

No. 3241

(Translation)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

A F F I D A V I TDeponent: KUWASHIMA, Kazue.

Date of birth: March 4, 1884.

Domicile: 3-365 Tamagawa Todoroki, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

Having first duly sworn an oath on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

(1) I entered the Diplomatic Service in October, 1908, and, after holding posts in China and the United States as well as in the Foreign Office at Tokyo, was appointed Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs (which changed its name to the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs after June, 1934) in August, 1933, remaining in that office till January, 1937. I was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherlands from June, 1937, to December, 1938, and Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Brazil from January, 1939, to November, 1940. I retired from office in January, 1941.

(2) I was transferred to the office of Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs from consul-general at Tientsin in August, 1933. The then Foreign Minister was Count UCHIDA. On September 14, about one month after that, Count UCHIDA resigned on the ground of ill health, and Mr. HIROTA succeeded him as Foreign Minister. The relations between Japan and China as well as those between Japan and the Western Powers were gloomy and oppressive at the time of Foreign Minister Count UCHIDA, owing to the Manchurian incident. Above all, the diplomatic relations between Japan and China were, in effect, half broken off, though ministers were still exchanged between them. And it was the firm resolution of Mr. HIROTA upon assuming the office of Foreign Minister to alleviate the oppressive tension attending the Sino-Japanese relations. Mr. HIROTA in person told me that very frequently. Besides, he made statements before the newspapermen to the same effect. At the Diet also, he made it clear that his policy aimed at alleviating the tense relations between Japan and China. People called the diplomacy of Count UCHIDA "the burnt ground diplomacy", and that of Mr. HIROTA the conciliatory diplomacy.

(3) Mr. HIROTA carried out his resolution steadily in every sphere of Japan's foreign relations. The Ambassador to China, when Mr. HIROTA assumed the office of Foreign Minister, was Mr. ARIYOSHI, Akira, a veteran diplomat, eager for the rapprochement between Japan and China. He had exerted all his efforts in alleviating the tense relations between the two countries, but could not attain the desired object easily. After the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, it was true that the Chinese, in and out of office, were prone to avoid to associate with Japanese, and such circumstances worked as important restraint for the activity of Minister ARIYOSHI. But, it was indeed favourable for Japan that Mr. HIROTA succeeded Count UCHIDA as Foreign Minister just when such feelings were gradually fading with the lapse of time. Mr. ARIYOSHI also seemed to be much encouraged.

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(4) The attitudes of the Nationalist Government towards Japan began to change considerably from the beginning of 1934, owing to the efforts of Minister ARIYOSHI. It resumed, for instance, the payment of several private loans which had been suspended since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, though in a small scale. Meanwhile, Minister ARIYOSHI opened conversations with Mr. WANG, Ching-wei, the then Home Minister and Foreign Minister of the Nationalist Government, upon the radical improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations. This ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation progressed considerably speedily. Mr. WANG at first maintained, at this conversation, that the settlement of the Manchoukuo question was the requisite condition for the general improvement of the relations between Japan and China. Minister ARIYOSHI, however, explained that the public opinion in Japan would not allow the Government to retract the recognition of Manchoukuo since Japan had already recognized it, and that any Government, if there be any, which would venture to do that, would find it difficult to exist even for one day. Mr. WANG seemed to understand the awkward position of the Japanese Government. The Nationalist Government, however, had to give consideration to the public opinion in its own country, and the main subject of the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation thereafter, accordingly, lay in how to harmonize the difficult and contradictory standpoints of both Governments with respect to the Manchoukuo question. The documents concerned are said to have been lost in the fire during the war. But the telegram No. 368, under date of April 20, 1934, addressed to the Foreign Minister from the consul-general at Nanking, which miraculously escaped fire, is a precious material reporting the contents of the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation of April 13.

In this way, the efforts of Foreign Minister HIROTA to improve the Sino-Japanese relations appeared much hopeful in 1934.

(5) On April 17, 1934, when the negotiation for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations between Japanese Minister to China ARIYOSHI and Chinese Foreign Minister WANG had hardly been opened, there arose a question of the so-called unofficial statement of spokesman AMO.

