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OF THE
IMMORTALITY
OF
Mans Soul,

And the Nature of it, and
other Spirits.

Two Discourses :

One in a Letter to an unknown
Doubter ; The other in a
Reply to Dr. *Henry Moore's*
Animadversions on a private
Letter to him ; which he
published in his Second Edi-
tion of Mr. *Joseph Glanvil's*
Sadducismus Triumphatus, or
History of Apparitions.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

L O N D O N :

Printed for *B. Simons*, at the *Three Golden*
Cocks at the *West End* of *St Pauls*. 1682.

THE HISTORY OF THE

ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE SOCIETY

TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY JOHN VAUGHAN

IN TWO VOLUMES

THE SECOND VOLUME

CONTAINING THE HISTORY OF THE SOCIETY

FROM THE DEATH OF SIR ISAAC NEWTON

TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY JOHN VAUGHAN

LONDON: Printed by J. B. RICHARDS, at the Theatre, in Pall-mall, 1757.

The PREFACE.

§. I. **T**HE Author of the Letter which I answer, being wholly unknown to me, and making me no return of his sense of my Answer, I suppose it can be no wrong to him that I publish it. I have formerly thought, that it is safer to keep such Objections, and false reasonings, from mens notice, than publickly to confute them. But now in London they are so commonly known, and published in open Discourse and Writing, that whether silencing them be desirable or not, it is become impossible. And tho I have said so much more, especially in two Books (The Reasons of the Christian Religion, and the Unreasonableness of Infidelity) as may make this needless to them that read those; yet most Infidels and Sadduces being so self conceited, and fastidious, as to disdain, or cast by all that will cost them long reading and consideration, it may be this short Letter may so far prevail against their sloth, as to invite them to read more. I would true Christianity were as common as the profession of it: There would then be fewer that need such Discourses. But alas! how numerous are those Christians that are no Christians, no more than a Carcass or a Picture is a man; yea, worse Christians, who hate Christianity, whose Godfathers and Godmothers

(not Parents, but Neighbours) did promise and vow three things in their Names. 1. That they should renounce the Devil, and all his Works; the Poms and Vanities of this wicked World, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh. 2. That they should believe all the Articles of the Christian Faith. 3. That they should keep Gods holy Will and Commandments, and walk in the same all the days of their lives. *Yea, before they could speak, the mouth of these Godfathers speaking for them, did not only promise, that they should believe, but profess in the Infants name, That even then they did stedfastly believe the Articles of the Christian Faith. The Infant is said to make both the Promise and Profession by these Godfathers; who also undertake to provide, that they shall [learn all things which a Christian ought to know and believe to his Souls health, and shall be virtuously brought up, to lead a godly and a Christian life]. Whether these Godfathers ever intend to perform this, or the Parents use to expect it of them, I need not tell you: But how little most of the baptized perform of it, is too notorious. And what wonder is it, if we have Christians that in Satans Image fight against Christ, even PERJURED, MALIGNANT, PERSECUTING Christians, haters of those that seriously practice the baptismal Vow, when they are PERJURED and*

Perfidious Violaters of it themselves, as to the prevalent bent of heart and life.

These Hypocrite nominal Ceremony Christians, become the great hinderance of the cure of Infidelity in the world. It is the SPIRIT by its supernatural Works, which is the great Witness of Christ, and the infallible proof of supernatural Revelation. These witnessing works of the Spirit, are these five: 1. His Antecedent Prophecies. 2. His inherent Divine impress on the Person, Works, and Gospel of Christ. 3. His concomitant Testimony in Christs uncontrolled numerous Miracles, Resurrection and Ascension. 4. His subsequent Testimony in the numerous uncontrolled Miracles of the Apostles, and supernatural gifts to the Christians of that Age. But tho the History of these be as infallibly delivered to us, as any in the world; yet the distance hindereth the belief of some, who have not this history well opened to them. 5. Therefore God hath continued to the end of the world a more excellent Testimony than miracles (thought not so apt to work on sense) even the special regenerating sanctifying work of the Spirit of Christ, on the souls of all sincere Believers: The raising of Souls to a Divine and Heavenly Disposition, and Conversation, to live to God and the common good, in the comfortable hopes of an everlasting heavenly glory, is purchased and given by our Redeemer, conquering the allurements of the world and flesh, the temptati-

ons of Satan, and all the flatteries and frowns of the ungodly; This is a work that none but God can do and will do, which beareth his Image and superscription.

But now these Hypocrites, obscure it to themselves and other unbelievers, and tempt men to say, Are not Christians as bad as Heathens? and Mahometans. Are they not as fleshly, and worldly, and false, and perjured, and malicious, and hurtful, and pernicious to others and themselves? But I answer, No, They are not: These are no more Christians, than Images are men: They are the Enemies of Christians, that under Christs banner, and in his livery and name, do the most perfideously hate him and fight against him: Who will tell them, Inasmuch as you did it to the least of these, you did it to me. They betray him for money, as Judas, by Hail-master and a Kiss. I challenge any Infidel to find me One that seriously believeth the Gospel of Christ, as perceiving the certain Evidence of its truth, who is not a person of a holy and obedient heavenly life: How can a man sincerely believe that God sent his Son from Heaven in flesh, to Redeem man, and to bring us to Glory, and that he sealed his Doctrine by all his miracles, resurrection and ascension, and the Holy Ghost, and that he is our Head in Heaven, with whom we shall live in joy for ever; and is the Author of eternal Salvation to all them that obey him, I say: How can a man
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believe this seriously, and not esteem, and choose and seek it, before all the shadows and vanities of this world. It is not Christians, but false hypocrites, whose lives represent Christianity, blasphemously as no better than Heathenism or Mahometanism; It is but for worldly Interest, and Reputation, or because it is the Religion of the King, Countrey, or Ancestors, that they take up so much as the name and badge of Christianity. And will you judge of our Religion by its enemies? Do you not see in their drunkenness, sensuality, covetousness, ungodliness, how unlike their lives are to the baptismal Vow; and that they hate, and seek to destroy them that are serious in keeping that Vow, and living as Christians?

§.2. And as I publish this for the use of unbelievers, so I must let the Reader know, that it is become one of the usual tricks of the Popish deceivers, to put on the Vizard of an Infidel, and to dispute about the immortality of the Soul, and the greatest difficulties of Religion: And it is to puzzle men, and convince them, that by Reasoning they can never attain to satisfaction in these matters; And then to infer, [‘You have no way left, but to believe the Church; & we are that Church. If you leave that easie quiet way, you will never come to any certainty’]. Why do they not try the same trick about all the difficulties in Philosophy, Astronomy, Physick, History, &c? For every Science, and Art, hath its difficulties. But are not all these as great difficulties to the Pope and his Pre-
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lates, as they are to us? But God hath given us a more clear and satisfactory way of the solution of such Doubts.

§. 3. I must further give notice to the Reader, That it was the publishing of Dr. H. More's answer to a Letter of mine, which occasioned the publishing of this. When I was put on the one, I thought it not unprofitable to premise the other, as being of much greater use. It seemed good to the worthy Dr. to desire my thoughts of his Description of a Spirit, which he laid down in the first Edition of Mr. Glanvile of Apparitions; which I gave him in a hasty Letter, which he thought meet, without my knowledg, to publish an answer to, in his second Edition of Mr. Glanvile. Our difference is scarce worth the Readers notice. And our velitation is only friendly, and Philosophical. But yet it may possibly be useful to some, at least to excite them to a more profitable search than I have made. And it explaineth some passages in my Methodus Theologiæ.

But I much more commend to the reading of the Sadduces and Infidels, the Histories themselves of Apparitions, and Witchcrafts, which Mr. Glanvile and Dr. More have there delivered; many of them, at least, with undeniable evidence and proof. To which, if he will but add the Devil of Mascon, and Bodin, and Remigius of Witches, he will scarce be able to deny belief to the existence and Individuation of Spirits, and *vis* future life of separated Souls.

SIR,

THE
NATURE
AND
IMMORTALITY
OF THE
SOUL
PROVED.

In Answer to one who
professed perplexing Doubt-
fulness.

By RICHARD BAXTER.

L O N D O N :

Printed for *B. Simons*, at the *Three
Golden Cocks*, at the *West End*
of *St. Pauls*. 1682.

IN A LETTER

AND

MEMORIAL

TO

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

AND

THE SENATE OF GREAT BRITAIN

BY EDWARD BAYNE

LONDON

Printed and Sold by J. B. G. & Co. Stationers, Strand, and by J. B. G. & Co. Stationers, Fleet Street, in the Strand.

S I R,

I Have Reason to judg you no Stran-
ger to such Addreses as these : and
therefore have adventured more
boldly to apply my self to you.
Others would, it may be, rigidly
censure this Attempt; but your
more Christian Temper will induce you,
I hope, to judg more charitably, did you
but understand with what reluctancy I un-
dertook this task.

I have had many Disputes with my self,
whether or no I should stifle these Doubts,
or seek Satisfaction. Shame to own such
Principles bid me do the first; but the
weight of the Concern obliged me to the
last. For I could not with any cheer-
fulness, or with that vigor I thought
did become me, pursue those unseen Sub-
stances, those Objects of Faith Religion
holds forth, except I did really believe their
existence, and my own capacity of enjoyn-
ing them.

I thought at first to satisfy my self in the certainty of the things I did believe, to confirm and establish my Faith by these Studies, that I might be able to render a Reason of the hope that is in me: but instead of building up, I am shaken; and instead of a clearer evidence, I am environed with uncertainties.

Unhappy that I am ! I had better have taken all upon Trust, could I so have satisfied my Reason, than thus to have involved my self in an endless Study. For such I am afraid it will prove without help; for that I may not in this Concern rest without satisfaction; and yet the more I consider, and weigh things, the more are my doubts multiplied. I call them only doubts, not to palliate any opinions; for I have not yet espoused any; but because they have not yet attained so much maturity or strength, as to take me off those things, my doubts being satisfied, I should conclude of indispensable necessity; they are but yet in the Womb: assist to make them Abortives.

I have not been wanting to my self, but in the use of all means to me known, have sought satisfaction, both by Prayer, Reading, and Meditation. I have weighed and consulted things according to my
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Capacity. I have been as faithful to my self in all my reasonings, as I could, and void of prejudice, have passed impartial Censures on the things in debate, so far as that light I have would enable me; and what to do more, I know not, except this course I now take, prove effectual, you inclining to assist me, that I know have studied these things.

My request to you therefore is, If your more publick Studies will permit you, That you would condescend to satisfy me in the Particulars I shall mention. I assure you, I have no other design, but to know the Truth: which in things of such moment, certainly cannot be difficult, tho to my unfurnished Head they have proved so: I hope my shaking may prove my establishment.

That I may therefore put you to as little trouble as I can, I will first tell you what I do believe, and then what I stick at.

First, therefore, I do really believe, and am very well satisfied, That there is a God, or a first Cause that hath created all things, and given to every thing its Being. For I am not acquainted with any independent Being. I know not any thing that is able to subsist without the Contribution of its

Fellow-Creatures. I am conscious to my self, when sickness invades me, and death summons my Compound to a dissolution, I can do nothing to the preservation of the Being I enjoy. And if I cannot preserve my self as I am, much less could I make my self what I am: For when I was nothing, I could do nothing. And Experience and Sense tells me, As it is with me, so it is with others; as there is none can preserve their Beings, so there is none could acquire to themselves the Being they have; and if none, then not the first man. And indeed that was it I enquired after, from whence every *species* had at first their Beings; the way, how, and means by which they are continued. I know not any Cause of the Being of any thing, of which again I may not enquire the Cause: and so from Cause to Cause, till through a multitude of Causes, I necessarily arrive at the first Cause of all Causes, a Being wholly uncaused, and without Cause, except what it was unto it self.

My next Enquiry was into my self; and my next business, to find what Concern I have with my Creator: which I knew no better way to attain, than by searching the bounds of humane Capacity. For I
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concluded it reasonable to judg those attainments I was capable of in my Creation, I was designed for. Now if man is nothing more than what is visible, or may be made so by Anatomy or Pharmacy, he is no Subject capable of enjoying, or loving God, nor consequently of a life of Retrobution.

In this Enquiry I found Man consisted of something visible and invisible; the Body which is visible, and something else that invisibly actuates the same. For I have seen the Body, the visible part of man; when the invisible, either through indisposition of its Orgains, or its self, or being expelled its Mansion, hath ceased to act (I speak as one in doubt): the Body hath been left to outward appearance the same; it was yet really void of Sense, and wholly debilitated of all power to act: But then what this invisible is, what to conclude of it, I know not: Here I am at a stand, and in a Labyrinth, without a Clue: For I find no help any where. Many have, I acknowledg, defended the Souls Immortality; but none have proved the existence of such a Being, and a life of Retrobution, and that copiously enough; but none have proved a Subject capable of it. I know all our Superior

*Here some
what is
wanting
the Author
Copy.*

Faculties and Actings, are usually attributed to the Soul; but what it is in man they call so, they tell us not. To say it is that by which I reason, or that now dictates to me what I write, is not satisfactory: For I look for a definition, and such an one, as may not to ought else be appropriated. Is it therefore a real Being, really different from the Body, and able to be without it? or is it not? If not, whatever it be, I matter not. If it be, is it a pure Spirit, or meerly material? If meerly material, and different only from the Body gradually, and in some few degrees of subtilty, it is then a question, whether or not that we call Death, and suppose a separation of the Compound, be not rather a Concentration of this active Principle in its own Body, which through some indisposition of the whole, or stoppage in its Orgains, through gross Corporeity, hath suffocated its actings. If it be a pure Spirit, I would then know, what is meant by *Spirit*? and whether or no all things invisible, and imperceptable to Sense, are accounted such? If so, it is then only a term to distinguish between things evident to Sense, and things not. If otherwise, how shall I distinguish between the highest degree of material, and the

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the lowest degree of spiritual Beings, or know how they are diversified, or be certain the Being of the Soul is rightly appropriated. For to me, an immaterial and spiritual Being, seems but a kind of *Hocus*, and a Substance stript of all materiality, a substantial nothing. For all things at first had their Origine from the deep dark Waters: witness *Moses Philosophy*, in the 1st of *Genesis*, on which the Spirit of God is said to move. I am far from believing those Waters such as that Element we daily make use of; but that they were material, appears by those multitudes of material Productions they brought forth. And if those Waters were material, such were all things they d'd produce, among which was Man, of whom the Text asserts nothing more plain; for it saith, *God created man of the dust of the earth*; the most gross part and sedement of those Waters, after all things else were created. Now the Body only is not Man; for Man is a living Creature: it is that therefore by which the Body lives and acts, that constitutes the Man. Now the Apostle mentioneth Man to consist of Body, Soul and Spirit. My Argument then is this, *God created man of the dust of the earth.*

But

But Man consists of a Body Soul and Spirit:

Therefore Body, Soul and Spirit are made of the dust, &c. and are material.

The *major* and *minor* are undeniable; and therefore the conclusion. Yet do I not therefore conclude its annihilation: for I know all matter is eternal; but am rather perswaded of its concentration (as afore) in its own body.

But of its real Being, purely spiritual, and stript of all materiality, really distinct from its body, I doubt.

•Because that by several accidents happening to the body, the man is incapacitated from acting rationally, as before; as in those we call Ideots, there is not in some of them so much a sign of a reasonable Soul, as to distinguish them from Bruits: Whereas were the Soul such as represented, it would rather cease to act, than act at a rate below it self. Did it know its Excellencies, such as we make them, it would as soon desert its being, as degrade its self by such brutish acts: It is not any defect in its Organs could rob the Soul of its Reason, its Essential Faculty. Tho the Workman breaks his Tools, his hands do not lose their skill, but ceaseth to act, rather

ther than to do ought irregularly : so likewise would the Soul then act contrary to its own nature.

Secondly, Because all the *species* both of the Mineral, Vegetable, and Animal Kingdoms, appear to me, but as the more eminent Works of a most excellent Operator, as Engines of the most accurate Engineer; they all live, and have a Principle of Life manifest in their growth and augmentation, and so far as they are living weights, as I can perceive from the same source. But then comes in those Natures and Faculties whereby each is distinguished from other, even like several pieces of Clock, or Watch-work: the one shews the hour of the day, and no more; the next shews the hour and minutes, another shews both the former, and likewise the Age of the Moon; another hath not only the three former motions, but an addition of the rise and fall of Tides; yet all this, and many more that in that way are performed, are several distinct motions, arising all from the same Cause, the Spring or Weight, the Principle of motion in them. So among living Weights, the first do only grow and augment their bulk, and have no possibility in nature to augment their kind; the next, to wit, Vegetables, do not
only

only grow and increase their bulk, but likewise have a power of propagating their like: the third Family, I mean the Animal Kingdom, do not only live and encrease their kind, but likewise are made sensative. And lastly, we our selves that are not only possess'd of all the former, but of something, I know not what, we think more excellent, and call Reason, and all this from the same source; namely, that we live; which if we did not, we could not perform any of these acts. For life in us is the same as the Spring or Weight in the Watch or Clock, which ceasing, all other motion ceaseth, as in a Watch or Clock, the Spring or Weight being down.

As Life therefore is the Cause of all Motion, and all natural Operation and Faculties; yet those multifarious Operations and Faculties, manifest in, and proper to the particular *species* of the Three Kingdoms, requires not divers Principles of Life, no more than divers motions specified in a Watch or Clock, requires divers Weights or Springs. And as the diversity of motion in Watch or Clock, ariseth not from diversity of Weights or Springs, but rather from other means: so those diversities of Natures and Faculties,
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manifest throughout the Three Kingdoms, arise not from divers Principles of Life, but from one Principle of Life, manifesting its power in Bodies diversly organized. So that a Tree or Herb that only vegetates and propagates its kind, hath no other Principle of Life than an Animal that hath Sense, and more eminent Faculties. The difference only, as I conceive, is, this Principle of Life in the vegetable, is bound up in a Body organized to no other end, by which Life is hindered exerting any other power: but in the Animal it's kindled in a purer matter, by which it's capacitated to frame more excellent Orgains, in order to the exerting more eminent Acts. For the Principle of Life can no more act rationally in matter capable of naught but vegetation (for it acts in matter according to the nature thereof, advancing it to its utmost excellency), than a man can saw with a Coult-Staff, or file with an Hatchet, or make a Watch with a Betle and Wedges.

I am apt to believe those rare Endowments, and eminent Faculties, wherewith men seem to excel meer Sensatives, are only the improvement of Speech, wherem we have the advantage of them, and the result of reiterated Acts, until they
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become habits. For by the first we are able to communicate our Conceptions and Experiments each to other; and by the other we do gradually ascend to the knowledg of things. For is all the knowledg either in the acts, Liberal or Mechanical, any more than this acts reiterated, until they become habits; which when they are, we are said to know them? And what is all our reasoning, but an Argument in Discourse tossed from one to another, till the Truth be found, like a Ball between two Rackets, till at last a lucky blow puts an end to the sport? We come into the World hardly men; and many whose natures want cultivation, live, having nothing to distinguish them from Brutes, but the outward form, speech, and some little dexterity; such as in Apes or Monkeys, in the things they have been taught, and the Affairs they have been bred to. And could we imagine any man to have lived Twenty or Thirty years in the World, without the benefit of Humane Converse, What would appear then, think you, of a rational Soul? which the wise man well saw when he asserted the Condition of Men and Beasts to be the same what a meer Ignorant hath, *Moses* himself made of *Adam*, that in his supposed

posed best state, knew not that he was naked: but I believe the Nine Hundred and Thirty years Experience of his own, and the continual Experiments of Posterity, in that time communicated to him, might quicken his Intellect. So that he died with more Reason than he was created, and humane nature in his posterity. The next Generation was imbellished with his attainments, to which their own Experiences still made a new addition. The next Generation built on their Foundation, and the next on their; and so on: and we are got on the shoulders of them all. So that it's rather a wonder, that we know no more, than that we know so much. So that what we have, seems rather times product, through the means aforesaid, than what our Natures were at first enrich wity.

The which appears likewise in those whose memory fails, and in whom the *vestigia* of things is wore out; the habits they had contracted, and manner of working in their several acts being forgotten, what silly Animals are they? Whereas were the Soul such as represented, who could rob it of its Endowments? It's true the debilitating of a hand, may impead a manual labour; but raise what hath formerly

merly been done out of the Memory, and you render Man a perfect Bruit, or worse: for he knows not how to give a signification of his own mind.

And indeed, I know not any thing wherein Man excels the Beasts, but may be referred to the benefit of Speech and Hands, capable of effecting its Conceptions; nor find any better way to attain a right knowledg of our selves, but by beholding our selves in *Adam*, and enquiring, what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far short of what we now admire in our selves.

But now supposing all this answer'd, what will it avail us to a Life of Retribution, if all return to one Element, and be there immerged as Brooks and Rivers in the Sea? If we lose our Individuation; and all the Souls that have existed, be swallowed up of one, where are the Rewards and Punishments of each individual. And we have reason to judg it will be thus, rather than otherwise, because we see every thing tends to its own Centre, the Water to the Sea, and all that was of the Earth to the Earth, from whence they were taken. And *Solomon* saith, *The spirit returns to God that gave it.* Every thing then returning to its own Element, loseth its Individuation.

dividuation. For we see all bodies returning to the earth, are no more individual bodies, but earth: Have we not reason then to judg the same of Spirits returning to their own Element? And what happiness then can we hope for, more than a deliverance from the present calamity? or what misery are we capable of, more than what is common to all?

The same is more evident in the body with which we converse, and are more sensibly acquainted with, seems wholly incapable of either, &c. For all bodies are material, and matter it self is not capable of multiplication, but of being changed. Therefore Nature cannot multiply bodies, but changeth them; as some bodies arise, others perish. Natures expence in continual Productions being constantly supplied by the dissolution of other Compounds: were it otherwise, her Storehouse would be exhausted; for its by continual Circulations, Heaven and Earth is maintain'd; and by her even Circular motion, she keeps her self imployed on the same stock of matter, and maintains every *species*. There is no body the same to day it was yesterday, matter being in a continual flux; neither immediately on the dissolution of a Compound, and Corruption

of the body, doth the earth thereof retain any specifick difference of that body it once was, but is immediately bestowed by Nature, and ordered to the new production of other things. That part of matter therefore which constituteth a humane body, in a short time is putrified, and made earth, which again produceth either other inferior Animals, or Grass, or Corn, for the nourishment of Beasts and Fowl, which again are the nourishment of men. Thus circularly innumerable times round, Nature continually impressing new forms of the same matter. So that that matter that now constitutes my body, it may be a thousand years ago was the matter of some other mans, or it may be of divers mens, then putrified; which in this time hath suffered infinite changes, as it may be sometime Grass, or Corn, or an Herb, or Bird, or Beast, or divers of them, or all, and that divers times over, before my body was framed; who then can say, why this matter so changeable, should at last be restored, my body rather than his, whose formerly it was, or the body of a Bird, or other Animal? For by the same Reasons that the body of man is proved to arise again, may, I think, be proved the Restoration of all other bodies, which is equally incredible to me (if understood at one time). For Na-

ures stock of matter being all at first exhausted, she could not employ her self in new Productions, without destroying some of the old; much less can she at once fabricate out of the same quantity of matter, all the bodies that ever were, are, or shall be; which yet, notwithstanding could she, they could not be said to be the same bodies, because all bodies suffer such alteration daily, that they cannot be said to be the same to day they were yesterday; how then can they be capable of Reward or Punishment?

