

46. Q. Anyway, you did this, and I was grateful. You then gave a special order to Capt. JAMES for Gen. PERCIVAL that all British troops must obey Japanese orders, especially as regards answering questions. Did you tell JAMES not to show that order to me before it was despatched?

A. Yes, perhaps, but I really do not remember.

47. Q. Do you remember a conference at Changi, at which you presided, when Brigadiers NEWBIGGIN, LUCAS and STRINGER and I discussed your orders to concentrate all the prisoners of war in a restricted area at Changi giving up many of the buildings? What was the reason for this order?

A. (misunderstanding) I think the British people were concentrated at Changi because the Japanese did not want them to see what was being done to the Chinese in SINGAPORE.

48. Q. We always thought that the order to crowd up more closely at Changi was because the Japanese were angry at finding that we had blown our guns. Was that so?

A. I think possibly so, though it was the correct thing to do. It may have been from jealousy by the Japanese troops at the comfort of prisoners of war.

49. Q. What was your opinion regarding the shooting of Chinese in SINGAPORE after the surrender of '42?

A. I did not know anything about it until after the war, at the conference on this subject at the Demobilization Centre in TOKYO. I heard that some hundreds were shot.

50. Q. Not some hundreds, some thousands. I know that you knew about it by 22 Feb '42. This is the fourth time that you have told me something which is untrue. It is unwise and you had better tell the truth. I will repeat my questioning. (Does so as in 49)

A. I thought it was cruel.

51. Q. Why was it done?

A. At the beginning of the war in MALAYA the Japanese Army respected the natives (sic). But they were annoyed by their resistance. Many Japanese officers had fought in CHINA and had experience of firm treatment of Chinese.

52. Q. Did the Kempeitai and Keibitai do the killings?

A. Yes. They did.

53. Q. The HOJO Kempeitai?

A. It was OISHI.

54. Q. Who gave the orders to OISHI to kill the Chinese?

A. The commander of the Keibitai -- KAWAMURA

55. Q. From whom did he get his orders?

A. From the Chief of Staff --- SUZUKI, who got them from Gen. YAMASHITA, but perhaps not orders, just an understanding.

56. Q. Who was the Japanese officer who discussed the Chinese massacre with you in Fort CANNING in Feb '42?

A. There was no discussion.

57. Q. Not a conference, a conversation?

A. I don't remember.

58. Q. I do. A Japanese officer talked to you about it on 22 Feb. '42.

A. I don't remember.

59. Q. But you remember that I was in Fort CANNING for a week after the surrender, and I drove round SINGAPORE for a week with a Liaison officer's armband and saw what was happening. Now do you remember?

A. No.

60. Q. A man with a dark face.

A. Yes. FUJIWARA

61. Q. What did he say?

A. I don't remember.

62. Q. Do you think that TSUJI was responsible?

A. I did hear, at the conference on this subject at the Demobilization Centre after the war, that TSUJI had at that time said, "We must kill 10,000 Chinese in SINGAPORE."

63. Q. He was a man who hated the Chinese?

A. Yes. He was.

64. Q. Did he consult his senior officer?

A. I suppose he must have, the Chief of Staff --SUZUKI.

Interrogation of Col. SUGITA, Ichiji resumed 1st September 1946

Col. SUGITA volunteered the following information:- "I remember now the name of OKAZAKI's wife's mother, Mrs. WATANABE. Col. IKETANI and TSUGI may not have been class mates, but were very intimate. Maj. Gen. SUZUKI was Chief of G.4. (Supply) on the G.H.Q. Tokyo 3/4 months before the war. At that time Col. IKETANI was Chief of the shipping section under SUZUKI. IKETANI was Staff Officer in Hankow Campaign. When Lt. Col. HASHIDA was Staff Officer of General Staff in Tokyo he went to Australia as a visitor in the spring of 1941 and then to N.E.I. where he was arrested at BANDOENG just before the war. He thought the British Authorities were responsible and was, perhaps anti-British because of it. Mrs. OKAZAKI told me that HASHIDA was at the shooting.

(Col. WILD Interrogating):-

65. Q. Did you really never hear from JAMES or OKAZAKI that the three British soldiers had been shot at Changi?

A. No. Nor from Gen. SUZUKI.

66. Q. Do you remember more than 100 Chinese being shot on the beach at Changi just outside the wire of the P.O.W. Camp in Feb. 1942?

A. I do not remember.

67. Q. Do you remember that Brig. NEWBIGGIN and I came to the Conference House at Changi and had a meeting there with you when Brig. NEWBIGGIN protested strongly against the shooting of these Chinese?

A. I do not remember.

68. Q. But I remember that you said to Brig. NEWBIGGIN in my presence:-

"These were very bad men and that is why the Japanese shot them. Have you any other things to ask"? Brig. NEWBIGGIN replied, "Yes, that you should not shoot any more Chinese or ask our men to bury them." You got very angry and said:- "We shall shoot them whenever we want to".

A. I do not remember.

69. Q. Will you tell me now about the conference which took place at the first Demobilization office at the War Ministry in Tokyo in September/November 1945.

SUGITA then gave the following information:-

This conference was called the Prisoners of War Investigation Committee, ("Furyo Chosa Iinkai"). It was convened by the Vice Minister of War, Lt. Gen. WAKAMATSU. There was a sub-committee enquiry into the Chinese massacre in SINGAPORE in Feb. '42 of which the members were:- Col. SUGITA, President and Lt. Cols: KUNITAKE, HASHIZUME, OISHI and FUJIWARA. This was called the "SHINAJIN GYAKUSATSU-JIKEN (Chinese Massacre Affair) Sub-Committee. Lt. Col OISHI told the sub-committee all about it and his evidence was recorded. OISHI said that he got his orders from Maj.-Gen. KAWAMURA to clean up the bad Chinese in SINGAPORE and the Chinese troops in hiding. First clean up was 21/23 February 1942 and second clean up from 25 Feb. 1942 lasting for two or three days. OISHI said that he gave orders to his subordinates to collect all Chinese between the ages of 15 and 45 in SINGAPORE and investigate them. He stated that about 5,000 Chinese were killed by the KEMPEITAI at this time, i.e. between 21st and about 28th February 1942. SUGITA added that it was difficult to find out the affair in detail so that he visited Mr. SUNADA, the former Mayor of SINGAPORE at that time and SUNADA told him that he knew all about it and recommended SUGITA to read a book called SHINSEI (Re-birth) by a Chinese called KOMAN who was a collaborator with the Japanese during the occupation. Gen. KAWAMURA told the sub-committee that he went to Gen. YAMASHITA's Headquarters on 17th Feb. 1942 and got the orders for the Chinese Massacre from the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. SUZUKI and that these were the same orders which he, KAWAMURA, passed on to the KEMPEITAI. KAWAMURA said that the same day, or on 18 Feb 1942 he saw Gen. YAMASHITA and understood that he agreed and approved of the proposed massacre. On the 24 Feb. 1942 there was a conference about administration in MALAYA at which Gen. KAWAMURA said that he was encouraged by Gen. YAMASHITA to proceed with the massacre. The sub-committee was not supposed to decide responsibility, but only to find facts. The duty of the main committee was to decide responsibility. SUGITA handed the report of the sub-committee to the Vice Minister for War, Gen. WAKAMATSU in October or November 1945.