At that time, Mr. MONNET, an expert financier of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, was staying in China from the end of 1934. The Foreign Office frequently received information from the Japanese Legation at Nanking and other sources that Mr. MONNET was drafting a plan for international cooperation to China, from which Japan was to be excluded, in concert with those antagonists of Mr. WANG, Chin-wei. The Foreign Office, thereupon, instructed the Japanese Minister to China and other officials to keep in touch with Mr. MONNET and discourage him so that his activity in China might be restrained. Telegraphic instructions to the same effect were frequently given to the Japanese representatives in China from the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, in which rather exaggerated expressions were used with a view to impress Mr. MONNET strongly.

The so-called unofficial statement of spokesman AMO to the newspapermen was a patchwork of the contents of those telegraphic instructions drawn up for such special purpose by a certain bureau of the Foreign Office. And this, when reported by the press as if had been the policy of the Japanese Government, gave rise to public discussion.

According to what I was told by Foreign Minister HIROTA at that time he had nothing to do with that unofficial statement of Mr. AMO before it was published and he reprimanded him because of that statement.

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(6) Since the Nationalist Government of China was formed at the beginning of the Showa Era, there had been two main currents of opinion within Japan as to the attitudes Japan should take towards the said Government. The one was tinted with pro-Nationalist Government sentiments, claiming to place confidence in the bona fides of the Chinese Government and strengthen the tie of friendship subsisting between the two nations. Upon this basis, all the problems between Japan and China were to be solved. The other was contradictory to the above views. It emphasized that the Nationalist Government was, after all, the Government of the Kwomintang, and, therefore, anti-Japanese. To show friendly attitudes towards such a Government would only encourage and strengthen its despise, and prove destructive to the settlement of various problems between Japan and China. And it insisted upon taking drastic attitudes towards the Nationalist Government. It was a matter of course, therefore, that there were dissenting voices against the above-said attempts of the Foreign Office within Japan. In China also, there were not a few persons who offered opposition to the ARIYOSHI-WANG conversation, not only among the people, but even within the Nationalist Government. But these opposers in both nations took the attitude to contemplate the development of the conversation in 1934.

(7) Foreign Minister HIROTA emphasized his policy for the rapprochement between Japan and China as well as his confidence in the Nationalist Government all the more in his address delivered at the Diet on January 22, 1935, and also in his statement made at a committee afterwards. He declared, at a committee, that he had not the slightest doubt about the sincerity of Mr. CHIANG, Kai-shek, in his exertion for the betterment of the Sino-Japanese relations, and roused public attention. On the other hand, Mr. WANG, Chin-wei, and Mr. CHIANG, Kai-shek, expressed their intention in response to the above-mentioned statement of Foreign Minister HIROTA. From that time on, the Nationalist Government resumed the control of anti-Japanese movements in real earnest. The trade between the two countries, which had been stagnant since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, regained its activity.

Early in May, the Foreign Minister in person took the initiative to submit to the Cabinet conference the question of raising the Japanese and Chinese Legations in China and in Japan respectively to the status of Embassies. This passed the Cabinet conference, and the Nationalist Government agreeing to the proposal, the raising of the status of the Legations was decided between the two Governments on May 17. The exchange of ambassadors between Japan and China had been advocated by those pro-Chinese for a long time, but at the end of April when Minister ARIYOSHI returned to Japan to make previous arrangements with the Government, the rumour was already abroad that it would be realized. At that time, certain military officers called at my office and expressed their dissention, though unofficially. Some of them pronounced it still premature. And, after the Cabinet conference decided to raise the status of the Legations, not a few military officers came to see me and revealed their anxiety about the influence this decision would exert upon the Kwantung Army.

(8) The situation in North China had been calm on the whole, since the conclusion of the Truce Agreement of May, 1932, at Tangku. But it began to change at the beginning of 1935. Especially after May, when the Legations were raised to Embassies, various matters occurred suddenly. My memory is not quite unfailling about the particulars of those old occurrences, but there occurred frequent skirmishes, from May or June onward, between the Kwantung Army and Chinese forces, near the border between Jehol and the provinces of Hopeh and Chahal -- such remote and out-of-the-way place where no official from the Foreign Office was stationed. The Kwantung Army, and sometimes the North China Stationary Force, would lodge protests directly with the Chinese Government, on all such occasions, on the ground that such were provocative

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acts on the part of the Chinese Government. They would impose considerably strict conditions such as, for instance, the withdrawal of Chinese forces from the above-mentioned provinces or the extermination of the Kwomintang branches in Hopeh and Chahal, and enforced the fulfilment of these conditions with an ultimatum. The Chinese Government regarded these as systematic plots designed by the Kwantung Army or the North China Stationary Force on small occurrences or some intentionally caused troubles. We were not so credulous as to believe everything that the Chinese Government pleaded, but still we could not but recognize that our military authorities in China were prone to raise a storm in a tea cup. It was our earnest hope that they should be more prudently, and we actually warned them against such destructive attitudes.

