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~~A Program of ^{Total} ~~War~~ in the~~
Outline of the national policies in the first period of ~~the~~
~~Outline of the National Policies in the~~
the Total War for the
general mobilization war for the Establishment of
~~General Mobilization War for the~~
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Establishment of East
Asia
Strategie of Total Wars
of the 1st Period

Translated by
Mayumi FURUKAWA
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p. 2/

~~Chapter 2~~
(Draft)

M. SAOHYASU

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in the Institute, after~~

p. 16/

Section 3. Scope and main points of occupation (semi-occupation)

p. 17/

4. In the north ~~direction~~ we must
strive to establish a national defense basis sphere
the ~~fundamental National~~
and to maintain a superior strategic position,
~~Defense Sphere~~ firmly, and keep the
as well as to make no miscalculation in the
~~later strategic position and by~~
acquisition of strategic war materials. The
~~careful to acquire our resources for~~
~~and~~ main points to bear in mind in
the ~~case of~~ the occupancy, the
effecting occupation are given in ~~Document~~
~~in~~ ~~point to see in~~ 3. in the other paper.

No. 3 attached herewith

x x x x p. 17 ends x

pp. 31-33

p. 31 tr.

Annex ~~no~~ 3

The main points of ~~the~~ ^{Eastern} ~~the~~ ~~occupancy of~~
~~the~~ ~~East~~ Siberia which are to be occupied.

1. The Maritime Provinces of the Soviet Union

(a) Vladivostok, Murinsk, Nikolaevsk,

Petropavlovsk, and other important

strategic points.

(b) ~~Two~~ ^{Important for} Natural resources:

Techue — iron ~~ore~~

o Oha and Ekabi — oil

Su-cheng, Artiem }

Fablyanka Tavrichanka } coal
Voroshilov.

~~Volochinov~~

II. Khabarovsk Province

(A) Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points

(B) Important for natural resources.

Umarita

— molybdenum

~~River~~ Kivda

Raichkinski

coal

~~Salda~~

III. Chita Province

(A) Chita, Karinskaya, ~~Rukhlovo~~ and

other important strategic points

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(B) ~~Important~~
for natural resources.

Kharekinsky — iron

Darasun — lead, zinc.

Gutai — molybdenum

Bukachcha

Chernovskiy

Tarbagatai

Arbagat

} coal

IV Buriat-Mongol Province, ^{Ulan-Ude} ~~Ulan-Ude~~,

and other important strategic points.

p. 32/

~~Part 4~~

Section 4. The Means of ^{waging} the War p 32 To ends.

— x x x x x x —

p. 78/

4; Against ~~USSR~~ the Soviet Union

(A) ~~Armed forces of the~~

1. Our policy is to ^{speedily complete our} ~~increase the~~ war preparations against ^{the Soviet Union} ~~USSR~~ and, ^{together} ~~overcome her~~ with ~~this and the~~

our victories in the Greater East Asiatic War, overcome the Soviet Union, and, by making ~~use to avoid the war for the time~~ active use of our power and force, ^{according} ~~and~~ to the circumstances, ^{cause} ~~bring by making of~~ ~~USSR~~ The Soviet Union to conclude peace with ~~conclude the peace negotiations, exercised~~

2. In waging war against the USSR we should utilize the strategic situation ^{on the} enemy's main theatres of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home ^{country}, and deal ^{it} a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying the enemy's forces on the field & the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

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Germany, thereby avoiding war for the
~~our authority of military power, according~~
present.

~~To the circumstances.~~

But, if there should be a ^{specially} good chance
during this war, or if a Soviet-American
America and USSR

~~we~~ alliances against Japan, ^{is formed,}
we expect to ~~involve~~ ^{for resolutely} armed force,
~~will be expected to wage war~~ (against the
Soviet Union,
USSR firmly.

the Soviet Union,
USSR, we

I taking

1. In waging war against the U.S.S.R. we should utilize the
strategic situation in the enemy's main theaters of war, the
great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in
the home country, and deal ~~it~~ a smashing blow at the outset,
speedily destroying the enemy's forces on the field and the
reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period
of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the
important strategic points having been captured by us.

main

~~first fatal blow~~

4

operations in the home country, specially
~~of their circumstances in which their~~
 intensify our first striking ~~blow~~ ^{blow} and
~~strategies in the main battle field and the~~
 speedily destroy the enemy's forces on
~~orders from the home country are~~
 the field and reinforcements, with a view
~~separately and occupy the important~~
 to ~~settling~~ ^{settling} the war in ~~the~~ a short period of
~~districts to prepare for the delaying action.~~
 time. Thereafter a protracted war will be
 carried on by occupying strategic areas.

3. As Our enemy will, ~~perhaps, take~~

~~the means~~ ^{scheme to} of directly attack ~~to~~ the center

of our sphere with ~~their superior~~ ^{a superior}

~~power~~ ^{also with} of air forces and submarines, and

we must ~~be very careful for the defensive~~ ^{carefully prepare counter-defense}

measures ^{sub} ~~and~~ to destroy ~~it at once in the very~~ ^{the enemy in a}
 single stroke at the ~~beginning of the war.~~

beginning of the war. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Although the strength of enemy forces
 4. ~~It will be proper to suppose that~~
 to be directed ~~toward~~ ^{to} East Asia will
~~the power of the enemy for the East~~
 vary, ^{especially} according to the development of the
~~war~~ will be a half or a third of
 Soviet-German War, it should be taken
 the whole, though it may possibly
 as a standard that one-third to one-
 change according to the state of the
 half of the enemy's total strength will
 war between Germany and USSR.
 be directed to East Asia x x x x
 — x x x x x x — 79 ends

189 (B) ~~The~~ Diplomatic war

1. The prevention of the war.

In order to make ~~USSR~~ ^{the Soviet Union remain}
~~that~~ neutral in
 her neutrality for the Greater East

Asiatic war for the time being, we

should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her
will take the way of ~~overawing~~ her
by completing our ~~own~~ armaments,
with our aggrandizement of the preparation

for the war against her ~~mainly~~, but,
in addition, ^{to it} the following means
there are, ~~some other ways~~ to take, as
will be considered:

~~following~~ (1) With our ~~own~~ armaments against the
Soviet Union as a pressure
focus to

~~It~~ It is necessary ~~not~~ to show ~~our~~ ^{no}
such attitude as to wish her
wish of her maintaining neutrality against

Japan, ~~with giving the pressure of our~~
~~preparation for the war against USSR.~~

However,) ~~provocation~~
But we must avoid any useless ~~stimulus~~

and maintain a)
~~showing our~~ attitude of ~~being neutral~~ ^{remaining neutral} against
the Soviet Union)
~~USSR~~ so long as she keeps hers.

While making the Soviet Union understand that
 (2) As for American and British
 Japan is determined to ~~surely~~ ^{surely} resort to force
 utilization of the East Siberia, we
 against the use of East Siberia by the United States
 must show USSR our decision of
 and Britain,

using the forces, and we ~~will~~ ^{may, under} possibly
 certain circumstances,) with the Soviet Union for the
 ✓ conclude a treaty ~~to reinforce the~~
 reinforcement of)

(treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we
 may consider supplying the Soviet Union with)
~~the products~~ ~~resources~~ of a certain
 quantities of the commodities of the Southern
~~USSR instead of her~~
 Regions as a compensation.)

(3) There may be ~~the case in which~~ ^{cases where} we,
 while prohibiting navigation in Japanese
~~will try to make intentionally the dependent~~
 coastal waters and the shipment of
~~economic relationship of USSR on Japan~~

contraband goods in the Indian Ocean
~~forbidding the navigation in the sea~~
~~consider an~~ areas, we may ^{agreement} mutually
~~near to Japan~~ and transportation
^{each other} supply specified articles and thereby
~~of prohibited goods to the districts of~~
~~conceive ~~interdependent~~ a relation~~
~~India, while promising to provide~~
^{Soviet} of economic dependency on Japan.
~~the specific resources mutually.~~

2. ^{conclusion of peace} ~~Make peace~~ between Germany and

~~USSR~~ the Soviet Union.

[If ^{should} ~~there arises~~ good prospect that
~~the~~ peace between Germany and
the USSR ~~will~~ ^{would} cause Soviet alienation from
~~the~~ ~~reparation~~

~~between USSR and America~~ ^{and} Britain

~~blocks~~, and reduce ~~the~~ ^{threat} pressure against

Japan, we shall ~~mediate for~~ ^{mediate for}

~~and make peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by ~~the pressure to beat~~ USSR, when necessary, catching a good bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear upon chance when the situation of the war is at a period when the war situation is favourable ~~for~~ ^{to} Germany.~~

(I) When the ^{war} situation is favourable for

Germany.

To force peace on the Soviet Union by ~~we should to the waging of the war~~ hinting ^{at} a declaration of war against her ~~against USSR, if she don't agree with~~ if she should refuse to suspend hostilities ~~the idea of the stopping of the war,~~

~~force her to conclude the peace Treaty.~~ ^{will obtain from the}

2). In this case we ~~ask~~ ^{will obtain from the} USSR to promise Soviet Union a promise that she would not to lend any military base to

... a substantial guarantee for the
America, and ~~an actual security of it.~~
fulfilment of this promise.

(II) When the situation is ~~unfavourable for~~
~~(war)~~

Germany

When the ^{war} situation is ~~unfavourable for~~
it shall be the general rule that ~~we will~~
Germany, ~~no efforts shall be made to~~
~~bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet~~
~~Union. However, we must be prepared~~
~~in unavoidable cases, we must give a~~
~~to expect)~~ the Soviet Union in case
great pressure on ~~USSR and expect the~~
of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a
~~result not so satisfactory.~~
peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make ~~USSR and Union~~ ^{agree to}
the resumption of hostilities by ~~USSR~~
the war, promising ~~to~~ ^{give her certain}
~~for instance providing resources~~ ^{such as the supply of goods,}
economic benefits, after the conclusion

14

peace, or
of the treaty ~~and~~ to support her ^{demands} ~~requirements~~
against)
to Germany to some degree ~~during~~ ⁱⁿ the peace
negotiations.