70. Q. What did you know about these massacres while they were going on in Feb. 1942?
- A. I had a general idea only, just rumours at the time.
71. Q. Did Lt. Col. FUJIWARA obtain from British records lists of Chinese Communists and give them to you in Fort CANNING at this time?
- A. Yes. I think that this was so.

72. Q. To whom did you give the lists?

A. Maybe to the Chief of the First Section, Col. IKETANI.

73. Q. And the lists of Chinese Detectives which FUJIWARA gave to you?

A. I think the same -- to IKETANI.

74. Q. Do you know that the Chinese Detectives were shot the same night?

A. No.

75. Q. What were you doing collecting this information about Chinese and what was FUJIWARA doing, as his main job was forming the Indian National Army?

A. It was a matter of everyone collecting Intelligence Information.

76. Q. What was FUJIWARA's attitude when he heard that the Chinese were being massacred?

A. I do not remember.

77. Q. Do you remember him coming to see you about it in Fort CANNING?

A. Such a thing may have hapened, but I do not remember.

78. Q. FUJIWARA said to me that he, himself, reported the killing of Chinese to you and you said that Col. TSUJI was responsible. You said that it was Col. TSUJI's fault and that you regarded him as a mad-man. Do you remember this?

A. I do not remember it, but I had that thought of TSUJI, He was "a man of cruelties".

79. Q. Could TSUJI give orders to KAWAMURA?

A. I do not think so, but KAWAMURA told our sub-committee that Maj. HAYASHI (a very cruel man), was attached to KAWAMURA's Headquarters and was instructed by TSUJI.

80. Q. Who gave orders to FUJIWARA? Did you?

A. I did not, but HAYASHI did.

81. Q. When did HAYASHI take your place?

A. After 17th March 1942.

82. Q. Including your duties as Liaison Officer of the Prisoners of War?

A. Yes.

83. Q. Where is HAYASHI now?

A. He was killed in an air crash at HAKONE when on the Staff of Lt. Gen. USHIJIMA at OKINAWA.

84. Q. Did HAYASHI give the orders for shooting the three British soldiers at Changi?

A. May be so, but please ask Mrs. OKAZAKI.

Resume by: Cmdr. Cole
Date: 16 April 1947

SUGITA, Ichiji

1. Subpoena Request: states that this witness will testify as to "the events surrounding the alleged shooting of more than 100 Chinese on the beach just outside the Changi Camp on or about 1 March 1942 and other relevant facts. The testimony of this witness is relevant in that it tends to justify the actions taken at such time and place.

2. Summary of Major Posts Held:

31 March 1904	Born
19 March 1923	Finished preparatory course at military academy
10 Dec. 1934	Appointed a member of the General Staff
22 Sept. 1937	Appointed Assistant Attache to Japanese Embassy in USA
10 Dec. 1938	Appointed a member of the General Staff and concurrently Instructor of Military Science at the Military Staff College. Attached concurrently to the Military Service Bureau of War Ministry
1 March 1941	Promoted to Lt. Col.
1 March 1944	Promoted to Colonel of the Army
31 Aug. 1945	Appointed a member of the suite to the Japanese Delegates sent to SCAP
1 Sept. 1945	Appointed Information Official of Information Bureau and concurrently Secretary to the Premier
1 Dec. 1946	Appointed 1st Demobilization Official
15 June 1946	Appointed Demobilization Secretary
11 Nov. 1946	Put on half-pay list

3. Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>
29 Apr 1934	6th Order of Merit and Order of Sacred Treasure	For service in the Manchurian Incident 1931-1934
19 May 1939	5th Order of Merit and Order of Sacred Treasure	
29 April 1940	4th Order of Merit and Small Cordon of the Rising Sun	For service in the China Incident
12 Sept. 1944	3rd Order of Merit and Order of Sacred Treasure	

4. Present Status - Army Colonel, retired on half-pay.
Present address - in Singapore in the custody of the British Army as a war criminal.

5. Summary of Interrogations:

Witness was interrogated at Sugamo Prison by Col. Wild on 28 August 1946.

Witness stated that he was an Intelligence Staff Officer during the Malayan Campaign from the beginning of the war till March 16, 1942. He denied that he was in charge of the P.O.W. but admitted he was Liaison Officer between Gen. Yamashita's Headquarters and the prisoners. As such Liaison Officer he was in daily contact with Col. Wild who acted as Liaison Officer for Lt. Gen. Percival. Capt. Okazaki was in charge of the P.O.W. all of whom were sent to Changi two or three days after the fall of Singapore.

In regard to the shooting of three British POW at Changi in March, 1942 witness stated that Mrs. Okazaki told him after the war that Capt. Okazaki gave the orders to shoot them. Witness does not know who gave the order to Capt. Okazaki but thinks it could have been Major Hayashi or Major Asaeda both of whom were very anti-British. He did not hear until after the war that Gen. Percival had lodged a strong protest against the shooting of these three men.

In regard to the shooting of Chinese in Singapore in 1942 the witness stated that he did not know about it until after the war but upon the question being repeated said he thought it was cruel. He admitted that the Kempeitai and Keibitai did the killings. The Kempeitai under Oishi received the order to kill from Kawamura of the Keibitai who received his orders from Chief of Staff Suzuki who in turn received orders from General Yamashita or perhaps just an understanding. Witness stated that Col. Tsuji may have been responsible also.

