

Doc. 4022 Evid.

Folder 16

(30)

Notes on the conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, on 28 March 1941.

The German Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuoka a second time. The Fuehrer would have liked to express his attitude to the questions at hand more fully, but was much occupied for the time being with the developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential part was the question of possibilities and prospects of closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, concerning the transition from the passive to the active cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Matsuoka was proceeding on this matter. It was actually the best opportunity that had ever been granted /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be better to make use of this opportunity before it slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important agreements and it formed the basis of relations between Japan and Germany for centuries. There were no clashes of interest.

The situation was such that a new order could only be established if Great Britain were utterly defeated. This was true in even greater measure for Japan than for Germany, which already dominated the European continent and which would within this year draw into her dominion the Mediterranean area and Africa, insofar as she had interests. Germany would then have all she needed. She did not seek world domination as Roosevelt had falsely asserted. The Fuehrer wanted to get the war over with as soon as possible in order to turn back to his task of construction. The goal which he had assigned himself, namely to assure the Reich the utmost security, had really already been achieved.

In contrast, the new order in the Greater East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan also controlled the south. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was essential.

Regarding Russia, the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans did not know how things would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia might take the wrong course, although he really didn't expect this of Stalin. No one could know. At any rate Germany would instantly strike if Russia undertook anything against Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and especially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the German army. The second misgiving,

which the Japanese Navy in particular had expressed with regard to the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer by saying that both these English fleets would be contained by Germany within European and Mediterranean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding America had been expressed. The United States, however, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything at all imprudent.

Although he (the German Foreign Minister) thoroughly understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had illustrated by his tale of the tiger and her young, yet he must allude again to the fact that two of the strongest countries in the world, who are possessed of a youthful, powerful, and fearless spirit, had been granted by Providence an opportunity that perhaps recurs only once in a thousand years. Germany's great opportunity lies in her Fuehrer, whose co-workers are merely implements to carry out his will. He (the German Foreign Minister) had again and again explained to the English and French Ambassadors that they must never fall into the error of comparing the Germany of Today with the Germany of 1914 and 1918.

Even then the Reich had stood up for four years against a world of enemies, and only through its disunity and its inner weakness had it lost the war. Now, however, it was unified and had thereby double strength, which, through the highly gifted leadership of Adolf Hitler, would be redoubled so that henceforth Germany must be regarded as having four times her strength in the /First/ World War. The ambassadors had thrown this warning to the winds. However these predictions had been fulfilled and there was nothing in the world which would stop Germany and Italy from ruling absolutely the European-African hemispheres. If such an opportunity should present itself to Japan under such circumstances, she must consider these things very carefully and not let the opportunity slip from her grasp.

To be sure when the present war would end, could not be prophesized with certainty, but the German Foreign Minister had the feeling that perhaps England might collapse sooner than was generally expected. If the English were to beg suddenly for peace, it would be most desirable if Germany and Japan were able together to determine that peace.

The German Foreign Minister then spoke of his family traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover he had already in 1934 had an important talk with the Fuehrer on German-Japanese collaboration. The Fuehrer's high respect for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most important thing was not to let slip the joint

opportunity which offered itself in 1941.

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the collapse of the British Empire, would take place. He felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japanese nation in the Far East acted almost under a divine order to break up the British Empire and to establish a New Order.

Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would assume toward the United States if England were brought to her knees in summer, but America were not as yet at war.

The German Foreign Minister answered that this depended on the attitude of the United States herself. Of course, the possibility of an occupation of the British Isles required a good-weather period, and the British might possibly try to set up a new government in the United States. But in his opinion this could not be carried out.