These are now my doubts; but are they the fruits of Diligence? and am I thus rewarded for not believing at a common rate? A great deal cheaper could I have fate down, and believed as the Church believes; without a why, or a wherefore, have been ignorant of these Disputes, and never have emerged my self in this gulf, than thus by Reflection to create my own disturbance. Had I been made a meer Animal, I had had none of these Doubts nor Fears that thus torment my mind; for doubting, happy Brutes happy, far more happy than my self! With you is none of this; with you only is serenity of mind, and you only void of Anxieties; you only enjoy what this world is able to accommodate with, and it may be too

have those Careffes we know not of, while we, your poor purveyors, go drooping and depending, doubting, fearing, and caring about, and our whole lives only a preying on one another, and tormenting our selves. You have the carnal content and satisfaction; we nothing but the shell, a vain glorious boast of our Lordship over you, with which we seek to satisfy our selves, as Prodigals, with husks, while the truth is, we are afraid to confront our Vassals, except we first by craft and treachery beguile them from whom likewise we flee, if once enraged: and what a poor comfort is this? Is this a Priviledg to boast of? Is this all Reason advanceth to, only a Purveyor to Beasts, and to make my life more miserable, by how much more sensible of misery! Well might *Solon* prefer the dead before the living; and those that had not been, before both; intimating thereby, that being best, least capable of misery; that is, of Trees, of Herbs, of Stones, and all inanimates, which wanting sense, are insensible of misery. Better any thing than man therefore, since that every brute and inanimate stock or stone, are more happy in that measure: they are less capable of misery. What the advantage then, what the benefit that occurs to us from them, or what pre-

preheminance have we above them, seeing as dieth the one, so dieth the other, and that they have all one breath?

Pardon this Degression; the real sense and apprehension I have of things, extort it from me. For I, as *Job*, cannot refrain my mouth, but speak in the bitterness of my Spirit, and complain in the anguish of my Soul, *Why died I not from the womb? why did I not give up the ghost when I came out of the belly? Why did the knees prevent me? or why the breasts, that I should suck? I had then been among Solomon's happy ones: I should now have lain still and been quiet; I should have slept, and been at rest: whereas now I am weary of life. For tho I speak, my grief is not assuaged; and tho I forbear, I am not eased; but now he hath made me weary, and made desolate all my company: he hath filled me with wrinkles, which is a witness against me; and my leanness rising up in me, beareth witness to my face, God hath delivered me to the ungodly, and turned me over into the hand of the wicked, and my familiar friends have forgotten me. I said, I shall die in my nest, and shall multiply my days as the sand, when my root was spread out by the waters, and the dew lay all night on my branch; when my glory was fresh, and my bow was renewed in my hand:*

but I find while my flesh is upon me, I shall have pain, and while my soul is in me, it shall mourn. Have pity upon me, O my friend! for the hand of God hath touched me. The wicked live, and become old; yea, they are mighty in power, their seed is established in their sight with them, and their off-spring before their eyes; their houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them, &c. they are planted, and take root, they grow; yea, they bring forth fruit, yet God is never in their mouth, and far from their reins. In vain then do I wash my hands in innocency, seeing all things come alike to all. There is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to the good, to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath.

I have now done (tho I hardly know how), lest I too far trouble you; and only beg your perusal of these lines, and two or three in answer of them by this Bearer, who shall at your appointment wait on you for the same. Let me farther beg these two things of you: first, That you would consider you have not to do with a Sophistick Wrangler, or with one that would willingly err, but with one that desires to know

know

know the Truth. Let therefore your Answer be, as much as you can, void of Scholastick Terms, or Notions that may lead me more into the dark. And then, as *Feb* did beg, That God would withdraw his hand far from him, and that his dread might not make him afraid ; so I. And further, That you would not awe me with his greatness, nor suppress my Arguments with his Omnipotence. Then call thou, and I will answer ; or let me speak, and answer thou me. Thus begging the Divine Influence to direct you, and enlighten me, I subscribe my self,

S I R,

§. I. **I**T is your wisdom in Cases of so great moment, to use all just endeavours for satisfaction; and I think you did but your duty, to study this as hard as you say you have done. But 1. I wish you had studied it better; for then you would not have been a stranger to many Books which afford a just solution of your Doubts, as I must suppose you are, by your taking no notice of what they have said. 2. And I wish you had known, that between the solving of all your Objections, and taking all on Trust from men, or believing as the Church believeth, there are Two other ways to satisfaction (which must be conjunct): 1. Discerning the unanswerable evidences in Nature and Providence, of the Souls future Life. 2. And taking it on trust from Divine Revelation; which is otherwise to be proved, than by believing as the Church by Authority requireth you.

I have

I have written on this Subject. so much already, that I had rather you had told me, why you think it unsatisfactory, than desire me to transcribe it, while Print is as legible as Manuscript. If you have not read it, I humbly offer it to your consideration: It is most in two Books: The first which I intreat you to read, is called, *The Reasons of the Christian Religion*: the other is called, *The Unreasonableness of Infidelity*. If you think this too much labour, you are not so hard or faithful a Student of this weighty Case, as it deserveth, and you pretend to be. If you will read them (or the first at least), and after come to me, that we may fairly debate your remaining Doubts, it will be a likelier way for us to be useful to each other, than my going over all the mistakes of your Paper will be. And I suppose you know, that we have full assurance of a multitude of Verities, against which many Objections may be raised, which no mortal man can fully solve, especially from Modes and Accidents. Nay, perhaps there is nothing in the World which is not liable to some such Objections. And yet I will not neglect your writing.

§. 2. When you were convinc'd, That there is a *first Cause*, it would have been an orderly progress to think *what that Cause is*; and whether his *Works* do not prove his *Infinite Perfection*, having all that *eminently* which he giveth *formally* to the whole World, as far as it belongeth to *perfection* to have it. For none can give more than he hath. And then you should have thought *what this God is to man*, as manifest in his Works: and you should have considered *what of man is past doubt*, and thence *in what relation he stands to God*, and to his *fellow-creatures*: And this would have led you to know *mans certain duty*: and that would have assured you of *a future life of Retribution*. Is not this a just progress?

§. 3. But you would know a *Definition of the Soul*. But do you *know* nothing but by *Definitions*? Are all men that cannot *define*, therefore void of all knowledg? You know not at all what *seeing* is, or what *light* is, or what *feeling*, *smelling*, *tasting*, *hearing* is, what *sound* or *odor* is, what *sweet* or *bitter*, nor what *thinking*, or *knowing*, or *willing*, or *loving* is, if you know it not before *defining* tell you, and better than bare *defining* can ever tell you. Every *vital faculty*

culty hath a *self-perception* in its acting; which is an *eminent sense*: *Intuition* also of *outward sensible Objects*, or immediate perception of them, as *sensata & imaginata*, is before all *Argument and Definition*, or reasoning action. By *seeing*, we perceive that we see; and by *understanding*, we perceive that we understand. I dare say, That you know the *Acts* of your own *Soul* by acting, tho when you come to *reasoning* or *defining*, you say you know not what they are. You can give no *definition* what *substance* is, or *Ens* at least, much less what *God* is. And yet what is more certain than that there is *Substance*, *Entity*, and *God*?

§. 4. But I'll tell you *what the Soul of man is*: It is a *Vital, Intellectual, Volitive Spirit*, animating a *humane organized Body*. When it is separated, it is not *formally* a *Soul*, but a *Spirit* still.

§. 5. *Qu.* But what is such a *mental Spirit*? It is a *most pure Substance*, whose *form* is a *Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition* (three in one).

§. 6. I. Are you not *certain* of all these *Acts*, viz. That you *Act vitally, understand* and *will*? If not, you are not sure that
you

you see, that you doubt, that you wrote to me, or that you are any thing.

II. If you act these, it is certain that you have the power of so acting. For nothing doth that which it cannot do.

III. It is certain, that it is a Substance which hath this power: For nothing can do nothing.

IV. It is evident, that it is not the visible Body, as composed of Earth, Water and Air, which is this mental Substance. Neither any one of them, nor all together have Life, Understanding, or Will. They are passive Beings, and act not at all of themselves, but as acted by invisible Powers. They have an aggregative inclination to Union, and no other. Were it not for the Igneous Nature which is active, or for Spirits, they would be cessant. Therefore you are thus far past the dark, That there is in man an Invisible Substance, which hath, yea, which is a Power or Virtue of Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition.

V. And that this Active Power is a distinct thing from meer Passive Power, or *mobilitie per aliud*, Experience puts past doubt. There is in every living thing a Power, or Virtue of self-moving, else Life were not Life.

VI. And

VI. And that this is not a meer *accident* of the Soul, but its *essential form*, I have proved so fully in my *Methodus Theologiæ*, in a peculiar Disputation, that I will not here repeat it. It's evident, That even in the *igneous Substance*, the *Vis Motiva, Illuminativa, Calefactiva*, is more than an *accident*, even its *essential form*: But were it otherwise, it would but follow, That if the very *accidental Acts* or qualities of a Soul be so noble, its *essential* must be greater.

VII. But it is certain, That neither Souls, nor *any thing*, have either *Being, Power, or Action*, but in *constant receptive dependence* on the continued emanation of the *prime Cause*; and so no Inviduation is a *total separation from him*, or an *Independence*, or a self-sufficiency. Thus far natural light tells you what Souls are.

§. 7. You add your self, That those *attainments which you were made capable of, you were designed to*. Very right: God maketh not such noble Faculties or Capacities in vain; much less to engage all men to a life of duty, which shall prove deceit and misery. But you have Faculties capable of thinking of God, as your Beginning, Guide, and End, as your Maker, Ruler, and Benefactor;

nefactor ; and of studying your duty to him, in hope of Reward, and of thinking what will become of you after Death, and of hoping for future Blessedness, and fearing future Misery : all which no Bruit was ever capable of. Therefore God designed you to such ends which you are thus capable of.

§. 8. You say (p. 3.) *Many have defended the Souls Immortality ; but none have proved a Subject capable of a life of Retribution.* It's a Contradiction to be *immortal*, or *rewarded*, and not to be a *Subject capable*. For *nothing hath no accidents*. Nothing hath that which it is *not capable* of having.

§. 9. You say, *None tell us what it is.* How many Score Volumes have told it us ? I have now briefly told you what it is. You say, [*To say it is that by which I reason, is not satisfactory. I look for a Definition*]. But on Condition you look not to *see or feel* it, as you do Trees or Stones, you may be satisfied. I have given you a Definition. The Genus is *Substantia purissima* ; the Differentia is *Virtus Vitalis, Activa, Intellectiva, Volitiva (trinum a Imago Creatoris)*. What's here wanting to a Definition ?

I have

I have told you, That there is an *antecedent more certain Perception*, than by *Definition*; by which I know that I *see, hear, taste, am*, and by which the *Soul, in act*, is *conscious of it self*.

§. 10. You ask, 1. *Is it a real Being?*

Ans. I told you, Nothing can do nothing.

2. *Is it really different from the Body?*

Ans. A Substance which hath in it self an *Essential Principle of Life, Intellection, and Volition*, and that which hath not, are *really different*. Try whether you can make a Body feel, or understand without a Soul.

2. Those that are seperable, are really different.

3. You ask, *Is it able to be without it?*

Ans. What should hinder it? The Body made not the Soul: A viler Substance giveth not being to a nobler. 2. Nothing at all can be without continued Divine sustentation. But we see, *juxta naturam*, God annihilateth no Substance: Changes are but by composition, and separation, and action, but not by annihilation. An Atome of Earth or Water, is not annihilated; and why should we suspect, that a Spiritual Substance is? Yea, the contrary is fully evident, tho God is able to annihilate all things.

§. 11. You

§. 11. You say, *If it be meerly material, and differ from the Body but gradually, Death may be but its concentration of this active Principle in its own Body.*

Ans. If you understand your own words, it's well. 1. Do you know what *material* signifieth? See *Crakenthorp's Metaphysicks*, and he will tell you in part, it's an ambiguous word. Sometime it signifieth the same as *substantia*; and so Souls are *material*. Sometime it signifieth only that sort of Substance which is called *corporeal*. *Dr. More* tells you, That *Penetrability*, and *Indivisibility*, difference them.

But what if *fire* should differ from *air* materially, but in *degree* of subtilty and purity, or *sensitive Souls* from *igneus*, and *mental* from *sensitive*, but in higher degrees of purity of matter; Is it not the *form* that maketh the specifick difference? *Air* hath not the *igneus Virtue* of Motion, Illumination, and Calefaction; nor *ignis*, the *sensitive Virtues*, nor *meer sensitives* the *rational Virtues* aforesaid. *Forma dat esse & nomen*. This maketh not a meer gradual difference, but a specifick.

There is in Compounds *matter*, and *materia dispositio receptiva*, & *forma*. There is somewhat answerable in *spiritual* uncompounded Beings. There is *substantia*, and *substantiae dispositio*, & *forma*. These are but *intellectually distinct*, and not *divisible*, and are but *inadequate conceptions* of one thing. That *substantia* is *conceptus fundamentalis*, is confest. Some make penetrability and indivisibility, *substantiae conceptus dispositivus*. But the *Virtus vitalis activa*, *intellectiva*, *volitiva*, in one, is the *conceptus formalis*.

2. But what mean you by [*the active Principles concentration in its own body*]? It is a strange Expression. 1. If you mean, that it's *annihilated*, then it *remaineth* not. 2. If you mean, that it *remaineth* an *active Principle*, you mean a *substance*, or *accident*. If a *substance*, it seems you acknowledge it a *self-subsisting being*, only not *separate* from its *carcass*. And if they be *two*, why are they not *separable*? If *separable*, why not *separated*? When the dust of the *Carcass* is scattered, is the *Soul* concentrated in *every* atome, or but in *one*? And is it *many*, or *one* concentrated *Soul*? If you mean, That it's but an *accident*, that's disprov'd before; what accident is it? If concentrated in the *body*, the *body*, and every dust of it,

is vital and intellectual. And if so, every clod and stone is so; which I will not so much wrong you, as to imagine that you think.

§. 12. But you would know what's meant by a spirit, whether all that is not evident to sense? *Ans.* It is a pure substance (saith Dr. More, penetrable and indivisible) essentially vital, perceptive and appetitive.

§. 13. You add, [How shall I know the difference between the highest degree of materials, and lowest of immaterials? To me an immaterial, and spiritual being, seems a kind of Hocus, a substantial nothing.

Ans. If you take matter for the same with substance, it is material. But not if you take matter, as it's usually taken, for corporeal; or gross, and impenetrable, and divisible substance, incapable of essential, vital, self-moving perception and appetite. If this seems nothing to you, God seems nothing to you, and true Nature, which is *Principium motus*, seems nothing to you: And all that performeth all the action which you see in the world, seems nothing to you. It's pity that you have conversed so little with God and your self, as to think both to be nothing.

§. 14. What

§. 14. What you say out of Gen. 1. is little else but mistake, when you say [*all was made out of the deep waters by the spirit of God*]. The Text nameth what was made of them. It saith nothing of the Creation of *Angels*, or *Spirits*, out of them (no, nor of the *Light*, or *Earth*, or *Firment*).

And whereas you say, [*God made man of the dust of the ground; but the body only is not man, ergo.* *Ans.* You use your self too unkindly, to leave out half the words, Gen. 2. 7. *And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul*; when the Text tells us the *two works* by which God made man, will you leave out *one*, and then argue exclusively against it? What if I said, [*The Chandler made a Candle of Tallow, and then by another kindled it*]? or [*a man made an house of Bricks, and cemented them with Mortar, &c.*]? will you thence prove, That he made a Candle burning without fire, or the House without Mortar? Words are useles to such Expositors.

§. 15. Page 4. you say; *You know all matter is eternal.*

But you know no such thing. If it be *Eternal*, it hath *one Divine perfection*: and if so, it must have the *rest*, and so should be *God*. But what's your proof?

You again (*believe the Souls concentration in its body*). *Ans.* Words insignificant. It's *Idem* or *Aliud*. If *Idem*, then dust is Essentially *Vital* and *Intellectual*. Deny not spiritual forms, if every clod or stone have them. If *Aliud*, how prove you it to be there, rather than elsewhere? And if you considered well, you would not believe *essential*, *substantial life* and *mind*, to *lye dead* and *unactive*, so long as the dust is so.

§. 16. You come to the hardest Objecti-
[*The Souls defective acting in infants, ideots, the sick, &c.* and say, [*It would rather not act, if it were as represented.*]

Ans. 1. It cannot be denied, but the Operations of the Soul here, are much of them upon the organized body; and tho' *not organical*, as if they acted by an *Organ*, yet *organical*, as acting on an *Organ*; which is the *material Spirits* primarily. And so there go various Causes to some Effects, called Acts.

2. And the Soul doth nothing independently, but as dependent on God, in Being and Operation: and therefore doth what *God knoweth*, and *useth it* too, as his Instrument, in the forming of the body; and in what it knoweth not it self. And as God, as *fons naturæ necessitateth* the natural agency of the Soul, as he doth the *Soul of Bruits*. But as the wise and free Governor of the world, he hath to *moral acts*, given mans Soul *free-will*, and therefore *conducting Reason*; which it needs not to *necessitated acts*, as digestion, motion of the blood, formation of the body, &c.

And as it is not made to do *all its acts freely* and *rationally*, so neither *at all times*, as in Apoplexies; Infancy, Sleep, &c. It is essential to the Soul, to have the *active power* or *virtue* of *Intellection* and *Free-will*, but not always to use it. As it is *essential* to the substance of *fire*, tho latent in a flint, to have the *power* of *motion*, *light* and *heat*.

And its considerable, that as a traveller in his journey, thinking and talking only of other things, retaineth still a *secret act* of *intending* his end, (else he would not go on) when he perceiveth and observeth it not at all. He that playeth on the Lute or Harpsical, ceaseth when his Instrument is out of
 C 3 tune,

tune; because he acteth by free-will.

But the Soul of an Idiot or mad-man acteth only *per modum naturæ*, not by *free-acts*, but necessitated by God by the order of nature. Only *moral* acts are free; and that some other are but brutish, and some but vegetative, is no more a wonder, than that it should *understand* in the *head*, and be *sensible* only in the *most* of the body, and vegetative only in the *hairs* and *nails*. It operateth in all the body by the *Spirits*, as *calid*; but about the *eyes*, and *open sensoria*, by *Spirits* also as *lucid*, for that use.

§. 14. But never forget this, That *nothing at any time doth what it cannot do*; but many *can do* that which *they do not*. Tho the Soul in the Womb, or Sleep, remember not, or reason not; if *ever it do it*, that proveth it had the *power* of doing it. And that power is not a *novel accident*, tho the *act* may be so.

§. 18. To your Explications p. 4. I say, 1. None doubts, but all the world is the work of *one prime operating Cause*; Whom I hope you see in them, is of perfect power, wisdom and goodness, the chief *efficient dirigent* and *final* cause of all.

2. I doubt not, but the *created universe* is all *one thing* or *frame*; and no one atome or part totally separated from, and independent on the rest.

3. But yet the parts are multitudes, and heterogeneous, and have their Individuation, and are at once *many* and *one* in several respects. And the unity of the Universe, or of inferior universal Causes (as the Sun, or an *anima telluris*, &c.) are certainly consistent with the specifick and individual differences of the parts.

E. g. Many individual Apples grow on the same Tree; yea, Crabs and Apples by divers grafts, nourished on the same stock: One may rot, or be sower, and not another. Millions of Trees, as also of Herbs and Flowers, good and poysonous, all grow in the same earth. Here is Unity, and great Diversity. And tho self-moving Animals be not fixed on the earth, no doubt they have a contiguity, or continuity, as parts with the Universe. But for all that, a Toad is not a Man, nor a man in torment, undifferenced from another at ease, nor a bad man all one with a good.

§. 19. And if any should have a conceit, That there is nothing but *God and matter*. I have fully confuted it in the Appendix to

Reas. of Christian Religion. Matter is no such omnipotent sapiential thing in it self, as to need no cause or maker, any more than Compounds. And to think, that the infinite God would make no nobler Creature than dead matter, no liker himself, to glorifie him, is antecedently absurd, but consequently notoriously false. For tho nothing be acted without him, it's evident that he hath made active Natures with a principle of self-moving in themselves. The Sun differs from a clod, by more than being matter variously moved by God, even by a self-moving power also. Else there were no living creature, but bodies in themselves dead, animated by God. But it would be too tedious to say all against this that's to be said.

§. 20. When you tell us of [One life in all, differenc'd only by diversity of Organs], you mean God, or a common created Soul. If God, I tell you where I have confuted it. It's pity to torment or punish God in a murderer, or call him wicked in a wicked man: or that one man should be hang'd, and another prais'd, because the Engines of their bodies are diverse. But the best Anatomists say, That nothing is to be seen in the brain of other Animals, why they might not be

as

as rational as Men. And if it be an *Animã creata communis* that you mean, either you think it is a *universal Soul* to the *universal world*, or only to *this Earth* or *Vortex*. If to *all the World*, you feign it to have *Gods Prerogative*. If to *part* of the world, if each *Vortex, Sun, Star, &c.* have a distinct individuate superior Soul, why not *men* also inferiors? And why may not millions of individual Spirits consist with *more common* or *universal* Spirits, as well as the life of *Worms* in your belly with *yours*. That which hath no *Soul* or *Spirit* of its own, is not fit for such reception and communion with superior Spirits, as that which hath. Communion requireth some similitude. We see God useth not all things alike, because he makes them not like.

§. 21. But if the difference between Beasts, Trees, Stones, and *Men*, be only the *organical contexture of the body*; then
 1. Either all these have but *one Soul*, and so are *but one*, save corporeally. 2. Or else every Stone, Tree and Beast hath an *Intellectual Soul*: for it is evident that *man* hath, by its Operations.

I. Had you made but *Virtue* and *Vice* to be only the effects of the *bodies contexture*, sure you would only blame the *maker* of
 your

your *body*, and not your *self*, for any of your Crimes: For you did not make your own body, if you were nothing.

Is the common light and sense of *Nature* no Evidence? Doth not all the world difference *Virtue* and *Vice*, *moral good* and *evil*? Is it only the difference of an Instrument in Tune, and out of Tune? Either then *all* called *sin* is good; or *God*, or the *universal Soul*, only is to be blamed. Then to call you a Knave, or a Lyar, or Perjured; &c, is no more disgrace, than to say, that you are *sick*, or *blind*. Then all Laws are made only to bind *God*, or the *Anima mundi*; and all punishment is threatned to *God*, or this *common Soul*. And it is *God*, or the *common Soul* only in a body, which sorroweth, feareth, feeleth pain or pleasure.

II. And if you equal the Souls of Beasts, Trees, Stones and Men, you must make them all to have an *Intellectual Soul*. If man had not, he could never understand. And if *they* have so also, *frustra fit potentia quæ nunquam producitur in actum*. It is certain that it is not the body (Earth, Air or Water) that *feelet*, much less that *understandeth* or *willeth*. If therefore all men have but *one Soul*, why is it not *you* that are in pain or joy, when any, or all others are so? *Your* suffering and joys are as much theirs. You hurt

hurt your self when you hurt a Malefactor. Why are you not answerable for the Crimes of every Thief, if all be one?