(2) ^{efforts} ~~USSR~~ shall promise ~~firmly~~ to
Soviet Union ^a ~~a~~ promise to
maintain ~~the~~ neutrality ~~towards~~ ⁱⁿ Japan's

war against America and Britain,

especially not to lend ~~them~~ ^{to} ~~any~~ military
bases to them.

It shall be necessary to have)

(3) ✓ Germany shall ~~make~~ a ^{great} ~~recognizable~~
recognize
concession ^{in respect to the recovery of}
~~of~~ ~~giving back~~ the former
Soviet territories, etc.
~~territory of U.S.S.R.~~

(III) When ^a the war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union

Though ~~these are no~~ ^{we do not propose any} special diplomatic measures ~~available~~ ^{have drawn out} until we ~~shall destroy her power~~ from Soviet forces from the Eastern Siberia ^{with our armed forces} ~~we have arranged warfare~~

the following ^{measures shall} ~~can~~ be considered:

(1) For the time being, ^{should lay stress} ~~between~~ ~~Japan and Germany~~ ^{the main point}

^{on a} ~~should be in the~~ war against ^{the Soviet Union,} and ~~of~~ cooperation between them ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~strategy~~ ~~of~~ ~~it~~ ~~in~~ ~~cooperation~~ guiding operations shall be effected ~~with each other~~ (as soon as possible)

(2) By ~~the~~ ^{use of} ~~active~~ the alliance ~~into~~ the

thought warfare shall be reinforced in order
~~practical ones, making the power struggles for~~
to bring about the collapse of the
~~war of thoughts, and trying to make~~
Soviet Union.

~~USSR mind~~

• After the rout of the Soviet forces,
(3) ~~After destroying USSR in the Eastern~~
~~there may be a case where)~~

Liberia, ~~and~~ Japan and Germany, if
the circumstances ~~point~~ according to
shall make peace ~~between USSR with~~ with the Soviet Union

on very lenient terms, and strive to
~~long~~ their ~~effort~~ ~~again~~
will allow us to do so. And we will

~~stress on~~ ^{again} concentrate ourselves to the war against

America and Britain ~~again~~

(4) ~~If~~ ^(peace) Germany ~~will~~ make peace with

Britain (and America) after the

outbreak)

~~breaking of Japan's~~ ^{between Japan and} war against ^{(the Soviet} Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may ^{at the same time try to)} ~~we will also~~ make peace with them at ~~once~~ Britain and America

~~The same time, according to the circumstances~~

and try to ^(successfully prosecute the war) ~~fight~~ against the ^{Soviet Union} ~~with all~~

P. 83 ends

~~our strength.~~

Chapter ~~II~~ ³

The Construction of war areas

X X X X X X X X X

(P. 190)

(P. 190)

~~This part is on the supposition of~~
Section 3 - The North. (This section is based

on ^{the supposition of a} ~~the~~ war against the ~~Soviet Union~~)

1. ~~The~~ military affairs

40 - ~~During~~ the ~~first~~ period of the enforcement of military administration in ~~military~~ ^{administration} ~~and~~ administration,

the first stage of military operations,

the main ~~point~~ shall be ~~the security of~~
freedom of operational replenishment.

~~Free strategical and supporting things,~~

Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet
Russia, we must not overlook anything in
~~USSR~~, we must keep completely firmly
securing strategic ~~bases~~ naval and air bases
~~air bases and naval bases~~ against
America and also maritime bases.

~~America and Britain.~~ As for the bases

against the Soviet Union, we will ~~strive~~
~~we shall try~~ to push them
as much as possible

to the western part of the ~~field~~ ^{war area} as far

in accordance with the progress
~~as possible, according to the advance of~~

the war. 190 ends

WB

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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14 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

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Title and Nature: Establishment of East Asia

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Has it been photostated? Yes No

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Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Cabinet Secretariat

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparing Jap opinion for war--education

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Work of students under leadership of officials to educate and train the students of Total War Institute.

The National Total War for Establishment of Greater East Asia will probably take over five years, and the main subject of this work is to draw up plans for construction for the first term of five years.

Covers: Strategy; establishment of occupied areas; and readjustment of national affairs, (military, economics, thought and culture, etc.)

Analyst: 2nd Lt. Miwa

Doc. No. 1621

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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Date *14 May 1946*

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

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Preparing Jap opinion for war - education
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*The work in this document has been done by
of ~~the~~ students under ~~the~~ leadership of officials and
~~the main~~ object of this work is to educate and
train the students of Total War Institute -*

*The National Total War for ~~the~~ Establishment
of Greater East Asia will probably take over
five years, and the main subject of this work*

Analyst: *2 D M. Miwa*

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余、高橋ニチトシ
(MICHITOSHI) ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ

内閣書記官長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ル

モノナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル

三九〇頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十二年—昭和十七年—

二月十八日附、下記題名、即チ東亞建設第一期總力

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研究ノタメ發行セシモノニシテ、該研究所ノ依頼ニ
依リ内閣書記官兼~~長~~官^長が其ノ保管ニ任ジ居リシ
モノナルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月十七日

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氏名 欄 / Richard H Jarsh /
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Rm 354

Col. Jaravens,

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please furnish it?

Miss Allen

1621 TOP SECRET

1. Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia. (A draft)

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/p.16/ Section 3. Scope and main points of occupation (semi-occupation).

/p.17/ 4. In the north, we must strive to establish a national defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position, as well as to make no miscalculation in the acquisition of strategic war materials. The main points to bear in mind in effecting occupation are given in Annex No. 3 attached herewith.

/pp.31-33/ Annex No. 3.

The main points of Eastern Siberia which are to be occupied.

- I. The Maritime Province of the Soviet Union.

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(a) Vladivostok, Marinsk, Nikolaevsk, Petropavlovsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Tchue - iron
Oha and Ehabi - oil
Su-cheng, Artiem
Vobeshilev, Tavrichanka } coal

II. Khabarevsk Province

(a) Khabarevsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Umabita - molybdenum
Kivda, Raichinsk - coal

III. Chita Province

(a) Chita, Karinskaya, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Kharekinsky - iron
Darasun - lead, zinc
Gutai - molybdenum
Bukachacha, Chernovsky } coal
Tarbagatai, Arbagar }

IV. Buriat-Mongol Province, Ulan-Ude and other important strategic points.

/p.32/ Section 4. The Means of Waging War.

/p.78/ 4. Against the Soviet Union.

(A) Armed warfare.

1. Our policy is to speedily complete our war preparations against the Soviet Union and, together with our victories in the Greater East Asiatic War, overawe the Soviet Union, and, by making active use of our power and force according to the circumstances, cause the Soviet Union to conclude peace with Germany, thereby avoiding war for the present.

But if there should be a specially good change during this war, or if a Soviet-American alliance against Japan is formed, we expect to resolutely involve ^{voice} armed force against the Soviet Union.

2. In waging war against the U.S.S.R. we should utilize the strategic situation on the enemy's main theaters of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home country, and deal the enemy a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying its forces on the field and the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

3. As our enemy will scheme to directly attack the center of our sphere with a superior air forces and also with submarines, we must carefully prepare counter-defense measures and seek to destroy the enemy in a single stroke at the beginning of the war.

4. Although the strength of enemy forces to be directed to East Asia will vary especially according to the development of the Soviet-German war, it should be taken as a standard that one-third to one-half of the enemy's ~~strength~~ strength will be directed to East Asia.

/p.80/ (B) Diplomatic war.

1. The prevention of the war

In order to make the Soviet Union remain neutral in the Greater East Asiatic War for the time being, we should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her by completing our armaments, but, in addition to it, the following means will be considered:

(1) With our armaments against the Soviet Union as a pressure, it is necessary for us to show no such attitude as to wish her neutrality against Japan. However, we must avoid any useless provocation and maintain an attitude of remaining neutral against the Soviet Union so long as she keeps hers.

(2) While making the Soviet Union understand that Japan is determined to surely resort to force against the use of East Siberia by the United States and Britain, we may, under certain circumstances, conclude a

pact with the Soviet Union for the reinforcement of treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we may consider supplying the Soviet Union with certain quantities of the commodities of the Southern Regions as a compensation.)

(3) There may be cases where we, while prohibiting navigation in Japanese coastal waters and the shipment of contraband goods in the Indian Ocean area, we may consider an agreement to mutually supply each other specified articles and thereby conceive a relation of Soviet economic dependency on Japan.

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfilment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make the Soviet Union agree to the cessation of hostilities by promising to give her certain economic benefits, such as the supply of goods, after the conclusion of peace, or to support her demands against Germany to some degree in the peace negotiations.

(2) Efforts shall be made to obtain from the Soviet Union a promise to maintain neutrality in Japan's war against America and Britain, especially not to lend any military base to them.

(3) It shall be necessary to have Germany recognize a great concession in respect to the recovery of former Soviet territories, etc.

III. When a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Though we do not propose any special diplomatic measures until we have driven out Soviet forces from Eastern Siberia in an armed warfare, the following measures shall be considered:

(1) For the time being, Japan and Germany should lay stress on a war against the Soviet Union and cooperation between them in guiding operations shall be effected as soon as possible.

(2) By the active use of the alliance thought warfare shall be reinforced in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(3) After the rout of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, there may be a case where Japan and Germany, according to the circumstances, shall make peace with the Soviet Union on very lenient terms, and strive to lay their stress again on the war against America and Britain.

(4) In case Germany makes peace with Britain (and America) after the outbreak of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may at the same time try to make peace with Britain and America and try to successfully prosecute the war against the Soviet Union.

