

2812

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 figures were.

3 Senator Lucas: Yes. Well, why was it, Admiral Stark,  
4 back in 1939, in, say, July 1939 you were not able to get all  
5 that you wanted? What was the reason?

6 Admiral Stark: Because we could not get it by the budget.  
7 May I have the page number that you are reading from on that?

8 Senator Lucas: Page 8.

9 Admiral Stark: Oh, yes. I may state that when I fin-  
10 ally got what I referred to as the green light I went di-  
11 rectly to Senator Byrnes. He will recall the incident, I  
12 think, very well. He called me the most persistent, stubborn  
13 man on personnel he had ever known, but he finally gave me  
14 what I had asked for. There were one or two other rather amus-  
15 ing incidents in that conversation that it is not necessary to  
16 go into here but we did get what we asked for.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, you got what you asked for but the  
18 point I am making is that you lay particular stress upon the  
19 fact, as I read the letter, that if you could have had what you  
20 were entitled to two years before that you could really have  
21 been somewhere with the Navy and that would have been in 1939,  
22 in the early part of 1939.

23 Admiral Stark: If we could have gotten authorization and  
24 money for full complements plus fifteen per cent it would have  
25 made our problems very much simpler and very much easier. We

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 solved it as best we could with what we got and the results  
3 speak pretty well for themselves.

4 Senator Lucas: I agree with you on that. Public opin-  
5 ion had something to do with what you got and what you did  
6 not get back in 1939, isn't that true?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. Things were not as grave. When  
8 I went before the Naval Committee there are some things that  
9 stand out very clearly and we were struggling on this situa-  
10 tion with regard to men, pointing out that the fleet was only  
11 85 per cent manned and what a great mistake I thought it was.  
12 I remember Congressman Ditter turning to me and saying, "No-  
13 body has ever talked to us like that before about men." "Where  
14 do you get this stuff?"

15 I went back to the Department and went over some of my  
16 recommendations and some of the previous recommendations of  
17 what is now known as the Bureau of Personnel. I had them back  
18 up what I am about to say, that the Navy's pleas had been con-  
19 stant for men. The Navy was cut down to a so-called 85 per  
20 cent complement some years previous when economy was a very  
21 potent subject and the Navy was faced, - I think Admiral Pratt  
22 was Chief of Operations at the time, - with either keeping  
23 fewer ships fully manned or a greater number of ships in com-  
24 mission partially manned and as I recall 85 per cent was put  
25 down as the lower limit of what we could keep ships going with

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 with any degree of efficiency. So we came to accept that 85  
3 per cent and I always thought it was dangerous and the minute  
4 I got where I could raise my voice against it, this practice  
5 which we had gotten to accept, I started doing so.

6 Senator Lucas: Well, it took a national emergency al-  
7 most before you could get what you really wanted?

8 Admiral Stark: It took a national emergency to blast it  
9 out, yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: And that was due to the temper of the  
11 people of this country?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, I think so.

13 Senator Lucas: That it took --

14 Admiral Stark: At that early time.

15 Senator Lucas: That is right. And the people, after all,  
16 usually make more or less the military and naval policy.

17 Admiral Stark: In the last analysis the man on the  
18 street is the first line of defense.

19 Senator Lucas: That is right. And I think it is per-  
20 tinent, too, along this line of inquiry, to just refer just  
21 briefly to the treaty of limitation of Naval Armaments signed  
22 in Washington on February 6, 1922 and ratified by the Senate  
23 March 29, 1922, as indicating how we felt at that particular  
24 time about peace and how far we were willing to go in order to  
25 maintain peace.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and we found out to our very  
3 great cost that disarmament by example did not pay.

4 Senator Lucas: I would like to ask you just one or two  
5 questions about the disarmament conference and see if you --

6 The Chairman: Senator, it is practically 12:30.

7 Senator Lucas: I can finish in five minutes I think.

8 The Chairman: All right. We want to have an executive  
9 session.

10 Senator Lucas: It may be ten minutes.

11 The Chairman: Well, go ahead if it won't take more than  
12 five minutes.

13 Senator Lucas: I want to ask, Admiral Stark, if he will  
14 agree with these facts: In 1918 the United States had a total  
15 combatant tonnage of ships 1,087,000 and had building addi-  
16 tional tonnage of 953,876 tons. Do you recall those figures?

17 Admiral Stark: I do not recall the figures but if you  
18 have it in front of you I assume they are correct.

19 Senator Lucas: Well, you recall that in the 1922 dis-  
20 armament conference which I have talked about we sank or de-  
21 militarized 767,880 tons of combatant ships?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. We did the sinking.

23 Senator Lucas: And for the next eight years for all prac-  
24 tical purposes ceased to build ships of war?

25 Admiral Stark: We had a period there where we practical-

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 ly stopped.

3 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you this: Did the limitation  
4 of armaments conference signed at London April the 27th, 1930  
5 and ratified by the Senate on July 1, 1930, was there anything  
6 in that treaty which prevented construction of our anti-  
7 submarine vessels and yet permitted Germany and Japan to build  
8 all the submarines they desired? Do you recall anything about  
9 that?

10 Admiral Stark: I think there was not. I think in the  
11 hearings that -- as you recall, I was nearly nine days straight  
12 morning and afternoon early in 1940 struggling for the in-  
13 crease in the Navy, for what I thought was a modest increase  
14 of 25 per cent that was cut in half by Congress. I pointed  
15 out we had not lived up to that very -- I mean we had not  
16 built up to the 5-5-3 ratio.

17 Senator Lucas: We had not built up to it?

18 Admiral Stark: We had not built up to it. We were dis-  
19 arming by example and it did not pay. I do not want to let  
20 that stay in, talking about Congress cutting it in half. They  
21 stated that; I accepted that because it was not just a straight  
22 cut in half. It was a question whether we could get through  
23 with 25 per cent and we might lose the whole thing, but the  
24 figure of about 13 per cent, as I recall, was all we could  
25 consider at that time and I accepted that as something sure

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 and was told that I could come back up later. I did and got  
3 a very heavy increase, so it is not fair just to say Congress  
4 out me. It did not hurt and they did give it to me when I  
5 came back afterwards.

6 Senator Lucas: Well, in 1940 when you testified before  
7 this committee Japan had as much ship tonnage, practically  
8 as much as the United States?

9 Admiral Stark: I think that is correct. We did not know  
10 exactly how much they had but they claimed that they were  
11 practically on a 5-5 ratio with us, some of their public speak-  
12 ers did.

13 Senator Lucas: That was not true, of course.

14 Admiral Stark: No, but it was not 5-3.

15 Senator Lucas: Now, Mr. Chairman, in order to further  
16 demonstrate the point I am trying to make here as to how pub-  
17 lic opinion dominates the affairs of this country I want to  
18 read a statement made by the Honorable David Walsh, Chairman  
19 of the Naval Affairs Committee, who about this same time, in  
20 April 1940, placed this very illuminating statement in the re-  
21 cord. (Reading)

22 "From 1922 to 1925 the United States laid down no  
23 ships. In 1925 it laid down one submarine. In 1926 it laid  
24 down 1 cruiser and 5 river gunboats. In 1927 it laid down  
25 1 cruiser and 2 submarines. In 1928, 6 cruisers. In 1929

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 none. In 1930, 3 cruisers and 1 submarine. In 1931, 1 air-  
3 craft carrier, 4 cruisers and 2 submarines. In 1932, 3 de-  
4 stroyers. In 1933, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers and 4 submarines.  
5 In 1934, 2 aircraft carriers, 1 cruiser (a), 1 cruiser (b),  
6 21 destroyers and 2 patrol gunboats. In 1935, 1 cruiser (a),  
7 7 cruisers (b), 14 destroyers and 5 submarines. In 1936  
8 the United States laid down" --

9 and that is true, that we lived up to this treaty close-  
10 ly while Japan did not, as I understand it?

11 Admiral Stark: We leaned over backwards the other way.  
12 We did not build up.

13 Senator Lucas: In 1936 the United States laid down 1 air-  
14 craft carrier, 1 cruiser (b), 6 destroyers and 7 submarines.  
15 In 1937 we laid down 1 battleship -- and I call attention to  
16 that because that is the first battleship we laid down since  
17 at least 1922 or before, I guess.

18 Admiral Stark: I think that is correct, yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: There were no battleships laid down  
20 between 1922 and 1937 during the fifteen years.

21 Admiral Stark: That is right.

22 Senator Lucas: And the date the last was laid down is  
23 not stated here.

24 In 1937, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers and 6 submarines.

25 In 1938, 1 battleship, 14 destroyers, 4 submarines, 2

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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destroyer tenders, 1 seaplane tender, 3 tugs, 2 oilers.

In 1939, 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 12 de-  
stroyers, 7 submarines, 3 sub chasers, 2 minesweepers, 1  
submarine tender, 1 seaplane tender, 1 oiler.

And that is all that I have.

The Chairman: The committee will recess until two  
o'clock and the chair asks the public to retire as rapidly as  
possible. We want to have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 o'clock P.M., a recess was  
taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)



AFTERNOON SESSION

2:45 p.m.

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2  
3 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

4 The Chair wishes to announce that after the Executive  
5 Session the committee has decided that following the testimony  
6 of Admiral Stark it will recess the hearing until the 15th  
7 of January in order that the new counsel collaborating with  
8 Mr. Mitchell and his staff may become familiar with the  
9 testimony adduced up to now and get into the case so he may  
10 go forward with it following the retirement of Mr. Mitchell.

11 Also the committee decided, upon the urgent request and  
12 in accordance with the wishes of counsel for Admiral Kimmel  
13 and General Short, when the committee reconvenes on the 15th  
14 of January Admiral Kimmel will be the first witness, to be  
15 followed by General Short when Admiral Kimmel has concluded.

16 You may go ahead now.

17 Mr. Murphy, I believe you are the next.

18 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK

19 (resumed)

20 Admiral Stark: May I make just a short statement?

21 The Chairman: Yes.

22 Admiral Stark: My attention has been called to the  
23 fact that this morning I stated that it was last summer that  
24 the President expressed to me his surprise over the Pearl  
25 Harbor attack. It was a year ago last summer, during the

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry which were held  
3 a year ago last summer.

4 The Chairman: That is an obvious error, because the  
5 President was not alive last summer.

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: All right, Congressman.

8 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I would like to direct your  
9 attention to the message that was sent to Hawaii on the 7th  
10 of December, 1941.

11 Do you have a copy of it?

12 Admiral Stark: The 7th of December?

13 Mr. Murphy: Yes, the message of General Marshall.

14 Admiral Stark: I think I have it in the statement.

15 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, the earliest moment  
16 you have any recollection of being aware of the 1:00 p.m.  
17 message was somewhere between 10:30 and 11:00 o'clock that  
18 morning. Is that right?

19 Admiral Stark: I think that is right, yes, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: And, as I understand it, General Marshall's  
21 testimony was that he was aware of the 1:00 o'clock message  
22 sometime subsequent to that on that same morning.

23 Admiral Stark: I believe it was sometime later.

24 Mr. Murphy: And then General Marshall sent a message to  
25 Hawaii, and I would like to read that message and discuss it

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 with you a bit.

