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MISSION #25 TACHIARI "OPENHOUSE 1"
6 Jan 45 Omura

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	
A. G.	

XX BOMBER COMMAND



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Tactical Mission Report

No. 25

DATE 6 JANUARY 1945

GENERAL H.H. ARNOLD

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of The Deputy Commander, IB and C
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 25

Mission No. 25

TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT

Omura, Japan

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section
XX Bomber Command

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of The Deputy Commander, IB and C
APO 493

26 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 6 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING:

The four Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 25 to attack the Tachiarai Machine Works if weather permitted visual releases or the Omura Aircraft Plant if radar conditions prevailed. The Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Rear Base</u>	<u>Forward Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Hsinching	Colonel W.H. Blanchard
444th	Dudhkundi	Kwangan	Colonel A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Kiunglai	Colonel A.F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Pengshan	Colonel J.V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 25.

b. Targets Specified:

- (1) Primary Targets: Visual - Tachiarai Machine Works, Tachiarai, Japan (AAF Target No. 90.35 - 1870).
Radar - Omura Aircraft Plant, Omura Japan (AAF Target No. 90.36 - 1627).
- (2) Secondary Target: Wharf Area, Nanking, China (AAF Target No. 83.1 - 129).
- (3) Last Resort Target: Airdrome Storage Area, Tangyang, China (XX Bomber Command Target No. 83.8 - C).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target (Visual): The Tachiarai Machine Works is an aircraft assembly and repair plant of moderate size which, according to intelligence derived from captured Japanese aircraft, probably assembles the Type 98 R Babs, a single engine light bomber and reconnaissance plane. It is possible that Tachiarai also assembles some type of single engine fighter plane, although this has not yet been definitely ascertained. The plant furthermore constructs airframe parts, wheels, and fuel tanks. While

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aircraft production at Tachiarai is but a small part of the Japanese total, the plant is one of the important producers within range of China Bases. Successful attack upon this target should halt its operations for at least four months, and deprive the enemy of new aircraft at a time when he needs them more than ever before.

(2) Primary Target (Radar):

(a) The Omura Aircraft Plant is divided into three distinct parts; (a) The old area 2200 feet by 1800 feet extending diagonally back from the main wharfs, (b) The new south plant 2550 feet by 1010 feet extending south along the shore line, and (c) The new east plant which is a continuation of the old plant.

(b) The work involved in these three shop areas consists of repair to Zekes and Jakes, manufacture of the Pete type aircraft as well as the manufacture of the new carrier-borne attack plane Grace. Engines are likewise repaired and built at the Omura Plant.

(3) Secondary Target:

(a) The city of Nanking, on the Yangtze River, is one of the enemy's military centers in Occupied China. The city contains a number of large barracks and storage areas. The movement of troops and supplies is accomplished by the excellent transportation facilities serving Nanking. The railroad line from Tientsin terminates at Pukow, across the river from Nanking with which it is connected by ferry. Another railroad line connects Nanking with Shanghai and continues on to Wuhu and the South. Ocean-going vessels are accommodated at the Nanking wharves.

(b) All these transportation services converge in the general target area, at the north of which is the Nanking R.R. Terminal and R.R. ferry wharves. The area contains numerous large warehouses, a power plant, and along the waterfront are large pontoon wharves. Over a period of months an average of 424 cars have been observed in the Nanking rail yards (700 at Pukow) and shipping at the Nanking and Pukow wharves generally amounts to between 20,000 and 30,000 tons, although shipping activity has possibly declined recently.

(c) Damage to this target area would hamper the flow of military traffic and destroy quantities of supplies stored there.

(4) Last Resort Target:

The airdrome and the Storage area at Tangyang are of importance to the enemy as an advance base for aircraft operating in the Yangtze River Area.

b. Details of Planning (See Annexes N and O):

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) The two primary factors determining the scope of Mission Number 25 were the logistic situation in the China Area and the developments in the Pacific. The mission, originally planned for the tenth of November, was to be preceded by a series of six strikes (three double strikes) in October. However, the first of the series was delayed until October 14 due to weather and naval operations, and all subsequent strikes, including Mission Number 25, were correspondingly delayed. Further delay of Mission Number 25 was caused by: (1) More aircraft being airborne on the first two strikes (Formosa targets) than originally anticipated, thus putting a strain on the POL stocks; (2) the desire of Washington for the

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November 10 mission to be a maximum effort; and (3) the change in timing for Pacific Operation M-1.

(b) Mission Number 25 was scheduled on December 17 as the first part of a double strike in support of Pacific Operation M-1 with the Shinchiku-Taikoku aircraft installations on Formosa as the targets. However, with the exception of airfields, there were at that time no targets on Formosa worthy of the name, so Tachiarai Machine Works on Kyushu was selected as the target and the date due to a delay in the Philippine Operation was again postponed -- this time to January 6, on which date the mission was run.

(c) Sufficient PCL had been stockpiled for approximately 75 forward area sorties on 6 January followed by 50 sorties on 8 January, but at the request of Washington the number of sorties between the two missions was equalized. Thus only 15 aircraft per group were ordered airborne from the rear area for the movement to the forward area for the double-strike mission.

(d) The tactical plan for Mission Number 25 was similar to the one for mission number 22 (Omura) with the following exceptions;

1. Bombing Altitudes were raised 3,000 feet because of the stiffening opposition over targets of this kind, and the specific group altitudes were rearranged to conform with the assignment of odd and even group assembly altitudes.

2. Route Back was designed to get the aircraft over the water as soon as possible and North of Saishu Island.

3. Time over the Target was moved slightly ahead in order to have the aircraft back at base in plenty of time prior to dusk for bad visibility had been forecast for that time.

4. The Primary Radar Target was Omura due to its good radar aspects and the inferior radar aspects of Tachiarai.

5. A Wing Commander was designated in order to select, at the time he was over the second assembly point, a new target time should it be necessary due to a substantial variance from the planned flight time caused by the actual winds being different than those forecast.

6. A Weather-Photo Aircraft was scheduled to be over the target approximately an hour before target time in order to relay the weather back to the strike formations and to permit the Wing Commander to make a decision as to whether to continue on to the primary visual target or to save time and fuel by proceeding directly from the second assembly point to the I.P. for the primary radar target.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load; (See Annex O)

For details on the determination of bomb load, see Annex O, Supplemental Information.

(3) Bombing Data:

(a) The field order prescribed that each group would furnish 15 fully modified aircraft airborne from the rear area. Each aircraft was to be loaded with a combined minimum of seven 500-pound G.P. (TNT or amatol filled) bombs and M-76 incendiary bombs, mixed in the ratio of one to one with the incendiaries loaded to release last.

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(b) The method of bombing was to be by 12-plane formations from the following pressure altitudes: 40th - 25,000 feet, 44th - 26,000 feet, 462nd - 23,000 feet, and 468th - 24,000 feet. The prescribed intervalometer setting was minimum train.

(c) The aiming point for the visual target was the center of the square machine shop building located in the center of the target complex. The aiming point for the radar target (Omura) was 2000 feet east of the eastern shoreline of Omura Bay.

4. MOVEMENT TO THE FORWARD AREA:

The field orders required each group to furnish 15 fully modified aircraft airborne from the rear area (a total of 60 aircraft). Actually 69 aircraft were airborne, all but 3 of which reached the forward area.

5. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-Off (See Annex A, Part I):

(1) Take-off times were not specified by the field orders, but each group was to schedule its take-off so as to place its aircraft over the target at 0130Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C Off</u>	<u>Last A/C Off</u>
40th	12	1956Z	2019Z
44th	12	1935Z	2004Z
462nd	12	1925Z	1950Z
468th	<u>13</u>	<u>1907Z</u>	<u>1939Z</u>
Over-all	49	1907Z	2019Z

(3) Weather at the bases at time of take-off consisted generally of a layer of broken stratocumulus between 4,000 and 5,500 feet and an overcast of altocumulus with a base of 7,000 to 9,500 feet. Visibility was from 2 to 3 miles in haze.

b. Route Out (See Annex A, Parts II and III):

(1) The route out was from the forward area bases to Anhang Airfield, to the north tip of Hungtse Lake, to Assembly Point Number 1 (different for each group), to a common Assembly Point Number 2 at Reizui Island, to the radar initial point at Shiro Reef, and thence to the radar target -- Omura Aircraft Plant.

(2) Deviations from the planned route to the primary target were made by 21 aircraft; 11 aircraft bombed the secondary target, 6 bombed targets of opportunity, 3 jettisoned their bombs and 1 aircraft returned with its bombs. These deviations were divided among the groups as follows: 40th - 4, 44th - 3, 462nd - 7, and 468th - 7.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 49 aircraft airborne 28 bombed the primary radar target at Omura. The first aircraft (a formation of 6 aircraft) dropped their bombs at 0113Z from an altitude of 23,000 feet indicated on a heading of 116 degrees magnetic. This formation was followed by 9 aircraft (only

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8 bombing) at 0118Z, 9 more at 0118Z, and six aircraft (only 5 bombing) at 0122Z. The 28 aircraft which bombed, during an interval of 9 minutes, dropped 178 M-64 General Purpose and 178 M-76 Incendiary bombs, a weight of 182,788 pounds or 91.39 short tons.

(2) Bombing altitudes varied from 23,000 to 26,000 feet indicated and headings ranged from 110 to 120 degrees magnetic.

(3) A 9/10 layer of strato cumulus clouds with tops at 6000 to 8000 feet prevented visual bombing.

d. Secondary Target:

(1) Eleven aircraft bombed the secondary target visually, 3 in formation and 8 singly. The first aircraft released its bombs at 052346Z and the last at 060508Z. During this interval of 5 hours and 22 minutes 66 M-64 General Purpose and 72 M-76 Incendiary bombs were released, a weight of 70,673 pounds or 35.33 short tons.

(2) Bombing altitudes varied from 15,000 to 25,000 feet indicated with headings ranging from 173 to 281 degrees magnetic.

e. Targets of Opportunity (See Annex A, Part IV, Section E):

(1) Six aircraft bombed targets of opportunity, releasing a total of 40 M-64 General Purpose and 33 M-76 Incendiary bombs, a weight of 37,695 pounds or 18.84 short tons. Three releases were visual, 1 was blind, and 2 were by radar.

(2) The targets included the docks and warehouses at Lao-yao, the Ichang Airdrome, a 7-ship convoy, a railroad bridge, and an unknown target in the Omura area.

f. Route Back:

(1) The 3 check points planned for the return route were, 33°51'N - 129°58'E, the South tip of Hungtse Lake, and Liangshan Airfield.

(2) For those aircraft bombing the primary target the substantial deviations from the planned return route consisted of landing short of base due to mechanical difficulties or shortage of fuel. Those aircraft bombing targets other than the primary target generally returned directly to their base or by way of Liangshan.

(3) Six aircraft landed at Liangshan, 1 at Laohokow, 1 failed to return and the other 41 aircraft returned safely to XX Bomber Command bases.

(4) The weather at the bases upon return consisted of a layer of broken stratocumulus clouds with a base varying from 3,000 to 4,500 feet and an overcast of altocumulus at about 7,000 feet. In addition one base reported broken stratus at 800 feet. Visibility ranged from 1 to 4 miles in haze.

6. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Meager to moderate and generally inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by the 3 formations (Totaling 21 aircraft) actually over the Omura area from 0108Z to 0125Z at altitudes varying from 23,000 to 26,000 feet under 9/10 to 10/10 undercast conditions. The first formation observed 1 or 2 phosphorous AA bursts and the second formation noted "seven white bursts, similar to phosphorous bombs, with streamers, as the formation turned to the right." It is believed that the enemy was using a Continuously

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Pointed type of fire and as indicated by R.C.M. intercept there is a possibility that it may have been radar controlled.

b. The 40th Group formation, which bombed an area approximately 6 miles north of Omura, drew meager to moderate and generally inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire from Kawataua through 7/10 to 9/10 undercast conditions. The fire is believed to have been both Continuously Pointed and Predicted Concentration types.

c. Meager to moderate and generally inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered at Nagasaki. That observed at Nanking was also meager to moderate but inaccurate to accurate, and that observed at Sasebo moderate and inaccurate. The remaining fire which was meager and inaccurate was encountered at Fuki Shima, Fukuoka, Kuchon, the vicinity of Tobo, and at 32°07'N - 128°00'E where some naval shipping was located.

d. No smokescreens, high-altitude balloons, or ground-to-air rockets were reported.

e. Twelve conventional barrage balloons were observed in the Laoyao area flying at approximately 500 feet.

f. Two aircraft sustained minor damage from heavy antiaircraft fire.

g. Based on the interception by R.C.M. observers of active Early Warning signals from 110°E to Omura and return to 110°E it is believed that the enemy had at least one hour prior warning of the attacks against all targets.

7. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. Enemy opposition was rated weak. A total of 75 individual encounters was reported by 25 of the 49 B-29's which were airborne to targets. One B-29 was lost due to enemy fighter action and 5 sustained minor damage. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft were 4 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 10 damaged.

b. Fifty-one encounters (68 per cent of the total) occurred in the P.T. area. The remainder was scattered, some occurring in the vicinity of Saishu Island, some in the S.T. area (Nanking), and others along the route home over China. The total of enemy fighters attacking in all areas was estimated at 14 Tojos, 9 Tonys, 5 Oscars, 5 Zekes, 2 Zeke 32's, 2 Jack 11's, 2 Dinahs, 2 Nicks, 3 unidentified single-engine enemy aircraft, and 1 unidentified enemy aircraft.

c. Thirty-nine per cent (the majority) of the encounters originated from the frontal quarter, 20 per cent from the right quarter, 20 per cent from the rear, and 21 per cent from the left quarter. Forty-nine per cent of the approaches were high, 12 per cent were level, and 39 per cent were low.

d. Both sides opened fire at long ranges. Japanese pilots fired in 44 of the 75 encounters, (58%), and B-29's in 69 encounters, 92 per cent of the total. Fifty-eight per cent of the B-29 fire was at ranges of 1000 yards or more. Enemy pilot aggressiveness and skill were improved in comparison to the relatively poor showing on Mission Number 22 (also Omura), but still failed to meet their former standards in the same area, and did not, at all, match the aggressiveness and skill displayed by Japanese pilots in the Mukden area.

e. Aerial bombs (principally phosphorous-type) were employed in 13 encounters, 17 per cent of the total. Additional bursts, similar to

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phosphorous bomb explosions were observed at extreme distances from formations but crews were unable to identify them definitely as aerial bombs or antiaircraft. In 2 aerial bombing attacks, small pieces of a metallic substance were seen falling out of the bombs.

f. There were 8 coordinated attacks which resulted in 18 individual encounters, 24 per cent of the total. Most attacks were by teams of 2 enemy airplanes. No new or unusual tactics were observed.

g. A Nick was reported with possible off-set wing guns. Contacts with the new Japanese Navy fighter, Jack 11, were again made in the Omura area.

