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ENEMY JAPAN

Prepared by the
U. S. OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION.

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FOREWORD

In mobilizing ourselves for the final push of the war — the long, hard push against Japan — it is important for Americans to recognize two hard realities: the Japanese are a tough enemy, and they are a distant enemy.

They are tough because they have a tough army and navy, a big industrial potential, a vast manpower reserve, a belt-tightened civilian mobilization, all welded as a single weapon of war by leaders who are ruthless, determined, and despotic.

Distance in warfare is to be translated in terms of supply lines, the turn-around time of cargo vessels, the availability of ports and of big bases close to the enemy. The vast, empty miles of the Pacific have to be conquered before we can come to grips with the Japanese enemy in large numbers — a thing we have not done despite our outpost only 350 miles from the Japanese homeland.

And lastly, we have to keep fighting until the Japanese admit complete and utter defeat because we must not give the Japanese warlords a chance to plot another sneak attack, another war of conquest, another Pearl Harbor, Nanking, or Hong Kong.

This book is an attempt to give American writers the knowledge of the Japanese, their war aims, and their ideology that will strengthen American determination to fight the Japanese to the finish.

This book has two major objectives:

FIRST To inform the American people of the enormity of the job ahead in defeating Japan. Because many Americans are unaware of the strength of Japan and are now confident of their own power, there is grave danger of a “let down” on the home front. Specifically, people should be encouraged to

- (a) Stay on their war jobs until released.
- (b) Continue to purchase War Bonds.
- (c) Continue to observe all wartime regulations.

SECOND To inform the American people that a negotiated peace would be nothing more than a pause between wars, while Japan reorganized for a more bitter, costly struggle. President Truman has stated clearly that we demand “unconditional surrender” from Japan. She now has conquered territories which can provide her with an abundance of raw materials and a huge reservoir of manpower. Once organized we would face a far more formidable enemy than Japan of today.

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Prepared by the
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GUMBATSU—THE JAPANESE ENEMY

The Nature of the Japanese Enemy

Gumbatsu is a Japanese word which symbolizes the core of Japanese aggression. It means "military clique" but is used here to refer to the present-day coalition of militarists, industrialists, and office-holders who are Japan's real rulers.

The **Gumbatsu** have bent the Japanese people to their will and they are now seeking to enslave one billion people of Asia—HALF THE ENTIRE POPULATION OF THE WORLD.

This is their war aim, stated in plain language: to create a single economic empire in the Far East under Japanese domination. The **Gumbatsu** run Japan and they would run what they call the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." They will use any means necessary to attain it and they will try to destroy anyone who stands in their way.

The Greater East Asia War, as they call it, has had the support of the Japanese people. There is no doubt about that. But the Greater East Asia War has been held up to the shopkeepers, small industrialists, farmers, and wage-workers of Japan as a means of getting land, jobs and trade for their sons—land, jobs and trade for the "One Hundred Million" at the expense of the "One Billion" peoples of Japan's New Order.

The **Gumbatsu** planned the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and sanctioned the Death March of Bataan. They stood by while Nanking and Hong Kong were sacked and raped. These are reasons, enough for Americans to fight and avenge their comrades and allies. But there are other reasons too.

Aggressive Expansion

Pearl Harbor, Bataan, and Nanking were only steps in aggressive expansion that began after the

Gumbatsu came to power. Here is the timetable:

1895	Formosa
1904	Kwantung
1910	Korea
1919	The Mandated Islands
1931	Manchuria
1932-44	Occupied China
	Indo-China
	Thailand
	Burma
	Netherlands East Indies
	The Philippines

The Japanese never filled out the rest of the timetable. The United Nations stopped that, beginning with the Battle of the Coral Sea. But their propagandists have filled it in for us. They say they are fighting a war to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In it, they propose to include all the peoples of India and China, besides the countries they already have overrun. Every day the Japanese radio paints a dream picture for the peoples of Asia and the Japanese home audience. All the countries of Asia will be "liberated" as free and independent peoples. Japan will merely "co-ordinate" such activities as national defense, foreign relations, and the development of natural resources.



The New Order in Asia

The Japanese war aim—to develop in Asia an economic empire similar to Hitler's New Order in Europe—together with the tight control of the **Gumbatsu** over the Japanese people—shows


that when we fight Japan we are fighting a social system similar to Nazism and Fascism.

The similarity extends into the propaganda field. Like the Nazis, the **Gumbatsu** regard themselves as supermen, chosen for a divine mission, and use racial themes in order to win support from their allies and whip up resentment against their enemies.

The **Gumbatsu** tell the peoples of Asia they are fighting a war of liberation; that if the races of East Asia unite they can "throw off the yoke of imperialism." Their theme is "Asia for the Asiatics," and imperialism is cleverly identified with "white" and "non-Asiatic," or "Anglo-American."

That this is a relatively disguised form of racism appears when the real jingoists begin to speak. In March 1941, the Greater East Asia League was organized, an amalgam of some 50 patriotic expansionist societies. A great mass meeting was held which took an oath "to eliminate the root evil in Greater East Asia—the whites, in line with **Hakko Ichiu**" the Japanese religious and mythological doctrine that all nations belong under one roof, the Emperor's.

If we were to stand idly by and let the Japanese achieve their war aim they would be the masters of a fortress Asia which contains one of the most powerful combinations of human and natural resources in the world. Half the world's population and immense reserves of coal, iron, timber, petroleum, rubber, tin, tungsten, antimony, chrome ore, bauxite, zinc, copper, quinine, fats and oils, animal and vegetable fibres—everything needed to wage war—economic war as well as military war. We would have no choice except to do business with them on their own terms, and we know that there never would be an end to their demands. We decided some time ago that we wouldn't do business with Nazis or Fascists. You can't do business with the **Gumbatsu** either, except at pistol point.



Who are the **Gumbatsu**?

Early European influences in Japan were first felt in the southern and western islands. In 1868

the hereditary feudal leaders of the local clans in the southern and western part of Japan overthrew what was then the ruling clan, the *Tokugawa*, and "restored" the Emperor as a temporal as well as a spiritual ruler. In this struggle for power the Satsuma and Choshu clans were victorious. The Satsuma leaders got an inside track on the Navy, the Choshu an inside track on the army which even to the present day has helped them exercise the principal control over Japan's armed forces.

Allied with them today are a number of important industrialists. Many of them are world famous, for they own shipping lines, mills, stores, newspapers, banks, factories, mines, and other establishments. Nothing quite like these industrial combinations exists in European countries, for they are family holding corporations in which control passes from generation to generation. Naturally these companies favor expansion and Japanese control in East Asia, for the economic exploitation of the occupied countries would be in their hands. Being business men of the "New Order" they would prefer to get this control without having to fight a war for it. But we know only too well to what lengths they are prepared to go if the "One Billion People" won't acquiesce peaceably.

In modern Japan these ruling families have found it advisable to have a family member in the civil service. It is natural and inevitable that a country which has been industrialized rapidly would need State assistance in developing large national projects such as railroads and munitions. Representatives of the big family combines have been called in to handle these matters. Hence, the army and navy, business and government all work together.

There are other components of the **Gumbatsu**. Large landholders are a part of it. Japan is a country of 75 million people in an area about the size of California. Land has been divided and redivided until a man doesn't have enough land to work to feed his family. When his sons grow up they get an even smaller piece. Under these circumstances a man turns to a money-lender—mortgages his land. In time, he loses it. Today, many of Japan's farmers are share croppers and tenant farmers. The rent and the interest they pay on their debts often funnel to a group of absentee landlords.

In the days of the so-called "liberal" governments in Japan, the absentee landlords were the most conservative and least expansionist of Japanese leaders. They were founders of the political parties and for many years operated as a check on the territorial-expansionist aims of the war lords. But today the former political parties are dissolved and all have been squeezed into one.

Last in the list of important groups which control Japan are the members of the Imperial Household ministry. Their influence spreads wide and penetrates deep. The Imperial Household is a heavy investor in industrial developments of national importance. In the days of Meiji, most large-scale national industrial projects were begun with capital furnished by the Japanese Government. Today, tight control is exercised over important wartime development projects through the voting power of stock held in the name of the Imperial Household represented by Ministers of State appointed for the purpose.

Taken together, these groups are the **Gumbatsu**, a closely interlocking clique of expansionists and imperialist-minded men who control the "One Hundred Million" people of Japan and Korea for their own benefit and profit, and now seek to control the "One Billion People" of Greater East Asia for the benefit and profit of Japan.

How the Gumbatsu Work

They exercise their control through political machinery devised to operate for their benefit, through economic controls which make certain those benefits will be perpetuated from one generation to the next, and through propaganda controls which insure that the Japanese masses will continuously adopt the only attitude required of them—acquiescence.