(9) It was early in June that a conference was held among the competent authorities of the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Ministry of the Navy, under the auspices of the Foreign Office. Prior to that, preliminary negotiations were made at a committee consisting of the chiefs of the sections concerned of the respective Ministries. On that occasion, the Foreign Office demanded more prudent attitudes of the Japanese military authorities in China, especially the leaders of the Kwantung Army. In response to this, the delegate of the War Office stated to the following effect in its own defense: (1) He pointed out that there still remained a large troop of CHANG HSUCH-LIANG's private army in North China, which was harassing the Japanese authorities there by taking the lead in the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo movements. And this caused not a little difficulty in maintaining the public order in Manchoukuo. (2) He called the attention of the delegates to the connection of trade and communications between North China and Manchuria, which had been severed with the outbreak of the Manchurian incident and was not yet restored, causing uneasiness in North China and Manchoukuo. (3) Lastly, he made reference to the Bolshevizing movement of the Chinese Communist Party in North China, which naturally had a grave influence upon the peace and order of Manchoukuo. He said we must take special precautions against such movement directed through Outer Mongolia and Chahal to Manchoukuo, and emphasized that these points must be taken into consideration when negotiating with the Nanking Government. To this, the delegate of the Foreign Office expressed his views as follows: (1) He admitted that the thorough-going control of the anti-Japanese movement was the very ground for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations, and declared that the Foreign Office was actually negotiating with the Nationalist Government along that line of policy. (2) As to the view that the restoration of the trade and communications between North China and Manchuria was requisite for the peace of these areas, he stated that the Foreign Office was of the same opinion, and pointed out the efforts of the diplomatic authorities in that line. (3) Lastly, as to the control of the Communist movement in China, he emphasized its necessity in Middle China and South China, not to speak of North China. He made it clear that the Foreign Office was actually negotiating with the Nanking Government in accordance with that policy. He maintained, however, that such questions must be brought to settlement through diplomatic negotiations with the Nationalist Government or any organ recognized by the said Government. The Foreign Office could not agree to the settlement of those problems through any other means. Moreover, it was the firm belief of the Foreign Office that, but for the method mentioned above, the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations would be utterly impossible.

(10) The delegates from the Army were Colonel HASHIMOTO, Gun, and Colonel KITA, Seiichi. They were both very sensible men, and understood the views of the Foreign Office well. Major-General NAGATA, Tetsuzan, the then Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Office, and Major-General OYAMA, Neiji, the then Chief of the Second Department, General Staff Office, supported the committee. Among the naval officers, Captain HONDA, the then Chief of the Sixth Section, Naval General Staff, also assisted the committee.

An agreement was reached at the committee, in this way, in June. And, on July 2, a tentative plan for the policy towards China was drawn up by the Chief of the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Office. This was the authority for the so-called HIROTA Three Principles. The committee continued its discussion upon that tentative plan, which was nearly completed in August. Throughout the negotiation, it appeared that the central organs of the Army kept in touch with the Kwantung Army and the North China Stationary Force. The progress of the committee was interrupted, however, by the assassination of Major-General NAGATA. The fixed plan was obtained about one month after the tragic incident. The heads of the said three ministries signed it. The approval of the Premier and the Finance Minister was also obtained by October 4. The Three Principles of the Japanese Policy towards China mentioned in the address of Foreign Minister HIROTA delivered at the Diet on January 21 of the following year, 1936, were based upon the very decision of October 4, 1935.

