

MISCELLANEOUS. No. 15 (1914).

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE WAR

PUBLISHED BY THE

FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

*Et Brit.*

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
December 1914.

*Command Papers*



LONDON:

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S  
STATIONERY OFFICE

By JAS. TRUSCOTT & SON, LTD.,  
SUFFOLK LANE, CANNON STREET, E.C.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from  
WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., 29, BREKKE BUILDINGS, FETTER LANE, E.C., and  
28, ABINGDON STREET, S.W., and 34, ST. MARY STREET, CARDIFF; or  
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (SCOTTISH BRANCH), 23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH; or  
E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN;  
or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,  
the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad of  
T. FISHER, LINCOLN, LONDON, W.C.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

1914 AT LOS ANGELES

Price One Penny.

*Series*  
[Cd. 7717.]

JUN 17 1915  
LIBRARY



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

---

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS.

---

THE EUROPEAN WAR.

---

1914.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

---

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS,  
1914.

# THE EUROPEAN WAR.

---

I.

## DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PRECEDED GERMANY'S  
DECLARATION OF WAR  
ON RUSSIA (August 1, 1914), AND ON  
FRANCE (August 3, 1914).

DECLARATION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1914.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

## CHAPTER I.

### WARNINGS.

(1913.)

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of De-patch.	Summary.	Page.
1	M. Jules Cambon.	1913. Berlin, March 17.	Transmission of reports of the military attaché and of the naval attaché at Berlin on the new military law. Efforts of the German Government to represent this law as a reply to the French project of a three years' law and to foster a war-like spirit in the people.	1
			Enclosure I. — Report of Lieut.-Col. Serret. German armaments are intended to place France in a definitely inferior position. Anger aroused in official circles by French precautionary measures.	2
			Enclosure II. — Report of M. de Parnond. The proposed military law is intended to make easy a crushing offensive against France. Confidence of Germans in the superiority of their army. Financial measures intended to cover military expenditure.	5
2	M. Étienne.	Paris, April 2.	Despatch of a German official secret report on the strengthening of the army.	9
			Enclosure.—Text of the report. Retrospective survey of the successive armaments caused by the Algiers Conference, the Agadir incident, and the Balkan war. Necessity of making a new effort, of accustoming public opinion to the idea of war, of stirring up trouble in French or English colonies, and of considering the invasion of Belgium and Holland.	9
3	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, May 6.	End of Balkan crisis. It nearly brought Germany to a war of aggression against France and caused preparations for mobilisation.	12
4	M. Allizé.	Munich, July 10.	Bavarian opinion considers the new armaments as intended to provoke a war in which it sees the only possible solution for internal difficulties.	14

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
5	Memorandum to Minister.	Paris, July 30.	Prevailing ideas in German opinion; desire for revenge for Agadir, fear of revival of a strong France. Powerlessness of peace party. Formation, composition, and growing development of a war party, encouraged in its ambitions by the presumed weakness of the Triple Entente.	15
6	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, Nov. 22.	Conversation of King of the Belgians with the Emperor, who has ceased to be pacific, gives in to the bellicose circle of which his son is the centre, and accustoms himself to the prospect of a near conflict with France.	21

## CHAPTER II.

## PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia (July 23, 1914).

7	M. Dumaine.	1914. Vienna, June 28.	News of assassination of Archduke Francis - Ferdinand at Serajevo.	23
8	"	Vienna, July 2.	Exploitation of that event by the Austrian military party.	23
9	M. de Manneville.	Berlin, July 4.	Pretended confidence of German Government in a friendly arrangement of Austro-Servian differences.	23
10	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 6.	M. Sazonof warned Austrian Ambassador that Russian Government could not accept assassination of Archduke as pretext for action on Servian territory.	24
11	M. d'Apchier.	Budapest, July 11.	Forced official optimism, contrasted with serious military preparations in Hungary.	24
12	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 15.	Official Austrian newspapers advocate a war to the finish against Pan-Servism, Russia and France appearing to them incapable of intervening.	25
13	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 19.	Forwards a Consular report	26
14	Consular Report from Vienna.		Austrian political circles appear determined on a war of aggression against Servia, and military circles consider possibility of a European conflict.	26

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
15	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 21.	German Government, who have already issued "preliminary mobilisation notices," state categorically that they have no knowledge of tenour of note which Austria intends sending to Servia.	27
16	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 21.	Germany will strongly support Austrian action, without attempting to act as mediator.	28
17	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 22.	French Government orders French Ambassador to give friendly counsel for moderation to Vienna.	28
18	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 22.	Conciliatory attitude of Russia and Servia. Reassuring indications furnished to foreign diplomats. Violent language of German Ambassador.	29
19	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 22.	Grave anxiety of Sir Edward Grey after a conversation with German Ambassador. Counsels of prudence and moderation given to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.	30
20	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 23.	Forthcoming presentation of Austrian note to Servia. Contradictory impressions of diplomats as to its contents and scope. Calming assurances given by Vienna.	31
21	M. Allizé.	Munich, July 23.	Pessimism of Bavarian official circles, particularly of President of the Council, who had knowledge of Austrian note to Servia.	32

## CHAPTER III.

## THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

22	M. René Viviani.	Reval, July 24.	In agreement with M. Sazonof, M. Viviani requests M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to give instructions that from Paris and London counsels of moderation shall be addressed to Count Berchtold, the delivery of the Austrian note the evening before being still unknown.	33
23	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 24.	Instructions sent in this sense to Vienna, where they did not arrive till after delivery of note to Belgrade.	34



No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
24	Austrian Note.	Vienna, July 24.	Text of Austrian note to Serbia, communicated on the morning of 24 July by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin.	34
25	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 24.	Analysis of note. Count Scézszen was warned, when he brought it, of the painful impression which must be produced, particularly under present conditions, by the extension of Austrian demands, as also by the shortness of the time limit for Serbia's reply.	40
26	"	"	Advice given by French Government to Servian Government to accept Austria's demands so far as may be possible, and to propose to submit the question to the arbitration of Europe.	42
27	"	"	Information given to our Ambassadors as to bellicose inclinations of the Austrian military party, as to difficulty for Serbia to accept whole of Austrian demands, and as to threatening tone of German press.	42
28	"	"	<i>Démarche</i> taken by Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay to support, in the name of his Government, the <i>démarche</i> of Austria-Hungary, approving its note, and making apparent the "incalculable consequences" which, by reason of the natural play of the alliances, would result from any attempt at interference by a third Power in the Austro-Servian conflict.	43
29	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 24.	Austrophil and chauvinist manifestations at Berlin; pessimism of diplomatic circles.	45
30	"	"	Herr von Jagow states approval of Austrian note, but denies absolutely previous knowledge of contents. He hopes Serbia will be advised by her friends to give in. The official press is equally in agreement with Austria.	45
31	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 24.	Peaceable tendency of Russian Government, in spite of deep impression made on public by presentation of Austrian note.	47
32	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 24.	Sir E. Grey explains to M. Paul Cambon his plan of mediation by four Powers. Pessimism of Count Benckendorff on subject of Germany's intentions.	48

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
33	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 24.	Semi-official intervention by Germany at Vienna appears to M. Paul Cambon the best means of arresting the conflict.	48
34	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 24.	Sir E. Grey wishes to propose to Germany that they should act together at Vienna and St. Petersburg, in order that Austro-Servian conflict should be submitted to mediation by four Powers not interested in question. Counsel of prudence given to Servian Minister at Paris.	49
35	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 25.	Belgian Minister at Berlin sees in the course crisis is taking the execution of warlike intentions premeditated by Germany.	49
36	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 25.	Summary of situation. At Paris, Herr von Schoen comes to the Quai d'Orsay to deny menacing character of his action of previous evening. At London the Austrian Ambassador states that Austrian note is not in the nature of an ultimatum. Sir E. Grey advises prudence at Belgrade and explains to German Ambassador his plan of mediation by four Powers.	50
37	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 25.	German Government refusing to intervene between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey draws Prince Lichnowsky's attention to fact that this attitude will help to bring on a general conflict in which England could not remain inactive.	51
38	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 25.	Conciliatory efforts of M. Sazonof; he requests Vienna to extend the time limit allowed Serbia for her reply.	52
39	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 25.	French Government support this request for delay.	52
40	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 25.	English Government also associate themselves with this request.	53
41	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 25.	Herr von Jagow again states categorically that he had no knowledge of Austrian note before its presentation. He gives evasive answer to request of English Chargé d'Affaires that he would intervene at Vienna in order to prevent a conflict and to prolong period of ultimatum.	53

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
42	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 25.	Russian Chargé d'Affaires also presents this last request to Berlin. He insists on the urgency of a reply which Herr von Jagow tries to postpone.	54
43	"	"	On further pressing action by Russian Chargé d'Affaires, Herr von Jagow states that he considers Austro-Servian differences as a purely local affair, which should be confined to Austria and Servia, and which does not appear to him likely to lead to international difficulties.	54
44	M. Barrère.	Rome, July 25.	Russian Ambassador at Rome requests Italian Government to intervene on behalf of extension of time limit of ultimatum.	55
45	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 25.	Austrian Government evade request for extension of time limit presented at Vienna by Russian Chargé d'Affaires.	55
46	M. Boppe.	Belgrade, July 25.	Summary of Servian reply to Austrian note.	56
47	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 25.	News of departure of Austrian Minister from Belgrade evokes demonstrations of chauvinism at Berlin. Financiers believe there will be war.	57
48	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 25.	French Ambassador at Vienna, on account of delay of telegram sent him from Paris, does not receive his instructions in time to associate himself with action of his Russian colleague.	57
49	Servian Note.	Belgrade, July 25.	Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note.	58

## CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (JULY 25, 1914)  
TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR (JULY 28, 1914) BY  
AUSTRIA ON SERVIA.

