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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**POACHING AS A SECURITY THREAT FOR
BOTSWANA AND THE REGION**

by

Kopano Baruti

September 2018

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POACHING AS A SECURITY THREAT FOR BOTSWANA AND THE REGION

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Despite efforts to combat poaching in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the practice continues to be a persistent problem. In particular, Botswana's wildlife is at risk because of ongoing transborder crime, including poaching for rhino horns and elephant tusks, both of which are highly detrimental to eco-tourism. In addition, transborder poaching poses a security threat, both inherently and because it is a potential source of funding for terrorism. The situation is made worse by the ungoverned spaces of vast porous borders between Botswana and its surrounding states. This thesis examines how these circumstances in Botswana and the surrounding states exacerbate transborder poaching and delves into the causal factors—ungoverned borders, weak enforcement capacity, and economic incentives—that motivate poaching. Domestic and multilateral intervention mechanisms, such as restructuring Botswana's anti-poaching efforts, implementing joint border-surveillance initiatives, and harmonizing regional anti-poaching laws, would offer control of the ungoverned borders. The solution, however, ultimately lies with the states themselves, which must fully address transborder poaching by embracing good governance, strengthening institutions, and improving the socioeconomic conditions of their people.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BDF	Botswana Defense Force
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CITES	Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs
EAL	Elephant Action League
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IEA	Environmental Investigation Agency
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
KAZA	Kavango Zambezi
KZTFCA	Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe National Union- Patriotic Front
ZAWA	Zambia Wildlife Authority

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I. INTRODUCTION

Botswana has diverse wild animals, including the so-called big five: elephants, rhinoceros, buffaloes, lions, and leopards. This wildlife is one of the major tourist attractions in Botswana, and nature tourism ranks second only to diamonds in its domestic economic impact, accounting for 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).¹ The Botswana Government National Conservation Strategy and Tourism Policy protects the National Parks and Game Reserves, and the Botswana government has allocated 17 percent of the land to wildlife parks and game reserves.²

Despite these efforts, Botswana faces the problem of poaching—the illegal hunting or killing of animals for various reasons. Jackson Sekgwama indicates that there are three types of poaching experienced in Botswana: subsistence, trophy, and commercial.³ According to Poaching Facts, subsistence poaching, known as “killing for the pot,” is done to feed one’s family.⁴ In comparison to other types of poaching, subsistence poaching usually does not diminish population of wildlife; it has been associated with the traditional culture. Trophy poaching, hunting of wildlife for sport, is not a serious threat in Botswana because it is fully regulated; in fact, since 2014, the government of Botswana has banned all types of game hunting. Commercial poaching in Botswana and elsewhere, however, does pose a serious threat to wildlife conservation efforts. It targets rhinoceros and elephants for their horns and tusks, respectively, often to the last animal. Transborder syndicates perpetrate poaching for ivory and rhino horn, violating the borders of Botswana in the process. As the security of the borders is the

¹ Lesego S. Stone, Moren T. Stone, and Joseph E. Mbaiwa, “Tourism in Botswana in the Last 50 Years: A Review,” *Botswana Notes and Records* 49 (2017): 58, <http://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bnr/article/viewFile/976/593>.

² Stone, Stone, and Mbaiwa, 59.

³ Jackson John Sekgwama, “Recommendations for Making Anti-Poaching Programs More Effective in the Southern African Region Through the Analysis of Elephants in Botswana,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 2012), 6, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a562969.pdf>.

⁴ “Subsistence Poachers and Farmers,” Poaching Facts, accessed August 10, 2018, <http://www.poachingfacts.com/faces-of-the-poachers/subsistence-poachers-farmers/>.

mandate of the military, the government of Botswana has sanctioned the military to combat poaching.

Botswana prides itself on being strong in the conservation of its natural resources, flora, and fauna. Nevertheless, Botswana's vast and porous borders render its animals vulnerable to poachers—and potentially to other security problems as a consequence. Poaching is a global security threat because of its connection to terrorism and terrorist groups, who often poach for ivory and rhino horn to sustain their operations. Such groups as Al Shahab, the Janjaweed, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have used poaching to finance their activities.⁵

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis introduces the anti-poaching efforts by the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) and explores the connections between poaching and security, and the associated economic threats. There are strong reasons to suspect that poaching connects with security issues because arms and drugs smugglers, as well as human-trafficking cartels, have violated Botswana's territorial integrity by taking advantage of porous borders; terrorists can use this vulnerability to perpetrate their activities in the country. Likewise, poaching negatively affects sectors of the economy that rely on wildlife. This thesis therefore asks the following question: Given that poaching is detrimental to the economy and linked to security issues such as terrorism, how can Botswana ensure that poaching does not cause further economic harm or lead to a terrorist problem to the extent that it has elsewhere in Africa?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn can be a major security threat in Botswana and its neighboring countries. It might, if not addressed in a timely way, become a breeding ground for terrorism.

⁵ Cathy Haenlein, Thomas Maguire, and Keith Somerville, "Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Terrorism," *Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Security in Africa: Myths and Realities, Whitehall Papers* 86, no. 1 (November 2016): 59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2016.1252126>.

Transborder poaching represents one of the more concerning types of poaching. First, it employs military weapons and targets only two species, the rhinoceros and the elephant, for the rhino horn and the ivory, which has a lucrative market in Asia because of claims that ivory has medicinal properties, and also for ornamental uses.⁶ Transborder poachers use such arms of war as AK-47s and various types of hunting weapons fitted with silencers and telescope sights. The author has witnessed the use of such weapons operating in northern Botswana, where the BDF patrols have encountered these poachers. Transborder poachers further apply military tactics during their operations and typically elude the wildlife wardens even though the wardens are armed with light assault rifles. The transborder poachers take advantage of vast and porous borders to carry out activities undetected.

Such poachers from neighboring countries undermine Botswana's sovereignty with every illegal border crossing. Botswana is a stable, land-locked country, but some of its neighboring countries are not economically secure due to poor governance. What is more, they have, as discussed by Jafari Kideghesho, depleted wildlife in their countries, which contributes to this transborder poaching.⁷ Thus, it is imperative to increase border surveillance to deter crime. This task falls to the BDF.

Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas point out that the state's security forces have to identify threats, have full knowledge of the terrain, and enhance surveillance measures by identifying would-be ungoverned spaces.⁸ The government of Botswana, through state, non-governmental, and international institutions, is engaged in reducing poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn. Therefore, the deployment of the armed forces in anti-poaching operations may also help to detect and react promptly to any security issue, including terrorism activities.

⁶ Moses Montesh, "Rhino Poaching: A New Form of Organized Crime" (master's thesis, University of South Africa, 2012), 5, http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/pdf_files/136/1368077595.pdf.

⁷ Jafari R. Kideghesho, "The Elephant Poaching Crisis in Tanzania: A Need to Reverse the Trend and the Way Forward," *Tropical Conservation Science*, 9, no.1 (2016): 370, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/194008291600900120>.

⁸ Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 289.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section examines poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn in Botswana and the Southern African Development Community countries (SADC) and how poaching could have a connection to terrorist activities. It covers literature demonstrating that poaching is a problem that connects to terrorism elsewhere. It also examines the poaching-terrorism link in some African states, ungoverned spaces as they relate to poaching, and confrontational spaces where poachers and security forces clash at borders and border areas. Further, it considers weak capacity of enforcement institutions, as well as rising international demand for rhino horn and ivory and economic incentives associated with megafauna products.⁹

1. Poaching-Terrorism Link

According to Cathy Haenlein et al., poaching, wildlife trafficking, and terrorism are linked.¹⁰ Most urgently, they claim that terrorist groups in Africa, including Al Shabab, the Janjaweed, and the LRA, are involved in the illegal ivory trade.¹¹ Weak states with weak institutions wittingly or unwittingly allow the terrorists to operate within; moreover, government officials may accept bribes from poachers and ivory peddlers or permit poachers to traverse freely within the state's borders.¹² Bad practices like corruption, crime, and other social ills can facilitate the social conditions that breed terrorism.¹³ Haenlein et al. allege that ivory finances terrorism; thus, poachers are engaged in illicit ivory trade for sustenance of the terrorist group. For example, according to the California-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Elephant Action League (EAL), from 2010 to 2013, Al Shabab covered 40 percent of its operating costs through

⁹ Phil Williams, "Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security," in *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty*, ed. Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 44.

¹⁰ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, "Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Terrorism," 58.

¹¹ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, 59.

¹² Stephane Crayne, and Cathy Haenlein, "Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Conflict," in *Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Security in Africa: Myths and Realities*, *Whitehall Papers* 86, no. 1 (November 2016): 51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2016.1252126>.

¹³ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, "Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Terrorism," 58.

the trafficking of ivory from Kenya, worth \$200,000–\$600,000 per month.¹⁴ Because poaching is a lucrative source of funding for terrorists, the prevalence of poaching in the SADC region potentially makes it attractive to terrorists looking to expand their resource base. The presence of terrorist-affiliated poaching operations would make the region, including Botswana, susceptible to the wide range of security threats associated with terrorist activity.

2. Ungoverned Spaces

Botswana’s vast porous borders constitute an “ungoverned space,” as Clunan and Trinkunas describe it, and non-state actors could use this space to conduct their nefarious activities undetected.¹⁵ Clunan and Trinkunas argue that ungoverned spaces are “social, political, and economic arenas where states do not exercise effective sovereignty or where state control is absent, weak or contested”¹⁶ and thus undermine state sovereignty. They further point out that ungoverned spaces convey new and unusual threats to both fragile and strong states.¹⁷ According to Clunan and Trinkunas, ungoverned spaces are also a potential threat because such activities as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug smuggling, money laundering, poaching, and terrorism can easily operate there without any hindrance.¹⁸

These spaces are a particular problem in areas with desirable game because transborder poaching for ivory is a security threat that could have a nexus with terrorism.¹⁹ Stephane Crayne and Cathy Haenlein point out that violence by non-state actors poses a security threat because non-state actors like transborder poachers are a threat to both human beings and targeted animals.²⁰ According to Dan Henk, in the

¹⁴ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, 62.

¹⁵ Clunan and Trinkunas, *Ungoverned Spaces*, 4.

¹⁶ Clunan and Trinkunas, 17.

¹⁷ Clunan and Trinkunas, 8.

¹⁸ Clunan and Trinkunas, 3.

¹⁹ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, “Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Terrorism,” 59.

²⁰ Crayne and Haenlein, “Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking, and Conflict,” 38.

1980s, poachers from Namibia crossed the border into Botswana's game parks without encountering any security patrols. At that time, there were no anti-poaching patrols.²¹ Such scenarios fit with Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart's association of ungoverned spaces with dysfunctional governance institutions, discussed in the next section, where states lack capacity to enforce law and order to curb poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn.²² Within ungoverned spaces, poaching causes border and border-area clashes that undermine state security. Phil Williams's theory of confrontational spaces of borders and border zones explains that the poachers from neighboring countries and security forces clash violently as they pursue conflicting goals in contested areas.²³ Likewise, according to Rosaleen Duffy, Southern Africa has transfrontier conservation areas where multiple networks compete for resources,²⁴ including wildlife that is susceptible to poaching.

These poaching clashes threaten peace and stability as well as the extinction of wildlife, especially elephants and rhinoceros. Goemeone Mogomotsi and Patricia Madigele claim that, currently, Botswana is effectively deterring poaching with its tough shoot-to-kill policy toward these poachers.²⁵ These scholars justify the policy by claiming it to be compliant with domestic and international law regarding the use of force;²⁶ therefore, they argue, it is legal for Botswana to exercise deadly force against poachers for elephant tusks and rhino horn.²⁷ They further claim that this policy has brought good results, pointing to the fact that poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn

²¹ Dan Henk, "The Botswana Defense Force and the War against Poachers in Southern Africa," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 16, no. 2 (2005), 176, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079924>.

²² Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26.

²³ Williams, "Here Be Dragons: Dangerous Spaces and International Security," 44.

²⁴ Rosaleen Duffy, "The Potential and Pitfalls of Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa," *Political Geography* 25, no.1 (January 2006): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2005.08.001>.

²⁵ Goemeone E.J. Mogomotsi and Patricia Kefilwe Madigele, "Live by the Gun, Die by the Gun: Botswana's 'Shoot-to-Kill' Policy As An Anti-Poaching Strategy," *SA Crime Quarterly*, no.60 (June 2017):54. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3108/2017/v0n60a1787>.

²⁶ Mogomotsi and Madigele, 51.

²⁷ Mogomotsi and Madigele, 52.

in Botswana, even though a challenge to combat is relatively infrequent when compared to neighboring countries.²⁸ They also contend that “anti-poaching is comparable to the war on terror”²⁹ and view the militarization of conservation as the only option to save the megafauna from armed and dangerous poachers. Finally, they assert that conservationists and the international community view anti-poaching as a just war and poaching as “a serious threat to peace and security,”³⁰ which has to be addressed in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.³¹ Considering the danger and the damage poaching poses to the conservationists and megafauna, Botswana treats poaching as seriously as it would treat terrorism.

Furthermore, poaching is a global security threat of concern to international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), World Wildlife Fund, the World Tourism Organization, and the African Wildlife Fund, to mention a few. Andrew M. Lemieux and Ronald V. Clarke assert that the Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species (CITES) came into effect, to some extent, to curb illegal sales of ivory and decrease poaching.³² They agree that disrupting the ivory markets and illicit trade in wildlife has had a significant impact on reducing poaching.³³ The authors criticize unregulated markets in Africa as counterproductive to the ban; they allege that some weak states would allow the trade and encourage poaching,³⁴ emphasizing the problem of ungoverned spaces and the vulnerability of weak states.

²⁸ Mogomotsi and Madigele, 51.

²⁹ Mogomotsi and Madigele.

³⁰ Mogomotsi and Madigele.

³¹ Mogomotsi and Madigele, 55.

³² Andrew M. Lemieux and Ronald V. Clarke, “The International Ban on Ivory Sales and its Effects on Elephant Poaching In Africa.” *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (2009):451, <https://doi.org/10.093/bjc/azp030>.

³³ Lemieux and Clarke, 452.

³⁴ Lemieux and Clarke, 454.

3. Weak Capacity in Enforcement Institutions

In addition to ungoverned spaces, weak capacity in enforcement institutions in the region continues to be a problem. Duffy argues that the fragility and weakness of states in the region allow poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn to persist.³⁵ According to Veterans for Wildlife, “insufficient anti-poaching capacity, weak law enforcement, and corruption undermine efforts to stop the poaching and trafficking” in the region.³⁶ The National Intelligence Council states that poor judicial processes play a role since they do not deter these problems of poaching and trafficking and points out that “criminal syndicates take advantage of the lack of oversight and inspection of containerized shipping when trafficking their illegal wildlife products.”³⁷ The National Intelligence Council indicates that poaching presents significant challenges for law enforcement agencies, which are often outgunned by poachers.³⁸ Henk posits that wildlife wardens are poorly resourced and inadequately trained to fully engage these resilient poachers.³⁹ The absence of security forces throughout the entire vast and porous borders creates space for transnational poachers.

4. Economic Incentives

The problems posed by poaching are likely to increase as elephant tusks and rhino horns become an increasingly lucrative market in Asia. According to Veterans for Wildlife, East Asia—namely, China, Vietnam, Thailand, and other parts of Asia—are the biggest consumer market for elephant tusks and rhino horn.⁴⁰ The National Intelligence Council reports that increasing economic growth and consumer purchasing power in East

³⁵ Duffy, “The Potential and Pitfalls of Global Environmental Governance,” 103.

³⁶ Veterans for Wildlife, “African Rhino,” accessed May 21, 2018, <https://www.veterans4wildlife.org/rhino-poaching>.

³⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, Security Priorities in Africa*, (September 2013), 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Wildlife_Poaching_White_Paper_2013.pdf.

³⁸ National Intelligence Council.

³⁹ Henk, “The Botswana Defense Force,” 176.

⁴⁰ Veterans for Wildlife, “African Rhino.”

Asia increases demand for elephant tusks and rhino horn.⁴¹ According to a research analyst at the Center for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, 2011 to 2012 were the years that poaching and illegal trade in rhino horn went up, threatening the black and white rhino species in Southern Africa. Further, she asserts that the increasing wealth in East Asia has exacerbated the demand for rhino horn, which is used as traditional medicine and can fetch up to \$110,000 per kilogram.⁴²

As a result, Brandley Anderson and Johan Jooste argue that the high prices of rhino horn and ivory have driven the increase in poaching of elephants and rhinoceros; the worldwide trafficking link further empowers poaching syndicates and involves some elements of the regional security sector.⁴³ They view this issue as a global problem since the global illicit trafficking network, which could sustain terrorists, poses a security threat. Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw contend that a well-organized global criminal network in elephant tusks and rhino horn from African countries to the end-use market escalates poaching for ivory and rhino horn.⁴⁴ Likewise, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicates that globalization has fostered the opportunity for illicit criminal links to expand their operations and intensity, thus undermining territorial sovereignty, good governance, and rule of law and posing a threat to security.⁴⁵ Maano Ramutsindela, too, argues that “poaching has become a national and global security threat, because it is a source of revenue for terrorist organisations,” thus creating the nexus between poaching and global security, specifically the threat of

⁴¹ National Intelligence Council, *Wildlife Poaching Threatens Economic, Security Priorities in Africa*.

⁴² Meryl Burgess, “Rhino Poaching and East Asian Policies: Facts and Debates,” *Center for Chinese Studies Stellenbosch University* (December 2012), http://www0.sun.ac.za/ccs/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MB-rhino-poaching-policy-briefing_FINAL.pdf.

⁴³ Brandley Anderson and Johan Jooste, “Wildlife Poaching: Africa’s Surging Trafficking Threat,” *Africa Security Brief*, no.28 (May 2014):1, <http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ACSS-Africa-Security-Brief-No.-28-EN.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Tom Milliken and Jo Shaw, “The South African-Vietnam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A Deadly Combination of Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates,” *Traffic Report* (May 2012): 61, http://www.trafficj.org/publication/12_The_SouthAfrica-VietNam_RhinoHorn_Trade_Nexus.pdf.

⁴⁵ OECD, *Illicit Trade: Converging Criminal Networks: OECD Review of Risk Management Policies* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), 14, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264251847-en>.

terrorism.⁴⁶ Thus, a clear relationship emerges between the price of rhino horn and ivory and the rate of poaching—and thus the amount of money poaching makes available to terrorist organizations.

To counter the demands and problems created by East Asian markets in Southern Africa, transfrontier conservation areas (TFCA), according to Duffy, are encouraged as a way of preserving natural resources such as wildlife and promoting sustainable economic growth.⁴⁷ Duffy argues that transfrontier conservation areas encourage good environmental management, where responsibility for conservation includes NGOs, INGOs, and International Community (SADC/UN).⁴⁸ Other scholars argue that TFCAs are the root cause of conflict over natural resources, while others counter-argue that good management applied by TFCAs contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity,⁴⁹ thereby conforming to the UN's idea of global governance. The UN Commission on global governance defines governance “as including the formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as the informal arrangements that people or institutions have agreed or perceive to be in their interest.”⁵⁰ According to Duffy, poaching and other illicit activities are security matters that contributed to the establishment of TFCAs in the region, and TFCAs will help in addressing transnational problems such as poaching and illicit trafficking effectively.⁵¹

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This research investigates three hypotheses. The first is that ungoverned spaces in the region, in the form of Botswana's vast porous borders, are a serious problem that allows poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn; therefore, transborder crimes are able to thrive unchecked, which is a grave security threat and could have a nexus with

⁴⁶ Maano Ramutsindela, “Wildlife Crime and State Security in South (ern) Africa: An Overview of Developments, *Politikon* 43, no.2, (2016):165, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2016.1201376>.

⁴⁷ Duffy, “The Potential and Pitfalls of Global Environmental Governance,” 4–6.

⁴⁸ Duffy, 99.

⁴⁹ Duffy, 98.

⁵⁰ Duffy, 93.

⁵¹ Duffy.

terrorism. The study explores the collective efforts of regional states and examines the cooperation and coordination in place for combating poaching for ivory and rhino horn and other transborder crime. It is through joint border operations and information sharing that states would be able to curb these problems.

The second hypothesis is that weak states surrounding Botswana are the breeding ground for organized and transnational crimes like poaching, which is a serious security threat in that poachers could collaborate with terrorists. Poaching for ivory and rhino in one way or another almost certainly fits into the paradigm put forth by Moises Naim, which indicates that these organized transnational crimes like drugs, arms, money laundering, human trafficking, and intellectual property are on the rise due to the enormous financial gains attached to them.⁵² He identifies these activities as the “five wars of globalization”⁵³ because of their prevalence worldwide. In this author’s experience, poaching is in the milieu of these five wars of globalization because it is now a global security threat due to its direct or indirect nexus with terrorism.

The last hypotheses is that economic incentives, including global demand for elephant tusks and rhino horn and domestic socio-economic conditions, escalate poaching in Botswana and the region due to the lucrative market in East Asia, and that poses as a security threat since meeting the demands of that market may involve terrorists.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

To find out exactly how poaching for ivory and rhino horn is a security threat to Botswana and the region, as well as how it affects the country’s economy, I examine the poaching situation in Botswana, analyzing how transnational poaching and trafficking operating in ungoverned spaces cannot be covered by the BDF. I also analyze how organized crime undermines sovereign security in the region. The literature related to ungoverned spaces, poaching, and anti-poaching in the region is explored, as well as

⁵² Moises Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January–February 2003):29, https://blackboard.angelo.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/LFA/CSS/Course%20Material/SEC6302/Readings/Lesson_6/Naim.pdf.

⁵³ Naim, 30.

available data relevant to the study to understand how poaching for ivory is a security threat that could have a nexus with terrorism.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

The remainder of the thesis comprises three chapters. The second chapter offers background on Botswana and how it became involved in the war against poaching. In Chapter II, I analyze the influence of ungoverned spaces, weak enforcement, and economic incentives for poaching in Botswana. Chapter III provides an examination of these variables in relation to regional states, showing how transnational poachers from the region, including South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, undermine the sovereign security of Botswana. The last chapter synthesizes the findings of the research, and recommends what best can be done to eradicate transborder poaching by having policies and strategies as a collective.

II. BOTSWANA AND THE WAR AGAINST POACHING

Botswana is among the African countries rich in natural resources, and it is home to substantial masses of the world's megafauna. These resources contribute to the country's economy through the tourism industry, but they also make the country vulnerable to poaching for ivory and rhino horn due to its porous borders. Botswana's ungoverned spaces allow poaching for elephants and rhinos to prevail.

The lesson of Botswana's experience with poaching and anti-poaching are that porous borders and weak enforcement make Botswana vulnerable to transborder poachers. This chapter therefore highlights Botswana's geography, politics, and game reserves; BDF's role in combating poaching; and conditions that led to poaching. It also examines the ungoverned spaces of Botswana's porous borders, its weak capacity in enforcement, and the economic incentives that facilitate poaching for ivory and rhino horn in Botswana.

