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
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Classification of Desires in St. Thomas
and in Modern Sociology

DISSERTATION

*Presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University
of America in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

BY

HENRY IGNATIUS SMITH, O.P.

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CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES IN ST. THOMAS AND IN MODERN SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to explain the classification of desires as sources of human action, found in the writings of St. Thomas of Aquin, and to compare that classification with those of Ward and Small, who may be taken as representatives of modern sociology. Small speaks as follows as to the value of such an effort: "We may join with Tarde in finding the progenitors of our sociologists long before the name was invented. Tarde implies belief that the old philosophers and theologians were actually the pioneers in the fields of study which have at last reached such intensive cultivation that the class of investigators known as sociologists had to be differentiated. He speaks of the change promising better results, which is observable from the time when such specialists in sociology as the philologists, the philosophers of religion and especially the economists began to perform the more modest task of identifying minute facts and of formulating their laws." (General Sociology, p. 44.)

Efforts have been made throughout the history of philosophy in all of its lines, to arrive at a satisfactory classification of human desires. No classification has yet met general acceptance. McCosh says (Motive Powers, p. 13), "It would be of great service to every branch of mental science to have an approximately good classification of the appetences by which mankind are swayed. This is a difficult work, more so than the classification of plants or animals, the determining motives being so many and so varied in persons and in reality. . . . It may be possible to form if not a perfect, a good provisional arrangement of man's springs of action." Professor Ladd

speaks as follows: (Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 52f), "It must be admitted that classification, even if the range employed to designate its results be somewhat misleading, is the necessary beginning of psychological as well as of every other science. . . . The first impression when we enter upon the field of psychic facts for the purpose of classifying them is one of bewildering variety. . . . Moreover, in the interests of scientific exactness we at once ask ourselves, what principles of classification shall we adopt?" Putnam says (Textbook of Psychology, p. 154), "The feelings are the motive powers of the soul. . . . A satisfactory classification of the feelings is a matter of much difficulty for several reasons. The feelings are very numerous and many of them very complex in character. Several classifications have about equal value. Almost every writer adopts a classification of his own, growing out of his peculiar views or adapted to the end for which he writes." Baldwin recognizes in a similar way the necessity of classification of sources of action. (Mental Development, p. 349; Handbook of Psychology, p. 135.)

The older psychologists such as Des Cartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Sully, Spencer, Bain, Lewes, Hamilton and even those who were opposed to the faculty theory of the soul such as Brown, Schleiermacher, Beneke, Drobisch, Taine, Ribot, Bailey and Vorlander, recognize without exception the value of classification of sources of action in our attempt to understand the processes of the human mind.

The economists no less than the psychologists recognize the advantage of this classification in the development of their science, as is to be seen throughout economic literature. Although Marshall says (Principles of Economics, p. 91), "The formal classification of wants is a task not without interest but it is not needed for our purposes," nevertheless few economists have failed to make an endeavor to work out a classification of either

desires or the objects which arouse them. Since sociology has taken on the psychological trend which marks its recent history, the problem of classifying desires has taken on for it a new importance. Professor Ward (*Pure Sociology*, p. 256ff; *Applied Sociology*, pp. 25, 244, 327; *Dynamic Sociology I*, p. 472), is the first American sociologist who makes the classification of social forces or desires a fundamental feature of his system of sociology. Baldwin says (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 15-22), "The only way to get a solid basis for social theory based upon human want or desire, is to work out first a descriptive and genetic psychology of desire in its social aspects." He bases his classification on the fundamental concept of conscious imitation. Ross (*Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 161-164), argues for the necessity of a complete classification of social forces. Professor Small (*General Sociology*, 436), says, "The resolution of human activities into pursuit of differentiated interests becomes the first clue to the combination that unlocks the mystery of society." (437) "Sociology involves first of all a technique for detecting, classifying, criticising, measuring and correlating human interests."

Professor Giddings seems not to share these views of the need or the possibility of making a classification of desires in the endeavor to develop the science of sociology. He speaks as follows (*Principles of Sociology*, pp. 11, 12): "The subjective explanation has not been carried through the whole range of social phenomena. Much less has it been reduced to terms of a single motive or principle uniquely characterizing the conscious individual as a social being and determining all his social relations in so far as they are volitionally created. Instead of attempting to find such a principle, to deduce from it all its consequences and to organize about it the conditioning motives or circumstances that should be taken into account, there has been a tiresome endeavor to enumerate all the motives that actuate a man in his varied relations and in the satis-

faction of all his wants, as if all motives were of coordinate importance to sociology." Hayes expresses a like disparaging view of classification of desires in the *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XVI, "The Social Forces Error."

St. Thomas of Aquin, who constructed a complete system of individual and social philosophy in the spirit of his century, gave fundamental importance to the classification of human desires. He explored it thoroughly in both its subjective and objective aspects. He solved for his time and under its limitations many of the problems to which modern sociology is giving increasing attention. This study represents an attempt to explain the relations between the classification established by St. Thomas and that aimed at in modern sociology. Since Lester Ward has developed the most elaborate subjective classification which we have, comparison is instituted between the subjective classification of St. Thomas and that of Ward. Since Professor Small has proposed the most definite objective classification that we have, comparison is instituted between his work and that of St. Thomas. Psychologists such as McCosh, James, Ladd, Tarde, Baldwin, base their classification of the sources of human action on emotional and affective states, instincts, impulses, appetencies. These are, of course, subjective. Among economists we find the objective classification of goods or objects of desire side by side with the subjective classification of wants or motives. Both subjective and objective principles are found, as has been said, among the sociologists. In addition to classifications of Ward and Small, which will be studied in detail, we find others discussed by Ross in his *Foundations of Sociology*; Stuckenberg in *Sociology*, vol. I; Ellwood in *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*; Small in *General Sociology*, pp. 183ff; Baldwin in *Mental Development*. A helpful summary is given in Howard, *General Sociology*, University of Nebraska Publications, 1907.

It must be kept in mind that St. Thomas viewed his work in social philosophy as a subsidiary portion of his theological view of life. In his mind, all life is a journey from God to God. He was interested in secular knowledge and utilized it only as it took position and served purpose in his cosmic philosophy. The moral spiritual point of view governed him.

St. Thomas' discussions of the subjective and the objective classifications of human desire are found chiefly in the *Summa Theologica*. In this great work, he constructs a scientific Christian philosophy of life. He does this by working into harmony the rational philosophy of Aristotle and the traditional Catholic theology which reached for the first time, full expression in his great work. Much material is to be found also in the *Contra Gentiles*, his *Commentaries of Aristotle's Books*, in his *Scripture Commentaries*, and *Questiones Disputatae*. In order to find the exact mind of St. Thomas regarding both the subjective and the objective classifications of desires, it was necessary to make a search of all of his writings. While his system of thought came to complete expression in only the *Summa*, he drew upon his vast range of information and his remarkable insight very frequently in the occasional writings which he left. There are to be found from time to time apparent discrepancies throughout the thirty-six volumes which he left, which after careful examination prove to be mainly nominal. Not only that, but in the course of his lifetime, St. Thomas had occasion to change his views. He takes great care to inform his reader of this whenever it occurs. The exposition of his doctrine which is here offered is the result of as careful a search of all of his writings as has been possible and of a faithful endeavor to discover the final views which he developed in his maturer life and to which he held.

A moral purpose governed St. Thomas in all of his study of human action whether individual or social. He

discusses and classifies human desires because ill regulated desire leads to sin and properly regulated desire leads to virtue. Sin and virtue are the ultimate terms in which he thinks of and describes human conduct. Modern sociology is in the main analytical and descriptive. Attempts to classify human desires result from the wish to discover categories of human action, methods by which we may classify and through classification understand the marvellous complex of life known as human society. An interesting discussion of the relations of ethics and sociology may be found in Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 653ff. See also *Chicago University Decennial Publications*, 1 S. vol. IV. Small, *The Significance of Sociology for Ethics*.

CHAPTER I.

SUBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES IN ST. THOMAS.

I.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION.

St. Thomas refers human action to the human soul. (1-2ae, Q. 37, a. 1). This simple spiritual substance is the remote principle of all action. In order to exercise its inherent powers it uses different channels or faculties. These are called the powers of the soul and are the proximate sources of action (1a, Q. 77, a. 1). These powers are distinguished from the essence of the soul although they are inherent in it (*ibid.*). They are related among themselves (1a, Q. 77, a. 7), being distinct from one another and of different dignities (1a, Q. 77, a. 4). These faculties are of two kinds; through some of them the soul executes an action while through others it is acted upon by another agent.¹ (De Verit., Q. 25, a. 2; Q. 16, a. 1.) The powers of the soul are drawn into action by the stimulus of their proper objects. They in turn stir the soul to action.

The soul is the vivifying principle of the material body; hence, it is the sustaining element of the body's vegetative and sensile life. It has also its peculiar spiritual activity. St. Thomas holds that human action is the combined result of interaction of soul and body and that, therefore, it is not correct to say that the intellect understands and the will wishes. His definite principle covering this point is, "Actiones sunt suppositorum." Man acts. It is the concrete individual who understands through the intellect and wishes through the action of the will. St. Thomas teaches that human action is neither en-

¹ Modern Psychology in general repudiates this faculty theory of the soul, substituting for it a function theory. The most distinguished defender of it according to the mind of St. Thomas is Cardinal Mercier, who is the leader of the Neo Scholastic movement.

tirely angelic nor totally animal, but that it is on the confines of the spiritual and the bodily natures and that both kinds of powers meet in the soul (1a, Q. 77, a. 2). Its simple spirituality can be reconciled with its varied activities only by assuming the existence of many different powers distinguished from one another by the nature of the object which stimulates them to act. In other words, the faculties of the soul are distinguished by their activities, and these activities are distinguished by their proper objects (1a, Q. 77, a. 3). Thus we see that the subjective and the objective classifications of desires are fundamental throughout the system of St. Thomas. Certain faculties, intellect and will, are complete acts of the soul and are situated in the soul itself; others, the vegetative and sensile faculties, are situated in the composite being (1a, Q. 77, a. 5). All of them depend on the soul as their principle of emanation (1a, Q. 77, a. 8).

St. Thomas presents his fundamental classification as follows (1a, Q. 78, a. 1):

Utrum quinque genera potentiarum animae sint distinguenda.

Respondeo dicendum quod quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt;—tres vero dicuntur animae;—quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi.

Et hujus diversitatis ratio est, quia diversae animae distinguuntur secundum quod diversimode operatio animae supergreditur operationem naturae corporalis. Tota enim natura corporalis subjacet animae, et comparatur ad ipsam sicut materia et instrumentum. Est ergo quaedam operatio animae quae in tantum excedit naturam corpoream, quod neque etiam exercetur per organum corporale; et talis est operatio animae rationalis. Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem; et talis est operatio animae sensibilis; quia etsi calidum, et frigidum, et humidum, et siccum, et aliae hujusmodi qualitates corporeae, requirantur ad operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis procedat, sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem operationum animae est quae fit per organum corporeum, et virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur tamen operationem naturae corporeae; quia motiones corporum sunt ab exteriori principio; hujusmodi autem operationes sunt a principio intrinseco, hoc enim commune est omnibus operationibus animae. Omne autem animatum aliquo modo movet seipsum; et talis est operatio

animae vegetabilis. Digestio enim, et ea quae consequuntur, fit instrumentally per actionem caloris, ut dicitur in 2 de Anima, text. 50.

