


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THE LEAGUE AND ITS GUARANTEES

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BY

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY



LONDON :

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION,
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*The writer of this pamphlet is alone responsible
for expressions of opinion contained in it,*

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
SEVEN PAMPHLETS

for Study Circles

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE LEAGUE AND ITS GUARANTEES. *By Professor Gilbert Murray*

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The League and Its Guarantees.

I.

The League of Nations is an attempt to meet a new and peculiar international situation. Hitherto it has been usual to make wars, so to speak, on limited liability. The stakes for winner and loser were heavy but not absolutely matters of life and death. The area of war was apt to spread, but not to spread over the whole world. Above all the necessary preparations, though very expensive, were not absolutely destructive and all-absorbing. But the Great War has changed the prospect. The "Next War," if it ever comes, will probably involve the whole world; the defeated party, and probably the victors also, will be utterly ruined and almost blotted from the face of the earth; and the mere necessary preparations for such a war, in the matter of policy and armament, will be such as to absorb practically the whole wealth and energy of the nations and leave no room over for anything beyond the bare struggle for life.

Consequently the nations have said to one another: "We none of us want another war. But as long as there is any danger of its coming we must make it our first care and the very foundation of our policy. We must increase our armies and navies to the utmost limit, we must make secret alliances, grab strategic frontiers, and—since the competition will be ruinous—we must each be ready, as soon as ever we are in a position of advantage, to strike suddenly with our whole force. We hate this prospect. We want to live at peace with our neighbours and to devote our energies to improving the material conditions and developing the higher life of our own peoples . . . if only we could be free from the danger of being attacked and destroyed. If any superior power can guarantee us against this fear of attack, as the Law guarantees the ordinary private citizen in a well-governed community, then we could cease plotting mutual destruction; but where is there such a power?" And the answer has been made: "Let us form a League of all nations, and guarantee one another."

“ A General Association of Nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to small and great States alike: ” such is the description of the League of Nations in Mr. Wilson's Fourteenth Point.

A guarantee in this context implies both a promise and a security that the promise will be fulfilled. Let us consider what exactly are the “specific covenants” under which the nations make these promises to one another and what security they offer for their fulfilment.

The first specific covenant is contained in Art. X., and deals specifically with **“ political independence and territorial integrity. ”** The Members of the League undertake (1) to respect and (2) to preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. That is, all the members agree that they will not themselves try to seize territory by war, nor take away the existing independence of any nation by war; and that they will unite to prevent any other nation doing so.

This engagement both relieves all peaceful nations of their most pressing fear and removes from possible aggressors their chief motive. It seems the first and most obvious of the “mutual guarantees” on which the League must be founded. Objection, however, is sometimes made to the acceptance of the *status quo* or existing state of affairs as a starting point.

“ We are not clear,” it is said, “ that the frontiers of all nations are drawn exactly right, or that the constitutions of all countries are just what they ought to be. How can we be expected to guarantee any frontier which seems to us unjust or any independence which is badly used? ” What is the answer? It is that the guarantee only applies to cases of “external aggression.” The League never says: “The present frontiers and constitutions are right and we guarantee their permanency.” It only says: “The present frontiers and constitutions, whether right or wrong, good or bad, shall not be corrected by War. If any details in the frontiers are wrong, as is sure to be the case, we provide a peaceful machinery for reconsidering and correcting them; if the constitution or domestic conduct of a particular nation is objectionable, we should be glad to see them improved, and are even willing, if invited, to help with our advice; but we will not tolerate the attempt to right any alleged wrong by War.”

For example: It is commonly believed that half the South Tyrol, now given to Italy, really by race, language, and desire, belongs to Austria. And, similarly, that the Shantung penin-

sula, now given to Japan, belongs to China. How, under the League, are these wrongs to be remedied? There are three main ways:—

1. The frontier question may be treated as a "dispute" between Austria and Italy, Japan and China, and either party may appeal to the Council or Assembly of the League to settle the dispute. (Art. XII.)

