

KAMEI, Kanichiro

Request by MUTO, Akira

a. Resident of Kamakura.

b. He was former member of House of Representatives and will give relevant testimony showing that Muto acted strictly within the scope of his Duties as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Off the Record Interrogation of KAMEI, Kenichiro held
on 30 April 1946

Answer received to Mr. Hyder's inquiry as to why the Japanese soldier commits such horrible atrocities:

- A. At the time of 1903 an expedition was sent to North China so as to safeguard the foreign residence at Peking. The Allied Powers sent an expeditionary force to Peking under treaty terms. That is the 1903 Incident. At that time the Japanese Army was the most disciplined army and was praised by the Japanese people. I would say that the Japanese Army grew too large without any discipline. The disciplined officers mainly connected with the Army revolted and they were expelled from the Army. The funny thing is in our country a clever boy of poor class has no chance to climb socially unless he goes into the military career or teaching career. So, the clever boys of poor families selected the military academy or the teaching profession. The education and discipline taught in the military academy and normal schools lacked the education of common sense. In the military academy they tried only to turn out people, I would say, who were good chess players, I mean tactical chess players, and good poker players otherwise good murderers. A good poker player, a good chess player, and an able murderer, that consisted the Japanese officer. That is entirely due to the defect of the Army education system. The normal schools were the same. The reason why the educational system in the Army and educational institutions was such was because the Government disapproved of the teaching of sociology studies. It was thought that if one was permitted to study sociology they would easily be placed under the influence of the Communistic idea. That is my analysis for that. Then, there was the stereotyped or fossilized system of governmental promotions. Unless one gained the favor of the wife of the man who sits over him he would never get a promotion. So, all the younger people lost ambition and since, I would say, 1920 or 1921, there was a great demoralization at large. These demoralized people were recruited into the Army.
- Q. Did you know of the atrocities at Nanking? Were they mentioned in Japanese papers?

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A. No, they were never mentioned. I had a report from my Chinese friends and also my friends who came back from Nanking told me. Several of my colleagues, that is to say, members of Parliament, were asked to go over to Nanking to console the expeditionary forces sent there and many of my friend went. Japanese newspapers were not independent. Before the Government tried to censor Japanese newspapers.

Q. Were newspapers censored that far back?

A. Yes.

Q. Who censored them, the Army?

A. Formal censorship was adopted from about 1936. At the same time the Army insisted that only Generals in active service could be made War Minister. But before that they established in the Army a section in charge of the publicity affairs and propaganda affairs, which was socially influential even with their censorship system.

Q. Did the War Minister encourage soldiers to kill as many as they could?

A. Which War Minister? It depends.

Q. Araki?

A. No. Personally I don't think so, but there is always a sentiment of punishment from the starting point. From was the beginning the Chinese expedition/under the feeling of sentiment of punishment. That kind of encouragement encouraged the tendency toward atrocities. Besides that our moral standard is somewhat different. You don't have any slapping by the officer toward a soldier. It is a common practice here. It is a kind of educational technique.

Q. Perhaps they desired to take it out on someone else. That could have been their psychology.

A. Yes.

INTERROGATION OF
KAMEI, Kenichiro

Date and Time: 30 April 1946, 1330-1645 hours

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : KAMEI, Kenichiro
Mr. Elton M. Hyder, Jr. Interrogator
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. Last week we were talking about the telegram that you received from General ONODARO. It was to the effect that he needed to see you about some event that might happen. That was before September 18. You saw him later?

A. About a week before, and his position at the time was Director of the Army Ordnance Department, or Budget Department. I don't know which is the proper translation. Anyway, he takes care of all the budgets and all the estimates.

Q. You saw him later and talked to him?

A. Later on. I came back to Tokyo - I don't remember accurately - sometime in the beginning of October and I visited General ONODARO. I knew General ONODARO when he was a Major and was stationed at Tientsin in 1918 and I was at the time Acting Council General in Japan at Tientsin. He was then working under Major General MINAMI, later War Minister. When I met the then General ONODARO in the beginning of October he told me, "I just wanted to let you know before hand about the Manchurian Incident and wanted you to know the opinion of myself as one of the leaders of the soldiers and peoples party".

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- Q. Did he tell you who was connected with the Manchurian Incident? Who planned it? Did he say the Kwantung Army?
- A. He did not mention exactly the names of the officers but the general impression was that he knew the plot beforehand.
- Q. He knew that Incident was going to happen on September 18?
- A. Some Army group, I don't say the whole Army institution, but a military clique or a group of Army officers in which General ONODARO was connected had been plotting the Manchurian Incident. I have that kind of impression.
- Q. I want to jump back to the resignation of General TANAKA as Premier. What was the main cause for his resignation - was it the murder of Chang Tso Lin in 1928?
- A. As far as I know, in the Diet Session of February 1929 the TANAKA Cabinet was supported by Seiyukai Majority, and our party, the Social People's Party, together with the Minseito Party had strongly denounced the expansion policy of General TANAKA's Cabinet and the Seiyukai policy, particularly, in connection with the, I would say, assassination or appropriation of the train on which General Chang Tso Lin was riding. This kind of impeachment and denouncement was on the front page of every newspaper and called forth the general support of public opinion. I don't know the channel through which the Emperor wanted to know, and could know, the actual status of the thing. But anyway, the Emperor did know that the Seiyukai and Army together plotted that Incident. The Emperor scolded Premier TANAKA and was very annoyed. TANAKA had been suffering from some heart disease/upset him and he died when he was lying in bed in the night in his villa.
- Q. Was not TANAKA criticized for not disclosing any report on the death of Chang Tso Lin?
- A. Strongly criticized.
- Q. Was that the cause of his resignation?