Genera vero potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum objecta. Quanto enim potentia est altior, tanto respicit universalius objectum, ut supra dictum est, quaest. praec., art. 3, ad. 4. Objectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Allicujus enim potentiae animae objectum est solum corpus animae unitum; et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum; non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile, et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed etiam universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei conjunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem oporteat operans aliquo modo conjungi suo objecto, circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est objectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo secundum quod nata est animae conjungi, et in anima esse per suam similitudinem; et quantum ad hoc sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum respectu objecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum respectu objecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem; et secundum hanc etiam comparisonem sunt duo genera potentiarum animae: unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus. Ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum omne animal movetur.

Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum, sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum, ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam; et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita. quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium; quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in 2 de Anima, text. 27.

From this text we find that our author describes five different kinds of objects around which the power of the soul is focused. The soul cares for the material welfare of the body which stands between it and the outer world. This class of powers is called vegetative. It includes

the nutritive power preserving the bodily existence, the augmentative power which carries the body to its right proportions, and the generative power giving life to others.

Other phases of the soul's activity bring it into relation with objects not joined to it like the body but extrinsic to it. The relation of the soul to these external objects has a two-fold direction, the motion of the object toward the soul and the motion of the soul toward the object. This difference of direction represents the difference between the cognitive and the conative faculties. Every agent must be united in some way to the object on which it is acting; it must either bring the object to itself or it must be carried in some way to the object. This holds true when applied to the operations of the soul about objects that are extrinsic to it. In the case of apprehension the mind draws the object of knowledge to itself and adapts it to its own processes. In the case of conation the faculty is drawn toward the object. In regard to that movement of the soul whereby it draws in the object, the object can be considered in two senses, either materially or immaterially. Thus in the cognitive class of the soul's activities we meet the fundamental division between the sensitive, and the rational or intellectual operations. To take care of the different phases of sensitive cognition St. Thomas enumerates the following faculties or powers of the soul. The faculties for internal sensible cognition are common sense, memory, imagination and the instinct of estimation. The faculties for external sensible knowledge are sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. To provide for the knowledge of things in a rational way we have the intellect.

In that kind of psychic activity by which the soul is drawn toward the object the latter is again either a material thing or something spiritual. For the soul's activity or motion toward an external sensible object there are two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible powers of

the sensitive appetency. The motion of the soul toward a more universal object is through the will. Where the external sensible object can be procured only by effort and travel the soul is aided by the faculty of locomotion (1a, Q. 78, a. 2; a. 3; a. 4; Q. 79; Q. 80; Q. 81, a. 2; 1-2ae, Q. 23, a. 4).

II.

FORMS OF DESIRE.

1. *NATURAL APPETENCY*.—Modern psychology confines the use of the term appetite or appetency to the lower faculties of man. St. Thomas, however, gave the word a much broader meaning, using it to denominate the universal tendency in all created things toward a particular kind of existence or action. In this sense, the word may be applied as readily to economic or geological activity as to the higher forms of rational evolution. *Appetitus* is the inclination or relation of a thing to an object that is agreeable to it (1-2ae, Q. 8, a. 1; 1a, Q. 80, a. 1; De Malo, Q. 3, a. 3; De Verit., Q. 25, a. 1); to a natural complement which it desires when not possessed and which it enjoys when possessed (1a, Q. 19, a. 1, a. 2); it is an inborn inclination placed in everything by the First Mover by force of which each thing tends to realize the purpose for which it exists and in the manner in which it exists (Eth. lec. 2; Phys. I, 5).

One can see at a glance the relation of this natural appetite to the problem of classification of the powers of the soul. Each power or faculty of the soul is distinct from the others. Each one is a channel of the soul's activity and is endowed with a natural inclination or *appetitus* to accomplish that for which it was placed in the soul. Each power of the soul, by force of a natural appetite, desires and loves the object to which it is ordained by nature (1a, Q. 78, a. 1, ad. 3). This natural appetite is not a distinct power of the soul (De Verit., Q. 22, a. 3).

St. Thomas uses the term "natural" here to indicate that this inclination is placed in each faculty by nature.²

2. *SENSILE APPETENCY*.—Natural appetite governs objects automatically. It is nothing other than natural inclination or tendency. There is in connection with it, no question of antecedent knowledge or understanding or choice.

St. Thomas devotes much time to the analysis of the sensitive appetency. The act of the sensitive appetite is called sensuality. This term covers any movement of the sensile appetite whether promoting or interfering with the welfare of the individual. The act of appetency differs from the act of apprehension. The latter is completed when the thing apprehended is brought toward the cognitive power (1a, Q. 81, a. 1). The general sensile appetency of the individual acts by two distinct faculties, the irascible and the concupiscible. The latter of these has for its object the good as such, while the former has for its object the difficult good and the removal of any obstacle which may stand in the way of a good desired. Thus the movements of the irascible faculty are grounded in the concupiscible faculty. Sensitive conation is an inclination that follows in the wake of sensitive perception just as natural conation is an inclination resulting from natural constitution. The apprehensive faculty may represent a desirable object as attainable without or with difficulty. The soul is prepared for each situation by the irascible and concupiscible faculties (1-2ae, Q. 23, a. 1, ad. 3).

a) Out of these two powers of the soul arise the passions known in modern terminology as the emotions. The word "passion" is relegated now to moral philosophy which uses it to denote ill regulated emotion. The phrase "sensile appetency" is no longer used in psychology outside of Thomistic circles. In the mind of St. Thomas the passions are movements of the sensile appetency which

² For the uses of the word 'natural' in St. Thomas, see Verit. Q. 22, a. 4.

follow upon sensible apprehension. He recognizes fully the importance of the emotions in human action (1-2ae, Q. 22, a. 2, ad. 2).

The following table represents the passions as St. Thomas explained them and their relation to the concupiscible and irascible powers of the soul:

	Concupiscible Faculty Awakens	Irascible Faculty Awakens
Object as first apprehended....	{ Good... Love Evil.... Hatred	
Object as to be possessed.....	{ Good... Desire Evil.... Aversion	Hope and Despair Fear and Courage
Object as possessed.....	{ Good... Delight Evil.... Pain	Anger

The good apprehended awakens the passion of love; evil apprehended awakens the passion of hatred. A perceived good, not yet possessed awakens the passion of desire or concupiscence; an evil perceived but not suffered arouses the passion of dislike. The good possessed occasions delight or joy. The good or the evil suffered awakens pain or sorrow. The irascible passions arise in a similar way. The good not yet obtained occasions hope or despair. The evil feared but not yet suffered awakens fear and daring. Evil suffered arouses the passion of anger (1-2ae, Q. 23, a. 1).

The emotions of the irascible faculty are secondary to the concupiscible emotions. The most important of these is love (1-2ae, Q. 25, a. 2). Others are joy, sadness, hope, fear and pleasure (1-2ae, Q. 25, a. 4).

b) St. Thomas considers instinct in two ways—as an inclination to action found in all of the faculties (appetitus naturalis), and as a special combination of the sense of estimation with one or another of the emotions. He would explain the general instincts for knowledge, imitation, self and race preservation as the natural appetite or inherent activity of the powers of intellect, nutrition, aug-

mentation and generation (1a, Q. 78, a. 1). In many instances instinct seems to indicate a kind of choice as is evident in the case of the lamb instinctively avoiding the wolf (1a, Q. 81, a. 3). This is due to the sense of estimation, the guide of the sensile appetite just as the practical reason is the guide of the will (3. Sent. dist. 26, Q. 1, a. 2). Unlike the other faculties, each one craving for selfish satisfaction, the sense of estimation is the governor of the other senses and directs the sensile welfare of the composite (De Verit., Q. 24, a. 2).

3. *RATIONAL APPETENCY*.—The rational appetite in man is the will. The will necessarily desires happiness as its last end (1a, Q. 82, a. 1). It is metaphysically determined to the good. However, in regard to individual goods, the will has the power of choice (ibid.) seeking all things under the aspect of good (1a, Q. 82, a. 2, ad. 1). Unlike the sensitive appetite which seeks particular sensile goods, the will seeks good in its universal aspect (1a, Q. 82, a. 5). Free will is essentially the act of choosing among goods (1a, Q. 83, a. 3) and is accompanied by the judgment of the reason (ibid., ad. 2), since the appetite itself does not make comparisons (ibid., ad. 3).

On the will rests the work of controlling the other appetites. The irascible and concupiscible faculties obey the will as an inferior obeys a superior, through a political but not despotic subjection (1a, Q. 81, a. 3). At times the will is not powerful enough to control the inordinate cravings of the lower appetites and is overcome very often by fear, anger and sexual passion (1-2ae, Q. 6).

This overpowering force of the lower appetites may come from habit, heredity and environment. On this basis St. Thomas accounts for diversity of actions among individuals where the powers of the soul—the sources of action—are theoretically the same in all.

Habits are acquired tendencies and are the results of repeated acts (1-2ae, Q. 51, a. 1). They are very often

initiated by inherited dispositions (De Potent, Q. 3, a. 9, ad. 7). The child resembles the parents in many personal traits (De Verit. Q. 23, a. 5) and many characteristics rooted in the organism are transmitted from parent to child, such as physical ability and keen minds (1-2ae, Q. 81, a. 2; De Malo, Q. 4, a. 8; 1-2ae, Q. 51, a. 1). Thus one will have a natural predisposition to science, another to bravery and another to temperance (1-2ae, Q. 63, a. 1). Inherited evil dispositions when gratified build up bad habits or vices; good inclinations repeated form good habits or virtues (1-2ae, Q. 49, a. 1; *ibid.*, Q. 50, a. 2, a. 3). The task of the will is to control vicious inclinations and direct the lower appetites toward the *Summum Bonum*. In this work it can be helped or hindered by environment because of the tendency of individuals to imitate actions of their neighbors (2-2ae, Q. 83, a. 1; In Rom., lec. 7, c. 2; lec. 14, c. 2). Good example is more powerful than words (1-2ae, Q. 34, a. 1) and the will is assisted by the imitation of the Savior and the saints (In Heb. 12, lec. 1; 3a, Q. 48, a. 5, ad. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 14, Q. 1, a. 5).

III.