2. Without any dispute arising, any member of the League may (Art. XI.) bring the matter before the Council or the Assembly as a "**circumstance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations on which peace depends.**"

3. Under Art. XIX. any member of the Assembly may propose that the clause in the Treaty which fixed this frontier should be "reconsidered" as having become "inapplicable."

Suppose, however, the Austrians or Chinese then said: "None of these methods satisfy us. We do not feel sure that the Council or the Assembly will decide justly; and even if they do, our opponents can still make delays and difficulties. We would sooner trust to our own guns and the righteousness of our cause!" The answer must be: "No: we do not allow guns. Our whole policy is to substitute an appeal to Law for an appeal to Force. The decision of the Law may be slow: it may sometimes even be wrong; there may be some trouble in enforcing it. But (1) it is the only alternative to War, and (2) it is the best approach to real Justice that human beings can devise."

Suppose, in defiance of this article, a nation does commit aggression in order to destroy its neighbour's territorial integrity or independence; what does the League do? It treats the matter as a case of War, and deals with it under Articles XII. to XVI. We will now consider those Articles and the "specific covenants" involved in them.

II.

So far, under Art. X., we have all agreed to let each other alone: *i.e.*, not to attack or invade in order to upset the present world order. But still, as nations develop and cross one another's paths, there may arise "**disputes likely to lead to a rupture**": what is to be done in such a case? Suppose, for example, that Chinese emigrants kept entering Northern Australia in spite of the Australian prohibition; that some were killed in an anti-Chinese riot; and the Chinese Government protested against the Australian law. Or suppose, in spite of the stipulation in Article XXII. of the Covenant ensuring "**equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of all members of the League**" in African mandated areas, Dutch traders found themselves excluded or handicapped in French

areas. Or again, suppose on some habitually troubled frontier, like that of Mexico or Afghanistan, the crop of disorders in some year became dangerously great. In view of such possibilities, what guarantee will a nation wish to have before it accepts the invitation to reduce its armaments and give up its chance of striking the first blow?

Presumably it will say: "Before I give up my preparations for war, I wish to be assured that I shall not be attacked suddenly, before I am ready, when a dispute arises." The League gives that assurance very elaborately in Articles XII. to XVII.

In the first place every member of the League binds itself not to make war suddenly or to take any enemy unprepared. If a dispute likely to lead to a rupture arises, and a settlement cannot be reached by ordinary diplomatic channels, all members of the League agree that "**they will submit the matter either (1) to arbitration or (2) to inquiry by the Council of the League**"; and "**in no case will they resort to war until three months after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Council.**" That means that they wait, first, until the arbitrators or the Council have carefully considered the dispute and tried to make a satisfactory award or report, and, secondly, for at least three months after the award or report is made. (The award has to be made within "**a reasonable time,**" and the report of the Council "**within six months.**")

This gives exactly the guarantee demanded: if this undertaking is observed, no nation can be attacked unprepared. What happens if some nation breaks this particular covenant will be considered later. Let us now see what undertaking each nation has to give, in order to be sure that each nation, itself included, is provided with this guarantee. For the guarantees, as Mr. Wilson says, are "mutual"; in order to be relieved of a danger each nation in the League has to afford the same relief to all others.

"I am involved in a quarrel," a nation may say; "I am, of course, in the right. If I attacked my opponent now, this moment, before he is ready, I could beat him and get what I want. You absolutely forbid me to get justice my own way. How then am I to get it?"

The answer of the League will be:—

I. DIPLOMACY.

First, there is ordinary diplomacy, the simplest and most obvious method in ordinary cases. Let your representatives talk it over with those of your opponent, and see if they cannot find a way. This will be the old pre-War diplomacy, with one great difference. In the old diplomacy it was always

possible, and easy, for a strong nation to use threats of war, open or concealed, to back up its arguments. Henceforth this evil weapon is taken away. The strong nation can no longer bully the weak, because any "threat of war" is ground for action by the Council of the League, and exposes the threatener to extreme penalties.

