

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 to be very careful and not try me on something where they
3 would fail and the effect would bounce back on them.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, coming to the Clausen report.
5 When did you see the Clausen affidavit?

6 General Short: About two or three days before this com-
7 mittee convened we got a copy of them.

8 Senator Ferguson: In the first part of the Clausen re-
9 port, the 23rd of November, 1944 -- have you got the Clausen
10 report before you?

11 Lt. Col. Karr: No, sir, we do not have that here.

12 Senator Ferguson: It is the letter by the Secretary of
13 War to Major Clausen and on the next page is this memorandum:

14 "Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen: Subject:
15 Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor investigations." You had
16 those before you this morning, did you not?

17 General Short: I think so.

18 Senator Ferguson: The unexplored leads.

19 General Short: I do not believe I did.

20 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in
21 evidence those two papers, the letter of the 23rd creating
22 the Clausen power and the Unexplored Leads.

23 Mr. Murphy: I wonder, Mr. Chairman, why the public are
24 not entitled to the whole thing? I move that we put it all in,
25 the whole volume.

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 The Chairman: Make them an exhibit or consider it as
3 being spread on the record?

4 Senator Ferguson: I would like to spread those pages
5 at least on the record because I have questioned General Short
6 and he gave some answers in relation to these unexplored
7 leads and that is what I desire to have in the record at the
8 present time.

9 Mr. Murphy: You mean you object, Senator, to the whole
10 thing going in?

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, I think we should wait. The
12 only thing is I think we should wait until Clausen came to
13 get the other papers in, to know how the other papers were ob-
14 tained before they go in.

15 Mr. Murphy: Well, I propose later on to ask that they
16 all go in. I would like to have it all go in now. I will
17 ask that again.

18 The Chairman: Well, the chair does not want to exclude
19 anything that ought to go in here, but if it is all going in
20 when Clausen comes in I do not see any need of putting it all
21 in here.

22 Mr. Murphy: I have no objection to those two going in
23 but I move that they all go in so that we will have every-
24 thing.

25 The Chairman: Let them go in.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: I will read them in, General, so that
3 you will have them before you.

4 General Short: Yes.

5 Senator Ferguson: (Reading) "November 23, 1944." Now,
6 that date is after the Board had rendered its opinion?

7 General Short: That is correct.

8 Senator Ferguson: But the Board, all the members were
9 living and in good health so that they could have carried on,
10 couldn't they?

11 General Short: So far as I know they were.

12 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

13 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

14 "Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

"In connection with the recent report of the Army

15 Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have
16 suggested themselves which require investigation. I have
17 directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major
18 Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

19 "You are directed to give Major Clausen access to
20 all records, documents, and information in your Division,
21 whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all
22 officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the
23 fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major
24 Clausen should be answered fully and the persons inter-
25 rogated should volunteer any information of which they

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major
3 Clausen's inquiries.

4 "In addition, copies of any papers required by Major
5 Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furn-
6 ished him, any present directives to the contrary not-
7 withstanding.

8 HENRY L. STIMSON,
9 Secretary of War.

10 "A true copy

11 "Henry C. Clausen,
12 Lt. Colonel, JAGD."

13 Now, the next page is:

14 "MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD:

15 "Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Inves-
16 tigation.

17 "1. In order to assist you in the investigation
18 you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain
19 unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantage-
20 ously be followed up in order to complete the general
21 picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely
22 contains suggestions and will not be construed as a
23 directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your
24 investigation.

25 "2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington,

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2 the following matters can be investigation.

3 "a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department
4 and the Navy Department notified the War Department of
5 the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.

6 "b. What was the naval condition of readiness
7 at Pearl Harbor.

8 "c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance
9 reports to Washington.

10 "d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington
11 requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.

12 "e. Whether Kimmel understood the term 'defensive
13 deployments' or wired back for its meaning.

14 "f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27
15 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so,
16 was the War Department furnished copies thereof.

17 "g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron
18 was specific and indicative of an established War Depart-
19 ment policy of being specific when war alerts were be-
20 lieved required by the situation.

21 "h. Whether the War Department manuals and war
22 plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General
23 of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the
24 situation, without consulting with or reporting to the
25 War Department.

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 "1. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's
3 letter of February 1941.

4 "j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941,
5 the state of their training and the possibility of con-
6 tinuing training under Alert 2 or 3.

7 "k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action
8 Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and
9 whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement
10 or discovered its existence.

11 "l. Whether Short was sent official notice of the
12 Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill
13 July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan. (Rep. 41)

14 "3. Concerning the 'magic' intercepts we should
15 ascertain:

16 "a. The exact date and time of first translation.

17 "b. The reason for the apparent delay in translat-
18 ing or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.

19 "c. Who got each message, when and in what form.

20 "d. The evaluation made of them at the time and
21 the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General
22 Staff and by the Navy.

23 "e. The origin of the 'Budapest' intercept.

24 "4. Significant details regarding the 'Winds'
25 intercept might be explored:

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Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 "a. The original of the Navy Department message
3 and translation, now probably part of the original
4 Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of
5 Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that
6 Commission disposed of it.

7 "b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of
8 the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133-135),
9 as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to
10 who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to
11 check up on whether the translation was received.

12 "c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel
13 Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-
14 U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would
15 have known that a 'War with Britain' message would ne-
16 cessarily have involved the United States in war."

17 Did you hever hear about that one before?

18 General Short: I learned that in respect to the report,
19 as I say, two or three days before the committee met. I had
20 never heard about it before that time.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know whether or not
22 Miles did know about that Anglo-Ducth-U.S. Joint Action
23 Agreement, in which case they would have known that the War
24 with Britain message would necessarily have involved the
25 United States in war?

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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General Short: I don't remember whether that question was specifically asked him or what his answer was.

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"d. Whether the partial implementation 'War with Britain' was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

"e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Roche of the implementation intercept?

"f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating 'Winds' message?

"g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?"

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Did you know that the Army Board had failed to examine certain intercept messages?

General Short: I did not know what they had examined. I was never permitted to see or know anything about magic.

Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

"h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing 'winds' message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities."

General Short: I never heard of the winds code until I read the Roberts Report here sometime in August, 1944. That was the first time I knew there was such a thing.

Senator Ferguson: You never knew then that Rochefort, Admiral or Commander, whatever he was -- it was Commander Rochefort -- had known that there was intercepted a winds or implementing message?

General Short: No, sir, I had never heard of it.

Senator Ferguson: So then you were not waiting, as a matter of fact, on an implementing winds message in order that you may be given advance notice of hostilities?

General Short: I was not.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: This is signed Myron C. Cramer,
3 Major General, U. S., Judge Advocate General.

4 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

6 Mr. Murphy: As you remember, we were first going to
7 put in the first 18 pages, and I then stated in the record
8 it was unfair to have the 18 in without the explanatory
9 part but to have incorporated in the Judge Advocate General's
10 opinion the report of Major Clausen.

11 There is also in the record the cross-examination from
12 the Clausen Report of General Gerow. I do not see how you
13 can intelligently understand a report if you have only
14 three parts of it in and not the whole.

15 I request, in view of the matters that have been read,
16 that the entire report go in as an exhibit.

17 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I am putting in here
18 just what the Judge Advocate General was asking Clausen
19 to look into. I haven't time this afternoon to examine
20 him on the whole matter here that is contained in this
21 volume.

22 I want to ask you, General Short, if you read this
23 paper that I read and that I have before me, these affi-
24 davits of Clausen, or in the Clausen report?

25 General Short: I have read the complete report.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: You have read the complete report?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: The papers have never had the Clausen Report. I think they are entitled to them.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection, then --

Mr. Keefe: (Interposing) Just hold it, Mr. Chairman. I have at least on one or two other occasions registered objection to the introduction of the so-called Clausen statement at this time, until after we have had an opportunity to go into that situation in connection with the examination of Colonel Bratton and others who expect to be witnesses.

When the full facts with reference to it are developed it can then be disclosed as to whether it is material and pertinent to this inquiry. I do not care to be a party to consenting to the introduction in evidence of matter which may or may not be pertinent.

The Vice Chairman: Does the gentleman of Wisconsin object to the request of the gentleman of Pennsylvania?

Mr. Murphy: May I say on this point, the Navy had a special examination after the Naval Court of Inquiry concluded, by Admiral Hart, and they had a subsequent examination by Admiral Hewitt, and in each of those cases it was conducted by an individual going about the world to

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 take testimony. The Clausen examination, as I understand
3 it, covered 57,000 miles to the warfronts of the world.

4 I am simply making my request so that everything
5 about Pearl Harbor shall be known, for whatever it is worth.
6 Maybe it will not be worth much in the view of individual
7 members, but so that all the facts will be before the
8 papers of the country I think it should be made an exhibit.

9 Mr. Keefe: In view of that statement, it is perfectly
10 obvious why the statement is made, I do not want any mis-
11 interpretation of the purpose of my objection.

12 There is quite a difference between the Hewitt report
13 and the Hart report and the manner in which the two were
14 prepared, quite a difference between the questions and
15 answers of witnesses recorded under oath than the mere
16 statement that is made in the taking of affidavits.

17 Now I have some knowledge as to the manner and method
18 in which affidavits are obtained, and so far as I am con-
19 cerned, it will all be brought out at the proper time. I
20 do not think they should be introduced in evidence at
21 this time but should await the time when the individuals
22 become witnesses on the stand and it gives us an opportunity
23 to examine those witnesses in reference to how those
24 affidavits were obtained.

25 Mr. Murphy: According to the papers the gentleman said

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 he wants to conclude by February 15, and I want to be
3 sure the Clausen Report is in by then, and I think this is
4 as good a time as any.

5 The Vice Chairman: Permit me to remind the gentleman
6 from Wisconsin, as I recall the only witness who has appeared
7 before the committee so far and who had appeared before the
8 Army Board of Inquiry and later gave an affidavit to Major
9 Clausen was General Gerow.