3 The message reads:

4 "The Japanese are presenting at 1:00 p.m. Eastern  
5 Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum;"

6 Now setting aside for the moment the 1:00 p.m. part of  
7 it, you had already told Hawaii, had you not, that negotiations  
8 had terminated with the Japanese, and as on the 27th you sent  
9 that message setting that particular date, did you not?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, the message continues, "also  
12 they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately."

13 You had, during the previous days of December, told  
14 Admiral Kimmel exactly that, had you not?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: And continuing, "Just what significance the  
17 hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly."

18 And then finally, "Inform Naval authorities of this  
19 communication."

20 Now outside of the 1:00 p.m. part of that message, was  
21 there anything in the message itself that you had not previously  
22 conveyed to Hawaii?

23 Admiral Stark: In my opinion there was not.

24 Mr. Murphy: Have you at any time looked into the matter  
25 of the condition of the ships and planes at Hawaii on the

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 morning of December 7, 1941?

3 Admiral Stark: I have not.

4 Mr. Murphy: Prior to the attack.

5 Admiral Stark: I had not.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, there is testimony that has been  
7 adduced, and will be adduced before the committee, as to the  
8 condition of readiness of the ships. Assuming that you had  
9 sent the message the very moment you had gotten it, somewhere  
10 between 10:30 and 11:00 o'clock, and assuming that the attack  
11 occurred about 2:30 -- that is when it was, was it not, about  
12 2:30 Washington time?

13 Admiral Stark: About 1:57, I think, somewhere in there.

14 Mr. Murphy: About 1:57 Washington time?

15 Admiral Stark: Shortly before 2:00.

16 Mr. Murphy: Then what change in ships by way of sorties  
17 could have occurred between 10:30 and 10:40 and 1:57 to 2:00  
18 o'clock?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, if I had sent a message, assuming  
20 I got the 1:00 p.m. message about 10:40, I have since asked  
21 the question, and recently, from Communications if I had  
22 given them a dispatch which they had coded and sent and decoded  
23 on the other end and delivered, what their estimate of the  
24 time was, and they gave me an hour and seven minutes.

25 Mr. Murphy: That would make it 11:47.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2       Admiral Stark: Assuming I had acted instantaneously  
3 on the message.

4       Mr. Murphy: Instantaneously, yes. Without any conference  
5 at all, if you had instantaneously acted, they would get it  
6 there at 11:47?

7       Admiral Stark: Yes.

8       Mr. Murphy: Does that take into consideration the  
9 decoding at Hawaii?

10       Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11       Mr. Murphy: Then at 11:47, from then until 1:57, what  
12 change could be made in the position of ships at that time?  
13 That would be approximately two hours, would it not?

14       Admiral Stark: Approximately two hours. That is more  
15 or less of a technical question. For example, I do not know  
16 which way the ships were headed. If they were placed in  
17 docks so they were heading out it would be one thing; if they  
18 had to be turned around it would be another. I think only  
19 Admiral Kimmel could give you real testimony on that.

20       Mr. Murphy: At any rate, if the battleships themselves  
21 were berthed, eight of them, in Pearl Harbor it would take  
22 some considerable time, would it not, to get them out of  
23 the harbor?

24       Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. The last time we sortied out  
25 of there we had to be turned around by tugs, but during the

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 and the attack, would he not?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my  
4 answer.

5 Mr. Murphy: All right, you may finish.

(3) 6 Admiral Stark: If he had forced them and the emergency  
7 were understood, they could have cut that time in half, or  
8 perhaps less than that. They would have taken a chance on  
9 raising steam without regard to the normal precautions of  
10 raising it slowly so as not to affect the boilers adversely.

11 Mr. Murphy: That would be also assuming that his mental  
12 processes were different than they were on the message of  
13 the 27th, which said it was a war warning?

14 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. That is assuming he forced them.  
15 He can give you, I think, better testimony on that than I can,  
16 because of his familiarity with the picture.

17 Mr. Murphy: There has been some testimony already in  
18 the record, and some to be covered, as to the condition of  
19 the readiness of the planes.

20 As I understand it, so far as the Army and Navy planes  
21 were concerned, in a great measure they required as much as  
22 four hours before they could go in the air. This two hours  
23 difference would not have gotten them in the air then, would it,  
24 if it required four hours from the time your message arrived  
25 at Hawaii to the time of the attack?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 preceding months in which the Fleet had been there they  
2 undoubtedly had become used to being handled in there. Just  
3 what their time would have been I do not know. They would  
4 first have to have been notified to get under way, and assum-  
5 ing that they would have to raise steam for propulsion purposes,  
6 and if tugs were required they would have to have been brought  
7 alongside and they would then have had to sortied, and they  
8 would, of course, have had to have destroyers ahead of them,  
9 and probably planes searching for submarines, which they  
10 would do if they thought the attack might be there, and  
11 just what the total time would have been I would rather Admiral  
12 Kimmel gave you that.

13  
14 Mr. Murphy: Well, to make a rough approximation, it  
15 would be a matter of hours, would it not?

16 Admiral Stark: Well, you can force when you have to.  
17 Normally, as I recall, we gave a ship with one or two boilers  
18 about two hours' notice to get under way.

19 Mr. Murphy: That two hours, Admiral, would be dependent  
20 upon the fact that as soon as Admiral Kimmel received the  
21 message from Washington he would have immediately and  
22 instantaneously had the reaction that there was to be something  
23 happening at 1:00 o'clock?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes.

25 Mr. Murphy: In order to consume the time between then

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 and the attack, would he not?

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I did not quite finish my  
4 answer.

5 Mr. Murphy: All right, you may finish.

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19 the readiness of the planes.

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21 were concerned, in a great measure they required as much as  
22 four hours before they could go in the air. This two hours  
23 difference would not have gotten them in the air then, would it,  
24 if it required four hours from the time your message arrived  
25 at Hawaii to the time of the attack?



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Stark: If it required four hours you could not have gotten them off in that time.

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Mr. Murphy: I think there will be considerable testimony along that line.

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Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: So far as the planes are concerned, if they could not get off in the air the next best thing would be to push them somewhere for protection, would it not?

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Admiral Stark: To spread them.

11

Mr. Murphy: To spread them?

12

Admiral Stark: Yes.

13

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Mr. Murphy: Instead of having them bunched together the best thing would be to spread them and maybe get them into bunkers?

15

16

Admiral Stark: Yes.

17

Mr. Murphy: They did have some bunkers there, did they not?

18

Admiral Stark: I do not know.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, then, there have been some questions asked about the so-called bomb plot message. You know about that?

21

22

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23

24

Mr. Murphy: That message actually was sent from Tokyo in September, was it not?

25

Admiral Stark: That is right, yes, sir.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: It was not translated in Washington until  
3 October 10, is that true?

4 Admiral Stark: I think so; sometime later.

5 Mr. Murphy: Was there anything unusual about our  
6 diplomatic relations in September, and was not the date of  
7 the forwarding of that message in Tokyo prior to the sub-  
8 mission of the Japanese note of September - or do you know that?

9 Admiral Stark: No, I do not. I am not quite sure of  
10 your question, Mr. Murphy.

11 Mr. Murphy: Well, my question is this: The change in  
12 Cabinet did not occur until October 16, and on October 16  
13 they did send a message to the Pacific.

14 Admiral Stark: Yes.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, this so-called bomb plot message  
16 was already translated on October 10.

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: And had been forwarded from the Japanese  
19 in the month of September. Would not there be less likelihood  
20 of that particular message being clipped or called to your  
21 particular attention then because of the state of the rela-  
22 tions between America and Japan at the time?

23 Admiral Stark: I do not know that that would have  
24 entered into the minds of the people who were going over that  
25 message. I would rather be inclined to think that the message

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 would have stood on its merits, that they would have looked  
3 at it as a message without regard to the Japanese Cabinet  
4 change.

5 Mr. Murphy: Then you do not know anybody that saw any  
6 particular significance in that, do you?

7 Admiral Stark: No.

8 Mr. Murphy: It was never called to your attention, that  
9 you know of?

10 Admiral Stark: It was never called to my attention, so  
11 far as I recollect.

12 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, this 1:00 o'clock message referred  
13 to 1:00 o'clock on Sunday, and there has been some considerable  
14 discussion about the fact that the Japanese were going to  
15 see the Secretary of State on Sunday. There was a discussion  
16 that morning about that, was there not, about the fact they  
17 were doing it on Sunday, or calling on the Secretary of  
18 State on Sunday?

19 Admiral Stark: When we got it we were a little puzzled  
20 as to just why they were making it at 1:00 o'clock.

21 Mr. Murphy: And on Sunday?

22 Admiral Stark: And on Sunday, yes, sir. We had covered  
23 the possibility of an attack on Sunday, if it came, in a  
24 previous message.

25 Mr. Murphy: I was wondering if there was any discussion

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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then about the fact that we also delivered our message on Sunday. When President Roosevelt came back from Argentina he asked to see the Japanese on Sunday, too, did he not? It was Sunday afternoon at 4:00 o'clock when he saw the Ambassador, was it not?

Admiral Stark: I believe it was. I am hazy on it. I recollect there was another instance when the message was to be delivered at a certain time. I think that occurs occasionally.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, President Roosevelt did send a wire to Secretary Hull and asked Secretary Hull to arrange to come to the White House on Sunday morning, and he asked the Japanese to see him at the White House that afternoon, did he not?

Admiral Stark: I recall that, yes, sir.

Larry follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, one of the reasons  
3 that prompted you in delaying or in not wanting to send the  
4 1:00 o'clock message to Hawaii was that you had already sent  
5 so much you thought maybe you might be confusing Admiral  
6 Kimmel?

7 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

8 Mr. Murphy: Have you seen Admiral Kimmel's statement  
9 given to this committee?

10 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I have not.

11 Mr. Murphy: I suggest that you have your counsel get  
12 a copy.

13 Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the witness I think he  
14 should have it. We may want to ask him some questions on it  
15 at some time.

16 Admiral Stark: Counsel, I think, has been furnished a  
17 copy.

18 Mr. Murphy: Do you think that the tenor of your papers  
19 that were sent to Admiral Kimmel throughout the year of  
20 1941 were such as to take away the effect or the meaning of  
21 your war warning message?

22 Admiral Stark: I do not.

23 Mr. Murphy: I understood you to say that you had never  
24 heard of a war warning message in the precise words that  
25 were used having been sent before to anyone in the Pacific.

WARD & SYLVESTER WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2           Admiral Stark: That is true. I never heard of such  
3 a message before.

4           Mr. Murphy: You had never, prior to 1941, December 1941,  
5 sent anything to Admiral Kimmel about codes being burned?

6           Admiral Stark: No, sir.

7           Mr. Murphy: When you sent your message to Admiral Kimmel  
8 in October, Admiral Kimmel wrote you a letter saying that he  
9 had sent submarines in certain directions and that he had  
10 made certain movements as a result of receiving your October  
11 message; you recall that?

