


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R E V I E W

OF

C E R T A I N R E M A R K S

MADE BY

THE PRESIDENT

WHEN REQUESTED TO RESTORE

GENERAL BEAUREGARD

TO THE COMMAND OF DEPARTMENT No. 2

CHARLESTON:

STEAM-POWER PRESSES OF EVANS & COGSWELL,

3 Broad and 103 East Bay streets.

1862

These pages have been put in print not for general circulation, but for more convenient reading by the gentlemen who signed the paper printed in the Appendix, and marked A.

CHARLESTON, S. C., *February 6*, 1863.

REVIEW of the Remarks of his Excellency President Davis (Richmond, September 13, 1862) relative to an application by many Members of the Confederate Congress for General G. T. Beauregard, C. S. A., to be returned to the command of Department No. 2, consisting of Tennessee and parts of Mississippi and Alabama.

INTRODUCTION.

Before entering on a review of the remarks of the President,* in order to give "a correct and faithful apprehension of the facts" involved, it appears in place to furnish a brief sketch of affairs in the Western department preceding the departure of General Beauregard from Tupelo.

General Beauregard left his army corps in Virginia and went to the West, to an inferior command, at the urgent solicitation of the south-western members of Congress, whose wishes were conveyed to him through Colonel R. A. Pryor, M. C. When the General reached Jackson, Tennessee, about the middle of February, 1862, after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, and the evacuation of Bowling Green, the following was the disposition of the troops in the West and South :

1. General Sidney Johnston's army of Kentucky, consisting of about 17,000 effective men of all arms, had fallen back, across the Cumberland river, on Nashville.

2. Major-General Polk's command, of about 14,000 effectives of all arms, was at Columbus chiefly, with troops at New Madrid and Fort Pillow, and small detachments at one or two

* See Appendix, A and B.

points south of Columbus. This was the command to which General Beauregard was specially assigned.

3. Major-General Bragg's forces were at and about Pensacola and Mobile.

4. Major-General Lovell's command was at and around New Orleans.

5. Major-General Van Dorn's and Price's forces were west of the Mississippi, on the borders of Arkansas and Missouri.

The movements of the enemy had made it apparent, meantime, that he intended to turn the position of our forces in West Tennessee by the way of the Tennessee river, then rising to a favorable stage for navigation, and left open by the fall of Fort Henry. General Beauregard determined to frustrate this design by the immediate evacuation of Columbus, the temporary occupation and fortification of Island 10, and Madrid Bend, on the Mississippi river (represented to be stronger positions by nature than they proved to be), by the construction of additional works at New Madrid, and the concentration, as soon as possible, of all available forces at Corinth, Miss., situated at the intersection of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio railroads.

General Johnston was averse to giving up so important a position as Columbus, but would not interpose his authority as Department commander.

Imbued with a high sense of the cardinal principle in war—*concentration*—a principle illustrated by the military history of all wars, General Beauregard further sought to swell his inadequate force in all possible ways. He called on Generals Bragg and Lovell for their disposable troops. Lovell at once detached for Corinth a fine brigade under General Ruggles, with certain other troops, in all quite 5,000 men, choice troops of all arms. General Bragg referred the matter to the War department, by whom positive orders were declined, and the responsibility was left to him. With the instincts of a good soldier, he determined to withdraw his main force from Pensacola and Mobile, and join General Beauregard, which he did in person at Jackson, Tennessee, about the 1st of March, 1862.

General Van Dorn, also, was strenuously urged by General Beauregard to transfer his whole command to the east bank of the Mississippi, and was already in motion to form the junction before the battle of Shiloh.

The Governors of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee had also been called on by General Beauregard for five thousand men respectively, or as many as could be sent to him.

It was further suggested to the War department that, for the campaign, troops might be spared from Charleston, Savannah, and Knoxville: and in consequence, a brigade was sent, after the battle of Shiloh, from Charleston, and several regiments from Chattanooga by General Kirby Smith. Further, General Sidney Johnston, whose army was now falling back along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, was requested by General Beauregard to send forward to Corinth one or two of his brigades. That judicious commander sent a brigade at once, and announced his determination to make a junction, with his whole force, at Corinth, which, in the main, was effected by the last of March, 1862.

It will thus be seen under what circumstances, at whose instance, and by whose efforts the forces concentrated at Corinth by the 3d day of April, 1862, were mainly brought together at that point, namely: General Beauregard.

These forces consisted of—

1. General Polk's army corps (infantry and artillery)...	9,136
2. General Bragg's army corps, consisting of his original command from Pensacola and Mobile, and Lovell's quota, with the new levies from Louisiana (infantry and artillery).....	13,589
3. The army of Kentucky, now subdivided into Hardee's army corps and reserve division, under Breckinridge (infantry and artillery)	13,228
	<hr/>
	35,953
4. Untrained cavalry, distributed with the three corps....	4,382
	<hr/>
Effectives of all arms.....	40,335

Unfortunately, this army being deficient in general officers, much precious time was lost through the defective organization of the several army corps as they were assembled at Corinth, and in efforts to effect a better organization for the field; and as a consequence, the battle of Shiloh, which ought to have been fought as early as the 1st, could not take place until the

6th of April, during the night of which Buell effected a junction with Grant. This event it was hoped might be averted even by marching from Corinth as late as the 3d of April, but untoward delays, chiefly the result again of defective organization, added to bad roads, lost us one day by the wayside, otherwise the battle would have been fought on the 5th of April, and Buell must have reached the scene twenty-four hours too late.