10 Mr. Keefe: That is correct.

11 The Vice Chairman: General Gerow was questioned by
12 members of the committee about his affidavit that he gave
13 to Major Clausen.

14 Mr. Keefe: I certainly would not have any objection
15 to having General Gerow's affidavit, which he gave to Clausen,
16 introduced in evidence.

17 Senator Ferguson: It is already in evidence.

18 Mr. Keefe: It is already in evidence. Now all I ask
19 is that the same situation with respect to the affidavit,
20 perhaps, of Colonel Bratton and others be indulged in. I
21 have no objection to the public and the world knowing just
22 exactly what is in every one of those affidavits, but I
23 would like to introduce them at a time when I have the
24 right to cross-examine the witness who gave those affidavits.

25 Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Major

Witness Short

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Clausen, I believe, questioned 135 witnesses. I do not believe we are going to have them all here. Ordinarily, if you put any part of an instrument in you ought to put all of it in, for whatever it is worth.

The Vice Chairman: The objection has been heard. That settles the matter for the present.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, in view of what has been said I think it should be made clear that we do not take the affidavits of 135 witnesses. If Colonel Clausen appears here and we can examine him about it, we can review that whole question at that time. In the meantime it is a little premature.

Mr. Murphy: I understand, sir, we have already agreed to take the statements of the staffs at Hawaii.

Senator Brewster: As the gentleman well knows, those who are in the category of these witnesses we agreed to let go in evidence.

Mr. Keefe: That matter has heretofore been determined by this committee, as the Chairman will know, when we agreed to put in sworn testimony in the place of calling certain witnesses, and the Clausen matter was specifically eliminated by unanimous action of the committee at that time.

Hook follows

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 The Vice Chairman: That is true, of course. It
3 was determined by the committee in executive session that
4 the Clausen material would not be included with this other
5 material, but it does not follow that any member of the
6 committee is deprived of the right to ask unanimous con-
7 sent to include it at any time he may desire.

8 Mr. Murphy: I ask it particularly in view of the
9 fact that those members of the Armed Forces of the United
10 States were fighting in the battlefronts of the world,
11 and swore before God under oath that what they said was
12 true, and it was presented to us by an officer of the
13 United States Army.

14 Senator Brewster: You produce the officer, and we
15 will listen to him.

16 The Vice Chairman: Proceed.

17 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

18 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

19 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar, General, with the
20 planes that were passing through Hawaii to other fronts
21 for other places in the Pacific?

22 General Short: To the Philippines in particular?

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

24 General Short : Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Were these planes up until the 7th

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 the same as those that came in then? They were not armed?

3 General Short: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: No ammunition in them?

5 General Short: That is correct.

6 Senator Ferguson: You were to arm them there and
7 then send them on?

8 General Short: That is correct.

9 Senator Ferguson: Had that ever been done before?

10 General Short: All the planes that had gone to the
11 Philippines came in in that condition up to December 7th.

12 Senator Ferguson: Came in that condition?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: So there was no alteration at
15 that time?

16 General Short: You mean the ones coming in on the
17 7th?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19 General Short: No, sir, that had been the normal
20 procedure.

21 Senator Ferguson: Was your form being reinforced
22 or were these planes, from a certain day, all going
23 through to the Philippines?

24 General Short: We had actually lost planes. We had
25 21 B-17's at one time and nine of those were sent to the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Philippines and we were down to 12, and had to rob six
3 of those of parts to keep the others going through.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did that impress you with the
5 fact that there was more thought of an attack in the
6 Philippines than there was in your territory?

7 General Short: No question about it. They were
8 ferrying in the last few months everything to the Philip-
9 pines they could.

10 Senator Ferguson: Can we get what planes went through
11 Hawaii from, say, July, or something like that, Mr.
12 Richardson?

13 Mr. Richardson: We will try.

14 Senator Ferguson: Try and get that, and what planes
15 stopped and how they completed their journey.

16 General Short: May I interject there also, there
17 were other types of planes that were not flown through,
18 that were shipped through on transports.

19 Senator Ferguson: You knew about that?

20 General Short: Yes.

21 Senator Ferguson: Had you been reinforced in such a
22 way by shipping planes in after, say, September?

23 General Short: I think we got most of our planes
24 before July 1st. I could not state definitely, but I think
25 we did.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: After that, had you requested
3 any more planes for your defense?

4 General Short: We had in August put in that study
5 showing that we should have a total of 180 B-17's.

6 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever received any word of
7 any kind that after the 27th of November the Secretary of
8 State had made a statement to the Secretary of War that
9 the matter, in effect -- I do not undertake to quote him
10 in exact words -- was then being turned over to the Army
11 and Navy?

12 General Short: I had not.

13 Senator Ferguson: You indicated yesterday that you
14 were of the opinion that General Marshall had never seen
15 the message of the 27th as it was sent prior to the time
16 it was sent to you.

17 General Short: Yes, sir, I believe that is correct.

18 Senator Ferguson: And where do you get that knowledge?

19 General Short: Because General Marshall was not in
20 Washington. He was, according to his testimony, and that
21 of others, in the Carolinas for maneuvers. He stated,
22 as I remember in his testimony that when he returned to his
23 office on the 28th, he thought he found his message on his
24 desk.

25 Senator Ferguson: And he saw it afterwards?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 He saw it after the maneuvers?

3 General Short: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to add anything to
5 or subtract anything from any of your answers that I may
6 have asked you questions on?

7 General Short: I might bring out the fact that in
8 addition to planes, a few days before December 7th, I had
9 a wire from the War Department asking me if I would be
10 willing to ship 48 75-mm guns and 120 30-calibre machine
11 guns to the Philippines, and that they would replace them
12 very soon. I agreed to that.

13 The transport was held at the time long enough to
14 get them aboard, and they were shipped to the Philippines.
15 That, of course, was another indication that they considered
16 the situation in the Philippines much more critical than
17 in Hawaii.

18 Senator Ferguson: And had you had the understanding
19 before that that we knew our authorities knew that in
20 case of a war with Japan, we could not hope to hold the
21 Philippines?

22 General Short: I think that for years it had always
23 been considered that we probably would lose the Philippines
24 and have to retake them. I think in playing our war games
25 at the War College, that had been the usual assumption.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the letter
3 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel wherein he quoted
4 the President as saying that it would be very embarrassing
5 to us if the Philippines were attacked?

6 General Short: I am not. I don't remember.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do you know, as a military man,
8 how it could have been embarrassing using that word; is
9 that the word you use in military circles, or is that
10 a diplomatic word?

11 General Short: I think it would always be embarrassing
12 from a military point of view, to lose anything of that
13 kind, but it was something we had expected would happen.

14 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

15 Senator Ferguson: And if an attack came, it would
16 come against the Philippines?

17 General Short: It would come against the Philippines
18 and we probably would not be able to hold them. We did
19 not have enough out there.

20 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

21 Senator Ferguson: Just a moment.

22 Had you ever asked the question as to what our policy
23 was in case of an attack on the Philippines?

24 General Short: No, sir. I thought I knew, because I
25 had seen the war plans when I was here in Washington.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 I had played war games, commanded one side of the
3 war game in actual maneuvering at the War College. I
4 think I at that time knew it very thoroughly.

5 Senator Ferguson: What was our policy in case of an
6 attack? Would we go into action, into war?

7 General Short: We would hold them as long as we
8 could and then expect to take them back.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did it mean a general war? Was
10 that our policy?

11 General Short: I think so.

12 Senator Ferguson: So then in your opinion, it meant
13 war if they attacked the Philippines, and the British
14 and Dutch?

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Just as much as if they attacked
17 Hawaii or the Marshalls, or Guam, or any other possessions?

18 General Short: That is correct.

19 Senator Ferguson: Or even our Coast?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

23 Mr. Murphy: I just want to say that you made an error
24 when you said that was quoting the President about the
25 embarrassing situation.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: I want to get the exact language.
3 I would not under any circumstances leave a quote in here
4 which is not a correct quote. Can I get the last letter
5 counsel, in the Stark-Kimmel letters?

6 Mr. Murphy: I think he quotes the President in some
7 matters, but I do not think that was the quotation.

8 Senator Ferguson: Under no circumstances do I want
9 to allow even a thought that I am misquoting.

10 Were you here the day that the MacArthur affidavit
11 was read into evidence?

12 General Short: I am sorry. I did not get the question.

13 Senator Ferguson: Were you here on the day that the
14 Clausen-MacArthur letter was read in evidence?

15 General Short: I think I was. At least I have read
16 it.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, the substance of it, as I
18 recall it, was that General MacArthur claimed that he had
19 enough information and was not embarrassed by any lack of
20 information. Did you know at that time that he had magic?

21 General Short: No, sir, I did not.

22 Senator Ferguson: That would indicate that if he had
23 sufficient information then you had sufficient information,
24 would it not.

25 General Short: If you read that alone, you could readily

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 draw that inference, if you did not know anything about
3 the situation.

4 Senator Ferguson: But if you know about magic, do
5 you think that changes the situation?

6 General Short; There were two things that would give
7 him much more information. One was magic and the other,
8 which I did not know about, the message from the President
9 to Commissioner Sayre, that Commissioner Sayre, General
10 MacArthur and Admiral Hart were to get together at a
11 conference. There was a considerable amount of information
12 there.

13 Senator Ferguson: And the fact that he had magic and
14 access to that?

15 General Short : Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: So that there will be no doubt
17 about my quotation, I am going to ask to strike my previous
18 question. I will quote directly from the letter.

19 This is the letter of the 25th of November, 1941,
20 in Exhibit 106.

21 The Vice Chairman: Whom is the letter from?

22 Senator Ferguson: The original letter is signed
23 "Betty."

24 The Vice Chairman: From whom to whom?

25 Senator Ferguson: From Admiral Stark to Admiral

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Kimmel.

Now, I will read the postscript:

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles, an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing - I think it is more likely to be 'anything'."

It is initialled "H.R.S."

Have you seen that? It was written on November 25, and he indicates that he is holding it up because of a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull and then he adds this postscript:

General Short: I have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson: Before December 7?