Witness stated he did not remember the shooting of 100 Chinese on the beach at Changi in February, 1942. He also denied remembering that Brig. Newbiggin and Col. Wild came to the conference house at Changi and protested against the shooting and that he (Sugita) told them on that occasion, "We shall shoot them whenever we want to."

Witness stated that after the war he was President of a sub-committee of the Prisoners of War Investigation Committee charged with inquiry into the Chinese massacre at Singapore. Oishi (also a member of the sub-committee) said he received orders from Maj. Gen. Kawamura to clean up the bad Chinese in Singapore and the Chinese troops in hiding. Oishi said he gave orders to collect all Chinese 15 to 45 years old in Singapore and investigate them. He said about 5,000 Chinese were killed by the Kempeitai between the 21st and 28th February 1942. Gen. Kawamura told the sub-committee that he went to Gen. Yamashita's Headquarters on 17 February 1942 and got orders for the Chinese Massacre from Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Suzuki and that he passed these orders to the Kempeitai. The same day or next day Kawamura saw Gen. Yamashita and understood that he agreed and approved of the proposed massacre.

Witness stated that while these massacres were going on, he had a general idea only, just rumours. He said he did not remember telling Lt. Col. Fujiwara at the time that Col. Tsuji was responsible.

6. Cross-Examination:

(a) Source material:

- (1) Testimony of Col. Wild concerning the Singapore Massacres (Transcript, page 5,362 to 5,846.)
 - (2) Court Exhibit #476 (Pros. Doc. #2647) which contains a report concerning the Chinese Massacre by the Prisoner of War Investigation Sub-committee of which Col. Sugita was Chairman. It appears that Col. Sugita and his sub-committee are responsible for the compilation of the entire Court Exhibit #476 (Transcript, page 5,847; also Interrogation, p. 10). Col. Sugita's name appears on page 21 of the original document which is page 1 of the sub-committee report (Transcript, page 5,800).
 - (3) Interrogation of Col. Sugita by Col. Wild at Sugamo Prison dated 28 August 1946.
- (b) The testimony of Col. Sugita will probably attempt to justify the massacre of Chinese on the ground of military expediency. A comparison of the above three items of source material should offer a useful basis for cross-examination.
- (c) Court Exhibit #476 contains the gist of Col. Sugita's anticipated testimony. It indicates that Sugita will attempt to justify the massacre of Chinese at Singapore on the ground of military expediency with particular emphasis on the following points:

- (1) The Chinese were active in guerilla warfare during the entire Malay campaign and engaged in communications with the British, marking targets for British artillery gunfire and disturbing Japanese near transport lines. These hostile Chinese were the leaders of the Federated Association of Chinese Volunteers and members of the Communist party in Malay. (Exhibit #476, p. 12, 13, 14, 25, 26 and 27).

Rebuttal - Col. Wild testified that most of such incidents involved members of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Force or the Straits Settlement Volunteer Force who were not "Chinese" but British subjects. He stated that he knew of no Chinese who took part in the fighting against the Japanese during the invasion of Malay other than those who were in the regular armed forces. (Transcript, p. 5630-1)

- (2) After the surrender of the British on 15 February 1942 there was a two or three day gap before the Japanese entry into the city. During that period rifles, machine guns, wireless equipment, etc. were concealed in the houses of the Chinese (Exhibit #476, p. 14, 28).

Rebuttal - Col. Wild testified there was no such gap (Transcript, p. 5,634).

- (3) The advance of the Japanese south was very speedy and there were a number of bases in the west coast of Malaya left for hostile groups

plotting brigandage. In view of rumors about British reinforcements the Japanese thought it necessary to secure public peace with some drastic measures (Exhibit #976, p. 14)

Rebuttal - Col. Wild testified that during the week after the surrender he was free to drive around the city and saw no signs of looting or disorder (Transcript, p. 5,367), although he later admitted that he heard of one or two isolated instances of it. (Transcript, p. 5,721).

- (4) During the period February 17 to 20 a search was made for "hostile Chinese" on the basis of a "list of the anti-Japanese Chinese," obtained from the local police register of criminals, advice of rescued Japanese residents, etc. The number of persons seized during the first series, February 21-23, amounted to about 5,000 persons; the second series, Feb. 18 - March 3, about 1500 persons; the third series at the end of March, about 300 persons. Among these, about 2000 persons were released after the investigation. Those who were punished strictly total about 5000. (Exhibit #476, p. 15, 16, 31). The meaning of the phrase "punished strictly" is shown on page 9 of Exhibit #476 where it is stated that they "arrested and executed about 5,000 delinquent persons."

Rebuttal Col. Wild stated that one survivor of the shooting told him there had been no trial of the Chinese. (Transcript, p. 5,367). The excerpt from the diary of Maj. Gen. Kawamura attached to Exhibit #476 indicates (p. 5, entry for 23 February) that the 5000 persons were killed prior to 23 February 1942. Sugita should be cross-examined as to the physical impossibility of interrogating, investigating and trying 5000 persons in the three days between 21 and 23 February with any semblance of justice or due process.

- (5) As to the overall responsibility for the killing of these 5000 persons Exhibit #476 states as follows (p. 38):

"With regard to the question of the disposition of the Chinese in Singapore, it is clear that Commander Yamashita, following the surrender of the British Army, issued to the various commanders of the corps and of the Garrison Forces an order concerning the clear-ing-up of battle-fields and purging operations (mopping-up operations) with the determination to eradicate spies and disturbers of peace and order, in view of the intensive obstructive measures and anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese during the campaign. However, no written order for the punishment of the Chinese alone exists. The Commander of the Garrison Forces at Singapore, on the basis of the above-mentioned order and the army's intention, carried it out as a part of the operations for clearing up the battle-fields and of the purging operations. Judging also from the objective situation at that time and the state of mopping-up

operations throughout the entire Malay Peninsula, it is clear that it was not based on the personal view of the Commander of the Garrison Forces. It should be judged that, in punishing the Chinese, preparations were made beforehand and various measures adopted after entry into Singapore in order to ensure propriety."

