cut off from the west. Shut in at the far end of the Black Sea, deprived of Poland and Courland, she would be reduced, as before the accession of Peter the Great, to the condition of a semi-Asiatic power, only to come into conflict at the other extremity of her territory with the aspirations and growing forces of the far-Eastern Empires. Italy would have to renounce all her dreams, in which the ambitions of a young nation blend with memories of the greatness of Rome. She would be driven back upon herself, a prey to the threats and temptations of a victorious Germanism resting upon a consolidated Austria-Hungary and master of the Balkans. As for Great Britain, who has more to lose than others, because she possesses more—she would be threatened in the very vitals of her Empire. The long chain of British possessions which stretch round the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to Australia and the borders of China would be cut at the very middle. Germany, established in Asia Minor as in a fortress, pushing on her railways to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, could in less time than any other Power throw her armies against any point in the East. In a second war—in which the blockade would no longer be of any use, since Germany would dispose of all the resources of the vast territories which she is preparing to exploit—she would aim at the disruption of the British Empire, already shaken by the fall of its key-stone.

And France, even if a victorious Germany consented to restore her provinces in return for her fairest colonies, would feel the effect of her Allies' bankruptcy in the East. She could no longer rely upon Russia when isolated and expelled from Europe and forced to terms with Germany, in order to secure a precarious right of passage through the Straits. In the event of a war for the destruction of the British Empire Germany would leave France to choose between the part of an accomplice or a hostage. If the French understand the full significance of the Eastern Question it is because they have long felt profoundly the full meaning of the phrase, Victory or Death.

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To destroy at all costs the Eastern dream of the Germans, to prevent them from installing themselves permanently on the Bosphorus and the Euphrates and from making the small Balkan states their vassals, and the peoples of Austria-Hungary their docile instruments for the conquest of the world—who can doubt that this is the sole means of saving the future of Europe? The French are interested in the Eastern Question, not although their soil has been invaded, but because their soil has been invaded—for the sixth time since 1792. They wish to eradicate from the soil of Europe the root of future wars.

It is, no doubt, possible to admit all this, and yet to oppose, for military reasons, extensive operations in the East. Does not victory mean the destruction or reduction to impotence of the hostile armies? It is only in the West, we are told, that French and English can and must deal decisive blows. Is it not there that the enemy has always concentrated his main forces, and consequently there that his military power can be broken? This once effected, it will be easy to impose our conditions and force the Germans to abandon the East without ever sending a single battalion there. Besides, those who speak of considerable operations in the East not only risk, we are told, compromising our victory in the West, but fail to reckon with the difficulties of the enterprise. Where will they find the tonnage needed for the supply of large armies so far from their base? How will they deploy these armies in a wild, mountainous, and roadless country? In short, among the Westerners some say that operations on a grand scale in the East are useless and can only weaken our action in the main theatre of war; while others treat the enterprise as seductive but impracticable. They then deal us the final blow by disdainfully opposing to an adventurous policy an infallible strategy. Unfortunately for them, and for us, the oracles of strategy have sometimes been at fault. Have they not repeatedly believed—and here I am speaking as much of Germany's military experts as of our own—that they were going to break through the enemy's front and revert to *la guerre de mouvements*? At first they thought that it could be done with the means of which they disposed at the beginning of the war, and this mistake has cost the lives of many thousands. Then they thought that they would succeed as soon as they had enough heavy artillery to destroy the

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enemy's entrenchments on a front of 20 or 30 kilometres : then after making the experiment they asked that this formidable artillery should be doubled or trebled, and both sides are working at this. They believed that Hindenburg had found the secret of victory by taking the Russian Army as it were between the points of a pincer : but could Hindenburg himself have renewed his success against an enemy supplied with material equal or even comparable to his own? The disillusionment of the Germans before Verdun supplies the answer. Haunted by the idea that one step more in the same direction would suffice to return to the classic conditions of war, our experts always find good reasons to explain how the most gigantic efforts have only produced limited results. The bad weather which stops aerial observation is an excellent one, and sometimes saves them from looking for others.

Is it surprising, in view of the still unsolved problem of our Western front, that we should be tempted by the battlefields of the East, where open warfare—as the Germans are demonstrating at this moment—is still possible? A secondary theatre of war? A theatre of war where one can act and conquer is never secondary. If the conclusion seems to emerge from the lessons of twenty-eight months of war, it is that mobility, if not movement, can alone lead to victory. To attack at several points at once or at different points, before the enemy has time to parry the blow, to form a common reserve of heavy artillery which could be rapidly transported from one end of the front to the other, to multiply behind the lines the field railways which permit a sudden stroke with all the advantages of surprise—it is thus that one may hope, not to reproduce the victories of the past, but to renew them by modern methods. The brilliant and inexpensive victories recently won before Verdun show what may be expected from this method. But must we not enlarge it and extend it to the immense line which extends from the coast of Flanders to the Archipelago and from the Baltic to the Dobrudja? To propose energetic operations in the East is nothing else than to apply to the "Single Front," which must be made a reality, the principles which the experiences of the war have taught to our best generals on the relatively narrow sectors where they command. It is natural that each of them dreams

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above all of the sectors where he keeps guard and does not like to divert from it one battalion or battery; and yet what would he do if his subordinates were immobilised by similar scruples at the moment of combat?

Mobility is victory to-day as ever. The Germans owe their greatest successes to their mobility, rendered easier by their central position and their admirable system of railways. Napoleon used to say that he won his victories with the legs of his soldiers. We must gain ours, at all costs, with our railways, our transport, and our ships. When we are told of the difficulties of a Balkan campaign, are we sure of having done what is necessary to solve the problem of transport? A few days ago I was reading in the *Daily Chronicle* that there are 3,000 sea miles between England and Salonica. Undoubtedly, and far more still, if we chose to sail round Africa! Are there, then, no railways in France, in Italy, and even in Greece, and can they not even be improved if necessary? In the same way is it not possible to multiply the means of communication behind our eastern army, in order to facilitate its re-*virtualling* and its movements? We cannot demand the impossible. But at a time such as the present we must exhaust every effort of imagination and of will before admitting that what is necessary is impossible. How many things would be impossible if we had to rely upon short-sightedness or sloth!

VILLEHARDOUIN.

The Allies' Candidate for Constantinople

HAS the Great War yet produced a great satirist? Of the pen—no! Of the pencil—possibly! Louis Raemakers puts in the point cleverly, and a stroke of his genius drives it home. But of a Horace or Juvenal, an Erasmus or Ulrich von Hutten, a Dryden or a Swift, a Boileau or a Molière, there is no sign. Is a life-and-death struggle provocative of satire? Or does the horror of it kill irony and humour? No! A leading daily, surely, offered not long ago a prize for "the best *bon mot* from the trenches." The atmosphere of death does not choke humour. Were it otherwise would the Florentine plague of 1348 have produced the *Decameron*? The elasticity of the human temperament

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is reflected in every scene recorded by the photographer and kinematographer. One *bon mot* alone from the trenches speaks volumes. It is: "If bread is the staff of life, what is the life of the Staff? One long loaf." The most telling commentary on that *multum in parvo* is the Roll of Honour.

The life-blood of satire is truth, and genius it is that keeps that life-blood in circulation. It deals not with "souls," unless it be that select *fin de siècle* circle of "affinities" which so styled itself thirty years ago. When the fire of genius burns low the blood stagnates. Vapouring about "souls" does not make it course merrily along. Oliver's "Ordeal by Battle" rejoiced the British "soul," but the satire of this war is no mere insular drama. All the world is its stage, its *dramatis personæ* "all peoples that on earth do dwell," its stage-manager a Miltonic monster got by Mammon out of Erinnys, and the piece to be staged, "The New Europe." The full dress rehearsal awaits the end of the war, and the gala representation the gatherings of the world's greatest congress.

This congress will deal not with "souls," but with principalities and powers; and it is of Russia, as a principality and power, not as a "soul," that I propose to speak here. In the old days Englishmen were quite content to let Russia look after her own "soul," provided she did not imperil the safety of the corporate existence of our Asiatic Empire. Our statesmen regarded Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as three useful buffers between Russian and British territories and interests in the Near and Middle East; and, since 1853, we have waged the Crimean, the Persian and the Second Afghan Wars expressly for the purpose of protecting those three countries from Russian aggression.

Now that the last decade of the world's history has completely reversed this position, I would fain briefly summarise the attitude of Europe towards Constantinople since the days of the Treaty of Tilsit (1807). Dealing with this topic there is a French work by a Roumanian, N. Dascovici, published at Geneva two years ago, entitled, "La Question du Bosphore et les Dardanelles." It is edifying to picture Alexander I. and Napoleon I. sitting down to divide the empire of the world between them. But they fell out over Constantinople, and the Campaign of 1812, the Abdication of 1814, the Hundred Days and Waterloo were the final scenes of that drama.

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It was not destined that the Frank and the Slav should dictate terms to Constantinople. After all it was Austria and Hungary, aided grandly in 1683 by John Sobieski the Pole, who stemmed the Moslem torrent. No wonder that Vienna had an eye on the Ægean Sea and Salonica, as also upon Constantinople and the Dardanelles. With the fall of Napoleon the Slav and the Teuton entered upon their rival candidature for the city which, since the days of Constantine the Great, had held a foremost place in the world's history. When, in 1890, M. Josef Popowski published his "Antagonismus der Englischen und Russischen Interessen in Asien" he wrote plainly in his preface: "The European Powers, and Austria in particular, cannot, at any cost, permit Russia to take possession of Constantinople." Von Moltke in his young days spent four years (1835-9) in the service of Turkey, and undoubtedly brought back with him to Berlin clear ideas of what German colonisation might achieve in the Balkans and Asia Minor. When the Russians in 1853-4 massed troops on the Danube it will be remembered that Austria and Prussia warned Russia to withdraw them, and, accordingly, withdrawn they were. We see here the sign that Prussia wished well to Austria's ambitions in the Balkans. The next move was in a new quarter—Schleswig-Holstein—the link between the North Sea and the Baltic. Did anyone in 1864 foresee the bond between that and the "*Drang nach Osten*"? Lord Redesdale is full of commiseration for his chief at St. Petersburg, Lord Napier of Ettrick, when he had to listen to these words from the lips of Prince Gorčakov: "Alors, milord, je mets de côté la supposition que l'Angleterre fasse jamais la guerre pour une question d'honneur." The British Government had declined to go to war in defence of Denmark. When we reflect that, at the very moment when Prince Gorčakov made that contemptuous remark, the Tsarevitch was engaged to Princess Dagmar, and the occupation of the Duchies by Prussia was a more direct menace to Russia in the Baltic and in regard to her Baltic provinces than it was to England in the North Sea, we are disposed to feel that Lord Napier should not have taken that blow lying down. When we recall what Lord Redesdale says elsewhere of Prince Gorčakov's "vanity and boastfulness," and of Bismarck's "ill-disguised contempt" for him, are we not justified in feeling

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that Lord Napier should have stood up to him instead of coming away with the tame remark: "Pretty words for an English Ambassador to listen to!" Lord John Russell was not alone responsible for that *finale*.

Mr. D. Mitrany, writing in the October number of the *Quarterly Review* on "German Penetration in Rumania," says (p. 390): "In October, 1871, Bismarck met Austria's Foreign Secretary, Count Beust, at Gastein, and there laid the foundation stone of the policy of the "*Drang nach Osten*," rich in evil consequences. Beust mentions in his Memoirs that, having touched upon the eventual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck 'obligingly remarked that one could not conceive of a Great Power not making its faculty for expansion a vital question.'" We gather from Prince Bernhard von Bülow's "Imperial Germany" (New edition, p. 74), that, in 1879, the ties between Berlin and Vienna were drawn still closer. This was after the Berlin Conference of 1878, consequent on the Balkan troubles and the Russo-Turkish War. We gather that, in order to check Russia, Beaconsfield and Salisbury deliberately encouraged the Austrian Protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Salisbury lived to realise the mistake that he had made. The completion of the Kiel Canal and the colonial and commercial expansion of Germany after the Franco-German War invited that empire to increase her naval power. By 1888, if not earlier, there was a German agent (afterwards Consul-General) at Bagdad, and the "B. B. B." *i.e.*, the Berlin-Byzance-Bagdad Railway, was common talk in Berlin commercial and financial circles. The subsequent visit of the Emperor William II. and his Empress to the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, established Germany as the dominant foreign influence at the Porte. It was the sense of this that gradually drew Britain and Russia together. The penetrative Teutonic wedge, driven by the power-stations of Berlin and Vienna, roused apprehension in both. Russia looked back on two centuries of war with Turkey, and England on three centuries of war and commerce in the Levant and the East, on the Overland Route, on Egypt, and on the projected railway along the Euphrates Valley, and both determined that the fabric of centuries should not be undone by the Teuton. If German ambition was to Britain a danger, to Russian aspirations, seeking a free outlet from the Black

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Sea to the Mediterranean, it was fatal. When people talk about Germany and Russia coming to terms regardless of the other Allies, I ask myself: "What about Constantinople and the Straits?" and I seem to see the same *impasse* reached as that which brought negotiations between Napoleon and Alexander I. to a standstill.

When Mr. Geoffrey Drage published in 1904 his book on "Russian Affairs," he set as a motto on his title-page these words written by Count Muraviev: "I believe that Russia has a civilising mission such as no other people in the world, not only in Asia, but also in Europe. We Russians bear upon our shoulders the New Age. We come to relieve the 'tired men.'" M. Josef Popowski, in his "Antagonismus" already quoted, says that in the sixties of the last century, soon after the suppression of the Polish insurrection, "the Pan-Slavonic theory of the 'decaying Western and quickening Russian civilisation' came to the front," and that, on the occasion of the death of the Emperor William I. (9 March, 1888), the organ of M. Katkov, the *Moskowskie Viedomosti*, stated that "the twentieth century is for us." It is not in my power to assert categorically, but I suspect that the spirit engendered by such pronouncements as these has animated the writings of those British Russophiles who have produced in this twentieth century a type of book which claims for Russia and her people a more than human mission. I do not intend here to touch upon that *rapprochement* between the Anglican and Russian Churches, of which the late Mr. Birkbeck was an ardent votary. That is a subject beyond my ken. Those who desire to pursue this subject may read an article by Bishop Bury in the *Treasury* for October, 1916, entitled, "The Clergy and People of Russia with the Archbishops," and may temper the picture there drawn by reading carefully the five chapters which Lord Redesdale devotes to Russia in Vol. I. of his "Memories." They will then probably have some slight comprehension of the religious spirit of Russia. It is little more than four years since the "British visit to Russia," in 1912, took special steps to cultivate possible religious affinities, and on this point I may quote what the correspondent of the *Times* (28 January, 1912) said: "An important section of the Russian public has always cherished the hope of closer relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church of England.

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For a country where the religious instinct is so strong as it is in Russia there could be no lasting friendship where this note was not sounded; and it happens that the English Church, separated from that of Russia by no important difference of dogma, except the "filioque," is the only one which can give so warm a response to the traditional instinct of Russians. This aspect of the visit is represented in Russia by the organisation of a special committee and programme, and in the visiting party by the presence of four Anglican bishops, Lord Hugh Cecil, and the natural pilot for this group, Mr. W. J. Birkbeck."

Friendly intercourse between the two Churches conducted on these lines can hardly produce aught but good, but of tangible result accruing therefrom we know nothing. What is most in evidence at this moment is the mystical interpretation of "Holy Russia." A Russian lady, after listening to one of Mr. Stephen Graham's lectures, pronounced judgment in these words:—"Very interesting. But really, we are not quite such saints as all that." Russian pretension to sanctity never obtruded itself upon my experience. The right hand of fellowship in this unique war we value and welcome. The Russian idea of "fellowship," when I went amongst them in the eighties of last century, was a health drunk in a glass of vodka or a bottle of champagne; and, despite Mr. Graham's unshaken convictions upon Russian teetotalism, I would confidently count upon the same tokens of "fellowship" if I went amongst them again now. It so happens that one of the ablest Russian journalists of the day, M. Žukovski, has placed on record in the *Ruskoje Slovo* his opinion of the Philo-Russian movement in Britain, and who can be a better judge of that than a Russian? M. Žukovski's article, entitled "The English and We," was translated *in extenso*, and appeared in the Literary Supplement of the *Times* of 16 March, 1916. It is markedly satirical. I quote a few passages from it: "Once again the deluge has come; all England is flooded with books about Russia. It has rained not 40, but 440 days, and the down-pour still goes on; and who shall say what will happen if this phenomenon continues? Here, for instance, we read of 'Glorious Russia'; in another book about 'Contemporary Russia'; elsewhere of 'Armed Russia'; here is 'Friendly Russia,' and so on they go. No one in the world has ever been so infatuated with us as the English are at present."

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Presently M. Žukovski passes on to Mr. Stephen Graham, and, after mentioning his "Martha and Mary," in which Russia is the Mary, and Europe and America are the Marthas, he says: "Mr. Stephen Graham has already written about half-a-dozen books on Russia, and will write at least two dozen more before the war is over. Some time ago he travelled with our pilgrims to Jerusalem to pray at the sacred shrine, and ever since then he has held forth about the mystical mission of Russia. He takes himself to be a disciple of Dostoievsky, but, in reality, he is a smart journalist who is making the best of a fashionable subject." From this individual instance M. Žukovski passes on to a more general picture of British infatuation, dubbing us "Slavophiles" and "more Russian than the Russians." The entire article deserves to be read. He wrote it just before he left Russia with a party of authors and journalists to visit England. One object of that visit was to make Russians better acquainted with England, but rationally, without the exaggerated idealism of Mr. Stephen Graham and his school.

It is not in idealism or in the blind repudiation of that juice of the grape which the Creator gave to gladden the heart of man that the solution of the Near Eastern question will be found. No one has charged the German with over-sobriety in this war, and yet to-day he holds such a position in Europe and Asia as shows that the collapse of "Berlin-Bagdad" will not be yet. "Central Europe," at this moment, holds all the small neutral States of Europe in bondage or terror. It would seem that Roumania must share the fate of Belgium and Serbia. We know that the ambition of Pangermanism is to absorb into the German Empire all countries which have even a minority of German population. Look at the line that the German armies hold from the Baltic to the Bukovina! The completion of the Taurus Range tunnel greatly strengthens the position of the Central Powers in Asia Minor and in relation to Persia, Turkish Arabia and Egypt. We cannot blind our eyes to these facts. The stubborn prosecution alike of war and all the alimentary channels of war by the Central Powers, and the resource and versatility with which they grapple with each new phase of it, are striking to a degree. We are not here concerned with all, but only one great issue of this war, and that is the future destiny of Constantinople and the Straits.

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We see that, in 1807, France and Russia alike coveted them; while Austria, once recovered from the exhaustion of the Napoleonic Wars, also determined that, if possible, "the Sick Man" should pay toll to her rather than to Russia. It is a complicated skein which I have striven, in a measure, to unravel. The final winding up of it awaits the termination of this war. Some years ago a Russian writer in the *Gazette de la Bourse*, weary with hope deferred, wrote: "Faut-il attendre l'époque où, dans la solution de cette question des détroits, seront intéressés les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et le Japon?" We *have* waited until those two Powers will almost certainly have a voice in the matter. The *Times* and the *Spectator* alike, towards the close of 1914, urged that Russia must have Constantinople and the Straits, and the *Spectator* went so far as to speculate whether Russia would establish land connection by the north or south shore of the Black Sea. The Russians in Asia Minor have a task before them that not less than half-a-million of men, if that, will accomplish. The Balkan upheaval in this war has been so thorough that the ultimate issue cannot yet be foreseen. If the words of statesmen are to carry any weight, the combat between "Central" and "Exterior" Europe is *à outrance*, and the future of Constantinople depends upon which group of Powers can stand the strain longest.

A. C. YATE.

Thoughts on the Polish Question

[*The following paper has been sent to us from Russia by a Commissioner of the "Great Britain to Poland Fund." The author is engaged in superintending relief work for the benefit of refugees from Poland and Galicia, and he here sets down his unbiassed observations of peoples and facts.*]

THE Polish question has once more burst upon the attention of a staggered and distracted Europe. It would, perhaps, be truer to say that, like an ammunition depôt, near which an acquaintance of mine was stationed, which, touched by an Austrian bomb, continued cracker-wise to explode in bits all day, the Polish question has been actively bursting ever since the beginning of the war, and has now given a particularly violent explosion which will certainly not be the last, and probably will not prove to be the most violent. At the present

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moment the Moscow and Kiev papers, which reach Rovno at irregular intervals, are full of the German proclamation of a quasi-independent kingdom of Poland, and contain interviews with any Pole within reach of their correspondents who may have something to say on the subject. In its main lines the situation created by the latest German move is clear enough. Mr. Lednicki, president of the Moscow Polish Committee and one of the most widely respected of the Polish leaders in Russia, formerly a member of the Duma, remarks briefly that it is difficult to say anything about the proclamation, except that it appears to be dictated by military motives and that it will create a most unpleasant situation for the upholders in Poland of the Russian "orientation," those, that is, who have looked to Russia as the direction from which the hopes of their country are most likely to receive the beginnings of fulfilment. But Mr. Szebeko, member of the Council of the Empire, goes further and lays the responsibility for the present situation, and for the fratricidal war that may develop from it between Poles in the Russian army and Poles from Russian Poland taken to serve in the German army, on the Russian Government and on the present Premier. He states as a fact that Mr. Sazonov resigned because of his dissatisfaction with Mr. Stürmer's policy upon the Polish question, and that after trying in vain to get an Act accepted that would have contented the Polish leaders and cleared the atmosphere, laden as it has been with storm clouds throughout the year, he left the Government. Other reasons, too, may have been at work, and the actual occasion of Mr. Sazonov's resignation is understood to have been different, but what Mr. Szebeko now says was freely said at the time and is probably true. The only remedy, Mr. Szebeko thinks, for the dangerous situation that has been allowed to arise would be the publication, on behalf of Russia and her Allies, with pointed emphasis on the latter, of a clear statement as to the proposed constitution of the future Polish state.

One of those interviewed on this vital question says that, although everyone has been talking of something of the sort for a long time, the German act took him entirely by surprise. As usual there has been plenty of talk on our side—and the Germans have acted. What they have done now has doubtless, as the authorities quoted above point out, a

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double motive; firstly, they want to create some show of legality before pressing Poles from Russian Poland into their army; secondly, they have to create a buffer of sympathy with themselves or antipathy against the Russians wherewith to hold up the pressure from the east towards the close of the war. But if the actual step taken by the enemy and the moment of it was unforeseen, the situation has clearly been developing in this direction for a considerable time past. As early as the beginning of summer the Polish leaders were much exercised by the news received of the political progress made by the Germans in Poland, and feared that when the Russian arms were victoriously carried back across the Vistula they would cease to be regarded as those of liberators by people of not sufficiently advanced political training to appreciate the underlying reasons for the privileges granted them by their German governors. Not long since a paper was read at a political club at Petrograd on the Polish question, when a Pole present put a damper on the subsequent discussion by remarking that since the proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicolas nothing had been done, and that the Polish question was at the moment being settled in Poland. In fact, the Germans have gone a long way towards satisfying the agitations of Poles as far as the internal life of the country goes. There is a Polish University in Warsaw, there are Polish courts and Polish schools, the Polish language and Polish customs are everywhere encouraged, and in Warsaw there have been elaborate Polish national demonstrations under the direct patronage of the German Governor, Von Beseler. In this benign atmosphere the German tyranny and persecution of everything Polish in Posen may well fall into oblivion. True, the matter of the Polish legions in Austria does not seem to have been handled with conspicuous success, but, as was found in the Russian Army when something of the same sort was attempted, this is an experiment fraught with difficulty.

Now it may well be that a mistake was made in not, within a reasonable time after the Grand Duke's proclamation, and during the palmy days of the war on the Bzura and the Rawka, publishing the intentions of the Russian Government on the future of Poland. Because this was not done, however, it does not follow that the motives for not doing it were altogether pernicious. Many Russians, believers in the sincerity of the proclamation and eager that

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Poland should have real autonomy, thought that while active military operations were going on it was not opportune to enter upon a detailed consideration of the legal steps that should define and assure it; and to have done so would undoubtedly have been to distract the attention of statesmen and administrators from the sole object which should have engrossed them—the prosecution of the war. Any attempt to put into motion an autonomous administration with the front fifty miles west of Warsaw would probably, when the cumbrous movements and infinite tentacles of the Russian bureaucratic machine are considered, have had an even more disintegrating effect. The flood of ink now let loose is a measure of what might have been expected had contrary counsels prevailed.

It may be objected that what the Germans have done could have been done on the side of the Allies. There is, however, this difference in the situation, that in setting up a new kingdom of Poland, the Germans are dealing with foreign land of which they are in occupation. We learn that German public opinion is not wholly favourable to the manner and policy of the proclamation. But the German Government can afford to disregard German opinion about Russian Poland just as it can disregard the dissatisfaction of Poles as expressed by the Rector of the University of Warsaw at the disappointingly partial scope of the measures promised to be put in force. If it were a question of Posen, or Silesia, the German Government could not maintain so comfortable an attitude. The Russian situation, on the other hand, is much what would be that of Germany were she called upon to set up autonomy in Posen: with the best will in the world Russia must tread warily, and has a long and thorny path before her. Not even with this considerable advantage have the German statesmen found their task easy. It is evident that there have been many abortive attempts to find a wider basis for their policy, and they have only succeeded in maintaining a scheme by strictly confining it to Russian Poland. They have, in fact, partially solved their problem by excluding from it all the refractory elements.

On the side of Russia and her Allies such a simple method is inadmissible. Now or later they will have to find a formula covering the whole question of Poland; and to leave out of present consideration many hard questions that

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will call for answer, there is one which, after insistently presenting itself time and again for inspection, now resolutely refuses to be put back into the box. This is the fundamental question of geographic delimitation. "There is no real Poland," says Mr. Lednicki, "without Galicia, Silesia, and Posen." In this he is supported by Mr. Szebeko, who will probably, he himself says, be entrusted with the task of presenting the Polish view to the Russian Government, as well, indeed, as by every other prominent leader of Polish public opinion. And Mr. Szebeko demands for this problem the attention and co-operation of the Allies.

In maps of Poland as it was, the territory claimed forms roughly a square from north-east of Vitebsk to west of Danzig, and embraces Breslau and Cracow on the west, Mogilov and Kiev on the east, Lvov and Tarnopol on the south. The reintegration in a new kingdom of Poland of the eastern strip with Vitebsk, Mogilov and Kiev, belongs evidently to the realm of dreams and need not be considered; the rest is of serious moment. When the military strength of Germany has been blasted away and the map of Europe is carved anew, the future of Silesia and Posen must be one for the general council of the Allied Powers, and it will be for them to consider whether by cutting away from Germany the whole of Silesia, containing, as it does, a large proportion of Germans, they will be paving the way towards a stable peace or will thereby rather create a new Alsatian problem in the east of Europe. Posnania, more definitely Polish, the cradle, it is called, of Polish civilization, more hardly treated, and not Germanised by the brutal thoroughness of the Expropriation Laws and their like, may present less trouble. The question of Danzig, however, is sure to give rise to difficulty if insisted upon by the Poles, and so far back as the spring of 1915 aroused spirited reproach from some leaders of the Polish National Democratic Party against the part they declared to be played by Great Britain in blocking the approach of Poland to the sea. "No Pole," repeats Mr. Lednicki in a separate article, "will be satisfied by a Polish State that does not take in Galicia, Silesia, and the principality of Posen, a Polish State without Danzig, without the mouth of the Vistula, without a way out to the sea." But far more urgent at the present moment than Danzig is the problem of Galicia's future, and at

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the same time it is one less within the competence of the Western Allies.

Polish writers and politicians claim Galicia as part of Poland. They have never made a secret of this. No Russian I have ever met admits their claim. The Polish claim is founded upon their historical possession before it fell into the seething pot of the Austrian Empire, and upon the preponderance of Poles among the town population. The Russian view has for its justification that still earlier in history the land was Russian before ever it became Polish, and that the bulk of the peasantry is Ruthenian, that is, Russian at one remove. The figures of the population taken from a recent Polish guide-book are—40 per cent. Polish, 40 per cent. Ruthenian, and 20 per cent. Jewish, and it needs only a very slight acquaintance with Galicia to see that the town and the rural population belong in the main to different nationalities. Therefore, if the principle of nationality were to be applied, it would be hard to say to which of its neighbours Galicia should be attached, save that it can never again be attached to Hungary, from which it is separated by mountains of rock and national hatred. The Ruthenians, who were the advance guard of the Little Russians, pushed up against the Carpathian Mountains, are, in fact, as much Russian as their brothers who stayed within the boundaries of Volynia and Podolia. They speak the same language, they wear the same clothes, they have the same high, broad foreheads and little tip-tilted noses; they are the same peasants, tillers of the same rich, black soil. By religion they belong to the Uniate Greek Church, but now many of them have become Orthodox, like a colony of Ruthenians who emigrated not many years since to Canada, to the indignation of the local Roman Catholic authorities. They belong so much to the land of Galicia and the land to them, that, in ordinary parlance, they are often simply called "Galicians," a term which would never be applied without qualification to the Poles or Jews of that country.

Among the Ruthenians are not only peasants, but also a substantial educated class. In Galicia they are divided politically. The majority are the so-called Ukraïnophils, supported by Austria-Hungary, who cherished the vain hope of a separate Little Russian state being set up under the auspices of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and even carried on their propaganda in the Russian Ukraine itself. The Russophile minority, as is

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only natural, have always turned towards Russia as to their true mother-country, and kept alive the spirit of Russia among their people. Their attitude was held a danger to the State, the Russian alphabet was forbidden, Russian tendencies persecuted, those found in possession of Puškin's poems were sent to prison by the active Austrian police. Therefore, when, in the autumn of 1914, General Brusilov and Radko Dimitriev drove the Austrians through Lvov and to the outer hills of the Carpathians, their troops were hailed by thousands of Ruthenians as saviours and as brothers. Every Russian who set his foot upon Galician ground felt that he was helping to reclaim a part—a very little part, but yet a part—of Russia's soul from the hated domination of the Teuton. The compact of welcome and brotherly friendship then made has since been sealed by suffering. Hardly a clod of Galician earth is there that has not been hallowed by the shedding of Russian blood. And though the suffering of the Galician people has been great, through it still shines the hope of a future life of peace under the sheltering arm of their great mother Russia. They had much that Russia cannot give them: good administration, beautiful roads, agricultural colleges, pretty things in the towns from Vienna, neat books from America; but their souls sighed for the spirit of Russia and without it will not be at rest.

The same must be said of the big Ruthenian fragment in Hungary. The persecution of these Ruthenians is very brutal, and the Magyars have been aided by Rome. They have been allowed to introduce the Magyar language in the Ruthene Uniate Church and to expel its Slavonic liturgy.

Here, then, is a point of acute difficulty in a pronouncement by the Russian Government on the Polish question. The Ruthenians welcomed the Russian arms, suffered for them, died in thousands for their movement of loyalty towards Russia. The Poles and Jews of Galicia were not inspired by the same feelings. Among the Poles the more far-sighted political leaders indeed accepted and welcomed the Russian conquest as the only means by which they could hope that Galician Poland might be rejoined to the greater part of their country; but the rank and file of the bourgeois population were too comfortable under Austrian rule to desire any change. Their province enjoyed practical autonomy, and within it they ruled the roost. Without displaying actual hostility towards the Russians, it was nevertheless clear that

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their sympathies were not with the conquerors. Nor must it be forgotten that the Russians were conquerors, and have been busy all this summer again driving back the Austrians. They won Galicia by the sword. A very typically Russian administration was set up in Lvov. The Emperor himself made a special tour through the province, and gave a diamond-mounted sword to the Grand Duke Nicolas in memory of his conquest. When the day of settlement comes, these things will not, and perhaps ought not, to be forgotten. Possibly some rational partition of Galicia can be devised, leaving the west and Cracow, Polish beyond all question, to the nation of which it is the ancient capital, and giving the east and south to Russia. But prophecy is useless. I am merely concerned here to point to the existence of a grave difficulty. The Poles say they will not be satisfied with anything short of Galicia. The Russians believe that Poland has no right to Galicia, and feel it to be a part of Russia. It is significant that, in the course of a lengthy interview, Mr. V. A. Maklakov, one of the chief Russian progressive politicians (not to be confused with his brother, a former reactionary Minister of the Interior), while emphasising the past faults of Russian policy towards the Poles and the necessity that Poland should be an autonomous state, makes no reference at all to Galicia. In view of these facts it would not seem easy for a Russian proclamation on the future constitution of Poland to satisfy the hopes or assuage the fears of the chief contending parties.

As if expressly to point a finger of warning for those who believe in easy solutions, the same papers bring the strange news that the police have searched the rooms of Mr. Grabski, President of the Central Citizens Committee (of the Government of the Kingdom of Poland) at Petrograd, and have seized his documents. The fact that such an incident should have taken place shows the bitterness of the Polish situation. The Poles feel themselves to be one people, whether under Russia, Germany, or Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, they are expected in Russia to be loyal against their brothers among the enemy; in Austria and Germany they are bound to fight against the Slav. During the terrible days of the great retreat, the loyalty of the Russian Poles was terribly tested, the more because each step backward taken by the Russian Army raised the hopes of the Austrian Poles that the liberation of their country might come from

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their side. A vain hope, indeed, as anyone who had considered the history of Austria might have known. From Germany, with her rod of iron, no one was rash enough to look for a liberating movement. Alone in Russia could hope be placed, and Russia had spoken through the Grand Duke Nicolas the word of freedom which had set Russia and all the world aflame. The Poles undoubtedly hoped for an earlier fulfilment of their national longing, and perhaps, without thinking of the practical difficulties, were deeply disappointed that nothing was done to put the Grand Duke's promise of freedom into practice. And this disappointment must have been the greater because it was exasperated by the repeated raising of expectation that immediate measures would be taken. In the last days before the evacuation of Warsaw, Mr. Goremykin, then Prime Minister, gave an assurance that a fundamental law expressing the promised autonomy was being worked out and would be published. No such law was published, and on other occasions hope was raised only to be equally disappointed. What makes the Polish position one of exceptional difficulty and gives to many utterances of the Polish leaders a tinge of bitterness, even of despair, is not the length of time that hope has been deferred, or the internal difficulties that confront them, but the fear that influences exist which if they gained the upper hand would annul the Grand Duke's proclamation, or at best end in such a whittling away of it that only a dead and fruitless stick would remain in place of the splendid young tree that imagination foresaw. It is this fear that makes the Poles now lay special emphasis on the connection of all the Allies with the Polish problem. It is impossible not to sympathise deeply with them. It is needless to repeat that the British public joins in their expectation of the fulfilment of the Grand Duke's words. It is elementary statesmanship that without a settlement of the Polish problem no peace can prevail in Europe after the war. It is essential that the Poles should believe that it will be honestly and well settled. But it is useless to disguise that the problem is a hard one, and that the settlement cannot be such as will fully satisfy everyone. This is of the essence of political settlements under given circumstances, a truism that is in danger of being forgotten, at all events on this side of the world.

JOHN POLLOCK.

Rovno, 11 November, 1916.

The Literature of Pangermanism (V)

THE Social Democrats play a conspicuous *rôle* in Austrian Pangermanism. Like their brethren in Germany, they have approved and championed the policy of Berlin and Vienna. It was not for nothing that the founders of the Austrian Social Democracy were Pangerman before they started their new party, and the war has revived their German nationalist instinct in all its original force. Both Herr Pernerstorfer and Dr. Victor Adler have advocated a Pangerman policy during the war, and their concessions to the non-German nationalities are of no real value. Another deputy, Dr. Carl Renner, the theorist of the German Social Democrats in Austria, whose books on Austria are well known, has published a series of essays under the name, "Oesterreichs Erneuerung" ("Austria's Renewal") (1916), in which he entirely accepts the policy of a Pangerman "Central Europe," and shows himself to be of one mind with Naumann. He affords an instructive example of the way in which political and moral materialism have brought the majority of the German Social Democrats on to the platform of the Prussian Pangerman imperialists.

The question of a Customs' Union with Germany is diligently and repeatedly discussed in Austria. The well-known Austrian economist, Professor E. von Philippovich, in his pamphlet, "Ein Wirtschafts- und Zollverband zwischen Deutschland und Oesterreich-Ungarn" ("An Economic and Customs League between Germany and Austria-Hungary") (1915), was the first to outline a practical plan for such a union. The pamphlet contains an interesting history of the different attempts made in Austria to reconcile the Austrian and German economic systems. Philippovich accepts in its entirety the *rôle* of Austria-Hungary as the vanguard of Germany in the Balkans and Asia.*

* Some other works of Austrian authors are: E. Pistor, "Die Volkswirtschaft Oesterreich-Ungarns und die Verständigung mit Deutschland," 1915; Prof. E. Heiderich, "Die weltpolitische und weltwirtschaftliche Zukunft von Oesterreich-Ungarn," 1916; Prof. A. Guertler, "Oesterreich-Ungarn: Ein Schema für Mitteleuropa," 1916. From other literature I may mention also the following: Dr. Alex. Redlich, "Der Gegensatz zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Russland," 1915; Prof. K. C. Schneider, "Mitteleuropa als Kultur-

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The Magyars are also taking their part in the discussion regarding Pangermanic "Central Europe" and the Customs' Union. On the whole they accept the political scheme of Berlin-Bagdad, and merely claim for themselves a privileged position in the new World-Empire; but their economists either express doubts respecting the feasibility of a Customs' Union or altogether condemn the scheme on its merits.*

Pangerman literature before the war definitely laid down the rôle which the present conflict was to play in the German scheme. It is interesting to compare the proposed programme with the results actually achieved up to the present moment. Two books will be enough to indicate what the programme was. The first, "Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950," by "A German" (1895), anticipated the war with Russia, and declared that, in case of victory, Germany would annex the Baltic provinces (Esthonia, Livonia, Courland), form a Polish State and a Ruthenian Kingdom, which would comprise the Jews and Slavs of Germany, would organise "Central Europe" on the basis of a political and economic union, and would thus have an empire which, in addition to Austria-Hungary, would include Luxemburg, Holland, Belgium and German Switzerland. That empire would form, together with the Baltic provinces, Poland and Ruthenia, the great Zollverein, in which the Germans would be the ruling lords and masters, and the other nations their servants. The author estimated that the empire would contain 86 million, and the Customs Union 131 million, inhabitants. The second book, "Grossdeutschland, die Arbeit des 20^{ten} Jahrhunderts" ("Greater Germany, the Work of the Twentieth Century"), by Tannenberg (1911), similarly based its speculations upon the assumption of a decisive victory over Russia and France. According to this forecast, Germany, in addition to the colonies which

begriff," 1916 (a very interesting attempt at a philosophy of history by a biologist, though it must be admitted that Herr Schneider's Pangerman bias does not lead him into intolerance).

