1st Edition

NB. The 3. Interlocutors

B. Beadon B.p of Bath & Wells an intimate College Acquaintance

H Horne the Author.

T. Took a retired Citizen Inhabitant of Purley where the Author composed the work, & who left him his Estate & Name.

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ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ.

OR, THE

DIVERSIONS

OF

PURLEY.

PART I.

BY JOHN HORNE TOOKE, A.M.

LATE OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

αν ἴδῃ τὰ ὀνόματα ἔσεται καὶ τὰ πράγματα. Plato.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, NO. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

MDCCLXXXVI.

TO THE

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

ONE of her grateful Sons,—who always conſiders acts of voluntary juſtice towards himſelf as Favours *,—dedicates this humble offering. And particularly to her chief ornament for virtue and talents, the Reverend Doctor Beadon, Maſter of Jeſus College.

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* Notwithſtanding the additional authority of Plato's deſpicable ſaying—Cum omnibus ſolvam, quod cum omnibus debeo :—(Senec. de benefic. lib. VI.) the aſſertion of Machiavel is not true ; that—Niſſuno confeſſera mai haver obligo con uno che non l'offenda.—(Diſcor. lib. I. cap. XVI.) It is not true either with reſpect to nations or to individuals : for the experience of much injuſtice will cauſe the forbearance of injury to appear like kindneſs.

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OF THIS

VOLUME.

Non ut laudemur, ſed ut proſimus.

Equidem ſic propè ab adoleſcentia animatus fui, ut inania famæ contemnam, veraque conſecter bona. In qua cogitatione ſæpius defixus, facilius ab animo meo potui impetrare, ut (quamvis ſcirem ſordeſcere magis & magis ſtudia Literarum, maximéque ea quæ propriè artem Grammaticen ſpectant) nihilominus paulisper, non quidem ſeponerem, ſed remiſſius tamen tractarem ſtudia graviora; iterumque in manus ſumerem veteres adoleſcentiæ labores, laboreque novo inter tot Curas divulgarem.

G. J. Vossius.

Le grand objet de l'art etymologique n'eſt pas de rendre raiſon de l'origine de tous les mots ſans exception, & j'oſe dire que ce ſeroit un but aſſez frivole. Cet art eſt principalement recommandable en ce qu'il fournit à la philoſophie des materiaux & des obſervations pour elever le grand edifice de la theorie generale des Langues.

M. Le Preſident de Brosses.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ:

OR,

THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY.

INTRODUCTION.

B.

—THE myſtery is at laſt unravelled. I ſhall no more wonder now that you engroſs his company at Purley, whilſt his other friends can ſcarce get a ſight of him. This, you ſay, was Preſident Bradſhaw's ſeat. That is the ſecret of his attachment to the place. You hold him by the beſt ſecurity, his political pre-

judices and enthuſiaſm. But do not let his veneration for the memory of the antient poſſeſſor paſs upon you for affection to the preſent.

H.

Should you be altogether ſo ſevere upon my politics; when you reflect that, merely for attempting to prevent the effuſion of brother's blood and the final diſmemberment of the empire, I ſtand the ſingle legal victim during the conteſt, and the ſingle inſtance of proſcription after it? But I am well contented that my principles, which have made ſo many of your way of thinking angry, ſhould only make you laugh. Such however as they are, they need not now to be defended by me: for they have ſtood the teſt of ages; and they will keep their ground in the general *commendation* of the world, till men forget to love themſelves; though, till then perhaps, they are

not

not likely to be ſeen (nor credited if ſeen) in the *practice* of many individuals.

But are you really forced to go above a hundred years back to account for my attachment to Purley? Without conſidering the many ſtrong public and private ties by which I am bound to its preſent poſſeſſor, can you find nothing in the beautiful proſpect from theſe windows? nothing in the entertainment every one receives in this houſe? nothing in the delightful rides and walks we have taken round it? nothing in the cheerful diſpoſition and eaſy kindneſs of its owner, to make a rational man partial to this habitation?

T.

Sir, you are making him tranſgreſs our only ſtanding rules. Politics and compliments are ſtrangers here. We always put them off when we put on our boots;

and leave them behind us in their proper atmoſphere, the ſmoke of London.

B.

Is it poſſible! Can either of you—Engliſhmen and patriots!—abſtain for four and twenty hours together from politics? You cannot be always on horſeback or at piquet. What, in the name of wonder, your favourite topic excluded, can be the ſubject of your ſo frequent converſations?

T.

You have a ſtrange notion of us. But I aſſure you we find more difficulty to finiſh than to begin our converſations. As for our ſubjects, their variety cannot be remembered; but I will tell you on what we were diſcourſing yeſterday when you came in; and I believe you are the fitteſt perſon in the world to decide between us. He inſiſts, contrary to my opinion, that all

ſorts

ſorts of wiſdom and uſeful knowledge may be obtained by a plain man of ſenſe without what is commonly called Learning. And when I took the eaſieſt inſtance, as I thought, and the foundation of all other knowledge, (becauſe it is the beginning of education, and that in which children are firſt employed) he declined the proof of his aſſertion in this inſtance, and maintained that I had choſen the moſt difficult: for, he ſays, that, though Grammar be uſually amongſt the firſt things taught, it is always one of the laſt underſtood.

B.

I muſt confeſs I differ from Mr. H. concerning the difficulty of grammar: if indeed what you have reported be really his opinion. But might he not poſſibly give you that anſwer to eſcape the diſcuſſion of a diſagreeable, dry ſubject, remote from the courſe of his ſtudies and the ob-

jects of his inquiry and purſuit? By his general expreſſion of — *what is commonly called Learning*—and his declared opinion of that, I can pretty well gueſs what he thinks of grammatical learning in particular. I dare ſwear (though he will not perhaps pay me ſo indifferent a compliment) he does not in his mind allow us even the poor conſolation which we find in Athenæus — ει μη ιαλροι ησαν; but concludes, without a ſingle exception, ȣδεν των Γραμμαλικων μωρολερον *.

I muſt however intreat him to recollect, (and at the ſame time whoſe authority it bears,) that — *Qui Sapientiæ & literarum divortium faciunt, nunquam ad ſolidam ſapientiam pertingent. Qui verò alios etiam à literarum linguarumque ſtudio abſterrent, non antiquæ*

* Ου γαρ κακως τινι των ειδιωτων ημων ελεχθη το, ει μη ιαλροι ησαν ȣδεν αι ην των γραμμαλικων μωρολερον.

Deipnoſoph. Lib. 15.

antiquæ ſapientiæ ſed novæ ſtultitiæ Doctores ſunt habendi.

H.

Indeed I ſpoke my real ſentiments. I think Grammar difficult, but I am very far from looking upon it as fooliſh: indeed ſo far, that I conſider it as abſolutely neceſſary in the ſearch after philoſophical truth; which if not the moſt uſeful perhaps, is at leaſt the moſt pleaſing employment of the human mind. And I think it no leſs neceſſary in the moſt important queſtions concerning religion and civil ſociety. But ſince you ſay it is eaſy, tell me where it may be learned.

B.

If your look and the tone of your voice were leſs ſerious, the extravagance of your compliment to grammar would incline me to ſuſpect that you were taking

your revenge, and bantering me in your turn by an ironical encomium on my favourite ſtudy. But, if I am to ſuppoſe you in earneſt, I anſwer, that our Engliſh grammar may be ſufficiently and eaſily learned from the excellent Introduction of Doctor Lowth: or from the *firſt* (as well as the *beſt*) Engliſh grammar, given by Ben Johnſon.

H.

True, Sir. And that was my firſt ſlight anſwer to our friend's inſtance. But his inquiry is of a much larger compaſs than you at preſent ſeem to imagine. He aſks after the cauſes or reaſons of Grammar *: and for ſatisfaction in them I know not

* *Duplex Grammatica: alia* CIVILIS, *alia* PHILOSOPHICA, CIVILIS, *peritia eſt, non ſcientia: conſtat enim ex auctoritate uſuque clarorum ſcriptorum.*

PHILOSOPHICA *vero, ratione conſtat; & hæc ſcientiam olet.*

Grammatica

not where to ſend him; for I aſſure you, he has a troubleſome, inquiſitive, ſcrupulous mind of his own that will not take mere words in current payment.

B.

I ſhould think that difficulty eaſily removed. Doctor Lowth in his preface has done it ready to your hands. "Thoſe," he ſays, "who would enter more deeply "into this ſubject, will find it fully and "accurately handled with the greateſt "acuteneſs of inveſtigation, perſpicuity of "explication, and elegance of method, "in a treatiſe intitled *Hermes*, by *James* "*Harris*, Eſq. the moſt beautiful and "perfect

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Grammatica CIVILIS *habet ætatem, in qua viget, & illam amplectuntur Grammatici, dicunt enim ſub Cicerone & Cæſare adultam linguam*, &c. *At* PHILOSOPHICA *non agnoſcit ætatem linguæ, ſed rationalitatem; amplectiturque vocabula bona omnium temporum.*

CAMPANELLA.

" perfect example of Analysis that has
" been exhibited since the days of Aris-
" totle."

T.

The recommendation no doubt is full, and the authority great; but I cannot say that I have found the performance to correspond: nor can I boast of any acquisition from its perusal, except indeed of hard words and frivolous or unintelligible distinctions. And I have learned from a most excellent authority, that " Tout ce qui varie, tout ce qui se charge
" de termes douteux & envelopés, à tou-
" jours paru suspect; & non seulement
" frauduleux, mais encore absolument
" faux: parcequ'il marque un embarras
" que la verité ne connoit point." Bossuet *des Var. des Egl. Prot.*

B.

And you, Sir?

H. I

H.

I am really in the ſame ſituation.

B.

Have you tried any other of our Engliſh authors on the ſubject?

H.

I believe all of them, for they are not numerous *; but none with ſatisfaction.

B. You

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* The authors who have written profeſſedly on this ſubject, in any language, are not numerous. Caramuel, in the beginning of his Grammatica Audax, ſays,—" *Solus, ut puto,* SCOTUS, *& poſt eum* SCALIGER & CAMPANELLA *(alios enim non vidi) Grammaticam ſpeculativam evulgarunt; vias tamen omnino diverſas ingreſſi. Multa mihi in Scaligero, & plura in Campanella diſplicuerunt; & pauciora in Scoto, qui vix alibi ſubtilius ſcripſit quam cum de Grammaticis modis ſignificandi.*"

The reader of Caramuel (who, together with Campanella, may be found in the Bodleian Library) will not be diſappointed in him; but moſt egregiouſly by him, if the ſmalleſt expectations of information are excited by the character which is here given of Scotus: whoſe

B.

You muſt then give up one at leaſt of your poſitions. For if, as you make it

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whoſe *De Modis Significandi*, ſhould be intitled, not *Grammatica Speculativa*, but — an Exemplar of the ſubtle art of ſaving appearances, and of diſcourſing deeply and learnedly on a ſubject with which we are totally unacquainted. *Quid enim ſubtilius vel magis tenue, quam quod nihil eſt.*

Wilkins, Part 3. Chap. 1. of his Eſſay towards a Real Character, ſays, after Caramuel,—" *The firſt of* " *theſe* (i. e. philoſophical, rational, univerſal Gram- " mar) *hath been treated of but by few*; *which makes* " *our learned Verulam put it among his* Deſiderata. *I* " *do not know any more that have purpoſely written of it,* " *but Scotus in his* Grammatica Speculativa, *and Cara-* " *muel in his* Grammatica Audax, *and Campanella in* " *his* Grammatica Philoſophica. *(As for Scioppius his* " *Grammar of this title, that doth wholly concern the Latin* " *tongue.) Beſides which ſomething hath been occaſionally* " *ſpoken of it by Scaliger in his book* De Cauſis Linguæ " Latinæ; *and by Voſſius in his* Ariſtarchus." So far Wilkins: who, for what reaſon I know not, has omitted the *Minerva* of *Sanctius*; though well deſerving his notice; and the declared foundation of Scioppius. But he who ſhould confine himſelf to theſe authors, and to thoſe who, with Wilkins, have ſince that time written profeſſedly on this ſubject, would fall very ſhort of

it out, Grammar is ſo difficult that a knowledge of it cannot be obtained by a man of ſenſe from any authors in his own language, you muſt ſend him to what is commonly called Learning, to the Greek and Latin authors, for the attainment of it. So

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of the aſſiſtance he might have, and the leading hints and foundations of reaſoning which he might obtain, by reading even all the authors who have confined themſelves to particular languages.

The great BACON put this ſubject amongſt his *Deſiderata*, not, as Wilkins ſays, becauſe "*few* had "treated of it;" but becauſe *none* had given a ſatisfactory account of it. At the ſame time Bacon, though evidently wide of the mark himſelf, yet conjectured beſt how this knowledge might moſt probably be attained; and pointed out the moſt proper materials for reflection to work upon. "*Illa demum* (ſays he) *ut* "*arbitramur, foret nobiliſſima Grammaticæ ſpecies, ſi* "*quis in linguis plurimis, tam eruditis quam vulgaribus* "*eximiè doctus, de variis linguarum proprietatibus trac-* "*taret; in quibus quæque excellat, in quibus deficiat* "*oſtendens. Ita enim & linguæ mutuo commercio lo-* "*cupletari poſſint; & fiet ex iis quæ in ſingulis linguis,* "*pulchra ſunt (tanquam Venus Apellis) orationis ipſius* "*quædam formoſiſſima imago, & exemplar quoddam in-* "*ſigne, ad ſenſus animi ritè exprimendos.*" De augment. Scient. Lib. 6. Cap. 1.

So true, in this ſcience at leaſt, if not in all others, is that ſaying of Roger Aſcham; that—" Even as a hawke fleeth not hie " with one wing, even ſo a man reacheth " not to excellency with one tongue."

H.

On the contrary, I am rather confirmed by this inſtance in my firſt poſition. I acknowledge philoſophical Grammar (to which only my ſuſpected compliment was intended) to be a moſt neceſſary ſtep towards wiſdom and true knowledge. From the innumerable and inveterate miſtakes which have been made concerning it by the wiſeſt philoſophers and moſt diligent inquirers of all ages, and from the thick darkneſs in which they have hitherto left it, I imagine it to be one of the moſt difficult ſpeculations. Yet, I ſuppoſe, a man of plain common ſenſe may obtain it, if he will dig for it; but I cannot think that

what is commonly called Learning, is the mine in which it will be found. Truth, in my opinion, has been improperly imagined at the bottom of a well: it lies much nearer to the ſurface; though buried indeed at preſent under mountains of learned rubbiſh; in which there is nothing to admire but the amazing ſtrength of thoſe vaſt giants of literature who have been able thus to heap Pelion upon Oſſa. This at preſent is only my opinion, which perhaps I have entertained too lightly. Since therefore the queſtion has been ſtarted, I am pleaſed at this occaſion of being confirmed or corrected by you; whoſe application, opportunities, extenſive reading, acknowledged abilities, and univerſal learning enable you to inform us of all that the antients have left or the moderns have written on the ſubject.

B. Oh!

B.

Oh! Sir, your humble ſervant! compliments, I perceive, are baniſhed from Purley. But I ſhall not be at all inticed by them to take upon my ſhoulders a burthen which you ſeem deſirous to ſhift off upon me. Beſides, Sir, with all your caution, you have ſaid too much now to expect it from me. It is too late to recall what has paſſed your lips: and if Mr. T. is of my ſentiments you ſhall not be permitted to explain yourſelf away. The ſatisfaction which he ſeeks after, you ſay *is to be had*; and you tell us the mine where you think it is *not to be found*. Now I ſhall not eaſily be perſuaded that you are ſo raſh and take up your opinions ſo lightly, as to advance or even to imagine this; unleſs you had firſt ſearched that mine yourſelf, and formed a conjecture at leaſt concerning the place where you ſuppoſe this knowledge is to be found. Inſtead therefore of making

me

me diſplay to Mr. T. my reading, which you have already declared inſufficient for the purpoſe, is it not much more reaſonable that you ſhould communicate to us the reſult of your reflection?

H.