and the fact that he was scolded by the Emperor

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- A. But you know in a Japanese Parliament it's a funny thing. Not a single Cabinet fell as the result of impeachment by the minority in the Parliament even if they are very much censored by public opinion.
- Q. The Cabinet did not fall?
- A. Never, but when this kind of impeachment was heard by the Emperor and in a way censored by the Emperor because the system is that the Cabinet had not been responsible for the Nation but responsible for the Emperor....
- Q. But the failure to disclose that report on the death of Chang Tso Lin was the direct cause of TANAKA's resignation? I want to know in particular why TANAKA resigned.
- A. Historically or politically he resigned because of the criticism in the public and also a great, I would say, sentiment of disapproval in the Parliament, but to be quite complete TANAKA resigned immediately after he was censored by the Emperor. The Diet Session was ended in March 1929 but the Emperor scolded TANAKA in June and TANAKA resigned immediately after that. At that time KIDO was the Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
- Q. Did you learn that from KIDO?
- A. No, I learned that through several sources. Among them were Prince KONOYE, who is now dead, and Mr. NAGAI, who is also dead. He was a leader of the Minseito Party.
- Q. How did KONOYE learn of the scolding by the Emperor?
- A. Perhaps he learned of it from Marquis KIDO. KONOYE and KIDO were very funny friends. They were competing with each other and sometimes they were always against each other but in the public they pretended to be very good friends. KIDO was in the Emperor's Household. Yes, there were lots of people who told me. My elder brother told me - Count KANAI - he was at that time Lord Chamberlain. He is also dead. Two are now living - Viscount TAKEI and Viscount Keimin MATSUDAIRA. They were closely attached to the

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- A. daily doings of the Emperor. They could know of these kind of situations very well.
- Q. The Emperor scolded TANAKA for not disclosing the report on the death of Chang Tso Lin?
- A. Of this I am not sure, but I was told that the Emperor received the full statement of the Incident. I don't know who rendered that report but I was told that General TANAKA had been connected, more than that, he initiated it.
- Q. You don't believe that TANAKA knew of the plot to assassinate Chang Tso Lin before it was heard?
- A. I do believe that he is one of the sponsors of the assassination.
- Q. Do you have any proof or evidence that would prove this?
- A. I am sorry, all witnesses have died. I will try to find a friend of mine. If he is inclined to think in my way of thinking he will be a good witness because he was a Secretary to Mr. MORI who was the Vice Foreign Minister.
- Q. Does he live in Tokyo?
- A. I haven't met him since the air raids.
- Q. Could you give us his name?
- A. Mr. Kogumi OKAMOTO. I will try to find out whether he is still alive or not. Also General MACHINO who was the Private Adviser on Chinese Affairs under General TANAKA.
- Q. Admiral OKADA was Minister of Navy in the TANAKA Cabinet?
- A. I don't think so. Oh yes, Mr. Shinzi SOGO was an official in the Japanese Government when he was transferred to Manchuria. He was at that time living in Dairen and he became befriended with so many officers in the Kwantung Army at Mukden. He is still a good friend of Mr. KOMOTAO, Daiski but I don't know whether he would disclose the matter. He is the manager, I would say, or in charge of the execution of that plot, generally speaking, "on the spot."
- Q. Captain KOMOTAO?

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A. Yes.

Q. Was Colonel DOIHARA in on the plot?

A. This I can't tell but I guess so. I don't know.

Q. Did HAMAGUCHI ever disclose any report as to who was responsible for the assassination of Chang Tso Lin, either Japanese or Chinese?

A. What do you mean by disclose?

Q. Did he ever make it public in the Diet?

A. Not HAMAGUCHI. NAGAI, NAKANO and I, myself, disclosed it in the February Session of the Diet - 1929.

A. What do you mean by report?

Q. Let the public know.

A. Yes. The public all knew because we three made speeches disclosing this orally in the Diet.

Q. Naming Captain KOMOTAO as responsible?

A. Yes. I think in the Parliament we had a document at that time. We had a record in the Diet and also newspapers published it.

Q. But, did HAMAGUCHI or his Cabinet ever make public a report.

A. No, his Cabinet never did.

Q. I want to go back to the Manchurian Incident. In between the inauguration of the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet and the Manchurian Incident, did you learn of any plan on behalf of the Army either here in Tokyo or the Kwantung Army for the taking over of Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident of September 1931?

A. I would never have noticed - it might have been - because at that time Japan was in the very deepest bottom of depression and we were very busy. Secondly, Parliament was busy. In the Parliament the Government was busy in defending itself. The Minority Party, the Seiyukai, was busy in condemning the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet on their conciliatory policy. In the February Diet Session of 1931 the present Premier, the then Baron SHIDEHARA as Foreign Minister sought the approval

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- A. of the Diet on the Naval Treaty and was strongly attacked by the Minority but I think immediately after the closing of the Diet Session in April there started the financial crisis. Several banks were forced to close. HAMAGUCHI officially resigned in April and WAKATSUKI replaced him. These internal affairs occupied our minds and the minds of the public so that there might have been a plot going on. Due to the general economic situation I had been in close touch with many plots or revolts to overthrow the Government. Several revolts took place in the period which you mention.
- Q. have Was there any connection between those revolts and Manchuria? In other words, the March 1931 plot, did that/any connection with Manchuria?
- A. To my mind the two Incidents do not have any direct connection. Each faction was competing with each other. One for the independence of Manchuria, and one for the revolt. There had been a kind of liaison or connection within these two factions which connection was complete in the personage of Mr. HASHIMOTO whose business was mainly the internal revolt.
- Q. The murder, supposedly, of Captain NAKAMURA - do you recall that Incident - did you learn anything relative to whether there was a Captain NAKAMURA, whether he was murdered, whether it was by Chinese troops or by bandits?
- A. I think at that time the sentiment of the Japanese and Koreans on this side, the Chinese on the other side, and the Russians, was rather antagonistic. Relations were rather strained. I remember two main Incidents where, as you mention, one Incident was the plan on the part of the Chinese Government to construct a railroad running north to south....
- Q. In connection with the South Manchurian Railroad?
- A. Yes. A railroad connecting Chengua and Aigun. The second was the Wanpaashan Incident, and thirdly, the matter of Captain NAKAMURA. I never studied that question of Captain NAKAMURA. I don't know whether he was killed by the bandits or Chinese civilians or soldiers. The Japanese Army took it for granted

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A. that he was killed by the Chinese Army.

Q. Did you learn that from the War Minister or someone from the Foreign Ministry?

A. Not directly from SHIDEHARA. One of my friends, I don't know who, told me. They were all my former colleagues. I belong to the Tokyo Club which is the best club, to my mind. There are two social clubs in Tokyo, one is the Tokyo Club, and the other the American Club. I talked with lots of people at the Tokyo Club some of whom were from the Foreign Office and the American Office. One of them was Mr. Dooman, Third Secretary to the American Embassy. We talked that matter over in the Club. Perhaps I was informed by some of my colleagues in the Foreign Office.