Rebuttal - In the interrogation of Col. Sugita dated 28 August 1946 Sugita testified (p. 11) that Gen. Kawamura told the sub-committee that he went to Gen. Yamashita's Headquarters on 17 February 1942 and got the orders for the Chinese Massacre from Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Suzuki and that these were the same orders which he (Kawamura) passed on to the Kempeitai. Kawamura stated that the same day or next day he saw Gen. Yamashita and understood that the latter agreed and approved of the proposed massacre. Again, on 24 February 1942 there was a conference at which Gen. Kawamura said that he was encouraged by Gen. Yamashita to proceed with the massacre.

- (d) Col. Sugita will probably deny that he knew about the Chinese Massacres at the time. In his interrogation of 28 August 1946 he stated (p. 11, answer to question #70) that he had a general idea only, just rumors.

Rebuttal - Col. Wild testified (Transcript, p. 5,366 and 5,715) that on 23 February 1942 he and Brig. Newbiggin had an interview with Col. Sugita at which a strong protest was lodged concerning the shooting of 100 Chinese on the beach at Changi. Col. Wild and Brig. Newbiggin derived their information about the shooting from one of the 100 Chinese who was shot but escaped alive (Transcript, p. 5,717). Again, Col. Wild states in the interrogation of 23 August 1946 (p. 12) that Lt. Col. Fujiwara told him (Wild) that he reported the killing of the Chinese to Sugita who said that Col. Tsuji was responsible.

- (e) Col. Sugita admitted in his interrogation of 28 August 1946 (p. 11) that at the time of the massacres he received from Lt. Col. Fujiwara a list of Chinese Communists and Chinese detectives. Sugita stated that he probably gave these lists to Col. Iketani of the First Section. He denied knowledge of the fact that the Chinese detectives were shot.

Sugita should be cross-examined further as to his complicity in rounding up the Chinese who were later shot without trial.

CERTIFIED COPY

EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE TRIAL
BY MILITARY COURT OF:

Lieut-Gen. NISHIMURA Takuma.
Major-Gen. KAWAMURA Sanro.
Lieut-Col. OISHI Masayuki.
Lieut-Col. YOKOTA Yoshitaka.
Major JYO Tomotatsu.
Major ONISHI Satorou.
Capt. HISAMATSU Haruji.

BETWEEN 10th APRIL 1947

&

2nd APRIL 1947

BEFORE

LIEUT.-COL. P.A. FORSYTHE, M.M. PRESIDENT.

COLONEL SUGITA ICHIJI FIRST PROSECUTION WITNESS being duly affirmed is Examined by the Prosecutor.

- Q. Is your full name Sugita Ichiji ?
A. Yes.
- Q. Are you a Colonel in the Japanese Army ?
A. Yes.
- Q. In February 1942 what duties were you doing ?
A. I was at the Headquarters of the 25th Division.
- Q. What was your job in the Headquarters ?
A. I was at the Intelligence Office.
- Q. Can you say what formations were garrisoned in Singapore Island immediately after the withdrawal of the British ?
A. Yes, I can.
- Q. Will you say what those formations were ?
A. In the city, under the command of Maj.General Kawamura there was the Keibetai. In the outskirts of the city was the Imperial Guard of the 5th Division and the 18th Division. That is all.
- Q. Who commanded the Imperial Guard Division ?
A. It was Lt.Gen. Nishimura.
- Q. Are you able to recognise either Gen. Nishimura or Gen. Kawamura if you see them again ?
A. Yes, I can.
- Q. Can you see them in Court this morning ?
A. Yes, I can.
- Q. Will you indicate who they are ?
A. The one that is sitting on the right hand side of Lt. Gen. Nishimura, next to him is Major General Kawamura.
- Q. Would you state what numbers, if any, they have on their chest ?
A. The one that has No.1 is Lt.Gen. Nishimura and the one that has No.2 is Maj.Gen. Kawamura.
- Q. Do you recognise any of the other accused who are standing up ?
A. The one with No.3 is Col. Oishi. The rest I do not know.
- Q. What position did Lt.Col. Oishi occupy ?
A. He was the head of No.2 Field Kempeitai.
- Q. What was the job of No.2 Field Kempeitai after the Japanese occupied Singapore ?
A. No.2 Field Kempeitai was at that time under Maj.General Kawamura.
- Q. Can you tell roughly what area of the island was garrisoned by the Imperial Guards Division, under the command of General Nishimura ?
A. In Singapore, there is a water reservoir and he held the East part of Singapore.

- Q. I will show you a map and you will try and indicate the reservoir which you mentioned.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Will you do so on the map which is being handed to you now? Hold it in such a way so that the Court will be able to see it.
- A. (Witness points to the area where the reservoir is located).
- Q. Will you show the whole of the Imperial Guards division area?
- A. The Imperial Guards Garrison, controlled nearly all the places in Singapore. Outside the Singapore city the Imperial Guards controlled the outskirts all over the island.
- Q. Who controlled the Changi area?
- A. It was under the Command of the Imperial Guards.
- Q. And Ponggol?
- A. It was also under the Imperial Guard.
- Q. What about Seletar?
- A. Seletary was also under the Imperial Guard.
- Q. Shortly after the arrival of the Japanese Army in Singapore, do you remember certain security measures being laid down by General Yamashita's H.Q.?
- A. Yes, there was an order.
- Q. Will you state what the substance of that order was?
- A. On the night of the surrender the Kempeitai was ordered to guard the city. I remember, I think it was the next day when there was an operational order issued to Gen. Kawamura stating that the city must be cleansed and in that order it stated that all the Anti-Japanese Chinese must be rounded up.
- Q. These orders - Anti-Japanese Chinese - under what category did they fall?
- A. It included the Communists, the Volunteer Force and any Chinese that were against the Japanese Army.
- Q. You said that Gen. Kawamura of the Keibeitai had No.2 Field Kempeitai under the Command of Col. Oishi. What other formations or units were in that Keibeitai commanded by Kawamura?
- A. Two Companies from the Infantry Division, named the Hojo Kempeitai were attached to Kawamura. There was a little change, but I do not know the particulars.
- Q. What was the role or function of these Hojo Kempeitais?
- A. The Hojo Kempeitai came under the Kempeitai to help the Kempeitai.
- Q. When Gen. Kawamura received these orders, to whom did he pass it to?
- A. He passed it on to Col. Oishi, Chief of the Kempeitai.
- Q. This Kempeitai commanded by Col. Oishi, how many small units were in the Kempeitai?
- A. To my knowledge there were two.
- Q. Who were they?
- A. I remember one was Lt.Col. Yokota and the other was Major Jyo.