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

While love is the beginning of all action, practically speaking, the desire for spiritual or material pleasure is the first step in the mental process (1-2ae, Q. 31, a. 1). In this sense, pleasure is the conditioning element of all appetite and action just as good is their object. Intellectual pleasures are called *gaudium*; when accompanied by elation, pleasure is called *laetitia*; when expressed externally it is *jucunditas*; when it arises from the animal appetites it is called *voluptas*. Pleasure is necessary as an antidote for sorrow and men usually choose material pleasure because they cannot obtain or appreciate spiritual pleasures (1-2ae, Q. 31, a. 5). Pleasures may be ob-

tained from Action well regulated (1-2ae, Q. 32 a. 1) : Hope and Memory (ibid., a. 3, ad. 3) : Sadness and Hatred (ibid., a. 4, ad. 2 and ad. 3) : Praise and Flattery (ibid., a. 5) : Charity (ibid., a. 6) : Correcting and Scolding Others (ibid., a. 6, ad. 3) : Similarity (consciousness of kind) (ibid., 7) : Wonder and Research (1-2ae, Q. 32, a. 8, ad. 3).

Pleasure has the following effects on desire: it causes a thirst or desire for itself (1-2ae, Q. 33, a. 2) : material pleasures hinder the use of the imagination and thus fetter the reason (ibid., a. 3).

St. Thomas recognizes four degrees of pain. Sorrow or pain is always occasioned by evil with which the individual is brought into contact. If the evil lies in the misfortune of a friend, pity is aroused; if a man think the success of a neighbor is his own misfortune, envy is stirred up. The inability to avoid evil is perplexity, and paralysis is the complete depression of the mind and body in the face of evil (1-2ae, Q. 35, a. 2). When the presence of evil is perceived by the interior senses, the emotion is called sorrow; otherwise it is called pain (1-2ae, Q. 35, a. 3).

Sorrow and pain, while the opposites of pleasure, can be the cause of pleasure; on this principle is built the philosophy by which material pains and sorrows are borne with a pleasure based on higher motives (ibid.). In many cases the avoidance of pain may be a stronger motive than the pursuit of pleasure (ibid., a. 6).

Sorrow is caused by delay in procuring the objects of desire or when the hope of satisfying our desires vanishes (1-2ae, Q. 36, a. 2). Were we to crush desire, sorrow would also disappear (ibid., a. 4).

The remedies for pain and sorrow are:

Pleasure: Tears and Groans (1-2ae, Q. 38, a. 2) : Friendly Sympathy (ibid., Q. 38, a. 3) : Contemplation: Sleep and Bathing (Q. 38, a. 4).

The following table presents the entire analysis of St. Thomas in brief form:

CLASSIFICATION OF SOURCES OF ACTION¹

CLASS OR GENUS	PARTICULAR POWERS	TENDENCIES
<i>Vegetative</i>	{	<i>Nutritive</i> (1a, Q. 78, a. 2) <i>Augmentative</i> (ibid. ad. 3; ad. 4) <i>Generative</i> (ibid. ad. 2; ad. 4)
<i>Sensitive</i> ...	{	<i>Sight</i> (1a, Q. 78, a. 3) <i>Hearing</i> (ibid.) <i>Smell</i> (ibid.) <i>Taste</i> (ibid.) <i>Touch</i> (ibid.)
		<i>External</i> ... (1a, Q. 78, a. 3)
<i>Sensitive</i> ...	{	<i>Common Sense</i> (1a, Q. 78, a. 4) <i>Memory</i> (ibid.) <i>Imagination</i> (ibid.) <i>Estimation</i> (ibid.)
		<i>Internal</i> (1a, Q. 78, a. 4)
<i>Appetitive</i> .	{	<i>Hope</i> (1-2ae, Q. 40) <i>Despair</i> <i>Courage</i> (ibid. Q. 45) <i>Fear</i> (ibid. QQ. 41, 42, 43, 44) <i>Anger</i> (ibid. QQ. 46, 47, 48)
		<i>Sensitive</i> ... (1a, Q. 80, a. 1, a. 2)
		<i>Irascible</i> (Q. 81, a. 2, a. 3 (1-2ae, QQ. 22, 23, 24, 25)
		<i>Concupiscible</i> .. (Q. 81, a. 2, a. 3)
<i>Appetitive</i> .	{	<i>Love</i> (1-2ae, QQ. 26, 27, 28) <i>Desire</i> (ibid. Q. 30) <i>Pleasure</i> (ibid. QQ. 31, 32, 33, 34) <i>Hatred</i> (ibid. Q. 29) <i>Aversion</i> <i>Sadness</i> (ibid. QQ. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39)
		<i>Rational</i> ... { <i>Will</i> (Q. 80, a. 2; Q. 82; Q. 83)
<i>Intellective</i>	{	<i>Intellect</i>
<i>Intellective</i>	{	(Q. 79, a. 1)
		<i>Active Intellect</i> (Q. 79, a. 3, a. 4) <i>Possible Intellect</i> (ibid.) <i>Practical Intellect</i> (a. 10, 11) <i>Speculative Intellect</i> (aa. 10, 11) <i>Universal Intellect</i> (ibid.)
<i>Locomotive</i>	{	<i>Locomotion</i>

¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 109-123 and 198-288, contains an excellent critical summary of modern sociological and psychological literature on this field. Mercier, in his *Psychologie*, gives an excellent and sympathetic exposition of St. Thomas' doctrine in the light of modern psychology.

CHAPTER II.
OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES
IN ST. THOMAS.

I.

PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION.

In the mind of St. Thomas, desire is the motive force awakened when a good is perceived and sought. It is the power by which the will is brought into conjunction with objects which complete it and bring to it pleasure. Since desire takes on many forms it receives many names in the vocabulary of St. Thomas. Unbridled desire is called cupidity or concupiscence. Sometimes the word libido is applied to this form of ill-regulated desire, but ordinarily it relates to inordinate desire of the pleasures of touch, just as ambition and avarice signify inordinate desire of honor and wealth. Desire is strictly a movement of the sensile appetency. Craving for wisdom and other spiritual goods such as virtue or knowledge, is called desire either by way of a figure of speech or because the craving in the higher part of the soul is so strong that it affects the sensile appetite (1-2ae, Q. 30, a. 1). Again, St. Thomas distinguishes desires into natural and artificial or acquired. Natural desires or concupiscences are common to men and animals and are called common desires. Desires that are not natural but artificial, are found only in men who alone have the power to devise goods beyond those indicated by nature. Man alone can go beyond the fixity of nature in his desires. The greatest possible diversity is introduced among these artificial desires since men reason and judge differently concerning objects which they seek. St. Thomas remarks that natural desires can be satisfied without end, successively, because the needs which awaken them are recurrent. Artificial or acquired desires can be multiplied

indefinitely because it is practically impossible to exhaust the resources of reason (1-2ae, Q. 30, a. 4).

Going back from these specific to general aspects of desire, we find that our author relates, as has been already seen, all conation directly to the appetitive powers and indirectly to the apprehensive. Human action in its objective aspects relates always to objects which men consider good, that is, capable of perfecting their being and giving them pleasure while so doing. Thus it is that the objective classification of human desires brings us to the study of the ends of action.

The end of an action and the goodness of its corresponding object are really identical, although a theoretical distinction between them may be made (1a, Q. 5, a. 4). Thomistic philosophy is essentially teleological. All actions are performed in pursuit of some purpose. All action taken collectively is in accordance with some ultimate end. St. Thomas makes a fundamental distinction between the order of intention and that of execution. In the order of intention, the desirability of an external object is held in mind. In the order of execution, the end of an action is identical with the desirability of the object completing the motion of the appetite. The possession of the object represented as good is, therefore, first in the order of intention and last in the order of execution. Thus we realize that the objective consideration of human action cannot be separated from the philosophy of purpose (Ethic., L. 1, lec. 2).

Any human action viewed teleologically is refracted prismatically into a dozen purposes. The analysis of human motives is notoriously difficult. It is practically impossible to explain our own actions to ourselves, let alone explaining those of others. Without a doubt, the average man will act in obedience to organic desires for health, wealth and companionship, but it is impossible to determine with accuracy why any particular person does a particular thing. There is all the difference in the world

between the family meal taken in the privacy of the home and an elaborate banquet instituted to promote a candidate's prospects for office. Thus it is that a man's purpose in eating may be different from nature's purpose in giving him the desire for food. In the animal world and in the lower strata of human life, the purposes of nature and the purposes of the individual nearly coincide. The more nearly fundamental an instinct or function is in us, the less apt are we to be swayed by the purposes foreign to those of nature. St. Thomas clears up all of this confusion by his discussion of ends.

Throughout the system of St. Thomas, an end is represented as that on account of which an action is performed (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1, ad. 1). Nature has her purposes in all things and man in addition may have his own particular ends in what he does. Bodily processes continue, whether or not we advert to them, because of the end that nature has in view. Neither reflection nor attention can interfere with them. The ends of nature are the aims of God. He is the Author of nature. There are two aspects to every human action, the interior and the exterior. The terminus or end of the external act is its object. The terminus or end of the internal act is the intention. The act of deciding the means to be used in seeking the end is called election. The application of the means chosen is called use and the peace or quiet obtained from the possession of the object is called enjoyment (1-2ae, QQ. 12-17). The act of intention is found in only rational beings. As regards animals, intention is found only in the mind of the Creator. In man we find capacity of choice among means, wherein consists freedom of the will and the power to distinguish between the end of an action and the end of an agent, between the *finis operis* and the *finis operantis*. St. Thomas does not fail to call attention to the fact that not all actions of man are rational (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1).

The following chart illustrates what has been said concerning ends in human action.

POINT OF VIEW	DIVISION OF ENDS
<i>In itself</i>	{ <i>End as a thing</i> (finis cuius) { <i>End as a person</i> (finis cui) { <i>End of the work</i> (finis operis) { <i>End of the agent</i> (finis operantis) { <i>End as an object</i> (objectivus) { <i>End as an action</i> (formalis)
<i>Relation in a series</i>	{ <i>Proximate End</i> { <i>Remote End</i> { <i>End in the Intention</i> { <i>End in Execution</i>
<i>Its value</i>	{ <i>Total End</i> { <i>Partial End</i> { <i>Principal End</i> { <i>Secondary End</i>

The universe was created by God for a divine purpose. Man as a part of that universe must conform to the general plan of the Creator (1a, Q. 44, a. 4). The last end or summum bonum of man is determined by the Author of Nature since He created the faculties and determined them toward Himself as the summum bonum or full complement of life (Con. Gen. L. 1, c. 1). All men find their unity in this final destiny. The last end is the complete perfection of the faculties of man (Con. Gen. L. 3, c. 16). All progress depends upon the extent to which men are enlightened about the nature of their ultimate perfection and are faithful in seeking it through action or conduct which is called virtuous. It is impossible to seek our last end unless we know it (1 Eth. lec. 2). Thus St. Thomas defines it as that which is desirable on account of itself and on account of which all other things are desired. Irresistibly, all men desire to be happy. It is a matter of natural instinct and not of free will (1a, Q. 19, a. 10; 1a, Q. 26, a. 1).

Men seek this summum bonum or ultimate perfection through contact with and the use of created things. Ob-

jects which appear good to the individual stir within him, desires. These desires are particular manifestations of the all-governing desire to find ultimate perfection and happiness (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 4). We are thus led to the consideration of the objects and relations which men desire during the process of seeking their ultimate happiness. The classification of such objects is made by St. Thomas in full consciousness of their relation to the summum bonum of man. His entire philosophy of life, of sin and virtue, and of progress can be understood only from this standpoint. In describing the objects which stir desire, he has two points of view in mind. First, he observes as a matter of fact the things which men actually desire. He then explains regulated and ill-regulated desire, or sin and virtue, in proportion as the process of actual desiring bears on the ultimate end of life.