Supposing the two disputant nations cannot settle their difficulty thus, they agree under Art. XII. that they will appeal to (2) "arbitration" or (3) "mediation"—which, of course, are not the same thing. Arbitration applies to the sort of question that, in domestic matters, can be settled in a Court of Law—either a point of law or a question of fact; mediation, to the sort of difficulty in which two people who have quarrelled can be helped out by the advice or kind offices of a mutual friend.

2. ARBITRATION.

For example: the most obvious point of law will be a question of the interpretation of a treaty. When Austria annexed Bosnia in 1908 Turkey or Serbia or Russia could (if the League had been in existence) have said: "This is a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, which Austria has signed." Austria would perhaps have denied the charge. That would be a case for Arbitration by a Court.

Or again, when in 1914 Austria charged the Serbian Government with complicity in the Serajevo murder and Serbia denied the charge, that would have been a question of fact and suitable for Arbitration by a Court.

Observe that a decision by a Court is definitely a decision of legal right or wrong or of truth or falsehood. Consequently, if two nations agree to appeal to the Court they must, by the Covenant, accept its decision and "**carry out in good faith any award that may be rendered.**" You cannot take a matter into Court and then, if it goes against you, refuse to accept the verdict.

Consequently it is only fair that disputing nations should be left free to choose whether they will refer a matter to this strict legal arbitration or choose another solution—as long as it is a peaceful one. Also, if they do decide to accept arbitration, they are not bound to go to one particular tribunal; they can agree on any tribunal they like, though the League, as a matter of fact, has set up a "Permanent Court of International Justice," which will be the supreme authority on international law and the most obvious tribunal to appeal to.

3. MEDIATION.

Suppose a thickly populated low-wage country, A, is next neighbour to a thinly populated high-wage country, B; the Government of B, in order to keep up its own standard of high wages, passes laws forbidding immigration from A; A in reprisal takes all the measures it can to damage B's commerce without actually breaking any treaty. A situation would easily arise which was very dangerous but was not capable of any legal decision; that would be a case for Mediation.

Either disputant nation has, by the Covenant, the right to bring the matter before the Council or Assembly of the League, asking them to "mediate" and propose a settlement. The other disputant cannot protest or object, as he could in the case of a proposal of "arbitration." Mediation may take place on the motion of any single aggrieved party; but the result is not as a rule compulsory. It is the "recommendation" of a council of friends; it is not the "award" of a Court. But of that presently.

For example, suppose in the dispute about the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, Austria refused to go to arbitration on the ground that, though she had technically broken the Treaty of Berlin, she was justified in so doing because circumstances had changed and her action was clearly to the benefit of the parties concerned. "I will not go to Law," she would say; "because it is not really a question for the Law." Then Serbia would turn to the Council and say: "I am involved in a dispute with Austria; we cannot settle it by discussion between ourselves and Austria will not bring it before the Court. I appeal to you to mediate between us." The Council in that case must mediate, unless for any reason the matter is referred to the Assembly.

Let us consider this reference. The matter may be referred to the Assembly either by the Council itself or by either of the disputants; the consent of the other is not necessary. This does not mean that there is an appeal to the Assembly from a report of the Council; there is only a choice between the Council and Assembly as the mediating body, and the superior ultimate authority of the Assembly is just so far recognised that if any one party desires the matter to go to the Assembly to the Assembly it must go. For example: Serbia might say, "The Council consists preponderantly of Great Powers, perhaps they will not be fair to a small nation." Or, equally, Austria might say: "The Council contains too large a proportion of my chief rivals." Or the Council itself may say: "This is a matter on which

the Council may be supposed to have a bias." To avoid any such suspicion it is well that every nation should have the right of having its dispute referred to the Assembly, *i.e.*, to the whole body of the League, though the proceeding involves considerable disadvantages in practice, as will be seen when we discuss the methods of mediation and the ways of carrying the report into effect.

III.