§. 22. You vainly liken *several Natures and Faculties to several pieces of Clock-work.* For *Natures and Faculties* are *self-acting Principles* under the prime Agent: but a *Clock* is only *passive*, moved by another: Whether the *motus gravitationis* in the poise, be by an intrinsic Principle, or by another unseen active Nature, is all that's controvertible there. All that your similitude will infer, is this, That as the *gravitation* of *one poise*, moves every wheel according to its *receptive aptitude*; so God, the universal Spirit, moveth all that is moved, according to their several aptitudes, passives as passive, actives as active, vitals as self-movers, intellectuals as intellectual-free-self-movers under him. No Art can make a *Clock* *feel, see or understand.*

But if the world have but *one soul*, what mean you by its *concentring* in the *Carcass*? Is the universal Soul there fallen asleep, or imprisoned in a Grave, or what is it?

§. 23. Add page 5. You well say, That *Life is the cause of all motion*: Yea, *infinite Life, Wisdom and Love*, is the cause of all: but there be second Causes under it: *Plurima ex uno*. And it maketh things various, which it moveth variously; and maketh them vital, sensitive or mental, which he will move to vital, sensitive and mental acts. *Operari sequitur esse*.

§. 24. You are apt to believe, That those eminent Faculties wherewith men seem meer Sensitive, are only the improvement of Speech, and reiterated Acts, till they become Habits.

Ans. 1. I had a Parrot that spoke so very plainly, that no Man could discern but he could have spoke as well as a Man, if he had but had the Intellect of a Man; and quickly would learn new words, but shewed no understanding of them.

2. Many men born deaf and dumb, are of a strong understanding (enquire of a Brother of Sir Richard Dyett's, a Son of Mr. Peter Whalley of Northampton, a Son in Law of the Lord Wharton's; &c.

3. The *Faculty* and the *Habit* are Two things. The *Faculty* is the *Essential form* of the Substance. The *Habit*, or *Act*, is but an *Accident*. The *Faculty* is nothing but

but the *active Power*. And the *Power* goeth before the *Act*. Doth *acting*; without *Power* to act, cause the *Power*? What need you the *Power*, if you can act without it? And what's a Contradiction, if this be not, to say, I do that which I cannot do, or I can do that which I have no power to do? You are not a man without the Faculty, but you are without the Act; or else you are no man in your sleep. The *act* then is but the *Faculties act*; and *Habits* are nothing but the *Faculties promptitude* to act. And this indeed is caused sometime by very *strong acts*, and sometime, and usually, by *frequent acts*; and sometime suddenly, by a special Divine Operation. No doubt, but Oratory, and all Arts and Sciences, are caused by frequent acts, and their Objects: But those *acts* are caused by *humane Faculties*, under God, the first Cause. You can never cause a Carcass, or a Parrot, or any Bruit, to *think of God*, and the *glory to come*, nor to do any proper humane act.

Credible History assureth us, That Devils, or separate Souls, have acted Carcasses, and discoursed in them, and seemed to commit Fornication in them, and left them dead behind them; and they were known to be the same that were lately executed,
or

or dead, and were re-buried. Here the dead Organ was capable, when a Spirit did but use it.

You too much confound *Intellection* and *Ratiocination*. The prime acts of intellectual Perception, are before Ratiocination. And there are a multitude of Complex Verities, which all sound men know without Syllogisms. The disposition to know them, is so strong, that some call it Actual Knowledge.

§. 25. Add page 6. It's well known, That the Natives in *New England*, the most barbarous *Abassines*, *Gallanes*, &c. in *Ethiopia*, have as good *natural Capacities* as the *Europeans*. So far are they from being but *like Apes* and *Monkeys*; if they be not Ideots, or mad, they sometime shame learned men in their words and deeds. I have known those that have been so coarsly clad, and so clownishly bred, even as to Speech, Looks and Carriages, that Gentlemen and Scholars, at the first congress, have esteemed them much according to your description, when in Discourse they have proved more ingenious than they. And if improvement can bring them to Arts, the *Faculty* was there before. When will you shew us an Ape or a Monkey, that was ever brought to

to the Acts or Habits before mentioned of Men? Yea, of those that were born deaf and dumb?

§. 26. Your mistake of *Adam's case*, and *Solomon's words*, is so gross, that I will not confute it, lest the description of it offend you.

§. 17. The case of *failing memories* is answered before, in the case of *Infancy* and *Apoplexies*, &c. Our memory faileth in our sleep: and yet when we awake, we find that there remains the same knowledg of Arts and Sciences. They did not end at night, and were not all new made the next morning. The Acts ceased, because the receptivity of the passive Organ ceased: but the Habit, and Faculty continued. And when memory in old men faileth about names, and words, and little matters, their judgments about great things are usually stronger (by better Habits) than young mens.

§. 28. You say, You *know nothing wherein Man excels Beasts*, but may be referred to the benefit of *speech and hands*, capable of *effecting its Conceptions*.

Ans. This is answered before. Those *Conceptions* are the *cause* of *words* and *actions*: and is there *no cause* of those *Conceptions*? And if *mans Conceptions* differ from the *beasts*, the *causes* differed. And if the *first Conceptions* did not differ, the *Subsequent* would not differ neither, without a difference in the *causal Faculties*. Why do not *Beasts* speak as well as *Men*? *Parrots* shew, That it is not in all for want of a *speaking Organ*. If one be born dumb, and not deaf, he will know but little the less for his dumbness. If he be born deaf and dumb, and not blind, he will still be rational, as *Dr. Wallis* can tell you, who hath taught such to talk and converse intelligibly by their fingers, and other signs, without words. I confess, if *all the outward Senses* were stopt from the Birth, I see not how the Soul could know *outward sensible things*, as being *no Objects* to it. And how it would work on it self alone, we know not; but *understand*, and *will*, we are sure it doth: and therefore *can do it*. And it's one thing to prove *Beasts to be men*, or *rational*, and another thing to prove *Men to be Beasts*, or *irrational*. If you could prove the former, *viz.* That *Beasts* have Souls that can think of God, and the Life to come, if they could but speak, this would rather prove
them.

them immortal, than prove man unreasonable, or of a mortal Soul. Your whole speech makes more to advance bruits, than to deny the reason of man.

§. 29. You say, You know no better way to attain a right knowledg of our selves, than by beholding our selves in Adam, and enquiring what Nature had endued him with, which will fall far short of what we now admire in our selves.

Ans. 1. As a multitude of Objects, and Experiences, more tend to Wisdom than one alone; so to know both what Adam was, and what all men are, and do, doth evidence more to our information, than to know Adam's first Case alone.

2. Adam's first Powers are to be known by his acts; and his acts were not to be done at once, in a minute, or a day: And we have not the History of his Life much after his Fall. But we may be sure, that Adam's Nature in Innocency, was no baser than ours corrupted. And therefore Adam had the Powers of doing whatever other men since have done.

3. But let us come to your Test: 1. Adam was made a living Soul by the breath of God, after the making of his body of the earth.

2. *Adam* and *Eve* were blessed with a generative multiplying Faculty: but they did not generate *God*; nor did every bruit that had also that Faculty. Therefore there is a *Soul* which is not *God*, in every *Animal*, (nor yet an *Uniyersal Soul*).

3. *Adam*, no doubt, could not know external sensible Objects, till they were brought within the reach of his sense: no more can we.

4. *Adam* knew the Creatures as soon as he saw them; and gave them Names suitable. This is more than we could so soon do.

5. *Adam* had a *Law* given him; and therefore knew that *God* was his Ruler. He knew that *God* was to be obeyed; he knew what was his *Law*: else it had been no sin to break it. He knew that he ought to love, and believe, and trust *God*, and cleave to him: else it had been no sin to forsake him, and to believe the Tempter, and to love the forbidden Fruit better than *God*. He knew that *Death* was the threatned Wages of Sin. In a word, He was made in the *Image of God*: And *Paul* tells us, it is that *Image* into which we are renewed by *Christ*: And he describeth it to consist in wisdom, righteousness, and true holiness.

6. And we have great reason to think, that it was *Adam* that taught *Abel* to offer *Sacrifice in Faith*, and delivered to his Posterity the Traditions which he had from God. Tho' *Adam* did not do all this at once, he did not receive a new Soul or Faculty for every new act. Can *Apes* and *Monkeys* do all this? Doth God give them Laws to know and keep as moral free-agents?

But you say, *Adam* knew not that he was naked. *Ans.* What! and yet knew God and his Law, and how to name the Creatures, and how to dress and keep the Garden? He knew not that *nakedness* was shameful; for he had newly made it shameful.

Perhaps you think of *Adam's* forbidden desire of knowledge, and his miserable attainment of it. But that did not make him a new Soul, that had no such Faculty before. *Adam* was the Son of God by Creation, *Luk. 3.* and it was his duty and interest to live as a Son, in absolute trust on his Fathers care and love: and instead of this, he was tempted to self-dependance, and must needs know more than his duty, & his fathers love and reward: He must know good and evil for himself: like a Child that must know what Food, and Rayment, and Work is fittest for him; which

he should know only by trusting his Father's choice; or as a Patient that must needs know every Ingredient in his Physick, and the Nature and Reason of it, before he will take it, when he should implicitly trust his Physician. Man should have waited on God for all his Notices, and sought to know no more than he revealed. But a distrustful, and a selfish knowledg, and busy enquiring into unrevealed things, is become our sin and misery.

Q. 36. You say, *Suppose all this answered: what will it avail, as to a life of Retribution, if all return to one element, and be there immersed as Brooks and Rivers in the Sea, and we lose our individuation.*

Ans. I answer'd this in the *Appendix to the Reas. of the Christian Religion.* I add
 1. Do you believe, that each one hath *now* one individual Soul, or not? If not, how can we lose that which we never had? If we have but *all one* universal mover, which moveth us as Engines, as the Wind and Water move Mills, how come some motions to be so *swift* (as a Swallow), and others so *slow*, or none at all, in as *mobile* a body)? Yea, how cometh motion to be so much in our Power, that we can *sit still* when we will, and *rise*, and *go*, and *run*, and *speak when*
we

we will, and cease, or change it when we will? A stone that falls, or an arrow that is shot, cannot do so. Sure it is some inward formal Principle; and not a material Mechanical mobility of the matter, which can cause this difference.

Indeed if we have all but *one Soul*, it's easie to *love our Neighbours as our selves*, because *our Neighbours are our selves*. But it's as easie to hate our *selves* as our *Enemies*, and the *good* as the *bad*, if all be one (for *forma dat nomen & esse*). But it's strange, that either God, or the Soul of the World, shall *hate it self*, and put it self to pain, and fight against it self, as in Wars, &c.

But if you think still, That there is nothing but *God* and *dead matter actuated by him*, I would beg your Answer to these few Questions.

1. Do you really believe, that there is a *God*? that is, an *eternal infinite self-being*, who hath all that power, knowledg, and goodness of will, in transcendent Eminency, which any Creature hath formally, and is the efficient Governor of all else that is. If not, all the world condemneth you: for *it is not an uncaused Being*, and can have nothing but from its Cause, who can give nothing greater than it self.

2. Do you think this God *can* make a Creature that hath a subordinate Soul, or Spirit, to be the Principle of its own Vital Action, Intellection, and Volition, or not? Cannot God make a Spirit? If not, it is either because it is a Contradiction (which none can pretend), or because God is not Omnipotent; that is, is *not* God; and so there is *no* God; and so you deny what you granted. But if God *can* make a Spirit,

3. Why should you think he *would* not? Some of your mind say, That he *doth* all the good that he can; or else he were *not* perfectly good. Certainly his *goodness* is equal to his *greatness*, and is communicative.

4. Hath he not imprinted his Perfections in some measure, in his Works? Do they not shew his glory? Judg of his Greatness by the Sun, Stars, and Heavens; and of his Wisdom, by the wonderful Order, Contexture, and Government of all things. Even the Fabrick of a Fly, or any Animal, poseth us. And do you think, that his love and goodness hath no answerable effect?

5. Do you think, that *passive matter* doth as much manifest Gods Perfection, and honour the Efficient, as *vital* and *Intellectu-*

al Spirits? If it be a far nobler Work for God to make a *free, vital, mental Spirit*, to act under him *freely, mentally, and vitally*, than to make *meer atomes*, why should you think that God *will not* do it?

6. And do you not dishonour, or blaspheme the prime Cause, by such dishonouring of his *Work*, as to say, he never made any thing more noble than *Atomes*, and *Compositions* of them.

7. Is there not in the *Creature* a communicative disposition to cause their like? *Animals* generate their like: *Fire* kindleth fire: *Wise men* would make others wise: *God* is essential infinite *Life, Wisdom* and *Love*: and can he, or would he make nothing liker to himself than dead *Atomes*? Yea, you feign him to make nothing but by *Composition*, while you say, That *matter* it self is *eternal*.

8. But when the matter of *Fact* is evident, and we see by the actions, that there is a difference between things moved by *God*, some having a created *Life* and *mind*, and some *none*, what needs then any further proof?

9. 31. But if you hold, That we have now *distinct Spirits*, which are *individual*

Substances, why should you fear the *loss of our individuation*, any more than our annihilation, or specifick alteration? If God made as many substantial individual Souls, as men, is there any thing in Nature or Scripture, which threatheneth the loss of Individuation? I have shewed you, and shall further shew you enough against it.

§. 32. You say, page 7. *Every thing returneth to its element, and loseth its individuation: Earth to Earth, Water to the Sea, the Spirit to God that gave it. What happiness then can we hope for more than deliverance from the present calamity; or what misery are we capable of, more than is common to all?*

Ans. 1. Bodies lose but their *Composition*, and *Spiritual forms*. Do you think, that any *Atome* loseth its individuation? If it be still divisible *in partes infinitas*, it is infinite. And if every *Atome* be infinite, it is as much, or more than all the world; and so is no part of the world; and so there would be as many Worlds, or Infinites, as *Atomes*. It is but an *aggregative motion* which you mention. *Birds of a Feather will flock together*, and yet are *Individuals still*. Do you think any dust, or drop, any *Atome* of Earth or Water, loseth

feth any thing of it self, by its union with the rest? Is any *Substance* lost? Is the simple Nature changed? Is it not Earth and Water still? Is not the *Hæcceity*, as they call it, continued? Doth not God know every dust, and every drop from the rest? Can he not separate them when he will? And if Nature in all things tend to *aggregation*, or *union*, it is then the *Perfection* of every thing. And why should we fear Perfection?

2. But *Earth*, and *Water*, and *Air*, are *partible matter*. *Earth* is easily separable: The parts of *Water* more hardly, by the means of some terrene Separaror: The parts of *Air* yet more hardly: and the Sun-beams, or substance of fire, yet harder than that (tho its contraction and effects are very different): And *Spirits* either yet harder, or not at all. Some make it essential to them to be *indiscerptible*; and all must say, That there is nothing in the Nature of them, *tending to division*, or separation. And therefore tho God, who can *annihilate* them, can *divide* them into parts, if it be no Contradiction; yet it *will never be*, because he useth every thing according to its nature, till he cometh to miracles. Therefore their *dissolution of parts* is no more to be feared, than their *annihilation*.

3. But

3. But if you take Souls to be *partible* and *unible*, then you must suppose every part to have still its own existence in the *whole*. And do you think, that this doth not more *advance* Souls than *abase* them? Yea, you seem to *Deifie* them, while you make them all to return into *God*, as drops into the Sea. And if you feign *God* to be *partible*, is it not more honour and joy to be a *part of God*, who is *joy it self*, than to be a *created Soul*? If a thousand Candles were put out, and their light turned into one *Luminary*, as great as they all, every part would have its share in the enlightning of the place about it. Is it any loss to a single Soldier, to become part of a victorious Army.

4. But indeed this is too high a Glory for the Soul of man to desire, or hope for. It is enough to have a blessed union with Christ, and the holy Society, consistent with our Individuation. Like will to like, and yet be it self. Rivers go to the Sea, and not to the Earth. Earth turns to Earth, and not to the Sun, or Fire. And the holy and blessed, go to the holy and blessed: And I believe, that their union will be nearer than we can now well conceive, or than this selfish state of man desireth: But as every drop in the Sea, is the

same Water it was, so every Soul will be the same Soul.

2. And as to the *incapacity of misery* which you talk of, why should you think it more *hereafter* than *here*? If you think all Souls now to be but *one*, doth not an aching Tooth, or a gouty Foot, or a calculous Bladder, suffer pain, tho it be not the *body* that feeleth; but the same *sensitive Soul* is pain'd in one part, and pleas'd in another. And if all Souls be now but God in divers Bodies, or the *Anima mundi*, try if you can comfort a man under the torment of the *Stone*, or other Malady, or on the Rack, or in terror of Conscience, by telling him, That his *Soul* is a part of God. Will this make a Captive bear his Captivity, or a Malefactor his Death? If not here, why should you think that their misery hereafter will be ever the less; or more tolerable for your conceit, that they are parts of God? They will be no more parts of him then, than they were here. But it's like, that they also will have an *uniting inclination*, even to such as themselves; or that God, will separate them from all true unity, and say, *Go you cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels, &c.*

§. 33. No doubt it's true, that you say, page 7, and 8. That *matter is still the same, and liable to all the changes which you mention.* But it's an *unchanged God*, who doth all this by *Spirits*, as second Causes, who are not of such a *changeable, dissoluble, partible nature*, as Bodies are: It is *Spirits* that do all that's done in the world. And I conjecture, as well as you, That *universal Spirits* are *universal Causes*. I suppose, That this Earth hath a *vegetative form*, which maketh it as a *matrix* to receive the Seeds, and the more active influx of the Sun. But *Earth* and *Sun* are but *general Causes*. Only *God*, and the *seminal Virtue*, cause the *species*, as such. The *Sun* causeth every Plant to grow; but it causeth not the difference between the Rose, and the Nettle. and the Oak. The wonderful unsearchable *Virtue* of the Seed causeth that. And if you would know that *Virtue*, you must know it by the effects. You cannot tell by the *Seed* only of a Rose, a Vine, an Oak, what is in it. But when you see the Plants in ripeness, you may see that the *Seeds had a specifying Virtue*, by the influx of the general Cause, to bring forth those Plants, Flowers, &c. Neither can you know what is in the Egg, but by the ripe Bird; nor what

what the Soul of an Infant is, but by Man-
hood and its Acts.

§. 34. You here pag. 7. divert from the
point of the *Immortality* or *Nature* of the
Soul, to that of the *Resurrection of the Body*:
of which I will now say but this; *Christ*
rose, and hath *promised us a Resurrection*;
and nothing is difficult to God. *ἀνάστασις* oft
signifieth *our living another life after this*.
The *Body* hath more parts than *Earth* and
Water. The *Spirits* as we call them, which
are the *igneous* parts, lodged in the purest
aerial in the blood, &c. are *that body* in and
by which the Soul doth operate on the rest.
How much of these *material Spirits* the
Soul may retain with it after Death, we
know not: and if it have *such a body*, it
hath partly the *same*; and God can make
what Addition he please, which shall not
contradict identity: *Paul* saith of Corn,
God giveth it a body as pleaseth him, in some
respect the *same*, &c. in some not *the same*
that was sown. We do not hold, That all
the flesh that ever a man had, shall be rai-
sed as that mans. If one man that was
fat, grow lean in his sickness, we do not
say, that all the flesh that sickness wasted,
shall rise: It shall rise a *spiritual body*. God
knoweth that which *you* and *I* know not.

§. 35. You add, *how easie it would have been to you to believe as the Church believeth, and not to have immersed your self in these difficulties ?*

Ans. 1. The Church is nothing but all individual Christians; and it is their *Belief* which makes them capable of being of the Church: As we must be *men* in order of Nature, before we are a *Kingdom of men*; so we are *Believers* before we are a *Church of Believers*. A *Kingdom or Policy* maketh us not *men*, but is made of *men*; and *Church-society or Policy* maketh us not *Believers*, but is made up of *Believers*. Therefore *Belief* is *first*, and is not caused by that which followeth it? And why doth the Church believe? Is it because they believe?

And *whom do they believe*? Is it themselves? I doubt you have fallen into acquaintance with those whose *Interest* hath made it their *Trade* to puzzle and confound men about things as hard to themselves as others, that they may bring them to trust the Church, and then tell them that it's *they* that are that *Church*, as a necessary means to the quieting their minds. And they tell them, *You are never able by reason to comprehend the mysteries of Faith; the more you search, the more you are confounded. But if*
you

you believe as the Church believeth, you shall speed as the Church speedeth., But it's one thing to believe the *same thing* which the Church believeth ; and another to believe it with the *same faith*, and upon the same *Authority*. If a man believe all the Articles of the Creed only because men tell him that they are true, it is but a *human Faith*, as resting only on mans *Authority* ; but the true Members of the Church believe all the *same things*, because God *revealeth* and *attesteth* them ; and this is a *Divine Faith*: And so must you.

If you love light more than darknes and deceit, distinguish, 1. Believing men for *Authority*. 2. Believing men for their *Honesty*, 3. Believing men for the *natural impossibility of their deceiving*.

And the foundation of this difference is here: Mans Soul hath two sorts of acts, *Necessary* and *Contingent*, or *mutably free*.

To love our selves, to be unwilling to be miserable, and willing to be happy ; to love God as good, if known, &c. are acts of the Soul as *necessary*, as for fire to burn combustible contiguous matter ; or for a Bruit to eat ; so that all the Testimonies which is produced by these *necessary* acts by *knowing men*, hath a *Physical* certainty, the contrary being impossible. And this is *infallible historical*

historical knowledge of matter of fact. Thus we know there is such a City as *Rome, Paris, Venice, &c.* and that there was such a man as *K. James, Ed. 6. Hen. 8. William the Conqueror, &c.* And that the Statutes now ascribed to *Ed. 3.* and other Kings and their Parliaments are genuine. For Judges judge by them, Lawyers plead them, Kings own them, all men hold their Estates and Lives by them. Contrary mens Interest by Lawyers are daily pleaded by them against each other; and if any one would deny, forge or corrupt a Statute, Interest would engage the rest against him to detect his fraud.

1. *The certain effect of natural necessary Causes hath natural necessary evidence of Truth.*

But when all knowing men of contrary Dispositions and Interests. acknowledg a thing true, this is the effect of natural necessary Causes.

Ergo it hath natural necessary evidence of Truth.

2. *It is impossible there should be an Effect without a sufficient Cause.*

But that a thing should be false which all knowing men of contrary Dispositions and Interests acknowledg to be true, would be an Effect without a Cause; for there is no Cause

in nature to effect it. It is impossible in nature that all men in *England* should agree to say, There was a King *James*, K. *Edward*, Q. *Mary*, or that these Statutes were made by them, if it were false. This is *infallible Historical Testimony*. It were not so strong if it were only by *one Party*, and not by *Enemies* also, or men of contrary Minds and Interests. And thus we know the History of the Gospel; and this *Tradition* is naturally *infallible*.

II. But all the Testimony which dependeth on humane Acts, *not necessary*, but *free*, have but an *uncertain moral humane Credibility*. For so all men are *Lyars*; i. e. *fallible*, and not fully to be trusted.

And I. Those Testimonies which depend on mens *Honesty*, are no farther credible, than we know the *Honesty* of the men: which in some is *great*, in some is *none*, in most is *mixt*, and *lubricous*, and *doubtful*, Alas! what abundance of false History is in the world! Who can trust the *Honesty* of such men, as multitudes of Popes, Prelates, and Priests have been? Will they stick at a Lye, that stick not at Blood, or any wickedness? Besides, the *ignorance* which invalidates their Testimony.