* The Pangerman plan is treated from the Magyar point of view by E. Pályi, "Deutschland und Ungarn" (1915), and "Das mittel-europäische Weltreichbündniss gesehen von einem Nicht-Deutschen" (1916). Pályi accepts the plan of a close Customs' Union. In opposition to him the well-known Hungarian economist and ex-Minister, Sztérényi, declines to accept the Customs' Union, but demands a system of preferential duties for Hungary.

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she would gain in every part of the world, chiefly at the expense of France, would build up a great empire in Central Europe extending even as far as the Persian Gulf. Austria would become part of that empire, whereas Hungary would form the nucleus of a new Habsburg Empire consisting, among other states, of Poland, Serbia (the latter being enlarged by the addition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavonia and the south of Dalmatia) and Bulgaria. This Habsburg Empire would be open to still further extension in the future. Germany would absorb Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland and the adjoining territories of France, which would be given the name of "Westfranken." The German Empire would also include Poland (Russian Poland, Galicia, Bukovina and parts of Russia), which would be incorporated in the new Austria; to Germany proper would be added the Baltic provinces and the governments of Kovno, Vilna and Grodno; while Turkey, including the west of Persia, but not the south of Arabia, would become a German Protectorate. Finland (excluding Viborg) would become part of Sweden.*

A more comprehensive survey of Pangerman literature would have included a fuller treatment of the various Pangerman reviews and papers, of which a few only have been mentioned. It should also be borne in mind that the various Pangerman societies publish leaflets, calendars, almanacks, and all kinds of propagandist literature, and that there is a considerable body of German literature, which, though not explicitly Pangerman, promotes the Pangerman plan: as, for instance, the endless number of books and pamphlets devoted to the cult of Bismarck. Rohrbach, as may be seen from his pamphlet, "Bismarck und Wir" (1915), wrote from the Pangerman point of view, and he affords a striking confirmation of the proposition laid down in a former article, that Pangermanism does not clash with the Bismarckian tradition. This is true, not only as regards its political aims, but also its political methods, and, indeed, the whole spirit of its policy.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

* To-day Germany dominates Austria-Hungary (68 millions), Turkey (51), Bulgaria (20), Serbia (4½), Montenegro (4½), Poland (9), part of the Baltic provinces (3), and a part of Russia (4), amounting in all to 164 million people.

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The Greek Elections



Map of Election, June 1915.

The fractions indicate $\frac{\text{VENIZELISTS}}{\text{TOTAL SEATS}}$

THE GREEK ELECTIONS

SUMMARY OF ELECTIONS, JUNE, 1915.

(See map on opposite page.)

I.— <i>New Greece.</i>	Venizelist.	Total.
(a) Macedonia	4	73
(b) Epirus	16	19
(c) Islands (Eastern)	43	44
	—	—
Total New Greece	63	136
II.— <i>Old Greece.</i>		
(a) Thessaly and Mainland north of Bœotia	40	50
(b) Attica-Bœotia	20	22
(c) Peloponnesus	30	60
(d) Western Islands	9	19
(e) Eastern Islands	21	29
	—	—
Total Old Greece	120	180
	—	—
Grand Total	183	316

In December, 1915, Election, 16 seats were added for North Epirus:
 Argyrocastron ... 10 Koritza 6

N.B.—The Greek system is that of the *scrutin de liste*, not the *scrutin d'arrondissement*. The constituencies are in every case for "counties," including the cities contained in them.

HOW FAR ARE THE FIGURES OF THE ELECTIONS OF JUNE, 1915, MODIFIED BY EVENTS?

(a) The Venizelists have gained largely in Macedonia because of the Bulgarian invasion. Their failure there in June, 1915, was partly due to Turkish and Jewish votes, but largely to Venizelos's willingness at the beginning of the year to sacrifice Kavala. The proof that there has been a change is not only the fact that the Government of National Defence has established itself successfully at Salonica—which might be explained as due to the presence of the Allies—but all the bye-elections of Drama, in May, 1916, when the Venizelists came out on top of the poll in a three-cornered fight and obtained, in the purely Greek part of the constituency—viz., Kavala town—3,070 votes to the Government's 470.

(b) The Venizelist majority in the Islands is certainly unchanged.

(c) There is no reason for thinking that the Venizelists have lost their great majority in Northern Old Greece.

(d) In Attica-Bœotia the Venizelists have, perhaps, lost slightly, but would recover at once if Venizelos returned to power.

(e) In Elis the Venizelists have certainly lost ground. One of their bitterest opponents to-day is K. Roupfos, elected in June, 1915, for Elis as a Venizelist. The Peloponnesus is probably uniformly Anti-Venizelist.

RONALD M. BURROWS.

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Our Insular Mind

A widely-advertised book with a too rhetorical title—"Eclipse or Empire"*—tells us that there is no limit to the progress of British enterprise once it is set free from the shackles of ignorance and prejudice. The thesis is already well known to all thoughtful men, though there is a natural and healthy divergence of opinion as to the cure for the disease. Dr. Gray and Mr. Turner have no doubt of the sovereign power of the remedy they prescribe; for, although they declare more than once, in the short course of this book, that their "*main object . . . is to create the consciousness of a need rather than to dogmatise on the methods to be applied,*" they proclaim, with confident emphasis, the virtue of education. "Education is the burden of their song. On it vested interests, tradition, and prejudice have, for many generations, laid heavy and paralysing hands. And yet, inasmuch as the child is the father of the man, from educational efficiency or inefficiency must spring the moral and intellectual health or maladies of the community." In the course of their argument they are driven, like all propagandists, to ignore the credit side of British achievements; they draw a dark picture—partly true, partly untrue—of the decay of enterprise in all walks of British life; and the industrial glossary which occupies two-thirds of the book is so drawn up as to lead us to suppose that the life has wholly gone out of British trade. Their thesis of the "slackening of momentum" is undeniably true; but the phenomenon is due at least as much to the late development of other countries as to the lowering of energy in our own. The war has given birth to a spirit of self-examination which tends to degenerate into depreciation of British worth just at those very points where we stand really high. There has been an excess of self-criticism, brought on sometimes by the deliberate design of factious persons in Press and Parliament, sometimes by the mere fit of pessimism produced by the prolonging of war without dazzling triumphs. Let us hold the balance even. In many regions we have worked better than we knew, far better, indeed, than certain reckless factions in our midst would have us believe. Despite many shortcomings which we are in no mood to conceal, we are entitled to hold our heads as high as any nation in the world war.

So much by way of prefatory caveat. We now proceed to apply the authors' argument to a subject which is as emphatically within our scope in THE NEW EUROPE as it was outside theirs in "Eclipse or Empire." In one passage "the insular character of the Imperial Government" is held up to our gaze as "symptomatic of an ill-organized condition of the body politic." Insularity permeates our whole being. No mere stream, mountain pass, or painted signpost separates us from neighbouring foreign nations. We are islanders enjoying all the priceless benefits, suffering all the serious drawbacks of an oceanic instead of a continental position. We have grown up

* "Eclipse or Empire." By H. B. Gray, D.D., and Samuel Turner. (Nisbet.) 2s.

OUR INSULAR MIND

in the atmosphere of the sea; adventurous, self-reliant and impatient of restraint. And now we have reached a point where we must submit our untamed qualities to the harness of a scientific organization in order that we may compete with our rivals on equal terms. For no nation under heaven is this lesson harder to learn than for ours; but the measure of its severity is the measure of its necessity. Side by side with the unorganized, anarchic energy of the vital men in trade and industry, there is the lethargy of the third generation, the inheritors of their fathers' wealth, who dissipate, by ignorance and indolence, the means of production which they have inherited. Both of these need discipline; both need the infusion of science to make their industry fruitful; and if it be said that science may drive the indolent to the wall, it can also be said that it will treble the production of the others.

Now, apply all this to politics, domestic and foreign. Insularity has cut us off from the world, robbing us of the knowledge of foreign peoples, by which alone we could choose the right path in peace and in war. It has given us the leaders we deserve; such leaders as, for instance, can carry us safely through such a crisis as the adoption of universal military service without an upheaval—a far greater service to the nation than is commonly realised—but cannot back the right horse for us in the Balkans. It has given us a matchless fleet and the Diplomatic Service which we know. The contrast between these last two is worth pursuing a little further, for it proves that when the British people sets its heart upon a thing it will get what it wants. There is not a man—nor, even in time of peace, were there many—who does not know the meaning of naval supremacy to our island kingdom; and upon this sure basis the Admiralty stood and stands in its demands for ships and men. The Admiralty thus gets the best of ships and men, because, in naval affairs, we mean business. But who cares about diplomacy? Who has ever time to probe the shrouded depths of our foreign relations? Not the House of Commons, not the people as a whole. No strong light is ever thrown upon the foreign service of Great Britain except at times of crisis, when we are all too deeply preoccupied with the machinations of the enemy to take true observations of the behaviour of our servants. When the crisis has passed, the waves of domestic strife engulf us once more, and we forget the great lesson that the domestic and foreign concerns of a nation are complementary, and that neither can be ignored without peril to the other. It is the besetting sin of Democracy, especially on an island, to ignore foreign affairs till they come home to roost! And it will be one of our chief tasks after the war so to educate ourselves that, while retaining our best qualities as islanders, we may acquire the enriching characteristics of "the Good European."

Education, generously interpreted, alone can do it. If we read Dr. Gray's book as a footnote to the story of *la Victoire Intégrale*, we can agree with him that the supreme need of the moment is the training of British intelligence. In his own words, "'War after war'—not so much upon our enemies or our rivals as upon our-

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selves—our own old ways, our own old prejudices and preconceptions, social, industrial, but, above all, educational—is the only road to the future peace, prosperity and power." Taken all in all, the intelligence of our people, regarded as a raw material, is as good stuff as exists anywhere, and, when properly trained, is second to none. But, in the past, it has gone to seed for lack of guidance in industry, education and in politics. The war has brought an awakening; it is our business to see that the old sloth does not come over us once more when the stress of war is removed; and particularly is this true in the realm to which THE NEW EUROPE is devoted. Never in our whole history has the whole people been aroused to so active an interest in Europe as to-day; never has the public mind been so hospitable to continental teaching, so eager to understand the meaning of European events; never has there been such an opportunity of giving our insular fellow-countrymen a taste for foreign affairs. As far as lies in our power the founders of THE NEW EUROPE will not allow the opportunity to pass. This journal exists for the two-fold purpose of supplying British readers with information which can hardly be available elsewhere, and of creating in their minds that permanent bias towards continental affairs which was so conspicuously lacking before the war. Only by close study of the contrasts between our ways and other ways can we possibly understand and select the true policy from the false; only by ridding ourselves of insular prepossessions which have no bearing whatever upon foreign situations can we ensure the success of our diplomacy in peace or in war. Guided in great questions by well-tried principles, we must be thorough-going realists in our estimates of persons and things abroad; for to judge a politician of Central Europe by the measure of Westminster leads to nothing but mortification. And this study is its own reward. The further one penetrates into the history of contemporary Europe, the deeper becomes the fascination of the pageant of men and affairs which it presents.

A. F. WHYTE.

Russia and the Dardanelles.

So far as we are aware, THE NEW EUROPE was the first to publish the details of Germany's "infamous proposal" to Russia for a separate peace and the partition of Roumania—a proposal which was an even grosser insult than that made to the British Government on the eve of war, and which was greeted with the same indignant refusal. THE NEW EUROPE was also alone in this country in announcing (in its issue of 23 November) that the agreement of the Allies concerning Constantinople and the Straits was about to be published. This is now publicly confirmed by the speech of the new Russian Premier, Mr. Trepov, in the Duma on 2 December. "The agreement," he tells

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us, "established in the most definitive fashion the right of Russia to the Straits and Constantinople . . . and there is no doubt that after she has obtained sovereign possession of a free passage into the Mediterranean, Russia will grant freedom of navigation for the Roumanian flag."

While reserving further comment until the full text of Mr. Trepov's speech and further details as to the terms of the agreement are available, we associate ourselves most cordially with the public proclamation of a policy which provides the only sure basis for lasting concord between Britain and Russia. It marks the final stage in the renunciation of a quite needless antagonism, the final abandonment of that mischievous "Jingo" policy which identified itself with the catchword, "The Russians shall not have Constantinople." And as this abandonment is no mere party move, but a natural evolution on the part of the British nation as a whole—as the farsighted views of Gladstone were eventually accepted by the wisdom of Salisbury—so it is fitting that the final step should have been taken by a Cabinet composed of the political heirs of both statesmen. However glaring the errors of the Coalition may have been in other spheres of foreign and domestic policy, this agreement will stand to their lasting credit. As the *Daily Chronicle* aptly points out, "The future peace and freedom of the world depend largely on the future friendship of Russia and Great Britain; and, to achieve this, it was necessary as a first condition for Russia to be allowed to complete her destiny at the Straits, with British goodwill in place of British obstruction. Let us be frank with the expression of that goodwill now. Let us give more than a grudging assent to this great historic removal of an age-long barrier to the development and civilisation of the Russian race."

A Prophet of Defeat

It was only to be expected that THE NEW EUROPE would meet with the disapproval of those who desire a German peace in Europe; but we are surprised to find, among the advocates of such a peace, a man of the position of Professor E. V. Arnold, of Bangor. In an article entitled "Reckless Propaganda," in the *New Age* of 30 November, he admits that "the list of the supporters of this new journal includes names known all over Europe, and such as taken together may not unfairly be deemed representative of the intellectual atmosphere of all the Allied nations." He then denounces our "doctrine" as "immoral in its foundations and most dangerous in its consequences," and bases this verdict upon the fact that an essential point of our programme is "the emancipation of the subject races of Central and South-eastern Europe." The liberation of the Slav and Latin peoples from the yoke of Austria-Hungary and Prussia is described as "a great scheme for the destruction of European civilization, as irrational as it is unreal," and a clumsy attempt is made to confuse the issue by identifying our ideals with the long

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vanished programme of Pan-Slavism. We cannot believe that his readers are so prejudiced or so ignorant as to be frightened by this bogey of the "Jingo" era. Between ourselves and Professor Arnold the issue is clear, and there can be no compromise. Not content with the craven assertion that "we stand to-day as a defeated combination," having "failed to make good our claims by arms" and that we "now clearly see that we can never win the war with our armies," he goes on to declare that "Central Europe," with its corollary "Berlin-Bagdad," exists to-day, "and that it would be a crime to destroy it." In other words, he boldly adopts and approves the policy of triumphant Pangermanism and denounces that of his own Allies. For let there be no mistake about it. The destruction of Austria-Hungary and the liberation of its countless victims is one of the cardinal points in the policy of France, Russia and Italy, and though the British Government has hitherto restricted its declarations on foreign policy to somewhat vague generalities, there is no reason to suppose that it is blind to the wishes of its Allies, or to the dangers involved in Germany's final assertion of hegemony at Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople and Bagdad. If Germany establishes herself from Hamburg to Basra, the fate of Belgium, and even of Alsace, will be a matter of complete indifference to her, except in so far as a victor naturally likes to extend his spoils to an unlimited degree; and if Professor Arnold has failed, after twenty-eight months of war to grasp this root-fact, we fear that neither will he be persuaded though one rose from the dead. His whole argument rests upon the grossest travesty of facts when he maintains that "the so-called subject races" (note the phrase "so-called") of Austria-Hungary "are lacking in the elements of ordered government, and that they have no characteristic political institutions, no industries, no unity." We shall not deal with this fundamental falsehood at the moment, for the excellent reason that every number, past and future, of the NEW EUROPE has contained, and will contain, abundant refutation of it.

R. W. S.-W.

A Sign of the Times.

We welcome the appearance of our new contemporary, *British Supremacy*, as we welcome any and every sign that the nation is awakening from the restless slumbers of party politics, insular prejudice and economic sloth. If *British Supremacy* develops and advocates a clear-cut policy of Imperial reconstruction, based upon a frank recognition of the extreme gravity of our situation and an unshakeable resolve to redeem it, it will be performing a real national service, and will be strengthening the hands of those of our leaders with whom the need for victory—for *la victoire intégrale*—swallows up every other issue and every other consideration.

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VOL. I, No. 9.

December 14, 1916

Wanted—A Foreign Policy

FOR eleven years our foreign policy has been controlled by one man. His tenure of office has not only been longer than that of any Foreign Secretary since Canning, but it has coincided with the most momentous events of our modern history. During the opening years of this period the Anglo-French Entente and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were consolidated, and the long-sought Anglo-Russian Agreement successfully concluded. Much of the credit for these achievements must rest with the late King Edward, whose political ability may have been exaggerated by uncritical admirers, but who combined an astonishing *flair* and knowledge of Continental affairs with that even rarer quality, the magical talent of creating or transforming an atmosphere. With his death our foreign policy entered upon a new phase, the most striking and regrettable characteristic of which was, on the one hand, the complete lack of interest in it displayed by the nation as a whole and by its representatives in Parliament, and, on the other hand, the profound secrecy in which our relations with foreign Powers were shrouded. It would be absurd to blame a single man for such a development. Parliament, which indulged in party brawls instead of acting as the trustee of the nation, and the nation itself, which was absorbed in domestic affairs and unduly bent upon its own amusement and enrichment, are at least equally to blame. But the fact remains that in the year preceding the war, parallel with a Balkan policy which gravely jeopardised our prestige and sowed the seeds of future trouble, a whole series of secret agreements with Germany were negotiated, such as would have transformed the map of Africa and Western Asia in her favour. We are still very much in the dark as to these treaties; but the testimony of four prominent students of foreign affairs—Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. Morton Fullerton, Count Reventlow and Herr Paul Rohrbach,

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enables us to provide the following survey.* Parallel but distinct negotiations appear to have been carried on between Turkey, on the one hand, and Britain, France, Germany and Russia, on the other; between Germany on the one hand, and France and Britain on the other; and finally between France and Britain. The essential point which underlay all these various agreements was that Germany was recognised as "the sole concessionnaire" of the Bagdad Railway, but consented to make its terminus at Basra instead of the coastline of the Persian Gulf, and to leave Koweit in the British sphere of influence. While France secured concessions for the construction of railways in Syria and even in Armenia, both she and Britain strictly bound themselves to refrain from building any line which would compete with the main German line; and Count Reventlow significantly tells us that the other concessions, though considerable if reckoned in kilometres, were "dependent on the Bagdad railway as the backbone of the whole system of communication." Meanwhile, according to Mr. Morton Fullerton, France acquired control of the ports of Heraclea and Inebali on the Black Sea and of Jaffa, Haifa and the Syrian Tripoli on the Mediterranean. Russia secured fresh pledges for the Europeanisation of Armenia, while Britain acquired effective control of the Persian Gulf.

So far as Africa is concerned, we learn from Sir Harry Johnston that France was prepared to surrender practically the whole of the French Congo, with the right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo; and that Walfisch Bay was to have been ceded to Germany for part of "the Caprivi strip in Zambezia," and the island of Zanzibar in return for the connection between Uganda and Tanganyika; while the dormant proposals for the sale of the Portuguese colonies to Germany were revived in a new form which aroused both alarm and dissatisfaction in Paris. The net result of all this would have been to secure for Germany a great Central African Empire, linking the Cameroons by land both with

* "The Political Geography of Africa before and after the War," by Sir Harry Johnston (*Geographical Journal*, April, 1915, with maps). "Problems of Power," by W. Morton Fullerton, 3rd (revised) edition, 1914, pp. 305-8. "Deutschlands auswärtige Politik," by Graf Ernst zu Reventlow (4th revised edition, 1916), pp. 472-3. Paul Rohrbach in *Das Grössere Deutschland* for 15 August, 1914.

WANTED—A FOREIGN POLICY

German East and South-West Africa, and in that case the transference of Angola and at least the northern half of Mozambique to Germany would have only been a question of time and opportunity. If it be true, as Sir Harry Johnston hints, that all this was to have been conditional upon "the retrocession of Metz and French-speaking Lorraine," and the "extrusion" of Luxemburg from the German Customs Union in favour of Belgium, it is, of course, impossible without further facts at our disposal to pass a final verdict upon the whole transaction; but in the light of our experience during 28 months of war the grave dangers which it involved are only too apparent. Turkey and Central Africa would have fallen like ripe fruit into the lap of Germany.

All these efforts towards peaceful demarkation seem at first sight admirable, and may perhaps have been worth trying as a last means of averting disaster. But they were vitiated by a fundamental misconception of Germany's intentions, and by a failure to comprehend her arrogant outlook towards her neighbours. Not merely the German Government or the Prussian ruling caste, but the average thinking German—as all who came into close contact with our enemies are well aware—was profoundly convinced of the decadence and growing exhaustion of France, and of course still more of the other "inferior" Latin nations. The "boundless corruption" of Russia and her inability to withstand German efficiency either in the military or the economic sphere had become a dogma with most Germans, and provided a common platform for Socialist, Liberal and Junker, for Jewish journalist and Uhlan officer, for commercial traveller and Centrum deputy. The fact that this overweening contempt was combined with an instinctive fear of what Russia might, and would, become when once she had thrown off the shackles which bound her giant limbs, and set herself in real earnest to putting her house in order, only served to increase the temptation to forestall the day of her reformation and to strike when her strategic railways were still unbuilt and her resources still undeveloped. And parallel with all this depreciation of France, Italy and Russia, though no doubt less widely spread, was the German conviction that Britain too had passed her zenith and was destined ere long to yield up her primacy and her undue share of the good things of this earth to more vigorous and more highly organised nations.

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In Germany there may have been more friends of Britain and of British ideals than it is to-day the fashion to admit. But there was also a growing number of those with whom power rested, who not merely looked across the Channel with eyes of jealousy and greed, but dreaded closer relations with Britain, as a nation whose habits, training and outlook upon life were antagonistic to their own, and likely, if studied too closely, to produce a dissolvent effect upon those old-world institutions upon which their own existence rests.

Our foreign policy, then, since King Edward's death, has rested upon a complete disregard of foreign psychology, a fundamental misconception of Germany's intentions, and a pathetic desire to placate the tiger with bread and milk. In view of the fact that our Government decided to intervene in the war before it was too late, it is not necessary at this juncture to pass in critical review all the acts of omission and commission that marked its conduct during the famous Twelve Days. Besides, too many important points remain obscure to permit a final judgment upon the method as distinguished from the result. What is clear, however, is that the decision to make war was not accompanied by a complete conversion to a warlike frame of mind on the part of the Government as a whole, and particularly on the part of the Foreign Secretary. For a long time his attitude was not merely that of a man who regretted the decision, as all such decisions must be regretted in the abstract, but who mourned inwardly over the collapse of a series of illusions which he had entertained for years, which the war had already shown to be illusions, but which he seemed to hope might nevertheless be resumed or revived after a short struggle should have convinced the belligerents of the folly of their course. It was not until shortly before his resignation that the Foreign Secretary seemed really to have felt that the war must be waged wholeheartedly, because its outcome involves not only the existence of the British Empire, but the very ideals to which his political life has been devoted.

The one outstanding feature of Allied and British diplomacy which our Foreign Office is entitled to recall with unqualified satisfaction is the conclusion of the Pact of London. The credit for that act of clear-sighted statesmanship has still to be allotted. The overwhelming burden of available evidence seems to indicate M. Delcassé as the real

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author or inspirer of the agreement that none of the Allies should make a separate peace. But to the credit of all of them it must be said that the suggestion was no sooner made than it was generally accepted. German attempts to circumvent the Pact of London, cunning as they have been, have hitherto utterly failed to achieve their object. Russia appears to have been the subject of the most elaborate of these efforts. The "creation" of the Polish Monarchy, which involved an unpardonable affront to the Tsar, indicates, perhaps, the moment of the failure. Other efforts of the same kind will doubtless be directed towards Italy, France, and even Britain. But every effort is an additional tribute to the solid wisdom of the step taken on 5 September, 1914.

Yet another solid achievement of our foreign policy, though it as yet relates to the future rather than the present, is the agreement by which the Western Allies recognise Russia's right to Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and with it that access to the open sea which geography has hitherto denied her. Our satisfaction at an arrangement which was alike inevitable and fundamental, is tempered by regret at the secrecy of the methods adopted, and the persistence with which that secrecy was maintained. It is quite true that King and Cabinet together represent the nation in war and may claim a latitude, unknown in times of peace, to institute and carry through secret negotiations with friendly and even hostile Powers, but that any individual Minister should acquire virtual omnipotence over the future destinies of the nation, by arrogating to himself an implicit power of attorney, creates a highly dangerous precedent. Once more we must emphasise the fact that Parliament has been gravely at fault in not exercising its right of control: but at least equal responsibility must fall upon the Minister who consistently refrained from any attempt to create machinery of any kind such as might facilitate such control without unduly hampering his own powers of discretion. The institution of a Special Committee of Foreign Affairs in the French Chamber points in the direction which must ere long be followed in Britain also. That exactly the same methods cannot be adopted in the two countries is obvious; but the principle of control, in some form or another, must be asserted, unless democracy is to be declared bankrupt in one of the most vital spheres of political action.

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The gulf between Parliament—and [therefore] the country at large—and the direction and control of foreign policy is one of the most disquieting factors in the present situation, and the sooner an attempt is made to bridge it the better.

How far is it possible to proclaim a national policy, couched in specific terms and no longer in vague, if eloquent, generalities? Such phrases as the vindication of public law and the rights of small nations, or the crushing of German militarism are far more abstract than they may seem at first sight. Obviously, our first and most essential aim must be to achieve such a victory as will not merely realise our immediate military objective, but also guarantee a lasting peace, based upon the firm foundations of popular will and the legitimate aspirations of all the nations. Our influence must be used constantly with our Allies in this sense; and no facts or expedients must be sanctioned by our rulers which are manifestly incompatible with such a result—even should these expedients seem to promise some momentary advantage. Moreover, we must endeavour to make the Alliance less and less a residuum of contradictory aspirations. If victory is to be achieved, all the allied nations must accept as inevitable, and cheerfully submit to, a complete “pooling” of all their military, diplomatic and economic resources. Much has been done to co-ordinate military enterprise, but the theory of the “Single Front” is still in its infancy; and in this respect we have still to learn not alone from the Germans, but even from the Turks. But this theory must be extended to every branch of life, and the requirements, capacity, and powers of resistance of each Ally must be carefully weighed. Notably, in regard to measures for safeguarding and regulating the food supplies of the populations, uniformity of policy and purpose is urgently required, whether it be in drastic measures against submarine warfare, in further control of freights and shipping, in shipbuilding reform, in the application of State control to all means of communication, or in the adoption of the “ton for ton” policy, or its equivalent, as a cardinal point in the Allied programme.

A diplomacy which has no directive and persists in waiting upon events has sheltered itself behind the proverb which says that it is unwise to divide the bear's skin until the bear has been killed. No one in his senses will venture to challenge this doctrine; but it is none the less true that the lack of

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definite plan is fatal to any enterprise, and it is essential that we should think out beforehand all possible contingencies and realise clearly whither events are leading us. Of course, all such speculation depends upon victory; since in the event of defeat the solution of every problem would pass from our control. The will to victory involves a clear knowledge of the lines upon which we desire to see Europe reconstructed and revived. The supreme test of this will to victory lies in a recognition of the fact that there can be no "New Europe" unless Austria-Hungary be broken up. The disruption of the Dual Monarchy is not to be regarded as the distribution of territory by conquest, but as a necessary step towards the institution of a new era in Central Europe, and towards that vindication of the Principle of Nationality which has been so solemnly proclaimed as a cardinal point in the Allied programme.

The British Cabinet crisis is merely part of an European crisis. In France the press is demanding with growing insistence far-reaching military changes. The practice of holding secret sessions of the Chamber is becoming more firmly established; and there is general dissatisfaction with the aimlessness and lack of co-ordination which characterise Allied policy. In Russia the late Premier has been driven from office, not merely by his mismanagement of the Roumanian situation, but by the extraordinary confusion which he and his colleagues had introduced into the vital problems of communications and food supplies at home. The astonishing scenes in the Duma, when the Ministers of War and Marine ostentatiously shook hands with an Opposition leader who had violently criticised not merely the Government but the Empress, would only have been possible in a situation where dissatisfaction with governmental methods had reached a dangerous pitch. It was to appease this universal discontent that the new Premier, M. Trepov—of course with the full approval of the Allied Governments—announced the agreement as to the fate of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. In Italy the sense of crisis is less acute, but none the less real, and the recent speech of the Premier Signor Boselli, regarding Italy's Adriatic aims and their recognition on the part of the Allies, is unquestionably due to a similar need for appeasing the nation's growing

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alarm and dissatisfaction at military failures and diplomatic fiascoes. Meanwhile, even in Germany, there are growing signs that the same process is in operation. Even the nation whose military successes have been so sensational—and so well advertised—is profoundly dissatisfied with the course of events. Those who escape from the vast prison house of the Central Powers always have the same tale to tell: even the misery and bereavement are felt less than the isolation, the absence of manpower and the continual strain. Everywhere in Europe new ideas and questionings are stirring. The discontent which in former epochs was directed against this or that institution is now disposed to challenge the ideas which have hitherto formed the very foundations of the social structure. When we describe the prevalent feeling in all countries as volcanic, it is because we have not as yet found a word to fit a situation for which there is no precedent in history.

Amid all this welter of ideas and conflicting tendencies nothing has been more remarkable than the piecemeal attitude of our statesmen. A policy has been proclaimed in resounding phrases, but no attempt has been made to define their meaning in the work-a-day world of practice. That here and there private engagements have been undertaken which can hardly be reconciled with the general principles laid down was perhaps inevitable; but there can be no excuse for a fundamental failure to realise the logical consequences of the commitments entered into by our statesmen. Here again, the case of Austria-Hungary provides the classical instance of our failure to think out a policy. THE NEW EUROPE, like other advocates of the disruption of Austria-Hungary, has been attacked on the grounds that such a proposal is not merely radical and drastic, but incompatible with the programme of the Entente, and dangerous in its effects upon Europe. And yet what we advocate, so far from being new, is implied in a whole series of public pledges and private engagements, for which all the Allied Governments are responsible, and most of which are known to, and sanctioned by, the overwhelming body of public opinion in their respective countries.

The convention which preceded the entry of Italy into the war recognised that country's right to annex the whole, or portions, of three or four of Austria's southern provinces; and if her national aspirations should be realised, Austria

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will *ipso facto* be deprived of her chief commercial port and her principal naval arsenal. While Serbia—largely as the result of bad diplomacy on the part of the Entente—was being overrun by the armies of the Central Powers, Mr. Asquith, speaking in the name of the British Government, and with the approval of our Allies, declared that we should “never sheathe the sword” until Serbia had recovered “in full measure all, and more than all, which she has sacrificed.” If this phrase has any meaning whatsoever, Serbia, in the event of our victory, must not merely retain all the territory secured to her by the Treaty of Bucarest, but also acquire at least a portion of the Serbo-Croat territories of Austria-Hungary. Thus, though careful to avoid committing us to the doctrine of Southern Slav Unity, the late Premier certainly committed us to a further inroad upon the integrity of Austria-Hungary. Again, the entry of Roumania into the war was preceded by a formal recognition on the part of the Entente Powers of her right to annex the Roumanian districts of Hungary, to say nothing of the southern portion of the Austrian province of Bukovina. The realisation of this design could be amply justified on the basis of nationality, but are we to suppose that some of the statesmen who sanctioned it failed to comprehend that it would involve nothing less than the end of the Kingdom of Hungary as at present constituted? Finally, the Russians have made it abundantly clear that they regard Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and the Ruthene districts of Hungary as “unredeemed” Russian soil, and Western Galicia as part of that future Poland which they hope to reunite under the sceptre of the Tsar. Thus we find that the British Government stands committed, in effect, to nothing less than that very disruption of Austria-Hungary which some of its staunchest supporters still refuse to contemplate. Yet it has shown such a rooted aversion to plain-speaking, or such a lack of confidence in its programme and its powers of persuasion, that no steps have been taken to bring this fact home to the general public. Mr. Lloyd George’s speech about the “ramshackle Empire” at an early stage in the war stands alone as the solitary pronouncement of any British Minister on the subject of Austria-Hungary.

This fatal reluctance to think out any policy or project to the end has not merely exercised a numbing effect upon public opinion at home and upon the Government’s own

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powers of decision, but, it must be added, has aroused very serious misgivings in the minds of our Allies themselves. The fear that British half measures and the fog which has hitherto surrounded British policy, are due to some dark purpose of preserving Austria-Hungary intact, is too real to be ignored with safety, and can only be finally dispelled by a clear and statesman-like pronouncement.

If the Old Europe is to be reorganised and regenerated, if the New Europe is not to remain a mere dream, the Allies must defeat Imperialism in its Prusso-Austrian and Pangerman form, and in so doing stave off finally the German *Drang nach Osten*. The centre of gravity in the war lies in that central zone of small nations which divides the East of Europe from the West or, to speak in terms of the Alliance, Russia from her western Allies. In this zone, too, lie the stakes, and it is for its control and exploitation that Germany is really fighting. The only alternative to such control and exploitation is the dismemberment of Turkey and Austria-Hungary. The aggressive designs of Prusso-Germany (*Preussen-Deutschland*, as Treitschke and his school of historians consistently re-christened the New Germany) aim at the organisation of Central Europe for her own selfish ends, and treat all those peoples which lie on her path as a mere bridge to Asia and Africa, not as units entitled to their own freedom and development. To such a design the Allies must reply with the rival project of *Free* Central Europe, neither German nor Pangerman, but organised on national lines and free to work out its own salvation.

The immensity of the war is the measure of the problem with which Europe is faced. Not merely the small nations, but even the greatest, are confronted, thanks to Pangerman Imperialism, with a struggle for existence, with a fateful alternative which brooks no half-measures. At the beginning of the war there were few who had realised this; now, after two years of struggle, it is beginning to be felt and understood on all sides. The iron hand of necessity and logic is forcing not merely the diplomatists, but the nations as a whole, to face a solution of the greatest of all world-problems. In this world-struggle Britain has been assigned a foremost part and a special responsibility. The war of to-day and the peace of the future may be stated as a British problem; and it is for us to decide whether the Great Alliance is to continue, and whether we

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will give our permanent support to the policy whose germ may be traced to the understanding between France and Russia. To-day half-measures in our foreign policy can only lead to incalculable disaster. If the war has forced us to choose between Germany and Russia, between the Teutonic and the Slavonic world, the latest developments of the struggle bring home to us the inexorable need for pushing the choice to its logical conclusion. The old hesitations of the past, the futile suspicions of Russia which still linger in certain quarters, but which—let us freely and unreservedly admit it—the late Foreign Secretary did so much to combat, must be banished once and for all. Neither military nor economic prejudices must be allowed to prevail. There must be an end to the Policy of Buridan's Ass. Our alliance with Russia was at first unconscious and experimental—a mere step at random, though prompted by a true instinct. The future of the British Empire, of Europe as a whole, depends upon Britain's conscious determination to choose, and to choose finally, between Germany and Russia.

The principle of nationality will play a decisive part in any reconstruction of Europe, but even more decisive will be the part of Democracy as a political force. As a result of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, only one new State—Bohemia—would emerge, and this would only be a reversion to a great historic past. Poland also would recover her lost individuality, this time in unison with Russia. Some States, like Serbia and Roumania, would be enlarged, others, like Prussia and Hungary, would be curtailed. The dynastic interests of the House of Habsburg would certainly suffer severely; but only a few reactionaries would venture to sacrifice to a single family the future of many millions of its present subjects. Vienna and Budapest have too long been judged in this country from the standpoint of the superficial tourist, who is impressed by fine architecture and charming manners. To the political student they are known as inveterate haunts of oligarchy and absolutism, none the less flaunting because there are moments of concealment. Indeed, nothing can be more repulsive than the megalomania of a small nation like the Magyar, which, once infected by the imperialist doctrine of Prussia, has of its own free will degraded itself to the position of Berlin's henchman.

Our political programme is not directed against the

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German nation, but rather against Prussian aggression and political materialism. We do not demand the destruction of Germany, if only for the excellent reason that a nation of seventy millions cannot be destroyed. The Germans have staked their all upon Brute Force, and must be forced, by their own weapons turned against their own breast, to revert to those humaner doctrines which inspired their greatest men. When they have abandoned the brutal and decadent philosophy of the Superman, the Blonde Beast, and the *Herrenvolk*, they may, perhaps, find their place once more as equals among equals. The Bismarckian policy of Blood and Iron, with its Machiavelian foundations, had sapped the moral fibres of a great nation and made of them a danger to Europe and to mankind. Germany, if set free from Prussian materialism and lust of conquest, may become once more a useful member of the community of nations, and may contribute once more to the constructive political and social work which lies before us all.

The Allies must not win the war merely to lose the peace. The greatness of this war does not consist in the vast armies thrown into the field, nor in the appalling loss of human life, but rather in the far-reaching evolution which is already altering all political and social values, and will assuredly bring with it changes such as no man living can foresee. In the light of these changes, mere rectifications of political frontiers almost sink into insignificance. An immense task awaits the diplomatists and statesmen of the future Congress of Peace: it will be theirs to mark out the lines of development which humanity should follow in a new era, or to warp that development fatally for all time. The Great War is in itself a hideous revelation of the futility and artificiality of the purely diplomatic peaces and compromises of the last century. This time there must be no mere ephemeral revisions of the map, no insincere makeshifts merely calculated to last till an early and more favourable resumption of hostilities, but an organic reform of international relations. At the future Congress history and philosophy must be the handmaids of diplomacy.

ÉMILE VERHAEREN

Emile Verhaeren (1855–1916)

THE personality of Emile Verhaeren has dominated the Belgian literary movement for at least thirty years past. During the first ten years of his activity, more exactly from 1883 to 1892, he belonged to a group of writers who, first in the *Jeune Belgique*, then in *L'Arc Moderne*, and other literary papers, attempted to create a national literature in Belgium, and to free Brussels from the dominating influence of Paris. He was still one among many, beside Eckhoud, Demolder, Van Leberghe, etc. . . . Ardently admired by his friends, he found, mostly among the defenders of the regular verse, some fierce opponents.