The methods of mediation are fairly obvious: the Secretary-General "makes all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration" of the dispute. Each side submits papers in statement of its case, and the Council (or Assembly) can make such inquiries as it thinks fit. In the end—and at latest within six months—it must issue its report. But now we have to consider several different possibilities. Let us omit the Assembly for the moment, and take only the Council.

1. Best of all, the Council may succeed before the six months are up in finding a settlement to which both parties agree. This, for various reasons, is likely to be the usual result partly because questions of small or middling importance are naturally much more numerous than those of extraordinary importance; and because under the League, it may be hoped, questions at issue will not be left to fester until public opinion is inflamed and irreconcilable; partly because the consequences of failing to agree will be so disagreeable to all concerned.

It is obvious that an agreement between the disputants may often be reached even when the Council is not unanimous. A minority on the Council—or even a majority—may often be content to say: "Well, I do not think this the ideal solution, but of course if the two parties are ready to accept it I am content."

2. The Council may not succeed in finding a settlement to which both parties agree, but nevertheless its own view may be clear and unanimous. ("Unanimous" in these cases means "unanimous except for the disputants themselves." Naturally the disputants themselves do not vote.) In that case the Council publishes its report, containing (1) a statement of the facts of the case, and (2) a recommendation.

It may be thought that this unanimous report of the Council ought to have the same binding force as a judgment of the Court, but the Covenant has decided otherwise. Members of the League are not absolutely bound to carry

out the " recommendation " of the Council ; they are only bound " not to go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendation." Thus a disputant who obeys is protected by the full force of the League ; but a disputant who passively disobeys, so long as he commits no acts of war and does not otherwise threaten the peace, suffers no penalty except the condemnation of public opinion. This decision is probably right. The alternative would be that the Council should not be free to offer any advice which it was not prepared to enforce with all the resources of the League. For example : Suppose by some chapter of accidents the Council of the League was called upon to make a recommendation on the Irish Question, it might very well wish to recommend certain guarantees for the fair treatment of Catholics in Ulster which the municipality of Belfast might fail to put into operation. This would be regrettable ; but, as long as the peace was preserved, it would hardly be desirable that the armies of the League should have to be put in action to coerce the municipality of Belfast. Thus the right line for the Council seems to be, to recommend the course it thinks best, and, having published it to the world, let the public opinion of the world gradually work on the refractory disputant . . . so long, of course, as he does not resort to war or threats of war.

3. The Council may neither find a settlement to which both parties agree nor reach a unanimous opinion of its own. This of course means failure ; to a less or greater degree in proportion as there is, or is not, a clear and large majority in favour of some one course. All that can be done is for both sides, or all parties interested, to publish their own reports, and for the several members of the League to " reserve their right of action " ; or, as a last resort, to refer the matter to the Assembly in the hope that some new solution may emerge.

We must remember that this is an extreme case. To produce it, the dispute must have been of such an extraordinary nature that (1) the parties themselves could find no settlement ; (2) no settlement was provided by international law ; (3) the other nations, meeting specially for the purpose and bent on preserving the peace, could still find no settlement. If such disputes arise—and it may well be hoped that in the nature of things they do not really exist but are only worked up by human error—all the League can say is : " You must still not fight for three months ; after that we have nothing more to say." Thus war is not, and

cannot be, absolutely forbidden, but an enormous pressure of forethought, force, and authority is put in operation against its occurrence.

Lastly, there is the possible reference to the Assembly. We spoke above of the motives which might lead one party, or the Council itself, to make such a reference: the objections to doing so come merely from the excessive size of the Assembly. About fifty nations, each with three representatives but only one vote.

Complete unanimity in so large and diverse a body is out of the question: what counts as unanimity is (1) unanimity among those nations which comprise the Council, together with (2) a bare majority of the rest of the members. A Report commanding this degree of unanimity has the same force as a unanimous report of the Council, and may have rather more moral authority, since the view of Council would, in this case, be definitely backed up by the majority of the other powers of the world.

UNANIMITY.