/p.111/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.

(1) In the period of the enforcement of military administration in the first stage of military operations, the main aim shall be to secure freedom of operational replenishment. Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, we must not overlook anything in securing strategic naval and air bases against American and also maritime bases. As for the bases against the Soviet Union, we will strive to push them as much as possible to the western part of the war area in accordance with the progress of the war.

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(1) Cover.

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Part II. Chapter 5

The plan to govern Siberia
(including outer Mongolia)

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is to draw up plans for ~~the~~ construction for the first term of five years.

~~(Typist please note.)~~

~~(Contents outlined as follows: attached pages)~~

Covers: Strategy; establishment of occupied areas; readjustment of national affairs, (military, economics, thought + culture, etc.)

(END)

(2)

1671

~~put it into print for the
reference of the future research.~~
~~(no number
of page)~~

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The End

(This book has 390 pages in all.)

(By F. Minowa.)

689A

TOP SECRET

1. Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia. (A draft)

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/p.16/ Section 3. Scope and main points of occupation (semi-occupation).

/p.17/ 4. In the north, we must strive to establish a national defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position, as well as to make no miscalculation in the acquisition of strategic war materials. The main points to bear in mind in effecting occupation are given in Annex No. 3 attached herewith.

/pp.31-33/ Annex No. 3.

The main points of Eastern Siberia which are to be occupied.

I. The Maritime Province of the Soviet Union.

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(a) Vladivostok, Marinsk, Nikolaevsk, Petropavlovsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Tschue - iron
Ona and Ehabi - oil
Su-cheng, Artiem
Voroshilov, Tavrichanka) coal

II. Khabarovsk Province

(a) Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Umarita - molybdenum
Kivda, Raichinsk - coal

III. Chita Province

(a) Chita, Karinskaya, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Kharekinsky - iron
Darasun - lead, zinc
Gutai - molybdenum
Bukachacha, Chernovsky
Tarbagatai, Arbagar) coal

IV. Buriat-Mongol Province, Ulan-Ude and other important strategic points.

/p.32/ Section 4. The Means of waging War.

/p.78/ 4. Against the Soviet Union.

(A) Armed warfare.

1. Our policy is to speedily complete our war preparations against the Soviet Union and, together with our victories in the Greater East Asiatic War, overawe the Soviet Union, and, by making active use of our power and force according to the circumstances, cause the Soviet Union to conclude peace with Germany, thereby avoiding war for the present.

But if there should be a specially good change during this war, or if a Soviet-American alliance against Japan is formed, we expect to resolutely invoke armed force against the Soviet Union.

2. In waging war against the U.S.S.R. we should utilize the strategic situation on the enemy's main theaters of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home country, and deal the enemy a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying its forces on the field and the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

3. As our enemy will scheme to directly attack the center of our sphere with a superior air forces and also with submarines, we must carefully prepare counter-defense measures and seek to destroy the enemy in a single stroke at the beginning of the war.

4. Although the strength of enemy forces to be directed to East Asia will vary especially according to the development of the Soviet-German war, it should be taken as a standard that one-third to one-half of the enemy's total strength will be directed to East Asia.

/p.80/ (B) Diplomatic war.

1. The prevention of the war.

In order to make the Soviet Union remain neutral in the Greater East Asiatic War for the time being, we should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her by completing our armaments, but, in addition to it, the following means will be considered:

(1) With our armaments against the Soviet Union as a pressure, it is necessary for us to show no such attitude as to wish her neutrality against Japan. However, we must avoid any useless provocation and maintain an attitude of remaining neutral against the Soviet Union so long as she keeps hers.

(2) While making the Soviet Union understand that Japan is determined to surely resort to force against the use of East Siberia by the United States and Britain, we may, under certain circumstances, conclude a

pact with the Soviet Union for the reinforcement of treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we may consider supplying the Soviet Union with certain quantities of the commodities of the Southern Regions as a compensation.)

(3) There may be cases where we, while prohibiting navigation in Japanese coastal waters and the shipment of contraband goods in the Indian Ocean area, we may consider an agreement to mutually supply each other specified articles and thereby conceive a relation of Soviet economic dependency on Japan.

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany.

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make the Soviet Union agree to the cessation of hostilities by promising to give her certain economic benefits, such as the supply of goods, after the conclusion of peace, or to support her demands against Germany to some degree in the peace negotiations.

(2) Efforts shall be made to obtain from the Soviet Union a promise to maintain neutrality in Japan's war against America and Britain, especially not to lend any military base to them.

(3) It shall be necessary to have Germany recognize a great concession in respect to the recovery of former Soviet territories, etc.

III. When a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Though we do not propose any special diplomatic measures until we have driven out Soviet forces from Eastern Siberia in an armed warfare, the following measures shall be considered:

(1) For the time being, Japan and Germany should lay stress on a war against the Soviet Union and cooperation between them in guiding operations shall be effected as soon as possible.

(2) By the active use of the alliance thought warfare shall be reinforced in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(3) After the rout of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, there may be a case where Japan and Germany, according to the circumstances, shall make peace with the Soviet Union on very lenient terms, and strive to lay their stress again on the war against America and Britain.

(4) In case Germany makes peace with Britain (and America) after the outbreak of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may at the same time try to make peace with Britain and America and try to successfully prosecute the war against the Soviet Union.

/p.111/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.

(1) In the period of the enforcement of military administration in the first stage of military operations, the main aim shall be to secure freedom of operational replenishment. Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, we must not overlook anything in securing strategic naval and air bases against America and also maritime bases. As for the bases against the Soviet Union, we will strive to push them as much as possible to the western part of the war area in accordance with the progress of the war.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: _____
Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this

17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takahashi
 Signature of Official
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Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

Secretary of Cabinet
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this17th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

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Chapter 1

General policy

The necessary REMOTE areas of Hsinchiang must be speedily secured to firmly establish a long-term endurance attitude; by practical application of the alliance, the war against the United States of America, Britain and China will be carried out. The preparations for war against Russia will be completed and we will promote the growth of New China, thereby effecting the first step toward the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. If it is unavoidable, we shall wage war against Russia. However, our Chief object in pursuing the war to its end lies in the existence and development of our national power and special care should be taken to grasp the right time for war so as not to leave any regrets.

On the termination of the present war, we must endeavour to firmly establish the foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. We will make it our minimum requirement to prevent another war with China and we shall equip ourselves at the very least with conditions for the defense of our national independence in that direction.

Chapter 11 StrategySection I Directing of the War

1. In our resolution to carry out a long period war, strategic points in the defense circle will be occupied, and while we prosecute the war on one hand, our essential powers of self-sufficiency will be strengthened and secured on the other.

In carrying out the war, England will be our main object, and in order to maintain our position of independence and initiative by every means possible we will give special efforts to the destruction of the American and English fleet. We will further strengthen the prohibition of intercourse between the territories under our power and the United States or England, and will destroy the transportation on the west coast of America as much as possible.

We will take strict precautions in particular against the egress of national defense materials for which the United States and England rely on East Asia.

2. Our attitude towards China will be to secure the occupied territories according to the policy previously arranged and to provide for the development of necessary materials. We will promote the growth of these so as to make them contribute towards the establishment of a New China, and in the meanwhile we will endeavour to crush and destroy the hinterland (T.N. - i.e. Chungking) by exhausting their armed forces, their economic abilities and every other measure.

3. We will try to utilize materials which can be procured in the war zones, thus striving to maintain and promote our national power, and at the same time we will complete our military powers so as to be able to overthrow the revised American and English attacks that will follow the lapse of time, especially any change in the European front.

4. We expect good results from the German and Italian domination in the Mediterranean, the counter-blockade on England proper and the destruction of transportation on the east coast of the United States.

With the development of the situation we will do our best to establish contact in (T.N. probably with Germany and Italy) the Indian Ocean.

5. In case of an actual German landing in England proper, we will turn the resulting shock to our own account and further strengthen our power in the sphere of our influence.

6. We hold it as our general policy to avoid war with Russia at present, and will strive for this end. However, preparations must be made to the utmost, to prepare for any change in the situation.

If the unavoidable happens, such as joint operations by the U.S.A. and Russia against Japan within our defense sphere, then we shall seize the opportunity to resort to military methods against Russia.

7. If the Chinese hinterland proposes peace, we are ready to accept it. We will settle sino-Japanese problems according to our policy previously arranged, and if possible we would like to advance and cooperate with India.

8. We will comply with the request to cooperate in the armistice between Germany and Russia, and we may propose it ourselves according to circumstances. If this is put into practice our security in the Manchuria-Russia border will be established; if possible, we further desire

desire the advance and cooperation of Russia in India and Iran.

In this event, we anticipate a German landing on British soil and also her domination in Africa.

9. The cessation of hostilities between our country and the United States and England will be settled at the same time as that between Germany and England. (The U.S.....)

10. At the moment that hostilities cease on the European front, hostilities will be suspended also in the Greater East Asia War. We will try to settle sino-Japanese matters between ourselves, apart from other problems, as far as possible.

We must strictly guard against Europe and the United States concluding a previous truce at the sacrifice of East Asia. We must also prepare some special way of dealing with things if the worst comes to the worst.

Chapter 11

Sec. 11 The aims of the Organization of National power

part 1 The Organization of Military Strength

1. The aims of the organization of military power in the first period lie in the prosecuting the war against Chungking and the war against the U.S.A. and Britain, and especially in completing our naval preparations so as to be able to smash their attacks when they regain their strength. In the meantime, we must be thoroughly prepared for a war with Russia.

2. The trend of military preparations of the different powers is as set down in Table No. 1 and their capacity for aggression against East Asia during the next five years generally is estimated as follows: -

Table of the Great Powers' estimated capacity for aggressive warfare against East Asia during the next 5 years.