Matsuoka thereupon made his question more specific in the following way: If England were beaten to the ground, the United States would not, in his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire. Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a New Order could not be established. The German Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise control in his own sphere. Germany would do this, together with Italy, in the European-African sphere, the United States would have to limit herself to the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would have to be watched closely and revolutionary propaganda would not be permitted on any account. In the future only the aforementioned three spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

Matsuoka replied that the only great problem that would remain thereafter was Russia. Japan was ready to let Russia get to an ice-free sea via India or Iran, but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast. Matsuoka then asked whether the Fuehrer had ever considered the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese-German Pact. The German Foreign Minister denied this and dubbed closer co-operation with Russia an absolute impossibility, as the spiritual bases of the army as well as the rest of the nation were completely opposed. The Soviet Union was still internationally inclined while Japan and Germany thought nationally. Russia undermined the family, Germany stood up for it. Here, as between fire and water, a union was

impossible. Stalin was very skillful and had therefore under the circumstances prevailing at that time, concluded the pact with Germany. Russia would also have joined the Tripartite pact, but her terms could not be met. The whole affair was being treated dilatorily by Germany, as he could tell Matsuoka confidentially. Besides that, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and -- this Matsuoka must know at all events -- she was prepared for any eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia, but if Stalin's policy was not in accord with what the Fuehrer thought right, he would shatter Russia. Matsuoka replied that Japan was now avoiding irritating Russia. Japan was waiting for Germany to complete its victory in the Balkans. Without the good services of Germany and without her strength Japan would have no chance to completely improve Russo-Japanese relations.

Matsuoka furthermore talked of the long-term commercial treaty, which would be concluded with Russia. He then put before the German Foreign Minister the question, if he should on his return trip stop over a little longer in Moscow, to negotiate with the Russians regarding the Non-Aggression Pact or the Neutrality Pact. Here he emphasized that immediate admission of Russia to the Tripartite Pact would never be allowed by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary cause one cry of indignation to arise throughout Japan. The German Foreign Minister replied that such an accession of Russia to the pact was out of the question and suggested to Matsuoka, if at all possible, not to touch on the aforementioned questions in Moscow, as it was not apt to fit quite into the framework of the present situation.

Upon a further remark by Matsuoka, that the conclusion of a fishing and of a commercial agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, the German Foreign Minister replied that there were no objections to the conclusion of such purely commercial treaties. In this connection, Matsuoka further mentioned that America was closely watching Japanese-Russian relations and for her part was trying to conclude an agreement with Russia against Japan.

Matsuoka then again came to speak of Singapore. The Japanese were not worried about the British Navy. However, there were Japanese circles which looked with great misgivings upon a conflict with America, as they presumed that in such a case it would mean a five-to-ten year war with the United States. He immediately admitted that America would not stake her fleet in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these Japanese circles were worried because under these circumstances the war would last for years. The German Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would never let it come to a war, as he was fully aware of the impossibility of an advance against Japan. Japan for her part, could, however, occupy the Philippines and thus deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan conquered Singapore, the greater part of the world would thus be under the control of the Tripartite Pact powers anyway and America would find herself in an isolated position.

Matsuoka was personally strongly in favor of the German Foreign Minister's line of thought. If Japan did not run the risk connected with the conquering of Singapore, it was his opinion that she would become a third-rate power. Therefore, in any case, the blow would have to be dealt one day. If he succeeded at the same time in keeping the United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation which hesitated in a matter of such fundamental national importance would only prove that it lacked the most important characteristic, the capability of decision.

Berlin, 31 March 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 28th 1941 between the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this
third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR
Lt COLONEL IGD
O-508524

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4022

1 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Memo of conference between Ribbentrop and MATSUOKA.

Date: 28 Mar 41 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (ALSO WITNESS if applicable):
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke; OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare (Germany)

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

(An affidavit by Dr. Paul Schmidt and a translation are attached to this document.)

Ribbentrop discusses the possibilities and prospects of a closer collaboration between Japan and Germany, i.e. "the transition from passive to active cooperation of Japan on the common cause". This concerns the greatest chance for achievement of the Japanese aims, and it would be good to use this chance. A New Order can be constructed only when G.B. has been completely beaten. As far as the East Asiatic area is concerned, the New Order can be built only if Japan dominates the South. The occupation of Singapore is necessary for this purpose.

He assures MATSUOKA that Germany would attack immediately if Russia would do anything against Japan, thus protecting Japan's back against Russia. This fact eliminates one of the misgivings uttered by Japanese statesmen and army officials as OTT reported to him. The Navy's misgivings regarding the British home and Mediterranean fleets are taken care of by the fact that these fleets are tied up by

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Page 1

Germany in the European and Mediterranean Seas. As for Japanese misgivings about America, he states that the U.S. would not risk her fleet against Japan and would not send it beyond Hawaii. A great Japanese success in Singapore would strengthen American neutrality. This is a chance which occurs only once in a thousand years.