It may be asked: "Why this artificial insistence on Unanimity? Why should the Council have to be unanimous before it can act? And, when a dispute is before the Assembly, why should 'the nations constituting the Council' have special consideration shown to them? Why not have the matter decided simply by a majority, or a two-thirds majority, of the Assembly?"

This question goes to the very root of the conception on which the Covenant is based. First, we must draw a distinction. On the one hand there is the pledge not to go to war without trying other methods first, as laid down in Arts. XII., XIII. and XV. This is an absolute pledge binding every member of the League and enforced under Art. XVI. by the whole League. There is no question of voting or of unanimity. On the other hand there is the general agreement to have frequent meetings of the Executive Council and fairly frequent meetings of the Assembly of the whole League in order to discuss any matters affecting the interests of the League and in certain cases to take common action, in others to suggest to particular nations modifications of policy or the like. It is to this sphere that the condition of unanimity applies. The great object of the promoters of the League is to get all the nations, and especially the great military nations, to agree to cease conspiring and building armaments against one another, and with that object to agree to meet regularly round a table for free and frank discussion

of all international problems and difficulties as they arise. Now it is comparatively easy for the League to say to any nation: "Come and confer with the rest of us. You are perfectly free to maintain your own opinion, and need not do anything you do not like." But it is very difficult to say: "Come and confer; and remember that whatever the majority decides, you must do, however much you dislike it or disapprove of it." Such an invitation would simply not be accepted. Consequently the rule of the Covenant is that, apart from the definite promises about refraining from war, no new decision taken by the Council is binding on the League unless it is agreed to by all the members of the Council. Consider the alternative: The Council now consists of England, France, Italy, Japan (United States absent), Belgium, Spain, Greece, Brazil. Would it be satisfactory that any decision taken by the last five should be compulsory on this country? Can one imagine power being given to Japan, Brazil, Greece, Spain and Belgium to compel Great Britain to take some action against the wish of the British Government and Parliament? Could such an arrangement last? Further, considering the populations of the nations involved, and considering that the actual executive force of the League lies mainly in the Great Powers, would it be just that the Great Powers should be under the orders of a majority of nations which did not represent a majority of human beings or a majority of responsibility?

The idea of the Covenant is, first, to bind all its members to definite contracts for avoiding war, but beyond that to leave them the very maximum of freedom, merely stipulating that they shall meet regularly, freely and frankly, make no secret engagements and keep each other fully supplied with all information.

The above rule chiefly affects the Council, *i.e.*, the small Executive of the League. But it may be asked why there should be this peculiar rule for the Assembly, that "unanimity" means (1) unanimity among those members who constitute the Council—*i.e.*, the Great Powers plus four others, backed by (2) a majority among the rest.

The answer is twofold: First, the League cannot act with world-authority and world-force unless all the Great Powers are with it. A decision of the League which was rejected by two or even one of the Great Powers would probably not be carried out, and would place the League itself in jeopardy. If the League has not the main force of the world behind it, I fear we must confess that the League will not work.

Secondly, though the position of the small nations may in this respect seem hard, the Covenant has made it no harder than before. If France, America, England, Italy and Japan choose to make Norway do something which she does not like, it is much to be feared that they can do it, League or no League. What the League does is to insist that, before so doing, they must induce four other small States to agree with them, or, if Norway wishes the matter referred to the Assembly, a majority of all the other nations of the League as well. Norway is vastly better protected with the League than without.

IV.

So far we have discussed the various methods proposed for settling a dispute between members of the League.

But there is, also, the position of the nations which do not join the League. Suppose they fight among themselves? Or suppose one of them has a quarrel with a member of the League?