REVIEW.

The object of the President's allusion to a telegram from General Beauregard to Governor Pickens,* to the effect that General Beauregard's presence was absolutely necessary to the army at Tupelo, was to involve the latter, at least, in an inconsistency, inasmuch as it would appear that a few days thereafter he actually left Tupelo and his command.

Will any unprejudiced mind fail to comprehend that although General Beauregard might be averse to a permanent separation from an army that he had brought together, organized,† and handled in battle, and might look upon such a separation as fraught with public and personal injury, he might nevertheless regard it as a duty, both to the country and himself, in his situation, to withdraw for a few weeks from the vexatious, distracting minor details of military administration, and seek temporary rest and respite from the cares which hamper and harass the commander of a volunteer army, especially when able to leave the execution of his plans of organization and preparation for offensive operations in the hands of so excellent an officer as General Bragg, his second in command, assisted by his Chief of Staff, who knew fully the details of all those plans as well as general views and expectations?

Is there not in reality a wide difference between a permanent separation from the command of the army at Tupelo, such as was involved in the transfer to a command in Charleston, one-third of the size of the former in number, and a *temporary* absence of probably less than a month,‡ for obtaining health, quiet, and time for reflection upon the momentous trust committed to his charge? Undoubtedly so, more especially when constant telegraphic communication, and a distance easily

* See Appendix, C.

† See Appendix, J.

‡ See Appendix, F and H.

travelled over on a near railroad in fifteen hours, made his absence not at all hazardous.

True, as the President says, Columbus, Ky., had been abandoned; and, it may be remarked, it was a great mistake to have *strongly* occupied so advanced a position, one so easily turned, and especially when left without a supporting army. True, that Island 10 had fallen, but after having served substantially the purpose for which it had been occupied and held, viz: as an obstacle to any movement of the enemy by the river on Memphis. True, moreover, that Memphis was in the hands of the enemy, but not until the occupation of Corinth so long and late in the season had served to force him to mass his troops, at an enormous expense of men and money, for its reduction, and until time had been gained for the fortification of Vicksburg: *then* was it successfully abandoned—a mere barren waste—to the enemy. It will, however, be the province of impartial history to investigate and record whether these losses were due to the incapacity of our generals in the field, or to a want of forecast, and the neglect on the part of the government to develop the abundant resources of the country, and to provide sufficient and timely means for the effective defence of that important region.

Lovell may have telegraphed the War department that he would abandon Vicksburg if not reinforced; possibly, too, the people in that quarter had lost confidence in him after the mishap at New Orleans; yet when General Bragg and, subsequently, General Van Dorn were ordered to relieve him not a soldier was detached with either.

It so happened that when the telegram of the President to General Bragg was handed to General Beauregard he had just returned from riding with Surgeons Brodie and Choppin, of his Staff, who had again urged him to take advantage of the lull in military operations, while preparations were being made for the summer campaign, to take at least a brief rest from the labors incident to his immediate presence with the troops. They both assured him that, from the nature of his disease (a severe, protracted laryngitis), it was absolutely necessary for him to have repose and relaxation. He being in more pain than usual, owing to the great quantity of dust on the road upon which he had been riding, had then agreed to follow their

advice, and seek, if possible, the restoration of his health, until General Bragg should inform him the army was ready in all things for the offensive. Made aware of the telegram of the President detaching that officer, General Beauregard telegraphed at once* the necessity for General Bragg's presence with the army, in consequence of his own urgent, absolute need of respite for "a while" from duty during the period of reorganization and preparation then going on. General Bragg also telegraphed his inability to leave under the circumstances.

It is pertinent here to state that there seemed to be an incomprehensible desire on the part of the government to deprive General Beauregard of the assistance of General Bragg, whose services had been reported to the War department on a former occasion as indispensable to the army in consequence of the physical condition of General Beauregard. The latter officer was considered by his physicians and his friends (from the time he arrived in Jackson, Tenn., February 17, 1862, until he left Tupelo, Miss., June 17, 1862) more fit for a hospital than for the field; but when urged by them to retire for a while from the command of the department, he invariably answered: "The condition of affairs did not permit it; that he had entered in this contest with the firm determination of sacrificing, if necessary, not only all he possessed, but his life also; and whether he died from sickness, or on the battlefield, the country was welcome to the sacrifice." When, however, he found the possibility of recruiting his health by an absence of only a few weeks, he did not hesitate to do so, for the purpose of soon resuming offensive operations; and had the President awaited the explanatory letters to the Adjutant-General of the 15th and 25th June, already referred to, instead of acting on the spur of the moment, after misreading an important telegram, he would, doubtless, have adopted a different course.