With all my heart, if you chuſe it ſhould be ſo, and think you ſhall have patience to hear me through. I own I prefer inſtruction to correction, and had rather have been informed without the hazard of expoſing myſelf; but if you make the one a condition of the other, I think it ſtill worth my acceptance; and will not loſe this opportunity of your judgment for a little ſhame. I acknowledge then that the ſubject is not intirely new to my thoughts: for, though languages themſelves may be and uſually are acquired without any regard to their principles; I very early found it, or thought I found it,

impoſſible to make many ſteps in the ſearch after truth and the nature of human underſtanding, of good and evil, of right and wrong, without well conſidering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inſeparably connected with them. I own therefore I long ſince formed to myſelf a kind of ſyſtem, which ſeemed to me of ſingular uſe in the very ſmall extent of my younger ſtudies to keep my mind from confuſion and the impoſition of words. After too long an interval of idleneſs and pleaſure, it was my chance to have occaſion to apply to ſome of the modern languages; and, not being acquainted with any other more ſatisfactory, I tried my ſyſtem with theſe, and tried it with ſucceſs. I afterwards found it equally uſeful to me with ſome of the dead languages. Whilſt I was thus amuſing myſelf the political ſtruggle commenced; for my ſhare in which you ſo far juſtly banter me, as I do acknow-

ledge that, both in the outſet and the progreſs of it, I was guilty of two moſt egregious blunders; by attributing a much greater portion of virtue to individuals and of underſtanding to the generality than any experience of mankind can juſtify. After another interval therefore (not of idleneſs and pleaſure) I was again called by the queſtions of our friend Mr. T. (for yeſterday is not the firſt time by many that he has mentioned it) to the conſideration of this ſubject. I have hitherto declined attempting to give him the ſatisfaction he required: for, though the notion I had of language had ſatisfied my own mind and anſwered my own purpoſes, I could not venture to detail to him my crude conceptions without having ever made the leaſt inquiry into the opinions of others. Beſides, I did not at all ſuſpect that my notions, if juſt, could be peculiar to myſelf: and I hoped to find ſome author who might give

him a clearer, fuller, and more methodical account than I could, free from thoſe errors and omiſſions to which I muſt be liable. Having therefore ſome ſmall intervals of leiſure and a great deſire to give him the beſt information; I confeſs I have employed ſome part of that leiſure in reading every thing I could eaſily and readily procure that has been ſuggeſted by others.——I am afraid I have already ſpoken with too much preſumption: but when I tell you that I differ from all thoſe who with ſuch infinite labour and erudition have gone before me on this ſubject; what apology——

B.

Oh! make none. When men think modeſtly they may be allowed to ſpeak freely. Come—Where will you begin?—*Alpha*—Go on.

H.

Not with the organical part of language, I aſſure you. For, though in many re-

ſpects

ſpects it has been and is to this moment groſsly miſtaken, (and the miſtakes might, with the help of ſome of the firſt principles of natural philoſophy and anatomy, be eaſily corrected) yet it is an inquiry more of curioſity than immediate uſefulneſs.

B.

You will begin then either with *things* or *ideas:* for it is impoſſible we ſhould ever thoroughly underſtand the nature of the *ſigns*, unleſs we firſt properly conſider and arrange the *things ſignified*. Whoſe ſyſtem of philoſophy will you build upon?

H.

What you ſay is true. And yet I ſhall not begin there. Hermes, you know, put out the eyes of Argus; and I ſuſpect that he has likewiſe blinded philoſophy: and if I had not imagined ſo, I ſhould never have caſt away a thought upon this

ſubject. If therefore Philoſophy herſelf has been miſled by Language, how ſhall ſhe teach us to detect his tricks?

B.

Begin then as you pleaſe. Only begin.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Of the DIVISION, *or* DISTRIBUTION *of* LANGUAGE.

H.

THE purpoſe of Language is to communicate our thoughts ——

B.

You do not mention this, I hope, as ſomething new, or wherein you differ from others?

H.

You are too hasty with me. No. But I mention it as that principle, which, being kept *singly* in contemplation, has misled all those who have reasoned on this subject.

B.

Is it not true then?

H.

I think it is. And that on which the whole matter rests.

B.

And yet the confining themselves to this true principle, upon which the whole matter rests, has misled them!

H.

Indeed I think so.

B.

This is curious!

H. Yet

H.

Yet I hope to convince you of it. For thus they reaſoned——Words are the *ſigns* of *things*. There muſt therefore be as many ſorts of words, or *parts of ſpeech*, as there are ſorts of *things* *. The earlieſt inquirers into language proceeded then to ſettle how many ſorts there were of things; and from thence how many ſorts of words, or parts of ſpeech. Whilſt this method of ſearch *ſtrictly* prevailed, the parts of ſpeech were very few in number: but *two*. At moſt *three*, or *four*.

All things, ſaid they, muſt have names †. But there are two ſorts of things:

1. *Res quæ permanent.*
2. *Res quæ fluunt.*

There

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* *Dictio rerum nota: pro rerum ſpeciebus partes quotque ſuas ſortietur.*

J. C. SCALIGER de Cauſis L. L.

† From this moment Grammar quits the day-light; and plunges into an abyſs of utter darkneſs.

There muſt therefore be *two* ſorts of words or *parts of ſpeech:* viz.

1. *Notæ rerum quæ permanent.*
2. *Notæ rerum quæ fluunt.*

Well; but ſurely there are words which are neither *notæ rerum permanentium*, nor yet *notæ rerum fluentium.* What will you do with them?—We cannot tell: we can find but theſe two ſorts *in rerum natura:* call therefore thoſe other words, if you will, for the preſent, *particles* *, or inferior parts of ſpeech, till we can find out what

* A good convenient name for all the words which we do not underſtand: for as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no deſcription, it will equally ſuit any ſhort word we may pleaſe to refer thither. There has latterly been much diſpute amongſt Grammarians concerning the uſe of this word, *particle*, in the diviſion and diſtribution of ſpeech: particularly by Girard, Dangeau, the authors of the Encyclopedie, &c. In which it is ſingular that they ſhould all be right in their arguments againſt the uſe made of it by others; and all wrong, in the uſe which each of them

what they are. Or, as we ſee they are conſtantly interſperſed between nouns and verbs, and ſeem therefore in a manner to hold our ſpeech together, ſuppoſe you call them *conjunctions* or *connectives* *.

This ſeems to have been the utmoſt progreſs that philoſophical Grammar had made till about the time of Ariſtotle, when a *fourth* part of ſpeech was added,—the *definitive*, or *article*.

Here concluded the ſearch after the different ſorts of words, or parts of ſpeech, from

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them would make of it himſelf. Dr. S. Johnſon adopts N. Bailey's definition of a *particle*—" A word unvaried " by inflexion." And Locke defines *particles* to be— " The words whereby the mind ſignifies what con- " nection it gives to the ſeveral affirmations and nega- " tions, that it unites in one continued reaſoning or " narration."

* The Latin Grammarians amuſe themſelves with debating whether Συνδεσμος ſhould be tranſlated *Convinctio* or *Conjunctio*. The Danes and the Dutch ſeem to have taken different ſides of the queſtion: for the Daniſh language terms it *Bindeord*, and the Dutch *Köppelwoord*.

from the difference of things: for none other apparently rational, acknowledged, or accepted difference has been ſuggeſted.

According to this ſyſtem it was neceſſary that all ſorts of words ſhould belong to one of theſe four claſſes. For words being the *ſigns* of things, their ſorts muſt neceſſarily follow the ſorts of the things *ſignified*. And there being no more than four differences of things, there could be but four parts of ſpeech. The difficulty and controverſy now was, to determine to which of theſe four claſſes each word belonged. In the attempting of which, ſucceeding Grammarians could neither ſatisfy themſelves nor others: for they ſoon diſcovered ſome words ſo ſtubborn, that no ſophiſtry nor violence could by any means reduce them to any one of theſe claſſes. However, by this attempt and diſpute they became better acquainted with the differences of words, though they could not

account for them; and they found the old ſyſtem deficient, though they knew not how to ſupply its defects. They ſeem therefore to have reverſed the method of proceeding from things to ſigns, purſued by the philoſophers; and, ſtill allowing the principle, (*viz.* that there muſt be as many ſorts of words as of things,) they travelled backwards, and ſought for the things from the ſigns: adopting the converſe of the principle; namely, that there muſt be as many differences of things as of ſigns. Miſled therefore by the uſeful contrivances of language, they ſuppoſed many imaginary differences of things: and thus added greatly to the number of parts of ſpeech, and in conſequence to the errors of philoſophy.

Add to this, that the greater and more laborious part of Grammarians (to whoſe genius it is always more obvious to remark

mark a multitude of effects than to trace out one cauſe) confined themſelves merely to notice the differences obſervable in words, without any regard to the things ſignified.

From this time the number of parts of ſpeech has been variouſly reckoned: you will find different Grammarians contending for more than thirty. But moſt of thoſe who admitted the feweſt, acknowledge *eight*. This was long a favourite number; and has been kept to by many who yet did not include the ſame parts to make up that number. For thoſe who rejected the *article*, reckoned eight: and thoſe who did not allow the *interjection* ſtill reckoned eight. But what ſort of difference in words ſhould intitle them to hold a ſeparate rank by themſelves, has not to this moment been ſettled.

B. You

B.

You ſeem to forget, that it is ſome time ſince words have been no longer allowed to be the ſigns of *things*. Modern Grammarians acknowledge them to be (as indeed Ariſtotle called them, συμβολα παθημαλων) the ſigns of *ideas:* at the ſame time denying the other aſſertion of Ariſtotle, that *ideas* are the *likeneſſes of things* *. And this has made a great alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words.

H.

That has not much mended the matter. No doubt this alteration approached ſo far nearer to the truth; but the nature of Language has not been much better underſtood by it. For Grammarians have ſince

* Εςι μεν ȣν τα εν τη φωνη των εν τη ψυχη παθημαλων συμβολα— ȣ ων ταυλα ομοιωμαλα, πραγμαλα.

ARISTOT. de Interpretat.

ſince purſued juſt the ſame method with *mind*, as had before been done with *things*. The different operations of the mind, are to account now for what the different things were to account before: and when they are not found ſufficiently numerous for the purpoſe; it is only ſuppoſing an imaginary operation or two, and the difficulties are for the time ſhuffled over. So that the very ſame game has been played over again with *ideas*, which was before played with *things*. No ſatisfaction, no agreement has been obtained: But all has been diſpute, diverſity, and darkneſs. Inſomuch that many of the moſt learned and judicious Grammarians, diſguſted with abſurdity and contradictions, have prudently contented themſelves with remarking the differences of words, and have left the cauſes of language to ſhift for themſelves.

B. That

B.

That the methods of accounting for Language remain to this day various, uncertain and unſatisfactory, cannot be denied. But you have ſaid nothing yet to clear up the paradox you ſet out with; nor a ſingle word to unfold to us by what means you ſuppoſe Hermes has blinded philoſophy.

H.

I imagine that it is, in ſome meaſure, with the vehicle of our thoughts, as with the vehicles for our bodies. Neceſſity produced both. The firſt carriage for men was no doubt invented to tranſport the bodies of thoſe who from infirmity, or otherwiſe, could not move themſelves: But ſhould any one, deſirous of underſtanding the purpoſe and meaning of all the parts of our modern elegant carriages, attempt to explain them upon this one principle alone, *viz.*—That they were

neceſſary for conveyance ——; he would find himſelf wofully puzzled to account for the wheels, the ſeats, the ſprings, the blinds, the glaſſes, the lining, &c. Not to mention the mere ornamental parts of gilding, varniſh, &c.

Abbreviations are the *wheels* of language, the *wings* of Mercury. And though we might be dragged along without them, it would be with much difficulty, very heavily and tediouſly.

There is nothing more admirable nor more uſeful than the invention of ſigns: at the ſame time there is nothing more productive of error when we neglect to obſerve their complication. Into what blunders, and conſequently into what diſputes and difficulties, might not the excellent art of Short-hand writing (practiſed

tised almost exclusively by the English *) lead foreign philosophers; who, not knowing that we had any other alphabet, should suppose each mark to be the sign of a single sound. If they were very laborious and very learned indeed, it is likely they would write as many volumes on the subject, and with as much bitterness against each other, as Grammarians have done from the same sort of mistake concerning Language: until perhaps it should be suggested to them, that there may be not only signs of sounds; but again, for the sake

* "The art of Short-hand is, in its kind, an ingenious device, and of considerable usefulness, applicable to any language, much wondered at by travellers that have seen the experience of it in England: and yet, though it be above threescore years since it was first invented, it is not to this day (for ought I can learn) brought into common practice in any other nation." WILKINS. *Epist. Dedicatory. Essay towards a Real Character.*

"Short-hand, an art, as I have been told, known only in England." LOCKE *on Education.*

of abbreviation, ſigns of thoſe ſigns, one under another in a continued progreſſion.

B.

I think I begin to comprehend you. You mean to ſay that the errors of Grammarians have ariſen from ſuppoſing all words to be *immediately* either the ſigns of things or the ſigns of ideas: whereas in fact many words are merely *abbreviations* employed for diſpatch, and are the ſigns of other words. And that theſe are the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of philoſophy have been cheated.

H.

It is my meaning.

B.

Well. We can only judge of your opinion after we have heard how you maintain

tain it. Proceed, and ſtrip him of his wings. They ſeem eaſy enough to be taken off: for it ſtrikes me now, after what you have ſaid, that they are indeed put on in a peculiar manner, and do not, like thoſe of other winged deities, make a part of his body. You have only to looſe the ſtrings from his feet, and take off his cap. Come—Let us ſee what ſort of figure he will make without them.

H.

The firſt aim of Language was to *communicate* our thoughts: the ſecond, to do it with *diſpatch*. (I mean intirely to diſregard whatever additions or alterations have been made for the ſake of beauty, or ornament, eaſe, gracefulneſs, or pleaſure.) The difficulties and diſputes concerning Language have ariſen almoſt intirely from neglecting the conſideration of the latter

purpoſe of ſpeech: which, though ſubordinate to the former, is almoſt as neceſſary in the commerce of mankind, and has a much greater ſhare in accounting for the different ſorts of words *. Words have been called *winged:* and they well deſerve that name, when their abbreviations are compared with the progreſs which ſpeech could make without theſe inventions; but compared

* M. Le Preſident de Broſſes, in his excellent treatiſe *De la formation mechanique des Langues*, tom. 2. ſays—" On ne parle que pour etre entendu. Le plus " grand avantage d'une langue eſt d'etre claire. Tous " les procedés de Grammaire ne devroient aller qu' à " ce but." And again—" Le vulgaire & les philo- " ſophes n'ont d'autre but en parlant que de s'expli- " quer clairement." Art. 160. Pour le vulgaire, he ſhould have added—& *promptement*. And indeed he is afterwards well aware of this: for Art. 173, he ſays, " L'eſprit humain veut aller vîte dans ſon operation; " plus empreſsé de s'exprimer *promptement*, que cu- " rieux de s'exprimer avec une juſteſſe exacte & re- " fléchie. S'il n'a pas l'inſtrument qu'il faudroit em- " ployer, il ſe ſert de celui qu'il a tout prêt."

compared with the rapidity of thought, they have not the ſmalleſt claim to that title. Philoſophers have calculated the difference of velocity between ſound and light: But who will attempt to calculate the difference between ſpeech and thought! What wonder then that the invention of all ages ſhould have been upon the ſtretch to add ſuch wings to their converſation as might enable it, if poſſible, to keep pace in ſome meaſure with their minds.—Hence chiefly the variety of words.

Abbreviations are employed in language three ways:

1. In terms.
2. In ſorts of words.
3. In conſtruction.

Mr. Locke's Eſſay is the beſt *guide* to the *firſt*: and numberleſs are the authors

who have given particular explanations of the *laſt*. The *ſecond* only I take for my province at preſent; becauſe I believe it has hitherto eſcaped the proper notice of all.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. II.

Some CONSIDERATION *of Mr.* LOCKE'S ESSAY.

B.

I CANNOT recollect one word of Mr. Locke's that correſponds at all with any thing that you have ſaid. The *third* Book of his Eſſay is indeed expreſsly written—" *On the Nature, Uſe and Significa-* " *tion of Language.*" But there is nothing in it concerning *abbreviations.*

H.

I conſider the *whole* of Mr. Locke's Eſſay as a philoſophical account of the *firſt* ſort of abbreviations in Language.

B. What-

B.

Whatever you may think of it, it is certain, not only from the *title*, but from his own declaration, that Mr. Locke did not intend or confider it as fuch: for he fays,—" When I firft began this difcourfe of the " *Underftanding*, and a *good while after*, I " had not the leaft thought that any con- " fideration of *words* was at all neceffary " to it *.

H. True.

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* Perhaps it was for mankind a lucky miftake (for it was a miftake) which Mr. Locke made when he called his book, An Effay on Human *Underftanding*. For fome part of the ineftimable benefit of that book has, merely on account of its title, reached to many thoufands more than, I fear, it would have done, had he called it (what it is merely) A *Grammatical* Effay, or a Treatife on *Words*, or on *Language*. The human *mind*, or the human *underftanding*, appears to be a grand and noble theme; and all men, even the moft infufficient, conceive that to be a proper object for their contemplation: whilft inquiries into the nature of *Language* (through which alone they can obtain any knowledge beyond the beafts) are fallen into fuch extreme

H.