The political controls are based on a theory of government which provides that all political acts are made in the name of the Emperor. All power, legislative, judicial, and executive, emanates from the Emperor. The Japanese "Diet" consists of the House of Peers and a House of Representatives. At the present time, it has little power in its own name. The cabinet is responsible to the Emperor, not to the Diet. Budgets are submitted to the Diet for approval, but if the Diet does not approve the budget, the budget of the previous year is automatically used.

The economic privileges and the political powers of the **Gumbatsu** might not be theirs in perpetuity save for one thing. By the theory of

the Emperor's divinity an act of opposition can be made an act of treason or near-blasphemy. Respect for the Emperor as a divine person is engendered in the growing child by his participation in the national cult, home training and his formal schooling. If, despite this training and tradition someone asserts his political opposition there is the Thought-Control Bureau to see that his words are not spread too far and the secret police to see that he doesn't get about too freely.



Government and Religion Inseparable

In Japanese theory the Emperor is a descendant of the Sun Goddess and all his people share, to a lesser degree, in his divinity. The theory of the Emperor's divinity is part of Japanese folklore and tradition and is officially made a part of the growing child's outlook. The Education Ministry controls the curriculum and personnel of all schools in Japan and determines the content of text-books. The Thought-Control Bureau has the power of censorship over books and magazines whether they are published in Japan or imported. Through these schools and through the practice of State Shinto, Japanese children are taught the supremacy of the State over the individual, just as in Nazi and Fascist countries. They are taught that the individual's full responsibility is realized only in sacrifice—if necessary, sacrifice of the individual's life to "keep the Emperor's mind at ease."

The majority of Japanese are Buddhist and nearly all practice a simple form of ancestor worship similar to that found throughout most of the East. But the official propagandists have taken the simple religious practices of the home and by channeling them through the official machinery of the State have developed the separate national cult, State Shinto—a very different thing. In State Shinto the simple religious observance of the home have been magnified and glorified into national patriotic-religious demonstrations in the name of the national spirit as exemplified by the Emperor.



Growth of Shinto

According to Japanese teaching, the first Emperor was named Jimmu. He was the great-grandson of the Sun-Goddess, Amaterasu O-Mikami, who annoyed by the bickerings of the earth-people, sent Jimmu to bring peace and unity, and rule over the earth as she ruled in heaven.

Jimmu arrived in Japan and founded the "Godly" Japanese nation *for the specific purpose of fulfilling the divine injunction of the Sun Goddess to conquer and rule the world.*

It was not until the reign of Emperor Kotoku in the seventh century A. D. that Japan's Emperor system really came into being. The early Japanese had already developed a legend to explain their presence on the islands. It was a simple and flattering answer for a primitive people who worshipped their ancestors and a multitude of nature gods and demons. They were of divine origin. They were in Japan because the gods had sent them there.

Buddhist missionaries, coming from China, were welcomed at Emperor Kotoku's court and were given every opportunity to expound their teachings. In addition to Buddhism, which was accepted by the Japanese side by side with their more primitive Shinto-cult of nature-ancestor worship, these missionaries brought the written language of China and much of her culture.

Soon the Japanese chief, no longer a mere warrior-prince, adopted the title of *Tenno*, "Divine Ruler," and retired to a palace where he devoted his time to enjoying all the pleasant things a "God on Earth" might desire. In the Chinese court tradition, the Emperor was completely isolated from his people, and his authority was delegated through the ministers of his court. It logically followed that this authority soon became Japan's prize political plum, to be seized and held by the strongest and most ruthless feudal factions.

Since that time the Emperor has existed only to give "divine sanction" to the acts of whichever clique was powerful enough to hold the reins. In fact, during the reign of the Tokugawa Shoguns who were overthrown in 1868 after

reigning more than 200 years, the Emperor was a palace prisoner, often hungry and without even an adequate wardrobe.

Today the Emperor is only a political instrument. His importance and his usefulness to the **Gumbatsu** derive from his religious and symbolic meaning to the Japanese populace—a meaning the **Gumbatsu** have thoroughly exploited.

To the Japanese masses, the Emperor today is an exalted person—a living representative of the gods. He is the high-priest of the separate State Shinto cult. He is the embodied symbol of national unity and the bearer, in direct line from his ancestor Jimmu, of the Sun Goddess' "divine injunction" to conquer and rule over the world. The Emperor is also the funnel through which the gods transmit their will and benevolence. As such, he is the fountainhead of all authority, which he does not use directly, but delegates to those who have official "access to the throne."



The Overthrow of the Shogunate

When Commodore Perry landed on Kurihama Beach in 1853, he found Japan divided among many hostile feudal clans. All were more or less loyal to the ruling Shogun, a hereditary military dictator, who kept his subjects in line by a shrewd combination of politics, force, and a hostage system. The Emperor was a palace prisoner, shorn of all political power, and used by the Shogun as a politico-religious symbol.

The armed retainers of the feudal barons were the Samurai, a warrior caste who pledged fealty to a particular overlord in exchange for a yearly allowance of rice.

For some two centuries the Shoguns of the ruling Tokugawa clan had carefully isolated Japan from the outside world. But with Perry's ships, the expanding west broke the walls of Japanese isolation, opening that nation to the flood of new ideas and mechanical progress.

As a direct result of these new influences from the west, Japan experienced a revolution. It began with a civil war in 1867 and did not end until the Shogunate was overthrown and the Emperor was "restored" to temporal as well as

spiritual power. Through this upheaval the heretofore despised merchant-class emerged as one of the dominant elements in Japan.

The new Emperor, Meiji, surrounded himself with an outstanding group of minds as advisors, familiar with Western thought. Japan took on the form of a liberal monarchy with a dominant middle-class. But this turned out to be an illusion.

Japan's Feudalists

Actually, Japanese feudalism was never destroyed. The balance of power shifted, so that merchants, who were a despised class under the Shogunate, eventually became a respected and powerful element in the new society. The rise of a merchant class was inevitable when Western industrial technology and Western trade goods were introduced. But as far as the overthrow of the Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor were concerned, the change meant only that the feudal lords who were on the *outside* during the Tokugawa regime now were on the *inside*.

Japan thus became a dangerous anachronism. She adopted Western industrial methods while, at the same time, Western liberal and democratic ideas were ruthlessly filtered out.

She stepped from the Dark Age into the

Machine Age without a parallel change in her thought-patterns and culture. Such a feudal society, intensely nationalistic, suddenly endowed with the latest industrial techniques, was bound to be explosive.

Japan's population was never permitted to develop and enjoy any real democracy. The peasantry, which forms the bulk of Japan's population, had to carry a staggering burden of constantly increasing taxes. What this burden means in cold figures can be shown in a statement released by the Imperial Agricultural Society shortly before the war. Japanese farmholders, according to the Society, paid from 31 percent to 50 percent of their total annual incomes in taxes, while manufacturers paid only 18 percent.

This machine-age feudalism has kept Japan's farmers, workers, and small tradesmen from sharing the new wealth created by Japan's industrialization, and has prevented them from enlarging their political participation in the fashion of the Western democracies. Because the masses of people are indoctrinated with docility, and are politically impotent, the **Gumbatsu** are free to expand their power without restriction from below. Whatever voice of opposition there may be in Japan will have no opportunity to speak or carry influence until the **Gumbatsu** have been stripped of all power and position.

JAPAN'S WAR AIM— GREATER EAST ASIA



On November 5th and 6th, 1943, the Japanese Government arranged a six-nation conference in Tokyo, followed by a mass rally of 100,000 Japanese. To the conference came the heads of government of Japan's puppet regimes: Wang Ching-wei of Occupied China, Chang Ching-hui of Manchuria, Ba Maw of Burma, Prince Varnvaidya Voravarn of Thailand, and Laurel, the Philippine quisling. Subhas Chandra Bose of the "Provisional Government of Free India" and representatives from Malay were also present. The host and chairman was Tojo, then prime minister of Japan.

The outcome of these puppets' discussions was a joint declaration, which the Japanese radio has since referred to as the "Greater East Asia Declaration." This document was intended to be Japan's answer to the Atlantic Charter. It is also Japan's major instrument of propaganda and psychological warfare in the Far East.

The purpose of this part of the program book is to compare the promises of this declaration with the actualities of Japan's exploitation of Occupied Asia—to show, in short, that the **Gumbatsu** technique of rule *outside* Japan is the same as the **Gumbatsu** technique of rule *inside* Japan.

Psychological Warfare

These are the main points of the Greater East Asia Declaration:

"It is a basic principle for the establishment of world peace, that the nations of the world each have a proper place, and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance. The United States and the British Empire have, in seeking their own prosperity, oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia they have indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

"The countries of Greater East Asia . . . undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the war of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination and insuring their self-existence and self-defense, in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

"Common Prosperity (1) The countries of Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation, will insure stabilization . . . and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based on justice.

"Mutual Assistance (2) The countries of Greater East Asia will insure the fraternity of nations in their region by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence, and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

"Respect of Traditions (3) The countries of Greater East Asia will respect one another's traditions and develop the creative faculties of each race.