<u>Classification</u>	Front-line Troop strength (in thousands)	First-line Air strength (in thousands)	Naval
1941 Chungking	2000-3000	some	none
The United States of America	700-1300		Battleships 28 Carriers 18 Cruisers 91 Destroyers 365 Submarines 200
Britain	500-700	7-13	Battleships 8 Carriers 8 Cruisers 55 Destroyers 100 Submarines 100
Soviet Union	2000-3000	406	Cruisers 2 Submarines over 100 Destroyers 11

- Remarks: 1. Front-line military strength includes, army, naval and air military strength at home is estimated at almost the same number.
2. Naval forces will change considerably, depending on how many naval battles are fought and with what results.

Accordingly, the countries' basic capacity for operations in East Asia during the first period will be as follows on an average basis, the military strength of the United States, Britain and Russia being estimated to fluctuate up to one third of its total according to the tension or slackening of the European front.

(1) Britain and America combined:

Front-line military strength	1,600,000 men
First-line air strength	10,000 planes
Naval craft:	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	460
Submarines	300

(2) The Soviet Union

Front - line military strength	2,500,000 men
First-line air strength	5,000 planes
Naval craft: a nucleus of over 100 submarines.	

(3) The United States of America, Britain and the Soviet Union combined

Front-line military strength	4,000,000 men
First-line air strength	15,000 planes
Naval craft	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	480
Submarines	400

(4) Chungking

Front-line military strength	2,000,000-3,000,000
Air strength	same number

Our country must carry out the present war on one hand, and on the other, must organize the requisite military strength for the aim of enabling ourselves to smash the operational strength of all these countries.

If our aim is mechanical parity we would require:

Front-line military strength	5,000,000 men
(including the home troops 10,000,000)	15,000 planes
First-line air strength	15,000 planes
Naval craft:	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	480
Submarines	400

3. However, there would be considerable difficulty in bringing this about within the next five years, when we consider the changing situation of modern warfare, the limitations of national powers, and especially when we consider the probabilities of the process of establishment. We shall thus establish ~~an~~ a separate standard of minimum essentials considering all the various circumstances, but strategy first and foremost. The estimated volume of essential military requirements based on this standard, and the total estimated volume of essential national requirements considered on the basis of the military requirements, will be as follows:-

	Military Requirements	Total National Requirements
Materials for ordinary steel	4,850,000 tons	11,700,000 tons
Materials for special steel	1,180,000 tons	1,400,000 tons
Aluminum	355,000 tons	378,000 tons
Coal	9,896,000 tons	140,508,000 tons
Benzine for aviation	2,500,000 litres	2,520,000 litres
Benzine for motor cars	1,249,000 litres	3,150,000 litres

Refer Table 11 for details.

such is the outline of the expansion we aim at for our national industrial power as being necessary for the proper organization of our military power in order to carry out the present warfare.

Chapter 11 Section 111 Occupied Areas (Anticipated
occupied areas) and Their Strategic points

1. The chief object of the territories to be occupied in the Greater East Asia War is to secure the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of the war in accordance with what follows. The territories will be decided upon in accordance with the progress of the operations, and on consideration of how best to gradually solidify the foundation for establishing a nucleus group and small Co-prosperity Sphere.
 - (1) We must secure strategically vital areas which would assist our offensive operation, and at the same time capture the strong-points which would afford a stronghold for the enemy counterattacks.
 - (2) To secure territories which produce materials necessary for the establishment of self-sufficiency in order to complete our capacity
 - (3) To control the areas necessary for the blockade of enemy countries in essential materials and the interception of their commerce and communication.

2. Every care must be taken to procure materials essential to use in the Southern Regions and at the same time we must control and smash the enemy's military and economic counterattacks. We must thoroughly enforce our

our counter-blockade of Chungking and of the U.S.A. and Britain in respect of strategy and urgently needed materials. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. 1.

3. In China, we must overthrow the Chungking regime and help the growth of a new China, thereby securing a nucleus group, and ensure that all is well with our procurement of materials essential to us. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. 11.

4. In the Farther Regions, we must do our best to secure a basic sphere of national defense and maintain our superiority in strategic materials. At the same time, we must ensure that all is well with our procurement of strategic materials. The essential points to which we must pay attention in the course of the occupation are as given in Appendix No. 11.

* -----

Chapter 11

Section V. The Termination of Hostilities

Chapter 11 Section V

part 11 Conditions of Security

The main point of the conditions to be secured at the termination of hostilities is to approach as near as possible to the concrete ideal of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prospersity Sphere, but the extent to which it can be realized depends on our national power at the time, especially on the extent to which we have secured the spoils of our victory, and will also differ according to the length of the war and the general aspect of the world war situation at the time in particular, the position of the countries on our side and the extent of the exhaustion of the countries against us. Any definite prognostication is therefore difficult, and the situation will best be met by reliance on circumstances at the time, and by avoidance of inordinate ambitions.

We shall accordingly not go into details here, but be content to enumerate the three basic principles.

I. When the war is soon over with enemy countries left with a margin of strength.

Our maxim will be the security of our existence and self-sufficiency ~~and~~ in the direction of the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged, though if necessary there is still some scope for mitigation.

(b) (In the Farther Regions, we will settle the problems of the Coastal regions.)

II When the war is brought to an end by a single enemy defeat.

Our maxim will be the establishment of a basis for the building of the East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Regions, we will secure the necessary military bases. We shall let the Philippines enjoy independence under our protection and guidance and shall put British Malaya and North Borneo under our jurisdiction. We shall establish a special economic zone in the Netherlands East Indies and secure a preferential hold on materials essential for our country with F.I.C., all contributing to the foundation of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere.

(v) In the Northern Regions, we shall take measures to sever East Siberia from the soviet Union.

III When the war is terminated by an enemy surrender with Japan still left with a margin of strength.

We shall plan the establishment of the smaller Co-prosperty Sphere at a single stroke.

(a) we shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Region we shall secure in toto all military bases in the smaller Co-Prosperty Sphere; the Philippines and Burma will have their independence under our protection and guidance. In the

Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, self-government will be realized and special zones essential for military and economic purposes will be established there. British Malaya and North Borneo will be annexed as Japanese territory and will become the basis of a small scale self-sufficiency spheres. For Australia and India we shall prescribe the necessary economic union.

(c) In the Northern Regions we shall complete the disposal of East Siberia)

Chapter 111

The Establishment of Operational Areas

Chapter 111

Section 11

The southern Regions

Part 1 Military Affairs

1. Policy

The aims of the fundamental policy of the military establishment in the South Regions war zone are:

- (1) In order to accomplish the aims of the present war, strategic strong points of the most urgent necessity must be secured and controlled.
- (2) Although the fulfilment of the demands of the present operations come first, care must be taken to ensure that everything tends in the direction of the establishment of East Asia.

These aims shall be realized in preference to the other policies for the Southern Regions.

In military establishment, provisions necessary for operations and military activities will be first completed, and after that, construction ~~general~~ work necessary for the maintenance of public order in the district, general transportation, and the control of communications.

Military administration will be established in the occupied territories during the necessary period of operative activities, to control all the different construction work.

11. Outline.

(1) The army and the navy will bear partial responsibility in establishing military administration, according to operational demands, the characteristics of the area in question, and other factors.

(2) Military administration must grasp the principle of the local administration and trivial interventions must be avoided as far as possible. It will try to make use of the existing machinery.

(3) The public peace and order in the occupied territories will be secured as far as possible by the ordinary police system and the native army, with the assistance and support of the expeditionary forces.

(4) Only those of the native armies that have abandoned their hostility and are positively cooperating with our troops will be permitted to exist in the occupied territories. Their organization, and military establishment will be directed by our army. Their chief purpose is to contribute to the establishment of East Asia as members of the peace police. We must do our utmost to use them to the best advantage.

(5) The standard number of the armed forces of the native armies will be about half of their pre-war number, and will be decided upon according to circumstances.

The type of troops will be limited to land troops, it being our principle not to let them have any naval forces for the time being. The imperial Navy will manage their ships.

Air forces will not exist and all associated establishments and armaments will be confiscated and disposed of by the expeditionary forces.

(6) The Thailand army will be strengthened on condition of its cooperation with us.

(7) Native armies will be widely dispersed, and put under the authority of the expeditionary force to facilitate their supervision.

The necessary arms will be distributed to them, according to circumstances, through the expeditionary forces.

(8) As a general rule, expeditionary forces will be stationed in places necessary for the procurement of articles required by the armed forces, and the control of the areas producing essential materials, but our forces should be concentrated as far as does not interfere with the foregoing, and thereby maintain the elasticity of the army and adjust all the varieties of its equipment so as to ensure its instantaneous operation.

(9) Expenses necessary for the maintenance of the occupation forces will be defrayed in future, wherever possible, by the areas concerned.

(10) For military equipment necessary for operational bases and the guarding of public order refitted enemy equipment will be used for the time being, so as to expedite and execute military and guarding measures.

We shall act according to our previously decided policy in French Indo-China and Thailand.

(11) During the present war, if there is any occasion for our forces to operate in the same district as the Thai army for the same object, the commanding officer of the Imperial Expeditionary forces will assume command by mutual understanding of both countries.

This will also apply to the French Indo-China army.

(12) The time for military administration to change the ordinary administration will be generally at the end of ~~the~~ the war, after consideration of the actual situation in the areas concerned, though there may be cases when ordinary administration is introduced before the termination of the present war, or the military administration still continued even after the end of the war, according to circumstances.

Part 11 politics

No. 1

1. The most important object of political construction in the Southern Regions at present is to comply with the demands of the present war, in consideration of the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (of, Draft plan of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,) In other words, although, of course, we must crush the tendency in the Southern Regions to rely on the United States and Britain and ~~guide~~ guide them into a belief in ourselves as the leading nation, we must lay stress on facilitating the procurement and delivery of the necessary military materials, and on carrying out operation.