The Covenant here takes a bold line and does not shirk its responsibilities. If there is a dispute likely to lead to a rupture between a member and a non-member, the Covenant lays down in Art. XVII. that the non-member shall be instantly invited to become a member for the purposes of that dispute. It is offered freely the privileges of a member and the whole protection of the League, if it chooses to accept them, and the dispute is then treated like a dispute between two members. If a State so invited refuses the invitation and resorts to war, of course the whole League comes in against it, as it would against a member of the League which resorted to war. (See p. 16). Nay, more. The Covenant declares that "**Any threat of war, whether immediately affecting any member of the League or not**" is "**a matter of concern to the whole League.**" The League intends to do its best to prevent any war whatever; and, for that purpose, if a dispute arises between two non-members and entirely outside the League, both of them shall be invited to become members for the purpose of settling that dispute.

If this offer is refused, the Council will take on its own responsibility such measures as in its opinion are likely to prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute. It will prevent war as best it can.

"And supposing," a critic will ask, "supposing, in spite of all these careful and elaborate arrangements, a nation simply breaks its word and does attack its neighbour and defeat him in the first week?"

It is like asking: "Supposing, in spite of all your establishment of law and order in England, the people of Cornwall, or the miners, or the Roman Catholics, chose to make a sudden rebellion?" We can only say: "Of course a nation might do so. But, first, we hope that in the constant meetings and discussions of the Council and the Assembly all great grievances will be freely ventilated and, where possible, remedied, so that there will be no overwhelming exasperation or suspicion left at work in any nation to drive them into war. Secondly, it will be very difficult indeed, under the conditions laid down, for a nation with all its statistics and preparations for armament open to inspection, with its representatives regularly meeting the representatives of its neighbours round a table and asking and answering questions, to make any secret preparations for war or establish any clandestine alliance. And lastly, if the League as a whole keeps its word, the offending nation has no chance of success and is sure to receive a tremendous punishment."

The guarantee is given in Art. XVI. Any nation which resorts to war in disregard of its covenants under Arts. XII., XIII. or XV., shall by that very act "**be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League.**" That is: if Turkey invades Serbia, it shall be treated instantly as if it had invaded England, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, and all the other forty-five nations of the League. Then what does the League do? Obviously, it does whatever it thinks most effective for stopping the war.

The first step definitely agreed upon in the Covenant is a boycott and blockade: (1) severance of all trade or financial relations; (2) prohibition of all intercourse between the nationals of the offending state and the nationals of all the rest of the League; (3) the complete cutting off of intercourse between the offending State and all the rest of the world.

This done, the Council of the League proceeds to arrange the suitable military and naval measures. But the first step is so comparatively easy to take and so terribly severe in its action that the fear of it, or at any rate the knowledge that it has actually been put in force, will probably bring most offenders to reason.

It is obvious that the boycott and blockade will cause great loss and inconvenience to some members of the League and not much to others. A blockade of Czecho-Slovakia, for instance, would be severely felt by Austria, Poland and Jugoslavia, but probably not by Venezuela or Peru. To meet such cases all the nations of the League agree to support one another in the financial and economic measures taken under

this article and so to minimise and divide evenly the loss and inconvenience involved. They also agree, of course, to give the necessary free passage through their territory to the troops of the League.

As to the methods by which such naval and military action shall be organised and applied, they are referred by the Covenant (Art. IX.) to an expert "permanent Commission" which shall advise the Council on all questions affecting armament. For example, it will have to deal with the problems of the reduction of armaments, the maximum and minimum forces to be allowed to any member or would-be member of the League, the dangers of the manufacture of armaments by private firms, the possibility of an International Force under control of the League and "military and naval questions generally." This important Commission has not yet (May, 1920) been constituted. If military or naval action had to be taken before this Commission reports, the methods would, of course, be settled *ad hoc* by the Council.

One last fundamental question still remains. The guarantees, it may be said, are sufficient and well thought out; the punishment appointed for "resorting to war" is crushing and the power to enforce it ample. But what security have we that, when the emergency arises, the nations of the League will effectively fulfil their undertakings? Suppose at this moment Jugo-Slavia made war upon Czecho-Slovakia, can we be certain that France, Italy, England and the rest of the League would act?

