

VESSEL	OCTOBER 1947						
	1	5	12	19	26	1	5
MARYLAND (BB)					(19 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 31)		
TENNESSEE (BB)							
PENNSYLVANIA (BB)							(1)
SARATOGA (CV)							(1)
OKLAHOMA (BB)							
HONOLULU (CL)						(1 M.I. Inspe	
ST. LOUIS (CL)						(1 M.I. Inspe	
HELENA (CL)							
PHOENIX (CL)							
NORTHAMPTON (CA)							
CHESTER (CA)				M.I.	20)		
PENSACOLA (CA)				M.I.	20)		
					(14 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 15)		
LOUISVILLE (CA)							(1)
INDIANAPOLIS (CA)					(16 A.M.I.-D.C.P. 17)		
MINNEAPOLIS (CA)							
ASTORIA (CA)							(1)
SAN FRANCISCO (CA)	(1 M.I.		12)				
HOPKINS (DMS)			(11 M.I. 12)				
PERRY (DMS)							
TREVER (DMS)							
WASMUTH (DMS)							
ZANE (DMS)							
SOUTHARD (DMS)			(11	M.I.	22)		
LONG (DMS)			(11	M.I.	22)		
CHANDLER (DMS)			(11	M.I.	22)		
HOVEY (DMS)			(11	M.I.	22)		
LAMBERTON (DMS)						(2	M.I.
BOGGS (DMS)						(2	M.I.
HULBERT					(16 A.M.I. 26)		
CURTIS					(16 A.M.I. 26)		
McFARLAND							
SWAN			(6	A.M.I.	16)		
TANGIER	Schedule to be submitted upon reporting						
TEAL							

KEY TO SYMBOLS: A.M.I. - Annual Military Inspection  
D.C.P. - Damage Control Practice





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1  
2 members of the committee for a report of the recall of  
3 United States merchant ships on the West Coast, after  
4 the attack on Pearl Harbor.

5 The Navy has submitted the order issued recalling the  
6 merchant vessels after the Pearl Harbor attack, the names  
7 of the ships, the dates they sailed, and the dates they  
8 returned. I suggest that that information be spread  
9 upon the record.

10 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

11 Senator Ferguson: Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Vice Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

13 Senator Ferguson: Are you going to furnish each  
14 member of the committee with copies of these exhibits?

15 Mr. Gesell: In saying "spread" on the record,  
16 Senator Ferguson, it was my thought that in that fashion  
17 it would come to all members of the committee.

18 The Vice Chairman: That brings it to us in the daily  
19 blue covered copy of the transcript.

20 Senator Ferguson: That is correct.

21 Mr. Gesell: This is a memorandum from the Navy to  
22 us, and we thought if it were copied into the transcript  
23 that would be enough. We can get the actual record.

24 Senator Ferguson: No. Does that report show whether  
25 those ships were in convoy or not?

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1  
2 Mr. Gesell: It doesn't relate to the question of  
3 convoy. It relates to when merchant ships were recalled.

4 Senator Ferguson: It doesn't designate when they were  
5 in convoy?

6 Mr. Gesell: No, it does not.

7 (The memorandum and accompanying copy of  
8 dispatch are as follows:)

9 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
10 Office of the Secretary  
11 Washington

12 13 December 1945

13 MEMORANDUM

14 To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

15 1. In regard to your request for report of the recall of  
16 U. S. Merchant ships to the West Coast after the attack on  
17 Pearl Harbor, we have the following table:

18 <u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Sailed from -</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Date Returned</u>
19 USAT TASKER H. BLISS	San Francisco	6 December	10 December
20 Coast Miller	San Francisco	6 December	8 December
21 Etolin	San Francisco	5 December	10 December
22 Henry D. Whiton	Balboa, C.Z.,	5 & 17 December	?

23 (cont'd)  
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J. A. Moffett	Balboa, C.Z.	7 & 16 December	?
Paul M. Gregg	San Francisco	5 December	10 December
President Garfield	San Francisco	6 December	8 December
President Johnson	San Francisco	6 December	9 December
Waipio	Portland, Ore.	6 December	?
West Portal	Balboa, C.Z.	8 & 17 December	?

2. These ships apparently put back in compliance with the attached dispatch instructions issued by CinCPac on 7 December 1941. No evidence has been found that other ships in addition to those listed put back to West Coast ports after the Pearl Harbor attack.

(Signed) John Ford Baecher  
Lieut. Comdr. USNR.

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NAVAL MESSAGE NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM RADIO HONOLULU	RADIO SANFRAN	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____	RADIO WASHN	PRIORITY
DATE 7 DECEMBER 1941		ROUTINE
		DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM _____		
DE/CODED BY _____		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____		ROUTINE
		DEFERRED

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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

WAR EXISTS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND JAPAN XX PROCEED CLOSEST US OR FRIENDLY PORT IMMEDIATELY

DISTRIBUTION:

380 . (\*) . ACTION

1/All .(\*) .38s .(\*) . 38w (\*) OPDC (\*) FILE . .

(\*) Initials illegible.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON. SEE ARTICLE 76(4) Nav Re s.

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D. G. NOTDINEAW JUAN & ORAW WASHINGTON, D. C.





1 defensive sea area for purposes of national defense.

2 "At no time shall any person (other than persons on pub-  
3 lic vessels of the United States) enter the defensive sea area  
4 above defined, nor shall any vessels or other craft (other than  
5 public vessels of the United States) be navigated within said  
6 defensive sea area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the  
7 Navy.

8 "Any person violating the provisions of this order shall  
9 be subject to the penalties provided by law.

10 "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

11 "THE WHITE HOUSE,

12 "May 26, 1939."

13 WILLIAM D. LEAHY,

14 Acting Secretary of the Navy.

15 - - - - -

16 GENERAL ORDER)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

17 NO. 144 )

Washington, D. C., March 29, 1941.

18 ESTABLISHING KODIAK ISLAND AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA  
19 AREAS AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATION

20 1. The following Executive orders are quoted:

21 "EXECUTIVE ORDER

22 "Establishing Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area Alaska

23 "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions  
24 of section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title  
25 18, sec. 96), the territorial waters between extreme high-water

1 mark and the three-mile marine boundary adjacent to the east-  
2 ern portion of Kodiak Island, Alaska, in and about Women's  
3 Bay to the westward within a line bearing true north and south  
4 tangent to the eastern extremity of High Island, are hereby set  
5 apart and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes  
6 of the national defense, such area to be known as 'Kodiak  
7 Island Naval Defensive Sea Area.'

8 "At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than  
9 public vessels of the United States, be navigated into Kodiak  
10 Island Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless authorized by the  
11 Secretary of the Navy.

12 "The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be  
13 enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation  
14 of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and  
15 of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is  
16 hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be  
17 necessary to carry out such provisions.

18 "Any person violating any of the provisions of this order  
19 shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of  
20 the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96).

21 "This order shall take effect ninety days after date  
22 hereof.

23 "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

24 "THE WHITE HOUSE,

25 "March 22, 1941."  
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## EXECUTIVE ORDER

1  
2 Establishing Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area and Subic Bay  
3 Naval Airspace Reservation

## 4 PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

5 "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions  
6 of section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18,  
7 sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May  
8 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 568, 570; U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the  
9 territorial waters within Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, between  
10 extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the  
11 entrance channel within a line bearing true southwest extending  
12 three nautical miles from Panibatujuan Point, a line bearing true  
13 southwest extending three nautical miles from Sanpaloc Point,  
14 and a line joining the seaward extremities of the above two  
15 bearing lines, are hereby set apart and reserved as a naval de-  
16 fensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such  
17 area to be known as 'Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area'; and  
18 the airspace over the said territorial waters and over the  
19 Subic Bay Naval Reservation, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, is  
20 hereby set apart and reserved as a naval airspace reservation  
21 to be known as 'Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation.'

22 "At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than  
23 public vessels of the United States, be navigated into Subic  
24 Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless authorized by the Secre-  
25 tary of the Navy.

"At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

"The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

"Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

"This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"THE WHITE HOUSE,

March 22, 1941."

(No. 8718)

(F. R. Doc. 41-2165; Filed, March 24, 1941; 1:14 p. m.)

JAMES FORRESTAL,

Acting Secretary of the Navy.

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1 GENERAL ORDER )

NAVY DEPARTMENT

2 No. 146 )

Washington, D. C., April 7, 1941.

3 NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AND AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS

4 1. The President, on February 14, 1941, signed Executive  
5 Orders Nos. 8680, 8681, 8683, and 8684. They are quoted:

6 "EXECUTIVE ORDER

7 "Establishing Naval Defensive Sea Areas Around and Naval Air-  
8 space Reservations Over the Islands of Kiska and Unalaska

9 "ALASKA

10 "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions  
11 of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U.S.C., title  
12 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved  
13 May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the  
14 territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and  
15 the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of  
16 Kiska and Unalaska are hereby established and reserved as naval  
17 defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such  
18 areas to be known, respectively, as 'Kiska Island Naval Defen-  
19 sive Sea Area', and 'Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area';  
20 and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands  
21 are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reserva-  
22 tions for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be  
23 known, respectively, as 'Kiska Island Naval Airspace Reserva-  
24 tion', and 'Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation'.