12           Admiral Stark: Yes, I do.

13           Mr. Murphy: As I understand it Admiral Kimmel takes  
14 the position that since he told you about what he had done  
15 subsequent to October and since you had not criticised the  
16 arrangement he had made then, that he was justified in con-  
17 tinuing the position which he had assumed in October right  
18 on down after receiving your war warning message. Do you  
19 think he was justified in that position?

20           Admiral Stark: No, I do not. The message that was sent  
21 in October, as I recall, he sent out some submarines to the  
22 outlying Islands, and informed me about it by letter, and  
23 I wrote him back "O.K.", but the situation in December was  
24 a decidedly different one.

25           Mr. Murphy: You think --

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I interpose to raise the question of propriety, as to whether or not the testimony to be given by Admiral Kimmel should be referred to. It has been furnished to us in confidence with a release date on it that it was not to be released until he takes the stand.

Mr. Murphy: I would like to say --

Mr. Gearhart: I don't think that should be pursued so as to destroy the effectiveness of Admiral Kimmel's testimony.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think that should be met by the committee. I have read Admiral Kimmel's testimony in the Narrative. I have it here. I am quite familiar with what his testimony was.

He has, however, given a statement to the committee and he has restricted the use of it until he takes the stand. Am I to understand that we are not to go into Admiral Kimmel's case at all and that if there are accusations made against the witness on the stand we are not to ask him about it?

Mr. Gearhart: I would like to point out that the testimony is marked plainly not to be released until the witness takes the stand.

Mr. Murphy: Do you see it here? Where is it? I am referring to the Navy Narrative.

Mr. Gearhart: You are not referring to the testimony that has been placed in our hands?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: I want to meet that now.

3 The Chairman: If that matter is put up to the Chair,  
4 the Chair would hold that inasmuch as a confidential description  
5 has been put on the advance statement of Admiral Kimmel, that  
6 it is not to be released until he goes on the stand, members  
7 of the committee would be bound by that instruction no less  
8 than the members of the press, but that does not restrict a  
9 member of the committee from using any testimony that Admiral  
10 Kimmel may have given at the numerous hearings at which he  
11 testified.

12 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Stark read this morning from the  
13 previous testimony that the Navy Board had referred to the  
14 message as being of the same tenor.

15 Do you recall reading that?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: I have Admiral Kimmel's testimony here and  
18 if the wish is that we not go into it, I suggest that it will  
19 be necessary to recall Admiral Stark back. At least I want  
20 to ask him some questions about what Admiral Kimmel said.

21 Mr. Gearhart: I am not objecting to any reference to  
22 any other testimony, except that which was handed us recently  
23 with a release date upon it.

24 Mr. Murphy: If you can see that here I would like to  
25 see it.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 The Chairman: Go ahead.

3 Admiral Stark: I think we were furnished a copy of  
4 that statement. Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve.  
5 I have not read it. I didn't know that I would be questioned  
6 on it.

7 Mr. Murphy: I have read a small part of it but I read  
8 what he said before.

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Admiral, the message about which  
11 I was asking you at the time the gentleman from California  
12 spoke about the confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as  
13 I understand it it is in this exhibit here. Do you have a  
14 copy of that? Your letters and Admiral Kimmel's letters.

15 Admiral Stark: I have a copy of my letters to Admiral  
16 Kimmel and his to me.

17 Mr. Murphy: You have read his letter to you and your  
18 letter to him, where you say "O.K."?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.  
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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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The Chairman: Go ahead.

Admiral Stark: I think we were furnished a copy of that statement. Counsel was furnished it on New Year's Eve. I have not read it. I didn't know that I would be questioned on it.

Mr. Murphy: I have read a small part of it but I read what he said before.

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Admiral, the message about which I was asking you at the time the gentleman from California spoke about the confidential statement of Admiral Kimmel, as I understand it it is in this exhibit here. Do you have a copy of that? Your letters and Admiral Kimmel's letters.

Admiral Stark: I have a copy of my letters to Admiral Kimmel and his to me.

Mr. Murphy: You have read his letter to you and your letter to him, where you say "O.K."?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

AL-6

1 Witness Stark

2 Mr. Murphy: At the time that you said "O.K.", would  
3 Admiral Kimmel be justified in assuming that the preparations  
4 that he had made subsequent to your October message had your  
5 approval to be the same that should be applied to the war  
6 warning message?

7 Admiral Stark: I think not.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, there has been reference in one of your  
9 letters about the routing of ships, and I believe you meant  
10 to refer to the routing of the ships through the Torres Straits,  
11 is that right?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: And in your letter you suggested that you  
14 were perhaps making that as a preliminary move to meeting the  
15 situation when things got more critical; is that right?

16 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

17 Mr. Murphy: In your judgment, was it necessary to route  
18 the ships at the time you did through the Torres Straits, and  
19 if so for what reason?

20 Admiral Stark: It looked like trouble ahead. It was our  
21 job to prevent capture of our merchant ships on the high seas  
22 if we could in a sudden emergency of a declaration or war act  
23 of Japan. For that reason we took ships off the usual routes  
24 and sent them on the southern where they could be better pro-  
25 tected and where there were ports to which they could go in

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 case of trouble. It also took time to get vessels routed  
3 and get into a groove as to just how to handle them, because  
4 it required routing across the broad Pacific, and we thought  
5 it advisable to initiate it at that time, and we did.

6 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, you did it as a pre-  
7 cautionary measure and as a security measure?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. And I might add, it was a  
9 matter of considerable pride to us that the only ship we  
10 lost of American tonnage was one on which we took a deliberate  
11 chance.

12 Mr. Murphy: Was that in the Pacific?

13 Admiral Stark: It was in the Pacific. A ship we sent  
14 out for the remaining Marines in China, and we didn't know  
15 whether we would have time or not. She was captured.

16 Mr. Murphy: Were there any German raiders in the Pacific  
17 prior to December 7, 1941?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, there were raiders off and on  
19 in the Pacific prior to December 7, German raiders.

20 Mr. Murphy: In your judgment who was at fault, if anyone  
21 for the failure to have the torpedo baffles or nets on the  
22 ships on December 7, 1941? You have already testified that  
23 Ordnance was working on it. There were three or four letters  
24 between you and Admiral Kimmel on the subject. Do you know of  
25 anyone particularly to blame for not having them on that day?

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 .Admiral Stark: I was asked this morning if I instituted  
3 any follow-up of my original request of Bureau of Ordnance  
4 to design and build those baffles. I perhaps can best answer  
5 the question by reading into the record the follow-ups which  
6 we made and if the committee so desires I will read them. They  
7 are not very long.

8 Mr. Murphy: I think it is important enough to do it.

9 The Chairman: Read them into the record.

10 Admiral Stark: The original letter was in February. On  
11 April 9, Chief of Naval Operations wrote this letter to Chief  
12 of Bureau of Ordnance, inviting attention to certain refer-  
13 ences and stating that the:

14 " . . . the Chief of Naval Operations brought forth  
15 the necessity for experimental and development work in  
16 connection with nets and booms, and especially the need  
17 for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the  
18 Bureau is directed to reference (b) which gives certain  
19 details of an apparently much lighter net now used by the  
20 Germans."

21 Signed: "R. E. Ingersoll, Acting."

22 On September 16, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the  
23 Bureau of Ordnance.

24 "Subject: Experimental and Developmental Work on Nets  
25 and Booms." -- with four references.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 The letter reads:

3 "It is suggested that in order that progress may  
4 be made in solving some of the problems which confront  
5 us, that a small group of officers, engineers and drafts-  
6 men be assigned exclusively to planning improvement in  
7 net and boom designs and to development and experimental  
8 work. The group, it is suggested, may be aided by using  
9 the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport.  
10 It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as  
11 centers for experimental and developmental work.

12 "In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Opera-  
13 tions indicated the desirability of undertaking some  
14 research and development work. Among other suggestions,  
15 the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed,  
16 which can be laid and removed in harbors in a short time  
17 for temporary use, and which will give good if not  
18 perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.

19 "Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T  
20 net protection to one or more large ships moored in  
21 harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the A/T  
22 net may be placed completely around one or more large  
23 ships, similar to placing the ship or ships in a 'dry  
24 dock' of A/T net. It may be assumed that the currents  
25 inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances,

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight  
3 and less extensive than for the present A/T nets which  
4 are designed principally for harbor entrances. As such  
5 nets may be desired for advance bases, as little weight  
6 and volume of material as possible is desirable. As  
7 little space as possible should be taken up by the nets  
8 in order not to take up too much anchorage space.

9 "Designs of 18 nets which might be attached to  
10 booms on ships or floating off of ships at anchor are  
11 requested to be prepared in conjunction with the Bureau  
12 of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible  
13 to do away with mooring the nets. A net which deflects  
14 rather than stops the torpedo may possibly be designed.

15 "Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report  
16 on the development of a torpedo net defense for merchant  
17 ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau of Ordnance  
18 in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a  
19 similar development work for the perfection of ships  
20 under way at sea.

21 "It is possible that in our Navy the assumption that  
22 has been reached that anchorages protected by nets are  
23 secure. Nets are defensive measures, and, in general,  
24 are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are  
25 required in conjunction with net defenses, and of the two

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

measures of defense, the vessels, capable of offensive action, are probable the more important. It is believed that the tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau, the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held. It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worthwhile to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-torpedo net from a torpedo fired in the net.

"Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we should be in a position to take more progressive action. In this letter it is realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be directed."

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 On 3 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote  
3 again to the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance on the same subject,  
4 with references and a copy of reference A, which were proceed-  
5 ings of meeting of Local Joint Planning Committee, Northern  
6 California Sector, Pacific Coastal Frontier, of September 17th.

7 The letter reads:

8 "Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

9 "Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure.

10 The Chief of Naval Operations considers it urgent to de-  
11 velop an anti-torpedo net which can be made up, toward to  
12 a desired location, and quickly laid. The use of pon-  
13 toons, as suggested, does not appear to solve this ques-  
14 tion; a reduction in the number of moorings, at present  
15 necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required."

16 That is the correspondence up to December 7th that Oper-  
17 ations had with the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject of  
18 getting nets.  
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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: What I was referring to previously was the  
3 Hewitt report contained in the Appendix to Narrative State-  
4 ment of Evidence which was given to me. On page 43 there is  
5 a reference made to a letter of February 15, 1941 from you to  
6 Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter of February 17, 1941 from  
7 you to Admiral Kimmel and again to a letter by Admiral Bloch  
8 of March 20, 1941 and again a letter of June 1941 from you to  
9 Admiral Kimmel, to which you referred this morning.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now, in the Hewitt report I find the fol-  
12 lowing:

13 "Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspond-  
14 ence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an  
15 air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor - and that even after  
16 the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would  
17 run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy  
18 made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He  
19 later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo at-  
20 tack would be made because he did not think such tor-  
21 pedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a  
22 great deal of consideration for that reason."

23 In the light of the fact that Bureau of Ordnance were  
24 working on it and none had been furnished to Hawaii was Ad-  
25 miral Kimmel justified in that statement?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Admiral Stark: I think the statement is not justified in  
3 view of the letter which I read this morning.