A. INTRODUCTION TO BOTSWANA

Botswana is a landlocked country with vast porous borders totaling 4,347 kilometers (km). Due to the paucity of manpower to monitor these vast borders, transborder criminals can traverse them easily. Thus, illicit activities like transborder poaching, drugs and weapon smuggling, and human trafficking take place with little or no deterrence. The country's enforcement further fails to deter these crimes due to lenient judicial penalties, and socio-economic problems contribute to poaching since corrupt government officials connive with criminal syndicates to perpetuate crime. High unemployment and poverty exacerbate corruption in the country and thus have some direct and indirect links to poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn. The effects of liberation wars on Botswana, moreover, played a part in the proliferation of arms used in poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn, and the socio-political situations of the neighboring states are also a contributing factor in transborder poaching. These conditions encourage transborder crime, including poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn, and may make Botswana susceptible to terrorism since poaching has a history of

sustaining terrorism. In this chapter, I assess Botswana’s ungoverned spaces around its porous borders, its weak capacity in enforcement institutions, and the economic incentives that fuel poaching in Botswana.

1. Geography

Botswana is a semi-arid country in sub-Saharan Africa, located in the southern hemisphere. The country covers an area of approximately 582,000 sq. km., almost the same size as Texas or France.⁵⁴ Botswana is a landlocked country; its total perimeter is 4,347 km of land border.⁵⁵ It is bordered to the north by Zambia; to the north and west by Namibia, with a borderline of 1,544 km; to the northeast and east by Zimbabwe, with a borderline of 834 km; and to the south, southeast, and southwest by South Africa, with a borderline of 1,969 km.⁵⁶

The terrain in northern Botswana, where a large number of elephants are found, is dense and difficult to traverse during the rainy season; the environment is harsh to personnel and equipment and therefore offers poachers good “cover and concealment and hampers friendly forces’ movement and maneuver.”⁵⁷ According to Jackson John Sekgwama, conducting anti-poaching operations in this environment requires ruggedized equipment as well as hardened and motivated troops.⁵⁸ Figure 1 shows Botswana’s borders and neighboring states.

⁵⁴ “Botswana,” Graphic Maps, accessed June 17, 2018, <https://www.graphicmaps.com/botswana#geography>.

⁵⁵ Graphic Maps.

⁵⁶ Graphic Maps.

⁵⁷ Sekgwama, “Recommendations for Making Anti-Poaching Programs More Effective in the Southern African Region,” 9.

⁵⁸ Sekgwama.




Figure 1. Map of Botswana and neighboring states.⁵⁹

2. Politics

After 81 years as a British protectorate, Botswana became independent on September 30, 1966.⁶⁰ Before independence, all of Botswana’s neighboring states except Zambia were under the rule of the colonial masters—rule that influenced regional political and socio-economic developments. Botswana transitioned to its independence peacefully from being a British colony and maintained peace through its democratic dispensation; even today, Botswana is a democratic country that abides by democratic tenets. Its neighbors, by contrast, had to fight liberation wars to attain independence. South Africa, for example, was occupied by the Afrikaners, practiced racial

⁵⁹ Source: “Botswana Map,” 1998 *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Botswana#ref1040556>.

⁶⁰ *World Atlas*, s.v. “Botswana,” <https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/bw.htm>.

discrimination, and marginalized the black majority. Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, was also under the rule of the minority whites, which disadvantaged the blacks; Zambia was a British colony; Angola was ruled by the Portuguese, who relinquished power after the liberation war; and Namibia was under apartheid South Africa.

These liberation wars destabilized the region as Botswana experienced an influx of refugees from these countries and experienced the rise of transborder crimes such as poaching for ivory and rhino and other crimes that posed a security threat to Botswana. These wars thus impacted Botswana's security and wildlife, as Paul Sharp and Louis Fisher point out:

The wars for independence in Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the struggle for freedom in South Africa have kept open warfare near Botswana's borders for virtually the entire period since its independence and have brought repeated armed incursions into Botswana's territory.⁶¹

Ramutsindela likewise contends that "anti-poaching in Botswana developed in the context of liberation struggles in southern Africa that involved the violation of Botswana's borders by freedom fighters from neighboring states and counter insurgency operations, but also in the protection of the ecotourism industry that is based on wildlife."⁶² According to Ramutsindela, internal conflict gives poachers and traffickers space to thrive, as was the case during liberation wars in Southern Africa, in which the apartheid government used poaching proceeds to sponsor wars in Angola and Namibia.⁶³ Therefore, those wars destabilized the region, which led to the proliferation of arms that were used in poaching for ivory and rhino horn.

According to Henk, as liberation wars intensified in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, Botswana's northern territory became a hunting ground for the transnational

⁶¹ Paul Sharp and Louis Fisher, "Inside the 'Crystal Ball': Understanding the Evolution of the Military in Botswana and the Challenges Ahead," *Evolution and Publications* (January 2005):44, <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/EVOLUTCHAP2.PDF>.

⁶² Ramutsindela, "Wildlife Crime and State Security in South (ern) Africa,"165.

⁶³ Ramutsindela, 164.

poachers.⁶⁴ Sharp and Fisher point out that Botswana also experienced an influx of political refugees from these countries at war.⁶⁵ This situation increased illicit activities like crime and poaching in the country that threatened Botswana's security.

Botswana's independence in 1966 brought a multiparty democracy that respects the constitution and democratic principles. Botswana is governed through three tiers of governance: the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The President is the head of state and the executive branch of government. According to Mpho Molomo, the government of Botswana has a single legislative chamber established along the Westminster parliamentary system, where Members of Parliament are elected on the "First-Past-The-Post" principle, where majority rules.⁶⁶ A lower chamber consists of traditional chiefs, tribal representatives who serve in an advisory role. In an article by Monageng Mogalakwe and Francis Nyamnjoh, Kenneth Good describes Botswana as "a shining example of liberal democracy in a continent notorious for one party states and military dictatorships."⁶⁷ According to Minister of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism Tshekedi Khama, the government now fully supports tourism as a means of sustainable economic growth.⁶⁸ Botswana's government is committed to conserving its natural resources through laws enacted by an act of parliament—for example, the Wildlife Act, which provides protection to wildlife.

3. Game Reserves and National Parks

In its effort to diversify the economy from its sole dependence on diamonds, the legislature of Botswana embraced tourism by reserving land for flora and fauna. Hence, Botswana recognized its need to protect its wildlife resources due to their economic

⁶⁴ Henk, "The Botswana Defense Force," 176.

⁶⁵ Sharp and Fisher, "Inside the Crystal Ball," 46.

⁶⁶ Mpho G. Molomo, "Civil Military Relations in Botswana's Developmental State," *African Studies Quarterly* 5, no.2, (summer 2001):38, <http://sites.clas.ufl.edu/africa-asq/files/Molomo-Vol-5-Issue-2.pdf>.

⁶⁷ Monageng Mogalakwe and Francis Nyamnjoh, "Botswana at 50: Democratic Deficit, Elite Corruption and Poverty in The Midst of Plenty," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 35, no.1, (2017):2, <https://DOI.ORG/1080/02589001.2017.1286636>.

⁶⁸ "Conserving a Sustainable Future for Botswana," *European Times*, June 10, 2015, <https://www.european-times.com/tshekedi-khama/>.

importance. The Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources Conservation and Tourism is responsible for the flora and fauna of the country; under this ministry is the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, which directly looks after wildlife through wildlife wardens. In Botswana, 17 percent of the land area is set aside for game reserves and national parks. There are four national parks—the Chobe National Park, the Nxai Pan and Makgadikgadi National Park, and the Kgalagadi Transfrontier—that have a very high concentration of game.⁶⁹ There are also six game reserves—the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Gaborone Game Reserve, Khutse Game Reserve, Mannyelanong Game Reserve, Maun Game Reserve, and Moremi Game Reserve—as well as some small privately owned reserves.⁷⁰ Figure 2 shows Botswana’s Game Reserves and National Parks.

⁶⁹ “Department of Wildlife and National Parks-Gaborone-Botswana,” Prod Africa, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://maps.prodafrica.com/places/botswana/south-east-district/gaborone/government-2/departement-wildlife-national-parks/>.

⁷⁰ “Department of Wildlife and National Parks-Gaborone-Botswana,” Prod Africa.




Figure 2. Botswana’s game reserves and national parks.⁷¹

B. BDF’S ROLE IN ANTI-POACHING EFFORTS

Given these commitments, Botswana became involved in a war against poaching in 1987, when the country experienced armed groups from neighboring countries, especially Angola, Namibia, and Zambia, poaching for ivory and rhino horn.⁷² According to Henk, these groups carried weapons of war such as Kalashnikov assault rifles and bolt action-hunting rifles.⁷³ Therefore, Henk further asserts that the BDF was the sole security agency that could effectively fight armed poachers;⁷⁴ thus, an “advocate

⁷¹ Source: “Botswana Game Reserves and National Parks,” Google Maps, accessed July 30, 2018, <https://www.google.com/search?biw=1350&bih=635&tbm=isch&sa=1&ei=1ZVgW7ipHeWx0PEPjpmqcA&q=botswana+map+game+reserves+and+national+parks&oq=bo>.

⁷² Henk, “The Botswana Defense Force,” 176.

⁷³ Henk, 171.

⁷⁴ Henk, 173.

for wildlife conservation and patron of environmentalist groups in Botswana,”⁷⁵ Ian Khama, recommended that the government involve the BDF in anti-poaching since poaching posed a grave security threat.⁷⁶ The deployment of the military in fighting poaching was granted by the legislature.⁷⁷ Henk posits that the deployment of the military for anti-poaching was a rational move to protect the government’s investment in wildlife, which poaching by foreign criminals directly threatened.⁷⁸ Hence, the country responded to poaching militarily.

The BDF’s role in anti-poaching broadened over time. The involvement of the BDF in anti-poaching started in earnest in 1987 with a “Special Forces unit with unique skills in small unit operations, tracking, patrolling, and ambush.”⁷⁹ According to Henk, poaching demanded specialized warfare skills because “organized poaching was a peculiar form of low-intensity warfare in which small groups of men using excellent intelligence and skillful field craft were infiltrating deep into the country, effectively frustrating detection and interception by government authorities.”⁸⁰ The BDF started its anti-poaching operations in the Kwando–Lenyanti area along the northern border with Namibia, where poaching was rife. Henk indicates that, within months, a significant number of poachers were killed or captured, and poaching dramatically decreased.⁸¹ By the year 1989, the BDF had broadened its anti-poaching mission by extending it to the rest of the Defense Force; thus, a large number of troops participated in this operation, and presently a Battalion plus is deployed for the mission.

BDF has continued to intensify its anti-poaching operations despite physical and technical challenges. Henk reveals how the BDF faces political, operational, and

⁷⁵ Henk, 174.

⁷⁶ Henk, 177.

⁷⁷ Henk.

⁷⁸ Henk, 173

⁷⁹ Henk, 177.

⁸⁰ Henk.

⁸¹ Henk.

technological challenges in fighting poaching.⁸² He contends that the anti-poaching mission in the northern sector faces a challenge due to vast rugged terrain, particularly in the Kwando-Lenyanti area, which gives poachers the chance to evade detection.⁸³ These challenges, however, did not deter the BDF from achieving its assigned task of protecting Botswana’s megafauna against transnational poachers. Therefore, to effectively patrol this vast area, the BDF carries out coordinated patrolling between the ground and the air forces to cover a large area of ground. Poachers in northern Botswana use anti-tracking techniques to elude the BDF patrols; however, Henk posits that these “armed gangs are ruthlessly hunted and eliminated.”⁸⁴ He further argues that the BDF currently is deployed “to deter all forms of poaching and reassure citizens and tourists that they are secure from armed criminals.”⁸⁵ For this reason, some South African conservationists relocated some rhinoceros species to Botswana since they view it as a safe haven for these endangered species.⁸⁶ According to Rhinos without Borders, already 77 rhinos have been translocated from South Africa’s high-risk poaching area to Botswana, and 23 will follow sometime this year.⁸⁷ Safe rhinos and elephants will multiply and enhance the tourism industry in the country.