- Q. Will you be able to recognise these two officers by face ?
- A. I am sorry, I do not know. Probably on Oishi's right maybe Yokota or Jyo. I am not sure.
- Q. How long did the screening of Anti-Japanese suspects last ?
- A. I cannot say for sure, but I am sure it lasted until the latter part of February; I am not sure if it lasted until the early part of March or the middle part.
- Q. Can you say what units or sub units carried out the interrogation of suspects ?
- A. In the city it was done by the Keibetaitai and most of the island was done by the Imperial Guards.
- Q. How were the suspects killed; what methods were used to kill them ?
- A. They were shot.
- Q. Do you know how the bodies were disposed of ?
- A. I have heard that they were buried at the sea shore.
- Q. How many purges were there during the latter part of February and early March ?
- A. The second time it was in the latter part of February and early part of March.
- Q. You speak about a second time. What about the first time ?
- A. I think it was on the 21st and 22nd.
- Q. This first purge, on the 21st and 22nd February, how many people, approximately, were killed ?
- A. It is said about 5,000.
- Q. And the second purge that occurred during the end of February and early March; approximately how many?
- A. About 300.
- Q. I am speaking of the Kempeitai, that is the Kempeitai commanded by Colonel Oishi, stationed in the Singapore town area. Where did this Kempeitai draw their victims from - what parts did they draw their victims from ?
- A. It was from within the city of Singapore. It was under the control of the Kempeitai.
- Q. Where did the Kempeitai carry out the shootings of those victims ?
- A. It was done at the seashore and it was not necessarily within the city.
- Q. What about the people who were living outside the city, whose responsibility were those ?
- A. The Imperial Guard Division was responsible for it.
- Q. Do you know how many people were killed by the Imperial Guard Division.?
- A. I have heard.
- Q. How many ?
- A. About 300.

- Q. Where was that ?
 A. It was at the latter part of February.
- Q. Where ?
 A. I have heard that the shooting was done mostly at Ponggol.
- Q. Anywhere else ?
 A. I have heard that some took place at the east part of the island. I do not know.
- Q. Did you attend the Committee of Inquiry in Tokyo, in October 1945 ?
 A. Yes, I did attend it.
- Q. What was your position on that committee ?
 A. I was the head of the Sub Committee.
- Q. Do you remember Gen. Kawamura appearing before that committee ?
 A. Yes, I remember.
- Q. Did he tell you anything about the massacre ?
 A. Yes.
- Q. What did he tell you ?
 A. He told me about the order he received from the Commander-in-Chief in regard to this massacre - Chinese massacre.
- Q. Did Gen. Kawamura tell you anything about how many people he had killed ?
 A. No, he did not give me any definite number.
- Q. Do you remember Col. Nomura ?
 A. Yes, I remember.
- Q. Did Col. Nomura say anything about the Imperial Guards Division's part in the February massacre ?
 A. Col. Nomura told me that the Anti-Japanese Chinese from Paya Lebar were taken over to Ponggol and were shot there.
- Q. Are you able to point out in the map where this place called Paya Lebar is ?
 A. Approximately I can.
- (Witness indicates position on map shown to him)
- Q. When did the Imperial Guards leave Singapore for Sumatra ?
 A. The Imperial Guard Division left in the early part of March 1942 for Sumatra.
- Q. And who took over the Imperial Guards Division area when they left ?
 A. Maj. General Kawamura of the Keibetai took the work over and guarded the whole of Singapore.
- Q. Referring to massacre which occurred in February 1942, can you say at what level rested the discretion as to which Chinese should be taken and killed ?
 A. I am sorry, I do not know details.
- Q. Was the responsibility for deciding that an individual Chinese was to be shot left with Gen. Kawamura, or was it left to the discretion of some junior Commander ?
 A. I do not know definitely, it may have been decided by the Kempeitai branches.

- Q. Can you say at what levels the screening was carried out? Did a Commander carry it out on his own initiative or did he refer to his Colonel or his junior?
- A. The kind of investigation?
- Q. Yes.
- A. It was done in accordance with the orders of his superiors.
- Q. What various orders of superiors? Which superior do you mean?
- A. For instance, Gen. Kawamura came under the command of the Commander in Chief. He carried out his order in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's orders. Oishi carried out the orders in accordance with Kawamura's orders and so other persons carried out the orders of his immediate superiors.
- Q. Who filled the details of these orders?
- A. I think Gen. Kawamura received his orders - Army orders - and Oishi received his order from Gen. Kawamura and so on. As it gradually went down, the orders were very much more elaborate in details.
- Q. While you were working as a Staff Officer at Gen. Yamashita's H.Q., did you receive any information referring back to G.H.Q. as how to carry out any particular phase of the screening of suspects?
- A. I have not seen these things.
- CROSS EXAMINED BY COUNSEL**
- Q. The massacre of Anti-Japanese Chinese by order of the Commander-in-Chief. Did the Commander in Chief have any man to carry this out before the surrender of Singapore or after the surrender of Singapore?
- A. After the surrender of Singapore.
- Q. Do you know what policy the Commander in Chief took towards the Chinese on the whole before entering Singapore?
- A. I do.
- Q. What was the policy?
- A. The policy was: No.1, to look after the Chinese with love. It was not an order towards the Chinese only. It was for the Malays and the Indians and other inhabitants of the Island.
- Q. Then if they decided to massacre the Chinese after the surrender, then the policy must have changed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did they have to change this policy?
- A. I do not know the details.
- Q. Does that mean that all the British soldiers were disarmed and became POWs?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Other than the British Army, was there a volunteer army?
- A. Yes, there was.
- Q. Did they become POWs?
- A. They were supposed to become POWs. I have only seen Indian and British POWs.
- Q. What do you mean by the volunteer army not becoming POWs?