(11) The Foreign Office was not quite satisfied with the decision of October 4. Nevertheless, it could not but admit that the spirit of the tentative plan of July 2 was living in it. The Foreign Office layed special importance upon it because it guaranteed, by the undertakings of the above-said three ministries and with the understanding of the Premier and the Finance Minister, that the Army, especially the Kwantung Army and the North China Stationary Force, should respect the negotiation which was to be made between the Foreign Office and the Chinese Government in conformity with the very decision.

The three ministries despatched their respective envoys to China, in order to enforce the thorough understanding and respect of the new policy by the various organs in China. The Foreign Office despatched Mr. MORISHIMA, the then Chief of the First Section, Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs. The Army sent Major-General OKAMURA and the Navy Captain HONDA.

(12) Major-General OKAMURA assembled, at Dairen, the chiefs of the staff of the troops stationed at various places in China, and conveyed the decision. On that occasion, Major-General OKAMURA was annoyed by the strong opposition of the Kwantung Army to the new decision. Mr. MORISHIMA, returning back from his trip in China, told that to me. He said he learned it from the aide-de-camp of Major-General OKAMURA.

Those envoys had hardly returned to Tokyo before various troubles arose in succession in China in defiance of the new policy. I have forgotten the particulars about those cases. But to cite several remarkable instances, the Chi-tung Regime was established, demanding self-government against the rule of the Nationalist Government, at the end of November, in the unfortified zones established by the Tangku Truce Agreement, that is, in the border between North China and Manchuria. The Foreign Office had a suspicion that this regime had a close connection with the Kwantung Army. In November, the Foreign Office received information that the Kwantung Army was concentrating its mechanized troops at Shanhaikwan with a view to intimidating North China. The Foreign Office warned the Army against the fact.

And again, in the middle of December, the Chi-cha Administrative Committee was formed. The Foreign Office suspected that the Japanese military authorities in China had a hand in the organization of that Committee. This Committee, however, had correspondence with the Nanking Government and was admitted by the latter to enjoy a certain degree of independence within the limit that it did not overshadow the sovereignty of the central Government.

The Foreign Office was against the establishment of the Chi-tung Regime. The smuggling in North China caused by the exceedingly low tariff rates of the said Regime was a matter greatly disadvantageous to Japan, even judged exclusively from the viewpoint of trade with China. I negotiated directly with the Kwantung Army concerning the matter, and inspected the actual circumstances of smuggling, when I was despatched to Manchoukuo and China by orders of the Foreign Minister ARITA from the beginning of June to the beginning of July.

Towards the Chi-cha Administration Committee, however, the Foreign Office took rather different attitudes. Though the Foreign Office had nothing to do with the formation of the said Committee, the consuls stationed in these areas used to deal with it, after they learned that it had correspondence with the Nanking Government, being formed with its approval.

(13) Meanwhile, the negotiations for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations made steady progress and attained the realization of the exchange of Ambassadors between the two countries in May, 1935. The national sentiments of China, however, seized this opportunity to take a turn unfavourable for Japan. In November and December, the situation got considerably serious. Mr. WANG CHING-WEI, who had shown such zeal for the rapprochement between Japan and China, barely escaped assassination, in November. And his most faithful friend and co-operator, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs TANG YU-JEN was assassinated in December. Such a change of the national sentiments in China was due, I considered, to the activities of the Japanese military against North China.

The attitudes of the Chinese authorities towards the HIROTA Three Principles were various; some approved, and others opposed. Mr. CHIANG KAI-SHEK, however, is said to have revealed that China could respond to the Japanese proposal with sincerity so long as the HIROTA Three Principles were carried out exclusively through the diplomatic means. And he actually declared to Ambassador ARIYOSHI, in the middle of November, that he had no objection to the negotiation based on the Three Principles. On that occasion, he also warned the Ambassador that it would become impossible to open negotiation if further disturbances were created in North China, and demanded a prudent consideration of the Japanese Government.

(14) It was through Foreign Minister HIROTA's address delivered at the Diet on January 21, 1936, that the Three Principles were let known to the general public for the first time. But the Government had decided the Principles on October 4 of the preceding year, 1935, as I have stated before. It was shortly after that that Foreign Minister HIROTA showed the Three Principles to Chinese Ambassador CHIANG TSUO-PIN. The above-mentioned opinion of Mr. CHIANG KAI-SHEK was revealed to our Ambassador ARIYOSHI in response to this.