True. And it is very ſtrange he ſhould ſo have imagined *. But what immediately follows?—" But when, having paſſed " over the original and compoſition of " our † ideas, I began to examine the ex- " tent and certainty of our knowledge; " I found it had ſo near a connexion with " words, that unleſs their *force* and *man-* " *ner*

treme diſrepute and contempt, that even thoſe who " neither have the accent of chriſtian, pagan, or man," nor can ſpeak ſo many words together with as much propriety as Balaam's aſs did, do yet imagine *words* to be infinitely beneath the concern of their exalted underſtanding.

* " Ariſtotelis profectò judicio Grammaticam non " ſolum eſſe Philoſophiæ partem, (id quod nemo ſa- " nus negat): ſed ne ab ejus quidem cognitione diſ- " ſolvi poſſe intelligeremus."

J. C. SCALIGER *de Cauſis. Præfat.*

† It may appear preſumptuous, but it is neceſſary here to declare my opinion; that Mr. Locke in his Eſſay never did advance one ſtep beyond the origin of Ideas and the compoſition of Terms.

" *ner* of ſignification were firſt well ob-
" ſerved, there could be very little ſaid
" clearly and pertinently concerning know-
" ledge: which being converſant about
" truth, had conſtantly to do with pro-
" poſitions. And though it terminated
" in things, yet it was for the moſt part
" ſo much by the intervention of words,
" that they ſeemed ſcarce ſeparable from
" our general knowledge." And again,—
" I am apt to imagine that, were the *im-*
" *perfections* of Language, as the inſtru-
" ment of knowledge, more thoroughly
" weighed, a great many of the contro-
" verſies that make ſuch a noiſe in the
" world would of themſelves ceaſe; and
" the way to knowledge, and perhaps
" peace too, lie a great deal opener than
" it does *."

So

* " This deſign (ſays Wilkins) will likewiſe con-
" tribute much to the clearing of ſome of our modern
" differences

So that, from theſe and a great many other paſſages throughout the Eſſay, you may perceive that the more he reflected and ſearched into the human underſtanding, the more he was convinced of the neceſſity of an attention to Language; and of the inſeparable connexion between words and knowledge.

B. Yes.

" differences in religion;" (and he might have added, in all other diſputable ſubjects; eſpecially in matters of law and civil government;)—" by unmaſking many " wild errors, that ſhelter themſelves under the diſ- " guiſe of affected phraſes; which, being philoſophi- " cally unfolded, and rendered according to the ge- " nuine and natural importance of words, will appear " to be inconſiſtencies and contradictions. And ſe- " veral of thoſe pretended myſterious, profound no- " tions, expreſſed in great ſwelling words, whereby " ſome men ſet up for reputation, being this way exa- " mined, will appear to be either nonſenſe, or very flat " and jejune. And though it ſhould be of no other " uſe but this, yet were it in theſe days well worth " a man's pains and ſtudy; conſidering the common " miſchief that is done, and the many impoſtures and " cheats that are put upon men, under the diſguiſe of " affected, inſignificant phraſes." *Epiſt. Dedicat.*

B.

Yes. And therefore he wrote the *third* Book of his Eſſay, on—" the Nature, Uſe, " and Signification of Language." But you ſay, the *whole* of the Eſſay concerns Language: whereas the two firſt Books concern the *Origin* and *Compoſition* of *Ideas:* and he expreſsly declares that it was not till *after* he had paſſed over them, that he thought any conſideration of *words* was at all neceſſary.

H.

If he had been aware of this ſooner, that is, before he had treated of the origin and compoſition of Ideas; I think it would have made a great difference in his Eſſay. And therefore I ſaid, Mr. Locke's Eſſay is the beſt *Guide* to the firſt ſort of Abbreviations.

B.

Perhaps you imagine that, if he had been aware that he was only writing con-

cerning Language, he might have avoided treating of the origin of Ideas; and ſo have eſcaped the quantity of abuſe which has been unjuſtly poured upon him for his opinion on that ſubject.

H.

No. I think he would have ſet out juſt as he did, with the origin of Ideas; the proper ſtarting-poſt of a Grammarian who is to treat of their ſigns. Nor is he ſingular in referring them all to the Senſes; and in beginning an account of Language in that manner *.

B. What

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* Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in ſenſu, is, as well as its converſe, an antient and well known poſition.

Sicut in ſpeculo ea quæ videntur non ſunt, ſed eorum ſpecies; ita quæ intelligimus, ea ſunt re ipsâ extra nos, eorumque ſpecies in nobis. Eſt enim *quaſi rerum ſpeculum intellectus noſter; cui, niſi per ſenſum repreſententur res, nihil ſcit ipſe.*

J. C. SCALIGER, *Cap.* lxvi.

" I ſenſi

B.

What difference then do you imagine it would have made in Mr. Locke's Eſſay, if he

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" I ſenſi (ſays Buonmattei) in un certo modo po-
" trebbon dirſi Miniſtri, Nunzj, Famigliari, o Segre-
" tarj dello 'ntelletto. E acciochè lo Eſempio ce ne
" faccia piu capaci,—Imaginianci di vedere alcun
" Principe, ilqual ſe ne ſtia nella ſua corte, nel ſuo
" palazzo. Non vede egli con gli occhi propj, ne
" ode co' propj orecchi quel che per lo ſtato ſi faccia:
" ma col tenere in diverſi luoghi varj Miniſtri che lo
" ragguagliono di cio che ſegue, viene a ſapere inten-
" der per cotal relazione ogni coſa, e bene ſpeſſo molto
" piu minutamente e piu perfettamente degli ſteſſi
" miniſtri: Perchè quegli avendo ſemplicemente no-
" tizia di quel che avvenuto ſia nella lor città o pro-
" vincia, rimangon di tutto 'l reſto ignoranti, e di fa-
" cile poſſon fin delle coſe vedute ingannarſi. Dove
" il principe può aver di tutto il ſeguito cognizione in
" un ſubito, che ſervendogli per riprova d'ogni par-
" ticolar riferitogli, non lo laſcia coſi facilmente in-
" gannare. Coſi, dico, è l'Intelletto umano; ilquale
" eſſendo di tutte l' altre potenze e Signore e Principe,
" ſe ne ſta nella ſua ordinaria reſidenza ripoſto, e non
" vede nè ode coſa che ſi faccia di fuori: Ma avendo
" cinque miniſtri che lo ragguaglian di quel che ſuc-
" cede, uno nella region della viſta, un altro nella
" giuriſdizion dell' udito, quello nella provincia del
" guſto

he had ſooner been aware of the inſeparable connexion between words and knowledge; or, in the language of Sir Hugh, in Shakeſpeare, that " the lips is *parcel* of the *mind* *.

H.

Much. And amongſt many other things, I think he would not have talked of the *compoſition* of *ideas*; but would have ſeen that it was merely a contrivance of Language: and that the only compoſition was

E in

" guſto, queſto ne' paeſi dell' odorato, e queſt' altro " nel diſtretto del tatto, viene a ſapere per mezzo del " diſcorſo ogni coſa in univerſale, tanto piu de' ſenſi " perfettamente, quanto i ſenſi ciaſcuno intendendo " nella ſua pura potenza, non poſſon per tutte come " lo 'ntelletto diſcorrere. E ſiccome il Principe, " ſenza laſciarſi vedere o ſentire, fa noto altrui la " ſua volontà per mezzo degli ſteſſi miniſtri; coſi an " cora l' Intelletto fa intenderſi per via de medeſimi " Senſi:" BUONMATTEI. *Tratt.* 2. *Cap.* 2.

* " Divers philoſophers hold that the lips is parcel " of the mind."

Merry Wives of Windſor, Act 1. Scene 4.

in the *terms*; and consequently that it was as improper to speak of a *complex idea*, as it would be to call a constellation a complex star: And that they are not ideas, but merely *terms*, which are *general* and *abstract*. I think too that he would have seen the advantage of "thoroughly weighing" not only (as he says) "the *imperfections* of Language;" but its *perfections* also: For the perfections of Language, not properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy. And indeed, from numberless passages throughout his Essay, Mr. Locke seems to me to have suspected something of this sort: and especially from what he hints in his last chapter; where, speaking of the doctrine of signs, he says— "The consideration then of Ideas and "Words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no despicable part of their "contemplation who would take a view

"of

" of human knowledge in the whole ex-
" tent of it. And perhaps, if they were
" *diſtinctly* weighed and *duly* conſidered,
" they would afford us *another ſort* of *Lo-*
" *gick* and *Critick* than what we have hi-
" therto been acquainted with."

B.

Do not you think that what you now advance will bear a diſpute: and that ſome better arguments than your bare aſſertion are neceſſary to make us adopt your opinion?

H.

Yes. To many perſons much more would be neceſſary; but not to you. I only deſire you to read the Eſſay over again with attention, and ſee whether all that its immortal author has juſtly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you ſubſtitute the compoſition, &c. of *terms* wherever he has ſuppoſed a compoſition, &c.

of *ideas*. And if that ſhall upon ſtrict examination appear to you to be the caſe, you will need no other argument againſt the compoſition of Ideas: It being exactly ſimilar to that unanſwerable one which Mr. Locke himſelf declares to be ſufficient againſt their being innate. For the ſuppoſition is unneceſſary: Every purpoſe for which the compoſition of Ideas was imagined being more eaſily and naturally anſwered by the compoſition of Terms: whilſt at the ſame time it does likewiſe clear up many difficulties in which the ſuppoſed compoſition of Ideas neceſſarily involve us. And, though this is the only argument I mean to uſe at preſent, (becauſe I would not willingly digreſs too far, and it is not the neceſſary foundation for what I have undertaken) yet I will venture to ſay, that it is an eaſy matter, upon Mr. Locke's own principles and a phyſical conſideration of the

the Senſes and the Mind, to prove the impoſſibility of the compoſition of Ideas.

B.

Well. Since you do not intend to build any thing upon it, we may ſafely for the preſent ſuppoſe what you have advanced; and take it for granted that the greateſt part of Mr. Locke's Eſſay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the compoſition, abſtraction, complexity, generalization, relation, &c. of Ideas, does indeed merely concern *Language*. But, pray, let me aſk you; If ſo, what has Mr. Locke done in the *Third* Book of his Eſſay? In which he *profeſſedly* treats of the nature, uſe, and ſignification of *Language*?

H.

He has really done little elſe but enlarge upon what he had ſaid before, when he thought he was treating only of *Ideas*:

that is, he has continued to treat of the composition of *Terms*. For though, in the passage I have before quoted, he says, that "unless the *force* and *manner* of significa-"tion of words are first well observed, "there can be very little said clearly and "pertinently concerning knowledge;"—and though this is the declared reason of writing his *Third* Book concerning Language, as *distinct* from Ideas; yet he continues to treat singly, as before, concerning the *Force* * of words; and has not advanced one syllable concerning their *Manner* of signification.

The only Division Mr. Locke has made of words, is, into—*Names* of Ideas and *Particles*. This division is not made regularly and formally; but is reserved to his

* The Force of a word depends upon the number of Ideas of which that word is the sign.

his *ſeventh* Chapter. And even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, looſe, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's uſual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the *ſeventh* Chapter is,—*Of Particles*;—yet he ſeems to chuſe to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include *Verbs* in that title, and particularly what he calls "*the Marks of the Mind's affirming or de-*" *nying*." And indeed he himſelf acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that —" Some parts of that *Third* Book con-" cerning Words, though the thoughts " were eaſy and clear enough, yet coſt him " more pains to expreſs than all the reſt " of his Eſſay. And that therefore he " ſhould not much wonder if there were " in ſome parts of it obſcurity and doubt-" fulneſs." Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to expreſs himſelf, in a language with which he is well acquainted,

let him be perſuaded that his thoughts are *not* clear enough: for, as Swift (I think) has ſomewhere obſerved, "When "the water is clear you will eaſily ſee to "the bottom."

The whole of this vague Chapter—*Of Particles*—(which ſhould have contained an account of every thing but *Nouns*) is comprized in *two pages* and a half: and all the reſt of the Third Book concerns only, as before, the *Force* of the names of Ideas.

B.

How is this to be accounted for? Do you ſuppoſe he was unacquainted with the opinions of Grammarians, or that he deſpiſed the ſubject?

H.

No. I am very ſure of the contrary. For it is plain he did not deſpiſe the ſubject;

ject; ſince he repeatedly and ſtrongly recommends it to others: and at every ſtep throughout his Eſſay, I find the moſt evident marks of the journey he had himſelf taken through all their works. But it appears that he was by no means ſatisfied with what he found there concerning *Particles:* For he complains that "this part "of Grammar has been as much neglect-"ed, as ſome others over-diligently cul-"tivated." And ſays, that "He who "would ſhew the right uſe of Particles, "and what ſignificancy and force they "have," (that is, according to his own diviſion, the right uſe, ſignificancy, and force of ALL words except the names of Ideas) "muſt take a little more pains, "enter into his own thoughts, and ob-"ſerve nicely the ſeveral poſtures of his "mind in diſcourſing." For theſe *Particles*, he ſays,—"are all marks of ſome "*action* or *intimation* of the *Mind*; and therefore,

" therefore, to underſtand them rightly, " the ſeveral views, poſtures, ſtands, " turns, limitations and exceptions, and " *ſeveral other thoughts* of the Mind, *for* " *which we have either None or very defi-* " *cient names*, are diligently to be ſtudied. " Of theſe there are a great variety, much " exceeding the number of Particles." For himſelf, he declines the taſk, however neceſſary and neglected by all others; and that for no better reaſon than—" I *intend* " not *here* a *full* explication of this ſort " of ſigns." And yet he was (as he profeſſed and thought) writing on the human *Underſtanding*; and therefore ſhould not ſurely have left mankind ſtill in the ſame darkneſs in which he found them, concerning theſe hitherto *unnamed* and (but by himſelf) *undiſcovered* operations of the Mind.

In ſhort, this ſeventh Chapter is, to me, a full confeſſion and proof that he had not ſettled

ſettled his own opinion concerning the *manner* of ſignification of Words: that it ſtill remained (though he did not chuſe to have it ſo underſtood) a *Deſideratum* with him, as it did with our great Bacon before him: and therefore that he would not decide any thing about it; but confined himſelf to the proſecution of his original inquiry concerning the firſt ſort of *Abbreviations*, which is by far the moſt important to knowledge, and which he ſuppoſed to belong to *Ideas*.

But though he declined the ſubject, he evidently leaned towards the opinion of Ariſtotle, Scaliger, and Meſſ. de Port Royal: and therefore, without having ſufficiently examined their poſition, he too haſtily adopted their notion concerning the pretended *Copula*—"*Is*, and *Is not*." He ſuppoſed with them, that *affirming* and *denying* were operations of the *Mind*; and referred

referred all the other ſorts of Words to the ſame ſource. Though, if the different ſorts of Words had been (as he was willing to believe) to be accounted for by the different operations of the Mind, it was almoſt impoſſible they ſhould have eſcaped the penetrating eyes of Mr. Locke.

ΕΠΕΑ

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. III.

Of the PARTS *of* SPEECH.

B.

YOU ſaid ſome time ago, very truly, that the number of Parts of Speech was variouſly reckoned: and that it has not to this moment been ſettled, what ſort of difference in words ſhould entitle them to hold a ſeparate rank by themſelves.

By what you have ſince advanced, this matter ſeems to be ten times more unſettled than it was before: for you have diſcarded

diſcarded the differences of *Things*, and the differences of *Ideas*, and the different *operations* of the *Mind*, as guides to a diviſion of Language. Now I cannot for my life imagine any other principle that you have left to conduct us to the *Parts* of Speech.

H.

I thought I had laid down in the beginning, the principles upon which we were to proceed in our inquiry into the *manner of ſignification* of words.

B.

Which do you mean?

H.

The ſame which Mr. Locke employs in his inquiry into the *Force* of words: viz. —The two great purpoſes of ſpeech.

B.

And to what diſtribution do they lead you?

H.

1. To words *neceſſary* for the *communication* of our Thoughts. And

2. To *Abbreviations*, employed for the ſake of diſpatch.

B.

How many of each do you reckon? And which are they?

H.

In what particular language do you mean? For, if you do not confine your queſtion, you might as reaſonably expect me (according to the fable) "to make a "coat to fit the moon in all her changes."

B.

Why? Are they not the ſame in all languages?

H. Thoſe

H.

Thoſe *neceſſary* to the communication of our thoughts are.

B.

And are not the others alſo?

H.

No. Very different.

B.

I thought we were talking of Univerſal Grammar.

H.

I mean ſo too. But I cannot anſwer the whole of your queſtion, unleſs you confine it to ſome particular language with which I am acquainted. However, that need not diſturb you: for you will find afterwards that the principles will apply univerſally.

B. Well

B.