50	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 26.	Summary of situation on evening of 25th, as resulting from Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude. Impressions made in the different capitals, and attempts to prevent aggravation of conflict which would result from military measures taken by Austro-Hungarian Government against Servia. Sir E. Grey still hopes to prevent a conflict by the intervention of four disinterested Powers.	62
----	---------------------	-----------------	--	----

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
51	M. Barrère.	Rome, July 26.	Italy will participate in efforts to maintain peace, but wishes to remain outside conflict if it comes.	64
52	"	"	Russia still hopes for peaceful solution; Italian opinion hostile to Austria.	64
53	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 26.	French Government support Serbia's request for mediation, addressed to English Government by Russia's advice.	64
54	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 26.	M. Sazonof, still imbued with the same spirit of conciliation, proposes a direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg on modifications to be introduced in ultimatum to make it acceptable.	65
55	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 26.	Russian Ambassador, on return to Vienna, proposes to present there fresh proposals for a settlement.	65
56	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 26.	<i>Démarche</i> by Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay that France should intervene with Germany at St. Petersburg only, in order to give counsels of peace. His refusal to reply, in default of instructions, to the request for mediation by four Powers at St. Petersburg and Vienna.	66
57	Note for the Minister.	Paris, July 26.	Further visit of German Ambassador to confirm and strengthen the pacific intentions of his previous <i>démarche</i> . He refuses to give an opinion as to the advisability of Germany recommending moderation at Vienna, and persists in trying to bind the French Government in a common action of "pacific solidarity" at St. Petersburg only, on whom, according to him, peace depends.	67
58	M. Chevalley.	Christiania, July 26.	Order to German fleet to return to Germany from Norway.	70
59	M. d'Annville.	Luxemburg, July 26.	First preparations for mobilisation at Thionville.	70

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
60	M. Farges.	Basle, July 27.	First preparations for mobilisation in Grand Duchy of Baden.	70
61	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 27.	Summary of three successive <i>démarches</i> made by Herr von Schoen. The situation becomes more serious, Austria refusing both to content herself with Serbian concessions and to enter into conversation on the subject with the Powers. New English proposal to endeavour to find, at Berlin, Paris, Rome, and London means of avoiding a crisis, Russia and Austria, the Powers directly interested, remaining apart.	71
62	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 27.	Further <i>démarche</i> of Herr von Schoen at the Quai d'Orsay, with the object of compromising France in regard to Russia, while gaining time to facilitate military action by Austria in Servia, which Germany does nothing to delay.	72
63	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 27.	The German and Austrian Ambassadors make it known that they are sure of England's neutrality, in spite of language used by Sir A. Nicolson to Prince Lichnowsky.	73
64	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 27.	Conciliatory attitude of M. Sazonof.	74
65	M. Bompard.	Constantinople, July 27.	It is considered at Constantinople that Austro-Serbian dispute will remain localised, and that Russia will not intervene on behalf of Servia.	74
66	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 27.	Great Britain stops demobilisation of her fleet, and warns Germany that an Austrian invasion of Servia may cause European war.	75
67	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 27.	Herr von Jagow gives vague pacific assurances, and states, in reply to a question, that Germany would not mobilise if Russia mobilised only on the Austrian frontier. The Secretary of State shows lively anxiety.	75
68	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 27.	Sir E. Grey suggests that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London should examine, in concert with him, the means of solving the present difficulties.	76

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
69	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 27.	Servia has not asked for English mediation; the plan of mediation by four Powers advocated by England must therefore be adhered to.	76
70	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 27.	French Government accepts English position, that a sincerely moderating action by Germany at Vienna could alone bring matters to a close.	77
71	M. de Fleuriau.	London, July 27.	Italian Government also accepts mediation by four Powers.	77
72	M. Barrère.	Rome, July 27.	The Marquis di San Giuliano states that he had no previous knowledge of Austrian note, and adheres, without hesitation, to Sir E. Grey's proposal.	78
73	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 27.	Herr von Jagow dismisses the plan of a conference of the Powers, while proclaiming his desire for a peaceful settlement.	78
74	"	"	He evades fresh pressure from M. Jules Cambon. Opportunity of renewing the English suggestion in a different form in order to drive Germany into a corner.	79
75	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 27.	Count Scézszen hands to the Quai d'Orsay a memorandum from his Government justifying the coercive measures against Servia which he states are imminent. Text of this memorandum.	80
75 (2)	Communiqué of the Press Bureau.	Vienna, July 28.	Semi-official communiqué of the Vienna Press Bureau on the subject of the Servian reply, which is represented as insufficient.	92
76	M. René Viviani.	On board the "La France," July 28.	Acknowledgment of receipt of communications received from M. Bienvenu-Martin and approval of replies he made both to Herr von Schoen and to Sir E. Grey's proposal.	93
77	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 28.	Summary of the situation: Germany's refusal to intervene at Vienna, objection raised by her to English proposal, postponement of Austrian memorandum. Dangers of the situation.	94
78	"	"	Visit of Herr von Schoen to the Quai d'Orsay. He protests again his pacific sentiments, but always evades investigation as to practical means of preventing a conflict.	94

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
79	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 28.	Recommendation to M. Dumaine to keep in touch with his English colleague for the purpose of presenting the English proposal for mediation to Vienna.	95
80	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 28.	German Ambassador at London insists, as does Herr von Schoen at Paris, on the expediency of moderating action by England at St. Petersburg alone. On the other hand, M. Sazonof has accepted the English proposal of mediation, but he would like it to be preceded by direct conversation with Vienna, from which he expects good results.	95
81	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 28.	Herr von Jagow continues to show hostility to the conference proposed by Sir E. Grey, and rests his dilatory attitude on the news of Russian efforts for a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg.	97
82	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 28.	M. Sazonof is obliged to state that Austria evades his proposal for a direct understanding.	98
83	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 28.	Austrian declaration of war on Serbia renders useless all attempts at conciliation, according to Count Berchtold, who thus breaks off all discussion with St. Petersburg.	98

## CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA  
(JULY 28, 1914) TO GERMANY'S ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA  
(JULY 31, 1914).

84	M. Barrère.	Rome, July 29.	The Consulta considers that Austria's declaration of war should not prevent the continuance of diplomatic efforts for the meeting of a conference at London.	99
----	-------------	-------------------	--	----

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
85	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 29.	Germany appears to renounce hope of Franco-English pressure on Russia alone, but continues to refuse to act at Vienna. It therefore appears indispensable that Russia should join definitely and at once in the English proposal for mediation by four Powers, in order that it should be accepted by Berlin before Austria's military measures should have definitely compromised peace.	99
86	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 29.	Russian Government gives complete adherence to this proposal.	100
87	M. Klobukowski.	Brussels, July 29.	Anxiety caused at Brussels by the enigmatical and threatening attitude of Germany.	101
88	M. Ronssin.	Frankfort, July 29.	Important movements of troops noted round Frankfort.	101
89	M. Allizé.	Munich, July 29.	Military preparations in South Germany.	101
90	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 29.	Military preparations in Bohemia.	102
91	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 29.	Austria evades the direct conversation to which she was invited, and hastens to arm.	102
92	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 29.	Herr von Jagow maintains his dilatory attitude, vaguely pacific, throwing all final responsibility for the conflict on Russia, stating at the same time his hope of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, for the success of which he claims to be trying to work.	103
93	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 29.	Austria appears to have decided for war; she is strongly urged thereto by Herr von Tschirscky, German Ambassador. The situation grows worse.	104
94	M. Bienvenu-Martin.	Paris, July 29.	Herr von Schoen called to say that Germany was going to consult Vienna as to its intentions, that that would furnish a basis for discussion, and that military operations would not be actively advanced.	105
95	"	"	Russia, confronted with the disquieting attitude of Germany and with the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue the discussions, and with Austria's military preparations, is obliged to proceed to partial mobilisation.	105



No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
96	M. Barrère.	Rome, July 29.	Marquis di San Giuliano explains the attitude of Germany and Austria as due to their erroneous conviction that Russia would abandon Servia.	106
97	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 29.	Direct Austro-Russian conversations having been interrupted by Austria's declaration of war on Servia, the French and Russian Governments beg Sir E. Grey to renew at Berlin his proposal of intervention by four Powers, and to work upon Italy to obtain her complete co-operation.	107
98	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 29.	Germany having been willing to accept only the principle of mediation by four Powers, Sir E. Grey, to avoid any further dilatory reply, will leave the German Government to choose whatever form of intervention may appear practicable to it. He considers the situation very grave.	108
99	M. Boppe.	Belgrade, July 29.	Servian Government has obtained from Russia the assurance that that Power will not abandon its interest in the fate of Servia.	108
100	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 29.	German Ambassador at St. Petersburg called to state that his country would mobilise if Russia did not discontinue her military preparations.	109
101	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 30.	Informed of this menacing step, the French Government declare their resolution to fulfil all the obligations of the Russian alliance, while continuing to work for a peaceful solution, and requesting the Russian Government to act in the same way on their side.	109
102	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 30.	Russian Government state their readiness to continue negotiations to the end, while remaining convinced that Germany will not work at Vienna in favour of peace.	110

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
103	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 30.	Upon a further and less threatening move by the German Ambassador, M. Sazonof hastened to make a fresh proposal, intimating that Russia would break off her military preparations if Austria declared herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which impugned the sovereignty of Servia.	111
104	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 30.	Following a very friendly interview between Russian Ambassador and Count Berchtold, a fresh attempt will be made at St. Petersburg to hold direct communication between Austria and Russia for friendly settlement of Servian affair.	111
105	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 30.	German Government deny the report of mobilisation, but take all necessary measures to hasten it.	112
106	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 30.	M. Paul Cambon is requested to bring to knowledge of English Government all corroborative information proving the active and threatening military measures taken by Germany since July 25, while France is keeping her covering troops at about ten kilometres from the frontier.	113
107	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 30.	Herr von Jagow states that M. Sazonof's proposal is unacceptable for Austria.	114
108	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 30.	German Ambassador has brought no answer to Sir Edward Grey's request that the German Government should themselves put forward a proposal for mediation by four Powers. Prince Lichnowsky has questioned English Government as to their military preparations. The information given to Sir E. Grey as to Germany's military operations has led him to believe, like M. Paul Cambon, that the time has come for them to consider together all the possibilities.	115
109	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 30.	Herr von Jagow states that in order to gain time he will take direct action at Vienna by asking to know the Austrian conditions, thus again evading Sir Edward Grey's request. He makes recriminations against Russia.	115