25 "At no time shall any person, other than persons on public

vessels of the United States, enter either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

"At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

"The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

"Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

"This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

1 "THE WHITE HOUSE,

2 "February 14, 1941."

3 (No. 8680)

4 (F.R. Doc. 41-1136; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a.m.)

5 - - - - -

6 "EXECUTIVE ORDER

7 "Establishing Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area and Kaneohe  
8 Bay Naval Airspace Reservation

9 "HAWAII

10 "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions  
11 of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U.S.C., title  
12 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved  
13 May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the  
14 territorial waters within Kaneohe Bay between extreme high-  
15 water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel  
16 within a line bearing northeast true extending three nautical  
17 miles from Kaolo Point, a line bearing northeast true extend-  
18 ing four nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining  
19 the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing  
20 lines, are hereby established and reserved as a naval defensive  
21 sea area for purposes of national defense, such area to be known  
22 as 'Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area'; and the airspace over  
23 the said territorial waters is hereby set apart and reserved as  
24 a naval airspace reservation for purposes of national defense,  
25 such reservation to be known as 'Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace

Reservation'.

"At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into said area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

"At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

"The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

"Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

"This order shall take effect ninety days after date



1 hereof.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"THE WHITE HOUSE,

"February 14, 1941."

(No. 8681)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1137; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a.m.)

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"EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Establishing Naval Defensive Sea Areas Around and Naval Air-space Reservations Over the Islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Kingman Reef

"PACIFIC OCEAN

"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Kingman Reef, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as 'Palmyra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area', 'Johnston Island Naval Defensive Sea Area', 'Midway Island Naval Defensive Sea Area', 'Wake Island Naval Defensive Sea Area', and 'Kingman Reef Naval Defensive Sea

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Area'; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and  
2 islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace  
3 reservations for purposes of national defense, such reserva-  
4 tions to be known, respectively, as 'Palmyra Island Naval Air-  
5 space Reservation', 'Johnston Island Naval Airspace Reserva-  
6 tion', 'Midway Island Naval Airspace Reservation', 'Wake  
7 Island Naval Airspace Reservation', and 'Kingman Reef Naval  
8 Airspace Reservation'.

9 "At no time shall any person, other than persons on public  
10 vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive  
11 sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel  
12 or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States,  
13 be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the  
14 Secretary of the Navy.

15 "At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft  
16 of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval air-  
17 space reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless author-  
18 ized by the Secretary of the Navy.

19 "The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be  
20 enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of  
21 the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of  
22 the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is  
23 hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be  
24 necessary to carry out such provisions.

25 "Any person violating any of the provisions of this order

1 relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be  
 2 subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal  
 3 Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person  
 4 violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the  
 5 above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to  
 6 the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938  
 7 (52 Stat. 973).

8 "This order shall take effect ninety days after date  
 9 hereof.

10 "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

11 "THE WHITE HOUSE,

12 "February 14, 1941."

13 (No. 8682)

14 (F. R. Doc. 41-1139; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a.m.)

15 - - - - -  
 16 "EXECUTIVE ORDER

17 "Establishing Naval Defensive Sea Areas Around and Naval Air-  
 18 space Reservations Over the Islands of Rose, Tutuila, and Guam

19 "PACIFIC OCEAN

20 "By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions  
 21 of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U.S.C., title  
 22 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved  
 23 May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U.S.C., title 49, sec. 174), the  
 24 territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and  
 25 the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Rose, Tutuila, and Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby  
2 established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for pur-  
3 poses of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively,  
4 as 'Rose Island Naval Defensive Sea Area', 'Tutuila Island  
5 Naval Defensive Sea Area', and 'Guam Island Naval Defensive  
6 Sea Area'; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters  
7 and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval air-  
8 space reservations for purposes of national defense, such  
9 reservations to be known, respectively, as 'Rose Island Naval  
10 Airspace Reservation', 'Tutuila Island Naval Airspace Reserva-  
11 tion', and 'Guam Island Naval Airspace Reservation'.

12 "At no time shall any person, other than persons on public  
13 vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive  
14 sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel  
15 or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States,  
16 be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the  
17 Secretary of the Navy.

18 "At no time shall any aircraft, other than public air-  
19 craft of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval  
20 airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless  
21 authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

22 "The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be  
23 enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation  
24 of the local law enforcement officers of the United States;  
25 and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe

such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

"Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

"This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"THE WHITE HOUSE,

"February 14, 1941."

(No. 8683)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1140; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:51 a.m.)

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GENERAL ORDER )  
No. 153 )

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 8, 1941

ESTABLISHING MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA

1. The President, on August 16, 1941, signed Executive Order No. 8853, quoted below:

"EXECUTIVE ORDER

"Establishing Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## "PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

"By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

"The following-described area is hereby established and reserved, for purposes of national defense, as a naval defensive sea area, to be known as 'Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area':

"All territorial waters of Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, and its approaches and tributaries from the contour line of extreme high water as shown on the latest U. S. C. and G. S. charts, to:

"A line running southwest true from Luzon Point, in approximate position, Latitude  $14^{\circ}27'40''$  North, Longitude  $120^{\circ}23'13''$  East to the seaward limit of territorial waters, thence southeasterly along the seaward limit of territorial waters, to the parallel of Latitude  $14^{\circ}10'15''$  North, thence east along that parallel of Latitude to meet the shore at Hamilo Point in approximate Latitude  $14^{\circ}10'15''$  North, Longitude  $120^{\circ}34'24''$  East.

"A vessel not proceeding under United States Naval or other United States authorized supervision, shall not enter or navigate the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area except during daylight, when good visibility conditions prevail, and then only after specific permission has been obtained. Advance arrangements for entry into or navigation through or within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area must be made, preferably by

1 application at a United States Naval District Headquarters in  
2 advance of sailing, or by radio or visual communication on  
3 approaching the seaward limits of the area. If radio telegraphy  
4 is used, the call 'NQO' shall be made on a frequency of 500 kcs.  
5 and permission to enter the port shall be requested. The name  
6 of the vessel, purpose of entry, and name of the master must be  
7 given in the request. If visual communications are used, the  
8 procedure shall be essentially the same.

9 "A vessel entering or navigating the waters of Manila Bay  
10 Defensive Sea Area does so at its own risk.

11 "Even though permission has been obtained, it is incumbent  
12 upon a vessel entering the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area to  
13 obey any further instructions received from the United States  
14 Navy, or other United States authority.

15 "A vessel may expect supervision of its movements within  
16 the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area, either through surface  
17 craft or aircraft. Such controlling surface craft and air-  
18 craft will be identified by a prominent display of the Union  
19 Jack.

20 "These regulations are subject to amplification by the  
21 local United States Naval authority as necessary to meet local  
22 circumstances and conditions.

23 "When a United States Maritime Control Area is established  
24 adjacent to or abutting upon the above-established defensive  
25 sea area, it shall be assumed that permission to enter, and

1 other instructions issued by proper authority, shall apply to  
2 any one continuous passage through or within both areas.

3 "Any master of a vessel or other person within the Manila  
4 Bay Defensive Sea Area who shall disregard these regulations,  
5 or shall fail to obey an order of United States Naval authority  
6 to stop or heave to, or shall perform any act threatening the  
7 efficiency of mine or other defenses or the safety of naviga-  
8 tion, or shall take any action inimical to the interests of  
9 the United States, may be detained therein by force of arms  
10 and shall be liable to attack by United States armed forces,  
11 and liable to prosecution as provided for in section 44 of the  
12 Criminal Code, as amended (U.S.C., title 18, sec. 96).

13 "All United States Government authorities shall place at  
14 the disposal of the Naval authorities their facilities for  
15 aiding in the enforcement of these regulations.

16 "The Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the pub-  
17 lication and enforcement of these regulations.

18 "FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

19 "THE WHITE HOUSE,

20 "August 16, 1941."

21 (No. 8853)

22 (F. R. Doc. 41-6114; Filed, August 18, 1941; 2:31 p.m.)

23 FORRESTAL,

24 The Acting Secretary of the Navy.  
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Mr. Gesell: Senator Lucas made a request for detailed information concerning the different types of planes which the Navy had at Pearl Harbor on January 6, 1940, and on February 1, 1941, the period when Admiral Richardson was in command, and information as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance conducted by those planes during that period.

This has been furnished in a memorandum to Mr. Mitchell dated December 13, 1945 to which is attached a detailed breakdown of the number of planes present, the sectors covered by the reconnaissance, and is responsive to that request.