Q. You do recall that the Army placed considerable emphasis on these three incidents that you mentioned?

A. Yes.

Q. They did that through the newspapers and public meetings?

A. In public meetings. The Japanese Government was anxious to solve the question of Wanpaoshan and the Chinese railroad question. The Army was anxious to give the public an impression that Captain NAKAMURA was killed by the Chinese. The former two incidents were in the charge of the Foreign Ministry. The last was used as publicity for arousing public sentiment by the Army group.

Q. Do you recall that public sentiment was aroused as a result of newspapers?

A. Yes. Besides the public had a background. At that time the depression hit the Japanese public so hard many people wanted to go over to Manchuria mainly the peasants and farmers to get a new start.

Q. They were extremely interested in Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Did MINAMI make speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they expansionist speeches?

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- A. Not expansionist, but condemning the Chinese.
Q. Did he refer to Manchuria as the life line of Japan?
- A. Yes. In the Parliament his speeches were recorded. If you ever go to the Parliament there is a huge file of Parliamentary Records recording all the speeches of the members.
Q. Those were not burned?
A. No they are still there. The February Session of 1931 and the February Session of 1929 - such kind of things are useful for you.
Q. Whose office are they in? Are they in the Secretariat's Office in the Diet Building?
- A. Yes. Mr. OIKE is the General Secretary of the Diet.
Q. Did the Army put on a display in Kyoto in the fall of 1931 on Manchuria? For instance, they had anti-Japanese posters that they had picked up in Manchuria which they brought back. Do you know that to be a fact that in the town of Kyoto the Army staged this exhibition? Do you recall that?
- A. Yes, that kind of thing took place.
Q. Did they take place in Tokyo? In other words, to arouse the sentiment of the people against the Chinese did they have displays here in Tokyo in the department stores?
- A. Yes.
Q. Did airplanes drop handbills over Japan before September, 1931 worded so as to arouse the peoples interest in Manchuria? I don't know whether you recall that they did so.
- A. I can't remember. To tell in detail -- In the February Diet Session of 1929 in the Private General Committee, NAKANO and I made the disclosure. The whole assembly of that Session neither disclosed or censored the Government for the killing of Chang Tso Lin. NAKANO made a very famous oration. I remember that I questioned the Army representatives in the March Session of 1936 whether they were thinking of abrogating the secret treaty which usurped the independency of Manchuria in the hand of the Army and I got a negative answer from Lt. KATAKURA.

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Q. What happened in February 1932 in the Diet?

A. Well, as I told you HAMAGUCHI resigned in April 1931 and WAKATSUKI replaced him. There had come about a split in the leaders of the Minseito Party and one faction expressed their dissatisfaction with the policy which was voiced by Premier WAKATSUKI whose policy was rather of a conciliatory tendency. As a result of the split in December the WAKATSUKI Cabinet resigned and Mr. INUKAI representing the Seiyukai Party was made Premier.

Q. There was a split in the WAKATSUKI Cabinet over Manchuria?

A. Yes, over the Manchurian question.

Q. How was the Cabinet divided?

A. SHIDEHARA on one side and NAGANO and ADACHI on the other side.

Q. Where was MINAMI?

A. He was against SHIDEHARA. At that time due to the characteristic depression there were three tendencies. One faction insisted on the socialization of Japanese economy so as to rebuild our national economy. To this proposal the Minseito and Seiyukai Parties were antagonistic because the Minseito represented the financial interests, mainly the Mitsubishi Industries, and the Seiyukai represented the interests of land lovers so both parties were very conservative on this question. The Minseito tried to follow the peaceful or conciliatory policy representing the financial interests and the Seiyukai followed the expansion policy. There was a split in the Minseito and a faction represented by Mr. ARACHI wanted to collaborate with Seiyukai and tried to drive the Minseito Party toward the Seiyukai policy. This could not be done so WAKATSUKI resigned and the Seiyukai Cabinet was formed under the Premiership of Mr. INUKAI. Naturally MINAMI as War Minister had a leading part in the collapse of the Minseito Cabinet and let the power shift from Minseito to Seiyukai thus allowing the adoption of the expansion policy of Japan.

Q. The Seiyukai Party wanted to expand in Manchuria and the Minseito did not. ARACHI favored the Seiyukai

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Q. Policy?

A. Yes, so the Minseito Party was split.

Q. MINAMI followed the same policy, maybe not along political lines but as a practical matter.

A. He was the leading actor at the time as the War Minister. The Army was very dissatisfied with the Minseito policy and although MINAMI was a War Minister in the Minseito Cabinet, the Army which he represented at the time in the Minseito Cabinet was dissatisfied with the Minseito policy, so it was his duty, perhaps he thought, to destroy the Minseito regime and turn over the power from Minseito to Seiyukai. He encouraged the split in the Minseito Party on one hand and on the other hand he was a good mediator between Seiyukai and one faction of Minseito. The latter plot was not successful so the Minseito Cabinet was destroyed. Seiyukai took its place. The young officers in the Army felt that MINAMI was not strong enough. They wanted to have a stronger War Minister in the name of General ARAKI. At that time Major HASHIMOTO was most active. He conferred with Premier INUKAI, Cabinet Chief Secretary HOTOYAMA, and Vice Foreign Minister.

Q. HASHIMOTO connived with Mr. MORI to put ARAKI in as War Minister?

A. This I was told by HASHIMOTO himself.

Q. Did he say, "I did it"? Did he say how?

A. HASHIMOTO tried his best he said to persuade Mr. INUKAI through Mr. MORI and HOTOYAMA.

Q. He asked MORI personally?

A. Yes. HASHIMOTO talked to MORI and asked him to persuade INUKAI to ask ARAKI for the Portfolio of War Minister in place of General MINAMI. HASHIMOTO also talked the matter over with Mr. HOTOYAMA who was to be the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Another witness to this statement is Mr. Isamu FUJITA. He is a living man. If you ask him, Mr. FUJITA, he will know many things. He was the man behind HASHIMOTO. When HASHIMOTO was running these plots he needed money and the money was furnished by Mr. FUJITA.

Q. Was he a businessman?

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A. He is a businessman but not the regular businessman.