C. CONDITIONS THAT HAVE LED TO POACHING

While the BDF has successfully thwarted poaching in the areas where it has strong presence, conflict in neighboring states, ungoverned spaces, weak enforcement capacities, and socio-economic factors have all contributed to poaching in Botswana.

⁸² Henk, 170.

⁸³ Henk, 181.

⁸⁴ Henk, 183.

⁸⁵ Henk, 182.

⁸⁶ Mogomotsi, and Madigele, “Live by the Gun, Die by the Gun,” 56.

⁸⁷ “A Global Effect to Secure on Going Survival: South Africa–Botswana,” Rhinos Without Borders 2015, <http://www.rhinoswithoutborders.com/about-the-project/>.

1. Ungoverned Spaces

Botswana's vast and porous borders allow poaching to take place often without hindrance. Henk's previous quote about Namibia's poachers shows how Botswana's borders are porous⁸⁸ and thus ungoverned spaces where states lack capacity to enforce law and order to curb poaching for elephant tusks and rhino horn.⁸⁹ According to BBC Africa correspondent Alastair Leithead, poachers cross Botswana's vast borders to poach for ivory.⁹⁰ The absence of security forces throughout the entire vast and porous borders creates space for transnational poachers, and poor cooperation with the neighboring states exacerbates poaching. The poachers who threaten Botswana's game, especially elephants and rhinos, are thus primarily from the neighboring SADC states.

All of Botswana's border areas are affected by poaching. In this author's experience, the northern area is where poachers for ivory and rhino horn traverse, where the river Kwando–Lenyanti marks the northern border with Namibia. This river, when it has water, acts as an obstacle to the movement of poachers from Namibia.⁹¹ At such times, though, when we experience less transborder poaching, Botswana often sees an uptick in illegal fishing by Namibians. Then, when the river is dry, an influx of poachers from Namibia can cross anywhere to move in and out of the game park. In the north, the gazetted immigration points of entry are two: Zambia and Namibia. Sometimes, the customs officials intercept illegal contraband like ivory, drugs, and tobacco.

The western part of Botswana's border with Namibia has its own challenges where the Namibians cross illegally to hunt in Botswana. This border area has four gazetted points of entry, where authorities frequently intercept smuggling of ivory, drugs, and arms. Still, the movement of illegal contraband is not as rife as at the point of entry in the north.

⁸⁸ Henk, "The Botswana Defense Force," 176.

⁸⁹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 26.

⁹⁰ Alastair Leithead, "Why Elephants are Seeking Refuge in Botswana," BBC News Africa, accessed March 16, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37230700>.

⁹¹ Author served in BDF's anti-poaching initiative from 1990 to 2017.

The southern part of the border is the Botswana-South Africa border, which is busy, and various contraband, such as drugs, arms, ivory, tobacco, and human trafficking, are often intercepted. In this border area, there are about 16 gazetted points of entry. This is because Botswana has its longest border with South Africa, with which it does a lot of trade, and so many goods move in and out of Botswana at these gazetted points of entry. In the southern region, the other challenge is vehicle smuggling and cattle rustling, whereby criminals cut the border fence and cross into South Africa or into Botswana. To arrest the situation is proving difficult due to inadequate personnel to patrol the entire border fully.

The last border area is the eastern border with Zimbabwe. Due to its porosity, this border allows significant illegal crossing into Botswana at ungazetted points. The economic situation in Zimbabwe is not good; therefore, illegal immigrants flood in, looking for jobs in Botswana. These illegal movements are coupled with trafficking of illegal contraband in and out of Botswana with little or no deterrence. The gazetted points of entry with Zimbabwe are five; in these points, the customs sometimes intercept illegal contraband such as tobacco, drugs, and ivory, to mention a few.

2. Weak Capacity in Enforcement Institutions

Compounding the problem created by geography, Botswana's judiciary and customs systems lack the capacity to deter poaching. The National Intelligence Council posits that corruption and lack of robust judicial penalties and financial charges found in Botswana make it fail to prevent wildlife trafficking and poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks effectively.⁹² Moreover, Botswana reflects management flaws in its law enforcement. For example, Oxpeckers asserts that the Environmental Investigation Agency (IEA) indicates that "Botswana has effective legislation in the Proceeds of Serious Crime Act criminalizes money-laundering, but the Act does not cover

⁹² National Intelligence Council, *Wildlife Poaching*.

environmental crimes such as wildlife products trafficking.”⁹³ The gaps in the legal framework make enforcement difficult.

Gaps in law enforcement coverage further make enforcement difficult. Lack of capacity means that much of wildlife population is left vulnerable to poaching. In the sub-region, Botswana by far has the largest elephant population; Alastair Leithead asserts that Botswana has the largest population of elephants of any country in Africa.⁹⁴ The armed groups target the northern region of Botswana, where there is large concentration of elephants and rhinos and where these poachers outgun the wildlife wardens.⁹⁵ Henk asserts that “in the 1980s, poachers infiltrating from Namibia’s ‘Caprivi Strip’ were able to move across the border from Namibia into Botswana’s game areas without the likelihood of encountering either human settlements or the sporadic Botswana security patrols.”⁹⁶ Thus, there was nothing deterring transborder poaching and lawlessness in the northern part of the country during that time. These armed groups from neighboring countries were threatening Botswana’s elephants as well as the tourism industry.

Veterans for Wildlife indicates that continued weak anti-poaching capacity and lack of resources today allows poaching to flourish unchecked.⁹⁷ The vast and porous borders of Botswana are difficult to man fully to deter transborder illicit activities. Only points of entry are manned ‘round the clock, but the rest of the borderland is patrolled by security agencies, which fail to cover the entire borderland due to inadequate manpower since effective border policing means continuous surveillance. Therefore, it is easy for transborder criminals to perpetrate their acts. Of the 26 gazetted points of entry, only two have scanners and x-ray machines to detect illegal goods. These are the Kazungula-Ferry

⁹³ Oscar Nkala, “Spy Arrests Lift Lid on Botswana’s Silent Trafficking Threat,” Oxpickers, May 10, 2017, <https://oxpickers.org/2017/05/spy-arrests-in-botswana/>.

⁹⁴ Alastair Leithead, “Why Elephants Are Seeking Refuge in Botswana,” BBC News, August 31, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37230700>.

⁹⁵ Henk, “The Botswana Defense Force,” 176.

⁹⁶ Henk.

⁹⁷ “African Elephant,” Veterans for Wildlife, accessed May 21, 2018, <https://www.veterans4wildlife.org/elephant-poaching>.

and Tlokweng border points of entry.⁹⁸ The rest of the border posts do manual searches, which are tiring and not thorough.

In addition to worsening the problem of poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks, weak enforcement capacity also facilitates corruption, which also contributes to poaching of megafauna. Poachers for ivory and rhino horn operate as a network syndicate. According to the National Intelligence Council, poachers and traffickers use sophisticated networks that transport contraband from the parks to consumers through ports of exports by the assistance of corrupt officials.⁹⁹ Furthermore, Anderson and Jooste indicate that illicit trade in ivory and rhino horn involves millions of dollars' increase in corruption within the region by government officials and security forces in collusion with criminal syndicates.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, poachers take advantage of that by bribing the officials to perpetrate their acts. The National Intelligence Council further assert that criminal syndicates also take advantage of poor customs control and search techniques at exit, transit, and entry points.¹⁰¹

It is clear that corruption by security agencies, as well as immigration and customs officials at the points of entry, also contribute to the poaching problem. Duffy and St. John further assert that corruption and collusion by officials allow ivory and rhino traffickers to move their contraband without detection.¹⁰² According to Oxpeckers, in 2012, wildlife wardens had been involved in ivory and rhino horn theft in conjunction with syndicates, as when 26 elephant tusks disappeared from the Wildlife Department storage room in Kasane.¹⁰³ Three years later, another wildlife warden was arrested for

⁹⁸ Patricia M. Makepe, Kgomotso, Montsi, and Chidozie Njoku, "Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) Enabled Trade Facilitation in Botswana," *Botswana Journal of African Studies* 26, no. 1, (2012):97, <http://journals.ub.bw/index.php/pula/article/view/158/31>.

⁹⁹ National Intelligence Council, *Wildlife Poaching*.

¹⁰⁰ Anderson and Jooste, "Wildlife Poaching," 2.

¹⁰¹ National Intelligence Council, *Wildlife Poaching*.

¹⁰² Rosaleen Duffy and Freya A.V. St. John, *Poverty, Poaching and Trafficking: What Are The Links?* (UK Department for International Development, June 2013), 6, <https://doi.org/10.12774/eodhd059.jun2013.duffy>.

¹⁰³ Nkala, "Spy Arrests Lift Lid."

rhino horn theft from the warehouse where he worked as a clerk.¹⁰⁴ In 2016, another case of crime by security agents surfaced when three security agents were arrested with two elephant tusks in the northern part of Botswana.¹⁰⁵ Corruptible and criminal officials accept bribes from criminal syndicates, and this complicates the challenge of porous borders in Botswana.

3. Economic Incentives

Finally, another major issue that contributes to poaching in Botswana is unemployment and poverty. Botswana's unemployment rate stands at 18.1 percent,¹⁰⁶ with youth (which Botswana's National Youth Policy defines as 15–35 years of age)¹⁰⁷ unemployment at 33.2 percent.¹⁰⁸ The World Bank indicates that poverty is pervasive in the country, and the economy is undiversified and thus vulnerable to macroeconomic and climatic shocks.¹⁰⁹ As a result, in Botswana, inequality and poverty are high, especially in rural areas:¹¹⁰ According to the World Bank, the poverty rate is 12.3 percent, and the most affected are youth and single heads of households.¹¹¹ Poverty compels some of the citizens to join the criminal syndicates and end up as couriers for contraband such as drugs, ivory, and rhino horn. William Adams et al. contend that “poverty is directly and indirectly linked to poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn from Sub-Saharan

¹⁰⁴ Nkala.

¹⁰⁵ Nkala.

¹⁰⁶ “Botswana: Unemployment Rate from 2007 to 2017,” Statistics Portal, 2018, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/407807/unemployment-rate-in-botswana/>.

¹⁰⁷ Republic of Botswana Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture, *Revised National Youth Policy 2010* (Gaborone: Ministry of Youth, Sport and Culture, 2010), http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Botswana_2010_National_Youth_Policy.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ “Botswana: Youth Unemployment Rate from 2007 to 2017,” Statistics Portal, 2018, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/811692/youth-unemployment-rate-in-botswana/>.

¹⁰⁹ “Botswana Overview,” World Bank, April 19, 2018, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/botswana/overview>.

¹¹⁰ World Bank.

¹¹¹ World Bank.

Africa.”¹¹² Therefore, these unemployed youth cross the borders illegally peddling drugs and ivory as means of survival. As Duffy and St. John posit, “the decision to poach or not is decided by an individual, but is shaped by the social, political, and economic context in which that individual finds themselves.”¹¹³ Poverty and unemployment among citizens, especially the youth, has driven crime and poaching. Therefore, addressing these issues could be an ideal way of reducing wildlife crime, including poaching for ivory and rhino horn.

D. CONCLUSION

Botswana’s wildlife is under serious threat, especially elephants poached for ivory. The transborder criminal syndicates traverse the unmanned porous borders of Botswana, perpetuating illicit activities of poaching, drug trafficking, and weapons proliferation, and these problems take place undeterred due to weak enforcement capacity and corruption. The country’s socio-economic situation, which includes unemployment, poverty, corruption, and crime, further contributes to poaching, which has become a source of livelihood. Corrupt government officials exacerbate poaching by conniving with criminal syndicates in these illegal acts. The transborder poaching syndicates pose a threat to Botswana’s elephants and threaten the county’s security. Thus, poaching may make the country vulnerable to terrorism. Nevertheless, the efforts of the security agencies, especially the military, have drastically reduced poaching for ivory in Botswana’s conservancy reserves in recent years, and in the sub-region, Botswana is considered a relatively safe place for megafauna.