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
110	M. Paul Cambon.	London, July 31.	Sir E. Grey warns German Ambassador at London that England could not remain neutral in a general conflict in which France was implicated. On the other hand, he had said to M. Paul Cambon that the English Government could not promise France that they would intervene. The autograph letter from the French President to the King of England had been handed to the King.	116
111	M. Mollard.	Luxemburg, July 31.	The Luxemburg Minister of State notifies military preparations on German frontier, and requests France to engage to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, a promise it cannot obtain from Germany.	117
112	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 31.	French Government, in compliance with England's wish, request St. Petersburg to modify the suggestion M. Sazonof has made to Austria, in order to make it acceptable to that Power and to permit of a peaceful settlement of the dispute.	118
113	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 31.	Russian Government have agreed to modify their formula, in spite of the feeling aroused by the bombardment of Belgrade and the constantly provocative action of Austria-Hungary.	119
114	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 31.	The concurrent efforts made by England and Russia for the maintenance of peace have been united, and give hope of an understanding with Austria-Hungary, who appears more inclined thereto. Germany's attitude, however, gives the impression that that Power has worked from the beginning for the humiliation of Russia, the breaking up of the Triple Entente, and, if this result could not be obtained, for war.	120
115	M. Dumaine.	Vienna, July 31.	General Austrian mobilisation is decreed.	121
116	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, July 31.	Germany, in her turn, decrees "Kriegsgefahrzustand," and requests Russia to demobilise.	121

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
117	M. René Viviani.	Paris, July 31.	In announcing to Paris the ultimatum addressed to Russia, Herr von Schoen asks the French Government to inform him, before 1 o'clock on the following afternoon, what attitude France would assume in the event of a Russo-German conflict.	121
118	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, July 31.	General mobilisation of Austro-Hungarian army entails general Russian mobilisation.	122
119	M. Klobukowski.	Brussels, July 31.	Belgian Government receive official assurance that France will respect Belgian neutrality.	123

## CHAPTER VI.

GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA (SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.), AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

120	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 1.	Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg make two conciliatory moves. Unfortunately Germany's attitude leaves hardly any hope of a peaceful settlement.	124
121	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, August 1.	Austria-Hungary announces at St. Petersburg that she is willing to discuss the ground of her differences with Servia; but Germany's summons to Russia to demobilise within twelve hours seems to destroy the last hope of peace.	125
122	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 1.	French Government inform English Government that they will respect Belgian neutrality.	126
123	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, August 1.	German Government refuse a similar engagement.	126
124	M. Barrère.	Rome, August 1.	Marquis di San Giuliano informs German Ambassador that Italy will preserve neutrality.	127
125	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 1.	Herr von Schoen, informed of Austria's conciliatory attitude and of Russia's acceptance of the English formula, makes no further mention of his departure and proclaims his peaceful intentions, at the same time stating that he has received no further information from his Government.	127

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
126	M. Paul Cambon.	London, August 1.	Sir E. Grey states that England has refused the promise of neutrality for which Germany asked. The observance of Belgian neutrality is of great importance to England, and Germany has not answered the question <i>pr<sup>t</sup></i> to her.	128
127	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 1.	French mobilisation has been ordered during the day, as a reply to German preparations.	129
128	M. Mollard.	Luxemburg, August 1.	Luxemburg Minister of State asks French Government for an assurance of neutrality similar to that received by Belgium.	131
129	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 1.	This assurance is given by French Government.	131
130	M. Jules Cambon.	Berlin, August 1.	General mobilisation is ordered at Berlin.	131
131	M. Eyschen.	Luxemburg, August 2.	Violation of Luxemburg neutrality by German troops. Protest by Minister of State.	132
132	M. Mollard.	"	Explanations furnished by German Government who state that measures taken in Luxemburg are solely preventive and are in no sense hostile to the Grand Duchy.	132
133	Note of Herr von Schoen.	Paris, August 2.	The same explanation regarding the entry of German troops into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.	133
134	M. Paléologue.	St. Petersburg, August 2.	Germany has just declared war on Russia.	133
135	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 2.	Communication of this news to French diplomatic representatives abroad.	133
136	"	"	French diplomatic representatives abroad are requested to make known the situation to the Governments to which they are accredited.	133
137	M. Paul Cambon.	London, August 2.	Sir E. Grey has given assurance that British fleet will defend French coasts against any German attack by sea. The violation of the neutrality of Belgium would be considered a <i>casus belli</i> .	134
138	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 2.	The President of the Council communicates to French Chamber Sir E. Grey's statements as to co-operation of British fleet.	135
139	"	"	Protest to Berlin against the violations of French frontier.	135

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
140	M. Pellet.	The Hague, August 3.	German Minister at The Hague informs Netherlands Government of the entry of Imperial troops into Luxemburg and Belgium, under the pretext of preventive measures.	136
141	M. Klobukowski	Brussels, August 3.	Belgian Government refuse the summons sent to them to allow German troops a free passage through their territory.	136
142	"	"	Belgium does not think the moment has come to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers to defend her independence.	137
143	M. Paul Cambon.	London. August 3.	The statement regarding intervention of English fleet is binding on British Government.	137
144	"	"	Fruitless attempt by German Ambassador to obtain from Sir E. Grey assurance that England's neutrality would not depend on the observance of Belgian neutrality.	138
145	"	"	Sir E. Grey makes statement in the Commons regarding intervention of English fleet, and reads a letter from King Albert asking for England's support.	138
146	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 3.	French Government deny in London statement that German frontier had been violated by French officers.	139
147	Herr von Schoen.	"	Declaration of war handed by German Ambassador at Paris to President of the Council.	139
148	M. René Viviani.	"	Communication of this news to French diplomatic representatives abroad.	140
149	"	"	Instructions sent to M. Jules Cambon, at Berlin, to ask for his passports.	140
150	M. René Viviani.	Paris, August 3.	French Minister at Munich instructed to ask for his passports.	141
151	"	"	Violation of Belgian territory by German troops.	141
152	M. Klobukowski.	Brussels, August 3.	Belgium's appeal to England, France, and Russia.	141
153	M. Paul Cambon.	London, August 4.	German Government will be requested by English Government to withdraw before midnight their ultimatum to Belgium.	142
154	M. Klobukowski.	Brussels, August 4.	German Government state at Brussels that they find themselves obliged to invade Belgian territory.	142

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
155	M. Bapst.	Copenhagen, August 6.	Enclosing a report in which M. Jules Cambon informs the Government of the circumstances of his return journey and of the annoyances to which he was subjected.	142
156	M. Mollard.	Paris, August 4.	Report of M. Mollard to the Government on the subject of his departure from Luxemburg, which was insisted on by German military authorities.	148
157	M. René Viviani. (Circular to the Powers.)	Paris, August 4.	Text of notification to the Powers of the state of war existing between France and Germany.	151
158	M. Raymond Poincaré, President of the Republic. (Message to Parliament.)	"	Message of President of the Republic, read at the sitting of Parliament on August 4, 1914.	152
159	M. René Viviani, President of the Council. (Speech in the Chamber.)	"	Text of speech delivered by President of the Council to the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.	154

## CHAPTER VII.

## [DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

160	M. Delcassé.	Paris, September 4.	Declaration of England, Russia, and France regarding their reciprocal undertaking not to conclude a separate peace, and not to put forward conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.	164
-----	--------------	------------------------	--	-----

## APPENDICES.

## APPENDIX I.

EXTRACTS FROM BLUE BOOK CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY ENGLAND DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH PRECEDED THE WAR.

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
6	Sir G. Buchanan.	St. Petersburg, July 24.	Conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue, and Sir G. Buchanan concerning an eventual declaration of solidarity of England with Russia and France in a European crisis.	165
87	Sir E. Grey.	London, July 29.	Information given to M. Paul Cambon of the view taken by English Government on the subject of their attitude: not to give Germany a false impression of possible abstention on the part of England, not to make any definite engagement from now on in regard to France.	166
88	"	"	Account of an interview with German Ambassador to warn him that England would in no case undertake not to intervene if the crisis developed and if Germany and France were implicated in it.	167
99	Sir F. Bertie.	Paris, July 30.	Conversation with the President of the Republic, who considers that a declaration by England affirming her intention of supporting France, whose wish for peace is known, would arrest Germany's desire for war.	168
119	Sir E. Grey.	London, July 31.	Statement made to French Ambassador that, in the present position of the crisis, the English Government cannot give any definite undertaking.	168
148	"	London, August 2.	Assurance given regarding the protection of the French coasts and fleet by the English fleet against any attack by German fleet by the Pas-de-Calais or the North Sea.	169



## APPENDIX II.

EXTRACTS FROM BLUE BOOK RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS  
MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT  
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE NEUTRALITY OF ENGLAND.