2. The form of administration in the occupied areas will thus be military administration during the war. As for its organization, a military commanding officer or a governor-general will be appointed to this office, with a number of able officials and civilians under him, called upon to fully administer the occupied territories.

It is necessary to choose from the very first the most able military officers and others for all who are to participate in the military administration, not to mention the governor-general himself.

The military administration will utilize the present administrative system as far as possible, and special care must be taken to restore and utilize the local system.

3. Concerning the management of the natives of the occupied territories, it is better not to force assimilative measures even in areas to be later annexed, but to adopt such policies as will agree with the natural abilities of the different races. It will be the policy of military administration to exercise strict control over the natives in all occupied areas who have previously shown hostile feelings towards us, and gradually slacken it. It will be our principle to treat the Europeans and the Americans in the occupied territories as we do the natives.

4. The Chinese in the occupied territories will also be treated in the same way. Strict supervision will be exercised over those who have previously shown hostility, but the others will generally be treated justly with no special measures taken to oppress them. We will take steps to make them cooperate in the accomplishment of the China Incident. Furthermore, our rule will be to control the southward advance of the ordinary Chinese during the war.

5. The southward advance of the Japanese will aim at the fulfillment of our wartime demands of a military and economic nature, and as a rule, it will be restricted to essential personnel for the occupied territories, great care being taken of their selection and education.

In the agricultural field, the rule will be to limit the advance of the Japanese to technical instructors.

The return of Japanese who have lived in the Southern Regions to the areas concerned will be permitted on a preferential basis only to those who are eligible as occupation members, but they must be selected and trained before returning. Adequate selection and training must also be given to military men discharged overseas and the officials who retire abroad.

Furthermore, when coming in contact with different races, officials and civilians must not feel that they are superior to them or treat them with contempt. On the other hand, they must be careful not to spoil the natives by being too anxious to win their hearts.

No. 11

Regional Divisions

1. Thailand

We shall respect the independence of Thailand, our ally, to the utmost, give all necessary assistance such as would contribute to strengthening the position of the present regime, and avoid all interference with domestic affairs. We shall adopt measures to make the

Government of Thailand comply fully of her own free will with our military and economic demands.

The military forces of Thailand will give cooperation necessary for the accomplishment of the common aim. Special precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intentions to separate Japan and Thailand.

We will make the government of Thailand obliterate all anti-Japanese tendencies among the Chinese residents of Thailand. The friendly relations between our government and Thailand should be maintained, and it would be better for the national government not to take any direct measures against the Chinese in Thailand.

2. French Indo-China

For the present, necessary supervision will be exercised over French Indo-China to ensure that she faithfully fulfils the treaty for joint defence and economy, and that the present government of F. I. C. ~~adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.~~ adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.

We shall keep a close watch on German-French relations in Europe and as long as there is not change in the attitude of the French Government, we shall respect French sovereignty, though we shall do our best to bring home to the officials and population of French Indo-China a thorough understanding of the new situation in Europe and Asia, and to plant and promote our power in both military and economic fields.

Although the self government or the participation in polities of the Annamites will have to be recognized to some extent on some proper occasion in the future, for the present we shall not permit their independence movements, though we shall ask France to improve the position and welfare of the natives in general.

3. Hongkong

We shall enforce a policy of dispersing the population under the military administration of the governor-general of the occupied areas, and we shall consider compulsory migration to supply the labour demands in Hainan Island. At present, reconstruction works will be limited to those of military necessity.

4. The Philippines

Military administration will be enforced for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-general, which the Philippines will gradually be made to run themselves as far as possible. The independence of the Philippines will be ~~accelerated as fast as possible~~ accelerated as fast as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as

It would be a means to instigate the desire for independence among the other natives of the Co-prosperity Sphere, and as we consider it a good example for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere. It is needless to say that in this case too they will have to cooperate positively in the war against Britain and the United States, and we shall hold onto our rights to station armies and to use certain places necessary as military bases even after the war.

5. Malaya and British Borneo

Military administration will be enforced for the present under the governor-general of the occupation territories; Singapore and Penang will be placed under his direct Jurisdiction. The governor-general will be in direct control of the native rulers and dispatch the requisite controllers to their dominions to direct them. The administration of these dominions and of areas smaller than provinces will be carried on as far possible on the lines of the existing machinery, through efforts must be made to obliterate British influence which has permeated all administrative organs, so that measures to reform the British way of ruling should be taken. We shall respect native rulers' Political measures and help to raise the (T. N. political) standard of the Malaysians. Furthermore, as regards the effect of economic reforms we will carry out a number of measures, giving the most consideration to the maintenance of public peace and order.

6. Netherlands East Indies

Military administration will be established under the governor-general and the existing administrative organs will be used to the utmost for minor or local administration. On the principle of Netherlands equality, some of the Dutch officials and Indonesians will be employed will be to fulfil our economic or these necessary to carry out the operations (especially petroleum), as this area will be adjacent to the front for some time, and strict military administration will be established. Measures to aid the promotion of the position of the Indonesians and to raise the standard of civilization must be adopted, to make the Indonesians gradually change their attitude towards the Dutch and give them the hope that with a certain period after the termination of hostilities, they will be permitted to enjoy independence.

7. Burma

Strict military administration will be established in Burma as it is expected to be adjacent to front for quite a long period. However, the existence of the Burmese' own administrative organ will be recognized and this under our guidance will become the nucleus of independent government in the future.

Handling of the Indians in Burma must be directed discreetly in consideration of the policy towards India.

Part III Economics

No. 1 Materials for national defence

1. Policy:

(1) Construction policy during this period is to restore and develop the production of national resources, especially mineral resources, and make these areas an important source of supply for the heavy industry materials necessary at the strengthening of our power to carry out the war.

(2) In construction and restoration special stress shall be laid on petroleum, iron ores, bauxite, copper and other non-iron metals. The production of iron ores is the basis, but a certain amount of reserve manufacturing equipment (the selection of non-iron metal ores and a part of the smelting process if possible) and quite a large amount of equipment for refining petroleum will be constructed and restored.

(3) As is the time limit for carrying out these works, for the first and second years, the aim will be the complete restoration of the damages done by the war, after that, the necessary increase in production will be attained.

(4) For the aim of procuring necessary materials rapidly, the areas where the least damage was done by the war will be selected.

However, greater importance is attached to the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines in the construction as great quantities of materials are expected to be procured in these areas.

(5) As for the method of construction, a national organization will be established to include the Southern Regions and unify and regulate the construction, and under the overall jurisdiction of this body, certain persons responsible for the development of certain material in a certain area will be selected to undertake the increase of production.

(6) The production of such materials as would prove superfluous, such as rubber and tin, will be reduced to the amount necessary for our demands, and the margin of construction power will both be directed towards the more urgent demands. However, in order to avoid confusion in the economy of the area concerned, and to maintain powerful weapon in the armoury of economic warfare by the material concerned, a certain amount of production may still be maintained insofar as does not prove a heavy burden on materials and labour.

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Part IV Ideas and Culture

1. Work in the ideas and culture of the southern races must be carried out on the lines of general policy for the development of ideas and culture set out in Chapter V, and in consideration of the fact that these races have been but recently attached to us, that their standard of civilization is very low than their racial characteristics are ones of mild behaviour and they hold no anti-Japanese feelings.

2. Instruction by reason

(1) Propaganda

As the knowledge of Japan held the southern races is insufficient, every method and occasion must be turned to account for propagating the true Japan, and efforts should be made for the introduction of Japan through publications and the establishment of organizations to spread information about Japan. Lectures, exhibitions, special methods adopted.

(2) It is necessary to comply with the characteristics and the civilization of each race when carrying out propaganda, which thus has a greater influence; further, the results of this propaganda must be thoroughly investigated, and the selection of the policy to follow also considered, so as to accord with the actual situation.

(3) The propaganda system in the Southern Regions must be extended and strengthened, and the main outline of the propaganda and essential parts of its organization must be held by the Japanese.

(4) Although the object of the propaganda is the controlling of intellectual class in district, special methods of propaganda among the ignorant will also be adopted.

(5) It is necessary to think of a way to utilize the secret Chinese associations in the south for our propaganda.

(6) When the situation permits, it would be a good idea to make the controlling or intellectual class travel in Japan and introduce them to the real situation in Japan, thus making them discard their idea of relying on Europe and the U. S. A.

II Education;

(1) The existing method and policies should be reinvestigated and those based on the influence of Britain, the United States and the Netherlands should be abolished. Although changes in direction will be made according to the general policy, there will be no great changes in educational institutions during this period, and care will be taken to utilize existing institutions.

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(2) We will assist and direct the spreading of national education and the instruction of the younger generation in each district, and in order to implant the idea of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, text books for children teachers and the general population will be compiled; we will cooperate in supplying them with teaching materials.

(3) The public thoughts shall be firmly established through the guidance and education of the army in each district.

(4) Cooperation and aidance shall be given to the training and re-education of the native teachers.

(5) Scholars and educationists of superior ability shall be dispatched from our country to important points.

(6) Elements of superior ability shall be picked from among the various races (in the case of an independent country they shall be recommended by the government concerned and by a well planned system of sending students abroad. They will be sent to our country (T.N. Japan) to study, and during their stay in our country special institutions shall be set up for them, so as to give them proper guidance, and after they have finished their studies practical use shall be made of them under a certain definite policy.

III Thought Movements:

(1) Although racial movements of an innocent nature, characteristic of the races in the various districts shall be nurtured and encouraged (in case of an independent country, guidance shall be given indirectly through the Government concerned), steps shall be taken so as to abolish the influence of European and American Liberalism and Communistic ideas. Especially when independence movements are based on narrow-minded racialism or what tends to be racial egoism, same shall be corrected and guidance shall be given so as to make same turn into Oriental moralism.

(2) A powerful thought movement shall be carried out and strengthened for the prosecution of the joint war against Britain and the United States so as to comply with the expansion of the (T.M. successful) war results.