¹¹² William M. Adams, Rose Aveiling, Dan Brockington, Barney Dickson, Jo Elliot, Jon Hutton, Dilys Roe, Bhaskar Vira, and William Wolmer, “Biodiversity Conservation and The Eradication of Poverty?” *Science* 306, no. 5699 (November 2004), <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/306/5699/1146.full>.

¹¹³ Duffy and St. John, “Poverty, Poaching and Trafficking.”

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III. REGIONAL IMPACTS ON POACHING AND SECURITY IN BOTSWANA

Botswana is not the only state in the region with a poaching problem. In fact, issues of poaching, porous borders, and weak governance among Botswana's neighbors have troubling effects on Botswana and its anti-poaching efforts. Poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks is prevalent in the four states that border Botswana: South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Botswana's vast porous borders with these states constitute ungoverned spaces in which illicit activities like poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks take place without hindrance. Furthermore, these states have weak governance institutions that lack the capacity to enforce the law to address the corruption and crime associated with poaching. The impact of these conditions is that they cause a spike in poaching. Likewise, the high demand in East Asia for rhino horn and elephant tusks exacerbates poaching, as Chinese syndicates are actively engaged in the illegal trade of rhino horn and elephant tusks in the region. Such organized crime undermines territorial sovereignty and threatens security and the economy of Botswana. Moreover, the poaching–China link is a threat that might have connections with terrorists who may use the income from poaching to finance their other illegal acts. This chapter examines how poaching from bordering states impacts Botswana, the status of poaching in these states, their ungoverned borders with Botswana, and their weak enforcement capacity, which leads to depleting wildlife and compromising Botswana's security and economy.

A. IMPACT OF REGIONAL POACHING ON BOTSWANA

Poaching for rhino horn and ivory is prevalent in the SADC region and leads to the decline and extinction of megafauna. The transborder poachers, influenced by high demand from the Chinese syndicates who are prepared to pay high prices for the rhino horn and elephant tusks, coupled with corruption and crime by government officials, escalate poaching in the region. Such organized crime undermines territorial sovereignty and threatens security, as poaching's link to China might have a connection with terrorists as a means of financing their illegal activities. For example, in Somalia “al-

Shabaab does tax ivory smuggled from Kenya into the Somali port of Kismayo”¹¹⁴ to sustain its operations. Likewise, according to Haenlein et al., the LRA of Uganda has gotten some of its funds through poaching in Kenya.¹¹⁵

In the region, corruption, crime, weak penalties, and greed, as well as poor socio-economic conditions, greatly contribute to poaching, as is the case with all the states sharing borders with Botswana. Thus, some government officials collude with poaching syndicates, and that facilitates wildlife trafficking. In the SADC region, one of the most important impacts of poaching is that it is severely detrimental to the economy of the states in the region. The Southern African region has an abundance of wildlife, which are an economic boost to these nations, as wildlife is a tourist attraction that generates revenue.¹¹⁶ The conservation initiatives on which tourism depends are negatively impacted by poaching for rhino horn and ivory. Furthermore, the link between Chinese traffickers and poaching syndicates in the region impacts threatens the regional wildlife populations, as these poachers hunt for rhinos and elephants in the regional states to meet the demand of the Chinese, which escalates poaching and thus harms the regional tourism industry.

In addition to its economic impacts, poaching in the SADC region also poses a security threat since it undermines territorial sovereignty. The transborder crime happens unchecked, including operations by these trafficking syndicates, which might have nexus with terrorists and which could lead to the decline and extinction of both rhinos and elephants in the region.

Poaching in neighboring states means that Botswana’s wildlife is under threat because of transborder poachers who often enter and exit the country south of the Zambezi River within Kavango Zambezi (KAZA). The three states that share the border with Botswana to the northwest, north, and northeast—Namibia, Zambia, and

¹¹⁴ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *The Extinction Market: Wildlife Trafficking and How to Counter It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 81.

¹¹⁵ Haenlein, Maguire, and Somerville, “Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Terrorism,” 72.

¹¹⁶ Phillip Muruthi, “The Economics of Africa’s Wildlife,” World Economic Forum, March 3, 2015, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/03/the-economics-of-africas-wildlife/>.

Zimbabwe—have a direct impact on Botswana’s wildlife, as their citizens carry out poaching in Botswana. Poaching is encouraged by the Chinese syndicates, which offer a lot of money for rhino horn and elephant tusks. The rate at which these poachers cross into Botswana is continual and undermines Botswana’s territorial sovereignty. In their poaching endeavors, they employ cruel tactics to kill animals such as poisoning, which kills wildlife indiscriminately, affecting many untargeted animals and reducing the numbers of animals in the country. In the author’s experience, poaching has made these animals suspicious of people who want to view them from close distances, as they will run away, thinking that game viewers are poachers, which makes it difficult for tourists to have a good view of the animals. The poaching of rhinoceros and elephants is a concern for Botswana as that could deplete the megafauna.

Poaching has consequences for Botswana’s other animals as well. According to Michael Flyman of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, elephant poachers also poison predators and vultures,¹¹⁷ as poachers view them as compromising their position by flying above the kill, alerting the wildlife authorities and BDF anti-poaching patrols.¹¹⁸ Such acts are harmful to both the predators and the tourism industry, which is Botswana’s second-highest revenue earner and provides 30,000 formal and informal jobs.¹¹⁹ Thus, it is critical to guard it jealously—hence the statement of the BDF director of protocol and public relations that the mission of the BDF is to “defend Botswana’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national interests.”¹²⁰

The regional poaching situation has also compelled Botswana to ban hunting completely, with the belief that hunting encourages poaching. That decision, however, has negatively impacted the economy, as hunting generated revenue for the country and

¹¹⁷ “No Longer at Ease: Clouds on the Horizon for Botswana’s Conservation Success Story by Keith Somerville,” African Arguments, July 23, 2015, <http://africanarguments.org/2015/07/23/no-longer-at-ease-clouds-on-the-horizon-for-botswanas-conservation-success-story-by-keith-somerville/>.

¹¹⁸ “No Longer at Ease,” African Arguments.

¹¹⁹ Joel Konopo, Ntibinyane Ntibinyane, and Tileni Mongudhi, “Botswana’s ‘Shoot-to-Kill Policy’ against Suspected Poachers,” *Mail & Guardian*, March 3, 2016, <https://mg.co.za/article/2016-03-16-botswanas-shoot-to-kill-policy-against-suspected-poacher>.

¹²⁰ Konopo, Ntibinyane, and Mongudhi, “Botswana’s ‘Shoot-to-Kill Policy.’”

benefited communities living with wildlife. The problem of poaching in the region also negatively affects Botswana's wildlife and economy, as wildlife tourism contributes to GDP.

In addition to causing economic problems, poaching has environmental consequences in Botswana. According to Christine Dell'Amore of *National Geographic*, poaching in Angola, Namibia, and Zambia has made elephants flee from those countries and take refuge in Botswana.¹²¹ Thus, there has been a surge of elephants in the Chobe National Park, and that negatively impacts the environment as such a high number cannot be sustained by the park. Therefore, Botswana has seen a high mortality rate among its elephants stemming from a lack of food, especially during winter. This negatively impacts the wildlife and tourism industry.

B. POACHING IN THE SADC REGION

Poaching for rhino horn and ivory in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region arises from the high concentration of the rhinos and elephants in Southern African countries. This concentration, coupled with the increasing value and demand for rhino horn and ivory in the world market, escalates poaching in the region. Poaching has proven to be a serious problem for the region as poachers are from within regional states as well as from abroad. These poachers are sophisticated and aggressive, using automatic weapons, night vision devices, and helicopters, and freely cross borders.¹²² This section provides an overview of the main poaching activities in Botswana's neighboring countries, and describes the ways that these efforts impact Botswana's security.

The global demand for rhino horn and ivory, particularly by East Asians, exacerbates the poaching problem in the region as Chinese syndicates operate in the

¹²¹ Christine Dell'Amore, "Elephant Refugees Flee to the Last Stronghold in Africa," *National Geographic*, November 23, 2016, <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/11/elephants-botswana-poaching-refugees/>.

¹²² Issah Gyimah, "Understanding the Attitude and Perceptions of South African Residents towards Anti- Rhino poaching Initiatives" (master's thesis, University of South Africa, 2006), 6, http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/23226/dissertation_gyimah_i.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

region in search of rhino horn and elephant tusk. The poaching syndicates responsible for this increase overlap with other crimes such as diamond smuggling, robberies, car theft, drugs, and cattle rustling, and they operate multinationally. The regional problem of poaching takes up Botswana's resources and severely harms the country's wildlife, tourism industry, and economy.

1. Poaching in South Africa

South Africa is facing a rhino-poaching crisis, with more rhinos poached than anywhere else on the entire continent. In an effort to save these rhinos, South Africa relocated some to Botswana, which has compelled Botswana to devote energy and resources to beef up security for wildlife. Poaching in South Africa is rising at an alarming rate. According to Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) statistics, poaching has been growing exponentially in South Africa: 333 rhinos were killed in 2010, 448 in 2011, and 668 in 2012.¹²³ As Rachel Bale highlights, South African government statistics reveal that poaching and rhino horn smuggling in the year 2017 numbered 1,028 rhinos.¹²⁴ Hildegard S. Koen points out that rhino poaching in South Africa is a daily phenomenon, as three rhinos on average are killed every day.¹²⁵ According to Save the Rhino, and as Figure 3 shows, notwithstanding a recent small decline, poaching has soared in South Africa for the past ten years.

¹²³ Gyimah, 4.

¹²⁴ Rachel Bale, "More than 1,000 Rhinos Killed by Poachers in South Africa Last Year," *National Geographic*, January 25, 2018, <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/01/wildlife-watch-rhino-poaching-crisis-continues-south-africa/>.

¹²⁵ Hildegard Suzanne Koen, "Predictive Policing in an Endangered Species Context: Combating Rhino Poaching in The Kruger National Park" (PhD diss., University of Pretoria, 2017), 7, https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/61301/Koen_Predictive_2017.pdf?sequence=1.

Recorded number of rhinos poached in South Africa




Figure 3. Number of rhinos poached in South Africa per year, 2007–2017.¹²⁶

South Africa’s high poaching rate for rhinos has made them relocate their rhinos to Botswana, where they will be safe.¹²⁷ The author has witnessed how this relocation affects Botswana’s wildlife management plan, as Botswana had to ensure that extra resources, such as more funds, security personnel, and logistics associated with safeguarding these rhinos be in place. Rhinos inhabiting a new place need daily monitoring to ensure that they do not move beyond the park boundaries as they will encroach on the human settlements and cause trouble. Therefore, dedicated personnel are there to ensure that movements of these rhinos are kept in check and that they are safe where ever they are. This task requires extra manpower to patrol the park and additional resources like vehicles and helicopters to be employed in this operation. Thus, South African poaching directly affects Botswana since Botswana has had to ensure its level of

¹²⁶ “Recorded Number of Rhinos Poached in South Africa,” Save the Rhino, https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics.

¹²⁷ Rhinos Without Borders, “A Global Effort to Secure on Going Survival.”

security would be equal to the task if these rhino poachers might try to follow the animals to Botswana.