"Economic Development (4) The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.

"Abolition of Racial Discrimination (5) The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all of the countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse, and the opening of resources throughout the world and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind."

This declaration is a propaganda document which plays skillfully upon the yearnings of Asiatic peoples for independence, and their feeling of racial discrimination. At the same time, the declaration cloaks Japan's ruthless domination of

Occupied Asia. Japan's deed undoes her word. Nevertheless, such propaganda is potent psychological warfare in the Far East. It is one of Japan's strengths which we should recognize when we gauge our enemy.

Below is an example selected from the tens of thousands of words the Japanese Home and Empire Radio Service broadcasts every day. This particular example is taken from Radio Tokyo's news broadcast of the mass rally following the Greater East Asia Conference. A resolution was adopted at the rally, of which this is the final paragraph.

"Here at this juncture, the whole of Greater East Asia shall prosecute the Greater East Asia War to a successful conclusion by advancing its total strength and by further joining in the common mission under unshakeable conviction of sure victory; and shall not allow the dominating power of America and Britain to exist in Greater East Asia again, thereby looking forward to the establishment of a new world order."

Greater East Asia Ministry

To build a sphere of influence in the Far East is Japan's main war aim. To enlist cooperation of Far Eastern nations she has created puppet regimes. To insure effective prosecution of the war, however, she does not rely on puppet governments, but on her government departments together with the army and navy.

The principal responsibility for insuring proper contribution to the war by the "independent" countries is entrusted to the Greater East Asia Ministry.

On November 1, 1942, Prime Minister Tojo reorganized the whole framework of colonial administration, vesting full powers in the Greater East Asia Ministry. The real intentions of the **Gumbatsu** are revealed by the organizations the new ministry replaced, and by its personnel. The duties of the new ministry were formerly in the hands of the Manchurian Affairs Board, the Asia Development Board, and other similar organizations. The first minister was Kazuo Aoki, formerly vice-director of the Manchurian Affairs Board; once president of the Cabinet Planning Board; once supreme economic advisor to the puppet Nanking regime in China. The magazine *Sozo* described him in December 1942, as, "the long war type, of man, who was nicknamed 'Tenacious Turtle' at school, with a sour

face that has forgotten how to smile, with a mouth hard as flint that never utters a joke or an idle word, with an undersized body that scampers around like a mouse, and with a burning zeal for work."

Since July 1944, the positions of Greater East Asia minister and foreign minister have been held concurrently. Some idea of the nature of Japan's interest in this sphere may be obtained by analyzing the organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. There are separate bureaus for Manchurian affairs, China affairs, and the southern regions. Individual bureaus handle trade and research problems, to say nothing of the interesting bureau which is responsible for "Military Training for Greater East Asia."

The true nature of "co-prosperity" appears, however, in the working agencies of the Ministry. They are listed below.

- East Asia Development Board.
- East Asia Deliberative Council.
- Southern Regions Development Company.
- East Asia Cultural Research Institute.
- Central Association for Overseas Japanese.
- Greater East Asia Training Institute.
- Southern Regions Natural Science Institute.

Japan's totalitarian party

In 1940 Prince Konoye, then Japan's Prime Minister, forced the existing political parties and many other organizations to disband in favor of a new, totalitarian organization, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Early in 1945, under the threat of American attack and because of internal political stresses, the IRAA and its political branch were replaced by a new, though similar national organization called the Greater Japan Political Association.

But for nearly 5 years the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was the **Gumbatsu's** main instrument of domestic propaganda in Japan and psychological warfare in the rest of Greater East Asia. The IRAA took under its wing the long-established neighborhood associations and made them responsible for enforcing civilian mobilization decrees. In the "independent" countries of Greater East Asia, branches of the IRAA were organized in nearly every Japanese community. Through subsidiary organizations of youth, women, patriotic societies, religious orders, and others, enthusiasm for Greater East Asia was whipped up.

Through the Greater East Asia Ministry and the IRAA, the **Gumbatsu** extended its influence and controls into the "independent" countries of Greater East Asia. Bearing in mind the promises of the Greater East Asia Declaration let us examine the record of Japan in two areas of special interest to Americans: the Philippines and China.



Japan in the Philippines

On the occasion of the induction of his Cabinet, March 8, 1945, President Sergio Osmena of the Philippines said, "The Japanese occupation of the Philippines was not only a military invasion. It was also an ideological and cultural invasion. It was an attempt to foist on our people the invader's totalitarian ideas, his spirit of conquest and exploitation, his theories of the superiority of the Yamato race, his way of life."

The release of American and Filipino prisoners and internees from Japanese concentration camps has shown all of us the results of purposeful brutality and starvation. Lesser hardships have been suffered by all residents of the Philippines as a result of soaring prices, currency inflation, and severe food shortages resulting from impounded transportation and reduction in trade.

Japanese economic policy in the Philippines was aimed primarily at utilizing Philippine resources for the prosecution of the war. With this the Japanese cleverly coupled the psychological warfare weapon of "independence."

The Japanese Military Administration ran the Islands from January 2, 1942, to October 14, 1943. It took over and operated coconut oil plants, large sawmills, sugar centrals, cigarette factories, basic mines, railways, telephone systems and power plants. And when the Philippines were granted "independence" in October, 1943, the Japanese kept control of these enterprises, through a clause provided in the new constitution.

The Japanese salvaged and repaired about two-thirds of the interisland steamers and took them away for use elsewhere, thus leaving the country virtually without commercial interisland trans-

portation. All that remained were small wooden sailing ships.

Having taken over the operation of important producing establishments, the Japanese then introduced a policy of "economic self-sufficiency." Responsibility for this development was placed on the puppet government, which was then required to be guided by Japanese advisors who set production goals and crop quotas based on the needs of the Japanese occupation forces.

By this device the Japanese were enabled to live off the country, thus depriving Filipinos, particularly those living in cities, of much-needed food and other goods. In rural districts the food situation was somewhat better, but there was and is a great shortage of consumer goods. Inflation and black markets have naturally developed.

Additional hardships were caused by the Japanese labor policy and the sugar and textile program. Labor for all needed military construction was conscripted by the military government, leaving the puppet Filipino government to cope with the unemployment and distress caused by economic breakdown.

The sugar program is an example of Japanese ruthless economic programming without reference to Filipino distress. The Japanese first diverted 40 percent of sugar acreage to cotton. The remaining 60 percent was divided on a basis of 20 percent for domestic sugar needs and 40 percent for the manufacture of fuel alcohol. There was thus no provision for the export of sugar, formerly an important source of income.

But the Japanese fuel requirements increased. All centrifugal sugar was converted into alcohol, leaving the Filipinos only the sugar produced in small local mills.

Financial manipulations have been equally ruthless. European owned banks were liquidated by the Japanese. Large quantities of military bank notes were circulated, contributing to price inflation. Price controls were attempted but were ineffective in the face of the acute economic distress.

Due to the splendid spirit of the Filipinos the Japanese were never able to raise a local army and were obliged to maintain large local forces to combat the *guerilleros*, the Filipino soldiers and civilians who took to the hills to harass the Japanese garrison.

Philippine "Independence"

Japan first held out "independence" as bait to the Philippines to induce the country to abandon

resistance. In January 1942, Tojo, then Prime Minister, said, "If the Filipinos would understand the real intentions of Nippon and offer to cooperate, Japan would give them independence."

In succeeding months, Tokyo issued propaganda appeals to "brother Filipinos now in hiding in the hills and in the mountains" and asked them to "realize that by their own activities they are hindering and delaying independence." In July 1942, the Japanese, faced by harsh necessity and convinced that nominal independence would encourage cooperation with the invaders, set the machinery in motion by appointing a preparatory commission headed by Laurel, which drafted a constitution. This constitution was never ratified by the people. DOMEI, the official Japanese news agency said, "Because of the necessary time to submit the constitution to a direct vote of the people, the *Kalibapi*, which is serving in the capacity of a people's association was entrusted with the ratification by their representatives attending the General Assembly." On October 14, 1943, independence was proclaimed by Laurel. The Manila radio broadcast the rules for this event. "Placards announcing slogans, petitions, protest and the like will be prohibited." The Manila radio also reminded the people that "Mayor Guinto has already issued the necessary instructions so that the ceremony may be carried out with appropriate respect and veneration for the Japanese National Flag . . ."

A pact was signed at the same time as the new "Constitution" and the "Declaration of Independence." It provided, "The two countries (Japan and the Philippines) will closely cooperate in matters political, economic and military for the successful prosecution of the war of Greater East Asia. The Philippines will provide all kinds of facilities for the military actions to be undertaken by Japan."