But as soon as the poet is able to give—in “Les Mois,” “Les Visages de la Vie” “Les Campagnes hallucinées,” “Les Villages illusoires,” and in his first book of love poems, “Les Heures Claires”—the full measure of his genius, he becomes, without further discussion, the head of the Belgian school, the man who will influence more than any other the work of the younger generation. There is nobody to oppose him, with the exception of Maeterlinck, who, precisely at this time, feels more and more attracted by France and by the world at large. The reputation of Maeterlinck is perhaps more universal, but the character of his later work did not keep him in such close contact with his people and his country. Verhaeren, on the contrary, may wander where he pleases, and I do not know in French literature any other poet possessing such a wide range of expression and of subjects: but he will always start from Flanders and come back to Flanders. There is very little to say about his life, but there is a great deal to say about his birth. If you remember that he was born at St. Amand, in the province of Antwerp, and that he could see from his window the ships gliding along on the Scheldt, and in the distance the now shattered towers of Termonde, you will possess the main characteristic of his extraordinary and complex genius. From this house of St. Amand his mind may travel miles away, through smoky towns, through busy harbours, through the most modern aspects of philosophy or sociology, it will always come back to the land and to the first impressions of his youth. One of his books is called “Toute la Flandre”:

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and if some day a complete edition of his thirty to forty volumes is published, the same title might be given to it. Even when he comes to London, even when he walks through the beautiful nightmare of "Les Villes Tentaculaires," Verhaeren remains, at bottom, the little boy of St. Amand, who looked at the boats passing on the river, his nose pressed against the window panes. To him, more than to any other, one could apply this rough description of the Belgian writer, "A Fleming writing in French."

This is the great secret of the enthusiasm which greeted every one of his books as they appeared, nearly regularly, once or even twice a year. They only contained twenty to thirty poems and were edited with great care by the editor Deman, a personal friend of the poet. And there was not one Belgian of the younger generation interested in literature who did not wait for them impatiently, who did not open them with trembling hands, who did not read them aloud carried away by the strength of the language and by the free rhythm of the verse.

I shall always remember the day when I opened "Les Mois" which was called then, if I remember rightly, "Le Calendrier," and illustrated by remarkable drawings by the Belgian painter, Van Rysselberghe. There is a poem there called "Le Vent" which would have made the dullest town clerk want to be a poet some day. It is the spring wind jumping about the fields, animating with its sweet breath even the black hedge and the morose holly. This poem is to classic prosody what Greek dancing might be to the conventional ballet steps. You saw the wind jump, you heard it whistle and blow. Even if the words had had no meaning whatever, you would have understood the drift of the poem, merely through their rhythm and their sonority. What I felt then, I suppose that every poet in Belgium must have felt at one moment or another. There is not one of us who could write as he writes if he had not been submitted to Verhaeren's powerful influence. We all owe him a great deal. Some, if I may be allowed to say so, owe him even too much, but many more owe him too little.

If there is some danger of altering one's own characteristics by the absorbing contact of a powerful genius like Verhaeren's, there is much more danger in ignoring his work altogether and the invaluable technical discoveries which he has

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made. The only comfort which some of us may feel to-day is to express their deep gratefulness to the great man whom they are proud to call their master.

ÉMILE CAMMAERTS.

Pangermanism and the Zone of Small Nations

THE present conflict in which the Pangermans are out to crush the Slavs is simply the final expression of the traditional designs of the Germans in the East. If the geographical significance of the catchword *Drang nach Osten* be extended so as to include the South-east and South as well as the East proper, it becomes a true summary of German ambition. From the very beginning of her history the main trend of Germany's expansion has been towards the South-east. The lines of that expansion first crystallised with the foundation of the Empire by Charles the Great, and an early manifestation of it was the establishment of Austria, or "Ost-Reich," which was followed later on by the foundation, in the North-east of Germany, of the Marches out of which grew Prussia.

In the West, Germany has long been in conflict with the French, and the controversy is still unsettled. The point at issue is, however, of a far different order from that in the East. In the former case Germany disputes the possession of a small strip of territory west of the Rhine; in the latter, as Treitschke points out, she regards the entire territory of every nation as a field for colonisation. In the West, moreover, Germany has been faced by the highly-civilised French nation, which obviously could not be colonised, whereas, in the East, in addition to the Slavs, there were the Huns, Avars and Magyars: in this case Germany secured the support of the Church by instituting a process of Christianisation side by side with that of Germanisation.

From the 8th to the 14th century the Germans persistently pressed Eastward. The German Hanseatic League and the knightly orders spread German dominion as far East as Petrograd to-day. From the 14th century onwards, however, that pressure was stemmed, not only by the attacks

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of the Turks, but also by the increasing power of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. Since that time the German *Drang nach Osten* has been attempted in two directions and by two different kinds of tactics. While the Habsburgs built up their Empire under the direct pressure of the Turks, by forming a confederation of the Eastern States (Austria, Bohemia, Hungary), the Hohenzollerns evolved in the North a project of colonisation and conquest at the expense of Poland. The present war is merely a phase of that long historical process, representing, as it does, the synthesis of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern tactics.

The significance of the German *Drang nach Osten* is explained to a great extent by the ethnographic formation of the zone which divides the West of Europe from the East.

Ethnographically and politically there are three divisions in Europe: the Western, the Eastern (Russia), and the Central. Our interest is here drawn chiefly to the central part, which consists of a peculiar zone of small nations, extending from the North Cape to Cape Matapan. Side by side we here find the Laplanders, Swedes, Norwegians and Danes, Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Lusatians, Czechs and Slovaks, Magyars, Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, Roumanians, Bulgars, Albanians, Turks and Greeks. The largest of these nations are the Poles; next to them come the Czechs and Slovaks, Serbo-Croats, Roumanians, and Magyars; the others are smaller. If the Little-Russians (Ruthenes, Ukrainians) were considered a separate nation, as distinct from the Great-Russians, they would be the largest nation of this zone.

To the West of this zone we find the bigger nations (German, English, French, Italian, Spanish), and only two smaller ones (Dutch and Portuguese); besides these there are the so-called "fragments" of nations (Basques, Bretons, Welsh, Irish, Gaels). In the East there are the Russians, a big, indeed the biggest, nation of Europe. It is a peculiar circumstance that the outskirts of this nation are non-Russian: on its West side there are some small nations of the Central Zone, while in the North, in the Caucasus and on its Asiatic frontiers, there are also several small nations and fragments of nations.

If we compare the political frontiers of Europe with the ethnographical, that is, if we distinguish the states from the

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nations, we find that in the majority of cases the state is made up of a mixture of nationalities, and that as yet no nation has formed a state of its own. We have in Europe twenty-eight states (or fifty-three if we count the component states of Germany and reckon Hungary as a separate state) and about sixty-two nations; the states are, for the most part, polyglot.*

Up till now states have been formed regardless of national frontiers. It was not until modern times, not until the end of the 18th century, that the national idea became a powerful political motive. At that time, however, it acquired a constructive influence. In the name of nationality the nations demanded their consolidation. The Germans, Italians, Slavs, Roumanians, Greeks and the rest, all demanded national unity and independence; and, indeed, in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries the frontiers of the states were modified in accordance with the national principle. Several subject nations have attained to various degrees of national independence, new states have come into existence, old frontiers have changed, and in some of the polyglot states various degrees and kinds of national autonomy have been introduced.

Although the national principle is not as yet recognised as paramount, and its influence is not yet decisive, it nevertheless has taken its place among the great political factors. According to Herder the nations of the New Age become the natural organs of the human race, while states are relegated to a subordinate position, as mere artificial organisations. The applicability of the terms "natural" and "artificial" in this new order of things may be questioned, but it cannot be doubted that since the 18th century nationality has been ranged side by side with the Church and the State as one of the decisive political forces.

There is no need for a more minute classification of states from the nationalist point of view. It will be enough to indicate the remarkable difference between the East and West of Europe in the relationship between state and nationality. In the West we have a greater number of states, the majority of which, as regards the extent of

* This number is only approximately correct—it is significant of the neglect with which this branch of sociology has hitherto been treated that there are as yet no exact statistics nor differential maps of nations and states.

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their territory, and the number of their population, belong to the category of the bigger states. We find in them a certain proportion of national minorities, most of which have no political claims. If, however, we turn towards the East, we find that the states become more and more mixed in the national sense; Germany (Prussia), and more especially Austria (and to go still further East, Turkey), show a great difference in this respect from France, or Italy, or Spain; while Russia, the easternmost state in Europe, is a type apart. It must not be forgotten, however, that whereas Russia constitutes the whole of the East, the rest of Europe, though smaller than Russia in extent, is divided into twenty-seven political organisations.*

In Germany, and especially in Prussia, we find the ethnographic differentiation as between East and West already apparent. There are non-German minorities consisting of French, Danish, Polish, Lusatian, Lithuanian (and Lettish) and Bohemian. The Polish minority is fairly numerous, especially as compared with the population of Prussia, and with the exception of the *Reichsland* Alsace-Lorraine, all the above-mentioned minorities are in Prussia, although part of the Lusatians are also to be found in Saxony. To the north-east, and, farther south, to the west of the Elbe, the development of Germany was only achieved by the Germanisation of the Slavs. The Germanised character of Prussia as the easternmost state of Germany is still discernible to-day.

Ethnologically, Austria-Hungary is unique. It comprises ten nationalities—Germans, Czechs with Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenes, Roumanians, Magyars, Italians, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes, as well as fragments of Rhaeto-Romans. None of these constitute by themselves a decisive majority. Austria is therefore an entirely artificial state, and, indeed, it was once thus described by the German leader Plener. Turkey, too, has always been, and still is, an entirely unnational state.

The foregoing facts explain the significance of the Central Zone of nations for the German *Drang nach Osten*. The

* The division of East from West is naturally indefinite; both those terms have a cultural as well as a geographical and ethnological connotation. The term "Central Europe," which is often used, is also vague; it must be borne in mind that we here distinguish between Central Europe and the Central Zone.

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smaller nations and states have not been able so far to offer an effective resistance to the greater states either economically or by force of arms. While in the West the Germans have always been faced by one nation only, a nation, moreover, which up to the 19th century was numerically stronger than Germany, in the East they have had several neighbours. They therefore took advantage of the weakness of the nations and states of the Central Zone. Early in history Charles the Great had already founded the Eastern and Pannonian March, while later on the marches of the Prussia of to-day were organised. The Holy Roman Empire was supplanted by the modern scheme of "Central Europe"; the German Empire pressed against the smaller nations in the East; Prussia in the north and Austria in the south assumed the rôle of the German conquerors and Germanisers. The tactics of Horatius Cocles and the principle of "*divide et impera*" rendered great services to the Germans.

It is not difficult to understand why the Germans have found allies among the small nations—the fear of a strong nation and the hope of a reward for services rendered brought the Magyars, the Bulgars, and the Turks to their side. The territories defended or occupied by the Central Powers, extending from Riga *viâ* Warsaw, Budapest and Belgrade to Salonika-Kavala-Constantinople, represent, in fact, the greater part of the Central Zone of the smaller nations.

It is none the less true that the nations of the Central Zone have resisted and still resist German, Austrian, Magyar and Turkish expansion, and they are fighting for their liberty. All these nations (with the exception of the Lapps) have their political aspirations, which are of two kinds. Some of the smaller among them would be content with national autonomy within a bigger state; this applies especially to the small nations of Russia. The Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, have not as yet demanded their independence, although the latter have adopted during the war a more radical policy, which has been partly fostered by the Germans. Even the Finns do not desire to be separated from Russia, for they know that they would only succumb again to the influence of Sweden, from which they are at present protected. Russia, indeed, has only one serious nationalist question—namely, Poland. On the other hand, the subject-nations of Austria-Hungary and Prussia do demand their independence.

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In the Central Zone of nations we find that the Magyars, Finns, Roumanians, Bulgars, part of the Serbians (those of the kingdom of Serbia and of Montenegro), the Greeks, Albanians, Turks, are already free, and in their case the only question that remains is how to render their liberty inviolable and how to consolidate the whole of each separate nation. There are three nations, however, which have not yet attained their freedom: the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, and the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary. All these three nations have for a long time been making efforts to attain freedom and unity. They are, indeed, the biggest nations of the Central Zone; all three were free and independent in the past, all three possess a remarkable history, all three have done much towards the development of the civilisation of Europe. The general level of education of the Southern Slavs and Poles is progressing rapidly in spite of unfavourable conditions, while the Czechs yield in no respect to the Germans as regards general education; and, lastly, all three nations would be economically self-sufficient. Why then should they not be free? Why should even the Albanians, who are devoid as yet of any European culture, be free before them?

The peculiar internal interdependence of these three Slav nations results from their geographical position and political constellation. All three are fighting against their common enemy, and therefore their respective fates are naturally connected. We have already seen, in the past, that the crippling of Bohemia by Austria was closely followed by the downfall of Poland; while the fall of the Southern Slavs under the attacks of Turkey was a fundamental cause for the formation of an alliance between Bohemia, Austria, and Hungary. In modern times all these three nations have often advanced hand in hand. I need only mention the Slavonic Congress at Prague in 1848, in which the Poles (even the Poles of Posnania) and the Southern Slavs unanimously took part; while in the Austrian Parliament the Czechs moved in accord with the Southern Slavs, and, indeed, with the Poles also, in spite of the attempt of Vienna to separate these three nationalities by granting them various concessions.

A more exhaustive treatise would involve an historical analysis not only of these three Slav nations, but of all the other nations of the Central Zone; each of those nations

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presents a peculiar and interesting problem. For the present the important thing is to grasp clearly the significance of the Central Zone in its bearing upon the war. Ever since the time of the Bohemian Reformation, which began in the 14th century, during the reign of Charles IV., Bohemia has been of great importance to Europe, both politically and culturally. At the same time Poland became a nation of European importance, as did also Serbia and the Southern-Slavs.

In the 16th century, as the result of a union with Bohemia and Hungary, Austria became a new power in Europe and she adopted a policy of opposition to Turkey; very soon after that Prussia began to expand, to the detriment of Poland and Bohemia (Prussian Silesia, it should be remembered, belonged to Bohemia). Russia, pressing towards the West, also began, with the advent of the 16th century, to play a more important part in the history of Europe, and so the relations between Russia and Turkey, Austria and Prussia, quite naturally assumed greater importance.

The centre of gravity of European history was, step by step, shifted eastward. This historical process can be summed up in the watchword of the Oriental question in the 19th century. That question came to be focussed on the relationship of Prussian Germany and Austria-Hungary with Russia. Russia stood up against Turkey and aspired to Constantinople, and that changed the relations of Austria-Hungary and Prussia with Turkey. The two Powers became her protectors against Russia. The Slav problem simply means that Russia and the Slavs stood in the way of Germany and her allies of the Central Zone in their projected expansion to the Persian Gulf.

Considering that the war broke out in the Central Zone on account of Serbia, no thinking person can be left in doubt that it is here that lies the centre of gravity of European history and of European politics. This Zone is the centre of political unrest; the wars of recent decades, not to say centuries, have had their fundamental causes in the inorganic conditions of this part of Europe. The German *Drang nach Osten*, the Pangerman plan of "Berlin-Bagdad," forces not only upon the Slavs, but upon the whole of Europe the imperative necessity of solving once for all the question of the Central Zone, the Oriental question.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

The Pangerman Peace Plot—A French Warning

SOME weeks ago we alluded briefly to the remarkable book published early last spring in French, by M. André Chéradame, under the title "The Pan-German Plot Unmasked: Berlin's formidable Peace-trap of the 'Drawn War'." We are now able to welcome an English edition of the book,* admirably translated by Lady Frazer, and recommended to its English public by an interesting preface from the pen of Lord Cromer. It is to be hoped that this book will be read, and its contents pondered, by every Englishman whose foremost thought is the achievement of that "integral victory," without which the new order of things in Europe will be worse than the old. It combines the expert's sureness of touch with that lucidity which is so characteristic of French political thinkers. While specially written for a popular audience, and therefore avoiding all unnecessary details or references to sources, it equally deserves the attention of serious students in this country. The history and literature of Pangermanism have been strangely neglected by British writers. What we believe to have been the earliest serious study of the subject, an anonymous volume published in 1903, under the title "The Pangerman Doctrine"—now known to have been the work of Mr. Austin Harrison—passed almost unnoticed at the time, and had already been forgotten when the war broke out. A series of articles on German aims re-published from the *Spectator* by the late Mr. Thomas Arnold, under the pseudonym of "Vigilans sed Æquus," aroused a certain amount of attention, but was for the most part rejected by public opinion as an unfair presentment of the case. The present writer well remembers his own indignation at an attitude which recent events have forced him to accept as justified. With these two exceptions there is virtually nothing in English which deals with Pangermanism, whether in theory or in practice; and Lord Cromer is amply justified in doubting "whether all that is implied in that term is fully realised in this country." Public opinion is at length awakening from its slumbers, and in its desire to become more closely acquainted with the details of the German war-

* Just published by John Murray, price 2s. 6d. net.

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plan it can find no surer guide than M. Chéradame, whose latest volume forms a useful supplement to Dr. G. W. Prothero's study on "German Policy before the War."

For nearly twenty years past M. Chéradame has devoted himself to the study of German policy in Europe and the Near East. His books upon "Europe and the Austrian Question on the Threshold of the Twentieth Century" (1901) and "The Bagdad Railway" (1903) have from the first enjoyed a European reputation and have formed the subject of much controversy. He was accused of rashly jumping at conclusions without stopping to link up the evidence, but the events of this war have shown that he was right in ascribing a capital importance to the problems of Austria-Hungary and the Near East. The main theme of this new volume is that Austria-Hungary is the "crucial point" of all the problems which the Allies have to solve. He points out that the Dual Monarchy entered the war at the bidding of its dynasty, which betrayed its own peoples to Berlin; that the great majority of the population is definitely hostile to Germany and in sympathy with the Entente; that the Austrian Parliament (as distinct from the Hungarian) cannot be summoned for that very reason; that Germany cannot permanently maintain "a war against Europe," except with the help of the human material provided by her chief ally; that even if at the peace Germany were to evacuate all the territory which she now occupies in the East and in the West, and to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, she would, if she retained her hold upon Austria-Hungary, possess all the means for regaining her lost ground after a brief delay, and that the Berlin-Bagdad scheme would then be an accomplished fact; but that if "at least the majority of the Austro-Hungarian territories" could be freed from German control, this would absolutely prevent for the future any aggressive revival of Prussian militarism; and that, in view of their geographical situation, nothing short of this freedom "could enable the Allies to keep their promises to Serbia, and by definitely breaking the backbone of the Pangerman plan, prevent the immense danger of 'the Hamburg to the Persian Gulf' scheme, the accomplishment of which all the Allies without any exception have a really vital interest to prevent." In passing, M. Chéradame breaks a lance against the extraordinary ignorance which still prevails with respect to the Dual Monarchy and the

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remarkable success of German and Magyar press agents in palming off inaccurate information and news upon public opinion in the Entente countries right up to the outbreak of the present war—and, he might well have added, a great deal later. M. Chéradame is no mere fanatical devotee of the national principle. He fully recognises that the strategic, historical and economic needs of the majority must also be taken into account, and that there are regions, notably in Macedonia and in Hungary, where the application of the principle of nationality can only be relative, owing to the extraordinary intermixture of races. Thus, just as France cannot think of incorporating the French-speaking populations of Belgium and Switzerland, so Bohemia, if liberated, would be entitled to retain her present boundaries even though they include a considerable German minority. The liberation of the Slav and Latin races of Austria-Hungary from their present yoke would, M. Chéradame is clear-sighted enough to realise, necessarily involve the union with Germany of most of the *Austrian* Germans, as distinct from those of Hungary and Bohemia. But while Germany would thus acquire an addition of seven or eight million inhabitants, and would at the same time virtually complete her national unity, she would lose the non-German districts of Posen, Alsace-Lorraine, and, perhaps, Schleswig, amounting to six or seven million. Thus Germany would gain as much as she lost, would be restricted to her own natural frontiers, and would no longer be able to exploit her neighbours.

Scarcely less valuable is M. Chéradame's summary of the Balkan situation. He has no difficulty in demonstrating what British statesmen and a large section of British opinion have steadily refused to recognise, that the Treaty of Bucarest was the natural and inevitable answer to Bulgaria's bid for supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, that the ambitions of King Ferdinand are shared by his people and were from the very first only capable of realisation through an alliance with the Central Powers, and that by our sentimentality and complete failure to recognise fundamental facts we threw away a position which was extraordinarily favourable to the Entente, and which, if full advantage had been taken of it, would long ago have made short work of German designs in the Near and Middle East. Even to-day it is not sufficiently realised in this

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country how absolutely identical our interests are with those of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and how impossible it is to reconcile Bulgarian dreams of hegemony with a Europe reconstructed upon national and democratic foundations. "The Eastern Question which is now raised in Europe is no longer the old orthodox question, but a Prussianised Eastern Question, coloured in all its aspects by the present and future ambitions of the Hohenzollerns. In the same way the question of modern Austria is no longer the old Austrian question, which consisted in the traditional struggle of the Habsburgs with their various nationalities." As M. Chéradame aptly points out, the Allies entered the war without a true perception of the inner meaning of the struggle. The Russians were at first chiefly concerned in saving Serbia from annihilation; the Italians hoped to limit their war to a conflict with the House of Habsburg; the French were absorbed in the problem of the lost provinces; while the British, indignant at the treatment of Belgium and convinced that they could not in their own interests allow France to be crushed, "had not the slightest notion that British interests would be so completely threatened as they have been in Central Europe, in Turkey, in Egypt, and in India." To-day there is a real danger that, as the struggle lengthens and its appalling sacrifices are brought home to every household, many people may be disposed to fall into the trap of the so-called "Drawn Game" without understanding "what would be concealed behind this apparent and partial German capitulation." M. Chéradame adduces many arguments to show that Germany, now that she is definitely baulked of the swift triumph which she had promised herself in the summer of 1914, would find it infinitely worth her while to evacuate Belgium, France, Luxemburg and Poland, to restore Alsace-Lorraine, and even to abandon the left bank of the Rhine, if in return she might maintain "her preponderant influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey." Nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan have already been achieved, and it ought therefore to be obvious even to those of the most limited intelligence, that the persistent peace manœuvres of Germany are due not to any change of heart on the part of Emperor or people, but to a clear perception of the fact that they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by a prolongation of

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the struggle, and that peace under present conditions would leave them in possession of all their "land aims," and therefore even of the means of attaining their "sea aims" on a subsequent occasion. What M. Chéradame has to say about economic exploitation of the conquered territory, as a method of easing the strain of Germany's own internal situation, about the meaning of the Briey mining basins as a factor in the war, about the methods of German propaganda in neutral states and many other subjects, is full of interest and deserves the widest possible publicity. But the reader will find that nothing allows him to be deflected from the central argument, that the fate of Austria-Hungary supplies the key to victory or defeat.

The book is issued at a popular price, and its value is greatly enhanced by a series of 31 maps and diagrams, which provide ocular demonstration for its arguments.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Democracy on Trial

(A Swiss Opinion.)

[It is often said, especially by those who object to decision of action and incision of phrase on the part of their leaders, that only neutrals are in a position to judge the issues at stake in the greatest of all wars. To them and to others we recommend the following remarkable article, which appeared in the *Journal de Genève*, the leading newspaper of French Switzerland, on 4 December, over the signature of "Alb. B.," the well-known Editor.]

* * * *

The German Reichstag has passed, in two sittings, a measure which places the whole civil population, male and female, between the ages of 16 and 60 at the disposal of the Government.

Roumania, attacked, like unhappy Serbia, from three sides at once, is still waiting in vain for adequate help from Russia. Her entry into the war might have been the salvation of Europe; as things stand, she is providing the Germans with a triumph of which they well know the value, and Hindenburg in his interview with Herr Paul Goldman congratulates himself on the action of the Bucarest Cabinet, which has given him the chance of a "fresh and joyous" war, by releasing the armies of Mackensen and Falkenhayn from the tedium of trench warfare.

The Poles are to be enrolled by the Germans. M. Boris Vatzov, a Bulgarian deputy, declares to *Outro*, one of the newspapers of his country, that "a population of 10,000,000 in Russian Poland will

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add another 1,000,000 soldiers of high morale and vigour to our armies by next spring, if the war should last so long."

Belgian workmen are being deported by the 100,000 for forced labour unless they can pay a ransom of 1,000 marks each, which in some cases is lowered to 500 marks.

Bulgaria is forcing such Serbs as still remain in Macedonia into the ranks to fight against their own compatriots.

Austria is credited with the intention of annexing without further ceremony Montenegro and such portions of Serbian territory as the Bulgars have not appropriated, in order to compel the few men left alive in those devastated and depopulated lands to march with them against the flag of their own country.

On the side of Berlin everything is marked by rapid decision, implacable, free from all scruple. Nothing is considered but the end in view. Everything is subordinated to that. The State alone counts; the individual is nothing. There are no more moral laws, there are no more treaties, no more valid signatures. There is no more freedom of decision for individuals, and there are no more consciences. As to the States whose fate is linked to that of Germany, they follow and obey; they no longer blink an eyelash without orders. The "Will to Victory" alone remains, and carries all before it. Meanwhile the French Chamber meets every day at 2.30, in secret session, in order to deliberate over interpellations of which the list grows longer and longer, and has now reached the number of 45. They are made by deputies from every group, and deal with every possible subject—and more besides. It is believed that the discussion of its contents will take three weeks at least.

The thing which strikes one is not, in the first instance, that the sittings should be secret. That matters little if the deputies are not too indiscreet, if above all they do not consider themselves absolved from the "*Union sacrée*" by closed doors, and do not indulge unrestrainedly, now that the general public can neither hear nor see them, in personal issues and party feuds.

But it is the contrast in the methods of government of the two opposing coalitions which ends by making the eyes of even the stoutest champions of parliamentarism and democracy almost start out of their heads.

Are we, out of love of parliamentarism and democracy, going to allow these same principles to be finally crushed out of existence in Europe, together with the nations who represent them?

The task of the French Government is complicated and distorted to an alarming degree by the incessant intrusion of six hundred deputies and three hundred senators. It is a miracle that it manages to carry on as well as it does. Imagine the unfortunate Ministers who are obliged to spend three whole weeks in giving the best of their attention to the dozens of speeches delivered from the tribune, in sharpening their replies, in polishing and repolishing their arguments, in drawing up the orders for the day in the Lobbies, while all the time the guns are thundering within an hour by motor from Paris, and while they themselves are assailed by the most agonising military,

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diplomatic, financial and economic problems. They must act, they must decide quickly. They are face to face with a Power which is practically absolute and which is deterred by nothing. And these unfortunate statesmen, who are responsible for the future of France in perhaps the most formidable crisis of her history, are overwhelmed by debates, by interminable debates.

The country is clamouring for unity and rapid decisions. And the Ministry, wide-awake at last, have to defend their portfolios against avalanches of words. It is not only the adherents of authority, the men of the Right, the Nationalists, the Moderates who are taking alarm. Even in the advanced parties the danger is understood. The Socialist, Gustave Hervé, denounces it with growing energy. Two days ago he was writing:—

“ We want a War Government, not a Peace Government. Suspicious Republicans ask me if I am not afraid of encouraging the reactionaries by clamouring aloud for the last fortnight for an energetic Government.

“ The reactionaries ?

“ Don't know 'em ! Since 30 July 1914 I only know the Germans.

“ Energy in war-time is neither reactionary nor Republican nor Socialist: it is a necessity of public safety. It was the Roman Republic, in its greatest days, which invented the temporary Dictatorship whenever the Fatherland was in danger. . . .”

Yesterday M. Hervé wished to pursue his train of thought. His article is entitled “ If I were President of the Republic. . . .” The Censorship has suppressed the principal passages, and we shall not know what M. Hervé would do if he inhabited the Elysée. Other articles in the same tone serve as symptoms. The imperious logic of facts is creating aspirations which are in no way inspired by personal ambition. No one, either in the Army or in the Government is aiming at grasping the reins of power. No name is coming to the front. Generals are all absorbed in their well-nigh anonymous military activities, in the midst of an army entirely devoted to its glorious duty. There is nothing to recall the rise of Bonaparte in the evil days of the Directory. No one is afraid of an 18 Brumaire. No one in France desires them. They ended too badly. We are confronted with a problem of which no solution is as yet visible. A few lovers of rhetoric and revolutionary quacks would like to call the Government a “ Committee of Public Safety.” This would only be a phrase. What is wanted is a reform which is radical, not merely formal, a Government freed from obstacles, free to will, to decide, to stand up against administration and orators alike, as against the enemy, with the support and confidence of the nation. It is quite enough to have to move in agreement with three great Powers, to say nothing of the smaller Allies, without encountering incessant Parliamentary difficulties. A change of personnel is neither indispensable nor even desirable. The Ministers have had some months to get acquainted with their work, and this is a bad moment for new-comers to serve their apprenticeship. Besides, it is essential not to complicate the situation by an internal crisis.

If the secret session were by some miracle to meet these crying needs, France would bestow her blessing on it.

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The New Government in Russia

The resignation of Mr. Stürmer was the natural outcome of the stormy scenes in the Duma, which culminated in the speech of Mr. Miljukov. We should not be far wrong in saying that the vigorous action taken by the Progressive Bloc, and especially by its leader, Mr. Miljukov, was a surprise even to his warmest supporters. At the opening of the session nothing more than the usual conflict of words with the Government was expected, and in the wording of the declaration made by the Progressive Bloc, special concessions had been made to the most conservative elements in the coalition. But it was the speech of Mr. Miljukov that electrified the Duma. Though the text of the speech was not published, its effect can be gauged by the flood of congratulations that came to the speaker from every quarter. The sharpness of Mr. Miljukov's criticisms gave the cue to those who followed him, and drew an unusually strong speech from Mr. Šulgin, who before the war was associated with the Nationalist party, but has now joined the Progressive Bloc.

These speeches, followed by those of the Ministers of War and Marine, brought matters to a head. The Prime Minister was faced with the alternative either of dissolving the Duma or himself resigning. True to his bureaucratic traditions he chose the former and presented a report at Headquarters to this effect. When his proposal was refused he resigned, and Mr. Trepov was sent for.

The public in England is apt to associate the bureaucracy in Russia with Germanophilism to an exaggerated degree. It is true that there are such influences, and that they have been exposed sufficiently in the Russian press. Articles unfriendly to Russia's Allies, such as that of Mr. Bulač in his paper *Rosiski Graždanin*, have received undue prominence, and we can trust public opinion in Russia to deal with such extremists as it thinks fit. But to apply the term "Germanophilism" to the bureaucracy as a whole is as untrue as it is insulting. The Russian bureaucracy is devoted to purely Russian interests, and its cause is that of the Allies. At the same time it resents any interference on the part of the Allies with what it considers the special sphere of Russia. Any association on the part of the Western Democracies with any one particular party would be considered a breach of that correct attitude that Britain has always maintained towards her Ally.

The appointment of Mr. Trepov can hardly be considered a victory for the Liberals. It has not been so regarded in Russia, as the new Prime Minister is closely associated with the party of the Right, and in internal politics could hardly be said to rank even as a moderate Conservative. At the same time it is a victory for Russia, for Mr. Trepov is a man of strong character and exceptional energy. His intention is to come to a working agreement with the Duma, though it would not be of a nature acceptable to the more pronounced Liberals, such as the Cadets. He is not willing to accept the demands of the Progressive Bloc, and he hopes instead to dissolve the united opposition by attracting to his side representatives of the Nationalist and, perhaps, too, of the Octobrist party. The success of such an attempt would mean an increase in Russia's military efficiency, though it would at the

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same time delay many of the reforms now urgently demanded by the Liberal parties. Whether the success of Mr. Trepov's policy, which resembles that of Mr. Stolypin, will be acceptable to the Duma will soon become apparent. It may be, however, that the Liberals will continue to possess their souls in patience, and provided they see sufficient guarantee of a strong Government for war purposes, will constitute themselves into a critical but not obstructive Opposition.

Italy and Peace

The Italian Chamber made short work last week of the "peace motion" brought forward at the end of November by the official, or pro-German, Socialists in favour of an immediate peace. By a singular "coincidence" the date of the motion coincided with that of Mr. Jacob Schiff's peace outburst in New York; and by another coincidence the chief promoter and first signatory of the Italian peace motion was Signor Treves, an Italian Jew, who, like Mr. Schiff, is of German extraction. The Socialist motion proposed that the belligerents should renounce annexations of territory by force; that the two sets of belligerents should declare the necessity for all the European States, large and small, to live together side by side "on the basis of their respective nationalities"; that future conflicts should be submitted to arbitration, by means of a permanent peace league between the States of the world; and that the Italian Government should advise its Allies of the urgent necessity of securing the prompt mediation of the United States of America.

The veteran Italian Premier, Signor Paolo Boselli, dealt courteously, though somewhat ironically, with the terms of the motion, and requested the Chamber to postpone it for six months—the Italian form of polite rejection. He added that there must be no vote in the Italian Chamber such as to allow the Allies to imagine that Italy was not in full agreement with them. The Allies must be told that Italy is bound to them, not only by treaty, but is with them above all in spirit. "Peace," concluded the Premier, "must be a pact born of armed victory—a peace for which Italy has drawn the sword in the name of maritime and territorial claims that are not mere poetry but a reality of our history and of our existence; a peace which, in order to be lasting, must replace the equilibrium of the old treaties by the equilibrium built up upon the rights of nationalities. This must not be the peace of a day, but the initial peace of new centuries."

The whole Chamber, except the pro-German Socialists, rose and applauded Signor Boselli for some minutes. The Socialist motion was then rejected by 293 votes to 47.

This interesting and explicit affirmation by the Italian Premier that the peace and the new equilibrium of Europe must be built up upon the rights of nationalities, completes and interprets authoritatively his recent statement upon Italian aims in the Adriatic. In this statement he said:—

"The final victory for which we hope will assure to us the dominion

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of the Adriatic, which means for Italy a legitimate and necessary defence, and which, without forgetting the just claims of neighbouring Slav nationalities and the necessities of their economic development, will equally assure the imprescriptible rights of our nationality on the opposite shore."

All the friends of Italy in this country, and, we believe, in Allied countries generally, will warmly welcome and heartily subscribe to Signor Boselli's declarations. With respect for the just requirements of neighbouring Slav nationalities and for the rights of the Italian nationalities on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic proclaimed as a programme by the responsible head of the Italian Government, and with the declaration that the future peace of Europe must be built up upon an equilibrium constituted by the rights of nationalities, there should be little difficulty in reconciling the just claims of the Adriatic Slavs with those of Italy, to the great good of both.

Our Last Chance in Greece

Our internal crisis coincided, by a piece of bad luck, with the very moment when strong and decisive measures were needed in Greece. Days have been lost, and every day is of vital importance. We may be thankful for the blockade of Greece, which was begun last Friday morning, but the fact remains that there is even now no evidence that the real decision has been taken by the Entente. Reparation has been demanded, but reparation is a vague word and lends itself to discussion and argument which might waste days, if not weeks. Reparation should be the obliteration of the King's Government north of the Isthmus of Corinth, to be effected within the shortest possible time limit. The Royalists are here and now our enemies, and our problem is how to destroy or incapacitate them before they can link up with the German forces. A Swiss telegram published in Saturday's papers states that Germany is asking Greece to declare war against us. It is to be hoped that the Entente will see through this ruse. King Constantine will plead that it is in our interests to keep him neutral, but exactly opposite is the case. It is in Germany's interest to be joined in a month or six weeks time by an army in being. It is in ours to see to it now that in a month's time that army shall be cooped up in Peloponnesus or otherwise rendered impotent. There is a clear issue before the Entente.

Two points must be kept steadily in view. The first is that the Royalists will endure a good deal of hunger unless the blockade is backed up by a visible threat of direct attack. They must be forced to realise that they will not be allowed to starve unmolested and that long before the Germans reach them they will either be directly attacked in the field or every Greek town within range of the fleet will be razed to the ground. The second point is that civil war in Greece cannot be avoided. The Venizelist cause is not crushed; the forces of Venizelos in being are said to number 30,000, and a levy in Venizelist Greece would bring them up to 100,000. It is for us to see to it that those men are at once armed and equipped. There is in Old Greece a seething mass of hostility against the King's Government. If we act now and back up that feeling there will, in six

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weeks' time, be no further need for our men in Greece. The Venizelists themselves will do the work, which is theirs as well as ours.

Mischievous Rumours

Not the least sinister feature in the situation is the *rôle* played by the Greek Princes, who are allowed to flit from Court to Court in Europe, without any regard to those frontiers which war has drawn between the two rival groups. The rumours of their paralysing influence upon the counsels of the Entente have been too persistent, and too often encountered in serious quarters to be absolutely groundless. No doubt the authentic incident of an intercepted German courier carrying letters from the Queen of Greece to her Imperial brother, and with them the plans of some of the Suez Canal defences, contributed to the spread of such rumours, especially as the very efficient agent who was responsible for this *coup* appears to have received an official rebuke for his excessive zeal.

The fate of a treacherous king and his relations is a matter of complete indifference to us. What we resent so intensely is the fact that official silence and hesitation has led to a very widespread and peculiarly dangerous illusion that the British and Russian reigning families are interfering on purely personal grounds with the vital requirements of Entente policy. The sooner such stories are laid to rest by an emphatic and explicit official refutation the better: for in times like these the suspicions bred by ignorance and calumny may do much to undermine even the most assured reputations.

Mr. Schiff repudiated

Long before the British change of Cabinet the peace intrigue launched in the United States by Mr. Jacob Schiff had fallen exceedingly flat. The League to Enforce Peace had formally repudiated the suggestion that it should busy itself with the present situation rather than with the situation after the war. But the *coup de grâce* has been given to this ill-timed agitation by the speech of Mr. J. W. Davis, the American Solicitor-General, to the Philadelphia Society, in the course of which he declared that peace proposals at this time would be "not only brutal but impertinent," and endorsed the view of the Canadian statesman, Sir George Foster, that no neutral nation "but those who have given their life and treasure will make the peace when the war has been fought to the end." An interesting sequel is provided by the publication of an official notice at Washington (*see* telegram in the *Times* of 12 December), "stating that President Wilson has neither made suggestions for peace nor intends to do so in the near future unless there is an unexpected turn in the belligerent situation." An equally explicit statement is added to the effect that Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador in Berlin, now on his way back to his post, is not the bearer of any peace proposals. Such declarations will be hailed with general satisfaction in Britain, as showing that President Wilson is fully alive to the insidious attempts of the enemy to sow discord between the two English-speaking communities.

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His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

NOTES,

The Admiralty Changes : A Foreign Opinion.