Q. A financier?

A. In the beginning he was the owner of a newspaper then he bought a life insurance company but he never restricted his activities in the business field. He had been once in the Back Chamber. He is a very able man. I would say it was he who with the late Baron BOTO asked Mr. JOFFE, Russian representative, to come over from Shanghai to Japan and he was successful in reaching a kind of understanding between USSR and Japan after the revolution. In such kind of things he was an expert.

Q. After the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 was the civil administration taken over by the Army?

A. That was just a continuation. Once Manchuria was independent there were lots of displays.

Q. In Japan? In Manchuria? Were they put on by the Army, Cabinet, or Government?

A. Mainly by the Army.

Q. How did you know they were put on by the Army?

A. Because you know the Army at that time had a propaganda section and they were very active, firstly, to arouse the public interest in favor of the plan of the Army toward Manchuria, and, secondly, to allow the general support for the reorganization of Japanese social, economic, and political structure after the copy of the Russian system that the nation could concentrate and enjoy for the defense of their country. At that time two famous pamphlets were issued by the Army Department.

Q. What did they say?

A. I think I can find that out. All my books were burned so I don't have it right now, but I think I can get one.

Q. That was what date, what year?

A. Immediately after the Manchurian Incident.

Q. 1932 - March or April?

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A. June 1932 and 1933. There were two famous pamphlets titled "True Meaning of National Defense" and "How to Obtain this Strong National Defense".

Q. You read those pamphlets?

A. Yes, and the "Report on the National Defense of the World Main Powers" in which the Army reiterated the completeness of national defense on the part of Germany, USSR, and USA and then concluding how it was necessary to strengthen our national defense and how it could be accomplished

Q. That was put out by the Minister of War, ARAKI?

A. Yes.

Q. The civil administration of Manchuria, the towns, and provinces were taken over by the Japanese Government?

A. Not by the Japanese Government - by the Japanese Army.

Q. The Japanese Army?

A. After September 1931 it took some time, I would say, to clean up the so called bandits or the antagonistic element out of Manchuria. Perhaps, it took more than a year. Independence was declared not in 1931 but September 15, 1932, one year later. Then a secret treaty agreement, I would say, was signed by the Manchurian Emperor and the War Minister. It is a funny thing, not by the Japanese Emperor but by the War Minister.

Q. The War Minister signed?

A. The Japanese War Minister and Chief of the Japanese Army signed.

Q. Did you see this agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you tell me the contents? Did it give special interests or rights to Japan?

A. No, it said to the effect that the entire administration was confined to the Japanese Army.

Q. Did it say for how long?

A. There was no date.

Q. And when was that signed?

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A. Immediately after the declaration of Manchurian independence.

Q. Was it done with the approval of the Cabinet?

A. No, it was secret.

Q. How did you happen to see the agreement?

A. HOSHINO and I were classmates. We studied in high school for three years and the Tokyo Imperial University for four years. We lived together for seven years and we are good friends. At that time he was in the Finance Department and after the Manchurian independence the Finance Minister, the late Mr. FUJII, wanted to send the more able officials in the Finance Department over to Manchuria. His intention was quite sincere. I don't doubt his sincerity. Mr. FUJII asked Mr. HOSHINO to go over to Manchuria saying that the Army would make the worst of it, would confuse the situation because they knew nothing about finance and economy and asked HOSHINO to take care of the financial matters. HOSHINO came and consulted with me as to whether I thought he should go. I advised him to go over to Manchuria and rectify the situation. He then resolved to go. A very great number of the civilian officials in the Manchurian Government were my friends. Among them was my younger brother, not my brother, but my brother-in-law. After he went to Manchuria they wrote to me. Some of them came back to Japan and sought my opinion on the question of fundamental relations with Manchuria and Japan. All civil officers were dissatisfied with the treatment on the part of the Kwantung Army. They were treated as people without any independent judgment - the Army officers treated them as if they were their secretaries. They were really indignant so we discussed the matter and found out the cause for this kind of thing. They brought to me the copy of the secret treaty and here I said it is not the Emperor nor our Government who are to be held responsible for the administration in Manchuria, it is the Army and unless this kind of treaty is amended our position will be quite a helpless one. They asked me to amend, or abrogate, or nullify that treaty on that occasion. I had a chance to study the text of that agreement which I have had in my library but that was burned by an air raid. A copy was burned which did

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- A. state the War Minister was to control the Administration. The War Minister, Chief of Staff, and the Commander of the Kwantung Army representing both parties have the full power for the administration of Manchuria
- Q. How did your brother in law get hold of it?
A. He was rather a high official in the Manchurian Government.
- Q. Was he an adviser to the Manchurian Government?
A. Not an adviser. He was the Chief of the Budget Section under Mr. HOSHINO. He was the Vice Finance Minister at that time.
- Q. Did it state that the Army was to get any revenue from Manchuria or did it simply state that the administration of Manchuria was to be controlled by Japanese?
A. I don't remember exactly but it stated that all matters on national defense and administration were entirely in the hands of the Kwantung Army. The national defense was in the hands of the Kwantung Army and the administration was handled by Manchurian officials and Japanese officials who were recommended by the Commander of the Kwantung Army to the Manchurian Emperor.
- Q. There was a third?
A. And third, the scope of that administration means everything, industry, agriculture, taxes, etc.
- Q. It was embraced within that treaty?
A. I wonder why you don't have the text of that treaty. It is so rather of a common sense of the Japanese people in politics. No, it may be even the people don't know about it much.
- Q. How did Japan benefit economically from Manchuria? After the occupation by the Japanese Army were any revenues diverted to either the Kwantung Army or to the Japanese Government here in Tokyo?
A. Yes, to the Kwantung Army partly. That is a very vital question. The expense of the Kwantung Army was partly paid by the revenues from the Manchurian budget.
- Q. You learned that from your brother-in-law?
A. Yes. At one time I took an objection to that in the