II. And to pretend *Authority* to rule our Faith, is the most unsatisfactory way of all.

For before you can believe that Jesus is the Christ, and his Word true, how many impossibilities have you to believe? 1. You must believe that Christ hath a Church. 2. And hath authorized them to determine what is to be believed, before you believe that he is Christ. 3. You must know who they be whom you must believe; whether all, or some, or a *major* vote. Whether out of all the world, or a party. 4. And how far their Authority extendeth? Whether to judg whether there be a God, or no God; a Christ, or no Christ; a Heaven, or none; a Gospel, or none: or what. 5. And how their determinations out of all the world may come with certainty to us: and where to find them. 6. And when Countreys and Councils contradict and condemn each other, which is to be believed. Many such *impossibilities* in the *Roman* way, must be believed, before a man can believe that Jesus is the Christ. In a word, you must not puzzle your head to know *what a man is*, or *whether he have an immortal soul*; but you must, 1. believe the *Church of Believers*, before you are a *Believer in Christ*. 2. And you must believe, that Christ was God and Man, and came to save man, before you believe that there is such a creature as *man*, or *what he is*, and whether he have a soul capable of salvation. But I have oft elsewhere opened these Absurdities and Contradictions;

traditions ; where you may see them confuted, if you are willing.

§. 36. Your question about the *souls nature, existence, and Individuation*, may be resolved by a *surer and easier way* : as followeth :

I. By *your own certain experience*.

1. You perceive that you *see, feel, understand, will and execute*. 2. You may know, as is oft said, that therefore you have an *active power* to do these. 3. You may thence know, that it is a *substance* which hath that power. Nothing can do nothing. 4. You may perceive, that it is not the *terrene substance*, but an *invisible substance*, actuating the body. 5. You may know, that there is no probability, that so noble a substance should be *annihilated*. 6. Or that a *pure and simple substance* should be *dissolved* by the separation of parts (or if that were, every part would be a *spirit* still). 7. You have no cause to suspect, that this substance should lose those *powers or faculties* which are its *essential form*, and be turned into some other *species*, or thing. 8. And you have as little cause to suspect, that an essential vital intellective power, will not be *active*, when *active inclination* is its *Essence*. 9. You have no cause to suspect, that it will want *Objects* to action in a World of such variety of Objects. 10. And you have as little cause to

suspect, that it will be unactive, for want of
 Organs, when God hath made its *Essence a-*
ctive; and either can make new Organs; or
 that which can act *on matter*, can act *without*,
 or on other matter. He that can play on a
 Lute, can do somewhat as good, if that be bro-
 ken. 11. And experience might satisfy you,
 that *several* men have *several* souls, by the
several and *contrary* Operations. 12. And you
 have no reason to suspect, that God will turn
many, from being *many*, into *one*; or that *unity*
 should be any of their *loss*. All this, Reason
 tells you, beginning at your own experience,
 as I have (and elsewhere more fully) opened.

§. 37. I I. And you have at hand *sensible*
proof of the *individuation* of *spirits*, by *Witches*,
Contracts, and *Apparitions*: of which the world
~~has~~ unquestionable proof, tho there be very
 many Cheats. Read Mr. *Glanvill's* new Book,
 published by Dr. *Maure*, *La water de Spectris*,
Zauchy de Angilii, *Manlii Collect. Bodin's Dæ-*
monolog. Remigius of Witches, besides all the
Malli Malificorum, and doubt if you can. If
 you do, I can give you yet more, with full
 proof.

§. 38. III. But all that I have said to you,
 but the *least part*, in comparison of the af-
 rance which you may have by the *full*

revelation of *Jesus Christ*, who hath brought life and immortality to light in the Gospel, where the state, the doom, the rewards and punishment of souls is asserted.

And without dark and long Ambages, or *Roman Juggles*, we prove the truth of this Gospel, briefly and infallibly thus :

I. The *History* of *Christ's* Life, Miracles, Doctrine, Death, Resurrection, Ascension, the *Apostles* Miracles, &c. is proved by such forementioned evidence, as hath *physical certainty*: Not such as dependeth only on *mens honesty*, or *moral argument*, much less on a pretended *determining authority*; but such as dependeth on *necessary acts of man*, even the *consent of all sorts of contrary minds and interests*, as we know the *Statutes of the Land*, or other certain *History*. But we are so far from needing to ask, *which part of Christians* it is that is *this Church*, that is to be believed, that it tendeth to the ascertaining of us, that all the *Christian World*, *Papists*, *Protestants*, *Greeks*, *Moscovites*, *Armenians*, *Jacobites*, *Nestorians*, &c. herein agree, even while they oppose each other. To know whether there was a *Julius*, or *Augustus Caesar*, a *Virgil*, *Ovid* *Cicero*, and which are their *Works*; yea, *which are the Acts of Councils*, no man goeth to an *authorized determining*

Judge for the matter of Fact, but to *historical proof*. And this we have most full.

I. And if the *History* be true, the *Doctrine* must needs be true, seeing it is fully proved by the matters of Fact. Christ being proved to be Christ, all his words must needs be true.

§. 39. The *Gospel* of Christ, hath these four parts of its infallible evidence.

I. The *antecedent and inhererent Prophecies* fulfilled.

II. The *inherent impress* of *Divinity* on the *Gospel it self*, unimitable by man. It hath *Gods Image and Superscription*; and its Excellency, *propria luce*, is discernible.

III. All the *Miracles*, and *Resurrection*, and *Ascension* of Christ, the *Gift of his Spirit*, and extraordinary *Miracles* of the *Apostles*, and first Churches.

IV. The *sanctifying work* of the *Spirit* by this *Gospel*, on all Believers in all Ages of the World, by which they have the Witness in themselves. A full constant unimitable Testimony.

§. 40. And now how highly soever you think of Bruits, think not too basely of Men, for whom *Christ* became a *Saviour*:

And

And yet think not so *highly* of *Men, Bruits* and *Stones*, as to think that they are *God*. And think not that your true *diligence* hath confounded you, but either your *negligence*, or *seducers*, or the unhappy stifling of obvious truth, by the ill ordering of your thoughts. And I beseech you remember, that *Gods Revelations* are suited to *mans use*, and our *true knowledg* to his *Revtlations*. He hath not told us *all that man would know*, but *what we must know*. Nothing is more known to us than that of *God* which is *necessary* for us: Yet nothing so incomprehensible as *God*. There is much of the *Nature of Spirits*, and the *world to come*, *unsearchable* to us, which will pose all our *Wits*: yet we have sufficient certainty of so much as tells us our *duty* and our hopes. *God* hath given us *Souls to use*, and to *know only so far as is useful*. He that made your *Watch*, taught not you *how it's made*, but how to *use it*. Instead therefore of your concluding complaints of your condition, thank *God*, who hath made man capable to seek him, serve him, love him, praise him, and rejoyce in hope of promised Perfection. Live not as a *willful stranger* to your *Soul and God*. Use faithfully the *Faculties* which he hath given you: sin not willfully against the truth revealed, and leave things *secret* to *God*, till you come into the clearer light: and you shall

shall have no cause to complain, that God, whose goodness is equal to his greatness, hath dealt hardly with mankind. Instead of trusting *fallible man*, trust *Christ*, who hath fully proved his trustiness; and his *Spirit* will advance you to higher things than bruits are capable of. God be merciful to us dark unthankful sinners.

Mar. 14.
1681.

Ri. Baxter.

E R R A T A.

IN the Second Part, p. 12. l. 9. for *primus* r. *Prima*.
p. 16. l. 21. for *is* r. *are*.

I have not leisure to gather the rest, if there be any.

OF THE
NATURE
OF
SPIRITS;
ESPECIALLY
MANS SOUL.

In a placid Collation with the Learned

Dr. Henry More,

In a Reply to his Answer to a private
Letter, Printed in his second Edition
of *Mr. Glanviles Sadduceismus Tri-*
umphatus.

By Richard Baxter.

L O N D O N, Printed for B. Smeethons,
at the *Three Golden Cocks* at the West
End of *St. Pauls.* 1682.



and I are agreed that we cannot conceive of a Spirit unico conceptu, but must have two inadequate conceptions of it: of which one is that which Dr. Glisson De Vita naturæ, calls conceptus fundamentalis, and is that which we call Substantia: for we can scarce think of a Virtus formalis, which is not substantiæ alicujus virtus, but qua virtus simpliciter existeth of itself, (unless we must so think with some of God.) And though this maketh not an actual composition, as Matter and Form in mixtis, yet intellectually we must take it as a distinct inadequate conceptus.

The other inadequate conceptus is Formal; and I think you and I are agreed that this is Virtus Una-trina, as described by me, viz. Virtus Vitalis, vitaliter activa, perceptiva, appetitiva, as Dr. Glisson speaks: (of which I make three species as described.) And I am myself far better acquainted with the nature of

a Spirit by the essential Virtus formalis, known to us by its acts ; (for nothing doth that which it cannot do) than from the notion of substantiality. And yet I dare not say that a self-moving principle is proper to a Spirit. Nor do I consent to Campanella de sensu rerum, and Dr Gliffon that would make all things alive by an essentializing form in the very Elements.

I distinguish Natures into Active and Passive ; and Passivity is a word that serveth me as well as materiality : But whence the Descensus gravium is, I despair of knowing ; and if it be of an innate principle, I call it not therefore a Spirit, because it is but passivorum motus aggregativus ad unionem in quiete, when Spirits motion is vital and so essential to them, that they tend not to union in quiescence, but in everlasting activity ; quiescence in inactivity, being as much against their nature as motion against a Stones. So

that I think we are agreed of the formal notice of a Spirit in general, and of an intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative in specie.

But truly I am at a loss about the *conceptus fundamentalis*, wherein the true difference lieth between *Substantia* and *Materia*. Do we by --- *Substantia* mean a *conceptus realis*, or only *Relative*. To say it doth *substare accidentibus*, speaks but a *Relation* directly, and leaves the question unanswered, *Quid est quod substare accidentibus*. To say it is not an *Accident*, tells us not what it is, but what it is not. To say it doth *subsist* per se, either saith no more than that it is *Ens reale*, or else tells us not what it is that doth *subsist*. *Quoad notationem nominis distinct* from use. doth not *materia* and *substantia* signify the same fundamental *conceptus*? And is not the form the notifying difference? You difference *Substance* and *Matter* antecedently to the formal difference by *Penetrabili-*

trability & Impenetrability, Indivisibility & Divisibility. *But 1. I despair knowing in this life, how far Spiritual Substances are penetrable and indivisible. I grant you such an extension as shall free them from being nothing substantial, and from being Infinite as God is.*

2. We grant Spirits a quantitas discreta; they are numerous, individuate; and formæ se multiplicant. Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter? But if he should, that would be no destruction of their Species, as the mixtorum dissolutio is; but as every drop of divided Water is Water, & one Candle lighting many, and many joynd in one, are all the same fire; so much more would it be with Spirits, were they united or divided; and their locality

and penetrability are past our conceit. 3. But were we sure of what we say therein; these two (Penetrability and Indivisibility) speak but Accidents, though proper; and therefore are no satisfying notice of the notion of Substance Spiritual as distinct from Matter. I am hitherto therefore constrained to contain many thoughts in the following compass.

1. I know Spirits best by the *Virtus vitalis formalis una trina*.

2. I hold that of Created Spirits *substantia* as notifying a *Basis realis*, must be the *Conceptus Fundamentalis*.

3. The word *Immaterial* signifying nothing (but a negation) and *Materia* being by many Antients used in the same sense as we do *Substantia*, I usually lay by the words.

4. I hold to the distinction of Natures, or Substances Passive and Active.

5. I

5. I distinguish Spiritual Substances as such by the Purity of the Substance, besides the Formal Difference.

6. Yet I doubt not but all Created Spirits are somewhat Passive, quia influxum causæ primæ recipiunt: And you grant them a Spissitude and Extension, which signifie as much as many mean that call them Material. But Custom having made Materia; but specially Corpus, to signifie onely such grosser Substance as the three Passive Elements have, I yield so to say, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material.

7. Though I run not into the excess of Ludov. Le Grand de Igne (nor of Telesius or Patricius) I would Ignis were better studied: But this Room will not serve me to say what I think of it. But in brief, He that knoweth that Ignis is a Substance, whose Form is the Potentia Activa movendi, illu-

illuminandi, calefaciendi, these as received in a gross Passive Body, being but their Accidents oft, but the Igneous Substance in act operating on them, and conceiveth of Spirits, but as Ignis eminenter, that is, of a purer substance than Ignis is, which we best conceive of (next the Formal Virtue) by its similitude, I think knows as much as I can reach of the Substance of Created Spirits. And the Greek Fathers that called Spirits Fire, and distinguished Ignem per formas into Intellectualive, Sensitive, and Vegetative or Visible Fire; (as it is in Aere Ignito,) allowing an Incomprehensible Purity of Substance in the higher above the lower (as in Passives Air hath above Water, &c.) I think did speak tolerably, and as informingly as are the notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility; though perhaps these also may be useful.

Sir, I crave your pardon of these
curt

curt expressions of the thoughts
which you desired concerning the
description of a Spirit. If God
make us truly holy, we shall quick-
ly know more to our satisfaction.
I rest

Your obliged Servant,

Nov. 17.
1681.

Rich. Baxter.

You make [a Spirit to be
Ens, ideoque, Unum, Verum, and
that *True* denotes the *answe-
rability* of the thing to its proper
Idea, and implies *right matter
and form duly conjoined.*] Q. Do
you not here make Spirits ma-
terial? But no doubt whether

to be called *Material* or *Substantial*, the form is not an *Adjoyned thing*, but the form of a simple essence is but an *inadequate conceptus*, making no composition.

OF

OF THE
NATURE
OF
SPIRITS:

A Placid Collation with the Learned Dr
Henry More; upon his Answer to a private Letter, published in the second Edition of Mr. *Glanviles Sadduceismus Triumphatus*.

Reverend Sir,

§ 1. **T**hat my hasty Letter should occasion you to benefit the World with more of your Information, in so considerable a point, as is the nature of a Spirit, was more than I thought of, or could hope for; Had I imagined that you would have so far honoured it, I should have so written it, as might have drawn out more of your Instruction, and made your Animadversions yet more edifying.

§ 2. I

§ 2. I desired you to have forbore the title of Psychopyrist, for these Reasons: 1. Because it tendeth plainly to misinform the Reader, as if I held that Souls (or Spirits) are Fire; whereas in my Books and Letters, I still say otherwise. And that they may be so called not formaliter, or univoce, but only eminenter and analogice. And when a name on the Title page, & through the whole, and a supposition in much of your arguing, implyeth that I hold what I renounce, it may wrong your Reader's understanding, though I am below the capacity of being wronged.

2. And the fastning of Nicknames on one another in Controversies of Religion, hath so much caused Schisms, and other mischiefs, that I confess I the less like it about Philosophy. But I must submit.

§ 3. My understanding is grown so suspicious of ambiguity in almost all words, that I must confess that what you say also against those whom
you

you call Hohenmerians and Nullibists satisfieth me not, unless many terms used in the controversies, were farther explained than I find them here, or in your *Metaphysicks* (your Books against Judge Hale I have not seen.) But I may take it for granted that you know that they who use the saying of [*Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*] ordinarily tell us; 1. That they use the word *Tota* relatively, and improperly; seeing that which hath no parts is improperly called *Tota*. 2. That they mean it but negatively, viz. That the Soul is not in the parts of the body, per partes, part in one part, and part in another, but indivisibly. And one would think this should suit with your own hypothesis.

And when I better know in what sense *Locus* is used, I shall be fitter to enquire whether Spirits be in loco. When some take it for a circumscribing body, and some for a subjective body (on which it operateth) and some for a meer room possess'd in vacuo,
and

'and some for God himself in whom are all things, the name of a Nullibist is as ambiguous to me.

§ 4. You tell your Reader that [All created Spirits are Souls in all probability, and actuate some Matter or other.]

Sir, Philosophers freedom is usually taken easlyer than Divines; I will therefore presume that our mutual freedom shall not be in the least distastful to either of us: And so I must tell you that I have long taken it for a matter of very great use to distinguish unknown things from known, and to bridle my understanding from presuming to enquire into unrevealed things: And I take that boldness of Philosophers to have had a great hand in corrupting Divinity. Secret things are for God, and things revealed for us and our Children, saith Moses. And when I presume most, I do but most lose my self, and misuse my understanding: nothing is good for that which it was not made for:

for : Our understandings as our Eyes are made only for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this to be an excess; And I have oft wondered at your Friend, and (sometime) mine, Mr. Glanvile, that after his *Sceptis scientifica*, he could talk and write of doubtful things with that strange degree of confidence, and censuring of Dissenters as he did. I am accused of overdoing, and curiosity my self: But I endeavour to confine my enquiries to things revealed.

This premised I say, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed, either as to any certainty or probability, that all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter. Alas how should we come to know it. Neither Nature nor Scripture tells it us.

But 1. If this be so; the difference between you and the Psychopysists must be opened as it is (much like that of Mammertus and Faustus,) whether the Soul (or a Spirit) have Matter by composition, or simply

ply un compounded: for a body you suppose it still to have. Is it separable from a Body or not? If it be, why should you think that it is never separated? If it can subsist without a Body, who can say that it doth not? If it cannot but be inseparable, it is a strange composition that God cannot dissolve. And if it perish upon the dissolution, then it was but an Accident of the body, and not a compounding Substance. Dr. Glissons and Campanella's way is as probable as this; And I marvel that when you have dealt with so many sorts of Dissenters you meddle not with so subtle a piece as that old Doctor's de Vita Naturæ: I have talkt with divers high pretenders to Philosophy here of the new strain, and askt them their judgment of Dr. Glissons Book, and I found that none of them understood it, but neglected it as too hard for them, and yet contemned it. He supposeth all Matter to be animated without composition, the Matter and Form being but conceptus inadequate.

qua.

quati, of an uncompounded being; however that Matter as such be divisible, into atomes, every atome still being uncompounded living Matter. You suppose all Spirit to be in Matter, but by way of composition as distinct substances. I go the middle way, and suppose that substance (simple) is Active or Passive: that the three Passive Elements, Earth, Water and Air are animated only by composition, or operation of the active; But that the active substances have no composition, (but intellectual) but Substance and form are conceptus ejusdem inadequati. So that what Dr. Glisson saith of every clod and stone, I say only of Spirits, (of fire I shall speak after.)

2. And do you think that the Soul carrieth a body out of the body inseparable with it, or only that it receiveth a new body when it passeth out of the old. If the latter, is there any instant of time between the dispossession of the old, and the possession of the new. If any, then the Soul is

*Sometime without a body : And how
 can you tell how long. If not what bo-
 dy is it that you can imagine so ready
 to receive it without any interpositi-
 on? I have not been without tempta-
 tions to over inquisitive thoughts a-
 bout these matters : And I never had
 so much ado to overcome any such
 temptation, as that to the opinion of
 Averrhoes, that as extinguished Can-
 dles go all into one illumi-
 nated air, so separated Souls go
 all into one common Anima
 Mundi, and lose their individuation,
 and that Materia receptiva indivi-
 duat. And then indeed your notion
 would be probable ; for the Anima
 mundi mundum semper animat, and
 so my separated Soul should be still
 imbodyed in the world, and should
 have its part in the worlds anima-
 tion ; But both Scripture and Appa-
 ritions assure us of the individuati-
 on of Spirits, and separate Souls.*

*And I confess to you that I have
 oft told the Sadduces and Infidels,
 that urge seeming impossibilities a-
 gainst*


gainst the Resurrection, and the activity of separate Souls for want of Organs, that they are not sure that the Soul taketh not with it, at its departure hence, some seminal material Spirits (ethereal and airy;) and so that this spirituous or igneous body, which it carrieth hence, is a semen to the body, which it shall have at the Resurrection, no man knoweth the contrary, and no man knoweth that it is so.

The Soul is many months here in organizing its own body in generation, and more in nourishing it to a useful state: That particular organical bodies are made ready to receive them just at death, is hard to be believed: That the matter of the Universe is still ready is past doubt. But how organized, or how the Soul worketh without Organs, we shall better know hereafter. Your opinion much favoureth the Pythagoreans; If the Soul be never out of a body, is it not as like to come into one new forming in the womb, as into we know not what or where? B 3 45

§ 5. I could wish you had printed my Letter wholly by itself before you had annexed your answer, that the Reader might have understood it; which I can hardly do my self as you have parcel'd it. But we must not have what we would have from wiser men.

I take it for an odd method, when I never asserted Spirits to be fire, but denyed it, first to be in your Epistle feigned to have said it, and yet in the end of it for you to say that [I mean not ordinary fire, but that my meaning is more subtle and refined] and never tell the Reader what it is before you dispute it, and then through the whole answer to dispute on a wrong supposition, and in the end of the Book to confess again that I say not that Spirits are fire or material.

§ 6. Had I been to choose an edifying method, we would first have stated our question, and agreed on the meaning of our terms; But I must follow your steps; though I had rather have done otherwise.



Ad S E C T. I.

§ I. **T**Hat my Notions are likethose of Judge *Hale*, is no wonder ; we were no strangers to each others thoughts about these matters ; and though he and you have had some peaceable Velitations, I take it for no dishonour to be of his mind.

1. *De Nomine* : There is no such agreement among Philosophers of the *name* *Matter* as you suppose. I refer you for brevity, but to a very small Book of a very Learned Author (advanced by the Preface of one eminent for subtilty) the *Metaphysicks* of Dr. *Rich. Crakenhorp*, who tells you at large, that *Matter* is taken either *properly* (as you and I do *Substance*) and so *Spirits* are *material*, or improperly and narrowly for that only which hath the three dimensions ; and so *Spirits* are not *material*. It's unprofitable to cite many more so to the same purpose : And I

B 4

suppose

suppose you know, that not only *Tertulian*, but many other of the Fathers (many of whom you may find cited by *Faustus Reg.* whom *Mammertus* answereth) so used both *Matter* and *Corpus* also.

§ 2. The word [*Form*] is as ambiguous; You and I are not the only persons that use it not in the same sense. Matter in its first *Conceptus* called *Primus*, hath no *Form*; that is, is conceived of abstracted from all Form. Matter in its next *Conceptus* is conceived of as diversified by accidents, as quantity, figure, &c. And so the 3 passive Elements, Earth, Air & Water, are diversified by many accidents, making up that *Consistence*, which is called their several *forms*, known only by sense, and capable of no perfect definition. Many such passive Materials conjunct have their Relative Form, which is that Contexture in which consisteth their aptitude for their use: as a House, a Ship, a Gun, a Watch. In Compositions where the Active natures are added, and operate unitedly on the passive, there the Active is the *Form* of the Compound, quite in another sense than any of the former, *viz.* as it is *principium motus*.