St. Thomas is interested in individual objects of desire only in so far as they impede or help man in the acquisition of his perfect happiness. Hence we find the most exhaustive treatment of the objects of desire in those portions of his work in which he discusses the problems of happiness (1-2ae, Q. 2; Con. Gen. L. 3, cc. 25-40). In his mind, happiness is either perfect or imperfect. Perfect happiness is that which man could obtain only in a future life, in the possession of the summum bonum in which his capacity for life is ultimately and entirely filled. Imperfect happiness is the pleasurable experience possible to man in this world. When this experience of happiness serves his ultimate end, it is morally approved and it ministers to his real progress. When this pleasurable experience is not in line with his ultimate happiness, it interferes with his real progress and takes on the nature of sin. In describing this portion of the doctrine of St. Thomas, therefore, we confine the term "happiness" to human experience in this life. This imperfect happiness is found in the satisfaction of desires. The reasonable satisfaction of all forms of appetency brings to the indi-

vidual, the happiness of which he is capable. The historian will describe men's desires as they are aroused and satisfied in fact. The moralist will describe them as they should be directed in line with the ultimate end of man.

II.

CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS.

It will be recalled that St. Thomas describes three kinds of appetency. Natural appetency is that inclination in all created things to obey the laws of their being. Sensitive appetency is the inclination of a sensile creature toward the good which it apprehends through sensation. Rational appetency is the inclination toward a good apprehended finally in the intellect. Man has natural appetency in common with all created things and sensile appetency in common with sensile beings. Rational appetency is confined to man alone in the visible world. The following classification of objects which stir desire, is substantially adhered to, throughout the writings of St. Thomas:

The goods of the body	Bona corporis.
The goods of the soul	Bona animae.
External goods	Bona exteriora.

This classification is found in this form in the following places: 1-2ae, Q. 84, a. 4; 2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 3; *ibid.*, Q. 85, a. 3, ad. 2; Q. 104, a. 3; Q. 118, a. 5; Q. 152, aa. 2, 4; Q. 186, a. 7; 3 Sent. dist. 9, Q. 1, a. 3, q. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 15, Q. 1, a. 4, q. 3; Con. Gen. 3, c. 141; De Malo, Q. 8, a. 1; De Virtut., Q. 3, a. 1; Quol. 5, 6; In Rom., lec. 1, prin.; Ethic, lec. 12, princ. Elsewhere we find the division of all objects of desire into two classes, corporal and spiritual. This classification is found as follows: 2 Sent. dist. 36, a. 4; 3 Sent. dist. 29, a. 5; De Verit., Q. 14, a. 2, a. 3; De Virtut., Q. 1, a. 9, ad. 7. Again we find St. Thomas calling the summum bonum absolute good and all created things which are the objects of human desire, relative goods. 1-2ae, Q. 114, a.

10; 2-2ae, Q. 23, a. 7. Elsewhere we find him speaking of things to be believed; things to be desired; things to be done (Opus. 4). Again we find our author dividing the objects of human desires into five classes: happiness, virtue, disciplined mind, health, external goods (Con. Gen. 3, c. 141). Whatever the variations found throughout all of the writings of St. Thomas, the classification indicated above as definite seems to have established itself permanently in his thought.

1. *GOODS OF THE BODY*.—By the goods of the body, St. Thomas means everything connected with the physical welfare and integrity of the organism. He means those goods which appeal to both the vegetative and the sensile appetites. They are of three classes. The first is the integrity of the body, which is impaired by killing or mutilation or injury. The second is the repose of the senses, that is sensile satisfaction, which is disturbed by anything which causes pain. The third is the pleasure of physical movement, that is the free use or movement of the limbs of the body, which is interfered with by bonds, prison or physical constraint of any other kind (2-2ae, Q. 65, a. 6). Elsewhere (Con. Gen. 3, c. 34), St. Thomas describes health, beauty and strength as the chief goods of the body. The faculties involved in the forms of pleasure here referred to are the external senses, the internal apprehensive senses, the nutritive, augmentative and generative faculties, the emotions of the irascible and the concupiscible appetites, the power of locomotion, The pleasure arising from the exercise of any one of these powers or from all of them is called by St. Thomas the *bonum corporis*.

The most intense pleasures of the senses are those resulting from the taking of food and the sex relations (Con. Gen. 3, c. 33); that is, pleasure resulting from the exercise of those faculties which relate to the preservation of the individual and the race; *conservatio individui et speciei*. St. Thomas finds in the intense pleasure

associated with these two forms of activity, nature's device to protect her purposes against too much interference on the part of the individual in making arbitrary choices. We see this in St. Thomas' doctrine of temperance, that virtue having for its mission the rational regulation of these two fundamental pleasures of man (Con. Gen. 3, c. 32).

2. *GOODS OF THE MIND*.—St. Thomas remarks frequently that since the nutritive and augmentative powers are common to man and plants, the distinctive pleasure of man cannot be in the exercise of these powers. Furthermore, since the sensile appetites are found in animals as well as in man, the distinctive happiness of the latter cannot consist in their exercise. Superior to the vegetative and sensitive appetites we have the rational appetite which is the crowning glory of man, in whose exercise his distinctive happiness must be found (Ethic. c. 1, lec. 10). Man's distinctive faculties are those of intellect and will. The pleasures that follow upon the satisfaction of these rational appetitive and apprehensive powers are peculiar to man. The natural appetency of the intellect inclines it towards truth or knowledge and nothing else. The natural appetency of the will inclines it toward good. Thus it is that knowledge and virtue are the goods of the mind, the objects in seeking which, man finds distinctive human happiness (1-2ae, Q. 3, a. 7; Q. 32, a. 8).

a. *KNOWLEDGE* is either speculative, knowledge for its own sake, or practical, with a bearing on the conduct of life (1a, Q. 83, a. 1). Every individual true to his nature loves the truth and desires it more intensely than the other things of life (Opus. 73, prol.). It is only occasionally that a man hates the truth (1-2ae, Q. 29, a. 5; 2-2ae, Q. 15, a. 1, ad. 3). Though all men desire knowledge, many do not obtain it on account of their inability to study (2 Sent. dist. 22, Q. 2, a. 1, ad. 5). This inability arises from mental indisposition, distracting occupations or laziness (2-2ae, Q. 2, a. 4). Knowledge is ac-

quired through inborn genius and study (1a, Q. 117, a. 1; Poster, lec. 1), through invention and instruction (De Verit. Q. 11, a. 1). The emotional character of youth often hinders these processes to a certain extent, while moral virtues, especially chastity, facilitate them (2-2ae, Q. 15, a. 3; 4 Sent. dist. 33, Q. 3, a. 3).

Knowledge is profitable when it is humble, retiring, certain, truthful, simple, charitable, useful, generous and effective (1 Cor. 8, lec. 1). It can be injurious when it hinders a man in performing his duty, makes him condemn divine things, inclines him to evil deeds (magic), when it goes to excess, or is useless (1a, Q. 22, a. 3, ad. 3; 2-2ae, Q. 167, a. 1). The whole range of knowledge falls under three classes, things to be believed, things to be desired and things to be done (Opus. 4). The most important of the practical sciences is civil knowledge. Metaphysics takes first place among the speculative sciences (Eth. lec. 2).

The desire for knowledge may be re-enforced by intellectual habits or virtues—wisdom, understanding, science, prudence and art (1-2ae, Q. 57, a. 2; 2-2ae, Q. 4, a. 8). Wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual habits (1-2ae, Q. 57, a. 2), directing all others (3 Sent. dist. 34, Q. 1, a. 4). Both wisdom and knowledge are perfections of the mind (1-2ae, Q. 62, a. 2) and the absolutely wise man is he who knows the absolute highest cause. All other wisdom is relative (*ibid.*).

b. VIRTUE. St. Thomas understands by natural virtues those moral habits by which the will is enabled to accomplish more easily the work of control over the other powers of the soul (1-2ae, Q. 55). Strictly speaking only the will or an appetitive power moved by the will can be the subject of a real habit (1-2ae, Q. 56, a. 3; 1-2ae, Q. 58, a. 1). Moral virtues are virtues strictly so-called and can be reduced (2-2ae, prol.) to the cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance (1-2ae, Q. 61, a. 2, a. 3) on which all moral life rests (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, a. 1, q. 1). These virtues help the will to regulate

the passions (1-2ae, Q. 60, a. 5). In every virtue, because the will acts in view of the Final Good, one can perceive an intelligent agent, choice of good for God's sake and perseverance in good (1-2ae, Q. 100; 2-2ae, Q. 58, a. 1). For this reason also, virtuous acts are those over which the will can exercise sway and choice (1-2ae, Q. 94, a. 3).

Virtues are the greatest goods in life to the man striving to live rightly (1, Sent. dist. 1, Q. 50). Moral virtues while inferior to supernatural faith, hope and love (theological virtues) (1. Tim., lec. 2) are more necessary in human life than intellectual habits (1-2ae, Q. 66, a. 3, ad. 1). The rule by which the will is guided in its government is two-fold, reason and the eternal law of God (1-2ae, QQ. 18-20). Of the moral virtues, prudence is supreme (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, ad. 1): it perfects the acts of the reason and the will (1 Sent. dist. 1, Q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2) and completes the other moral virtues (2-2ae, Q. 166, a. 2, ad. 1). No other moral virtue can exist without prudence (1-2ae, Q. 51, a. 5). While it is said to be an intellectual habit also it is, strictly speaking, the guide of the will in all particular things (3, Sent. dist. 33, Q. 2, a. 1), whether in the monastery, family, among citizens, soldiers or rulers (1-2ae, Q. 56, 6; 2-2ae, Q. 48).

3. *EXTERNAL GOODS*.—St. Thomas understands by exterior goods objects of desire which are separate from the individual. The goods of the body and goods of the mind are identified with the individual organically. The external goods of the body are persons or things. He understands by things the sum total of objects to which we give the name wealth. His term is riches. He distinguishes two kinds: natural riches, namely, meat, drink, clothing, houses, that is consumption goods; artificial riches, forms of money, or other media of exchange which are symbols of wealth. The latter are not desired normally by man except in as far as they give him access to the former. Theoretically, artificial riches are not

sought except in as far as by means of them consumption goods, understood in modern economics by the term wealth, may be obtained (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 1, ad. 3; Con. Gen. 3, c. 30).

There is much in the texts of St. Thomas in reference to persons as these are necessary to the happiness of the individual. He appears to look upon friends as valuable in associated life in enabling the individual to obtain the physical goods which he needs for his continued existence. In addition he needs them that he may act well, that he may do good to them and that he may receive kindly services from them. The normal conduct of active life as well as the works of contemplative life, show forth the necessity of friendly relations in the integrity of life (1-2ae, Q. 4, a. 8; 2-2ae, QQ. 23-46; Opus. De Dilectione).