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- A. Parliament. I don't think economically Japan profited by the exploitation of Manchuria but this is true that several Japanese people could find positions not only officials but several industrial undertakings so a great number of Japanese could go over and find employment. It is only after the Chinese Incident that Japan was assisted by Manchuria a great deal in the form of supplying foodstuff.
- Q. Was payment made?
A. Without actual payment,
- Q. Was this supplied the Japanese Army?
A. Not only the Japanese Army but they brought it here into our country.
- Q. How did they do that without paying for it?
A. By long term loans.
- Q. Did Manchuria loan you all of these foodstuffs?
A. Yes.
- Q. To be repaid by Japan at some future date?
A. Yes - it was a long term loan. That took place about 1938. About that time the country began to feel the shortage of foodstuffs and we started to be worn out by the long continuing war with China.
- Q. Advisers were sent to Manchuria after the occupation, and up to 1945 Japanese advisers to the Manchurian Government occupied important posts?
A. Well, what do you mean by advisers? The Kwantung Army recommended many people to the Manchurian Government which employed those recommended as their government officials though they are genuinely the Manchurian officials.
- Q. I see, and that was done up to 1945?
A. Exactly. In the beginning the governmental positions were generally divided among four races. The Koreans mainly occupied posts in the diplomatic service. There were some Mongolians who were governors of some districts. There were some Chinese and Japanese but mainly the actual key positions were occupied by Japanese officials,

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- A. perhaps as a Cabinet Secretary or Vice Minister in Manchuria.
- Q. And what else?
- A. The assistants to the prefectural governors were all filled by Japanese.
- Q. All recommendations made by the Kwantung Army?
- A. Yes. Later on almost all of the Manchurian Government positions were filled by Japanese.
- Q. That was approximately when?
- A. Approximately from 1940 on since the declaration of war against the Allied Powers.
- Q. From 1940 on and even before, Manchuria helped in sending supplies to Japan, such as, iron, guns, arsenals - did they have an arsenal in Manchuria?
- A. Yes.
- Q. After war started they had prisoner of war camps in Manchuria?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did the General Staff here in Tokyo have a bureau which had to do with the Government of Manchuria. Do you know that?
- A. Do you mean official bureau or secret bureau?
- Q. Either one or both.
- A. They established officially a bureau attached to the Cabinet.
- Q. What was the name of the Bureau?
- A. The Manchurian Bureau. But in the General Staff there is a section and also there is a section in the Army Department mainly to take care of the Manchurian and Mongolian affairs.
- Q. When were they started?
- A. After the signing of that secret pact.
- Q. Back in 1932?
- A. Yes. To me it seemed comical that such an administration of great political significance with its vast scope and field like Manchuria was handled by the very petty officers in that section. Particularly, Manchurian ques-

(KAMEI, Kenichiro 30 April 1946 Cont'd)

- A. tions were handled by the War Minister and Chief of Staff. The Government never knew the Manchurian situation in detail unless anyone of the Department's under the Cabinet were asked by the Army to handle certain problems. For instance, the sending out to Manchuria financial advisers. This business was later transferred to the Agriculture Ministry and Ministry of Overseas Affairs.
- Q. Which Bureau under the Cabinet was transferred to the Ministry of Overseas Affairs?
- A. The Bureau remains as it is but it is always through that Bureau that the Army talks the matter over with the Government or the Cabinet. The Cabinet never knew in detail what was going on in Manchuria but when the Government was asked through that Bureau by the Army to handle a certain problem then the Government sometimes after consultation with the Army asked one Ministry to take over the business, for instance, the immigration question.
- Q. Do you know the name of the Bureau in the War Ministry that handled the Manchurian Affairs.
- A. In the War Ministry, Manmo Han (Manchurian and Mongolian Affairs Subsection) and Gunziha (Ministry Affairs Section) under Gumukykyo. That is to say, the Bureau for Military Affairs in the War Ministry. The directors of that Bureau were very influential. One of them was General MUTO.
- Q. When was that?
- A. Immediately after the signing of the Pact.
- Q. 1932?
- A. Yes. MUTO was influential all through - since the Manchurian independence. After that, until the end of this war. There is another subsection corresponding and corroborating with this subsection in the General Staff.
- Q. Do you know the name of that?
- A. It is also called Manmo Han (Manchurian and Mongolian Affairs Subsection) and was under the General Staff, or a certain department of it which I do not know but can find out very easily.
- Q. Were the functions the same?

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- A. One was from the strategy standpoint, that was in the General Staff, that is, civilian administration of Manchuria..... To say in short it is just, I would say, a bogey government but in fact it is a military government so military governmental affairs were in the jurisdiction of Mammo Han in the War Ministry, and strategical affairs were in the jurisdiction of that subsection of the General Staff.

26 April 1946

Statement of Professor KAMEI, Ken-ichiro
1112 Onachi, Kanakura

The Manchurian Incident was planned and started by some younger army officers with rather idealistic aspirations, but they were later used by the realistic element and within five years the latter had expelled the former from Manchuria. The realists then tried to expand their influence into China. One thing which encouraged their doing so was the growth of the Communists in China, which is evidenced by the capture of Marshal Chiang Kai Shek by General Shue Liang and his Communistic troops at Seian in 1936.

The invasion of Mongolia by the Japanese army in Manchuria under the plan of the realists, represented by General TOJO and Lieutenant Colonel or Major MUTO, was badly and sadly beaten by the Chinese Army and then it is certain that TOJO and MUTO felt this to be a humiliation of their Japanese army and were thinking of restoring their prestige by attempting a new undertaking. This is one cause of the China Incident on the part of the army. General ISHIHARA was the leader of the small group of idealists who talked on the question of Manchuria with Chinese people who had been very much impressed by the successive incidents at that time on the Russo-Manchurian border, and the Chinese Central Government's power was not enough to put an end to these kinds of incidents. The Chinese and General ISHIHARA discussed the question. The conclusion they reached in the beginning was the autonomous Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, but later the assassination of leading Chinese, including General WANG by General Chang Shue Liang, caused a change of the original conclusion and they thought the plan of making Manchuria independent along the lines of the United States of six races, including Mongolian, Russians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and Manchurians. But this idealistic group was too powerless and although they obtained some support from the idealistic population they failed to keep their plan being carried out genuinely according to their spirit and were abused by more realistic, chauvinistic, imperialistic group in the army.

General ISHIHARA and General KAWABE, Torashiro are both good witnesses as to the plans of the realistic group in the army during both the China and the Manchurian Incidents.

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As a result of the assassination of General HAGATA, who headed a group mainly composed of middle class officers who were thinking of national reconstruction firstly on the ground of national defense and secondly on the ground of appeasing the young officers who were dissatisfied with the status not only in the army but also in the country at large and the suppression of the February 26 Incident which had been executed by the young officers' group which was idealistic and passionate but not rational and sensible, there remained in the army no element of reason and will. Rather people obedient and tame remained under the simple but ambitious, foolish but purely militaristic generals, namely HATA, HAYASHI, SUGIYAMA, TERADAUCHI, UMEZU and FOJO. That was the Japanese army in 1937. This army started the Chinese Invasion in July 1937, taking advantage of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. A good witness to this statement is Dr. SAITO, Ryu.