Stressing Germany's great strength, RIBBENTROP urges Japan to consider her chances carefully and not to let them go by unused.

If the English would sue for peace all of a sudden, it would be desirable that Germany and Japan would determine the peace conditions together.

He repeats then the statement that at present the most important thing is not to lose the chances of 1941.

MATSUOKA agrees to this. Reason as well as intuition lead him to the belief that 1941 is a decisive year in history. He feels that the German and the Japanese people are acting under divine order to break up the British Empire and to construct a New Order.

He then asks what Germany's attitude would be towards the U.S. if England were beaten during the summer while America did not yet participate in the war. He later specifies this question to mean whether Germany would under these circumstances leave the U.S. alone. To this RIBBENTROP answers that Germany is not interested in a war against the U.S.

MATSUOKA remarks that a New Order could not be constructed if America could not be converted to the Axis opinions. RIBBENTROP states that Germany and Italy would dominate Europe and Africa the United States would be limited to the American continent and the Far East would be reserved for Japan.

MATSUOKA mentions that in this case the only remaining problem was Russia. Japan is ready to give Russia access to an ice free port via India or Iran. He then inquires whether the possibility of a Russo-Japanese-German alliance has ever been considered, which RIBBENTROP denies.

Then MATSUOKA discusses a long-term Russo-Japanese trade agreement and his stay in Moscow in connection with the question of Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. RIBBENTROP advises against discussing this question in Moscow.

MATSUOKA then speaks again about the question of Singapore. The Japanese, he says, have no misgivings about the British Navy. Such misgivings, however, exist in certain Japanese circles regarding a war with America which might last five or ten years.

RIBBENTROP replies that Roosevelt will avoid a war. Japan could occupy the Philippines and thus deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan occupies Singapore, the greater part of the world would come under the control of the Tripartite Powers.

MATSUOKA expresses his personal strong agreement with RIBBENTROP's idea. If Japan would not take the risk connected with the occupation of Singapore, she would become a third-rate power. The blow must be dealt some day under all circumstances. There are no difficulties if he could succeed in keeping the U.S. quiet for six months.

Notes on the conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, on 28 March 1941.

The German Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuoka a second time. The Fuehrer would have liked to express his attitude to the questions at hand more fully, but was much occupied for the time being with the developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential part was the question of possibilities and prospects of closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, concerning the transition from the passive to the active cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Matsuoka was proceeding on this matter. It was actually the best opportunity that had ever been granted /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be better to make use of this opportunity before it slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important agreements and it formed the basis of relations between Japan and Germany for centuries. There were no clashes of interest.

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In contrast, the new order in the Greater East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan also controlled the south. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was essential.

Regarding Russia, the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans did not know how things would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia might take the wrong course, although he really didn't expect this of Stalin. No one could know. At any rate Germany would instantly strike if Russia undertook anything against Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and especially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the German army. The second misgiving,

which the Japanese Navy in particular had expressed with regard to the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer by saying that both these English fleets would be contained by Germany within European and Mediterranean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding America had been expressed. The United States, however, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything at all imprudent.

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opportunity which offered itself in 1941.

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the collapse of the British Empire, would take place. He felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japanese nation in the Far East acted almost under a divine order to break up the British Empire and to establish a New Order.

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Matsuoka thereupon made his question more specific in the following way: If England were beaten to the ground, the United States would not, in his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire. Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a New Order could not be established. The German Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise control in his own sphere. Germany would do this, together with Italy, in the European-African sphere, the United States would have to limit herself to the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would have to be watched closely and revolutionary propaganda would not be permitted on any account. In the future only the aforementioned three spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

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Berlin, 31 March 1941

NOTE

27 August 1946

Rolling extracted:

H. — : 40'22"

Frame : 47376 - 47389

W.A. Wagner

Exh 579 4022-1

獨逸外務省覺書第十八ノ四一

一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月二十八日獨逸外務大臣及日本外務大臣松岡ノ會談ニ關スル覺書