- A. They disarmed themselves and hid.
- Q. What was the condition of peace and order immediately after the surrender of Singapore?
- A. Immediately after the surrender there were many rumours and looting was going on.
- Q. What was the condition of the communists at that time?
- A. I do not know about the communists, but I have heard that some of them were in Changi and were released before the surrender.
- Q. Do you know if the wireless had been cut off?
- A. Until we came up to Perak River, the lines were in good condition, but further on the lines were intervened once or twice - several times.
- Q. Looting of arms, did they become very numerous?
- A. Do you mean before the surrender or after the surrender?
- Q. I mean after the surrender.
- A. I have heard that there were lootings after the surrender, but I do not know if there were.
- Q. Do you know of any fires at that time due to espionage?
- A. I do not remember the date, but on the Kallang airfield, on the other side, there was a big fire after an explosion.
- Q. Was it due to these conditions that the policy changed and the massacre was ordered?
- A. It may have been the reason, but at the other end of the Perak river, communists hindered the Japanese operation and that is one of the reasons also. Another reason was that they knew that in Malaya, arms would be very scarce in the future. The Army that occupied Singapore may be reduced.
- Q. To what degree did you think they would be reduced?
- A. As I have told you, the 5th Division, the 18th Division, the Kemibetai and the Konoi Division were not in Singapore at that time. The Konoi went to Sumatra, the 18th Division went to Burma and the 5th Division was supposed to go back to Japan.
- Q. By "order" what do you mean?
- A. It was an order from the Imperial H.Q. to the Southern Expeditionary Forces.
- Q. Was there an order from the Central Government regarding the massacre of the Chinese?
- A. I believe there were no orders from the Central Govt. nor from the Southern Expeditionary Forces regarding the massacre.

(Court adjourns until 1400 hours)

AT 1400 HRS ON 10 MAR 47 THE COURT
 RE-ASSEMBLED PURSUANT TO ADJOURNMENT.
 PRESENT THE SAME MEMBERS.

Col SUGITA ICHIJI - 1st P.W.
Cross-Examined by the Defence Counsel (continued):-

- Q. In the morning you said that some of the Guards were transferred over to Sumatra but what was the number transferred and what was the remaining number ?
- A. In the first part of March the main forces of this Konoye or Imperial Guards Division went over to Sumatra and the remainder was only a small portion which was attached to the Kempeitai in Singapore.
- Q. At that time the Kempeitai was reduced to a small number and it looked as if there was 12 or 13 to a unit but can you detail about that ?
- A. I don't know the number attached to a unit but I think it was a small number.
- Q. In the morning you said the volunteer forces hid instead of being POWs and you said this was one of the motives for the operation, but what dangers did they give to the operations of the Japanese Forces ?
- A. The same incidents might have occurred in Singapore that the Japanese experienced in the China incident.
- Q. You said what the Army "experienced". What do you mean by that ?
- A. As I have not been in the China incident I do not know what happened but probably these forces that hid might have done some looting or disturbed the Japanese operations in the rear and killing of the people might have occurred too.
- Q. In December 1941 some Chinese inhabitants of Taiping were armed and they carried out guerilla activities behind the Japanese. How do you account for that ?
- A. In what part of Taiping ?
- Q. In the northern part.
- A. It might have been in the southern area of Grik because I remember them obstructing the Japanese rear lines and transportation there and also obstructing messengers.
- Q. Near Tambak during the night raids the volunteer forces raided the Artillery and they also shot up signals and there were many casualties among the Japanese ?
- A. I remember receiving a report from the front about this Tambak incident.
- Q. There were also signals shot up with many casualties among the Japanese Army in the operations of Gemas, Kluang, Batu Pahat and Singapore ?
- A. There were also reports from the front that signals were shot up with casualties occurring to the Japanese in the operations of Gemas, Kluang, Batu Pahat and Singapore and I have also seen for myself signals shot up at the Muar River.

- Q. Do you know of the aerodrome being raided in Kuala Lumpur in the middle of January and on this occasion there were signals shot up from the sides of the aerodrome and the Japanese suffered much damage owing to this as the signals directed the position of the Japanese ?
- A. I remember there being a report from the Air Force to the Army.
- Q. And in the middle of January when the Japanese were crossing the Muar River the Chinese made signals for the enemy air forces and owing to this there was much damage to the Japanese Forces ?
- A. There was absolutely an incident like that occurring.
- Q. In the middle of January 1942 during the operations of Malacca and Batu Pahat the Chinese were in touch with Allied submarines passing through the Straits of Malacca and they helped out informers from the submarines and gave protection to them. They also gave signals showing the position of the Japanese Forces and they made the bombardments from the submarines easy for the Allies. Owing to these activities many difficulties arose in the operations of the Imperial Guards Divisions.
- A. I have heard about the difficulties they had and I also know of the connection between the submarines and the Chinese but I do not know where they exactly happened.
- Q. In the latter part of January of the same year at Batu Pahat several battalions were engaged in the operation of obstructing the rear lines of the enemy from the north-west and by the action of the Chinese the enemy found this out and the Japanese received a counter attack which left them in isolated positions. It is a fact that the head of the battalion and many other members also died as a result of this incident ?
- A. I also know of such an incident occurring.
- Q. In the last part of January in the same year at Gemas, Seremban, Labis and Segamat, the Chinese tipped trees over the roads to obstruct the transportation of the Japanese and after stopping the Japanese vehicles they shot at them from both sides where they had hidden themselves before-hand.

(Prosecuting Officer: I would like to suggest that my learned friend for the Defence be asked to frame his cross-examination in the form of questions rather than statements because at the moment it almost appears that my learned friend is giving evidence and not the witness.

(The Court agreed and requested the Defence to break up the questions into a shorter form which could be more easily understood by the witness).

- Q. I would like to know of any obstructions caused by the Chinese or guerillas in Malaya?
- A. In the first stages of the operations by the Japanese there were no such incidents excepting the incident that occurred in the place called Grik near the Perak River. Besides this incident I remember other incidents south of the Perak River.