8. WEATHER (See Annex D):

The forecast of cloud conditions and winds aloft for the route and target were rated uniformly good by all the groups. Formation flying was possible over the entire route, but the cloud cover over the target area, which had been forecast, prevented visual bombing and the observation of results. The weather at the bases upon return was somewhat worse than expected, but only light rime ice in the clouds and occasional moderate turbulence were experienced on let-down.

9. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Communications for this mission were better than usual, mainly as a result of good weather which permitted excellent signal readability.

b. The practice of appointing a wing commander was innovated with this mission, and all information transmitted by the wing commander was successfully received by all formations.

c. As in the past few missions, a practice message was sent to the aircraft in flight in order to familiarize still further the communications personnel in the procedures involved in passing a message from the Command Post to aircraft in flight. A time study of the handling of this message is included as Annex 1 to Annex E.

d. With the exception of one group using the wrong take-off code word, all required traffic was handled satisfactorily, and compliance with the provisions of the Tactical Doctrine by both aircraft and ground stations was excellent.

e. Air-to-air homing was successfully employed by 3 groups. However, the 468th Group aircraft were unable to pick up the homing signals due to improper calibration of the low frequency tuning unit and failure of the transmitter to tune on the antenna.

f. There were no violations of cryptographic security logged.

g. The usual number of malfunctions was encountered with some antenna difficulty resulting from icing.

10. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. Estimates of the radar bombing results on this mission were encouraging. From radar scope photographs and a few visual photographs, it was possible to trace the bombing run of three (3) formations and to estimate the point of impact.

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b. Radar scope photography was satisfactory with a number of excellent sets returned.

c. Radar failures were slightly higher than average; however, the operation of the systems was satisfactory.

11. RCM (See Annex G):

a. Seven RCM equipped aircraft participated in the mission. The RCM observers searched for enemy early warning equipment enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment in the target area. Two of the aircraft were equipped with a bottom mount D/F antenna.

b. Signal intercepts were numerous on this mission and were practically continuous from the longitude of 110°E to the target and return. As noted on previous missions, Occupied China and Saishu Island were areas of much radar activity.

c. Several new radar sites in China, located near the battle line, give the enemy warning of our attacks sooner than was previously possible.

d. Although there were numerous 200 mc. signals intercepted near and in the target area, only one may be classified as having gun laying characteristics. The route to the target placed some of the search aircraft directly over the Sasebo Naval Base, but no signals were logged on the centimeter and 500 mc. bands.

e. Jumbled characters which may have been jamming were noted on the 8 and 12 megacycle bands.

12. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

a. Gunnery and the CSFC system both are considered satisfactory for this mission. Five malfunctions out of 240 CSFC turrets on the mission were reported -- a malfunction percentage of 2.08. In the case of 50-caliber machine guns, 11 malfunctions out of 480 guns were reported -- a malfunction percentage of 2.29. (These statistics are based on 48 aircraft for which a specialist interrogation form was submitted.)

b. Rounds of ammunition expended totaled 29,370, of which 4,315 were expended in test firing and 25,055 in combat.

13. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I):

Fifty-three cameras of the K-18, K-20 and K-22 types were installed in the aircraft airborne. Of these 36 cameras obtained 118 usable photographs of the targets. The number of usable photographs was greatly limited by the cloud cover over Omura. Only one mechanical failure was reported -- a broken case drive.

14. LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M):

a. Known Battle Losses and Battle Damage: Aircraft 254 of the 462nd Group was shot down by fighters in the region of 34°45'N - 129°34'E according to one report and at 32°05'N - 127°53'E according to the second report. No aircraft suffered major damage as the result of enemy action, but 7 aircraft received minor damage as the result of enemy action (5 from enemy aircraft and 2 from heavy antiaircraft fire).

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b. Known Operational Losses and Damage; None.

c. Missing Aircraft; None.

15. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M);

a. Of the 49 aircraft airborne, 15 failed for mechanical reasons to bomb the primary target, 10 because of engineering malfunctions, 3 due to inoperative radar, 1 due to a blown blister, and 1 because of a bomb release malfunction.

b. There were 76 engineering malfunctions of equipment in flight (exclusive of the 10 engineering malfunctions that were related to failure to bomb the primary target) as follows: power plant and accessory section - 9; propellers and governors - 9; oil system - 14; fuel system - 10; electrical system - 9; instruments - 16; and miscellaneous - 9.

c. Over-all averages in fuel consumption were: average - 6740 gallons; maximum - 7000 gallons; minimum - 6200 gallons (for an average of 14 hours and 51 minutes of flight). Averages by groups were: 40th - 6800 gallons (maximum - 7000, minimum - 6500); 444th - 6765 gallons (maximum - 6900, minimum - 6650); 462nd - 6435 gallons (maximum - 6700, minimum - 6200); and 468th - 6805 gallons (maximum - 7000, minimum - 6700).

16. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L);

a. No post-strike cover has been obtained as of the date of this report and all statements must be considered provisional.


b. The attack was carried out by four formations through 8/10 to 10/10 cloud cover, all formations using radar instruments to accomplish the bombing. Of these four formations, two returned with strike photos showing sufficient ground detail to allow an estimate of results.

c. The 40th Bomb Group formation, 8 aircraft, bombing at an altitude of 24,500 feet True and on a heading of 120° Magnetic show bombs away just south of the village of Chiwata which is approximately 6 1/2 miles north of the Aircraft Factory. A study of heading, altitude and air speed give an estimate point of impact of this formation's bombs as being approximately 5 miles on a 40° bearing from the factory.

d. The 462nd Bomb Group formation, 5 aircraft, bombing at 23,000 feet and on a heading of 114° Magnetic show bombs away over cloud but the strike photo run proceeds directly over the airfield located just north of the factory. Clouds obscured detail and no bursts can be identified but it is believed that the mean point of impact was in the immediate vicinity of the target if not actually within the area.

e. Neither the 444th nor the 468th obtained photos showing ground detail and no statement can be made in these cases.

For the Deputy Commander;



LEO I. HERMAN
Colonel, Air Corps
Acting Adjutant General

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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path *
- IV - Bombing Data **
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report *
- IX - Information on Landings

* Prepared by Staff Navigator

** Page A-IV-1 prepared by Staff Bombardier

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I -- INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

Group	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. of A/C Taking Off	Average Take-off Interval
40th	1956Z	2019Z	23 min	12	125 sec.
444th	1935Z	2004Z	29 min	12	158 sec.
462nd	1925Z	1950Z	25 min	12	136 sec.
463th	1907Z	1939Z	32 min	13	160 sec.
Over- all	1907Z	2019Z	72 min	49	90 sec.

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II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

A. Planned Routes

Base	40th Hsinching	44th Kwangshan	462nd Kiunglai	468th Pengshan
1st Check Point	Ankang Airfield (32°35'N-109°14'E)			
2nd Check Point	N. tip of Hung-tse Lake (33°42'N-118°32'E)			
Assembly Point No. 1	Santai Is. (34°23'N- 125°17'E)	Ko Is. (34°10'N- 125°11'E)	Kokuzan Is. (34°02'N- 125°08'E)	Bansai Is. (34°12'N- 125°28'E)
Assembly Point No. 2	Reizui Island (33°58'N - 126°55'E)			
Initial Point	Visual - Madara Is. (33°34'N-129°45'E) Radar - Shiro Reef (33°09'N-128°54'E)			
Target	Visual - Tachiarai Machine Works (33°24'N-130°38'E) Radar - Omura Aircraft Plant (32°55'N-129°30'E)			
1st Return Check Point	33°51'N - 129°58'E			
2nd Return Check Point	S. tip of Hung-tse Lake (33°12'N-118°42'E)			
3rd Return Check Point	Liangshan Airfield (30°42'N - 107°50'E)			
Base	Hsinching	Kwangshan	Kiunglai	Pengshan

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. 40th Group:

- a. A/C 522 being unable to climb above 24,000 feet due to loss of oil in #1 and #4 engines turned from the briefed course at 33°55'N - 120°40'E and proceeded to the secondary target at Nanking.
- b. A/C 589 blew a blister and having insufficient oxygen to proceed to the primary target the pilot turned at 33°55'N - 121°30'E and went directly to the secondary target at Nanking. Return was on a heading of 275° until the briefed course was intersected at 32°30'N - 115°45'E at which time the course was changed to coincide with the briefed route to Hsinching.
- c. A/C 718 flew the briefed course to the initial point, but being unable to join a formation proceeded to a turning point north of Saishu Island and then to the secondary target at Nanking. Return was to Hsinching via Liangshan.
- d. A/C 685, 396, and 798 after bombs away proceeded from an area west of Nagasaki to Laohokow, China for aircraft 685 had been hit by a 20mm. shell, losing 2 engines (1 temporarily) and aircraft 396 and 798 were escorting. Aircraft 685 landed at Laohokow, low on gas, 798 landed at Liangshan due to fuel shortage and 396 proceeded directly to Hsinching.

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2. 444th Group;

- a. A/C 485 left the briefed route at the First Assembly Point due to engine trouble, returning to the China Coast on the planned course. At the Coast a turn was made for the secondary target at Nanking which was bombed. Return from Nanking was by the briefed route.
- b. A/C 730 deviated from the briefed route at $34^{\circ}32'N - 124^{\circ}23'E$, proceeded to Nanking, and returned directly to Kwanghan.
- c. A/C 464 and 724 on return landed at Liangshan. These aircraft proceeded to Kwanghan on 8 January 1945.

3. 462nd Group;

- a. A/C 484 bombed the secondary target due to inoperative flight instruments and number 4 turbo.
- b. A/C 728 turned around at $33^{\circ}40'N - 122^{\circ}15'E$ and bombed the secondary target due to a fuel transfer malfunction. This aircraft landed at Hsinching low on gas.
- c. A/C 506 bombed the secondary target due to an inoperative radio compass.
- d. A/C 450 jettisoned its bombs into the sea after losing the number 3 engine and was escorted back to base by aircraft 590 and 786 which bombed Lao-yao Harbor while returning.
- e. A/C 3503 bombed a railroad bridge at $32^{\circ}30'N - 119^{\circ}00'E$ because the bomb bay doors which accidentally opened could not be closed.
- f. A/C 232 after bombing the primary target landed at Liangshan low on gas.

4. 468th Group;

- a. A/C 703 flew the briefed route to the Second Assembly Point, but being unable to join a formation it bombed a convoy at $33^{\circ}20'N - 128^{\circ}02'E$ and returned to Hsinching by way of Pusefing Lake and Liangshan.
- b. A/C 714 after flying the briefed route to the China Coast turned about due to mechanical difficulty and proceeded directly to Tangyang, but was prevented from bombing due to weather. Return was directly to Pengshan.
- c. A/C 415 after flying the briefed route to $33^{\circ}08'N - 113^{\circ}10'E$ proceeded to $32^{\circ}04'N - 111^{\circ}54'E$, to Tangyang, to the Ichang Airdrome which it bombed, and back to Pengshan.
- d. A/C 500 and 442 flew the briefed route to the primary target and the briefed return route as far as Liangshan where they landed due to mechanical difficulty and a low gas supply. Return to Pengshan was on 8 January 1945.
- e. A/C 542 left the briefed route at $33^{\circ}50'N - 121^{\circ}45'E$, proceeded to Nanking (bombing the secondary target), and returned to Pengshan by way of Liangshan.
- f. A/C 734 and 691 followed the planned route to the Second Assembly Point, returned to bomb the secondary target at Nanking, and made their way to Pengshan via Liangshan.


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Authority NRD 760063

By AN NARA Date 11-15



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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

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Auth: CG XX BC
Initials: *MM*
Date 14 Jan 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

Date Prepared: 14 January 1945

Field Order Number 25
Date of Mission: 6 Jan 45

1. Complete cloud cover over the primary target made it necessary for all formations to release blind.

2. The radar-bombsight procedure was used by all lead crews with no reported difficulties.

3. Malfunctions reported:

40th Group:

#718 - 3 bombs could not be released electrically or by electric salvo. Cause - undetermined.

#505 - 2 bombs could not be released electrically, but were jettisoned after leaving target. Cause - undetermined.

444th Group:

#724 - All bombs failed to release electrically and were later jettisoned. Cause - undetermined.

462nd Group:

#728 - One bomb brought home. Cause - frozen release

#503 - 4 bombs would not release electrically and were later jettisoned. Cause - undetermined

#484 - All bombs failed to release electrically on first run over secondary. They were salvoed on second run. Cause - undetermined

#590 - 4 bombs failed to release electrically and were jettisoned later. Cause - undetermined

468th Group:

#3456 - 2 bombs failed to release electrically and were later jettisoned, Cause - undetermined.

#3415 - 1 bomb failed to release electrically and were jettisoned later. Cause undetermined.