獨逸外務大臣ハ再度松岡ト會談シ得ルコトニツイテ満足ノ意ヲ表シタ。總統ハ現在ノ問題ニ關シモツト充分ニ態度ヲ表明シタカツタノデアルガ、差當リ、「ユーゴスラビヤ」ニ於ケル進展ニ關シテ多忙デアツタ。併シ詳細ハサシテ重要ナモノデアハナイ。重要ナ部分ハ、日獨間ノヨリ緊密ナ協力ノ可能性ト見込ノ問題デアル。即チ、共通ノ事業ニ對スル日本ノ協力ノ受動的カラ能動的ヘノ推移ニ關シテデアアル。獨逸人ハ、松岡ガ如何ニ元氣旺盛ニコノ問題ニ近ツキツ、アルカラ、非常ナル満足ヲ以テ聞イテ居タノデアツタ。ソレハ誠ニ日本ノ目的ヲ成シ遂ゲルタメニ日本ニ與ヘラレタ最良ノ機會デアリ、ソノ機ヲ逸セザル中ニソレヲ利用スルノガヨイノデアラウ。三國協定ハ、最モ重要ナ條約ノ一ツデアリ、ソレハ幾世紀ニモ亘ル日獨ノ關係ノ基礎トナル。ソコニハ何等ノ利益ノ衝突ハナイ。

時局ハ英國ガ完全ニ敗化シテ始メテ新秩序ガ建設サレルト云フ状態ニアル。コレハ、日本ニトツテ獨逸ヨリ以上ニ眞實デアアル。何トナレバ、獨逸ハ既に歐洲大陸ヲ支配シテ居リソノ利害關係ヲ有スル範圍内

ニ於テハ地中海地域及ビ「アフリカ」ヲモ、今年中
 ニソノ支配權内ニ引入レルデアラウカラデアアル。カ
 クナツタ場合ニハ獨逸ハソノ必要トスル全部ヲ持
 ツコトニナル。獨逸ハ「ルーズベルト」ガ傳ツテ言
 明シタ如ク、世界ノ霸權ヲ求メテ居ルノデハナイ。
 總然ハ建設事業ニ立戻ルタメニ、出來ル限リ早ク、
 戰ヲ終了サセルコトヲ望ンテ居ル。彼ガ彼自身ニ定
 メタ目標ハ即チ獨逸國ニ最高度ノ安全ヲ保障スル事
 ハ既ニ實際殆ド成就サレタノデアアル。ソレニ對照シ
 テ大東亞圖ニ於ケル新秩序ハ、日本ガ南方ヲモ支配シ
 テ始メテ成就サレルモノデアアル。併シコノ爲ニハ、
 「ロシヤ」ガ「ポトル」ノ攻略ガ必要デアアル。

「ロシヤ」ニ關シテハ、獨逸外務大臣ハ、此ノ方
 面ニ於テ如何ナル進展ヲ見ルカ、獨逸ハ知ラナイト
 言明シタ。彼ハ實際「スターリン」ガ誤ツタ方針ヲ
 トルトハ期待シテ居ナイガ、「ロシヤ」ガ間違ツタ
 方針ヲトル可能性ガアル。然シ誰モ之ヲ知ルコトガ
 出來ナイ。兎ニ角獨逸ハ、若シモ「ロシヤ」ガ日本
 ニ對シテ何ラカノ反對行動ニ出タ時ニハ時ヲ移サズ
 之ヲ攻撃シ以テ「ロシヤ」ニ對シ背後カラ日本ヲ擁
 護スルデアラウ。斯様ニシ「オット」大使ガ報告シ
 タ日本政治家等ニ日本陸軍ノ第一ノ懸念ハ、獨逸軍
 ノ援助ニヨツテ取除カレルデアラウ。第二ノ懸念ハ

即チ英國本國艦隊及ビ地中海艦隊ニ就テ時ニ日本海軍ガ抱ク懸念ニ就テハ、彼（獨逸外務大臣）ハ、コレヲ兩英國艦隊ハ歐洲及ビ地中海域内ニ於テ獨逸ニ東縛サレルテアラウト述ベテ答ヘルコトガ出來ル。最後ニ米國ニ關スル日本ノ懸念ガ表明サレタ。併シ米國ハソノ艦隊ヲ日本ニ對シテ敢テ危険ニサラスコト又「ハワイ」諸島ヨリ遠クマテ派遣スルコトモナイデアラウ。ソレニ反シテ「シンガポール」ニ於ケル日本ノ遠大ナ成功ハ米國ノ中立ヲ強メルデアラウ。ソノ時ニハ「ルーズベルト」ハ無謀ナ事ニ乘出スルコトヲ躊躇スルデアラウ。