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
85	Sir E. Goschen.	Berlin, July 29.	Offers made by German Chancellor to English Ambassador in endeavour to obtain English neutrality; promise to respect integrity of French territory, but not of her colonies; intentions with regard to Holland and Belgium. Proposal of a general understanding of neutrality between Germany and England.	170
101	Sir E. Grey.	London, July 30.	Refusal of German proposals, not only unacceptable in fact, but their acceptance would be a stain on England's reputation. Uselessness of considering the proposal for a general agreement of neutrality between England and Germany for the future. England will keep her entire freedom of action and continue to co-operate for the maintenance of peace in Europe: that is the only way by which good relations can be maintained between Germany and England.	123
123	"	London, August 1.	Account of a conversation with German Ambassador regarding Belgian neutrality. Prince Lichnowsky presses for a statement by the English Government of the conditions on which England would remain neutral; the reply is given that the English Government definitely refuse any promise to remain neutral and will keep their hands free.	171

## APPENDIX II. (b).

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, UNDER PRETENCE OF A  
 "MISUNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE  
 NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.  
 (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, AUGUST 20, 1914.)

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
1	Prince Lichnowsky.	London, July 31.	Account of a <i>soi-disant</i> request by telephone concerning an eventual undertaking by Germany not to attack France if the latter would remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.	172
2	His Majesty Emperor William II.	Berlin, August 1.	Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V. stating that he cannot stop his mobilisation against Russia and France, but will not attack France in the hypothesis of that Power offering its neutrality guaranteed by the English army and fleet.	172
3	Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.	"	Telegram to Prince Lichnowsky repeating Germany's undertaking.	173
4	His Majesty King George V.	London, August 1.	Telegram from the King of England to the Emperor William, stating that German Ambassador is mistaken and that Sir Edward Grey spoke to Prince Lichnowsky only of the means of delaying an armed conflict between France and Germany until some definite ground of understanding should have been reached by Austria-Hungary and Russia.	173
5	Prince Lichnowsky.	London, August 2.	Notice given to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg that the conversations of which he had given an account had been abandoned as "useless."	173

## APPENDIX III.

EXTRACTS FROM BLUE BOOK CONCERNING ENGLAND'S REFUSAL TO  
 ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF  
 THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

153	Sir E. Grey.	London, August 4.	Request for immediate undertaking by Germany that she will respect Belgian neutrality.	174
-----	--------------	-------------------	--	-----

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
155	Sir E. Grey.	London, August 4.	Statement to Belgium that England is ready to unite with France and Russia to resist a German attack on Belgium and to guarantee the integrity and independence of that country.	174
157	Herr von Jagow.	Berlin, August 4.	Declaration communicated through German Ambassador at London that in spite of the violation of Belgium, which is judged necessary, no territory will be annexed. Proof of the sincerity of this declaration is given by the affirmation that the neutrality of Holland will be respected, <i>an annexation of Belgian territory having no value without a simultaneous annexation of Dutch territory.</i>	175
159	Sir E. Grey.	London, August 4.	England's ultimatum to Germany.	175
160	Sir E. Goschen.	London, August 8.	Report of English Ambassador at Berlin of his last conversations with Herr von Jagow, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Herr von Zimmermann. The German Chancellor cannot understand how, "for a word, <i>neutrality.</i> " how, "for a scrap of paper," England could go to war with a nation to which she is related and which desired nothing so much as to be her friend. The English Ambassador tries to make his interlocutor understand that it is a question of life or death for the honour of Great Britain to keep a solemn engagement which she has signed in defence of the neutrality of Belgium.	175

## APPENDIX IV.

EXTRACTS FROM THE GREY BOOK SHOWING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

—	—	—	Despatches Nos. 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71.	176 to 183
---	---	---	--	------------------

## APPENDIX V.

## EXTRACTS FROM WHITE BOOK.

No.	Name of Signatory.	Place and Date of Despatch.	Summary.	Page.
—	—	—	Telegrams exchanged between the Emperor of Germany, William II., and the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., from July 28 to August 1, 1914.	188

## APPENDIX VI.

EXTRACTS FROM ORANGE BOOK RELATING TO GERMANY'S  
DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA.

76	Count Pourtalès.	St. Petersburg, August 1.	Note transmitted through the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.	191
77	M. Sazonof.	St. Petersburg, August 2.	Communication from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs summing up the events which took place between July 23 and August 1, 1914.	192
78	"	"	Circular letter from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Representatives of the Empire abroad.	194

**LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED  
IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING  
THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS.**

**FRANCE.**

<i>President of the Republic</i>	-	M. Poincaré.
<i>President of the Council</i>	-	M. René Viviani.
<i>Ministers for Foreign Affairs</i>	-	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. M. Jonnart.</li> <li>2. M. Stéphen Pichon.</li> <li>3. M. René Viviani.</li> <li>4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting).</li> <li>5. M. Doumeigue.</li> <li>6. M. Delcassé.</li> </ol>
<i>Political Director</i>	-	M. Berthelot.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	-	Sir Francis Bertie.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	-	M. Isvolsky.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	-	Baron von Schoen.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	-	Count Szeesen.
<i>Servian Minister</i>	-	M. Vesnitch.

**GREAT BRITAIN.**

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	-	Sir Edward Grey.
<i>Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	-	Sir A. Nicolson.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	-	M. Paul Cambou.
<i>French Chargé d'Affaires</i>	-	M. de Fleuriau.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	-	Count Benckendorff.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	-	Prince Lichnowsky.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	-	Count Mensdorff.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	-	Count de Lalaing.

**RUSSIA.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	-	M. Sazonof.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	-	Sir George Buchanan.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	-	M. Paléologue.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	-	Count Pourtalès.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	-	Count Szápáry.

**GERMANY.**

<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>	-	Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
<i>Secretary of State</i>	-	Herr von Jagow.
<i>Under Secretary of State</i>	-	Herr von Zimmermann.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	-	Sir Edward Goschen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	-	M. Jules Cambou.
<i>French Chargé d'Affaires</i>	-	M. de Manneville.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	-	M. Swerbeiev.
<i>Austro-Hungarian Ambassador</i>	-	Count Szogyeny.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	-	Baron Beyens.
<i>French Minister at Munich</i>	-	M. Allizé.
<i>French Consul-General at Frankfurt</i>	-	M. Ronssin.

**AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.**

<i>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	- - - -	Count Berchtold.
<i>Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs</i>	- - - -	{ Baron Macchio. Count Forgach.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	- - - -	Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	- - - -	M. Dumaine.
<i>Russian Ambassador</i>	- - - -	M. Schebeko.
<i>Russian Chargé d'Affaires</i>	- - - -	Prince Koudacheff.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	- - - -	Herr von Tschirscky.
<i>Italian Ambassador</i>	- - - -	Duke d'Avarna.
<i>French Consul-General at Budapest</i>	- - - -	M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin.

**ITALY.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	- - - -	Marquis di San Giuliano.
<i>British Ambassador</i>	- - - -	Sir Rennell Rodd.
<i>French Ambassador</i>	- - - -	M. Barrère.
<i>German Ambassador</i>	- - - -	Herr von Flotow.

**TURKEY.**

<i>French Ambassador</i>	- - - -	M. Bompart.
--------------------------	---------	-------------

**BELGIUM.**

<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>	- - - -	M. Davignon.
<i>British Minister</i>	- - - -	Sir Francis Villiers.
<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Klobukowski.
<i>German Minister</i>	- - - -	Herr von Below Saleska.

**SERVIA.**

<i>Prime Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Pashitch.
<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Boppe.

**LUXEMBURG.**

<i>Minister of State and President of the Government</i>	- - - -	Dr. Eyschen.
<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Mollard.
<i>German Minister</i>	- - - -	Herr von Buch.

**HOLLAND.**

<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Pellet.
<i>Belgian Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Fallon.

**DENMARK.**

<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Bapst.
------------------------	---------	-----------

**SWEDEN.**

<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Thiébaud.
------------------------	---------	--------------

**NORWAY.**

<i>French Minister</i>	- - - -	M. Chevalley.
------------------------	---------	---------------

**SWITZERLAND.**

<i>French Consul-General at Basle</i>	- - - -	M. Farges.
---------------------------------------	---------	------------

## CHAPTER I.

---

### WARNINGS. (1913.)

---

#### No. 1.

*M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin,  
to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, March 17, 1913.*

OUR naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive

memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

---

ENCLOSURE I.

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché  
to the Embassy of the French Republic at Berlin,  
to M. Étienne, Minister of War.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

THE patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.



To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.\* The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pellé a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

"The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion.

The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

"It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany always requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them

---

\* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again.*"

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

---

## ENCLOSURE II.

*M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Financial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important

that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:—

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves."

And the Prince added: "I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such

a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be." And Prince Donnersmarck added: "An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

---

No. 2.

*M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, April 2, 1913.*

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

---

ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.*

*Berlin, March 19, 1913.*

I. GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

THE increase has taken place in three stages —

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Serbia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns

rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of negroes in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

## II.—AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our



financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organisations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite

the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions.

---

### No. 3.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 6, 1913.*

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." "The

height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the "Imperator," did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces

as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 4.

*M. Allizé, Minister of the Republic in Bavaria,  
to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 10, 1913.*

FROM a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's

minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.

---

No. 5.

*Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).*

Paris, July 30, 1913.

FROM observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds:—

- (1) The Treaty of the 4th November 1912 is considered a disappointment for Germany;
- (2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered:—"Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider

that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit England.

The forces consist of the following elements :—

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions :—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear :—The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey

the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine*, and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting



of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by

statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine* and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The English fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that

victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

#### No. 6.

*M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, November 22, 1913.*

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the war-like tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success "for," he said, to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

---

## CHAPTER II.

## PRELIMINARIES.

From the death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914)  
to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia  
(July 23, 1914).

---

## No. 7.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

NEWS has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph.

DUMAINE.

---

## No. 8.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 2, 1914.*

THE crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

---

## No. 9.

*M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 4, 1914.*

THE Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador,

that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

DE MANNEVILLE.

No. 10.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him: "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 11.

*M. d'Aphier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Budapest, July 11, 1914.*

QUESTIONED in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche*

at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (*à plaisir*). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents. were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

---

No. 12.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 15, 1914.*

CERTAIN organs of the Vienna press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Serbia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in

which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter to-day.”