This army faction which started the China Affair was related to the textile industry. I was told by a number of younger officers and civilians of the North China Army that this army received a large sum of money from TSUDA, Shingo (President of the KANEBO Cotton Mill) in exchange for the delivery of the Chinese Mills in that area to him. This money was placed in the custody of General IKEDA, Junkyu. TSUDA's sentiments were clearly indicated in a conversation he had with Ambassador Grew. Baron OKURA will be a good witness as to the influence of General IKEDA with the capitalists.

At the time of the Chinese Incident, General ISHIBARA was removed from his post in Kwantung Army in Manchuria and was casually placed in the post of Chief of the Operations Department, Japanese Army General Staff, and General MUTO, Akira was also placed in the post as Chief of the First Section under ISHIBARA. The Chief of the Second Section, or Deputy to that Chief, was General KAWABE. KAWABE is a witness to the fact that ISHIBARA opposed the sending of troops into China but MUTO pushed through his will to send the expedition with the corroboration of the War Minister GENERAL SUGIYAMA and General KAGESA, Teisho, Chief of General Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Department. I told MUTO in July 1937 not to send expeditionary forces but MUTO said he must send them to punish Chinese at this juncture and he also said ISHIBARA never concurred to his plan but finally with the help of the War Minister he caused ISHIBARA to yield.

At this time I was one of the leaders of a political party called Shakai Taishu to (Social Peoples Party) of about 38 members in the House of Representatives in the Diet. I judged at the time the

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sending of an expedition to China would develop into a wild fire covering the whole continent and I thought I must stop it as best as I could and thought out a plan thinking that there might be a possibility for conciliation if the Japanese Government might send a capable man in an official character who is a good friend of Chinese leaders and at the same time a good representative of the Premier Prince KONOYE. Prince KONOYE and I were classmates in first high school and intimate friends as his political inclination being sympathetic for social justice and international peace. His father, the late Prince KONOYE, was a good friend of Chinese revolutionary leaders and was helped in his work by AKIYAMA, Teisuke, a veteran statesman.

AKIYAMA was in good relationship with young Prince KONOYE as advisor. KONOYE, AKIYAMA and I decided to send MIYAZAKI, Ryusuke to Hanking. MIYAZAKI's father was MIYAZAKI, Toten, who all through his career in the continent collaborated with his Chinese friends in the accomplishment of the Sun Yat Sen Revolutionary Movement. So his son was thought to be a part of them who were the leaders of the Kuomintang.

KONOYE and AKIYAMA provided the money and KONOYE approached the then War Minister General SUGIYAMA for his approval to send MIYAZAKI on the secret mission. General UMEZU, Yoshiziro, the then Vice War Minister, also agreed to it. When MIYAZAKI was about to embark on a boat at Nagasaki on his way to Shanghai he was seized by the gendarmes at the same time AKIYAMA was visited at his home in Kojimachi, Tokyo, by gendarmes and was taken to the Kojimachi Military Police Station and interned. Under the protest of KONOYE to the War Minister, AKIYAMA was released after a week and MIYAZAKI after a month. This incident, together with other incidents, caused KONOYE to replace SUGIYAMA with ITAGAKI.

ITAGAKI was the head of the group which planned the Manchurian Independence with ISHIHARA. This was told to me by KONOYE and AKIYAMA was present. Their power grew afterwards and with their help KONOYE was able to push out SUGIYAMA. ITAGAKI was also a compromise because he was forced to have General TOJO as his Vice Minister, so ITAGAKI could do nothing because the Prime Minister ^{in 1937} has under the army regulation the sole power of appointing and discharging and was antagonistic to the Minister.

In 1937 I went to Germany, hoping to get intervention on its part as mediator in the China Affair, but I was not successful and returned in April 1938. I then suggested to Prince KONOYE that the formation

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of the united front of the political parties was the only way to stop the army. In his name I approached the other party leaders and although they were in favor of it their parties were not. MUTO at that time was in North China. He returned to Tokyo as Chief of Military Affairs Department in November 1938.

General SUZUKI was in Manchuria during 1936, 1937 and part of 1938 as the commander of a division but was always in touch with higher political circles through various agencies, one of which was YAMASHITA, Kamesaburo, the shipping magnate. YAMASHITA recommended SUZUKI to Prince KONOYE as the influential personage in military circles who might drag the army according to the desire of Prince KONOYE. I know that SUZUKI persuaded KONOYE that they together would find an amicable settlement of the Chinese Incident and obtained KONOYE's permission to establish under the cabinet a bureau which is in charge of official negotiations between Chinese and Japanese settlement of the affair. KONOYE agreed to it but feared at heart this might make much more complex the Chinese Incident and asked HIROTA to accede to it. HIROTA declined and resigned because he wanted only one Foreign Office.

KONOYE asked General UGAKI to become Foreign Minister, seeking to utilize his influence with the army. Finally the fight between SUZUKI and UGAKI was won by SUZUKI to establish the second Asiatic Foreign Office. The army supported SUZUKI, namely, General TOJO (then Vice War Minister) and MUTO's predecessor (Chief Military Affairs Bureau) and Koa-In was established. SUZUKI installed his most able right hand man, General OIKAWA, in Koa-In to handle his personal financial interests in the name of authority. The first policy SUZUKI advocated was the enterprise in China by co-partnership of Japanese and Chinese, which he called the economic conciliation policy, but no Chinese would join the plan.

YAMASHITA had many Chinese friends in the camp of Chiang Kai Shek, so he was asked by General SUZUKI to help him induce Chinese to collaborate with the plan. Out of these efforts many enterprises were undertaken, one of which was the opium business in Shanghai and Hankow, supervised by SATOMI, who was TOJO's friend. SATOMI could not operate without permission of Koa-In. OHASHI, Chuichi, who lives in Gifu Prefecture, can testify as to the connection between Koa-In and the opium trade. The income from opium was used to finance TOJO's and SUZUKI's political influence. Koa-In made the Chinese affairs go from bad to worse.