- Q. I have another question I would like to ask at this point: In the arrests that took place in March 1942 were arms, ammunition and other supplies taken away from them - I mean did they disarm them?
- A. They might have been but I do not know anything about that because I had nothing to do with it.
- Q. Do you know anything about such orders being issued owing to the small numbers of the Japanese Forces and do you know anything about the operation being ordered because the Japanese Garrison was reduced and the activities of the guerillas still kept on?
- A. Maybe the operation orders were issued owing to these reasons.
- Q. When was Maj/Gen Kawamura appointed head of the Garrison troops?
- A. I think it was on the 16th.
- Q. Then which occurred first - the time that Yamashita issued these operation orders or the time when Kawamura was appointed head of the Garrison?
- A. It goes without saying that Yamashita decided these operation orders first and then issued orders to Kawamura.
- Q. In this case you have been referring to orders time and time again. By these orders do you mean operation orders?
- A. Yes.
- Q. About these operation orders if one disobeys the orders what would happen?
- A. Anyone that disobeyed operation orders would be charged for insubordination.
- Q. Were there any examples of anyone being executed without a court martial for disobeying orders during action?
- A. I have never seen such examples during the Malayan operations but I have heard of some actually occurring during the China incident.
- Q. Were the operation orders of the Army issued to Oishi through Kawamura?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you remember Maj/Gen Kobayashi being at the Imperial Guards Division?
- A. I know him being brigade commander.
- Q. Then do you know that in this case Maj/Gen Kobayashi took over the Division and carried out these orders?
- A. Under the Konoye or the Imperial Guards Division there was an infantry regiment brigade commander and Kobayashi might have been that and this is probable.
- Q. In the morning you said that you knew of Col Nomoura. What reports did this Col Nomoura make to you while you were the head of the sub-committee?
- A. I stated this morning that in this case I did not know anything besides that which I stated. In this case Col Nomoura stated that he did not know where the Chinese had been massacred - I mean Col Nomoura said that Nishimura said he did not know where the Chinese were massacred.
- Q. At that time the Konoye Division only knew that they were handing over their men to them for further operations?
- A. That might have been possible but I do not know anything about it.

- Q. Will you relate of the anti-Japanese formations that the Chinese had in Singapore? By that I mean the volunteers.
- A. I know that there was one unit of the Chinese Volunteer Forces and as our operations went on they gradually increased but I do not know of their organisation.
- Q. This morning while the Prosecutor was examining you you said that the Kempeitai took over to restore peace and order in Singapore; but was not there a Military Government to take care of the general peace and order at that time?
- A. The Military Government was still in the stage of being formed then.
- Q. Is it not a fact that the functions of the Kempeitai were to keep order within the Army?
- A. Yes it used to be.
- Q. In the first purge of this massacre you said that the estimated number was about 5,000 but is it not a fact that this number is larger than what it actually was?
- A. The Tokyo Investigation Committee came to the conclusion that the estimated number might be around 5,000 but not larger.
- Q. Did you ever hear of the number being 9,773 among the Chinese?
- A. I never heard of the number or the figure you just mentioned but we heard rumours in Tokyo that the actual number was around 5,000.
- Q. And the figure you said about the second purge was about 300 and was not this larger than the actual number?
- A. During the investigation in Tokyo we heard rumours that it was around 200 or 300 so we came to the conclusion it might be around 300. But I say 300 would be an exaggeration.
- Q. A little while ago you said that the Hojo Kempeitai or Auxiliary Kempeitai came under the Kempeitai. But what happened when the officers of the Hojo Kempeitai were superior to those of the Kempeitai?
- A. Even if the officer of the Hojo Kempeitai was senior to the Kempeitai officer he would get all his orders concerning military police duties from the Kempeitai officer.
- Q. And what about the orders besides military police duties?
- A. By that what do you mean?
- Q. You mentioned of the military police duties so I asked you about duties besides military police duties.
- A. Besides that I have just mentioned I mean about saluting and personal affairs.
- Q. Do you know that in the text of the Army Act it states that the Kempeitai has no authority to order a senior?
- A. I know about that.
- Q. What I want to know is the meaning of that?
- A. In the Hojo Kempeitai a senior officer had no obligation to obey but they were to co-operate with the Military Police duties that the Kempeitai carried on.

- Q. What were the connections on this occasion of operation orders and not of the ordinary military police orders ?
- A. If the officer of the auxiliary kempeitai is senior to the other in receiving orders he receives it through the ordinary channels, i.e. from the direct superior what he would have received from the Kempeitai.
- Q. This morning during your testimony you said that there were two companies attached to this Kempeitai as Hojo Kempeitai but is this true ?
- A. According to the orders issued on the 15th two Coys from each infantry division were attached to the Kempeitai therefore the number might have been reinforced later on. It would not have decreased below that number.
- Q. At first two Coys were attached but later on three Coys were attached making a total of five Coys but is not this a mistake ?
- A. As I have already said this morning two Coys were sent over to the Kempeitai from each division of the Infantry so they made 6 altogether and they might have increased later on.
- Q. When the interrogations were carried out did you have any roll or something to refer to ?
- A. According to the information I had during the Tokyo Investigation there was a nominal roll which was referred to and besides this we got some reference from the Communists and anti-Japanese elements that were arrested at that time in Singapore.
- Q. Then if there was a nominal roll and Chinese elements to get reference from then the Kempeitai officer did not have any authority to pick out anyone by himself did he ?
- A. It might have been possible but I do not know of the details within the Kempeitai organisation. What he said might be the case but I do not know the details of the Kempeitai work.
- Q. Then the organisation of the Kawamura Kempeitai was the Garrison Division or 6 Coys and the Kempeitai was under it ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Besides this was not the other battalions such as Ichikawa and Miyamoto attached to it ?
- A. The two Coys that were attached there might have been reinforced and made into a battalion but I do not know anything further about it.
- Q. The question I just asked was: was there any other battalion such as Ichikawa and Miyamoto besides the auxiliary kempeitai ?
- A. In the investigation carried out in Tokyo I didn't notice such battalions but I do not know definitely about them.

(At this stage the Defence applied to defer the cross-examination of the witness pending the receipt of certain documents from Tokyo. The Court agreed to have the witness re-called later).

(Prosecuting Officer: May it please you, Sir, my learned friend Mr. Lim will re-examine ?

RE-EXAMINED by Mr. R.C.H. Lim.

- Q. May it please the Court the order which was given to Maj/Gen Kawamura was of a very general nature ?
- A. I have never seen this order but the information we got during the Investigation in Tokyo was that this

order was a general order.