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, “Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made clear.” These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

No. 13.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 19, 1914.

THE Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Serbia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINE.

No. 14.

*Memorandum.*

*(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria.)*

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

FROM information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in



co-operation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenour of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

---

No. 15.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial co-operation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 16.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 21, 1914.*

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 17.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 22, 1914.*

M. JULES CAMBON having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenour of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed

his great astonishment at this. He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 18.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

NOTHING is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Jovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both

to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 19.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 22, 1914.*

YOUR Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian

Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the wrong methods which the Austrian Government have used in approaching that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 20.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 23, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 21.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.*

*Munich, July 23, 1914.*

THE Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

---

## CHAPTER III.

## THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

No. 22.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.

Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 a.m.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Serbia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia, of such a kind that Serbia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and English Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir

Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 23.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on  
board the "France."*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Serbia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his English and Russian colleagues as to his action.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 24.

*Text of the Austrian Note.*

(Note communicated by Count Scezsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 a.m.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

“On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

“ ‘Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia



undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.'

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole

series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

“In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their ‘Official Journal’ of the 13/26 July the following declaration :—

“‘The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“‘The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“‘The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.’

“This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the army.

“The Royal Servian Government further undertake :

“(1) To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ;

“(2) To dissolve immediately the society styled ‘Narodna Odbrana,’ to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ;

“(3) To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that

serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

- “(4) To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ;
- “(5) To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ;
- “(6) To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory ; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto ;
- “(7) To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ;
- “(8) To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ;
- “(9) To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally,
- “(10) To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.
- “The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening the 25th July.\*

---

\* The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction :—

“In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

“I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.”

“A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.”

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government

hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

---

#### APPENDIX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

- (1) The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

- (2) The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voijs Tankosić at Belgrade.
- (3) The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevać.
- (4) In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider.
- (5) To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

---

No. 25.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board  
the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna,  
St. Petersburg, Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Scézszen informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.\*

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger

---

\* See note on page 37.

to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the co-operation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depôt of the Servian army; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Scezsen without any observations informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a *démarche* with so short a time limit; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburg and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

## No. 26.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Thiébaud, French Minister at Stockholm (for the  
President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna,  
London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

M. VESNITCH was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the English and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 27.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade,  
London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers



who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Jovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 28.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

HERR VON SCHOEN came to inform me of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he read it twice over to me.

The Note was almost word for word as follows :—

“The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

“The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously

increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them."

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally; it is as follows:—"The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances be followed by incalculable consequences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined ; if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 29.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

THE delivery of the Austrian note to Serbia has made a deep impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the Chargés d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg. He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 30.

*M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic  
at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the news-

papers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such

as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 31.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at S. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 32.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the English Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Servia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 33.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give

the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's "Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 34.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belygrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

THE Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the co-operation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four Powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to co-operate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 35.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England

appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the military law is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 36.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris* which applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian



demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The English Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the English Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 37.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude (*pourrait s'en désintéresser*).

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 38.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*, the communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Serbia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtalès left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 39.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier* which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 40.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, July 25, 1914.

SIR Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the English Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

No. 41.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

THIS morning the English Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with England, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German\* Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case, Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

---

\* In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed.

The English Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 42.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 43.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Serbia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "*exécution*" in a local matter.

The Chargé d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 44.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna.

BARRÈRE.

No. 45.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia; it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

No. 46.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

M. PASHITCH has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them; they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

No. 47.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

THROUGHOUT the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Serbia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessäul*, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Serbia would accept the whole Austrian note, reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in England the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 48.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d'Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the

Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

No. 49.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.*

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Servian Minister, July 27.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

THE Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school-book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary, they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in



the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13/26 July, the following declaration :—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 18/31 March 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake :—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankositch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15/28 June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribune of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

---

## CHAPTER IV.

FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,  
(JULY 25, 1914), TO THE DECLARATION  
OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERVIA, (JULY 28, 1914).

No. 50.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

THE events of Saturday can be summed up as follows:—refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia,—departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Serbia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession—order for mobilisation given in Serbia whose Government retired to Kragoujewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for English mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the English Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the English Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

## No. 51.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

A telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

---

## No. 52.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

BARRÈRE.

---

## No. 53.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

M. PALÉOLOGUE sends me the following telegram:—

"M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government."

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the English Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 54.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

PALEOLOGUE.

---

No. 55.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

M. SCHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance

from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirsky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 56.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France," ) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

THE summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay. Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the English Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.



In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Ambassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 57.

*Note for the Minister.*

*Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.*

AFTER the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the *Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to

avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Echo de Paris* of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (*sentiment de solidarité pacifique*), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the

Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,<sup>1</sup> and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

Cf. also the English Blue Book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, English Ambassador at Vienna, states:—

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."

## No. 58.

*M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

THE whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

---

## No. 59.

*M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.*

ACCORDING to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.

---

## No. 60.

*M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Basle, July 27, 1914.*

FOUR days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

---

## No. 61.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic:—On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences;"—the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;"—the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone

able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Serbia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome: the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your English colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 62.

M. *Bienvenu-Martin*, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

AFTER his *démarche* of yesterday tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation; he even suggested the following terms:—"During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful cooperation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace, had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows:—"The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately terse, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: "Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows:—"The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 63.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England

would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

No. 64.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

No. 65.

*M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Therapia, July 27, 1914.*

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

---



## No. 66.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Serbia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 67.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

TO-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by

her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 68.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

YESTERDAY in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Serbia was disposed to appeal to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

No. 69.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

THE Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

However, the English proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

---

No. 70.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

THE English Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the English Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the English Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 71.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 72.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

THE Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way:" the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 73.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

THE English Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 74.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

I HAD a conversation yesterday with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the English Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the co-operation of England and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to

Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress. I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 75.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

Paris, July 27, 1914.

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of

Servia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Scézszen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézszen handed to me.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.*

THE Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the South Slav districts, in order to attach them to a great Servian state, dates from far back. This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached its culminating point at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purposes openly and undisguisedly, and showed, under the patronage of the Servian Government, its intention of achieving its aims by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy with shouts of rancour and by the perversion of facts, associations were being formed to foment this strife—irrespective of other means of propaganda.

The association which had become the most important was the Narodna Obrana. Having its origin in a revolutionary committee which already existed, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation dependent upon the Foreign Office at Belgrade through military

and civil officials. Amongst its founders should be specially mentioned General Buzo Jankvic, ex-Ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic and Valislav Valovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government Printing Establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tanovic, and Milan Pribicevic. This association adopted as its aim the creation and organisation of armed bands, with a view to the war that they hoped for against the Monarchy. A convincing description of the activity of the Narodna Obrana at this time will be found, in particular, in the statements of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the Council of War at Serajevo; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy, as *comitadji*. Krstanovic had been brought, with about one hundred and forty others, to a school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija, in the district of Jagodina, managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnick. The only masters in this school were Servian officers; General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic introduced great regularity into the courses of organisation of these bands, which lasted three months.

The *comitadji* received there complete instruction in musketry, bomb throwing, mines and the destruction of railways, tunnels, bridges and telegraphs; their duty was, according to their leaders, to put into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action on the part of the Narodna Odbrana, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, guerilla warfare was carried on against the Monarchy. In this way the subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced as Servian emissaries systematically to practise secret attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the announcement of the Servian Government on the 31st March 1909, in which that Government announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in public law by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and solemnly promised that they would do their best to maintain in future friendly and neighbourly relations with the Monarchy.

With this declaration it might have been expected that the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, would be brought to an end, and that means might have been found for an amicable *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy. Deprived of the support of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with its engagements, the hostile propaganda could only have continued secretly, and would have been condemned to prompt destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race, and culture existing between the Servian districts in the



south of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interest.

However, these hopes have not been realised. Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued: and, under the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this agitation, the propaganda instituted against Austria has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and has developed into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by the old methods, which have been adapted to the situation, and by more thorough methods, have been called "to an inevitable struggle of annihilation" against Austria. Their secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav domains in the south of the Monarchy, whose subjects have been incited to treason.

Above all, this spirit has found constant expression in the Servian press.

Up to the present time, no fewer than 81 newspapers appearing in Servia have had to be withdrawn from postal circulation on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law. There is hardly a clause protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and of the members of the Imperial Family or the integrity of the State that has not been violated by Servian papers. In Appendix I. will be found a few of the numerous instances occurring in the press, of ideas of the nature indicated above.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the points of view of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that the press has, in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which reparation is due. This idea recurs not only in the papers of advanced views, but also in the *Samoprava*, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office at Belgrade, where this idea finds expression in hardly veiled terms. (See Appendix II. (b).)

Nor can one omit to consider how the attempt made on 15th June 1910, at Sarajevo by Bogdan Zerajic against Commandant von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was applauded by the press.

It will be remembered that Zerajic killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burned all his papers. For these reasons it is impossible to throw full light upon the motive of this outrage; it has, however, been possible from a document found on his person to form the conclusion that he was a follower of the views of Kropotkin. Circumstantial evidence likewise leads to the conclusion that the attempt was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from proclaiming the criminal as a national Servian hero, or from praising his deed. The *Politika* even combated the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be a "Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."

The *Politika* considers the 18th August of the same year, "the birthday of His Imperial and Royal Majesty," as a favourable opportunity on which to return to the subject of Zerajic, "whose name will be to the people something like that of a saint," and solemnly to praise the outrage in a poem. (Appendix No. 1.)

This is the way in which this crime, which was quite foreign to territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, has been exploited for the furtherance of this idea, and in which the murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim, and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This sanctification of murder, as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy, reappears later in papers speaking of the attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner of Cujav. (Appendix. I.(e).)

