

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

Confidential
~~RESTRICTED~~
(Reclassify when filled out)

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. **VC-84 #40**

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

1- 0740 K
2- 0900 K
3- 1000 K

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) **# See below** (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) (Zone)

(c) Clouds Over Target **None affecting attacks** (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target **Clear** (e) Visibility **10** (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type **Glide** Bomb Sight Used (TYPE)

* Bombs Dropped per Run **2** Spacing **40** Altitude of Bomb Release **1500** (FEET)
* **Rockets** " " " (NUMBER) **Slant range 1500 feet**

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed **0** Probably Destroyed **0** Damaged **0**

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING, (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Area No. 1 below	400 x 400 yards	1 TBM-3 VC-84 8 TBM-3 VT- 7 F6F VF- (both USS LEXINGTON)	(2) 100 Rockets Mk 1 body, Mk 7 motor. Unknown Unknown	2 All in area	Unknown Unknown Unknown
2 Area No. 2 below	400 x 200 yards	1 TBM-3 VC-84 8 TBM-3 VC-90 8 FM-2 VC-90	(2) 100 Rockets Mk 1 body, Mk 7 motor. Unknown Unknown	2 Unknown Unknown	Unknown Unknown Unknown
3 Area No. 3 below	400 x 400 yards	1 TBM-3 VC-84 16 F6F VF- 11 SB2C VB- 12 TBM-3 VT- (all USS RANDOLPH)	(2) 100 lb GP AN-M 80 Unknown Unknown Unknown	2 All bombs & rockets in area about 1/3 of Napalm	Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary)

As was the usual case with the area attacks on Iwo Jima specific results of damage could not be observed.

- # 1- Area at base of Mt. Suribachi, Iwo Jima, containing artillery positions and shore batteries.
- 2- Area 1000 yards west of Airfield No. 3, Iwo Jima, near crossroad, containing artillery positions.
- 3- Area on north rim of Mt. Suribachi, Iwo Jima, containing artillery positions.

* Air Coordinator.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? **No** Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

On 21 February 1945, at 0700, Lt. Douglas K. English took off from USS MAKIN ISLAND in a TBM-3 to act as Air Coordinator for D plus 2 support missions on Iwo Jima. Shortly after arrival on station he was assigned 7 F6F and 8 TBM-3 of VF and VT based on USS LEXINGTON for an attack on an area about 400 x 400 yards containing artillery positions and shore batteries on cliffs at the base of Mt. Suribachi (132 King Peter 131 Oboe Sugar on local grid). Lt. English spotted the target area for the support group by firing a pair of rockets into it at slant range of 1500 feet. The group attack started at 0740 and the area was well worked over until 0845 with all 100 lb. G.P. bombs, rockets and strafing going into the area. The Air Coordinator was given at 0900 a support group of 8 TBM-3 and 8 FM-2 of VC-90 to lead in an attack on an area 1000 yards west of Airfield No. 3, 400 x 200 yards, containing artillery positions (216 Roger Sugar on local grid). He again spotted the target with a pair of rockets fired from a slant range of about 1500 feet. He could not observe results of the attack but felt that the target had been assigned to the group too close to the scheduled time for their departure from station to permit the most effective work. As a final group the Air Coordinator had 16 F6F from VF, 11 SB2C of VB and 12 TBM-3 of VT for an attack on the north rim of Mt. Suribachi from which artillery was reported to be firing on Airfield No. 1. The attack was made in 3 waves from 1000 to 1035. VF dropped napalm but about 20% seemed duds. Rockets and strafing from VF went into the area. VB went in next putting all but 1 bomb into a 200 x 200 yard portion of the area which was altogether some 400 x 400 yards (132 Uncle Peter 131 Sugar, on local grid). VT concluded the attack dropping on the northeast rim of the crater. The Air Coordinator went in following the VF and before the VB placing (2) 100 lb. G.P. bombs in the 200 x 200 yard area attacked by the VB. He was relieved by the next coordinator prior to the completion of the attack. The Air Coordinator felt that the CV Air Group Commanders organized and led their attacks very well. At a time when various strikes were in progress communications seemed poor due to crowded channels. Landing instructions and bombing reports cluttered up the support frequency.

➔ USS RANDOLPH

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar
Homing Devices
Visual Signals
Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF
Signals
Battle Lights
Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
Life Belts, Life Rafts
Safety Belts
Emergency Kits
Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight
Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant
Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment
Personnel Facilities

Performance of equipment was normal.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

Robert G FULTON, Jr., Lt., USNR
AGI Officer, VC-84

RANK AND DUTY

Douglas K. ENGLISH, Lt., (A1), USNR
Acting Commanding Officer, VC-84

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

3-6-45

DATE