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S E C R E T

IV - BOMBING DATA (continued)

A. Times of Bomb Release at Primary Target

Z Time	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
0113				6	6
0118	5	9			14
0119	3				3
0122			5		5
Total	8	9	5	6	28

B. Bombing Altitudes at Primary Target

Altitude (feet)*	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
23,000 - 23,499		1	5	6	12
24,500 - 24,999	1				1
25,000 - 25,499	7	1			8
25,500 - 25,999		4			4
26,000 - 26,499		2			2
26,500 - 26,999		1			1
Total	8	9	5	6	28
Briefed Altitude	25,000	26,000	23,000	24,000	

* Indicated altitude

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

C. Axes of Attack at Primary Target

Degrees*	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
105		3			3
107		4			4
110		1			1
114			5		5
115		1			1
116				6	6
117	1				1
120	2				2
122	1				1
125	2				2
125 true	1				1
128	1				1
Total	8	9	5	6	28

* Magnetic except where indicated.

Note; Briefed axis of attack was 110° magnetic

D. Indicated Air Speeds at Primary Target

I.A.S. (mph)	40th	44th	462nd	468th	Total
190	1	2			3
195	4	3	5	6	18
196	2				2
198	1	1			2
200		2			2
205		1			1
Total	8	9	5	6	28

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S E C R E T

E. Aircraft Bombing Targets other than Primary Target

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

Group	A/C	Target	Bombs Dropped GP, Inc.	Type of Release	Time of Release	Altitude	Axis of Attack	I. A. S. (mph)
40th	522	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0107	23,000' I	241°M	195
40th	589	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0105	21,800' T	265°M	195
40th	718	Nanking (S.T.)	4	Visual	0508	15,000' F	270°M	195
40th	462	Unseen target at completion of turnaway from Omura	6	Blind	0125	25,000' P	242°M	190
444th	730	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0148	24,000' I	281°M	200
444th	485	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0245	22,900' I	270°M	190
462nd	484	Nanking (S.T.)	4	Visual	2346	25,000' I	173°M	200
462nd	728	Nanking (S.T.)	9	Visual	0102	21,000' I	260°M	205
462nd	506	Nanking (S.T.)	7	Visual	0442	18,500' I	260°M	200
462nd	3503	R.R. Bridge at 32°30'N - 119°00'E	7	Visual	0020	22,000' I	230°M	200
462nd	590	Docks and Warehouses at Lao-yao (34°40'N - 119°25'E)	6	Visual	0450	15,000' I	340°M	180
462nd	786	"	7	Visual	0450	15,000' I	340°M	185
468th	734	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0443	18,000' I	270°M	195
468th	691	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0441	18,000' I	280°M	---
468th	542	Nanking (S.T.)	6	Visual	0049	24,000' I	253°M	190
468th	415	Ichang Airrome	7	Radar	2346	14,500' I	300°M	175
468th	703	7 ship convoy at 33°20'N - 128°02'E	7	Radar	0228	26,250' I	240°M	195

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V - BOMB LOADING*

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

Type of Bomb Load	40th			44th			462nd			468th			Totals			Wt. in lbs per A/C**
	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc	A/C	G.P.	Inc.	A/C	G.P.	Inc	
4 G.P. 9 Inc							3	12	27				3	12	27	6523
5 G.P. 7 Inc				1	5	7							1	5	7	6100
5 G.P. 8 Inc							1	5	8				1	5	8	6583
6 G.P. 6 Inc	12	72	72	1	6	6				1	6	6	14	84	84	6161
6 G.P. 7 Inc				8	48	56	2	12	14	4	24	28	14	84	98	6644
6 G.P. 8 Inc										1	6	8	1	6	8	7127
7 G.P. 6 Inc				1	7	6	1	7	6	6	42	36	8	56	48	6705
7 G.P. 7 Inc				1	7	7	1	7	7	1	7	7	3	21	21	7188
8 G.P. 5 Inc							1	8	5				1	8	5	6766
9 G.P. 4 Inc							1	9	4				1	9	4	6827
10 G.P. 4 Inc							1	10	4				1	10	4	7371
10 G.P. 5 Inc							1	10	5				1	10	5	7854
Total A/C	12			12			12			13			49			
Total G.P.		72			73			80			85			310		
Total Inc.			72			82			80			85			319	
Wt. in lbs per A/C**		6161			6609				6846				6714			6585

* Based on aircraft airborne. "G.P." indicates a 500-pound general purpose (TNT or amatol filled) bomb, fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail. "Inc." indicates a M-76 incendiary bomb, fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail.

** Based on the M-64 G.P. bomb weighing 543.9 pounds and the M-76 Inc. bomb weighing 483 pounds.

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VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Totals		Weight in pounds*	Weight in tons*					
	A/C	GP. Inc	A/C	GP. Inc	A/C	GP. Inc	A/C	GP. Inc	A/C	GP. Inc							
A/C bombing all targets and bombs dropped	12	69	70	11	67	75	11	76	66	11	72	72	45	284	283	291,157	145.57
A/C bombing P.T. and bombs dropped	3	47	47	9	55	61	5	36	32	6	40	38	28	178	178	182,788	91.39
A/C bombing S. T. and bombs dropped	3	16	17	2	12	14	3	20	19	3	18	22	11	66	72	70,673	35.33
A/C bombing T. O. and bombs dropped	1	6	6	-	-	-	3	20	15	2	14	12	6	40	33	37,695	18.84
A/C jettisoning bombs	-	3-a	2-a	1	6	7	1	4	13-b	1	6	7	3	19	29	24,341	12.17
A/C returning with bombs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1-c	1	7	6	1	7	7	7,188	3.59
Total A/C and bombs airborne	12	72	72	12	73	82	12	80	80	13	85	85	49	310	319	322,686	161.34

- a. A/C 505 jettisoned 1 G.P. and 1 Inc. and dropped 5 G.P. and 5 Inc. on the P.T. A/C 718 jettisoned 2 G.P. and 1 Inc. and dropped 4 G.P. and 5 Inc. on the S. T.
 - b. A/C 590 jettisoned 4 Inc. and dropped 6 G.P. and 3 Inc on a T/O.
 - c. A/C 728 returned with 1 Inc. and dropped 9 G.P. and 3 Inc. on the S.T.
- * Based on the M-64 G.P. bomb weighing 543.9 pounds and the M-76 Inc. bomb weighing 483 pounds.

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S E C R E T

VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

A. Formation Required

Aircraft were to be flown individually to the respective group assembly points, where 12-plane formations were to be assembled. For the location of assembly points, see Part II, Section A, of this annex.

B. Formations over the Primary Target

Formations are shown as they were at the time of bomb release over the primary target. Times, altitudes, and headings shown are those of the lead aircraft. These diagrams are intended to show relative position only. "W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group, "X" the 444th, "Y" the 462nd and "Z" the 468th.

1. Time - 0113Z
Altitude - 23,000'I
Heading - 116°M
No. of A/C, in formation,
which bombed - 6
No. of bombs dropped by
formation - 40 GP; 38 Inc.

Z-456		
Z-469	Z-525	
	Z-494	
Z-500	Z-442	

2. Time - 0118Z
Altitude - 25,000' Pressure
Heading - 120°M
No. of A/C, in formation,
which bombed - 8
No. of bombs dropped by
formation - 47 GP; 47 Inc.
* A/C 462 did not bomb with
the formation, but bombed
a target of opportunity
after the formation turned
from the target.

		W-685
	W-462*	W-798
W-498	W-620	
W-505	W-739	W-738
		W-396

3. Time - 0118Z
Altitude - 26,000'I
Heading - 110°M
No. of A/C, in formation,
which bombed - 9
No. of bombs dropped by
formation - 55 GP; 61 Inc.

		X-411
	X-538	X-492
X-507	X-524	
X-584	X-462	X-464
		X-496

4. Time - 0122Z
Altitude - 23,000'I
Heading - 114°M
No. of A/C in formation
which bombed - 5
No. of bombs dropped by
formation - 36 GP; 32 Inc.
* A/C 724 jettisoned
its bombs.

		Y-254
	Y-232	Y-448
	Y-457	
X-724*	Y-800	

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C. Formations over the Secondary Target

1. Time - 052346Z
Altitude - 25,000'I Y-484
Heading - 173^oM
No. bombs dropped - 4 GP; 9 Inc.
2. Time - 0049Z
Altitude - 24,000'I Z-542
Heading - 253^o
No. of bombs dropped - 6 GP; 8 Inc.
3. Time - 0102Z
Altitude - 21,000'I Y-728
Heading - 260^oM
No. bombs dropped - 9 GP; 3 Inc.
4. Time - 0105Z
Altitude - 21,800'T W-589
Heading - 265^oM
No. bombs dropped - 6 GP; 6 Inc.
Note: 6 bombs were seen to go into
target, and 6 to hit water.
5. Time - 0107Z
Altitude - 23,000'I W-522
Heading - 241^oM
No. bombs dropped - 6 GP; 6 Inc.
6. Time - 0148Z
Altitude - 24,000'I X-730
Heading - 281^o
No. bombs dropped - 6 GP; 7 Inc.
7. Time - 0245Z
Altitude - 22,900'I X-485
Heading - 270^o
No. bombs dropped - 6 GP; 7 Inc.
8. Time - 0443Z Z-734
Altitude - 18,000'I
Heading - 270^oM Y-506 Z-691
No. of bombs dropped - 19 GP; 21 Inc.
9. Time - 0508Z
Altitude - 15,000' Pressure W-718
Heading - 270^oM
No. bombs dropped - 4 GP; 5 Inc.

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

Secret

Auth: CG XX BC

Initials: WKM

Date: 23 Jan 1945

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF
STAFF NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 23 January 1945

Field Order Number 25

Date of Mission: 6 Jan 45

1. This mission was accomplished satisfactorily considering the problems encountered as a result of very high winds and the undercast. Main difficulties of navigation were inability to find assembly points and join the proper formation. In most cases of inability to find the assembly point some vital equipment such as radar was inoperative. Failure to join proper formations was the result of two factors, the first of which was that the distances to the assembly points were so great that differences in reckoning and flying caused time disparities and the second of which was that because of the extreme wind velocities formations drifted considerably off their assembly points during the assembly period.

If assemblies must be made in the future at medium and high altitudes where great winds are encountered, navigators in lead planes must attempt to keep the formation over the assembly point. It is realized that assembly points at such great distances are not desirable, but it is pointed out in this case that high ground speeds on the route out made it necessary to move the assembly points near Korea so that assemblies could be accomplished in daylight and so that landing at base could be made before it became totally dark.

a. Average navigation time out and back and times for Group Assemblies follow:

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV TIME BACK</u>	<u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u>
40th	5h 11m *	9h 00m	26m
444th	5h 23m	8h 53m	25m
462nd	5h 41m	8h 42m	30m
468th	5h 52m	9h 11m	34m

* Higher Av altitude on route out.

b. The following navigational aid work was reported:

	<u>CEL</u> <u>FIXES</u>	<u>CEL</u> <u>LOP'S</u>	<u>RADIO</u> <u>FIXES</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
40th	12	49	6	0
444th	13	57	1	1
462nd	15	43	23	6
468th	16	78	1	9

c. The winds forecast was considered good. Reported winds are as follow

	<u>HUNG-TSE</u> <u>LAKE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>HUNG-TSE</u> <u>LAKE (BACK)</u>
40th	15000' 279°49k	25000' 275°103k	13300' 279°47k
444th	16000' 278°58k	26000' 280°88k	15000' 272°53k
462nd	13000' 288°41k	23000' 270°80k	14000' 281°33k
468th	14600' 278°44k	23000' 270°85k	14100' 271°43k

Good aid work reported - 1 -

Good aid work reported - 1 -

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- d. Good aid was received by navigators who reported checkpoints and ground speed good and drift fair.
2. Comments by Groups. None.

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IX - INFORMATION ON LANDINGS

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

A. Landed at XX Bomber Command Bases;

1. A/C bombing primary targets;

	<u>40th</u>	<u>44th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. First down	1030Z	1020Z	1006Z	1029Z	1006Z
b. Last down	1040Z	1039Z	1032Z	1052Z	1052Z

2. A/C failing to bomb primary target;

a. 40th Group;

- (1) A/C 522 - 0624Z - bombed secondary target.
- (2) A/C 589 - 0604Z - bombed secondary target.
- (3) A/C 718 - 0947Z - bombed secondary target.
- (4) A/C 462 - 1038Z - bombed target of opportunity.

b. 44th Group;

- (1) A/C 730 - 0634Z - bombed secondary target.
- (2) A/C 485 - 0802Z - bombed secondary target.

c. 462nd Group;

- (1) A/C 484 - 0405Z - bombed secondary target.
- (2) A/C 728 - 0537Z - bombed secondary target.
- (3) A/C 506 - 0950Z - bombed secondary target.
- (4) A/C 503 - 0451Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (5) A/C 590 - 1009Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (6) A/C 786 - 1028Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (7) A/C 450 - 1013Z - jettisoned bombs.

d. 468th Group;

- (1) A/C 734 - 0941Z - bombed secondary target.
- (2) A/C 691 - 0938Z - bombed secondary target.
- (3) A/C 542 - 0523Z - bombed secondary target.
- (4) A/C 415 - 0223Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (5) A/C 718 - 1056Z - bombed target of opportunity.
- (6) A/C 208 - 051936Z - jettisoned.
- (7) A/C 714 - 0611Z - brought bombs back.

B. Landed Elsewhere;

1. 40th Group;

- a. A/C 685 - landed at Laohokow at 0730Z with one engine out and low on gas, after having bombed the primary target.
- b. A/C 798 - landed at Liangshan at 0918Z low on gas after having bombed the primary target. Return to Hsinching was at 070332Z.

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2. 444th Group:

- a. A/C 464 - landed at Liangshan after having bombed the primary target.
- b. A/C 724 - landed at Liangshan after having jettisoned its bombs.

3. 462nd Group:

- a. A/C 232 - landed at Liangshan at 0927Z low on gas after having bombed the primary target. Return to Kianglai was at 100607Z.