A few hours before the outbreak of the Cabinet crisis one of our most valued and distinguished foreign collaborators wrote as follows :—

"The British Navy is a national institution, and yet the drastic changes at the Admiralty seemed to cause neither surprise nor shock, but general satisfaction in Britain. This satisfaction does not necessarily mean that the nation is certain that the new men will be absolutely the right men in the right places; it is, above all, the fact of the change which is so widely welcomed. People rejoice at the breaking of a chain—the chain of a cunningly fostered political superstition, to the effect that the heads of the Government cannot be changed. During this war the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, has been dismissed with very little ceremony. M. Delcassé has been driven from the Quai d'Orsay. Germany has twice changed the Chief of the General Staff, and only the other day the Prussian Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, was replaced by a high official. In Russia not merely the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sazonov, but a whole series of other ministers have been superseded. Signor Salandra has fallen in Italy. The number of Generals and high officers with whose services our French, Russian, and Roumanian allies, and still more our German and Austro-Hungarian enemies, have dispensed with, is very much greater than the general public appears to realise. To-day there is no man in Europe of whom it can be said that he is irreplaceable. Great changes will be necessary, and ministers must feel that the nation is controlling them. There are some whom nothing short of fear will prompt to quicker action. The existing muddle merely causes a prolongation of the war, and the squandering of countless precious lives and the accumulated resources of generations. Where everything is in process of change, down to the very foundations of society, let us not be afraid of changing a few individuals."

Books Recommended

(Inclusion in this list does not exclude subsequent review.)

- RUSSIAN MEMORIES. Madame Novikoff. (Herbert Jenkins.) 10s. 6d. net.
GERMANISM FROM WITHIN. A. D. McLaren. (Constable & Co.) 7s. 6d. net.
EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. E. Lipson. (A. & C. Black, Ltd.) 4s. 6d. net.
SOME FRONTIERS OF TO-MORROW. L. W. Lyde. (A. & C. Black, Ltd.) 2s. 6d.
FOR THE RIGHT: Essays and Addresses by Members of the "Fight for Right" Movement. (T. Fisher Unwin.) 2s. net.

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The New Europe

"THE NEW EUROPE" is a weekly paper devoted to the study of foreign politics and of the problems raised by this war. Its foremost aim is to further and consolidate that entente cordiale of allied publicists, which must accompany the wider political entente, if the Allies are to think and act in harmony, and to help towards the formation of a sane and well-informed body of public opinion upon all subjects affecting the future of Europe. Its highest ambition will be to provide a rallying ground for all those who see in European reconstruction, on a basis of nationality, the rights of minorities, and the hard facts of geography and economics, the sole guarantee against an early repetition of the horrors of the present war.

It will be our endeavour to unmask the great designs of German war policy, to provide the historical, racial and strategic background of problems too long neglected in our comfortable island, and to emphasize the need of a carefully thought-out counter-plan, as an essential condition to allied victory. After our armies have won the war, our statesmen will have to win the peace, and their task will, indeed, be difficult unless public opinion is alert, organised and eager to support them in a clearly defined and enlightened policy.

Our attitude, then, will be constructive rather than destructive; our methods will be frankly critical and vigilant, reading the meaning of history out of the brutal logic of facts. An "integral" victory such as alone can secure to Europe permanent peace and the reduction of armaments, the fulfilment of the solemn pledges assumed by our statesmen towards our smaller allies, the vindication of national rights and public law, the emancipation of the subject races of central and south-eastern Europe from German and Magyar control—such must be our answer to the Pangerman project of "Central Europe" and "Berlin-Bagdad."

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VOL. I, No. 10.

December 21, 1916

Germany's Signal of Distress : a French Opinion

"Ni trêve ni composition."—Danton (1792).

IN view of the many faults committed since the beginning of the war by the Allied Governments, it is consoling to be able to chronicle a mistake on the part of the Germans. For, look at it as we will, Germany's recent overture of peace can scarcely be regarded as anything but a mistake.

On 12 December, when a German radiogram announced that Berlin was about to make peace proposals to the Allies, our first hasty impression may have been that we had to deal with a political manœuvre in the grand style, demoralising and seductive, inspired by a truly Bismarckian daring and skill. There were, indeed, a few who thought that Germany, realising the merely temporary advantages and the permanent drawbacks of her situation on the morrow of her Roumanian victories, was concentrating her efforts, with formidable frankness, upon liquidating at one fell swoop the territories which she holds in pawn, by proposing to the Allies a bargain such as to-day affords her the solitary chance of victory. Obviously no one can fail to realise that a "draw" would be a triumph for Germany. This plausible arrangement would secure to the Central Powers, whose attempt to take us unawares had definitely failed, sufficient time to recover, to improve still further their technical equipment, to break up the hostile coalition with which they are faced, and to prepare in safety for the final annihilation of France and Britain. But this "draw" being an extremely clumsy trap, Germany had to set it, not for the professional diplomat, but for the credulous and impulsive crowd on which democratic governments seem to be so dependent. In a recent letter to President Wilson, the British pacifist Member of Parliament, Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, has pointed out the advantages of this method, and has recommended the President of the United States to address

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his offers of mediation, not to the Governments, but to the peoples of the belligerent countries. On 12 December some people may have feared that Germany, in pursuance of this advice, might make an appeal to public opinion among the Allies by bringing forward a peace programme involving not merely moderate terms but even costly concessions for Germany, in order, by a sudden stroke, to gain the sympathy of neutrals and, at the same time, to weaken the resistance of the Allies after the severe tests of twenty-nine months of war.

Several days passed, and everyone realised that the wisdom of German statesmen had been estimated too highly. It soon became clear that the famous German note was not any more explicit than the speech of the Chancellor, which was itself less explicit than first impressions had seemed to suggest. It soon transpired that the German radiogram, by a stylistic trick of a species dear to the Wilhelmstrasse, had, by the change of a preposition, created the impression that Germany was about to propose terms of peace, whereas, in reality, the Chancellor had simply declared that she would be prepared to produce them at a conference, if it should be held. Instead of a Bismarckian manoeuvre, the Allies found that they merely had to deal with a feeble and transparent ruse, the stratagem of a petty bureaucrat. Germany merely expresses her readiness to enter a conference. She limits herself to urging a truce or armistice, and to endeavouring thereby to create among her adversaries a suitably favourable pacific atmosphere. Reduced to these meagre dimensions, the German offer ceases to be dangerous, and must be regarded as nothing short of a blunder.

What is Berlin's objective in making such proposals, and what results may be expected? Let us rapidly consider the various hypotheses. If the German Government aims, above all, at justifying itself in the eyes of German opinion and inducing it to accept a continuance of the war, then it is undoubtedly playing a very risky game. German public opinion, in an overwhelming majority, is convinced of the victory of the Central Powers. A refusal to treat on the part of the Allies can only give rise to discouragement. Never was the war-map more favourable to Germany, and yet her enemies reject her offers. How could such an answer stimulate the energies of the German people? Were Napo-

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leon's veterans encouraged when, on reaching Moscow, they learnt that the Tsar refused to negotiate? The moral consolation of knowing that the German Government does not consider itself to be responsible for a prolongation of the war will not suffice to galvanise the nation. And, besides, even this moral consolation will not be vouchsafed to it. The German offer of peace is not sufficiently sincere even to deceive the Germans themselves. The *Arbeiterzeitung* of Vienna has already entered its protest, and declared that the Chancellor ought not merely to announce his desire to negotiate, but should define the essential conditions of an agreement.

If the German Government is thinking of the neutrals and hopes to win their sympathy by this diplomatic comedy, its Note ought to have been much more explicit, and to have contained a definite programme. How could the neutrals be expected to treat seriously a Government which begins to talk of peace at the top of its voice and yet declines to provide the elements upon which any serious conversations could be based?

It is open to argument, then, that the Germans simply aim at sapping public opinion among their enemies, whom they mistakenly suppose to be weary of the war and exhausted by the struggle. Here the evidence of their miscalculation is patent enough. Allied public opinion, distressed by the news from Roumania and by the lamentable vicissitudes of the Greek situation, has been, on the contrary, greatly comforted by this move on the part of Germany, which has diverted its attention from gloomy reflections. In all the Allied capitals the German offer has already been interpreted as an avowal of anxiety and even of weakness. On the other hand, the somewhat vulgar crudity of this diplomatic trick may have a disconcerting effect upon certain pacifists whose idealism is fanatical but none the less honest. It is possible that they have sufficient penetration to realise that Germany is playing with them, and to perceive that Berlin, which they believed to be ready for an acceptable peace, is prevaricating, playing for time, and refusing to talk clearly. The German offer could only have exercised a demoralising effect if it had been at once explicit and seductive. This pacific comedy, which is but a third-rate intrigue, despite its showy and sensational *mise-en-scène*,

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cannot hope to influence the sound common-sense of Allied public opinion.

Thus it seems as though we should be justified in asserting without further ado that this latest move on the part of Germany is a blunder, and is likely to lead to no useful result for the German Government, either in the Empire or in neutral countries, or among the Allies.

It still remains for us to consider why Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not venture upon the skilful device of offering to end the war by a draw. As a matter of fact, such a device was almost impossible. That this was so is best shown by the state of opinion in Germany itself. The German people does not consider itself beaten or anywhere near being beaten. On the contrary, it is convinced that it is victorious. The whole press re-echoes this belief, the war-map provides ocular proof, and the daily bulletins of victory confirm it. The German Government was faced by the following dilemma. Either it must announce conditions of peace whose severity and insolence would have stimulated the Allies and scandalised the neutrals, or it must put forward moderate proposals such as might perhaps seem tempting to the enemy, but would provoke in Germany itself feelings of mingled rage and consternation. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is in a truly tragic situation. The semblance of victory which surrounds him makes it impossible for him to submit to his adversaries the only proposals which, in the privacy of his study, he knows to be wise or reasonable. The German people believes itself to be victorious; its Chancellor knows that it cannot continue to be so. This inherent discrepancy makes all *open* peace negotiations definitely impossible. The victories which Germany has won on the lines of least resistance and against adversaries of secondary importance are like those doubtful securities which certain shady bankers keep in their safes. Their purse is well filled; they seem to be rich; but they cannot sell, and the day of liquidation will bring them ruin. Germany, ever victorious and ever advancing, must insist upon a glorious peace, though prudence bids her lose no time in coming to terms at whatever sacrifice. Had she been half-beaten and thrown back upon the Rhine and the Silesian frontier, Germany could have obtained satisfactory terms, such as might have been accepted alike by the German people and by her conquerors, but, stretched as she

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is across the whole of Europe, from Riga to Bucarest, and from the Alps to Nieuport, the German colossus resembles the legendary Milo of Croton. At his first effort the athlete as nearly as possible snapped the oak, but the crack in the tree has suddenly caught his hands as in a vice. He can no longer struggle free, and will die by slow degrees, with every muscle strained to its utmost, yet powerless to save himself.

This diplomatic incident shows how little so tremendous a conflict is influenced in its development by the personal will of the puppet figures who fill the foreground of the vast stage. A premature peace is impossible; not, indeed, because of the opposition of the Governments, but rather because of the wide and unbridgeable gulf which to-day separates the warring groups. The Germans believe in their victory; the Allies are convinced of their final triumph. The difference of level, so to speak, between the opinions of the two camps is such as to make conciliation impossible. Each regards itself as victorious and the other as on the point of succumbing. A peace always presupposes as its basis a certain tacit agreement regarding the relative position of the belligerents. To-day no such agreement exists. The peoples will have to continue the war until they come to think more or less alike as to the issue of the struggle.

None the less, there is something to be learnt from the German offer. The fact that one of the warring Governments has raised its voice in a demand for peace is the first sign of flagging energy after many months of silent struggle. It is not the type of peace offer which Napoleon sometimes made, and which consists in a catalogue of harsh conditions, accompanied by the threat of others still more pitiless to follow. The German Government refuses to explain itself, as if it understood that a persistence in a policy of bluff would put it uselessly in the wrong, while a display of frankness would be tantamount to an admission of defeat. Embarrassment reduces it to silence. This strange cry of distress, almost unique in history, will neither be explained by those who uttered it nor answered by those to whom it was addressed. The struggle is resumed in grim and obstinate silence. But none the less the impression remains that this cry was a mistake, since it was Germany's first public confession of anxiety.

VILLEHARDOUIN.

Don Quixote is not Neutral

THE general lines of Spanish opinion towards the war have repeatedly been described in the British press. Roughly, the past, authority, officialdom, Conservatism, are with the Germans; the future, the people, the manual and intellectual workers and Liberalism, are with the Allies. Feeling is keen on the war. Indeed, there are many pro-Germans who out-Tirpitz von Tirpitz, and not a few pro-Allies who out-Barrès M. Maurice Barrès.

This is certainly the dominant fact. Spaniards plunged into the war with all their heart,—then, when they found themselves in the thick of the fight, they summoned arguments and reasons to the rescue. The inexhaustible stores of History, Philosophy, Geography, and Economics were ransacked; Religion, not forgotten, and a mighty array of statistics—a slower body to mobilise—came in the rear.

But the impulse which split the Spanish nation into two antagonistic camps was not a mere blind whim. It was under the play of natural forces that each section of our national mind joined the spiritual fight behind the armies with which it felt in sympathy, and the purpose of this article is not so much once again to recount the external reasons whereby parties explain their attitude, as to throw some light on the natural ties which drew them to their respective sides before they were aware of having lost their mental neutrality.

The Church is pro-German.* There are several explanations of this, at first sight, startling fact—the Jacobin policy of the French Government, the old religious rivalry with England, the *capitis diminutio* which the Pope had to undergo at the hands of the Italian King. But all these arguments are arms for the fight, not force for the fighter. Otherwise, why is the Kulturkampf forgotten, and how are we to explain the indifference of the Spanish

* The Archbishop of Tarragona, recently interviewed by an American journalist, declared himself in favour of the Allies. He is certainly not alone. But the feeling of a very small minority of liberal churchmen does not alter the general position. His somewhat unexpected interview has been more than counterbalanced by an extremely outspoken statement against the Italian Government published by the Primate, Cardinal Guisasola.

DON QUIXOTE IS NOT NEUTRAL

Catholic Church, while the only really Catholic kingdom in the world was ruthlessly overthrown, and German flames consumed the time-honoured Catholic library of Louvain?

The surest way of finding the root is to follow the stem. The Spanish Catholic Church is not so much a religious as a political body. Its aim is not religion, but power. There is neither time nor space to go into the question and to prove this assertion with historical facts. The religious life of the Spanish Church is nil, its political strength enormous. The Spanish Church is not a Priest-Guild, but a Hierarchy. All its social, economic, and political views are based on the idea of authority. And the sure instinct of its members rightly felt in republican France and liberal England, the two arch-enemies of its hierarchical and unitarian thought. This assertion is borne out by the fact that the enmity of the Spanish Church is directed more towards England than towards France. The strong centralising spirit of the French State is at bottom in sympathy with the Roman Catholic turn of thought, and M. Combes was after all a kind of anti-clerical Pope; while the liberal tolerance of the British is utterly repellent to the Spanish clerical mind.

The Army is pro-German. The military prestige of Germany which the present war has, if anything, enhanced, certainly accounts for the admiration which Spanish officers feel towards the country of Moltke and Mackensen. But there are two reasons at least as important for the attitude of the Spanish Army towards the war. Our officers are recruited from the middle and upper classes. Whatever their technical education may be, there is no doubt as to their political education: they have none. Extremely touchy on points of honour and patriotism, they have the usual military ideas on the State, Government, and citizenship. They genuinely believe the Army to be the nearest approach to an incarnation of the Fatherland, and the body of officers the nearest approach to an incarnation of the Army. They are naturally, therefore, led to think highly of that State wherein the three concepts of nation, State, and Army are most intimately welded into one infallible body.

The second motive for the attitude of the Army is their little sympathy for the French. This feeling, born, perhaps, as a mere counterpart of their admiration for Germany, has thriven in Morocco, where the efforts of Spanish and French

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officers towards the welfare of the native population seem to give rise to more friction than might be expected from the pursuit of a common and elevated aim. It is well known that the bracing air of the colonies usually has a very invigorating effect on the energetic pioneers of the steadiest European nations, and that the path of the spirited colony-hunter is strewn with conflicts. Moreover, the unrestrained and outspoken polemics which the French "Colonial" party inspired in the Parisian and Algerian press during the Franco-Spanish negotiations was attentively followed and deeply resented by our Army, and those deplorable quarrels are not old enough to be forgotten.

The Court is pro-German. Ever since Queen Isabella was firmly established on her throne, thanks to the gallant devotion of the Liberals, the Spanish Crown has been particularly anxious to win back the Carlist foe, in order to avoid a new civil war. This tendency, which implied a policy of deference to Roman and retrograde Catholic views, had free play during the minority of King Alfonso. When, under the liberal guidance of Señor Moret, the King married a British princess, great hopes were raised in the more enlightened zone of Spanish opinion, where it was generally anticipated that, along with English furniture and English sports, the air and light of English liberalism would at last penetrate into the Royal Palace. These hopes have unfortunately not been realised; and the new Court failed to detect in the nation its natural allies, while attempting the somewhat thankless task of conciliating the good graces of the old conservative circles.

Shortly after the death in action of Prince Maurice of Battenberg, brother of the Queen of Spain, Señor Vazquez de Mella, the Carlist leader, addressed a pro-German meeting crowded with wealthy aristocrats. In a high-falutin' style, which goes by the name of eloquence among his enthusiastic supporters, he sang his admiration for mighty Germany, cried his pity for "poor France," and shouted his historical hatred of perfidious Albion. A bright array of Court ladies attended the meeting and ostentatiously applauded the speaker, whose feet they covered with flowers while he declaimed a passionate *finale*.

The personnel of the old political parties is mainly pro-German. The fact that the official policy of these parties is

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one of respect for the standing agreements, which to a certain extent place Spain within the orbit of the Occidental Powers, is due to the sense of realities which political parties cannot afford to lose. Besides, Spanish political leaders, who are not true representatives of the nation but mere managers of an artificial political machinery, instinctively feel that the bureaucratic and economic nets, wherewith they have entangled the country, may be shattered any day by a sudden upheaval of real popular life. It is this secret fear which makes them incline towards the side of authority, in spite, or perhaps because of their complete ignorance of German civilisation, and which, more than external and obvious reasons, makes of Spanish neutrality (*i.e.*, immobility) a dogma of their political faith.

And now let us speak of Spain. Spain is pro-Ally. The three forces which make Spain are business men, manual and intellectual workers. The bulk of business men are pro-Ally. In a distinctly unemotional country, business men cannot be expected to be particularly prone to sentimentality. Our industrial and commercial classes know that Great Britain stands for saner commercial ideas than Germany. Close bonds of capital and trade make Spain a partner in the fortunes of France and England ; and, moreover, the war proved a boon to our industries, which found in the Allies excellent customers and ready cash. Surely a solid foundation for friendship when business men are concerned.*

Workers, at any rate "les travailleurs conscients," look to France as the Mecca of liberty. It is typical of Spanish labour, and of Spanish thought in general, that they are more interested in political and idealistic questions than in mere economic matters. Spanish workers are anti-clerical and republican more than socialist, and still sing La Marseillaise with a faith which their French brethren no longer feel for the song of the Bourgeoisie. Their devotion to republican and revolutionary France, their hatred of militarism, the fruits of which are not totally unknown to them, their distrust of the state, inspired by an individualism unrivalled even in England, their keen sense of justice, shocked by German

* Present economic conditions are very bad. Living is dear and the poor are worse off than ever. But this situation is general in Europe, and business men manage to escape from it, and even to benefit by the general trouble.

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aggression, were all powerful impulses which enlisted them from the first day of the war on the side of the Allies.

But the best advocate of the Allied cause in Spain is the school of Spanish thinkers and writers who came of age under the shadow of defeat, at the close of the nineteenth century. Professors, essayists, journalists, poets, these men inherited from their elders a nation exhausted by a century of violent struggles, a mere skeleton under the much battered armour of a glorious past. It was to be their stern duty to cast away the ruins of this past in order to clear the ground and lay the foundations of a new Spain, the general lines of which were beginning to rise from the melancholy chaos in their minds.

The two great evils of modern Spain are the inefficiency of the bureaucracy and the low level of education, whereby democracy degenerates into a mixture of tyranny and demagogy. Spanish thinkers were therefore attracted to the study of the political problem of our age, efficiency versus democracy, and of the solutions which it has received in the leading European nations. Germany and England were their two chief subjects of observation. Some of them, who limited themselves to the study of German life and philosophy, preached efficiency and technique *über alles*, and—not without reservations—set up the example of German culture before the Spanish public. This view was most vehemently opposed by the most vigorous of our living minds, Miguel de Unamuno, who as early as 1900 was writing with his usual spirit and vitality about the difference "*entre Kuliura con K y cultura con c.*" But the majority of Spanish writers perceived the fecundity of the two antagonistic principles of Europe, the English and the German, and devoted their intellectual youth to the study of both. To this group belong the three strongest champions of the Allied cause in Spain: Maeztu,* Ayala, Araquistain.

This double influence is slowly bringing forth a new Spanish ideal from the depths of the Spanish soul. At

* Ramiro de Maeztu has just published a book in English, in which, after showing the negative character of the German principle of authority and of the English principle of liberty, he endeavours to build a constructive theory of political law on the principle of function.

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bottom, the decadence of Spain is due to the defeat of the cause of Catholic unity, which was her cause—a defeat which left her soul empty and desolate. Hence the depression of the race and the weakening of its social and national virtues. The only remedy lies in the formation of a new ideal and the creation of the means of attaining it. For an example of the first we came to England; for a lesson in the second, to Germany. Our ideal is the reformation of the Spanish family, scattered by our great political faults and the fate of history, but still deeply conscious of the racial union of all the Hispanic nations of the world. The way to reach this ultimate goal is pacific and spiritual, and consists merely in a strong educational and economic revival, for which many advocate German technique purified of its most objectionable elements.

If our intellectual classes have pronounced themselves on the side of the Allies, it is, therefore, because their aim is dearer to them than the means. Germany believes in a German civilisation, while England is fighting for a human civilisation where all races may have free and fair play. This our intellectuals knew from the very beginning, even those who, like Professor Ortega, had been the most brilliant advocates of German thought. The wide and more universal reasons of justice and philosophy which have supported their decision need not be dwelt upon: they are the same which inspire men of learning all over the world to give their moral help to the Allied cause.

This, then, is the situation: official Spain is pro-German, and real Spain is pro-Ally. And yet, officially Spain is neutral, and favourable to the West. This is an encouraging fact, and shows that officialdom, all-powerful as it is in home questions, feels the responsibility of its position in international issues and dares not defy the true will of the people. This is further emphasized by the fact that in all its relations with the Allies the Spanish Government has known how to preserve the dignity of the nation by never bargaining with our geographical advantages. This policy is in the best traditions of a country which was often wrong in history, but never base.

S. DE MADARIAGA.

“Sub specie æternitatis.”

THE religious significance of the war is being discussed in all countries, and a whole literature has sprung up on the subject. Since the very dawn of culture and history death has had a significance, not merely ethical, but essentially religious. The altar, we are told, is but a slight transformation of the tomb. Death is the problem of life and of its meaning: it is that central point of light or darkness towards which all our thinking and striving tends; and as this war is a veritable orgy for the grim figure with the scythe, it forces upon us religious meditation. In common honesty we have to confess that the petty details and technicalities of war interest us to such an absorbing degree that only a relatively small part of our time is devoted to philosophic and religious thought. We are all strangely anxious to avoid speaking of death, though we all feel it so nearly. But, after all, this peculiar attitude is not a new one: it has merely been accentuated by the war.

Thoughts of death are intimately connected with the ultimate problems of the meaning and value of the individual life and of the life of communities. Can we detect a plan in the life of the individual or of society, and in the workings of history? Exactly two hundred years have elapsed since the death of Leibniz, one of the greatest thinkers of all times, and the last great modern philosopher who dared to trace out the divine design of the Creation. In his *Théodicée* this German thinker tried to justify the Logos of life and history. In the universe and in mankind he saw an eternal and predestined harmony: he thus accepted and followed up the noble thought of the Bohemian Comenius.

After Leibniz the philosophers no longer had the courage to attempt a justification of the Divinity: they resigned themselves to a study of historical facts, in the hope of detecting the divine purpose in the development of the nations and of mankind at large. History and the Philosophy of History became the favourite sciences, and still hold their ground to this day. And by a strange destiny it was the German followers of the great philosopher of Universal Harmony who sought to justify the Discord of War. Death on the battlefield has been glorified by them, and the primacy of the German nation and its world-power has been revealed

" *SUB SPECIE ÆTERNITATIS* "

as the destiny for which the nations were waiting. Pan-germanism is indeed nothing else than an endeavour to erect a system of the telegraphy of war and of human death.

The question with which the heartbroken mother greeted the news that her only son had fallen: "Is there, can there be, any God?"—this question is put by the historian and the philosopher, when they inquire into the lawful development of nations and of humanity. To-day this question fills millions with misgiving. The huge armies in the field, the vast army of the fallen, stir our imagination and force us, in anxious terror, to ask the meaning of this Great Death. We turn away with impatient disgust from the politicians, who are unable to take in the universal import of the war, to rise to the grandeur of so historic a moment, or to comprehend the significance of the Great Judgment. We all, individuals and nations alike, are standing before the bar of history, before the Great Judge.

The war is a religious problem: it is also a problem of the churches and the theologians. Every day we witness searchings of conscience on the part of the various churches, and we hear them asking how far they are responding to the religious needs of the combatants and of the warring nations as a whole. It is indeed an acute question, but it is in no way new. To my mind, the churches in war are scarcely better adapted to cope with the spiritual needs of the time than they were in former days of peace. The special questions so dear to theological minds, as to whether and how far Christianity sanctions war, whether the teaching of Christ can be reconciled with war, whether the churches should approve of and endorse patriotism and nationality in its prevailing forms—all these and kindred questions do not appeal to men who are fighting in the trenches, and have at least some grasp of the political and strategic situation. There have been many wars before and since the days of Our Lord, and all these questions are very old. To-day we feel that the warm blood of nations, shed in torrents all over Europe, compels all thinking men to face the decisive question: who is guilty of so hideous a crime as the present war? Like all its predecessors, this war is a question of conscience; but in it, as in them, we see the churches each following its own country. They do not lead—they are led. Foolish

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atheists are never tired of pointing to the fact that one and the same church is praying in Germany for a German, in France for a French victory; but they are as beside the mark as the theologians and scholastics.

Certainly the polemics between French and German Catholics, between Catholic and Protestant, between Catholic and Orthodox, make melancholy and depressing reading. Only in one respect do they deserve to be studied, namely, as a key to the question how far the churches share the responsibility for having brought about this war.

It is easy to understand why politicians and publicists avoid the religious questions of the war. Being all members of distinct parties, and, therefore, the slaves of a partisan outlook, they are afraid of offending the religious sentiments of either side. But it is quite possible to discuss the matter without hurting religious susceptibilities. Indeed, I think that the gravest offence which could be offered to thinking men would be the assumption that they cannot listen to a serious criticism of the churches and their significance in the present struggle.

The churches, as an ethical organisation of society, come into close relations with the State, as its political organisation: the nature of these relations has varied in different periods and stages of culture. In the Middle Ages, Church and State formed a peculiar theocratic unity: its two chief types were the Roman and the Byzantine. In the former, the Church had the upper hand; in the latter, the State. The Reformation put an end to theocratic tendencies, and the State gained in strength—in Protestant countries, through the religious and ecclesiastical revival; in Catholic countries, through the Counter-Reformation. This double process lies at the root of modern State-absolutism. The great Catholic theocracy split up into smaller and more national theocracies, differing from the mediæval in creed and organisation. Modern democracy is opposed to theocracy as distinct from religion; but democracy is as yet in its first stages.

It was only to be expected that the various churches would, on the whole, espouse the policy of their own States. For instance, official Austria, so far as it has any idea at all, still relies in every respect upon the Church, tottering, from the force of habit, in the direction given by the counter-Reformation. It is well known that Francis Ferdinand

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formulated his plans of a Great Austria mainly on ecclesiastical lines, and that religious motives played their part in Vienna's hostility to Serbia and Russia. It was no mere accident that the Jesuits, shortly before the war, constituted a new "Serbian" province in the Balkans. There was a parallel Austrian agitation among the Catholic Albanians. Moreover, the Habsburg Court has always been an enemy of modern Italy; and the Vatican, on its side, feels for Austria-Hungary as the last great Catholic Power.

Austria's ecclesiastical policy is far from finding support among the Slav population, but the Germans—not merely the Clericals, but even the Liberals, despite their hatred of the Church—support it. The Southern Slavs, whose future it affects so vitally, desire the union of Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats and Slovenes, regardless of religious differences. Some official circles in the Russian Orthodox Church are tinged by ultra-conservative views, and hope to protect themselves from Catholicism by keeping the Catholic Slavs at arm's length. They cling to the theory that the Orthodox Church rests on pure Christian doctrine and is not aggressive: whereas Catholicism is purely political. But the national idea among the Southern Slavs and their antagonism to Austria-Hungary is so strong that any attempt to divide them according to religion is foredoomed to failure.

Of special interest is the religious attitude of Germany during the war. Early in its course the leaders of the Catholic Centrum party presented to the Cardinals assembled in Conclave a memorandum directed against Orthodox "Muscovitism," whose victory, they argued, would involve grave injury to Catholicism. The leaders of the Centre praise William II. for his piety and trust in him. In his war speeches, it is true, he never ceases to appeal to God, even if, in unguarded moments, he puts God in the second place, after himself. They seem unable to see through the official anthropomorphism of Prussia, who uses Protestantism and Catholicism alike for her Pangerman aims.

The fact that Protestant Prussia supports Vienna's Catholic policy is easily understood if we consider Berlin's attitude to the Centrum and to German Catholicism. The Centre, in its turn, makes skilful use of the Protestant Kaiser and of the weaknesses of Austrian Catholicism. The Centre press organs, even during the war, have demanded its reformation in head

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and members. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* even spoke of the Catholic mire in Austria. And they were right. Catholicism in Austria, having crushed the Reformation, especially in Bohemia, is spiritually inert and stagnant, relying completely on the police state of Vienna, and very different from the Catholicism of England, the United States or Germany, which has to face an ecclesiastical, cultural, and political enemy. To some extent Slav Catholicism is also saner, since it has to stand guard against strong Hussite memories and a pronounced anti-clerical (not anti-religious) movement. In Austria clericalism means the misuse of religion for political ends.

In Russia, too, religion plays a decisive part in the war. The great bulk of the nation is devoted to the Church, and regards the struggle with Turkey from the religious point of view, as a conflict of Christianity and Islam. The Russian claim to Constantinople has its religious and mystical side. But just as even Turkey could not rouse the old passion of a Holy War and disappointed German hopes of Panislamism, so, in Russia, the national and political motives overshadow more and more the religious. There are influential circles in Russia which approach the Polish and all other Slav problems from an ecclesiastical angle, and politicians who, like the old "Slavophiles" and Dostoevsky, still dream of Russian Messianism. But even these politicians no longer preach a policy of aggression against the West. There is no Russian or Slavonic pendant to Pangermanism, no aggressive Pan-slavism, no "Slav Danger."

The Pangermans proclaim themselves as the direct successors of 'the Holy Roman Empire of German nation.' They praise the mediæval Church for her support of Germany in her 'Drang nach Osten' and in her Germanisation of the Slavs, and they recognise the mediæval Empire as the forerunner of "Mitteleuropa." The French Catholic thesis that German Protestantism, as personified in Luther, Kant and Nietzsche, is the real aggressor, requires modification in the light of the aggressive policy of Catholic Austria. Meanwhile, it is highly amusing to find German Catholic writers accusing the Freemasons of having caused the war. They forget that the Kings of Prussia, and other German princes also, have always favoured Freemasonry, and that it has the fervent support of the Magyars, Prussia's most faithful ally.

The Allies have proclaimed as their aim the reconstruction

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and regeneration of Europe, and it is evident that this cannot be attained merely by re-shaping the map. Europe's whole mentality must be changed. Her regeneration must be as much moral and spiritual as political. A policy *sub specie æternitatis* is not merely possible but even necessary, but it can only be worked out on a purely democratic basis. Its foremost demand is true equality—alike in the inward and the outward sphere—an equality which extends to every citizen and to every nation.

THOMAS G. MASARYK.

Allied Portraits (II) : Baron Sidney Sonnino

SOME six or seven miles south of Livorno (which the English, for some inexplicable reason, continue to call “ Leghorn ”) a rocky headland juts out into the sea, or, rather, forms a division between two bays. The headland is not accessible from the coast road. A gateway of forged iron shuts it off, but permits a glimpse of a narrow drive, which seems to lead towards a small square castle with a Tuscan tower that crowns the extreme point of the promontory. There are no houses near, but enquiry at the village of Antignano, a mile or so away, may elicit the information that the headland and the castle are called “ Il Romito ” (the Hermitage), and that the hermit is Baron Sidney Sonnino, twice Premier of Italy and, since November, 1914, her Minister for Foreign Affairs. If enquirers draw the conclusion that Baron Sonnino loves seclusion, and that his thoughts are scarcely less guarded from the world than is his seaside retreat, they will not be far wrong in their estimate of his public character.

Should good fortune enable a visitor to pass beyond the iron gate, his initial impressions will be at once deepened and modified. Aloes and prickly pear alternate with patches of the dark green Tuscan *macchia*, or scrub, while the deep red rock of the headland is seen to fall some hundreds of feet almost sheer into the sapphire sea, which breaks gently or violently, according to the state of wind and tide, against the jagged base. The castle is surrounded on the land side by a deep, dry “ moat,” or fissure in the rock, that is spanned by a drawbridge. Inside, the whole sea front of the castle is taken up by an immense room, half library, half drawing-room, with stout walls of masonry surmounted by a con-

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tinuous thick glass window. This vast *salon* is called the "Batteria." It is, in fact, the ancient battery of a Tuscan stronghold built to guard the coast against the Barbary pirates. Baron Sonnino bought and restored the place, and made of it an abode ideally suited to his temperament and habits—a place of strength, of rugged beauty and of taciturn peace.

Of more than medium height, slightly bent, with a heavy white moustache and close cropped hair, a ruddy complexion, strong nose and chin, and eyes from which a humorous twinkle is rarely absent, Sidney Sonnino carries lightly the weight of his all but three-score years. As his Christian name indicates, he is half-British by blood, his mother, *née* Terry, having married a Florentine Jew who amassed considerable wealth in Egypt towards the middle of last century. There Sidney Sonnino was born in February, 1847, but was brought back to Italy by his parents in early infancy. Of his youth little is known, except that he graduated in law at an early age and entered the diplomatic service as attaché by the time he was twenty. He spent some months in each of the great continental capitals in turn, and was in Paris during the events of 1871. The base of a shell that burst near him is among the "diplomatic" souvenirs in his great library at Rome.

That library is, in its way, as eloquent of the man as is his Tuscan hermitage. When he bought what is known as the Palazzo Sonnino in Rome, he knocked six good-sized rooms into one, and had them fitted up as a library of which the like is not to be found in any private Roman "palace." The work was not hastily done, but was completed little by little, as the collection of carefully-read books demanded more space. Two mottoes grace the room—one running along the heavy walnut beam that supports the book-shelves—*Aliis si licet tibi non licet*—and the other, painted above the massive fireplace—*Nitor in adversum*. Here we have the man's conception of himself and of his task. It is the anti-thesis of the Nietzschean doctrine of the "superman," which D'Annunzio and, after him, so many young Italians have adopted to their grievous moral hurt and to that of their country. To the "superman" all things are permitted, even though to others of the common herd they be not lawful. This doctrine is the essence of Prussianism, of aristocracy

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gone mad, of anarchism and of utter reaction. It is all the more dangerous because it is based on a perversion of the fundamental truth that all men are not equal, and that some men of exceptional gifts may, without harm to themselves or to the community, demand scope for the accomplishment of work—political, artistic or literary—that lesser men could not do. The Sonninian motto implies, on the contrary, the truer or, at least, the more social, that is to say, the more moral, view that upon men conscious of great powers is placed a special responsibility lest, by abuse of those powers, they prove a stumbling block to themselves and others, and cause "little ones" to offend. This is the truly aristocratic conception of life, though, in the case of Sonnino, it may be compounded of the Protestant influence of his early maternal training, the austere force of ancient Roman examples, blended, perhaps, with some atavistic instinct derived from his Hebrew strain of blood. Who can presume exactly to determine what forces have moulded a mind steeped in humanist culture, fed upon the best of modern literatures, and constantly played upon by the atmosphere of Florence and of Rome? Who can determine the ancestry of an intellect that examines with equal eagerness and discusses with equal competence the latest discoveries of Boni, the wizard of the Forum and Palatine, a difficult canto of the "Divina Commedia," the weak points of a budget or of a State Bank return, the internal problems, doctrinal and administrative, of the Roman Church, the inner tendencies of Socialism, and the logical flaws of an astute Austro-Hungarian diplomatic note? And who shall set down as hard and repellant a character which, beneath a cold exterior—insulated by timidity and stiffened by horror of popularity-hunting—is suffused with passion and aglow with tenderness?

The public career of Sidney Sonnino hardly supplies the clue to the problem of his inward quality, save in so far as it shows that his whole life has been guided by an overmastering devotion to what he has believed to be the welfare of Italy. On leaving the diplomatic service in the early 'seventies, he devoted himself to social studies and examined on the spot, with rare patience and pertinacity, the miserable plight of the Sicilian peasants and the economic condition of the Italian South. He founded and maintained for some years a review

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that helped to mould the political thought of his contemporaries, and, upon entering Parliament, his speeches constantly struck a note of informed sincerity. He cared nothing whether he offended this powerful minister or that, whether he antagonized formidable combinations of interests or forfeited Royal favour. He was intractable and upright, ambitious for his country—not for himself, or for himself only in so far as he might be persuaded that his strength of character would one day prove to be an untouched reserve in the assets of Italian public life. When, at length, Crispi called him to office in 1893, to avert the national bankruptcy prepared by Giolitti's failure to face a menacing situation, he acted with the utmost vigour. If, as the warden of finance, he taxed the poor, he also mulcted the rich and distributed the burden of sacrifice with inexorable impartiality. He saved Italian credit. For a decade his rigour was exploited against him by unscrupulous rivals, of whom Giolitti was one of the chief; and when, at last, he could no longer be excluded from the Premiership, Giolittian intrigues, aided by his own carelessness of the small arts of government, twice overthrew him in a hundred days. But the outbreak of war brought him his opportunity. Not even the journalists, whose subsidies from the secret funds had been withdrawn during his Premiership, nor the politicians, whom the notice in the antechamber of his ministry: "Senators and Deputies who demand favours will not be received," had enraged, could then deny that Sonnino was indispensable to the conduct of public affairs. He took over the Italian Foreign Office in November, 1914, and has held it ever since. His successful diplomatic duel with Austria and Germany is related in the Italian Green Book. Posterity may learn what other triumphs he achieved, what mistakes he made, how far he directed and how far he was swayed by tendencies which he believed himself strong enough to master at the right moment—but it will hardly learn that he ever stooped to any dishonourable act, or that he ever placed his own glory, comfort or health above what he held to be his duty.