(3) Consideration shall be given to the gathering of men of leading spirits and intelligence from the various districts so as to form a spiritual organization representing the whole of East Asia, thereby to contribute towards promoting the common consciousness among the various races.

3. Enlightenment through Facts.

In conformity with the enlightenment based on the above-mentioned

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ideals, efforts shall be made to make the people realize the idea of the Co-prosperity Sphere through their actual living, by means of concrete and practical measures. However, by taking into consideration the actual situation of the prosecution of war, some ~~sex~~ shall be realized by degrees from those that are possible (T. N. to realize).

(I) Development of political Ideas.

(1) It shall be made the main principle to respect the natives' political volition as much as possible, and ~~it~~ it is necessary that, during this period, efforts shall be made to relieve them of their economic sufferings that are expected to appear, and to adopt such political measures as would not dampen their hopes towards the future. For example, consideration should be given to maintenance and extension of the natives' rights to participate in the government, the immediate abolition of the bad laws and systems which were enacted by Britain, the United States and the Netherlands that are painful to the natives, the appointment and utilizing of native officials and leaders, and other such measures befitting to the actual conditions, ~~thereby~~ thereby elevating the hopes and enthusiasm of the natives.

(2) The traditional spirit of the various races shall be respected, and protection as well as manifestation of the ancient sages and patriots, when the natives respect, as well as their surviving descendants, shall also be considered.

(II) Development of Economic Ideas.

(1) It is estimated that the hardships in the material living of the natives during this period will become considerably aggravated, but it must be expected that, for the sake of the prosecution of the war, there may, for a while, be no time for considering their sufferings. Therefore, economic development necessitates the utmost care, and not only is it obvious that it must be avoided to cause unnecessary economic handking with compassion. For example, consideration shall be given toward adequate measures which would touch the hearts of the natives, such as the assisting and education of the natives, ~~thereby~~ the releasing of farms belonging to hostile British and Americans, the amending or abolition of bad taxes, which had been levied by the British and Americans.

(2) Although the hostile Chinese residents in the South Seas shall be ousted, these who are not so shall have their positions recognized and as for their past support of Chungking, it shall be aimed at making them switch over so as to have them cooperate in the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(III) Development of Social Culture.

(1) The customs and morals peculiar to the natives shall not be

interfered with unless same should greatly obstruct the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere, and it shall be made our principle not to disturb or change the tranquillity of their private lives as much as possible.

(2) Utmost cooperation shall be given towards the rehabilitation work for the natives having suffered war damages.

(3) For the sake of spreading medical treatment and sanitation, efforts shall be made to build hospitals, travelling clinic organizations, and institutes for the research of tropical medical treatment and sanitation, as well as to improve and expand medical schools.

IV Linguistic policy:

During this period, efforts shall be stressed for the popularization of the Japanese language for the purpose of attaining the object of making same the common language of East Asia in the future, by banning English and Dutch as official languages.

Various measures shall be adopted such as the opening of Japanese language schools at important places, the appointment of natives who understand Japanese as officials, or the popularization of Japanese news papers and publications, as well as the teaching of elementary Japanese through radio-broadcasts.

V Counter-measures towards the Japanese on the spot.

(1) It is necessary to strictly enforce the following plans as the character and practice of the Japanese on the spot who are constantly in contact with the natives bear a decisive effect on the spiritual and cultural development:-

(1) To leave no stone unturned in manifesting the Imperial Army in its true light.

(2) To carefully pick out the Japanese officials for positions on the spot and to strictly enforce official discipline.

(3) As regards the advance of Japanese to the Southern Regions, general crossing-over shall not be permitted, but shall be restricted to only those who are to become the leaders, who, while on the one hand, paying attention to the protection and good treatment of the Japanese residents on the spot, shall make them display strict discipline so as to win the confidence and respect of foreign races.

(4) Importance shall be attached to the education of the Japanese children on the spot, and special institutes shall be erected both in Japanese and on the spot for the training of educators to be sent there.

(11) Special institutes shall be established for the selecting, training and dispatching of spiritual and cultural leaders. In other words, plans shall be devised on a national scale and enforced for the selection, education and stationing of talented men, who are qualified to moral consolidation of the East Asiatic Races. These persons must be able to come into close contact with the actual life of the natives as apititually cultured persons without utilizing any power or authority as a background, and must be qualified to become teachers as well as friends of the natives through the reality of their spiritual and cultural living. It is also their duty to investigate the actual conditions of their respective districts and to gather informations. These leaders shall be selected and appointed from the broad field of civilization, from among the talented religionists, artists, educators, scientists, technicians, economists, and social workers.

VI The ousting of these considered as injurious to the Establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

(1) Efforts shall be made towards preventing any Red propaganda activities by the Soviet Union, and a strict control shall be enforced over Communistic movements,

(11) Although it shall be made the principle to convert any anti-Japanese movements by positive education, those of an obstinate and malicious nature shall be crushed.

(11) As it is anticipated that the counter-propaganda of Britain the United States and the Soviet Union will be intensely active, strict restrictions shall be imposed on the listening in to broadcasts, newspapers and publications shall be subjected to strict censorship.

(IV) As regards Christicity, the missionary work of hostile English and American missionaries shall be prohibited, and they shall be substituted by native missionaries. Moreover, it shall be planned to dispatch Japanese missionaries to the spots.

(V) Literary works of art and publications tending to imply the adoration of Europe and America and which are obstructive to the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be strictly banned, and a clean sweep shall be made of thinkers and cultural persons possessing no intention of abandoning their European and American hostile feelings.

VII Miscellaneous :

The preparatory plans for the Establishment of East Asiatic Culture and the plans for the Interchanging of Culture shall be based on part I.

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Page 1

Excerpt from: "Establishment of East Asia," a symposium of
the Institute of Total War

2. Conclusion of Peace between Germany and the Soviet
Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between
Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from
America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we
shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union
by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when
the war situation is favorable to Germany.

1. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting
at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to
suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet
Union a promise that she would not lend any military base
to America, and a substantiated guarantee for the fulfillment
of this promise.

11. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it
shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to
bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.
However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on
the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to
expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takebashi, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity, Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows, Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takebashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

SEAL
Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Japan - Total War

Doc. No. 1621

Page 1

TOP SECRET

1. Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia. (A draft)

Document number	Total War Research Material No. 46
Ream number	No. 20
Date of compilation	February 18, 17th Year of Snows (1942)
Number of copies of Compilation	150 copies
Disposition	Keep within the Institute; the ones taken out must be returned after use.

2. Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.

/p.16/ Section 3. Scope and main points of occupation (semi-occupation).

/p.17/ 4. In the north, we must strive to establish a national defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position, as well as to make no miscalculation in the acquisition of strategic war materials. The main points to bear in mind in effecting occupation are given in Annex No. 3 attached herewith.

/pp.31-33/ Annex No. 3.

The main points of Eastern Siberia which are to be occupied.

- I. The Maritime Province of the Soviet Union.

(a) Vladivostok, Marinsk, Nikolaevsk, Petropavlovsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Tschue - iron
Ona and Ehabi - oil
Su-cheng, Artiem
Voroshilov, Tavrichanka) coal

II. Khabarovsk Province

(a) Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Umarita - molybdenum
Kivda, Raichinsk - coal

III. Chita Province

(a) Chita, Karinskaya, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
Kharekinsky - iron
Darasun - lead, zinc
Gutai - molybdenum
Bukachacha, Chernovsky
Tarbagatai, Arbagar) coal

IV. Buriat-Mongol Province, Ulan-Ude and other important strategic points.

/p.32/ Section 4. The Means of waging War.

/p.78/ 4. Against the Soviet Union.

(A) Armed warfare.

1. Our policy is to speedily complete our war preparations against the Soviet Union and, together with our victories in the Greater East Asiatic War, overawe the Soviet Union, and, by making active use of our power and force according to the circumstances, cause the Soviet Union to conclude peace with Germany, thereby avoiding war for the present.

But if there should be a specially good change during this war, or if a Soviet-American alliance against Japan is formed, we expect to resolutely invoke armed force against the Soviet Union.

2. In waging war against the U.S.S.R. we should utilize the strategic situation on the enemy's main theaters of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home country, and deal the enemy a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying its forces on the field and the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

3. As our enemy will scheme to directly attack the center of our sphere with a superior air forces' and also with submarines, we must carefully prepare counter-defense measures and seek to destroy the enemy in a single stroke at the beginning of the war.

4. Although the strength of enemy forces to be directed to East Asia will vary especially according to the development of the Soviet-German war, it should be taken as a standard that one-third to one-half of the enemy's total strength will be directed to East Asia.

/p.80/ (B) Diplomatic war.

1. The prevention of the war.

In order to make the Soviet Union remain neutral in the Greater East Asiatic War for the time being, we should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her by completing our armaments, but, in addition to it, the following means will be considered:

(1) With our armaments against the Soviet Union as a pressure, it is necessary for us to show no such attitude as to wish her neutrality against Japan. However, we must avoid any useless provocation and maintain an attitude of remaining neutral against the Soviet Union so long as she keeps hers.

(2) While making the Soviet Union understand that Japan is determined to surely resort to force against the use of East Siberia by the United States and Britain, we may, under certain circumstances, conclude a

pact with the Soviet Union for the reinforcement of treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we may consider supplying the Soviet Union with certain quantities of the commodities of the Southern Regions as a compensation.)

~~1941~~ (3) There may be cases where we, while prohibiting navigation in Japanese coastal waters and the shipment of contraband goods in the Indian Ocean area, we may consider an agreement to mutually supply each other specified articles and thereby conceive a relation of Soviet economic dependency on Japan.

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfilment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany.

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make the Soviet Union agree to the cessation of hostilities by promising to give her certain economic benefits, such as the supply of goods, after the conclusion of peace, or to support her demands against Germany to some degree in the peace negotiations.