4. 468th Group:

- a. A/C 442 - landed at Liangshan at 0921Z after having bombed the primary target. The aircraft had mechanical difficulty and was low on gas.
- b. A/C 500 - landed at Liangshan at 0922Z after having bombed the primary target. The aircraft had mechanical difficulty and was low on gas.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Flak Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

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* S E C R E T *
* By Auth of the C.G. *
* XX Bomber Command *
* 19 Jan 1945 *
* Date Initials *

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
Intelligence Section
APO 493

19 January 1945

* CORRECTION TO ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION ENCOUNTERED ON MISSION NUMBER 23, MUKDEN *

Damage listed under Part "G", page B-I-5;

Aircraft #737 of the 468th Group did not sustain damage from heavy antiaircraft fire. The fragment, initially thought to have been from a HAA shell, was identified upon recovery from #2 cell of the center section wing tank as base plate of one of our own bombs.

P R E L I M I N A R Y R E P O R T

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 25, (DAYLIGHT), 6 JANUARY 1945

Primary Target - OMURA, Secondary Target - NANKING
Target of Last Resort - TANGYANG

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. OMURA (32°54'N - 129°57'E)

a. Meager to moderate and generally inaccurate heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by the 3 formations totalling 21 aircraft over the area from 0108Z to 0125Z at altitudes varying from 23,000 to 26,000 feet under 9/10 to 10/10 undercast conditions.

b. All aircraft reported black bursts while some encountered both white and phosphorous antiaircraft fire as well. The 1 to 2 phosphorous AA bursts observed between 0108 and 0114Z by Formation #1 were reported as approximately 50 feet above the formation, abreast, but a little to the left of course.

c. Formation #2 also observed at 0117Z "seven white bursts, similar to phosphorous bombs, with streamers, as the formation turned to the right. No enemy aircraft were seen at that particular time that could have released these projectiles. Bursts were accurate for altitude and all but one were approximately 2000 yards ahead of the formation. The bursts seemed to burn out very fast." One of these bursts occurred approximately 50 feet above the aircraft at 26,000 feet.

d. Bombing was accomplished by 3 formations totalling 21 aircraft as follows. Aircraft of the 40th Group bombed an area approximately 6 miles north of OMURA, and the heavy AA fire encountered by this formation is believed to have originated from KAWATANA as discussed below, Part 2.

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By AN NARA Date 11-15

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Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Fire Encountered	Altitude in feet	Undercast	Heading
1	6	0113Z	0108-14Z	Meager to Moderate Accurate-Inaccurate	23-24,000	9/10	116°M
2	9	0118Z	0115-16Z	Meager to Moderate Inaccurate	26,000	9/10	110°M
3	6	0122Z	0118-25Z	Meager to Moderate Inaccurate	23,000	9-10/10	114°M

e. Following are reports of accuracy, intensity, and deviations. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below:

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck	0 (0 percent)	Intense	0 (0 percent)
Rocked	1 (5 percent)	Moderate	13 (62 percent)
Within 150'	2 (10 percent)	Meager	8 (38 percent)
Outside 150' . . .	18 (85 percent)		

Reports of Deviations

Above . 11 (29 percent)	Ahead . . 3 (17 percent)	Left . . . 11 (61 percent)
Level . 17 (45 percent)	Abreast . 3 (17 percent)	In Line . . 5 (28 percent)
Below . 10 (26 percent)	Behind . . 12 (66 percent)	Right . . . 2 (11 percent)

f. From reports of fire encountered it is believed that the enemy was using a Continuous Pointed type of fire. The number of bursts observed at any one instant varied from 1 to 4 while the total seen in the area varied from 20 to 75. No enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude.

g. There is a possibility of radar controlled fire having been used as indicated by R.C.M. Intercept.

2. KAWATANA (33°03'N - 129°52'E)

a. Meager to moderate and generally inaccurate black and some white heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by 1 formation of 9 aircraft bombing an area approximately 6 miles north of OMURA at 0118Z from 25,000 feet altitude on a heading of 120°M under 7/10 to 9/10 undercast conditions. Heavy AA fire was encountered from 0115Z to 0121Z with 1 aircraft reporting bursts within 150 feet while the remainder reported bursts at distances greater than 150 feet.

b. Deviations were reported as generally below, abreast or behind, and to the left. This fire is believed to have been both Continuous Pointed and Predicted Concentration types. One aircraft "reported eight black bursts of flak climbing up to their altitude and following on the course of the formation as it came in to the area." Reports of bursts "climbing to altitude" as aircraft enter target areas have been received before and would indicate that the Japanese commence firing at maximum fuse range before our aircraft have entered the maximum fuse range envelope. Then as the aircraft approach the maximum fuse limit, the altitude difference between aircraft and bursts is progressively reduced until bursts are occurring at the correct

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altitude. If the bursts were occurring behind and above formations as they approached the target area, moving to above and in line as the target area is entered, with a corresponding increase in the apparent accuracy, the use of "proximity fuses" would be indicated. As yet, however, no evidence of their use has been obtained.

c. The number of bursts observed at any one instant varied from 8 to 25 with the total observed in the area greater than 40. The Predicted Concentration type of fire was reported when 25 black bursts were observed, all within a short space of time, about one-half minute before "bombs away" at 0118Z.

d. One phosphorous burst was also observed by the crew of aircraft #162 at 0116Z with deviations ahead, level and in line. "The burst was compared in shape to a balloon and white in color. It was very persistent and did not seem to move. Several black objects appeared to be all around the white burst, but from the distance it could not be determined what they were. No enemy aircraft were in the area."

e. The fire encountered by this formation is also believed to have been observed by aircraft bombing OMURA at 0118Z when a Predicted Concentration of bursts were reported to their left. This heavy AA fire is believed to have originated from land-based guns in the KAWATANA area, although it may have come from naval shipping.

f. There is a possibility of gun laying radar having been used according to RCM Intercepts.

3. NAGASAKI (32°43'N - 129°52'E)

a. Meager to moderate and generally inaccurate (although 1 aircraft was struck at 0140Z) black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by 3 formations totalling 21 aircraft over the area from 0125Z to 0140Z, at altitudes varying from 22,000 to 23,000 feet under 7/10 to 10/10 undercast conditions.

b. Deviations were generally below or level, abreast or behind, and to the right. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

c. Barrage type fire was reported over NAGASAKI at 0125Z by formation #1, while Continuously Pointed fire was encountered a few minutes later by aircraft of the formation bombing approximately 6 miles north of OMURA. The type of fire met by Formation #3 could not be determined. The number of bursts observed at any one time (for the last 2 formations) varied from 2 to 5, while the total observed in the area varied from 10 to 50.

d. There is a possibility of gun laying radar having been used according to RCM Intercepts.

4. SASEBO (33°10'N - 129°43'E)

a. Moderate and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by the formation of aircraft bombing approximately 6 miles north of OMURA at an unstated time at altitudes varying from 24,500 to 25,200 feet under 7/10 to 9/10 undercast conditions.

b. Deviations were generally below, abreast or behind, and to the left. The number of bursts observed at any one instant varied from 19 to 25 while the total observed in the area varied from 30 to 60. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

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c. It is possible that fire reported from SASEBO merges into that carried as originating in the vicinity of KAWATANA above.

d. There is a possibility of gun laying radar having been used according to RCM Intercepts.

5. FUKI SHIMA (32°40'N - 128°40'E)

One aircraft of a formation of 9 reported meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire at 0205Z at 22,500 feet altitude through 9/10 undercast. The number of bursts observed at any one instant was 3 while the total observed in the area was 10. Continuously Pointed fire was used with deviations of level, abreast and to the right. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

6. Vicinity of TOBO at 33°30'N - 129°55'E

One aircraft encountered meager and inaccurate black heavy anti-aircraft fire at an altitude of 25,000 feet at 0135Z through an 8/10 undercast. Fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed with the number of bursts observed at one instant 4 while the total seen in the area was 15. Deviations were below, ahead, and in line and no enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude.

7. FUKUOKA (33°31'N - 130°24'E)

One aircraft observed meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire directed at a formation of 6 aircraft at 0115Z at an altitude of 23,000 feet through an 8/10 undercast. Fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed with from 3 to 4 bursts observed at one instant and a total of 10 to 12 seen while in the area. Deviations were below, ahead and to the left.

8. Heavy AA Fire from Naval Shipping at 32°07'N - 128°00'E

Three aircraft of a formation of 6 reported meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire at 0217Z at 21,000 feet under broken 10/10 conditions. Fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed with 3 bursts observed at one instant and a total of from 5 to 8 seen while in the area. Deviations were level, behind, and both to the left and in line. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude. This shipping was reported as consisting of one CV, one CA and three DD's.

9. NANKING (32°03'N - 118°47'E)

a. Ten out of 11 aircraft encountered meager to moderate and inaccurate to accurate black and some white heavy antiaircraft fire from 2345Z to 0509Z at altitudes varying from 15,200 to 25,000 feet altitude under CAVU and haze conditions. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to the time and Heavy AA fire encountered;

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Formation	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Fire Encountered	Altitude in feet	Undercast	Heading
1	1	052346Z	2345-48Z	Meager-Inaccurate	25,000	CAVU-Haze	173°M
2	1	060049Z	0050Z	Meager-Accurate	24,000	CAVU-Haze	253°M
3	1	060102Z	0050Z	Meager-Inaccurate	21,500	CAVU-Haze	260°M
4	1	060105Z	0105Z	Moderate-Inaccurate	21,800	CAVU-Haze	265°M
5	1	060107Z	0100Z	Meager-Acc. to Inacc	23,000	CAVU-Haze	241°M
6	1	060149Z	-----	None	24,000	CAVU-Haze	281°M
7	1	060245Z	0244Z	Meager-Inaccurate	22,900	CAVU-Haze	270°M
8	3	060433Z	0440-43Z	Meager-Inaccurate	18,500	CAVU-Haze	270°M
9	1	060508Z	0509Z	Meager-Accurate	15,200	CAVU-Haze	270°M

b. Following are reports of accuracy, intensity, and deviations. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below;

Reports of Accuracy

Struck 1 (9 percent)
 Rocked 0 (0 percent)
 Within 150' . . . 2 (18 percent)
 Outside 150' . . 8 (73 percent)

Reports of Intensity

Intense 0 (0 percent)
 Moderate 2 (18 percent)
 Meager 9 (82 percent)

Reports of Deviations

Above . 6 (38 percent) Ahead . . 1 (9 percent) Left . . . 4 (36 percent)
 Level . 6 (38 percent) Abreast . 4 (36 percent) In Line . . 5 (46 percent)
 Below . 4 (24 percent) Behind . . 6 (55 percent) Right . . . 2 (18 percent)

c. Continuously Pointed type of fire was used with the number of bursts observed at any one instant varying from 2 to 12 while the total observed in the area varied from 6 to 50. Bursts were reported as black by all crews while at 0105Z one crew observed white heavy antiaircraft fire. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

10. KUCHEN (33°34'N - 117°20'E)

Meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire was encountered by 1 aircraft at 2250Z at 15,000 feet altitude under CAVU conditions.

B. SMOKESCREENS AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

None reported.

C. GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS

None reported.

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D. BARRAGE BALLOONS

Two aircraft of the 462nd Group bombing LAOYAO (34°46'N - 119°25'E) at 0450Z from 15,000 feet observed 12 conventional barrage balloons (sausage shaped, silver, and anchored) flying at an altitude of approximately 500 feet in the area.

E. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Two aircraft sustained minor damage as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>BRT</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Extent</u>
40th	24522	0107Z	23,000'	241°M	Nanking	Damage to right wing tip.
462nd	3457	-----	22,000'	240°	Nagasaki	Hole in left wing (top right inboard panel)
	(Flak encount. 0140Z)			approx		

F. WARNING NETS

It is believed that the enemy had at least one hour prior warning of the attacks against all targets based on the interception by R.C.M. Observers of active Early Warning signals from 110°E. to Omura and return to 110°E.

Frank L. Scott Jr.

FRANK L. SCOTT JR.,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

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ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Operational Intelligence Unit *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

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I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 25

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: ~~26~~ January 1945.

1. General

a. Enemy opposition was weak. Of the 49 B-29's airborne to targets, 25 reported interception to the extent of 75 individual encounters. There were 56 encounters by single enemy aircraft; and 8 coordinated attacks in which 16 enemy aircraft were employed, resulting in 18 individual encounters. Aerial bombs were employed in 13 encounters. One B-29 was lost due to fighter action and 5 sustained minor damage. One additional B-29 reported battle damage but no information has been received up to this time in regard to the cause or the extent of the damage. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft were 4 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 10 damaged. The enemy attacking force was estimated 14 TOJOS, 9 TONYIS, 5 OSCARS, 5 ZEKES, 2 ZEKE 32's, 2 JACK 11's, 2 DINAHS, 2 NICKS, 3 unidentified single-engine enemy aircraft, and 1 unidentified enemy aircraft. (Enemy aircraft encountered in all areas of interception were included in the estimate of attacking enemy fighters. See following paragraph and Exhibit A.)

b. The majority of the encounters, 51, (68 per cent of the total), occurred in the primary target area, within a period of 35 minutes, from 0112Z to 0147Z, at altitudes from 14,000 to 26,000 feet. Four encounters were before bombs away, 47 after bombs away. Of the remaining encounters, 8 occurred over the Yellow Sea, in the vicinity of Saishu Island while B-29's were enroute to the primary target area, 7 were in the secondary target area (Nanking), and 9 were scattered along the route home over China.

c. All encounters are graphically indicated in Exhibit A.

2. Directions and Levels of Approach

a. The majority of encounters originated from the frontal quarter, with 39 per cent of the total. This is a change from the last raid on Omura, Mission No. 22, when encounters from the right side were in the majority, but is consistent with the 25 mission average summary of air opposition to B-29's in which the frontal quarter is indicated as the favored direction of approach. The frontal quarter was in the majority on Mission No. 17, the raid on Omura previous to Mission No. 22, with 33 per cent of the total encounters. Of the remainder on Mission No. 25, 20 per cent were from the right quarter, 20 per cent were from the rear, and 21 per cent were from the left quarter.

b. Forty-nine per cent of the approaches were high, 12 per cent were level, and 39 per cent were low. This division, too, is consistent with the average summary of all B-29 air opposition encountered up to this mission which indicates a majority of high approaches - even though Mission No. 25 shows a change from Mission No. 22 where the majority of encounters were low.

c. A summary of directions and levels of approach for all encounters on Mission No. 25 is shown in Tables No. 1 and No. 2, and in Exhibit B.