The second category of external goods is that of a higher order, relating to the mind. They are honors, fame, glory and power.

HONOR is the testimony or recognition of a person's excellence (3a, Q. 25, a. 1; 2-2, Q. 25, a. 1), and is shown by external signs of respect (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 3; Eth. 18, prin.). It is a laudable object of desire (2-2ae, Q. 129, a. 1, ad. 3), since it is among the greatest of man's external goods (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 2). It is deordinate only when not referred to God or when it is made the principal end in life (2-2ae, Q. 131, a. 1). Men are happy when they are honored (1-2ae, Q. 2 ad. 2). They desire to be honored preferably by men of wisdom and position (*ibid.* ad. 3).

FAME is also an object of universal desire and one of the greatest goods men can possess. It is reputation (1-2ae, Q. 2), a fickle thing easily ruined by gossip (*ibid.*). Fame or a reputation is necessary for us. It fits us for our daily duties and prompts us to acquire virtue. For our neighbors' welfare, it is also necessary for us to acquire reputation because otherwise they may be scandalized and led into sin (2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 2, a. 3). We have a right to our reputations and no one has the privilege of

ruining them either by slander, exaggerating our deficiencies, revealing secret faults, questioning motives, minimizing our good influence or by malicious silence (2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 1, ad. 3). The desire for fame or reputation is sinful when it is made the end of existence (Quol. 10, 13).

GLORY is reputation accompanied by praise (2-2ae, Q. 103, a. 1, ad. 3). To desire to be well spoken of is laudable (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 2), but it must be referred to the glory of God, utility of our neighbor or our own advancement. It may not be taken as the end of life (2-2ae, Q. 132, a. 1, ad. 1). Glory is vain when we desire to be praised for our insignificant or sinful actions; when it is sought from men alone and not from God (*ibid.*; De Malo, Q. 9, a. 2, ad. 1). This vain glory is dangerous because it makes one presumptuous and self-confident and weakens virtue (2-2, Q. 132, a. 3, ad. 3).

The following table shows the relations of the various classes of goods described by St. Thomas as objects of human desire:

CLASSES OF GOODS		OBJECTS		
Goods of the Body.....	{	{ Food Pleasure (Con. Gen. 3, c. 27)		
		{ Sex Pleasure (<i>ibid.</i>)		
Goods of the Mind.....	{	{ Health (Con. Gen. 3, c. 32)		
		{ Beauty (<i>ibid.</i>)		
		{ Strength (<i>ibid.</i>)		
		{ Activity (2-2ae, Q. 65, a. 3)		
		{ Integrity (<i>ibid.</i>)		
		{ Knowledge (1-2ae, Q. 3, a. 7; <i>ibid.</i> Q. 32, a. 8)		
External Goods {	{	{ Virtue (1-2ae, QQ. 58-67; 2-2ae, QQ. 23-171)		
		{ Meat (Ia, Q. 78, a. 2, ad. 4; Q. 97, a. 3, a. 4)		
		{ Drink (<i>ibid.</i>)		
		{ Things... { Clothing (2-2ae, Q. 169, a. 1)		
		{ Money (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 1; 2-2ae, Q. 118)		
		{ Houses (Joan1 c.4, lec. 1)		
		{ Persons.. { Friends (2-2ae; QQ. 23-46; 1-2ae, Q. 4, a. 8)		
		Mind....	{	{ Honor (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 2)
				{ Things... { Fame (1-2ae, q. 2, a. 2)
				{ Glory (Con. Gen. 3, c. 29)
{ Power (Con. Gen. 3, c. 31)				
{ Persons.. { Friends (2-2ae, QQ. 23-46)				
		{ God (<i>ibid.</i> ; De Dilectione)		

CHAPTER III.

SUBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES IN ST. THOMAS AND IN WARD.

Professor Ward's classification of desires is found exposed in his *Dynamic Sociology* which was published originally in 1883; in his *Pure Sociology* which appeared in 1903 and in his many occasional writings, notably in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Professor Ward thus describes the field of *Pure Sociology* (*Pure Sociology*, p. 4):

“By pure sociology, then, is meant a treatment of the phenomena and laws of society as it is, an explanation of the processes by which social phenomena take place, a search for the antecedent conditions by which the observed facts have been brought into existence, and an aetiological diagnosis that shall reach back as far as the state of human knowledge will permit into the psychologic, biologic, and cosmic causes of the existing social state of man. But it must be a pure diagnosis, and all therapeutic treatment is rigidly excluded. All ethical considerations, in however wide a sense that expression may be understood, must be ignored for the time being, and attention concentrated upon the effort to determine what actually is *Pure Sociology* has no concern with what society ought to be or with any social ideals. It confines itself strictly with the present and the past, allowing the future to take care of itself. It totally ignores the purpose of the science, and aims at truth wholly for its own sake.”

Applied sociology is described as follows (*Applied Sociology*, p. 5ff.): “Just as *Pure Sociology* aims to answer the questions *What, Why, and How*, so *applied sociology* aims to answer the question *What For*. The former deals with facts, causes, and principles, the latter with the object, end or purpose. The one treats the sub-

ject-matter of sociology, the other, its use. However theoretical pure sociology may be in some of its aspects, applied sociology is essentially practical. It appeals directly to interest. It has to do with social ideals, with ethical considerations, with what ought to be. . . . Applied sociology takes account of artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed by society to bettering society. . . . In applied sociology the point of view is subjective. It relates to feeling—the collective well-being. In pure sociology the desires and wants of men are considered as the motor agencies of society. In applied sociology they are considered as sources of enjoyment through their satisfaction. . . . Applied sociology may be said to deal with social utility as measured by the satisfaction of desire.”

Desire, according to Ward, is an inclination to experience agreeable and escape disagreeable sensations (*Dynamic Sociology*, vol. II, p. 322). Desires are those states of mind that involve a tendency on the part of the individual experiencing them to act in such a manner as will satisfy them and cause them to cease to exist. All of them are physical excitations (*Vol. I*, p. 603), propelling men to such acting as will best afford a gratification craved. Their basis is the nervous system. They are the springs of action, the social forces. Desires make known the need of the system which aims always to complete itself by securing the objects by which that self-completion is conditioned. Action resulting from desire has built up human civilization. Desires and the activities resulting from efforts to satisfy them furnish the matter of inquiry into the conditions of human progress and social change (*ibid.* 664).

Ward builds his system upon the philosophy of materialistic evolution. This leads him naturally to determinism in human conduct. The analysis of aggregation as found in the first volume of *Dynamic Sociology* represents the process by which progress was made from chaos

to social organization. Intellect and will are highly organized forms of matter. All human action is determined by laws of matter, and desire of whatsoever kind is purely a function of matter in sentient beings.

St. Thomas builds his system upon the dualistic philosophy which traces the earth in its origin to the act of a personal God creating. This leads him to a libertarian view of human conduct in which the will is regarded as metaphysically determined to the good but undetermined as to the specific goodness of objects of human desire (1a, Q. 82, a. 2). In other words the will has liberty of choice among relative goods. This liberty as conceived of by St. Thomas is extensively interfered with by the passions and by ignorance. Not all human acts are free. However, freedom is found among human acts. Intellect and will are spiritual, distinctively of the soul, discontinuous with matter. While human action is to an extent determined by laws of matter and the sentient appetite is organically related to matter, nevertheless intellect and will as forms of rational appetency escape the tyranny of matter and enter for the direction of their activity under the dominion of the moral law of God. The touching point is freedom of the will. According to Ward, all desire is physical excitation.

Professor Ward sees in the variety of human desires nothing other than manifestations of physical force acting under immutable natural laws which eliminate totally the thought of a freedom of action in the will. St. Thomas finds that human actions result from intrinsic principles, the powers of the soul and habits; and extrinsic principles, laws and divine grace.

Professor Ward, like St. Thomas, draws a distinction between the ends of nature and the ends of the individual. For the former, the fundamental ends of nature in the organic world, are the preservation of the individual and of the race. These ends are procured by means of desires inherent in the individual and leading him to perform with sufficient regularity the actions through which these two

purposes are secured. Hence nutrition and reproduction give rise to two kinds of fundamental desire. They awaken two appetites, the gustatory and the sexual. The end of nature is the preservation and perpetuation of life; that of the individual man is the satisfaction of desire. The former is objective, constituting a biologic process; the latter is subjective, causing a moral or sociological process. Properly understood, these processes have no natural or necessary relation to each other (Dynamic Sociology, I. 469). These two fundamental desires explain the greater part of man's life. They are the original and essential forces back of social organization (Dynamic Sociology, I. 666).

Beside these essential human desires, there are others which Professor Ward calls non-essential since they have no direct and necessary relation with the functions of nutrition and reproduction. They have, however, taken on in the development of civilization, extremely important rôles. "These are: First, the aesthetic sentiments, resting physiologically upon the remaining four senses, as the nutritive function rests upon that of taste: secondly, the emotional or moral forces, in so far as they can be distinguished from those presiding over reproduction; and, thirdly, the intellectual forces, or the sociologic result of those yearnings after normal exercise which the mind soon begins to manifest when lifted above the necessity of concentrating its energies upon the mere supply of bodily wants. . . . The emotional forces may perhaps be most conveniently grouped around the dominant sentiments of love (with its opposite, hate) and fear (with its opposite, hope) . . ." (Dynamic Sociology, I. 471).

The following tables represent these social forces:

Essential Forces . . .	{	Preservative. { Positive, gustatory (seeking pleasure)
		Forces . . . { Negative, protective (avoiding pain)
Non-essential Forces . . .	{	Reproductive { Direct. The sexual and amative desires
		Forces . . . { Indirect. Parental and consanguineal affections
	{	Esthetic Forces
	{	Emotional (moral) Forces
	{	Intellectual Forces

In Pure Sociology (p. 261), the terms are slightly different.

Physical Forces . . . (Function bodily)	{	Ontogenetic Forces . . .	{ Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure) Negative, protective (avoiding pain)
		Phylogenetic Forces . . .	{ Direct, sexual Indirect, consanguineal
Spiritual Forces . . . (Function psychic)	{	Sociogenetic Forces . . .	Moral (seeking the safe and good)
			Esthetic (seeking the beautiful)
			Intellectual (seeking the useful and true)

Ward's classification is based upon the relation of human powers to human progress. This progress assumes the continuity of the race. The essential social forces or desires are, therefore, those which lead the individual to strive to live and those which lead individuals to strive to make the race live. Aside from these essential forces, the esthetic, emotional and intellectual are looked upon as non-essential in their relation to the race purpose which is conceived to be ultimate. This division finds its principle, therefore, in a relation to progress and continuity. St. Thomas does not draw into his classification of faculties, a principle derived from their bearing upon progress. His conception of progress relates to the finding of the summum bonum or the perfection of the individual in God. His ultimate view is, therefore, spiritually individualistic and not racial as is the case with Ward. Since St. Thomas relates all of the processes of desire to the moral spiritual purposes of life, he descends into the individual, into the constitution of his nature to find his principle of classification. At certain points the two forms of classification overlap but the principle of discrimination is different in each case. Thus we find Ward distinguishing desires into essential and non-essential because they are essential to race continuation and progress. We find St. Thomas classifying desires according to the types of power or activity exercised in the individual. Vegetative appetency, sensitive appetency and rational appetency are three forms of nature found in man. The distinctions among them furnish St.