Well. For the preſent then confine yourſelf to the *neceſſary* Parts: and exemplify in the Engliſh.

H.

In Engliſh, and in all Languages, there are only *two* ſorts of words which are *neceſſary* for the communication of our thoughts.

B.

And they are?

H.

1. Noun, and
2. Verb.

B.

Theſe are the common names, and I ſuppoſe you uſe them according to the common acceptation.

H.

I ſhould not otherwiſe have choſen them, but becauſe they are commonly employed;

and it would not be eaſy to diſpoſſeſs them of their preſcriptive title: beſides, without doing any miſchief, it ſaves time in our diſcourſe. And I uſe them according to their common acceptation.

B.

But you have not all this while informed me how many *Parts of Speech* you mean to lay down.

H.

That ſhall be as you pleaſe. Either *Two*, or *Twenty*, or more. In the ſtrict ſenſe of the term, no doubt both the neceſſary words and the Abbreviations are all of them Parts of Speech; becauſe they are all uſeful in Language, and each has a different manner of ſignification. But I think it of great conſequence both to knowledge and to Languages, to keep the words employed for the different purpoſes

of

of ſpeech, as diſtinct as poſſible. And therefore I am inclined to allow that rank only to the *neceſſary* words *: and to include all the others (which are not neceſſary to ſpeech, but merely *ſubſtitutes* of the firſt ſort) under the title of *Abbreviations.*

B.

Merely Subſtitutes! You do not mean that you can diſcourſe as well without as with them?

H.

Not as well. A ſledge cannot be drawn along as ſmoothly, and eaſily, and ſwiftly, as a carriage with wheels; but it may be dragged.

* "Res neceſſarias Philoſophus primo loco ſtatuit: "acceſſorias autem & vicarias, mox."
I. C. Scaliger de Cauſis L. L. cap. 110.

B.

Do you mean then that, without uſing any other ſort of word whatever, and merely by the means of the Noun and Verb alone, you can relate or communicate any thing that I can relate or communicate with the help of all the others?

H.

Yes. It is the great proof of all I have advanced. And, upon trial, you will find that you may do the ſame. But, after the long habit and familiar uſe of *Abbreviations*, your firſt attempts to do without them will ſeem very aukward to you; and you will ſtumble as often as a horſe, long uſed to be ſhod, that has newly caſt his ſhoes. Though indeed (even with thoſe who have not the habit to ſtruggle againſt) without *Abbreviations*, Language can get on but lamely: and therefore they have been introduced, in different plenty, and more

or leſs happily, in all Languages. And upon theſe two points—*Abbreviation* of *Terms*, and *Abbreviation* in the *manner of ſignification* of words—depends the reſpective excellence of every Language. All their other comparative advantages are trifling.

B.

I like your method of proof very well; and will certainly put it to the trial. But before I can do that properly, you muſt explain your Abbreviations: that I may know what they ſtand for, and what words to put in their room.

H.

Would you have me then paſs over the *two neceſſary Parts* of Speech; and proceed immediately to their Abbreviations?

B.

If you will. For I ſuppoſe you agree with the common opinion, concerning the words which you have diſtinguiſhed as neceſſary to the communication of our thoughts. Thoſe you call neceſſary, I ſuppoſe you allow to be the *ſigns* of different ſorts of *Ideas*, or of different *operations* of the mind.

H.

Indeed I do not. The buſineſs of the mind, as far as it concerns Language, appears to me to be very ſimple. It extends no farther than to receive Impreſſions, that is, to have Senſations or Feelings. What are called its operations, are merely the operations of Language. A conſideration of *Ideas*, or of the *Mind*, or of *Things* (relative to the Parts of Speech) will lead us no farther than to *Nouns*: i. e. the ſigns of thoſe impreſſions, or names

of

of ideas. The other Part of Speech, the *Verb*, muſt be accounted for from the neceſſary uſe of it in communication. It is in fact the communication itſelf: and therefore well denominated Ρημα, *dictum*. For the Verb is QUOD *loquimur* *; the *Noun*, DE QUO.

B.

Let us proceed then regularly; and hear what you have to ſay on each of your *two* neceſſary Parts of Speech.

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* "Alterum eſt quod loquimur; alterum de quo "loquimur."

Quinctil. lib. i. cap. 4.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. IV.

Of the NOUN.

H.

OF the firſt Part of Speech — the Noun,—it being the beſt underſtood, and therefore the moſt ſpoken of by others, I ſhall need *at preſent* to ſay little more than that it is the *ſimple* or *complex*, the *particular* or *general ſign* or *name* of *one* or *more Ideas*.

I ſhall only remind you, that at this ſtage of our inquiry concerning Language, comes in moſt properly the conſideration of

of the Force of terms: which is the whole buſineſs of Mr. Locke's Eſſay; to which I refer you. And I imagine that Mr. Locke's *intention* of confining himſelf to the conſideration of the *Mind* only, was the reaſon that he went no farther than to the *Force* of Terms; and did not meddle with their *Manner* of ſignification, to which the Mind alone could never lead him.

B.

Do you ſay nothing of the Declenſion, Number, Caſe and Gender of Nouns?

H.

At preſent nothing. There is no pains-worthy difficulty nor diſpute about them.

B.

Surely there is about the Gender. And Mr. Harris particularly has thought it worth

worth his while to treat at large of what others have ſlightly hinted concerning it *: and has ſupported his reaſoning by a long liſt of poetical authorities. What think you of that part of his book?

H.

That, with the reſt of it, he had much better have let it alone. And as for his poetical

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* "Pythagoriti *ſexum* in *cunctis* agnoſcunt, &c. "*Agens*, Mas; *Patiens*, Fœmina. Quapropter *Deus* "dicunt maſculinè; *Terra*, fœmininè; & *Ignis*, maſ-"culinè; & *Aqua*, fœmininè: quoniam in his *Actio*, "in iſtis *Paſſio* relucebat."

Campanella.

* In rebus inveniuntur duæ proprietates generales, "ſcilicet proprietas *Agentis*, & proprietas *Patientis*. "Genus eſt modus ſignificandi nominis ſumptus a pro-"prietate activa vel paſſiva. Genus maſculinum eſt "modus ſignificandi rem ſub proprietate agentis: "Genus femininum eſt modus ſignificandi rem ſub "proprietate patientis."

Scotus-Gram. Spec. Cap. xvi.

poetical authorities; the Muſes (as I have heard Mrs. Peachum ſay of her own ſex in caſes of murder) are bitter bad judges in matters of philoſophy. Beſides that Reaſon is an arrant Deſpot; who, in his own dominions, admits of no authority but his own. And Mr. Harris is particularly unfortunate in the very outſet of that —" ſubtle kind of reaſoning (as he calls it) " which diſcerns even in things without " ſex, a diſtant analogy to that great na- " tural diſtinction." For his very firſt inſtances,—the SUN and the MOON,—deſtroy the whole ſubtilty of this kind of reaſoning *. For Mr. Harris ought to have

* It can only have been Mr. Harris's authority, and the ill-founded praiſes laviſhed on his performance, that could miſlead Dr. Prieſtley, in his thirteenth lecture, haſtily and without examination, to ſay——— " Thus, for example, the SUN having a ſtronger, and " the MOON a weaker influence over the world, and " there

have known, that in many Asiatic Languages, and in all the northern Languages of this part of the globe which we inhabit, and particularly in our Mother-language the Anglo-saxon (from which SUN and MOON are immediately derived to us) SUN is *Feminine*, and MOON is *Masculine* *. So

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" there being but two celestial bodies so remarkable; " *All nations*, I believe, that use genders, have as- " cribed to the Sun the gender of the *Male*, and to " the Moon that of the *Female*."

In the Gothic, Anglo-saxon, German, Danish and Swedish, SUN is *feminine:* In modern Russian it is *neuter*.

* " Apud Saxones, Luna, *Mona*. *Mona* autem " Germanis superioribus *Mon*, alias *Man*; a *Mon*, " alias *Man* veterrimo ipsorum rege & Deo patrio, " quem Tacitus meminit, & in *Luna* celebrabant.— " Ex hoc Lunam masculino (ut *Hebræi*) dicunt ge- " nere, *Der Mon:* Dominamque ejus & Amasiam, e " cujus aspectu aliàs languet, aliàs resipiscit, *Die Son*; " quasi *hunc* Lunam, *hanc* Solem. Hinc & Idolum " Lunæ viri fingebant specie; non, ut Verstegan opi- " natur, fœminæ."

Spelman's Gloss. MONA.

" De

So feminine is the Sun, that our northern Mythology makes her the *Wife* of Tuiſco.

And if our Engliſh Poets, Shakeſpeare, Milton, &c. have, by a familiar Proſopeia, made them of different genders; it is only becauſe, from their claſſical reading, they adopted the ſouthern not the northern mythology; and followed the pattern of their Greek and Roman maſters.

Figure apart, in our Language, the names of things without ſex are alſo without

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" De generibus Nominum (quæ per articulos, adjectiva, participia, & pronomina indicantur) hic nihil tradimus. Obiter tamen obſervet Lector, ut ut minuta res eſt, *Solem* (*Sunna* vel *Sunne*) in Angloſaxonica eſſe *fœminini* generis, & *Lunam* (*Mona*) eſſe *maſculini*." G. Hickes.

" Quomodo item *Sol* eſt *virile*, Germanicum *Sunn*, *fœmininum*. Dicunt enim *Die Sunn*, non *Der Sunn*. Unde & Solem Tuiſconis uxorem fuiſſe fabulantur."

G. J. Voſſius.

out gender *. And this, not becauſe our Reaſoning or Underſtanding differs from theirs who gave them gender; (which muſt

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* " Sexus enim non niſi in Animali, aut in iis quæ " Animalis naturam imitantur, ut Arbores. Sed ab " uſu hoc factum eſt; qui nunc maſculinum ſexum, " nunc fœmininum attribuiſſet.——Proprium autem " generum eſſe pati mutationem, ſatis patet ex genere " incerto; ut etiam *Armentas* dixerit Ennius, quæ nos " *Armenta*." J. C. Scaliger de cauſis, cap. lxxix.

" Nominum quoque genera mutantur adeo, ut pri- " vatim libros ſuper hac re veteres confecerint. Al- " terum argumentum eſt ex iis quæ *Dubia* ſive *Incerta* " vocant. Sic enim dictum eſt, *Hic* vel *Hæc* dies. " Tertium teſtimonium eſt in quibuſdam: nam Plautus " *collum* maſculino dixit. Item *Jubar*, *Palumbem*, " atque alia, diverſis quam nos generibus eſſe a priſcis " pronunciata." Id. cap. ciii.

" *Amour* qui eſt maſculin au ſingulier, eſt quelque- " fois feminin au pluriel; *de folles amours*. On dit " au maſculin *Un Comté*, *Un Duché*; & au feminin " *Une Comté pairie*, *Une Duché pairie*. On dit encore " *De bonnes gens*, & *Des gens malheureux*. Par où " vous voyez que le ſubſtantif *Gens* eſt feminin, " lorſqu'

muſt be the caſe, if the Mind or Reaſon was concerned in it *.) But becauſe with us

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" lorſqu' il eſt précédé d' un adjectif; & qu'il eſt " maſculin, lorſqu' il en eſt ſuivi."

L' Abbé de Condillac, P. 2. chap. iv.

The ingenious author of—Notes on the Grammatica Sinica of M. Fourmont—ſays, " According to " the Grammaire Raiſonnée, *les genres ont eté inventés* " *pour les terminaiſons*. But the Meſſ. du Port Royal " have diſcovered a different origin; they tell us that " —*Arbor eſt feminine, parceque comme une bonne mere* " *elle porte du fruit*.—Miratur non ſua. How could " Frenchmen forget that in their own *la meilleure des* " *langues poſſibles*, Fruit-trees are maſculine, and their " fruits feminine? Mr. Harris has adopted this idea: " he might as well have left it to its legitimate pa- " rents." P. 47.

* " Sane in ſexu ſeu genere phyſico omnes nationes " convenire debebunt; quoniam natura eſt eadem, " nec ad placitum ſcriptorum mutatur. At Poetæ & " Pictores in coloribus non ſemper conveniunt. Ven- " tos Romani non ſolum finxerunt eſſe viros, ſed & " Deos: at Hebræi contra eos ut Nymphas pinxerunt. " Arbores Latini ſpecie fœmineâ pinxerunt; virili " Hiſpani, &c. Regiones urbeſque Deas eſſe voluit " Gentilium

us the relation of words to each other is denoted by the place or by Prepoſitions; which denotation in their language uſually made a part of the words themſelves, and was ſhewn by caſes or terminations. This contrivance of theirs, allowing them a more varied conſtruction, made the terminating genders of Adjectives uſeful, in order to avoid miſtake and miſapplication.

" Gentilium Latinorum Theologia: at Germani omnia hæc ad neutrum rejecerunt. Et quidem in Genere, ſeu ſexûs diſtinctione grammaticâ, magna eſt inter authores differentia; non ſolum in diverſis linguis, ſed etiam in eadem. In Latina, ne ad alias, recurram, aliter Oratores, & aliter Poetæ: aliter veteres, & aliter juniores ſentiunt, &c. Iberes in Aſia florere dicuntur, & linguam habere elegantem, & tamen nullam generum varietatem agnoſcunt."

Caramuel, lxii.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. V.

Of the ARTICLE *and* INTERJECTION.

B.

HOWEVER connected with the *Noun*, and generally treated of at the ſame time, I ſuppoſe you forbear to mention the *Articles* at preſent, as not allowing them to be a ſeparate Part of Speech; at leaſt not a neceſſary Part; becauſe, as Wilkins tells us, " the Latin is without " them *." Notwithſtanding which, when you conſider with him that " they " are ſo convenient for the greater diſ-

* Eſſay, Part 3. Chap. 3.

" tinctneſs of ſpeech; and that upon this " account, the Hebrew, Greek, Sclavonic, " and moſt other languages have them;" perhaps you will not think it improper to follow the example of many other Grammarians: who, though like you, they deny them to be any part of ſpeech, have yet treated of them ſeparately from thoſe parts which they enumerate. And this you may very conſiſtently do, even though you ſhould conſider them, as the Abbé Girard calls them, merely the *avant-coureurs* to announce the approach or entrance of a Noun *.

H. Of

* " J'abandonne l'art de copier des mots dits & " répétés mille fois avant moi; puiſqu'ils n'expli- " quent pas les choſes eſſentielles que j'ai deſſein de " faire entendre à mes lecteurs. Une étude attentive " faite d'apres l'uſage m'inſtruit bien mieux. Elle " m'apprend que l'Article eſt un mot établi pour an- " noncer & particulariſer ſimplement la choſe ſans la " nommer: c'eſt à dire, qu'il eſt une expreſſion in " definie, quoique poſitive, dont la juſte valeur n'eſt " que

H.

Of all the accounts which have been given of the Article, I muſt own I think that

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" que de faire naitre l'idée d'une eſpece ſubſiſtente
" qu'on diſtingue de la totalité des etres, pour être
" enſuite nommée. Cette definition en expoſe claire-
" ment la nature & le ſervice propre, au quel on le
" voit conſtamment attaché dans quelque circonſtance
" que ce ſoit. Elle m'en donne une idée nette & dé-
" terminée : me le fait reconnoitre par tout : & m'em-
" peche de le confondre avec tout autre mot d'eſpece
" différente. Je ſens parfaitement que lorſque je veux
" parler d'un objet, qui ſe préſente à mes yeux ou à
" mon imagination, le génie de ma langue ne m'en
" fournit pas toujours la denomination préciſe dans le
" premier inſtant de l'exécution de la parole : que le
" plus ſouvent il m'offre d'abord un autre mot, comme
" un commencement de ſujet proposé & de diſtinction
" des autres objets ; enſorte que ce mot eſt un vrai
" préparatoire à la denomination, par lequel elle eſt
" annoncée, avant que de ſe préſenter elle même : Et
" voilâ l'*Article* tel que je l'ai defini. Si cet *Avant-*
" *coureur* diminue la vivacité du langage, il y met en
" récompenſe une certaine politeſſe & une délicateſſe
" qui naiſſent de cette idée préparatoire & indéfinie
" d'un objet qu'on va nommer ! car par ce moyen
" l'eſprit étant rendu attentif avant que d'être inſtruit,

that of the very ingenious Abbé Girard to be the moſt fantaſtic and abſurd. The fate of this very neceſſary word has been moſt ſingularly hard and unfortunate. For though without it, or ſome equivalent invention *, men could not communicate their thoughts at all; yet (like many of the moſt uſeful things in this world) from its unaffected ſimplicity and want of brilliancy, it has been ungratefully neglected and

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" il a le plaiſir d'aller au devant de la dénomination, " de la deſirer, & de l'attendre avant que de la poſ- " ſéder. Plaiſir qui a ici, comme ailleurs, un mérite " flateur, propre à piquer le gout.—Qu'on me paſſe " cette metaphore; puiſqu'elle a de la juſteſſe, & fait " connoitre d'une maniere ſenſible une choſe *tres-me-* " *taphyſique.*" *Diſc.* iv.