These newspapers, which are circulated not only in Servia, but also, as was ascertained later, illicitly in the Monarchy, by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the misdeeds of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana has become the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. They still include the very violent opponents of the Monarchy mentioned above in the capacity of active and energetic organisers. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and governed by a hierarchy of officials (*see* Appendix II., "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana had soon acquired about 400 members who carried on a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna became closely allied with the "Shooting Federation" (762 societies), the Association of the Sokol, *Dusan Silni* (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the Association of Horsemen, *Knez Mihajlo*, the Society of Sportsmen and the League of Development, as well as numerous other associations, all of which, under the guidance and protection of the Narodna, work on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are only members of the single body of the Narodna. Thus the latter has set up all over Servia a very close network of agitation and has attracted to its principles all those who are receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of this Society demonstrate sufficiently clearly the policy of the Narodna.

In its statutes, ostensibly those of a "Development Society," concerning itself only with the spiritual and corporal improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna discloses in its deed of amalgamation (*see* Appendix II.) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "reorganised programme."

To preach to the Servian people especially "the sacred truth by fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Monarchy wishes "to take away Servia's liberty, her language, and even to destroy her"; that it is an unavoidable necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her first and greatest enemy, "a war of destruction with rifle and cannon" and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war for the liberation of the conquered territories in which seven millions of their brothers are subject to contumely and oppression. All the efforts for progress of the Narodna are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people, with a view to the struggle of annihilation that they foresee.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna work in the same spirit. The association of the Sokol of Kragujevac will serve as an example. (*See* Appendix III.)

As in the case of the Narodna, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the annual meeting of 1914 made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is the real object of the Sokol, and only spoke of "preparation for War" against a "dangerous, heartless, and odious enemy invading us from the North," who robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberties and rights, and keeps them in bondage and irons.

In the administrative reports of the association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the records of the real "objects of the activities of the Administration," especially "*the preparation of national development and the necessity of strengthening the oppressed nation,*" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "*incomplete programme, its unfinished task*" and accomplishing "*that great action which is to be carried out in the near future: the liberation of brothers who are living beyond the Drina and who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified.*"

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "hawks must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers not yet freed."

As in the case of the aspirations of progress in the Narodna, the gymnastic activity of the Sokol is not the real object, but simply a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on with the same intentions, not to say with the very same words.

When the Narodna makes its appeal for the struggle of annihilation against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the people of the Monarchy but to all the Southern Slavs. In the eyes of the Narodna the Slav regions in the South of the Monarchy belong to "our subjected Servian territories." (See also Appendix IV.) So also the Slav subjects of the South of the Monarchy must take part in this "national work," so also this "healthy and necessary" activity must make itself felt on the other side of the Southern frontier, and even on the soil of the Monarchy the Narodna seeks its "heroes for the holy war," among whom Obilic, the murderer of Mourad, is cited as an example worthy of imitation, of sacrifice for one's country.

But in order to induce the brothers "outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna is intimately associated with the "brothers on this side of the frontier." It is not said in what way this intimate association is effected, no doubt because *it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot and ought not to be explained."*

How far this branch of its activity extends is shown by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

The foreign activity of the Narodna and its affiliated branches is particularly varied.

What is relatively the less dangerous, because it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by the influential members of the Narodna in the South-Western parts of the Monarchy, where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These occasions give the speakers the opportunity of explaining the true aims of the association in the most receptive circles of their adherents, in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already *au courant*.

Amongst these emissaries one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic, Director of the Government Printing Establishment, already alluded to; it was he who on the 8th of August 1909 issued an appeal to the Servian people in which he called Austria "the enemy of Servia" and invited Servia to prepare herself for a war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions he has undertaken tours of this nature. At Karlova, in 1912, he flung prudence to the winds and spoke of "the union of all the Serbs against the common enemy."

More dangerous are the relations formed by associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna, under the cloak of common interests and of culture, with associations in the Monarchy; for the respective envoys and corporate visits of these associations, which escape all control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, an envoy of the Narodna at the fête of Serajevo in September 1912 (*see* Appendix VI.) had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. The sending of a representative of the Sokol of Kragujevac to this fête must have meant for the brothers of Bosnia: "We have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still strong"—a thought which, to the initiated, will no doubt have found a quite different expression consonant with the aims of the Narodna explained above (Appendix III.). As to the events that take place at the meetings of the same kind in Servia, it is clear that they escape all control of the Royal and Imperial authorities, who only possess on this matter confidential information which is difficult to check. In this connection doubts must be raised regarding the visit of Agram students to Servia (April 1912) who received from the Servians an official reception of an almost military character, accompanied even by a parade and by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the association of the Sokol of Kragujevac could say, "This event marks the beginning and the key of a great deed which must find its accomplishment in the near future; it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bounds until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the associations of the Servian Sokols have succeeded in making arrangements with some similar societies of the Monarchy to establish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear; for the information on this point is still being collected. Up to the present, however, the information obtained admits of the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols have seduced and led astray certain groups of persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda among circles so very different assumes minor importance if it is compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna and its friends in the form of a personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of mutiny to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late Officers of Honved V.B.D.K.V.N. and the Lieutenant of Gendarmerie of Slav Croatia V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevitch, left the service of the army of the Monarchy in the most suspicious circumstances and turned towards Servia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their hopes falsified, or at any rate in part, and are thinking of returning to the country that they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from Servia into the

middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily so well known that it hardly needs illustration. What is less known is that people who have been expelled from the Croatian and Bosnian schools, owing to grave acts against discipline, are received in Servia with open arms and often even protected by the State and supported as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their masters, who, inspired by hostility towards Austria, are to a great extent members of the Narodna, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case may be quoted here. Last March several pupils of the normal training college of Pakrac (Croatia) were expelled on account of a strike. They returned to Servia, where they immediately obtained places as school masters or were admitted to training colleges. One of those who had been so expelled, and who had relations with circles unfriendly to the Monarchy, declared publicly that he and his people would express the opinion and disseminate the view during the stay of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province is Servian territory. It should be particularly noted that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia the prefect of the Servian district of Krajna gave to three scholars, who were thus involved, Servian passports, in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croats. With these passports the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

But all this is not enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna.

The Imperial and Royal Government has been informed for a long time past confidentially that the Narodna has made military preparations for the war which it desires to make against the Monarchy in the following way: it has been sending emissaries in order, as soon as hostilities broke out, to attempt in bands the destruction of the transport and to stir up revolt or panic (*see* Appendix VII.).

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the Council of War at Serajevo against Jovo Jajlicic and his associates for espionage, confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for war by armed bands still figures in the programme of the Narodna, to which must now further be added a complete service of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna, described as "reorganised" is, in reality, an *extended* programme. Acts of terrorism must finally result from an atmosphere of hatred which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which evades all responsibility; and in order to bring them about, all means are to be regarded as good in the struggle against Austria including even, without any sense of shame, common acts of murder.

On the 8th of June 1912, a man named Jukic shot at von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that Councillor von Herwic, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded; in his flight he killed a policeman who followed him and he wounded two others.

From the subsequent investigation it appeared that Jukic was saturated with the ideas and plans of the Narodna, and that, although Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students, for the celebrations prepared in honour of these visitors on the 18th April 1912; that Jukic entered into relations with several people belonging to the Narodna with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there he received *from a Servian Major a bomb and from a friend a Browning pistol*, with which he carried out his crime. The bomb found at Agram came, according to experts, from a military arsenal.

Jukic's attempt had not yet been forgotten, when on the 18th August 1913, Stephan Dojcic, who had returned from America to Agram, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the southern Slavs living in America, and which was the work of the foreign propaganda of the Narodna.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevitich, printed in Chicago, with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to enter Servia, demonstrates the correspondence between the propaganda carried out unchecked by the Servians in America and that carried on from Servia in the territory of the Monarchy.

And again, scarcely a year afterwards, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th May 1913, Jacob Schäffer made an attempt at the Agram theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a policeman. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of the latter and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October 1912), where together with his accomplice Marojan Jakcic he was seen in company with *comitadjis* and members of the Narodna. As frequently happens when immature minds concern themselves too early with political questions, these meetings had the worst possible result. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma of Belgrade, that the Slav areas in the south of the Monarchy

should be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the teachings of his friends that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office in the Monarchy.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne.

A few months before Suka Alginovic had been tried for high treason. In the course of his trial three witnesses declared that Alginovic had told them that he had received one hundred dina from the Narodna and a similar sum from a secret association of students to start propaganda, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

*It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna and of those who share in its views has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke.*

From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy which were grouped around it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy that the Narodna limits itself in this way to *inciting*, and where the incitement had fallen on fertile soil, to *providing means of material assistance*, but that it has confided all the dangerous part in this active propaganda exclusively to the youth of the Monarchy, which has been excited and corrupted by this organisation, which alone ought to bear the burden of this pitiful "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th June.

Princip and Grabez are examples of these young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna. At Belgrade, where he consorted with students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the hereditary Archduke (against whom was directed the particularly rancorous hatred of the elements hostile to the Monarchy), when he made his tour in the annexed territories.