General Short: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: When is about the first that you heard of it?

General Short: I heard it discussed here.

Senator Ferguson: In one of our joint committee hearings?

General Short: Yes, the first I ever heard of it.

Senator Ferguson: So you did not know what they were talking about in there, about it being embarrassing if an attack was made on the Philippines?

General Short: I did not know specifically what was intended.

Witness Short

1
2 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

3 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

4 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, before Congressman
5 Keefe proceeds, there is a matter that I would like to bring
6 to the attention of the committee that just came to my
7 attention in connection with the introduction of this record
8 called the Brief and Resume of Records of the Roberts Com-
9 mission. I brought this originally to the attention of
10 the committee and asked its consideration, and it was de-
11 ferred. Copies were made available for examination.

12 Subsequently I stated that an examination of this indi-
13 cated to me clearly it was excerpts from a much longer
14 report of the Roberts Commission and I asked that a complete
15 record be put in this record and be made an exhibit, in
16 justice to all concerned, and that was agreed to.

17 Subsequent thereto there were certain letters that
18 were discussed in connection with this, which went into the
19 record yesterday. Last night, just before adjournment,
20 the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, stated:

21 " -- I do not want to offer something that was brought
22 to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record to show that
23 if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file
24 in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go
25 in the record because I think it ought to be straightened

Witness Short

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3 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe.

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23 if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file
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25 in the record because I think it ought to be straightened

Witness Short

1
2 out on the record."

3 That being brought to my attention I came here this
4 morning and spoke to the Chairman, Mr. Cooper, in charge,
5 and I told him I had to go to a meeting of conferees on
6 the Ship Sales Act, and if it were to be offered I wanted
7 to be heard. He suggested I talk to Mr. Murphy, which I
8 did. I asked Mr. Murphy if he wanted to put this in and
9 he said no, that he had no intention at this time to put
10 it in. I went back to Mr. Cooper and told him the matter
11 was adjusted. I find subsequently in the morning Mr.
12 Murphy did offer it. I am ready to consider the further
13 factors which led Mr. Murphy to change his mind in the
14 course of the morning.

15 Mr. Murphy: I would like to speak for myself.

16 Senator Brewster: I certainly shall be happy to hear
17 you.

18 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

19 Mr. Murphy: I talked to the Senator from Maine this
20 morning and told him it was my understanding that exhibits
21 1 and 2 attached to the file he had were not in evidence.
22 I was informed by counsel that they were, the counsel for
23 General Short. Thereafter, after the Senator from Maine --

24 Senator Brewster: Just a moment. You said that was
25 all our conversation?

Witness Short

1
2 Mr. Murphy: I told you I did not intend to put the
3 file in right then.

4 Now with the understanding that the General was not
5 going to be a witness after today, the General then made
6 a statement to the effect, as I recollect it, that the
7 Judge Advocate General did not want any one on the Army
8 Board, but rather, one individual to go out to make a
9 survey of certain additional facts.

10 Then there is one other thing. Yesterday the gentleman
11 said, as I remember it, that there were certain parts of
12 that record in this exhibit.

13 Senator Brewster: The Roberts Commission.

14 Mr. Murphy: Yes. In this exhibit there is a letter
15 which states that they are referring only to things on
16 the record. When the gentleman saw fit to refer to the
17 Adjutant General of the United States Army, and apparently
18 to the Secretary of War, with the inference, as I got it,
19 that there was some impropriety in sending out Major Clausen
20 to make this survey, I then asked that not only this exhibit
21 but all of the files of the War Department, including these
22 and everything else, go into the record, so we would have
23 the entire picture.

24 I also stated on the record that this, in effect, was
25 a complaint that it was a one-sided, ex-parte proceeding. I

(7)

Witness short

1 used that word before the noon hour, an ex-parte proceeding.
2 I said in fairness to the General, he ought to be able to
3 give his answer here. Whereupon the General said, "I have
4 a paper prepared here. I have examined the exhibit." He
5 then read his answer.
6

7 I do think, inasmuch as the gentleman from Maine has
8 brought it up, that he should be the one to offer it.
9 Apparently he thought it was significant, because he brought
10 it up twice. I certainly do not want to offend the General's
11 feelings, but I am interested in the whole truth. My only
12 purpose in introducing it, is if there was any wrong committed
13 by the Adjutant General, or anyone else on the staff, as to
14 the procedure, we ought to know it. That is the only reason
15 why it should be in this record.

16 Senator Brewster: I appreciate the gentleman's state-
17 ment that he wants the whole truth, and so do I want the
18 whole truth, but having examined this document I have found
19 it does not even purport to be anything but a very partial
20 summary of certain portions of the evidence. I asked for
21 the entire evidence before the Roberts Commission to be
22 put in as an exhibit, so that we would have the whole truth,
23 and that was agreed to.

24 I do not think we need to, or want, perhaps, to take
25 the time of the committee at this time. In the light of the

Witness Short

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2 circumstances as stated by Mr. Murphy and myself, I would
3 ask that the decision of the committee be reconsidered and
4 that we have an opportunity over the week-end to consider
5 the situation, with a view to whether or not this should
6 be incorporated in the record as an exhibit.

7 I think there were some serious questions about this
8 which I should like to consider and perhaps discuss with
9 Mr. Murphy and the committee.

10 Mr. Murphy: I would like to say that inasmuch as the
11 good faith of the Adjutant General of the United States Army
12 appears to be challenged, or the Judge Advocate General, I
13 think this committee and everybody should want to know the
14 whole story, and for that reason I think it should remain
15 in the record.

16 Senator Brewster: I simply ask the matter be reconsidered.

17 The Chairman: That matter can be pending and the
18 committee can consider it.

19 The Vice Chairman: As the record stands now, it is in
20 the record. The Senator is asking to reconsider it and the
21 question of reconsideration is carried over.

22 The Chairman: It is in the record as an exhibit, not
23 as a part of the transcript, I understand, so the question
24 of reconsidering that, as to whether it should be filed as an
25 exhibit, will be pending.

Witness Short

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Mr. Murphy: May I just say, Mr. Chairman, that there are additional papers, and, as I understand it, counsel have a great volume of them, and I hope there will be a study made over the week-end. There is particularly one paper that is a memorandum dated February 17, 1942 which refers to the original retirement paper, or proposed retirement paper of the General, and it refers to a memorandum from General Marshall, and I would like to see that memorandum.

I have asked to have it here.

Senator Brewster: I think we should have all the records bearing on this which were asked for some days ago by me. It was as the result of that that these various records were produced.

Mr. Murphy: I want to give the Senator full credit for it.

Senator Brewster: I want to say that I cannot conceive that similar records to this do not exist in the Kimmel case in the Navy Department, and I should like to have the matter thoroughly explored in order that entire justice may be done to all concerned, if it is finally decided that particularly documents of this character are to be included in this record as exhibits.

The Chairman: All those matters can be straightened out by the committee. The Chair would like to see if we we cannot finish with General Short today. We cannot do it

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2 if we argue back and forth on these matters, which I
3 think can be disposed of in the committee itself.

4 Senator Ferguson: Just a moment. I do not want the
5 record to show that I feel that I was in a position to
6 really examine General Short on this because we dropped
7 the subject and I did not cover it as carefully as I would
8 want to. I did the best I could.

9 The Chairman: You made a pretty good stab at it.

10 Congressman Keefe.

11 Mr. Keefe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman: You are welcome.

13 Mr. Keefe: It is always a great pleasure to find
14 myself at the end of this whip cracking and get thrown off
15 into the last minute of the last hour of Saturday afternoon
16 with witnesses, so that I am under the urge, of necessity,
17 of not consuming any time in trying to complete with the
18 witnesses.

19 I assure you, General Short, that I shall not utilize
20 any of these bulky minutes in my examination. I will try
21 to get through by 4:00 o'clock.

22 Now, General, I sat here during your entire examination
23 and listened as attentively as I knew how to this mass of
24 detail that has been submitted to this committee.

25 The Chairman: Will you permit me to say that counsel

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 wishes to have a brief Executive Session at the conclusion
3 of today's session, so the members who are here will remain.

4 I beg your pardon for interrupting.

5 Mr. Keefe: I wonder if I have arrived at a wrong
6 conclusion, or whether I am correct when I assume that the
7 evidence up to date, and the cross-examination of yourself,
8 has tended to meet the issues with respect to your conduct
9 as the Commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 when,
10 in the public's mind for a long time after December 7, it
11 was apparent that you and Admiral Kimmel were charged with
12 the failure of your responsibilities as Commanders at Pearl
13 Harbor.

14 You specifically had training to alert your command
15 to meet this air attack, with all that is involved in that
16 matter of alerting your command.

17 In other words, the statement has repeatedly been made
18 that had Kimmel and Short been on the alert they would have
19 been able to meet this Jap attack and either repel it or
20 to have minimized the results of that attack, and therefore
21 Pearl Harbor was the result of the failure to be on a
22 suitable and proper alert.

23 You felt the impact of that sentiment in the last four
24 years, did you not?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Mr. Keefe: I understand your position to be, General
3 Short, that as Commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December
4 7, 1941 and subsequent to your appointment to that important
5 position you did everything within your power to provide
6 the physical things necessary to provide for the defense
7 of the Hawaiian Islands.

8 General Short: That is correct.

9 Mr. Keefe: And it is your contention that as to many
10 items of physical property, such as guns, installations,
11 radar equipment, air strips, buildings, and so on, you did
12 not get but a small part of the material that you had re-
13 quested prior to December 7, 1941.

14 General Short: That is correct.

15 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall has testified, as I recall,
16 that in his opinion the material which you did have at
17 Pearl Harbor on December 7, if alerted and effectively
18 used, would have given a good account of itself and perhaps
19 enabled you to repel the attack, or to severely minimize
20 the damage that was caused. Do you agree with that?