Thomas with sufficient basis of classification. In the system of St. Thomas we meet God everywhere. In the system of Ward we meet Him nowhere except to find His existence denied.

According to St. Thomas, the fundamental purpose of nature is different in each form of existence. That is to say in each succeeding grade of life there is besides the purpose of the lower grades, another external purpose united with its own specific purpose. Thus if A represents the purpose of nature in vegetative life; B, that of nature for sensitive life; and C, that of nature for rational life, the purpose of nature in vegetative life is A. That of nature in sensitive life is A plus B, B conditioning A. The purpose of nature in rational life is A plus B plus C, C conditioning both A and B. Since man is A plus B plus C, we may say that one purpose of nature is the preservation of the individual and of the race. But we cannot say with Professor Ward that the fundamental purpose of nature including man, is the preservation of the individual and of the race.

It does not escape St. Thomas' attention that the activities related to the preservation of the individual and of the race frequently interfere with and disturb the activities of intellect and will in man. It is the whole man that acts. Man is not pure reason nor pure animal. In the order of dignity and in relation to destiny the rational side of man is supreme. Hence in the mind of St. Thomas, the existence of the individual and of the race contributes to progress just in proportion as the individual is spiritualized, moralized, and kept through regulated conduct in touch with God and subject to his known moral law. "In all series of agents and causes of change, the end of the prime agent and mover must be the ultimate end of all, as the end of the general is the end of all the soldiers who serve under him. But among all the component parts of man we find the intellect to be the superior moving power: for the intellect moves the appetite, putting the object before it; and the intellectual ap-

petite moves the sensible appetites, the irascible and the concupiscible, . . . the sensible appetite crowned by the consent of the will proceeds to move the body. The end, therefore, of the intellect is the end of all human actions. But the end and good of the intellect is truth. . . . Therefore, the last end of the whole man and his activities and desires is to know the first truth which is God'' (Con. Gen. 3, c. 25).

When discussing the purpose of the individual as distinct from the purpose of the race our two authors agree in substance if not in spirit. Desires are understood in largely the same way as will be seen by a comparison of the table to follow.

Both of our authors hold that happiness is the end of the individual. They agree in understanding the function of pleasure as related to desire. They disagree fundamentally in the functions placed upon desires and in the moral interpretation of the relation of these to life as a whole. "All motives whatever are desires, and their satisfaction becomes an end of conation. In man, too, the satisfaction of desire in general, which in each particular case is attended with, or rather consists in, pleasure, acquires, in consequence of the highly derivative and greatly varied character of his desires, a distinctive name, not applicable to animals, and is called happiness. So far as the direct purposes of the sociologist are concerned, therefore, the ultimate end of conation is happiness'' (Dynamic Sociology, II, p. 94). Happiness is "Excess of pleasure or enjoyment over pain or discomfort'' (Dynamic Sociology, II, p. 108). St. Thomas holds likewise that "Every action is the result of man's desire for happiness'' (1-2ae, Q. 1, a. 1). Happiness, according to him, means the satisfaction of desires through action. Pleasure is the natural concomitant but pleasure coming from the satisfaction of desires to do God's will is often obtained at the cost of bodily pain. Pleasure is the object of action in a limited way but not alone physical pleasure.

St. Thomas might agree with Ward in saying that happiness is the preponderance of pleasure over pain, but the latter would have in mind pleasure unrelated to God whereas the former, true to his system of thought, conceives of no pleasure as true pleasure except when interpreted in its ultimate relation to God in human life.

The following table indicates the scope of Ward's classification and the places in St. Thomas where the subjects listed in Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, are treated.

PROFESSOR WARD	ST. THOMAS
A. ESSENTIAL FORCES	
I. <i>Preservative Forces</i> might be called nutritive (p. 482) and represent the efforts to secure necessary food supply. They are	(1a, Q. 78, a. 1, a.2)
(1) <i>Positive</i> seeking active preservation (hunger)	(2-2ae, Q. 64)
(2) <i>Negative</i> securing protection (cold) and are covered in the subjective term want and its correlative subsistence (p. 485). This subsistence desire (under intelligent direction) (p. 487) accounts for origin and development of	(ibid.) (1a, Q. 11, a. 1; 2-2ae, Q. 25, a.7)
Art (Industrial p. 486)	(ibid. Q. 66)
Industry (488)	(ibid.)
Property (493) in the intelligent explanation of which we meet	(ibid.)
Laws of Acquisition (497 ff)	(1-2ae, QQ.90-108)
Modes of Acquisition (524)	
Production & Distribution (528-581)	
Parasitic Acquisition through	
Robbery and theft (583)	(2-2ae, Q. 66)
War (584)	(Opus. 20; 2-2ae, Q. 40)
Statecraft (585)	(De Regimine Principum)
Priestcraft (587)	(3a, De Sacerdotio)
Monopoly (590)	
II. <i>Reproductive Forces</i> operating for the future (598) preserving the race (ibid.) and considered as	(1a, Q. 78, a. 1, a. 2)
(1) <i>Direct</i> —results flowing from sexual instinct (p. 603)	(1a, QQ. 98-101)
(2) <i>Indirect</i> —dependent on generative function (ibid.),—family, tribe nations (604). All of these forces are covered by term Love (610). From the mere desire (direct) to perform this act follow the whole physiological and psychological differentiation of the sexes (605-664).	(Supp. QQ. 41-69)

PROFESSOR WARD

ST. THOMAS

- B. *NON-ESSENTIAL FORCES*—not indispensable to the life of either the individual or species (665). All are reducible to a physical basis (666) and are localized in the body (*ibid.*) and are divided into
- I. *Aesthetic Forces*—love of the beautiful in sight and sound (668) and account for (1-2ae, Q. 27, a. 1, ad. 3)
 - (1) Fine arts that appeal to the eye (669), Sculpture, Painting, Landscape gardening and Architecture (669-672). (*ibid.*)
 - (2) Fine arts appealing to the ear—(672-674) (*ibid.*)
 - II. *Moral Forces*—meaning all the emotions grouped with their consequences (675). (1a, Q. 81)
 - (1) *Love Forces* (including opposite, hate forces—676) covering (1-2ae, Q. 22-49)
 - Parental Love (676) (2-2ae, De Charitate)
 - Consanguineal Love (677) (*ibid.*)
 - Patriotism (*ibid.*) (*ibid.*)
 - Philanthropy (*ibid.*) (*ibid.*)
 - Self Love (679) (*ibid.*)
 - (2) *Fear Forces*
 - Physical* — anticipating bodily results (682) from *violence* (684) of man (*ibid.*) animals (*ibid.*) inanimate nature (686) and spiritual beings (687) or *disease*. (1a, QQ. 106-115)
 - Psychical*—of a religious nature immortality,—on which all religion is built (690-96). (1a, Q. 75, a.6)
 - III. *Intellectual*—source of man's superiority (697) and include (passim)
 - Love of acquiring knowledge
 - Pleasure of intellectual activity
 - Control over nature (697 ff)

Our two authors disagree fundamentally in philosophy and in the moral interpretation of life. Ward concludes his thinking with a concept of race progress. This requires that he exalt individual and race preservation into primacy in his system. His conception of progress is expressed in the terms of a continually improving human race. The essence of this improvement lies in the increasing mastery of man over nature, the widening of the horizon of life of the individual which in turn is

accomplished by the strengthening of the non-essential or ameliorating forces, namely, the esthetic, the moral and the intellectual powers. While both of them necessarily disagree in understanding the nature and function of free will, this difference does not result in important discrepancies in the descriptive portion of their systems in as far at least as the observation and explanation of desires are concerned. St. Thomas agrees in making the functions of the individual and race preservation fundamental in life. But this view of them is essentially moral or directive. He at no time separates these processes from their relation to the understanding and unfolding of the will of God in human life as a whole and the interpretation of life as the progressive revelation of the divine will on the part of the individual.

St. Thomas does not present to us any clear conception of human progress as the term is now understood. He gives us a theoretical concept of it in which its standard is derived from the relation of the individual to the realization of the will of God for that individual. We miss in Ward the clearcut and suggestive analytical view of appetency which is the heart of the Thomistic exposition. On the other hand, we miss in St. Thomas the thoroughgoing recognition of the esthetic forces such as is found in the system of Ward. The two are practically agreed in their explanation of the nature and functions of pleasure, but St. Thomas is led irresistibly to throw the atmosphere of ultimate spiritual interpretation around his treatment. This we miss in the work of Dr. Ward, who does not carry the thought beyond a conception of race progress. The work of interpreting the thought of each in the language of the other is beyond present purpose. Opportunity to make that study conveniently is offered in the above table. In the main, this dissertation is prompted by the hope that modern sociology may find it to its advantage to acquaint itself more thoroughly with our old theological

and philosophical literature. At the same time, it may not be vain to expect those who are thoroughly acquainted with that older literature may find new insight in their own fields and a wider vision of truth by taking advantage of the splendid results of the research work that must be credited to modern sociology.

CHAPTER IV.

OBJECTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES IN ST. THOMAS AND IN SMALL.

Professor Small's classification is found in the text-book which he published jointly with Dr. Vincent, "Introduction to the Study of Society," 1894. It appears in its most developed form in Small's "General Sociology," 1905, *passim* and in particular from pages 443-481. Pages 718-727 contain a suggestive elaboration of fundamental human interests as the achievement of them might be described in American civilization.

It is to be noted that Small offers this classification without attempting to elaborate a whole system of philosophy as is done by Ward and by St. Thomas. He makes his study simply as a work of social observation without paying any attention to metaphysical implications. "Our purpose . . . is not to propose psychological, and still less metaphysical, solutions. We shall simply schedule, with scant illustrations, certain components of the real individual which are to be reckoned with whenever we try to understand human affairs. Psychological analyses and metaphysical hypotheses have their own competence with respect to these elements, but all sane social theory must first accept certain crude facts as part of its raw material" (General Sociology, 444).*

Small uses three terms: desire, want, interest. "An interest is an unsatisfied capacity, corresponding to an unrealized condition, and it is predisposition to such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated condition" (433). "Human interests, then, are the ultimate terms of calculation in sociology. The whole life-process, so far as we know it, whether viewed in its individual or in its social phase, is at last the process of developing,

* All references in this Chapter, not otherwise specified, are to Small's General Sociology.

adjusting, and satisfying interests. . . . Interests in the sociological sense, are not necessarily matters of attention and choice. They are affinities, latent in persons, pressing for satisfaction, whether the persons are conscious of them generally or specifically, or not; they are indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realizing their personality." (ibid.) Professor Small finds that each of these interests has a subjective and an objective aspect. These interests pass from the latent subjective unconscious state to the active objective conscious form. The difference in meaning between interest, want, and desire, is not worked out because of the complex relations among them and the various meanings in which the words are used. In a footnote (436), Professor Small says: "We might reserve the term 'interest' strictly for the use defined above, applying the term 'desire' to the subjective aspect of choice, and 'want' to the objective aspect, *i.e.*, the thing desired. Precisely because the term 'interest' is in current use for all these aspects of the case, we prefer to retain it." "For our purpose in this argument we need not trouble ourselves very much about nice metaphysical distinctions between the aspects of interest, because we have mainly to do with interests in the same sense in which the man of affairs uses the term." (436.)