* For ſome equivalent invention, ſee the Perſian and other Eaſtern languages; which ſupply the place of our Article by a termination to thoſe Nouns which they would indefinitely particularize.

This circumſtance of fact (if there were not other reaſons) ſufficiently explodes Girard's notion of *Avant-coureurs.*

and degraded. It has been conſidered, after Scaliger, as "*otioſum loquaciſſimæ* "*gentis Inſtrumentum*;" or, at beſt, as a mere *vaunt-courier* to announce the coming of his maſter: whilſt the brutiſh inarticulate *Interjection*, which has nothing to do with ſpeech, and is only the miſerable refuge of the ſpeechleſs, has been permitted, becauſe beautiful and gaudy, to uſurp a place amongſt words, and to exclude the Article from its well-earned dignity. But though the Article is denied by many Grammarians to be a Part of Speech; it is yet, as you ſay, treated of by many, ſeparately from thoſe parts which they allow. This inconſiſtency * and the cauſe of it are pleaſantly ridiculed

* What Scaliger ſays of the Participle may very juſtly be applied to this manner of treating the Article. "Si non eſt *Nota*, imo verò ſi nonnullis ne pars qui-"dem orationis ulla, ab aliis ſeparata, judicata eſt; "quo conſilio ei rei, quæ nuſquam extat, ſedem ſta-"tuunt." *Lib.* 7. *Cap.* cxl.

by Buonmattei, whoſe underſtanding had courage ſufficient to reſtore the Article; and to launch out beyond *quelle fatali colonne che gli antichi avevan ſegnate col—Non plus ultra.* " Dodici" (ſays he, Tratt. 7. Cap. 22, 23.) " affermiamo eſſer " le Parti dell' orazione nella noſtra lin- " gua. Nè ci ſiam curati che gli altri " quaſi tutti non ne voglion conceder piu " d' otto; moſſi, come ſi vede, da una " certa ſopraſtizioſa oſtinazione (ſia detto " con pace e riverenza loro) che gli au- " tori piu antichi hanno ſtabilito tal nu- " mero: Quaſi che abbiano in tal modo " proibito a noi il paſſar quelle fatali " colonne che gli antichi avevan ſegnate " col—*Non plus ultra.* Onde perchè i " Latini dicevan tutti con una voce uni- " forme—*Partes Orationis ſunt octo:*— " quei che intorno a cent anni ſono ſcriſ- " ſon le regole di queſta lingua, comin- " ciavan con la medeſima cantilena. Il

" che

" che ſe ſia da commendare o da biaſimare
" non dirò: Baſta che a me par una coſa
" ridicoloſa, dire—*Otto ſon le parti dell'*
" *orazione*, — e ſubito ſoggiugnere — *Ma*
" *innanzi che io di quelle incominci a ra-*
" *gionare, fa meſtiero che ſopra gli Arti-*
" *coli alcuna coſa ti dica*,

" Queſto è il medeſimo che ſe diceſſi-
" mo—Tre ſon le parti del mondo: Ma
" prima ch' io ti ragioni di quelle, fa meſ-
" tiero che ſopra l'Europa alcuna coſa
" ti dica."

B.

As far as reſpects the Article I think you are right. But why ſuch bitterneſs againſt the Interjection? Why do you not rather follow Buonmattei's example; and, inſtead of excluding both, admit them both to be Parts of Speech?

H.

Becauſe the dominion of Speech is erected upon the downfall of Interjections. Without the artful contrivances of Language, mankind would have nothing but Interjections with which to communicate, orally, any of their feelings. The neighing of a horſe, the lowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, ſneezing, coughing, groaning, ſhrieking, and every other involuntary convulſion with oral ſound, have almoſt as good a title to be called Parts of Speech, as Interjections have. Voluntary Interjections are only employed when the ſuddenneſs or vehemence of ſome affection or paſſion returns men to their natural ſtate; and makes them, for a moment, forget the uſe of ſpeech: or when, from ſome circumſtance, the ſhortneſs of time will not permit them to exerciſe it. And in books they are only uſed for embelliſhment, and

to

to mark ſtrongly the above ſituations. But where Speech can be employed, they are totally uſeleſs; and are always inſufficient for the purpoſe of communicating our thoughts. And indeed where will you look for the Interjection? Will you find it amongſt laws, or in books of civil inſtitutions, in hiſtory, or in any treatiſe of uſeful arts or ſciences? No. You muſt ſeek for it in rhetorick and poetry, in novels, plays and romances.

B.

If what you ſay is true, I muſt acknowledge that the Article has had hard meaſure to be diſplaced for the Interjection. For by your declamation, and the zeal you have ſhewn in its defence, it is evident that you do not intend we ſhould, with Scaliger, conſider it merely as *otioſum Inſtrumentum*.

H. Moſt

H.

Moſt aſſuredly not: though I acknowledge that it has been uſed *otiosè* by many nations *. And I do not wonder that, keeping his eyes ſolely on the ſuperfluous uſe (or rather abuſe) of it, he ſhould too haſtily conclude againſt this very neceſſary inſtrument itſelf.

B.

Say you ſo! very *neceſſary* inſtrument! Since then you have, contrary to my expectation, allowed its neceſſity, I ſhould be glad to know how the Article comes to be

* "Il ſeroit à ſouhaiter qu'on ſupprimât l'Article, "toutes les fois que les noms ſont ſuffiſamment deter- "minés par la nature de la choſe ou par les circon- "ſtances; le diſcours en ſeroit plus vif. Mais la "grande habitude que nous nous en ſommes faites, ne "le permet pas: & ce n'eſt que dans des proverbes, "plus anciens que cette habitude, que nous nous faiſons "une loi de le ſupprimer. On dit—*Pauvreté n'eſt* "*pas vice:* au lieu de dire—*La pauvreté n'eſt pas un* "*vice.*" CONDILLAC. *Gram. Part* 2. *Chap.* 14.

be ſo neceſſary to Speech: and, if neceſſary, how can the Latin language be without it, as moſt authors agree that it is * ? And when you have given me ſatisfaction on

---

* See Plutarch, as cited before—" L'on peut dire " du langage des Romains, &c. Quant aux *Articles*, " il n'en reçoit pas un tout ſeul."

" *Articulus* nobis nullus & Græcis ſuperfluus."

" Satis conſtat Græcorum *Articulos* non neglectos " a nobis, ſed eorum uſum ſuperfluum."

J. C. SCALIGER de C. L. L. Cap. lxxii.—cxxxi.

It is pleaſant after this to have Scaliger's authority againſt himſelf, and to hear him prove that the Latin not only has *Articles*; but even the very identical Article ὁ of the Greeks: for he ſays (and, notwithſtanding the etymological diſſent of Voſſius, ſays truly) that the Latin *Qui* is no other than the Greek ὅς ὁ.

" *Articulum*, Fabio teſte, Latinus ſermo non deſi- " derat: imo, me judice, planè ignorat."

G. J. VOSSIUS.

" Diſpleaſed with the redundance of Particles in the " Greek, the Romans extended their diſpleaſure to the " *Article*, which they totally baniſhed." *Notes on the* Grammatica Sinica *of* Monſ. FORMONT, p. 54.

on thoſe points, you will permit me to aſk you a few queſtions farther.

H.

You may learn its neceſſity, if you pleaſe, from Mr. Locke. And that once proved, it follows of conſequence that I muſt deny its abſence from the Latin or from any other language *.

B.

Mr. Locke! He has not ſo much as even once mentioned the Article.

H.

Notwithſtanding which he has ſufficiently proved its neceſſity; and conducted us

* "L'Article indicatif ſe ſupplée ſur tout par la ter-
" minaiſon, dans les langues à terminaiſons, comme
" la langue Latine. C'eſt ce qui avoit fait croire
" mal-à-propos que les Latins n'avoient aucun Article;
" & qui avoit fait conclure plus mal-à-propos encore
" que l'Article n'etoit pas une partie du diſcours."

COURT DE GEBELIN, *Gram. Univerſelle*, p. 192.

us directly to its uſe and purpoſe. For in the eleventh Chapter of the ſecond Book of his Eſſay, Sect. 9. he ſays,—" The uſe " of words being to ſtand as outward " marks of our internal ideas, and thoſe " ideas being taken from particular things; " if every particular idea ſhould have a " diſtinct name, names would be endleſs." So again, Book 3. Chap. 3. treating of *General Terms*, he ſays,—" All things that " exiſt being particulars, it may perhaps " be thought reaſonable that words, which " ought to be conformed to things, ſhould " be ſo too; I mean in their ſignification. " But yet we find the quite contrary. " The far greateſt part of words that make " all languages, are *General Terms*. Which " has not been the effect of neglect, or " chance, but of reaſon and neceſſity. " For, firſt, it is impoſſible that every " particular thing ſhould have a diſtinct " peculiar name. For the ſignification

" and uſe of words depending on that con-
" nection which the mind makes between
" its ideas and the ſounds it uſes as ſigns
" of them; it is neceſſary, in the applica-
" tion of names to things, that the mind
" ſhould have diſtinct ideas of the things,
" and retain alſo the particular name that
" belongs to every one, with its peculiar
" appropriation to that idea. We may
" therefore eaſily find a reaſon why men
" have never attempted to give names to
" each ſheep in their flock, or crow that
" flies over their heads; much leſs to call
" every leaf of plants or grain of ſand that
" came in their way by a peculiar name.—
" Secondly, If it were poſſible, it would
" be uſeleſs: becauſe it would not ſerve
" to the chief end of Language. Men
" would in vain heap up names of parti-
" cular things, that would not ſerve them
" to communicate their thoughts. Men
" learn names, and uſe them in talk with
" others,

" others, only that they may be under-
" ſtood; which is then only done, when
" by uſe or conſent, the ſound I make by
" the organs of ſpeech excites in another
" man's mind who hears it, the idea I ap-
" ply to it in mine when I ſpeak it. This
" cannot be done by names applied to
" particular things, whereof I alone hav-
" ing the ideas in my mind, the names of
" them could not be ſignificant or intelli-
" gible to another who was not acquainted
" with all thoſe very particular things
" which had fallen under my notice."—
And again, Sect. 11.—" General and Uni-
" verſal belong not to the real exiſtence of
" things; but are the inventions and crea-
" tures of the Underſtanding, made by it for
" its own uſe, and concern only *ſigns*. Uni-
" verſality belongs not to things themſelves
" which are all of them particular in their
" exiſtence. When therefore we quit Par-
" ticulars, the *Generals* that reſt are only
" creatures

" creatures of our own making; their *ge-*
" *neral* nature being nothing but the ca-
" pacity they are put into of ſignifying or
" repreſenting many Particulars."

Now from this neceſſity of *General Terms*, follows immediately the neceſſity of the *Article:* whoſe buſineſs it is to reduce their generality, and upon occaſion to enable us to employ *general* terms for *Particulars.*

So that the Article alſo, in combination with a general term, is merely a *ſubſtitute.* But then it differs from thoſe ſubſtitutes which we have ranked under the general head of *Abbreviations:* becauſe it is *neceſſary* for the communication of our thoughts, and ſupplies the place of words which *are not* in the language. Whereas *Abbreviations* are *not neceſſary* for communication; and ſupply the place of words which *are* in the language.

B. As

B.

As far then as regards the *Article*, Mr. Harris ſeems at preſent to be the author moſt likely to meet with your approbation: for he not only eſtabliſhes its neceſſity, in order "to circumſcribe the latitude of ge-"nera and ſpecies," and therefore treats of it ſeparately; but has raiſed it to a degree of importance much beyond all other modern Grammarians. And though he admits of only two Articles, "properly "and ſtrictly ſo called," viz. A and THE; yet has he aſſigned to theſe two little words full one fourth part in his diſtribution of language: which, you know, is into— "Subſtantives, Attributives, Definitives, "and Connectives."

H.

If Mr. Harris has not intirely ſecured my concurrence with his doctrine of *Definitives*, I muſt confeſs he has at leaſt taken

effectual care to place it compleatly beyond the reach of confutation. He ſays,

1. " The Articles have no meaning, " but when aſſociated to ſome " other word."

2. " Nothing can be more nearly relat- " ed than the Greek article Ὁ to " the Engliſh article THE."

3. " But the article A defines in an " imperfect manner."

4. " *Therefore* the Greeks have no ar- " ticle correſpondent to our arti- " cle A."

5. However " they ſupply its place."

—And *How*, think you?

6. " By a *Negation*"—(obſerve well their method of ſupply)—" by a *nega-* " *tion* of their article Ὁ;" (that

is, as he well explains himſelf,)—
" without any thing prefixed, but
only the article Ὁ withdrawn."

7. " Even in Engliſh, we alſo *expreſs*
" the force of the article A, in
" plurals, by the ſame *negation* of
" the article THE *."

Now here I acknowledge myſelf to be compleatly thrown out; and, like the phi-

* " It is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner in
" which the Article A defines, that the Greeks have
" no article correſpondent to it, but ſupply its place,
" by a negation of their Article Ὁ.—Ὁ ανθρωπος επεσεν,
" THE man fell; ανθρωπος επεσεν, A man fell;—without
" any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn.

" Even in Engliſh, where the Article A cannot be
" uſed, as in plurals, its force is expreſſed by the ſame
" negation.—*Thoſe are* THE *men*, means, Thoſe are
" individuals of which we poſſeſs ſome previous know-
" ledge.—*Thoſe are men*, the Article apart, means no
" more than they are ſo many vague and uncertain
" individuals; juſt as the phraſe,—*A man*, in the ſin-
" gular, implies one of the ſame number."

Book 2. Chap. 1.

loſopher of old, merely for want of a firm reſting-place on which to fix my machine: for it would have been as eaſy for him to raiſe the earth with a fulcrum of ether, as for me to eſtabliſh any reaſoning or argument on this ſort of *negation*. For, "*no-* "*thing being prefixed,*" I cannot imagine in what manner or in what reſpect a *negation* of 'O or of THE, differs from a *negation* of *Harris* or of *Pudding*. For lack however of the light of comprehenſion, I muſt do, as other Grammarians do in ſimilar ſituations; attempt to illuſtrate by a parallel.

I will ſuppoſe Mr. Harris (when one of the Lords of the Treaſury) to have addreſſed the Miniſter in the ſame ſtyle of reaſoning.——" Salaries, Sir, produce no " benefit, unleſs aſſociated to ſome receiv- " er: my ſalary at preſent is but an im- " perfect proviſion for myſelf and family: " but

" but your ſalary as Miniſter is much more
" compleat. Oblige me therefore by with-
" drawing my preſent ſcanty pittance; and
" ſupply its place to me, by a *negation* of
" your ſalary."—I think this requeſt could not reaſonably have been denied: and what ſatisfaction Mr. Harris would have felt by finding his theory thus reduced to practice, no perſon can better judge than myſelf; becauſe I have experienced a conduct not much diſſimilar from the Rulers of the Inner Temple: who having firſt *inticed* me to quit one profeſſion, after many years of expectation have very handſomely ſupplied its place to me by a *negation* of the other.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE four following chapters (except ſome ſmall alterations and additions) have already been given to the public in *A Letter to Mr.* DUNNING in the year 1778: which, though publiſhed, was not written on the ſpur of the occaſion. The ſubſtance of that Letter, and of all that I have farther to communicate on the ſubject of Language, has been amongſt the looſe papers in my cloſet now upwards of twenty years; and would probably have remained there twenty years longer, and have been finally conſigned with myſelf to oblivion, if I had not been made the miſerable victim of—*Two Prepoſitions and a Conjunction.*

The

The officiating Priests indeed * were themselves of rank and eminence sufficient to dignify and grace my fall. But that the Conjunction THAT, and the Prepositions OF and CONCERNING (words which have hitherto been held to have NO meaning) should be made the abject instruments of my *civil extinction*; (for such was the intention, and such has been the consequence of my prosecution); appeared to me to make my exit from civil life as degrading as if I had been brained by a lady's fan. For mankind in general are not sufficiently aware that words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning, are the everlasting engines of fraud and injustice: and that the *grimgribber* of Westminster-Hall is a more fertile, and a much more

* The present Chancellor, the two present Chief Justices, Judge Buller; the late Attorney General Mr. Wallace, the late Solicitor General Mr. Mansfield, and Mr. Bearcroft.

formidable, ſource of impoſture than the *abracadabra* of magicians.