I again suggest that the memorandum and the attached schedules be spread upon the daily transcript.

The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

(The memorandum of December 13, 1945 referred to above is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Secretary  
WASHINGTON

13 December 1945

MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. In response to the questions asked on the record by Senator Lucas, I am forwarding as you requested the necessary information in compliance therewith.
2. Exhibits A and B outline in detail the information

concerning the number of Naval planes, and their types, attached to the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Richardson assumed command on 6 January 1940 and when he was relieved of command on 1 February 1941.

3. The number of Naval planes attached to the Pacific Fleet during the period 6 January 1940 and 1 February 1941 that were capable of running a long distance reconnaissance over the sea are indicated on Exhibits A and B as "VPB" planes of "Patwing 2 (Pearl Harbor)" or a total of 67 on 1 January 1940 and 63 on 1 February 1941. It is also possible that some "VJ" planes were capable of such use in case of necessity and in fact such planes were so used on 7 December 1941 after the attack.

4. The number of Naval planes that were assigned and performed daily reconnaissance duty, in pursuance of the order issued by Admiral Richardson on approximately 17 June 1940, is indicated in the attachments to the "Search Plan", (Exhibit E).

5. The exact sectors and distances from Oahu covered in the reconnaissance ordered by Admiral Richardson are also indicated in detail on the "Search Plan" (Exhibit E).

/s/ John Ford Baecher  
John Ford Baecher  
Lt. Comdr., USNR

Encls: (HW) Exhibits A, B, and E.

NAVAL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. FLEET (PACIFIC) ON  
1 JANUARY 1940

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>BATTLE FORCE</u>	VOS	10		
	VS	8		
	VSO	112		
	VF	95		
	VSB	175		
	VB	47		
	VTB	96		
	VJ	13		
	VN	<u>3</u>		
		559		559
<u>BASE FORCE</u>	VB	1		
	VSO	2		
	VPB	8		
	VJ	32		
	VJR	14		
	VN	5		
	VR	1		
	VTB	<u>3</u>		
		66		66
<u>CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE</u>	VSO	<u>78</u>		78
		78		
<u>SUBMARINE FORCE</u>	VSO	<u>2</u>		2
		2		
<u>AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE</u>				
<u>COMAIRSCOUTFOR</u>	VSB	1		
	VSO	<u>2</u>		
		3	3	
PATWING 1 (San Diego)	VSO	1		
	VPB	<u>34</u>		
		35	35	
PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor)	VSO	2		
	VPB	67		
	VJ	<u>1</u>		
		70	70	
PATWING 4 (Seattle)	VPB	<u>24</u>		
		24	24	
			<u>132</u>	<u>132</u>
ENCLOSURE (A)				<u>837</u>

NAVAL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC FLEET 1 FEBRUARY 1941

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.


	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>BATTLE FORCE</u>	VS	4		
	VSO	137		
	VF	88		
	VSB	142		
	VB	40		
	VTB	90		
	VJ	11		
	VN	<u>5</u>		
		517		517
<u>BASE FORCE</u>	VSO	17		
	VJ	30		
	VJR	12		
	VB	<u>1</u>		
		60		60
<u>CRUISER SCOUTING FORCE</u>	VSO	<u>60</u>		60
<u>SUBMARINE FORCE</u>	VSO	<u>2</u>		2
<u>AIRCRAFT SCOUTING FORCE</u>				
COMAIRSCOUTFOR	VSO	2		
	VN	<u>1</u>		
		3	3	
PATWING 1 (San Diego)	VSO	1		
	VPB	<u>34</u>		
		35	35	
PATWING 2 (Pearl Harbor)	VSO	4		
	VPB	63		
	VJ	<u>1</u>		
		68	68	
PATWING 4 (Seattle)	VPB	<u>19</u>		
		19	19	
PATWIND 6 (Alameda)	VPB	<u>7</u>		
		7	<u>7</u>	
			132	
ENCLOSURE (B)				<u>132</u>
				771

SEARCH PLAN

Security Patrol from Barbers Pt.

(as of 30 June 1940)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



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20 Mile Visibility

Enclosure (E)

FLEET SECURITY PATROL FROM BARBERS PT. OAHU

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

<u>Plane "A"</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>to</u>	<u>Lat. N</u>	<u>Long. W.</u>
<u>Course T.</u>				
345°	75		22-31	58-27
000	226		26-15	58-27
265-1/2	37		26-12	59-08
175	123		24-14	58-55
336	1(23)?		26-01	59-52
248	37		25-47	60-30
150	226		22-31	58-27
165	75		21-18	58-07
<u>Plane "B"</u>				
315°	75		22-11	59-05
330	226		25-21	61-07
232	38		25-04	61-39
144	123		23-23	60-21
306	123		24-35	62-10
218	37		24-04	62-36
120	226		22-11	59-03
135	75		21-18	58-07
<u>Plane "C"</u>				
285°	75		21-37	59-23
299-1/2	226		23-29	62-57
202	37		22-55	63-10
115	123		22-05	61-10
277	123		22-16	63-22
187	37		21-38	63-27
90-1/2	226		21-37	59-23
105	75		21-18	58-07
<u>Plane "D"</u>				
255-1/2	75		20-58	59-23
270	226		20-58	63-23
172	37		20-19	63-18
084	123		20-32	61-07
246	123		19-41	63-07
157	37		19-03	62-52
060	226		20-58	59-23
074-1/2	75		21-18	38-07

FLEET SECURITY PATROL FROM BARBERS PT. OAHU

<u>Plane "E"</u>	<u>Distance</u>	<u>to</u>	<u>Lat. N</u>	<u>Long. W</u>
<u>Course T.</u>				
224 <sup>0</sup>	75		20-25	59-02
239	226		18-30	62-27
142-1/2	37		18-01	62-04
054	123		19-13	60-12
215	123		17-32	61-33
127	37		17-09	61-01
030	226		20-25	59-02
044	75		21-18	58-07
<u>Plane "F"</u>				
194-1/2	75		20-05	58-27
209-1/2	226		16-50	60-23
113	37		16-35	59-47
024-1/2	123		18-27	58-54
185	123		16-25	59-05
097-1/2	37		16-20	58-27
000	226		20-05	58-27
015	75		21-18	58-07

Total Distance for each plane 922 miles.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Gesell: Congressman Gearhart made a request for a copy of the order fixing the time of operation of the radar stations in the period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Pursuant to that request the Army communicated with the Commanding General in Hawaii and a search was made of the files there to find out if there was any written record establishing those times. A negative report has come back stating that an exhaustive search of the files does not disclose the publication of official orders of any kind in connection with the time schedule for training or the operation of the radar stations on Oahu during the period 7 in question. That answer suggests that those orders were orally established and, of course, we will have the responsible officers who were not only in command but particularly concerned with radar before the committee and they can give the information at that time.

The Vice Chairman: Do you want to put anything in the record on that?

Mr. Gesell: I think there is no need of simply documenting this negative fact. We will have to get the information by witnesses.

The Vice Chairman: All right. You may proceed.

Mr. Gesell: We have a substantial number of requests relating to the Department of State.



1           There was placed before the committee this morning two  
2 mimeographed documents. These are submitted by counsel.  
3 The first is dated November 25, 1941, and represents the  
4 Dutch Government's views on the matter of the type of reply  
5 which should be given to the Japanese.

6           This is offered for the purpose of completing the record.

7           I might say that we had requested it earlier. We were  
8 unable to submit it to the committee because we were awaiting  
9 the approval of the Dutch Government for its release, which  
10 has now been obtained.

11           I would like to have the text of that document, as well  
12 as the text of the other document, the document of November  
13 27, 1941, covering Secretary Hull's negotiations, discussions  
14 with the Netherlands Minister on that date, concerning  
15 threatened Japanese invasion of French Indochina, spread upon  
16 the record.

17           The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

18           Senator Lucas: May I ask one question of counsel on that  
19 point?

20           The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

21           Senator Lucas: Does the record contain at this point  
22 now all of the so-called tentative proposals by the various  
23 governments on this question?

24           Mr. Gesell: Yes, I think we have now had released all  
25 of the documents which we requested be released.

1 Senator Lucas: That was my understanding.

2 (The documents referred to, dated November 25, 1941 and  
3 November 27, 1941, are as follows:)

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Washington, 25th November 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have the honor to transmit herewith in form of a memorandum the comments of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the tentative proposals of Mr. Kurusu which you were kind enough to communicate to me last Saturday.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,

yours sincerely,

/s/ A. Loudon

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

---

M E M O R A N D U M

As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and general agreement, it is necessary that for the reasons expressed by the Secretary of State, it should be endeavored to arrive at a limited and temporary agreement.