In a grotto of the rock below the foundations of his Tuscan castle, facing seawards, stands a massive granite sarcophagus, on the lid of which are carved the words, "Sidney Sonnino 1847- . ." Before the missing date is inscribed all lovers of Italy will hope that he may have helped to assure to her

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security within the frontiers of the Italian race, and have gained for himself the honour reserved for those who, in serving their own country, serve humanity and vindicate the high ideal of liberty for it and for others, which Cavour, Garibaldi and Mazzini taught the world to revere.

C. R.

The Growth of Anti-Venizelism

AT last the situation in Greece has reached a crisis in which further delays are impossible. The moment therefore seems opportune for a consideration of the origin and composition of the forces that to-day control official Greece. Much has been written about these forces, and their growth has been variously attributed to German gold, party spite, King Constantine's Germanophilism, and the mistakes of Allied diplomacy, and it may be worth while to consider how far these and how far other reasons have been responsible for the attitude of the Athens Government and a great part of the Greek people to-day.

Till eighteen months ago there was no such thing as Germanophilism in Greece. Greece was united by every reason of history, geography, economics and sentiment to the three Powers who had assisted her in her war of Liberation and guaranteed her independence in 1830, her constitution in 1863, and her financial soundness in 1898. To these Powers, together or severally, she owed the gift of the Ionian Islands, the annexation of Thessaly, the autonomy of Crete, the support of Greek rights in Northern Epirus. She had, in common with Russia, the Eastern Orthodox faith; with Britain, the belief in sea power and overseas trade; with France, the principles of political and social culture which, handed down from Greece and Rome, have found their chief modern devotees in the French people. Of Germany Greece knew no more than that her first King Otho with his stiff Bavarian retinue had come thence and returned thither; and that Germany favoured the Turks, whom she had supported in the war of 1897, and the Bulgarians, in whom she saw her natural allies in the Balkan department of "Berlin-Baghdad." On the outbreak of the European War every responsible newspaper in Greece took the Allies' side. Germanophilism in Greece was confined to

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hyphenated Greeks, like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Streit (grandson of one of Otho's courtiers), the Athenian advocate, M. Hesselin, M. Schliemann (son of the great excavator), and others of foreign descent. The Queen, it is true, was a Prussian, but her relations with the Kaiser's court had not been uniformly friendly, and the young Greek princes were more at home in England. The King, half Dane, half Russian, had, indeed, astonished the world in 1913 by his speech to the Prussian Guard at Potsdam, in which he politely attributed to German example the successes of his troops in the Balkan Wars. But this "gaffe" was so transparently illogical as to be ridiculous. Like all soldiers, Feld-Marschal King Constantine could not but admire German military organisation, but it was unthinkable that a Dano-Russian prince, born and bred in Greece, could ever put this admiration above the acknowledged ties of interest and sentiment which indissolubly bound Greece to her historic friends.

Greece, for the first nine months of the war, offered, apparently, a poor prospect to the German propagandist. It was not till about May, 1915, that Baron Schenck, who had exchanged Krupp's for Wolff's wares as his stock-in-trade at Athens, was able substantially to influence Greek opinion. It is true that, on 13 June, the Greek electorate returned Venizelos to power by a large majority, but public opinion was already appreciably affected by the failure at the Dardanelles and the Russian retreats. For the first time the Greek king and Greek nation began to contemplate the probability of a final victory for the Central Powers. It was during the two months that elapsed between Venizelos's victory at the elections and his return to power in August that the Ghounaris Government, in collusion with the court and general staff, came to an understanding with Germany on the basis of the desertion of Serbia. It was during these two months that the anti-Venizelist press first began to adopt a definitely neutral and vaguely anti-Entente attitude—beginning with tirades against Italy's and Russia's aims on Greek territory, and subsequently specialising in abuse of British "navalism." The explanation is two-fold. Ghounaris and his colleagues, repulsed by the Entente when they proposed—whether in good faith or not—an invasion of neutral Bulgaria, and subsequently defeated at the elections, saw

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in the future their only definite and distinctive programme in the resolute championing of neutrality at all costs. The Entente's mistakes in August, 1915, and the effectiveness and brazenness of German propaganda, had reinforced the Greek people's vague fears of the dangers attaching to intervention. The crowning misfortune, that the 150,000 Anglo-French troops Venizelos had relied on were not at Salonica at the critical moment, decided the majority of Greeks (and finally determined, according to a private admission, the King himself) against intervention and played into the hands of anti-Venizelist politicians and Germanophil generals. Add to this that half the Athenian press was now, for financial and party reasons, obliged to take subsidies from the open-handed baron, and it is easy to see how Greek opinion was converted. Once the proffered hand of friendship was refused, it was useless for the Entente to tap Greece lightly with the boxing-glove when Germany raised her mailed fist.

Germanophilism is not, however, the chief constituent of present Greek policy. No Greek paper has ever seriously proposed intervention on the German side. Not even the late M. Theotokis, the time-serving M. Ghounaris, or Herr Streit himself, has ever openly supported such a plan. The chief factor in recent Greek policy is anti-Venizelism pure and simple. Venizelos refused to contest the elections of 19 December, 1915, because he denied their legality and validity. With him half the Greek electorate abstained from the polls. The chance had come for Venizelos's battered opponents to raise their heads. The eminently honest and respectable ex-Premiers, MM. Theotokis, Rallis and S. Dhraghoumis, combined with the unscrupulously active Patras politician, M. Ghounaris, to return to power a fairly compact "National" party. Compact in practice, the party was complex in origin. A glance at the list of deputies shows that it was local influences that enjoyed a triumph over the Liberals' clear-cut policy. The great families—Mavromikhalis in Lakonia, Koumoundhouros in Messinia, and many more—led their fellow-provincials to the polls. The feudal vote in Thessaly and the Ionian Islands, the Turkish and Jewish vote in Macedonia, had their full weight. The whole policy of the "parish pump," which Venizelos cast away as impatiently as Cromwell his "bauble," revived in full force.

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The modern Greek is still intensely parochial, still pre-eminently a partisan. Many an average citizen had tired of the praises of Venizelos, as men tired of the "justness" of Aristeides. The opponents of yesterday—(the Republican Rallis, the courtly Theotokis, the adventurer Ghounaris) as well as the small but intelligent group of young deputies, mainly from Macedonia and Epirus, which centred round the younger Dhraghoumis and Alex. Karapanos—united, for political, party and personal reasons, to exploit their advantage. Into the current were swept former supporters of Venizelos—like his ex-colleagues, Dhimitrakopoulos and Stratos, Pop (editor of the clever but capricious journal, *Athine*) and the intriguing Achæan deputy, Loukas Roupfos. In the Chamber, which met in January and sat till its adjournment the following May—it has never yet been dissolved—were represented all the varying factors of the anti-Venizelist movement. It was to this Chamber, the *raison d'être* of which was anti-Venizelism pure and simple, that was entrusted the discussion of foreign affairs during the first five critical months of this year.

The anti-Venizelists went still further. Conscious of their complete lack of constructive policy, they sheltered themselves under the ægis of the Crown. They struck an alliance with the King, practically recognising his autocratic claims and conceding him a deciding voice in foreign policy in return for his royal patronage in the party campaign. Like our own Charles I., King Constantine believes in Divine Right. In his interviews he has repeatedly claimed for himself the privilege of saving the Greek people from a suicidal policy. The anti-Venizelists are by nature no lovers of monarchy—some of them, like Rallis, have had republican leanings. None of them can boast of such loyal service to the dynasty as Venizelos has rendered in the past, and has always, up till only the other day, expressed himself willing to render in the future. But for Venizelos the future of Hellas is even more important than the future of the dynasty. The anti-Venizelist leaders, some of whom are indifferent to both ideals, and some of whom sincerely believe that only by the destruction of Venizelism can Greece regain her independence of action, eagerly seized on the divergence of views between the King and his great Prime Minister to proclaim the latter disloyal. They cared, in reality, so little for the Crown that when, some months ago, at a Ghounarist meeting at Patras,

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the report was spread that the King had at last agreed to intervention, cries were heard of "Down with the King!" But they knew that, with the peasants up country and the soldiers commanded by a court clique, the King's name still counted, and they raised the banner of Royalism.

Modern Greece may be stated in the formula H₂O—two parts Hellenic, one Orthodox. The oldest, the strongest and the most modern force in Greek life is the Hellenic—that of liberty. It is the tradition of the ancient city State, and it is the tradition of the French revolution and the war of Greek Independence. Its symbol is the Akropolis of Athens. But by its side is the second, sprung from the millenium when Constantinople was the centre of the world—the Orthodox. This is mystic, autocratic, starkly conservative, and its symbol is the Church of Ayia Sophia. In St. Augustine's antithesis it is the City of Cecrops and the City of God.

What devotion, then, can a King not claim who bears the sacred name of the sainted founder of "The City" and the not less sacred name of its last royal defender, Constantine XI. Palaiologos, who, tradition says, never died but, turned to marble, waits for the liberation of the great cathedral! What devotion will such a King not win whose Queen bears the very name of Sophia, and who himself has already led his victorious armies to Salonica and beyond, and still dreams of Constantinople. To the simple Greek the King is sacred, protected and loved by God and the Saints, predestined in turn to protect and be loved by his subjects. It is this natural loyalty that the anti-Venizelist politicians and Prussianising general staff have exploited for their sinister ends.

Lastly, his opponents have accused Venizelos of debasing Greece to subservience to foreign Powers. "Son Excellence M. Venizéloff, Arch-Senegalese of the Entente Powers," is what M. Loukas Roupfos was pleased to call him some months ago in the *Nea Imera*. Venizelos it was, they say, who invited the Anglo-French troops to Salonica. Venizelos it was who instigated the Powers in all their blockades of Greece and ultimatums to the successive anti-Venizelist Governments. Venizelos it is who has now begun a revolutionary movement, and thrown in the lot of himself and his followers with foreign Powers, careless of the fortunes of his own fatherland. These charges are as constant as they are unjust. Venizelos has repeatedly explained that he did

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not invite the Anglo-French troops to Salonica. He enquired whether 150,000 men were available in case Greece, in conformity with her treaty obligations, were drawn into war with Bulgaria. Under formal protest he acquiesced—as he understood with the King's consent—in the *fait accompli* of the Allies' landing, but his successors—the Zaimis Government—did the same. He has indulged no personal ambitions at the expense of his country. He has repeatedly offered to support any Government which would champion the national interests. At a time when Greek Ministries were handing over Greek forts and guns to the Bulgarians, and a Greek army corps to the Germans, Venizelos's only relations with the Entente Powers were those of cordial co-operation for the liberation of Macedonia and the defeat of the hereditary foe. At a time when his opponents have arrested and brutally ill-treated the adherents of the "National Defence" movement, Venizelos is anxiously caring for the future of Greece's lost territories and for Greece's own future prospects, isolated as she is in a world hostile, contemptuous or suspicious.

There is nothing premature or ill-considered in a movement which can boast as its leaders such a triumvirate as Venizelos, Koundouriotis, and Dhanglis. Further delay in asserting the claims of the national cause would have been a frank confession of despair for Greece's future. Even those who now speak with scorn of the Greeks—unfortunately an increasing number—can surely not withhold their admiration from the gallant men who have stepped, at their own personal risk, into the breach the Athens Government has opened in the defences of the country. There can be no further compromise with such a Government. Since its first innocent appearance, anti-Venizelism has proved itself a cancer growth.

A. W. A. LEEPER.

The Fall of the Austrian Cabinet

THE sudden fall of the new Austrian Cabinet is an event of extreme significance. Herr von Koerber, who became Premier after the assassination of Count Stürgkh, was the strong man of Austria, so far as Austria can boast of any strong man. He represented her best administrative traditions, and held a deserved reputation for efficiency and

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clear political thinking. During his first premiership he had greatly extended the liberty of the press and had drawn up plans for a far-reaching administrative reform. But originality or independence of thought is not what recommends a man for the part of Austrian Premier; and not being an aristocrat, but an official who had made his own political career, he had no influence at Court and was only employed so long as the Emperor had urgent need of him. His appointment two months ago was but the gesture of a feudal lord who, when disaster attends his declining years, turns for help to a faithful retainer whom he had long slighted and left in the background.

The advent of the Koerber Cabinet was eminently distasteful to Hungary and its masterful Premier Count Tisza, who had found it extremely convenient to have during such a war, as Premier in the other state of the Monarchy, a man of Stürgkh's supreme insignificance, who was content to leave the Austrian Parliament unsummoned, while the Hungarian Parliament continued to meet and thereby strengthened its relative position and prestige. Moreover, Count Stürgkh was incapable of serious resistance to Hungarian demands in the important negotiations for the renewal of the commercial compromise between Austria and Hungary, which have to be concluded before the end of the present month. Dr. von Koerber was a far more formidable opponent, and was certain to make a firmer stand against Magyar encroachments.

Everything points to the fact that the new Emperor, who is absolutely without political experience, has surrendered himself to Magyar leading, and is preparing to act more or less openly on the advice which Bismarck gave to his granduncle over a generation ago, and to transfer the centre of gravity in his dominions from Vienna to Budapest. The new Austrian Premier, Herr von Spitzmüller, is virtually a nominee of Hungary. Till recently he was manager of the Kreditanstalt, the leading Austrian bank, and is closely identified with the financial interests of the Austrian Rothschilds and consequently with the high finance of Berlin: and his appointment may be taken to mean that official Austria has surrendered its control of the economic situation to Berlin and Budapest.

The Roumanian victories have drawn Germany and

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Hungary still closer together, and revealed to all the world what was patent enough to those who had known the countries concerned, that the Magyars are Germany's most valuable asset outside her own frontiers. William II., then, and his puppet Chancellor are definitely backing the Magyars, and though Count Károlyi raises periodical protests for foreign consumption, Count Tisza's position is more secure than ever. This merely means that "nothing succeeds like success": defeat would swiftly transform the situation to his disadvantage. Meanwhile the idea of reverting to parliamentary conditions in Austria seems to have been abandoned once more. The old Absolutism, in its peculiar Austrian form, is to remain, and the General Staff is to be left undisturbed in its incursions upon civil rights.

Meanwhile the air is full of rumours of the proclamation of a Central European Federation, in the event of the Allies declining to treat with Germany. An even more circumstantial story was published by the *Times* of 27 November, to the effect that a new Southern Slav State is to be created inside the Dual Monarchy, by the union of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and north-west Serbia, as a kind of glorified appanage of Hungary. Such a scheme would be in full accord with the claims publicly put forward at the time of the Bosnian annexation, by the then Hungarian Premier, Dr. Wekerle, and other Hungarian parliamentarians—claims which are based upon the shadowy suzerainty exercised by the Holy Crown of St. Stephen over Bosnia, Rascia, Rama (these two more or less represent modern Serbia) and Wallachia. Such an arrangement would be in the highest degree flattering to the Hungarian Chauvinists, would greatly extend Magyar political and commercial influence, and would more than counterbalance any economic concessions which it might be necessary for Hungary to make to Germany for the sake of Central European unity. It will be most interesting to note whether King Charles IV. will use the occasion of his coronation at Budapest for such a pronouncement. One of the main objects of such a scheme would, of course, be to seduce the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary from their devotion to the ideal of Jugoslav Unity: and if it should be attempted, it will be more essential than ever that the Allies should reach a clear decision upon a problem which lies at the root of the European

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future, by applying to it that principle of Nationality and of the inalienable rights of small nations, to which they stand irrevocably committed.

Nationalism and Internationalism

Professor Ramsay Muir has written a very notable volume,* which should be read by all those whose interest in the war is not confined to deeds of military prowess or brutality, but who strive to understand the underlying causes of the struggle. The gist of his argument is that the nationalist and internationalist movements—two of the most powerful factors in modern history—are far from being so mutually hostile as a superficial study might suggest; that Napoleon was right when he maintained that an effective internationalism can only be realised on the basis of triumphant nationalism; and that "it is only by means of an organised international system that the rights, or even the existence, of the weaker nationalities can be protected." The two movements are mutually interdependent, and if, instead of being kept in rigid watertight compartments as is the practice of so many writers they are treated as two parts of a syllogism, many facts tend to assume an altogether new light.

It has become almost a commonplace, alike with friend and foe of the principle of nationality, to treat it as the main cause of war during the nineteenth century. Professor Muir is certainly right in deprecating this view. It is far too often forgotten that it was really the absence, or to be more correct the dormant state of national feeling, which was the main cause of war in the eighteenth century. Throughout that period princes and diplomats were free to play with and carve up the peoples of Europe according to their good pleasure, and thus created conditions which inevitably forced those peoples to seek redress by violence. The outlook which regarded the masses as livestock, mainly useful for purposes of breeding and taxation, was too unnatural to stand the test of time. What may be called the nationalist doctrine was first fully developed in France during the Great Revolution, though it by no means formed one of the most prominent points in the new political programme. In due course what was implicit in this programme emerged as the result of French logic and clear thinking. "As the rights of man primarily included the right to choose their own governors, it was a corollary that men had a right to be governed by their mutual sympathies and affinities in the organisation of the state, and once this position is granted, the nationalist doctrine is established." But at the very outset of his argument, Professor Muir forestalls the shallow tendency to assume that, because it is impossible to find in all Europe anything which can fairly be described as a "pure" race, and because so many divers elements go to the making of a single nation, therefore the principle of nationality is artificial

* "Nationalism and Internationalism: the Culmination of Modern History." By Ramsay Muir. (Constable.) 4s. 6d. net.

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and unnatural. To render his argument still more clear and effective, he attempts to draw a much-needed distinction between "nationalism" and "racialism." By this latter term he means "the belief in the inherent superiority of one race over another, and in the fundamental antipathy between races." Such a theory rests upon an essentially unscientific basis, and when applied to the study of history, has been fruitful of infinite mischief. It is indeed the very antithesis of nationalism; "for the national principle begins by recognising that nations may be, and commonly are, formed from a blend of many races, and maintains only that whenever a coherent body of people has developed, by dwelling together, ties of affinity which make it easy for them to understand one another, they have a right to enjoy their own modes of life and freedom." Nationality in its essence rests upon sentimental ties and traditions which are the strongest thing in human nature and are justified by all the subtle daily influences of kinship and environment, and at supreme moments by common memories of tyranny and struggle. "Once such memories have been branded into the soul of a people, their nationhood becomes indestructible," and we, who have such memories, can only commiserate those who have not. The admission that there is no single infallible test of nationality does not weaken the case of its adherents; it merely broadens the basis of their argument and identifies nationality with the whole gamut of human sympathies and passions. Nationality should be regarded as universal and inalienable, and the attempt to impose it from without or to assert the rights of some super-culture to assimilate or dominate its neighbours, is a gross perversion of a principle which, if understood in its true bearing, is simply the application on a higher plane of those rights of individual development and progress which lie at the very root of life and religion. It is here that the theory of nationality and of national culture touches the great problem of the present war. The Entente Powers, each of which has at one time or another sinned against the light, find themselves to-day confronted with an outbreak of racialism on a hitherto unknown scale. Philip II., Louis XIV., Napoleon, each represented a great culture, perhaps even the greatest of its day, but in each case its imposition upon the whole of Europe would have been an unmixed disaster, "because in the last resort it rested upon military force and not upon consent, and still more because it was accompanied by a grave restriction of freedom of thought." Vast learning in the fields of history, philology, and every other branch of science was prostituted in the cause of megalomania and self-glorification, and this in the very country where pure learning had stood highest and won the widest recognition. "It is difficult to exaggerate the mischief that was done to the true cause of nationalism by its distortion under the influence of this pretentious pseudo-scientific exploitation of the idea of race superiority." Nor would it be easy to over-emphasize the contrast between nationalist doctrine as it developed in Italy and in Germany. Mazzini's theories of Young Italy developed naturally and logically into the idea of European regeneration and brotherhood. The theories of

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race-dominance so popular in modern Germany and expounded by Treitschke and (by a cruel irony) the Frenchman Gobineau and the Germanised English renegade Chamberlain, lead as inevitably to the assertion and maintenance of racial caste. The theory of the Blonde Barbarian and the Superman is only the extreme statement of a *Weltanschauung* built upon the assumption of Latin decadence and Teuton pre-eminence. It is no mere claptrap phrase to suggest that Germany, so long the home of high thinking and plain living, has been slowly poisoned by the infiltration of Prussianism. Prussia has never lifted a finger for any other national cause and has always been the chief opponent of nationality. Indeed, it was Prussia who for her own ends defeated the cause of German nationalism, represented by its honourable, if visionary and unpractical, leaders in the first half of the nineteenth century. Germany's unification, when it came, was attained by methods absolutely contrary to those of the Italian patriots, and its success gave rise "to the worship of mere power and efficiency." "Germany is the only nation-state whose unification has been accompanied by the forcible subjugation of peoples of other nationalities."

What Professor Muir has to say of the growth of internationalism is equally instructive and interesting. He points out—what is still too often overlooked by our theorists—that the real reason why schemes for a common authority to enforce peace failed, is "because they necessarily started with the assumption that the State-units of Europe would be, and ought to be, regarded as permanent and unalterable." A guarantee of existing rights or governments might easily mean in practice a guarantee of a prince against his own subjects. The history of the Holy Alliance and its eventual championship of black reaction and legitimacy aptly illustrates the need for reaching permanent lines of territorial division before attempting to crystallise results. To aim at a theoretical before a territorial settlement is to place the cart before the horse.

Nowhere is the sound commonsense of the author more obvious than when he discusses the assumption that the sanctity of treaties forms the very foundation of international morality. Mutual confidence between states, he points out, becomes impossible unless they can be trusted to fulfil their formal pledges. "But it is also true that no treaty has any claim to be regarded as sacred, except in so far as it is a just settlement of the question with which it deals." Most readers will agree that a real international agreement cannot be realized, unless (1) the aspirations of the peoples take precedence over the rival claims of the dynasties; (2) the dogma of the sanctity of treaties is supplemented by proper machinery for periodical revision; and (3) unless the League, once constituted, refrains from interference in the internal affairs of its constituent members (p. 169). The chief enemies of the international idea have been nationalism, commercialism and militarism, but of these only the third is necessarily and inevitably hostile. But that idea has steadily progressed for a century past, and if the Congress experiment of 80 years ago and the more recent experiment of the European

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Concert have both ended in failure and bankruptcy, it is not because the underlying idea was false or unrealisable, but because their chief exponents built upon false foundations. We agree with Professor Muir that the very wars which are sometimes bemoaned "as the evidence of an incurable European anarchy," have been a fresh stage in the triumph of a world-embracing ideal. We, who find ourselves in the centre of a whirlwind, need not for that reason adopt "the blank pessimism of the disillusioned sentimentalist." Internationalism is dependent upon nationalism, and is even necessary as its fulfilment; "the two are as mutually dependent as Liberty and Law." Only such a faith as this can provide us with the robust courage which the builders of the New Europe must possess.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

"Central Europe" in the Making

That our enemies are busily engaged in working out the Central European scheme on eminently practical lines is shown by the important economic Conference which met on 11 December at Budapest, under the hospitable roof of the Magyar Academy of Sciences. The names of its three Presidents are a sufficient guarantee of its serious intentions: Germany was represented by Duke Ernst Günther of Schleswig-Holstein; Austria, by the veteran German political leader, Baron Plener, the president of the Staatsrechnungshof and the son-in-law of the great Magyar leader Eötvös; and Hungary by Dr. Wekerle, twice Premier and one of her ablest Ministers of Finance. Papers were read by the Magyar-Jewish statesman, Mr. Sztérényi, a former Commercial Secretary of State; by Dr. Klein, the Austrian Minister of Justice; by the Austrian ex-Premier Dr. Wittek; by the presidents of the Central Union of Austrian Industries, of the Austrian Industrial Union, and of the Breslau Chamber of Commerce; and by some of the chief officials of the Hungarian railways and Danubian and Adriatic shipping companies. The Hungarian Government was officially represented at the Conference. The main subjects of discussion were the need of a common commercial policy in the Balkans, the introduction of uniform railway tariffs among the four allies, the possibility of an unified judicial system, and the development of the Danube as a means of communication and the extension of the system of canals. This last question had already been discussed at a special conference held last September in Budapest, and attended by representatives of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

The Central Powers are sparing no trouble to consolidate their political and economic position; and if the Allies should through ignorance or weakness consent to an inconclusive peace, they would at once find themselves confronted by a compact organism of 150,000,000, perhaps 170,000,000, inhabitants, dominating Europe and possessing such vast resources and undeveloped possibilities as would rapidly render it a danger to the whole world.

NOTES

The Re-opening of the Duma

The ten days' adjournment of the Duma that followed Mr. Stürmer's resignation was a period of suspense and anxiety. The new Prime Minister had gone to Headquarters, and there were rumours in Petrograd that important changes were to be expected. It was taken for granted that Mr. Trepov would make an effort to come to terms with the moderate parties in the Progressive Bloc, as it was obvious that the Duma could no longer be ignored. It was also expected that several other members of the late Cabinet would retire, especially Mr. Protopopov, who more than any other Minister had provoked the open hostility of the Duma.

The expected, however, did not happen. No overtures were made by Mr. Trepov, and no direct attempt was made to compromise with the Progressive Bloc. This may have been partly due to the resolute attitude taken up by the Cadets, who explained that the demands of the Bloc were already the result of a compromise and could not be whittled down any further; at the same time the continued presence of Mr. Protopopov and Mr. Makarov in the Cabinet made it impossible to negotiate even with the more Conservative elements in the Bloc.

Such was the situation on 2 December when the Duma resumed its sittings. The differences between the Government and the Duma had not been bridged, and a stormy sitting was inevitable. This time the disturbance came from the Extreme Left, who refused to give the Prime Minister a hearing. After an angry scene, half a dozen members, chiefly Social Democrats, were ejected and excluded for a certain number of sittings. It was in such an atmosphere that Mr. Trepov mounted the tribune to read the Government's declaration of policy.

The declaration of the Government was not well received. It embraced many questions of internal politics, but the Duma was not in a mood to listen to promises so long as no change had been effected in the system of administration. So long as Mr. Protopopov remained in the Government it was obvious that the Duma would not be won over. Criticism of Mr. Protopopov as Minister of the Interior was the main theme of the Opposition speakers. Even a moderate Conservative, such as Count Vladimir Bobrinski, denounced the late Vice-President of the Duma for associating with himself in a semi-official character his personal friend General Kurlov—a man whose administration in Courland shortly before the German occupation had been indicted in the strongest terms by the Duma.

It is too early to prophesy the results of the session, but there are no signs as yet of an understanding between the Government and the Duma. Indeed there is little likelihood of any real co-operation until the fundamental demand of the Progressive Bloc is realised—that is to say, until the Cabinet itself is transformed into one consisting of "Ministers who enjoy the confidence of the public."

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

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VOL. I, No. II.

December 28, 1916

The Two Voices—Britain and America

I

“To guide three mighty states by counsel, to conduct them from institutions of error to a worthier discipline, to extend a provident care to furthest shores, to watch, to foresee, to shrink from no toil, to flee all the empty shows of opulence and power,—these indeed are things so arduous that, compared with them, war is but as the play of children.”

NEARLY three centuries have passed since Milton, in his sonorous prose, wrote these words of the Man who had saved England from the abyss. Since 1914 the British peoples have found themselves once more at a crisis of their history; and, for all that time, their conscious yearning has been for a Man—not in the sense of a dictator, but as a personification of their own determined striving to make good the shortcomings of the past. The whole of this striving can be summed up in the one word: Victory. Yet not victory as an end in itself, but as the means of preserving and extending those conceptions of justice and liberty which, often ill-expressed and even misunderstood, lie deep down at the heart of the race.

We have longed for a man who should be utterly a Man for War, because war is unhappily now our supreme business—not necessarily a soldier, still less a politician, but a man whose mind should be entirely given to the work in hand, caring for nothing else, thinking of nothing else, and staking his whole being on the achievement of his task. Have we found such a man? We do not yet know. We only know that Mr. Lloyd George has made mistakes in the past, that he has not always spoken or acted wisely, that he has seemed at times to be demagogue rather than statesman, but that there has nevertheless been in him, throughout the phases of his career up to the beginning of the war, a certain sweep and range of vision, a squareness of mind, a power of rising to occasions, a readiness to face awkward facts, that distinguished him from, and placed him *potentially* above, his contemporaries. We are not quite sure what his record

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was during the crisis that preceded the war, or whether during "the Twelve Days" he stood firmly for the great issue with which he has since become identified. But we do know that, having made his choice, he stood by it, and has since been the most warlike of our Ministers, not excepting even Lord Kitchener himself. If he was slower than some of his colleagues to "find himself," he has outdistanced them all in his adaptability to new circumstances and new requirements. He faced, and with competent advice overcame, the formidable financial situation that marked the outbreak of war. He assumed, and again with competent help carried through, the task of organising the production of munitions of war. He went to the War Office at a moment when the handling of compulsory service presented extraordinary difficulties. But so far was he from mere self-seeking or personal ambition that he is credibly related to have been ready, at one moment, to go to Ireland as Chief Secretary, in the hope of mending a gaping rent in our national armour. This he was prepared to do, counting the cost and knowing the penalty of failure, but impelled by the instinct which has often tempted him to undertake necessary and dangerous tasks, and inspired by that keen sense of nationality which has always been one of the chief motive forces in his character.

Of his insight into the requirements of the war situation the public knows less, though it is by this time an open secret that, very early in 1915, he saw and urged upon his colleagues the necessity of saving Serbia; that he understood from the first the immense importance of Russia for the Allied cause, and trusted the Russian people and their Emperor; and that, had his foresight prevailed, what he somewhat tersely called "the Roumanian blunder" would have been avoided. He has shown himself to possess an intuitive insight into the essentials of a swiftly-changing situation which men far more learned, and "experts" far better equipped than he, have failed to display. He is the bugbear of all pedants—military, diplomatic and parliamentary no less than literary. With him instinct often atones for lack of detailed knowledge, and is sometimes little less than prophetic. The insight of vision which this faculty bestows is strengthened tenfold by executive power. But it may also involve risk, unless constantly corrected by calm con-

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sideration of facts, and sustained by the energy generated by high mental tension.

But, above all, he has faith and fire. Faith goes to faith. The country has had from the outset far greater faith in itself and in the Allied cause than many of its responsible leaders have shown, and it has certainly not had many opportunities of indulging in its faith in leadership. It has responded to Mr. Lloyd George, because, almost for the first time during the war, its ear was caught by an appeal which corresponded to its own intensity of feeling. There have been two occasions on which a Man gave us an inspiring lead—when Lord Kitchener asked for his armies, and when the King appealed for temperance and economy. But with these two exceptions, the nation has long been accustomed to expect a wet blanket where it looked for enthusiasm. It was failure to recognise the growing impatience aroused by a permanent reluctance to “play up” that was the main cause of the severe disillusionment of the late Prime Minister and his associates during the recent crisis, and of their inability to gauge its outcome.

Mr. Lloyd George's critics say of him that he is the “laziest” Minister on record, and that he cannot be got to “work.” This merely implies that he refuses to wear away his strength by performing punctiliously all the routine duties of a departmental chief; that red tape has no attractions for him, and that despatch boxes do not strike awe into his soul. He has been known to “idle away” hours on important days in thinking out the fundamentals of a given problem, and in discussing them with unofficial acquaintances, instead of “working” in his department. Thanks to his “laziness,” he is almost the only minister who has solved the problem of being at once a member of the Government and an independent mind. His long years of office have scarcely dulled the freshness of his outlook, and, despite the keen anxiety which he has felt about the progress of the war, he is probably less jaded than many unofficial members of Parliament. All this should tend towards vigour and comprehension, clearness of decision and rapidity in action. Those who still feel misgivings lest what they used to regard as his subversive tendencies might be strengthened by supreme executive power, may be reassured by the fact that solid foreign Conservatives in countries which are now

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enemy, expressed years ago admiration for the sure touch and unerring instinct which enabled him time after time to forestall what seemed to them a real revolutionary movement. If he were to be defined in a phrase, we should be tempted to call him a Conservative Iconoclast, as distinguished from the Reactionaries, Conservative and Radical, whom he has combated or with whom he has been associated. It is his Celtic imagination, his Calvinistic faith, his openness to ideas, and his restless faculty for "getting things done," that have irresistibly impelled him to break with the policy of leisurely procrastination which was eating out the vitals of the Empire.

Mr. Lloyd George's first speech as Prime Minister shows that he is under no illusions, and suggests that he is inoculated against the praise alike of his friends and of his secret enemies of yesterday. He, like the nation at large, has no time for compliments. He is burning to "get on with the war," and he will be judged by his capacity for sustained effort throughout a crisis of which the end is not yet in sight.

In mere words the programme which he announced—"restitution, reparation and guarantees"—in no way differs from that of the late Government; and Mr. Asquith was the first to endorse his scepticism regarding overtures made in a spirit of ostentatious arrogance, and aptly illustrated by the brutal dragoonings and slave-hunts of Belgium. But when we leave phrases and theories behind, we find that the whole outlook and *raison d'être* of the Government has been transformed. Instead of rhetorical complaints against "whimperers" who resented the ostrich methods of our easy-going leaders, we find an insistence upon hard facts, even "at the risk of being characterised as a pessimist." The ponderous coach, which, even in times of peace, had lagged and rumbled so far behind executive requirements, is superseded by a light, compact and highly-g geared machine, working at high pressure, and, on the rare occasions when it was not actually in use, ready for the road at a moment's notice.

The foolish old tradition which apportioned political offices according to party services and standing, and transferred ministers of proved incompetence from one department to another with a sublime disregard for qualifications, gives way, not all along the line, but in many important directions, to the principle of filling offices according to

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expert knowledge and proved administrative merit. A huge farther stride is taken on the road which leads to that final recognition of equality in sacrifice, in opportunity, and in control between employers and workers, against which both sides have so often sinned in the past, and without which there can be no industrial or social peace in the future. The nationalisation of railways is to be followed by that of mines and shipping, and we hope that prompt steps will be taken to extend the same principle to the Drink Trade. The privilege of National Service is to be extended, as it ought to have been from the first, far beyond the ranks of the combatants, and made to include both sexes and every age. Drastic measures are to be taken to secure our food supplies, and to check the dwindling of the wheat area in these islands. Last, but not least, the Dominions are to be more formally consulted regarding our national policy and the conduct of the war, and thus the first steps taken towards that constitutional evolution which must, ere long, transform the still undeveloped British Empire into the Commonwealth of our dreams.

The speech concentrates attention upon "the complete mobilisation of all our national resources," and may therefore be described rather as an administrative than a political programme. The Prime Minister doubtless feels that the first step is to *prepare* victory, the second to expound it. His resolve to insist upon efficiency and to face facts hitherto ignored or suppressed lead us to hope that he will enforce the principle that responsibility shall not be distributed so widely that it can rarely be fixed, and that failure in politics, as in the field, shall meet with punishment instead of condonement or reward.

II

The advent of the new Coalition Government coincided with the theatrical peace overtures announced by the German Chancellor on behalf of the Central Powers; and it is, of course, difficult to judge how far the form finally adopted was determined by the hope of handicapping Mr. Lloyd George in his new task. The difference between German theory and practice is so glaring as to render comment very largely superfluous. But this only serves to accentuate our surprise at the response which the German Note has awakened

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at Washington, and forces us, however reluctantly, to contrast the outlook and mentality of the two men who to-day stand at the head of the two chief English-speaking communities.

The Wilson of 1916 is no longer the Wilson of 1912. He entered upon office as a professor and a doctrinaire, whose academic and literary merits were supplemented by a curious hankering after party politics. Throughout his tenure of office Mr. Wilson's real attention has been concentrated upon party politics, and he has always judged the war through Democratic spectacles. He knew his strength in the South, but he has always been torn by uncertainty as to his hold upon the East and Middle West. If comprehension of the war and its issues has been faint in New England, it has been nebulous in Chicago and positively non-existent beyond the Rockies; and therefore, the President's policy, to be successful, had to fulfil those promises of "peace and prosperity" which his agents had puffed so sedulously. Though not as phrase-bound as his Democratic colleague, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Wilson can never detach himself from those catchwords of American "idealism" which the twentieth century has worn so threadbare.

Nothing in his behaviour hitherto suggests a perception of the fact that for the American people no less vital an issue is at stake in this war than the international position and prestige of the United States. Are the 100,000,000 inhabitants of the Union to become a real nation, with definite principles and interests of their own to defend, if necessary, by force of arms? Or are they, before they have acquired the vertebræ that distinguish mammals from molluscs, to degenerate, as all democracies which lack strong traditions in foreign policy inevitably tend to degenerate, into an inchoate mass of hunters after pleasure and prosperity? We Britons have a right to speak straight to Americans, without diplomatic nicety or turn of phrase. To us they are our good friends and kinsmen, to whom the name of foreigner cannot be applied, and hence privileged to give and to receive criticism such as is not allowed to others—and this despite the vast influx of other elements which has transformed American life during the last two decades. We remember that, on two great occasions in history, America saw more clearly than the Home country which way the cause of liberty and democracy led; and

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this only serves to increase our regret that at an even greater turning-point in the history of humanity she should have allowed her leaders to balance between Right and Wrong, and left others to champion those principles of international law and arbitration which she regarded as falling specially within her own province.

Rightly read, the lessons of this war should teach every American citizen with pretensions to statesmanship that nothing is more dangerous than moral and material unpreparedness to face issues that may be raised at any moment, and that it is of high importance, when such issues are raised, to possess the goodwill and esteem of other countries. Not the least surprising effect of the present war—and one that fills all friends of America with dismay—is that official America has lost the goodwill and esteem of both groups of belligerents, and occupies a position of isolation which may become only too apparent when peace returns.