4 Mr. Murphy: The letter in June 1941?

5 Admiral Stark: Of June 13th of 1941, in which appears  
6 the paragraph in part:

7 "Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed  
8 that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe  
9 when at anchor from this type of attack" -- that is  
10 torpedo attack -- "if surrounded by water at a suffi-  
11 cient distance to permit an attack to be developed and  
12 a sufficient run to arm the torpedo."

13 Now, you will recall that I follow that with other para-  
14 graphs which while not changing that paragraph may have mini-  
15 mized it to the extent that it would not occur.

16 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Those letters are all in the record  
17 and you read them this morning.

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: Did Admiral Kimmel have the facilities at  
20 Pearl Harbor for manufacturing or preparing torpedo nets?

21 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: If he had gotten them wouldn't he have to  
23 get them through the CNO or would he go direct to Ordnance?

24 Admiral Stark: Well, he probably would have written us  
25 about them. He could have written the Bureau of Ordnance but

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 I think he would have come to us, undoubtedly, on it.

3 Mr. Murphy: What is your judgment subsequent to June  
4 of 1941? Should he or should he not have initiated a move to  
5 get them before December and if he did initiate it, in your  
6 judgment would they have been available?

7 Admiral Stark: Well, we had initiated it and we did not  
8 have them, but we were pressing the Bureau of Ordnance. You  
9 will note that I also mentioned the Bureau of Ships. I re-  
10 member personally suggesting to the Bureau of Ships the  
11 possibility of developing something like our targets to be  
12 placed alongside of ships in Pearl Harbor. Just what they  
13 had arrived at at that time I do not know, but they had not  
14 produced.

15 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, why was the President opposed to  
16 the use of draftees on ships by the Navy?

17 Admiral Stark: I may state with regard to that that I  
18 also was initially opposed to them.

19 Mr. Murphy: Will you explain why?

20 Admiral Stark: It was a matter of sentiment, a matter  
21 of pride. We had always been a volunteer service and we think  
22 a service where men come into it because they want to, if you  
23 can get them, is a good thing and initially I was also op-  
24 posed to it. The time came when wages were high ashore, when  
25 a man on a merchant ship could get several times what a man on

Witness Stark

Questions by Mr. Murphy

1  
2 board a Navy ship could get, when it was not so easy for us  
3 to get volunteers. It then became necessary for us to resort  
4 to the draft.

5 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, in studying the message of November  
6 27th and in studying the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and Gen-  
7 eral Short in previous hearings I am wondering if the people  
8 in Washington and the people at Hawaii were not influenced  
9 more by the war plans that had been drawn up in the mind of  
10 messages and in the kind of defense that was instituted, than  
11 they were by what actually occurred between the end of Novem-  
12 ber and the beginning of December and I refer particularly  
13 first, - I am now referring to page 23 of the Appendix to the  
14 Narrative Statement. Do you have a copy of that available,  
15 Admiral?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, there is one here. I haven't read  
17 the narrative.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, you have read what I am going to speak  
19 about but it is more easy for me to refer to it here.

20 I would like to direct your attention first to the United  
21 States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five. It first  
22 sets forth the Introduction, Mobilization and the Assumptions,  
23 and then the assumption that would include war with Japan,  
24 under Section 1211, would be A-2. Do you see that?

25 Admiral Stark: "A", yes, sir.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: A-2.

3 Admiral Stark: A-2?

4 Mr. Murphy: A-2 would be war with Japan. A-1 would be  
5 war without Japan.

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, if you go over to the next page,  
8 page 24, under Section 1332 there is a statement, "It is  
9 conceived that Japanese action will be as follows", and I  
10 read first Section "a":

11 "a. The principal offensive effort to be toward  
12 the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philip-  
13 pines) and Hong Kong.

14 "b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward  
15 the interruption of American and Allied sea communica-  
16 tions in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,  
17 and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying  
18 positions.

19 "c. The offensive against China to be maintained  
20 on a reduced scale only."

21 Now, then, I do not see anything in there about Hawaii.

22 Do you?

23 Admiral Stark: No, sir. He mentions there the principal  
24 offensive effort and we approved this plan, so I will accept  
25 responsibility for it also.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: That is right, but these places --

3 Admiral Stark: In another part of this plan I think he  
4 specifically mentions possibilities of air raid even before  
5 war is declared or anything done.

6 Mr. Murphy: I am just taking this step by step. At  
7 least, these places that are referred to in 1-a are the places  
8 that were referred to substantially in your telegram, weren't  
9 they?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Then you speak of defensive efforts. Then  
12 you come over to Section 1333:

13 "To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that  
14 Japan's initial action will be toward:

15 "a. Capture of Guam.

16 "b. Establishment of control over the South China  
17 Sea, Philippine Waters, and the waters between Borneo  
18 and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases,  
19 and by the destruction of United States and allied air  
20 and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture  
21 of Luzon.

22 "c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

23 "d. Denial to the United States of the use of the  
24 Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed  
25 defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States  
3 Fleet.

4 "e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops,  
5 aircraft and light naval forces.

6 "f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake,  
7 Midway and other outlying United States positions."

8 Now, I do not think Hawaii is included in any of those  
9 either, is it?

10 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Certainly, they would not refer to our main  
12 naval base as an outlying position, would they? That would  
13 be one of the smaller islands, wouldn't it?

14 Admiral Stark: Smaller islands are referred to in that  
15 particular section I believe, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, the places that you refer to there in  
17 1333 are the places that you refer to in your telegram, are  
18 they not?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and I think they were also re-  
20 ferred to in our own war plan.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, I will come to that but I am trying  
22 to get what was the background for the telegram and why Hawaii  
23 was not included.

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, in Section 1334 you speak of the initial



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Japanese deployment. It says:

3 "The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estim-  
4 ated to be as follows."

5 Then you speak of A, B, C, D and E and then when you  
6 come to "F":

7 "Raiding and observation forces widely distributed  
8 in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area."

9 There is nothing there about an attack on Hawaii via the  
10 air, is there?

11 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I come over to the tasks assigned  
13 by the Navy Basic Plan and the mission and in Section 2101 you  
14 come down to "H", "Protect the territory of the Associated  
15 Powers in the Pacific area."

16 That might include Hawaii but that was offensive action,  
17 wasn't it?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, then I come over to Section 2202 and  
20 I find, "Tasks formulated to accomplish the assigned missions"  
21 and I go on through "A". I come to "B":

22 "Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages  
23 and at sea."

24 That would definitely be Hawaii, wouldn't it?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: And then on down to "K";

3 "Continue training operations as practicable."

4 That would be for Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't it?

5 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. That always holds in war as  
6 well as peace.7 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, regardless of what plans there were  
8 by anyone, the first law of nature is self-preservation, isn't  
9 it?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: And the fleet belonged to Admiral Kimmel and  
12 those at Hawaii, and General Short, and self-preservation, re-  
13 gardless of when it was, dictated that they should protect  
14 that fleet in order to save themselves and be able to operate,  
15 isn't that true?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, then I come to "M":

18 "Guard against surprise attack by Japan."

19 That would be definitely the obligation of those at  
20 Hawaii and at the base, would it not?21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and, of course, they had covered  
22 that in other plans.23 Mr. Murphy: Well, Admiral, at any rate I have studied  
24 these different plans and I come to the air raid but it seems  
25 to me that the air raid itself, or the possibilities of an

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 air raid, - in fact, in the plan at Hawaii a submarine attack  
3 was listed as probable, an air attack was listed only as  
4 possible, and I was wondering if the thought in the Navy,  
5 particularly, perhaps, when these plans were prepared and  
6 manufactured was not to work that air attack in Hawaii down  
7 the line a little from what was expected in the event that  
8 war started?

9 Admiral Stark: Well, I had not thought of that, par-  
10 ticularly in view of the special letters which were written  
11 on the subject and the follow-up of special plans made to  
12 guard against air raid, such as the Bellinger agreement,  
13 Bellinger-Martin agreement and the letters exchanged between  
14 Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson and the drills which were  
15 being implemented and the fact that when we got these very  
16 excellent plans of Admiral Kimmel we had distributed them  
17 throughout the service.

18 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, it is your feeling that these  
19 supplemental plans that pertained particularly to Hawaii and  
20 the danger of an air attack and the letter of the Secretary  
21 of War and the correspondence you had kept that to the fore-  
22 front regardless of where the attack on Hawaii might be in  
23 these several other plans?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, and the final letter which I  
25 read this morning dated in October, which was gotten out on

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 that subject.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now, I have this last question, Admiral.  
4 In all of the messages that were sent to Hawaii and in all  
5 of the considerations in Washington about the possible move  
6 to the southward, the reason why you were fortifying the  
7 Philippines was so that the Japanese would fear an attack on  
8 their flank specifically and, therefore, would hesitate going  
9 into the South China Sea, that is right, isn't it?

10 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir. Whether we  
11 could deter them or not, - I believe I stated that we hoped  
12 that they might have some weight toward prevention, if not  
13 then in execution, but that flank position, unless the Japan-  
14 ese had made up their minds that we would not come in, was a  
15 serious threat to their communications to their main offensive  
16 to the south.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, isn't it also true that if the Japanese  
18 were going to go to the South Seas that the fleet, once it  
19 was in the Pacific, was always a danger to their flank and,  
20 therefore, had to be taken into consideration every time you  
21 thought of what the Japs might do, because they would have to  
22 get the fleet off their flank to be safe, wouldn't they?

23 Admiral Stark: Ultimately they would have to lick the  
24 fleet or be licked by the fleet.

25 Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 The Chairman: Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman  
3 Gearhart is at bat.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Stark, what is the tour of duty of  
5 a Chief of Naval Operations?

6 Admiral Stark: The normal tour, provided an officer has  
7 that much time in his active service left, is four years.  
8 That is true of the Bureau Chiefs also.

9 Mr. Gearhart: That was not the thought I had in mind.  
10 I meant the tour of duty on a twenty-four hour period.

11 Admiral Stark: You mean how long is he supposed to --  
12 I do not know just what you mean. You mean how many hours a  
13 day?

14 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

15 Admiral Stark: I do not think there is anything. It  
16 depends on the individual and particularly on the work.

17 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, Admiral, I think  
18 under Navy regulations he would be on duty constantly during  
19 the time that he is serving in that office.

20 Admiral Stark: Always available, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: He must never be beyond reach, isn't  
22 that correct?

23 Admiral Stark: Yes. It always must be known where he is.  
24 He might be in the West Indies but he would still be within  
25 reach by radio, or he might be with the fleet on an exercise

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 but his whereabouts is always known and there is always a means  
3 of communication with him.

4 Mr. Gearhart: That is also true of the Chief of Staff  
5 of the Army, is it not?

6 Admiral Stark: I suppose so.

7 Mr. Gearhart: In fact, that is the rule applying to all  
8 high ranking commanding officers, is that not true?

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I would say it would be true,  
10 certainly, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Then a commanding officer, a Chief of  
12 Naval Operations, should not at any time put himself beyond  
13 communication by his subordinates, is that correct?

14 Admiral Stark: That would be correct, except some special  
15 circumstance might arise, which would be thoroughly understood,  
16 but I have never heard of such special circumstance.

17 Mr. Gearhart: And that is also true of the Chief of  
18 Staff of the Army?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, I suppose it is, Mr. Gearhart.