21 General Short: I could have given a better account of
22 myself, but to see how inadequate it was we need to only
23 compare two items. The best anti-aircraft defense against
24 low-flying planes, which did the most damage there, is the
25 .50 caliber machine gun. We had 109. Our program at

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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that time called for 345, but by December 1, 1942, they had actually increased the number of .50 caliber machine guns on Hawaii to 793, showing how much more the War Department thought was necessary, and keep in mind that that date is after the Japanese had been seriously defeated at Midway.

Mr. Keefe: Now, General, I do not want to indulge in the realm of hindsight or speculation. I know how easy it is to judge when you have the benefit of hindsight and I do not feel I should call upon you to indulge in a matter of speculation. The fact of the matter is, is it not, that except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into action and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that was done, regardless of what you had out there on December 7, this attack would have come in by surprise, isn't that true?

Larry follows

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 General Short: With the information.

3 Mr. Keefe: With the information that you had?

4 General Short: The information we had from Washington,
5 it was bound to be a surprise.

6 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

7 Now, then, I think it is quite clear from this evi-
8 dence, and anybody can correct me if they think I am in
9 error, but as I recall the evidence up to date, every wit-
10 ness that has testified concluded that there was no pro-
11 bability of an attack by air on Hawaii, except, as I re-
12 call, the testimony of Admiral Turner. He is the only
13 witness that testified to the probability, in his opinion,
14 that an attack by air would be made upon Pearl Harbor.

15 General Short: Except that General Miles said that
16 the attack was so obvious that they couldn't take the
17 trouble to mention it.

18 The Chairman: What was that?

19 General Short: So obvious that they didn't mention
20 it in any of his estimates.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, General Miles said that?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Very well. But it impresses me that
24 everybody that had access to the diplomatic changes and
25 all of the information with respect to the Japanese inten-

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 tions concluded that the attack, if it came at all,
3 would be in the far west Pacific.

4 General Short: That is correct.

5 Mr. Keefe: That is what you thought?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: That is what Stark thought?

8 General Short: I think so.

9 Mr. Keefe: That is what General Marshall thought.

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Everybody that I know of that had access
12 to anything thought that is where the attack would come.

13 Now, as evidence of that, you have brought before the
14 Committee a long series of situations. Admiral Kimmel
15 has done likewise. That is, that that was the intention.

16 You have pointed out the fact that B-17's were sent
17 out there unarmed, with their guns cosmolined, that they
18 arrived at the very time that the attack was going on,
19 as evidence that the Air Corps or nobody else would have
20 sent those B-17's into that fray unarmed had they expected
21 an attack.

22 You have indicated that they were ordering you to ship
23 your supplies to the Philippines, material that you had on
24 hand. That is correct, is it not?

25 General Short: Yes, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h3 2 Mr. Keefe: As indicating that that is where the
3 attack would take place?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Some place in the record there is evi-
6 dence of a plan by which the Army was to garrison our
7 outlying islands. Do you remember that?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: You would garrison the islands of Samoa,
10 Canton, Christmas, Palmyra, and Johnston, is that right?

11 General Short: I think that Palmyra and Johnston
12 were not specifically mentioned. They stated that we
13 would at some future time take over the outlying islands
14 and we would garrison Christmas and Canton at once.

15 Mr. Keefe: And when was that supposed to take place?

16 General Short: The message was received, I believe,
17 November 29th.

18 Mr. Keefe: Then the idea was, after the war warning
19 message of the 27th, plans were invoked by which you were
20 to deplete your garrison at Honolulu and to send Army
21 replacements to garrison Canton, Samoa, Christmas; is that
22 right?

23 General Short: I am doubtful whether Samoa was
24 included, but Christmas and Canton definitely.

25 Mr. Keefe: Canton and Christmas.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: And they proposed to replace the troops
4 thus removed from Oahu with fresh troops to be brought
5 from the mainland?

6 General Short: That is correct.

7 Mr. Keefe: That is correct?

8 General Short: Yes, sir. You took all of those
9 things into consideration, along with a lot of other facts
10 that I will not burden the record with at this time, that
11 indicated to you that if there was any intent on the part
12 of the Japs to attack Hawaii, that that information would
13 be available to Washington, and would be forwarded to you?

14 General Short: Mr. Keefe, and you got no information
15 that would indicate a specific attack on Hawaii?

16 General Short: No, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: Now, it appears in accordance with the
18 record that is before the committee that this November 27
19 warning message, page 7 of Exhibit 32, was received in
20 the Hawaii Signal Center at 6:46 p. m. Washington time,
21 1:16 Hawaiian time, having been dispatched from Washington
22 to Hawaii at 6 o'clock p. m., Washington time on the
23 27th day of November, and that you replied as shown by
24 your message on page 12 of Exhibit 32, which was encoded in
25 Hawaii at 11:10 p. m. Washington time, or 5:40 p. m. Hawaii

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h5 2 time, and it was received in the War Department code
3 room at Washington at 5:57 a. m. on the 28th of November,
4 or 12:27 a. m. the 28th of November, Hawaiian time.

5 Now, there we had the war warning message to General
6 Short and General Short's reply to General Marshall in
7 which you stated that you were alerted against sabotage,
8 and had liaison with the Navy.

9 Now, after that message of Marshall's you received
10 a message from G-2, that has been referred to, sent to
11 you by General Miles, a short message, on November 27,
12 which reads:

13 "JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALE-
14 MALE STOP HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE STOP SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
15 MAY BE EXPECTED STOP INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF
16 OF STAFF ONLY."

17 Signed Miles.

18 That message went from G-2 in Washington to G-2
19 Hawaii?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: And advises the G-2 in Hawaii to inform
22 you and your Chief of Staff only, and refers to nothing
23 but sabotage?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: You saw that message, did you?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1
2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: Then on the 28th day of November you
4 received a message signed "Adams". Who was Adams?

5 General Short: He was the Adjutant General.

6 Mr. Keefe: He had authority to send you messages?

7 General Short: His message meant that it was authorized
8 by the Chief of Staff.

9 Mr. Keefe: He would not send you a message unless
10 it was authorized by the Chief of Staff, would he?

11 General Short : I am sure he wouldn't.

12 Mr. Keefe: He had the authority to give you a command?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: And in this message which he sent you
15 on the 28th day of November he states:

16 "CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS
17 BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN
18 THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT.
19 ALSO DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL
20 MEASURES TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS
21 COMMA PROPERTY COMMA AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE COMMA
22 PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA
23 AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE STOP
24 THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES
25 ARE AUTHORIZED STOP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h7

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2 TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY COMMA AVOIDING UNNECESSARY
3 PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION
4 IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS
5 BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR POSSIBILITY UNDER
6 EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS."

7 Now, when you received that telegram on the 28th
8 after Washington had received your message in which you
9 stated that you were alerted against sabotage, did that
10 tend to influence you in your thinking that the alert
11 which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washing-
12 ton wanted?

13 General Short: It did. I thought it was an answer
14 to my radiogram and wanted to emphasize the question of
15 legality.

16 Mr. Keefe: Now, there was also sent to the Commanding
17 General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, on the 28th
18 a message signed Carl Robinson, Adjutant General. Did you
19 receive that one?

20 General Short: Robinson?

21 Mr. Keefe: That is what it looks like to me.

22 General Short: What page is that?

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't know --

24 Mr. Murphy: He is reading from different exhibits.

25 Mr. Keefe: Here it is. This one here. Wouldn't you

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h8

2 say that is "Robinson"?

3 Senator Ferguson: I have one by Sullivan. Is
4 this the one you want?

5 Senator Lucas: "Williams" isn't it?

6 Mr. Murphy: The record shows that somebody thought
7 it was Wall, somebody thought it was Sullivan, and now you
8 say it is Robinson.

9 Mr. Keefe: Here is the photostatic copy.

10 Mr. Murphy: I have seen it. I can't make it out.

11 Mr. Keefe: Robinson, R-o-b-i-n-s-o-n, as plain as
12 anything.

13 General Short: It is the Arnold message you are
14 reading, from the Chief of Air Corps?

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes, that is the one.

16 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, is it Robinson, Arnold,
17 Williams, or Sullivan?

18 Mr. Keefe: This is signed Carl Robinson, Adjutant
19 General. My eyes aren't too good, but I can certainly
20 see that.

21 That came out to you on the 28th of November, did it
22 not?

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: And that reads:
25

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h9

2 "ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE PERIOD
3 THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO
4 ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND
5 IS DESIRED COLON AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN
6 THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPART-
7 MENT PAREN SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR THREE ZERO DASH FOUR
8 FIVE PAREN --"

9 Whatever that means. That is what you were worried
10 about, Mr. Chairman, the other day.

11 The Chairman: I am still worrying about it.

12 Mr. Keefe: So am I.

13 Then it says:

14 "THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRE-
15 CAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE PERIOD IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT
16 ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU
17 IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING COLON PROTECTION OF
18 YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA COMMA. PROTEC-
19 TION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE COMMA AND PROTEC-
20 TION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT COMMA PROPERTY AND
21 ESTABLISHMENTS PERIOD THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE
22 ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES PERIOD AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM
23 AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO
24 THOSE ESSENTIALLY TO SECURE PERIOD PARA IT IS ALSO DESIRED
25

Witness Short Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h10

THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE
SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS
INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS
PERIOD SIGNED ARNOLD.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Now, you got that on the 28th of November?

3

General Short: Yes, sir.

4

5

Mr. Keefe: Another message which refers specifically
and only to sabotage and espionage; that is true?

6

General Short: That is true.

7

Mr. Keefe: The message speaks for itself.

8

9

Now, you replied to those two messages, the one from
the Adjutant General and the one from the Air, the Arnold
message, you replied separately, did you not?

10

11

General Short: Yes, sir.

12

Mr. Keefe: And you replied at considerable length?

13

General Short: Very great detail.

14

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Mr. Keefe: And those replies, your reply was addressed
to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.?

16

General Short: That is correct.

17

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Mr. Keefe: And in this reply, which I shall not attempt
to read, I take it this message is in the record and I
won't burden the record with reading it again, you give
them a full and complete description of everythig you have
done?