You and I are enquiring of the different *Forms* of *Matter* and *Spirit*: You say that *Impenetrability*, and *Divisibility* are the

Form

Form of Matter, and the contrary of Spirit:
 I say, that 1. *Substance as Substance,* (and
Matter taken for Substance, which Dr.
Crakenthorpe thinketh is the properest
 sense) as such hath no Form, that is, *in*
conceptu primo. 2. That substance distin-
 guished by subtilty & crassitude, visibility
 and invisibility, quantity, shape, motion,
 &c. doth herein differ *Modally*: And this
Mode may well enough be called the
Form, before it have another Form:
 And as the divers foresaid Elements thus
 differ, so the substance of Spirits no doubt
 hath some *Modal Excellency* above all
 Bodies or Matter strictly or narrowly so
 called: And if you will call this a *Form*,
 I contend not about the word, but it is
 but equivocally so called, Spirits having
 another nobler sort of Form. 3. Nothing
 hath two Forms univocally so called: But
 Spirits have all that *Virtus formativa*, which
 I oft described. which is their very form:
 There is no Spirit without it: It's not a
 Compounding part, but the form of a
 simple substance. *Vital Virtue, Vis, Poten-*
tia activa, signifieth not the same thing
 with Penetrability, and Indiscerpibility;
 Therefore both cannot be the Form uni-
 vocally so called: And how you could put
 both these your self into one definition,
 as

as a kind of *Compounded Form* I wonder. Yea, your two words themselves signify not the same thing: Penetrable and Indiscerpible are not words of one signification. And surely you will grant that these two, *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible* can be no otherwise a Form to *Spirits*, than *Impenetrable* and *Discerpible* are a Form to Matter. And it's apparent that the first is but a modal *conceptus*, and the latter a relative notion of Matter, and neither one nor both are contrary to *Virtus Vitalis* in a Spirit (or *Virtus activa*:) Meer *passive potentiality* is rather the contrary difference here.

And I know not why you might not as well have named divers other Accidents or Modes, especially *Quantity*, and the *trina dimensio*, and called them all the *Form of Matter*, as well as your two.

Indeed when we have from sense a true notion of Matter, we must know that it hath *Quantity*, and is *somewhere*, and therefore that one part of it, and another part cannot possess just the same place, and so we grant you the *Impenetrability*: And how far you prove *Spirits* to be such substances as are *extended*, and have *Amplitude* (as you say pag. 105.) and *spissitudinal*, and be *in loco*, and in *more* or *less* space

space variously, and yet that they have no dimensions which the Divine Intellect or Power itself can measure; and whether all the Spirits in the universe can be *in eodem puncto*, and all that are finite, contracted into that one point, I leave this to Wits more subtil than mine to judge of.

For to tell you the truth, I know nothing at all without the mediation of sense, except the immediate sensation itself, & the acts of Intellection & Volition or Nolation, & what the Intellect inferreth of the like, by the perception of these. I have seen & felt how *Water differeth* from *Earth*, and from that sensation my Intellect hath that Idea of the difference which it hath: But without that *seeing* and *feeling* it, all the definitions in the world, and all the names of hard and soft, and dry and moist, would have given me no true notice of the formal difference. Now hence I infer, that I have no sense at all of the difference of a Spirits Substantiality in such modes and accidents from that of *Matter*; and therefore how can I know it? I know by *knowing* what *knowing* is, and by *willing* what *willing* is: And I know that these Acts prove a *power*, (for nothing doth that which it cannot do,) and that *Act* and *Power* prove a *Substance*. (for
nothing

nothing hath nothing, and can do nothing :) *ab est tertii adjecti ad est secundai valet argumentum* : And I know, that unless Light might be called Spirit, Spirits are to me invisible: And so I can knowingly say, 1. What *they do*, 2. What they *can do*, 3. What they are in the *genus* of *Substantiality*, 4. And what they *are not* as to many Attributes proper to Visible Substances or Bodies; 5. And I have elsewhere fully proved in a special Dispute (in *Methodo Theol.*) that the *Power of Vital Action*, Intellection and Volition, is not a meer Accident of them, but their very essential form. But as to that Modification of their Substance which is contrary to *Impenetrability* and *Divisibility*, I may grope, but I cannot know it positively, for want of sensation.

§ 2. Is an *Atom Matter* ? or is it not ? If one Atom be no matter, then two is none, and then there is none. If an Atom be matter, is it *Discerpible* or not ? If not, how is this the *Form* of Matter ? If it be divisible, it is not an Atom ; that's a contradiction. And if every Atom be divisible in *infinitum*, it is as great, or greater than the world, and then there are as many Infinites as Atoms. That three Atoms united cannot be divided just in
the

the middle, *etiam per Divinam Potentiam*, is because it implieth a contradiction, *viz.* that an Atom is divisible; so that by you an Atom is a Spirit.

Do you take the word [*Penetrable*] *actively*, or *passively*, or *both*? If *actively* according to you *Matter* is *penetrable*; for it can penetrate a *Spirit*, that is, possess the same place. But I perceive you mean that *Spirits* can penetrate *Bodies*, & also that they can penetrate one another.

And I suppose that by *Penetration* you mean not that which separateth parts, of the *Matter*, & cometh in between these parts,; but you mean possessing the same place, as is said: And if so, do you put no limitation? or what? I ask before, can all the *Created Spirits* in *Heaven* and *Earth* be in the same *Atom* of *matter*? If so, are they then absent from all other place? or is every *Spirit* *ubiquitary*? You confute the *Nullibists* by the operation of the *Soul* on the *Body*: *Ibi operatur, ergo ibi est*: And do you think that all the *Angels* in *Heaven*, and all *Created Souls* may be in one *Body* by *Penetration*? If so, Are they one *Soul* there, or innumerable in one man? And if they may be all in one point, and so be all one, may they not be divided again? I confess my ignorance of the *Consistence* of *spiritual Substance*

Substance is so great, that I am not able to say, that God who hath given Souls *quantitatem discretam*, and made them innumerable, is not able to make one of two, or many, and to turn that one into two, or many again: I am not sure that it is a contradiction; especially if it be true that *Sennertus*, and many more say of the multiplication of Forms by Generation.

But if you take *Penetrability passively*, then you mean that *Spirits* may be *penetrated* by *Bodies*, or by one *another*, or *both*. No doubt you mean both, and so, as I said, *Bodies* also are *penetrable*, both actively and passively; that is, *Bodies* can penetrate *Spirits*, and be penetrated by *Spirits*. Whether any *Bodies* penetrate each other, *viz.* whether *Light* or its vehicle at least be a *Body*, and whether it penetrate the body of *Glass* or *Crystal*, with more about these matters, I have heretofore spoken in my *Reasons of the Christian Religion Append. Obj. 2. p. 525.* and forward.

§ 3. To conclude this; as in natural mixt *Bodies*, there are three principles, *Materia*, *Materia Dispositio* (for that I think is a fitter expression than *Privatio*) & *Forma*; so in *simple Beings* there are three (not parts, but) *conceptus inadequati* answerable hereto; *viz.* I. In

I. In the three passive Elements, Earth, Water and Air, there is in each, 1. The Matter, 2. The Disposition of that matter by contexture, and various modes, of which Impenetrability and Divisibility are parts; 3. The passive Form resulting from all these, which consisteth in their various aptitude to their uses; especially their Receptivity of the Influx of the Active Natures. Here you put two Attributes together, which are both but parts of the *Materia Dispositio*, and call them two the Form.

II. In the *Active Natures*, there is, 1. The *Substantiality*, 2. The *Substantia Dispositio*, 3. The *Form*.

Of the first (not part, but) inadequate *Conceptus*, *Substantiality*, we agree, of the second *Conceptus* we differ: That such Substances have an incomprehensible Purity, of which we can have no distinct Idea for want of Sensation, but a General Conception only; and that this Purity (whatever it be) is not the *Form* of Spirits, but the *Substantia Dispositio*, is that which I say: And you say that *Penetrability* and *Indivisibility* are the *Form*, which (at most) are but the *Dispositio Substantia*; and yet you joyn the *Vital Virtue* as part of the formal Conception too; which

which is quite of another conception. And so we differ of the third *Conceptus*, viz. the *Form* also; which I affirm of all simple active natures to be the *Virtus Activa*: And if they are *Vital*, the *Virtus Vitalis*.

Of the name *Vita*, there is a Controversie, which must be distinguished from that *de re*. If it be true that Dr. *Glisson* saith, that every Atom of matter hath in it a *Motive Principle* without Composition, then the *Motive Virtue* is the *Form* of all Matter, as well as of *Spirit*. If all be to be called *Living* or *Spirit*, which hath a *Virtus Motiva* for its *Essential Form*, then *Ignis* (or *Aether*) is *Vital* and *Spirit*; for it hath an *Essential Motive Principle* as its *Form*. Therefore the Question whether *Ignis* (or *Aether*) be *Life* or *Spirit*, is but a question *de nomine* (such as too many usually in Disputes manage, as if it were *de re*.) It is no *Life* or *Spirit*, if by those names you mean only *Sensitive* and *Intellectual* Natures: But it is *Life* and *Spirit*; if by that name you mean only an *Essential Formal Motive Principle*.

I have oft professed that I am ignorant whether *Ignis* and *Vegetative Spirit* be all one (to which I most incline) or whether

ther *Ignis* be an Active Nature, made to be the Instrument by which the three Spiritual Natures, Vegetative, Sensitive and Mental work on the three Passive Natures: And though I was wont to think, that what I knew not my self, all men of great Learning knew, specially such as you, in the points which you have with singular industry studied; yet now experience hath banished that modest Error, and convinced me that other men must be content with an humble *Ignoramus* as well as I.

§ 4. And here I must note, that § 18. p. 127. where you purposely define a Spirit, you agree with me: Your definition is [*A Spirit is an Immaterial Substance intrinsically endued with Life, and the Faculty of Motion.*] Forgive me for thinking that you are not strict enough in your terms for a definition; but plainly you seem to mean the same as I do. You should, I think, have mentioned a Spirit as a simple Substance differing from a mixt; and have said, not only [*intrinsically*] endued, for so is every *Animal* who is Body as well as Spirit, but also endued with it as its *simple Formal Essence*: And whether all *Faculty of Motion* (e.g. *Gravitation*) be *Life*, I am in doubt. But here

1. You agree with me in the first *Conceptus* [*Substance*]; And 2. As to that mode of Substance which I call the *Dispositio Substantia ad Ferream*, you call it but [*Immaterial*] which is a negative, and speaketh nothing positively; which is such an honest Confession as we poor Ignorants apertly make, that what the excellent *Purity* or modal Consistence of Spiritual Substance is as compared to Material (or Corporeal) because we never saw or felt it as we do Corporeal; we do not formally know, and therefore only tell men *de genere*, that it is most *pure* and *excellent*; but in special, that we have no true Idea of it, and therefore only tell men what it is not [*not material*] and not what it is. 3. But you name no *Formal Difference* but *Life*: When you add [*the Faculty of Motion*] it is a defective Explication of the *Virtus Vitalis*, which is ever *Unica-triplex*, viz. *Activa-Perceptiva-Appetitiva*, when it operateth to generation or augmentation. And do you think that *Life* and *Immateriality* are *Synonyma's*? Or that *Life* and *Penetrable* and *Indiscerpible*, are *Synonyma's*? Or that the Form of a Spirit is a *Compound* of such and so many Heterogeneals? Had you held to this definition, I think you had done best.

§ 5. Pag. 129. You seem to explain *Immaterial* so as to make *Indiscerpibility* an immediate Attribute, and expound it, *It is indiscerpible into real Physical parts*: (so is an Atom.) But as *Physical* signifies *corporeal*, some will say, it may yet be *per potentiam divinam* divided into *Spiritual* parts. And you expound *Penetrability* actively, that it *can penetrate the matter and things of its own kind*, that is, *pass through Spiritual Substances*: And such any gross Body can pass through.

§ 6. When Answ. p. 3. you say of a Spirit, that it is [*so subtil as to be in such sort penetrable.*] And in Sect. 31. to which you refer us, you make the difference of *Spirit penetrating*, and *Body impenetrable* to be *subtilty* and *crassitude*.] Could any of us have said more whom you contradict? Is *Subtilty* and *Crassitude* the difference between *Spiritual Substance* and *Material* in their Consistency? I have not said so much as this.

§ 7. As to your oft-mentioned *per se & non per aliud*, as proper to Spirits, I am pisset doubt, that Spirits more depend on God for Being and Motion, than Matter doth on Spirits (Created.) But it's difference enough that God giveth them an Essential Formal Virtue self-moving

receptive of his moving Influx, when Passives move only as moved by self-movers: (unless the aggregative Motion must be excepted, of which afterward.)

Ad SECT. II.

§ 1. **T**Hree Faults, of which one is a *Mischief*, you find with my *Conceptus formalis*. 1. That it leaveth out what is contained in the *Conceptus formalis of a Spirit in General, Penetrability and Indiscerpibility*.

Ans. 1. It is but the *dispositio Substantia* at most, and not a proper *Conceptus formalis*. 2. You leave out other modifications as essential. 3. It leaveth none out that is known, while I say that it is *Substantia purissima*, which containeth your Modes and Attributes with more if they be true, if not, it avoideth the errors.

§ 2. 2. You say, [*It puts in Perception, and we have no assurance that a plastic Spirit hath Perception, but as such hath*

bath none: Else the Soul would perceivue the Organization of its own Body.

Ans. Dr. Gliffon, *de Vita Naturæ* and *Campanella*, have said so much against you of this, that supposing the Reader to have perused them, I will not repeat it.

Did you think that there is no *Perception* but *sensitive* or *Intellectual*? Such indeed the vegetative Spirit hath not; but it hath a vegetative Perception. A Plant groweth in a Soil of various qualities: It attracteth to itself that part of Nutri-ment which is congruous to it, and digesteth that so Attracted: And therefore it hath an answerable *Perception*, which sort is congruous to it, and which not, when it neglecteth one sort, and draweth another. It doth not *see* or *feel* it, nor *understand* it, but *insensibly perceiveth* it.

3. You say, you [*do not easily assent to that conceit of a Trinity in this Conceptus formalis which I make to consist in Virtute una-trina, vitali, perceptiva, appetitiva.*]

Ans. Nor did I easily assent to it; nor did Dr. *Gliffon* after 80 Years of age, easily procure men to assent to it, nor *Campanella* take so marvellously with others as he did with our *Commenius* and some such. And far be it from me to expect you should easily assent to it, when I come

not to you as a Teacher. But whereas you say, that these make three no more than *Animal, Homo, and Brutum*, or *Cupiditas, Desiderium, and Fuga*, you silence me; for it becometh me not to speak to you in a Teaching Language, and there is no other to convince you. And if all that I have said in *Method. Theol.* will not do it, I confess it will not easily be done, *Animal, Homo, and Brutum*, are three words containing only a *Generical*, and *specifick* nature in two distinct species of Subjects: If you think that in the Sun *Virtus-motiva, illuminativa, & calefactiva*, or in mans Soul a vegetative, sensitive, and Intellective power, or in the latter, *mentally-active, Intellective, and Volitive Virtue*, are no other, I will not persuade you to change your mind, much less give you any Answer to your simile of *cupiditas, desiderium, fuga*, save that you might almost as well have named any three Words.

§ 3. But you say [*The Omission of Immaterial in your Conceptus formalis, or which is all one of Penetrability and Indiscerpibility is not only a mistake but a mischief; it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva & perceptiva may be in a Substance though material, which betrays much of the*

sus-

succours which Philosophy affords to Religion, &c.

Ans. Melancholy may cause fears by seeming Apparitions. I hope no body will be damned for using or not using the Word *Material* or *Immaterial*: It's easie to use either to prevent such danger. And I am not willing again to examine the sense of these words every time you use them. You know I said not that Spirits are *Material*: And you say they are *Substances of Extension, Amplitude, Spissitude, Locality, and Subtilty*, as opposite to *Craffitute*. And what if another think just so of them, (or not so grossly) and yet call them *Matter*, will the word undoe him? But you say I omit *Immaterial*.

Ans. See my *Append. to Reas. of Christ. Rel.* whether I omit it: But is a bare *Negative Essential* to a just definition here? Why then not many *Negatives* more, (as *invisible, insensible, &c.*) To say that Air is not Water, or Water is not Earth, was never taken for defining, nor any mischief to omit it.

But that the positive term *Purissima* doth not include *Immaterial*, and is not as good, you have not as yet proved. Is *Substantia purissima* material? Do not you by that intimation do more to assert

the Materiality of Spirits than ever I did? Have you read what I have answered to 20 Objections of the Somatists in the aforesaid Append.

But you say, *It implyeth that Virtus perceptiva, &c. may be in a substance material.* *Ans. Negatur.* If I leave out 20 Negatives in my Definition, it followeth not that the form may be with their positives. But can you excuse your self from what you call a Mischief, when you intimate that *Substantia purissima* may be *material*? Because I only called it *purissima*, you say I imply it may be *material*.

But I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue *matter* itself with the formal Virtue of Perception: That you say the *Cartesians* hold the contrary, and that your Writings prove it, certifieth me not. O the marvellous difference of mens Conceptions! Such great Wits as *Campanella*, *Dr. Glisson*, &c. were confident that no *Matter* in the world was without the *una-trina Virtus*, viz. *Perceptive*, *Appetitive*, and *Motive*; I agree not with them: But you on the contrary say, that *Materia qualitercunque modificata* is incapable of Perception: I doubt not, *materia qua materia*, or yet *qua me-ve modificata* hath no Life: But that it is

uncapable of it; and that Almighty God cannot make *perceptive living Matter*, and that by *informing* it without mixture, I cannot prove, nor I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible? Nor do I believe that it giveth a man any more cause to doubt (as you add) of the *Existence of God*, or the *Immortality of the Soul*, than your Opinion that saith, *God cannot do this*.

To pass by many other I will but recite the words of *Micralius Ethnophron*, li. I. c. 13. p. 23, 24. instancing in many that held the Soul to be *Pure Matter*.

[*Eam Sententiam inter veteres: probavit apud Macrobinum, Heraclitus Physicus, cui anima est Essentia Stellaris scintilla; Et Hipparchus apud Plinium, cui est cœli pars: Et Africanus apud Ciceronem qui detrahit animum ex illis sempiternis ignibus quæ Sidera vocamus; quæq; globose & rotundæ divinis animata mentibus circulos suos orbesq; conficiunt celeritate mirabili: Et Seneca qui descendisse eam ex illo cœlesti Spiritu ait; Et Plato ipse qui alicubi animam vocat αὐδοειδὲς ὄργανον, radians & splendidum vehiculum: Et Epictetus qui Astra vocat nobis φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ σοικεία, amica & cognata elementa: Ipseque cum Peripateticis Aristoteles qui eam*
quinta

quinta essentia constare, & ἀνάλογον τῷ
 πνεύματι ὁμοίαν in animabus inesse dicit: In-
 ter nostrates quoque Scaliger vocat animam
 Naturam cœlestem & quintam essentiam,
 alia quidem à quatuor Elementis natura
 præditam, sed non sine omni materia: Ea-
 dem Opinio arridet Roberto de Fluctibus,
 &c. And what many Fathers say I have
 elsewhere shewed.

And yet on condition you will not
 make the name *Substance* to signifie no *re-
 al Being*, but a meer *Relation*, or *Quali-
 ty*, I think you and I shall scarce differ in
 sense.

§ 4. But you magnifie our difference,
 saying [*In this you and I fundamentally dif-
 fer, in that you omit, but I include, Pene-
 trability and Indiscerpibility in the Concep-
 tus formalis of a Spirit.*] *Ans.* I think you
 mean better than you speak, and err not
 fundamentally. 1. I do not think that
 your two hard words are fundamentals,
 nor that one or both are *Synonyma* to Im-
 material. 2. I do not think but *Purissima*
 includeth all that is true in them, and so
 leaveth them not out. 3. I do not leave
 them out of the *Dispositio vel modus Sub-
 stantia*, though I leave them out of the
Conceptus formalis. 4. Your self affirm the
vital Virtue to be the *Conceptus formalis*.

And hath a Spirit more forms than one? You know of no existent Spirit in the World that hath not its proper specifick form: And if your *two words* had been a Generical Form, that's no form to the species, but a *Substantia dispositio*. Doth he fundamentally err that saith *Corpus humanum organicum* is not *forma hominis*? Or that the *paritas vel subtilitas materiae* is not *forma ignis vel solis*, but only the *materiae dispositio*? If our little self made words were so dangerous on either side, I should fear more hurt by making the form of a Spirit 1. To be but the Consistence or mode of the Substance, 2. And that to consist in divers accidents conjunct, 3. And those uncertain in part, or unintelligible, 4. And Spirits to have two Forms, or one made up of divers things, 5. And to place the form in a Negation of Matter. What a jumble is here, when the true definition of a Spirit is obvious?

§ 5. You say, [*Penetrability maketh it pliant and subtil, and to a Substance of such Oneness and Subtility is rationally attributed, whatever Activity, Sympathy, Synenergy, Appetite and Perception is found in the world.*]

Ans. There is *Oneness* in Matter (in Atoms at least) and doth *Penetrability* make

make *Subtilty*? And is *Subtilty* the difference? sure, if you make any sense of this, it must favour the conceit of *Materiality* more than my term *Purissima*.

But do you verily believe that *Penetrability* or *Subtilty* is a sufficient, efficient, or *Formal Cause* of *Vitality*, *Perception*, *Appetite*? and so of *Intellection* and *Volition*? I hope you do not: It is the *Essential Virtus Formalis* (including *Potentiam activam*, *Vim* & *Inclinationem*) which must immediately cause the Acts; *Subtilty* and *Penetrability* else will not do it: No man will grant you that the Proposition is good, *ex vi Causalitatis*, [*Quodcumq; penetrabile vel subtile est, ideo necessario vivit, percipit, appetit*] unless it proceed à *necessitate concomitantia* & *existentia*. Yet where you are most out of the way, you are at it again, that *This Mistake is a mischief*.

Ad SECT. III. & IV.

§ 1. **Y**OUR Third Section I am not concerned in: I tell you till I deny not your *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility*, though I lay not the stress on them as to

Certainty or *Importance*, as you do, and am past doubt that they do but defectively speak the *Substantiality sub conceptu modali & dispositivo*, and are unskilfully called the *Forma Spiritus*.

§ 2. Your 4th Section I had rather not have seen. 1. You dislike that I say, that [*a self-moving Principle I dare not say is proper to a Spirit.*] I hope Ignorance is never the worse for being confest: All are not so wise as you. I *deny it* not; but I am not certain that Stones, Earth, and other heavy things, move not to the Earth by a self-moving Principle. I am not sure that if a Stone in the Air fall down, it is by a Spirits motion, and that God hath not made *Gravitation*, and other aggravative motion of Passives, to be an Essential self-moving Principle. Few men I think have thought otherwise. And yet I am not sure that all Stones and Clods are alive. If you are, bear with our *Ignorance*; for that is no *Error*.

§ 3. When I say [*I consent not to Campanella de sensu rerum, or Dr. Gliffon, that would make all things alive by an Essential Form in the very Elements.*] Here you talk of foul play, to make one part fish, and the other flesh; one part of Matter self-moved, and other not.]

Ans.

Ans. But, worthy Sir, the foul play is yours, that seem to tell your Reader that I do so, which I never do: That is scant fair play. I said not that Spirits are Matter, and I do but say I am ignorant whether Gravitation be from the Motion of a Spirit thrusting down the Stone, &c. or from an Essential Principle in the Matter. May not one be ignorant where he cannot chuse? I cannot but much difference the *motus aggregativus*, such as Gravitation causeth, which is only the tendency of the *parts* to the *whole*, that they may there *rest from motion*, from the natural motion of known Life, which abhorreth cessation. I take *Motus* to be no Entity, but a mode of Substance; to be in motion or quiescence, are several modes of it; and that mode which is most stated, most sheweth nature. I see no contradiction in it, that a Stone should fall without Life: I dare not say, that God cannot make a Rock or Clod to fall by an intrinsic Principle of Gravitation, without vital motion. And yet I am most inclined to your Opinion: But the stream of Dissenters obligeth such a one as I am to more modesty than must be expected from one of your degree.