20 Mr. Gearhart: When you left the office on Saturday night  
21 didn't you leave word there as to where you were going to be  
22 and where you could be reached on December 6, 1941?

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, when I went out I always left word.  
24 I do not recall of any time when I did not, and occasionally  
25 I had it checked just to see if I were absent whether the

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 follow-up would be effective. I do not recall being out that  
3 night but I also do not recall whether I was out or not, so  
4 there it is.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Now, isn't there a record kept in the office  
6 of the Chief of Naval Operations as to where he is every min-  
7 ute that he is away from the office?

8 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

9 Mr. Gearhart: When you leave --

10 Admiral Stark: When you say "every minute", yes, if I  
11 were going out at night my aide would usually leave word with  
12 the duty officer where I could be found, assuming that my  
13 intentions to go out were before I left the office. If after  
14 I got home I suddenly decided to go out somewhere, I would  
15 leave word with the house and usually call up the duty of-  
16 ficer in addition.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, have you searched the records in  
18 the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to ascertain where  
19 you were on Saturday night, the 6th day of December 1941?

20 Admiral Stark: We have found nothing as to where I was  
21 and it follows my assumption that my thought was that I was  
22 at home. There is nothing I have been able to find out which  
23 locates where I was that evening.

24 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the fact that the Chief of  
25 Staff cannot remember where he was on that night is it pos-

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 not. If I got home in time for dinner at half past seven I  
3 was rather lucky and my brief case always went with me.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Did you, as General Marshall did, have  
5 orderlies at your quarters at all times?

6 Admiral Stark: No, sir. I might add that the servants  
7 in the house were given my address and there was one always  
8 on duty.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You have been informed that an effort  
10 was made to locate you on Saturday night, have you not?

11 Admiral Stark: Yes, I have heard that an effort was  
12 made to locate me.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And you also have learned that a courier  
14 called at your quarters and you were not there?

15 Admiral Stark: No, I have not heard that.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Did you have any telephone call that  
17 evening from Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

18 Admiral Stark: Not that I recall.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you testified in your written state-  
20 ment, page 51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic  
21 on the 7th day of November 1941. You remember that testimony?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: If we were at war on the 7th day of  
24 November of 1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin?

25 Admiral Stark: I would like to say as to that statement



1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 sible that you and he could have been together?

3 Admiral Stark: I think we had no such conspiracy at that  
4 time, sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, do you shut it out as being an utter  
6 impossibility that you and he could have been in each other's  
7 company that night?

8 Admiral Stark: I do not shut it out as an utter im-  
9 possibility that we could have been in each other's company,  
10 but I think we were not.

11 Mr. Gearhart: You do not remember that.

12 Admiral Stark: No, but I feel that perhaps we both  
13 would have remembered it if that had occurred.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you not remembering where you were  
15 certainly you cannot remember that you were not with General  
16 Marshall on that night, can you?

17 Admiral Stark: Well, I think that may be a reasonable  
18 assumption.

19 Mr. Gearhart: You were together a great deal all the  
20 time, were you not?

21 Admiral Stark: We were together either talking by tele-  
22 phone or inter-office visits a great deal during office hours.  
23 We were not together a great deal in the evening. Once in a  
24 while we would have just a little family supper party but  
25 neither one, - I was not going out much at that time. I could

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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3 was rather lucky and my brief case always went with me.

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17 evening from Colonel Knox, the Secretary of the Navy?

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20 ment, page 51, that the Navy was in the war in the Atlantic  
21 on the 7th day of November 1941. You remember that testimony?

22 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: If we were at war on the 7th day of  
24 November of 1941 in the Atlantic when did that war begin?

25 Admiral Stark: I would like to say as to that statement

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 that we were at war that it should be interpreted as in effect.  
3 We were not belligerents, we did not have the right of bel-  
4 ligerents, but when we had orders to shoot any German or  
5 Italian on the high seas to the westward of the twenty-sixth  
6 meridian and when they in turn were attacking us and we were  
7 endeavoring to sink their attacking vessels and they were  
8 endeavoring and had wounded our vessels at that time, we were  
9 in effect engaging them and to that extent we were at war, and  
10 so far as the high seas were concerned when we actually entered  
11 the war there wasn't much change in that particular case.

12 On the other hand, there was at one time a request come  
13 to me to apprehend a certain vessel, a German vessel which  
14 was, we found, approaching Germany with rubber and we refused  
15 to do it because of the fact that we did not have belligerent  
16 rights.

17 On the other hand, again as regards being in war, we  
18 were in the position of having command of Canadian vessels or  
19 they might have of ours, or we might under certain circum-  
20 stances under the shooting order command British vessels,  
21 Britain being at war with Germany, or a British officer might  
22 have command of ours, so in effect I made the statement we were  
23 at war. There were certain belligerent rights technically and  
24 the thing had not been openly declared, but in the ways which  
25 the President had defined and of which he had informed the

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 country in his speech in September, there was practically war  
3 on the sea for any Axis power that came within that limit.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you described the conditions as exist-  
5 ing on the 7th day of November 1941 as indicating a condition  
6 of war. Now I am asking you when did that condition come into  
7 being?

8 Admiral Stark: I think perhaps I might read a brief which  
9 I had made up thinking it might be of use to the committee, -  
10 primarily I wanted it for myself to get the sequence, - of the  
11 hemispheric defense orders and whether or not I have enough  
12 copies here to give the committee at this time I do not know.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Was there an order commanding commanders  
14 of American ships in the Atlantic to fire upon German sub-  
15 marines or surface ships under any conditions?

16 Admiral Stark: There was.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Who issued that order?

18 Admiral Stark: I did, by direction of the President.

19 Mr. Gearhart: And when was it issued?

20 Admiral Stark: "On October 8, 1941 by despatch 082335  
21 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan  
22 executed at 1400 G.C.T." -- that is Greenwich Civil Time --  
23 "11 October 1941. The plan remained in effect until December  
24 11, 1941 at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by des-  
25 patch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

replaced by WPL 46, Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5."

I think it might be helpful if I would read this correspondence which lays down the sequence and is a brief.

The Chairman: Go ahead and read it, Admiral.

Mr. Gearhart: I will be glad to have you do that, Admiral, with permission of the chair.

Admiral Stark: It is six pages long.

Mr. Gearhart: Go ahead.

Admiral Stark: But it gives the picture and consolidation of a good many pages.

Mr. Gearhart: All right.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.  
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Witness Stark

"DIGEST OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLANS

"Navy Hemisphere Defense Plan #2 (WPL-49), promulgated April 21, 1941, issued by the Chief of Naval Operations at the direction of the President, was based on the general concept:-

'Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.'

"The General Task assigned the Navy was:-

'\*\*\*warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger, and defend United States flag shipping against attack.'

"The specific tasks assigned the Naval Operating Forces were:-

'(a) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory) and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary.

'(b) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty

## Witness Stark

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2 over Western Hemisphere Territory) if suspected  
3 of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise  
4 assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or  
5 aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements  
6 of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

7 '(c) Prevent interference with United States  
8 flag shipping by belligerents.

9 '(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with  
10 the armed engagements of belligerents.'

11 "The above plan became effective in the Atlantic on  
12 April 24, 1941, the dispatch placing it into effect stated  
13 'The execution of this plan shall give the appearance of  
14 routine exercises where the departure of units from port are  
15 being made.' (Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of  
16 April 1941 to Holders of WPL-49).

17 "Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPL-51), issued by the  
18 Chief of Naval Operations on July 11, 1941, at the direction  
19 of the President, was based on the following general concepts:-

20 '(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval  
21 vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other  
22 than of those Powers which have sovereignty over  
23 Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as  
24 actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward  
25 territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.

## Witness Stark

1  
2 over Western Hemisphere Territory) if suspected  
3 of acting as supply vessels for, or otherwise  
4 assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or  
5 aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements  
6 of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

7 '(c) Prevent interference with United States  
8 flag shipping by belligerents.

9 '(d) Avoid intervening in or interfering with  
10 the armed engagements of belligerents.'

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12 April 24, 1941, the dispatch placing it into effect stated  
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14 routine exercises where the departure of units from port are  
15 being made.' (Chief of Naval Operations Dispatch 211520 of  
16 April 1941 to Holders of WPL-49).

17 "Hemisphere Defense Plan #4 (WPL-51), issued by the  
18 Chief of Naval Operations on July 11, 1941, at the direction  
19 of the President, was based on the following general concepts:-

20 '(a) Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval  
21 vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers, other  
22 than of those Powers which have sovereignty over  
23 Western Hemisphere Territory, will be viewed as  
24 actuated by a possibly unfriendly intent toward  
25 territory or shipping within the Western Hemisphere.



Witness Stark

1  
2 (b) The President of the United States, in a message  
3 to Congress on July 7, 1941, made the following  
4 pronouncement:

5 "The occupation of Iceland by Germany would con-  
6 stitute a serious threat in three dimensions:

7 The threat against Greenland and the Northern  
8 portion of the North American Continent, in-  
9 cluding the Islands which lie off it.

10 The threat against all shipping in the Atlantic.

11 The threat against the steady flow of munitions  
12 to Britain - which is a matter of broad policy approved  
13 by the congress.

14 "It is therefore imperative that the approaches  
15 between the Americas and those strategic outposts, the  
16 safety of which this country regards as essential to its  
17 national security, and which it must therefore defend,  
18 shall remain open and free from all hostile activity or  
19 threat thereof.

20 "As Commander in Chief I have consequently issued  
21 orders to the Navy that all necessary steps be taken to  
22 insure the safety of communications in the approaches  
23 between Iceland and the United States, as well as on  
24 the seas between the United States and all other strateg-  
25 ic outposts.

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Witness Stark

"This Government will insure the adequate defense of Iceland with full recognition of the independence of Iceland as a sovereign state."

"The General Tasks assigned the Navy were within the Western Hemisphere and were as follows:-

- '(a) Insure the safety of communications with United States strategic outposts;
- '(b) Insure the adequate defense of Iceland;
- '(c) Defend United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack or threat of attack; and
- '(d) Warn Western Hemisphere Powers against possible impending danger.'

"When the order to execute this plan was issued, Change #1 had been incorporated. The Tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet were:-

- '(a) Protect United States and Iceland flag shipping against hostile attack, by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as required by circumstances, and by destroying hostile forces which threaten such shipping.
- '(b) Escort convoys of United States and Iceland flag shipping, including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland.

## Witness Stark

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- '(c) Provide protection and sea transportation for the initial movements and continued support of United States overseas garrisons.
- '(d) Trail naval vessels and aircraft of belligerent Powers (other than of those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory and other than belligerent vessels and aircraft involved in encounters in executing a, b, and c), and broadcast in plain language their movements at four hour intervals, or oftener if necessary. Amplify such broadcasts by encrypted despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations.
- '(e) Trail merchant vessels of belligerent Powers (other than those Powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere Territory), if suspected of acting as supply ships for, or otherwise assisting the operations of, the naval vessels or aircraft of such belligerents. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.