Taking interests as these unsatisfied capacities of man and recognizing his tendency toward the satisfaction of these capacities, Professor Small holds that there are six fundamental human interests which explain all desires and, therefore, all of the activities of man. "Interests are the simplest modes of motion which we can trace in the conduct of human beings." (426.) These fundamental interests are health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty and rightness. "Sociology might be said to be the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions." "Our systematized knowledge of the human process, will be measured by the extent

of our ability to interpret all human society in terms of its effective results" (442).

St. Thomas' view of appetency and of its different forms which he described as natural, sensient and rational comes to expression substantially in the following from Professor Small: "It is evident that human beings contain one group of interests which are generically identical with the factors that compose plants and animals. . . . They exist in trees and fishes and birds and quadrupeds and men alike. . . . These forces are incessantly displaying themselves in the movements that arrive at certain similar types of result." (426.)

The "interests" described by Small, generically at least, are identical with the bona or goods described by St. Thomas. The resemblances and differences will be seen by a comparison of the two systems of classification.

THE HEALTH INTEREST.—Professor Small's understanding of the health interest will appear from the following: "The primary interest of every man, as of every animal, is in sheer keeping alive." "A universal form of the primary interest is the food interest." (196.) "Again, the food interest is merely foremost in a group of interests that are in the most intimate sense peculiar to the body, the animal part of them." "In this group the sex interest is usually made coordinate with the food interest." (197.) "I venture to call all the other positive types of bodily interests by the general name 'the work-interests.' . . . I mean by it all the impulses to physical activity for its own sake. I mean the impulses to physical prowess and skill, that vary from the pranks of childhood to the systematized trial of skill among athletics." The explanation is summarized as follows: "The three species of interest which I call food, sex, and work make up one genus of human interest to which I give the name the health interest. By this phrase I mean all the human

desires that have their center in exercise and enjoyment of the powers of the body." (197.)

There is an interesting agreement between the *bona corporis* of St. Thomas and the health interests thus described by Professor Small. Self-preservation is the first law of nature. Corresponding to the food, sex and work interests as phases of the health interest in Professor Small's classification we find enumerated by St. Thomas among the goods of the body, food, sex, health, beauty, strength, activity, integrity. The following indications facilitate the comparison: *Con. Gen.* 3, c. 32; *ibid.*, c. 33; 2-2ae, Q. 65, ad. 3.

THE WEALTH INTEREST.—Dr. Small describes this interest as follows: "We recognize, alongside of health, this second factor which enters into complete personal realization, viz., that lordship over things which is founded upon direct mastery of natural forces." (454.) "Lordship over things in this sense is an essential social function." (455.) Dr. Small recognizes the great range of unlike motives which may inspire the quest of wealth. "The fact that most of the things deemed desirable in highly developed society are to be accomplished only with the aid of wealth, obscures more than it reveals the intimate nature of the wealth desire proper." (450.) Our author understands by lordship over things the conquest of nature and its subjection to human uses. It is the wealth interest as understood by economic science distinct from the popular identification of money with wealth. "It is part of complete human personality to exercise lordship over things." (451.) "Real wealth is not appreciated by men who know nothing intimately of the difficulties of creating wealth. Wealth as the measure and as the realization of man's mastery over things is neither too highly nor too generally valued in our civilization. Wealth as the mere accumulation of things that others have mastered is both too highly and too generally valued." (454.)

“Wealth is man’s first realization of independence among the world-forces.” “The individual is incomplete and monstrous, unless the power and the practice of the direct lordship of things are evident in him.” (455f.) “Lordship over things . . . is the satisfaction appropriate to the wealth desire.” (456.)

St. Thomas includes among external goods, those of the body and those of the mind. Among the external goods of the body, he places things and persons. Among them he enumerates meat, drink, clothing, houses. Here again, is an interesting agreement between our two authors. It extends even to the use and abuse of wealth. St. Thomas’ distinction between natural wealth, or goods, and artificial wealth, or money, is repeated fundamentally in the text of Small. In his treatise on avarice (2-2ae, Q. 118; 1-2ae, Q. 84), he works out some interesting aspects of misguided love of wealth or money into which we need not for the moment enter. One point may be mentioned. Natural riches are desired for the preservation of life. Artificial riches, or money, is desired because by means of it, natural wealth, or necessaries can be obtained. The desire for artificial riches is without limit (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 1, ad. 3). There is, however, a fundamental difference in the treatment of the two authors. As St. Thomas conceives of these things, they are strictly and literally subdivisions of the health-interest. As Small treats them, they are a form of lordship over things. St. Thomas touches upon that aspect of the matter by telling us that things were made for the dominion or lordship of men (2-2ae, Q. 66, a. 1), and that lordship over things is natural to men (1 Polit., lec. 5).

SOCIABILITY.—Dr. Small describes the sociability-interest as including “appetites for personal intercourse of a purely spiritual sort, without conscious reference to physical contact or material exchange” (457). “The fact is, that all men tend normally to desire contacts with other

men of a sort to gratify their pure sense of personality. We mean by sociability, then, those elements in the relations of persons which correspond with this desire" (458). "It means assertion of right to have feelings respected and opinions weighed and judgments considered on their merits, instead of having them summarily quashed at the dictation of other men's interests" (459). Closely related with this instinct of personal integrity, and intimately involved in its realization, is a social claim which may be called, in the absence of a better term, the craving for reciprocal valuation" (461). "No one has made it evident that there is an important section of life made up of conditions in which personality pure and simple reacts upon personality, and immediately assists or retards normal satisfaction" (458). "Assertion of personality in distinction from other personality, and exchange of recognitions of personal valuation, are as proper incidents of human satisfaction as supply of the bodily demand for food and air" (461).

St. Thomas treats these matters as external goods of the mind. "The principal external goods satisfying intellectual cravings are fame, honor, glory" (1-2ae, Q. 2, a. 3). "Men desire to be recognized and honored" (ibid). "These spiritual goods are necessary to fit us for our daily duties" (2-2ae, Q. 73, a. 2, ad. 3). "No one has a right to take from us our reputation or glory" (ibid.).

The content of the term "sociability" in Small's classification is substantially identical with what St. Thomas calls external goods of the mind.

KNOWLEDGE.—Professor Small looks upon knowledge as "good both as a means to other goods, and also as an activity of the person, without reference to any ulterior end" (462). In representing knowledge as a means to other elements of living he indicates that the knowledge needed by an individual is such as to "insure the persistence of the social process at the point where

the given individual functions. One is not a well-working socius unless one has the knowledge necessary to provide for self-conduct of one's own part of the social process" (462f). "On the other hand, knowledge as an achievement by itself calls for a going out in thought as far as possible from the thinker's personal function, and a discovering of the content and meaning of as much as possible of the whole life-process, within which the thinker occupies a place" (463). "Knowledge as a means of maintaining the standard of life is practically desired by everybody. Knowledge as vision of the meaning of life, and of what the standard of life should be, is needed by everybody, but is in far less general demand" (463). Our valuations of knowledge tend to scale up and down from the meaning of the nearest details of our individual lives, at the one extreme, to the largest correlations of the total life-process, past, present, and future, at the other" (463). "The whole social process thus realizes itself through the intelligence of the individual, while the individual process, in its intellectual phase, realizes itself through progressive mental representation of the whole social process" (464).

We see from the above that there are included in the knowledge interest, all phases of practical and theoretical knowledge in as far as the former is needed for the practical social efficiency of the individual, and the latter is needed in completing the problem of understanding and interpreting the social universe. The range of this interest, therefore, is from the smallest practical detail of life out to its ultimate philosophy. Thus it includes all sciences, methods of research, coordination of social forces to promote research, all technological sciences, and as well the knowledge element in ethics and theology (General Sociology, 724).

St. Thomas describes three kinds of knowledge: that of things to be believed, things to be desired, things to be

done (Opus., IV). Unfortunately he does not develop the thought here.

Of course, the fundamental desire of man to know the truth is not neglected by St. Thomas (Opus., 73). In the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, which constantly recurs in St. Thomas, we find phraseology and content practically alike in our two authors. He recognizes the necessity of knowledge in order that man may fulfill his duties to God, neighbor and self (1a, Q. 13). These relate to man's moral social efficiency, evidently a wider concept than Dr. Small has. He seems to confine the term to the social efficiency of the individual. The detailed explanation of St. Thomas' understanding of the knowledge element as a fundamental human interest is found on pages 27, 28. He has an interesting observation on the pleasure that is derived from knowing things for the first time (1-2ae, Q. 32, a. 8, ad. 3).

BEAUTY.—Dr. Small's discussion of the beauty-interest is somewhat brief. His essential thought is that "life, at its largest, involves feeling of the aesthetic type, and conduct aimed at satisfaction of the feeling. In this case again the element in question is both a means to other elements of life, and an activity to be regarded as having a distinct and self-sufficient value in the scheme of factors that compose the individual" (464). Dr. Small registers the interest without any attempt whatever at analysis of it. He suggests on page 726, the line along which the detailed study of the beauty interest in social life might lead us. It explains the attempt of literature, sculpture, painting, music, architecture, landscape architecture, and the minor arts. Thus understood, the beauty interest seems to become a collective rather than an individual interest, since all of these are collective social creations. St. Thomas appears to have consulted brevity in his dealing with the subject. We are familiar with the

fundamental principle of St. Thomas that all men desire the good. "The beautiful is the same as the good and they differ only in point of view. The nature of the good is that which calms desire, while the beautiful is that which calms desire whose vehicle of expression is eye or ear. Thus we speak of beautiful sights and sounds, but not of beautiful tastes and odors. The good appeals to the appetite; the beautiful adds to this something pleasant to the apprehensive sense" (1-2ae, Q. 27, a. 1, ad. 3). In the classification of goods of the body, our author uses the term "beauty" to indicate symmetry of physical proportions in the individual. Probably this symmetry is desirable as causing pleasure to one who contemplates one's own beauty, and satisfaction in being esteemed or regarded as beautiful by others. If this be true, the meaning of St. Thomas becomes rather an aspect of sociability in Small's sense (Polit., 8, lec. 1; 1a, Q. 39, a. 8; Quol., L. 6, a. 1; 1a, Q. 5, a. 4). At any rate, St. Thomas does not make beauty a fundamental human interest. It is an aspect of sensile appetency as exercised through the two organs of sight and hearing.