Upon a motion made by me in arreſt of judgment in the court of King's-Bench in the year 1777, the Chief Juſtice adjourned the deciſion: and inſtead of arguments on the merits of my objection, (which however by a ſide-wind were falſely repreſented by him as merely *literal flaws* *) deſired that *Precedents* might be brought by the Attorney General on a future day. None were however adduced, but by the Chief Juſtice himſelf; who indeed produced two. (Thereby depriving me of the opportunity of combating the Precedents and their application, which I ſhould have had if they had

* " *Lord Mansfield*
" If the Defendant has a legal advantage from a " *Literal* flaw, *God forbid* that he ſhould not have the " benefit of it."
Proceedings in K. B. The King againſt Horne.

had been produced by the Attorney General *. And on the ſtrength of theſe two Precedents alone, (forgetting his own deſcription and diſtinction of the crime to the Jury) he decided againſt me †.

I ſay,

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* " Lord Mansfield

" I fancy the Attorney General was *ſurprized* with " the objection."

† The Attorney General, in his reply, ſaid to the Jury, " Let us a little ſee what is the nature of the " obſervations he makes. In the firſt place, that I " left it exceedingly ſhort: and the objection to my " having left it ſhort, was ſimply this; that I had " ſtated no more to you but this, that of imputing to " the conduct of the King's troops the crime of mur- " der. *Now I ſtated it, as imputed to the troops*, OR- " DERED *as they were upon the* PUBLIC SERVICE."

Lord Mansfield to the Jury

" Read the paper. What is it? Why it is this; " that our beloved American Fellow-ſubjects—*in* RE- " BELLION *againſt the ſtate*—not beloved ſo as to be " *abetted in their* REBELLION." Again,—" What is " the employment they (the troops) are ORDERED " upon? Why then what are *they who gave the* OR- " DERS?

I ſay, on the ſtrength of theſe two precedents alone. For the groſs perverſion and

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" DERS? Draw the concluſion." Again,—" The " unhappy reſiſtance to the LEGISLATIVE AUTHO- " RITY of this kingdom by many of our Fellow-ſub- " jects in America: the LEGISLATURE of this king- " dom have avowed that the Americans REBELLED: " Troops are EMPLOYED *upon this ground.* The caſe " is here between a *juſt Government and* REBELLIOUS " *ſubjects.*"—Again,—" You will read this paper; " you will judge whether it is not *denying the Govern-* " *ment and Legiſlative authority of England.*" And " again,—" If you are of opinion that they were all " murdered (like the caſes of *undoubted murders*, of " Glenco, and twenty other maſſacres that might be " named) why then you may form a different con- " cluſion."

And again—" If ſome ſoldiers, *Without authority*, " had got in a drunken fray, and murder had enſued, " and that this paper could relate to that, it would be " quite a different thing from the charge in the in- " formation: BECAUSE it is *charged—as a ſeditious* " *Libel tending to diſquiet the minds of the People.*" See the Trial.

A man muſt be not only well practiſed, but even *hackneyed* in *our* Courts of Juſtice to diſcover the above deſcription

and misapplication of the technical term *de bene esse*, was merely *pour eblouir*, to introduce the proceedings on the trial, and to divert the attention from the only point in question—the sufficiency of the charge in the Record. And I cannot believe that any man breathing (except Lord Mansfield) either in the profession or out of it, will think it an argument against the validity of my objection; that it was brought forward only by myself, and *had not been alleged before by the learned Counsel for the Printers*. This however I can truly tell his

description of my crime in the *Prepositions*, OF and CONCERNING. Be that as it may: It is evident that the Attorney General and the Chief Justice did not expect the Jury to be so enlightened; and therefore (*when I had no longer a right to open my lips*) they described a crime to them in that plain language which I still contend I had a right to expect in the *Information*; BECAUSE—" *A seditious Libel tending to disquiet the minds of the people*,—has been determined to be mere *paper and packthread*, and no part of the *Charge*.

his lordſhip; that the moſt learned of them all, (*abſit invidia*) Mr. Dunning, was not aware of the objection when I firſt mentioned it to him; that he would not believe the information could be ſo defective in all its Counts, till I produced to him an Office Copy: when to his aſtoniſhment he found it ſo, he felt no jealouſy that the objection had been miſſed by himſelf; but declared it to be *inſuperable* and *fatal:* and bad me reſt aſſured, that whatever might be Lord Mansfield's wiſhes, and his *courage* on ſuch occaſions, he would not *dare* to overrule the objection. And when after the cloſe of the firſt day, I hinted to him my ſuſpicions of Lord Mansfield's intentions by the "*God* "*forbid*;" and by the perverted and miſapplied "*De bene eſſe*," in order to mix the proceedings on the trial with the queſtion of record; he ſmiled at it, as merely

a method

a method which his lordſhip took of letting the matter down gently, and breaking the abruptneſs of his fall.

Strange as it may appear! One of thoſe Precedents was merely *imagined* by the Chief Juſtice, but never really exiſted. And the other (through ignorance of the meaning of the Conjunction THAT) had never been truly underſtood; neither by the Counſel who originally took the exception, nor perhaps by the Judges who made the deciſion, nor by the Reporter of it, nor by the preſent Chief Juſtice who quoted and miſapplied it.

Mr. Dunning undertook to prove (and did actually prove in the Houſe of Lords) the *non-exiſtence* of the main precedent. And I undertook, in that Letter to Mr. Dunning, to ſhew the real merits and

foundation, and conſequently Lord Mansfield's miſapplication of the other. And I undertook this, becauſe it afforded a very ſtriking inſtance of the importance of the meaning of words; not only (as has been too lightly ſuppoſed) to Metaphyſicians and Schoolmen, but to the rights and happineſs of mankind in their dearest concerns — the deciſions of Courts of Juſtice.

In the Houſe of Lords theſe two Precedents (the foundation of the Judgment in the Court of King's Bench) were abandoned: and the deſcription of my crime againſt Government was adjudged to be ſufficiently ſet forth by the Prepoſitions OF and CONCERNING.

Perhaps it may make my readers ſmile; but I mention it as a farther inſtance of the

the importance of inquiry into the meaning of words;—that in the decision of the Judges in the House of Lords, the Chief Justice De Grey (who found OF and CONCERNING so comprehensive, clear, and definite) began by declaring that—— "the word *Certainty* [which the Law re- "quires in the description of Crimes] "is as indefinite [that is, as *Uncertain*] "as any word that could be used." Now though *certainty* is so *uncertain*, we must suppose the word *Libel* to be very *definite:* and yet if I were called upon for an equivalent term, I believe I could not find in our language any word more popularly apposite than *Calumny*; which is defined by Cicero, in his Offices, to be— "*callida & malitiosa Juris interpretatio.*"

If there was any *Mistake* (which however I am very far from believing) in this decision

decision, sanctioned by the Judges and the House of Lords; I shall be justified in applying (with the substitution of the single word *Grammatici* for *Istorici*) what Giannone, who was himself an excellent lawyer, says of his countrymen of the same profession:—" Tanta ignoranza avea loro " bendati gli occhi, che si pregiavano " d'essere solamente Legisti, e non Gram- " matici; non accorgendosi, che perché " non erano Grammatici, eran perciò " CATTIVI LEGISTI."

Ist. civil. di Napoli. Intro.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Word THAT.

B.

BUT besides the Articles "properly and strictly so called," I think Mr. Harris and other Grammarians say that there are some words which, according to the different manner of using them, are sometimes *Articles* and sometimes *Pronouns:* and that it is difficult to determine to which class they ought to be referred *.

H. They

* "It must be confessed indeed that all these words do not always appear as Pronouns. When they stand

 by

H.

They do ſo. And by ſo doing, ſufficiently inſtruct us (if we will but uſe our common ſenſe) what value we ought to put upon ſuch claſſes and ſuch definitions.

B. Can

" by themſelves and repreſent ſome Noun, (as when " we ſay—THIS *is virtue*, or δεικλικως, *Give me* THAT) " then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are aſſoci- " ated to ſome Noun, (as when we ſay—THIS *habit* " is virtue, or δεικλικως, THAT *man defrauded me*) then " as they ſupply not the place of a Noun, but only " ſerve to aſcertain one, they fall rather into the ſpecies " of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed a " near relation between Pronouns and Articles, the " old grammarians have all acknowledged; and ſome " words it has been doubtful to which claſs to refer. " The beſt rule to diſtinguiſh them is this.—The ge- " nuine Pronoun always ſtands by itſelf, aſſuming the " power of a noun, and ſupplying its place.—The " genuine Article never ſtands by itſelf, but appears " at all times aſſociated to ſomething elſe, requiring a " noun for its ſupport, as much as Attributives or " Adjectives."

HERMES, Book I. Chap. V.

B.

Can you give us any general rule by which to diſtinguiſh when they are of the one ſort, and when of the other?

H.

Let them give the rule who thus confound together the *Manner* of ſignification of words, and the Abbreviations in their *Conſtruction*: than which no two things in Language are more diſtinct, or ought to be more carefully diſtinguiſhed. I do not allow that *Any* words change their nature in this manner, ſo as to belong ſometimes to one Part of Speech, and ſometimes to another, from the different ways of uſing them. I never could perceive any ſuch fluctuation in any word whatever: though I know it is a general charge brought erroneouſly againſt words of almoſt every

denomination *. But it appears to me to be all, Error: arising from the false measure which has been taken of almost every sort of words. Whilst the words themselves appear to me to continue faithfully and steadily attached, each to the standard under which it was originally inlisted. But I desire to wave this matter for the present; because I think it will be cleared up by what is to follow concerning the other sorts of words: at least, if that should not convince you, I shall be able more easily to satisfy you on this head hereafter.

B. I

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* "Certains mots sont *Adverbes*, *Prepositions*, & "*Conjonctions* en même temps: & repondent ainsi "au même temps à diverses parties d'oraison selon "que la grammaire les emploie diversement."

BUFFIER, Art. 150.

And so say all other Grammarians.

B.

I would not willingly put you out of your own way, and am contented to wait for the explanation of many things till you ſhall arrive at the place which you may think proper for it. But really what you have now advanced ſeems to me ſo very extraordinary and contrary to fact, as well as to the uniform declaration of all Grammarians; that you muſt excuſe me, if, before we proceed any farther, I mention to you one inſtance.

Mr. Harris and other Grammarians ſay that the word THAT, is ſometimes an *Article* and ſometimes a *Pronoun*. However I do not deſire an explanation of *that* [point]: becauſe I ſee how you will eaſily reconcile *that* [difference], by a *ſubauditur* or an abbreviation of Conſtruction: and I agree with you there. But what will you do with the *Conjunction* THAT?

Is not this a very conſiderable and manifeſt fluctuation and difference of ſignification in the ſame word? Has the *Conjunction* THAT, any the ſmalleſt correſpondence or ſimilarity of ſignification with THAT, the *Article*, or *Pronoun?*

H.

In my opinion the word THAT (call it as you pleaſe, either *Article*, or *Pronoun*, or *Conjunction*) retains always one and the ſame ſignification. Unnoticed abbreviation in conſtruction and difference of poſition have cauſed this appearance of fluctuation; and miſled the Grammarians of all languages both antient and modern: for in all they make the ſame miſtake. Pray, anſwer me a queſtion. Is it not ſtrange and improper that we ſhould, without any reaſon or neceſſity, employ in Engliſh the ſame word for two different meanings and purpoſes?

B.

I think it wrong: and I ſee no reaſon for it, but many reaſons againſt it.

H.

Well! Then is it not more ſtrange that this ſame impropriety, in this ſame caſe ſhould run through ALL languages? And that they ſhould ALL uſe an *Article*, without any reaſon, unneceſſarily, and improperly, for this ſame *Conjunction*; with which it has, as you ſay, no correſpondence nor ſimilarity of ſignification?

B.

If they do ſo, it is ſtrange.

H.

They certainly do; as you will eaſily find by inquiry. Now does not the uniformity and univerſality of this ſuppoſed miſtake, and unneceſſary impropriety, in

languages which have no connexion with each other, naturally lead us to ſuſpect that this uſage of the *Article* may perhaps be neither miſtaken nor improper? But that the miſtake may lie only with us, who do not underſtand it?

B.

No doubt what you have ſaid, if true, would afford ground for ſuſpicion.

H.

If true! Examine any languages you pleaſe, and ſee whether they alſo, as well as the Engliſh, have not a ſuppoſed *Conjunction* which they employ as we do THAT; and which is alſo the ſame word as their ſuppoſed *Article*, or *Pronoun*. Does not this look as if there was ſome reaſon for employing the *Article* in this manner? And as if there was ſome connexion and

ſimilarity

ſimilarity of ſignification between it and this *Conjunction?*

B.

The appearances, I own, are ſtrongly in favour of your opinion. But how ſhall we find out what that connexion is?

H.

Suppoſe we examine ſome inſtances; and, ſtill keeping the ſame ſignification of the ſentences, try whether we cannot, by a reſolution of their conſtruction, diſcover what we want.

EXAMPLE.

I wiſh you to believe THAT I would not wilfully hurt a fly.

RESOLUTION.

I would not wilfully hurt a fly; I wiſh you to believe THAT [aſſertion].

EXAM-

EXAMPLE.

She knowing THAT Crooke had been indicted for forgery, did ſo and ſo.

RESOLUTION.

Crooke had been indicted for forgery; ſhe, knowing THAT, did ſo and ſo *.

EXAMPLE.

You ſay THAT the ſame arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmoſt reach, will not be able to raiſe—. You mean THAT we ſhould never forget our ſituation, and THAT we ſhould be prudently contented to do good within our own ſphere, where it can have an effect: and THAT we ſhould not be miſled even by a virtuous benevolence and public

* King v. Lawley. Strange's Reports. Eaſter T. 4 Geo. II.

lic ſpirit, to waſte ourſelves in fruitleſs efforts beyond our power of influence.

RESOLUTION.

The ſame arm which, when contracted, can lift—; when extended to its utmoſt reach, will not be able to raiſe—: you ſay THAT. We ſhould never forget our ſituation; you mean THAT: and we ſhould be contented to do good within our own ſphere where it can have an effect; you mean THAT: and we ſhould not be miſled even by a virtuous benevolence and public ſpirit to waſte ourſelves in fruitleſs efforts beyond our power of influence; you mean THAT.

EXAMPLE.

They who have well conſidered THAT kingdoms riſe or fall, and THAT their inhabitants are happy or miſerable, not ſo much from any local or accidental advan-

tages

tages or diſadvantages; but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; may beſt determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics.

RESOLUTION.

Kingdoms riſe or fall, not ſo much from any local or accidental advantages or diſadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who have well conſidered THAT (maxim), may beſt determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics. And the inhabitants of kingdoms are happy or miſerable, not ſo much from any local or accidental advantages or diſadvantages, but accordingly as they are well or ill governed; they who have conſidered THAT, may beſt determine how far a virtuous mind can be neutral in politics *.

EXAM-

* " Le deſpotiſme ecraſe de ſon ſceptre de fer le plus " beau pays du monde: Il ſemble que les malheurs " des

EXAMPLE.

Thieves rise by night THAT they may cut men's throats.

RESO-

" des hommes croissent en proportion des efforts que
" la nature fait pour les rendre heureux."

The above heart-rending reflection which Savary makes at the sight of Egypt, might serve as another *example* for the *Conjunction* in question: but I give it for the sake of its matter. And I think myself at least as well justified (I do not expect to be as well rewarded) as our new Poet Laureat; who, upon the following passage of Milton's Comus,

" *And sits as safe as in a Senate house,*"

adds this flagitious note:

" Not many years after this was written, MILTON'S
" FRIENDS shewed that the safety of a Senate house
" was not inviolable. But when the people turn Le-
" gislators, what place is safe against the tumults of
" innovation, and the insults of disobedience."

I believe our new Laureat meant not so much to cavil at Milton's expression, as to seize an impertinent opportunity of recommending himself to the *powers which be*, by a cowardly insult on the dead and perse-

cuted

RESOLUTION.

Thieves may cut men's throats, (*for*) THAT (*purpose*) they rise by night.

After

---

cuted author's memory, and on the aged, defenceless constitution of his country.

A critic who should really be displeased at Milton's expression, would rather shew its impropriety by an event which had happened *before* it was used, than by an event which the poet could not at that time foresee. Such a critic adverting to the 5th of November, 1605, and to the 4th of January, 1641, might more truly say——" Not many years both *before and after* this " was written, WHARTON'S FRIENDS shewed that " the safety of a Senate house was not inviolable."

With equal impertinence and malignity (pages 496, 538.) has he raked up the ashes of Queen Caroline and Queen Elizabeth; whose private characters and inoffensive amusemen · were as little connected with Milton's poems, as this animadversion on Wharton is with the subject I am now treating.