As in Japan, the **Gumbatsu** created in the Philippines, a totalitarian political organization. The Philippine model was called the *Kalibapi*, which is a contraction of the Tagalog words for "National Service Organization for the New Philippines." It was a faithful duplicate of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, complete with women's auxiliary, youth corps, religious representation and neighborhood associations. Laurel, the collaborationist President, was also President of the *Kalibapi*, and Aquino, speaker of the puppet legislature, was the vice president.

Control of Religion

In the Philippines, as elsewhere, the Japanese placed all religious organization under the control of the Religious Section of the Japanese Military Administration. The section was a specially trained group of Japanese including "Catholic Priests," "Protestant Clergymen," "Y. M. C. A. Secretaries," "Catholic Sisters," and "Catholic Lay Women." Radio Tokyo in announcing their arrival in Manila, said, "The section is not restrained in its work by any theory of the separation of church and state." To the Japanese, religion was merely another element, to be furthered, or persecuted, at the will of the military.

One of the goals of the Religious Section was to nationalize the churches. Radio Tokyo reported in April 1944 that members of the Religious Section are "doing their best to further consolidate the various religious bodies into one strong Christian sect."

Among other things, the Japanese decreed that sermons of all clergymen must conform to rules outlined by the Religious Section. This meant supporting some phase of the policies of the central government, or paying lip service to the benefits of Greater East Asia.

In this, as in other phases of the occupation, the Japanese attempt to win the cooperation of the Filipinos failed because the Japanese Military Government's treatment of the Filipinos gave the lie direct to their cultural and political propaganda.



Occupied China and Manchuria

The pattern of Japanese exploitation in China followed that set earlier in Manchuria, where the invaders have been in occupation since 1931.

From the beginning, the Japanese recruited labor battalions by force, on the basis of assessments from each village and each household.

These forces have been used to construct military installations, such as airfields, railways, and highways. It has been a common practice to send such labor units away from home.

Besides the labor units, the various puppet regimes in Occupied China maintain their own armies. These have been used in fighting the Chinese guerillas, have acted as police, served as guards on trains, and as coastal patrols.

Economic Exploitation

In all economic matters, Japanese are favored over Chinese. In the matter of rationing, for example, Japanese in Occupied China get larger rations than the Chinese—at half-price. Where food of two qualities is available, the Japanese get the higher grade. This is the case with Saigon rice, which goes to the Japanese, while the Chinese are left to divide the available local grain adulterated with peanut shells and ground bean cakes.

Chinese farmers are subject to crop control. The farmer's needs count for nothing. He must grow what is wanted by the Japanese—soybeans instead of wheat, for example—and he must grow an amount set by his quota. Drastic penalties are imposed if the farmers in the district fail to meet their quotas. In some places the Japanese demand from one-fourth to one-third of the crop. In addition to the quotas the Japanese buy up, confiscate or seize for taxes all available wheat, rice, cotton, and livestock.

Restrictions have been placed on trade under which one part of Occupied China can trade with another only under strict controls. Such economic transactions take place under great difficulties in any case, since the country has been flooded with unbacked currency. Not one but several occupation currencies are used—and there are penalties for those who do not use them. In order to help gain circulation for the occupation currencies the Japanese conducted an organized campaign to discourage the circulation of Chinese Government currency. At first, the Chinese Government currency was systematically and progressively devalued by edict. When its value had been reduced almost to zero (except in the black market) the Japanese forbade anyone to have Chinese Government currency in his possession.

Japan has established not one but four puppet governments in Occupied China. They are:

The Manchurian Government, headed by the puppet Henry Pu-yi, pretender to the "throne" of China;

The North China Political Council at Peiping, headed by the puppet Wang Yin-tai;

The Nanking government, headed by the puppet Chen Kung-po;

The Federated Autonomous Mongolian government, headed by the puppet Prince Teh.

The Nanking government was originally established by a renegade from the Chinese National Government (Chungking) named Wang Ching-wei. Wang died in Japan in November 1944 after a long absence from China.



Dope Peddling

Dope has been one of Japan's major weapons of war in Occupied China. The Japanese have deliberately increased the production and consumption of opium, heroin, and cocaine with the hope of narcotizing the Chinese people into acquiescence to the Japanese rule—and for a profit. Under Japanese stimulus, opium production has increased in Inner Mongolia and in Occupied North China. Opium shops are flourishing in Occupied China and protection fees are paid to the puppet governments and to the Special Service Bureau of the Japanese Army. In one street in Peiping, eight blocks long, there were two opium shops in June 1937. By the fall of 1939 the same street had 147 opium shops.

Both education and religion have been turned to use by the Japanese. The Japanese now control all educational institutions. Japanese is the only foreign language permitted. Chinese textbooks have been rewritten to suit Japanese purposes. Only Japanese-approved studies are permitted in the curriculum. In the universities the scholastic standards have been lowered. Western ideas are being replaced by philosophies which are "clearer" on the right relationships between governor and governed.

It is plain to see that the true pattern of Japanese occupation is intended to result in the "Japanization" of China. This is the real meaning of Greater East Asia.

Japan's New Order

These examples have been chosen because they show, in typical form, the wide gap between Japan's real war aim and the statement of it for propaganda purposes.

The lesson for Americans in all this is simple and direct. *Do not underestimate the Japanese enemy.* He is ruthless, crafty, and organized on the model of a tight, totalitarian state. He is cannily capitalizing on proindependence and anti-imperialist sentiment throughout the whole of East Asia. He has stripped the countries of Occupied Asia without any regard whatsoever for the needs of their people.

In the meantime we should all remember that State Shinto, the national cult which all Japanese are required to practice, holds three fundamental beliefs:

1. The emperor is divine because he is the living extension in time of the very bodies and soul of the great divine ancestors of the past, and, in particular, of the physical and spiritual attributes of the Sun Goddess.

2. Japan is the "Land of the Gods." The Japanese islands are the offspring of the sky-father and the earth-mother, and hence are

divine, while the rest of the world was made much later out of sea water and mud. The Japanese are, therefore, of divine nature and of special concern to the gods.

3. Japan has a sacred mission to save the world. Hence the slogan of Hakko-Ichiu, "The Whole World Under One Roof." This means that the **Gumbatsu** are supported by the doctrine of the national cult when they say that Japan's leadership in bringing about a universal reign of peace must be recognized, and *will be accomplished through the agency of her military power.*

The *idea* of divine conquest, the *power* of the political clique which seeks conquest, and the *ability* of the Japanese army and navy to wage war must all be eliminated before any country in the world is safe from Japanese aggression. Japan's unconditional surrender, as stated in the Cairo Declaration, is a necessary first step to protect our own national future and secure a peaceful Asia.



THE FORGER OF THE SWORD: JAPAN'S INDUSTRY

Development and Structure of Japan's Industry

Like her army and navy, most of Japan's modern industry is of comparatively recent growth. The greater part of her industrialization has taken place within the past 30 years. This industrial development was brought about by a national plan and was paid for by heavy government subsidy.

Japan's industry is an organic outgrowth of the nation's feudal-totalitarian organization. It is built on feudal lines and dominated by a small number of family groups. These trusts, the largest of which are Mitsui and Mitsubishi, are vast industrial empires controlling raw material, factories, shipping, banking and finance, commercial establishments, and distributing agencies.

These holding companies were formed as family trusts. Executives, who may never own any part of the firm, are often taken from outside the owning clans, trained by and for the firm, and thoroughly indoctrinated with the same sense of clan loyalty as were the samurai of the middle ages.

Japanese Industry Geared for War

Japan's industrial plant has been geared to turn out all of her war needs, from wire nails to battleships. In a remarkably short period, and by dint of enormous expenditure of wealth and self-sacrifice on the part of the Japanese masses, she achieved a large degree of self-sufficiency in the inner Empire, consisting of North China, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, and Japan proper. Within this inner citadel, Japan has extensive deposits of strategic raw materials, large sources of hydroelectric power, factories, and a deep well of cheap labor.

Japan's Industrial Manpower

Japan's "Inner Empire" contains about 152,000,000 people, more than the population of the United States. There are 75,000,000 in Japan; 45,000,000 in Manchuria; 32,000,000 in Korea, Formosa, and various islands. These figures do not include parts of China now being exploited by Japan, nor the millions in the rest of occupied Asia—Malaya, Burma, and the Indies.

Inside Japan proper, reliable statistics showed 35 million persons to be gainfully employed early in the war. About half of these were in agriculture and fishing, and only about 20 percent, or 7 million, were in industry and mining. These people worked an average of 11.4 hours a day, exclusive of all rest periods, and had only 2 days off a month.

Manpower from subjugated areas is being drafted into Japan to supplement her native labor force. In 1940, over 1 million Koreans were employed in Japan and an estimated 100,000 are added yearly from this single source.

In Manchuria, North China, and Korea, Japan is rapidly expanding her industrial and mining operations. However, there are no reliable statistics from those regions.

Raw Materials and Resources

The present war has given Japan access to some of the best sources of strategic raw materials. She took these sources, denying them to us, and for 3 years now, has been carrying raw material back to her Inner Empire, either for manufacture or stock piling.