§ 4. Next you complain of [*horrible Confusion.*] What's the matter? why, to
include

include Life in the Conceptus Formalis of a Spirit (of which Self-motion is certainly an Effect) and yet say It is not proper to a Spirit. *Ans.* It's worse than confusion to intimate that I said what I did not. Your saying [It's certain] is no conviction of me, that there is no *Self-motion* but by *Life*. You think not that Fire liveth; and I am not sure that a Stone is a self-mover: I only say, *I know not*. I never yet saw your proof, that God is able to make no self-mover but vital! And if he *can*, how know I that he *doth not*? The World suffers so much by mens taking on them to know more than they do, that I fear it in my self, as one of the worst Diseases of Mankind.

§ 5. You conclude [*We are to deny Self-motion in the matter it self every where as not belonging thereto, but to Spirit*]

Ans. No doubt but *Materia qua talis est mere passiva*: But that God can put no motive inclination in it, or that he cannot give a Spiritual Vitality to any matter, are conclusions fitter for you than for me.

§ 6. To shew why I oft neglect the name [*Materia!*] (some taking it for the same with *Substance*, and some only for *Corporeity*) I said, that the distinction of *Natures* into *Active* and *Passive*, serveth

as

as well.] To this you say [*Materiality is a Notion more strict, distinct and steady.*]

Ans. The contrary is commonly known, and before and elsewhere proved; when *Materia* is not only a very hard ambiguous word (and you have not yet enabled me by all your words, to know what you mean by it) but even such great men as before named make the more general sense (equal to Substance) to be the more proper: Had all used it, as you do, and you made us understand what you mean by it, I would hold to it accordingly.

You say, *Passivity* belongs to things *Immaterial.* *Ans.* 1. *Passivity* as exclusive of *Activity*, or as predominant, doth not. 2. No *Passivity* belongeth to that which is not *Matter* in the foresaid large sense of *Matter*, of which more anon.

Ad S E C T. V, V I.

§ 1. **I** Confest my Ignorance of the Cause of the *descensus gravium*; whether it be from a Principle made by God essential to the matter that descend-

erit

eth, or from an intrinſick compounding Active nature, or only from an extrinſick Mover. You here bid me not deſpair, for it is *demonſtrable that the deſcenſus gravium is not from any principle ſpringing from their own Matter, but from an Immaterial principle diſtinct therefrom.*

Anſ. 1. All doth not demonſtrate to me, which ſome call *demonſtration*; I perceive you note not at all what is my doubt, and how can you then ſolve it? I do not think that the Gravitation is from a *principle ſpringing from the Matter*. How can a Principle of Motion *ſpring from Matter*? But the doubt is of the ſeveral waies fore-named: 1. Whether it be from a principle *in the Matter*, as Dr. Gliffon thought, as a *Conceptus inadequatus* of its Eſſence, or at leaſt an inſeparable Quality or Accident. 2. Or whether it be by an Eſſential *Compounding Principle*, as *Anima in homine*: 3. Or by an extrinſick Agent only; Did you think that you had answered theſe?

You ſay, [*which Principles to be the Mover of the Matter of the Universe, I have over and over again demonſtrated in Ench. Metaph.*]

Anſ. I would have had it plainer, but muſt take it as it is. It ſeems then that you think that it is only the *Anima*

Mundi, without any subordinate moving Principle: But you should have spoken out. I will not wrong you so much as to suppose that you think any Indiscerpible Spirit proper to a Stone, or a Fox, or an Ass, moveth all the World: Therefore I must judge that to the Motion of all the Stones, Clods, &c. in the world, there is none but an Universal Mover. I confess I think (as Dr. *Gilbert de Magn.*) and many others, that the whole *Tellus* hath one Active Principle (which I plainly think is Fire;) and if he call it *Anima Telluris*, I leave him to his liberty. But I think there are subordinate particular Moving Principles besides the Universal?

Do you think that only the *Anima Mundi* animateth all *Animals*? I think you do not; else all Apparitions should be but by one Soul. Besides an *Anima Universalis*, there must be a particular (or singular) Soul in every Man, Beast, Bird, &c. There must be more than the Universal Soul, to make you write, speak, do better than others: And if so, how am I sure that nothing under the Universal Spirit moveth *descendentia gravia*? In *motu projectorum* (another instance of my Ignorance) there is sure some causality in *Anima singulari projicientis*. The Universal

versal Cause is ever one, but excludeth
 not subordinate Moving Causes. My old
 Friend Mr. *Sam. Got* (on *Mosis Philos.*)
 supposeth each Element to have its spe-
 cial Spirit: I am not so well skilled in
 such things, as to come to that certainty
 which others pretend to: I think to an
 equal common Motion an Universal Cause
 may suffice; but when Motions differ, I
 know not the different Causes so well as
 some think they do. How you answered
 Judge *Hale* of the Rundle in the Water, I
 know not: But you that think Fire in the
 Sun to be no Spirit but Matter, I am confi-
 dent will never make me believe, that Fire
 and Sun are moved only by the Universal
 Mover, without any motive principle in
 themselves. Your *Metaphys. c. 13.* I have
 perused, and am past doubt of a Spiritual
 Moving Power: But two things I see not
 proved; 1. That there are not particular
 Moving Principles subordinate to the
 more Universal. 2. That the God of Na-
 ture hath not put into the passive Ele-
 ments, a strong inclination of the parts to
 union with the whole, and to aggregative
 Motion when forcibly separated; which
 Inclination Dr. *Glisson* calleth their Essen-
 tial Life; but I think is somewhat that
 deserveth not that name. I have not read

your *Vol. Philos.* nor *Adnotam.* nor Answer to Judge *Hale*.

§ 2. Sect. 6. You say, *This is to joyn the property of a Spirit to Matter.* Answ. That's it that I doubt of, whether all *Self-motion* (under the Universal Mover) be proper to a Spirit, or only *Vital Self-motion*.

§ 3. Your Assurance of the *Earth's Motion*, assureth not me: I have seen a *M. S.* of your Antagonist's Judge *Hale*, that inclineth me to deny it; and nothing more than the Igneous nature of the Sun, to which Motion is natural, and the torpid nature of Earth; God making every thing fit for its use. But of this, as my judgment is of little value, so I profess Ignorance.

§ 4. That there is *Activity* in *fixed Thoughts*, I grant; for *Thinking* is *Acting*. But that there is as much *Activity* in the not-acting of a Rock, *e. g.* I deny.

§ 5. Again, you are at the *Mischief* of Leaving out your *Penetrability*, and *Indiscerpibility*, and *Immateriality*; to which I have oft answered. And I now add, you make it an absurdity to name that as a *Form*, which is not proper to the thing: But *Immateriality*, *Penetrability*, or *Indiscerpibility* in your own Judgment (I think) are none of them proper to Spirit.

For

For they are common to divers Accidents in your account, *viz.* Light, Heat, Cold, &c. are all these.

Ad SECT. VII, VIII.

§ I. YOU come to the main thing which I importuned you to bless the world with your explication of, *viz.* *The true difference of Substance and Matter.* And you say, *It's obvious to any observing Eye. They differ as Genus and Species.* *Ans.* I would I had an observing Eye. If by *Matter* you mean *sensible Matter*, such as Man can see, feel, or measure, &c. the difference indeed is obvious: My doubt is here; seeing you confess that *substantia accidentibus* is but a relative notion; (and it's commonly said that God hath no Accidents, and yet is a Substance: How true I say not,) and all your notice of it, besides Negatives is, that [*Substantia est a Being subsistens per seipsum*] and call this [*a completat Definition;*] 1. How you can call that a *compleat Definition* of that which indeed is not definable, for want of a *Genus*: For you say *Metaph.c.2. that Ens quatenus Ens non potest esse obiectum Metaphysicæ cum tam generale*

rale sit ut & Ordine & Natura & Doctri-
na res Physicas antecedit, &c. But this I
 trick not at: Things not definable may be
 partly known. But 2. whereas it's grant-
 ed by you, that *Substantia* and *Vita* (or
Virtus Activa) are two inadequate *Con-*
ceptus of a Spirit, do you hold that the
Conceptus of *Substantiality* hath any more
 in it of *Real Entity*, than the bare *Concep-*
tus of *Virtus Activa* (or *Vitalis*) alone?
 Or whether the meaning be, that as it is
Res the *Virtus Activa* is its total *Concep-*
tus, and *Substantia* is but added to signifie
 that *Res illa quæ dicitur Vita vel Virtus*
Vitalis subsistit per se, & non in alio, id est,
non est Accidens. If this be the meaning
 that the word *Vis*, or *Virtus*, speak all that
 is *Res*, and *Substance* speak only its state, as
 being no *Accident*, but a *Self-Being*; this
 is intelligible, and it agreeth with some
 mens thoughts of God himself. But this
 seemeth neither to be true (at least of
 Creatures) nor to be your sense. Not
 true; for a Created *Virtus* (vel *Vita*) *quæ*
non est alicujus Substantia Virtus, vel ut
Forma vel ut Accidens, seemeth above
 our reach to conceive. Though I know
 many call God *Purus Actus*, & the Schools
 mostly agree that *Substantia* is not univo-
 cally spoken of God and us, and deny it

to be properly said of God ; and I can easily grant that God is utterly above all formal knowledge of ours ; yet that Created Spirits should be a meer *Virtus* (or *Potentia Activa*, or *Actus*) seemeth hard to believe.

And many words intimate that it is not your Judgment, but that *Substantiality* signifieth not only the *Modus* of the Existence of the *Actus Entitativus*, or *Virtus*, but is the first half and fundamental *Conceptus* of a Spirit as *Res*, speaking halfly its Entity. In this I think we agree.

And now if this be so, this very *Conceptus* of Fundamental Reality, is but that same which Schibler, and abundance others call *Materia Metaphysica*, as different from *Materia Physica*; and which Dr. Crakenthorpe, & many others, take the general and most proper sense of *Materia* to contain. & therefore I say but, that you should not take an equivocal word for univocal, and lay so great a stress on an ambiguous name. And I confess still all your names of *Indiscerpibility*, *Penetrability* and *Immateriality*, give me no scientific notion of the true difference between the lowest *Substantiality* of a Spirit, and the highest of *Fire* or *Aether*, or *Aristotelis quinta Essentia* (which you call Matter.) But I am

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fully

fully satisfied of an Incomprehensible *Purity* of Substance; 2. And of the true Form of a Soul; and I find myself to need no more.

§ 2. The *Thomists* take the Faculties of the Soul to be but Accidents (as Mr. *Pemble de Orig. Formar.* doth the Souls of Brutes to be but Qualities of Matter) which I have elsewhere confuted: And these must needs think that the Notion of Substantiality is almost all of the Soul.

§ 3. You add out of your Ethicks, *nul-
lius rei intimam nudamq; essentiam cognosci
posse, sed Attributa tantum essentialia, es-
sentialiaesq; habitudines.* We are not any way able to discover the very bare Essence or Substance of any thing.] *Ans.* Yet you say before, [What can be more plain?] and [It's obvious to every observing Eye.] I confess I understand you not: I know no *essentia* that is not *intima*: And if by *nudam* you mean *accidentibus nudatam*, we know no Substance so, because there is none such created: but we can abstract the Essence from the Accidents. And if we know not the *nudam essentiam* of any accident we know nothing. *Essential Attributes*, and *Habitudes* are hard words: If by the *Attributes* you mean the *names* or *second signal notions*, we know the Essence

of Letters, Names, Sentences; but by them *ut per signa* we know the things themselves, but *scientia abstractiva non intuitiva*. But this is true knowledge of the Essence signified. If by the *Attributes* you mean any *Accidents* signified by those Names, those are not essential Attributes. But if you mean the *Essence signified* you say and unsay. I am past doubt that we know the Essences of the immediate Objects of Sense, and also of our own Intellectual Acts. But how? There is *scientia adequata* and *inadequata*: I am past doubt that *nihil scitur scientiâ adequatâ*, (but only *inadequata*: And so *strictè, Res ipsa non scitur quia tota ejus Essentia non scitur*; but *aliquid rerum scitur*; and this is true of the Essence itself. All our knowledge is partial and imperfect, a half Science, but it reacheth Essences.

A D S E C T. V I I I.

§ I. **W**Hereas I think that only *U-
sage* must expound the difference between the sense of *Substance* and *Matter*, you deny it not, but still mis-suppose that use taketh *Matter* but in one sense,

sense, and never applieth it to spiritual Substance. All this *de nomine* is to little purpose, but I will recite some words of your own: *Ench. Metaph. c.2. p.8,9,10.*
Essentia quæ nihil aliud est quam materia & forma simul sumpta--- Duo principia illa *Entis interna & incomplexa quatenus ens est, esse Materiam & formam Logicam---* Et uniuscujusq; rei quatenus ens est *Essentia consistit ex Amplitudine & Differentia quæ amplitudinem ab amplitudine discriminat. Nam quod res quelibet aliquatenus Ampla sit, ex eo patet, tum quod id voci materia valde consonum sit quæ tanquam principium Entis quatenus Ens est consideratur; tum etiam quod nullam aliam ideam menti nostræ ea afferre potest præter hanc amplitudinem; Nec revera quicquam ab animis nostris concipi omni amplitudine destitutum---* p. 10.
Ex quibus omnibus tandem profluit præclarum hoc consuetarium quod omne Ens quatenus Ens est-- Quantum, Quale--- Ens dicitur respectu formæ, legitimæq; conditionis *materia---* Quod omne Ens sit *Quantum, ex illius Materiâ intelligitur---* Then you blame them qui imaginantur quedam *Entia omni Materia carentia, etiam hac Logica, omniq; ad materiam relatione---* p. 12.
Omnis substantia ex eo quod Ens sit, Materiam quandam vel Amplitudinem in se includat.

You see here how much more now you write against your self than me: I never said that Spirits are material, nor that every Substance hath some matter, as you do.

§ 2. *But this is but Materia Logica.*
Ans. And those that I excuse do but call it *Materia metaphysica*: And what's the meaning of *Materia Logica*? If Logick or Grammar use second Notions, Names, and Signs, if they be not *rebus aptata* they are false. What is it now but the aptitude of the Name that we speak of?

Yea, you that make *Spatium* to be God, calling it *Locus internus*, really distinct from Bodies, yet say that you prove by *Apo-dictical Arguments*, that it is *tribus dimensionibus preditum*: And no doubt God is a Spirit, so that you your self make a Spirit, even the Father of Spirits, to be *Matter* that hath *Amplitude*, *Quantity*, and the *three dimensions*; And yet write a Book against one as asserting Spirits to be matter, who never asserted it, unless the word *Matter* signifie but *Substance*: For I ascribe no more to it than your *Amplitude*, if so much. And yet I take the word *Amplitude* to signifie no form at all, no more than *Quantity* or *Dimensions*, or *Indivisibility*, or *Penetrability*, but to be
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the Consistent *Dispositio Substantia*.

And you once hit on that true notion of the *Conditio materiae* as a necessary *Conceptus Entis prater ipsam materiam & formam*; *Metaphys. c. 2. p. 10. [Verum Ens dicitur respectu formae, Legitimeq; Conditio materiae: Neq; enim Galea ex tenui Papyro fabricata & concinnata vera galea est, sed potius ludicrum illius imitamentum.* And so elsewhere. Yet now you make the *Conditio Substantia* to be the *Form*.

§ 3. And when you make all *Spirits* to be *Souls*, and to *animate some matter*, You seem to make God to be but *Anima Mundi*: And if so, he animateth it either as a distinct compounding Substance, as we say the Soul doth the Body, or else as the *forma rei simplicis* which is but *Conceptus inadequatus*, as *Vitality* is *forma anime*. If in the first sense, you that say that operation of the Soul proveth locality, and ascribe Amplitude and Quantity to God, and the three dimensions, do seem to make him Intellectually though not actually Divisible: That is, the Intellect may conceive of God as partly in the Sun, and partly on Earth, &c. or else you must ask pardon of your opposed *Holenmerians* as you name them, and say as they, that God is *totus in toto & totus in qualibet parte*.

If in the 2d sense, then you make the matter only to be Substance, and God to be but the Form of that Substance (or as some dreams a *Quality*.) And then I confess your *Notions* of *Indiscerpible* and *Penetrable* are very easily intelligible, as agreeing to the meer *Form*, (*Vitality*, *Active-power*, *Wisdom*, and *Love*.)

But how either of these notions will stand, either with Gods Existence *ut spatium infinitum*, beyond all *Matter*, (which you sometime hint) or the *Infiniteness* of *Matter*, but with *intermixt Vacuities*, which (*pag. 44. Metaph.*) you seem to suppose to be *communis natura voce confirmatum*) I know not: For then the *vacuum* is *Deus extra materiam*, and so all Spirit is not in matter. I think that all matter and Spirit is in God; and that he is much more than *Anima Mundi & omnium animalium*.

Ad S E C T. I X.

§ 1. **T**O your *Indiscerpibility* I further say, I distinguish, 1. Between *Actual* and *Intellectual* dividing; 2. Between what God can do, and what a Creature can

can do, and 3. Between the Father of Spirits and created Spirits : And so I say, 1. That if you had spoken of the meer *Virtus Vitalis* of a Spirit, I think it is a contradiction to say that it is Discerpible or impenetrable ; But seeing you ascribe Amplitude, Quantity, and Dimensions, and Logical Materiality to the Substantiality of Spirits, I see not but that you make them Intellectually divisible ; that is, that one may think of one part as here and another there. 2. And if so, though man cannot separate or divide them, if it be no contradiction God can. Various Elements vary in divisibility : Earth is most divisible : Water more hardly, the parts more inclining to the closest contact : Air yet more hardly : And if as you think the Substance of Fire be material, no doubt the Discerpibility is yet harder. And if God have made a Creature so strongly inclin'd to the Unity of all the parts, that no other Creature can separate them but God only, as if a Soul were such ; it's plain that such a Being need not fear a Dissolution by separation of parts : For its own Nature hath no tendency to it, but to the contrary, and no fellow Creature hath power to do it, and God will not do it. God maketh all things apt for their use, and useth things as he hath

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hath made them, He made not Marble and Sand alike, nor useth them alike. And if he should make a Spirit (*e. g.* an *Ani-ma hujus Vorticis, Solis, Stella, &c.*) Such as he only can divide, but hath no natural tendency to division, but so much Indiscerpibility as no Creature can overcome, this (besides Scripture) intimateth Gods purpose about it.

3. But doubtless God and Creatures are both called Spirits equivocally or analogically and not univocally: And it is the vilest Contradiction to say that God is capable of Division: But whether it be so with created Spirits I know not: They have passivity and God hath none. It's no great Wisdom to confess ones Ignorance; But not to confess it is very great folly.

I am scarce of your mind, that a *man* may be in the like puzzle in another World as he was in this, if he methodize not his Thoughts aright. But if it be so, you are best think again.

§ 2. For Penetrability you say, that one Spirit may have a greater Amplitude than another, and that the parts, as I may so call them, of the same Spirit, may in the Contraction of itself penetrate one another, so that there may be a Reduplication of Essence through the whole Spirit. *Ans.* You tempt

tempt me to doubt lest you talk so much against materiality of Spirits to hide the name of your own Opinion, for that which others call materiality. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you'll hardly so easily prove as say, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings shall I find satisfaction, into how much space one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted? And whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-shell, or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convexe of all the World.

Ad S E C T. X.

§ 1. I Said, [*We grant that Spirits have a Quantitas discreta; they are numerous, individuate, and Formæ se multiplicant: Generation is the work of Spirits, and not of Bodies. And how can I tell, that that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, and unite and divide them as well as Matter.*] You say, [*This passage is worth our attentive consideration.* And 1. You hence infer Amplitude

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tude and Dimension of Spirits. *Ans.* I meddle not for you, nor against you: What's this to me?

§ 2. You ask what are the *Formæ quæ se multiplicant*? *Ans.* Sensitive and Rational as well as Vegetative Spirits: You say, That must be *Creation*, or *Self-division*. *Ans.* No; it is but *Generation*. And in *Append.* to the *Reas.* of *Christian Religion*, I have partly shewed that *Generation* is from *God* as the *Prime Cause*, and yet the *Parents Souls* as a *Second Cause*, so that somewhat of a sort of *Creation* and *Traduction* concur: which having further opened in *Method. Theol.* I here pretermitt.

§ 3. But to my *Question*, *Why God cannot make two of one, or one of two*, you put me off with this lean *Answer*, that we be not bound to puzzle our selves about it. *Ans.* I think that *Answer* might serve to much of your *Philosophical Disputes*. But if you will puzzle us with a naked *Assertion* of *Indiscerpibility*, we must ask your proof of it, why *God* cannot divide and unite extended ample quantitative Spirits? and if he can, how you know that he doth not? or that *Indivisibility* is the *Form* of a *Spirit*; when as if *Water* be divided into drops, every drop is *Water* still.

Ad SECT. XI.

§ 1. **I**N your further thoughts of this Sect. 11. you do first mis-suppose that my Question intimatech such a Divisibility of Souls, as of terrene Bodies into Atoms, or a contrary Union. Terrene Atoms have the most imperfect Union. All the Sands on the shoar are not only divisible, but partly divided: I cannot say, that all the parts of the Air are so; much less of the Fire. There is a far closer Union of all the Substance of that *Lucid Calefactive* Element, than of Earth, Water, or Air.

§ 2. And here I must insert, that after long thoughts, I doubt not but all things Created are truly one, and truly many: No one particle of the Universe is independent on the rest: Parts they are; as every part of a Clock or Watch: Every Leaf, and Grape, and Apple on the Tree hath a certain individuate or numerical Being, and yet every one is a part of the Tree: And every Herb and Tree is a part of the Garden or Orchard, and that a part of *England*, &c. and all a part of the Earth in which they grow; and no doubt the
 Earth

Earth is as dependant on other parts of the Universe; and all on God. We dream of no total separation of any Creature from the rest, much less Spirits.

But all the *Illuminated Air*, is more one *Lamma tenuis* (though compound of *Air* and *Fire*, and called by us *Light*) than the Sands are one Earth: And I doubt not but that *Fire*, which is the *Motive, Illuminative, and Calefactive* Substance, in all the *Air*, and elsewhere, is yet much less divisible than the *Air*, and Souls than it: So that should God make many into one, they would be many Individuals no more, but one again Divisible by God himself.

§ 3. And you mis-suppose me to suppose that the whole Substance of all Humane Souls, are but the same which once in *Adam* was but one, and from him divided. Writing is a tedious work, because it so hardly causeth men to understand us. I suppose that a continued Creative Emanation from the Father of Spirits, giveth out all that Spiritual Substantiality which becometh new Souls; but that God hath ordained that the Generating Souls shall first receive this Divine Emanation, and be organical in communicating it to the *Semen*, and so to new organical Bodies; not that the Parents Souls only dispose

the seminal recipient Matter, but are themselves partly receptive, and then active in the communication: It will be a defective similitude if I say, as a Burning-glass by a receptive contraction of the Sun Beams, is instrumental in kindling combustible matter: Rather as one Candle kindleth a thousand, and yet the substance of the Lucid and Calid Being, is communicated from the Ignite Air by the means of that one Candle. (For that it is only *Motus a Motu*, I believe not.)