22

General Short: Yes, sir.

23

Mr. Keefe: Now, General --

24

The Chairman: What is the date of that?

25

Mr. Keefe: The date is the 29th of November 1941.

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Perhaps I had better read it into the record right
et this spot:

"RE YOUR SECRET RADIO FOUR EIGHT TWO TWENTY EIGHTH
COMMA FULL PRECAUTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN AGAINST SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
OF WAR DEPARTMENT PAREN PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY DASH
FORTY FIVE END PAREN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT STOP AS REGARDS PROTECTION OF VITAL
INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS SUCH AS
POWER PLANTS COMMA TELEPHONE EXCHANGES AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES
COMMA THIS HEADQUARTERS BY CONFIDENTIAL LETTER DATED JUNE
NINETEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE REQUESTED THE GOVERNOR OF
THE TERRITORY TO USE THE BROAD POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY
SECTION SIXTY SEVEN OF THE ORGANIC ACT WHICH PROVIDES COMMA
IN EFFECT COMMA THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY CALL UPON THE
COMMANDERS OF MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO PREVENT OR SUPPRESS
LAWLESS VIOLENCE COMMA INVASION COMMA INSURRECTION ETC STOP
PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY STATED THE GOVERNOR ON JUNE
TWENTIETH CONFIDENTIALLY MADE A FORMAL WRITTEN DEMAND ON
THIS HEADQUARTERS TO FURNISH AND CONTINUE TO FURNISH SUCH
ADEQUATE PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE
COMMA AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH COMMA
BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 IN THE TERRITORY STOP PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST
3 APPROPRIATE MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL
4 CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS STOP IN THIS CONNECTION COMMA AT
5 THE INSTIGATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY
6 OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED
7 AN ORDNANCE WHICH PERMITTS THE COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN
8 DEPARTMENT COMMA TO CLOSE COMMA OR RESTRICT THE USE OF
9 AND TRAVEL UPON COMMA ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND
10 COUNTY OF HONOLULU COMMA WHENEVER THE COMMANDING GENERAL
11 DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL
12 DEFENSE STOP THE AUTHORITY THUS GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN
13 EXERCISED STOP RELATIONS WITH F B I AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL
14 AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND
15 MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ON ALL PERTINENT
16 MATTERS"

17 Signed, "Short".

18 Did you consider that there was full and complete
19 and ample notice to the War Department at Washington as to
20 what you were doing out there in Hawaii?

21 General Short: It seems to me I thought it was very
22 definitely a full explanation.

23 Mr. Keefe: So if your message of the 27th in response
24 to the Marshall message in which you used the language "alerted
25 against sabotage - liaison with the Navy", might be contended

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 by some people to be too short and too brief and not
3 full enough, this message which went to the Adjutant General
4 is full and complete as stating everything that you were
5 doing?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Then also on the next day, November 30,
8 1941, originating at Fort Shafter at 12:57 a.m., the
9 message being dated November 29, you replied to the message
10 from General Marshall?

11 General Short: That was on December 4. On page 19.
12 I think the one you have is a Panama message.

13 Mr. Keefe: No. Did you send a reply to the message
14 from Arnold?

15 General Short: General Martin sent the reply after
16 my O.K., and it is shown on page number 19, 19 and 20,
17 sent over both General Martin's name and mine.

18 Mr. Keefe: Oh yes. That is pages 19 and 20 of
19 Exhibit 32.

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: That gives a full and complete response
22 to the wire received by you from General Arnold?

23 General Short: That is correct.

24 Mr. Keefe: And this was prepared by General Martin
25 of the Air Corps in Hawaii but bears your signature?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2

General Short: Yes, sir, and bears his also.

3

Mr. Keefe: So that there again was a full and complete statement to Washington addressed to the Chief of the Air Corps setting forth completely just what you were doing out there at Hawaii?

4

5

General Short: Yes, sir.

6

7

Mr. Keefe: Now, I understand that from the time you sent your reply on the 27th of November right down to December 7, the time of the attack, you never received a single word from Washington that would indicate that these replies which you gave to these messages, and which are now in the record, did not indicate that you were carrying out the instructions from Washington?

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General Short: I did; I felt that.

25

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact, your war plans,

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 you were familiar with Rainbow 5, were you not?

3 General Short: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: And WPL-46?

5 General Short: Less familiar with it than Rainbow 5
6 but familiar with it.

7 Mr. Keefe: It is a fact, is it not, General Short, that
8 the war plans, the joint war plans of the Army and the
9 Navy for war in the Pacific with Orange, which was Japan,
10 contemplated an offensive war in the event of outbreak of
11 hostilities?

12 General Short: That is correct.

13 Mr. Keefe: And that commencement of hostilities was
14 to be announced by radiogram to all theaters announcing
15 in plain English just what ways to put that plan into
16 effect -- M-Day?

17 General Short: M-Day, that is right.

18 Mr. Keefe: Then everybody knew, all over the Pacific,
19 just exactly what to do; isn't that true?

20 General Short: That is true.

21 Mr. Keefe: In accordance with the plans already worked
22 out?

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: That contemplated, so far as the Fleet was
25 concerned at Pearl Harbor, an offensive action against the

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Marshalls and the Carolines, did it not?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, according to the recorded plan which is here in evidence, that Fleet was supposed to go on the offensive immediately?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That meant air cover, did it not?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And when Pearl Harbor happened the plans had to be completely revised and instead of an offensive war it became a defensive war; isn't that true?

General Short: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Did any of the war plans, so far as you know, contemplate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Short: Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Keefe: Of course, I assume, General Short, that you were training personnel out there at Honolulu all the while you were there in various games of one kind or another designed to protect that island?

General Short: That is correct.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Shefner follows 3:40

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Mr. Keefe: You knew that Pearl Harbor and the Island
3 of Oahu was a vital thing in our war games and plans as far
4 as the Pacific area was concerned?

5 General Short: That is correct.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, radar has been mentioned here repeated-
7 ly. You were pretty young and pretty new in the radar field
8 at the time of the 7th of December, weren't you?

9 General Short: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: The fact of the matter is you only had about
11 two people out there that knew much of anything about it,
12 isn't that true?

13 General Short: We had had two and three more arrived and
14 became available the day before the attack.

15 Mr. Keefe: In fact, you had sent a couple of men to the
16 mainland to sort of get some instructions a short time before
17 December 7th, hadn't you?

18 General Short: That is right. They had just gotten back.

19 Mr. Keefe: They had gone there with the full knowledge
20 of Washington and practically on instructions from Washington
21 to get some knowledge about this radar business?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: And what you were trying to do was to train
24 as many men as you could in the use of such facilities as you
25 had?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Short: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: Isn't that true?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, the utilization of the radar then, as
6 I understand it, in view of the attitude that no one expected
7 any attack out there at Pearl Harbor, was more largely based
8 upon the desire for training than it was the expectation that
9 they would intercept Jap planes coming into an attack that
10 nobody expected would ever occur out there, am I correct in
11 that assumption?

12 General Short: You are correct.

13 Mr. Keefe: Admiral Kimmel has testified that he was
14 compelled to indulge in large scale training activities be-
15 cause his fleet was being depleted constantly of trained per-
16 sonnel for transfer to other theaters. Did you know that
17 that was taking place?

18 General Short: I think I did.

19 Mr. Keefe: Did you transfer any troops from your command
20 in the fall of 1941 to other theaters?

21 General Short: Trained crews for the B-17's.

22 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, you were training those crews out
23 there, were you not?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: You couldn't ship B-17's out to the Philip-

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 pines without trained operating and ground crews, could you?

3 General Short: That is correct.

4 Mr. Keefe: And you were busy training those crews as
5 fast as the B-17's would come in, to take them on and ferry
6 them out to the Philippines?

7 General Short: That is correct.

8 Mr. Keefe: And that is where the emphasis was being
9 placed, to get those bombers out to the Philippines?

10 General Short: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Short, how in the world
12 could you have put your command on a Number 3 alert without
13 disclosing your intent?

14 General Short: It was impossible.

15 Mr. Keefe: Well, I agree with you.

16 The military installations on Oahu, which is a very small
17 island, some of them are right next door to the biggest hotel
18 there, isn't that true?

19 General Short: That is correct.

20 Mr. Keefe: Right near the public parks?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Now, if you went on an all-out alert it would
23 mean more than just having a few people running around with
24 steel helmets and a little field equipment, would it not?

25 General Short: It would.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: It would mean putting up barbed wire entanglements,
3 ments, it would mean stretching signal wires around and putting
4 up emergency signal equipment, would it not?

5 General Short: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: It would mean the complete control of the life
7 of that island so far as black-outs and all that sort of
8 thing was concerned.

9 General Short: I could not have exercised complete control
10 over the civil population until martial law was put into
11 effect, but it would have been control so far as the Governor
12 could have complied with my wishes.

13 Mr. Keefe: Now, I am wondering if I am correct in my
14 thinking that here is some 135,000 Japanese with a tremendous
15 number of loyal Japanese but an unknown number of disloyal
16 Japanese. You had that problem before you constantly, did
17 you not?

18 General Short: We did.

19 Mr. Keefe: And you could not tell what would happen in
20 the event of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this
21 country and Japan so far as that overwhelming Japanese population
22 out there was concerned?

23 General Short: That is correct.

24 Mr. Keefe: Now that was well known to the War Department
25 at all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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20 the event of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this
21 country and Japan so far as that overwhelming Japanese population
22 out there was concerned?

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25 at all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 it?

3 General Short: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: So this question of sabotage and espionage
5 became a highly important thing so far as Oahu was concerned?

6 General Short: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Now, when they sent you this message that said
8 you should take a reconnaissance and such other defensive
9 measures as you deem necessary, you explained the failure of
10 reconnaissance by reason of the fact that you had a written
11 contract with the Navy which was approved by the War and Navy
12 departments and you say that General Marshall thoroughly under-
13 stood that in your opinion?