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'The Atlantic Fleet will be organized into Task Forces of the approximate strength indicated:

Ocean Escort -- 6 BB, 5 CA, 27 DD, 23 ODD, 48 VPB.  
Striking Force -- 3 CV, 4 CL(10,000 tons), 13 DD,  
12 VPB.

## Witness Stark

Southern Patrol 4 CL (7500 tons), 8 DD (1850 tons),  
Force --4 CGC (327 tons), 12 VPB.

"The plan stated that Canada had made available Shelburne and Halifax as operating bases for United States Naval vessels and patrol planes, and Sydney for United States Naval vessels in case of necessity.

"The Chief of Naval Operations would exchange information on movements of British and Canadian convoys and Naval forces and United States Naval forces and United States and Iceland flag shipping with the British and Canadian authorities.

"On July 25, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 251600 ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1200 (GCT) July 26th, except that only United States and Iceland flag shipping was to be escorted, i.e., the words in Task (b), 'including shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys, between United States ports and bases, and Iceland,' were not to be executed until necessary arrangements had been made.

"Change #2 to WPL-51, issued on August 13, 1941, transferred the task of providing sea transportation for the initial movement and continued support of the Army and Navy forces overseas, other than those which are to be transported by the Operating Forces, to the Naval Transportation Service. It also contained detailed instructions for the

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Witness Stark

1  
2 operation of convoys and escorts in the North Atlantic  
3 which were to become effective when the escort of convoys  
4 including ships of nationality other than those of United  
5 States and Iceland was ordered.

6 "On 25 August, the Chief of Naval Operations informed  
7 Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet by dispatch 252000 that  
8 WPL-51 was to be interpreted as requiring Atlantic Fleet  
9 forces to destroy surface raiders which attacked shipping  
10 along the sea lanes between North America and Iceland or  
11 which approached these lanes sufficiently close to threaten  
12 such shipping.

13 "Change #3, issued on September 3, 1941, stated:-

14 'Hostile forces will be deemed to threaten United  
15 States or Iceland flag shipping if they enter the  
16 general area of the sea lanes which lie between North  
17 America and Iceland or enter the Neutrality Zone in  
18 the Atlantic Ocean described in the Declaration of  
19 Panama of October 3, 1939.'

20 "This change revised the detailed instructions for the  
21 operation of convoys and escorts, which were to become  
22 effective when the inclusion in United States escorted convoys  
23 of other than United States and Icelandic ships was ordered.

24 "Change #3 established a Southeast Pacific Sub-area  
25 consisting of that part of the Pacific Ocean outside of

## Witness Stark

1 territorial waters south of the Panama Naval Coastal  
2 Frontier and north of Latitude 57° South and between the  
3 West Coast of South America, and Longitude 100° West.

4 "On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch  
5 232121 ordered Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to establish  
6 a Southeast Pacific Force of two 7500-ton light cruisers.  
7 This force, cooperating with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier,  
8 was to destroy surface raiders which attacked or threatened  
9 to attack United States flag shipping. The approach of surface  
10 raiders within the Pacific Sector of the Panama Naval Coastal  
11 Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area was to be inter-  
12 preted as a threat to United States flag shipping.

13 "On 13 September, Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch  
14 131816 ordered deletion of the Task -- 'Trail naval vessels  
15 and aircraft of belligerent Powers, etc.'

16 "Change #4, issued on September 3, 1941, enlarged the  
17 Western Atlantic Area (which had been the area west of  
18 longitude 26° West, as far west as the continental land  
19 areas) to the area west of the following line:

20 'Beginning from the North along longitude 10°  
21 West as far south as latitude 65° North, thence by  
22 rhumb line to the position lat. 53° North long. 26°  
23 West, thence south along long. 26° West.'

24 "On 13 September the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch  
25

## Witness Stark

1  
2 131645 ordered that commencing on September 16, 0001 (GCT),  
3 the Atlantic Fleet was to execute the words, 'including  
4 shipping of any nationality which may join such convoys,  
5 between United States ports and bases, and Iceland.'

6  
7 "This order also placed into effect the detailed in-  
8 structions for the operations of convoys and escorts. Under  
9 these instructions the United States assumed responsibility  
10 for transatlantic trade convoys on the North Atlantic route  
11 when west of the line from the North Pole along the Meridian  
12 10° West to Lat. 65° North thence to the point Lat. 53° North  
13 Long. 26° West and thence along the Meridian of 26° West.

14 "On 13 September 1941 Chief of Naval Operations informed  
15 Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, by dispatch 131855 that  
16 the President had modified previous instructions regarding  
17 convoy and escort, and that the United States Naval vessels  
18 could escort convoys in which there were no United States  
19 or Iceland flag vessels and that United States flag vessels  
20 could be escorted by Canadian ships.

21 "Western Hemisphere Defense Plan #5 (WPL-52), issued  
22 September 26, 1941, superseded Western Hemisphere Defense  
23 Plan #4. It was to be placed into effect by the Chief of  
24 Naval Operations after Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet,  
25 had submitted a readiness report.

"It stated that approximately 60 Royal Navy and Royal

Witness Stark

1  
2 Canadian Navy destroyers and corvettes would be engaged in  
3 escorting convoy in the Western Atlantic Area under the  
4 strategic direction of the United States. It quoted extracts  
5 from the President's speech of September 11, such as:-

6 'Upon our Naval and air patrol - now operating in  
7 large numbers over a vast expanse of the Atlantic  
8 Ocean fell the duty of maintaining the American  
9 policy of freedom of the seas - now. That means \*\*\*  
10 our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all  
11 merchant ships - not only American merchant ships,  
12 but ships of any flag - engaged in commerce in our  
13 defensive waters.'

14 \*\*\*\*\*

15 'From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war  
16 enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary  
17 for American defense, they do so at their own peril.  
18 'The orders which I have given as Commander in Chief  
19 of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out  
20 that policy - at once.'

21 "It is stated in the Concept of the Plan:-

22 'IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT, UNDER THE CONCEPT OF  
23 THIS PLAN, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR IN THE LEGAL  
24 SENSE, AND THEREFORE DOES NOT HAVE ANY OF THE SPECIAL  
25 BELLIGERENT RIGHTS ACCORDED UNDER UNITED STATES LAW TO  
STATES WHICH ARE FORMALLY AT WAR.



Witness Stark

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'THE OPERATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THIS PLAN ARE CONCEIVED TO FORM A PREPARATORY PHASE FOR THE OPERATIONS OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW NO. 5 (WPL-46).'

'The Tasks assigned the Atlantic Fleet were:-

- '(a) Protection against hostile attack United States and foreign flag shipping other than German and Italian shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling as circumstances may require, and by destroying German and Italian Naval, Land, and Air Forces encountered.
- '(b) Insure the safety of sea communications with United States strategic outposts.
- '(c) Support the defense of United States Territory and Bases, Iceland, and Greenland.
- '(d) Trail merchant vessels suspected of supplying or otherwise assisting the operations of German and Italian naval vessels or aircraft. Report the movements of such vessels to the Chief of Naval Operations.'

'On October 8, 1941, by dispatch 082335, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the above outlined plan executed at 1400 (GCT) October 11, 1941. This plan remained in effect until December 11, 1941, at which time the Chief of Naval Operations by dispatch 111550 ordered the above outlined plan cancelled and replaced by WPL-46 (Navy Basic War Plan,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Rainbow No. 5)."

3 Mr. Gearhart: Now is this the order that you made  
4 pursuant to the direction of the President under which the  
5 Navy began to wage war in the Atlantic?

6 Admiral Stark: It is the order under which we operated  
7 and under which we told the Germans, and Italians in the  
8 later stages, that if they came to the westward of the 26th  
9 Meridian, as I recall, that their intent would be regarded  
10 as hostile and they would be dealt with accordingly, and re-  
11 garding which the President had previously informed the  
12 country.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Then pursuant to this order shells were  
14 exchanged by American surface warships carrying American flags  
15 and German submarines?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, we attacked German submarines  
17 under this order.

18 Mr. Gearhart: How many instances can you recount at  
19 this moment?

20 Admiral Stark: I do not know just how many instances  
21 there were where we attacked submarines with depth charges,  
22 in cases, for example, like when we were sending troops into  
23 Iceland, and which I mentioned. There are three rather  
24 outstanding cases in this connection.

25 There was the GREAR, which was attacked, as I recall,

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 in September. There was the REUBEN JAMES, which was attacked  
3 and sunk, I believe, in November. There was the SALINAS,  
4 a tanker, which was attacked and damaged and got into port  
5 about that time. There was some one other of our destroyers.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Was the REUBEN JAMES one of them?

7 Admiral Stark: Sir?

8 Mr. Gearhart: The REUBEN JAMES, was that one of them?

9 Admiral Stark: The REUBEN JAMES was one. I have a  
10 paper here on those four cases. The other one was the  
11 KEARNEY on October 17, which was attacked by an enemy sub-  
12 marine, position 57.04 North and 23 West, 300 miles southwest  
13 of Iceland. One torpedo struck the boiler room. Seven men  
14 killed, four missing and ten wounded.

15 The SALINAS, a naval tanker, was torpedoed without  
16 warning during the night of October 29-30, 1941, in waters  
17 southwest of Iceland. Ship was sufficiently damaged to  
18 require six weeks or more in drydock, but a Navy press release  
19 stated there was no loss of life and no serious injury to  
20 personnel.

21 The REUBEN JAMES was sunk west of Iceland while on  
22 convoy duty during the night of October 30-31.

23 The GREAR was not damaged.

24 We had a ship, the ROBIN MOORE, torpedoed and sunk off  
25 Brazil in June. There was a ship called the STEEL SEAFARER

AL-14

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Witness Stark

1 I think, that was attacked. I have forgotten whether it  
 2 was sunk, but that was another case, and there was still  
 3 another to which I believe the President referred in his  
 4 September speech, called the CAESAR. I have forgotten just  
 5 what she was.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Were any American transports carrying  
 7 the American flag transporting the troops of any of the  
 8 nations that later became our Allies, after the declaration  
 9 of war?

10 Admiral Stark: I do not recall such at the time. We  
 11 were escorting British ships at one period, carrying British  
 12 troops. One of the Queens was sent over to this side of the  
 13 Atlantic and routed south and down around the southern tip  
 14 of Africa. She was sent here as a matter of safety, that  
 15 being a safer route. Whether or not we let the British have  
 16 any of our ships at that time, or allocated them to carry  
 17 troops to the Middle East I am not certain. I do not recall  
 18 any at the moment.

19 Mr. Gearhart: We did later?

20 Admiral Stark: We did later, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Now we occupied Iceland prior to December  
 22 7, 1941, did we not?

23 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: And our American Navy took to Iceland not  
 25

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 only Marines but soldiers?

3 Admiral Stark: Army, yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Soldiers of the Army?

5 Admiral Stark: That is correct. And we established  
6 seaplanes up there also.

7 Mr. Gearhart: We also occupied Greenland, did we not?

8 Admiral Stark: We developed certain air stations, as  
9 I recall, in Greenland, to help get aircraft across the  
10 Atlantic. I do not remember of any occupational forces other  
11 than those in connection with air bases.