That you have drawn me thus *effutir quæ circa generationem, opinor*, must help you to be patient with my tediousness. And the rather, because to avoid offending you, I will now pass by any further Answer to your Queries, *Whether Adam's Soul was a Legion? which else was Adam's Soul? How come they to be Male and Female? was that number of Souls expanded or contracted? what a change by Venery? what becomes of the many Souls in the Chast? and the rest.* I would not by particular Answer disgrace your Questions, or the jocular urgent amplifications. No doubt Lights are too low Illustrations; but the highest within the reach of sense. There was not a Legion of Candles in that which lighted a Legion

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or need I tell you which of the lighted Candles was that which lighted it; nor why lighting more consumed not the first; nor why it kindled a Wax-Candle; and a Tallow-Candle, &c. I knew not till now that you thought Souls differed in Sex, because the Persons do. But I will not strive against your Conceit. The Soul of a Male and Female I better understand, than a *Male and Female Soul*.

§ 4. But you tell me; *I must consider the Nature of Light thoroughly, and I shall find it nothing, but a certain motion of a Medium, whose particles are so or so qualified, some such way as Cartesianism drives at: But here's not Substances but Motion communicated, &c.*

Ans. I had as willingly have heard *Cartesius* tell me any Dream else that ever came into his Brain: For this I greatly despise: And wonder not that any man is ignorant of the nature of Spirits, who is so grossly ignorant of the igneous analogical Nature as he was. I have said so much in divers Books against it, that I will not here in *transitu* any further touch so noble a Subject, than to tell you that if you have studied the old Stoicks, Platonists, &c. and *Patricius, Telesius, Campanella, Lud, le Grand, &c.* as much as *Cartesius,*

I pitty you for believing him. I doubt not the Substance of Fire hath a *Virtus motiva*, as well as *illuminativa* & *calesfactiva*: And consequently that *Light* and *Heat* are neither of them without *Motion*: But that they are a tripple operation of the *Una-trina forma ignea*, I am past doubt, (after as hard study as you can advise me to.) But your terms [*certain motion*] and an (unnamed) *Medium*, and *particles so and so qualified, and some way, &c.* are not notifying terms to me.

That *Lumen* is *ipse motus* methinks a man of half *Cartesius's* Age should never dream: That it's an effect of *Motion* many say, and think it so, as much as *Intellection* is an effect of *mental-Vitality*, and *Volition* of *Intellection*. But (to lay no stress on *Sir Ken. Digby's* Arguments) I make no doubt *Ignis lucens* is as truly a Substance as a Spirit is. If *Light* be an Act or Quality it hath some immediate Agent or Subject: It doth not exist separated from them. It is in the *Air* but as the Recipient, as it is in the Oil of the Candle. The *Air* shineth not of itself (as the Night informeth us.) It is therefore a Substance that moveth and illuminateth the *Air*: And if *Cartes* will call that Substance *Globuli atherei*, or *materia subtilis*, I need not
a game

a game at such toyish words : As *Motus* causeth *Sensation*, and *Intellection*, which yet by meer motion would never have been caused, without the conjunct Acts of the Sensitive and Intellectual Faculties as such; so is it of Light. Really when I read how far you have escaped the delusions of Cartesianism, I am sorry that you yet stick in so gross a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the Nature of Fire, which is the active Principle by which mental and sensitive Nature operateth on Man, and Bruits, and Vegetables, and all the passive Elements, (if it be not *ipsa forma telluris*) and all the visible actions in this lower World are performed, what can that mans Philosophy be worth? I therefore return your Counsel, study more thoroughly the Nature of Æthereal Fire.

I find cause to imagine (by your Writings) that you are (as Mr. *Glanvile*) for the pre-existence of Souls before Generation. And when do you think they were all made? And what Bodies did all the Souls that have ever since been in the World animate, when there was no human Body but *Adam's* and *Eve's*? Can you conjecture what Animal's they were before they were men's? If you on the one ex-

stream (thinking that God made as many Souls, yea Animals the first week, as ever are in Being to the end of the World) and the Averrhoists on the other extrem (who think all Souls are but one individuated by receptive Matter, as one Sun lighteth many Candles by a Burning-Glass, and all return as Candles put out, into one again) were to dispute it out by meer Philosophy (without the Experience of apparitions,) I know not which would get the better.

Ad SECT. XII, XIII.

THe 12. Section being all meer fiction needs no further Answer.

§ 1. It seems you call that the [*excited Spirit of Nature,*] lighting every Candle which other men call *Fire*: And so you will number Fire with Spirits.

§ 2. Your 13. Section is strange. 1. You say Penetrability and indivisibility are not accidents at all, no more than *Rationale* of a man. *Ans.* *Animarationalis* is *forma hominis* in the strict proper sense of *Forma* as an Active Principle. Indivisible is a Negative, and it and Penetrable are the consistency or mode of the Substance

stance (or, as you call it, *Matter*;) As Amplitude, Quantity, Spissitude, Dimensions, Locality are by you said to be, which are called *Forms* in another sense, as the passive Elements differ from each other. But the *Principium Activum* being the true and only Form of a Spirit, these modalities and Consistencies are but *conditio materia*, as you call it, or *Substantia* as I call it, as to the Form. Yet that *Dispositio materia* is Essential I have asserted.

§ 3. And yet though all along I deny not your two words to be the *conditio omnis Substantia spiritualis* (joined with more) I still tell you that difficulties make me not lay so much on them as you do. To add one more, As I told you *Quality* is *penetrable*; as well as Spirit, e. g. heat, so yet though we commonly say, it is *indivisible*, I wish you would solve this Objection: You prove the locality of Spirits by their operation on this or that Body, (And doubtless you may well prove that the Recipient body is *in loco*, and consequently the Agent relatively.) But how shall we avoid the division of Qualities or Spirits *ex divisione materia subjectiva*. E. g. If a red hot Iron be penetrated by the heat, yet if this Iron be cut in two, while hot, and each part set (*per potentiam su-*
peri-

periores) at 20 Miles distance. is not the heat divided with the Iron? So if a mans Head be struck off, and (by such a quick mover as you think moveth the Earth) the Head in a moment were carried far off, while both parts of the Body are yet alive, is not the Soul in each part? And if the Parts were 20 or 100 Miles a sunder, is it still one undivided Soul?

• I can say somewhat to satisfie my self of this; but hardly without crossing somewhat that you say.

§ 4. Again when my chief dissent from you is more against your *Confidence* than your *Verity*, yet you again tell us, that we know not bare *Essences*, but *Essential Attributes*. I tell you I take not these to be notifying Expressions: We know some Essences either *intuitively* (as *Ockam* saith) or without signs, immediately, *e. g.* what it is to see, taste, hear, smell, &c. and what to understand and will. And we know other Essences *Scientia abstractiva per signa*. And what good would the knowledge of Attributes else do us. Attributes in *notione prima* are the thing itself: And to know an Essential Attribute, and to know *ipsam Essentiam Scientia inadequata* is all one. But an Essential Attribute as *notio secunda*, is but *signum per quod res significata*

ficata cognoscenda est: And this is knowing the Essence too, but *scientia abstractivâ*: And all is *scientia valde imperfectâ*.

§ 5. You say, that *Neither the faculty nor Operation of Reasoning is the Essence, and consequently not rationale.*

Ans. Things of so great Moment should not be obtruded on the World with a bare *ipse dico*. The Act of Intellection or Reasoning is but the Essence in *hoc modo*: but the *Faculty* is the Essential Form of the Soul. When you have confuted the Scotists, and my peculiar *Disput. in Meth. Theol.* where I think I fully disprove what you say, I may hear you further.

Ad SECT. XIV, XV, XVI.

§ **H**ere you would first know, *How I know that the Vitalitas formalis belongs not to Matter, unless I have an Antecedent notion of Spirit distinct from Matter.* *Ans.* 1. I consent not to Dr. Glisson, who thought all *Matter* had a *Vital Form*. But I undertake not to prove that God cannot endow any *Matter* with a *Vital Form*. And *forma denominat*; where I find the Form of a Spirit I'll call it *Spirit*.

2. Dr. Henry Moore in his *Metaph.* would ask me, how I know that a Helmet may not be made of Paper; and he and I would agree that Paper is not *materia disposita*, and yet we would not call it *Galea formam*.

§ 2. Your denial of Substantiality to be *ex traduce*, I answered before; telling you that I think it is both *ex emanatione creativa*, & *ex traduce*, but not by either alone; nor all Souls that ever will be, created in Indiscernible Individuality at once, and transmuted from Body to Body.

§ 3. When I say, the *Negative Immaterial* notifieth not the form, you say that *Immaterial* implieth *Positiveness*. *Ans.* Therefore give us the positive notion, or you give us no definition, nor any notifying word.

§ 4. When you say, [*You believe it is not easie to give an Example that materia is put in lieu of substantia in that adequate sense.*] What abundance of Authors could I name you, yea, have I oft named, besides Dr. Crakenthorp?

§ 5. When you say, [*All created Substance is both Active and Passive in some sense or other.*] It's but to say, all words are ambiguous. So *all created Substance is matter in some sense or other.* But one would have thought by your oft repeat-

ed denial of the *self-moving Power of Matter*, that you had thought only *Spirits* have a *self moving power*. And if so, will you yet say, that [*this is a distinction which distinguisheth nothing?*] I think thus, *Natura activa* as meet a name as *Spiritus*. And that yet it hath some *Passivity*, *Damascene*, yea, and *Augustine*, *de Spir. & Anim.* c. 8. say that is because the Soul [*respectu incorporei Dei corporea est.*] though in respect to our Bodies it is *Incorporeal*: Other Fathers say much more, but I justify not their words.

§ 6. *Ad 15. Sect.* I pretend not to have such an *Idea* of *Spiritual Substance*, as to denominate its consistence more fitly than by *Purity*, a word which you also use, yet not denying your several *Attributes*.

§ 7. As to your *Doctrine of Atomes*, I think no wise man dare say that God made matter first in divided *Atomes*, and after set them together. But that God is able to divide all matter into *Atomes* or indivisible parts I doubt not. The *Virtus Formalis* of *Spirits* (and so some *qualities*) consist not of *Atomes*: But how far God can divide the ample *Substance* of them, I only tell you, that I know not; and to pretend to know it would be none of my *Wisdom*. Your *Attributes* of *amplitude*, *quantity*,
dimen-

dimensions, imply that God made some Spirits bigger in amplitude than others, as well as *Virtutis fortioris*. You think I suppose that which you call the *Spirit of the World*, or *Nature*, bigger in amplitude than the Spirit of a Wren:

§ 8. *Ad Sect.* 16. You that say, *Spirits have Extension and Spissitude*, say that *spissitude* signifieth more substance in less compass. And these Phrases sound liker to Corporeity than any that I have used: More substance and less substance, spissitude by Contraction signifie much change, and signifie that which the Intellect may distinguish into *partes extra partes*, though undivided which would increase a mans doubt, whether God be not able to make a bigger Spirit less, and a less bigger, and to separate the parts that are so distinguishable in amplitude, and to make one into two, or two into one.

§ 9. Whether *Aether* or Fire be material, methinks you should be as uncertain at least as I. For you say *Light* is but *motus*, of somewhat exciting the *Spirit of the World*. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the nearest cause of Illumination by way of Natural activity, than that which you call the *Spirit of the World*, I call *Fire*; and so we differ but *de nomine*. But
I have

I have oft profest my Ignorance whether *Fire*, and the *Vegetative Nature* be all one, (which I encline to think) or whether *Fire* be a middle active Nature between the *Spiritual* and the meer passive, by which *Spirits* work on *Bodies*. I think I shall quickly know all this better than you do.

Ad SECT. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

§ 1. OF your Doctrine of Atomes I spake before: I have no mind to examine the weight of your Reasons publickly.

§ 2. I thought you that so extol the Atomists Doctrine, would have deigned to read at least some of the Leaders of the various Sects: And my undervaluing them is no excuse to you: for as you knew not my judgment, so I suppose you do not much esteem it. That which I blame them for, is, that *Lud. le Grand* over-magnifieth *Fire*, *Telesius* and *Campanella* over-magnifie *Heat*, *Patricius* over-magnifieth *Light*, as *Cartesius* doth *Motion*: But if the one Principle of Motion, Light, and Heat, had been better handled as one, (as it is) it had been sounder.

§ 3. I

§ 3. I need not your hydrostatical experiment of the *rising Rundle* to convince me of the Motion of the matter of the World by a spiritual power: I doubt as little of Spirits as of Bodies: But I understand not what greater wonder there is in the rising of your Rundle, than in the rising of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea; or that the heaviest body should sink lowest if it have way. Whether Water consist of oblong flexible Bodies, I am not much regardful to know: Each of those oblong ones are divisible into Atomes.

§ 4. But as to what hence you infer of Fire, I make no doubt but the *Flames* and the *red hot Iron* are compound things; and that the oily or sulphureous matter *moved and heated*, is the Substance which we see. But I believe not that bare *motion as motion*, were it never so swift, wo'd cause this: But that these effects are caused in the capable matter by the special action of a permeant Substance in itself invisible as Substance, whose form is the Active Virtue of *moving, illuminating, and heating*, and so is sensible only in this triple Effect. And if you call this a Spirit I leave you to your Liberty.

Ad SECT. XX. XXI.

S I. **T**HE seven Propositions which you find in my words I own, save that the fourth should be thus formed [That the *Substantia dispositio* in fire distinct from the form, beareth some such Analogy to a Spirit (if it be not one, *viz.* Vegetative) that may somewhat serve us to conceive of it thereby, and they that from this Analogy, call it *Ignis non formaliter sed eminenter*, are excusable; though it can be no strict proper name that cometh not a *forma*.

§. 2. *Ad sect. 21.* But you ask [*Whether by Active power I mean a power alwaies exerting itself into act, so that this fire is alwaies moving, enlightning, and hot formaliter, else why should it be called Ignis?*]

Ans. Answer your self, when you speak of a power of Sensation, and Intellection and Volition in a Soul, do you mean a power alwaies exerting itself into sensation, Intellection and Volition, else why is it called a Soul.] *Ans. 2.* I mean a power which hath alwaies an inclination to Act; & hath its own secret immanent act, & alwaies acts *ad extra*, when it hath fit recipient

ipient objects. As to your oft mentioned Confutation of Judge *Hale*, having not read it, I am no Judge of your performance.

You Question *what is this new igneous substance never heard of before*] while in all Ages it hath been so famous a controversy; when not only the Stoicks but most old Philosophers gave to it so much more than meet; when *Lud. Le Grand*, would make us believe that it was almost the only God of all the Heathen World, under various names, and while so many new Sects have written so many volumes of it, who would have believed that even Dr. *Henry More* had never heard of it before?

To your question, *Is it material or immaterial?*] I still answer, *material* is a word of larger or narrower sense, ambiguous: I know that it hath the aforesaid Actions: And by them I know that it hath the Power so to act: and by both I know it is a substance capable of such power & Acts: And I know that the substance is invisible *in se*, but seen in its Effects. And my brain is too dark to be confident of more: Let him that knoweth more boast of it.

§ 3. You say [*A material Fire distinct from the flame of a Candle, or Fire-stick, or red hot Iron, there is no more ground for,*
than

than material Water distinct from Wells, Rivers, Seas, &c.]

Ans. Do you not take *Cartesius materia subtilis*, if not *globuli aetherei*, to be invisible, & not alwaies appearing in Candles or Fire-sticks? If a Soul may be a sensitive and intellective Substance, and yet not be alwaies feeling or understanding, why may there not be Fire where it shineth not. It seemeth you take not the illuminated Air to be Ignite, because it is not a Candle or Fire-stick: I doubt not but Fire is a Substance permeant and existent in all mixt Bodies on Earth; & in *ipsa tellure*; in Minerals; in your Blood it is the prime part of that called the *Spirits*, which are nothing but the Igneous Principle in a pure aerial Vehicle, and is the Organ of the Sensitive Faculties of the Soul: And if the Soul carry away any Vehicle with it, it's like to be some of this. I doubt you take the same thing to be the Spirit of the world, while you seem to vilifie it.

§ 4. It's strange when I tell you that I conceive of a Spirit but as *Ignis eminenter*, and not *formaliter*, that you should still ask *whether I take it not for Ignis formaliter*? I have often said, that I think Substances differ so gradually, that the lower hath still some Analogy to the higher:

And I still say that *Natura Mentalis*, & *sensitiva* are not *Ignis formaliter*; But whether the *Natura Vegetativa* be any other than *ipse ignis* I know not; but think it is no other. Do you that better know its consistence call it *Spirit* or not as you please.

Ad Sect. 22. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.

§ 1. YOU puzzle me more and more :
Before you said, *Fire is nothing but motion of sulphureous particles*, and only in Candles, Fire-sticks, hot Irons, &c. And yet now [*The vehicles of Angels are Igneous or æthereal.*] Is an Angel only in a Candle or hot Iron, &c. Is motion, yea motion of sulphureous particles their vehicle? If they are Animals, and have bodies, as you think, they are such as deserve a nobler Character.

§ 2. I tell you still, the Greek Fathers, I think, as well as I, call'd mental and sensitive Spirits, *Ignis*, but *Analogically*, which you call *Symbolically*: If that satisfy you, what have you all this while disputed against? And if Fire be the *vehicle of Angels* it is a *substance*. And when you see the Motion, Light, and feel the heat, do
- you

you think, what ever is the Recipient moved Matter, that the invisible Mover is not *present* and *contiguous*? It is that immediate mover which I call Fire, and am fully satisfied doth it not by *Motion* only, but the exerting of its triple Virtue.

§ 3. You confess, Sect. 24. the common use of the name of *Fire* applied to Souls by the old Philosophers: and still you say it was but Symbolically: and did they find no Reason to make Fire a Symbol rather than Earth or Water. When I still tell you that it is only analogically that Souls may be called Fire, did you fairly to pretend the contrary?

§ 4. Yea Sect. 25. You are at it again, saying that [*I seem to conceive the Fathers to speak not symbolically, but properly.*]
Ans. where and when did I say any such thing? will you tell the world that a Man holds that which he never said, and hath oft written against, and write a Book against him on such a supposition, and at last have nothing to say but *Putarem*? I use not the words *Symbolical* and *Proper*; they are not precise enough for this subject: I said more when I said that Souls and Angels are called *fire*, only *eminenter* & *analogice*, but not *formaliter*: and *serma dat nomen*.

But you are offended that I say those Greek Fathers spake tolerably and informingly, and you say, *It was mischievously, inducing men to believe the Soul mortal. For Light may be blown out, and hot Iron cooled.* *Ans.* Alas! What dry Philosophy is this of Fire? Is any thing annihilated when the Candle goeth out? Was there not an invisible active principle moving your supposed sulphureous particles, which was as immediate an Agent as your Soul is of Sensation or Intellection: which remaineth the same? But indeed it is *Air* and not Sulphur which is the first and nearest Recipient of the illuminating Act, and is *Conjux Ignis*, I suppose you'll say, *The Spirit of the World doth this.* *Ans.* Call it by what name you will, *It is a pure active Substance, whose form is the Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva*; I think the same which when it operateth on due seminal matter is *Vegetative*. But the World hath Spiritual Natures more noble than this; *viz.* sensitive and intellective.

§ 5. *Ad Sect.* 26. You say against the Fathers, [*When we enquire into the distinct Nature of things we must bid adieu to Metaphors.*] *Ans.* When I am ignorant of my own Ignorance, I will hear you, I am far from dreaming that I have one formal Conception

Conception of God, but only Analogical: Only that of *Ens* is disputed between the Thomists and Scotists, whether it be Univocal *de Deo & Creaturis*. And here *Analogical* is but *Metaphorical*: And yet it is not **nothing** to see as in a Glass & enigmatically. And when I can perceive that your two hard words do not only signify more than negatively and modally, or qualitatively, but also give us an *Idea* of a Spirit which hath *nothing Metaphorical*, but all *formal*, I shall magnifie them more than I do.

§ 6. You say we must *search out the adequate definition.*] *Ans.* That [*adequate*] is a word too big for me: I dare say that you have not an adequate knowledg of any thing in the World; not of one Fly or Flea or Pile of Grass: And can you make adequate Definitions of Angels and all Spirits? Even who before twice told us that we know not the intimate essence of things, but the Attributes? Indeed I perceive your Attributes are such as will not notify Essences. I ask my own experience whether *Indiscerpible* is a word that giveth any *Idea* of the Essence, save negative (that it cannot be torn into pieces) and modal? and I find no other that it maketh on my Mind.

The common note of Matter is, that it hath *partes extra partes*: and I think you thus make Spirits material. You make them parts of the compound Animal: and you deny them to be *toti in toto*; and you give them locality, & amplitude, & quantity. And if so, though they be indiscernible, they have continued parts intelligible; and that part of the Soul is not in one hand which is in the other: and as *partes Animalis* they are actually separable from the matter. The *Spiritus Mundi* you suppose to be a great continued amplitude or extended Substance. And Atomes are in some Elements a closely continued Substance. You seem to make all Substance to be Atomes, spiritual atomes and material atomes. And I am not sure that God cannot make material atomes so continued a matter as that no Creature can discern them: is it any contradiction? and I doubt not but Souls and Angels are so indivisible, as that their Nature tendeth to continued, undivided Unity, and no Creature can divide them. But that God cannot do it I cannot say.

Even of the Souls Mortality not only *Arnobius*, but many other Christian Writers maintain, that it is mortal *naturâ*, but immortal *ex dono*; which is unjustly spoken

spoken but well meant: that is, God hath made their Natures such as have no tendency in themselves to a Dissolution or Destruction, but not such as he cannot dissolve or destroy; Yea I doubt not but without a continued Divine Sustainment, all the World would in a moment be annihilated; Preservation being a continued sort of Creation. Your owning nothing in Fire but what's visible, I have spoke to.

Ad S E C T. XXVIII.

§ I. **T**HAT Spirits are each *Ens unum per se*, so as to have no divided parts, or such as tend to dissolution I doubt not: that they are each one by the continued *uniting* Influx of that God who continueth their Being, and so far *per aliud*, is past doubt. You here make Metaphysical Monades absurd and ridiculous. But is not that a Monad and Atome which is *one* and *indivisible*? though it be not *minimum*: and if your Penetrability imply not that all the singular Spirits can contract themselves into a *punctum*; yea, that all the Spirit of the World may be so contracted, I find it not yet sufficiently explained: For you never
tell

tell us into how little parts only it may be contracted: And if you put any limits I will suppose that one Spirit hath contracted itself into the least compass possible; and then I ask, cannot another and another Spirit be in the same compass by their Penetration; If not, Spirits may have a contracted Spissitude which is not penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but only dilated ones. If yea, then *quero* whether all created Spirits may not be so contracted.

And I should hope that your Definition of Spirit excludeth not God; and yet that you do not think that his Essence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

And as to your rejection of Metaphors I say, the very name *Spiritus* which you use is a Metaphor: the first sense being our *Breath à spirando*, or the Air or Wind: *Martinus* nameth no fewer than Fifteen senses of it, and Wisdom itself said, 1 Cor. 15. *There is a natural Body, and there is a spiritual Body.*

§ 2. You add, [If you will say, that if he should create such a Spirit with metaphysical Amplitude, which though so large himself cannot divide, and sever into parts, he would thereby puzzle his own Omnipotency,

cy, at this rate he shall be allowed to create nothing, no not so much as matter, nor himself indeed to be.