14 General Short: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: And that whoever wrote that message in his ab-
16 sence apparently had overlooked the fact that that was a Navy
17 responsibility, is that your answer?

18 General Short: That is my answer.

19 Mr. Keefe: And that when it says "other defensive meas-
20 ures", measures against sabotage and espionage would be those
21 other defensive measures, would they not?

22 General Short: To me they appeared the most important.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now, you had a Chief of Staff. Was it Colonel
24 Phillips?
25

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2

General Short: Yes, sir.

3

Mr. Keefe: Was he a Colonel or a Major?

4

General Short: He was a Colonel.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: You requested that he be assigned to you as your Chief of Staff, is that correct?

7

General Short: That is correct.

8

9

Mr. Keefe: You made that request of General Marshall when you were appointed?

10

General Short: Yes, sir.

11

Mr. Keefe: When will he get out there?

12

General Short: About March 1st.

13

14

Mr. Keefe: Who was the Chief of Staff prior to the time that Colonel Phillips arrived?

15

General Short: Colonel Philip Hayes.

16

17

Mr. Keefe: When will Colonel Hayes retire as Chief of Staff?

18

19

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General Short: I believe it was effective November 5th but I think he had been on leave of absence for a few days before that.

21

22

23

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Mr. Keefe: Well, I do not quite understand that, General. You say that Colonel Phillips was sent out there to be your Chief of Staff in March but Colonel Hayes continued out there until about the 5th of November.

General Short: It was understood that Phillips was to

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 become Chief of Staff upon the expiration of the tour of
3 Colonel Hayes and the time, the interim was used to put
4 Colonel Phillips through all the sections of the General
5 Staff to familiarize him with conditions.

6 Mr. Keefe: So that he would have full knowledge when
7 he actually assumed the responsibilities of Chief of Staff?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: So that he actually did not perform as Chief
10 of Staff until some time, you think, in --

11 General Short: The last part of October, the last few
12 days of October.

13 Mr. Keefe: When the commission came through ordering
14 Hayes back?

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: He was an experienced man, was he not?

17 General Short: He was an unusually experienced man on
18 field work and training.

19 Mr. Keefe: Did he talk Chinese?

20 General Short: I think so. He has been since that time
21 the senior liaison officer with the Sixth Chinese Army, with
22 three hundred officers under him, one down to each battalion
23 and I believe that the rating of that Sixth Army, from talk-
24 ing with American officers, was extremely high, perhaps the
25 best of the Chinese armies.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Well, your Chief of Staff continued on after
3 this debacle at Pearl Harbor?

4 General Short: Yes, sir, he continued. The War Depart-
5 ment had ordered Colonel Collins over there to become Chief
6 of Staff and General Emmons asked him to stay as Deputy
7 Chief of Staff. He remained on for almost a year and at his
8 own request was relieved as he desired to get more active
9 service.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, in this line of command you had a staff?

11 General Short: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: Kimmel had a staff?

13 General Short: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: You each had your Chief of Staff?

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: And you had your chiefs of various depart-
17 ments of your layout out there?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: Now, in the line of command it was the re-
20 sponsibility of the Commanding General to issue an order to
21 his Chief of Staff and it went on from him down through to
22 the various other elements that would be affected by that
23 order?

24 General Short: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: Is that correct?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Short: That is the normal way.

3 Mr. Keefe: That is a normal method of doing business, is
4 it not?

5 General Short: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: And in connection with your determinations,
7 they were your determinations and your orders when issued,
8 but on vital matters were they the result of the combined
9 action of your staff?

10 General Short: I could go to them for advice but the
11 responsibility was definitely mine no matter under what cir-
12 cumstances I made the decision. I could not pass the respon-
13 sibility to them because they participated.

14 Mr. Keefe: Oh, I understand that thoroughly, but the
15 point is you are the president of this corporation out there
16 and you have got a board of directors as your staff and you
17 sit in staff meetings and talk these things over, isn't that
18 true?

19 General Short: That is correct.

20 Mr. Keefe: And you as the president have to make the ul-
21 timate decision.

22 General Short: That is correct.

23 Mr. Keefe: Did you ever have a situation where you and
24 your staff disagreed on anything of great importance?

25 General Short: I don't think we did.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Did you have a telephone out there that you
3 could call Washington?

4 General Short: I had what we called a scrambler phone
5 and General Marshall had one in his office.

6 Mr. Keefe: Did you ever use it?

7 General Short: I did.

8 Mr. Keefe: How long did it take to get a message through
9 normally from Honolulu to Washington here using that scrambler
10 telephone business?

11 General Short: The times I used it I would say ten or
12 fifteen minutes. On the morning of the attack, along about
13 8:15 I directed Colonel Phillips to call General Marshall be-
14 cause I was going to my field command post and I believe that
15 he got the connection at 8:22. I think it took seven minutes.

16 Mr. Keefe: In other words, do I understand that that
17 morning right while the attack was going on Colonel Phillips
18 called General Marshall on this scrambler telephone and got
19 a connection in about seven minutes?

20 General Short: And told him if he would listen he could
21 hear the bombs. The attack was still going on.

22 Mr. Keefe: I might also say in that connection that I
23 was advised by Mr. Hoover when Mr. Gearhart and I talked with
24 him that Mr. Shivers, his agent out there, called him when
25 he was up in New York and got a direct telephone connection

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 in just a few minutes right while the attack was going on and
3 he heard the bombs dropping over the telephone.

4 Well, if you could get the telephone message while this
5 attack was going on in just a few minutes there wouldn't be
6 any reason why the line was not clear so a message could
7 come from the other way, from Washington to Honolulu, is there?

8 General Short: There wouldn't appear to be.

9 Mr. Keefe: Now I would like to get some idea about the
10 use of this other means of communication out there. Wasn't
11 there radio communication?

12 General Short: The Army had a 10 kilowatt station and the
13 Navy had a 25 kilowatt station; the FBI had a station, I
14 think it was quite a good deal more powerful than the Army.
15 I am not sure whether it was 25 or what. And there was also
16 a commercial radiogram and commercial cable.

17 Mr. Keefe: These radiograms back and forth, did you use
18 the Army setup frequently?

19 General Short: I think they always used it when it was
20 not overloaded and when the atmospheric conditions were such
21 that the 10 watt system would go through.

22 Mr. Keefe: Well, do you know whether any investigation
23 has ever been made to see what the atmospheric conditions were
24 that morning as to whether or not they could use this radio
25 as a means of communication?

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 General Short: I have heard, - I did not know it at the
3 time, - I have heard since that they did have some trouble
4 getting through with that 10 kilowatt system that morning.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, do you know about the Navy or the FBI?

6 General Short: I am sure that they could have gotten
7 through.

8 Mr. Keefe: I recall the testimony here that at the time
9 they were considering the question of sending this message
10 on the morning of December 7th in General Marshall's office,
11 I think I recall that somebody suggested that Admiral Stark
12 covered the use of the Navy radio.

13 General Short: That is correct.

14 Mr. Keefe: And it was not used. Well, now, supposing
15 you had been called on the telephone, or supposing a telephone
16 call had been put in here that morning by somebody when the
17 Japanese fourteenth part message and the short message of
18 instruction was received, decoded and translated and in clean
19 form some time between seven and eight o'clock that morning,
20 would you have been aroused from your slumbers that morning
21 or somebody out there to answer a telephone if one had come
22 through?

23 General Short: We had an officer on the General Staff
24 on duty all night long right by the phone and there would
25 have been no difficulty in getting anyone. He could have

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

gotten me within a minute or two.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the story has gone around the country that you were all drunk out there that night; that you were drunk and that Kimmel was drunk and everybody else was drunk and that everybody was asleep out there at Pearl Harbor sleeping off a jag. That is the way it has been told out around the country. Now, is there any truth in that, General Short?

General Short: There is absolutely no truth in it. If I may add one thing --

Mr. Keefe: Go ahead.

General Short: To show that the War Department, if they were not conscious at that time that more than one means of communication could be used, they became fully conscious at the time they issued the order to relieve me. I got that order three different ways within thirty to forty minutes. I received a radiogram first. Ten or fifteen minutes later General Emmons got off of a plane with a printed order. Fifteen or twenty minutes later the Secretary of the General Staff called Colonel Philipps to ask if I had received the order.

Mr. Keefe: So you got it in --

General Short: In three different ways.

Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- in three different ways?

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Short: Yes.

3 Mr. Keefe: To make sure that you got it?

4 General Short: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Short, to be perfectly
6 frank and candid, you have told us where you were that night?

7 General Short: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: You were not expecting an attack at all?

9 General Short: No, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: You had your various members of your estab-
11 lishment at their respective duties that night the same as
12 they had been?

13 General Short: Yes, sir, and my Chief of Staff at mid-
14 night, owing to the fact that we were expecting the B-17's
15 in from Hamilton Field, went over to headquarters and checked
16 up to find out whether any additional information had been
17 received in regard to them. I know my Chief of Staff was at
18 our headquarters as late as midnight the night before.

19 Mr. Keefe: You had no notice whatsoever of this inter-
20 cept of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen part message
21 and no knowledge whatsoever until after the attack of the re-
22 ceipt of the short message or anything else?

23 General Short: Seven hours after the attack.

24 Mr. Keefe: As evidence of the fact, if I understand your
25 statement correctly, General Short, when the attack did take

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 place and your all-out alert was ordered the men did to a
3 remarkably splendid job of defense?

4 General Short: They did it with great rapidity and pre-
5 cision. Every man knew exactly his job and it went into ef-
6 fect extremely rapidly.

7 Mr. Keefe: It was too late.

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: I was a little intrigued by the questions that
10 were asked this morning by Senator Ferguson with respect to
11 the difficulties which were encountered out there due to not
12 only duplication of or, rather, separation of command but also
13 the intervention of a third governmental unit in the picture,
14 namely, the Interior Department, which had to be dealt with in
15 the matter of securing permission to erect military installa-
16 tions out there and I think you testified that it took nearly
17 a year to get permission to erect some installations for radar
18 equipment on government-owned land, part of the parks system,
19 under the supervision of the Interior Department.