In view of the fact that before the occupation of Indo-China by Japan no sanctions were applied against the latter, it seems reasonable that if Japan gradually withdraws from Indo-China proportionately sanctions may be lifted to a certain extent, provided, however, that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indo-China goes so far that the remaining

rlk 1

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

rlk 2

1 Japanese forces cannot be considered a direct threat of the  
2 Netherlands Indies, Malakka, the Philippine Islands and the  
3 Burma road.

4 But even in that event, according to the opinion of the  
5 Netherlands Government, sanctions should not be lifted to  
6 such an extent that this would constitute an increase of  
7 Japan's war potential. For instance no delivery of high  
8 octane gasoline should be allowed, but rice and if necessary  
9 low grade oils could be furnished.

10 The Netherlands Government will be glad to follow the  
11 same policy concerning oil deliveries to Japan as applied by  
12 the United States. It goes without saying that the license  
13 system will remain in operation.

14 The first point at issue of the Japanese proposals is  
15 aiming farther than the above. The Netherlands Government  
16 wonders whether it might not be possible to give the following  
17 reply:

- 18 1. If it is the intention of Japan to military withdraw  
19 from China, then there are no objections; if Japan  
20 is not willing to do so, then the right to continue  
21 to give assistance to China, should be reserved.
- 22 2. It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia)  
23 be also included in the regions enumerated in point 1  
24 of the Japanese proposal in which regions the powers  
25 should agree that no armed advance should take place.

rlk 3

1 Point 2 of the Japanese proposal has been answered by  
2 the above observations.

3 Ad point 3 of the Japanese proposals. The Netherlands  
4 are prepared to treat all countries on the same favored  
5 footing provided that no foreign power tries to obtain a  
6 preponderant position in the Netherlands Indies to the  
7 detriment of other nations and provided that defense require-  
8 ments be taken into account.

9 Point 4 and 5 of the Japanese proposals have already  
10 been dealt with in the above observations.

11 The Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that  
12 the above gives at least room for discussions with which we  
13 fully entrust the Secretary of State especially now that we  
14 have been so fully informed by him and since we have been  
15 given the opportunity to inform him of our point of view.

16 As far as the possible reduction of economic pressure  
17 on Japan is concerned, consultations with Governor General  
18 Starckenborgh and Economic Warfare will be necessary in view  
19 of the fact that deliveries of tin and rubber which were  
20 originally destined for Japan are now being shipped to the  
21 United States.

22 In general it will not be possible to go further than  
23 the final proposals of the Batavia Conference as proposed  
24 before the Netherlands - Japanese discussions had been broken  
25 off. Moreover as a result of Russian and American purchases,

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the amounts of tin and rubber offered in the final proposals  
are no more available.

November 25th, 1941.

WARD & BYRD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

Date: NOVEMBER 27, 1941

SUBJECT: THREATENED JAPANESE INVASION OF FRENCH INDOCHINA  
AREAPARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE NETHERLANDS  
MINISTER, DR. A. LOUDON

## COPIES TO:

The Netherlands Minister called at his request to inquire what reactions I had from the Japanese situation. I proceeded to hand him three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I abandoned on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November twenty-

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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rlk 2

1 sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the  
2 document containing a proposed draft of an agreement  
3 which set forth all of the basic principles for which this  
4 Government stands and has stood for, for many years, es-  
5 pecially including the maintenance of the territorial  
6 integrity of China. I reminded the Minister that the  
7 central point in our plan was the continuance of the  
8 conversations with Japan looking toward the working out  
9 of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settle-  
10 ment in the Pacific area and that the so-called modus  
11 vivendi was really a part and parcel of these conversa-  
12 tions and their objectives, intended to facilitate and  
13 keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing  
14 that in any way could be construed as a departure from  
15 the basic principles which were intended to go into the  
16 general peace agreement. The Minister said he understood  
17 the situation.

C.H.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 The Vice Chairman: You may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

2 Mr. Gesell: At page 1265 Senator Ferguson requested  
3 the notes made by Mr. Welles regarding conferences with  
4 President Roosevelt in connection with the Atlantic Conference,  
5 discussions concerning a parallel declaration to Japan.

6 The State Department advises that to date it has not  
7 found any such notes. The State Department has, however,  
8 found a draft dated August 16, 1941 which appears to be a  
9 revision of a draft dated August 15, 1941. The committee  
10 will recall that the August 15 draft was part of Exhibit 22  
11 and was submitted by us in the presentation.

12 The State Department now has a draft dated August 16,  
13 which we are glad to furnish for the record. It has to be  
14 photostated and is not yet here.

15 Senator Ferguson: Could you make that Exhibit 22-A  
16 so it will be with Exhibit 22?

17 Mr. Gesell: We will make it 22-A.

18 That draft, which is a day later than the August 15,  
19 I understand already shows the watering down of the crucial  
20 paragraph at the end.

21 (Exhibit No. 22-A reserved, to  
22 be furnished later.)  
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Shatner  
follows  
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fls LaChar  
12:15 PM 1

Mr. Gesell: We have also obtained a message dated August 18, 1941 from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill advising Prime Minister Churchill of the statement made to the Japs on August 17, 1941. I would like to read that into the record. This is dated August 18, 1941, to (Reading):

"AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (ENGLAND).

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR CHURCHILL.

QUOTE With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far East, upon my return to Washington I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations which the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest which had led to the cessation of those conversations.

"On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with

1 respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direc-  
2 tion of military domination by force along the lines of the  
3 proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The  
4 statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was  
5 substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

6 "The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to  
7 the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conver-  
8 sations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's ac-  
9 tion in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in in-  
10 spiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt  
11 on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international  
12 relations which this Government has emphasized and I sug-  
13 gested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to readjust  
14 its position and embark upon a peaceful program this Govern-  
15 ment would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversa-  
16 tions and that before undertaking the resumption of those  
17 conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a  
18 clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and  
19 plans.

20 "The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communi-  
21 cate what I had told him to his Government. "

22 (Signed) "ROOSEVELT."

23 I would like to have this marked as exhibit 70.

24 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

25

(The document referred to  
was marked Exhibit No. 70)

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2  
3 Mr. Gesell: At page 127 of the transcript a request  
4 was made by Senator Ferguson for any record that Great Bri-  
5 tain took parallel action in accordance with the Atlantic  
6 Conference agreement. That request was also made at page  
7 1804 of the transcript.

8 No record of any such action has been found by the State  
9 Department in its files. However, on August 25, 1941 the  
10 State Department telegraphed to Ambassador Grew for his in-  
11 formation an extract from Prime Minister Churchill's radio  
12 address on August 24, 1941. We have that telegram as No.  
13 535 to Tokyo and I would like to read it into the record  
14 since it does indicate information, perhaps, of a kind that  
15 Senator Ferguson was inquiring about as to whether it is  
16 available.

17 The Vice Chairman: Proceed.

18 Mr. Gesell: It is dated August 25, 1941. It is ad-  
19 dressed to the Embassy Tokyo, Japan, via Shanghai, China  
20 and Naval Radio, and it reads as follows: (Reading)

21 "There follows for your information extract from  
22 the Associated Press text from London of Prime Minister  
23 Churchill's radio address of August 24."

24 This is the quote, I take it, from the press:

25 "But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented

1 and devastated by aggression. For five long years the  
2 Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style  
3 of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as  
4 if it were a new European revelation, have been invading  
5 and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China.  
6 Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land  
7 in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin  
8 and corruption, and calling it 'the Chinese incident.'  
9 Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas  
10 of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy  
11 French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace  
12 Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace  
13 the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United  
14 States.

15 " It is certain that this has got to stop. Every  
16 effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement.  
17 The United States are laboring with infinite patience  
18 to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will  
19 give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate  
20 interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will  
21 succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes  
22 should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves un-  
23 hesitatingly at the side of the United States."

24 I would like to have that telegram marked as exhibit 71.

25 The Chairman: So ordered.

1 (The document referred to was  
2 marked Exhibit No. 72)

3 The Vice Chairman: Now, that is a quotation from Mr.  
4 Churchill's speech in London?

5 Mr. Gesell: Right, sent by Secretary Hull to Ambas-  
6 sador Grew.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

8 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

9 Senator Ferguson: May I just inquire as to where coun-  
10 sel obtained exhibits 70 and 71, whether they were both in  
11 the State Department files?

12 Mr. Gesell: Yes, we obtained them from the State De-  
13 partment files.

14 Senator Ferguson: That is what I mean, the State De-  
15 partment files.

16 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

17 The Vice Chairman: Proceed.

18 Mr. Gesell: At transcript page 1285 there is a request  
19 by Senator Ferguson for any messages to Ambassador Grew re-  
20 garding alleged parallel action taken by him in Japan on  
21 August 12, 1941 with Sir Robert Craigie relating to Thailand.