松岡ガ虎トソノ仔ノ話ヲ説明シタ日本ニ於ケル立場ヲ彼（獨逸外相）ハ充分ニ理解シテ居ルケレドモ、彼ハ再ビ次ノ事實ヲ指摘シナクテハナラナイ。即チ若々シイ張力且豪膽ナ魂ヲ持ツ世界ノ二大強國ガ、神ニヨツテ多分千載一遇ノ好機ヲ與ヘラレタノデアル。

獨逸ノ絶好ノ機會ハ總統ニアル、彼ノ協力者達ハ單ニ彼ノ意志ヲ遂行スル道具ニスギナイ。彼（獨逸外相）ハ英、佛兩大使ニ向ヒ、現在ノ獨逸ヲ一九一四年カラ一九一八年ノ獨逸ト比ベルガ如キ過誤ニ決シテ陷ツテナラヌト繰返シ繰返シ説明シタメデアル。ソノ時テサヘ獨逸ハ、世界ノ敵ヲ向フニ廻シテ四

年間モ抵抗シタノデアリ、唯國內分裂ト内面的弱點ノタメニ、戰ニ敗レタノデアツタ。併シ現在ノ獨逸ハ結合サレ、ソレニヨツテ倍加サレタ勢力ヲ持ツテキル。ソノ勢力ハ「アドルフ・ヒトラー」ノ、偉大ナ天賦ノ指導力ニ依ツテ、更ニ倍加サレテ、今後ノ獨逸ハ「第一次ノ世界大戰當時ノ國力ノ四倍ヲ持ツテキルト見做サネバナラヌ、大使達ハコノ警告ヲ馬耳東風ト聞流シタノデアアル。併シコレヲ予言ハ實現サレ、歐洲ト「アフリカ」トヨリナク半球ヲ獨逸ト伊太利ガ支配スルノヲ妨害スルモノハ全ク存在シナイノデアアル。若シモ斯ル機會ガ斯ル狀態ノ下ニ日本ニモ與ヘラレタナラバ、日本ハ是等ノコトヲ非常ニ慎重ニ考察シ、ソノ機ヲ逸シテハナラヌ。

無論、現在ノ戰ガ何時終了スルカ確信ヲ以テ予言出來ナイガ、併シ獨逸^遠外相ハ多分英國ハ、一般ニ期待サレテキルヨリモ早ク崩壊スルカモ知レナイト感シテキル。若シモ英國ガ急ニ講和ヲ請フコトニナレバ、ソノ講和ヲ獨逸ト日本ガ共同シテ決定スルコトガ非常^望マシイデアラウト。

ソレカラ、獨逸外相ハ、常ニ親日的デアツタ、彼ノ家ノ傳統ニ就テ語ツタ。尙彼ハ既ニ一九三四年（昭和九年）日獨提携ニ就テ總統ト重大ナ會談ヲ遂ゲタノデアツタ。總統ノ日本ニ對スル深イ尊敬ハ、日

露戰役ニ始ツタ。今ヤ最モ重大ナコトハ、一九四一年（昭和十六年）ニ現レタ共同ノ好機ヲ逸シテハナラヌコトデアルト。松岡ハ同意見デアルト答ヘタ。彼モ直感ト理性ニ基イテ一九四一年ガ、歴史上決定的ナ年トナルト信ジテキル。コノ年ノ内ニ、一大悲劇、即チ英帝國ノ崩壊ガ到來スルデアラウ。彼ハ獨逸民族ガ歐洲ニ於テ、又日本民族ガ極東ニ於テ、英帝國ヲ打破ツテ新秩序ヲ建設スベク、殆ド神ノ命ノ下ニ行動シテ居ルト感ジテ居ルト。