It was General Beauregard, be it here noted, who had undertaken the fortification of Vicksburg, who had sent his engineers thither with plans and instructions to execute the work; it was he, also, who had (while at Corinth) urged its defence to the last.† General Beauregard, therefore, knew the defensive

* See Appendix, E.

† See his letter on files of the War department relative to defences of Vicksburg, September 24, 1862.

resources of the position; and, at the time, probably better than the War department, the offensive capacities of the enemy: moreover, he was then in constant communication with General Lovell, whom he expected at that very moment to see and confer with at Tupelo (in consequence of information received from him to that effect) as to the summer's operations, with a view to a co-operation of forces. And it may be further stated that General Lovell did reach Tupelo that same evening. Under the circumstances, it is but fair to suppose General Beauregard knew better than any one in Richmond or distant from the theatre of war, the precise condition of affairs and the needs of Vicksburg, as compared with those of his own department; hence his assumption of the responsibility of retaining General Bragg until further orders.

The President says (according to the committee) the latter officer stated in his dispatch that General Beauregard had left on sick certificate for *four months*; this must be an error; and the President assuredly must have confounded what General Bragg wrote with the terms of General Beauregard's dispatch of 14th June, *misreading the latter*, as may be seen; that is, misplacing the punctuation, as the context ought to have shown to any one reading it with care. The passage misconstrued is as follows: "I am leaving for a while on surgeons' certificate—for four months I have delayed obeying their urgent recommendations." From this it is plain that the absence was to be but temporary, that it is "for a while," and not "for four months," or one-third of a year.

The opinions of the surgeons, and the manifest physical needs of General Beauregard, were better standards, it is submitted, of what he should have done than the opinion of any one far from his head-quarters, and not well informed of the circumstances bearing on the case. The President was pleased to say that "General Beauregard should have remained at Tupelo, even if he had to be carried about on a litter," until General Bragg's return, or for at least two or three weeks.

Probably the President is not aware that General Beauregard has already shown his devotion to the service by going to the immediate scene of the battle of Shiloh *in an ambulance*, when unable to endure the fatigue of riding. He would have been found ready to do the same again, at Tupelo, had he, the

commanding general of the forces, not been amply assured of what events have subsequently proven, that an early attack by the enemy was not possible, and that any active movement on our side was out of the question during the period of his proposed absence. But with full knowledge of his own ills, the continuous and strenuous solicitations of his surgeons, he left under the stress of an absolute necessity, simply to secure a period of future usefulness to his country—a future capacity to lead his countrymen in battle.

Every day he remained on duty at Tupelo (where the dust was excessive, as already stated) was calculated to make chronic and incurable the malady under which he suffered; as any one must have been satisfied who had seen him at Manassa, and subsequently at Corinth or Tupelo. To attempt to chain him to the routine duties of the commander of an army during the stage of constrained inaction inevitable from *our want of means of transportation and strength for a forward movement* against an enemy as yet undivided, and when, at the same time, our forces were beyond the probable offensive attempts of that enemy, is untenable. And, it may be affirmed, no “military man” *will say* that General Beauregard, who commanded a department, should have remained at Tupelo under the circumstances one day longer.

Instead of “remaining two or three weeks longer, while General Bragg should repair to Vicksburg,” he left because it is notorious that he hoped within a month, at latest, means of transportation would have been accumulated, and such a division of the enemy’s forces (which did actually happen as anticipated) would come to pass as would enable him to take the offensive and strike an effective blow.

With the rest and quiet to be gained by relief from his labors, he expected to fit himself to the utmost of his capacities for the high trust imposed on him; to have remained would have destroyed his future usefulness.

The President was also pleased to remark that “General Beauregard had left the army without permission,” and was “without right to leave on a surgeon’s certificate.” It may be safely answered that it would be difficult for any one to show the regulation which forbids the commander of a department from quitting it on a surgeon’s certificate—even the subordinate

officers and privates enjoy the right denied the commanding general. It was in the power and province of General Beauregard, as department commander, to have given up the immediate command of the forces at Tupelo at any time, and, in the exercise of his own judgment, to have gone to remote parts of the department, to Grenada for instance, where he had troops in the field under General Villepigue. Had he done so, he would have been further removed (in respect to time) from the main force at Tupelo than while at Bladon Springs, or even Mobile. At one time, for example, General Sidney Johnston proposed to General Beauregard, at Corinth, to turn over the command of the troops, and remove his own head-quarters to Memphis, or some other point in the department.

General Bragg took one of his corps (army of the Mississippi), at his own instance, into the department of General Kirby Smith; General Jos. E. Johnston can, at his pleasure, establish his head-quarters at Vicksburg, Jackson, Grenada, Mobile, Chattanooga, etc., unless otherwise ordered, and General Beauregard can do likewise with regard to Charleston, Savannah, etc.