22 We would like to point out that at page 1649-52 of the  
23 transcript Ambassador Grew testified that he took no such par-  
24 allel action.

25 We have some documents from the files of the Department

of State which bear on this subject and I will designate them all as the next exhibit and describe them. That will be exhibit 72.

(The documents referred to were marked Exhibit No. 72)

Mr. Gesell: The first is a telegram, No. 452, from the State Department to Ambassador Grew, reporting statements made by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassador August 1, 1941 and requesting Grew to report these statements to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Telegram No. 1153, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department, reporting that he has taken action in accordance with the instructions.

And, three, a State Department radio bulletin of August 6, 1941 reporting a press conference of Secretary Hull on that date at which Secretary Hull commented on Thailand.

We believe this whole document would in the normal course of the State Department procedure have been sent to Ambassador Grew. Perhaps all three of these documents should be spread on the record so that the committee will have it for their information.

The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that the last one,

7 there is no knowledge that it was sent to the Ambassador?

8 Mr. Gesell: Well, it is a Department radio bulletin  
9 which we understand were sent generally to all of our Am-  
10 bassadors and representatives and, therefore, the presumption  
11 is very strong that it went to Ambassador Grew.

12 Senator Ferguson: That is what I want to know.

13 Mr. Gesell: Yes. He had the facilities to receive it  
14 and he was one of the logical people to be looking for it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 (Exhibit No. 72 is in words and figures as follows,-  
17 to-wit:)



TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

August 1, 1941.

Noon

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN)

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL TO THE AMBASSADOR

Reference my 793 94 451 August 1, 11 a.m.

One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's message in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina authorities; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension; and that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand. I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this. The Ambassador replied that he would do so.

Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above.

Acting (Signed) Welles

WARD PAUL WASHINGTON D. C.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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EJ

TOKYO

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

From Dated August 2, 1941  
Rec'd 7:47 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Stamped: AUG 5 - 1941  
Noted

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH

1153, August 2, 3 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY.

Department's 452, August 1, noon.

One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of  
the Foreign Minister, who is leaving tonight to worship at the  
Ise Shrines, counselor called this afternoon on the Acting Vice  
Minister and communicated to him the substance of the first para-  
graph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the same  
time conveying my request that the information be transmitted  
promptly to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report  
along precisely similar lines had already been received from Am-  
bassador Nemura, but that he would immediately inform the Minister  
of the information received through us.

-----  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TRB

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 This telegram must be  
 2 closely paraphrased be-  
 3 fore being communicated  
 4 to anyone. (SC)

Tokyo

From

Dated August 2, 1941

Reu' d 7:48 a.m.

5 Secretary of State,  
 6 Washington.

RUSH.

1153, August 2, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

9 Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the  
 10 Foreign Minister on Monday afternoon after his return from Ise,  
 11 Mr. Yamamoto said that he would of course arrange for the inter-  
 12 view if I desired to communicate further views or information  
 13 with regard to the American Government's proposition, but that  
 14 if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication  
 15 of the Japanese Government's considered views with regard to the  
 16 proposition he believed that the interview might be usefully de-  
 17 ferred for a few days. He said that the proposition was being  
 18 carefully studied by the Japanese Government with every desire  
 19 to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of  
 20 the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador  
 21 Nomura.

(Signed) GREW

HPD

D. G. HODGKINS WASHINGTON D. C.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

August 6, 1941.

Radio Bulletin No. 186

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. Questioned again today whether any credence could be placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday morning.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper's mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that he had heard a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent people who come to this country.

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the

rbm 5

1 Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard  
2 to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we  
3 had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the  
4 part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area.  
5 He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest  
6 in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed  
7 out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the  
8 correspondents a statement on that general question as it related  
9 to the Pacific area.

10 Asked if he could say whether this Government had had oc-  
11 casion to express any views to the Government of Thailand con-  
12 cerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not  
13 go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could  
14 be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps  
15 followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired  
16 whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follo  
17 the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The  
18 Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern  
19 about a movement that would include the step to which the corres-  
20 pondent referred.

21 Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government  
22 has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said  
23 that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything  
24 that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina  
25 would have especial application to Thailand and the present situa-  
tion.

1 A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also made  
2 some demands upon the Ecuadorans, and he asked whether we were  
3 going to do anything about that. The Secretary said that we had  
4 nothing on that subject except what appeared in the newspapers.  
5 He added that he had not heard from Ecuador nor from our repre-  
6 sentatives.

7 A correspondent asked whether there had been some indica-  
8 tions that Thailand had been offered what amounted to a protec-  
9 torate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese  
10 would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Common-  
11 wealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. The  
12 Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He  
13 mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that  
14 area lately and said that we were observing all of these as closely  
15 as possible.

16 A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Nether-  
17 lands Indies paper that there was no question that the United  
18 States was behind the Netherlands Indies but the question was how  
19 far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a weakening  
20 of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary said  
21 that he had nothing new on that subject.

22 To a question of whether the United States had had any  
23 change in relations with Finland, the Secretary said that there  
24 had been nothing especially new on that recently.

25 Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from

1 Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that  
2 he had not yet heard from him.

3 A correspondent asked whether there was any development on  
4 the question of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary  
5 said that there was nothing especially new. He said that we had  
6 not had any communications yet from any of the persons who were  
7 refugees if we might call them that or from our consuls. He added  
8 that at the same time we are giving every attention to the whole  
9 problem.

10 A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group,  
11 including several Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last  
12 night to Congress (see below) to put a stop to the step-by-step  
13 projection of the United States toward an undeclared war and he  
14 asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull said that  
15 he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
16 in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-  
17 Lease Bill in which he sought to state the issues confronting us  
18 in the international situation.

19 Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a trans-  
20 lation of a letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State  
21 from the Minister of Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the  
22 President of Paraguay and Sonora de Morinigo for the courtesies  
23 shown in the United States to Senora de Morinigo and their son.  
24 The letter said that the general health of the child has improved  
25 notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the

rbm 8

1 treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21).

2 Chile. Senorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress  
3 and musician from Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11  
4 on an invitation extended by the Department of State to visit  
5 the United States.

6 Max W. Thornburg. The Department has announced the appoint-  
7 ment of Max W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Sec-  
8 retary of State, to act as consultant to the State Department on  
9 international petroleum matters. Mr. Thornburg has been assigned  
10 to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

11 CONGRESS

12 Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to  
13 adopt the Property Requisitioning Bill. The House added three  
14 amendments to the measure as passed by the Senate, thus necessi-  
15 tating its going to conference to iron out the differences. (See  
16 Radio Bulletin No. 173 of July 22)

17 Highway Defense Program. The Senate today over-rode by 57  
18 to 19 the President's veto of the \$320,000,000 highway defense  
19 bill.

20 The measure will now go to the House for consideration (See  
21 Radio Bulletin No. 185 of July 5).

22 DEFENSE

23 Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six addi-  
24 tional section bases for refueling and minor repairs for small  
25 ships at Key West, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Corpus Christi, Tex.;



1 Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif., and Neah Bay,  
2 Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that  
3 additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.

4 Airplane Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director  
5 General Knudsen, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary  
6 of the Navy Forrestal would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to  
7 inspect East Coast Airplane factories with a view to possible  
8 speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy and the British.

9 Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator  
10 Jones announced that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of  
11 the Navy Department, had authorized a lease agreement with Revere  
12 Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C. to construct and equip a plant  
13 at Baltimore, Md., costing \$3,100,000. to be used for naval equip-  
14 ment production.

15 The Defense Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agree-  
16 ment with Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and  
17 equip a plant at Niagara Falls Airport (\*)

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\*Reporter's Note:

20 End of last page attached Exhibit 72.  
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1 Mr. Gezell: At transcript page 1300, 1305 and 1316  
2 a request was made by Senator Ferguson for messages transmitted  
3 by Sumner Welles to Lord Halifax referred to in Ambassador  
4 Winant's telegram dated December 6, 1941.

5 We cannot find any further record and call attention to  
6 the testimony of Secretary Welles at transcript 1337 and 1338  
7 where he gave his explanation of what he thought that in-  
8 formation was. We are unable to find any further record.

9 At transcript page 1399 a request by Congressman Keefe  
10 for drafts prior to October 17, 1941 of messages to Emperor  
11 Hirohito.

12 There are two State Department drafts of October 16, 1941  
13 prior to the receipt of what is referred to as a draft from  
14 the White House, and one State Department draft of October  
15 16, apparently following the receipt of the White House draft.  
16 We are not clear. Those drafts we have marked as exhibit 73  
17 and if the Congressman wishes we can have them spread upon  
18 the record.

19 The so-called White House draft which came between these  
20 two drafts has not yet been found. Further search is being  
21 conducted for the White House draft.