Ans. I had rather tremble at this than boldly answer it. Whatever is a contradiction cannot be; and it is not for want of power that God cannot do it: It is no work of power: Had you proved it a Contradiction for God, to make two Spirits of one, or one of two, you had done that part in an easier way, which I should not gainsay. But this Speech of yours is as if you said, [*He denieth God to be the Creator, or to be God, who saith that God is able to divide an Ample spiritual Substance; that is, who saith, that this is no contradiction, and that God is Almighty: when our Creed saith, that God is the Father Almighty maker of Heaven and Earth. Cannot he alter or annihilate his own works: Before he made the World, he could have made the ample Substance of the Spirit of the World into many Spirits: And is he less able so to change it? If Spirits be unified as the Bodies which they animate, cannot God make many Bodies into one? Cannot he make many Stars into one? And then would that one have many unifying Spirits, or but one? It's a thing so high as required some shew of proof, to intimate that*

that God cannot be God, if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency.

§ 3. Your words like an intended Reason are [*For that cannot be God, from whom all other things are not produced & created.*]

Ans. 1. Relatively (as a God to us) it's true; though *quoad existentiam Essentia* he was God before the Creation. 2. But did you take this for any shew of a proof? The sense implied is this, [*All things are not produced and created by God, if a spiritual ample Substance be divisible by his Omnipotency that made it: Yea, then he is not God. Negatur Consequentia.*]

Ad SECT. XXIX, XXX, XXXI.

§ 1. **Y**OU say your definition is more informing than defining a Spirit by Fire, viz. [*a Spirit is an immaterial substance indued with Life, and the faculty of Motion*] and virtually containing in it *Penetrability, and Indiscerpibility*] *Ans.* 1. Your definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. The same things need not be so very oft repeated in answer to you:

you : but briefly I say ; if by *Immaterial* you mean not [*without substance*] it signifieth truth : but a negation speaketh not a formal essence. 2. *Spirit* is itself but a Metaphor. 3. *Intrinsic* , *indued with Life* , tells us not that it is the form : Qualities and proper accidents are intrinsic. 4. The [*faculty of motion*] is either a tautology included *in life* , or else if explicatory of *life* , it is defective ; or if it distribute Spirits into two sorts , *vital* and *motive* , it should not be in the common definition. 5. No Man can understand that the negative [*Immaterial*] by the terms , includeth Penetrability and Indiscerpibility. 6. You do not say here that they are the form , but elsewhere you do : and the form should be exprest , and not only *virtually contained* as you speak. 7. They are not the form , but the *Dispositio vel conditio ad formam* . 8. If such modalities or *consistence* were the *form* , more such should be added which are left out. 9. *Penetrability* and *Indiscerpibility* are two notions , and you should not give us a compound form. 10. Yea you compound them with a quite different notion , [*Life and the faculty of motion* :] which is truly the form , and is one thing , and not compounded of notions so different , as *Consistence* and *Vir-*

the or *Power.*] II. You say *Life intrinsecally issues from this immaterial substance*: But the form is concreated with it, and issues not from it.

You mean well: It is informing truth which you intend, and offer to the world. And we are all greatly beholden to you for so industrious calling foolish sensualists to the study and notion of invisible beings, without which what a Carcass or nothing were the world. But all our conceptions here must have their allowances, and we must confess their weakness.

And you might have informed us of all that you know, without fathering opinions on others, which they never owned, and then nicknaming them from your own fiction: As if we said that Souls are fire, and also took fire as you do for Candles, and hot Irons, &c. only.

§ 2. Now I that pretend not to a perfect definition repeat that which is the nearest to it that I understand.

And first I am for agreeing on the sense of words before we use them in definitions.

I. I take not the word [*Spirit*] to be of *univocal* signification here, but so analogical as to be equivocal. God and Creatures are not univocally called [*Spirits.*]

2. I know not (and I think no other) that all Created *Spirits* in the universe are so far of one substantial consistence as that the word [*Spirit*] univocally fits them all, as a *Genus* among the 15 senses of the word before said mentioned by *Martinus*; when we confine it to one, men are apt to boggle at the ambiguity: yet when we have defined it, the name is to be used.

3. *Materia* is as ambiguous as *Spiritus*; and is oft used for *Res* or *Substantia*, which is fundamental to modes and qualities and active forms: and oft for substance of such a consistence as is sensible (to the highest senses) and as a mind in the flesh can have an Idea of in its consistence; and if you will, such as you call Impenetrable and Discerpible.

4. The word [*substance*] itself, if used only to signifie, either *Quoddity* and not *Quiddity*; (as *Ens* for *Quod est*, and not *Quid est*, and *subsistit* for *aliquid subsistit*, not telling *what*) or relatively only for *Quod subst at accidentibus*; or negatively for *Quod non est accidens; sed aliquid subsistens in se*, and include not the notion of *Res fundamentalis*, is not fit here to be used as a *Genus*; but in this sense it is.

5. *Forma* being oft taken for *substantiæ figura*, and oft for the contexture of
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corporeal parts making it receptive of Motion, and oft for the union of the moving and the moved parts, and oft for the moving principle in a compound, and oft for the Motive or Active Virtue in a simple substance, but ever strictly for the specific constitutive cause, *per quam res est id quod est*; I take it to be but improperly and equivocally applied to the meer Receptive consistence presupposed to the form.

These things supposed. I presume not to give a definition of God, but such a description as we can reach.

Supposing the word [*Nature*] to signify in general [*Quoddity* and *Quiddity*] I first distinguish [*Nature*] into *Active* and *Passive*: By *Active* I mean that *Nature* which hath a formal Power, Virtue, and Inclination to Activity. By *Passive* I mean that *Nature* which having no such Active form, is formed to receive the Influx of the Active.

I refuse not to call the first *Spirit*: but because they so greatly differ, I choose rather the common name of *Active Nature*; being not metaphorical.

2. I suppose there is no such thing as *Spirit* (or *Active Nature*) which is not some *species* of *Spirit*: Therefore I give no definition of [*Spirit*] or *Active Na-*

Nature in general, for where there is no *form* and no *species* there is no proper definition. And all Spirit being actually *Mental*, *Sensitive* or *Vegetative*, and every thing having but one univocal *form*, I name no form but of each species, but as in compounds, so in simples we mentally distinguish the *materia* (*vel substantia*) *Dispositio* & *forma*.

Therefore defining only the species, I define, *Naturam Mentalem* to be [*substantia Purissima Virtuosissima, Virtute scilicet. Formali Vitaliter-Activa, Intellectiva, Volitiva* (una-trina:) I define *Naturam Animalem seu sensitivam*, to be [*substantia Purior Virtuosior, scilicet, virtute Vitali-Activa sensitiva, Perceptiva-sensitiva, Appetitiva-sensitiva*.

I have told you oft enough why I say *Purissima*, including as much of your [*Immaterial, Penetrable, Indiscernible*] and more, as is really the *substantia dispositio*; and if you will call it as some do *forma dispositiva*, I quarrel not: But I use [*Purissima*] 1. to avoid many words, and 2. To avoid pretending to more distinct conceptions of spiritual consistencies than I find any idea of in my mind.

I use but the Comparative degree of

[*Purior* and *Virtuosior*] to *sensitives*, not being sure that there is not a *gradual difference* in both *consistency* and *virtue* in these species of *Spirits*.

I define the *Vegetative Nature*, supposing it to be *ipse Ignis*, to be [*Substantia Pura, Virtuosa, scilicet Virtute formali Activa, Illuminativa, Calefactiva* ; by which prime operations it causeth *Vegetation*, & thereby in plants, *Discretionem, Attractionem, Digestionem*, &c. by an *Analagous perception, appetite* and *motion*. But these *actions* belong to *compounds* ; And I still profess my self in this also uncertain, whether *Natura Vegetativa* and *Ignea* be all one : or whether *Ignis* be *Natura organica* by which the three superior operate on the *Passive*. But I incline most to think that they are all one ; when I see what a *Glorious Fire* the *Sun* is, and what operation it hath on *Earth*, and how unlikely it is that so glorious a substance, should not have as noble a formal *Nature* as a plant. And I take all the superior *Virtues* to be the inferior, *eminenter*, and the inferior to have analogy to the superior.

Your frequent repetitions draw me to this repetition. If we agree in the definitions, I will not contend about any name.

And I confess if you could prove that

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Indivisibility is proper to any species, then it would be a contradiction for it to be that *species*, and yet to be *divisible*, and so it would be no act of Omnipotency to do it. But as in Materials, so as far as I can conceive in Spirituals, to make two into one is no change of the Nature of the things, nor to make one into two. This belongs to Individuation, and not to specification.

Who can doubt but God being *all in all things*, he is as intimate to us as our Souls to our bodies, and more : And tho the Schools commonly say, that God *hath no Accidents*, pardon my dissent who doubt. not he hath the accidents of Relations, and dare not say that all the world is not *Dei Accidens*, while in him we live, and move, and have our being : for I will not, and I do not think that it is *Pars Dei*, as if he were but *Anima mundi*, and yet I will not say that the world hath no entity or substance ; nor yet that the entity of God and the world, is more than the entity (or substance) of God alone ; for to be *Minor* or *Pars* is below God. But Accidents though no parts are *substantia accidentia*. And though I think the Fryar (*Benedictus de Benedictis*) in *Regula Perfectionis* speaketh fanatically when he ta-

keth it to be perfection to suppose we see and know no being but God; yet we must know nothing quite separate from God, and that hath not some dependent union with him. And yet while all things are in God, and so inseparable from him that nothing but annihilation can totally separate them, yet they are multitudes in themselves, and wicked Men and Devils are separated from the influx of his Grace and Glory. And the human nature of Christ hath some nearer union with God than other Creatures have. And so I doubt not but every Creature is so united to the universe, that nothing but annihilation can totally separate it from the rest; and yet this is consistent with individuation. I remember when I told him, whom you so oft mention of *Augustines* words de *Anima*, in which he seemeth to favour the saying that [*All Souls are one, and yet many*] rather than that [*All Souls are one, and not many*] or [*many and not one*] he seemed much taken with it: all which I mention to infer that there is a *separability* (from God and the universe) which is no way possible but by annihilation; and in compounds some separation of parts will change the *species*; and if it were proveable which *Aquinas* holds, that no

two Angels are not of distinct *Species*, then every alteration of the individual might alter the *Species*; but yet it wo'd be a Spirit.

And I have long thought that so much selfishness as is our sin or imperfection, is a potent cause of making all men more regardful of Individuation and fearful of losing it by Union of Spirits than they ought; and that holy Souls will be nearer one with Christ and one another than we can here desire or conceive; and yet Individuation *secundum quid* at least, shall be continued. But yet I say, while there is *numerus animarum*, and it is uncertain whether also each Orb hath not one, and you plead for Amplitude, and Minority, (Quantity) and the Bodies animated may as vastly differ as a Flea, or a Wren, or a Pigmy, and the Sun, it is quite above my reach to know that a change of Individuals, by making one many, or many one, is a contradiction, and so impossible.

And as to Penetrability I repeat, that seeing by *Penetration* I suppose you mean not piercing *inter partes*, but possessing the same place with other things, and contraction of itself, into less amplitude, as I know not how a thing that hath no parts (and that *extra partes*) can contract itself into less space, (which is to contract parts

that are no parts) so I cannot see but such Contraction and Colocality must needs be limited, so as that all the World cannot be deserted and mortified by all Spirits Contraction to one narrow space; nor yet that at once every Spirit is every where; and when the Contraction and Colocality is come to the narrowest possible, in that state Spirits must needs be further impenetrable, that is, no more can be in that space.

So that while I am past doubt, that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do naturally abhor separation, and so are inseparable, unless God will separate them, and so there is no fear of altering the Individuation much less the species of Souls; I there stop and will put no more into my definitions of Souls or Spirits than I know, at least as strongly probable, much less by laying the formal Essence on a Composition of hard & doubtful words, tempt all to believe that the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as those words are.

Ad S E C T. XXIII.

§ I. **Y**OU said, [*That a Spirit is Ens, id-eoque verum, and that True im-*
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plieth a right matter and forms duly conjoined.] To which I said, [Do you not here make Spirits material?] You answered, [I do not make Spirits material in any sense derogatory to their Nature and Perfections.]

Reply. Nor do those that I excused; so then after all these Sections, you make Spirits consist of Matter and form, in a sense agreeable to their nature and perfection: And so *de nomine*, you come nearer those that you accuse than I do.

§ 2. But you say, [That Matter and Form I there speak of, is a Matter and Form that belongs to *Ens quatenus Ens*--- in a most general notion prescinded from all kinds of Being whatever, and therefore belongs to Beings Immaterial.]

Ans. If you may say *Quidvis de quovis*, lay not too great stress on words. *Ens quatenus Ens* hath no Form, nor proper Matter. *Ens* is that *terminus incomplexus*, to whose Conception all other are resolved. Therefore every other conception incomplex or complex, must add somewhat to it. It can be no *Genus*, or *Species*: If it have any kind of Matter and Form it is more than *Ens quatenus Ens*: And sure that which is [prescinded from all particular kinds of Being, is prescinded from Material and Immaterial, unless the word [particular]

cular] be a *Cothurnus*. To say that *Ens* hath Matter and Form, is to say more than *Ens*, a most general notion, as you call it.

But if *Ens* as the most general notion, have Matter and Form, then so hath Spirits, and every subordinate; for the general is in them all.

§ 3. But you say, [*It's only materia & forma logica.*] To which I answered before. That's but to say, *It is notio secunda*, which if it be not fitted *ad primam*, or *ut signum ad rem significandam*, it is false. And we suppose you to mean to speak truly and aptly. If you should mean neither *materia ex qua*, nor *in qua*, but *circa quam*, so Form may be Matter.

§ 4. You say, [*Nor is the Form adjoined in a Physical Sense to the Matter, unless where the Form and Matter are Substances really distinct.*]

Ans. 1. I believe not this to be true: If it be, then only Compounds have Form and Matter; but I think Simples have Matter and Form, that are not two Substances but one. As I have oft said, *Dr. Glisson* after others most subtilly laboureth to prove it of every simple Substance, that its Matter and Form are not compound-ing parts, but *Conceptus inadequati*: If the Intellect compound and divide its

own Conceptions that maketh not a real Composition of two Substances in the objects, but as the *Scotists* call it, of two *Formalities*, or *Conceptus objectivi*: which if you will call a Logical Composition or Intellectual, if you explain it, the matter is small. But besides that Earth, Water and Air have their Matter and differencing Forms, which are not two Substances, so hath Fire in a more noble sense if it be material: And by your Application of the word [*Physical*] you seem to extend it to Spirits: And if so, I am past doubt that the *Substance* and *Form* of Spirits are not two distinct conjoined Substances.

Too many Logicians have hitherto taken the *Potentia naturalis*, or Faculties of the Soul to be accidents in the Predicament of Quality: Let them call them *Qualities* if they please, but the *Scotists* have fully prov'd them to be no Accidents, but the formal Essence of the Soul, (and I have answered all *Zabarell's* Arguments *ubi sup.*) And this *Virtus formalis*, (*vel facultas, vel potentia activa*) is not a Substance joined to a Substance, but the form of a simple Substance. But I perceive by your next words that you approve all this, and speak only of *mental Composition* as to *Spirits*. And I say that the Mind should

should conceive, and the Tongue speak of things as they are, and not at once deny Materiality to Spirits, and call them Logically material; or at least bear with others that say but the same. If *Logical Matter* speak not *Substantiality* at least, it is delusive.

Your *Interminata amplitudo* sounds so like *Infinita*, that I am not willing to say that no Spirit hath any *Terminos Substantia*.

Ad SECT. XXXIII, XXXIV.

The Conclusion.

§ 1. **Y**OU say that *I wrote not so curtly, but that I have sufficiently conveyed my mind to you.*] *ans.* I would have done so, had I dream'd of your Printing it. But that I did not, appeareth by your grand Mistake, as if I had asserted that materiality of Spirits which is proper to Bodies.

§ 2. As in all, our difference lieth in a much smaller matter than you thought. so in your great design of convincing the blinded Sadduces of this Age, and in the truly pious Conclusion in your 24. Sect. I not only agree with you, but in my own name, and many others, humbly tender you unfeigned Thanks.

§ 3. And because I would not seem more distant from you than I am, I shall first tell you, that on these Subjects your thoughts and mine have been so long working to the same ends & much in the same way, that, 1655. your Book
against

against Atheism and my popular discourses of the unreasonableness of Infidelity coming out together, we both used many of the same Histories of Apparitions, Witches, &c. for Confirmation; and in that Book of yours, you have these following words, which if they are not (as I think they are not) *mischievous*, it's like mine of the same importance are not so, nor are more so proved by you than your own.

Antid. Li. I. p. 17. [*The parts of a Spirit can be no more separated though they be dilated, than you can cut off the Rays of the Sun by a pair of Scissors made of pellucid Chrystal.*]

Appen. p. 304. [*Suppose a point of Light, from which rayes out a luminous Orb according to the known Principles of Optiques: This Orb of Light doth very much resemble the Nature of a Spirit, which is diffused and extended, and yet indivisible: For we'll suppose in this Spirit the Center of Life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse itself by a kind of circumscribed Omnipotency, as the point of Light is discernible in every point of the luminous Sphere. And yet supposing that central lucid point indivisible, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of Light. For it is ridiculous to think of any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous Rayes from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves, as any man will acknowledge that does but consider the thing we speak of. Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an Orb as this, as Substance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of Light itself, it not inhering in any Subject in the place it occupieth, looks far more like a Substance than any Accident. And what we fanry unadvisedly to befall Light and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in spiritual Substances, whose central Essence spreads out into a secondary Substance, as the lumi-*

luminous Rays are conceived to shoot out from a lucid point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inseparable dependance on the central Essence, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an extension of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discernible from another, but the entire Substance, as well secondary as primary, or central, is indivisible. But let us again cast our Eyes on this lucid point and radiant Orb we have made use of: It is manifest that those Raies that are hindered from shooting out so far as they would, need not lose their Virtue or Being, but only be reflected back toward their shining Center; and the Obstacle being removed they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no Generation of a new Ray.—

And p. 357. [When I speak of Indivisibility that imagination create not new troubles to herself, I mean not such an Indivisibility as is fancied in a Mathematical point, but as we conceive in a Sphere of Light made from one lucid point or radiant Center. For that Sphere or Orb of Light, though it be in some sense extended, yet it is truly indivisible, supposing the Center such. For there is no means imaginable to discern or separate any one Ray of this Orb, and keep it apart by itself disjoined from the Center.

Now a little to invert the Property of this luminous Orb, when we would apply it to a Soul or Spirit: As there can be no alteration in the radiant Center, but therewith it is necessarily in every part of the Orb, so there is also that Unity and Indivisibility of the exterior parts, if I may so call them, of a Spirit or Soul, with their inmost Center, that if any of them be affected, the Center of Life

is thereby also necessarily affected, and these exteriour parts of the Soul being affected by the parts of the Object with such Circumstances as they are in, the inward Center receives all so circumstantiated, that it hath necessarily the entire and unconfused Images of things without, though they be contrived into so small a compass, and are in the very Center of this spiritual substance: This Symbolical Representation I used before, and I cannot excogitate any thing that will better set off the nature of a Spirit, &c.]

Here is the same and more than I have said, unless you think Light here to be no Fire; but take Light for a Substance, and Fire but for Motion: which if you say, I am willing to believe you will recal.

And that a Spirit is in its Contraction impenetrable, let your words testify, p. 312,

Υλοπαδία I define thus: *A Power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal Emanation from the Center of Life, that it will so perfectly fill the Receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same, and of hereby becoming so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate and be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.*

So here is a Spirit when it hath filled a Body, that can no more be penetrated by another Spirit or Body; and so in this contracted state is impenetrable. So that this is but bringing diffused parts closer together, and then no other can be in the same place. And is this the necessary Form of a Spirit?

But may not this extension and Indivisibility also be omitted as too hard, without all the mischief mentioned by you, and a truer notifying Form found out?

Let

Let us hear your self, p. 359. [To prevent all such Cavils we shall omit the Spinosities of the Extension or Indivisibility of a Soul or Spirit, and conclude briefly thus: That the manifold Contradictions and Repugnancies we find in the nature of matter, to be able to either think or spontaneously to move itself, do well assure us that these operations belong not to it, but to some other substance: Wherefore we finding those operations in us, it is manifest that we have in us an immaterial Being really distinct from the Body, which we ordinarily call a Soul: The speculation of whose bare Essence, though it may well puzzle us, yet those properties that we find incompatible to a Body, do sufficiently inform us of the different Nature thereof: for it is plain she is a Substance indued with the power of Cogitation, that is, of perceiving and thinking of Objects, as also of penetrating and spontaneously moving of a Body; which properties are as immediate to her as impenetrability and separability of parts to the matter, and we are not to demand the cause of the one any more than of the other.]

So here we have the true Form as sufficient notice.

And if voluntary Motion be proper to a Spirit, I think meer Fire (Solar or Æthereal) is no Spirit; But if all self-moving Power be proper to a Spirit, Fire is a Spirit. And from the Form will I denominate, while you oft tell us, that the Essence of Substance is unknown. (By Essence meaning somewhat else than that which I can fully prove to be the Form.

To conclude, there are these different Opinions before us.

I. That the whole Entity or *Conceptus realis* of a Spirit is *Virtus vitalis*, and is *mera forma*,
or

or rather *simplex actus Entitativus*; and that *Substantia* is added not as a partial real *Conceptus*, but as *respective*, to notify that this *Virtus vitalis* is no Accident, but a thing that may subsist of itself. Some hold this true only of God, and some of all Spirits: If this be true, your notions of Penetrability and Indivisibility are most easily defended.

II. That Spirits have two inadequate, real *Conceptus*, and that *Substantia* is the fundamental as truly as *materia* is in meer Bodies, and an incomprehensible *purity* of Substance (or that it is *Immaterial*, not having *partes extra partes* with the *trine dimension*) is *Substantie dispositio*; (yet that this hath degrees as the Forms have, all Spirits not being of equal *Purity*;) And that *Virtus vitalis* is the partial *Conceptus*, viz. *Formalis*. And this I incline to, as to created Spirits.

III. That the *Conceptus formalis* of Spirit is this *Virtus vitalis, vel motiva, perceptiva, appetitiva*, but that all *Matter* is essentially informed by that *Vitality*, and so *Matter* and *Vitality* are the inadequate *Conceptus* of every Substance, and that not by Composition, but as of one simple thing. And this is Dr. *Glisson's* and some others.

IV. That a Spirit is both a real *Substance*, (as the fundamental *Conceptus*) and informed both by *Immateriality, Penetrability, and Indiscernibility*, and also by a vital and moving *Power*: But that it existeth only in Bodies or *Matter*, and so always makes up a Compound of *two Substances*, (saying that God is infinite, beyond all *Matter*.) And that all such
Spirits

Spirits were at first made together indivisible Individuals, both that of the least Creature and of the greatest, but changed from Body to Body, and so are parts of Animals. This I suppose is your Opinion.

Our chief difference is, that I profess to be ignorant of the *Consistency* and *Incorporation* which you talk of, and must be so: Though I am assured of the *Substantiality* and *Form*, which satisfieth me; for Christ knoweth all the rest for me.

F I N I S.

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