What is Mr. Wilson's record during the War? He remained silent when Serbia's offer to submit to the Hague Tribunal was rejected with contumely, and when the efforts of Sir Edward Grey and the Tsar in the same direction failed equally. He remained silent when Belgium's neutrality was violated, when the enormity of such an act was publicly admitted by the German Chancellor, when outrage, murder and terrorism were erected into a system by the German army. He remained silent when the population of Armenia became the victims of massacres to which there is no historical parallel since the days of Zenghis Khan. He remained silent when open watering-places were bombarded, and when Count Zeppelin and his nocturnal murderers dropped explosives at random among sleeping civilians. He protested against the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the *Sussex* because there were American citizens on board. He remained silent upon countless other occasions when international law and the lives and fundamental rights of neutrals were openly defied by German submarines. He exchanged wordy Notes with Germany, in which he talked of "strict accountability"; and his friends seem to imagine that it was an "ultimatum" of his, and not the success of British naval measures, that brought about a cessation of the submarine campaign off America. Thus, when after 29 months he entered his first serious protest against German

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war methods—with regard to the deportations from Belgium and France—it was only to be expected that his action should be unavailing. With such a record Mr. Wilson is entitled, like every State and every individual, to stand out against infringements of his own rights; but he has long since forfeited all claim to speak in the name of humanity, or to press upon any of the belligerents his opinion as to what is right and wrong.

Let us accept the most favourable American hypothesis of the meaning of the American Note; and we are forced to conclude that Mr. Wilson imagines himself able to apply to the war situation in Europe the same kind of petty astuteness which distinguished his electioneering campaign in America. He has shown himself unable to judge as to what is or is not opportune, and, influenced apparently by a desire to mark his second term of office by the same kind of glory as that which Mr. Roosevelt achieved at the Portsmouth Conference, he rushed into the arena at a moment when the only possible signal from the audience was a well-nigh universal "Thumbs down." His intervention has been so ill-timed and his standpoint so utterly divorced from reality, that it seems almost superfluous to add further criticism. But we believe that one of the main causes of his diplomatic blunder is to be sought in Mr. Wilson's complete failure to grasp the meaning of the modern movement of Nationality. Only on such a basis can we account for his parallel references to the need for "safeguarding the territorial integrity . . . of the nations involved," and for "relieving the smaller and weaker peoples . . . of the peril of wrong and violence." The first of these phrases, if logically applied, involves a reversion to the *status quo ante bellum* and the perpetuation of the miseries from which Europe has suffered; the second involves such territorial changes as shall set free the small nations who at present groan under the tyranny of the Central Powers—not merely Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Poland, Roumania, whom they have conquered, but Alsace, Posen, Bohemia, Croatia, Trentino, Transylvania and the many races whom they have oppressed through all the years of peace. But Mr. Wilson, to use the phrase which he applied in April, 1915, to the United States, "has no racial momentum," and the motive forces of nationality in Europe are to him a sealed book.

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Thus, while we readily pay tribute to Mr. Wilson's intellectual qualities and transparent honesty of purpose, we cannot accept either his premises or his conclusions, and we can only express our regret at his fundamental inability to understand that war is a very serious business, and that the nations engaged in it are not disposed to tolerate the antics of unbidden amateurs.

Our answer to his well-meant, but none the less insulting, overtures, must be modelled upon the instructions which one of the greatest of his predecessors, Abraham Lincoln, issued to the American Ambassador in London when mediation seemed to be in the air. "If the British Government shall in any way approach you, directly or indirectly, with propositions which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seems to imply a purpose to dictate or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way to receive, entertain or transmit any communications of the kind." To-day the Allies represent the same cause of spiritual freedom for which Lincoln lived and died, and nothing will deter them from pursuing it to its final issue. If Mr. Wilson has forgotten the traditions of his Covenanting ancestors, we may be thankful that at England's hour of need the ancient spirit is alive in the nationalist leader whom Calvinist Wales has given to her.

British Policy and the Rights of the People

[The following article is from the pen of Mr. H. M. Hyndman, the veteran of English Socialism. While not committing ourselves to all the views expressed in it, we feel that the problems which it raises in so startling and suggestive a form deserve the closest consideration of our readers and of the wider public beyond.]

THE present war will undoubtedly lead to many modifications in the map of Europe. Already it has brought about a complete change of ideas in regard to the organisation of industry and affairs generally in Great Britain. But, owing to the incompetence of politicians and officials, the inevitable transformation is attended by wholesale mismanagement and waste. Even now, after two years and a half of hostilities the like of which the world has never yet seen, the

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old, worn-out methods still hold their ground in many directions, and the whole Empire is cajoled and fleeced because there is no means provided by our chaotic Constitution of getting rid of Government employees who will neither learn anything themselves nor submit to be taught by those who are able to inform them. The nation is thus arrested in its advance towards a better state of things by an antagonism to progress, not only of individuals in its service, but of a *system* built up against itself. We are, in fact, afflicted with all the drawbacks of an irresponsible and almost irremovable bureaucracy, without the efficiency sometimes displayed by highly-trained public servants under capable leadership.

Some of us have continuously pointed out the defects of our happy-go-lucky arrangements for many years past. All to no purpose. There are too many vested interests at stake for criticism from without to be of any avail. A politician who is appointed chief of a department, however able he may chance to be, can seldom effect any radical reform before the exigencies of government by faction transfer him to another office or turn him out of place altogether. No real training for his post is thought necessary for the responsible Minister: no serious training does he get. We are all so accustomed to muddle through in this fashion that the absurdity of the thing rarely strikes us.

Our political forms themselves are at least four generations behind our economic development. Bourgeois parliamentarism has been tested and found wanting; capitalist administration has proved rotten all through, from agriculture upwards; permanent officialism obstructs every genuine attempt at effective democratic reform. The theories of the governing class are in ruins. Their practice is discredited more and more every day. Plutocracy, with its dependent Aristocracy, and a few captured Labourists, is now in control of the old machine. Such is the situation, with the worst of the war, probably, still before us.

Of all the departments, however, which call for thorough investigation, overhaul and reconstruction, the Foreign Office is, at present, the most important. Nobody, even in joke, can accuse Democracy of being responsible for the wholesale blundering of that great public service. It is the closest of close boroughs: the most exclusive of exclusive societies.

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And *l'esprit de bureau* was never more carefully cultivated, regardless of all national interests, than by the literati and superior persons of Downing Street. In the days of recognised Whig supremacy the formula for the Foreign Office was: If you cannot find a Russell, take an Elliot; if an Elliot is not to be had, take a Grey; if a Grey is unavailable, secure a Leveson-Gower. Changing the names, the same rule applied to the Tories. The tradition holds good to this hour. Fitzmaurice, Grey, Cecil, Balfour. Could Brown, Jones, Robinson, or even Smith, fresh from the farm, the forge, the mine and the factory, replete with ignorance and destitute of manners, have managed worse for us common Englishmen than the highly-cultivated and elegant gentlemen who have done us the honour to be born to rule over us? Certainly not.

But, this being so, all the talk about the danger of democratic control, the necessity for absolute secrecy, and so on, becomes sheer nonsense. There is obviously nothing to be gained by keeping the people in the dark about their own business, on the ground of the superior intelligence of the men at the top. Yet, nowadays, the claim for entire freedom from public influence on the course of foreign policy is asserted more crudely than ever before. The recent demand of Lord Robert Cecil, that he and his associates and subordinates should have absolute and irresponsible authority over the whole of our relations with other Powers, has never yet been formally withdrawn. For the past twenty years there has been an increasing tendency to deceive the country on matters of most crucial importance. Secret agreements to divide up large portions of Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe are now being disclosed, which proves that we have been engaged, as a nation, for years past in most perilous negotiations about which the people knew nothing at all, and which, most assuredly, they had never authorised the Foreign Office to enter into on their behalf.

All this is the more dangerous, since, even if the successive heads of the Foreign Office were much abler men than they are, the permanent officials would possess far too great power. Apart from the fact that it would take a man of altogether remarkable capacity to obtain control of officials who are always on the spot, the natural inclination of the political chief is to repose more and more confidence in his

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subordinates, chosen out of a nominated list of competitors, whom he cannot discharge. If these permanent officials are attacked and their influence denounced, this is claimed to be unfair, as they are not allowed by custom to defend themselves. If their superior upholds the policy of the Office, then all the force of the faction in power is brought into play in order to maintain the prestige of the Cabinet Minister.

Thus Sir Edward, now Viscount, Grey, who has been Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since 1906, frequently left Sir Eyre Crowe in full command during his own absence. Yet he bitterly resented that any mention should be made of this permanent official or any other person in the background, and all his political supporters in Parliament and the Press upheld his view of the matter. There is no means whereby an independent public committee can review the facts and inform the people about the whole business. Take the case of our hopeless muddling in Greece. Everybody speaks of undue influence exerted in favour of King Constantine and his treacherous reactionists. Yet, even in so simple a case as this it is impossible to obtain full information in Parliament, and those who know the truth are afraid to disclose it. We are in the same position with reference to the disastrous adherence to the illegal Declaration of London, which cost us and our Allies endless losses in money and men, and protracted the duration of the war by many months.

The present may not be the moment to go fully into these suspicious transactions. But surely the system which permits this doubtful and ruinous misuse of bureaucratic authority must be finally put an end to. This is of immediate and crucial importance. The war came suddenly when we were unprepared and misinformed. We were left no option in honour but to do what we did. Peace, too, may come upon us suddenly, when likewise we are unprepared and misinformed. It is impossible for us to feel sure that we shall not be traded away by our rulers, so long as the Foreign Office is manned and handled as it is.

What is to be done? A small, independent non-party Committee should at once be formed, before whom all important information and all proposed treaties or arrangements should be laid. This Committee need not be composed solely of Members of Parliament; but it is essential that its repre-

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sentatives should be nominated and chosen by direct popular vote, and that they should be authorised to publish all matters that come before them. The dangers of such publicity cannot possibly be greater than the dangers of the secrecy which has landed us, unready, in the horrors of an unprecedented war. Moreover, if this were done immediately, the first step would be taken towards the complete reorganisation of the Foreign Office itself.

As matters stand, men in whom the country has less than no confidence may be sent to the Peace Congress which must sooner or later be held. The self-nominated politicians and bureaucrats alone responsible for exercising the authority of the King are practically at liberty to nominate whom they please to represent the Empire at the most important world Congress that has ever met. What is the use of arguing in favour of a thoroughgoing policy for the recognition of nationalities and the safeguarding of the rights of small States when at any moment bargains may be struck such as those made at the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin, which sowed the seeds of future wars? Special envoys seated round a table with full powers have often committed this nation to treaties and conventions and declarations which are dead against its true interest—as witness what the two old Whigs, Lords Clarendon and Cowley, did in relation to our rights at sea at the Paris Congress of 1856. By the Declaration of Paris these statesmen gave away for nothing, without argument, debate, or proper authority, nearly all that our fathers had been fighting for on the ocean for generations. Our Foreign Office has held us bound by that foolish action ever since. Let us take care that we are not treated in still worse fashion a few months hence. Only full publicity can save us from the likelihood of a fatal vicarious sacrifice after all the hundreds of thousands of lives that have been lost to avert it. Viscount Grey has already prepared the way for this complete surrender, and his successors are pledged to proceed in the same direction.

But we are told that the complications on the continent of Europe are so great and so closely connected with our colonies and dependencies that it is quite impossible the people should be able to form any correct judgment on the facts. That, no doubt, is partially true. But who are the geniuses capable of solving these difficult

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problems in secret conclave? Let us, at least, know that. For example, we are told that Constantinople and the Dardanelles are to be handed over absolutely to Russia when the Allies have gained their final victory over the Germanic Powers. Is no account to be taken of English opinion on this serious matter, or has the Foreign Office pledged the nation irrevocably to this tremendous change without recourse? Those who have long advocated the neutralisation of the great city and the Straits, on the ejection of the Turks, are surely entitled to know what the considerations are which induce the British Government to put in the hands of the Tsar the keys of the commerce of the Danube to the possible permanent damage of the whole of the Slav States.

There is a growing party³ in the Duma and throughout Russia which is opposed to the continuance of this expansionist policy. That party favours the establishment of Constantinople as a neutral centre, with free outlet for all nations bordering on the Black Sea and the Danube. Are not the members of this incipient democracy entitled to be heard? Moreover, knowing as we do that a few weeks ago Stürmer and Jagow had come to terms for a separate peace between Germany and Russia, are we quite sure that a another and a successful underground arrangement between the pro-Germanists of Russia and Germany herself might not be sprung upon us, after the Congress had ratified possession by Russia of the districts which it is proposed to cede to her?

As an Englishman who has been very friendly with three generations of Russian Revolutionists, who is proud to number the most eminent of their leaders, of all shades of opinion, among his intimate friends, and as one who for more than fifty years has done his best to oppose the Russian Government and its policies, I nevertheless recognised, when Germany set to work to obtain the domination of Europe and the Near East, that an arrangement with Russia was inevitable. It was a choice between two evils. An alliance with Russia was the lesser of the two. Barbarism emerging into civilisation is not so dangerous to freedom as scientific ruffianism, regardless of all the morality and decency of human life. But it is precisely because I have⁴ no doubt on this head that I am anxious there should be no attempt to burke discussion as to the policy now being adopted without any popular control.

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Again, we talk freely of the emancipation of nationalities all over Europe, and our distinguished fellow-worker, Professor Masaryk, has done splendid work in pleading the cause of his oppressed brethren, under Austrian rule, among all the English-speaking peoples. The Jugo-Slavs and the Slavs generally are rightly clamouring to be left free to pursue their own course of development unhampered by German tyranny. But, in addition to the difficulties of enforcing the just demands of Bohemia, what obstacles must be met in any attempt to deal with Hungary on the lines of nationality only! There the population is about equally divided between Magyars and Slavs, who are interspersed all over the territory. With the break-up of Austria, now openly advocated and apparently inevitable, here is another nation which cannot with safety be left entirely to the mouth-to-ear chaffering of envoys at a Peace Congress. Discussion, publicity and popular decision are indispensable throughout.

But, after all, the affairs of England and the British Empire are the most important for Englishmen and Colonists. We shall enter the Peace Congress as the Power which has done more than any other to obtain victory over the most formidable combination against the liberties of Europe in modern times. Our services and our sacrifices have alike been stupendous. Taken entirely at a disadvantage, owing to the pernicious suppression of the truth and constant vacillation by our own statesmen, we have so conducted ourselves as a nation that our navy, our army, our finance and our munitions have constituted the mainstay of the Allied resistance. At the close of the war (should the menace of famine at home be averted) England closely united with France can exercise a conjoint pressure in favour of a thoroughly democratic and nationalist policy, unprecedented in the history of these Assemblies. Italy and Russia may well find it to their advantage in every way to follow on the same lines. The complete victory to which all the Allies are now irrevocably pledged would then mean something much more than the defeat of the Central Powers and the overthrow of Prussian militarism. It would carry with it the certainty that democratic institutions would secure rapid development where they already exist, and would strengthen their growth in countries where, as yet, they are

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in their infancy. Out of the great war might result a great and a durable peace.

Unfortunately, England herself will not appear with clean hands to advocate this glorious policy for the future unless a great change is immediately made. The misgovernment of Ireland, which obliges us to keep a powerful army in that unlucky island, in order to prevent its inhabitants from governing themselves, lays us open to the charge of hypocrisy when we demand the reconstitution of Poland and justice for the Slavs all round. How can we honourably deny to our own people, tens of thousands of whom are fighting for the freedom of others, the like freedom which they demand for themselves? Our position in India is even more injurious to our good name. There no fewer than 315,000,000 people are under the direct or indirect control of a despotism as harsh, and even more completely foreign, than any that Austria has ever exercised. Ought not the solemn petition of nearly all the most prominent Indians in the British service, recently submitted to the British Government, to be forthwith considered and accepted as we go to the front to struggle for universal emancipation at a great International Congress? Were Ireland and India both honestly assured of just treatment beforehand, then, indeed, England and her Empire might stand forward, in the trying period ahead of us, as the unselfish and powerful champions of the cause of the people all over the world.

H. M. HYNDMAN.

Political Factors in Austria-Hungary

SOME weeks ago THE NEW EUROPE published a survey dealing with the political development of Austria-Hungary under the late Emperor, and we propose, in future articles, to deal in some detail with the internal situation created by the war, the disintegrating effects of racial rivalries, and the hideous reign of oppression by which the authorities have sought to counteract them. But the full impression of the facts which we propose to lay before the British public—facts which have been quoted from time to time in isolation, but whose cumulative effect is simply overwhelming—cannot make itself felt without some preliminary study of the com-

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plex forces at work inside the Dual Monarchy and their political value. Even to-day it is insufficiently realised in England that there is no such thing as an Austrian nation, far less an Austro-Hungarian nation. The famous Bohemian historian, the late Count Lützow, once complained to the present writer that he was frequently asked at English dinner-tables whether Austrian was a very difficult language! In reality Austria-Hungary is one huge mosaic of nationalities. The nine principal groups are the Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenes, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes (sometimes classed as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as three branches of the Southern Slav race), Czechs and Slovaks (the two latter so closely allied as virtually to constitute a single nation), Roumanians and Italians. The tiny Rhaeto-Roman fragment of Ladines in the Tyrol—commonly confounded with the Italians—is sometimes claimed as a separate nationality; and this applies with much greater force to the Jews of the Monarchy, among whom the Zionist and Jewish national movement has taken considerable hold, especially in Galicia. The total population of the Monarchy amounts to fifty-one millions—twenty-eight in Austria, twenty-one in Hungary, and two in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The root fact of constitutional life since 1867 has been that, in each half of the Dual Monarchy, political power has been vested in a minority. In Austria less than ten million Germans, in Hungary less than nine million Magyars, have held the great non-German and non-Magyar majority in bondage, though it is to be remembered that German methods in Austria, even at their worst, have always been less crude than those employed by the Magyars towards their subject races.

From the true constitutional and parliamentary point of view the Dual system is simply one of systematised oppression. For example, there are 516 deputies in the Austrian Parliament; of these, 233 are Germans, while the Czechs only have 107. If representation were genuinely based upon the proportion of the population, the Germans would only have 160 seats; but a deliberately artificial device secures them 73 more than they are entitled to possess, and, consequently, an altogether disproportionate control of parliamentary proceedings. The necessary majority in the House being 259, they only require to find 26 outside their own ranks, and it is always a comparatively easy task

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to seduce one or other of the minor nationalities to their side. Thus, though universal suffrage was introduced in Austria in 1907, and though equality is the very essence of the electoral law, the old familiar practice of "electoral geometry," so dear to the hearts of German and Magyar, has been preserved sufficiently to secure an altogether fictitious majority.

In Hungary the same system is applied, but in an infinitely cruder form. The Hungarian Parliament consists of 413 deputies (exclusive of the 40 delegates sent to it by Croatia-Slavonia); and of these 405 are Magyars and only eight represent the other races. On a basis of population, however, the non-Magyars would be entitled to 198 seats. Their exercise of the franchise is prevented or restricted by every imaginable device or chicanery, and there is an elaborate governmental system of terrorism and repression which, in scores of constituencies, keeps back the Slav or Roumanian voters from the polls or unashamedly falsifies the result in his disfavour. The whole machinery of the State is thrown into the scale against the non-Magyar voter, and his chances are rendered well nigh hopeless by the wholesale employment of troops and armed gendarmes to "preserve order." Such brutal methods have vanished from Austria, with the notorious exception of the province of Galicia, where the Polish magnates—the so-called Szlachta—are still adepts in the art of "managing" the peasant electors, whether they be Pole, Ruthene or Jewish. Drastic methods of governmental pressure and corruption were, it is true, employed by the Austrian authorities in the Serbo-Croat province of Dalmatia as recently as the elections of 1908; but it is only fair to point out that though what we should regard as incredible may have been mild and commonplace in Dalmatia eight years ago, what every Dalmatian Croat would regard as incredible even in 1916 is still more mild and commonplace throughout the length and breadth of Hungary.

The Austrian parliamentary machine, despite crying defects and inequalities, is perfection itself compared with that of Hungary, despite all its ancient traditions of procedure and its much more effective control of the executive. The introduction of separate electoral constituencies for the rival nationalities was in itself a valuable experiment which was

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not merely calculated to diminish, but did actually diminish, friction between the various races. But the wholly arbitrary apportionment of seats to the different nationalities vitiated the whole scheme; and the Austrian Parliament, after each reform, has still remained little better than a screen for Absolutism. The Government is appointed by the Emperor, and as it does not ever represent a distinct party in the House, and does not even necessarily command a majority, it has the power to rule by the aid of decrees, and to interpret or modify the law in a highly arbitrary manner. The notorious Paragraph 14 which, in case of need, empowers the Emperor and his Cabinet to govern without parliamentary sanction, had been resorted to with disquieting frequency in recent years. If the Government proves to be too weak, the Emperor himself intervenes and enforces his will. The constitution gives him an overwhelming power. He is inviolable and above the law. All ministers and officials are appointed by him and also all the higher officers of the joint army, of which he is the supreme chief. Not merely are the army and navy free from all control save that of the Emperor himself, but foreign policy also lies outside the sphere of the two Parliaments of Vienna and Budapest. It is true that the Joint Foreign Minister is nominally responsible to the two Delegations appointed annually by those Parliaments, and that there have been occasions when their disapproval has driven him from office. But their rôle has always been far too amorphous, far too unreal, to exercise any permanent or decisive influence upon foreign policy, which has, in effect, remained in the hands of the Emperor and of officials who owe their continuance in power to him. It is only natural that in a State composed of so many nationalities the dynasty should be the focussing point. But the Habsburg dynasty is even more than that; it is the State itself exploiting all the nationalities. It is the heart of the starfish, so far as there is a heart at all.

Side by side with the dynasty, the aristocracy is very powerful in Austria, and still more in Hungary. In all monarchical countries the aristocracy has hitherto enjoyed many privileges and prerogatives, but, in the Dual Monarchy, it has tended to dominate the situation. It enjoys the *entrée* to a Court where no amount of genius can atone for the absence of the requisite thirty-two quarterings; and it is

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through it that the influence of the Court is distilled. But among the many nationalities whom we have enumerated it is only the Germans, the Magyars and the Poles who can boast a truly national aristocracy of their own; and this explains, to a very large extent, why these three nations exercise greater political influence than all the rest. Bohemia, it is true, possesses a rich and powerful aristocracy; but, unlike that of the Magyars and the Poles, it is more German than Czech, and devotes its efforts to maintaining the balance between the two races in Bohemia. This is the inevitable result of the process of denationalisation enforced by the Habsburgs and their Jesuit advisers upon conquered Bohemia amid the horrors of the Thirty Years' War; the old Czech nobility was almost exterminated, and its lands divided among a motley crowd of adventurers from every country in Europe—German, Irish, Spanish, Italian, etc. It is worth adding that at the provincial Diets, of which there are no fewer than seventeen in Austria, the traditions of the old aristocratic Estates have never died out, with the result that the nobility still forms a caste apart, possessing its own electoral body. For instance, in Bohemia, the great landed proprietors hold 70 seats out of a total of 242; and sometimes a deputy is elected by four or by even fewer electors.

Much has been written, and not without justice, of the Austrian Camarilla, as a more or less permanent political institution. The fact is that the Archdukes and Archduchesses, of whom there are to-day over seventy, form a special group of the highest aristocracy, and that there are always some among them who exercise a special influence over the Emperor. Certainly the most notable example of this is the rôle played by the Archduchess Sophie at the Court of her son, the youthful Francis Joseph. In recent years, the influence of the Archduchess Isabella (the wife of the Archduke Frederick, who has played so sorry a part in the present war as Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian forces), and of the Archduchess Maria Josefa (a Saxon Princess and the mother of the new Emperor), has been very marked, and, before the war, was especially inimical to the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, to hismorganatic wife, and to the forces of reform for which he stood. The House of Habsburg has lately become a huge vested family interest, which broods like a nightmare over the populations whose fate it controls;

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and there is an added danger in its trivial outlook, its utter lack of imagination, knowledge or intellectual qualities, and its failure to develop any qualities of statesmanship or political vision. The murdered Archduke, with all his faults, towered head and shoulders above all the rest; and it was his very energy and enthusiasm for an idea which may have been distorted or unrealisable, but was certainly sufficiently alive to awaken a response in many serious quarters, that aroused such keen antagonism against him on the part of the rest of the family. Behind them stood a tiny clique of high court officials, who latterly formed a Chinese wall between sovereign and people, and whose occult and pestilential influence was as boundless as their capacity for intrigue.

A more recent political factor is the plutocracy. Industry, both in Austria and in Hungary, has been, to a very considerable extent, developed by the aristocracy who, as great landowners, sought to combine agricultural and industrial enterprises. Anyone who knows Vienna will remember the Schwarzenberg dairies and the Harrach glass factories; but these are merely two random instances out of many. In the last two decades, however, industry and finance have far outgrown their aristocratic and agrarian petticoat. A new class of finance-barons has arisen, not unlike what is sometimes known in England as the "beverage," and has developed an elaborate system of trusts and Kartells for the exploitation of sugar, coal, iron and so on. The great financial houses indulge in commercial ventures to a degree hardly realised in the West, and they have become more and more identified with Berlin. Jewish influence is predominant in the economic sphere, and, in Budapest in particular, all the great banks and all the principal industries are in Jewish hands. In both capitals the Bourse is practically controlled by the Jews, and this control is rendered all the more effective by their control of the leading organs of public opinion. The *Neue Freie Presse*, the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, the *Zeit*, and the *Arbeiterzeitung* are almost exclusively Jewish, while such official and semi-official organs as the *Fremdenblatt* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung* are also under Jewish influence (the clerical *Reichspost* is the only important paper in Vienna in which the Jews have no say). In Budapest, where there are three times as many daily papers as in London, Jewish predominance in the press is even more remarkable, whether

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it be in the governmental *Pester Lloyd*, in the representative Liberal *Az Újság*, in the Chauvinistic *Budapesti Hirlap*, in the Independent *Magyarország*, the Radical *Világ*, or the Social Democratic *Népszava*. The plutocracy, within certain limits, has enormous political influence, but it has been cryptic and indirect, and has, to some extent, been hampered by national differences. The leaders of industry, like the workmen whom they employ, are recruited from every race in the Monarchy. In Austria the Czechs have a powerful and flourishing industry of their own, while the Poles, too, are evolving one. In Hungary industry, under a sham *façade* of Magyarisation, is, for the most part, not Magyar at all, but either German or Jewish, and, in the last twenty years, one effect of the persistent exclusion of the non-Magyar races from all share in political and administrative life has been to force them to concentrate upon private enterprise and to build up industries, banks and co-operative societies of their own, which are certainly modest enough when compared to those of their neighbours, but are self-sufficing and capable of great development.

No doubt the greatest unifying force in Austria-Hungary is the joint army. Its language, the so-called "language of command," is German. Officers of non-German nationality find themselves obliged to use the German language, and gradually they tend to become Germanised, though latterly the intensity of national feeling has made itself very apparent even in the officers' corps, and has had a disintegrating effect upon the army as a whole. With the advent of Dualism, a separate Hungarian reserve or territorial army was created (known as Honvéd, the equivalent of Landwehr), while Croatia also has her own reserve. The growth of Socialism in Austria has, in recent years, permeated the army with anti-militarist tendencies; and it is known that the Commander-in-Chief, Conrad von Hoetzendorff, and the high military and dynastic clique of which he was the mouthpiece, quite definitely aimed, during the Bosnian annexation crisis, at provoking war with Serbia, in order to consolidate the army by means of military successes. This motive undoubtedly played a considerable part in Austria-Hungary's whole policy of hostility to Serbia.

Yet another political factor of very great importance is the Church. Austria herself is overwhelmingly Catholic,

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there being only half a million Protestants, a sprinkling of Orthodox and a million and a quarter Jews. In Hungary, on the other hand, roughly half the population is Catholic, while there are three million Orthodox, four million Protestants, and nearly a million Jews. But, in both cases, the Roman Church enjoys vast revenues from the land, and the country is studded with monastic establishments whose heads maintain a princely style and seem wholly absorbed in selfish and worldly pursuits. Undoubtedly the fact that the huge latifundia of the Church, only too often neglected and undeveloped, are the object of a growing land hunger on the part of a peasantry whom political discontent and official backwardness have driven to emigrate in increasing numbers, tends to make the Church in Austria-Hungary even more conservative and amenable to authority than she naturally would be. The hierarchy is appointed by the Emperor, and it is significant that in this, the greatest of Catholic States, confirmation by the Holy See is a mere formality. Even during the period of the Reformation the Habsburgs refused to compromise on that question of investiture which had divided mediæval Europe into a Papal and Imperial party. Throughout the long reign of Francis Joseph Rome has supported them by every means in her power, and meekly submitted to the revocation of the Concordat in Austria in the sixties, and to the introduction of civil marriage and other ecclesiastical reforms in Hungary in the early nineties. The hierarchy, which is recruited, but with some very notable exceptions, from the aristocracy, controls the great bulk of the clergy; the laity has absolutely no influence in the Church. Indeed, the intellectual and academic classes in Austria, and perhaps, to a lesser degree, in Hungary, are overwhelmingly freethinking, and have, to a great extent, shaken off Church ties altogether. But religion still exercises an immense influence upon the peasantry, and, through the medium of the parish clergy, whose moral and intellectual standards vary very greatly according to the particular nationality, the Church still exercises a vast political influence and its *role* as an unifying factor can hardly be exaggerated. It is to be remarked, however, that the clergy have always been well to the front in the various national movements of the last century, and have been affected to a growing extent in recent years by national feeling. Nowhere is this tendency

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more marked than among the Southern Slavs; indeed, the Slovene Catholic clergy have been very much in evidence as advocates of Southern Slav unity and sympathisers with Serbia. It may be added that as not merely the Catholic, but also the Orthodox and Uniate hierarchy, owe their appointments to the State, their attitude to the dynasty and the State is almost equally conservative and subservient.

In a subsequent article we propose to discuss in detail the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy during the present war.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Count Czernin : the New Emperor's New Foreign Minister

[In Austria there has been another and even more surprising shake of the political kaleidoscope. Dr. von Spitzmüller, the financial nominee of Budapest and Berlin, who had replaced Dr. von Koerber, failed to maintain himself and has been succeeded by the Bohemian feudal aristocrat, Count Clam-Martinitz. He, like his colleague without portfolio, Dr. Baernreither (the well-known German-Bohemian Conservative leader), is known to have enjoyed the confidence of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and to have favoured a revision of the Dual System, and just concessions to the Southern Slavs and the Hungarian nationalities. At the same time another prominent supporter of the same policy, Count Ottokar Czernin, also a member of the high Bohemian aristocracy, has been appointed Joint Foreign Minister. It is too soon to express a definite opinion as to these changes, but they certainly suggest a rally of the "Old Austrian" party against the excessive influence of Prussia and Hungary.]

The following interesting study of Austria-Hungary's new Foreign Minister, who till last August was Minister in Bucarest, is from the pen of the distinguished Roumanian statesman, M. Take Ionescu, and appeared in his newspaper *La Roumanie* a few days before the evacuation of the capital.]

* * * * *

Count Czernin is a thoroughly typical Austrian. We all know, and are always repeating, that there is no Austrian nation. This is true in the real sense of the word. An Austrian people, that is to say, an agglomeration of individuals possessing a collective conscience, does not, and, could not, exist. But "Austrians" there are. They are the members of a clique which is recruited from among all the nations of the earth, who, from generation to generation, have served the Habsburgs, who live by the Imperial favour, and who form a kind of civil General Staff to that family, which itself is the only link which holds together all the different races of the Monarchy. These people speak German among them-

COUNT CZERNIN

selves, but their mentality is not German. Whether they be of Czech, Polish, Italian, Croat or German origin, they are, in fact, neither Czechs, Poles, Italians, Croats nor Germans. Until quite lately they might even be of Magyar origin, and yet no true Magyars. These people, the members of this little clique, are Austrians. They are, indeed, the only Austrians in the world. Their essential characteristic is a lack of real intelligence. But, nevertheless, they are not as simple as they appear to be. They have the bureaucratic tradition and a certain cunning which takes the place of intelligence. On first acquaintance one is attracted by their charming manners, and by a certain veneer of omniscience which hides a deplorable vacuum. Then one is apt to fall into the other extreme, and out of sheer amazement at their ignorance and lack of intelligence, to look upon them as harmless. It is only later that the real facts emerge, and then one realises that these people are, at bottom, mere *roublards*, and that it does not do to count too much upon their intellectual insignificance. Count Czernin is a very representative "Austrian." Intercourse with him is most agreeable, as his manners are, at any rate in appearance, altogether delightful. His intelligence is of the most rudimentary order, but cunning supplies its place sometimes, even to advantage. Added to his, he has a sense of humour, and is almost witty on occasion. He remarked one day to Radev, the former Bulgarian comitadji, now turned diplomat: "Neither you nor I will ever be good diplomatists; I because I never lie, you because you never speak the truth."

Count Czernin was no longer in the Service when, in 1913, Vienna thought fit to replace Prince Fürstenberg, who had not been able to prevent Roumania's entry into the war against Bulgaria, and in consequence, the Peace of Bucarest. It was the Archduke Francis Ferdinand who chose Czernin. He had long singled him out as his future Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the meanwhile he sent him to Bucarest with the definite mission of patching up Austro-Roumanian relations once more by means of serious concessions which the Magyars were to make to the Roumanians of Transylvania.

I met Count Czernin, for the first time, soon after his arrival at the opening of the new Industrial Museum. He took me into a corner, and, despite the crowd all round us, explained to me that he had come to Bucarest with the sole object of consolidating our relations by the large concessions which the Magyars were to make to the Roumanians. He assured me that these concessions would be made, whether the Magyars liked it or no, but that it was certain that Budapest would see reason in the end, since it was not merely a matter of justice, but of sheer necessity. Without these large concessions on the part of the Magyars, the Austro-Roumanian alliance could no longer continue.

There was a measure of true courage in this firm declaration. I had no doubt whatsoever that Count Czernin was under an illusion as to the possibility of serious concessions, but it was very honourable on the part of an Austro-Hungarian Minister to acknowledge that they were necessary. At the same time, it seemed very strange that

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he should make such a definite declaration to me at our first meeting, and in the midst of a crowd which jostled us at every turn. It merely confirmed my former opinion of Austrian diplomatists. In course of time it became obvious, even to Count Czernin, that the story of Magyar concessions to the Roumanians of Hungary would remain a mere Arabian Night's Entertainment, and he spoke of it less and less whenever I met him. . . .

In the early days of the war . . . I often met Count Czernin at Sinaia. . . . He stopped me once in the street to ask whether it was true that Talaat and Zaimis were both coming to Roumania in order to try and adjust the Turko-Greek differences with regard to the Islands. When I answered that it was quite true, he asked me, with a malicious smile, whether I really thought that it was merely for that that Talaat was coming? I answered him bluntly: No. Talaat had stopped in Sofia on the way, and it was obvious to me that he was coming to Roumania in order to try and conclude a Turko-Roumano-Bulgar alliance against Russia.

"Well," said Czernin, "if they make a proposition of this sort to you, what will you answer?"

"I am not the Government," I said, "but if I were, and if they made me any such proposition, I should simply reply that in the event of wishing to ally myself with Austria I should prefer to discuss the matter with her and not with her servants." Some days after the fall of Lemberg, Czernin asked me, by telephone, if I could receive him. Naturally I said yes. . . . This was our last conversation. . . . The Austrian Minister began by saying that he had a favour to ask of me: "We shall soon be at war with each other," he said. "But after the war there will be the peace. Promise me, that when I have the pleasure of meeting you after the war we shall be friends again, as we have been." . . . Then, when I answered that the issues of war and peace did not rest with me, he declared:

"You will go to war with us. That is an understood thing. It is both your interest and your duty. Why, if I were a Roumanian I should attack Austria, and I do not see why you should not do what I would do in your place. It certainly is not a noble action to turn against an Ally, but history is full of such villainies, that of Austria as well as of other States, and I do not see why Roumania should be the only exception. . . . Only," he went on, "I ask you one thing. Wait two weeks longer. In two weeks' time the whole military situation will be changed in our favour; and whatever interest you may have in making war on us, you will see then that it would be a mistake."

I smiled, and Czernin continued: "No, not two weeks, but three. That's all that I ask. If in three weeks' time the situation is unchanged, then attack us, I repeat. I should do it in your place." "But I insist upon these three weeks. For, you see, this will be a war of extermination. If we win, we shall suppress Roumania. If we are beaten, there will be no more Austria-Hungary." I repeated that our entry into the war did not depend on me, and

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that, so far as I could see, he might count not merely upon three weeks, but upon far longer, even if it should eventually come to war between us." I also added that to speak of extermination was an exaggeration. "But with regard to all this," I said to him, "our positions are not the same. I, if Roumania were suppressed, should lose everything. I should be a pariah wandering on the face of the earth. Whereas you, who claim to be a good German, would lose nothing by the disappearance of Austria. You might even gain by it, since Germany can never be suppressed."

It was thus that we parted. This was in the course of the afternoon. In the evening I heard from Nicu Filipescu that Czernin had spoken to him, on the same day, in exactly the same sense.

This last conversation with Count Czernin is the strangest that I have ever had with a diplomatist. If I had not heard it with my own ears it would seem to me not merely extraordinary, but absolutely incredible that the representative of Austria-Hungary should declare that if he were a Roumanian he would go to war with Austria, that being both the interest and duty of Roumania.

The Ethiopian Pivot

L'Ethiophe et les Convoitises Allemandes. By Pierre-Alype. (Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1917.) 7 frs. 50.

In the first number of THE NEW EUROPE Professor Masaryk aptly wrote: "In my opinion, the actual plan of Germany might be expressed even more fittingly by the watchword, 'Berlin—Cairo.'" The great Germanic Empire of the future must command, not only the valley of the Euphrates, but the valley of the Nile. The undisputed control of Asiatic Turkey must eventually lead to the acquisition of Egypt, for when Palestine and Arabia have been covered with a network of strategic railways, "Moltke" (as Paul Harms wrote in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, 10 October 1915) "will have conquered Mahan"—a world-continental Power will have been created which, from its size and compactness, can defy Sea-Power, and concentrate irresistible forces on the Suez Canal.

Some months ago the catchword "Mittel-Afrika" enjoyed once more a wide popularity in Germany. Originally revived as a counter-cry of the Hanseatic and Colonial groups whose interests cannot be exclusively identified with the "Mittel-Europa" plan, the campaign was merely another aspect of the demand for oversea colonies and a strong Navy to protect them. The unemployed Colonial Minister, Dr. Solf, was, however, prudent enough to point out that oversea colonies did not necessarily demand a predominant Navy. In other words, "Mittel-Africa"—the dream of a great German belt from Kamerun and Angola to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean—was both supplementary to and dependent on "Mittel-Europa." What the outbreak of the European War had prevented Germany from obtaining by peaceful persuasion from Britain—namely, the gradual absorption of Central Africa—must be

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obtained more fully and more surely by the victories of the Central Empires' armies in Europe and Asia.