22 The Vice Chairman: The exhibits will be received.

23 (The documents referred to were  
24 marked Exhibit No. 73)

25 Insert

rlk 1

## DRAFT TELEGRAM

October 16, 1941

(Draft no. 2)

His Imperial Majesty

Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a narrower concept than I had anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to establish a durable

rlk 2

1 and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

2 The procedure which the Government of the United  
3 States and the Government of Japan have been following  
4 during these past weeks has not produced the results  
5 hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials  
6 of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses,  
7 I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting  
8 between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman  
9 of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of  
10 China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a  
11 meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can  
12 be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best  
13 hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific  
14 area.

15 I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek  
16 in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so imme-  
17 diately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

18 FE:MMH:HES

19 - - -

20 DRAFT TELEGRAM

21 October 16, 1941.

22 His Imperial Majesty

23 Hirohito,

24 Emperor of Japan

25 I have just been informed through news reports that

rlk 3

1 the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation  
2 to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions  
3 have been carried on during the past few weeks between  
4 high officials of the Government of the United States  
5 and high officials of the Government of Japan directed  
6 toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting  
7 between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped  
8 would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of  
9 peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages  
10 I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were  
11 very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the  
12 concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese  
13 Government seemed to present a more narrow concept than I  
14 had anticipated (than that conveyed by the Premier's  
15 message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2  
16 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return  
17 to the original concept and endeavor through re-  
18 examination of that concept to evolve general lines of  
19 action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty  
20 concepts) of our original concepts and thus might be  
21 expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace  
22 in the Pacific area.

23 The procedure which the Government of the United  
24 States and the Government of Japan have been following  
25 during these past weeks has not produced the results

rlk 4

1 hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials  
 2 of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses,  
 3 I suggest that Your Imperial Majesty signify approval of  
 4 a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the  
 5 Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be  
 6 held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed  
 7 furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of  
 8 maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

9 I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, the  
 10 Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to  
 11 do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

12 FE:MMH:HES

13 - - -

14 October 16, 1941

15 DRAFT OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
 16 TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN -- SUPERSEDED BY A LATER  
 17 DRAFT DATED OCTOBER 17, 1941.  
 18 THIS DRAFT WAS NOT USED.

19 - - -

20 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

21  
 22 

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 23 Adviser on Political Relations

24 October 16, 1941.

25 Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed

rlk 5

1 action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to  
2 come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly  
3 that this proposed message in the form in which it  
4 stands should not at this time be sent.

5 A redraft is submitted here attached. The important  
6 paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel  
7 that great care should be exercised to avoid making any  
8 too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself  
9 feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenanc-  
10 ing of the Japanese operations in China.

11 PA/H:SKH:BGT

12 - - -

13 PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE  
14 EMPEROR OF JAPAN

15 Only once and in person and on an emergency situa-  
16 tion have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel  
17 I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because of a  
18 deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process  
19 of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversa-  
20 tions have been in progress between representatives of  
21 our two governments for many months for the purpose of  
22 keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific  
23 area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has  
24 equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty.

25 I personally would have been happy even to travel.

rlk 6

1 thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if  
2 in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized  
3 so that the success of such a conference would have been  
4 assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached.  
5 The first related to the integrity of China and the second  
6 related to an assurance that neither Japan nor the United  
7 States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

8 If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government  
9 is considering armed attacks against Russia or against  
10 France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent  
11 territory in the South, the obvious result would, of  
12 necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European  
13 and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the  
14 Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve  
15 American interests.

16 The United States opposes any procedure of conquest.  
17 It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It  
18 would like to see freedom of the seas and trade conducted  
19 on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve  
20 peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume  
21 normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of  
22 certain articles which we must keep at home for our own  
23 defense and that of all of the Americas against possible  
24 aggression from abroad.

25 If on the other hand Japan were to start new military  
operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy



of peace, would be very seriously concerned.

258

1 Mr. Gesell: At page 1419 and 1420 of the transcript a  
2 question was raised by Congressman Keefe as to the time when  
3 President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1941 to Emperor  
4 Hirohito was released to the press.

5 The State Department has advised us as follows, that at  
6 7:40 P.M., December 6th, correspondents were informed orally  
7 at the State Department that the President had sent a per-  
8 sonal message direct to Emperor Hirohito of Japan. It is  
9 my understanding --

10 Mr. Keefe: Was that, do I understand you, at 7:40 P.M.?

11 Mr. Gesell: At 7:40 P.M., December 6th.

12 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

13 Mr. Gesell: It is my understanding that the text of  
14 the message was not released at that time.

15 We have a release of the State Department dated December  
16 7, 1941 for the press or from the White House, but it comes  
17 from the State Department files, releasing the text of the  
18 message to the Emperor. We haven't yet been able to ascer-  
19 tain whether this release was handed to the press before the  
20 Pearl Harbor attack or after and we are continuing on that  
21 matter, but it looks as though the text of the message was  
22 released on December 7th.

23 At page 1410 of the transcript a question by Congressman  
24 Keefe was raised as to the issuance by the State Department  
25

1 of official notices advising American nationals to leave the  
2 Orient.

3 Now there are quite a number of those warnings, as the  
4 Congressman himself indicated.

5 The major warnings to Tokyo are three:

6 One, No. 381, to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1940;

7 One, No. 100 to Tokyo, dated February 11, 1941; and

8 One, No. 765 to Tokyo, dated November 19, 1941 and we

9 feel that these, particularly because they refer to prior  
10 orders and because they show they also went to other embas-  
11 sies in the Pacific area, will give the Congressman the in-  
12 formation he wants and perhaps the three of them should be  
13 designated as the next exhibit, No. 74.

14 The Vice Chairman: They will be received and made an  
15 exhibit.

16 Mr. Gesell: I do not suppose you want those in the re-  
17 cord, do you, Congressman, or do you?

18 Mr. Keefe: Can they put into the record some way?

19 Mr. Gesell: All right, we will have them copied into  
20 the transcript.

21 The Vice Chairman: It is so ordered.

22 (The documents referred to were re  
23 marked Exhibit No. 74)

24 (Insert)

Copy  
r1k 1

## TELEGRAM SENT

AC

October 6, 1940

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (Br)

2 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA)

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA)  
AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA)  
AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG

381.

The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in widespread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultural, and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely affected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Department to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French

rlk 2

1 Indochina quietly repeat quietly inform American citizens  
2 in their respective districts of the substance of the  
3 preceding sentence and suggest withdrawals insofar as  
4 is practicable from the areas in question to the United  
5 States. This applies especially in regard to women and  
6 children and to men whose continued presence in China,  
7 in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indochina is not  
8 repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed.  
9 There should be pointed out to American citizens the  
10 advisability of their taking advantage of transportation  
11 facilities while such facilities are available, as it  
12 goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such  
13 facilities will remain available indefinitely.

14 In order that this instruction be not repeat not  
15 misconstrued in any quarter, it is desired that effort  
16 be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that  
17 endeavor be made to preclude the reading into it of  
18 sensational implications.

19 The Department would appreciate receiving from you  
20 and from Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other  
21 interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans  
22 who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo  
23 should instruct consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping  
24 should instruct those in China.

25 The Department will expect shortly to issue further

rlk 3

instructions embodying various administrative considerations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.

HULL

S

FE:GA:HES

FE

PA/H

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TELEGRAM SENT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This cable was sent in Washington,  
 confidential Code. It  
 should be carefully para- February 11, 1941  
 phrased before being  
 communicated to anyone. (Br) 7 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN)

100

URGENT.

Department's 381, October 6, 2 p.m., withdrawal of  
 American citizens.

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct  
 American consulates in Japanese territory to renew, im-  
 mediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any  
 sensational publicity, to American citizens, especially to  
 women and children and to men whose continued presence in  
 Japan is not highly essential, this Government's suggestions  
 that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the

rlk 4

1 Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should  
2 explain to American inquirers that this Government is making  
3 no repeat no assumption that a situation of acute physical  
4 danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this  
5 Government, in the light of obvious trends in the Far  
6 Eastern situation, desires to reduce the risks to which  
7 American nationals and their interests are exposed by  
8 virtue of uncertainties and, through the process of with-  
9 drawal of unessential personnel, to improve its position  
10 in relation to problems which may at any time be presented  
11 of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons  
12 who are not in position to withdraw, those interests which  
13 cannot be abandoned, and those principles and those rights  
14 to which it is the duty of the American Government to give  
15 all appropriate support at all times. This instruction  
16 and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not meant  
17 to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary precautionary  
18 measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary  
19 hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those  
20 whom you address shall realize that there are real risks,  
21 that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this advice  
22 is being given in the interest both of the safety and con-  
23 venience of the American nationals addressed and in the  
24 interest of national security.

25 The Department is sending similar instructions

rlk 5

to Peiping, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such transportation facilities as may be currently available.