12 Mr. Gearhart: And we also dispossessed some Germans who  
13 established some air stations in Greenland, did we not?

14 Admiral Stark: I think what you refer to may be some  
15 Germans up there in connection with weather reports.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but they were German Army people,  
17 were they not?

18 Admiral Stark: I do not recall whether they were German  
19 Army or not. They were Germans.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Anyway, we ousted them from Greenland?

21 Admiral Stark: Either ousted them or they got out  
22 themselves at that time. I do not know what the situation was.

23 Mr. Gearhart: They were ousted prior to December 7, 1941?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Now let us take a look at the Pacific. Did

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 you have any orders comparable to the one that you have  
3 given me a copy of applying to the Pacific?

4 Admiral Stark: We did in the Southeast Pacific.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Have you a copy of that order here?

6 Admiral Stark: No, I have not. I can get it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Would you be so kind as to get it and  
8 have it inserted in the record at this point, if you come to  
9 it in time?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now what was the substance and effect of  
12 that order?

13 Admiral Stark: In the Southeast Pacific?

14 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

15 Admiral Stark: I do not recall any incident in connection  
16 with that.

17 Mr. Gearhart: What was the order?

18 Admiral Stark: That commanders of the Army and Navy  
19 continue similar, as I recall, to that as I recited in October,  
20 that if any German or Italian raider came within the boundary  
21 line which we set there, and which we published, they were  
22 to be engaged.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Did that only apply to the Germans and  
24 Italians?

25 Admiral Stark: They were the only ones at that time.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SHACK(?)

WLC1

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: What was the date of that order?

3 Admiral Stark: It is covered in this digest which you  
4 have there, on page 5, and reads:

5 "On August 28 the Chief of Naval Operations by  
6 dispatch 282121 ordered Commander in Chief, Pacific  
7 Fleet, to establish a southeast Pacific force of  
8 two 7500-ton light cruisers. This force, cooperating  
9 with the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, was to destroy  
10 surface raiders which attacked or threatened to attack  
11 United States flag shipping. The approach of surface  
12 raiders within the Pacific sector of the Panama Naval  
13 Coastal Frontier or the Pacific Southeast Sub Area  
14 was to be interpreted as a threat to United States flag  
15 shipping."

16 The effect, therefore, of that was to engage any German  
17 or Italian raider which might appear in that area.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, was any order promulgated by  
19 you which had direct application to Japan prior to December 7,  
20 1941?

21 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you regard the freezing of the  
23 assets of Japan on July 26, 1941 as an overt act?

24 Admiral Stark: I did not.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Did you regard the imposition upon Japan





WLC3

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
2 which Japan received the mandated islands, it was understood,  
3 was it not, by everybody that the Japanese were not allowing  
4 any persons to come within those areas?

5 Admiral Stark: She had taken that stand, and in my  
6 opinion it was not a legal stand for her to take.

7 Mr. Gearhart: But legal or illegal, we were avoiding  
8 going in there and creating an incident by reason of our  
9 presence there, is that not correct?

10 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir. We had abided  
11 by her decision not to let us go, a decision which, on our part,  
12 I thought was wrong at the time. That went back some years.  
13 Once it had been made, we stayed out.

14 Mr. Gearhart: When you considered sending an air reconnais-  
15 sance expedition over Truk, did you consider the question of  
16 whether or not that would constitute an overt act against the  
17 Japanese?

18 Admiral Stark: Those ships, airships -- I am referring to  
19 aircraft -- had they made that reconnaissance flight would have  
20 gone very high. They might have been seen or might not, so the  
21 argument probably falls out. They would then have taken the  
22 pictures. The Japanese had been doing the same thing. We  
23 know of flights over our territory. It was taking a chance,  
24 but we thought the chance worthwhile. Whether it would be  
25 regarded as an overt act on our part, I do not know. I primarily

WLC4

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
2 wanted the information and I was prepared to take the chance.

3 Mr. Gearhart: If Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor,  
4 would you regard that as a sort of reconnaissance, the same  
5 as was to be conducted by the United States?

6 Admiral Stark: At that time, if I had seen them I would  
7 have shot them down, if I had been on the spot and in command.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Had there been any reports to you of  
9 Japanese ships flying over Hawaii?

10 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you read the story in the Saturday  
12 Evening Post of October 9, 1942, a story written by the then  
13 flying Naval Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson, did you not?

14 Admiral Stark: No, I think not.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Did you read that story?

16 Admiral Stark: No.

17 Mr. Gearhart: The story which is entitled "I Fly for  
18 Vengeance"?

19 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: He recites in that story that he flew under  
21 war orders, to keep his mission secret at all costs, to sink  
22 all Japanese ships he encountered on the surface of the sea  
23 or in the air. How would you classify such an order as that?  
24 Would that be considered an overt act against the Japanese?

25 Admiral Stark: At what time was that?

WLC5

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: That order was issued November 22, 1941,  
3 three weeks before Pearl Harbor was attacked.

4 Admiral Stark: I never heard of it. I would like to  
5 see the order.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Well, it was printed in the Saturday Evening  
7 Post of October, 1942. The first six inches of type in that  
8 story "I Fly for Vengeance" has never, to my knowledge, been  
9 denied.

10 Admiral Stark: I never heard of it before. I did not  
11 read the article. I say, I would not believe it regardless  
12 of whether it was printed, unless I saw the authenticated  
13 original order.

14 Senator Lucas: Congressman, will you yield?

15 Mr. Gearhart: I will yield.

16 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman tell me who gave the  
17 order, according to the article?

18 Mr. Gearhart: I think it was given by Admiral Halsey.  
19 That was what I was going to inquire. I thought you might have  
20 information about it at this time.

21 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: There was widespread publicity given to it.  
23 It was printed ever since.

24 Admiral Stark: I missed it somehow. I missed it or it  
25 may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy.

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC6

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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The Chairman: What was your last word?

Admiral Stark: I say it may have been I just dismissed it as something crazy, because I never had any knowledge of any such order.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, since that time the then flying Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson has been twice promoted. He is known today as Commander Clarence Dickinson.

Admiral Stark: Well, I would be very much interested in seeing the order.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, you have testified that the President told you about a year and a half ago or two years ago, that he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is correct, is it?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And in your statement, on page 57, you testify: "The letter points out that neither the President nor the Secretary of State will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack." That is your testimony, emphasizing and repeating that which you have said in a letter of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Stark: To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That quotation being, "The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Government

WARD &amp; BYUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WLC6

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 The Chairman: What was your last word?

3 Admiral Stark: I say it may have been I just dismissed  
4 it as something crazy, because I never had any knowledge of  
5 any such order.6 Mr. Gearhart: Well, since that time the then flying  
7 Lieutenant Clarence Dickinson has been twice promoted. He  
8 is known today as Commander Clarence Dickinson.9 Admiral Stark: Well, I would be very much interested in  
10 seeing the order.11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you have testified that the President  
12 told you about a year and a half ago or two years ago, that  
13 he was surprised when the Japanese attacked Hawaii. That is  
14 correct, is it?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: And in your statement, on page 57, you  
17 testify: "The letter points out that neither the President  
18 nor the Secretary of State will be surprised over a Japanese  
19 surprise attack." That is your testimony, emphasizing and  
20 repeating that which you have said in a letter of November 27  
21 to Admiral Kimmel.

22 Admiral Stark: To Admiral Kimmel, yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: That quotation being, "The chances of favor-  
24 able outcome of negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This  
25 situation, coupled with a statement of the Japanese Government

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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WLC7

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
2 and movements their naval and military forces indicate, in our  
3 opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction,  
4 including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility."

5 Then, going on further down, "I held this (the letter) up  
6 pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I  
7 have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after  
8 a long talk that I sent the message to you a day or so ago  
9 showing the gravity of the situation. Will confirm that in  
10 today's meeting by the President. Neither will be surprised  
11 over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack  
12 on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing that could  
13 happen to us."

14 Do you sense any inconsistency in your statement if I told  
15 you that the President was surprised when the Japanese attacked  
16 Hawaii? Isn't that what you said in your letter to Admiral  
17 Kimmel?

18 Admiral Stark: No, I do not know that I do. I can give  
19 you practically the exact words which the President mentioned  
20 to me a year ago last summer. I was in the White House, and  
21 he said, in effect: "Betty, you were surprised at that attack  
22 and so was I." And my reply was: "Yes, sir, I was, and I  
23 just testified to that fact." Now, the previous surprise  
24 I think was more general in nature. I am not trying to make  
25 out a case for the President -- I want that understood.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: We just want the facts. I am not trying  
3 to prove anything.

4 Admiral Stark: That neither Mr. Hull nor the President  
5 would be surprised at a surprise attack anywhere, in my opinion,  
6 the President was not expecting that attack on Hawaii anymore  
7 than I was. I had gone over the situation with him very care-  
8 fully on the chart, and the movement of vessels. He was expect-  
9 ing it to the southward and so was I. We did not know whether  
10 it would hit the Philippines or not. But I think there is no  
11 particular inconsistency there.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Since you referred to a meeting with the  
13 President, I direct your attention to a meeting of the War  
14 Council, of which you are a member according to the report  
15 of the Army Board, a meeting which occurred at the White House  
16 on the 25th of November, 1941.

17 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: I will quote from Secretary Stimson's  
3 diary as follows:

4 "Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we  
5 were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull,  
6 Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought  
7 up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event  
8 that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as --  
9 perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making  
10 an attack without warning, and the question was what we should  
11 do."

12 Do you remember that meeting and do you remember those  
13 remarks by the President of the United States?

14 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: With respect to whether or not he was  
16 surprised, do you think there is any inconsistency between  
17 what he said then and what you have just recited to us?

18 Admiral Stark: I think not. You can look at this thing  
19 in two or three different ways. And again I would repeat  
20 that I was surprised at the attack on Pearl Harbor. And I  
21 want to make sure that anything I state is not intended to  
22 weaken that, because I was surprised. When one had been  
23 talking about the possibility of an attack for a year or more,  
24 when you had been pressing for means to counter such an  
25 attack should it come, when you had laid out a plan to counter



Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 it, and stated that war might well be initiated, and the  
3 most embarrassing thing that could happen to us there was  
4 an attack on Hawaii, and you had gone over it forwards and  
5 backwards, to that extent you were not surprised, it was  
6 not as though it were something that suddenly came on you.

7 But regardless of the fact that we had been over it,  
8 we countered and we talked about the possibility, and we had  
9 done what we could, and we had made it our strongest outpost,  
10 when it came at that particular time, and in view of the  
11 fact that we had no leads to indicate it was coming at that  
12 time at Hawaii, and we did have leads only of an amphibious  
13 force pointing to the southern, and we had no indication  
14 that the Japanese carriers, the last thing I had in that line  
15 was information in the Pacific of the whole Japanese Fleet  
16 laid out as of 1 December showing the carriers in home waters --  
17 I was surprised.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you say that you were surprised?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: That the Japanese should attack Hawaii  
21 on the 7th day of December 1941?

22 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: You were taken by surprise as well as  
24 the President was taken by surprise?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. All these things I had talked

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 over with the President.