Love of beauty and desire for pleasure which its contemplation affords, has to do primarily with sense perceptions as a source of knowledge. The two senses involved are those of sight and hearing. The fine arts arose because of the human impulse leading men to seek the particular kind of pleasure that results from seeing or hearing certain things done in certain ways. After satisfying a need in the crude manner usually associated with beginnings, man has always endeavored to advance by satisfying the need in such a way as to associate the satisfaction of the sense of beauty while satisfying a need. A plain, well-constructed hut will satisfy the need for shelter. The whole science of architecture results from the endeavor to assemble around the hut and in its construction, such forms, harmonies, proportions, contrasts, and

masses as furnish to the eye a constant stimulus around pleasurable sensations. This is true of architecture, painting, sculpture. The appeal to the sense of hearing passes likewise from the realm of bald utility to the contemplative attitude in which beauty is perceived. The love of the human ear for concord of sweet sounds, rhythm, polished expression, reveals that deeper longing for accessory pleasurable sensations added over and above to the process of communication among men.

Esthetic enjoyment is a social experience which develops sympathy and the impulse to the exchange of views and impressions. The cultivation of beauty and of art gives new emotional experience, new forms of expression, widening our sympathies. Thus by its very nature it is social. Undoubtedly the quest for beauty deserves a place among the fundamental human interests. The scope of this study hinders us from going beyond the actual treatment found in our two authors. (See article on Esthetics in the *Brittanica*, 11th edition.)¹

¹From Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, we take the following, from the definition of Beauty, vol. I. "Beauty in its ultimate or metaphysical character is an expression, a shining forth of spirit in some particular form or shape. The ground of esthetic pleasure is that the soul perceives in the beautiful object a trace of its own nature as rational, participating in 'form' or 'idea.' Unity in variety is thus pleasing because the soul is such a unity. Bodily beauty is, however, inferior to beauty of soul and this in turn receives its charm from reason. Hence symmetry is quite inadequate as explanation of beauty. Beauty consists rather in the light, the life that streams forth in connection with sympathy: and this in turn derives its value from its ultimate source, the good.

"This general conception of beauty as a manifestation of the good under sensuous conditions was influential with medieval writers. Thomas Aquinas names as its objective characteristics, 'clearness or brightness of color,' 'symmetry,' 'brilliance of form,' in addition to materials proportionally divided or to diverse forms of action, harmony and diversity."

Vallet in his *Praelectiones Philosophicae ad mentem S. Thomae*, vol. II, p. 47 ff, speaks as follows, quoting St. Thomas. "Ratio pulchri, in universali, consistit in resplendentia formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas vires, vel actiones."

Baldwin appears to have used the same source in the definition just quoted. Unfortunately, he does not indicate the source in St. Thomas from which he draws his reference. Vallet indicates his source as an *Opusculum de Pulchro*. A careful search of all of St. Thomas' writings, a careful study of Mandonnet (*Ecrits de S. Thomas d'Aquin*), which is the latest critical review of the genuine and apocryphal writings of St. Thomas fail to locate any treatise de Pulchro.

RIGHTNESS.—The last of the fundamental human interests to which Dr. Small would reduce all social life is that of rightness. In explaining it, he takes care to avoid metaphysical and theological implications, confining himself to the domain of observed facts. He discovers activities not identical with the five types already explained. He observes that “men always manifest some species of premonition of a self somehow superior to their realized self, or of a whole outside of themselves with which it is desirable to adjust the self” (466). “The real individual is at last, in one fraction of his personality, a wistfulness after that other self, or a deference to that inscrutable whole” (466). Dr. Small finds as a matter of fact that “the feeling of oughtness, or conscience, as a meaning factor in men’s activities” (466) operates by means of this premonition of a superior self. “It is not at all necessary to an understanding of the human individual up to date to decide whether there is an actual realm for rightness apart from conduct in the spheres where men gain health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, and beauty satisfactions” (468). “To most men, whether they merely acquiesce in authority, or reason for themselves, rightness is an activity with a content as peculiarly its own as the realm of the health activities” (468).

In describing the field of rightness as an object of fundamental human desire, Dr. Small repeatedly warns us that he is observing the action of human desires and not stating doctrines or implications. His exposition locates rightness as a coordinate fundamental interest and not as a feature of all conscious human behavior whatever. His developed tables of details under each of the fundamental interests permit us to see that he has in mind the group of phenomena relating to religion. In fact, the title implied in that division of his general table, 727, “Achievement in Religion,” identifies the two fields. The following headings make that clear:

DIVISION VI. ACHIEVEMENT IN RELIGION.

- A. In defining standards of religious authority.
- B. In shifting center of religious interests from another life to present life.
- C. In enlarged religious tolerance, with distinction between religion and theology.
- D. In definite religious tendencies, promoted by the example of eminent religious men of the century; *e. g.*, Pope Leo XIII, Cardinal Newman, Phillips Brooks, Spurgeon, Moody, General Booth, etc.
- E. In federation of religious effort.
- F. In religious extension.
- G. In local, national, and international enlargement of the sphere of religious activities.

St. Thomas discusses rightness under the name of virtue. Virtue is a habit of right action. The rightness of action is determined by its harmony with or departure from the law of God, relationship to the law of God being direct or indirect. The proximate rule and ideal of life is right reason or conscience (1-2ae, Q. 19, a. 5; 1a, Q. 79). The remote rule and ideal is God the eternal law. A right life is one that is faithfully guided by the law of God known through conscience. St. Thomas differs fundamentally from Dr. Small in not finding a separate field for rightness as an object of human desire. The former constantly describes rightness as an aspect of all human conduct and by no means as a distinct department of it. The details of the Thomistic view may be found on pages 28, 29. The sharpness of the distinction between the two views is somewhat blunted by recalling that Dr. Small is describing the facts of life as he observes them, while St. Thomas is laying down the laws for the direction of life, the guidance of the sense of oughtness in human conduct.

The following table indicates references in St. Thomas where Small's thought is discussed in its place in the system of the former :

<i>Professor Small</i>	<i>St. Thomas</i>
Health {	Individual Integrity (1a, Q.78, a.2; Q.11, a.1; 2-2ae, Q.25, a.5; Q.64, a.5, a.7; Q.142, a.3, ad.2)
	Work (2-2ae, Q.65, a.3; Q.168, a.4, ad.1; Opusc. 43, a.5)
	Sex (Con. Gen. 3, c32, c33; Supp. De Matr.)
Wealth {	Lordship over things (2-2ae, Q.66, a.1; 1 Polit. lec 5)
	Mere accumulation (1a, Q.63, a.2; 1-2ae, q.2, a.1, ad.3. Opusc. 73, c 4)
Knowledge {	Practical (1a, Q.14, a.16; DeVerit. Q.2, a.8; Meta. lec 2)
	Philosophical (1a, Q.14, a.16; 2-2ae, Q.51, a.2, ad.3; Meta. lec. 1, lec. 3)
Beauty	{ (Polit. L.8, lec. 1; 1a, Q.39, a.8; 1-2ae, Q.27, a.1, ad.3, 1a, Q.5, a.4. Quol. 6, a.1)
Sociability {	Recognition (1-2ae, Q.2, a.2; 2-2ae, Q.103, a.1; Q.131, a.1; Q.73, a.1, a.2; Q.103, a.1; De Malo Q.9, a.2)
	Reciprocal Valuation (2-2ae, Q.113; Q.114)
Rightness	(1-2ae, QQ. 1-6; ibid. QQ.18-22)

The purpose of Small in excluding all metaphysics and higher interpretations from his concrete description of fundamental human interests, is made evident throughout his entire text. He constantly reminds us that his effort is to look upon human life, to discover and describe the central objects around which human activities are gathered. Hence, there are no differences of philosophy, of understanding of free will, of the philosophy or psychology of desire, to be noted between our two authors. They are largely alike in the substance of their thinking, the chief differences come in logical arrangement and in the point of approach. Possibly the work of Small emphasizes Tarde's thought as to the message of the old theologians to the newer sociology, more emphatically than even Ward. At any rate, a comparative study gives abundant confirmation of the thought of Tarde to which reference has already been made.

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NOTE—In order to facilitate the work of the reader the following list of the works of St. Thomas most frequently used, is given, together with the abbreviations by which reference is made to them.

Theological Works

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 Summa Theologica. The principal work of St. Thomas, in three parts with supplement, the second part subdivided into two parts. Each part is divided into questions and each question into articles followed by answers to objections. | 1a—Prima Pars.
1-2ae—Prima Secundae
2-2ae—Secunda Secundae
3a—Tertia Pars
Supp.—Supplementum
Q.—questio
a.—articulus
ad—responiones |
| 2 Commentaria in IV Libros Sententiarum. Each book is divided into distinctions which are again divided | 1 Sent.—1 Liber Sententiarum
2 Sent.—2 Liber Sententiarum
3 Sent.—3 Liber Sententiarum
4 Sent.—4 Liber Sententiarum |

into questions which in turn are divided into articles, these often followed by "questiunculae" Dist.—Distinctio
Q.—Questio
a.—articulus
q.—questincola

3 Summa Contra Gentiles. Divided into four books, each book divided in chapters. Con. Gen.
L.—Liber
c.—caput

Philosophico-Theological Writings

1 Questions Disputatae..... QQ.Disp.
These include the following works, each of which is divided into questions, articles and answers to objections.
(a) De Veritate..... De Verit.
(b) De Potentia..... De Potent.
(c) De Anima..... De Anima.
(d) De Malo..... De Malo.
(e) De Virtutibus in communi..... De Virt.
2 Quodlibeta..... Quol.
3 De Regimine Principum..... De Reg. Princ.

Commentaries on the Books of Aristotle

1 In VIII libros Physicorum..... Physic.
2 In III libros de Anima..... Anim.
3 In XII libros Metaphysicorum..... Meta.
4 In X libros Ethicorum..... Eth.
5 In IV libros Politicorum..... Polit.

Commentaries in Sacred Scripture

1 Expositio super Matthaeum..... In Matt.
2 Expositio super Marcum..... In Marc.
3 Expositio super Lucam..... In Luc.
4 Expositio super Joannem..... In Joan.
5 Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos.. In Rom.
6 Expositio super primam ad Corinthids... I Cor.
7 Expositio super Epistolam ad Hebraeos.. In Heb.
Each of these commentaries is divided into
Chapters..... c.—caput.
Lessons..... lec.—Lectio.

Various Letters

These are short writings known as
Opuscula..... Opusc.

VITA.

Henry Ignatius Smith was born in Newark, N. J., August 25, 1886. His early studies were made in the public schools of Newark. He was graduated from Seton Hall, South Orange, N. J., in 1904. He entered the novitiate of the Order of Preachers (Dominican Fathers) in the same year at Springfield, Ky. In the year 1905 he entered the Dominican House of Studies at the Catholic University, Washington. Here he completed his undergraduate studies in philosophy and theology, attending at the same time courses in English under Dr. Egan, theology under Dr. Kennedy and sociology under Dr. Kerby, at the Catholic University, from 1905 to 1910. In the latter year he was ordained to the priesthood. He entered the graduate school of the Catholic University in 1912, taking courses in sociology under Dr. Kerby, psychology under Dr. Pace and economics under Dr. O'Hara. He received the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology in 1912. In 1913 he was appointed professor of philosophy in the Dominican House of Studies.

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