ソレカラ松岡ハ、若シモ英國ガ夏中ニ屈服シ、シカシ米國ガ未ダ參戰シテキナイ場合ニハ、獨逸ハ合衆國ニ對シ如何ナル態度ヲ執ルカト尋ネタ。

獨逸外相ハ、コレハ合衆國自身ノ態度ニ依ルト答ヘタ。勿論、英本國ノ占領ヲ可能ナラシムルニハ、良イ天候期ノ到來ヲ必要トスル。尙英國ハ、多分合衆國ニ新政府ヲ樹立シヨウト試ミルカモシレナイ。併シ彼ノ考ヘテハコレハ實行不可能デアル。

ソコテ松岡ハ次ノ方法ヲ彼ノ質問ヲモツト明確ニシタ。即チ若シモ英國ガ屈服シタナラバ、彼ノ考テハ米國ハ英帝國ヲ支持ヲ續ケナデアラウ。「カナダ」ハ、多カレ少チカレ簡單ニ併合サレルデアラウ。斯ル事情ノ下ニ於テ獨逸ハ米國ヲ真儘ニシテ置クデアラウカト。獨逸外相ハ、獨逸ハ米國トノ戰ニ全然與

味ヲ持ツタヌト答ヘタ。松岡ハコレヲ満足ヲ以テ諒承シ、我々ハ「アングロサクソン」民族ヲ全体トシテ考慮ニ入レネバナラヌト述ベタ。若シモ米國ヲ我々ノ考ニ歸依サセルコトニ失敗シタナラバ、新秩序ハ建設出來ナイ。獨逸外相ハ、双方共自己ノ國內ニ於テ、支配權ヲ行使スルテアラウト答ヘタ。獨逸ハ伊太利ト共ニ之ヲ歐洲及「アフリカ」圈内ニ於テ行使シ、米國ハ「アメリカ」大陸内ニ限定セラレネバナラズ、極東ハ日本ノ爲ニ保留セラレルデアラウ。「ロシヤ」ニ關シテハ綿密ニ觀察サレルデアラウ。革命的宣傳ハ斷ジテ許可サレナイデアラウ。將來ハ、唯前述ノ三ツノ利害關係圖ノミガ、勢力ノ大中心トシテ強ルデアラウ。英帝國ハ消滅スルデアラウト。松岡ハ、其後獨ル只一ツノ重大問題ハ「ロシヤ」デアルト答ヘタ。日本ハ印度又ハ「イラン」ヲ通ジテナラ、「ロシヤ」ガ不凍海ニ達スルコトヲ許ス用意ガアルガ「ロシヤ」ガ支那沿岸ニ出ルコトハ辛抱シナイデアラウ。ソレカラ松岡ハ日獨ソ條約ノ可能性ニ就テ、總統ハ會テ考慮シタコトガアルカト尋ネタ。獨逸外相ハ之ヲ否定シ、軍ノ精神的基礎ハ他ノ國民全部ノト同様ニ、「ロシヤ」トノヨリ緊密ナ協力ニ全ク反對デアル爲ソレハ絶對ニ不可能デアルトイッタ。日本及獨逸ガ國家的ニ考ヘテキルノニ反シ、

「ソヴイエット」聯邦ハ未ダ國際的ニ向ツテキル。
「ロシヤ」ハ家族ヲ毀損スルノニ反シ獨逸ハソレヲ
擁護スル、此處ニ火ト水ノ間ニ於ケル如ク、結合ハ
不可能デアル。「スターリン」ハ非常ニ巧妙デアル
ノテ當時情勢ニ鑑ミ獨逸ト條約ヲ締結シタノデアツ
タ。「ロシヤ」ハ亦三國條約ニモ加ル筈デアツタガ、
ソノ條件ハ容レラレナカツタ。彼ガ松岡ニ内々ニ語
リ得タ如ク、獨逸ハ此ノ問題全体ヲ手間取ツテ取扱
ツタノデアル。更ニ獨逸ハ「ロシヤ」ヲ注意深ク觀
察シテ居リ、ソシテ「之ハ松岡ガ是非共知ラネバナ
ラヌコトデアアルガ」獨逸ハ將來起リ得ベキ如何ナル
事件ニ對シテモ用意ガ出來テキル。獨逸ハ「ロシヤ」
ヲ挑發シナイガ併シ「スターリン」ノ政策ガ總統ノ
是トスル所ト一致シナケレバ總統ハ「ロシヤ」ヲ粉
碎スルデアラウト。松岡ハ日本ハ現在「ロシヤ」ヲ
怒ラセルコトヲ避ケテキルト答ヘタ。日本ハ、獨逸
ガ「バルカン」ニ於テ、戰勝ヲ完了スルノヲ待ツテ
キル。獨逸ノ盡力トソノ力ナクシテハ日本ハ日ソ關
係ヲ完全ニ改善スル機會ヲ持タナイデアラウト。
松岡ハ更ニ「ロシヤ」ト締結サレル等ノ、長期通
商條約ニ就テ語ツタ。ソレカラ彼ハ獨逸外相ニ向ツ
テ、彼ガ歸途「モスコ」ニ少々長ク滞在シ「ロシ
ヤ」ト不可侵條約又ハ中立條約ニ關シテ交渉スベキ