It is true that General Beauregard, in his telegram of the 14th June, did not state where he intended going; but the whole dispatch showed that he could not be going far; while in his letter of the 15th June* he did expressly make known his movements and future plans.

“So long as Beauregard remained invested with the command of the department,” says the President, “Bragg was only the commander of the army at Tupelo; he could not correspond with the War department except through Beauregard, and no orders could be issued to other forces in the department at Vicksburg or elsewhere, except through Beauregard; and under these circumstances a change of the head of the department was absolutely necessary for the public interests.”

It is believed the honorable gentlemen of the committee misunderstood the President in all this, for the following reasons:

Although the contemplated period of his absence, and the nature of his departmental duties, might well have prevented

* See Appendix, F.

General Beauregard from surrendering command of the department, yet he did, nevertheless, turn over the *entire* command when he left Tupelo. This he stated explicitly in his letter of the 15th June. But grant that this fact was not known on the 20th, when General Bragg was directed to assume "permanently" the command of the department; there was no obstacle whatever to unrestricted communication between the War department and General Bragg. In an army, as in a monarchy, "the king never dies." All communications addressed to the commander of an army are always opened by the commander present, or his staff. The War department could then have experienced no difficulty on that score; moreover, when General Beauregard was present in chief command, within half a mile of General Bragg's head-quarters, his Excellency communicated with the latter *directly*, and ordered him (not through General Beauregard) to go to Vicksburg, situated in another department, that of General Lovell, although, indeed, when the latter officer was ordered, a few days thereafter, to be relieved by General Van Dorn, the order was sent "through General Bragg."

Moreover, General Beauregard corresponded directly with the War department when in command of a corps at Manassa, under General Jos. E. Johnston, commanding the department, and also when he commanded an army in Western Tennessee, under General A. S. Johnston. It is believed, further, that at this moment both Generals Bragg and Pemberton, commanding armies under General Jos. E. Johnston, correspond directly with the War department, copies of orders to them being sent merely to that officer; a course which was not adopted in the case ordering General Bragg to Vicksburg—for to this day General Beauregard has no official copy of that order.

To give command to General Beauregard, and "put a new commander at the head of the army after General Bragg had taken the field, and when that officer had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the department, Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall, would be so prejudicial to the public interests he would not do it if the whole world united in the petition"—so says the President.

This would be quite well founded in a difficult campaign, with troops and general officers who had never served under

General Beauregard; but they were mainly his own troops, reported to have great confidence in him, and it is permitted to doubt whether General Bragg could not have explained fully to General Beauregard, in the course of an hour's conversation, all the plans and arrangements which have since been carried into effect in Tennessee and Kentucky. Moreover, General Beauregard had studied thoroughly the operations on that theatre of war, and had offered to the War department* a plan of campaign, subsequently made public by the enemy, who captured a copy while *in transitu* to be filed.

It is true the defence of Charleston and Savannah is of vital importance to the Confederacy, and their loss, or the loss of either, would be fraught with immeasurable mischief. Yet a general of the highest capacity, the utmost fitness for the responsible trust of their defence, cannot successfully defend them without means adequate to the end in view. Had either place been seriously attacked as early after General Beauregard's arrival in that department as was confidently expected, disaster must have been the consequence.

Up to this date not a regiment (except some ninety days state reserves) has been added to, but one subtracted from the force, and heavy guns have only been added to the armament of the works by pertinacious applications to the War department, through an officer sent specially for that purpose, or (beyond a certain limited number of 10-inch Columbiads) by an exchange of four or five lighter for each additional heavy gun.

It is worthy of record here that after General Beauregard was relieved, the limits of Department No. 2 were soon increased by the absorption into it of two other departments, namely: that under General Forney, and the one commanded by General Van Dorn (Lovell's).

It has been no agreeable task to write the foregoing, but it was required in vindication of the truth of history, and has been done with the endeavor

“Naught to extenuate, nor set down aught in malice.”

Charleston, S. C., January, 1863.

* See Appendix. I.

APPENDIX.

A.

To the President of the Confederate States :

SIR—The undersigned, senators and representatives in Congress from the western and south-western states, have learned with pleasure that General Beauregard, restored in health, has reported for duty, and that he has been assigned to the command of South Carolina and Georgia. They have also been reliably informed that the General is anxious and eager to return to the command of the army of the West.

Without in any manner desiring to interfere with the military dispositions of the government, or with the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief of all the forces, they would respectfully submit that a due regard, consistent with the best interests of the country, should be paid to the wishes of one who has given such proofs of disinterested devotion to our cause, and who has contributed so much by his generalship to insure the success of our arms. Compelled by the exigencies of the country to separate himself from his army of the Potomac to go west in a new field, at a most gloomy period of our revolution; then with scanty resources to form a new army under every possible disadvantage, consequent upon the unexpected fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, he was found equal to every emergency; and then at the battle of Shiloh, and in the masterly retreat from Corinth, saved that army

Broken in health, and worn out by the cares and anxiety of the great responsibility of his position, he sought a restoration of health in a temporary absence from his command, and is now, with invigorated health and renewed patriotic zeal, ready to return to active operations in the field.