Perhaps, after all, the concluding line of Milton's epitaph,

" Rege sub *augusto* fas sit *laudare* Catonem,"

is artfully made by Mr. Wharton the concluding line also of his Notes; in order to account for his present virulence, and to soften the resentment of his readers, at the expence of his patron.

After the ſame manner, I imagine, may all ſentences be reſolved (in all languages) where the *Conjunction* THAT (or its equivalent) is employed: and by ſuch reſolution it will always be diſcovered to have merely the ſame force and ſignification, and to be in fact nothing elſe but the very ſame word which in other places is called an *Article* or a *Pronoun*.

B.

For any thing that immediately occurs to me, this may perhaps be the caſe in Engliſh, where THAT is the only Conjunction of the ſame ſignification which we employ in this manner. But your laſt example makes me believe that this method of reſolution will not take place in thoſe languages which have different Conjunctions for this ſame purpoſe. And if ſo, I ſuſpect that your whole reaſoning on this ſubject may be without foundation.

tion. For how can you resolve the original of your last example; where (unfortunately for your notion) UT is employed, and not the neuter *Article* QUOD?

"UT jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones."

I suppose you will not say that UT is the Latin neuter Article. For even Sanctius, who struggled so hard to withdraw QUOD from amongst the Conjunctions, yet still left UT amongst them without molestation *.

H. You

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* It is not at all extraordinary that UT and QUOD should be indifferently used for the same conjunctive purpose: for as UT (originally written UTI) is nothing but ὅτι: So is QUOD (anciently written QUODDE) merely Καὶ ὅτι.

"*Quodde* tuas laudes culpas, nil proficis hilum."

LUCILIUS.

(See Note in Havercamp's and Creech's Lucretius; where QUODDE is derived from ὅτιδε.) QU, in Latin, being sounded (not as the English but as the French pronounce QU, that is) as the Greek

H.

You are not to expect from me that I ſhould, in this place, account etymologically

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Greek K; Καὶ (by a change of the character, not of the ſound) became the Latin *Que*, (uſed only enclitically indeed in modern Latin). Hence Καὶ ὅτι became in Latin *Qu' otti—Quoddi—Quodde—Quod.* Of which if Sanctius had been aware, he would not have attempted a diſtinction between UT and QUOD: ſince the two words, though differently corrupted, are in ſubſtance and origin the ſame.

The perpetual change of T into D, and *vice verſa*, is ſo very familiar to all who have ever paid the ſmalleſt attention to Language, that I ſhould not think it worth while to notice it in the preſent inſtance; if all the etymological canoniſts, whom I have ſeen, had not been remarkably inattentive to the *organical* cauſes of thoſe literal changes of which they treat.

Skinner (who was a Phyſician) in his Prolegomena Etymologica, ſpeaking of the frequent tranſmutation of S into Z, ſays very truly——" Sunt ſanè literæ ſono " *ferè* eædem."

But in what does that *ferè* conſiſt? For S is not nearer in ſound to Z, than P is to B, or than T is to

gically for the different words which ſome languages (for there are others beſide the Latin)

D, or than F is to V, or than K is to G, or than TH (Θ) in *Thing*, is to TH (Đ) in *That*, or than SH is to the French J.

(N. B. TH and SH are ſimple conſonants, and ſhould be marked by ſingle letters. J, as the Engliſh pronounce it, is a double conſonant; and ſhould have two characters.)

For theſe ſeven couple of ſimple conſonants, viz.

With the Compreſſion	B	—	P	Without the Compreſſion
	G	—	K	
	D	—	T	
	Z	—	S	
	Đ	—	Θ	
	V	—	F	
	J	—	SH	

differ each from its partner, by no variation whatever of articulation; but ſingly by a certain unnoticed and almoſt imperceptible motion or compreſſion of or near the Larynx; which cauſes what Wilkins calls "*ſome* "*kind of murmure.*" This compreſſion the Welch never uſe. So that when a Welchman, inſtead of

"I vow, by God, Đat Jenkin iz a Wizzard,"

pronounces it thus,

"I fow, py Cot, Θat Shenkin iſs a Wiſſart;"

he

Latin) may ſometimes borrow and employ in this manner inſtead of their own common Article. But if you ſhould hereafter exact it, I ſhall not refuſe the undertaking: although it is not the eaſieſt part of Etymology: for *Abbreviation and Corruption are always buſieſt with the words which are moſt frequently in uſe.* Letters, like ſoldiers, being very apt to deſert and drop off in a long march, and eſpecially if their paſſage happens to lie near the confines of an enemy's country *. Yet I doubt not that,

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he articulates in every reſpect exactly as we do; but omits the compreſſion nine times in this ſentence. And for failing in this one point only, changes ſeven of our conſonants: for we owe ſeven additional letters, (i. e. ſeven additional ſounds in our language) ſolely to the addition of this one compreſſion to ſeven different articulations.

* " Nous avons deja dit, que l'alteration du derivé " augmentoit à meſure que le temps l'eloignoit du pri- " mitif; & nous avons ajouté—*toutes choſes d'ailleurs*

that, with this clue, you will yourſelf be able, upon inquiry, to account as eaſily (and in the ſame manner) for the uſe of all the others, as I know you can for UT; which is merely the Greek neuter Article ὅτι *, adopted for this conjunctive purpoſe by the Latins, and by them originally written UTI: the o being changed into U, from that propenſity which both the ancient

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" *egales*,—parceque la quantité de cette alteration de-
" pend auſſi du cours que ce mot a dans le public.
" Il s'uſe, pour ainſi dire, en paſſant dans un plus
" grand nombre de bouches, ſur tout dans la bouche
" du peuple : & la rapidité de cette circulation equivaut
" à une plus longue durée. Les noms des Saints &
" les noms de baptême les plus communs, en ſont un
" exemple. Les mots qui reviennent le plus ſouvent
" dans les langues, tels que les verbes *Etre*, *faire*,
" *vouloir*, *aller*, & tous ceux qui ſervent à lier les au-
" tres mots dans le diſcours, ſont ſujets à de plus
" grandes alterations. Ce ſont ceux qui ont le plus
" beſoin d'etre fixes par la langue ecrite."

Encyclopedie (*Etymologie*) *par* M. DE BROSSES.

* " UTI eſt mutata ὅτι."

J. C. SCALIGR, de C. L. L. Cap. 173.

cient Romans had *, and the modern Italians ſtill have †, upon many occaſions, to pronounce even their own o like an u. Of which I need not produce any inſtances.

The Reſolution therefore of the original will be like that of the tranſlation;

"Latrones jugulent homines (Δι) ὅτι ſurgunt de nocte."

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* So in the antient form of ſelf-devotion.

"VTEI. EGO. AXIM. PRAI. ME. FORMIDINEM. "METOM. QUE. OMNIOM. DIRAS. SIC. VTEI. VER-"BEIS. NONCOPASO. ITA. PRO. REPOPLICA. POPOLI. "ROMANI. QUIRITIOM. VITAM. SALUTEM. QUE. "MEAM. LEGIONES. AUXSILIA. QUE. HOSTIOM. "MEOM. DIVEIS. MANEBOUS. TELLOURI. QUE. "DEVOVEO."

So in the laws of Numa, and in the twelve tables, and in all antient inſcriptions, O is perpetually found where the modern Latin uſes U. And it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that the pronunciation preceded the change of the orthography.

† "Quant à la voyelle U pour ce qu'ils (les Italiens) "l'aiment fort, ainſi que nous cognoiſſons par ces "mots *Ufficio*, *ubrigato*, &c. je penſe bien qu'ils la "reſpectent plus que les autres."

HENRI ESTIENE, *de la precell. de la L. F.*

B.

You have extricated yourſelf pretty well out of this ſcrape with UT. And perhaps have done prudently, to decline the ſame ſort of explanation in thoſe other languages which, as well as the Latin, have likewiſe a double Conjunction for this purpoſe, not quite ſo eaſily accounted for, becauſe not ready derived to your hands. But I have not yet done with the Engliſh: for though your method of reſolution will anſwer with moſt ſentences, yet I doubt much whether it will with all. I think there is one uſage of the conjunction THAT which it will not explain.

H.

Produce an inſtance.

B.

The inſtances are common enough. But I chuſe to take one from your favourite *ſad Shepherd:* in hopes that the difficulty it may cauſe you, will abate ſomething of

your extreme partiality for that piece. Which, though it be

——————" ſuch wool
" As from mere Engliſh flocks his Muſe could pull,"

you have always contended obſtinately, with its author, is

——————" a Fleece
" To match or thoſe of Sicily or Greece."

EXAMPLE.

" I wonder he can move! that he's not fix'd!
" IF THAT his feelings be the ſame with mine."

So again in Shakeſpeare *,

——————" IF THAT the king
" Have any way your good deſerts forgot,
" He bids you name your griefs."——

How will you bring out the *Article* THAT, when two Conjunctions (for I muſt ſtill call THAT a Conjunction, till all my ſcruples are ſatisfied) come in this manner together?

* 1ſt Part of Henry IV. Act IV. Scene 5.

ADVERTISEMENT.

I PRESUME my readers to be acquainted with French, Latin, Italian and Greek: which are unfortunately the uſual boundaries of an Engliſh ſcholar's acquiſition. On this ſuppoſition, a friend of mine lamented that, in my Letter to Mr. Dunning, I had not confined myſelf to the common Engliſh character for the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic derivations.

In the preſent publication I ſhould undoubtedly have conformed to his wiſhes, if I had not imagined that, by inſerting the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic characters in this place, I might poſſibly allure ſome of my readers to familiarize themſelves with thoſe characters, by an application of them

to

to the few words of thoſe languages which are here introduced: and thus lead the way to their better acquaintance with the parent language, which ought long ago to have made a part of the education of our youth. And I flatter myſelf that one of the conſequences of my preſent inquiry will be, to facilitate and abridge the tedious and miſtaken method of inſtruction which has too long continued in our ſeminaries: the time which is at preſent allotted to Latin and Greek, being amply ſufficient for the acquirement alſo of French, Italian, Anglo-ſaxon, Dutch, German, Daniſh and Swediſh. Which will not ſeem at all extraordinary, when it is conſidered that the five laſt mentioned (together with the Engliſh) are little more than different dialects of one and the ſame language. And tho' this was by no means the leading motive, nor is the preſent object of my inquiry; yet I think it of conſiderable importance: although

although I do not hold the acquiſition of languages in ſo very great eſtimation as the Emperor Charles the Vth did. Who, as Brantome tells us, " diſoit & repetoit ſou-
" vent, quand il tomboit ſur la beautè des
" langues, (ſelon l'opinion des Turcs)—
" qu' autant de langues que l'homme ſçait
" parler, autant de fois eſt—il homme."

Anglo-

Anglo-Saxon.			Mœso-Gothic.	
A	a	a	ᚨ	a
B	b	b	ᛒ	b
C	c	k	*	*
D	ð	d	ᛞ	d
E	e	e	ᛖ	e
F	ƒ	f	ᚠ	f
G	ȝ	g	ᚷ	g
H	h	h	ᚺ	h
*	*	*	ᛟ	hw
I	ı	i	ᛁ	i
*	*	*	ᛄ	j and y
K	k	k	ᚲ	k
L	l	l	ᛚ	l
M	m	m	ᛗ	m
N	n	n	ᚾ	n
O	o	o	ᛟ	o
P	p	p	ᛈ	p
*	*	*	ᚹ	cw
R	ꝛ	r	ᚱ	r
S	ſ	s	ᛊ	s
T	ꞇ	t	ᛏ	t
Ð	ȣ	th	ᚦ	th
U	u	u	ᚢ	u
Ƿ	ƿ	w	ᚹ	w
X	x	x	ᚷ	ch
Y	ẏ	y	*	*
Z	z	z	ᛉ	z

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VII.

Of CONJUNCTIONS.

H.

I WAS afraid of ſome ſuch inſtances as theſe, when I wiſhed to poſtpone the whole conſideration of this ſubject till after we had diſcuſſed the other received Parts of Speech. Becauſe, in order to explain it, I muſt foreſtall ſomething of what I had to ſay concerning *Conjunctions*. However, ſince the queſtion is ſtarted, perhaps it may be as well to give it here.

The

The truth of the matter is, that IF is merely a *Verb*. It is merely the Imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon verb ᵹᵢᵽᵃᵃᵣ, Giſan. And in thoſe languages, as well as in the Engliſh formerly, this ſuppoſed *Conjunction* was pronounced and written as the common Imperative, purely ᵹᵢᵽ, Giſ, *Gif*. Thus

——— " *My largeſſe*
" Hath lotted her to be your brother's miſtreſſe
" GIF ſhee can be reclaim'd; GIF not, his prey *."

And accordingly our corrupted IF has always the ſignification of the Engliſh Imperative *Give*; and no other. So that the reſolution of the conſtruction in the inſtances you have produced, will be as before in the others.

RESO-

* Sad Shepherd, Act II, Scene 1.

RESOLUTION.

" His feelings be the ſame with mine,
" GIVE THAT, I wonder he can move,
" &c."

" The King may have forgotten your
" good deſerts, GIVE THAT in any way,
" he bids you name your griefs."

And here, as an additional proof, we may obſerve, that whenever the *Datum*, upon which any concluſion depends, is a ſentence, the Article THAT, if not expreſſed, is always underſtood, and may be inſerted after IF. As in the inſtance I have produced above, the Poet might have ſaid,

" *Gif that* ſhe can be reclaimed," &c.

For the reſolution is——" She can be
" reclaimed, *Give that*; my largeſſe hath
" lotted her to be your brother's miſtreſſe.
" She cannot be reclaimed, *Give that*; my
" largeſſe

" largeſſe hath lotted her to be your bro-
" ther's prey."

But the Article THAT is not underſtood, and cannot be inſerted after IF, where the *Datum* is not a ſentence, but ſome Noun governed by the Verb IF or GIVE. As,—

EXAMPLE.

" How will the weather diſpoſe of you
" to-morrow? IF fair, it will ſend me
" abroad; IF foul, it will keep me at
" home."

Here we cannot ſay—" IF THAT fair it
" will ſend me abroad; IF THAT foul it
" will keep me at home."—Becauſe in this caſe the verb IF governs the Noun; and the reſolved conſtruction is,

" GIVE fair weather, it will ſend me abroad;
" GIVE foul weather, it will keep me at
" home."

But

But make the *Datum* a ſentence, As—
" IF it is fair weather, it will ſend me
" abroad; IF it is foul weather, it will
" keep me at home."

And then the article THAT is underſtood, and may be inſerted after IF; As—
" IF THAT it is fair weather, it will ſend
" me abroad; IF THAT it is foul weather,
" it will keep me at home."

The reſolution then being,
" It is fair weather, GIVE THAT; it will
" ſend me abroad; It is foul weather,
" GIVE THAT; it will keep me at home."

And this you will find to hold univerſally, not only with IF; but with many other ſuppoſed *Conjunctions*, ſuch as, *But that*, *Unleſs that*, *Though that*, *Leſt that*, &c. (which are really *Verbs*) put in this manner before the *Article* THAT.

B. One

One word more to clear up a difficulty which occurs to me concerning your account of IF, and I have done.

We have in Engliſh another word which (though now rather obſolete) uſed frequently to ſupply the place of IF. As— "AN you had any eye behind you, you "might ſee more detraction at your heels, "than fortunes before you *."

In this and in all ſimilar inſtances, what is AN? For I can by no means agree with the account which Dr. S. Johnſon gives of it in his Dictionary: and I do not know that any other perſon has ever attempted to explain it.

H.

How does he account for it?

L B. He

* Twelfth Night, Act II. Scene 8.

B.

He ſays,—" AN is ſometimes in old " authors a contraction of *And if*." Of which he gives a very unlucky inſtance from Shakeſpeare *; where both AN and IF are uſed in the ſame line.

——" He cannot flatter, He!
" An honeſt mind and plain: he muſt ſpeak Truth:
" AN they will take it,—So. IF not; He's plain."

Where, if AN was a contraction of AND IF; AN and IF ſhould rather change places.

H.

I can no more agree with Dr. S. Johnſon than you do. A part of one word only, employed to ſhew that another word is compounded with it, would indeed be a curious method of *con-traction*. Though even this account of it would ſerve my purpoſe.

* Lear, Act II. Scene 6.

purpoſe. But the truth will ſerve it better: and therefore I thank you for your difficulty. It is a freſh proof, and a very ſtrong one in my favour. AN is alſo a *Verb*, and may very well ſupply the place of IF; it being nothing elſe but the Imperative of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Ǽnan, which likewiſe means to *Give*, or to *Grant*.

B.

It ſeems indeed to be ſo. But, if ſo, how can it ever be made to ſignify AS IF? For which alſo, as well as for *And if*, Johnſon ſays AN is a con-traction.

H.

It never ſignifies *As if:* nor is ever a contraction of them.

B.