20 General Short: About ten months.

21 Mr. Keefe: About ten months. In the face of possibili-
22 ties of an attack in Hawaii?

23 General Short: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Now, General Short, there has been a tre-
25 mendous amount of information given to the American people with

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 respect to a Colonel Clausen and a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who were
3 in charge of Army construction out there in Hawaii. Now, I
4 do not want to go into that because that would take all next
5 week.

6 The Vice Chairman: You mean Colonel Wyman.

7 Mr. Keefe: Wyman, that is right. I don't mean Clausen.
8 I mean Colonel Wyman.

9 And the inference has been that due to certain failures of
10 the Army engineers in making installations out there at Pearl
11 Harbor the installations were delayed and, thus, as a result
12 Pearl Harbor happened and all the damage was done.

13 Now I would like to ask you the flat, plain, square ques-
14 tion: If you had had all the installations that were contem-
15 plated and that you had asked for and the operators of those
16 installations were not alerted to use them, the best that you
17 could have hoped for was to have minimized this attack rather
18 than to have stopped it or prevented the damage which did
19 actually occur, isn't that right?

20 General Short: That is correct.

21 Mr. Keefe: In other words, it doesn't make any differ-
22 ence how many guns you have if there is nobody to use them
23 and if there is no ammunition in them, isn't that right?

24 General Short: That is true.

25 Mr. Keefe: It doesn't make any difference how many radar

1 Witness Short:

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 they not?

3 General Short: If you knew where they were coming from
4 they would have been very easy.

5 Mr. Keefe: Now, all during this war the element of sur-
6 prise has been a thing that has been involved in almost every-
7 thing that has been done on both sides out there in the Paci-
8 fic, isn't that true?

9 General Short: All over the world. It is always the most
10 important element.

11 Mr. Keefe: It is always the attempt on the part of a
12 commander to involve his adversary in surprise, isn't that
13 true?

14 General Short: That is correct.

15 Mr. Keefe: And as far as an air attack itself is con-
16 cerned our experience has been that regardless of the fact
17 whether an attack is known or not a lot of these planes, -
18 some of them, at least, get through and cause damage, isn't
19 that true?

20 General Short: That is correct.

21 Mr. Keefe: That was true at Okinawa, is it not?

22 General Short: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now, when we think of the exploits at Midway
24 and the magnificent job that our Navy did in sinking the Jap
25 Navy, it was possible because of intelligence, was it not, and

Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 the fact that our Navy was informed and had the facts and knew
2 what to do?

3
4 General Short: That is correct.

5 Mr. Keefe: And when they show down this Admiral Yamamoto
6 that was possible because they got an intercept which put
7 them on notice and gave them some information?

8 General Short: That is correct.

9 Mr. Keefe: I refer to those two incidents because it
10 correctly illustrates the idea that intelligence is necessary
11 and fundamental, is it not?

12 General Short: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: And when Intelligence fails you are liable
14 to have serious results?

15 General Short: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Now, your position in this case is that In-
17 telligence, so far as Washington was concerned, failed?

18 General Short: A hundred per cent.

19 Mr. Keefe: And thus Pearl Harbor occurred. Is that your
20 defense?

21 General Short: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

23 The Chairman: Does counsel for General Short wish to ask
24 any questions?

25 Lt. Col. Karr: No questions, Mr. Chairman.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 The Chairman: Counsel for the committee?

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

4 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

5 Senator Ferguson: There are several questions I would
6 like to ask.

7 Senator Lucas: I would like to ask a couple, too.

8 Senator Ferguson: Now, counsel, give me the ship move-
9 ments exhibit, the intercepts on the ship movements. It is
10 on page 22. On page 22 of that exhibit there is an intercept;
11 I want to ask you about that. It is in exhibit 2.

12 Lt. Col. Karr: I am sorry. We do not have that.

13 Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 2, page 22. It has been re-
14 ferred to at times as the "light in the window" message. Are
15 you familiar with that?

16 General Short: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: It may have been a Paul Revere, it has
18 been suggested here, but nobody was riding.

19 Are you familiar with that?

20 General Short: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, if it appears in the testimony and
22 from the evidence that that was translated in the rough by
23 one o'clock on Saturday, the 6th, and that information had
24 come to you, would that have made any difference to you? It
25 is dated the third, from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo.

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 General Short: Unquestionably that would have given us
3 some very definite information if we had had the message and
4 knew how to read it.

5 Senator Ferguson: What I mean is if you could have had
6 that information it would have indicated an attack on Hawaii,
7 would it not?

8 General Short: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: No doubt about that.

10 General Short: It shows a definite desire for detailed
11 information of just exactly what our Fleet is doing and is
12 preparing to do.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, there is another message on page
14 27. It is dated the 6th, from Honolulu to Tokyo, on page 27.
15 That is the one that says:

16 "No barrage balloons."

17 And then it says at the end:

18 "I imagine that in all probability there is con-
19 siderable opportunity left to take advantage by a surprise
20 attack against these places."

21 If that had been decoded and sent to you, or the informa-
22 tion from it, would that have meant anything to you?

23 General Short: That would practically have meant a sur-
24 prise attack was in store for us or was a certainty.

25 Senator Ferguson: There isn't any doubt whatever that such

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 a message, while not decoded, as shown by the instrument itself
3 at the bottom, because it shows that it was decoded 12/8 but
4 it was sent on the 6th and therefore, was intercepted on the
5 6th, - if that information had come to you that would have
6 uncontradicted have indicated a surprise attack on Oahu?

7 General Short: Yes, sir.

8 Sen. Ferguson: And would that alone have alerted you?

9 General Short: Very decidedly.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, there was one other thing that
11 I wanted to inquire about. Did you know about the General
12 Carter Clarke report or investigation?

13 General Short: I never heard of it till some time after
14 this committee met. I have since then read it. I think it
15 probably was a month after this committee started meeting be-
16 fore I knew of the existence of this report.

17 Senator Ferguson: How do you account for that investi-
18 gation by Carter Clarke after Clausen got through and we
19 find a new investigation by Carter Clarke, General Carter
20 Clarke?

21 General Short: It is pretty difficult to say just what
22 they were attempting to do. They were apparently wanting to
23 find out exactly what every man holding an important position
24 in G-2 would say about their so-called Top Secret material,
25 magic and about their estimates, and so forth, and it was a

Witness Short

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

very difficult report to get hold of.

Senator Ferguson: And do you know whether or not it indicated in any way that there had been an investigation by G-2 for the President and that there had been some changes made in it by General Marshall?

General Short: Somewhere, - I have forgotten whether it was in that report or not, but somewhere I have run across something of that kind.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Isn't it fair to say that after reading it that there is a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a General Spaulding and others who had some kind of a rumor going about that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was unequivocally, absolutely and positively contradicted?

Senator Ferguson: But there is also more in it. I think at some time Carter Clarke or General Clarke should appear and give us the reason for it, if there was a reason, but I am just asking you, General, what you know about it.

General Short: I know nothing except what the report states.

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

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1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I want to ask just one
3 question, if I may.

4 The Chairman: All right.

5 Mr. Keefe: Stories have gone about, been bandied
6 about that you had your planes lined up on the apron
7 wing-tip to wing-tip without any gasoline in them, without
8 any ammunition, making a perfect target and a perfect set-
9 up for the Japs to come in to spray with incendiary
10 bullets that demolished the whole works at one time, and
11 that set-up there was likened to the story of the ships
12 in the harbor like a lot of sitting ducks for the Japs to
13 come in and shoot up.

14 That is the story.

15 Now, I would like to know whether or not under your
16 provisions against sabotage, there were specific provisions
17 made and orders given as to how the airplanes were to be
18 fixed?

19 General Short: That is correct. General Burwell --
20 Colonel Burwell then --

21 Mr. Keefe: Colonel who?

22 General Short: Burwell.

23 Mr. Keefe: Who is he?

24 General Short: He was a colonel in the Air Corps
25 detached to make a study in connection with sabotage. He

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 made a very extensive study and was absolutely insistent
3 that the way to protect them was to place them close
4 together where they could be guarded absolutely safely
5 leaving the ammunition out of them, so if one was hit
6 the ammunition would not explode.

7 I am quite sure that the gasoline was not removed.
8 It was an element of danger to have gasoline in them,
9 but the gasoline was in them, so the planes could be
10 moved.

11 Mr. Keefe: In other words, then, the placing of
12 the planes wing-tip to wing-tip on the aprons of the bunkers
13 was in accordance with the practice that had been developed
14 by the Air Corps representative out there, this Colonel
15 Burwell?

16 General Short: That is correct.

17 Mr. Keefe: In his report?

18 General Short: That is correct.

19 Mr. Keefe: And that was considered after a long
20 investigation and study to be the most effective manner
21 of protecting those planes against the possibility incident
22 to sabotage?

23 General Short: That is correct.

24 Mr. Keefe: And you referred to the fact that some of the
25 Navy planes, I believe over at Kaneohe were not so placed,

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Short Questions by: Mr. Keefe
2 and that they were the ones that really got damaged.

3 General Short: It just happened that the planes
4 that were dispersed in the water were sunk, and a con-
5 siderable number on the apron were saved.

6 Mr. Keefe: Those that were anchored were all shot
7 and sunk?

8 General Short: They were all sunk.

9 Mr. Richardson: May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

10 The Chairman: Yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: General Short, the only difference
12 there, so far as you are concerned, as to guarding the
13 planes against sabotage, would have been whether you
14 used a couple of hundred men if they were concentrated or
15 400 or 500 to guard them, if they were dispersed?

16 General Short: That is not correct. The bunkers
17 for the planes at Wheeler Field, a very large percentage
18 of them, were right along the highway where a man could
19 have driven a truck along the highway and simply hurled
20 a grenade into each bunker.

21 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

22 The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

23 Senator Lucas: I desire to ask a question or two.

24 Following the thought that has just been discussed,
25 I should like to ask you this question, General Short:

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Short Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Your planes were lined up, most of them wing-tip to wing-tip under the sabotage alert order, under which you were operating; is that correct?