We know the enthusiasm with which his return would inspire our noble army, who long to see him, and that the worthy general commanding would be rejoiced and gladdened by his presence. As representatives, aforesaid, knowing well the sentiments and wishes of the people we represent, we unhesi-

tatingly say that the restoration of General Beauregard to the army of the West would be hailed with great joy by them; and without detracting from the acknowledged merit and well earned reputation of the present commander, we respectfully submit that a new guarantee for the success of our arms would be given. For these reasons we earnestly ask the President to duly consider the expressed desire of General Beauregard, ere he be definitely assigned to any position. Understanding that the assignment of General Beauregard to Charleston has been pressed upon the government by the Governor and Council of South Carolina, we tender herewith the names of the representatives of that state, as expressive of their assent to our petition.

It is but justice to General Beauregard to say that this step is taken without his knowledge or consent.

A true copy.

(Signed)

CHS. J. VILLERE,
Representative in Congress.

<i>Signers.</i>	<i>State.</i>		<i>Signers.</i>	<i>State.</i>	
Ed. Sparrow	La.	Sen.	— Menees.....	Texas.	Rep.
T. J. Semmes	"	"	C. W. Bell.....	Mo.	"
W. L. Yancey.. .. .	Ala.	"	C. J. Villere	La.	"
L. C. Haynes	Tenn.	"	G. D. Royston	Ark.	"
H. C. Burnet.....	Ky.	"	J. M. Elliott.	Ky.	"
J. B. Clark	Mo.	"	David Clopton	Ark.	"
— Peyton	"	"	G. W. Ewing.....	Ky.	"
G. A. Henry	Tenn.	"	W. M. Cooke.....	Mo.	"
L. J. Wigfall.....	Texas.	"	F. S. Lyon	Ala.	"
J. Perkins, Jr.....	La.	Rep.	F. J. Foster	"	"
C. M. Conrad	"	"	E. M. Bruce	Ky.	"
J. Wilcox.....	Texas.	"	A. H. Garland.....	Ark.	"
P. W. Gray	"	"	G. G. Vest.....	Mo.	"
T. B. Sexton	"	"	J. W. Crocket	Ky.	"
J. C. Atkins.. . . .	Tenn.	"	W. R. Machen	"	"
W. G. Swan.....	"	"	H. R. Wright.....	Ga.	"
H. S. Foote	"	"	M. D. Graham	Texas.	"
T. B. Handley	Ark.	"	D. M. Currin	Tenn.	"
H. W. Bruce	Ky.	"	G. B. Hodge.....	Ky.	"
R. J. Breckinridge	"	"	H. E. Read.....	"	"
W. R. Smith	Ala.	"	Wm. H. Tibbs	Tenn.	"
E. L. Gardenshire	Tenn.	"	J. L. M. Curry.....	Ala.	"
J. W. Moore	Ky.	"	A. W. Conrow	Mo.	"
D. F. Kenner	La.	"	F. W. Freeman.....	"	"
L. C. Dupre.....	"	"	Wm. Porcher Miles.....	S. C.	"
E. S. Dargan.	Ala.	"	M. L. Bonham	"	"
F. J. Batson	Ark.	"	W. W. Boyce	"	"
J. B. Heiskell.....	Tenn.	"	F. Farrow.....	"	"
T. A. Harris	Mo.	"	J. McQueen	"	"
C. C. Herbert	Texas.	"			

B.

Notes of an interview with the President relative to transferring back General Beauregard to the command of Department No. 2.

RICHMOND, *September 13, 1862.*

General Sparrow and myself this day called on the President and delivered to him a petition signed by about fifty members and senators from the western and south-western states, in which the restoration of Beauregard to the command of the army now under Bragg was solicited, it being stated in the petition that it was known that Bragg would welcome the restoration of Beauregard. The President received it politely, and immediately read it aloud in our presence, making "*en passant*" some running comments on the correctness of some of the facts stated in the petition. He then calmly and dispassionately read aloud all the signatures attached to the petition. Having sent to an adjoining office for five or six dispatches, he read them aloud in the order they were sent or received, according to date, and accompanied them in a calm manner with the following explanation, prefacing it with the remark that he supposed we had not a correct and faithful apprehension of the facts. He stated that on the day preceding his first dispatch commanding Bragg to proceed to Vicksburg (14th June, I think) he received a dispatch from Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, informing him that Beauregard (to whom Pickens had previously sent a dispatch requesting him to come to Charleston and take command there) had replied that his presence was *absolutely necessary* to the army at Tupelo, and that he could not leave it. He (the President) further stated that the following condition of things existed at that time: Columbus and Island No. 10 had surrendered, Fort Pillow was evacuated, Memphis was abandoned, the enemy were taking possession of the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and threatening a descent through Mississippi; that New Orleans had fallen, and the disposition seemed to be to give up everything; that he had just received a dispatch from Lovell, stating unless reinforced he would abandon Vicksburg; besides all this, he knew the people had no confidence in Lovell, and would not serve under him. He at once determined to send Bragg to Vicksburg, and on 15th June, I think, telegraphed to