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
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Table No. 1 - Direction and Level of Approach

Direction of Attack or Pass	Front			Right			Rear			Left			Total
	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
High	9	7	2	6	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	11	37(49%)
Level	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	9(12%)
Low	0	4	0	0	6	2	6	5	2	3	0	1	29(39%)
Total	12	14	3	6	7	2	7	6	2	3	1	12	75(100%)
	29(39%)			15(20%)			15(20%)			16(21%)			

Table No. 2 - Level of Approach

Level of Approach	Front	Right	Rear	Left
High	18 (62%)	7 (47%)	1 (6 1/2%)	11 (69%)
Level	7 (24%)	0	1 (6 1/2%)	1 (6%)
Low	4 (14%)	8 (53%)	13 (87%)	4 (25%)
Total	29 (100%)	15 (100%)	15 (100%)	16 (100%)

3. Exchange of Fire

a. Japanese pilots opened fire in 14 of the 75 encounters, 58 per cent, a slightly lower percentage than usual, and B-29's in 69 encounters, 92 per cent of the total. The high percentage of B-29 fire compares closely to Mission No. 22, (95%), which was the highest for all recent missions. Both sides opened fire at long range with 58 per cent of the B-29 fire at ranges of 1000 yards or more.

b. The following table shows comparative percentages of fire at various ranges.


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Exhibit B

DIRECTION AND LEVEL OF APPROACH



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Table No. 3 - Distances Opened Fire

<u>Distance (yards)</u>	<u>Enemy Fire</u>		<u>B-29 Fire</u>	
	<u>No. of Attacks</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>No. of Attacks</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0 to 499	4	9	7	10
500 to 799	9	21	10	15
800 to 999	11	26	12	17
1000 & over	19	44	40	58
Total	43*	100	69	100

* In one attack the enemy opened fire but the range was unreported.

4. Aggressiveness of Enemy Attacks and Pilot Ability

a. Japanese pilots exhibited a little more aggressiveness on this mission in comparison to Mission No. 22, but were still not up to the aggressiveness encountered on recent missions to Omura and other targets, particularly those to Mukden. On Mission No. 25, 25 (35%) of a total of 71 encounters were pressed to less than 250 yards. (4 encounters were unreported as to distances pressed.) The percentage compares favorably to Mission No. 2 (18%), but is lower than Missions No. 23, (59%), No. 21, (45%), No. 19, (52%), No. 18, (53%), and No. 17, (38%). Three instances were reported of Japanese pilots flying through formations on their breakaways. As to Japanese pilot ability there was nothing to indicate that the enemy was either more less skillful than on previous missions. The fact that 1 B-29 was shot down and 5 others sustained known damage is sufficient evidence that some skilled and possibly experienced Japanese pilots were engaged. One crew reported that enemy fighters were climbing and flying in formation for the first time, and another reported that enemy attacks seemed better executed than ever before.

b. Distances to which encounters were pressed are shown in the following table.

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Table No. 4 - Distances to which Attacks Were Pressed

<u>Distance (yards)</u>	<u>No. of Encounters</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1000 & over	5	7
800 to 999	13	18
500 to 799	14	20
250 to 499	14	20
0 to 249	25	35
Total	71*	100

* Four encounters unreported.

5. Aerial Bombs

a. Aerial bombs, again principally of the phosphorous type, were reported employed in 13 encounters, 17 per cent of the total. Additional bursts were observed at extreme distances from formations which crews were not able to identify definitely as aerial bombs or anti-aircraft. The bursts were white and the familiar streamers were observed spreading out from underneath, but due to the distances involved crews could not be sure of the presence of enemy aircraft when the explosions occurred.

b. One aircraft reported that approximately 8 aerial bombs were dropped on a formation during a period when fighter attacks were heavy, and believed one or more may have exploded close enough to aircraft 254 (the B-29 lost to enemy fighter action) to have done some damage. Fighter attacks were so heavy at the time that no more information could be secured.

c. An unusual type of aerial bomb was reported to have been dropped on a formation by a DINKH. The enemy aircraft came from 1130 o'clock, high, and dropped what was described as an oblong can about 10 feet long and 8 feet wide, from 700 feet above the formation. It fell end over end, with small pieces of a metallic substance, which shone like silver and stuck together in the air, falling by the hundreds out of both ends. (One pilot pulled up his B-29 to avoid the pieces.) The can burst above the formation with a bluish color, then white smoke, in the shape of a parachute, appeared above it as it continued to tumble. Silver colored cables which looked to be about 6 to 8 feet long were observed hanging from the can and remained attached to it as it continued on down.

d. Reaching the China coast, enroute home, a formation reported that 2 single-engine enemy aircraft, 2000 yards above and 300 yards ahead, dropped what appeared to be metallic streamers or tinfoil pieces. B-29's flew through the streamers with no ill effect.

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At the same time one of the enemy aircraft dropped a cylindrical object about 15 inches long and 8 inches in diameter. As it dropped below one of the B-29's smoke was seen coming from it; but immediately after it disappeared in the undercast and the explosion, if any, was not observed.

6. Coordinated Attacks

a. There were 3 coordinated attacks, employing 16 enemy aircraft, and resulting in 18 individual encounters, 24 per cent of the total. This is a smaller percentage than was encountered on Missions No. 22, (43%), and No. 17, (29%), both over Omura. One attack was executed by 3 enemy aircraft, the remainder by teams of 2 enemy aircraft. A formation of 7 enemy aircraft and another of 5 were seen but neither came close enough to attack. The use of aerial bombs was reported in only 1 of the 3 coordinated attacks.

b. No new or unusual tactics were observed in the execution of coordinated attacks. The only comment came from one crew, and it was to the effect that coordinated attacks seemed better executed than ever before.

7. New Aircraft: Several contacts in the primary target area were reported with JACK 11, the new Japanese Navy fighter, although one crew was not positive of its identification, stating that while it was larger than a TOJO it could have been a ZEKE. The possibility of the aircraft having been JACK 11 remains, however, as 9 individual encounters with JACK 11's were reported on Mission No. 17, on 21 November 1944, in the same area. (The one enemy aircraft in question was reported to have had 2 protruding guns on each wing.)

8. New Tactics: Two crews reported what may have been a new idea of the Japanese to signal their airborne pilots when to attack B-29 formations. As the formation left the I.P. and approached the target on the bomb run, a large white burst of smoke was observed at altitude over the target area, and immediately after, fighter attacks began. It was reported that the smoke remained visible and stationary from the time the formation left the I.P. until the formation left the target area after bombs away.

9. Armament: A NICK was reported with possible off-set wing guns. The enemy aircraft flew parallel and abreast of the formation and puffs of smoke were noted along the wing. No projectiles were seen, nor did B-29's report damage from the encounter.

10. Evasive Action: B-29 pilots occasionally pulled up or lifted a wing over streamers and metallic objects from aerial bombs. One instance of evasive action was reported by a B-29 pilot who stated that he had turned the nose of his airplane head-on to meet an attacking enemy aircraft.

11. Preliminary Claims Against Enemy Aircraft: Following are details of combat on preliminary claims of 4 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 10 damaged.

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Table No. 5 - Details of Combat - Preliminary Claims

Enemy Aircraft	Claim	No. of B-29's In Formation	Direction and Level of Approach	B-29's Opened Fire (yards)	Distances E/A Brokeaway or Disintegrated (yards)
ZEKE 32	Destroyed	3	11 high	800	35
S/E	Destroyed	3	10 high	1000	50
TOJO	Destroyed	6	12 level	1000	50
TOJO	Destroyed	6	12 low	800	500
OSCAR	Prob Dest	6	6 low	1200	800
JACK	Prob Dest	9	1 level	1000	100
TOJO	Prob Dest	6	6 low	500	400
OSCAR	Prob Dest	6	5 low	1200	500
NICK	Damaged	3	5 level	1200	1000
TOJO	Damaged	6	11 high	2000	500
TOJO	Damaged	6	5 low	500	500
DINAH	Damaged	3	2 high	1500	400
OSCAR	Damaged	6	3 low	700	600
TONY	Damaged	6	3 low	800	400
ZEKE	Damaged	3	1 high	800	100
ZEKE	Damaged	9	12 high	800	20
TONY	Damaged	9	12 high	1000	thru form
TONY	Damaged	9	5 low	1000	265
JACK	Prob Dest	6	3 low	1500	300
TOJO	Prob Dest	6	6 low	1500	300

12. Summary

a. Enemy air opposition was rated weak, with 75 individual encounters reported by 25 of the 49 B-29's airborne to targets. One B-29 was lost to enemy fighter action and 5 sustained minor damage. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft were 4 destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 10 damaged.

b. Fifty-one encounters (68 per cent of the total) occurred in the primary target area, of which 47 were after bombs away. There were 8 encounters in the vicinity of Saishu Island enroute to the primary target area, 7 in the secondary target area, and 9 scattered along the route home over China.

c. Encounters from the frontal quarter were in the majority with 39 per cent. Of the remainder 20 per cent were from the right side, 20 per cent from the rear, and 21 per cent from the left side. Forty-nine per cent of the approaches were high, 12 per cent were level, and 39 per cent were low.

d. Japanese pilots were moderately aggressive and skillful. Both B-29's and enemy pilots opened fire at long ranges, with 58 per cent of the B-29 fire at ranges of 1000 yards or more.

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e. Aerial bombs, principally of the phosphorous type, were employed in 13 encounters, 17 per cent of the total. One unusual type of aerial bomb was reported.

f. Coordinated attacks accounted for 18 individual encounters, 24 per cent of the total. The majority of attacks were executed by teams of two enemy aircraft. No new or unusual tactics were reported.

g. Several contacts were made with JACK 11, the new Japanese Navy fighter. This is the second time for B-29's. A NICK was reported with possible off-set wing guns.

13. Enemy Aircraft Markings

<u>Color</u>	<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Wing and Fuselage Markings</u>	<u>Tail Markings</u>
Silver	TONY	No markings observed.	
"	TONY	Red balls on each wing.	
"	TOJO	Bronze circles.	
"	OSCAR	Camouflaged on top.	
"	Several E/A	Red circles on top of wings.	
Olive-drab	TONY	Red insignia.	
" "	Several E/A	Red circles on top of wings.	
Camouflaged	TCJO	Red ball insignia.	
"	TOJO	No markings observed.	
"	JACK	White circle around fuselage behind canopy.	
"	ZEKES	No markings observed.	
"	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
"(brown)	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
" "	TONY	No markings observed.	
"	TONYS	Orange insignia.	
Grey	TONY	White spinner.	
Brown	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
Black	TONY	Orange balls.	
"	OSCAR	No markings observed.	
"	TOJO	No markings observed.	
"	ZEKE	Silver cowling, white spinner.	

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13. Enemy Aircraft Markings (continued)

<u>Color</u>	<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Wing and Fuselage Markings</u>	<u>Tail Markings</u>
Unreported color	ZIKE 32	Red circles on side and top.	Orange, brown, and OD tail markings.
"	TOJO		Two parallel horizontal stripes on vertical stabilizer.
"	TOJO	Green and yellow stripes around fuselage back of wings.	
"	TOJOS		Red stripes on tail.
"	NICK		Black rudder.
"	DINAH	Single white stripe around fuselage behind cockpit; two white stripes around wing between rising sun insignia and wing root.	

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ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

* Prepared by: *
* Weather Section *
* XX Bomber Command *

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I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base At Take-off	<p><u>ALL BASES:</u> Altcumulus overcast with breaks base 9000', tops 12,500' msl. Visibility 1 to 2 miles at 0200 decreasing to 3/4 mile in fog at dawn, and improving to more than 1 mile after 0900 GMT.</p>	<p><u>HSHINGH:</u> Altcumulus overcast, Base 9500' msl, tops 11,000' scattered stratocumulus at 5500' msl. Visibility 3 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>KWANG IAN:</u> Overcast stratocumulus and altocumulus clouds, base 5000', tops 12,500' msl. Visibility 2 miles.</p> <p><u>KIUNGLAI:</u> Overcast altocumulus base 7000' msl. Broken stratocumulus at 4-5000' msl. Visibility 2 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>PENGSHAN:</u> Overcast altocumulus base 8000' msl. Broken stratocumulus 5500' msl. Visibility 2 miles in haze.</p>
Route Out	<p><u>BASE TO MOUNTAINS:</u></p> <p>Broken stratocumulus base 4000', top 7000' MSL. Altcumulus overcast deck, top 12,500' MSL persisting to mountains with both decks breaking rapidly in vicinity of Anking. Thin higher altocumulus top at 15,000' from 108 to 110 deg E. Light to moderate rime ice in clouds.</p> <p><u>MOUNTAINS TO COAST:</u> Clear. Visibility 10 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>COAST TO TARGET:</u> Overcast stratocumulus top 4000' beginning at coast and persisting with few breaks to target area.</p>	<p><u>BASE TO MOUNTAINS:</u></p> <p>Overcast stratocumulus and altocumulus clouds base 4 to 5,000', tops to 12,500'. Scattered higher altocumulus clouds between 14,000' and 17,000'. Light to moderate rime ice in clouds.</p> <p><u>MOUNTAINS TO COAST:</u></p> <p>Scattered altocumulus between 15,000' to 17,000'. Scattered stratocumulus tops 8000' vicinity of coast. Visibility 10 miles.</p> <p><u>COAST TO TARGET:</u> Stratocumulus overcast with breaks, tops 6000' to 8000'. Scattered cirrostratus above 25,000'.</p>
Target Area	<p>Stratocumulus overcast with breaks, tops 5000'. Tops of mountains beyond target area visible. Target pressure 30.39 in.</p>	<p>9/10 stratocumulus, tops 6,000' to 8000'.</p>