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Just prior to the establishment of the Nanking Government I told KONOYE and MUTO that it should not be done and they should make further efforts to conciliate with China. I discussed it also with Vice Foreign Minister FUJIRI and we talked with MUTO. MUTO said, "I think you are right but SUZUKI is rampant for approving it and his political influence is so great that he crushed every effort to oppose the Nanking Government". KONOYE later told me that SUZUKI visited often and told him the army opinion favored the Nanking Government.

Although I know SUZUKI was a rampant protagonist of the war against the United States, I personally never heard him say so.

I first became a member of the House of Representatives in 1928. I know about the plot connived between the army and the politicians to invade Manchuria and China. MINAMI and KOISO as War Minister and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, HAYOTAMA, then Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the late Mr. NOBI, Vice Foreign Minister in General TANAKA's cabinet formed 1927, were in on the plot. The death of General Cheng Tso Ling was an incident to this plot in 1928. In 1929 I, HAGAI and MAKANO, all of the Minseitō Party, disclosed the plot and moved for the impeachment of TANAKA, OGASA Tadao, NODA Takeo, MIYAKAWA Taneo and INUKAI are witnesses to this.

TANAKA resigned in July. HAMAGUCHI and SHIDEMARA concluded the Non-aggression Pact and the Shipping Ratio Treaty. SHIDEMARA was firm in his non-interference policy. This was unpopular with young officers of the army and navy. They secretly met and held conferences but the boss of the army, UYEHARA, then Chief of General Staff, supported the government, so ARAKI was thought to be the desirable leader by the younger officers. His prestige grew daily. He presided at several of their conferences. HAMAGUCHI was shot and MAKATSUKI replaced him but the Minseitō Cabinet could not survive.

In December 1931, immediately after the Manchurian Independence, the Seiyukai Party Cabinet was formed. MORI became Chief Cabinet Secretary and was the virtual cabinet maker. He connived with the younger officers of the army to place General ARAKI in post as War Minister. From hence the ascendancy to power of General ARAKI began. He had been in favor of several military revolts, all of which occurred in 1931. In May 1932 another revolt took place, called the May Incident. ARAKI was placed in an awkward position because the premier who had named him was assassinated by the young officers with whom he was in sympathy. But at that time his influence was established so he remained in office even

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~~was~~ in the next cabinet under Admiral SAITO. General ARAKI and Baron HIRANUMA were very good friends of the same tendency, so there with the backing of HIRANUMA he strongly opposed the conciliation policy against the Foreign Minister HIROTA.

On that occasion I had frequent talks with General ARAKI. I once ridiculed him, "Are you going to be a hero like ASHIKAGA, Takauji?"

He said, "I have no intention at all to become a hero. I only sympathize with the younger officers. They only boast of me."

I said, "Then why do you not use your influence to make them support the conciliation policy toward U.S.S.R. and China?"

He answered, "No, we cannot have faith in Soviet diplomacy, so we must always be prepared for the unexpected attack from Soviet Russia." He added, "Party leaders do not understand this international situation and only talk of peace. Unless men who understand this situation and make nationwide preparation, the fate of our country is at stake. Japanese system, political and economic, must be changed fundamentally after the manner so to speak Soviet system ^{and} Japanese ideology."

I said to him, "The historical development of mankind does not know national borders. You should select between Communism, Socialism or New Deal or Feudal Capitalism as we have and nothing more. There is no such thing as sovietic national organization under the Japanese family system."

ARAKI retorted always like Kipling, "East is East and West is West. Japanese system should always be the Japanese system but for the sake of progress we must sometimes take in something from Europe. We should have Sovietic concentration of national power for the purpose of defense under Japanese family system which is democracy itself."

At the time of the Manchurian Independence, the officers connected with it were mainly whose leader was General ISHIHARA. At that time ARAKI was not connected but once he knew the success of Manchurian Independence he tried first to leave of the League of Nations to secure that Independence. His opinion prevailed in the cabinet and Japan left the League. This I know. Before MATSUOKA left to attend the League I told him to see to it that Japan agreed to the Class A Mandate for Manchuria and not to leave the League, in return for which I would see to

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his reelection as Member of the House of Deputies. He agreed with me. ARAKI changed the nature of the Manchurian Government by exercising his authority as War Minister to appoint men under his authority in the Kwantung Army to the governing posts in Manchuria, and in doing that he deprived Manchuria of its independence. All the successive chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army continued to deprive Manchuria of its independence and keep it under the control of the Japanese Army. ARAKI was solely responsible for the Secret Manchurian-Japanese Army Pact which enabled the Chief of Staff to exercise the authority mentioned above.

From this time on there developed two factions in the army seeking power. One called "Kodoha" led by Generals ARAKI and MASAKI and the other called "Toseiha" led by Generals NAGATA, TOJO and UMEZU. The latter's figureheads were Generals SUGIYAMA, TERAUCHI and HATA.

In Manchuria, ISHIHARA's idealistic group tried to take back power but by the coalition of "Kodoha" and "Toseiha" it was unsuccessful. Here HOSHINO played an important part. He was then Deputy General in Manchuria. He went there entirely in sympathy with General ISHIHARA but once he was placed in the important post he severed his relations with ISHIHARA's group and established a close connection with TOJO. I once reproached him for that but he made some excuse that ISHIHARA was only an idealist and TOJO from the administrative standpoint was such realistic.

"Kodoha" was defeated because they lacked administrative ability and made spiritual preaching. "Toseiha" carried the day because their aims were completely organized for the reorganization of Japan's political and economic institutions for the sake of national defense and they were more able administrators. Hence the days of the sway under "Toseiha" started. ARAKI's regime as War Minister continued until December 1933 and he was afterwards only one of the political leaders with Baron HIRONUMA of the nationalistic group. And the real power in the leadership in the army transferred to "Toseiha".

I met Major HASHIMOTO in 1928. He came with others to get my assistance of the younger officers in their revolution. He wanted to make it as the people's revolution by having it sponsored by the Proletariat Party in which I was one of the leaders. Then in 1931 he virtually took the leadership of the November Revolt against the Military. Then he conferred with the late Mr. MORI to put General ARAKI in the cabinet as War Minister. His activity was disapproved by the successive war ministers, excluding General ARAKI. He was removed to the heavy artillery

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regiment at Mishima in Shizuoka Prefecture near Atami about 1934. There he remained until the February revolt of 1936, when he was caused to retire. At that time he came to me and discussed the possibility of making a new political party under his leadership, imitating Hitler's party. I counselled against him on several occasions; knowing that I am always against him he tried to establish a direct connection with the Japanese Seaman's Union, which was very friendly to me. With that union he brought about a strike in protest and caused all ships to stop. At this time I went to Kobe to stop the plot. Then he was recalled to the service and went to central China.