Bragg to proceed at once to Vicksburg, as the danger was pressing and imminent, and that the assignment of him to Vicksburg *was but temporary*. Bragg immediately replied by telegraph (16th or 17th, I do not now remember) that Beauregard had retained him at Tupelo, he, Beauregard, being in bad health, desired temporary repose, and intended to leave the army for a short period, and concluded by saying he would await further orders. When this dispatch arrived in Richmond the President was at Raleigh; as soon as he received it from the Adjutant-General he telegraphed Bragg to go *at once* to Vicksburg—the danger was pressing and imminent, and he was sorry he had permitted anything to interfere with his orders. Bragg replied on 18th or 19th that Beauregard *had left* on a surgeon's certificate of *four months*, stating, however, that Beauregard would return in a short time, and as soon as the army was reorganized. I forget the exact terms of the dispatch. It conveyed the idea of Beauregard's absence being temporary and of no very long duration; but how long was uncertain, and where he had gone was not stated. Bragg informed the President his presence had now become absolutely necessary to the army, and that he awaited further orders. The President replied giving Bragg the command of the department, and ordered Van Dorn to Vicksburg through Bragg. The President stated that under these circumstances every military man will say that Beauregard should have remained at Tupelo, even if he had to be carried about in a litter. He knew that Bragg's assignment to Vicksburg was but temporary, and he ought to have waited at least two or three weeks; that he left the army under these circumstances *without permission*, and that he had *no right* to leave on a surgeon's certificate without permission, and he had not stated where he had gone; that so long as Beauregard remained invested with the command of the department Bragg was only the commander of that army at Tupelo; that Bragg could not correspond with the War department except through Beauregard, and no orders could be issued to other forces in the department at Vicksburg or elsewhere, except through Beauregard as head of the department, and therefore, under the circumstances, a change of the head of the department was absolutely necessary for the public interest. The President,

though stating the irregularities of Beauregard's conduct in leaving the army, said he had overlooked all that, and disavowed its influence on his conduct, and based his action exclusively on the public interests at that time.

That so far as giving Beauregard command of Bragg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the department, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall, and to put a new commander at the head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the petition. He further stated that Charleston was no unimportant command, that Charleston and Savannah were of vast consequence to the Confederacy, and as he believed General Beauregard's qualifications peculiarly fitted him for its defence, he had selected him on that account, as the best man in the army for the South Carolina and Georgia department. The President read aloud to us all the dispatches spoken of above. I may not therefore give their tenor accurately; he promised us copies, and moreover authorized us to repeat what passed in conversation. The above, however, is substantially what passed as far as I can recollect; it is not all that passed, nor do I pretend to give the exact language.

(Signed)

THS. J. SEMMES.

C.

By telegraph from Columbia, S. C.

JUNE 12, 1862.

TO General BEAUREGARD :

Sorry to hear of your ill health and affliction. Sea air good for you. We want you to fight our batteries again. We must now defend Charleston. Please come, as the President is willing, at least for the present. Answer.

(Signed)

F. W. PICKENS.

Answer to above.

Would be happy to do so, but my presence absolutely required here at present. My health still bad. No doubt sea air would restore it — but have no time to take care of it.

(Signed)

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

D.

[Certificate No. 3.]

HEAD-QUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Tupelo, June 14, 1862.

We hereby certify that after attendance upon General Beauregard for the past four months, and treatment of his case, that in our professional opinion he is incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present command, and we urgently recommend rest and recreation.

(Signed)

R. S. BRODIE,

Surgeon P. A. C. S.

SAM. CHOPPIN,

Surgeon P. A. C. S.

N. B.—Certificate No. 1 was given in Jackson, Tenn., dated February —, 1862.

Certificate No. 2 bears date Corinth, April 24, 1862.

E.

[Telegram.]

TUPELO, *June 14, 1862.*

General SAM. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va. :

General Bragg has just communicated to me a telegram sending him to relieve, temporarily, General Lovell. His presence here I consider indispensable at this moment, especially as I am leaving for a while on surgeons' certificate. For four months I have delayed obeying their urgent recommendations in that respect. I desire to be back here in time to retake the offensive as soon as our forces shall have been sufficiently reorganized. I must have a short rest.

(Signed)

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

F.

HEAD-QUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
Tupelo, Miss., June 15, 1862.

GENERAL :

After delaying as long as possible to obey the oft repeated recommendations of my physicians to take some rest for the restoration of my health, I have concluded to take advantage of the present lull in the operations of this army, due to the necessity of attending to its organization and discipline, and to the uncertain movements of the enemy, for absenting myself for a short while from here, hoping to be back in time to assume the offensive at the earliest moment practicable. Meanwhile, I will transfer the command of the forces and of this department to the next officer in rank, General B. Bragg, furnishing him with such instructions as will enable him to give all orders required during my absence.