PA/H:SKH:ZMK/HNS

FE

PA/H

(HULL)

- - -

TELEGRAM SENT

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 Department of State

"Br"

NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

November 19, 1941

3 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN) VIA SHANGHAI (CHINA).

INFO: AMEMBASSY, CHUNGKING (CHINA).  
 AMEMBASSY, PEIPING (CHINA).  
 AMERICAN CONSUL, HONG KONG.

Reference Department's 100, February 11, 7 p.m.  
 and previous telegrams in regard to withdrawal of  
 American citizens.

The Department desires that the American diplo-

rlk 6

1 matic and consular officers concerned call to the atten-  
 2 tion of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japa-  
 3 nese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and  
 4 French Indochina the advice previously given in regard  
 5 to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping  
 6 problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that be-  
 7 cause of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance  
 8 that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even  
 9 the present facilities.

10 Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking,  
 11 Peiping and Hong Kong. Tokyo please repeat to all consular  
 12 offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dairen. Peiping  
 13 please repeat to all consular offices in Japanese-occupied  
 14 areas of China, and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please  
 15 repeat to Saigon and Hanoi.

(HULL)

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 17 FE:WAA:NHS/MHP FE PA/H SD A-L S  
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Mr. Gesell: On transcript page 1436 a question was raised by Senator Ferguson as to whether the State Department has a record of a statement by Senator Pepper on November 24, 1941 which he made in Boston in a speech.

The answer from the State Department is that there is no record of any such statement found in the State Department files.

On transcript page 1437 a question by Senator Ferguson as to whether the declaration suggested by Prime Minister Churchill in the message to President Roosevelt on November 30, 1941 was ever made.

You will recall that was a message from Prime Minister Churchill in which he asked for a warning to be made by the United States and referred to his appreciation of President Roosevelt's constitutional difficulties.

The answer is that no record was found by the State Department in its file that any warning or declaration was ever issued to Japan pursuant to that suggestion.

We would like to call attention to Volume 2 of the Foreign Relations papers which is in evidence here, to page 771, an inquiry by President Roosevelt which was handed by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassadors, as to their intentions with respect to going into Indo-China.

Now, here is a question raised by myself at page 1499 of the transcript, as to whether the Japanese government gave

any publicity to their proposal of November 20, 1941, which has been referred to as the Japanese ultimatum.

The answer was that no answer was found by the State Department in its files that the Japanese ever gave publicity to their note.

The further information is furnished that the Japanese proposal was published in the United States on December 15, 1941 as annex 11 to House Document No. 458 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, First Session, which was President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December 15, 1941.

At page 1505 of the transcript a question by Senator Barkley as to when Ambassador Grew received word of the delivery of the U. S. note of November 26th. I believe that question was also raised by Senator Ferguson at transcript 1820 and 1821.

We have here a series of despatches to Ambassador Grew from the Department of State, -Number 783, 784 and 787; the first is 8 P.M. November 26, 1941; the second dated 9 P.M. November 26, 1941; and the third dated November 27, 1941.

These despatches show that Ambassador Grew was immediately advised that a proposal had been received and subsequently the actual text of the note was sent there, a summary of it, at 9 P.M. I think all three of those documents should be spread upon the record and designated exhibit No. 75.

The Vice Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were  
marked Exhibit No. 75)

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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## TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

"SC"NO DISTRIBUTION

Washington,

November 26, 1941

8 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

783

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE  
COUNSELOR ONLY.

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu  
in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents--  
an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis  
for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area.

A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent  
telegram.

(HULL)

FE:MWS:MJF

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## TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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This cable was sent in Washington,  
 confidential Code. It November 26, 1941  
 should be carefully para- 9 p.m.  
 phrased before being com-  
 municated to anyone. (SC)

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO.

784

and Counselor  
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE ~~SECRETARY~~ AND AMBASSADOR/  
 ONLY.

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at  
 my request November 26.

I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement  
 substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in  
 reference to the general principles which we have been  
 discussing for the past several months in informal and  
 exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settle-  
 ment of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included  
 among those principles are the principles of reliance upon  
 international cooperation and conciliation to improve world  
 conditions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent  
 and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial  
 integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal

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1 affairs of other nations and the principle of equality.  
2 Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government  
3 received on November 20 and recent statements of the  
4 Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue  
5 these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be  
6 helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

7 This Government most earnestly desires to further  
8 the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific  
9 area and to provide full opportunity to continue dis-  
10 cussions with the Japanese Government looking to the  
11 working out of <sup>a</sup> broad programs of peace. In the opinion  
12 of this Government the Japanese proposals of November 20  
13 in some ways conflict with the fundamental principles  
14 to which each Government has committed itself and would  
15 not be likely to further our ultimate objectives. It  
16 is suggested that further efforts toward resolving  
17 divergences of views on the practical application of those  
18 principles be made. There is therefore offered the  
19 Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifesta-  
20 tion of the sort of program this Government has in mind  
21 to be worked out during further discussions. The hope  
22 is expressed that there thus may be expedited progress  
23 toward a meeting of minds.

24 The draft proposal for a broad-gauge settlement  
25 was substantially as follows:

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The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which there was embodied an affirmation by both Governments that their national policies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the Pacific area, that both Governments are without territorial designs, that both have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to certain fundamental principles. (There are then listed the four principles which are mentioned above in the oral statement.)

to

Both Governments agree ~~to~~ practically/apply and actively support five economic principles in a program to eliminate and to prevent recurrent political instability, economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) the establishment of international financial institutions and arrangements designed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of all nations; (b) non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) non-discriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of extreme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

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Miss  
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten  
2 steps to be taken:

3 1. Both Governments to exert their influence to  
4 bring about other governments' adherence to and practical  
5 application of the basic political and economic principles  
6 set forth. ~~to~~

7 2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multi-  
8 lateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British  
9 Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and the  
10 United States.

11 3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already  
12 concluded by either with any third power or powers will be  
13 interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental  
14 purpose--establishment and preservation of peace in the entire  
15 Pacific.

16 4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement  
17 among the Netherland, Thai, American, British, Chinese, and  
18 Japanese Governments calling for pledges on the part of each  
19 Government to respect Indochina's territorial integrity and  
20 should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon  
21 immediate consultation with regard to that threat;

22 ~~in order that measures necessary and advisable to meet that~~  
23 ~~threat may be taken~~ such agreement to provide also that each  
24 signatory ~~should not~~ would not repeat not accept or seek preferential  
25 economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each



fls  
Miss  
King

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten  
2 steps to be taken:

3 1. Both Governments to exert their influence to  
4 bring about other governments' adherence to and practical  
5 application of the basic political and economic principles  
6 set forth. ~~apply~~

7 2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multi-  
8 lateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British  
9 Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and the  
10 United States.

11 3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already  
12 concluded by either with any third power or powers will be  
13 interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental  
14 purpose--establishment and preservation of peace in the entire  
15 Pacific.

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19 Government to respect Indochina's territorial integrity and  
20 should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon  
21 immediate consultation with regard to that threat;

22 ~~In order that measures necessary and advisable to meet that~~

23 ~~threat may be taken~~ such agreement to provide also that each  
24 signatory

25 ~~signed for it~~ would not repeat not accept or seek preferential  
economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each

1 signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all  
2 signatories equality of treatment in those matters.

3 5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all  
4 police, air, naval and military forces.

5 6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritorial  
6 rights in China and rights and interests in and with regard  
7 to concessions, international settlements and rights under  
8 the Boxer Protocol; both Governments to seek to obtain from  
9 other governments, including the British, an agreement to  
10 give up all similar rights in China.

11 7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward  
12 conclusion of an American-Japanese trade agreement on the  
13 basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American  
14 undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, and of reci-  
15 procal most-favored-nation treatment.

16 8. Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions  
17 on each other's funds.

18 9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate  
19 stabilization plan, each allocating one-half of the funds  
20 adequate for that purpose.

21 10. Both Governments not repeat not to support--  
22 economically, politically, militarily--any government or  
23 regime in China except the National Government located  
24 temporarily at Chungking.

25 An account of the conversation will be sent you in a

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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TELEGRAM SENT

"SC"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

November 27, 1941

NO DISTRIBUTION

7 pm

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

787

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND THE  
COUNSELOR ONLY.

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p.m.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation this Government also had its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 received. He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with  
2 international organizations as the basis for his objection  
3 to the proposed multilateral non-aggression pacts. He added  
4 that China had received the wrong impression from the Washing-  
5 ton treaties and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's  
6 rights. He said that if this proposal represented the ideas of  
7 the American Government he did not see the possibility of any  
8 agreement and added that he did not see how the Japanese  
9 Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw  
10 all military, naval, air and police forces from China and  
11 withdraw all support from regimes or governments in China  
12 except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

13 The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these  
14 questions.

15 Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely  
16 to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was  
17 marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser  
18 course further to discuss it informally before sending it to  
19 the Japanese Government.