Shortly after the official announcement of the Three Principles, the so-called February 26 incident broke out in Japan. The OKADA Cabinet collapsed, and Mr. HIROTA received an Imperial mandate to form a new Ministry.

(15) Mr. ARITA, the then Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, was ordered to succeed Ambassador ARIYOSHI in his office. He left Brussels at the end of 1935 and arrived at his post in Shanghai probably at the end of February, 1936. And one month had hardly elapsed when he was ordered home again, in accordance with the intention of Premier HIROTA who wished to appoint the diplomat whom he placed special confidence in as Foreign Minister. After receiving this order, he had a talk with Mr. CHANG CHUN, the then Chinese Foreign Minister, four times in all during the period from March 16 to 19. They exchanged frank views in order to find out the ground for the

adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations. They were old acquaintances and had a thorough-going discussion about the matter. These conversations convinced Mr. ARITA that there was a hope of compromising with China, through diplomatic negotiations based on the HIROTA Three Principles, if only the activities of the Japanese military against North China could be suppressed. I was told these facts by Mr. ARITA in person.

(16) Mr. ARITA, returning to Tokyo from his trip through North China and Manchuria, accused the office of Foreign Minister on April 2. Prior to that, when he visited Hsinking on his way home, on March 28, a responsible senior officer of the Kwantung Army conveyed to him the views of the said Army that the rapprochement between Japan and China under the Nationalist Government was impossible so long as the Kwomintang held fast to its anti-Japanese doctrine; that the Kwantung Army was against the negotiation for the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations based on the HIROTA Three Principles because they thought the Principles were too weak to accomplish anything; and that steps should be taken so as to urge the autonomy of North China. He made it clear that these were the opinions of the Kwantung Army. I was informed of this fact by Mr. ARITA in person, and also read a document of the Foreign Office giving a detailed account of the said views of the responsible officer of the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit No. 761)

(17) Mr. ARITA ordered me to negotiate with the central organs of the Japanese Army, with a view to paving the way for the realization of his own policy towards China. His intention was to have me persuade the central organs of the Army to suppress the activities of the Japanese military against North China. The Foreign Minister ordered me also to persuade the Army to withdraw or overhaul "Hokushi Shori Yoko (Gist of the Policy towards North China)" which the War Office had given to the North China Stationary Force on January 3, 1936.

In the light of the circumstances of the formation of the HIROTA Three Principles and the attitude of the military authorities in China towards these Principles, I was well aware of the difficulty to persuade the Army in this connection. Encouraged by the zeal of Foreign Minister ARITA, however, I set about negotiating with the competent authorities of the War Office and the General Staff Office, only to find that it was a difficult task as I had expected. They were not of such drastic opinions as expressed by a responsible senior officer of the Kwantung Army on March 28. But they had no confidence in their own power to enforce the faithfulness of those authorities in China to the decision of the Tokyo Government. They were ready to understand the policy of the new Foreign Minister, but reluctant to put it to practice. Foreign Minister ARITA in person negotiated with War Minister TERAUCHI in this connection. But it was hardly possible to count much upon it, judging from the circumstances of those days. Though I did not know much about the usages of the older days, it was the common sense at least after the Manchurian incident that, if one wished to succeed in persuading the central machineries of the Japanese Army, he had to deal first with the chief sections or bureaus of those central organs.

As regards the "Gist of the Policy towards North China", it was brought to discussion at a committee formed under the auspices of the Foreign Office, consisting of the competent chiefs of sections of those ministries concerned: the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Ministry of the Navy, and, this time, the Financial Department in addition. The standpoint of those committee members, however, was almost the same with that of the directors of bureaus with whom I used to negotiate at that time, and naturally they could hardly be expected to consent to the withdrawal or the thorough going amendment of the military instructions of January 3.

(18) The Japanese military authorities in China, in the meantime, did not hesitate, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, to take advantage of the vagueness of the said instructions and proceed with their own programme to encourage an autonomous government in North China. No one could tell what the result might be, if it was left unchecked. The Foreign Office was compelled, in this way, to compromise with the Army on condition that the new policy should be such that the central machineries of the Army could readily accept, and that the fundamental obstacles standing in the way of negotiations with the Nanking Government for the general improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations should be removed as thoroughly as possible. As a result of such compromise, the "Second Gist of the Policy towards North China" was drafted at the said Committee, and was approved by the Foreign, Finance and War Ministers and the Minister of the Navy by August 11.