The other poaching problem posed by the South African poaching syndicates is smuggling of live predators from the southern part of Botswana to South Africa. Oxpeckers points out that these syndicates “smuggle lions and other predators out of Botswana to supply a growing demand for lion-bone potion in the Far East.”¹²⁸ This has a negative impact on the predators as their population dwindles, and that affects Botswana’s tourism industry as well as the economy, as predators like lions are the favorite of tourists. Furthermore, the South African trafficking syndicates are engaged in other crimes like smuggling in and out of Botswana contraband like drugs, diamonds, weapons, and ivory. For example, during the writing of this thesis, two men were intercepted at the South African-Botswana border post in possession of elephant tusks.¹²⁹ In addition, South African criminals perpetrate cattle rustling from Botswana, and this syndicate is well equipped as it uses motorcycles to drive the herd, load them in trucks, and cross into South Africa.¹³⁰ All these crimes create security and economic problems for Botswana.

2. Poaching in Zambia

Zambian poachers frequently cross the border to Botswana to hunt rhino or elephant, depleting one of Botswana’s most important sources of revenue, and continually engage in armed clashes with security forces in anti-poaching operations. The Zambian poachers have links with the Chinese syndicate, which encourages them to perpetrate poaching for rhino and elephant in Botswana. According to the Zambian Deputy Minister of Tourism, Patrick Ngoma, Chinese ivory trafficking syndicates

¹²⁸ Lawrence Seretse. “Botswana Bans Canned Hunts,” Oxpeckers, April 1, 2014, <https://oxpeckers.org/2014/04/botswana-bans-canned-hunts/>.

¹²⁹ “South Africa: Environmental Affairs on Poachers Arrested during Operation Thunderstorm,” All Africa, July 25, 2018, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201807250526.html>.

¹³⁰ Fiona Macleod, “Officials Turn a Blind Eye to the Smuggling of Wild Lions,” Oxpeckers, December 9, 2013, <https://oxpeckers.org/2013/12/officials-turn-a-blind-eye-to-the-smuggling-of-wild-lions-2/>.

employ Zambians to poach elephants and rhinos in Botswana.¹³¹ Oxpeckers notes that a Zambian wildlife crimes tracker asserts: “it is because the poachers have finished the free-roaming elephants in our country, so they now poach in neighboring countries to meet the endless demand for ivory from Chinese syndicates.”¹³² The Zambian poachers have a record of depleting their own wildlife as *African Geographic* illustrates that in the past 30 years, about 144,000 elephants in Zambia have been lost to poaching.¹³³ The International Union for the Conservation of Nature likewise reports that the elephant population in Zambia went down by 90 percent from 1981 to 2015.¹³⁴ It further contends that in Zambia, the black rhinos had been poached to extinction by 1984.¹³⁵

Having killed most of their animals, Zambian poachers spill into Botswana in pursuit of game, bringing with them the same attitude that depleted Zambia’s wildlife. These poachers will kill as many elephants as possible provided the security forces do not disturb them. Oscar Nkala, an associate investigative journalist, mentions that sometime in June a Zambian ivory trafficker who was discovered to have 13 elephant tusks in his vehicle at a checkpoint in Botswana, ran away and abandoned his vehicle.¹³⁶ Nkala further reports that by the beginning of the year six elephants were killed by Zambian poachers.¹³⁷ Another incident of poaching in Chobe National Park left about 26 elephants dead and these killings are suspected to have been a month or two operation. Don Pinnock notes that, according to Chase, the killing was unprecedented and the blame was

¹³¹ Oscar Nkala, “Chinese-Military Axis behind Zambian Poaching,” Oxpeckers, June 21, 2016, <https://oxpeckers.org/2016/06/2912/>.

¹³² Nkala, “Chinese-Military Axis behind Zambian Poaching.”

¹³³ Oscar Nkala, “Zambian Poaching Crisis Fueled by Chinese Military,” *Africa Geographic*, November 2016, <https://africageographic.com/blog/zambian-poaching-crisis-fuelled-by-chinese-military/>.

¹³⁴ International Union for the Conservation of Nature, *cited in* Nkala, “Zambia Poaching Crisis.”

¹³⁵ Nkala, “Zambian Poaching Crisis.”

¹³⁶ Oscar Nkala, “Suspected Zambian Poacher Abandons 13 Elephant Tusks at a Police Roadblock in Botswana,” LinkedIn, June 22, 2018, <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/suspected-zambian-poacher-abandons-13-elephant-tusks-police-nkala/>.

¹³⁷ Oscar Nkala, “How Chinese Syndicates Send Zambian Poachers to Their Deaths,” *Standard* April 27, 2016, <https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2016/04/27/chinese-synicates-send-zambian-poachers-deaths/>.

apportioned to the Zambians.¹³⁸ Such a level of killing seriously threatens the viability of Botswana's tourism industry.

In addition to the threat they pose to wildlife, the well-armed, organized, and resilient Zambian poachers also pose a threat to Botswana security forces. According to the *Zambian Daily Mail*, the majority of Zambian poachers use military weapons in their poaching endeavor.¹³⁹ As Martin Fletcher reports, the aggressiveness of Zambian poachers is displayed by their use of weapons—particularly the AK-47 and high caliber hunting rifles.¹⁴⁰ The AK-47 and hunting rifles are used for personnel and animals, respectively.¹⁴¹ Therefore, their lethality cannot be overemphasized, and when they are cornered by Botswana security forces the result is often a skirmish, which is sometimes deadly. According to Sylvester Mwale of the *Times of Zambia* in 2014 Botswana security forces exchanged gunfire with about 14 Zambian poachers who escaped, leaving one dead.¹⁴² Similarly, Nkala recounts that in 2017 about 30 Zambian poachers were involved in the killing of six elephants in the Chobe National Park, which led to a gun battle between the Botswana Defense Force and the poachers, resulting in two poachers shot and killed.¹⁴³

3. Poaching in Zimbabwe

The killing of elephants by poisoning by Zimbabwean poachers impacts Botswana's elephants because these elephants are shared by both Zimbabwe and Botswana and inhabit in both countries. These killings impact tourism, as fewer animals

¹³⁸ Don Pinnock, "#Poachers Kill 26 Elephants in Chobe National Park," *Traveller24*, August 31, 2016, <https://www.traveller24.com/Explore/Green/shockwildlifetruths-poachers-kill-26-elephants-in-chobe-national-park-20160831>.

¹³⁹ Stuart Lisulo, "Poaching Continues to Plague Tourism Sector," *Zambia Daily Mail*, February 2017, <https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/poaching-continues-to-plague-tourism-sector/>.

¹⁴⁰ Martin Fletcher, "War on Poaching," Pulitzer Center, September 7, 2017, <https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/war-poaching>.

¹⁴¹ Fletcher.

¹⁴² Sylvester Mwale, "Botswana Pursues 13 Zambian Poachers," *Times of Zambia*, July 13, 2014, www.times.co.zm/?p=26874.

¹⁴³ Oscar Nkala, "Chinese Demand Drives Zambia's 'Amateur' Ivory Gangs," *Oxpeckers*, April 12, 2016, <https://oxpeckers.org/2016/04/chinese-demand-drives-zambias-amateur-poaching-gangs/>.

are available to be viewed by the tourists. Poaching in Zimbabwe is very lethal because the tactics used by poachers has a collateral effect on all wildlife. Poaching in Zimbabwe is different from the one perpetrated in the surrounding states in that the poachers use a very unusual and lethal method—cyanide poisoning. This method indiscriminately kills many animals. This results in the decline and extinction of some species. Paul Steyn of *National Geographic* indicates that since 2005, elephant populations in Zimbabwe has decreased by 10 percent.¹⁴⁴ That implies that Botswana is affected by that 10 percent decline. According to the Wildlife Fund, Zimbabwe is among the hardest-hit countries, as between 2003 and 2005, poachers killed about 60 percent of the rhino population.¹⁴⁵ Brian Latham reveals that the number of elephants is likewise plummeting in Zimbabwe due to this poaching problem, particularly in Hwange National Park, where about half of the Zimbabwean elephants are found.¹⁴⁶ Peta Thorneycroft and Aislinn Laing indicate that in 2013, about 300 elephants “and countless other animals” were killed by cyanide poisoning in Hwange National Park, regarded as the worst massacre in the region in 25 years.¹⁴⁷ In 2015, other cyanide killings were reported where 62 elephants were killed after eating poisoned oranges laced with cyanide in Kariba and Hwange National Parks.¹⁴⁸ Poachers in Zimbabwe have widely adopted poisoning for killing the elephants; as Jerry Chifamba notes, *The Chronicle* mentions that about 53 elephants were killed by cyanide poisoning in 2017.¹⁴⁹ The chemical attacks on elephants negatively impact the

¹⁴⁴ Paul Steyn, “African Elephant Numbers Plummet 30 Percent, Landmark Survey Finds,” *National Geographic*, August 31, 2016, <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-african-elephants-population-decrease-great-elephant-census/>.

¹⁴⁵ “Alarming Upsurge in Rhino Poaching in Key African Countries Say Traffic/WWF,” WWF, June 6, 2007, <https://www.worldwildlife.org/press-releases/alarming-upsurge-in-rhino-poaching-in-key-african-countries-say-traffic-wwf>.

¹⁴⁶ Brian Latham, “The Number of Elephants in Parts of Zimbabwe is Plunging,” Bloomberg, February 18, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-18/zimbabwe-elephant-population-dwindles-amid-threat-from-poachers>.

¹⁴⁷ Peta Thorneycroft and Aislinn Laing, “Poachers Kill 300 Zimbabwe Elephants with Cyanide,” *Telegraph*, October 20, 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/10390634/Poachers-kill-300-Zimbabwe-elephants-with-cyanide.html>.

¹⁴⁸ Julian Rademeyer, “The Role of the Secret Police in Zimbabwe’s Deeping Poaching Crisis,” *African Arguments*, August 4, 2016, <http://africanarguments.org/2016/08/04/the-role-of-the-notorious-central-intelligence-organisation-in-zimbabwes-worsening-wildlife-crisis/>.

¹⁴⁹ Jerry Chifamba, “Zimbabwe: Poachers Wield Cyanide as New Weapon against Elephants.” *All Africa*, February 13, 2018, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201802130838.html>.

elephant population of the two countries as the animals decrease in number, and that affects the tourism industry, which fuels the economy.

Zimbabwean poachers do not only kill shared animals within their borders, they also cross the border and poach in Botswana. A Zimbabwean poaching kingpin, Dumisani Moyo, was arrested in Botswana for possession of rhino horn.¹⁵⁰ According to Lebogang Mosikare of Mmegi News, the arrested culprit is involved in sponsoring poaching of rhino and elephant in Botswana.¹⁵¹ Such activity has impacts on the population of megafauna in Botswana.

C. UNGOVERNED BORDERS

The poaching activities described in the previous section thrive in part because the vast porous borders surrounding these states constitute ungoverned spaces in which illicit activities like poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks can take place without hindrance. The most problematic area of Botswana's borders in this respect is the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KZTFCA), which spans the northern part of Botswana as well as portions of Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 4.

¹⁵⁰ Lebogang Mosikare, "How Botswana Finally, Nailed SADC Poaching Kingpin," *Mmegi Online*, January 12, 2018, www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=73915&dir=2018/January/12.

¹⁵¹Mosikare.



Figure 4. Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area.¹⁵²

The KAZA TFCA is a vast area of savannah encompassing three states where the national parks are adjacent to one another, leaving the area sparsely populated. As a result there is very little infrastructure in this area in the form of border crossing points—only six in a stretch of approximately 1,100 km.¹⁵³ The area between the crossing points, which is secured by patrols by Botswana security forces, cannot be covered entirely because of its vastness. Thus, it is porous, enabling poachers to cross borders frequently

¹⁵² Source: “Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area,” *2012 Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed July 27, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kavango-Zambezi-Transfrontier-Conservation-Area-1883803>.