20 The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully  
21 to study the documents before further discussion. The Secre-  
22 tary said that with the public having lost its perspective  
23 it was necessary to present a complete picture of our posi-  
24 tion. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil  
25 question and reminded the Japanese of the great injury being

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1 done to us by Japan's immobilizing large forces of democratic  
2 countries in territories near Indochina and indicated that  
3 should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people  
4 would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries  
5 south and west of Indochina and to our direct interests.

6 Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on  
7 Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wei and  
8 observed that the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of  
9 opinion.

10 The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our  
11 response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached  
12 an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus  
13 vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and  
14 whether they could see the President.

15 The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of  
16 a modus vivendi and, in response to a further inquiry as to  
17 whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of  
18 the attitude of other powers, he added that he had done his best.  
19 He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the  
20 Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged  
21 for November 27).

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1 Mr. Gesell:

2 At page 1510 of the transcript a request by Congressman  
3 Murphy for a copy of the official German report on discussions  
4 between Adolph Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister  
5 Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, 1941, as introduced at the  
6 Nuernberg trial on November 23, 1941.

7 We have the complete text, which we will simply keep in  
8 our files, and the full translation of the document relating  
9 to this subject, which was introduced in the Nuernberg trial,  
10 I suggest be spread on the record at this point.

11 Perhaps we should also designate that as Exhibit 76.

12 The Vice Chairman: So ordered.

13 (The document referred to was  
14 marked Exhibit No. 76.)

15 (Exhibit 76 is as follows:)

16 TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS  
17 OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

18 Notes Fueh 20/41

19 NOTES

20 regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and  
21 the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, in the  
22 presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the  
23 Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of  
24 April 1941.  
25 -----



1 Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make  
2 those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the per-  
3 sonality of Cardinal CASPARI.

4 Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that  
5 the United States and particularly the American President  
6 prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the  
7 question to determine, if America or its President were right  
8 or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their  
9 policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one  
10 had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe  
11 and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the  
12 POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself,  
13 but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China  
14 and in the entire far East. It is regretful that America and  
15 England sided with Bolshevism.

16 The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided  
17 in Spain with Bolshevism.

18 MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, and the FUEHRER  
19 should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as  
20 broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military  
21 Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly  
22 concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by making  
23 available to them the latest experiences of the war as well  
24 as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan  
25 would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States.

1 In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore,  
2 the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight  
3 with the United States, because in that case America probably  
4 would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally  
5 believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplo-  
6 matic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great  
7 Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst  
8 situation, that is with war against America. They were of the  
9 opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer  
10 and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific  
11 and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason  
12 the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the  
13 greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war  
14 would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements  
15 of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like,  
16 could best be exploited by Japan.

17 To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should  
18 see to it that the proper German authorities would place at  
19 the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions  
20 concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

21 The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany  
22 too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable,  
23 but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.  
24 In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions  
25 depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that

1 this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's  
2 war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not  
3 merely against England, but also against America. Germany has  
4 made her preparations so, that no American could land in  
5 Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against  
6 America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her  
7 superior experience, which would still have to be acquired  
8 by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that  
9 quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally  
10 ranks high above the American.

11 In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer  
12 pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take  
13 the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United  
14 States. It did not matter with whom the United States would  
15 first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would  
16 always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come  
17 to an understanding with the other country subsequently,  
18 but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany  
19 would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of  
20 a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of  
21 the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their  
22 weakness would be if they would let themselves, be beaten  
23 individually.

24 Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer  
25 might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper

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1 German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese  
2 the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest  
3 to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately  
4 for a conflict with the United States.

5 As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka  
6 explained further that he has always declared in his country,  
7 that sooner or later a war with the United States would be  
8 unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present.  
9 In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than  
10 later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore,  
11 not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk  
12 upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she  
13 perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained  
14 predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in  
15 Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought.  
16 Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with  
17 dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan contin-  
18 ued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to  
19 fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable  
20 circumstances than at present.

21 The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the  
22 situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar  
23 situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of  
24 sovereignty of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that  
25 he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an

WLC2

1 anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still  
2 young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude  
3 was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not  
4 hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the  
5 war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored  
6 those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will  
7 bravely face them.

8 Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their  
9 ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre  
10 towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan  
11 on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave  
12 free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to  
13 their place of destination. However, America would war against  
14 Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with  
15 the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain.  
16 Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon  
17 the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English  
18 lines which many had received.

19 The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of  
20 America did not mean anything but that the United States had  
21 the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed,  
22 one day they could advance against Japan together with Great  
23 Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire,  
24 they would be totally isolated and could not do anything  
25 against Japan.

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1           The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans  
2 precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the power-  
3 ful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other  
4 hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears  
5 a joint action of Japan and Germany.

6           Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance  
7 to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real  
8 attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform  
9 him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity  
10 as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in  
11 Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before  
12 the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his  
13 plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and  
14 financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake,  
15 before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell  
16 a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that  
17 the latter had spread these things and thus brought about  
18 all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose  
19 energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under  
20 these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he  
21 could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier  
22 or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully  
23 in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his  
24 decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his  
25 proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then

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1 the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the  
2 plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

3 Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that  
4 would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power  
5 of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should  
6 he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in  
7 Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

8 On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to  
9 the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and  
10 the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however,  
11 state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

12 Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to  
13 cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear  
14 that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he  
15 would send a courier.

16 The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could  
17 rest entirely assured of German reticence.

18 Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence,  
19 but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

20 The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some  
21 personal parting words.

22 Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

23 Signed: SCHMIDT.

24 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

25 OF DOCUMENT NO 1881-PS

4 April 1941.

4531

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1 I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am  
2 thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;  
3 and that the above is a true and correct translation of  
4 Document 1881-PS.

5 ERNST COHN

6 Pfc.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

3 The Vice Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

4 Mr. Murphy: At that point, the papers in this country  
5 this week contained a notation to the effect that an entry  
6 was made in the trial at Nuernberg of a conversation between  
7 Von Ribbentrop and the Japanese representative, asking them  
8 in February 1941 to have a surprise attack on the United  
9 States. I will get the specific reference.

10 Mr. Gesell: I am familiar with that. We have asked  
11 for those documents.

12 Mr. Murphy: All right.

13 Mr. Gesell: I might say to the committee we have also  
14 been working this process in reverse and making available to  
15 Justice Jackson and Mr. Keenan the intercepted messages, which  
16 have proved to be of great interest to them, and we think  
17 they will be of value in both of those trials.

18 On transcript pages 1537, 1586 and 1968 questions were  
19 raised by Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew was  
20 consulted when the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor in 1940.

21 No record can be found by the State Department, in its  
22 files, that such was the case. In other words, there is no  
23 documentary evidence found that he was consulted one way or  
24 the other, which appears to confirm his own testimony concern-  
25 ing it.

1  
2 At transcript pages 1544 and 1586 are questions by  
3 Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew ever expressed  
4 an opinion regarding the effect of basing the Fleet at Pearl  
5 Harbor.

6  
7 The answer is again the same, that there is no record  
8 which can be found in the State Department files, except the  
9 statement on page 69 of Volume II of Foreign Relations, that  
10 the presence of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor did not constitute  
11 a threat to Japan.

12 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I think that has already  
13 been read into the record.

14 Mr. Gesell: That has already been read so we will not  
15 pursue that further.

16 At transcript 1641, a request by Senator Ferguson for  
17 Ambassador Grew's so-called "green light" telegram dated  
18 September 12, 1940, to the State Department.

19 We simply want to note that that was offered as Exhibit  
20 26 and read into the record by Mr. Grew at pages 1668 to  
21 1679 of the transcript.

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Shack(12)  
fls  
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hl

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2 At transcript 1652, a request by Senator Ferguson  
3 for information received by Ambassador Grew from the State  
4 Department in August, 1941, as to the U. S. attitude re-  
5 garding the independence of Thailand.

6  
7 That is covered by the previous discussion of the  
8 Thailand documents at transcript page 1285.

9 At transcript 1669, a request by Senator Ferguson  
10 for telegram No. 300 from Peiping to the State Department  
11 referred to in Ambassador Grew's so-called "green light  
12 telegram."

13 We have this, and I will not bother to read it. It  
14 is a rather lengthy document. We will offer it as the  
15 next exhibit, No. 77, and have it spread on the transcript.

16 The Vice Chairman: So ordered.

17 (The document referred to was  
18 marked Exhibit 77, and is as  
19 follows:)

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N.R.

Dated: August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 9:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m.

Mr. A. T. Steel, Far Eastern correspondent for the CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steel is an experienced and able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totalitarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

SMYTH