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S E C R E T

As Forecast	As Encountered
<p>Return Route</p> <p>Similar to outgoing except along China Coast where stratocumulus will have become 5/10 to 6/10 small cumulus.</p>	<p>Target to Coast; Overcast stratocumulus layer top 6000' to 8000' persisted over sea, breaking to 8-9/10 and finally dissipating at China Coast. Coast to Mountains; Thin altostratus overcast, top 10,000' began at coast and became more dense westward with tops lifting to 11,000'. Mountains to Base; Tops of overcast altostratus lifted to 13,000' with a higher altostratus deck base at 16,000' beginning at 110°E. and persisting rest of route.</p>
<p>Base on Return</p> <p>All Bases; Broken to overcast altocumulus base 10,000' top 12,000'. Visibility 3 miles in haze.</p>	<p>Hsinching; Broken stratocumulus base 4500' MSL. Altostratus overcast 7500' MSL. Visibility 4 miles in haze. Kwanghan; Broken stratus 800'. Overcast stratocumulus and altocumulus base 3000' tops 10,000'. Visibility 1 mile in light drizzle. Kiunglai; Overcast stratocumulus base 3500'. Visibility 2 miles in haze. Pengshan; Altocumulus overcast at 7000'. Broken stratocumulus base 3500' MSL. tops frequently merging with upper layer. Visibility 1 mile in haze.</p>

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Base	Halfway	Target
5,000'	200 Deg - 10K		
10,000'	250 Deg - 25K	310 Deg - 32K	290 Deg - 37K
15,000'	260 Deg - 40K	295 Deg - 50K	275 Deg - 60K
20,000'	270 Deg - 55K	285 Deg - 65K	270 Deg - 80K
25,000'	270 Deg - 70K	280 Deg - 85K	265 Deg - 100K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	Halfway	Target
13,000'	265 Deg - 45K	
15,000'	285 Deg - 45K	
17,000'	285 Deg - 65K	
24,000'		270 Deg - 85K
26,000'		265 Deg - 85K

C. Target Temperatures

As Forecast:

Altitude	Temperature
15,000'	- 22 Deg C.
20,000'	- 27 Deg C.
25,000'	- 36 Deg C.
Mean temperature	- 18 Deg C.


As Encountered

Altitude	Temperature
26,000'	- 37 Deg C.


D-I-2

S E C R E T


SECRET
XX BOMBER COMMAND
WEATHER AS FORECAST




WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
ROUTE OUT




WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
ROUTE BACK



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TO TECH. UNIT



SECRET
REPRODUCED BY
10TH PHOTO TECH. UNIT

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By AN NARA Date 11-15

S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Communications Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

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By CD/MT NARS, Date OCT 21 1975

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Authority NND 760063
By AP NARA Date 11-15

SECRET

SECRET
:Auth: CG XX BC
:Initials: [Signature]
:Date: 14 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 13 January 1945. Field Orders No. 25

Date of Mission: 6 January 1945.

1. General:

a. Communications for mission number twenty-five (25) were very satisfactory. Comparatively good weather conditions, which resulted in signals having good readability, is the main contributing factor.

b. On this mission, for the first time, a new system was evolved to obtain better coordination of units reaching the target. This system consisted of assignment of a wing commander to transmit all target information to the various formations. The frequency used was 5110 kcs, and all information transmitted by the wing commander was successfully received by all formations. Interrogation showed that this was a decided aid in getting the formations over the target at the specified time, and it has been adopted as standard operating procedure on all future missions to be flown by this command.

2. A practice message was sent from the Command Post, and a time study of the handling of this message is contained in Annex Number One (1) to this report.

3. All required traffic was handled satisfactorily, and compliance with the provisions of Tactical Doctrine by both aircraft and ground stations was excellent. The only violation noted was that the 468th Group used the wrong take-off code word. A compilation of the number of messages handled as required by Tactical Doctrine is as follows:

	<u>40th Gp</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
a. Aborts	0	0	0	3
b. Bombs Away:	4	3	5	4
c. Attack:	1	2	3	4
d. Convoy Sighting:	0	1	1	2
e. Position:	5	4	9	7

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4. A comparative study of the readability, signal strength and noise level of the frequencies in use, divided into two (2) hour periods is as follows. Time indicated is GMT:

a. AIRCRAFT TO GROUND STATION

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>1900-2100</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0100</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>
2055 kes	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S2 R2 W3	-- -- --
2807.5	S4 R4 W3	S4 R4 W3	S3 R3 W3	-- -- --
2900	S5 R5 W0	S5 R4 W0	S4 R4 W0	-- -- --
4785	S4 R4 W2	S3 R3 W3	S2 R3 W3	S2 R2 W3
8260	-- -- --	S3 R3 W2	S5 R5 W2	S3 R3 W2
8310	-- -- --	-- -- --	S4 R4 W0	S3 R4 W0
8495	-- -- --	-- -- --	S1 R1 W3	S2 R2 W3
12215	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W3
8545	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R3 W3	S3 R3 W3

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>	<u>0700-0900</u>	<u>0900-1100</u>
2055 kes	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2807.5	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2900	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785	S3 R3 W3	S3 R2 W4	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2
8260	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
8310	S4 R5 W0	S4 R5 W0	S5 R5 W0	-- -- --
8495	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2	-- -- --
8545	S3 R3 W2	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2
12215	S3 R3 W2	S2 R2 W3	S1 R1 W3	-- -- --

b. GROUND STATION TO AIRCRAFT

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>1900-2100</u>	<u>2100-2300</u>	<u>2300-0100</u>	<u>0100-0300</u>
2055 kes	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S2 R2 W3	-- -- --
2807.5	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	S2 R2 W2	S2 R2 W2
2900	S4 R5 W2	S4 R4 W2	S2 R3 W3	-- -- --
2955	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2	S3 R3 W2
4785	S4 R4 W2	S3 R2 W3	S2 R2 W3	S2 R2 W3
8260	S1 R1 W4	S2 R2 W3	S4 R4 W2	S3 R3 W3
8310	S4 R4 W2	S3 R4 W1	S2 R3 W2	S2 R2 W3
8495	-- -- --	S4 R4 W1	S4 R4 W1	S3 R3 W1
8545	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W4
12215	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --	S2 R2 W4
12285	-- -- --	-- -- --	S3 R3 W2	S4 R4 W2

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b. GROUND STATION TO AIRCRAFT (CONT'D)

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0300-0500</u>	<u>0500-0700</u>	<u>0700-0900</u>	<u>0900-1100</u>
2055 kcs	---	---	---	---
2807.5	---	---	---	---
2900	---	---	---	---
2955	---	---	---	---
4785	S3 R3 W3	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2
8260	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310	S3 R4 W3	S4 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2	---
8495	S4 R4 W1	S4 R4 W1	S4 R4 W1	S3 R3 W1
8545	S3 R3 W3	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
12215	S3 R3 W3	S3 R3 W2	S2 R2 W3	S1 R1 W4
12285	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S3 R3 W2

c. Only slight spasmodic interference was reported on the frequencies. Readability and signal strength was exceptionally good, as is shown in sub paragraphs a and b above.

5. The following statistical data was compiled regarding the use of aids to air-navigation; all distances are in statute miles:

a. Radio Homing Beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of A/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Ankang (PR)	11	80	135	
Hsinching (CU)	26	126	212	
Liangshan (LM)	29	106	159	275°
Hsien (OF)	5	60	100	
Kwanghan (LK)	10	100	180	275°
Suining (SI)	8	75	120	267°
Pengshan (MV)	4	70	100	

b. Radio Ranges:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Hsinching (CU)	17	80	210	270°
Kwanghan (LK)	5	38	50	280°

c. D/F Facilities

<u>Station</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>No. of Requests</u>	<u>Type Bearing</u>		
			<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>
444th Gp - 3B8	8495	1	1		
462nd Gp - 7D3	8310	7	5	2	
468th Gp - 5D5	8260	4	1	2	1
468th Gp - 5X5	5110	5	3		2

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d. Air-to-Air Homing.

- 40th Group - A/C 620 transmitted homing signals over the first assembly point for approximately twenty (20) minutes. Although the actual rendezvous was effected visually, the signal was picked up by seven (7) aircraft at an extreme distance of eight-six (86) miles, and an average distance of thirty (30) miles.
- 444th Gp - A/C 411 transmitted homing signals at the first rendezvous point for approximately twenty (20) minutes. Eight (8) A/C picked up this signal at an extreme distance of approximately one hundred and ten (110) miles.
- 462nd Gp - A/C 448 transmitted homing signals at the first rendezvous point. Five (5) A/C picked up the signals at an extreme distance of one hundred and fifteen (115) miles, an average distance of fifty-two (52) miles. All other A/C homed visually with the exception of A/C 506, which attempted to use air-to-air homing but was unsuccessful.
- 468th Gp - A/C 525 transmitted homing signals for sixty-eight (68) minutes. All A/C homed visually as homing signals were not picked up. Failure was due to low frequency tuning unit being out of calibration. The transmitter was not tuning properly on the fixed antenna. Proximity of other ships in formation made use of trailing wire antenna impossible.

6. There were no violations of cryptographic security logged.

7. Malfunctions of equipment were as follows:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 620 - liaison antenna shot off; used trailing wire when not in formation.
- (2) A/C 4738 - base plate for compass loop broken due to excessive vibrations.
- (3) A/C 522 - compass flat top antenna shot away; used whip antenna.

b. 444th Group

- (1) A/C 341 - strong electrical interference in all receivers made it impossible to receive any signals; cause not determined.

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c. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 3457 - liaison transmitter would not stay tuned; cause undetermined.
- (2) A/C 506 - shorted jackbox which caused command and liaison transmissions to be received at same time. Radio compass out of alignment.
- (3) A/C 448 - CW oscillator on radio compass burned out. Tail gunners jack box shorted out; both repaired in flight.
- (4) A/C 4786 - low frequency command transmitter out; cause undetermined.
- (5) A/C 484 - compass flat top antenna broke; used jumper to command set antenna.
- (6) A/C 232 - compass flat top antenna broke; used jumper to command set antenna.
- (7) A/C 728 - six (6) to nine (9) megacycle band very noisy; repaired by substituting dynomotors from three (3) to six (6) megacycle frequency receiver.

d. 468th Group:

- (1) A/C 4691 - radio compass out; cause undetermined.
- (2) A/C 456 - intermittent interphone out; cause undetermined.
- (3) A/C 714 - radio compass antenna lead in broken; not repairable in flight.
- (4) A/C 734 - radio compass antenna broke because of icing; used jumper to command antenna.
- (5) A/C 703 - radio compass out; cause undetermined.
- (6) A/C 500 - radio compass out; cause undetermined.

8. Wire facilities:

a. Telephone and teletype communication between the Command Post at Hsinching and the 468th Group at Pengshan were disrupted at approximately 1030Z, due to one of the 468th Group's aircraft salvoing its bombs. Trunk number two was restored to service at 0300Z and trunk number one at 0430Z. Teletype communications was resumed coincident with the restoration of trunk number one.

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SECRET

SECRET
 :Auth: CG, XX BC:
 :Initials: [initials]
 :Date: 13 Jan 45:

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HEADQUARTERS
 XX BOMBER COMMAND
 APO 493

ANNEX NO. 1

TO

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 13 January 1945 Field Orders No. 25
 Date of Mission: 6 January 1945.

1. The following is a time study involving message handling time on the practice messages sent on Mission Number twenty-five (25).

2. The message was filed for transmission at 060400Z and was transmitted via teletype to the groups, being receipted for as follows:

<u>40th Group</u>	<u>444th Group</u>	<u>462nd Group</u>	<u>468th Group</u>
0402Z	0407Z	0402Z	0406Z

a. In addition to being transmitted by group air-ground stations, the message was sent by the XX Bomber Command Air-Ground station, 5X5, as follows:

- 5110 kcs - 0405Z, 0415Z, 0430Z, 0445Z
- 11440 kcs - 0405Z, 0415Z, 0430Z, 0445Z
- 8130 kcs - 0421Z, 0435Z, 0445Z

b. A time study showing time of receipt, means by which message was received and number of aircraft receiving message is as follows:

(1) 40th Bomb Group:

<u>A/C Call sign</u>	<u>How Rec'd</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
620	Intercept	0409Z	
522	Intercept	0409Z	
396	Intercept	0410Z	
462	Intercept	0411Z	
498	Intercept	0412Z	
718	Intercept	0415Z	
505	Intercept	0415Z	
798	Intercept	0416Z	
589	Intercept	0418Z	
738	Relay	0515Z	
739	Intercept	0418Z	
562	Not Rec'd	----	Operator was workin g fighter net at time message being transmitted

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Time of first transmission: 0407Z
Time of receipt by first a/c: 0409Z
Time of receipt by last a/c: 0515Z
Total elapsed time: 68 minutes
Average transmission time: 11.9 minutes

(2) 444th Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Rec'd</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
492	Intercept	0421Z	Formation leader retransmitted msg on command channels to the 8 a/c. who were in formation with him at this time. Simultaneously on 3 frequencies
495	Intercept	0422Z	
524	Intercept	0423Z	
730	Intercept	0430Z	

Time of transmission: 0417Z
Time of receipt by first a/c: 0421Z
Time of receipt by last a/c: 0430Z
Total elapsed time: 13 minutes
Average time: 5 minutes.

(3) 462nd Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Rec'd</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
503	Intercept	0415Z	This a/c had moved into lead position and was on Air/Sea Rescue freq rendering aid to other a/c from 0400 to 0525Z. Repeated at 0418Z, on two frequencies.
786	Intercept	0418Z	
728	Intercept	0423Z	
232	Intercept	0425Z	
591	Intercept	0430Z	
800	Intercept	0428Z	
4786	Intercept	0415Z	
450	Intercept	0438Z	
448	Intercept	0425Z	
506	Intercept	0428Z	
3457	Not Rec'd		

Time of first transmission: 0415Z
Time of receipt by first a/c: 0415Z
Time of receipt by last a/c: 0438Z
Total elapsed time: 23 minutes
Average time: 9.5 minutes.