When the United Nations cut the land and sea supply lines leading from this raw materials treasure house to Japan's industrial maw, Japan will lose access to her major oil supply, to rubber,

to import sources of manganese, chromium, lead, copper, nickel, zinc, and aluminum. From that moment she will have to fight from her stock piles. How large these have grown it is difficult to say with accuracy. However, she will still have close at hand many other sources of raw materials, and will be able to replace a portion of those lost by the use of substitutes and by synthetics.



Coal

Japan has fairly large coal resources in the home islands, although there is a lack of coking coal for the manufacture of steel. However, Manchuria and Occupied China now fill at least 10 percent of Japan's coal needs, and a large part of this coal is good coking quality.



Iron and Steel

Japan has had accessible supplies of iron ore and other materials for ferro-alloys. Iron ore from the home islands is low grade. In the past Japan has imported at least a third of her pig-iron. Better grade ores are available from China and Japan also imports from Manchuria and Korea. With these ores, Japan could produce about 12,600,000 tons of steel a year.



Oil

Japan's maximum wartime consumption of oil products is estimated at approximately 55 million barrels a year. Her home production of natural crude is placed at about 3 million barrels. Between 15 million and 22.5 million barrels of synthetic oil could be produced each year in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria.

Before our liberation of the Philippines, the difference between Japan's production and consumption of oil was made up by imports from the conquered East Indies. Besides filling current needs, the East Indian oil fields were supplying Japan with fuel stock piles against such time as her outer communication should be cut. Military operations have reduced Japanese oil imports from the Netherlands East Indies. It is difficult to estimate just how much imports have been reduced, but there are indications that the reduction is substantial.

It is estimated that Japan's stock pile of aviation gasoline would last 2 years at the present rate of operations. Her stock pile of naval fuel oil, however, is believed sufficient for only 5 months of operations over the present huge area of her empire. Of course, as the area of her control is reduced by military operations, her fuel requirements will also be reduced.



Rubber

When Japan occupied the island archipelagoes lying off southeast Asia she gained control of 90 percent of the world's supply of natural rubber. Japan has had 3 years in which to stockpile this essential war material. During all this time, however, shipping conditions have been difficult. There are indications that no sizeable stocks have been accumulated in the home islands, although very large amounts accumulated in the southern regions.




Railways

At present the North China railways are operating at about their prewar level—30 million tons per year. The Japanese have been working full speed to double-track the arc of coastal railways that extend from China's Yellow Sea ports to the east coast of Korea. This double-track-

ing, when complete, should increase the capacity of those sections by 150 percent.

Japan's recent land campaign in China was designed, among other things, to clear the north-south railway that extends from Hankow to Canton, and extend it south to Indo-China.



Electric Power

Japan's modern industry is highly electrified. In 1943, it was estimated to have an installed capacity of 12.6 million kilowatts, more than half of it from water power. Use of electricity in private consumption is rigidly regulated, so that most of it is available for industrial purposes.



Food

Experts do not expect disruptive scarcity in


Japan's food supply in the immediately foreseeable future. There are shortages; the average daily intake has been reduced from 2,400 to 2,100 calories per person.

Rice supplies fully half of Japan's caloric intake, with fish and beans, in that order, forming the other two staples. Almost 94 percent of Japan's total rice needs are raised on the islands themselves. Of the remainder, approximately 3 percent comes from Korea and 3 percent from Formosa. In order to increase the rice supply and reduce vitamin deficiency diseases, Japan has prohibited the polishing of rice and is reported adding wheat, barley, millet, and beans to the food ration. Home production of rice has undoubtedly suffered from the wartime shortage of fertilizers, manpower, and farm implements.

The decrease in caloric intake has come about largely through the effect of wartime stringencies on Japan's huge consumption of fish. It is estimated that this consumption has dropped by at least 50 percent.

The soya bean provides proteins and vegetable oils for the Japanese diet. In recent years, Japan annually imported approximately 1½ million metric tons of beans from Manchuria.

THE WIELDERS OF THE SWORD: JAPAN'S ARMY



The Japanese Soldier

American soldiers know from hard-won experience that the Japanese soldier is a ruthless, fanatical fighter. He accepts physical privation and the expectation of death without question, the result of his training, education, and political indoctrination. His highest goal is to "keep the Emperor's mind at ease," and to attain it he is willing to lay down his own life.

The typical Japanese soldier is hard, tough, and well disciplined. On the average he is 5 feet, 3 inches tall and weighs 117½ pounds. He is intelligent and crafty, not a stupid, insensate robot as he is sometimes pictured. The Japanese school attendance law requires every Japanese to go through the sixth grade with the result that the Japanese are a highly literate people. The years of schooling of the typical Japanese soldier are about the same as those of the typical American soldier.

In his military training the Japanese soldier has been taught that his only choices are death or victory. He knows that if he is captured he will be officially listed as dead and so reported to his family. His officers tell him that to be captured is to be "Twice-Dead." Rather than face disgrace, the Japanese soldier will fight to the death.

The Japanese soldier's credo comes from Emperor Meiji's Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. It is this: "Duty is heavier than a mountain; Death is lighter than a feather."



Japanese Military Training

Able-bodied Japanese begin their training at the age of 8 when they receive at least 2 hours drill

each week. Between the ages of 14 and 15, they become army youth soldiers and begin an apprenticeship in military training. This qualifies them for the superior private rating when they become of age. Later they become lance corporals and, upon graduation from school, become corporals.

Peacetime conscription calls for 2 years of military service for all physically and mentally fit males between the ages of 17 and 40. Today, a 3-year term of service is mandatory.

The actual training is tough and realistic, intended to make the soldier withstand hunger, fatigue, privations. He is taught to master weapons, climate and terrain and, equally important, is conditioned to unquestioning discipline.



Organization and Structure of the Japanese Army

According to the Japanese constitution, the Emperor is the commander in chief of the army and navy. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, concludes treaties. In all this, he is advised by two military councils; the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the Supreme Military Council.

The Japanese Army in the field is organized into groups of armies, area armies, armies, and forces with special missions—land task forces which do not initially come under the command of any specific army.

The chief of staff of the Japanese Army is responsible for the general direction of army forces in the field.

A group of armies, such as the Kwantung Army, is equivalent to one of our commands of a theatre of operations. An area army, such as the Eighth Area Army, is equivalent to a British or American Army.

A Japanese Army may be considered the equivalent of an American or British Army Corps. It is composed of a headquarters, a variable number of infantry divisions, and army troops. It normally comprises from 50,000 to 150,000 officers and enlisted men.

A Japanese infantry division is commanded by a lieutenant-general, with a colonel of the general staff as chief of staff.

A Japanese "strengthened" infantry division consists of the following:

Total personnel.....	29,408
Horses.....	9,906
Motor vehicles.....	502
Rifles.....	10,000
Light machine guns.....	405
Heavy machine guns.....	112
Grenade dischargers.....	457
Machine cannon or 20 mm. antitank rifles.....	72
37 mm. or 47 mm. anti-tank guns.....	40
70 mm. regimental guns.....	36
75 mm. regimental guns.....	24
75 mm. field or mountain guns.....	12
105 mm. howitzers.....	24
150 mm. howitzers.....	12
Light tanks.....	20
Medium tanks.....	48
Tankettes or armored cars.....	13



Japanese Infantry Weapons

Japanese weapons should not be underestimated. While they may not compare with our own in design, machining, or durability, they are still adequate and perform their combat function.

The Japanese infantryman uses a 7.7 mm. rifle known as the M-99. This is an improved version of the older Arisaka model, weighs only 8.8 pounds, has a muzzle velocity of 2,300 feet per second, and its sights are graduated from 300 to 1,500 meters.

To date, a major Japanese weakness appears

to be in her artillery, particularly in variety, concentration, and marksmanship. However, since Japan has had access to German designs, it may be expected that Japanese artillery is due for a marked improvement. Japanese artillery weapons may soon be encountered which embody the following features: Hollow charge projectiles, new incendiary projectiles, self-propelled mounts of various kinds, and rockets.

Japanese tanks, too, are bound to improve and new models may show considerable German influence. That the Japanese tank design is not stagnant is clearly indicated by the recently captured new type amphibious tank, a definite advance over older models.


Their aircraft too, are improving and, while they still cannot match our long-range bombers, their new fighter models can perform about as well as our own.



Size of Japan's Army

The Japanese Army today numbers at least 4 million first-line troops, of whom more than 2 million are in China and Manchuria. This army can still undergo considerable expansion if it becomes necessary. At this moment, Japan can mobilize and equip 2 million more soldiers without seriously affecting war production. In addition, Japan's high birth rate supplies her with a large yearly quota of new recruits, and there are additional millions who might be "recruited" from subject nations.