¹⁵³ Kanika Saigal, “African Elephants Are Migrating to Safety and Telling Each Other How to Get There,” *Quartz Africa*, February 23, 2018, <https://qz.com/1203988/african-elephants-are-migrating-to-safety-and-telling-each-other-how-to-get-there/>.

to escape arrest, and they are highly unlikely to be intercepted by the neighboring states' security forces. In addition, the terrain is a rugged dense vegetation that offers an advantage to poachers as it gives cover for illegal activities, making it hard to govern. During rainy season, the terrain is difficult to traverse on vehicles due to black cotton soil, which bogs down vehicles, and that limits the monitoring and control in certain areas. Thus, the area is a challenge to operatives as it limits their authority in conducting long border patrols. The KAZA TFCA states have weak border surveillance and security, which is why there is continual border crossing to Botswana to perpetrate illicit acts like trafficking and the killing of Botswana's wildlife, particularly rhinoceros and elephants.

Another problematic border area comprising ungoverned space is in the southern part of Botswana, along the Botswana-South Africa border. There, illegal border crossings are common for the perpetration of illicit activities in Botswana by South African criminals. For example, cattle rustling and smuggling of stolen vehicles have become increasingly common.¹⁵⁴

Ungoverned spaces of vast porous borders of these regional states are a serious challenge for Botswana. All illegal border crossings, especially by armed poachers, undermine territorial sovereignty and threaten Botswana's security. This external threat by transborder poachers might make Botswana vulnerable to terrorist acts as has happened elsewhere. Therefore, it is imperative for Botswana to come up with robust counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism strategies in cooperation with its neighboring states.

D. WEAK ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY

The weak capacity for enforcement by government institutions in the region is a grave problem for Botswana, because it allows criminal syndicates to go unpunished; socio-economic problems further contribute to this issue because corruption and crime are rife within neighboring states. Therefore, some criminals, due to their connections with government officials, are not prosecuted for crimes of poaching, which increases the

¹⁵⁴ Pini Bothoko, "Ramatlabama Farmers Hit by Cross Border Cattle Rustling," Mmegionline, June 13, 2018, <http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=76194&dir=2018/june/13>.

threat to wildlife and undermines Botswana's efforts to curb poaching. The East Asian syndicates further fuel poaching by corrupting government officials, who then allow them to traffic wildlife trophies with ease. Weak capacity in enforcement fails to deter poaching, and socio-economic conditions escalate poaching for ivory and rhino horn.

Several states in the region offer important lessons to Botswana about how weak governance can worsen poaching and give space to other crimes to happen, creating regional problems that Botswana must address. South Africa shows how weak enforcement can make a population of wildlife—in this case, rhinos—vulnerable to poaching. Namibia also shows inadequacy of law enforcement, as poachers there frequently cross to Botswana for poaching. Zambia is a case in which security forces are implicated in poaching, resulting in the total collapse of the Zambian rhino and elephant populations. In addition, all of these cases show how weak enforcement in the area of poaching allows other crimes to occur.

1. South Africa

The South African judicial system lacks commitment to deter or stop poaching by not giving the deserving punishment to habitual poachers as they continue with their illegal acts.¹⁵⁵ Weak capacity for enforcement by South Africa allows poaching for rhino to thrive. Poachers with previous offences are arrested in rhino dealings and later released on bail, and while on bail, continue with poaching; for example, habitual rhino poachers Van Deventer and Niklaas “have countless previous convictions of rhino poaching.”¹⁵⁶ Vanda Felbab Brown asserts that arresting low-level poachers does not reduce poaching since they are easily replaceable; therefore, South Africa's failure to arrest syndicate leaders and dismantle the syndicate network allows poaching to continue.¹⁵⁷ Laurel Neme reports that the delay in prosecution of poaching kingpin Domisani Gwala and his

¹⁵⁵ Laurel Neme, “Why Has This Rhino Poaching Trial Delayed 17 Times?” *National Geographic*, November 13, 2017, <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/wildlife-watch-rhino-poaching-trial-south-africa/>.

¹⁵⁶ Simon Bloch, “Serial Rhino Poaching Brothers Denied Bail by Limpopo Court,” *News24*, June 6, 2017, <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/serial-rhino-poaching-brothers-denied-bail-by-limpopo-court-20170606>.

¹⁵⁷ Felbab-Brown, *The Extinction Market*, 115.

co-accused due to “changes in venue, changes in magistrates, changes in defense counsel, and requests by Gwala’s attorney for time because of lack of preparation” is not helping in deterring poaching.¹⁵⁸ According to WildAid, South Africa’s rhino crisis is due to incompetence of the prosecutors and the failure to prosecute habitual rhino poachers, as some get acquittals because prosecutors lack knowledge of the appropriate law.¹⁵⁹

In addition, the disbanding of the most effective law-enforcement and prosecutions unit in South Africa contributes to the increase of poaching for rhino and the low rate of prosecution of poachers.¹⁶⁰ According to Save the Rhino, one South African millionaire, a rhino breeder, treated CITES regulations with contempt by selling his rhino horn stock, and no action was taken against him. At the same time, Julian Rademeyer states that a TRAFFIC report reveals that Chinese criminal syndicates are “now processing rhino horn locally into—beads, bracelets, bangles, and powder—to evade detection and provide a finished product to their consumers in East Asia.”¹⁶¹ Weak enforcement is thus a persistent problem that allows the poaching syndicates to expand beyond poaching and establish other portions of their operations relating to wildlife crime within the borders of South Africa. Moreover, these criminals are also involved in drugs and money laundering; as Felbab Brown reveals, the East Asian syndicates used to supply local syndicates in Cape Town with methaqualone and agents to produce methamphetamines.¹⁶² Such lack of enforcement makes rhinos vulnerable to traffickers.

2. Namibia

As in South Africa, in Namibia, weak enforcement allows corruption to thrive, which enables illegal trade in wildlife and allows poaching and poaching products to spill across its borders. According to TRAFFIC, corrupt officials at border points and airports

¹⁵⁸ Neme, “Why Has This Rhino Poaching Trial Delayed 17 Times?”

¹⁵⁹ Neme.

¹⁶⁰ Felbab-Brown, *The Extinction Market*, 124.

¹⁶¹ Julian Rademeyer, “The State Security Boss and The Rhino Horn Trafficker,” *Al Jazeera Investigates*, November 13, 2016, <http://killingforprofit.com/2016/11/13/the-state-security-boss-and-the-rhino-horn-trafficker/>.

¹⁶² Felbab-Brown, *The Extinction Market*, 73.

facilitate the illegal passage of contraband.¹⁶³ For example, a Namibian police officer was charged with turning a blind eye to the passage of 18 rhino horns at the International Airport from Namibia to South Africa.¹⁶⁴ Some senior Namibian government officials are also involved in wildlife crime according to Wildlife Angel; at least two ministers and a senior official in the northern region are implicated in the poaching of rhinos and elephants in Etosha National Park.¹⁶⁵ According to a Namibian Financial Intelligence report, a Chinese businessman dealing with wildlife trophies was arrested after buying two elephants tusks from Namibian Ministry of Environment officials.¹⁶⁶ J.P. Olivier de Sardan holds that “the complex of corruption is almost unanimously experienced as an evil or even a calamity.”¹⁶⁷ This is true in Namibia where many problems are caused by corruption in the region, such as officials’ complicity with criminal syndicates that traffic wildlife products. Wildlife crime and corruption are prevalent due to the lack of enforcement capacity, and that makes wildlife vulnerable to poachers.

3. Zambia

In Zambia, the problem of weak enforcement is compounded by the fact that its military is implicated in poaching activities. Corruption and crime are prevalent in Zambia due to weak enforcement, which plays a role in poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks, as officials and poaching syndicates circumvent laws and policies to perpetrate their illicit acts. Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI) reveals that out of 175 countries, Zambia is ranked 96 of the least corrupt

¹⁶³ WWF Report 2015, “Strategies for Fighting Corruption in Wildlife Conservation.: A Premier,” WWF/TRAFFIC, November 30, 2015, http://www.traffic.org/generalreports/wci_strategies_for_fighting_corruption_wildlife_conservation.Pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Republic of Namibia, Financial Intelligence Centre, *Rhino and Elephant Poaching, Illegal Trade in Related Wildlife Products and Associated Money Laundering in Namibia*, Trends and Typology Report No. 1, 2017, <https://www.fic.na/uploads/TrendsandTypologies/FICTrendsandTypologyReports/>.

¹⁶⁵ “Namibia between Corruption and Poaching,” Wildlife Angel, December 28, 2015, <https://wilang.org/en/namibia-between-corruption-and-poaching/>.

¹⁶⁶ Republic of Namibia, Financial Intelligence Centre, *Rhino and Elephant Poaching*.

¹⁶⁷ J.P. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no.1 (1999): 29.

nations.¹⁶⁸ According to Andreas Wilson Spath, in 2013, a Zambian Defense Minister was intercepted with three large bags full of elephant tusks at the International Airport; he was never arrested, claiming immunity, and the tusks were confiscated by ZAWA. Amazingly enough, though, the same tusks were found in the luggage of a Chinese diplomat two days later at the same airport, and no charges were brought.¹⁶⁹

Indeed, high-ranking military and other officials having a link with Chinese syndicates frequently perpetrate corruption in Zambia:

Colonel Oscar Chapula was arrested along with two unnamed Chinese embassy officials who reportedly claimed diplomatic immunity. They were released following interventions by authorities who included then defense Minister Geoffrey Mwamba, army commander Brigadier General Paul Mihova, and the then Chinese ambassador to Zambia, Zhou Yuxiao, who deployed his military attaché to win back custody of the tusks.¹⁷⁰

These officials are acting with impunity, as a weak state with weak institutions allows corruption, crime, and illegal trafficking of ivory to thrive. According to David Shepherd, crime in Zambia is very high. He observes, “Zambia’s capital city, Lusaka, is a well-known wildlife crime hub where wildlife products are processed and criminals can source weapons, finance, and other logistics.”¹⁷¹ Numbeo holds that Zambia is engulfed in a plethora of crimes, the most prevalent being corruption and bribery, which stands at 80.26 percent of the total crimes.¹⁷² According to Newton Sibanda, people living adjacent to national parks are often recruited by wildlife criminal syndicates via cash payments and,

¹⁶⁸ “Zambia Corruption Rank, 1998 to 2018,” Trading Economics, accessed May 31, 2018, <https://tradingeconomics.com/zambia/corruption-rank>.

¹⁶⁹ Andreas Wilson Spath, “Home Grown Corruption Is Killing Africa’s Rhinos and Elephants,” Daily Maverick, November 28, 2014, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-11-28-home-grown-corruption-is-killing-africas-rhinos-and-elephants/#.WxD6oEgvzIU>.

¹⁷⁰ Nkala, “Zambian Poaching Crisis Fueled by Chinese Military.”

¹⁷¹ David Shepherd, “Wildlife Crime Prevention: Zambia,” David Shepherd Wildlife Foundation, accessed June 12, 2018, <https://davidshepherd.org/our-works/wildlife-crime-wildlife-crime-prevention-project-zambia>.

¹⁷² “Crime in Zambia: 2009 to 2018,” Numbeo, accessed June 1, 2018, https://www.numbeo.com/crime/country_result.jsp?country=Zambia.

due to their poor living conditions, become involved in poaching for rhinos and elephants.¹⁷³

Thus, corruption and crime coupled with weak enforcement capacity are one cause of the elephant and rhino meltdown in Zambia. Non-participation of the military in fighting poaching exacerbates this illicit activity in Zambia since the military is implicated in poaching, which is hugely detrimental to wildlife as well as being a security issue in Zambia.

4. Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, weak enforcement capacity against poaching is paired with prosecution of journalists who try to expose the corruption that weak enforcement promotes. Weak enforcement and weak penalties allow those who are connected to perpetrate illegal acts without any deterrence. According to the CPI for 2017, Zimbabwe ranked 157 out of 180 least corrupt countries.¹⁷⁴ Rademeyer maintains that poaching rises in Zimbabwe because of the involvement of some influential government operatives.¹⁷⁵ For example, an operative of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) was arrested for supplying the poachers with weapons; even though arrested, he is still an employee of the CIO because of his connections with high-ranking government officials.¹⁷⁶ Rademeyer also notes that according to conservationists, there is proof that some corrupt game rangers and poachers often collude with CIO operatives on dealings with rhino horn or elephant tusks.¹⁷⁷ Temba Dube notes that the Minister of Environment, Water, and Climate, Oppah Machinguri-Kashiri, is on record mentioning that “highly placed people are involved in poaching in the country.”¹⁷⁸ *Mail and Guardian* points out that senior Zanu-PF officials

¹⁷³ Newton Sibanda, “Poaching High in Rufunsa,” *Zambian Daily Mail*, January 14, 2015, <https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/poaching-high-rufunsa/>.

¹⁷⁴ “Zimbabwe Corruption Perception Index 2017,” Transparency International, February 21, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.

¹⁷⁵ Rademeyer, “The Role of the Secret Police.”

¹⁷⁶ Rademeyer.

¹⁷⁷ Rademeyer.

¹⁷⁸ Temba Dube, “Poacher Kills 2 Cops with CIO Firearm,” *Chronicle*, December 21, 2015, <http://www.chronicle.co.zw/poacher-kills-2-cops-with-cio-firearm/>.

and military chiefs who invaded the wildlife-rich Save Valley Conservancy were ordered to vacate but defied eviction orders.¹⁷⁹ This led to poaching for rhinos and elephants by these officials and military chiefs. Rhino horn and elephant tusk trafficking is prevalent in Zimbabwe: as Brian Chitemba and Tinashe Farawo note, in September 2015, security officials in Hong Kong Airport intercepted two inbound airmail parcels of ivory worth over US\$100,000.¹⁸⁰ Law enforcement officers, according to Brian Chitemba and Tinashe Farawo, also perpetrate poaching, as senior police officers, rangers, and Asians were implicated in the killings of 22 elephants for ivory in 2015.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, according to Edom Kassaye, immediately after publication of the poaching incident, the journalists who reported on it were arrested on claims that they published falsehoods.¹⁸² Selective prosecution contributes to poaching, allowing those with connections to carry out poaching without any hindrance.

E. CONCLUSION

Transborder poaching thrives in the states surrounding Botswana, negatively affecting Botswana's wildlife, economy, and security. This poaching phenomenon is rife due to ungoverned spaces characterized by porous borders, weak governance, and weak institutions of enforcement, as well as economic incentives associated with megafauna products. Corruption by officials in the region facilitates poaching because poachers bribe officials to let rhino and elephant tusks be trafficked easily. Moreover, the high demand for the rhino horn and elephant tusks in East Asia escalates poaching, as the prices of the products are high. Also exacerbating the problem of transborder poaching are unstable socio-economic conditions and weak governance in neighboring states, which poses a grave security threat that might have a link with terrorist groups.

¹⁷⁹“Conservancy Land Invaders Defy Zanu-PF” *Mail and Guardian*, August 15, 2014, <https://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-14-conservancy-land-invaders-defy-zanu-pf/>.

¹⁸⁰ Brian Chitemba and Tinashe Farawo, “Top Cop Fingered in Poaching Saga.” *Sunday Mail*, November 1, 2015, <http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/top-cop-fingered-in-poaching-saga/>.

¹⁸¹ Chitemba and Farawo.

¹⁸² Edom Kassaye, “Zimbabwe Journalist Fights Charges after Poaching Report,” *Global Journalist*, February 11, 2017, <https://globaljournalist.org/2017/02/zimbabwe-journalist-fights-charges-poaching-report/>.

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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem of transborder poaching due to ungoverned spaces undermines security and economies in the SADC region. In particular, poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks, coupled with maladministration and porous borders due to weak state institutions in neighboring states, pose serious challenges to Botswana's security and economy. Poaching thrives in the region because of the ungoverned spaces of neighboring states' porous borders, weak enforcement capacity, and poor socio-economic conditions. The borders are vast, with challenging and difficult terrain to monitor and fully control, and as such, transborder syndicates can perpetrate illegal acts of poaching. Such poaching is a threat to eco-tourism, which contributes substantially to Botswana's GDP. Moreover, where state institutions are weak and there are high levels of crime and corruption, investor confidence is weakened, which further dampens the economy. Worsening the problem is that Chinese syndicates fuel and facilitate poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks in the region through bribing officials and paying high prices for rhino horn and ivory, as these products are in high demand in East Asia.

Thus, it is incumbent on Botswana to address this security threat so that poaching does not bring terrorism into the region as it has elsewhere. For Botswana to eradicate transborder poaching and prevent the emergence of a poaching-terrorism nexus, Gaborone must implement both short- and long-term prevention measures. Any such measures will require the provision of optimal resources. Considering the risk poaching poses to the national interest, the magnitude of the task, and the resources needed to accomplish it, a dedicated budget for anti-poaching tasks should be approved by the legislature. This reliable funding will ensure that the appropriate resources are in place to effectively combat poaching.

Botswana's top priority must be to protect its porous borders. For Botswana's vast porous borders to be monitored and controlled effectively, a high-mobility capability should be developed, centered on procurement of hardware—helicopters, vehicles, drones, and other surveillance devices—as this equipment would be a force multiplier, allowing anti-poaching patrols to operate effectively in a much larger area, and playing a

huge role in making execution of the task yield results. On the ground, all Botswana border posts should have scanners to detect any trafficking of contraband. Furthermore, manpower is a prerequisite for properly maintaining surveillance of the entire vast porous borders, and physical presence of personnel is a great deterrent to any illegal activity. Optimizing these personnel will require human resource management to recruit more personnel to be engaged in anti-poaching activities, and this recruitment effort can only happen if the budget allows.

Authorities also should restructure Botswana's anti-poaching efforts. Botswana's existing anti-poaching cluster includes the department of wildlife, police, intelligence services, prisons, and BDF. Because of this arrangement, there are no coordinated efforts to fully address the poaching problem as each of these organizations formulates its own approach. To have unity of effort, all of the parent departments should devote relevant personnel to forming a dedicated anti-poaching coordinating center. As part of the restructuring, this center should be the one institution coordinating and directing the anti-poaching operations in Botswana. To that end, it would require a National Anti-Poaching Joint Fusion Center—a joint command center that should have both strategic intelligence and joint operational planning staffed by experts from various agencies. Such an anti-poaching cluster must have structures in place that will ensure that this problem of poaching is addressed fully, including a comprehensive strategy to counter rhino horn and elephant poaching. In other words, the members of the cluster will be the ones making the task analysis that will inform them how to prepare for the task. As such, this unit will prevent the escalation of poaching in Botswana by preparing and protecting against any transborder violation.

In addition to streamlining its approach to enforcing the law, Botswana should also toughen its laws regarding poaching, especially concerning those who commit triple offences at once like illegal border crossing, illegal possession of arms of war, and killing of the megafauna, in order to deter such illegal activity. Current sentences are not deterring poaching effectively enough. Moreover, some poachers are given fines instead of long jail sentences—fines that the poachers themselves or their kingpins often pay, freeing them to continue their illegal activities. Regarding foreigners involved in this

illegal activity, there should be laws that ensure that any foreigner caught trafficking rhino horn and ivory is deported and declared a persona non grata since such criminals are a threat to national interests.

Moreover, Botswana should fully involve the citizenry in conservation programs by educating the community about the value of wildlife to the country, as well as ensuring that communities living with wildlife benefit from proceeds of wildlife. Botswana's hunting ban has deprived these communities of their share of trophy hunting fees, an important source of revenue. As a result, members of these communities are getting involved in poaching. Programs that use proceeds from wildlife tourism to fund community development projects will reduce poaching by locals since they would understand the importance and reap the benefits of wildlife initiatives. Likewise, wildlife education programs will teach people the value of wildlife and possibly encourage them to report poaching to the authorities and support government wildlife initiatives.

Finally, Botswana should also appeal to international organizations and NGOs to assist in any form, be it funding, training, or provision of equipment to support the anti-poaching initiative.

While all these measures are important and necessary, the fact is that Botswana cannot stop poaching alone—regional problems require regional effort. Presently, the regional states have bilateral and regional arrangements where poaching is on the agenda, but it is not producing the desired results because poaching is not reduced. This trend indicates that regional states are failing to address the problem; therefore, it is imperative that regional states reorganize their anti-poaching endeavors to come up with better policies and strategies to address the problem.

Botswana should therefore take the lead on a number of international initiatives. One such initiative is to coordinate border security. States share borders, and the control and security of these borders is a mutual responsibility. The poachers traverse the region's porous borders with little hindrance, and that needs to be addressed collectively. Moreover, wildlife in the region is shared by these states because of its migratory nature. This across-the-borders movement by wildlife calls for regional states to have a robust

coordinated anti-poaching operation along the state borders. Therefore, states in the region must focus their security efforts toward border security to curb transborder crime. Regional states must deter transborder poaching by establishing measures that ensure safe and secure borders.

This goal can be achieved through unity of effort. SADC states should collectively plan and strategize on how to eradicate transborder crime, including poaching, by conducting regular meetings to formulate strategies for addressing the problem. States should effectively equip border posts with scanners to enhance searches of containers and haulage trucks, and deploy joint border surveillance teams to cover their vast porous borders with regular patrols. Such measures will safeguard the regional wildlife and enhance security, as they will likewise deter the poaching-terrorism nexus that manifests elsewhere. Furthermore, regional states should appeal to international bodies like the UN to assist in engaging consumer nations to stop their nationals from taking part in the illegal business.

Another measure Botswana could instigate is to harmonize regional anti-poaching laws. Currently poaching laws in the SADC states and their enforcement are highly variable and weak, which allows poaching to persist in areas poachers view as lenient in their laws. Thus, nation-states should make the law uniform in the region by having essentially the same stiff penalties to discourage the would-be poachers from targeting certain countries with lax laws for poaching. The rules of engagement should also be consistent and commensurate with the prevalent threat; thus, use of lethal force against poachers should be permitted.

Ultimately, however, minimizing poaching in the region will require each individual state to effectively address this illicit act; states themselves must have strong institutions of governance to be capable of asserting authority over their territory, including borders. Poaching levels are high in the region, and it is imperative that the drivers of poaching should be addressed. For states to contain poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks, they must address socio-economic factors such as poverty, corruption, youth unemployment, and weak governance. Ultimately, the regional states must strive for good governance, even though that varies in interpretation, and must promote civil

liberties, freedom of association and speech, rule of law, respect for human rights, transparency, and accountability.¹⁸³ This good governance would maximize the chances that social ills like crime and corruption as well as poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks are curtailed, thereby strengthening regional security and creating safe borders.

Poaching for rhino horn and elephant tusks is a grave security threat that undermines territorial integrity and negatively impacts the economy. All regional states should be fully committed to collectively combating transborder poaching, especially because poaching elsewhere shows a pattern of having links with terrorism. This collective effort will require dedicated efforts by regional states to monitor and control their shared borders. Whether such poaching–terrorist links already exist or are liable to exist in SADC region remains an object for future research and vigilance.

¹⁸³ Yap Kioe Sheng, "What Is Good Governance?" United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific accessed June 12, 2018, <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

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