- Q. And the details had to be worked out either by Maj/Gen Kawamura or his subordinate officers, is that correct ?
- A. As I have stated this morning the order was detailed as it went down the channels.
- Q. Now can you tell me this - do you know the manner of screening the Chinese suspected for anti-Japanese feelings laid out or was the officer in charge of the screening given a very wide discretion ?
- A. I do not get the point.
- Q. The screening of Chinese suspected for anti-Japanese feelings was not carried out by Maj/Gen Kawamura but by his subordinate officers. Now the manner of the screening I suppose was left to these subordinate officers ?
- A. The concrete measures were left to the subordinates but they were carried out according to the orders of the superiors.
- Q. Is it true to say that this order to screen and exterminate Chinese with anti-Japanese feelings had to be carried out as quickly as possible ?
- A. By that do you mean just after the fall of Singapore ?
- Q. That is correct.
- A. The order was issued from the General Headquarters as operation orders and as the situation at that time was grave it could not have been helped.
- Q. Then you agree that there was an order that this operation must be carried out very quickly ?
- A. It was requested in the order to be carried out as soon as possible.
- Q. Was an application made to Headquarters for an extension of time to carry out this order ?
- A. It is true that an application was sent.
- Q. Was the application granted or refused ?
- A. It was refused.
- Q. Is it true to say that there was no method of screening at all ? The victims were chosen at random ?
- A. The unit that carried out these orders made the investigations as much as possible and then carried them out.
- Q. This is not from your personal knowledge is it ?
- A. It is not my personal knowledge but is what I got during the investigation at Tokyo.
- Q. During that investigation was any person who carried out the screening called to give evidence ?
- A. No, no one was called.
- Q. In your cross-examination you mentioned the Geylang explosion which took place in Singapore almost immediately after the surrender. Can you say whether that explosion took place some time in the middle of March 1942 ?
- A. I cannot remember definitely the date but I think it was some time around the middle of March.
- Q. Now is it true to say that some of the Chinese volunteers were included in this massacre ?
- A. I am told that it is a truth.

(Court: Very well, the witness may stand down.)

(Prosecuting Officer: Call Mr. Shinozaki.

SHINOZAKI Mamoru - 2nd P.W. being duly sworn is
Examined by the Prosecutor:

- Q. Is your full name Shinozaki Mamoru ?
A. Yes Sir.
- Q. Now when the Japanese Forces entered Singapore Island where were you at that time ?
A. I was in Changi Gaol until the 16th February 1942.
- Q. And on the 16th February 1942 what happened ?
A. I was released by Lt/Col Yokota.
- Q. Now immediately following your release from Changi Gaol on what duties were you employed ?
A. I was looking after the interests of neutrals because I was on the Foreign Office Staff.
- Q. Now just after the fall of Singapore can you remember certain orders being issued relating to the civilian inhabitants of Singapore Island ?
A. Yes, I know.
- Q. What was the substance of these orders ?
A. It was an order by Gen Yamashita to maintain peace and order for the occupation and the main purpose was to concentrate all the Chinese males in certain areas.
- Q. And how was this to be carried out ?
A. This I have learned after the liberation, at that time I did not know the real facts. After the surrender I have learned everything. The purpose of this concentration was to find out anti-Japanese movements and elements and people.
- Q. And what was to be done with these anti-Japanese elements after they had had been concentrated and screened ?
A. At that time I did not know the full details but I could suppose. After the surrender I came to know everything. The Kempeitai divided each section into areas and in these areas they investigated and questioned all Chinese males.
- Q. Now where were these concentration areas ?
A. They were Ord Road, off River Valley Road, Arab Street, Jalan Besar, Tiong Bahru, and others I don't know.
- Q. Now who was in charge of the Jalan Besar area ?
A. Lieut Onishi, now Major Onishi.
- Q. And who was in command of the Arab Street area ?
A. Major Mizuno.
- Q. And the Ord Road district ?
A. Capt Goshi.
- Q. Who was Lieut Onishi's immediate superior officer ?
A. Lieut/Col Yokota.
- Q. And in what unit was this Yokota ?
A. 2nd Field Kempeitai.
- Q. Who commanded the 2nd Field Kempeitai ?
A. Lieut/Col Oishi, now Colonel Oishi.
- Q. Did you yourself have any dealing with the Chinese who were taken to the concentration areas ?

A. Yes.

(Court: I do not know what the position of the witness is but I feel it is my duty to inform him that if he is asked any questions that are likely to incriminate him at this stage he may not answer them).

- A. (contd) When I gave a pass to the Swiss Consul General some friends came to see me for the purpose of obtaining passes, which I gave frankly and freely to help them. But my name Shinozaki every Japanese soldier did not know. Therefore I asked the Commander of the Defence Headquarters Maj/Gen Kawamura to allow me to use some powerful type for the passes. He allowed me to use an arm band and a special type which was special Foreign Office attached to Singapore Defence Headquarters. Then the soldiers who saw my pass respected my title from Defence Headquarters although they did not know my name. Therefore many people came to me and I gave them protection passes and working passes.
- Q. You mentioned that you approached Maj/Gen Kawamura in command that you issued all these passes. Did you approach any of the Japanese officers that were subordinate to him ?
- A. Yes, after my release I was looked after by Lt/Col Yokota and he introduced me to Maj/Gen Kawamura.
- Q. Are there any other Japanese officers whom you approached ?
- A. Yes, when I issued passes, a husband or wife or child was released and they could come out and I went myself many times to Ord Road and explained to the Kempeitai officer there that these people were my friends so Capt Goshi released them.
- Q. You mentioned approaching Maj/Gen Kawamura and Col Yokota. Can you give me the names of other Japanese officers whom you approached ?
- A. Col Oishi and Major Jyo.
- Q. Can you see any of the Japanese whom you have mentioned here in Court this afternoon ?
- A. No 2 Maj/Gen Kawamura, No 3 Col Oishi, No 4 Lt/Col Yokota, No 5 Major Jyo, No 6 Major Onishi. The others I did not see at the time.
- Q. Do you recognise any of the other Accused ?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Will you state who they are ?
- A. No 1 is Lieut/Gen Nishimura, Commander of the Imperial Guards Division and No 7 Capt Hisamatsu, I think.

AT 1600 HRS THE COURT ADJOURNED
UNTIL 1000 HRS ON 11 MAR 47.

CERTIFIED that I have duly compared the above extracts with the original proceedings and that they are a true and correct copy thereof.

DA Forsythe
Lt-Col. M.M.
President.