Again he was retired in 1939 and formed himself a party called "Seikiseikai". It was dissolved in 1940 and he was made one of the directors of "Taishiyoku Sankai". In it there had been four tendencies: 1) to make that organization a Japanese Nazi Party, the group led by SHIRATORI and HASHIMOTO; 2) to transform that organization into the popular national party, powerful enough firstly to reduce the influence of the army and secondly to make a conciliation with China and the United States, whose leaders were Count ARIMA, OASA and myself; 3) to dissolve it and go back to separate old political camps as we had before represented by political leaders of the dissolved political parties; 4) to make that organization servile servant of the government to train and tame and drag the people ~~for the nation~~, to cooperate with the government aims, represented by General ARAKI, Baron HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, War Minister TOJO, Prince KIDO and GOTO. The battle was fought from 1940 until April 1941 and the last named group won.

ARAKI and HIRANUMA are the responsible persons who deprived from the people the chance of expressing their ideas and making the total population subservient to the government. And secondly they are also mainly responsible for deceiving the people into believing that by this organization we can come to a happy conclusion of the negotiations between Japan and the United States, but in fact they offered a very nice present to General TOJO.

General ITAGAKI was nominated as War Minister in KONOYE's Cabinet because he was the head of the ISHIHARA group who were against the Chinese wars. He always was checked by General TOJO and UMEZU as Vice Minister. I had several conversations with him and know that he was quite in sympathy with ISHIHARA. He preferred to settle matters by peaceful means. When there was a dispute between the War Minister and the Vice Minister the latter controlled appointments and in that was ITAGAKI was checked.

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General SATO is a man without a brain. He was always the spokesman and actor of the play written by General TOJO and his right hand man Colonel AKAMATSU. In war time the position of the Director of the Military Political Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry was so influential and important that everybody looked for opinions from SATO but he is a man of no independent judgment. His opinions and doings have always been inspired by Colonel AKAMATSU and Colonel KOSAKA of the Gendarmes, who had been General TOJO's left hand man. SATO's tendencies were the same as TOJO's.

HOSHINO, KAYA and ISHIKAWA were the most able officials in the Finance Ministry and were all my classmates. They are able as financial experts but they were all ardent social climbers. KAYA was a pet of IKEDA's. If he is a good Finance Minister he must speak against war with the United States. Everyone hoped he would and urged him to do so but he did not do so but rather encouraged TOJO's plan by assuring TOJO of the financial and economic capability of Japan in waging the war. We had several talks with him but his mentality can easily be proven by the documents in the Parliament.

KOISO supported the invasion into North China. Later he agreed to our plan for peace.

OKAWA was the spiritual or ideological leader or tutor of younger officers and he was in the conference at which HASHIMOTO and I were present, but his activity mainly was in causing a revolt and propaganda but never touched political proceedings. On one occasion he tried very hard to persuade the army to invite a loan from the Pacific interests in the United States to Manchuria. Through this collaboration he tried to bring about pacification of the relations between the United States and Japan. Therefore, as far as I know he was a strong protagonist of expelling British Imperialism from the Asiatic continent but so long as the United States followed the policy of open door and equal opportunity policy in Asia - in other words, trading policy - he is not very much against the United States.

OSHIMA had no power at all. He always allowed the Japanese government and public to misunderstand the situation in Germany. He connived with German politics to deceive the Japanese government. A popular saying in our country was "He is not the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin. He is the German Ambassador at Berlin."

ATSUJI (Secretary to Prince KONOYE) is a good source of information as to who were the principal Japanese aggressionists. KAZAMI, Akira (Minister of Justice under KONOYE) also knows a great deal.

In 1940 MUTO came and told me (at that time I was anxious to form a new party because only through people's support can we stop the army) that ~~the army~~ and he thought a new people's party would be o.k. But later on I learned from him that the new party idea was scrapped by Prince KONOYE, chiefly through GOTO, Tyanosuke, Secretary to Prince KONOYE. So I asked MUTO if he was the one who transformed the new party in Teisei Yo Ka Sankai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association). He said no. He said it was the right wing ultranationalistic element which surrounded Prince KONOYE. So I asked "What do you think now?" MUTO said he believed that this organization must be the people's party, so I concluded "You must use your influence to change the character of the organization".

MUTO agreed to do so. He said he was anxious to send a punitive expedition into China. It was his personal sentiment of revenge as he was sadly beaten on the Mongolian incident in 1936 and he was surprised by the situation which had developed since the North China incident. So MUTO said he would like to do his best to conciliate the China question in 1940.

In May 1941, when General MUTO was Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, I said to MUTO, "I ardently hope the American-Japanese negotiations are successful". MUTO agreed with me and said he would do his best. I asked what terms MUTO wanted and MUTO said, "I would go to the extreme case of humiliation". I demanded that the Japanese Army be withdrawn from China. MUTO said, "It can't be done all of a sudden. It needs time. If only the United States will agree to some time limits I should be very happy".

In November 1941 MUTO said, "I have drafted the last proposition to the United States. It seems to me the United States may agree to this. If so, personally, I am happy and it will be good for the Japanese nation. But from the standpoint of the army it means calamity. I had an argument with General TOJO. TOJO was angry at the argument that the army must yield". A few months later MUTO was removed by TOJO.

In November 1941 I asked MUTO if there was any way to avoid the split of the negotiations. MUTO said, "TOJO doesn't yield. The single way out of this is that the Navy will oppose TOJO and waging war". MUTO

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asked me if there was a way to persuade the Navy to oppose the war. I said that if he could talk to YAMAMOTO perhaps something could be accomplished. I promised to talk to Prince KONOYE and get him to argue with the Navy. I did this and KONOYE talked with someone in Navy high authority.

On that same day MUTO was angry with TOJO and I saw him again. MUTO told me TOJO didn't like to give in to the counter-proposals on November 26 and MUTO had opposed him.

I, KAMEI, Ken-Ichiro, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read and understand the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein, consisting of eleven (11) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of April 1946.

JAMES M. McKENNEN, 1st Lt.
Duty Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section
GHQ, SCAP.