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(4) 468th Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Rec'd</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
525	Intercept	0420Z	
456	Intercept	0435Z	
4494	Intercept	0443Z	
542	Intercept	0415Z	
442	Intercept	0431Z	
734	Not Rec'd	--	{ Making bomb run at secondary target Descending thru overcast. Radio operator using aurial nul method to aid navigation.
4691	Not Rec'd	--	
714	Not Rec'd	--	
500	Intercept	0418Z	
703	Intercept	0435Z	
469	Not Rec'd	---	No reason given
Time of first transmission:		0411Z	Repeated several times simultan- eously on two frequencies.
Time of receipt by first a/c:		0415Z	
Time of receipt by last a/c:		0443Z	
Total elapsed time:		32 minutes	
Average time:		17 minutes.	

S E C R E T

ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - Radar Information

Section A - Navigation and Bombing
Section B - Scope Photography
Section C - Serviceability

II - Radar Tables

Table A - Bombing Data
Table B - Photographic Results
Table C - Navigational Ranges
Table D - Serviceability
Table E - Malfunctions

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Radar Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

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:SECRET
:Auth: CG XX BC
:Initials
:Date 13 Jan 45
:

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 495

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 13 January 1945 Field Orders No. 25
Date of Mission 6 January 1945

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. The targets on this mission were designated as primary visual and primary radar. In the event conditions prevented bombing of the visual target, the primary radar target, Omura, was to be bombed. A total of twenty-eight (28), or sixty-two (62) per cent of all planes bombing, bombed Omura by radar. Radar scope photographs were secured and provided a means of tracing three bombing runs.

2. One (1) formation of nine (9) aircraft made a good bombing run but considerably north of the target. The point of impact, as estimated from a few visual and radar photographs, indicates the bombs to have fallen approximately four and one-half (4½) miles northeast of the target. A possible explanation for this error may be due to the lack of time for the final lead plane to assume the lead and proper course. Radar malfunctions necessitated the lead to be changed twice between the final assembly point and the initial point. The final lead aircraft did not assume the lead position until twenty-three (23) miles from the target. At a ground speed of roughly three hundred and ninety (390) m.p.h., the radar operator did not have more than three (3) minutes to make all corrections.

3. A six (6) plane formation made an excellent bombing run. From a few visual strike photographs and radar photographs, it is estimated the point of impact to be approximately twenty-five hundred (2500) feet from the center of the target.

4. A third formation bombing run was traceable; however, the center of impact could not be estimated.

5. Results of other radar bombings are unknown to date; however, operator reports indicate good runs were made.

B - Scope Photography

Twenty-two (22) radar scope cameras were installed for this mission, returning eleven (11) sets of useable photographs. Three (3) sets traced the bombing runs on Omura, as mentioned above. Two (2) other sets of photographs traced the course of other visual bombing runs.

C - Serviceability

The percentage of failures on this mission was slightly higher than average. The percentage of sets operative over the target was seventy-seven (77) per cent, or eight per cent lower than the overall average. Failures due to pressurization at high altitudes accounted for forty (40) per cent of the malfunctions over the target. In addition to inverters, pressurization is a main source of trouble.

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II - Radar Tables

A - Bombing Data

Total A/C Bombing	- 45
Total A/C Bombing Omura (Radar)	- 28
Total A/C Bombing Nanking (Visual)	- 11
Total A/C Bombing T/O (Visual)	- 3
Total A/C Bombing T/O (Radar)	- 3
Total Radar Bombing	- 31
Percentage Radar Bombing	- 69

(Radar Includes Radar and Blind Bombing)

B - Photographic Results

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Installed	4	-	3	-	5	-	10	-	22	-
K-35 Cameras	2	-	-	-	2	-	4	-	8	-
K-24 Cameras	2	-	3	-	3	-	6	-	14	-
No. Cameras in abort, Early Ret & Missing A/C *	0	-	1	33	2	40	2	20	5	23
No. Cameras Complet- ing Mission *	4	100	2	67	3	60	8	80	17	77
No. Cameras in Camera & Radar Malfunction A/C #	2	50	0	-	1	33	2	25	5	30
Sets Pic Returned #	2	50	2	100	2	67	5(a)	63	11	65
No. Neg. Returned	24	-	125	-	69	-	58	-	276	-
Sets Pic Usable **	2	100	1	50	2	100	4	80	9	82
Sets Pic Tracing Bomb Run **	2	100	1	50	1	50	0	-	4	36

(a) - No pics yet received from A/C No. 500.

SECRET

C - Navigational Ranges

CHECK POINT	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Total No. Reporting	Weighted Average Range
Mapping Range	11	35	12	35	9	51	11	41	43	40
Mura (PT)	2	27	12	32	1	35	6	30	21	31
Nanking (ST)	2	27	4	31	1	25	1	50	8	32
Nadara Is (IP)	3	21	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	21
Raizu Is (AP-2)	4	31	3	28	2	35	6	29	15	30
Santai (40th AP)	6	25	2	24	--	--	--	--	8	25
So Is (444th AP)	--	--	10	25	--	--	--	--	10	25
So-Kuzan (462nd AP)	--	--	5	32	5	49	2	27	12	38
Sansai Is (468th AP)	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	35	6	35
Shankang	--	--	1	20	2	17	5	17	8	17
Shina Coast	1	30	10	26	4	34	12	29	27	35
Shanjo Archipeligo	--	--	2	40	1	45	--	--	3	42
Show Ho	1	35	1	43	--	--	9	32	11	33
Sukue Island	--	--	3	25	--	--	--	--	3	25
Suto Archipeligo	--	--	2	38	--	--	6	33	8	34
Tan Ho	--	--	13	17	4	23	14	24	31	21
Tataka Rock	--	--	1	50	--	--	3	42	4	39
Tungtze Lake	10	31	15	29	9	31	10	31	44	30
Tsailing Ho	1	30	2	29	--	--	9	33	12	32
Tsuyou Lake	--	--	4	28	--	--	3	20	7	23
Uino Island	--	--	1	55	--	--	--	--	1	55
Uragasaki	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	20	1	20
Uroying Lake	--	--	3	21	--	--	3	26	6	23
Ushu Island	2	22	2	42	2	48	6	35	12	36
Utsubo	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	20	1	20
Ushiro Reef	4	35	7	22	1	45	6	27	18	28
Uhanghai	--	--	1	90	--	--	--	--	1	90
Uangtze River	--	--	8	25	--	--	2	55	10	31

D - Radar Serviceability

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
/C Airborne	12	--	12	--	12	--	13	--	49	--
/C Reporting	11	--	12	--	11	--	12	--	46	--
-13 Op. at Take-Off*	10	91	12	100	11	100	10	83	43	93
/C Bombing	12	--	11	--	11	--	11	--	45	--
/C Reporting Bombing*	11	100	11	92	11	100	11	92	44	96
-13 Op. over Target#	7	64	10	91	8	73	9	82	34	77
-13 Unrep. Failures#										
Completely Inop.	5	45	2	18	4	40	2	22	13	30
Partially Inop.	2	18	1	9	0	--	0	--	3	7
Total Inoperative	7	64	3	27	4	40	2	22	16	37
-13 Rep. in Flight*	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
CR-718 Failures	0	--	0	--	0	--	1	8	1	2
CR-729 Failures	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--
CR-695 Failures	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--	0	--

* Percentage based on A/C reporting.

Percentage based on A/C reporting Bombing.

SECRET

E - Malfunctions


DATA	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
<u>At Take-Off</u>					
Completely Inoperative					
Transmitter out	1	-	-	-	1
No Signals	-	-	-	1	1
Inverter	-	-	-	1	1
<u>Total</u>	1	-	-	2	3
<u>Between Take-Off & Target</u>					
Completely Inoperative					
Synchronizer Short	1	-	-	-	1
Pressurization	1(a)	1	1	-	3
Modulator (Due to					
Pressurization)	1	-	-	-	1
Signals Disappeared	-	-	1	-	1
Crystal Bad	-	-	1	-	1
<u>Total Complete</u>	3	1	3	-	7
Partially Inoperative					
Navigator's scope out					
of place	1	-	-	-	1
Range Unit Calibra-					
tion bad	1	-	-	-	1
A.F.C.	-	1(b)	-	-	1
<u>Total Partial</u>	2	1	-	-	3
<u>Total Partial & Complete</u>	5	2	3	-	10
<u>Between Target & Landing</u>					
Completely Inoperative					
Spoking	1	-	-	-	1
Transmitter	-	1(b)	-	-	1
Inverter	-	-	1	-	1
<u>Total</u>	1	1	1	-	3
<u>Summary APQ-13 Failures</u>					
Complete	5	2	4	2	13
Partial	2	1	-	-	3
Repaired in Flight	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	7	3	4	2	16
<u>Auxiliary Equipment</u>					
SCR-718	-	-	-	1	1
SCR-729	-	-	-	-	-
SCR-695	-	-	-	-	-

(a) - Failed above 18,000 feet, O.K. below that.
 (b) - Same Airplane.

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS OMURA AREA-JAPAN


MISSION NO.25 - TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (33°55'15"N-129°56'30"E)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0063
By AN NAPA Date 11-15




HEADING 110°M (105°T)
50 MILE SWEEP

33°07'00"N
129°26'30"E




HEADING 125°M (120°T)
50 MILE SWEEP

33°04'00"N
129°40'00"E




HEADING 125°M (120°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

33°03'45"N
129°40'45"E




HEADING 130°M (125°T)
20 MILE SWEEP




HEADING 281°M (276°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

32°45'45"N
129°43'20"E




RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS OMURA AREA - JAPAN


MISSION NO. 25 - TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (33°55'15"N-129°56'30"E)



33°04'00"N
129°40'00"E




HEADING 125°M (120°T)
20 MILE SWEEP





33°03'45"N
129°40'45"E

HEADING 130°M (125°T)
20 MILE SWEEP



HEADING 142°M (137°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

33°00'00"N
129°50'15"E



HEADING 131°M (126°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

32°57'00"N
129°54'15"E

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 76 0063
By: AN NAPA Date: 11-15

HEADING 110°M (105°T)
50 MILE SWEEP

HEADING 120°M (115°T)
50 MILE SWEEP

HEADING 120°M (115°T)
50 MILE SWEEP


HEADING 120°M (115°T)
50 MILE SWEEP

20 MILE SWEEP

HEADING 129°40'45"E
20 MILE SWEEP


HEADING 129°40'45"E
20 MILE SWEEP

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0963
BY AN NAPA Date 11-15




HEADING 281°M (276°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

32°45'45"N
129°43'20"E




AIRCRAFT 457
462nd BOMBARDMENT G




HEADING 279°M (274°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

32°45'30"N
129°48'00"E




HEADING 265°M (260°T)
20 MILE SWEEP

32°44'50"N
129°55'15"E



HEADING 273°M (268°T)
20 MILE SWEEP



32°45'00"N
129°58'50"E



HEADING 217°M (212°T)
20 MILE SWEEP


PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND

SECRET




HEADING 131°M (126°T)
20 MILE SWEEP


32°57'00"N
129°54'15"E




32°44'50"N
129°55'15"E




HEADING 273°M (268°T)
20 MILE SWEEP



32°45'00"N
129°58'50"E



HEADING 217°M (212°T)
20 MILE SWEEP



HEADING 164°M (159°T)
10 MILE SWEEP


32°52'45"N
130°01'00"E

SECRET
RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
OMURA AREA-JAPAN

MISSION NO.25-TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (32°55'15"N-129°56'30"E)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0963
By AN NAPA Date 11-15


21



50 MILE SWEEP

145°M (140°T)


22



50 MILE SWEEP


122°M (117°T)

23



128°M (123°T)


24




129°M (124°T)

SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, IS 30 MILES
ALTITUDE - 25,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

32



264°M (259°T)







AIRCRAFT 462
40 TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP

SECRET
 RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS
 OMURA AREA-JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 76 0963
 By AN NAPA Date 11-15

MISSION NO.25-TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (32°55'15"N-129°56'30"E)




122°M (117°T)

128°M (123°T)


129°M (124°T)

129°M (124°T)

SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, IS 30 MILES
 ALTITUDE - 25,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED




172°M (167°T)



AIRCRAFT 462
 40 TH. BOMBARDMENT GROUP


SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, IS 30 MILES
ALTITUDE - 25,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0063
BY AN NAPA Date 11-15




32

264°M (259°T)




AIRCRAFT 462
40 TH. BOMBARDMENT GROUP




31

264°M (259°T)
ALTITUDE 20,000




30

270°M (265°T)
ALTITUDE 20,000



29






239°M (234°T)
ALTITUDE 20,000



28

239°M (234°T)
ALTITUDE 20,000

122°M (117°T) 128°M (123°T) 129°M (124°T) 129°M (124°T)
 SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, IS 30 MILES
 ALTITUDE - 25,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED



DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 76 0063
 BY AN NAPA Date 11-15


RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS OMURA AREA - JAPAN

MISSION NO. 25 - TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (32°55'15"n - 129°56'30"e)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 76 0063
By: AN NAPA Date: 11-15




HEADING 110°M(105°T)



HEADING 110°M(105°T)




HEADING 110°M(105°T)




HEADING 110°M(105°T)

SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IS 20 MILES
ALTITUDE 27,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED



HEADING 110°M(105°T)






AIRCRAFT 507

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R 90.36-1627 SHEET I

RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS OMURA AREA - JAPAN

MISSION NO. 25 - TARGET: OMURA AIRCRAFT PLANT (32°55'15"N - 129°56'30"E)





HEADING 110°M(105°T)

HEADING 110°M(105°T)

HEADING 110°M(105°T)

HEADING 185°M(180°T)
ALTITUDE 26,000'

SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IS 20 MILES
ALTITUDE 27,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED



HEADING 248°M(243°T)
ALTITUDE 25,000'


DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0063
By AN NAPA Date 11-15

SWEEP LENGTH ON ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IS 20 MILES
ALTITUDE 27,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0963
BY AN NAPA Date 11-15


HEADING 110°M(105°T)

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


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
16



HEADING 110°M(105°T)




AIRCRAFT 507
444th BOMBARDMENT GROUP




PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND
SECRET


ALTITUDE 27,000', UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED




HEADING 185°M (180°T)
ALTITUDE 26,000'



HEADING 248°M (243°T)
ALTITUDE 25,000'



HEADING 235°M (230°T)
ALTITUDE 25,000'



PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76 0063
By AN NAPA Date 11-15

S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* RCM Section *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMANDER, IB & C
APO 493

.
SECRET
. AUTH: Dep Comdr,
. 20th AF
. INITIALS D.F.
. Date: 18 Jan 45
.