He became friendly with Kabrinovitch, who mingled with the same associates, and whose radically revolutionary opinions, as he himself admits, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the active propaganda. But however carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however determined the conspirators may have been, the attempt would nevertheless not have been carried out if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukic, to provide for the conspirators means of committing their crime; for as



Princip and Kabrinovitch have expressly admitted, they lack the necessary arms as well as money to purchase them. It is interesting to see where the conspirators procured their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivogin Dacic, the two principal men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators turned as to a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition among those ready to commit crimes that they could obtain from the members of the Narodna instruments for murder. The fortuitous circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless frustrated this plan; however, Princip and Kabrinovitch had no difficulty in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-comitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade and member of the Narodna. The latter and his friend Major Voja Tankosic, who has already been mentioned, and was also one of the heads of the Narodna, and who in 1908 was the head of the school of armed bands of Kuprija (Appendix V.), now appear as the moving spirits in the plot. They had only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, namely, whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their own suggestions. Thenceforward they were ready to give every assistance. Tankosic procured four Browning pistols and ammunition, and money for the journey. Six hand grenades from the Servian army completed the armament, a fact which recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious to be successful, Tankosic obtained shooting lessons for them, but Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to insure secrecy for the plot by special means scarcely desired by the assassins. They therefore suborned Zian Kali, pointing out that the two culprits must commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to them because secrecy would relieve them of the slight danger which they themselves were incurring in this enterprise. *Sure death for victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, such is the motto, as is now known, of the Narodna.*

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the arms and the bombs should arrive in Posnia by underhand methods and without being perceived. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power; he explained to the conspirators the route which had been agreed upon, and assured them that the Servian customs authorities would help them. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret route prepared in advance and already often used for the secret designs of the Narodna. With a simplicity and assurance which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabak and Losnika lent their administrative organisation for the purpose; the secret transport with its complicated system of con-

stantly changing guides, who could be summoned as if by magic, and were always to be found on the spot when there was need, was effected without any difficulty. Without investigating the object of this strange journey of a few very young students, the Servian authorities set this smooth machinery in motion at a word from the ex-comitadji and minor railway official Ciganovic. However, they had no need to make any inquiry, for, from the information before them, it was clear that a new mission of the Narodna was being carried out. When he saw the arsenal of bombs and revolvers, the guard, Crbic, smiled a benevolent smile of approval, showing conclusively how accustomed they were on this route to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have committed a serious default in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed the press to excite hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of masters and of judges, to busy themselves with a public campaign against the Monarchy, instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of its citizens; they have not prevented men with a share in the direction of the military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience contrary to all moral sentiment, to such an extent that in this conflict vulgar and treacherous assassination appears the most praiseworthy weapon.

---

No. 75 (2).

*Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.*

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

THE Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.

---

No. 76.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*On board the "La France," July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Servia to ask for and to the English *démarches* at Berlin, as well as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two English proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with

perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 77.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France."*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the English proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Serbia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Scezsen has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 78.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by England, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 79.

*M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

THROUGH the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the English proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your English colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the English suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche*; you will adapt your attitude to his.

No. 80.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 28, 1914.*

SIR EDWARD GREY yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that

the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied "that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the English proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey, has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 81.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szápáry was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the English suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma, by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but

to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 82.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

No. 83.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

COUNT BERCHTOLD has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany—"Mediation between Austria and Russia,"—is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

---



## CHAPTER V.

FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA  
ON SERVIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN  
ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

---

No. 84.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference in London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

---

No. 85.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna,  
Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Servia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg; it has been

also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the English proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 86.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and England may propose in order to maintain peace. My English colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

## No. 87.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand "with grounded arms ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

## No. 88.

*M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Frankfort, July 29, 1914.*

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

RONSSIN.

## No. 89.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 29, 1914.*

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manœuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

---

No. 90.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THE French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 91.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all English efforts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---

## No. 92.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir. E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for

peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 93.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna,  
to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

THE opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by MM. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

## No. 94.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna,  
Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

THE following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador:—

“The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred.” A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron Von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 95.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  
London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople,  
Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did

not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Serbia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Serbia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

---

No. 96.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his English colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating



Servia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence in Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent English intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

BARRÈRE.

---

No. 97.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the English Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

## No. 98.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 29, 1914.*

IN his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by England, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 99.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 29, 1914.*

THE Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

## No. 100.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.

PALEOLOGUE.

## No. 101.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors  
at St. Petersburg and London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

M. ISVOLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 102.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg,  
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

M. SAZONOF, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation. He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 103.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

THE German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia:—

“It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard,” answered M. Sazonof, “but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria.”

M. Sazonof added: “The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name:

“If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations.”

Count Pourtalès promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 104.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

IN spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilisation taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed that *pourparlers* should be resumed at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry; they had only been interrupted owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which would be acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilisation arrived at Vienna.

DUMAINE.

---

No. 105.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of

the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of England that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

JULES CAMBON.

---

No. 106.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

PLEASE inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of positions on the frontier (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and protection of railway junctions) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures have been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 107.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.



My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtalès had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 108.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 30, 1914.*

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 109.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating England, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirsky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 110.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

At the beginning of our conversation to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if England would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, England would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved England would be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, England should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 111.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sûre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me—and this was the real object of his visit—to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration.

*Postscript.*—Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing suspicion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister

for an official declaration from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr Von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking."

MOLLARD.

---

No. 112.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Government asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers endeavoured to secure that Serbia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition (*if Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations*) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way:—

That the Powers would examine how Serbia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Government joined in the English suggestion, and in the

following terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to try to obtain, without delay, the assent of the Russian Government :—

“Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

“The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

“I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed.”

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 113.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

THE news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way :—

“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian

Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 114.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE efforts made up till now concurrently by England and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day ; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying it in accordance with the request of England ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors, that English mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation ; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted ; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 115.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

GENERAL mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

DUMAINE.

## No. 116.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

HERR VON JAGOW sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been declared, and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Petersburg that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 117.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

THE German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required

at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 118.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to  
M. René Viviani, President of Council, Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

PALÉOLOGUE.

---



No. 119.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

L'AGENCE HAVAS having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the English Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

## CHAPTER VI.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY GERMANY ON RUSSIA  
 (SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.);  
 AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

No. 120.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

Two *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors—the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory.

Count Scézszen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible.

At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the *pour-parlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the English Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Servia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the English proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum giving the Russian

Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the English proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers.

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 121.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria; my British

colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

J. CAMBON.

---

No. 122.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Government, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 123.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

THE British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-morrow afternoon.

J. CAMBON.

---

## No. 124.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy would not be able to take part in the war.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 125.

M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:—

- (1) An English compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.
- (2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis* of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the English formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 126.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

SIR Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked England to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to England. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place, the English fleet is mobilised, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (*venaient à le passer*), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 127.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

WE are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it breaks out, will fall on Russia. Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise moderation at St. Petersburg; this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Serbia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Scézszen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Scézszen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has continued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This measure has been taken by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.

To-day M. Paléologue telegraphed that Count Pourtalès had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisation.

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.

Our decree of mobilisation is then an *essential measure* of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, English opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---



## No. 128.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Government an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar *démarche* is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg.

MOLLARD.

## No. 129.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.*

Paris, August 1, 1914.

BE good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 130.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

SPECIAL editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 131.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded especially towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is immediately expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

*The Minister of State,  
President of the Government.*

EYSCHEN.

## No. 132.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

THE Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

MOLLARD.

## No. 133.

*Note handed in by the German Ambassador.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.

VON SCHOEN.

## No. 134.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.

YESTERDAY at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Government; he will leave St. Petersburg to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instructions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 135.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 136.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

THIS morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the

fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 137.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration to me:—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that England was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that England will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. It is a specially English interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 138.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 30th, 31st July and the 1st August, and in that which you have sent to me to-day.

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the English fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that English ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 139.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

Paris, August 2, 1914.

GERMAN troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador:—

“The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

“The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of a French

soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses.

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 140.

*M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Hague, August 3, 1914.

THE German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

No. 141.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

YESTERDAY evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide.

The Government of the King answered that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by

France, and were still quite recent ; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 142.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered :

“It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take.”

---

No. 143.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows :—

“In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war.”

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the English fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 144.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of England did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a *communiqué* saying that if England remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*. My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 145.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 3, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has made the statement regarding the intervention of the English fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of England has deeply stirred the House.



The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 146.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 147.

*Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m.*

M. le Président,

THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to

furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

(Signed) SCHOEN.

No. 148.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 149.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to

the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 150.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

BE good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 151.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.*

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I LEARN from an official Belgian source that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

No. 152.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THE Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to England, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future."

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places."

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 153.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 4, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to England before 12 o'clock to-night.

• PAUL CAMBON.

---

No. 154.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels, August 4, 1914.

THIS morning the German Minister informs the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

---

No. 155.

*M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.

THE French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram:—

"I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all

“ the staff of the Embassy and the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Darmstadt with his family.” The treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz by French aviators, who according to his statement “had come from Belgium.” I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added: “ You will admit that under no circumstances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished.

“ An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature.”

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

“ The Government has not yet come to a decision ” Herr von Jagow answered. “ It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive yours.” The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had

been courteous and could not make me anticipate what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth:—

“ M. LE BARON,

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

I HAVE been thinking over the route for my return to my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of trains.

Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the

persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

JULES CAMBON."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy:

"Sir,

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

MORE than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good

enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

"In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated.

JULES CAMBON."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only represented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alexandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow.

"Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914.

YESTERDAY before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

"To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to



the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further.

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour.

"I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier.

JULES CAMBON."

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.\*

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my English colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the

---

\* Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attachés.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 156.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Paris, August 5, 1914.

THE Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection; this he promised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as possible, was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.).

MOLLARD.

---

ENCLOSURE I.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

IN an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,

EYSCHEN,

*Minister of State, President of the  
Government.*

ENCLOSURE II.

*Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister, at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard.

EYSCHEN.

ENCLOSURE III.

*To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.*

Your Excellency,

IN accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard.

VON BUCH.

## ENCLOSURE IV.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency  
M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government  
of Luxemburg.*

Sir,

Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

ARMAND MOLLARD.

---

No. 157.

*Notification by the French Government to the Representatives  
of the Powers at Paris.*

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory ; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May 1867, and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government ; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war

exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October 1907. relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.

---

No. 158.

*Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel of the 5th August 1914.)*

*(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message.)*

“GENTLEMEN,

“FRANCE has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated. The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created.