I propose leaving here to-morrow, at 12, m., for Mobile, where I will remain a day or two, inspecting the condition of its defences, and will offer to Brigadier-General Forney such advice as, in my judgment, may be necessary, and he may be willing to accept. I will then repair to Bladon Springs, on the Tombigbee river, about seventy-five miles north of Mobile, where I will remain about one week or ten days, or long enough to restore my shattered health.

Very resp'y your obd't servant,

(Signed)

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General Commanding.

G.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, June 23, 1862.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Mobile, Ala. :

GENERAL—I enclose copies of a telegram from the President to General Bragg, and of a letter which I have addressed to him.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

GEO. W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

[By telegraph.]

RICHMOND, *June 20, 1862.*

General BRAXTON BRAGG,

Tupelo, Miss. :

Your dispatch informing me that General Beauregard had turned over the command to you and left for Mobile on surgeons' certificate, was duly received. You are assigned permanently to the command of the department, as will be more formally notified to you by the Secretary of War. You will correspond directly, and receive orders and instructions from the government in relation to your future operations.

(Signed) JEFFERSON DAVIS.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,

Richmond, June 23, 1862.

General BRAXTON BRAGG,

Commanding Army of the West, Tupelo, Miss. :

GENERAL—You have no doubt received a telegram from the President assigning you permanently to the command turned over to you by General Beauregard. I write to inform you officially of the fact, and to request that you will correspond with and receive instructions from this department, and consider yourself as the commander-in-chief of the forces within your department. I do not wish to be understood as restricting General Lee's functions. They continue as heretofore.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) GEO W RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War.

H.

MOBILE, ALA., *June 25, 1862.*

GENERAL :

Enclosed please find the certificate* of my physicians, members of my general Staff as inspectors, recommending that I

* Dated Tupelo, June 14, 1862.

should withdraw for a while from the command of Department No. 2. This is the third certificate to the same effect I have received from them since my arrival at Jackson, Tenn.; but finding, or believing, that my presence until now was absolutely necessary with the forces under my command, I persistently refused to avail myself of their recommendation until the present moment, when I feel that in justice to myself and to the cause I am endeavoring to defend, I must take a little rest, and retire for a while from the active scenes of life to which I have been accustomed for the last sixteen months. I will, for the present, repair to Bladon Springs, Ala., where I will be always ready to obey any orders of the department (regardless of my health) to resume the active duties of the field whenever circumstances will require that I should be so ordered.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General C. S. A.

General SAM. COOPER,

Adjutant-General C. S. A., Richmond, Va.

I.

General Beauregard to General Braxton Bragg.

[Confidential.]

CULLUM SPRINGS, BLADON, ALA., *July 28, 1862.*

MY DEAR GENERAL:

Your letter of the 22d inst. was received only last night. I give you with pleasure the following views on your proposed operations from Tupelo, for I wish you the amplest success, both on your and the country's account.

You have evidently but one of four things to do: First, to attack Halleck at Corinth; second, to attack Buell at or about Chattanooga; third, to attack Grant at or about Memphis; fourth, to remain idle at Tupelo.

From what you state the first is evidently inadmissible, and the last cannot be entertained for one moment, for action—action—action is what we require.

Now, with regard to the other two propositions, it is evident

that unless you reinforce General E. K. Smith, at Chattanooga, he will be overpowered by Buell, and that our communication with the East, and our supplies at Atlanta, Augusta, etc., will be cut off; also, that a partial reinforcement would so weaken you at Tupelo, as to paralyze you for any other movements from there; hence you have adopted the wisest course in sending to Smith all your available forces, except just enough to guard your depots, etc., to the rear of your present position at Tupelo.

The third proposition would have afforded you some success, but not as brilliant and important in its results as the second one, if the newspapers will permit you to carry it successfully into effect; for Halleck and Buell, occupying the base of a long isosceles triangle, of which Mobile is the apex, could get to Chattanooga before you if they should become aware of your movements, and then you would have to contend again with superior forces, as usual to us. The moment you get to Chattanooga you ought to take the offensive, keeping in mind the following grand principles of the art of war:

First, always bring the masses of your army in contact with the fractions of the enemy; second, operate as much as possible on his communications without exposing your own; third, operate always on interior or shorter lines. I have no doubt that with anything like equal numbers you will always meet with success.

I am happy to see that my two lieutenants, Morgan and Forrest, are doing such good service in Kentucky and Tennessee. When I appointed them I thought they would leave their mark wherever they passed.

By the way, I think we ought hereafter, in our official papers, to call the "Yankees" "Abolitionists" instead of "Federals," for they now proclaim not only the abolition of slavery, but of all our constitutional rights; and that name will have a stinging effect on our Western enemies. I intend to issue a general order on the subject whenever I assume a command.

Sincerely your friend,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General BRAXTON BRAGG,

Commanding Department No. 2, Mobile, Alabama.

General Beauregard to Adjutant-General Cooper.