(2) Efforts shall be made to obtain from the Soviet Union a promise to maintain neutrality in Japan's war against America and Britain, especially not to lend any military base to them.

(3) It shall be necessary to have Germany recognize a great concession in respect to the recovery of former Soviet territories, etc.

III. When a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Though we do not propose any special diplomatic measures until we have driven out Soviet forces from Eastern Siberia in an armed warfare, the following measures shall be considered:

(1) For the time being, Japan and Germany should lay stress on a war against the Soviet Union and cooperation between them in guiding operations shall be effected as soon as possible.

(2) By the active use of the alliance thought warfare shall be reinforced in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(3) After the rout of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, there may be a case where Japan and Germany, according to the circumstances, shall make peace with the Soviet Union on very lenient terms, and strive to lay their stress again on the war against America and Britain.

(4) In case Germany makes peace with Britain (and America) after the outbreak of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may at the same time try to make peace with Britain and America and try to successfully prosecute the war against the Soviet Union.

/p.111/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.

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/p.111/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.

(1) In the period of the enforcement of military administration in the first stage of military operations, the main aim shall be to secure freedom of operational replenishment. Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, we must not overlook anything in securing strategic naval and air bases against America and also maritime bases. As for the bases against the Soviet Union, we will strive to push them as much as possible to the western part of the war area in accordance with the progress of the war.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621Statement of Source and Authenticity

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Signed at Tokyo on this

17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takahashi
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this17th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

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Page 1

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(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1621B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takehashi, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takehashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

SEAL
Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Japan - Total War

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Page 1

Top Secret

Establishment of East Asia

Maneuvers for the First Period of Total War

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Chapter I

General Policy

The necessary ^{Remote} areas of ~~Heinchiang~~ must be speedily secured to firmly establish a long-term endurance attitude; by practical application of the alliance, the war against the United States of America, Britain and China will be carried out. The preparations for war against Russia will be completed and we will promote the growth of New China, thereby effecting the first step towards the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. If it is unavoidable, we shall wage war against Russia. However, our chief object in pursuing the war to its end lies in the existence and development of our national power and special care should be taken to grasp the right time for war so as not to leave any regrets.

On the termination of the present war, we must endeavour to firmly establish the foundation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. We will make it our minimum requirement to prevent another war with China and we shall equip ourselves at the very least with conditions for the defence of our national independence in that direction.

Chapter II StrategySection I Directing of the War

1. In our resolution to carry out a long period war, strategic points in the defence circle will be occupied, and while we prosecute the war on one hand, our essential powers of self-sufficiency will be strengthened and secured on the other.

In carrying out the war, England will be our main object, and in order to maintain our position of independence and initiative by every means possible we will give special efforts to the destruction of the American and English fleet. We will further strengthen the prohibition of intercourse between the territories under our power and the United States or England, and will destroy the transportation on the west coast of America as much as possible.

We will take strict precautions in particular against the egress of national defence materials for which the United States and England rely on East Asia.

2. Our attitude towards China will be to secure the occupied territories according to the policy previously arranged and to provide for the development of necessary materials. We will promote the growth of these so as to make them contribute towards the establishment of a New China, and in the meanwhile we will endeavour to crush and destroy the hinterland (T.H. - i.e. Chungking) by exhausting their armed forces, their economic abilities and every other measure.

3. We will try to utilize materials which can be procured in the war zones, thus striving to maintain and promote our national power, and at the same time we will complete our military powers so as to be able to overthrow the revived American and English attacks that will follow the lapse of time, especially any change in the European front.

4. We expect good results from the German and Italian domination in the Mediterranean, the counter-blockade on England proper and the destruction of transportation on the east coast of the United States.

With the development of the situation we will do our best to establish contact in (T.H. probably with Germany and Italy) the Indian Ocean.

5. In case of an actual German landing in England proper, we will turn the resulting shock to our own account and further strengthen our power in the sphere of our influence.

6. We hold it as our general policy to avoid war with Russia at present, and will strive for this end. However, preparations must be made to the utmost, to prepare for any change in the situation.

If the unavoidable happens, such as joint operations by the U.S.A. and Russia against Japan within our defence sphere, then we shall seize the opportunity to resort to military methods against Russia.

7. If the Chinese hinterland proposes peace, we are ready to accept it. We will settle Sino-Japanese problems according to our policy previously arranged, and if possible we would like to advance and cooperate with India.

8. We will comply with the request to cooperate in the armistice between Germany and Russia, and we may propose it ourselves according to circumstances. If this is put into practice, our security in the Manchuria-Russian border will be established; if possible, we further /
desire

desire the advance and cooperation of Russia in India and Iran.

In this event, we anticipate a German landing on British soil and also her domination in Africa.

9. The cessation of hostilities between our country and the United States and England will be settled at the same time as that between Germany and England. (The U.S....)

10. At the moment that hostilities cease on the European front, hostilities will be suspended also in the Greater East Asia War. We will try to settle Sino-Japanese matters between ourselves, apart from other problems, as far as possible.

We must strictly guard against Europe and the United States concluding a previous truce at the sacrifice of East Asia. We must also prepare some special way of dealing with things if the worst comes to the worst.

Chapter II

Sec. II The Aims of the Organization of National Power

Part I The Organization of Military Strength

1. The aims of the organization of military power in the first period lie in the prosecuting the war against Chungking and the war against the U.S.A. and Britain, and especially in completing our naval preparations so as to be able to smash their attacks when they regain their strength. In the meantime, we must be thoroughly prepared for a war with Russia.

2. The trend of military preparations of the different powers is as set down in Table No. 1 and their capacity for aggression against East Asia during the next five years generally is estimated as follows: -

Table of the Great Powers' estimated capacity for aggressive warfare against East Asia during the next 5 years.

Classification	Front-line Troop strength (in thousands)	First-line Air strength (in thousands)	Naval craft
Chungking	2000 - 3000	Some	none
The United States of America	700 - 1300	7 - 13	Battleships 28 Carriers 18 Cruisers 91 Destroyers 365 Submarines 200
Britain	500 - 700		Battleships 8 Carriers 8 Cruisers 55 Destroyers 100 Submarines 100
Soviet Union	2000 - 3000	4 - 6	Cruisers 2 Submarines over 100 Destroyers 11

Remarks: 1. Front-line military strength includes, army, naval and air forces. Military strength at home is estimated at almost the same number.
2. Naval forces will change considerably, depending on how many naval battles are fought and with what results.

Accordingly, the countries' basic capacity for operations in East Asia during the first period will be as follows on an average basis, the military strength of the United States, Britain and Russia being estimated to fluctuate up to one third of its total according to the tension or slackening of the European front.

(1) Britain and America combined:

Front-line military strength	1,600,000 men
First-line air strength	10,000 planes
Naval craft:	
Battleships	36
Cruisers	150
Carriers	26
Destroyers	460
Submarines	300

(2) The Soviet Union

Front-line military strength	2,500,000 men
First-line air strength	5,000 planes
Naval craft:	a nucleus of over 100 submarines.

(3) The United States of America, Britain and the Soviet Union combined	4,000,000 men
Front-line military strength	15,000 planes
First-line air strength	
Naval craft	Battleships 36
	Cruisers 150
	Carriers 26
	Destroyers 480
	Submarines 400

(4) China

Front-line military strength	2,000,000 - 3,000,000
Air strength	some number

Our country must carry out the present war on one hand, and on the other, must organize the requisite military strength for the aim of enabling ourselves to smash the operational strength of all these countries.

If our aim is mechanical parity we would require:

Front-line military strength	5,000,000 men
(including the home troops 10,000,000)	
First-line air strength	15,000 planes
Naval craft:	Battleships 36
	Cruisers 150
	Carriers 26
	Destroyers 480
	Submarines 400

3. However, there would be considerable difficulty in bringing this about within the next five years, when we consider the changing situation of modern warfare, the limitations of national power, and especially when we consider the probabilities of the process of establishment. We shall thus establish a separate standard of minimum essentials considering all the various circumstances, but strategy first and foremost. The estimated volume of essential military requirements based on this standard, and the total estimated volume of essential national requirements considered on the basis of the military requirements, will be as follows:-

	Military Requirements	Total National Requirements
Materials for ordinary steel	4,850,000 tons	11,700,000 tons
Materials for special steel	1,180,000 tons	1,400,000 tons
Aluminum	355,000 tons	378,000 tons
Coal	9,896,000 tons	140,508,000 tons
Benzine for aviation	2,500,000 litres	2,520,000 litres
Benzine for motor cars	1,249,000 litres	3,150,000 litres

Refer Table II for details.

Such is the outline of the expansion we aim at for our national industrial power as being necessary for the proper organization of our military power in order to carry out the present warfare.

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Chapter II Section III Occupied Areas (anticipated occupied areas), and Their Strategic Points

1. The chief object of the territories to be occupied in the Greater East Asia War is to secure the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of the war in accordance with what follows. The territories will be decided upon in accordance with the progress of the operations, and on consideration of how best to gradually solidify the foundation for establishing a nucleus group and a small Co-prosperity Sphere.
 - (1) We must secure strategically vital areas which would assist our offensive operations, and at the same time capture the strong-points which would afford a stronghold for the enemy counterattacks.
 - (2) To secure territories which produce materials necessary for the establishment of self-sufficiency in order to complete our capacity for prosecuting the war.
 - (3) To control the areas necessary for the blockade of enemy countries in essential materials and the interception of their commerce and communication.

2. Every care must be taken to procure materials essential to us in the Southern Regions and at the same time we must control and smash the enemy's military and economic counterattacks. We must thoroughly enforce

/ our

our counter-blockade of Chungking and of the U.S.A. and Britain in respect of strategy and urgently needed materials. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. I.