(19) Foreign Minister ARITA was very much dissatisfied with this decision. When compared with the military instructions of January 3, however, this four ministry plan of August 11 shows clearly the effect of the exertion on the part of the Japanese Foreign Office to get rid of the fundamental obstacles to the anticipated negotiations with the Nanking Government for the adjustment of the general relations between Japan and China. It is also manifest that careful consideration is given therein to the respect of the interests of the Powers in China. For instance, the instruction of January 3 aimed chiefly at the extension of self-governing areas and the repletion of the substance of self-government. It also intended to prevent the influx of the foreign capital. Whereas, the decision of August 11 did not use the term "self-government", but adopted "bun-chi (sectional government)", which denoted a lesser degree of independence than "ji-chi (self-government)". This special term was used in consideration of the circumstances that the Chi-cha Administrative Committee was not permitted to use the term "self-government", but was allowed to enjoy a certain degree of privilege within the limit that it did not harm the sovereign rights of the central Government, through the negotiations with the Nanking Government early in December, 1935. This decision of August 11 also established the maintenance of the Chinese maritime customs system, the respect of the vested interests of the third Powers and the economic cooperation with the nationals of the third Powers.

(20) On August 24, the Chinese mob attacked four Japanese (two were newspapermen and the other two merchants) at Chengtu, killed two of them, and severely injured the other two. And shortly after that, a Japanese shop was mobbed at the port town of Pakhoi, Kwangtung Province, and a Japanese was killed. Then, in September, there occurred bloody cases in succession, such as the murder of a Japanese police officer of the consulate-general at the Japanese settlement of Hankow, the murder of a Japanese sailor at the international settlement of Shanghai, etc. These occurrences, as a matter of course, shocked the Japanese people.

(21) The Foreign Office negotiated with the Nationalist Government of China for the prompt settlement of these bloody cases. Nevertheless, the public opinion pointed out that these cases were not mere occurrences, and that they were rooted deep in the anti-Japanese sentiment original to China, rejecting to deal with them as mere accidents. It maintained, in this way, that the Japanese Government should take this opportunity to settle the anti-Japanese problems perfectly, as well as the general problems between Japan and China. The Foreign Office, therefore, referred those various problems to discussion en bloc, together with the above-mentioned cases of injury, at the negotiations with the Nationalist Government.

(22) The negotiation was made chiefly at Nanking on and after September 8. A detailed account of the progress of the negotiation is given in an official announcement of that period.

Conversations were held about thirty times during the period from September 8 to the end of December between Ambassador KAWAGOYE and Consul-General SUMA representing the Japanese side and Foreign Minister CHANG CHUN and Director of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs KAO TSUNG-WU representing the Chinese side. I was despatched to Nanking, in the meantime, by orders of the Foreign Minister, to urge the conclusion of the negotiation. By the beginning of December, negotiations had made a considerable progress with regard to various problems pending between the two countries.

(23) The Foreign Office was anchoring its hope upon the future development of the negotiation, when there broke out the so-called Suiyuan incident owing to the activities of a part of the officers of the Kwantung Army in Inner Mongolia. The attitude of the Chinese Government towards the Sino-Japanese negotiations also underwent a sudden change. It went as far as to disapprove the results of the past negotiations on the pretext of the Suiyuan incident. The negotiation was brought to a standstill and no further progress was made in spite of all the efforts on the part of the Japanese Government to urge it.

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The Diet was to open in the middle of January of the following year. Judging from the political standpoint of the then Government, it was considered to be untoward to leave the negotiation as it was at a deadlock. The Foreign Office was, thus, compelled to close the negotiation, except that for the settlement of the Chengtu and Fakhci incidents upon which perfect understanding had already been reached between Japan and China.

The HIROTA Cabinet resigned en masse in January, 1937. I also resigned the office of the Director of the Bureau of East-Asiatic Affairs, and then was transferred to the post of the Japanese Minister to the Netherlands.

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On this 19th day of August, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) KUWASHIMA, Kazue (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the above-mentioned date and place.

(Signed) MORISHIMA, Goro (Seal)

Witness

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) KUWASHIMA, Kazue (Seal)