3 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the fact that the Commander  
4 in Chief of the United States Forces, the President of the  
5 United States, a student of naval affairs, a frequent visitor  
6 on board ships, and you, the Chief of Naval Operations, were  
7 taken by surprise by the news that came that the Japanese  
8 had attacked Hawaii, does that mitigate or does that aggravate  
9 the fact that the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was taken  
10 by surprise?

11 Admiral Stark: The possibility of that attack existed.  
12 We knew of the possibility though we weren't expecting it.  
13 I had specifically written, by letter, that I thought we  
14 should be on guard. We had sent a dispatch of a war warning  
15 and we had directed the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic  
16 and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific to take a defensive  
17 deployment. That direction was because of the possibility  
18 of an attack. We didn't expect it, but we felt we had to  
19 be on guard against it.

20 I was surprised at the attack, and I also was greatly  
21 surprised that more steps had not been taken to endeavor to  
22 guard against it and counter it, if possible.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Well, if you condemn Admiral Kimmel for  
24 being taken by surprise over there, do you not in the same  
25 breath condemn yourself?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Admiral Stark: I am not condemning Admiral Kimmel for anything. And in my statement and in what I said I would do I have left that up to others. I have stated the situation as I saw it. I acted in accordance with my best judgment and I assume he did, too.

What I intended to convey apparently did not get over. Whether the fault was mine for not having expressed it properly or whether the fault lay elsewhere if I did express it properly is something which is not for me to say.

Mr. Gearhart: Now --

Admiral Stark: I felt I had, we all felt, that we had given warning and a directive which would have fully alerted the forces out there, and, as I say, what we thought we had done did not materialize, to the best of my knowledge and belief, at least as far as we thought it had. What Admiral Kimmel did do he can testify to.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, the fact that you admit that you were surprised when Hawaii was hit, and you inform us that the President told you that he was surprised when Pearl Harbor was attacked, does that not account for the fact that you left out of all these warnings that you sent to the Islands any mention of Hawaii?

Admiral Stark: The only specific objectives we gave were objectives of an amphibious force. It is all we had.

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 The war warning was broad. The amphibious objectives we  
3 gave. And in an earlier dispatch we put "in any direction".

4 Mr. Gearhart: But all of the war warnings that you sent,  
5 all that General Marshall sent, all, after calling attention  
6 to the imminence of war, all narrowed down the message later  
7 on by pointing out that you expected the attack to occur  
8 in the Far East.

9 Does that not spring from the fact that the President,  
10 yourself and General Marshall, and all of the officers that  
11 stood around you close and advised with you, were of the  
12 opinion that Pearl Harbor was impregnable and that it would  
13 not be attacked?

14 Admiral Stark: No, I never thought Pearl Harbor was  
15 impregnable and that it would not be attacked. I did not  
16 think it would be attacked at that time.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Now, going back again to that meeting  
18 with the President on the 25th day of November of 1941,  
19 that was held at the White House, wasn't it?

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: The three Secretaries were there, the  
22 two Chiefs of Staff were there, and the President brought  
23 up the subject of Japan and pointed out that the Japanese  
24 were notorious for making an attack without warning, a sneak  
25 attack, and that we might expect an attack as soon as next

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Monday, referring to the Monday following the 25th day of  
3 November, 1941.

4 Do you know whether the President had any reason for  
5 believing that an attack might occur on the 1st of December  
6 or 2nd of December?

7 Admiral Stark: No, sir; I don't know just why he made  
8 that statement, except that it was a guess that it might come  
9 within the next few days. I never went -- I don't know that  
10 anybody questioned it. We had the 29th as a deadline.

11 Mr. Gearhart: That was what I was going to ask you next.  
12 Did anybody bring up in the discussion the Japanese intercept  
13 that the 29th was a deadline?

14 Admiral Stark: I don't remember that that was specifi-  
15 cally discussed at that time. We all had it -- wait a minute.  
16 I think we had it prior to the meeting of the 25th. It was  
17 about the 22nd, I think, that we got it.

18 Mr. Gearhart: First they fixed the 25th as the deadline  
19 and then a later message came through before the 25th extending  
20 it to the 29th.

21 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

22 Mr. Gearhart: It could have been before you.

23 Admiral Stark: I think it came in about the 22nd. If  
24 so, we all had seen it.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, you discussed it, did you not?

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Admiral Stark: It was translated on the 22nd.

3 Mr. Gearhart: And it had been served upon you by  
4 Captain Kramer and it had been served upon the Secretary of  
5 War and the Chief of Staff by Colonel Bratton; is that not  
6 correct?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: You all had knowledge of that 29th  
9 deadline?

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. It had also been delivered  
11 to the White House.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Did Mr. Hull bring up any discussion  
13 of his associations with Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy  
14 Kurusu?

15 Admiral Stark: The situation was undoubtedly discussed.  
16 I have forgotten the exact trend of it. It is a long time ago.

17 The one thing that I remember is that we went over the  
18 situation but as to details I don't recall.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Did Mr. Hull --

20 Admiral Stark: I kept no diary.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Did Mr. Hull say anything about the kind  
22 of message he was going to give the Japanese in reply to the  
23 one they served on him on the 20th?

24 Admiral Stark: I do not recall, at that time. We  
25 were still thinking, at least under the impression, that he

Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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was still considering the modus vivendi.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Did he read you his modus vivendi?

Admiral Stark: I do not recall that he did at that time.

However, we had a copy of it in the Navy Department.

Mr. Gearhart: Were you and General Marshall disturbed by what Secretary Hull had to say about his impending answer?

Admiral Stark: About his impending answer -- you mean to the Japanese?

Mr. Gearhart: The one he was about to turn over to the Japanese.

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WLC

1 Witness Stark: Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Stark: Of the 20th. Well, we were playing for  
3 time. I do not recall that what was said in the White House  
4 on the 25th was responsible for our message of the 27th. As  
5 I have stated, I have been unable to separate and clarify just  
6 what happened on the dates around the 25th, which was when the  
7 Chiang-Kai-shek note was delivered, and the 26th, and the 27th,  
8 except as to what happened during that over-all period.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Refreshing your memory, weren't you very  
10 much disturbed, and wasn't General Marshall very much disturbed,  
11 by what Secretary Hull told you that he planned to do?

12 Admiral Stark: I don't recall at that time that he told us.  
13 We did not know of the note of the 26th until after it was sent.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Didn't he tell you at that time that he  
15 was thinking about not answering at all, that he was thinking  
16 about ignoring the whole thing, letting it go on?

17 Admiral Stark: I don't recall that he did. You are referr-  
18 ing to the --

19 Mr. Gearhart: Meeting of the 25th.

20 Admiral Stark: To the 25th. I have stated that whether  
21 he spoke to me about that note on the 25th or the 26th or the  
22 27th, I am not sure. I know that we got it, that he called me  
23 with regard to it. It may have been the 25th, it may have been  
24 the 26th. I don't recall its having come up at the White House  
25 meeting. It may have. I do not recall the details.



WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: This is very, very important, and I want  
3 you to try to remember.

4 Admiral Stark: I have spent hours trying to recall what  
5 went on, on the 25th, -6th and -7th, as to time. I have dis-  
6 cussed it with others. We come to an impasse as to any  
7 agreement everytime we do it, and everytime we start it we  
8 waste a couple of hours and get nowhere. I cannot recall the  
9 details of just when I got that information. I wish I could,  
10 but I just can't do it.

11 Mr. Gearhart: To refresh your memory, reading from the  
12 Army report -- I am not picking this out of the air -- didn't  
13 Mr. Hull say in that meeting and during the course of the dis-  
14 cussion that he was about ready "to kick the whole thing over  
15 and tell them (the Japanese) that he had no other proposition  
16 at all"?

17 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that he did.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Then, what caused you and General Marshall  
19 to immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to  
20 the President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of  
21 November, 1941, your memorandum recommending to the President  
22 that he should do everything in his power to gain time?

23 Admiral Stark: I do not know that it was immediately after  
24 that meeting of the 25th that we did that.

25 Mr. Gearhart: The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it?

WLC2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: This is very, very important, and I want  
3 you to try to remember.

4 Admiral Stark: I have spent hours trying to recall what  
5 went on, on the 25th, -6th and -7th, as to time. I have dis-  
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7 agreement everytime we do it, and everytime we start it we  
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9 details of just when I got that information. I wish I could,  
10 but I just can't do it.

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12 Army report -- I am not picking this out of the air -- didn't  
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14 cussion that he was about ready "to kick the whole thing over  
15 and tell them (the Japanese) that he had no other proposition  
16 at all"?

17 Admiral Stark: I do not recall that he did.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Then, what caused you and General Marshall  
19 to immediately meet again together and to prepare and send to  
20 the President immediately after that meeting of the 25th of  
21 November, 1941, your memorandum recommending to the President  
22 that he should do everything in his power to gain time?

23 Admiral Stark: I do not know that it was immediately after  
24 that meeting of the 25th that we did that.

25 Mr. Gearhart: The instrument is dated the 27th, isn't it?

D. G. HOTTENHAW - JUNE 8, 1941

WLC3

1 Admiral Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Stark: It is dated the 27th, yes, sir.

3 Mr. Gearhart: It contains General Marshall's signature,  
4 doesn't it?5 Admiral Stark: It contains his signature which, his best  
6 judgment is, if I recall his testimony correctly, he put on,  
7 on the 28th.8 Mr. Gearhart: Either the 28th or the 26th, because he  
9 wasn't in Washington on the 27th, the date that the instrument  
10 bears; that is correct, isn't it?

11 Admiral Stark: That is correct, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: So if you and General Marshall worked out  
13 that instrument which bears the date of the 27th, you had to do  
14 it on the 26th, didn't you?

15 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Because General Marshall was not here on the  
17 27th.18 Admiral Stark: We didn't have to start it on the 26th.  
19 When I first asked Turner about it, because it was drawn up  
20 by War Plans of both sections, he was under the impression --  
21 I don't know whether he has testified on it or not -- but my  
22 impression is, in asking him, he thought it started about the  
23 24th. We are not clear just when we started that memorandum.24 Mr. Gearhart: You are not in the habit of sending memo-  
25 randums to the White House without the signatures of the people

WLC4

1 Admiral Stark Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
2 who are responsible?

3 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Then, it must have been prepared and signed  
5 on the 26th for delivery on the 27th; is that not correct?

6 Admiral Stark: No, that is not necessarily correct. I  
7 might have signed it on the 27th. You have Marshall's testi-  
8 mony. I have no reason to doubt it. You have his testimony  
9 that his best judgment is that he signed it on the 28th when  
10 he came back.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Is there any reason he should have signed  
12 it on the 28th rather than the 26th?

13 Admiral Stark: According to Secretary Stimson's diary,  
14 as I recall, he made some minor changes in it on the 27th.  
15 It was not up in smooth form at that time. I say his diary.  
16 I believe Gerow testified to that.

17 The Chairman: It is now 4:30. I presume you cannot  
18 finish soon?

19 Mr. Gearhart: No, I will need 15 or 20 minutes more.

20 The Chairman: We will recess until 10:00 o'clock  
21 morning.

22 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., a recess was taken until 10:00  
23 a.m., Friday, January 4, 1946.)

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