While United States troops have killed a minimum of 280,000 Japanese and isolated another 250,000 in bypassed island pockets, we still have not yet come to grips with the main forces of Japan's army. If past experiences are any indication, defeating them will be a long, difficult, and costly task.





THE WIELDERS OF THE SWORD: JAPAN'S NAVY

Growth of Japan's fleet

Currently, Japanese naval personnel totals 850,000, afloat and ashore. Of this number, 200,000 are manning ships; 200,000 are in naval aviation; 275,000 are in naval garrisons abroad; and the remainder is in Japanese yards, garrisons, and communications centers.

Among modern navies this is a mushroom growth. When Commodore Perry arrived in Yedo in 1853, Japan had no navy. But the Japanese learned quickly, and the importance of sea power in the modern world was not lost on them. By 1872 Japan had a small navy of 20 warships and 1,500 officers and men. This navy grew rapidly, built up by scores of ships purchased in France, the Netherlands, and England.

In 1894 Japan's fleet was strong enough to challenge China. It had grown to 60,000 tons and was manned by 15,000 officers and men. In the 9 years between the defeat of China and the surprise attack on Port Arthur, Japan's fleet tonnage had increased 500 percent to 300,000 tons aggregate, and her personnel had risen to 40,000 officers and men. The victory over Russia, and the utter destruction of that nation's fleet, established Japan, the newcomer to the field, as a naval power of the first rank.

On October 10, 1941, when, according to a Japanese admiral, the Imperial Navy received sealed orders to deploy for the war against the United States, Japan's Navy was the third largest in the world. It had an aggregate tonnage of 1,049,148 tons and, in number of cruisers and aircraft carriers, was second only to the British Fleet.

Losses in personnel

Japanese naval losses (personnel) have reached 262,000, it is estimated. Fully 25,000 members of the Japanese naval air corps are included in the total losses.

Japanese naval personnel ashore, killed to date, is estimated to number 50,000. Fully 10,000 Japanese seamen have been killed on naval vessels damaged during the course of the war. Another 10,000 Japanese navy men have lost their lives in transit aboard naval troop ships while being carried to forward areas.

The remainder of Japanese navy men killed is 75 percent of the complement of Nipponese fighting vessels sunk to date. In view of the fact that the Japanese do not engage in life-saving operations if it interferes with activities on hand and that the United States Navy has captured only a few hundred Japanese sailors, the estimate of 75 percent of personnel lost is conservative, the United States Navy declares.



The Japanese sailor

The United States Navy rates the Japanese sailor a good fighting man, well-trained, well-educated, well-equipped. Japanese naval officers are cited as of high quality. Japanese seamanship is high; the naval vessels excellent.

Of the Japanese sailor as a fighting man, a United States Navy report issued before the great naval actions of recent months has this to say:

"The Japanese are taught to be aggressive, resolute, and daring. During the heat of battle, they fight without fear and once they are engaged, they fight to the bitter end and are taught never to surrender to the enemy, even in the face of certain death.

"*Endurance.*—The Japanese say that the loyalty of officers and men enables them to endure

the hardships of a Spartan life at sea, and their men-of-war accordingly are combatant ships, even sacrificing some things which we consider basic necessities.

"Loyalty.—Training and education does much to bring to the front the devotion of the Japanese to his Emperor and country. They revere the Emperor as God who is the head of the whole family.

"Discipline.—The Japanese sailor is easy to command. They expect orders and feel unhappy when left to themselves.

"Confidence.—Their morale is excellent, thanks to past victories in former wars and the initial successes after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese feel themselves, man to man, superior to any of us. They believe in their divine destiny to conquer the world. They are not discouraged by single battles. They are confident they will win the war.

"Foresightedness.—The Japanese are prudent and careful. The war has been long planned with certain details taken care of years ago. They expect to conquer all of Eastern Asia and the Pacific Ocean and then force us to make a peace which will weaken us, and cause us to grow weaker with time."

The average Japanese sailor is about 20 years old, the youngest being just above the age of 14 and the oldest now accepted for active sea duty being not above 41. This average sailor is 5 feet 4½ inches tall, weighs 124 pounds, has a chest measurement of 33 inches. Sailors, for the most part, derive from seaside communities. In peacetime, conscripts (40 percent) served 3 years, volunteers (60 percent) 5 years and petty officers 6 years. Enlisted men were promoted through the ranks of petty officers to warrant officers. Since 1942, warrant officers have been eligible for advancement to both line and staff officers' ranks.

The Japanese Navy has not yet reached the bottom of the barrel with respect to manpower reserves. Navy recruiting can still draw on well over 1,500,000 men now engaged in merchant shipping and fishing. The present non-naval maritime population of Japan includes 115,000 holders of mariners' certificates, 250,000 holders of mariners' service books.

In 1937, Japan had 364,260 fishing boats, of which 66,299 had engines. Fishermen "disciplined to the sea" total at least 1,250,000.

Officers

Admirals are appointed by the Emperor, after consultation with the Supreme War Council and the Navy Minister. Vice admirals, rear admirals, and captains are selected by the Board of Flag Officers. The selection system in these grades is quite drastic.

In the lower grades, selection boards comprised of flag officers and captains are convened in the fleet and in each naval district; these boards select the eligible officers in each command and determine the relative seniority on the promotion list. The results are then submitted to the Board of Flag Officers, which then makes the final decision. Excellent officers are quickly promoted to the higher ranks. Even in peacetime, it is not unusual for an officer to become a commander at 37, a captain at 41, a rear admiral at 45, a vice admiral at 49 and an admiral at 55.

The major principles of Japanese naval education are as follows: Devotion to the Emperor, obedience to orders, courage, truth, and simplicity.

Japan has three naval academies: The Imperial naval academy at Etajima for line officers; the Imperial naval engineering academy at Maizuru; the Imperial naval paymaster's academy at Tokyo. The Japanese rate these academies socially and professionally in the same order. Since the outbreak of this war, attempts have been made to eliminate this snobbery. The United States Navy observes, however, that there is continued social friction between the Japanese army and navy—friction that, at times, has probably made the task of American forces easier than it might otherwise have been.

Merchant marine officers.—Both the central government and various prefectural governments have taken an active part in the training of merchant marine personnel. Japan has 32 merchant marine schools, including 2 for navigation and 2 for engineering officers. Prewar admission to the nautical training schools required the equivalent of a high school education and the passing of a difficult physical examination.

Actual work in nautical schools ranged from 4 to 7 years. After being graduated, students undergo 3 years of intensive training before they can qualify as officers of commercial ships. This training includes 6 months of work with the Japanese Navy, completion of which at once qualifies them as regular naval reserve officers;

1 year aboard nautical training ship; and 1½ years aboard a regular commercial vessel, as midshipman under the vessel's officers. Upon completion of this program, the graduate is given a final examination before he is made an officer of the Japanese merchant marine. After serving from 2 to 3 years as a junior officer on commercial vessels, he is commissioned an ensign in the naval reserve. Since the beginning of the war, merchant marine officers have been ordered to active naval duty.

Higher merchant marine schools.—There are two institutions of this nature, one in Tokyo and the other in Kobe. Both are administered by the Government. At these two schools, students, in addition to receiving technical education to prepare them for the merchant marine, receive also a regular college education. Here also naval officers educate the students in naval matters. Upon graduation, the students are given commissions as officers in the merchant marine. After some additional naval training, they are also commissioned in the naval reserve.


Japanese construction battalion. This outfit, corresponding to our "Seabees," is 80 percent civilian, 20 percent military. A Japanese construction battalion has approximately 1,000 members. The men are trained and equipped to construct airfields, primarily. They are able also to construct roads, tunnels, and bridges.

Underestimation by the West a Japanese Military Weapon

When the history of this war is written, it will undoubtedly record that Western underestimation of Japan's military power was one of the most potent weapons in the Japanese arsenal. Japan deliberately fostered this ignorance of her strength and intentions, using it as a screen behind which she mustered her forces for an all-out blow for conquest.

In an incredibly short time Japan's underrated army and navy chased the Western Powers out of East Asia and the Southwest Pacific, winning control of a land and water empire measuring nearly 5,000 miles from north to south, and more than 3,000 miles from east to west. Within this huge conquered area resides a population of more than 400 million people—almost one-fourth the total population of the world.

A nation that can accomplish this military miracle, whose speed and scope are unparalleled in modern history, must never again be underestimated. Japan will always be dangerous—especially so in retreat: capable of fanatical, unremitting resistance, and sharp, sudden surprises—until her army and navy, and the forces which created and nourished them for aggression, are totally destroyed. Until that moment, we relax at our own peril.



THE JAPANESE HOME FRONT

Japan's Total Mobilization

When Japan goes to war, all of her people in virtually all of their activities are at war. There is no such thing as "limited liability," business as usual, or a division between home-front and war-front pursuits. The war front covers the entire national life, enveloping each activity, each individual. Each separate Japanese, in and out of the armed forces, is fighting and sacrificing for victory 24 hours a day.