3. In China, we must overthrow the Chungking regime and help the growth of a new China, thereby securing a nucleus group, and ensure that all is well with our procurement of materials essential to us. The essential points that we must pay attention to in the course of the occupation are given in Appendix No. II.

4. In the Northern Regions, we must do our best to secure a basic sphere of national defence and maintain our superiority in strategic position. At the same time, we must ensure that all is well with our procurement of strategic materials. The essential points to which we must pay attention in the course of the occupation are as given in Appendix No. III.

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Chapter II

Section V. The Termination of Hostilities

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Chapter II Section V

Part II Conditions of Security

The main point of the conditions to be secured at the termination of hostilities is to approach as near as possible to the concrete ideal of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, but the extent to which it can be realized depends on our national power at the time, especially on the extent to which we have secured the spoils of our victory, and will also differ according to the length of the war and the general aspect of the world war situation at the time in particular, the position of the countries on our side and the extent of the exhaustion of the countries against us. Any definite prognostication is therefore difficult, and the situation will best be met by reliance on circumstances at the time, and by avoidance of inordinate ambitions.

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We shall accordingly not go into details here, but be content to enunciate the three basic principles.

I When the war is soon over with enemy countries left with a margin of strength.

Our maxim will be the securing of our existence and self-sufficiency in the direction of the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged, though if necessary there is still some scope for mitigation.

(b) In the Southern Regions, we will secure a number of the most important military bases, and establish a preferential hold on essential materials such as petroleum, iron, metals other than iron, and foodstuffs.

(c) (In the Northern Regions, we will settle the problems of the Coastal regions.)

II When the war is brought to an end by a single enemy defeat.

Our maxim will be the establishment of a basis for the building of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Regions, we will secure the necessary military bases. We shall let the Philippines enjoy independence under our protection and guidance and shall put British Malaya and North Borneo under our jurisdiction. We shall establish a special economic zone in the Netherlands East Indies and secure a preferential hold on materials essential for our country with F.I.C., all contributing to the foundation of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere.

(c) In the Northern Regions, we shall take measures to sever East Siberia from the Soviet Union.

III When the war is terminated by an enemy surrender with Japan still left with a margin of strength.

We shall plan the establishment of the smaller Co-prosperity Sphere at a single stroke.

(a) We shall take as our standard for China the policy previously arranged.

(b) In the Southern Region we shall secure in toto all military bases in the smaller Co-prosperity Sphere; the Philippines and Burma will have their independence under our protection and guidance. In the

Netherlands

Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, self-government will be realized and special zones essential for military and economic purposes will be established there. British Malaya and North Borneo will be annexed as Japanese territory and will become the basis of a small scale self-sufficiency sphere. For Australia and India we shall prescribe the necessary economic union.

(c) In the Northern Regions we shall complete the disposal of East Siberia.)

Chapter III

The Establishment of Operational Areas

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Chapter III Section II

The Southern Regions

Part I Military Affairs

1. Policy

The aims of the fundamental policy of the military establishment in the Southern Regions war zone are:

(1) In order to accomplish the aims of the present war, strategic strong points of the most urgent necessity must be secured and controlled.

(2) Although the fulfilment of the demands of the present operations come first, care must be taken to ensure that everything tends in the direction of the establishment of East Asia.

These aims shall be realized in preference to the other policies for the Southern Regions.

In military establishment, provisions necessary for operations and military activities will be first completed, and after that, construction work necessary for the maintenance of public order in the district, general transportation, and the control of communications.

Military administration will be established in the occupied territories during the necessary period of operative activities, to control all the different construction work.

11. Outline.

/(1)

(1) The army and the navy will bear particl responsibility in establishing military administration, according to operational demands, the characteristics of the area in question, and other factors.

(2) Military administration must grasp the principle of the local administration and trivial interventions must be avoided as far as possible. It will try to make use of the existing machinery.

(3) The public peace and order in the occupied territories will be secured as far as possible by the ordinary police system and the native army, with the assistance and support of the expeditionary forces.

(4) Only those of the native armies that have abandoned their hostility and are positively cooperating with our troops will be permitted to exist in the occupied territories. Their organization, and military establishment will be directed by our army. Their chief purpose is to contribute to the establishment of East Asia as members of the peace police. We must do our utmost to use them to the best advantage.

(5) The standard number of the armed forces of the native armies will be about half of their pre-war number, and will be decided upon according to circumstances.

The type of troops will be limited to land troops, it being our principle not to let them have any naval forces for the time being. The Imperial Navy will manage their ships.

Air forces will not exist and all associated establishments and armaments will be confiscated and disposed of by the expeditionary forces.

(6) The Thailand army will be strengthened on condition of its cooperation with us.

(7) Native armies will be widely dispersed, and put under the authority of the expeditionary force to facilitate their supervision.

The necessary arms will be distributed to them, according to circumstances, through the expeditionary forces.

(8) As a general rule, expeditionary forces will be stationed in places necessary for the procurement of articles required by the armed forces, and the control of the areas producing essential materials, but our forces should be concentrated as far as does not interfere with the foregoing, and thereby maintain the elasticity of the army and adjust all the varieties of its equipment so as to ensure its instantaneous operation.

(9) Expenses necessary for the maintenance of the occupation forces will be defrayed in future, wherever possible, by the areas concerned.

(10) For military equipment necessary for operational bases and the guarding of public order refitted enemy equipment will be used for the time being, so as to expedite and execute military and guarding measures.

We shall act according to our previously decided policy in French Indo-China and Thailand.

(11) During the present war, if there is any occasion for our forces to operate in the same district as the Thai army for the same object, the commanding officer of the Imperial expeditionary forces will assume command by mutual understanding of both countries.

This will also apply to the French Indo-China army.

(12) The time for military administration to change to ordinary administration will be generally at the end of the war, after consideration of the actual situation in the areas concerned, though there may be cases when ordinary administration is introduced before the termination of the present war, or the military administration still continued even after the end of the war, according to circumstances.

Part II Politics

No. I

1. The most important object of political construction in the Southern Regions at present is to comply with the demands of the present war, in consideration of the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (cf. Draft Plan of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.) In other words, although, of course, we must crush the tendency in the Southern Regions to rely on the United States and Britain and guide them into a belief in ourselves as the leading nation, we must lay stress on facilitating the procurement and delivery of the necessary military materials, and on carrying out operations.

2. The form of administration in the occupied areas will thus be military administration during the war. As for its organization, a military commanding officer or a governor-general will be appointed to this office, with a number of able officials and civilians under him, called upon to fully administer the occupied territories.

It is necessary to choose from the very first the most able military officers and others for all who are to participate in the military administration, not to mention the governor-general himself.

The military administration will utilize the present administrative system as far as possible, and special care must be taken to restore and utilize the local system.

Concerning

3. Concerning the management of the natives of the occupied territories, it is better not to force assimilative measures even in areas to be later annexed, but to adopt such policies as will agree with the natural abilities of the different races. It will be the policy of military administration to exercise strict control over the natives in all occupied areas who have previously shown hostile feelings towards us, and gradually slacken it. It will be our principle to treat the Europeans and the Americans in the occupied territories as we do the natives.

4. The Chinese in the occupied territories will also be treated in the same way. Strict supervision will be exercised over those who have previously shown hostility, but the others will generally be treated justly with no special measures taken to oppress them. We will take steps to make them cooperate in the accomplishment of the present war, and especially to use their assistance in the settlement of the China Incident. Furthermore, our rule will be to control the southward advance of the ordinary Chinese during the war.

5. The southward advance of the Japanese will aim at the fulfilment of our wartime demands of a military and economic nature, and as a rule, it will be restricted to essential personnel for the occupied territories, great care being taken of their selection and education.

In the agricultural field, the rule will be to limit the advance of the Japanese to technical instructors.

The return of Japanese who have lived in the Southern Regions to the areas concerned will be permitted on a preferential basis only to those who are eligible as occupation members, but they must be selected and trained before returning. Adequate selection and training must also be given to military men discharged overseas and the officials who retire abroad.

Furthermore, when coming in contact with different races, officials and civilians must not feel that they are superior to them or treat them with contempt. On the other hand, they must be careful not to spoil the natives by being too anxious to win their hearts.

No. II

Regional Divisions

1. Thailand

We shall respect the independence of Thailand, our ally, to the utmost, give all necessary assistance such as would contribute to strengthening the position of the present regime, and avoid all interference with domestic affairs. We shall adopt measures to make the /
Government

government of Thailand comply fully of her own free will with our military and economic demands.

The military forces of Thailand will give cooperation necessary for the accomplishment of the common aim. Special precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intentions to separate Japan and Thailand.

We will make the government of Thailand obliterate all anti-Japanese tendencies among the Chinese residents of Thailand. The friendly relations between our government and Thailand should be maintained, and it would be better for the national government not to take any direct measures against the Chinese in Thailand.

2. French Indo-China

For the present, necessary supervision will be exercised over French Indo-China to ensure that she faithfully fulfils the treaty for joint defence and economy, and that the present government of F.I.C. adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.

We shall keep a close watch on German-French relations in Europe and as long as there is no change in the attitude of the French Government, we shall respect French sovereignty, though we shall do our best to bring home to the officials and population of French Indo-China a thorough understanding of the new situation in Europe and Asia, and to plant and promote our power in both military and economic fields.

Although the self government or the participation in politics of the Annamites will have to be recognized to some extent on some proper occasion in the future, for the present we shall not permit their independence movements, though we shall ask France to improve the position and welfare of the natives in general.

3. Hongkong

We shall enforce a policy of dispersing the population under the military administration of the governor-general of the occupied areas, and we shall consider compulsory migration to supply the labour demands in Hainan Island. At present, reconstruction works will be limited to those of military necessity.

4. The Philippines

Military administration will be enforced for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-general, which the Filipinos will gradually be made to run themselves as far as possible. The independence of the Philippines will be accelerated as fast as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as