Egypt is the link which must bind "Mittel-Europa" to "Mittel-Afrika." Before the war, German traders, hotel-keepers, tourists and archæologists flocked there in ever-increasing numbers, and much was hoped from Egyptian supporters of Pan-Islam when the Khalif proclaimed the Holy War. Further south, however, there was a freer field, for in the loosely-ruled feudal Empire of Ethiopia there was opportunity for intrigue such as was not possible in the Egypt of Lord Cromer or Lord Kitchener. Some account of these intrigues as well as of the sometimes legitimate, sometimes unscrupulous, attempts made by the Germanic Empires to increase their trade in Abyssinia is given in M. Pierre-Alype's book. The author is conscious of the importance of Abyssinia in the German world-plan. It commands or threatens the Upper Nile; it looks down towards the Red Sea and (once) Turkish Arabia beyond; it invites connections with German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, on which Germany has long fixed her gaze. For his interest in and presentation of the Ethiopian question we have no hesitation in commending M. Pierre-Alype's book to our readers. The tone of it is admirable, and no Englishman can fail to be grateful to him for his generous words on "the loyalty of British policy." The book is, however, unfortunately not free from grave defects. It does not, it is true, pretend to give a full account of modern Abyssinian history; and that, together with a feeling of delicacy with regard to our loyal Italian ally, may be sufficient reason for the fact that the names Adua and Crispi are not once mentioned. The author, however, seems to lack real acquaintance with Abyssinia and even makes serious mistakes. His statement on p. 19: "Presque toute l'Abyssinie est catholique" is of course quite incorrect, unless "catholique" includes the curious local variety of Coptic Monophysitism taught by the Abyssinian Church (as the author notices on p. 9!). On p. 9 he commits the still more inexcusable blunder of connecting the Ge'ez and Amharic languages with the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family. The former—the Church language of the country—is of course of purely Semitic origin, and Amharic, though more corrupted, has no Indo-European affinities.

The author's faith in Ligg Jeassu's power to prove himself a second Menelik has been unfortunately disproved by the course of events since he wrote.

A. W. A. L.

The Empire and the Future. (Macmillan.) 1916. 2s. 6d.

Under the above title, six lectures, academic in origin but entirely practical in substance, were delivered in the autumn of 1915 to crowded audiences in King's College, London. The aim of their promoters was the crystallization of the vague but fast-growing sentiment of Imperial fraternity into a clear, intellectual conception of the imminent task of consolidation. Each of the lecturers spoke with authority: whether it be Sir Charles Lucas, in a new and illuminating application to the British Commonwealth of the judgment of Thucydides upon

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the failure of Democracy as an imperial authority; or the Master of Balliol proclaiming his belief that the British workman has the root of this Imperial matter in him, though partisanship has so far concealed it; or Mr. Steel Maitland, in his conviction that the essential strength of Britain is unimpaired and full of the power of expansion; or the Editor of the *Round Table* expounding his favourite theme that Greater Britain Overseas is an Empire no longer but a Commonwealth: each has a message and commands our ear. As Mr. Philip Kerr points out, the secret of the unarmed strength of the British Empire lay in its power to give the fullest liberty to legitimate nationalism, and to combine it with loyalty to the greater commonwealth by promising good government and eventual self-government. The secret was no divine gift but a hard lesson of history. Having learned it, the British people may justly claim a high (if not the highest place) in the practical political progress of the world. But this claim carries with it a very great obligation; for it imposes upon us the duty of carrying on the work of consolidation, and thus of displaying the feasibility of a world-wide commonwealth composed of many kinds of men and races. If we succeed—and I, for one, do not doubt it—we shall have taken the first substantial step towards a stable form of international authority which, for our children's children, may supersede all war between civilised nations.†

A. F. W.

Monsieur Briand's Position

Between the two Governments of France and Great Britain there are interesting points of resemblance and equally interesting contrasts. Each has arisen out of dissatisfaction with its larger and slower predecessor; each has at its head a man who may fitly claim the title which M. Briand once gave himself, "*un homme de réalisation*"; each has signalled its arrival in office by an encouraging if also slightly too spectacular display of activity; each tends to lean more to the Right than to the Left for support in the popular chamber; and each shows a tendency to rule with a minimum rather than to seek a maximum of parliamentary approval. Here the resemblance ceases. Monsieur Briand's Government is a reconstruction and consolidation under the same chief; Mr. Lloyd George is a "clean sweep of the old gang," entailing certain revolutionary innovations. Monsieur Briand retains the heads of the great fighting Departments in his Cabinet; Mr. Lloyd George excludes them from his. Monsieur Briand amalgamates three important ministries—Commerce, Agriculture, and National Economy—under one chief, M. Clémentel; for the very same tasks Mr. Lloyd George creates a whole bevy of new administrative posts. And so on: the points of contrast might be multiplied with ease. We will mention but one more. While Mr. Lloyd George's Cabinet is markedly more "Chauvinistic" than its predecessor, Monsieur Briand's has undergone no such spiritual change in its attitude to Germany, and is demonstrably better educated in European affairs than its British contemporary. But, leaving the comparison, we may take note of

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certain factors in the French political situation. Monsieur Briand's hold on power is not as secure as might be wished, and would be quickly undermined if an alternative Cabinet were ready to replace him. But we are at war, and the inveterate game of Cabinet-making, as played in peace-time at the Palace Bourbon, is out of favour; and no prominent rival steps forward to challenge the Premier. This circumstance cannot for long conceal the weakness of M. Briand's position—a weakness which we unfeignedly regret. It is worth noting, for instance, that at the outset all the deputies on leave from the front voted against the Government in a powerful minority of 165, which also included Augagneur, Painlevé, Delcassé, René Renoult, Cruppi, Franklin-Bouillon, Tardieu, Leygues, and Thomson, as well as a full two-thirds of the Unified Socialists. This figure—165—does not fully reveal the strength of the opposition, for there were about fifty abstentions and thirty members absent by permission. The three principal Socialist leaders, MM. Sembat, Guesde and Renaudel, voted for the Government, the majority of their followers against it; and M. Painlevé's refusal to take office in it is not compensated by the adhesion of M. Herriott, the active Mayor of Lyon, whose tendency to pacificism was very marked before the war, but has probably gone the same road as Mr. Lloyd George's. In all this there is, of course, no weakening of the French resolve; for even the Socialist Federation of the Seine, in demanding that the Allies should accept "all negotiations necessary to obtain official information of the conditions of peace proposed by Germany," insists at the same time on "the vigorous continuance of the war of national defence."

Baron Sonnino on Peace Intrigues

The peace motion of the Italian pro-German Socialists has been rejected, as was only to be expected, by an overwhelming majority in the Chamber. The whole incident was chiefly remarkable for a fine *extempore* speech of the Italian Foreign Secretary, Baron Sonnino, which appears to have aroused very genuine enthusiasm on all sides. After re-emphasising the fact that the Central Powers have submitted nothing which can in any way be described as "proposals," and that none of the Allies can even begin to consider anything in the nature of separate overtures, he declared that all are desirous of a lasting peace. "But by this we mean an ordered arrangement whose duration would not depend upon the *saldezza* with which are forged the chains that subject one people to another, but rather upon a just balance between states, upon respect for the principle of nationality, the rules of international law and the rights of humanity and civilisation. . . . We do not aspire towards any international arrangement of slavery or hegemony such as would involve the annihilation of peoples or nations." A

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serious offer would, of course, be seriously discussed; but "the tone of braggadocio and insincerity" which characterises the German Note does not inspire confidence. It rests upon the argument that the four Central Powers were forced to take up arms in self defence, whereas this is as patently false of them collectively as it is of them individually. "We all have the duty to watch lest the *malizia* of the enemy should empoison the country. But let us also take care not to contribute unconsciously ourselves towards playing the enemy's game by untimely and ill-thought-out manifestations,—inoculating, thoughtlessly, the soul of the nation with the pestilential germs of division and calumny, or rendering more difficult . . . perfect harmony of thought and action among the Allies in all matters bearing upon the war." "No politician," he concluded, "is necessary in the sense of being irreplaceable. But what is supremely necessary to-day is, that those to whom the country entrusts the conduct of its policy in this grave moment in its history, should be able, abroad no less than at home, to adopt a free and strong attitude, without which they can do absolutely no good; and to-day such an attitude is only possible, not only in fact but even in appearance, both at home and abroad, for one who enjoys the full and obvious confidence of Parliament."

It was only natural that language of such directness and obvious sincerity should have won the hearts of the Italian Chamber. We confess to some envy when we compare it with the grudging and secretive attitude adopted by those responsible for foreign policy in the Mother of Parliaments, whose members meekly submit to the astounding thesis that they are unfit to control the nation's relations with the outer world. Parliament's abdication of its most vital privilege—a privilege which is at the same time a sacred trust, to be exercised on behalf of the nation at large—is one of the most disturbing and depressing features of the late Coalition *régime*; and we can only hope that the new Government will adopt healthier and more democratic methods.

Greece and Italy

There are situations when an action, trifling in itself, becomes the last straw which turns the scale. King Constantine has revealed his treacherous and ignoble nature in a long series of hostile acts, to which the Entente Governments have submitted with humiliating weakness. But when he presumes to re-name a street in his capital after the First of December—the day on which his hired bravos indulged in open murder and outrage—we feel that the time for mere protest or discussion has passed for ever. In the words of one of the ablest French publicists, M. Auguste Gauvain, "Constantine is playing exactly the same game as Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and hitherto both have succeeded admirably. The Coburg of Sofia let M. Bratianu believe till the last moment that he would observe benevolent

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neutrality after Roumanian intervention, and then, without declaring war, fell upon the Roumanian troops in the Dobrudja and put them out of action. Constantine pretended to agree confidentially to the Entente demands, and on the day agreed upon for the execution of this friendly pact he had the unsuspecting French and British blue-jackets massacred. Under the protection of Mackensen and Falkenhayn Tsar Ferdinand is celebrating his triumph. Under the menace of our cannon Constantine, killer of the Venizelists, mocks us with compliments." He has behaved like an open enemy, and as an enemy he must be treated.

The late Government, true to its ostrich policy, persisted in concealing the true reason for the paralysis of Entente policy in Greece. To preserve silence further on this vital question is to court disaster, and we are glad to see this view adopted in no less a quarter than the *Journal des Débats*. Its leading article of 19 December alludes quite frankly to the campaign which has for weeks past been conducted against M. Venizelos and in favour of the recreant King, in many of the leading Italian newspapers. But, being doubtless well aware how public opinion is manufactured in Italy, he is not so foolish as to treat this campaign as the sign of a serious breach between Italy and her Allies. Far rather is it a typical manœuvre intended to induce the Allies, in return for Italian complaisance in Greece, to pay a bigger price in other directions.

M. Gauvain is undoubtedly right in arguing that no good purpose can be served by suppressing all reference to the complaints or criticisms of an Ally, from fear lest frank discussion might injure certain susceptibilities. This is "the fundamental vice of the diplomatic method of the Allies. If they felt that they were not at one on certain points they ought at once to discuss it and clear matters up. On the contrary, they have persisted in letting them drag on in obscurity, and the result has been misunderstanding and catastrophe. Between friends, and still more between Allies, there must be explanations. If the Venizelist question is envisaged in different ways inside the Quadruple Entente, we shall not improve the situation by fighting shy of it." It is essential that we should know that reputable Italian journals have for weeks past been applauding the repression of Venizelism by the Royalists, declaring M. Venizelos to be at once the enemy of Greece and of the Allies, clamouring for the extension of the blockade to Venizelist territory, and blaming France and Britain for not running after Constantine and his court minions. While the *Tribuna* argues on these lines, the *Corriere della Sera* actually went so far as to accuse Venizelos of working in secret accord with Constantine and protesting against the philhellenism of London and Paris. Meanwhile the minister of our Italian Ally remains in Athens and hob-nobs with the murderer of Allied bluejackets.

Such a situation cannot be allowed to continue, and we are confident that our Italian friends must be as eager as we are to clear up a misunderstanding which, if allowed to continue, can only have one end, namely, the complete and final extinction of all Entente influence in the Balkan Peninsula.

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The Importance of the Danube

The great importance of the Danube for the new Central European State is thoroughly realised in Germany and Austria. Considerable attention has been aroused by a lecture on the subject delivered at the Geographical Society of Munich by Professor Heiderich, of Vienna, on 8 December. He pointed out that the Danube is an ideal line of communication, and must be made "an instrument of Central European economic and cultural policy." The first essential is the ejection, from the Commission which regulates its traffic, of the three Powers who do not possess any territory on its banks, namely, Britain, France and Italy; for "this 'international' Commission violates the sovereign rights of the riparian states, and is, from the point of view of international law, a monstrosity which has no analogy." This reform will lead to fresh activity and to a resumption of the schemes of regulation. The next essential is the speedy construction of canals on a grand scale, such as will free the Danube from its present geographical isolation. The most obvious of these are the Danube-Main and the Danube-Oder canals (the latter with a branch to the Elbe). The old "Ludwig-Donau-Main Canal," though the war has revived its use, should not be further developed; but the project of Hensel for a new Bavarian canal, connecting Munich and Augsburg with the Danube, should be adopted. These canals, supplemented by the extension of the "Mittelland" Canal, will render possible a regular system of circular tours on German home waterways, and, consequently, a successful competition in freights with the far longer sea route from the North to the Black Sea. "By the valour of our armies," said the lecturer, "the Lower Danube has been set free. In the interest of our undisturbed economic development and our military safety it must remain free for all time." These German ideas of freedom cannot be brought home too often and with too great insistence to the British public.

"THE NEW EUROPE" MAPS.

In view of the necessity of a clear understanding of the geographical distribution of the nations, as opposed to the States, of Europe, it is proposed to issue a series of maps as free supplements to THE NEW EUROPE. The first map, "The Pangerman Plan as Realised in the War," will appear on 11 January.

ERRATUM: p. 221, The price of "A History of the Modern World."
By Oscar Browning (Cassell & Co.), should read 7/6, not 12/6.

Printed for MESSRS. CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

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VOL. I, No. 12.

January 4, 1917

The Internal Situation of Austria

IN a previous article an attempt was made to give a brief survey of the main factors which render the internal situation in Austria-Hungary so complicated and so kaleidoscopic. The Dual Monarchy cannot be fitted into any existing category of States; indeed, it is neither a state nor a nation in any sense of the words, but merely a government, an amorphous organism which owes its prolonged existence merely to the comfortable myth of "indispensability." The war has exercised upon it an even more profound effect than upon the other countries involved, and this is still very inadequately understood in Western Europe, in spite of all that has been written on the subject. Diplomatically, the population was deliberately "rushed" into war by a small clique of army chiefs and court officials, backed by the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, and their diplomatic ally in the Ballplatz, Count Forgách. The assassination of the Archduke, whatever may be thought of the suspicious circumstances which accompanied it, was unquestionably received with jubilation rather than with grief or indignation among those circles which favoured a forward policy in the Balkans. It provided an excuse for crushing Serbia such as might never present itself again, and every feeling of horror and injured patriotic pride among the masses was skilfully exploited. The inspired press of the Monarchy was daily fed with irritants throughout the period which intervened between the murder and the ultimatum, with the result that Serbia's abject reply was rejected with contumely by public opinion in the two capitals. The mob of Vienna and of Budapest was genuinely enthusiastic for the war, and the old songs of Prince Eugene, "the noble knight" who stormed Belgrade, were chanted on every hand. But the frothy outcries of the "street" merely served as a partial blind for foreign opinion; the authorities themselves were under no illusions as to the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the population.

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Sofia, in Constantinople and Damascus. German non-commissioned officers are lent to Austria and Bulgaria; German troops are sent to stiffen, and, if necessary, to fire upon, unreliable non-German regiments. Even the commissariat is more and more in German hands, and German officers and German agents are everywhere in the Dual Monarchy and the Balkans.

Germany's economic control is scarcely less effective than her military predominance. Vienna and Budapest have long been financially at the mercy of Berlin, and the longer the war lasts the more complete will their economic thralldom become. Sofia receives at stated intervals the doles which alone enable her to continue fighting, and these are withheld whenever she shows signs of being refractory. Of Constantinople it is unnecessary to speak, since utter bankruptcy and liquidation are inevitable in Turkey, whatever may be the issue of the war.

Germany herself, as a compact State of nearly 70,000,000 inhabitants—organised, and organised, above all, for war, as no State has ever been in the history of the world—is already sufficiently formidable. But we find her also in effective control of the 52,000,000 inhabitants of Austria-Hungary and the 20,000,000 of Turkey, and the war has added to these the intermediate populations of the Balkan peninsula. Geographically, Germany and her satellites form a single unit, and the essence of the Pangerman plan is to weld it into a political and economic whole. The realisation of "Central Europe," as a federation of States under the Prussian hegemony—not falling, it may be, under any known category of States, but none the less effective for the business of this world—would not immediately supply the Germans with an equivalent for the loss of their overseas trade and of the possibilities of colonial expansion. But it would provide an incentive for the future, and a field for operations on a vast scale. The whole of the Danubian and Balkan countries, with the vast undeveloped riches of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, would become Germany's economic sphere of influence, and, indeed, a virtual German monopoly; while Germany would be free to resume undisturbed, at the expense of the Slavonic and other non-German races of the Central and South-East European zone, that policy of colonisation and Germanisation which was one of the main features of her mediæval history.

WHY GERMANY WANTS PEACE NOW

During the last two years the design of Berlin-Bagdad has materialised under our very eyes. Its weak spot was Serbia, who, when war broke out, gallantly held the breach alone. The supineness of the Entente and the successive blunders of its political and military leaders muddled the attack upon the naval base of Cattaro, lost us the Danube front, with its infinite possibilities of striking at the vitals of the Central Powers, made a present to Austria of the strategic point of Mt. Lovćen, produced chaos in Greece and failed to save Roumania from disaster. The narrow and precarious corridor of a year ago has become the broad route of to-day, with several alternative railway lines and waterways. But for us the problem remains what it was from the beginning, save that it has become more difficult, and that the very success of our efforts in other directions makes Germany exert herself all the more in the South-East. Germany's land connection with the East must be cut, the Turks must be ejected from Europe, the 35,000,000 Slavs and Latins whom Germany is ruthlessly exploiting in a quarrel which is not theirs, must be set free to live their own lives without foreign interference. It is only by their emancipation that the *Drang nach Osten* can be effectually checked and the menace to European peace, which comes from unsatisfied national feeling, allayed. The alternative is the rise of a continental power far more formidable than that of Napoleon, and threatening the very existence of the British Empire by its access to the frontiers of Egypt and of India, under changed conditions of naval warfare which every year may render more unfavourable to Britain.

Ocular demonstration is the best of all appeals, and we believe that the map which we this week present to our readers is more eloquent than a thousand Peace Notes. Our only wonder is that such a map, with its eloquent lesson, has not long ago been upon every hoarding in the Empire.

Roumania and the West

The following article has been sent to us by Professor Nicholas Iorga, the distinguished Roumanian historian and politician, whose great speech in the refugee Parliament at Jassy was received with general enthusiasm, and is now being circulated, by order of the Chamber, to the troops. Some eloquent phrases from his covering letter may serve as an introduction and a motto:—

“ THE Roumanian peasant has done his whole duty, and far more than his duty, if one considers the conditions in which

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he has lived hitherto. Do not forget to proclaim the superb sacrifice which he has made for a country which he only knows instinctively, without its ever being made clear to him by word or writing. He has saved our honour, and he will have created our future. You who know us well, do not forget it. Declare it aloud, that we have not been found wanting; that only the means failed us; that Roumanian manhood has been the same as it was in the past; that we regret nothing which we have given, and that we hope for all that is our due."

I

Political vicissitudes may bring together for a time, and even form close ties between, peoples who have nothing further in common when a certain combination of circumstances has ceased. The alliances which have been formed during these last eventful years will not, however, so far as one can see, prove to be of this ephemeral character, their object not being merely the safeguarding of material interests, important as these are. The question at issue, for the first time in the world's history, is whether a nation which has made military brigandage her profession has the right, in respect of her superiority in that domain alone, violently to transform the life of the whole human race in her own interests, reducing all other nations to a state of abject slavery and their countries to a field for perpetual exploitation.

Those who in the course of this unique war have suffered such unimaginable horrors will not easily forget the cause of their misfortune. The brotherhood established in the midst of such terrible dangers will necessarily have a future. If in days past there was a "Holy Alliance" to keep the peoples of Europe under the oppressive "police-state" system instituted by the conquerors of Napoleon, there will assuredly be another to keep these same peoples, this time conquerors in a gigantic struggle for the liberty of nations and of individuals, out of all danger of future oppression; and since this war, which has been imposed upon Europe by Germany and by her palpably and indisputably "cultured" allies, has its economic side also—the result of the anticipated victory being to transform all the outer world into docile and submissive clients of German industry—it is to be hoped that the members of the league which possesses in Russia the greatest reserve of raw materials in the world,

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and in Great Britain, France and Italy, the oldest established, most honest and best-informed manufacturers, will manage to dispense with Austria-Hungary's "cheap and nasties," and with the goods Germany turns out with such feverish haste. In this way economic links will be forged to strengthen that unshakable moral solidarity which will make any degrading hegemony of one nation over the others impossible for the future, and which will in the end teach even Germany that she made a mistake in "taking on" the whole world, and that nothing is left for her but to take the road of sanity back to her proper place among the working and thinking nations.

After the ancient Europe of the Crusades whose common efforts were consecrated to the deliverance of the Holy Places; after the dynastic Europe of "equilibrium" between States which were merely the patrimony of their princes and kings; after the Europe dominated by courts and salons which interchanged their *beaux-esprits*; after, finally, the Europe of the Congress of Vienna, concerned only to preserve, in face of the ever-rising tide of Nationality, the ancient frontiers traced according to the wishes of the Reigning Families alone, there will come—we must needs believe it, lest we should despair of the future and of the human race—there will come that "*New Europe*" of which the title of this review speaks, in the form of a free economic and cultural confederation of human labour and also a fellowship founded on emancipated national consciousness.

In this fellowship, consecrated to the highest human aims, each people will take the place to which it is entitled by its aptitudes and by its willingness to collaborate in the work of that Society of States to which this war will give birth.

What, then, will be the place of the Roumanian people who, for the first time—despite the close ties which have always existed between the different provinces inhabited by the race—will be able to show what they are capable of when united in their entirety (or very nearly in their entirety) under a single political flag? We will try to define it in the following pages, and more especially with regard to Great Britain and the British people.

II

Very little was known in England before 1914 about the kingdom of Roumania, which was formed in 1859 by

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the union of the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, after half a century's stubborn fight for independence against the Turks, as well as against their Christian neighbours. There was no British Consulate in these countries until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and this diplomatic post was at first established on a very modest footing. Blutte, the second Consul (succeeding Cook), resided for many years at Bucarest and formed connections in the Wallachian principality, but did not count politically. He acted chiefly on behalf of shady Greek merchants and speculators, and of indigenous Jews who were in search of protection. A second war between Russia and Turkey, ending with the treaty of Adrianople in 1829, which delivered the Roumanian Danube and its ports from Ottoman usurpation, and rendered possible the free export of grain from the principalities, was necessary in order to arouse the interest of Great Britain to any practical degree. The British flag soon appeared at Braila, the new Wallachian port, and at Galatz, the only Danubian port of Moldavia; and English buyers figured prominently among the exporters of Roumanian grain.

The commercial relations thus started developed fairly rapidly, but did not reach the dimensions to which they might have attained if it had not been for the active, and sometimes unscrupulous, competition of Austria-Hungary and Germany, who, in the second half of the last century, cornered the important Roumanian market. A large portion of the wheat exported from Roumania to England is, however, to be found under the official statistics of imports to Belgium and Holland, since the ports of those countries served as intermediaries. The English iron trade plays quite a subsidiary part in supplying Roumania's needs, and even the drapery trade—despite the overwhelming superiority of its products—has had to make way for very mediocre Austrian manufactured goods. Sewing cotton and needles are the only articles which still come exclusively from England.

It must be remembered also that at a time when Roumania was trying to raise the money needed to establish her public services and to meet the many fresh needs of the modern State by means of loans in the richer countries which had available capital, it was Germany, anxious to secure complete control of the lower Danube, who came forward as her chief banker. English capital, on the other hand, made no attempt to compete, although England had at one time

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been the chief banker as well as the chief exporter along the Danube.

In the sphere of politics it was the institutions of England, as well as those of France, which all lovers of liberty took as their model, when the new generation of Roumanians entered upon its difficult fight—first, against the Russian Protectorate, then against Turkish innovators *à la mode de l'Occident*; and it was to the Consulates of England, as well as of France, that they turned for support. At this period Colquhoun and David Urquhart—the first, Consul at Bucarest; the second, author of an extensive and important work on the Ottoman Empire—exercised an active and beneficent influence on the political development of the two Danubian principalities. But these promising beginnings unfortunately led to nothing. Only France, under Napoleon III., was left to protect a movement which, nevertheless, should have appealed to English public opinion at a time when the Magyar dictator, Kossuth, was being received with acclamations in his exile. Since it was a question of carving out an united and independent Roumania from the body of the moribund Turkish State, the champions of the dogma of Ottoman integrity became the enemies of all Roumanian efforts and hopes. English prestige in Roumania was affected for a whole generation, and one has only to turn over the leaves of a book dedicated by a friend to the memory of Sir William White (who was British Minister at Bucarest in 1878, before being sent as Ambassador to Constantinople), in order to realise how insignificant a part England then played with regard to Roumania's political development.

III

Mr. Blutte, when British Consul in Bucarest, wrote enthusiastically of the beauties of Roumanian landscape, "as classical as that of Italy." From the heights of the Transylvanian Alps to the marshy banks of the Danube, hidden in primæval willow forests, every kind of scenery and vegetation is to be found, in a kind of harmonious progression unique in Europe. Within the borders of the kingdom alone there are many different climates; the climate of Moldavia, which is akin to that of the Russian steppes; the mild climate of the Wallachian plain; the Mediterranean climate of Oltenia, which is similar to that of neighbouring

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Serbia; finally, the curious climate of the Dobrudja, that strange region whose ancient granite formations, rising from the waters of the Black Sea, have been washed bare by age-long drainage from its hills and plateaux. During the summer, Mr. Butte lived in the hilly region of Valeni-de-Munte, where he wrote interesting pages on the subject of the race whose aristocratic fineness of fibre he appreciated, as well as the vivacious intelligence and power of quick decision which it derives from its remote Latin origins.

If the scenery of Roumania has charms for the intelligent traveller who delights in discovering new beauties for himself, her historical monuments—of which many will doubtless have suffered from the avenging vandalism of German, Magyar, Turkish and Bulgarian invaders—are no less worthy of his attention. Nay more, of particularly reverent attention, in view both of their unique artistic character and of the many vicissitudes through which these fragile monuments of a poor and weak country have passed.

It is in these valleys of the Carpathians and in this portion of the Danubian plain alone that a new and distinctive form of art has been born of the union of East and West, of Greco-Slav and Latino-Germanic elements alike. Although official and ecclesiastical life in Moldavia and Wallachia was impregnated with Roman law, Greek Orthodoxy and the Slav language, it was at the same time always subject to revivifying influences which came from mediæval Western Europe. From that quarter came the general social structure of the two principalities; from the West also the intellectual tendencies of the Renaissance, and latterly those ideas of liberty which are the distinguishing feature of modern times. The results were a class of feudal boyars, who, however, have never encroached upon the autocratic powers of their prince—*dominus*, in Roumanian, *domn*; a literature which first sprouted in the cold shadow of the venerable Orthodox Church, but soon turned elsewhere for sun and air; a permanent bias towards Western political ideals; and, finally, an architecture marked by charming proportions, great freedom of line, and a delightful native spontaneity. It is the child equally of the Gothic cathedrals of France and of the ancient basilicas of Byzantium, and employs, even in the domain of sculpture and painting, motifs and ornamentations taken impartially from the rival civilizations of East and West.

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Even if the ideal of warfare which Germany of to-day has the invidious distinction of creating and proclaiming, should entail the sacking of the museums of Bucarest and of the principal churches and famous monasteries, with their rich store of artistic treasures, there will still remain much to arouse the admiration of the traveller, hidden away in the hundreds of smaller ecclesiastical buildings in out-of-the-way corners throughout the country.

Doussault, the French draughtsman, published his beautiful engravings during the forties at the very time when two other artists, Bouquet and Raffet, were enchanted with the natural beauties of Roumania. He writes as follows, after long acquaintance with the country: "The churches of Roumania are the only monuments which deserve the attention of the artist and archæologist; they are many in number, and some of them can well bear comparison with the most famous examples of Arabic or Byzantine art of the best period. This art of the Eastern Empire assumes, in the Danubian Principalities, a characteristic elegance which is quite unknown in Western Europe, whose artists and scholars wander even to the banks of the Ganges and the Mississippi in search of that inspiration which is so hard to find."*

Quite recently the greatest authority on Byzantine and Oriental art, M. Strzygowski, wrote in terms of the highest admiration of the mural paintings in some of the convents of the Bukovina, whose importance in the history of art, he declared, was equal to that of the collections of the Hofburg Chapel in Vienna, or Italy's finest mediæval frescoes.

The Roumanian peasant is the inheritor of a rich treasure of folk-songs, legends and traditional ballads, which, although well-explored of late years, appears to be literally inexhaustible, and to which he is constantly adding. During the shepherds' long night-watches he has adapted the ancient music of his Thracian ancestors to his own melancholy mood, and from it has sprung a new musical blossoming which can contribute fresh and charming elements to the more learned harmonies of Western Europe.

He is also—and here we speak of the peasant woman as well—an original artist of the first rank, inspired, but not hide-bound, by tradition, with a marked sense of

* *L'Illustration*, 1856, Vol. I, p. 319.

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harmony and proportion, both in wood-carving and in weaving. Those who have admired "Magyar" and "Bulgarian" carpets and embroideries shown off at exhibitions for the purpose of national *réclame*, have only to come to our Roumanian villages to find there the oldest and most authentic models.

In order not to be accused of exaggeration, we will quote the words of an outside authority, the same M. Dousault: "However crude this art may be, one always finds in it that wonderful Oriental feeling for colour, that harmony which no amount of study has as yet revealed to our Western artists, and which remains the prerogative of a favoured few amongst us. What we seek so patiently, what we try to arrive at by methods of comparison and study, the peasant of the East, thanks to the long traditions of the past, grasps at once and without conscious effort. The young girl passes long winter evenings in weaving her fête-day costume, in which she will dance the "Hora" when summer comes again, and under her clever fingers the bright coloured silks and threads of silver and gold blend into delightful and harmonious designs. This ignorant slip of a girl, in her humble cottage, far away on the remote steppes or in the wild Carpathians, is a truer artist than our best skilled craftsmen, who have all the resources of our schools of art and of our industries to draw upon."

A whole literature has grown up on the basis of these traditions, songs and legends, and the spectacle of a peasant life so fresh and unexplored might well provide inspiration for those contemporary writers in the West who are always in search of the archaic and the simple. For the sole means of understanding a people and of establishing permanent contact with it, is to reach those springs of genuine creative impulse which lie at the root of its soul.

N. IORGA.

The Importance of Salonica

Two of the prime causes of failure in war have always been the ignorance of politicians who presume to interfere in strategy and the ignorance of soldiers who persist in paralysing policy. In this war we have suffered from both to an alarming degree. Meanwhile, the Germans have not merely had the immense advantage of interior lines and superior communi-

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cations, but have been able to exploit this advantage to its fullest extent because they have from the first co-ordinated strategy and policy. They have always had a war plan—and indeed a war plan with several alternatives and “second-bests.” The Allies as a whole have never had a plan at all, and even at this moment are only very slowly evolving one. It is the consciousness of the fact that we are at length beginning to learn from our mistakes and to prepare for a really concentric attack, based upon unity of aim, that is one of Germany’s main reasons for desiring peace while her armies are yet at the top of their effort.

Individual initiative has always been the glory of the British race; but the days of Wolfe and Clive are in the past. To-day initiative is more needed than ever, but it must be disciplined in a sense hitherto unrealised, and must know how to take full advantage of all those forces upon which modern science and organisation compel soldier and statesman alike to rely.

The Allies, we repeat, have need of a clear political plan. Without this there can be no such thing as strategic victory, for strategy is merely policy translated into terms of war. “The destruction of Prussian Militarism” or “the crushing of Germany” are mere rhetorical phrases far too vague to deserve the title of a programme. They can only satisfy the type of mind which regards the present war as a death grapple between two wild animals, one of which must scratch out the other’s eyes. The real problem at stake is the final emancipation of Europe as a whole from those feudal conceptions which have lingered in so many quarters—from the right of dynasties to prescribe the fate of peoples, from the belief in brute force as the dominant factor in human progress, from the pacifist illusion that the wealth of nations merely consists in financial credit and from the veiled designs of capital upon the liberties of labour. The German Will to Power can only be met on the part of the Allies by the Will to a New Europe. The determining factor in reconstruction will be the fate of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey, for it is in these countries that the stakes lie. So long as they remain the blind instruments of German policy and of German strategy—and the narrow castes which control their destinies can never be detached voluntarily from an alliance which is the very basis of their continuance in power—so long will Germany dominate the continent.

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It took the nation a long time to realise that it was at war at all, and even to-day it has scarcely realised that it is at war with Austria-Hungary and with Turkey. Yet upon the fate of these two countries depends our ability to settle accounts once and for all with Germany. The skill with which the latter dovetailed the armies of her allies into her own military system, thereby supplementing indefinitely the available stock of "cannonfodder," symbolises the extent to which her fate is bound up with theirs. The neglect of these problems, the persistence of the theory that our only foe is Germany, who faces us at close range across the North Sea, is the natural legacy of that "splendid isolation" to which our insular traditions gave birth, and lies at the root of the exaggerated theory of "Westernism" which still lingers in high places.

While endeavouring to combat "Westernism" in its extreme form, we venture to think that any attempt to define the strategic issue as a combat between East and West rests upon a fundamental misconception of the facts. We believe it to be true to say that no serious advocate of operations in the East would dream of denying that our main effort must be in the West, and that the future of our relations with Germany, and therefore the whole future development of Europe, depends upon the military decision on the Western front. But this is a very different thing from arguing that "the fate of the world must be staked upon the Western front and nowhere else." Such an argument is merely a comic inversion of the proverb which warns us against putting all our eggs in one basket; and, after all, even what its most extreme advocates desire to convey, is simply that there is a limit to the number of baskets of eggs which two arms can conveniently carry at one time.

The problem of Salonica has from the first been surrounded by grave difficulties; but that is no excuse for complicating it still further by irresponsible and dishonest criticism. To-day the very people who consistently opposed it in the first instance, and thwarted and starved it at every stage of its existence, are not merely trying to justify its abandonment by proclaiming a "failure" for which they themselves are largely responsible, but are actually trying to foist the responsibility for that "failure" upon the shoulders of the late Government. There are many things for which the late Government, and the late Foreign Secretary, deserve

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criticism, and nowhere more so than in connection with the Salonica expedition; but the main criticism which might fairly be directed against them is that they listened so long to the advice of those who wished the Balkans to be abandoned to the enemy, that when at last they acted, they did too little, and did even that little too late. To suggest that because General Sarrail's forces have hitherto failed to cut Germany's route to the East they should be withdrawn altogether, is as absurd as to suggest that, because the Somme offensive failed to prevent the overrunning of Roumania, our Western policy is definitely bankrupt. The two arguments are based upon the same fallacy, whether we regard them from the military or from the political point of view.

"War," we are told, "is a business for soldiers and their trained minds," and we are left to assume by implication that civilians are not entitled to a say in military affairs and are sure to provoke disaster. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to find in history any instances of successful wars being conducted by mere soldiers to the exclusion of the politicians, though, of course, there have sometimes been supreme commanders like Gustavus, Frederick or Napoleon, who combined the military and political control in their own persons. All experience goes to show that the ideal combination in war is a clear political brain to direct and a strong military hand to execute; when the positions are reversed, a dangerous lack of balance ensues. It is for the statesmen of the country at war to prescribe their aims, to find generals capable of executing them, and to provide them with means adequate to the task. The Dardanelles Expedition is probably the most flagrant example in recent history of a political idea, essentially sound in itself but undigested and ill-thought-out, rashly imposed by politicians upon sailors and soldiers alike, under circumstances which rendered success extremely improbable. It is now notorious that saner counsels were overridden, and that the alternative proposal which was then laid before the British Cabinet—the despatch of reinforcements to Serbia—might have averted subsequent disaster in the Balkans, maintained Turkey in isolation from Germany, prevented Bulgaria from entering the war against us and given us the full benefit of Greek and Roumanian co-operation.

What is not nearly so well known is the fact that no less grave miscalculations have been committed by the most

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eminent soldiers on the Entente side, and that these were due, above all, to their undue neglect of political considerations. If the military had had their way, one of the most important towns on the eastern frontier of France would have been evacuated early in the war; and the decision was only reversed because the civil population decided to risk utter destruction rather than allow their homes to fall into German hands without resistance. If the military had had their way, Paris would not have been defended, and the Germans, thus enabled to suck dry the richest prize in France, would long ago have brought the Republic to its knees. Even more significant was the indifference shown by the military, on purely military grounds, to the evacuation of Lille and "the French Lancashire." It was only too late that they realised all that the loss of so many great industrial centres would mean to France during a long war, and all the many advantages which it would bring to commanders so devoid of scruple as the German. Finally, it is hardly necessary to point out that at a critical moment in the psychology of the war, Verdun would have been evacuated, again on purely military grounds, unless the politicians had wisely insisted upon its defence.

If we turn to the Balkans we find the same story. Lord Grey, starting from the fundamental error that "our direct interests in Serbia are nil," completely failed to understand her significance to the British Empire as a barrier on Germany's road to the East. But the blame rests equally with the supreme military command of those days, who, only three weeks before Mackensen crossed the Danube, disregarded urgent warnings and treated the idea of a German invasion as bluff. It was military pressure quite as much as his own weakness that made the late Foreign Secretary try to recede from his public pledges of assistance to Serbia ("without reserve and without qualification") and brought upon him the historic reproach of General Joffre, "Vous nous lâchez sur le champ de bataille."