Total Rationing

There is practically not a single article necessary to Japanese life and well-being that is not rationed, restricted, or otherwise controlled. The Japanese civilian accepts this situation because he knows that war needs come first, and what is left must be shared if it is to go around.

Food

All food is rationed in Japan. Not a single item can be freely bought. For an adult male doing light work, the daily rice ration is $\frac{3}{4}$ of a pint of dry rice. The ration varies according to the sex, age, and occupation of the individual. Monthly rice allotments were reduced from 30 pounds per person in 1943 to 22.5 pounds in 1944. Fish, the second most important item in the Japanese diet, is increasingly difficult to obtain. Many fishing boats and fishermen have gone to war and the boats that remain are allowed only enough gasoline to operate $4\frac{1}{2}$ days a month.

The sugar ration has been reduced one-half pound per month and the vegetable ration is reported to be 4 pounds a month.

All food is rationed to consumers under government control through Central and Local Food Corporations which are comprised of large dealers, food processing and handling groups. From this

national food pool, the Central Food Corporation provides first for the needs of the armed forces, then sells the balance to the Local Food Corporations. These local organizations distribute the foodstuffs through Neighborhood Associations, each of which serves 10 families, and whose president is appointed by the police.

Because of the burdened transportation system, food distribution sometimes breaks down. One Japanese village had to stretch a 15-day rice ration for a month, and had no fish to fill in the gap. Adults in Aichi prefecture managed an entire month without sugar. In another locality, some residents had only tomatoes to eat for a week, in addition to a meager supply of rice.

Because of inadequate food rations, many Japanese are forced to resort to the black market, where prices may be four times as high as legal ceiling prices.

Clothing

Clothing rationing is as widespread as that of food. Nearly every item of apparel was rationed as long ago as 1942. Since then, with the war effort requiring increasing amounts of cotton and other textiles, the clothing situation has become more difficult. The ration value of most items has consequently increased, and the quality, because of widespread use of synthetics, has deteriorated. Most newly manufactured clothing is made from *sufu*, a synthetic textile that shreds after two or three washings. Leather is unavailable for civilian use, so shoes are made of cloth, fishskin, or paper, which fall apart after a good rain. Even wooden clogs are rationed.

During 1944 three kinds of clothing ration cards were issued in two allotments, one for summer, one for winter. There was a first-class ticket valued at 50 points for persons under 29 years of age; a second-class ticket of 40 points for

persons over 30; and a ticket of varying values for special cases.

That this clothing ration is hardly adequate to maintain a proper wardrobe is at once apparent from the following point values: Western style suit, 63 points; kimono, 40 points; woman's blouse and skirt, 44 points; rayon dress, 32 points; workman's coat, 43 points; child's blouse and skirt, 22 points; long-sleeved undershirt, 15 points, handkerchief, 3 points.

Even blankets, towels, bedding and other home textile supplies are included in the meager ration allowance.

Fuel and Other Rationed Goods

In addition to food and clothing, virtually all other items of consumer's goods are rationed. These include soap, matches, medicines, charcoal (Japan's home heating fuel), and kerosene, to name a few. There is no coal for private use, and gas and electricity are not allowed for heating.

Despite rent control measures, Tokyo rentals rose 150 percent between 1937 and 1943. Actually, this increase is still higher than the rent index indicates, since repairs, which had previously been paid for by landlords, must now be carried by the tenants.

There is an acute housing shortage in Japan. This has been aggravated by the fact that, while about 150,000 of Japan's flimsily constructed dwellings must be rebuilt each year, there has been practically no housing construction except in the large cities for the past 2 years. In addition, the migration of Japanese to cities to take war jobs has increased the need for new houses to approximately 400,000 a year.

Air raids have, of course, increased this shortage. We do not know the exact numbers. Our source is Radio Tokyo which may well be interested in maximising reports of the damage. Radio Tokyo in April 1945 made the following estimates of houses destroyed:

Tokyo.....	510,000
Osaka.....	130,000
Nagoya.....	60,000
Kobe.....	70,000

Japan's Total Labor Draft

Practically every Japanese able to work—man, woman, and child—is actively engaged in furthering the war effort. Under the terms of Japan's "Emergency Mobilization of National Labor" (the economic equivalent of military conscrip-

tion), all males between the ages of 12 and 60, and all unmarried females between 12 and 40 are registered with the labor exchange. Private hiring is no longer permitted. All placements are made through agencies of the Ministry of Welfare.

Manpower needs are submitted to this Ministry by the various war industries, and conscription notices are then sent out, calling up workers for service.

Japanese conversion to war production has been just about complete. Men are forbidden to work in the 17 occupations classified as non-essential. Numerous restaurants, bars, theaters, geisha houses, and other places of amusement have been closed, their buildings converted into workshops and factories, and their personnel sent into war jobs. Public projects not contributing to the war effort have been suspended, and Japan's civil service personnel has been cut by 5 percent.

University departments, except those giving technical or military training, have been closed. Study hours have been concentrated so that students can work part-time in factories.

Not only technical institutions, but many middle and even primary schools have been organized as workshops and turn out war goods. The Yokohama Technical School is making nuts under subcontract from the Nissan Motor Co., Sendai Higher Industrial School has subcontracts for the manufacture of munitions, and children in the Shimizu Primary School are making airplane parts.

Even religious teachers and priests—Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian—have doffed their robes to work in their nation's armament industry.

Wages and Living Costs

While wages in Japan are low by western standards, they are supplemented with bonuses, sickness allowances, holiday gifts, dormitory or housing accommodations, "living-out" allowances, retirement and discharge pay. Consequently actual earnings are higher than the size of the pay envelope would indicate.

The Welfare Ministry reported that comparatively few workers in Tokyo received less than \$34.50 (150 yen) per month, and that those who did get less received a government allowance of between 46 cents and \$2.30 monthly for each member of the family who was under 18, or was crippled or infirm.

According to official figures, though, wages are not keeping pace with increasing living costs. Official prices and wages were frozen in 1939. Nevertheless they have responded to upward pressures. Between 1937, the year of the attack on China, and 1943, average Japanese living costs have risen 71 percent according to the Japanese Cabinet Bureau of Statistics. Food costs in this period have risen 77 percent and clothing costs, 134.4 percent.

Despite these difficulties, however, the Japanese worker has been steadily increasing his war effort.

Civilian Defense and Evacuation

Fully aware of the dangers of intensified American air war, Japan is going all-out to reduce its interference with her war effort. In January 1945, the Japanese Cabinet voted an air defense budget of \$460 million to expand fire fighting and damage repair facilities, and construct permanent underground shelters.

Drills are held regularly in industrial and residential areas, and residents of metropolitan Tokyo must wear standard identification tags around their necks, giving name, address, and blood type. Fire breaks have been built in 35 sections of Tokyo, shelter trenches have been dug along sidewalks, and essential materials such as food and fuel have been stored in places considered safe from air attack. The Tokyo branch of the Greater Japan Civilian Defense Association has set up food canteens in municipal mess halls.

In addition to the official air defense agencies, practically every civilian has a job in civilian defense. The basic local civil defense unit is the 10-family neighborhood association, the chiefs of which comprise a community council.

Compulsory evacuation of nonessential civilians has been carried out in Japan's principal cities and industrial areas. Elderly persons, prospective mothers and small children were evacuated first. Those with relatives in rural areas were advised to join them and take up farming. Others were sent to government constructed evacuee shelters. Workers on war jobs, however, are urged to stay at their machines and keep producing even while raids are under way.

Other Wartime Measures

Travel in private automobiles is virtually non-

existent, travel on trains drastically limited. Japanese may not make railroad trips, even on urgent personal business, without a special police permit.

Many autos, even official cars, are powered by charcoal-burning engines to conserve gasoline.

Telephone and telegraph facilities for private use are restricted to urgent business.

Postal rates and taxes have been increased

There has been a 50 percent price rise in all tobacco and tobacco products for public consumption.

Evening newspapers are no longer published. Morning papers are limited to four pages.

Local community branches of the National Total Stimulation Movement have been organized to increase the Japanese fighting spirit, strength, war and food production, and spirit of self-sacrifice.

Hardships Are the Path to Victory

The Japanese are ready to undergo almost any suffering in defense of the "Imperial Throne." They have already known 8 years of war, and today, despite increasing privations and the mounting tempo of Allied attack, the 75 million Japanese have lost none of their unity, their morale, their willingness to make even further sacrifices for "victory."

Joseph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State and former United States Ambassador to Japan, had this to say about Japanese morale:

"Japanese civilians, although undergoing privations and living under severe restrictions, are doing so willingly and energetically. Japanese men, women, and children are organized for war to an extent that we Americans, with our democratic tradition, find hard to understand. Japan's low standard of living, stringent diet, and the long working hours to which her people are accustomed, make home front conditions that seem like privations to us, appear only discomforts to the Japanese. The Japanese are a disciplined and regimented people. We must realize that behind the Japanese fighting man whom we are even now in the process of defeating, stands a determined foe, the Japanese civilian with whom we must also reckon before achieving eventual victory."