The only security that we have or can have is the nation's pledged word; exactly the same security which we have for the payment of any of the national debts. This in no case amounts to certainty, but in the case of the chief nations in time of peace it is as near certainty as is generally possible in human affairs. Yet admittedly the credit of nations varies. And we must recognise the fact that the undertaking which they are called upon to fulfil under the League is in some ways more precarious than the payment of a national debt. For one thing, the debt is paid regularly at fixed times; to repudiate it means the breaking of a habit, whereas the action required of a member of the League under Art. XVI. will be a new and difficult step, a breach of ordinary habit. It will be expensive; it may involve loss of life. It is sure to be unpopular, unless, indeed, it is made popular by deliberate—and very undesirable—agitation. Perhaps the greatest dangers will come from the general lack of interest in

the affairs of remote foreign nations and the great ease of mendacious propaganda. If nation A means to attack B and suddenly does so, it will probably endeavour to confuse public opinion in the centres which matter most, such as London and Paris, and will have agents maintaining that it was really B who began, or, at worst, that both parties are much of a muchness, and neither of them worth the blood of a British or French working man.

In such ways there is probably a greater danger of a democratic nation failing to fulfil its undertakings under the League than of its repudiating its regular debt.

The best way to diminish this danger is to (1) to realise fully, and make the whole nation realise, the absolute sanctity and necessity of the obligation. If it is certain that the League can and will strike down a war-maker, it becomes almost certain that no nation will venture to make war. Next (2) the League of Nations Societies and the various Governments must try to keep in existence a fairly widespread and well-informed interest in international matters, and a realisation of the fact that events may be important even if they occur in far-off places with odd names. If public interest among the great nations is fairly vigilant, the mischief-maker will be kept down by the fear of detection; and if by any strange mischance war does break out, it will not take the peoples of the League by surprise and find them bewildered. Probably, as a matter of fact, there is little danger of a great war finding the League unwilling to act; the real danger is that some small and remote nation, which happens to be impervious to blockade and difficult to get at, may occasionally try how far it can go in oppressing or attacking its neighbours without provoking the great League into definite action. A danger of this sort would be greatly reduced if the League had a Police Force of its own.

Thus, to ensure the successful working of the League, it seems necessary that there should be in the chief nations intelligent and vigilant Governments, with a proper sense of public spirit and responsibility, determined that, even at the cost of temporary unpopularity, their own nations shall carry out their pledges. But it must be remembered that the coercive action of the League, though a necessary function, is always a mark of failure. A League always in arms coercing would-be war-makers would be a League in the last stage of collapse. A successful League will be one which by securing international justice, by removing oppressions and fears of oppression, and by spreading the habit of general

confidence and security, shall make large armies and navies gradually disappear and reduce even the police forces of the world to a minimum.

Questionnaire.

I.

- (1) What is the main difference between the international system proposed in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the pre-war international system?
- (2) What is the main guarantee, under Article X. of the Covenant, which the League gives to its members?
- (3) What is the objection frequently made to this guarantee?
- (4) What are the three methods provided in the Covenant for accomplishing changes in international society without resort to war?

II.

- (1) What are the guarantees in Articles XII.-XVII. which the League gives to a peaceful nation against aggression?
- (2) What are the three alternatives to war which the League provides as methods of settling disputes?
- (3) What is the fundamental difference between arbitration and mediation?

III.

- (1) What are the methods of mediation prescribed by the League in the Covenant?
- (2) What is the procedure when the Council mediates in a dispute and is unanimous?
- (3) What is the procedure when the Council is not unanimous?
- (4) What is the procedure when a dispute is referred to the Assembly?
- (5) Why is the principle of unanimity insisted upon in the Covenant?
- (6) Why is unanimity of the Great Powers in the Assembly required?

IV.

- (1) How does the Covenant deal with the question of States not members of the League and the possibility of war with or between them?

- (2) What guarantees does the League provide in Article XVI. against breach of the primary obligation of the Covenant?
- (3) What constitutes the real danger of failure to secure compliance with the obligations of the Covenant, and how may it be diminished?

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