18 January 1945

Subject: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 25, Omura, Japan,
6 January 45 - Daylight.

To : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

RCM activities on this mission, as on previous missions, were confined to searching. Seven RCM equipped aircraft, each with one RCM observer, participated in the mission. The RCM observers searched for enemy early warning equipment en-route to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment in the target area. Two RCM search aircraft were equipped with a bottom mount D/F Antenna.

B. Results

1. Radar intercepts were numerous on this mission with one operator reporting as many as 30 separate intercepts. Signal intercepts were practically continuous from the longitude of 110° E to the target and return.

A. As noted on previous missions, occupied China and Saishu Island were areas of much radar activity.

B. After leaving the Saishu Island Area, a convoy was sighted at 32°15' N 128°24' E and a confused band of MK 1 Model 3 signals were intercepted. The characteristics of the signals were as follows: Freq. 147 - 160 Mc; PRF, approximately 500; PW, 15 to 30 USEC.

C. The Japanese mainland was also very active with as many as ten MK 1 Model 2 Type Radar Signals being intercepted in the target area. MK 1 Model 1, MK 1 Model 3, and "CHI" Type Radar sites were also intercepted in this area.

2. Several new radar sites in China, located near the battle line, gives the enemy warning of our attacks sooner than was previously possible. The addition of different types of radar leads to the possibility that a better type of radar is needed to supplement the Army "CHI" warning net already in operation. Following is a brief resume of the new intercepts:

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S E C R E T

A. 79.3/1000/25: The first intercept of this Radar site occurred at $32^{\circ}38' N$ $108^{\circ}56' E$. The signal was weak and unsteady and did not begin tracking until $110^{\circ}E$. The PRF of 1000 is high for this type of set, as it is normally 500. Previous intercepts of this type occurred at Rangoon, Amoy, Palombang, and near Tungchow (Refer to D/F Enclosure).

B. 102/380/40-50: The first intercept of this Radar site occurred at $32^{\circ}50' N$ $110^{\circ}48' E$. The low PRF suggests a modified MK 1 Model 1 for long range early warning. Enroute to the target, this station was on course and D/F cuts were of no value but enroute home, suitable D/F cuts were obtained. These cuts will be attached to a later report.

C. 149.5/470/3-5: This Radar site has been intercepted enroute home on the past two missions, but due to the area of intercept, well into friendly territory, the radar intercepts have been classified as suspected. Enroute home on this mission, however, the Radar site was again intercepted; Good D/F cuts were obtained and the Radar site located at approximately $32^{\circ}50' N$ $111^{\circ}33' E$. This changes the classification of the radar site from suspected to probable. It is interesting to note that this site is of the MK 1 Model 3 type which is used by the Navy as a portable early warning unit. Previous intercepts have occurred near coast lines or Naval convoys.

3. Due to operational conditions, all of the D/F cuts obtained on this mission will not be included in this report. The D/F cuts that have been submitted to date are plotted on the two inclosures and additional D/F cuts will be attached to a later report. Following is a resume of available D/F cuts: (Refer to enclosures).

A. 80/510/46: This is the 80 Mc. station reported on Mission No. 22. Three D/F cuts place it SW of Tungchow at approximately $120^{\circ}48' E$ $31^{\circ}50' N$.

B. 157/530/8-10: Good cuts were obtained on a Naval Type MK 1 Model 3. $124^{\circ}35' E$ $34^{\circ}08' N$.

C. 74.5/515/30: Two D/F cuts place this "CHI" Radar site on the Western part of Saishu Island.

D. 97/600/25: The RCM Observer reported these cuts not sharp but it is possible that this MK 1 Model 1 is located on a barge or boat, a system known to be used by the Japanese for early warning.

E. 75/510/27: D/F'ed NE of Suchow to approximately $117^{\circ}50' E$ $34^{\circ}17' N$ "CHI" Type.

-2-

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By AN NARA Date 11-15

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F. 74/520/30: Similar to E and probably the same station but D/F'ed from a different aircraft. Located SE of Suchow at approximately 117° 30' E 34° 10' N. "CHI" Type.

G. 149.5/470/3-5: Unusual to find a set of this type so far inland. D/F'ed to Lijuanchiao at approximately 111° 33' E 32° 50' N. MK 1 Model 3 Type.

C. Radar Fire Control Equipment

1. There were numerous 200 Mc. signals intercepted near and in the target area, only one of which may be classified as having gun laying characteristics, which are as follows: Freq. 197 Mc.; PRF 5000 PPS; PW 6 USEC. The PRF appears to be high but the RCM Observer checked this very carefully.

2. The route to the target took some of the search aircraft directly over the Sasobo Naval Base. A careful check of the centimeter band and the 500 Mc. band produced negative results.

D. Enemy Counter Measures

Various aircraft reported possibly jamming, in what may be intended as a nuisance type of counter measures. The eight and twelve megacycle band were subject to jumbled characters and repeated call signs. There is no definite proof of intentional jamming.

E. Equipment

One AN/APA-6 pulse analyzer and one O-10/APA-6 Oscillator caught fire and failed in operation. No explanation is offered for this other than a sudden voltage surge.

A limiting switch on a D/F Antenna failed.

An O-10/APA-6 oscillator operated in an intermittent manner and had to be cooled at regular intervals.

For the Deputy Commander:

Leo I. Herman
LEO I. HERMAN
Colonel, Air Corps
Actg. Adjutant General

2 Incls

1 - 2 RCM Search Aircraft Track and D/F cuts

-5-


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By AN NARA Date 11-15

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RCM SEARCH AIRCRAFT TRACK AND D/F CUTS


PREPARED BY: XX BOMBER COMMAND
RCM SECTION

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
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PREPARED BY: XX BOMBER COMMAND
RCM SECTION

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Staff Gunnery Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

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Auth: CG XX RC

Initials: VK

Date: 13 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 13 Jan 45

Field Order No. 25

Date of Mission: 6 Jan

1. On mission No. 25 fighter opposition was reported as moderate with the majority of attacks occurring in the vicinity of the target. Airplane No. 254 of the 444th Group was attacked by two enemy fighters from the front quarter high and level, and as a result of this attack No. 3 and 4 engines were hit. The airplane crashed 34 minutes from the target with No. 3 and 4 engines on fire. Other attacks were less aggressive with no new tactics reported.

2. The following statistical data is submitted:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Ammunition used test firing	1280	1075	1210	750
Ammunition used on combat	4420	2385	14110	4140
Malfunctions of C.F.C. system	3	1	0	1
Total turrets on mission	60	60	60	60
Malfunctions of cal.50 M.G.S.	3	2	5	1
Total M.G.S. on mission	120	120	120	120
Total airplanes (included in report)	12	12	12	12
Total percent malfunctions all groups C.F.C. 2%, cal. .50 M.G. 2.2%				
Claims by our gunners:				
<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	
Our losses from guns of enemy fighters	1	0	3	

3. From all reports it is quite evident that gunners and other interested personnel desire the replacement of all guns in the four gun turrets. This may not be the complete answer to countering attacks from the high front quarter but it will increase our firepower by over thirty-three percent in this high frontal area.

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Authority XXD 760063

By AN NARA Date 11-15

S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T

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Authority XXD 760063

By AP NARA Date 11-15

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

	40th			444th			462nd			468th			Total		
	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22
Cameras Airborne	1	6	6	4	5	3	4	6	5	3	3	7	12	20	21
No. in A/C falling to bomb any target	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	3
No. in A/C bombing targets	1	6	6	4	5	3	3	5	5	3	5	11	19	19	19
No. photographing targets	1	6	6	4	0	3	2	3	3	3	5	10	9-K	17	17
Failure to photograph-mechanical	0	0	0	1-c	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0-K	0	0
Failure to photograph - other	0	a	2-b	3-b	d	1-b	1-e	3	2-h	1-i	3-b	3	3-K	10	10
No. usable negatives	10	a	34	0	0	43	7-f	3	19	5	0	0	22	0-K	96

- a. One camera was jettisoned; results of others not reported.
- b. Clouds over Omura.
- c. Broken case drive.
- d. Reason not specified.
- e. Not used.
- f. Number limited by faulty loading.
- g. Not reported.
- h. One aircraft failed to return and one camera was not used.
- i. Target covered by clouds.
- j. Four failures due to cloud cover; one reason not specified.
- k. Incomplete.

Note: For information concerning radar cameras, see Annex F, Radar Information.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

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Authority XXD 760063

By AP NARA Date 11-15

S E C R E T

I - AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

1. Known Battle Losses (1):

a. A/C 254 (462nd) was attacked by a fighter just after bombs away. Number 3 and 4 engines were shot out, but the only injury sustained by personnel was a slight nick in the Bombardier's arm. The aircraft lost too much speed and altitude to be escorted, but radio contact was maintained by aircraft 457 and 448. Aircraft 254 was on fire and the crew thought it would be necessary to bail, but later indicated maybe they could ditch. Aircraft 448 gave the position of 254 to a submarine and received acknowledgement. Some time later, at 0140Z, aircraft 457 received a message purportedly from the submarine stating it had found the wreck of 254, and still later a garbled message was received by aircraft 457 asking if there were 12 chutes aboard. The observations made by 3 different crews, although apparently in conflict as to time and location, bear out the fate of aircraft 254. Aircraft 457 reported the aircraft to have been shot down at 34°45'N - 129°34'E at 0140Z. An aircraft of the 468th Group saw a B-29 that was smoking drop out of a 6-aircraft formation about 30 miles NW of Sasebo. About 10 minutes later the B-29 was surrounded by 5 to 6 fighters and disappeared into the overcast at 13,000 feet. The third observation by aircraft 724 was of a B-29 from the 462nd Group going down in flames at 32°05'N - 127°53'E at approximately 0215Z.

2. Operational Losses: None

3. Missing Aircraft: None

B. Aircraft Damage

1. No aircraft received major damage and only 7 received minor damage -- 5 as a result of enemy air opposition and 2 as a result of heavy antiaircraft fire.

2. For details of battle and operational damage, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

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By AP NARA Date 11-15

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ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data *

* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

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Authority XXD 760063

By AP NARA Date 11-15

S E C R E T

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 25

6 January 1945

A. Summary

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. A/C airborne rear area	16	16	19	18	69
Less: A/C failing to reach forward area	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
2. A/C arriving in forward area	16	16	16	18	66
Less: A/C not taking off on mission	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>
3. A/C airborne on mission *	12	12	12	13	49
Less: A/C failing to bomb PT - mechanical reasons	2	2	4	7	15
Less: A/C failing to bomb PT - other reasons	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>
4. A/C bombing P.T.	8	9	5	6	28

* Due to limited gas stocks only 12 aircraft per group were required to be airborne in the forward area for the mission.

B. Details by Aircraft

1. A/C airborne - - - - - 49
2. Less: A/C failing to bomb PT - mechanical reasons - - - - - 15
 - a. Bombed secondary target (3):
 - (1) A/C 589 (40th) - blew top blister.
 - (2) A/C 522 (40th) - loss of oil #1 and #4 engines through engine breather tube.
 - (3) A/C 485 (444th) - exhaust valve stuck open.
 - (4) A/C 728 (462nd) - fuel transfer system out.
 - (5) A/C 484 (462nd) - flight instruments out.
 - (6) A/C 734 (468th) - radar inoperative, could not locate formation.
 - (7) A/C 542 (468th) - #1 engine emitting black smoke trail.
 - (8) A/C 691 (468th) - radar inoperative, could not locate formation.
 - b. Bombed targets of opportunity (3):
 - (1) A/C 503 (462nd) - turbo governor out #2 engine, closing waste gate.
 - (2) A/C 415 (468th) - oil leak.
 - (3) A/C 703 (468th) - radar out.

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c. Jettisoned bombs (3):

- (1) A/C 724 (444th) - bomb release malfunction.
- (2) A/C 450 (462nd) - material failure of #18 cylinder of #3 engine.
- (3) A/C 208 (468th) - lost #2 engine on take-off.

d. Brought bombs back (1):

- (1) A/C 714 (468th) - broken push rod housing hose clamp #1 engine, #1 cylinder. Lost 40 gallons of oil.

3. Less: A/C failing to bomb PT - other reasons - - - - - 6

a. Bombed secondary target (3):

- (1) A/C 730 (444th) - weather
- (2) A/C 506 (462nd) - personnel error in failure to adjust radio compass. Could not find formation.
- (3) A/C 718 (40th) - arrived at rendezvous point too late to join formation.

b. Bombed targets of opportunity (3):

- (1) A/C 462 (40th) - personnel error. Dropped bombs 6 minutes late.
- (2) A/C 590 (462nd) - designated escort for A/C 450.
- (3) A/C 786 (462nd) - designated escort for A/C 450.

4. A/C bombing Primary Target - - - - - 28

K-I-2

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC

Initials: JW

Date: 21 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date prepared: 21 January 1945

Field Order Number 25

Date of Mission: 6 Jan 45

1. A summary of the performance of aircraft that bombed the primary target and returned to their own bases is contained in the attached table.
2. The overall performance was as anticipated.

Attached: 1 Table.

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By AP NARA Date 11-15