デアアルヤ否ヤヲ尋ネタ。コ、デ彼ハ「ロシヤ」ガ三
 國條約ニ即時參加スルコトハ日本國民ガ決シテ承知
 シナイト強調シム。ソレハ寧ロ日本全國ニ、憤激ノ
 叫ビヲモタラスデアラウ。獨逸外相ハ「ロシヤ」ノ
 斯ル條約加入ハ問題外デアルト答へ、亦コノ問題ハ、
 現在ノ時局ト完全ニソグハヌカモシレヌカラ、出來
 ルコトナラ、「モスコ」ニ於テコノ問題ニフレル
 ナト松岡ニ報告シタ。

更ニ漁業及通商條約ノ締結ガ日ソ間ノ霧國氣ヲ改
 善スルヲアラウト松岡ガ意見ヲ述べタ所、獨逸外相
 ハ斯ル純然タル通商條約ノ締結ニ對シテハ全然異存
 ハナイト答へタ。コンニ就テ松岡ハ更ニ、米國ハ念
 入りニ日ソ關係ヲ注視シテ居リ、米國トシテハ、日
 本ニ對シテ「ロシヤ」ト協約ヲ締結シコウト努メテ
 キルト指^補シタ。

松岡ハ、次ニ再ビ「ソングボール」ニ就テ語ツタ。
 日本ハ英國海軍ニ就テ心配シテ居ナイ。併シ日本人
 筋ニハ米國トノ紛争ヲ多大ノ懸念ヲ以テ見テキル者
 ガアル。ソレハ彼ラハ、新ル場合ニハ米國ト五年乃
 至十年ノ戰爭問題ニナルデアラウト、推測シテカカラ
 デアル。彼ハ米國ハソノ危險ヲ日本トノ戰ニ賭ケル
 コトハシナイデアラウト遠座ニ認メタ。併シ正シクソ
 ノ理由ニ依ツテ、是等ノ日本人筋ハ斯ル事情ノ下デ

ハ、戦争が数年間モ續クダラウト心懸シテキルノデアル。獨逸外相ハ彼ノ考ヲハ「ルーズベルト」ハ、日本ニ進スル進軍ガ不可能ナルコトヲ、充分ニ心得テキルカラ、彼ニハ至ラシメナイテアラウト答ヘタ。併シ日本自身「シテハ「フイリツピン」洋島ヲ占領スルコトガ出来、カクシテ「ルーズベルト」ノ威信ニ甚大ナ打撃ヲ與ヘルコトガ出来ラウ。若シ日本ガ「フシンガポール」ヲ占領スレバ、世界ノ大部分ハ三國條約參國ノ支配下ニ導入リ、米國ハ孤立ノ位置ニ置カシムテラウ。松岡ハ個人的ニハ獨逸外相ノ考ヘ方ニ強ク共鳴シタ、若シ日本ガ「フシンガポール」ヲ攻畧ニ懸ル危險ヲ引受ケナイナラバ、日本ハ第三流國トナツテシマツダラウトイフノガ松岡ノ考デアツタ。故ニドナ事ガアツテモ何時カハ打撃ヲ受ケルバナイデアラウ。若シ彼ガ同時ニ、米國ヲ六ヶ月間沈没サセルコトニ成功スルナラバ、凡ユル國難ハ克服サレルデアラウ。斯様ナ根本的ニ國家的重要性ヲモツ事件ニ就テ、眞ニ懸望スル國ハ此ニ依ツテ最も重要ナ者デアラウ、決斷力ニ缺ケテキルコトヲ立證スルノミデアラウ。