“For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation.

“They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

“Since the ultimatum of Austria opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

“To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

“At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

“On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation (*loud and unanimous applause*), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.*)

“But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed.

“Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (*loud applause*) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

“The President of the Republic interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman (*loud and prolonged applause*).

“Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory (*applause*).

“In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals (*loud and unanimous applause*).

“She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith (*loud and prolonged applause and cries of ‘Vive la France’*).

“She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud and unanimous applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship of England (*loud and unanimous applause*).

“And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (*loud and repeated applause*) ‘Haut les cœurs et vive la France!’ (*unanimous and prolonged applause*).

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.”

No. 159.

*Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

(*Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.*)

M. René Viviani, *President of the Council.*

GENTLEMEN,

THE German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.



This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale* asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the

peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declaration which the German representative continued to shower upon us (*hear, hear*).

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter which he handed to me on the subject:—

“ M. Le President,

“ THE German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

“ I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

“ At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

“ My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

“ Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

“ (Signed) SCHOEN.”

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed loud and unanimous applause.*)

The entire English fleet is mobilised and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

Since 1912 *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.

Foreign Office,

My dear Ambassador,

November 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,  
E. GREY.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November 1912 :—

Dear Sir Edward,

London, November 23, 1912.

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,  
PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has

already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen (*loud and unanimous applause*.) I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the English Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment (*renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause*).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration:—

“In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war.”

From now onwards, the English fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (*unanimous applause*), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII. of England and the Government of the Crown (*applause*), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (*loud and unanimous applause*).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Serbia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise (*prolonged applause*).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another (*renewed applause*).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack—it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud to defend (*loud applause*).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (*Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the onlookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (*Loud applause, all the deputies rising*



*to their feet.*) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (*applause*).

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

RENÉ VIVIANI.

---

## CHAPTER VII.

No. 160.

## DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

(September 4, 1914.)

## DECLARATION.

M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.

Paris, September 4, 1914.

The following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London :—

“The undersigned duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows :—

“The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.”

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.  
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.  
EDWARD GREY.

This declaration will be published to-day.

DELCASSÉ.

## APPENDICES.

## EXTRACTS.

FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" (ENGLISH), FROM THE "GREY BOOK"  
(BELGIAN), FROM THE "WHITE BOOK" (GERMAN), FROM  
THE "ORANGE BOOK" (RUSSIAN).

## APPENDIX I.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" RELATING TO THE ATTITUDE  
TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO RUSSIA,  
GERMANY, AND FRANCE, DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH  
PRECEDED THE WAR

## No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey.*  
—(Received July 24.)

St. Petersburg,  
July 24, 1914.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was

being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Austria by Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

G. BUCHANAN.

---

No. 87

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

Foreign Office,  
July 29, 1914.

AFTER telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged

her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

E. GREY.

---

No. 88.\*

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Foreign Office,

July 29, 1914.

Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

E. GREY.

---

\* *Sic* in the French text, this should be 89.

No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Paris,

July 30, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for his Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

F. BERTIE.

No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Foreign Office,

July 31, 1914.

Sir,

M. CAMBON referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

E. GREY.

---

No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Foreign Office,

August 2, 1914.

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon

in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

E. GREY.

---

APPENDIX II.

---

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ENGLAND'S NEUTRALITY.

---

No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

Berlin,

July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

E. GOSCHEN.

---



*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Foreign Office,  
July 30, 1914.

HIS Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

E. GREY.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Foreign Office,  
August 1, 1914.

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve

anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

E. GREY.

## APPENDIX II. (b).

### GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, ON THE PLEA OF A "MISUNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.

(Semi-official publication in the "*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*,"  
August 20, 1914.)

#### No. 1.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.*

London,  
July 31, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone and asked me if I thought I could say that we would not attack France if she remained neutral in a German-Russian war. I said I thought I could assume responsibility for this.

LICHNOWSKY

#### No. 2.

*Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V.*  
Berlin,

August 1, 1914.

I HAVE just received the communication from your Government offering me the neutrality of France under the guarantee of Great Britain. This offer was accompanied by the question whether, in these circumstances, Germany would not attack France. For technical reasons my mobilisation, which has been ordered for both fronts, East and West, this afternoon, must be carried out in accordance with preparations already begun.

Orders countermanding this cannot be given and unfortunately your telegram came too late. But if France offers her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English navy and army, I will refrain from attacking her and will use my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. At this moment the troops on my frontier are stopped by telegraphic and telephonic orders from continuing their advance over the French frontier.

WILLIAM.

---

No. 3.

*Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, to  
Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.*

Berlin,

August 1, 1914.

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposals if England will guarantee, with her military and naval forces, the neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilisation took place to-day, in reply to Russian provocation, and before the receipt of the English proposals. Consequently our concentration on the French frontier cannot be modified. We guarantee, however, that between now and Monday, August 3, at 7 p.m., the French frontier shall not be crossed if England's acceptance has reached us by that time.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

---

No. 4.

*Telegram from King George V. to the Emperor William.*

London,

August 1, 1914.

IN reply to your telegram which has just reached me, I think there has been a misunderstanding with regard to the suggestion made during the course of a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, when they were discussing how an armed conflict between Germany and France might be delayed until a means of agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia had been found. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning to make it clear that there has certainly been misunderstanding on the part of the latter.

GEORGE.

---

No. 5.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.*

London,

August 2, 1914.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S suggestions, founded on England's wish to remain neutral, were made without previous agreement with France, and have since been abandoned as useless.

LICHNOWSKY.

---

## APPENDIX III.

---

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" RELATING TO ENGLAND'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

---

No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin*

Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

THE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:--

"Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

E. GREY.

No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

Foreign Office,

August 4, 1914.

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

E. GREY.

No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

Berlin,  
August 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

JAGOW.

No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Foreign Office,  
August 4, 1914.

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

E. GREY.

No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

London,  
August 8, 1914.

Sir,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been

obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to

understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

E. GOSCHEN.

---

#### APPENDIX IV.

---

EXTRACTS FROM THE "GREY BOOK" POINTING OUT THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

---

No. 2.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels,

July 24, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a

communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

DAVIGNON.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Sir,

THE international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

---

No. 8

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Brussels,

July 29, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.



Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

DAVIGNON.

No. 9.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Brussels,

July 31, 1914.

Sir,

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said:—

“I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

DAVIGNON.

No. 11.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Brussels,

July 31, 1914.

Sir,

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that the other Power violated it:—

“In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it.”

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

DAVIGNON.

No. 12.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Brussels,

Sir,

July 31, 1914.

IN the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

DAVIGNON.

Enclosure in No. 12.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin,

May 2, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

"A member of the Social Democrat Party said: 'The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

BARON BEYENS.

No. 13.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London,

August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.

No. 14.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Berlin,

August 1, 1914.

(Telegram.)

THE British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Brussels,

Sir,

August 1, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

“I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

DAVIGNON.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels,

Sir,

August 2, 1914.

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

DAVIGNON.

*Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels,

August 2, 1914.

RELIABLE information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The

German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms. The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

---

No. 22.

*Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

Brussels,

August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.)

THE German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, consider themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

DAVIGNON.

No. 27.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels,

August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).

Sir,

IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

VON BELOW.

No. 28.

*Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Brussels,

August 4, 1914.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

FRANCIS H. VILLIERS.

No. 30.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels,  
August 4, 1914.

THE GENERAL STAFF announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

DAVIGNON.

No. 31.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

Sir,

Brussels,  
August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

DAVIGNON.

No. 35.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Berlin,  
August 4, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality :-

"We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity knows no law.

"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

"Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

BEYENS.

No. 39.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London,  
August 4, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

COUNT DE LALAING.

No. 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Brussels,  
August 4, 1914.

Sir,

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

DAVIGNON.

No. 41.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London,  
August 5, 1914.

(Telegram.)

GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

COUNT DE LALAING.



*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

Brussels,

August 5, 1914.

Sir,

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of Article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

DAVIGNON.

No. 48.

*Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

No. 52.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Brussels,

August 5, 1914.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

DAVIGNON.

No. 60.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

The Hague,

August 9, 1914.

THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so:—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

BARON FALLON.

No. 71.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels,

August 12, 1914.

PLEASE communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.”

DAVIGNON.

## APPENDIX V.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.  
AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

(EXTRACTS FROM THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK.)

## I.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 28, 1914, 10.45 p.m.

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscrupulous

agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

WILLIAM.

---

## II.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

Peterhof Palace,  
July 29, 1914, 1 p.m.

I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

NICHOLAS.

---

## III.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 29, 1914, 6.30 p.m.

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

WILLIAM.

---

## IV.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 30, 1914, 1 a.m.

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

WILLIAM.

## V.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

Peterhof,

July 30, 1914, 1.20 p.m.

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICHOLAS.

## VI.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

July 31, 1914.

I THANK You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

Your cordially devoted  
NICHOLAS.

## VII.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 31, 1914, 2 p.m.

UPON Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of

defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.

WILLIAM.

---

VIII.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

August 1, 1914, 2 p.m.

I HAVE received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.

NICHOLAS.

---

IX.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

Berlin,

August 1, 1914.

I THANK You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.

WILLIAM

---

APPENDIX VI.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "ORANGE BOOK" RELATING TO GERMANY'S  
DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA.

No. 76.

*Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

July 19 (August 1), 7.10 p.m.

THE Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part

of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer\*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude\*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

F. POURTALÈS.

---

No. 77.

*Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events.*

July 20 (August 2), 1914.

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review:—

On the 10th (23rd) July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Serbia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts,

---

\* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.



the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia half-way in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SAZONOF.

No. 78.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives Abroad.*

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg,

July 20 (August 2), 1914.

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

SAZONOF.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
LOS ANGELES

JUN 15 1962

LIBRARY  
GOVT. PUBLS. ROOM