General Short: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Now, I do not think the record is clear as to what position the Navy planes were in that were on the ground at that time.

General Short: At Kaneohe Bay the seaplanes were well dispersed, but they had on the apron a bunch of planes, or a group of planes that were bunched.

Now, I do not know the exact arrangement of their planes at Ford Island. I do happen to know it at Kaneohe Bay, but I do not know at Ford Island.

Senator Lucas: The record discloses that the Navy lost 102 planes and the Army lost 96 planes, and I have been at a loss to understand why the Navy lost more planes than the Army unless the Navy was also alerted to sabotage.

General Short: Their planes were dispersed. There is probably one reason. A plane that was anchored in the bay at Kaneohe was hit, sunk, and was a complete loss. Where they were hit on the runways, on the aprons, the men got in and pulled them out, even while the attack was going on, and a great many were saved that way.

Senator Lucas: Do you know whether or not any of

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1 Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 the Navy planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip
3 similar to the planes that you had?

4 General Short: I think that was true of Kaneohe
5 Bay, and as to the other places, I do not know.

6 Senator Lucas: You made no inquiry about that
7 afterwards?

8 General Short: If I had known, I have forgotten
9 it. I do not know now.

10 Senator Lucas: I do not believe Admiral Kimmel
11 was interrogated along that line. It does seem to me
12 in view of his testimony, that that is somewhat important.

13 One other question. It is not clear in this record
14 whether or not Admiral Kimmel knew that you were operating
15 on the sabotage alert. What would you say about that.

16 General Short: I believe you will find in his testi-
17 mony one place that he does make the statement that he
18 did understand that I was on the sabotage alert, and I
19 think he said some other things.

20 Mr. Keefe: That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

21 Senator Lucas: I was under the impression that he
22 said in one place that he did not know that he was on the
23 sabotage alert, and in another part of the testimony that
24 he thought he was on the sabotage alert.

25 General Short: I believe he made slight variations in

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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his testimony. I would say that the Navy, the Navy staff, the staff of the 14th Naval District definitely should have known, on account of their liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, who knew exactly what was going on.

Senator Lucas: In other words, if Admiral Kimmel you were on the sabotage alert, it was no fault of yours, because you gave that information definitely to his liaison man?

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 General Short: Yes, sir. I have the quotation here.
3 Page 6985 of the transcript, Witness Kimmel:

4 "I conferred with General Short on November 28 about
5 the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We dis-
6 cussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as
7 we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities
8 and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In
9 this connection there was discussion of the effect of the
10 suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be
11 sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood
12 the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against
13 sabotage, among other things, although I do not now recall
14 General Short specifically mentioning the details of his
15 alert."

16 Senator Lucas: Well, the morning you received the
17 message from General Marshall and you alerted your command
18 for sabotage, a short while thereafter, as I understand
19 you did not directly tell Admiral Kimmel?

20 General Short: I sent a copy of the message to him.

21 Senator Lucas: You sent a copy of the message that
22 you had alerted for sabotage through your Navy liaison man?

23 General Short: Yes, sir. I sent a copy of my message
24 from the Chief of Staff.

25 Senator Lucas: One other question. On yesterday

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Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 there was considerable controversy here between yourself
3 and the committee with respect to court martials and Army
4 and Navy inquiries and Army and Navy Boards.

5 In order to clear up a cloud in my mind as to how
6 they operate, I want to ask you whether or not there is
7 any difference in the way an Army Board operates and the
8 way a Navy Board operates insofar as it being a public
9 affair?

10 General Short: The Navy Board in this particular case
11 was a Court of Inquiry. Now, I do not know under their
12 regulations whether they can have a Board that would operate
13 just as the Army Board did. They were both closed sessions --
14 secret -- but in the Navy Court of Inquiry the accused, so
15 to speak, had the right to be present all the way through,
16 hear all the witnesses and have counsel with him, and had
17 the right of cross-examination.

18 Before the Army Board I was not permitted to hear the
19 evidence given by the other witnesses or to have counsel,
20 except when I was personally giving my testimony.

21 Senator Lucas: The point I raise is whether or not
22 there is a difference between the regulations of the Army
23 and the Navy in an investigation of a question of this
24 character.

25 General Short: I would rather an officer of the Judge

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Advocate General's Department answer that.

2
3 Senator Lucas: My conclusion upon it is that if the
4 Navy has one set of regulations on an important matter
5 of this kind, which permits an accused to come before that
6 Board of Inquiry with counsel and have the right to cross-
7 examine witnesses, and the Army has a different system,
8 which denies that very thing, it certainly is a question
9 for consideration by the Congress, because I cannot see
10 why you should be denied the right and Admiral Kimmel have
11 the right. That is the point I make.

12 General Short: Yes, sir. It actually worked out that
13 way. I don't know all the details of the law.

14 Senator Lucas: Now, General Short, the Congressman
15 from Wisconsin and the Senator from Michigan have raised
16 some questions about stories that have originated from
17 time to time about what happened at Pearl Harbor, about
18 the laxity here and the laxity there. I want to state
19 that those are not the only stories that have originated
20 about Pearl Harbor from time to time.

21 It has been alleged and reported by certain individuals
22 as well as a segment of the press that members of this
23 committee have sought to suppress certain evidence and in
24 so doing have attempted to whitewash the real reason for
25 this investigation. In answer specifically to a question

Witness Short

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 submitted by Senator Ferguson you stated that this committee
2 had given you every consideration and, as I understand it,
3 you are perfectly satisfied with the fair and impartial
4 treatment that you have received at the hands of this
5 committee; is that correct?

6 General Short: That is correct, absolutely.

7 Senator Lucas: Do you know of any evidence that has
8 been covered up, that has been suppressed, by any member
9 of this committee, or by counsel for the committee, that
10 would have in any wise affected your interest, or any other
11 individual who is interested in this hearing?

12 General Short: I do not.

13 Senator Lucas: There have been a lot of investigations.
14 I suppose you hope this is the last one?

15 General Short: As far as I am concerned.

16 The Chairman: Is that all?

17 Senator Lucas: Yes.

18 The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask this one
19 question, General. I am not thoroughly familiar now with
20 what your answer was as to whether between the 3rd of
21 December and the 7th of December 1941 you had any conferences
22 with Admiral Kimmel.

23 General Short: I did not.

24 The Chairman: That is the way I remembered it.
25

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 General Short: Yes, sir.

(2) 3 The Chairman: Now, this has nothing to do with
4 what actually happened at Pearl Harbor, but the matter
5 of your retirement and the communications between General
6 Marshall and you. I am in doubt there, too.

7 I want to see if I can clear up something because it
8 may affect your personal relations with General Marshall.

9 You had been relieved of your command at Pearl Harbor
10 prior to the Roberts Report?

11 General Short: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: And you had returned to this country
13 and were in Oklahoma City?

14 General Short: That is correct.

15 The Chairman: You saw in the morning paper accounts
16 of the Roberts Report and then you called General Marshall
17 over the telephone?

18 General Short: Yes, sir.

19 The Chairman: Did he tell you in that conversation
20 that he had read the report?

21 General Short: He told me he had not read it.

22 The Chairman: You, seeing the report in the newspapers,
23 probably thought over in your mind whether your continued
24 active status in the Army would be embarrassing to the
25 War Department and therefore you called up to inquire

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 whether they desired you to ask for retirement; did that
3 happen?

4 General Short: I thought both the country and my
5 personal interest required a rather careful consideration,
6 I had great confidence in General Marshall's judgment and
7 his loyalty as an old friend, and that was the reason I
8 called him and put the thing entirely in his own hands.

9 The Chairman: You told him in your conversation with
10 him that you were going to write him and you would enclose
11 a letter to the Adjutant General requesting retirement?

12 General Short: I do not believe that I told him in
13 that conversation. I think probably after I hung up I
14 decided it was fair to him to send it to him.

15 The Chairman: Throughout the conversation between
16 General Marshall and you then he did not know and was not
17 told that you were going to actually send your request
18 for retirement to the Adjutant General?

19 General Short: He told me that he would take that
20 conversation as an application for retirement if they got
21 to the point where it looked like it was the thing to do.

22 The Chairman: And after you hung up you decided to
23 put it in writing and make it formal?

24 General Short: Yes, sir, and I sent it to him personally.

25 The Chairman: Now, is there any other statement not

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 brought out by any questions by counsel or members of the
3 committee that you wish to make with reference to any
4 further pertinent facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor
5 attack?

6 General Short: I would like to make a very brief
7 statement.

8 The Chairman: All right.

9 General Short: As a matter of the interests of the
10 country and as a loyal soldier, I maintained a steadfast
11 silence for four years and I bore the load of public censure
12 during this time and I would have continued to bear it so
13 long as I thought the question of national security was
14 involved. However, the war is now ended and I have been
15 very appreciative of the opportunity that has been given me
16 here to make a full and frank statement of my point of view.

17 I want to thank all the members of the committee for
18 the attitude that they have taken and I want to assure them
19 that I have tried to give them fully and frankly all the
20 information that I have on the subject.

21 The Chairman: The Chair might state that regardless
22 of any conclusions that may be reached by the committee when
23 the evidence is all in, in any report that it makes to the
24 Congress, the Chair feels that one of the outstanding benefits
25 of this hearing has been that the evidence has been brought

Witness Short

Questions by: The Chairman

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forth in public and everybody has been given an opportunity to give to the committee and to the country whatever information they had. In all likelihood, regardless of what report the committee makes, the country will very probably have made up its own mind, and maybe before we do.

But there has been that benefit that has accrued by reason of this public hearing.

The committee thanks you, General, for your courtesy and patience in cooperating with us in attempting to bring out all the evidence. I hope you will soon completely recover your health.

General Short: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: You are excused.

(Witness excused)

The Chairman: The committee will now go into Executive Session and the spectators will retire as promptly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned and went into Executive Session.)

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