The French Government and the French Staff combined to save the honour of the Entente, and ever since then they have been unanimous in recognising the political importance of the Salonica front. But, none the less, obstruction and counter-intrigue continued, and the result of our lop-sided military policy and of the perennial lack of co-ordination between the Allies, has been that "the Army of the Orient"

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has never had numerical superiority, or anything like it, in fighting men. On paper we have nursed one illusion after another. In sober fact, the Bulgarians have always been able to hold their own because our forces have been "starved" politically; and the only real exploit has been that of the Serbs, but for whose capture of Kajmakčalan (heights of 8,000 feet) in the teeth of every strategic and physical disadvantage even Monastir would still be in Bulgarian hands. Our present tactics place an unduly heavy burden upon the most sorely tried of all our Allies, and if pursued indefinitely, threaten the Serbian army with extinction before the end of the war.

It is his knowledge that there is powerful opposition in the West to placing the Salonica Expedition on a sound footing that lies at the root of King Constantine's attitude to the Entente, and has produced chaos in Greece. But the "starvation" policy of *extreme* Westerners (we repeat, we are all of us *Westerners*) is also very largely responsible for the "Roumanian blunder." Roumania's entry into the war was sheer insanity unless the Russians were ready to pour masses of troops through the Dobrudja and General Sarrail to make a simultaneous advance in force from Salonica. The fact that neither of these two elementary and essential steps was taken reflects equally upon the political and the military policy of the Entente, and proves that an entirely new outlook upon the war is needed in very high quarters if victory is to be assured. When at length there was a Balkan advance, it came two whole months too late, and lacked from the first the means necessary for success. A strong offensive from the South might have prevented Mackensen from pushing home in Roumania; but he was, of course, acting upon full knowledge of its impossibility in view of the limitations imposed upon Sarrail.

Now that prolonged neglect has prevented the Salonica Expedition from achieving much more than a negative success, those who have hampered and opposed it at every turn are now adding insult to injury by advocating its complete withdrawal. Such a proposal is the very culmination of that inability to take wide views and envisage Europe as a whole which has been the secret of our failure hitherto. The life-interests of our Allies make abandonment unthinkable, and as Austria-Hungary's exhaustion progresses, the presence of a Southern army, ready to create a diversion when the

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time comes for Russia to strike home, will assume steadily greater, not lesser, importance. This should be obvious to all save those who have consistently refused to recognise that we are at war with Austria-Hungary as well as her partners. The abandonment of Salonica would be an irreparable blow to British prestige, and would mean the final extinction of our influence in the Near East, and the certain triumph, in one form or another, of the Pangerman design of "Berlin-Bagdad." That would be a just Nemesis for so craven and cynical an attitude towards our Balkan Allies, who have staked their all upon loyalty to the common cause.

The policy of abandonment rests upon so profound a neglect of the whole political and racial constellation in Central and Southern Europe, that we absolutely decline to believe that it can ever receive the sanction of those who now control the political and military destinies of the Entente.

RUBICON.

The Austrian Kaleidoscope

THE dismissal of Dr. von Koerber, which had seemed to assure the final subjection of Vienna to the leadership of Berlin and Budapest, has been followed by a political *volte-face*, the meaning of which is still extremely obscure. Indeed, it is not quite clear whether his successor, Herr von Spitzmüller, really failed to form a working Cabinet, or whether the new Emperor was induced at the last moment to refrain from the policy upon which he seemed about to embark. For the present we are reduced to conjecture with regard to a situation which becomes more puzzling in proportion to one's acquaintanceship with the personal and impersonal factors that govern it.

The attitude of the new Emperor towards the Supreme War Lord of Berlin was neatly defined the other day by one whose knowledge of Austria has been gained in the hard school of political experience. "William offered an embrace and was met by a salute." All the facts go to suggest a rally of the "Alt-Oesterreicher," of the few men to whom "Austria" is something more than a political expression—a last *fronde* against the excessive tendency of Prussia and Hungary to shape the destinies of Austria and of the Monarchy as a whole. The new Austrian Premier, Count

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Clam-Martinitz, is one of the leaders of the Bohemian feudal aristocracy, which, though more or less Germanised, has not lost all touch with the national life of the Czechs, and favours an accommodation between the two leading races of Austria. The most notable feature in the new Cabinet was the inclusion, as a Minister without portfolio, of Dr. Baernreither, who in the days preceding the introduction of universal suffrage was leader of the powerful party of Conservative landowners, and who has for a number of years past played a prominent and honourable part in those negotiations for a German-Czech compromise, which the *Neue Freie Presse* and other political and financial satellites of Berlin spared no effort to render abortive. Both men belong to the little group of statesmen who enjoyed the complete confidence of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and stood for the revision of that Dual System which has hampered the development of the Monarchy and its motley nationalities for over a generation past. Dr. Baernreither in particular is known as a consistent advocate, in the days before the war, of a saner policy towards the Southern Slavs, of the abandonment of Magyar repression in Croatia, and of a conciliatory attitude towards Serbia; and it was he who attempted to mediate between Vienna and Agram after the scandals of the Friedjung forgeries and who published more than one pamphlet revealing an understanding of Southern Slav aspirations.

First impressions of the change were strengthened when a few days later the joint Foreign Minister, Baron Burián, the nominee and faithful disciple of Count Tisza, was replaced by Count Ottokar Czernin, another intimate friend of the late Archduke. Czernin's record is markedly anti-Magyar, and his appointment as Austro-Hungarian Minister to Roumania after the treaty of Bucarest and the fiasco which it involved for Austrian diplomacy, was greeted at the time by furious outcries in the Hungarian official press, and even in the Hungarian Parliament. Indeed, the new Minister made no concealment of the mission with which the Archduke had entrusted him, to prepare an Austro-Roumanian *entente* by forcing Hungary to abandon her infamous policy of Magyarisation towards the Roumanians of Transylvania. It is true that his mission was entirely unsuccessful, but this was due, not to the Minister, but to

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Count Tisza's persistent influence over the old Emperor. Count Czernin was again severely criticized on the occasion of Roumania's entry into the war; but the recent Austrian Red Book has vindicated him from the charge of having been taken by surprise.

Two of the cronies whose influence upon Francis Joseph was most profound and deadening, and who acted as a Chinese wall between him and all save the narrow official world, were his aide-de-camp, Count Paar, and the Court Chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo. Their reign, like that of Frau Schrott, is now over, and the new master of the ceremonies at the Hofburg is the former Foreign Minister, Count, now become Prince, Berchtold, whose fall in 1915 was due to Count Tisza's desire to see his lieutenant in control of the Ballplatz, and whose brother-in-law, Count Károlyi, is one of Tisza's foremost political opponents.

The next to go was Baron Sieghart, the influential Jewish financier, who, as President of the Bodenkreditanstalt, had been one of the chief powers in the background of Austrian politics, and had helped to make or mar more than one Cabinet. The *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* has attempted to explain the whole crisis as a struggle between the two great rival banks represented by Spitzmüller and Sieghart, and the fall of the latter as the result of feudal and agrarian influences. But while financial considerations undoubtedly play a very important part, it is only natural that they should be exaggerated by this typical organ of the Jewish commercial *bourgeoisie*, to the exclusion of political and racial motives.

Even more significant is the latest change announced from Vienna. The two chief permanent officials of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, Baron Macchio and Count Forgách, have been removed from their posts and replaced by two entirely colourless substitutes. This change is capable of interpretation as a recognition on the part of the new Emperor of the baneful influence exercised by Count Forgách, as one of the spiders who wove the web of European war. It was he who, as Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, held in his hands all the threads of espionage and forgery which were to provide Count Aehrenthal with a pretext for attacking Serbia, and to convict the Coalition leaders in Croatia of treasonable relations with the Serbian Government. It was in his legation, and with his moral

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support, that one of his junior officials and the spy Vasić concocted those voluminous forgeries which figured in the famous Friedjung trial at Vienna in December, 1909. It was he to whom the responsibility for these forgeries was finally brought home by Professor Masaryk in a series of scathing speeches in the Austrian Delegation. It was on this occasion that Forgách was publicly branded with the insulting name of Count "Azev," and that Count Aehrenthal listened in embarrassed silence, instead of defending his subordinate against a comparison with the most infamous *agent provocateur* of the Russian revolution. The late Emperor is known to have been furious at the discredit thrown upon Austrian diplomacy by the Friedjung trial; but his fury took the form of reproaching his ministers, not for having repeated the methods so widely employed in Lombardy and Venetia in the thirties and fifties, but for having imitated them so clumsily as to be found out. Nothing is more characteristic of Austrian and Habsburg methods than the fact that Forgách, after his public exposure, was made a Privy Councillor and appointed to the honourable position of Minister in Dresden, and that, after a comparatively short interval, he was promoted to the Ballplatz itself, as permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Throughout the critical period, 1912-1914, Count Forgách played a decisive part in the Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary. The easy-going methods of his new chief, Count Berchtold, left him free to develop his Magyar proclivities in an anti-Slav direction, in close conjunction with the Hungarian Government. He was largely responsible for the anti-Serb press campaign which brought the Monarchy to the verge of war with Serbia in November, 1912. It was on his instructions that Prochaska, the consul in Prizrend, attempted to "make" an incident with Serbia and that public opinion in Vienna and Budapest was allowed for a fortnight to believe that he had been brutally mutilated by Serbian officers. It was he who did more than any other man to prevent Serbia's overtures to Vienna from receiving a friendly welcome, and he worked steadily in conjunction with Count Tisza as Hungarian Premier and Count Tarnowski as Minister in Sofia, to undermine the Balkan League and set Serbia and Bulgaria at each other's throats. Finally he was, with Count Tisza and the late German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the joint author of the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia, which was the immediate cause of the

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present conflict. He has for years worked for Magyar dominance and the close alliance with Berlin which it involved, and for the consistent suppression of the Slavs; and it is not uninteresting to note that it was he who sent through a close kinswoman—who was acting as a specially-authorized Red Cross emissary to the Austrian prisoners of war in Russia—a letter containing the first proposals for a separate peace to a highly-placed Germanophile in Petrograd. His colleague, Baron Macchio, has a very similar record. During Forgách's activity in Belgrade he held the Viennese end of the forgers' special wire. Though he always worked consistently against the Slavs, he had, in recent years, concentrated his attention against Italy. It is too soon to say whether the removal of two such men is due to a genuine desire to create a purer atmosphere, or whether it is merely intended to reassure Entente diplomatists, whose attitude at the peace negotiations, if they had had to deal with Forgách and Macchio, would certainly have been one of extreme reserve and distrust.

The gradual grouping of the friends of the late Archduke round the new Emperor lends some colour to the persistent rumours that Charles intends to take up the political legacy of his uncle, and to establish a new Yugoslav State inside the Monarchy, including all the Southern Slav provinces, Montenegro, and most of Serbia as well. It is believed that during the weeks following Francis Joseph's death this project took a Magyar form; that Southern Slav unity would only have been granted in such a form as to satisfy all the mediæval pretensions of the Holy Hungarian Crown of St. Stephen, and that the economic gains which Hungary would win from Austria as part of the arrangement would find their equivalent for the Germans of Austria in the removal of the Slav deputies of Galicia and Dalmatia from the Parliament of Vienna, and the consequent certainty of a permanent German majority in that body. The recent changes, however, seem to have shaken Tisza's position and to foreshadow serious modifications of the Southern Slav project in a less Magyar and more "Austrian" sense—in other words, in the direction of that blend of Centralism and Trialism which the late Archduke is known to have favoured. The latest rumour, transmitted from Switzerland to the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* (Krupp's organ), announces the creation

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of a Southern Slav Kingdom as a federal unit of the Habsburg Monarchy with its own sub-king; and the candidate mentioned for this post is Prince Mirko, the second son of the king of Montenegro. Mirko, who remained behind by arrangement when the Austrians overran his country, has for years past enjoyed an unenviable notoriety in the Balkans; and his selection, if it has seriously been considered at all, could only mean that the Central Powers desired to have at the head of the new organism a man whose moral character and political record would make him their tool to a far greater degree than could ever be said of Milan or Alexander of Serbia.

What is much more probable is that the rumour has been put about by German agents in Switzerland, with the obvious object of creating friction between the Montenegrin and Serbian dynasties, and, above all, between King Nicholas and his grandson, the Serbian Prince-Regent.

An ingenious theory has been put forward by an Italian writer,* to the effect that William II. and Count Tisza are secretly encouraging the young Habsburg couple, Charles and Zita, in a policy which it will be easy to represent as anti-German and anti-Magyar, and which, in the meantime, may delude the Entente Powers and render them more willing to negotiate. The situation is immensely complicated by the still unsolved problem of the new commercial compromise between Austria and Hungary, which ought to have been concluded by 31 December; and this, in its turn, is complicated by the fact that the authorities have not dared to convoke the Austrian Parliament since March 1914. Its convocation now would raise in an acute form the long reign of terror in Bohemia and would open the mouths of many deputies whom the military authorities have found means to shut hitherto. Moreover, the Austrian Germans oppose the summons of the Reichsrat for yet another reason. The extended autonomy of Galicia, which was decreed by Francis Joseph simultaneously with the proclamation of Polish "independence" on 5 November, 1916, was welcomed by the Germans as removing 106 Slav deputies from the Austrian Parliament, and thus securing

* Signor Bianco in *Tribuna* of 27 December.

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an absolute German majority.* This, however, introduced a further complication, since it involved the abandonment of the Ruthenes, who form the overwhelming majority of the population throughout Eastern Galicia (with the exception of the town of Lemberg itself), and who on the eve and during the early stages of the war had been encouraged to expect from Austria the creation of an Ukraine State, under the Habsburg sceptre and at the expense of Russia. It is known that Count Goluchowski, the distinguished Polish statesman who for eleven years was Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, has recently visited Switzerland and made semi-official overtures to Russia on the part of Cracow and Vienna in the idea that Austria might well throw the Ruthenes to the wolves in return for Russian recognition of a Polish State.

It remains to be seen, however, how far such an abandonment might prove acceptable even to the Germans of Austria, who in late years have found the Ruthenes more and more convenient as a means of keeping the Poles in order; while Count Clam-Martinitz and several at least of his colleagues are known to disapprove of the separation of Galicia. Their aim is probably the "Austrianisation" rather than the Germanisation of Austria, and such few men of vision as are to be found among the German Austrians have long recognised that a *modus vivendi* between German and Czech is essential both from the political and economic standpoint, if Austria is to be saved from the abyss. But the resignation of Dr. Sylvester, the influential German President of the Reichsrat, suggests that the Germans in their turn are arming against the feudalist *fronde*; and we must be prepared for a vigorous counter-attack upon the Emperor Charles and his advisers by all the combined forces of Budapest and Berlin. With the country upon the verge of bankruptcy, with the Joint Army completely under the control of Germany, and with the spectre of imminent famine hovering in the background,

* The Pangermans have always demanded the autonomy of Galicia, and it was a notable point in the well-known Linz programme of the year 1899. The Pangerman leader, Schönerer, in 1901, introduced a motion in Parliament for the exclusion of Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia, with the avowed object of securing to the Germans a permanent majority and thus enabling them to hold down the Czechs, as the strongest of the Slav nations of Austria, and the one most consistently opposed to Germanism.

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their prospects are anything but enviable, and we may expect an acute and growing conflict between the rival forces.

“The Clean-Fighting Turk”

IN politics, as in other things, distance lends enchantment to the view; and there has been nothing more extraordinary in the history of this war than the legend which has gradually been allowed to grow up round the figure of the “clean-fighting Turk.” The ferocity displayed by the German High Command, its brutal disregard for the rights of civilians and the rules of international conventions, above all, the hideous excesses to which deliberate encouragement from above gave rise, have produced a frame of mind in this country, in which some people affect to regard the German as a savage and the Turk as a gentleman. In reality, the German combines the qualities of the bully with habits of extreme docility such as render him peculiarly amenable to superior orders, of whatever character. His excesses are imposed upon him by an iron discipline which seeks to exploit his exaggerated sentimentalism and transform it into “frightfulness.” The Turk also takes his behaviour on order, but in his case it is the unchaining of the natural savage, not the reversion of the civilised man. Thus it comes about that the same troops which had perpetrated, according to a secret official programme, some of the worst atrocities in the Armenian massacres of 1896, comported themselves like lambs during the campaign against Greece in the following year, when the *mot d'ordre* was exemplary conduct in the face of Europe. And thus, too, it came about that the same troops which won the respect of our soldiers at Gallipoli could commit the fiendish cruelties of which the Armenian nation has been the victim.

The volume dealing with the fate of Armenia which has been compiled under the auspices of Lord Bryce and the skilful editorship of Mr. Arnold Toynbee,* will remain in history as one of the most terrible documents of the Great War. It is much more than a mere record of “atrocities,” though every page is filled with them. It is a human

* “The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon.” (Hodder and Stoughton.) 3s. net.

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document of the most poignant interest, throwing light upon a tragedy before whose vastness and unspeakable horror even the tragedy of Belgium pales. The evidence of Turkish guilt is overwhelming, and has been sifted with the same scrupulous care as in the case of the famous "Bryce report" on Belgium. That portion of it which comes from Armenian sources is no less reliable than the rest; but if neutral readers should, none the less, prefer to leave it aside as questionable, there still remains sufficient evidence from neutral sources—in particular from members of the various American missionary settlements in Armenia—and even from the protests of high-minded German witnesses. The reports of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, and of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, give a terrible picture of the exodus of a whole nation, and fix the responsibility for wholesale massacre and outrage upon the Turkish authorities and the Turkish regular troops. It is known that a mass of information on the subject of the massacres has reached Germany, but for political reasons it has been effectively suppressed. Even the few articles from German missionary papers which are reprinted in this volume were not allowed to be reproduced in the German press, and attempts were made by the censorship to lay its hands upon all available copies. A remarkable letter from four German missionaries in Aleppo, addressed, in October 1915, to the German Foreign Office (*see* p. xxxiii) describes the terrible treatment meted out to such Armenian refugees as survived the journey to that city. "There are forty or fifty emaciated phantoms crowded into the compound opposite our school. There are women out of their mind; they have forgotten how to eat; when we offer them bread, they throw it aside with indifference. They only groan and wait for death. 'See,' say the natives, 'Taalim el Alman (the teaching of the German).' The German escutcheon is in danger of being smirched for ever in the memory of the Near Eastern peoples."

Armenia has almost been wiped out, amid scenes which recall the Mongol or Tartar invasions. The new Armenia will be in every way something different from the old; between the two eras a great gulf of blood has been fixed. The Great War—to quote the admirable summary of

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Armenian history which has been printed at the end of the book—has "brought the spiritual neutrality of the Near East to a violent end, and however dubious the future of Europe may be, it is almost certain that it will be shared henceforth by all that lies between the walls of Vienna and the walls of Aleppo and Tabriz."

Armenia is one of the most ancient strongholds of Christianity, and it is her Christian faith which has so often been the prime cause of her sufferings. Ever since St. Gregory of Cappadocia converted her king in the third century, religion and nationality have been the two pillars of her existence. For two thousand years she has been torn between East and West. Parthians, Persians, Romans and Arabs have fought over her as their prey. In the tenth and eleventh centuries two rival Armenian principalities asserted themselves once more under dynasties of their own, and, a little later, the kingdom of Lesser Armenia held its own for nearly three centuries, at first in precarious union with the Crusaders. The Armenians had to bear the brunt of Turkish and Mongol invasion, and Christian Byzantium proved a futile ally. When Turkish rule was finally asserted over Armenia in 1514, a period of comparative calm followed upon centuries of distraction. But under Turkish rule the Armenians vegetated rather than lived, and became more scattered than any other race except the Jews. Their position was gravely complicated by the relations of Turkey and Russia. In 1877 part of Armenia came under Russian occupation, and reforms were propounded in their favour and accepted at the Congress of Berlin, but never enforced. But Kars and Erivan remained in Russian hands, and Russian influence was increased by having the Katholikos of All the Armenians resident within the new territory. Henceforth the political dividing line between two great empires, one decaying and one advancing, cut the Armenian race in half and divided its allegiance more and more. The policy of Abdul Hamid brought this fact into sharp relief, for it was his aim "not to strengthen the empire by bringing the nationalities into harmony, but to weaken the nationalities at whatever cost to the empire, by setting them to cut each other's throat." Abdul Hamid armed the Kurds against the Armenians, and when their methods of bullying, plunder and forcible disarmament gave rise to the inevitable revolu-

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tionary societies, an excuse seemed to have been provided for the ferocious massacres which took place in 1894 at Sassoun, in 1895 at Trebizond and elsewhere, and in 1896 at Constantinople itself. The natural result was to shift the centre of gravity for the Armenian race from Ottoman to Russian soil; and yet there was a very large party among the Armenians which eagerly threw in its lot with the Young Turkish *régime*, and, still convinced of their community of interest with the Turks, worked loyally for the revival of the Ottoman Constitution.

For a moment the foul and crumbling house seemed to have been swept and garnished, and simple enthusiasts in the West welcomed the regeneration of Turkey. But the Committee of Union and Progress took upon itself the part of the seven devils of the parable. The intolerable methods which forced the Balkan States to intervene in 1912 in defence of their kinsmen of Macedonia were employed no less effectively in Armenia, and the horrors of 1915 were the natural and logical result. "Abdul Hamid"—to quote once more from the excellent summary of Armenian history—"repressed the Armenians to a nicety after preparing for it eighteen years. The Young Turks were adventurers who had caught the catchwords of another generation and another school—the apes of Danton and Robespierre, and doctrinaires to the core. For the old anachronistic ascendancy of Moslem over Rayah, to the maintenance of which Abdul Hamid had cynically devoted his abilities, they substituted the idea of Turkish nationalism, which clothed the same evil in a more clearly cut and infinitely more dynamic form. They were fanatics with an unreasoned creed, builders with a plan that they meant to carry through; and no half measures would content them, no inhibitions of prudence or humanity deter them from the attempt to realise the whole. Hindrances only exasperated them to sweeping action, and a blind concentration on their programme shielded them from doubts. "Our acts," Talaat Bey is reported to have said, "have been dictated to us by a national and historical necessity. The idea of guaranteeing the existence of Turkey must outweigh every other consideration." The first of these sentiments is the pure milk of the eighteenth century *idéologues*; there is a Prussian adulteration in the second, which smacks of more recent times. It is the voice of the youngest, crudest,

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most ruthless national movement in Europe, and the acts which it excuses, and which the documents in this volume describe, were the barbarous initiation of the Near East into the European fraternity" (p. 636).

Chiefly in deference to American public opinion, the Turks have recognised the need for some explanation of their deliberate attempt to exterminate one of the most ancient Christian nations in the world. The evidence of American missionaries abundantly refutes the pretence that their action was merely a regrettable measure of defence against a widespread revolutionary movement. They are thus left with a still more flimsy argument. "Thousands of Armenians," they tell innocent neutrals, "have fought against us in the Russian army; was it not, then, natural that we should exact vengeance?" The obvious answer is that the reference is to Armenians who are Russian subjects and owed no allegiance whatever to Turkey. But even if they were Turkish subjects, this would provide no shadow of an excuse for what has happened. Indeed, on the same analogy, Russia should have sacked every town in Galicia, because there were Polish legionaries fighting in the Austro-Hungarian army. Herr Bratter, in a recent German pamphlet on the Armenian question, condones the Turkish methods of "upholding law and order" (*sic!*), on the ground that an Armenian deputy and other leaders had joined the Russians during the first winter of the war. On this basis it might be argued that our own authorities would have been justified in deporting the population of Dublin after the Easter rising! Perhaps Herr Bratter, when he wrote, remembered the wholesale deportations which his Austrian allies had carried out in Bosnia against those peasants who had shown sympathies with the Serbian army, and the methods of exacting vengeance upon the families of Austrian Slav soldiers who had surrendered to the enemy.

The Young Turkish leader, Talaat Bey, in an interview published in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, declared that he was unable to sleep at nights owing to "the sad events" in Armenia. Let us hope that this is true. In the next sentence, however, he lifts the veil from the Turkish attitude. "We have been reproached," he said, "for making no distinction between the innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible in view of the fact that *those*

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who are innocent to-day might be guilty to-morrow” (p. 633). In this connection it is interesting to note the statement of a foreign resident in Turkey, communicated by the American Committee. “On 1 August the beating began in the church. . . . A German woman tried to save her Armenian husband. ‘Get out of the way, or I will beat you,’ cried the Beast, ‘I don’t care for the Emperor himself. My orders come from Talaat Bey’ ” (p. 398).

Halil Bey, the Foreign Minister, gave an interesting interview on 25 October, 1916, to a representative of the Associated Press,* in which he claims to have always been a friend of the Armenians, but argues that self-government cannot be given to them because they only form a majority in their own country. He claims to have called together the Armenian leaders at the outbreak of war and to have assured them that he fully understood their position. “We have engaged,” he claims to have said to them, “in a war in which we may go down. That will be your opportunity to make arrangements with the Entente. But bear in mind that the Ottoman Government will apply the most severe measures if you act against the Turks before you know we are conquered. . . . Sit quiet, let us try the issue. When you see we have lost, go over to the Entente and get from them all you can.” Evidence is slowly accumulating to the effect that the Young Turkish leaders deliberately indulged in a policy of extermination; that Enver Pasha himself was, to a large extent, personally responsible; that his own brother-in-law, Djevdet Bey, opened the whole campaign of massacre at Van; and that another intimate friend of Enver, the Mutessarif of Moush, declared openly that the Turks would wipe out the Armenians at the first opportune moment. Such a policy simply accords with the whole previous record of the Turks. The massacres of Chios in 1822, of Batak in 1875, of Constantinople in 1896, are merely the continuation of a policy which has been applied at intervals to every non-Turkish race since the Osmanlis first established their political power. The events of 1915 are the crowning proof of a fact which is writ large on every page of modern history—that the Turks are absolutely unfit to govern Christians, and that their power to do so must be taken from their hands for ever.

* “New York Times Current History,” Vol. V., No. 3.

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One incident deserves a special reference. "About 1,700 Russian prisoners of war, captured by the Turks in February 1915, were brought to Sivas in a deplorable condition. The Russian soldiers of Moslem origin had already been released at Erzerum, most of the Armenians had been killed, and the Russians were stripped of their clothing. On their way to Sivas they were grossly insulted, spat on by every Moslem passer-by, and whipped by their escort into quicker march. Half their number reached Sivas almost naked, covered with filthy rags, their feet swollen, and, in some cases, with their sheepskin coats glued to their sore bodies. . . . Only some 60 Russians survived." This incident recalls to our mind the disquieting answer given by Mr. J. F. Hope in the House of Commons on 14 November to Sir Edward Carson's question regarding British prisoners in Turkey. "Notwithstanding all our efforts and those of the American Embassy at Constantinople, we have failed to obtain any but the most incomplete lists of our officers and men in Turkish hands. Apart from those who were taken prisoners in the Gallipoli operations, some 12,530, including, of course, Indian prisoners surrendered at Kut-el-Amara, but . . . we have been able to identify only 1,923. To this must be added another 764, of whom we have heard by means of private letters." Mr. Hope added that conditions among the prisoners in Turkey are "very far from satisfactory, and that the mortality in certain cases has been heavy," that our men suffered severely on their way from Kut to places of internment, that they are short of clothing, and that the Turkish authorities insist on keeping any distribution in their own hands. It is greatly to be feared that a large proportion of these men have fallen victims to the same neglect and brutality as that which proved fatal to the Russians.

Miljukov and Stürmer.

After long hesitation the Russian censorship has permitted the publication of the memorable speech delivered by the Cadet leader, Professor Miljukov, in the Duma on 1/14 November, 1916. As this speech contributed more than anything else to the fall of Mr. Stürmer's Cabinet, and throws a flood of light upon the abnormal political

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situation in Russia, we make no apology for printing the following summary of it. It is curious that, though it has now been allowed to appear virtually *in extenso* in the Russian press, and has received great prominence in the *Temps* of 3 January, it seems to have received very little attention from the British press.

Mr. Miljukov opened his speech by contrasting the attitude of the authorities in the summer of 1915 and the winter of 1916. At the former period those Ministers whom the Duma regarded as obnoxious were dismissed, and notably the War Minister, General Suhomlinov, whom the country regarded as a traitor. To-day the whole Russian people was united and ready for any sacrifice which would bring victory, but it had lost faith in the ability of the existing authorities to achieve that victory, the more so as all the men who had deserved the nation's confidence were systematically dismissed from the Cabinet. "The abyss between our authorities and us has widened and become impassable. We could appeal before, assuredly not in the sense and capacity of the rulers, but at least to their patriotism and goodwill. Could we do so now? The French Yellow Book contains a German document showing how an enemy country can be disorganised, and how discord and disturbances can be produced there. If our Government involuntarily desired this as their object, or if Germany had won them over by pressure or money, they could not have gone to work in a better way than they are now doing."

Mr. Miljukov went on to allude to the sinister rumours which had circulated for over a year past regarding many of the highest in the land, and then referred more directly to "a handful of mystical figures" who "conduct the most vital affairs of the State in accordance with their personal interests." In this connection he mentioned the names of Manuilov (Secretary to the then Premier), Rasputin (the notorious monk whose assassination is the latest Russian sensation), Prince Andronikov, and the Metropolitan Pitirim (a weak prelate much under Rasputin's influence), and described Mr. Stürmer as the first in rank of these plunderers. He then quoted the following passage from the declaration of the 28 Zemstvo Presidents assembled in Moscow on 29 October, 1916:—"The painful and terrible suspicions, the sinister rumours of treason and of occult forces working for Germany, in order to pave the way for a shameful peace, as the price of the destruction of our national unity—all these rumours are transformed into the certitude that an enemy hand is secretly directing the affairs of the nation." "Naturally such rumours," he continued, "attribute to the Government the view that it is useless to continue the struggle, and that a separate peace must be concluded. . . . I have in my hands a copy of the *Berliner Tageblatt* of 16 September which contains an article entitled: 'Manuilov-Rasputin-Stürmer.' . . . Its author is *naive* enough to think that it was Stürmer who arrested his private secretary, Manasevič-Manuilov. You all know that those who arrested him without asking Stürmer's permission were removed from the Cabinet for doing so. No! Manasevič-Manuilov knows too much to be arrested.

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Stürmer did not arrest him; Stürmer set him free. Why does such a man interest us so much? I will tell you. He was formerly an official in the Russian Secret Police in Paris, the well-known 'Maska' in *Novoje Vremja*, who supplied this paper with piquant details on the life of the Russian revolutionaries. He was at the same time entrusted with secret missions. One of these will interest you specially. Some years ago he tried to carry out a mission of the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, who offered a large sum—800,000 roubles, it is said—to buy the *Novoje Vremja*. I am glad to say that the representative of that journal kicked him out of the house. Pourtalès had great trouble in hushing up this disagreeable affair. This, then, is the kind of mission on which the private secretary of M. Stürmer, the Foreign Minister, was employed. . . . I shall be saying nothing new if I repeat to you that he was arrested for taking a bribe. Why was he released? That also is no secret. He informed the magistrate that he shared the bribe with Rasputin. 'Manuilov-Rasputin-Stürmer.' In the article two other names are mentioned—Prince Andronikov and the Metropolitan Pitirim—as having helped Rasputin in the appointment of Stürmer as Foreign Minister."

Mr. Miljukov then quoted from the *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* and *Neue Freie Presse*, to show that the Germans welcomed Stürmer's appointment, and regarded him as lacking in enthusiasm either for the war or for the acquisition of Constantinople. These impressions, he added, were gathered from the Moscow papers, which printed last summer a memorandum of the Extreme Right, presented to headquarters after Stürmer's second visit, and arguing that though a final victory was needed, it was also necessary to end the war in time, since otherwise the fruits of victory 'would be annihilated by revolution.' . . . "This is an *idée fixe*—that a revolution is coming from the Left and that every new member of the Cabinet is bound to prevent it. Everything is sacrificed to this *idée fixe*—the lofty national enthusiasm for helping in the war, the beginnings of Russian freedom, and also the stability of our relations with our Allies." He then described the impression produced in London and Paris by M. Sazonov's resignation as "something like a complete pogrom on the part of vandals." . . . "When Sazonov was at the head of affairs, they knew in England and France that what our Ambassadors said was also said by the Russian Government. But what faith could be put in those Ambassadors when Stürmer stood behind them? Naturally the relations which had taken decades to develop were not destroyed in a minute by the caprice of a single person. In this respect the press was correct in saying that with the change of persons there was no change in Russian policy. But in the delicate affairs of diplomacy there are *nuances*. There is the lacework and there is also the rough stitching, and the former is only possible under very favourable conditions. I saw the destruction under my own eyes of the most delicate web of the Allies. This was what Stürmer did . . ." After dealing in considerable detail with the intrigues of Russian agents of Germany in Switzerland, and especially with the activities of a certain lady "who

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started the diplomatic career of Stürmer," Mr. Miljukov declared that what was needed was a "judicial process of the kind taken against Suhomlinov." He denounced the interview of Mr. Protopopov (now Minister of the Interior) with Herr Warburg, a German attaché in Stockholm, and described it as "a business which belongs to the well-known corridor through which Protopopov, like many others, found his way to the ministerial chair. (Uproar. Cries: "Splendid. He means Rasputin." "What corridor?") I have indicated it already. Manuilov, Rasputin, Pitirim, Stürmer, all the Court party, for whom, according to the *Neue Freie Presse*, Stürmer's appointment was a victory—"the victory of the Court party which is grouped round the young Empress" (*der Sieg der Hofpartei; die sich um die junge Kaiserin gruppiert*).

Mr. Miljukov proceeded to marshal his charges against the authorities, confronting each with the question: "Was it folly or treachery?" After applying this to "the Roumanian blunder" and to the neglect of Poland, he concluded as follows:—"When the authorities try to cause disturbances, such as could later on serve as grounds for ending the war, and when the Court party, in the middle of a raging war attacks the only man who has gained our Allies' respect for honourable conduct, and replaces him with a person of whom one can say everything which I have said—then it is almost impossible to believe that it is folly, and one cannot blame people for reaching another conclusion. We have many grounds for being dissatisfied with the Government, but they are all to be traced to its incapacity and illwill. There lies our most deadly enemy. Victory over this evil thing would mean the same as victory in the whole war. And, therefore, in the name of the millions whom the war has claimed, in the name of the rivers of blood which have flowed, in the name of our struggle to realise our national aims, in the name of our sense of responsibility towards the nation which has sent us hither, we promise to fight on until we have attained our aim—a Cabinet which deserves the complete trust of the nation."

This resounding speech had a truly remarkable sequel. At the next sitting of the Duma the Minister of War, General Šuvaiev, publicly shook hands with Mr. Miljukov and thanked him, while both he and his colleague—the Minister of Marine—made speeches emphasising the achievements of the nation in the war. No less significant is the fact that Mr. Stürmer, who at first threatened to prosecute Mr. Miljukov, appears to have abandoned his intention and withdrawn with his family for a rest in the Caucasus. The "Anti-German Society of 1914" passed resolutions congratulating Mr. Miljukov and other speakers on their action, "which helped to put an end to the policy of 'Hofmeister-Oberkammerherr Stürmer.'" The struggle against the "dark forces" and "irresponsible influences" working in favour of Germany has, since then, become general, and the Council of the Empire and the Congress of Nobles have taken the same line as the Duma. But it was Mr. Miljukov's courageous speech that opened the floodgates which have swept away the late Premier and threaten to engulf his régime.

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
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Errata in Vol. I.

- Page 17, footnote (line 5), for "1915" read "1914."
 Page 145, line 11, for "1915" read "1905."
 Page 152, line 10, for "divorce" read "dévore."
 Pages 189 (bottom) and 190 (top) "If the Austro-Germans . . . Posen and Galicia." This passage should be read at end of Note on "Some Russian Opinions on Polish Independence" (p. 192, top).
 Page 249 (footnote). The note should read " . . . Germany (68 millions), Austria-Hungary (51), Turkey (20), Bulgaria (4½), Serbia and Montenegro (4½), Poland (9) . . ."
 Page 347, line 20, for "L'Ethiope" read "L'Ethiopie."

The Russian Press and the Dardanelles



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The Russian Press and the Dardanelles

The first public mention of the Dardanelles Agreement appears to have been in Dr. Dillon's article in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1916. This was followed by Mr. Miljukov's speech in the Duma on 11 March. It is interesting to note that his arguments in favour of publication were, on that occasion, strongly backed by the present Premier, M. Trepov, who used the words: "The Russian people must know what it is shedding its blood for."

Novoje Vremja of 20 November (3 December), after references to the promise of territorial integrity offered by the Entente to Turkey when she was still neutral, goes on to assert that "the transference of the Straits to the firm hands of a peace-loving nation is a general European requirement. Russian power over them means peace and the tranquil development of the economic life of all the nations and States on the coasts of the Black Sea, and continuous commercial relations with Western Europe. Moreover, such a solution of the question of the Straits is the only means of destroying the annexationist plans of Germany, which are a danger to the whole of mankind. Germany, in her avarice, stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, would be a danger to the whole world. The resurrection of the independent Slav States, who, for centuries, fought against the Germans and the Turks, and the transference of the Straits to Russia are guarantees to Europe that the present bloodshed will not be repeated.

"The agreement about the Straits announced by the Prime Minister satisfies the historic claims and the real needs of Russia. If Trepov realises this aim his name will be included in the sacred list of the builders of the Russian Empire."

Next day *Novoje Vremja* polemises with the Magyar journal, *As Est*, which had declared the Dardanelles to have become an internal Turkish question, and argues that even the Germans recognise the need for revising the treaty of 1841. "The Dardanelles must be in the sovereign possession either of Turkey or Russia." The agreement is a proof that the Allies mean to fight to a finish, and that an inconclusive peace is impossible.

Birkeviija Vjedomosti treats the agreement as a proof that the former distrust of Russia which prevailed in Britain and France has finally passed away. "It has created a new factor in international politics, the importance of which it is difficult to estimate at present. After the agreement about Constantinople, *Persia and the Far East*, it is clear that a new international grouping of powers has come into existence, the kernel of which will be Britain and Russia, united by common designs."

The *Reč*, on 20 November, restricted its comment to the following words: "This announcement, read under different conditions, would of course, have raised a storm of applause. Yesterday it passed by almost unnoticed, as the Parliamentary majority received the Government's declaration coldly and with reserve. There were only exclamations such as 'Bravo Sazonov!' 'Where is Sazonov?'" Next day, however, *Reč* welcomed this "confirmation of one of our war aims" as especially welcome to the Russian public at so grave a moment.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co, LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.

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