[Confidential.]

MOBILE, ALA., September 5, 1862.

GENERAL:

Under the supposition that on the restoration of my health I would be returned to the command of Department No. 2, I had prepared while at Bladon, Ala., a plan of operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based on my knowledge of that part of the theatre of war; but hearing that my just expectations are to be disappointed, I have the honor to communicate it to the War department, in the hope that it may be of service to our arms and to our cause. It was submitted by me to General Bragg on the 2d inst.

By looking at the map it will be seen that the forces operating in that section of country will be separated at first by one river (the Tennessee), and afterward by two (the Tennessee and Cumberland), hence they will be unable to support each other, being unprovided with pontoon trains; but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will first refer to those in East Tennessee and then to those west of it.

In the first case, our objective points must be, first Louisville, and then Cincinnati. How best to reach them from Chattanooga, with Buell at Huntsville and Stevenson, is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations, the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, and that if we advance toward our objective points without getting rid of him, we would expose our lines of communication with Chattanooga. We must, then, give him battle first, or compel him to retire before us.

Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing), we will be advancing toward Louisville; but should he venture on Florence or Savannah, to unite his forces with Rosecrans and Grant, we will have to concentrate enough of our forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when we would be able to resume our march as before indicated. We must, however, as soon as practicable, construct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for otherwise our

communication would be cut off by the enemy as soon as those two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gun-boats and transports.

The best positions for said works are about forty miles below Forts Donelson and Henry, not far from Eddysville, where those two rivers come within one and a half mile of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation where a strong field-work could be constructed for a garrison of about twenty-five hundred or three thousand men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) against a large army. Under the guns of this work, and along the bank of each river, a series of batteries, armed with the heaviest guns (eight, nine, ten inch, and rifled guns), could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers.

When Louisville shall have fallen into our possession, I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible, so completely that future travellers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankee vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of our army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main body would be marching to Cincinnati; but if we could get boats enough it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.

Now, for the operation of Western Tennessee. The object should be to drive the enemy from there and resume the command of the Mississippi river.

For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army, and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dorn's. From there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident that the forces at Memphis and Yazoo river would then have their line of communication by the river with the North cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth, and Jackson, Tennessee, to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their

lines of communication would be cut off also. We would then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or the Ohio at Paducah.

We would thus compel the enemy to evacuate the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss on our part of only a few hundred men. General Price could then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy.

The armament and ammunition of the works referred to should be collected as soon as possible at Meridian and Chattanooga.

Such are the operations which I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the President had judged proper to order me back to the command of that army which I had, with General Bragg's assistance, collected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my shattered health, while my presence could be spared from it, and until he informed me that it was ready to take the offensive.

Hoping for its entire success, I remain, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General C. S. A.

J

[GENERAL ORDERS.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE FORCES,
Corinth, Miss., March 29, 1862.

I. The undersigned assumes the command and immediate direction of the armies of Kentucky, and of the Mississippi, now united; and which, in military operations, will be known as the army of the Mississippi.

II. General *G. T. Beauregard* will be second in command to the commander of the forces.

III. The army of the Mississippi will be subdivided into three army corps, and reserves of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, as follows:

1. The first corps, under the command of Major-General *L. Polk*, to consist of the grand division now under his com-

mand, as originally organized, less the artillery and cavalry herein after limited and detached as reserves, and the garrison of Fort Pillow, and the works for defence of Madrid bend, already detached from that command.

2. The second corps, under Major-General *Braxton Bragg*, to consist of the second grand division of the army of the Mississippi, less the artillery and cavalry herein after limited and detached as reserves.
3. The third corps, under Major-General *W. J. Hardee*, to consist of the army of Kentucky, less the cavalry, artillery, and infantry herein after limited and detached as reserves.
4. The infantry reserve, under command of Major-General *G. B. Crittenden*, shall be formed of a division of not less than two brigades.

IV The brigades of each army corps, and of the reserve, will be so formed as to consist severally of about 2,500 total, infantry, and one light battery of six pieces if practicable.

V Divisions shall consist of not less than two brigades, and of one regiment of cavalry.

VI. All cavalry and artillery not herein before assigned to divisions and brigades will be held in reserve—the cavalry under Brigadier-General — *Hawes*, the artillery under an officer to be subsequently announced.

VII. All general orders touching matters of organization, discipline, and conduct of the troops, published by General *G. T. Beauregard* to the army of the Mississippi, will continue in force in the whole army until otherwise directed, and copies thereof will be furnished to the third army corps and the reserves.

VIII. Major-General *Braxton Bragg*, in addition to his duties as commander of the second army corps, is announced as “Chief of the Staff” to the commander of the forces.

(Signed) A. S. JOHNSTON,
General C. S. A.

NOTE.—The above organization of the forces at Corinth was submitted by General *G. T. Beauregard*, second in command, and adopted by General *A. S. Johnston*, first in command, without any alteration whatever.

THOMAS JORDAN, *A. A. G.*

April 15, 1862.