ベルリン 一九四一年（昭和十六年）三月三十一日

供 述 書

余、パウエル、〇、シュミット/Paul O Schmidt/r
正式ニ宣誓ヲ行ヒタル上、左ノ如ク證言陳述ス

一 一九二三年／大正十二年／ヨリ一九四五年／昭和
廿年／五月ニ於ケルドイツ國崩壊迄、余ハ獨逸國外
務省ノ主任通譯官ニシテ且本職ノ任トシテ重要ナル
外務省及ビ其他ドイツ政府指導者及ビ外國政府ノ代
表者トノ間ノ凡ユル會議ニ自ラ出席シ通譯及ビ（或
ハ）書記ヲ勤メタル事

二 前述ノ如キドイツ國外務省ノ主任通譯官タルニ加
ヘテ余ハ亦一九三九年／昭和十四年／以後ハドイツ
國外務省ノ官房長ニシテ、又余ノ最後ノ官位ハドイ
ツ國外務省ニ於ケル公使ナリシ事。

三 上記諸會合ニ於テ通譯及ビ（或ハ）書記ヲ勤メシ
間行ハレシ會談ヲ筆記スルハ余ノ公務ニシテ且實行
セシ事。斯ル會合終結毎ニ斯ル筆記ヨリ同會合ニ於
テ語ラレシ事及起リシ事ノ完全ニシテ詳細ナル記録
ヲ調製セル事。

四 余ノ調製セシ記録ハ斯カル諸會合ニ於テ語ラレ又
起リシ事ニ關スルドイツ政府ノ公式文書トナリシ事。
記録ノ寫シ一部ハドイツ國外務省ニ於ケル秘書ノ權
能ヲ行使スル同外務省ノ公使事務課ニ提出サレシ事。

斯カル各會合ノ記録ノ第三ノ寫シ一部ハ余ノ許ニ保
有サレシ事。

ニ前述セル如ク余ガ記録ヲ作製セル上記諸會合ハ歴
史的重要性ヲ持テルモノナリシ事及ビ斯カル諸記録
モ亦歴史的目的ノタメニ斯カル諸會合ノ記録ヲ持續
シ保存セムガタメ特ニ余ニ依ツテ訂製セラレシモノ
ナル事。

ニ此處ニ添附ノ書類ハ上述ノ方法ニ依リ余自ラ訂製
シタル一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ三月二十八日ニ、
ドイツ國外務大臣ト松岡日本外務大臣トノ間ニ行ハ
レシ會議ニ關スル原記録ノ眞實且正確ナル寫眞版ナ
ル事。

ニ前記ノ該會議ニ余ハ自ラ出席シ通譯及ビ（或ハ）
書記ヲ勤メシ事及余ニ依ツテ訂製サレシ記録ノ添附
ノ書類ハソノ寫眞版ナリ一ハ、同會議ニ於テ語ラレ
且起リシ事ノ眞實ニシテ正確ナル報告ナル事。

ニ余ハ本供述書及ビ添附ノ書類ガ日本戰爭犯罪人ノ
起訴ニ關シ使用セララルコトアルベキヲ通知セラレ
且承知シ居ル事且又本供述書ヲ余ハ自由ニ、自發的
ニ且上記事實ヲ了解ノ上作製セルモノナル事。

博士パウロ、シュミット/Paul O. Schmidt/

當一九四六年ノ昭和廿一年ノ五月三日「ドイツ」國

「ニューロンベルグ」/MURNBERG/ニ於テ余ノ面前

ニテ署名宣誓セリ

スミス、W、ブルツクハート/Smith, W. Brockhart, JR./

總監部 陸軍中佐

供 述 書

余、W. W. P. P. Cumming カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問
間部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ
於ル國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ
占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ
テ國獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル
／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ
ニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ謄本タル事

茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング

(W. P. Cummings)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード

Cf. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部