PROBLEMS OF FIGHTING THE PACIFIC WAR



Distance Is Also an Enemy

Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief of the United States Fleet, has said that in the Pacific war we face two major opponents—The Japanese and distance.

Space is an eater of time and resources, both essential to the successful conduct of warfare. The problems of conquering the vast Pacific spaces are a major concern of the military men who plan our operations and are responsible for the delivery of the right amounts of men and war implements to the right spot at the right moment.

The nature of our war, its tempo and scope, has been determined by our ability to vanquish distance—by the availability of transport and supply, of ships to carry the assault troops and their battle gear, of tankers to deliver the rivers of oil and gasoline necessary to keep the fighting ships and planes and tanks going against the enemy.

And as these distances grow with our continuing advance, more and more fighting ships and planes, and the men and supplies necessary to operate them, are expended on the purely defensive task of protecting our supply lines from possible enemy attack, removing these combat units from the actual battlefronts where they would otherwise increase the power of our attack. Thus the closer we draw to Japan, the greater becomes the attrition of distance.

To one who has not actually participated in the Pacific operations it is difficult to comprehend the logistics problems created by the tremendous distances, or to appreciate by what tenuous threads the fate of some of our campaigns have hung.

Our forces, fighting at the end of the longest exterior communication lines in history, must maintain a ceaseless, mounting offensive against an enemy with ever-shortening lines of supply. And this enemy is ever ready to capitalize on any diminution of our offensive pressure through break-down of supply.

Regular shipping routes in the Pacific, long as they normally are, could not be used during the war because of the possibility that the enemy might sever them. Our wartime shipping had to be routed over newer, more distant lanes in order to keep it out of range of possible enemy action. These distances not only eat up time, but available shipping as well.

Another shipping problem is the time a ship must remain in port. This is determined by the available loading and unloading facilities. Far Eastern ports are generally lacking in efficient cargo handling facilities, even in peace time. And the equipment of those we capture will very likely be destroyed by the retreating Japanese.

When we invaded Europe, we had a well equipped base in England across a channel no wider than the strip of water dividing Manila from Bataan. In the Pacific, our nearest home port to the Philippines is Pearl Harbor, more than 4,000 miles away. Every ounce of equipment and every cartridge for every member of the landing force had to be carried over these thousands of miles of treacherous sea—and arrive *on time*.

These problems will continue to increase in magnitude and complexity until we finally bring Japan to defeat.

The Effect of Germany's Defeat

The defeat of Germany brings no early solution to the problem of Pacific distances. Even if all transport shipping now serving the European theatre had been released to the Pacific immediately on VE day, 6 months would elapse before there would be any measurable effect in the Pacific operating areas. As a result, the Pacific war must be fought with the transport now in that ocean, plus every ton our shipyards can deliver in the meantime.

The purely military task of defeating Japan is no less difficult than the task of defeating Ger-

many. It will require a corresponding quantity of matériel. Transport of these enormous supplies over the vast distances involved will require a shipping tonnage greater than the combined merchant fleets of the entire world before Pearl Harbor.



Production and Logistics

Production and prompt delivery of the myriad materials essential to the conduct of the war is the major consideration in the logistics of supply. Shipping presents only one facet of the problem.

Obviously it is vital to offensive operations that the fuel, shells, food, and gear for ships, planes, guns, tanks, and men be on hand when needed. Because of the great distances and the critical shipping situation, all materials needed for Pacific operations must be ordered many months in advance of their actual use. Consequently any delay or failure, either in production or delivery

of essential goods, may bring costly failure in battle.

Coordination of our production is not enough—the entire national production and transport effort must be completely synchronized, with clockwork precision from factory and field to the battle front.

Nothing in modern war is more complex than the amphibious operations peculiar to our war against Japan. Men and matériel must be transported vast distances to the scene of combat, and be ready to go into action at an exact moment. The landing must be prepared by land-based and carrier plane bombing; by protracted shelling by surface forces; then finally comes the putting ashore of assault troops under the fire support of ships and aircraft.

All these operations must be delicately balanced in plan, personnel and matériel preparation, and execution. Failure of any element to keep to an exact time schedule may easily endanger the success of the entire operation.

And then, after all these obstacles—of production, shipping, distance, time, and synchronization—are overcome, there still remains the Japanese enemy.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Japan's Main Forces Must Still be Encountered

While the ultimate defeat of Japan is certain, her armed forces are as yet nowhere near final defeat. Japan will not be defeated until our will has been so completely imposed on the enemy that all Japanese have no further hope of victory. Until that moment is reached, any over-confidence on our part, any relaxation of the steady intensification of our effort, might well be disastrous.

With but few exceptions, all of our military efforts so far have been directed toward the reconquest of territory we had previously lost. Only at bloody Iwo and Okinawa have we touched Japan's inner bastion. The unyielding fanaticism of the enemy's resistance there gives grim evidence of what we must expect as we draw closer to the centers of Japanese power.

The Japanese Army has suffered serious setbacks, but actually our war against it is still in its opening phases. Nowhere have we met the main forces of the Japanese Army. Until recently we have encountered only outpost garrisons. The bulk of Japan's armed might is still fresh, confident and untouched by defeat. It is a large, tough, efficient fighting force stationed on the home islands, China, and Manchuria. It is this army that we will have to face and overcome *after* we have first won the gruelling, heartbreaking campaign to reach it.



The Japanese Navy Still Dangerous

The Japanese Navy, too, has suffered serious

reverses and losses, but it still has to be decisively defeated. So far it has evaded decisive combat because, merely by remaining in being, it is able to pose threats to our overseas operations and communications. This compels us to use large naval and air forces for purely defensive and preventative operations, thus weakening our strategic striking force.

Japanese Civilians vs. U. S. Civilians

In the final analysis, before our armed forces can defeat Japan's armed forces in combat, our people must defeat Japan's people in courage, staying ability and production.

In the Japanese civilian we face a person whose entire history, culture and conditioning have fashioned him into an instrument of total war. He has a regimented mind, directly focused on victory. He is a skilled, resourceful worker, motivated by religious fervor. Long conditioning has made him willing to endure hardship, privation, and hunger over a long period of time. And to him self-sacrifice is a cult that carries the blessings of his gods. His defeat will be no mean task.

The Japanese Nation Fashioned for War

Like the Japanese warrior and civilian, the Japanese nation has been fashioned for total war. This is no recent phenomenon, but the culmination of a long process that reaches back into the dawn of Japanese history. All of her develop-

ment, social, economic, cultural, religious, and political has led Japan into the path of attempted world conquest. The coalition of militarist, office holder, and industrialist—**Gumbatsu**—is the logical outgrowth of the grafting of modern techniques onto a feudal social organism. Like Nazism it is the result of a successful conspiracy and an effective reign of terror. All of which makes Japan's fascism fundamentally dangerous and difficult to destroy.

Japan Still Hopes to Win

It may well be that Japan's **Gumbatsu** overlords by no means feel they will lose the war. If they intended this as a war for limited objectives—for raw materials and pan-Asiatic prestige—an inconclusive defeat would still be a partial victory for them. By fighting on and on with relentless fanaticism, squandering the lives of their fighting men in prodigious quantities, they may hope to make the price we pay for each victory so great that ultimately our home and fighting morale will be shaken.

Knowing how highly we value each American life—and rating this a weakness—they might expect to bring us to the point where we will ask: "Is total victory worth this terrible cost?" Then, they feel, the prospect of still more American dead will make us willing to stop our war short of complete victory, and accept a Japanese surrender which will leave them some of their booty or, at least, leave some of the **Gumbatsu** free to plan again a greater, more devastating war of conquest.

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**EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS
JUNE 1, 1945**

The primary task facing the Nation today is to win the war in Japan — to win it completely and to win it as quickly as possible. For every day by which it is shortened means a saving of American lives.

But there can be no peace in the world until the military power of Japan is destroyed — with the same completeness as was the power of the European dictators.

To do that, we are now engaged in a process of deploying millions of our armed forces against Japan in a mass movement of troops and supplies and weapons over 14,000 miles — a military and naval feat unequalled in all history.

The job ahead for this Nation is clear.

We are faced with a powerful Japanese military machine. These are the same Japanese who perpetrated the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor three and one-half years ago; they are the same Japanese who ordered the death march from Bataan; they are the same Japanese who carried out the barbarous massacres in Manila.

They now know that their dreams of conquest are shattered. They no longer boast of dictating peace terms in Washington.

This does not mean, however, that the Japanese have given up hope. They are depending on America tiring of this war — becoming weary of the sacrifices it demands. They hope that our desire to see our soldiers and sailors home again and the temptation to return to the comforts and profits of peace will force us to settle for some compromise short of unconditional surrender.



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