Johnſon however advances Addiſon's authority for it.——" My next pretty cor-

" respondent, like Shakespeare's Lion in
" Pyramus and Thisbe, roars AN it were
" any nightingale."

H.

If Addison had so written, I should answer roundly, that he had written false English. But he never did so write. He only quoted it in mirth and ridicule, as the author wrote it. And Johnson, an Editor of Shakespeare, ought to have known and observed it. And then, instead of Addison's or even Shakespeare's authority, from whom the expression is borrowed; he should have quoted *Bottom*'s, the Weaver: whose Language corresponds with the character Shakespeare has given him,—

" *The shallow'st thickscull of that barren sort*, viz.
" *A crew of Patches, rude Mechanicals,*
" *That work for Bread upon Athenian Stalls.*"

" I will

"I will aggravate my voice ſo (ſays "Bottom) that I will roar you as gently "as any ſucking Dove: I will roar you "AN 'twere any nightingale."

If Johnſon is ſatisfied with ſuch authority as this, for the different ſignification and propriety of Engliſh words, he will find enough of it amongſt the clowns in all our comedies; and *Maſter Bottom* in particular in this very ſentence will furniſh him with many new meanings. But, I believe, Johnſon will not find AN uſed for *As if*, either ſeriouſly or clowniſhly, in any other part of Addiſon or Shakeſpeare; except in this ſpeech of *Bottom*, and in another of Hoſteſs *Quickly*—"He made a "finer end, and went away AN it had "been any Chriſtom child *."

* Henry V. Act II. Scene 3.

B.

In Engliſh then, it ſeems, theſe two words which have been called *conditional* Conjunctions (and whoſe *force* and *manner* of ſignification, as well as of all the others, we are directed by Mr. Locke to ſearch after in " the ſeveral views, poſ- " tures, ſtands, turns, limitations, and " exceptions, and ſeveral other thoughts " of the mind, for which we have *either* " *none or very deficient names*") are, according to you, merely the original Imperatives of the *verbs* to *Give* or to *Grant*.

Now let me underſtand you. I do not mean to divert you into an etymological explanation of each particular word of other languages, or even of the Engliſh, and ſo to change our converſation from a philoſophical inquiry concerning the nature of Language in general, into the particular

ticular buſineſs of a polyglot Lexicon. But, as you have ſaid that your principles will apply univerſally, I deſire to know whether you mean that the *conditional conjunctions* of all other languages are likewiſe to be found, like IF and AN, in the original Imperatives of ſome of their own or derived *verbs*, meaning to *Give?*

H.

No. If that was my opinion I know you are ready inſtantly to confute it by the Conditionals of the Greek and Latin and Iriſh, the French, Italian, Spaniſh, Portugueze and many other languages. But I mean, that thoſe words which are called *conditional conjunctions*, are to be accounted for in ALL languages in the ſame manner as I have accounted for IF and AN. Not indeed that they muſt all mean preciſely as theſe two do,—*Give* and *Grant*; but

ſome word equivalent: Such as,—*Be it*, *Suppoſe*, *Allow*, *Permit*, *Put*, *Suffer*, &c. Which meaning is to be ſought for from the particular etymology of each reſpective language, not from ſome *un-named* and *un-known* " Turns, Stands, Poſtures, &c. " of the mind." In ſhort, to put this matter out of doubt, I mean to diſcard all ſuppoſed myſtery, not only about theſe *Conditionals*, but about all thoſe words alſo which Mr. Harris and others diſtinguiſh from Prepoſitions, and call *Conjunctions* of Sentences. I deny them to be a ſeparate ſort of words or Part of Speech by themſelves. For they have not a ſeparate *manner of ſignification:* although they are not *devoid* of ſignification. And the particular ſignification of each muſt be ſought for from amongſt the other parts of Speech, by the help of the particular etymology of each reſpective language. By

ſuch

ſuch means alone can we clear away the obſcurity and errors in which Grammarians and Philoſophers have been involved by the corruption of ſome common words, and the uſeful Abbreviations of Conſtruction. And at the ſame time we ſhall get rid of that farrago of uſeleſs diſtinctions into *Conjunctive*, *Adjunctive*, *Disjunctive*, *Subdisjunctive*, *Copulative*, *Continuative*, *Subcontinuative*, *Poſitive*, *Suppoſitive*, *Cauſal*, *Collective*, *Effective*, *Approbative*, *Diſcretive*, *Ablative*, *Preſumptive*, *Abnegative*, *Completive*, *Augmentative*, *Alternative*, *Hypothetical*, *Extenſive*, *Periodical*, *Motival*, *Concluſive*, *Explicative*, *Tranſitive*, *Interrogative*, *Comparative*, *Diminutive*, *Preventive*, *Adequate Preventive*, *Adverſative*, *Conditional*, *Suſpenſive*, *Concluſive*, *Illative*, *Conductive*, *Declarative*, &c. &c. &c. which explain nothing; and (as moſt other technical terms are abuſed) ſerve only to throw

a veil

a veil over the ignorance of thoſe who employ them *.

B.

You mean, then, by what you have ſaid, flatly to contradict Mr. Harris's definition of a *Conjunction*; which he ſays, is—" a Part of Speech devoid of ſignifi-
" cation itſelf, but ſo formed as to help
" ſignification, by making two or more
" ſignificant ſentences to be one ſignificant
" ſentence."

H.

I have the leſs ſcruple to do that, becauſe Mr. Harris makes no ſcruple to contradict himſelf. For he afterwards acknowledges that *ſome* of them—" have a kind of ob-
" ſcure

* Technical terms are not invariably abuſed to cover the *ignorance* only of thoſe who employ them. In matters of law, politicks, and Government, they are more frequently abuſed in attempting to impoſe upon the ignorance of *others*; and to cover the injuſtice and knavery of thoſe who employ them.

" ſcure ſignification when taken alone;
" and appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes*
" in nature, a kind of middle Beings of
" amphibious character; which, by ſharing
" the attributes of the higher and the
" lower, conduce to link the whole to-
" gether."

Now I ſuppoſe it is impoſſible to convey a *Nothing* in a more ingenious manner. How much ſuperior is this to the oracular Saw of another learned author on Language (typified by Shakeſpeare in *Sir Topaz*)

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* Theſe *Zoophytes* have made a wonderful impreſſion on Lord Monboddo. I believe (for I ſurely have not counted them) that he has uſed the alluſion at leaſt twenty times in his progreſs of language; and ſeems to be always hunting after extremes merely for the ſake of introducing them. But they have been ſo often placed between two ſtools, that it is no wonder they ſhould at laſt come to the ground.

Topaz *) who, amongſt much other intelligence of equal importance, tells us with a very ſolemn face, and aſcribes it to Plato, that——" Every man that opines, muſt " opine ſomething: the ſubject of opinion " therefore is not nothing." But the faireſt way to Lord Monboddo is to give you the whole paſſage.

" It was not therefore without reaſon " that Plato ſaid that the ſubject of opinion " was neither the το ὂν, or the thing itſelf, " nor was it the το μη ὂν, or nothing; " but ſomething betwixt theſe two. This " may *appear* at *firſt* ſight a little myſte- " rious, and difficult to be underſtood; " but,

* " As the old Hermit of Prague, that never ſaw " pen and ink, very wittily ſaid to a niece of king " Gorboduc,—*That that is, is: So I being Maſter* " *Parſon, am Maſter Parſon. For what is that, but* " *that? And is, but is?*"

Twelfth Night, Act IV. Scene 3.

" but, like other things of that kind in " Plato, when *examined to the bottom*, it has " a *very clear* meaning, and *explains* the " nature of opinion *very well:* FOR, as he " ſays, Every man that opines, muſt opine " ſomething; the ſubject of opinion there- " fore is not nothing. At the ſame time " it is not the thing itſelf, but ſomething " betwixt the two *." His Lordſhip, you ſee,

* Origin and Progreſs of Language, Vol. I. p. 100. " Il poſſede l'antiquité, comme on le peut voir par " les belles remarques qu'il a faites. Sans lui nous " ne ſçaurions pas que dans la ville d'Athenes les enfans " pleuroient quand on leur donnoit le fouet.—Nous " devons cette decouverte à ſa profonde erudition."

But his lordſhip's philoſophical writings are full of information, explanations and obſervations of equal importance. Vol. I. p. 136, he informs us, that— " Porphyry, *the greateſt philoſopher as well as beſt writer* " *of his age*, relates that crows and magpies and par- " rots were taught in his time not only to imitate hu- " man ſpeech, but to attend to what was told them " and to remember it; and many of them, ſays he, " have learned to inform againſt thoſe whom they ſaw " doing

ſee, has explained it very clearly; and no doubt muſt have ſweated much to get thus to the bottom.

But

" doing any miſchief in the houſe. And he himſelf tamed " a partridge that he found ſomewhere about Carthage " to ſuch a degree, that it not only played and fondled " with him, but anſwered him when he ſpoke to it in " a voice different from that in which the partridges " call one another: but was ſo well bred, that it never " made this noiſe but when it was ſpoken to. And he " maintains, that all animals who have ſenſe and me- " mory are capable of reaſon: and this is not only his " opinion, but that of the Pythagoreans, the *greateſt* " *philoſophers in my opinion that ever exiſted*, next to " the maſters of their maſter, I mean the Egyptian " prieſts. And beſides the Pythagoreans, Plato, Ariſ- " totle, Empedocles, and Democritus, were of the " ſame opinion. *One thing cannot be denied*, that their " natures may be very much improved by uſe and in- " ſtruction, by which they may be made to do things " that are really wonderful and far exceeding their " natural power of inſtinct."—So far we are obliged to *the greateſt of all philoſophers that ever exiſted.* And thus far the judgment of the extract can alone be called in queſtion. Now for the farther confirmation of this doctrine by their illuſtrious diſciple.—" There is a " man in England at preſent, who has practiſed more " upon

But Mr. Harris has the advantage of a Similie over this gentleman: and though Similies appear with moſt beauty and propriety in works of imagination, they are frequently found moſt uſeful to the authors of philoſophical treatiſes: and have often helped them out at many a dead lift, by giving

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" upon them and with greater ſucceſs than any body " living:"—(I ſuſpect his lordſhip means the owner of the learned Pig)—" and he ſays, *as I am informed*," —(Ay, Right, my lord, Be cautious how you take an aſſertion ſo important as this, upon your own authority! Well, He ſays? What?)—" That, *if they* " *lived long enough*, and pains *ſufficient* were taken " upon them,"—(Well, what then?)—" *it is impoſ-* " *ſible to ſay to what lengths ſome of them might be car-* " *ried!*"

Now if this, and ſuch ſtuff as this, be Philoſophy; and that too, of the greateſt philoſophers that ever exiſted; I do moſt humbly intreat your lordſhip, if you ſtill continue obſtinate to diſcard Mr. Locke, that I may have my *Tom Thumb* again. For this philoſophy gives to my mind as much diſguſt, though not ſo much indignation, as your friend and admirer Lord Mansfield's LAW.

giving them an appearance of ſaying ſomething, when indeed they had nothing to ſay: For Similies are in truth the bladders upon which they float; and the Grammarian ſinks at once if he attempts to ſwim without them.

As a proof of which, let us only examine the preſent inſtance; and, diſmiſſing the *Zoophytes*, ſee what intelligence we can draw from Mr. Harris concerning the nature of *Conjunctions*.

Firſt he defines a *Word* to be a "*ſound* "*ſignificant*." Then he defines *Conjunctions* to be words (i. e. *ſounds ſignificant*) "*devoid* "*of ſignification*."—Afterwards he allows that they have—"*a kind of ſignification*."

But this kind of ſignification is—"*ob*-"*ſcure*," (i. e. a ſignification unknown): ſomething I ſuppoſe (as Chillingworth

couples them) like a *ſecret Tradition*, or a *ſilent Thunder*: for it amounts to the ſame thing as a *ſignification* which does *not ſignify*: an obſcure or unknown ſignification being no ſignification at all. But, not contented with theſe inconſiſtencies, which to a leſs learned man would ſeem ſufficient of all conſcience, Mr. Harris goes farther, and adds, that they are a—" *kind of middle* " *beings*"—(he muſt mean between ſignification and no ſignification)—" *ſharing* " *the Attributes of both*"—(i. e. of ſignification and no ſignification) and—" *conduce* " *to link them both*"—(i. e. ſignification and no ſignification) " *together*."

It would have helped us a little, if Mr. Harris had here told us what that *middle ſtate* is, between ſignification and no ſignification *! What are the *attributes* of no

* If common reaſon alone was not ſufficient to keep Mr. Harris and Lord Mondboddo from this middle ſtate

ſignification! And how ſignification and no ſignification can be *linked* together!

Now all this may, for aught I know, be "read and admired as long as there is "any taſte for *fine writing* in Britain †." But

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ſtate between the το ον and the το μη ον, and between ſignification and no ſignification; they ſhould at leaſt have liſtened to what they are better acquainted with, *Authority*.

"Οσα δε των εναντιων τοιαυτα εστιν, ωστε εν οις πεφυκε γινεσθαι, "η ων καταγορειται, αναγκαιον αυτων θατερον υπαρχειν;—τουτων "ουδεν εστιν ανα μεσον." Ariſtot. Categ.

"Inter affirmationem & negationem nullum medium "exiſtit." J. C. SCALLIGER, Lib. 5. C. cxiv.

† "The truly philoſophical language of my worthy "and learned friend Mr. Harris, the author of Hermes, "a work that will be read and admired as long as "there is any taſte for philoſophy and fine writing in "Britain."

Orig. and Prog. of Language, Vol. i. *p.* 8.

"But I can hardly have the ſame indulgence for "the philoſopher, eſpecially one who *pretended*, like "Mr.

But with ſuch unlearned and vulgar philoſophers as Mr. Locke and his diſciples, who

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" Mr. Locke, to be ſo attentive an obſerver of what " paſſed in his own mind, and has written a whole " book upon the ſubject.—If Mr. Locke would have " taken the trouble to ſtudy what had been diſcovered " in this matter by the antients, and had not reſolved " to have the merit of inventing himſelf a whole " ſyſtem of philoſophy, he would have known that " every material object is compoſed of *matter* and " *form.*"

Orig. and Prog. of Lang. Vol. i. *p.* 38.

" Mr. Locke wrote at a time when the old philo- " ſophy, I mean the ſcholaſtic philoſophy, was gene- " rally run down and deſpiſed, but no other come in " its place. In that ſituation, being naturally an " acute man, and not a bad writer, it was no wonder " that his Eſſay met with great applauſe, and was " thought to contain wonderful diſcoveries. And I " muſt allow that I think it was difficult for any man, " without the aſſiſtance of books, or of the conver- " ſation of men more learned than himſelf, to go fur- " ther in the philoſophy of mind than he has done. " But now that Mr. Harris has opened to us the trea- " ſures of Greek philoſophy, to conſider Mr. Locke " ſtill as a ſtandard book of philoſophy, would be, to

who ſeek not *Taſte* and *elegance*, but truth and common ſenſe in philoſophical ſubjects, I believe it will never paſs as a "*perfect example of Analyſis*;" nor bear away the palm for "*acuteneſs of inveſtigation and perſpicuity of explication.*" For, ſeparated from the *Fine Writing*, (which however I can no where find in the book) thus is

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"uſe an ancient compariſon, continuing to feed on "*acorns* after *corn* was diſcovered." Page 53.

"It was the misfortune of us in the weſtern parts "of Europe, that after we had learned Greek, and "got ſome taſte of the Greek philoſophy, we immediately ſet up as maſters ourſelves, and would needs "be inventors in philoſophy, inſtead of humble ſcholars of the ancient maſters. In this way Deſcartes "philoſophized in France, Mr. Hobbes and Mr. "Locke in England, and many ſince their time of leſs "note. I would fain hope, if the indolence and diſſipation that prevail ſo generally in this age would "allow me to think ſo well of it, that Mr. Harris "would put a ſtop to this method of philoſophiſing "without the aſſiſtance of the ancients, and revive "the genuine Greek philoſophy among us." *Id. p.* 54.

is the *Conjunction* explained by Mr. Harris, ——A ſound ſignificant devoid of ſignification, having at the ſame time a kind of obſcure ſignification; and yet having neither ſignification nor no ſignification; but a middle ſomething between ſignification and no ſignification, ſharing the attributes both of ſignification and no ſignification; and linking ſignification and no ſignification together.

If others, of a more elegant Taſte for *Fine Writing*, are able to receive either pleaſure or inſtruction from ſuch *truly philoſophical language* *, I ſhall neither diſpute with them nor envy them: But can only

* "Clarus ob obſcuram linguam magis inter inanes
"Quamde graveis inter Grajos, qui vera requirunt.
"Omnia enim ſtolidi magis admirantur amantque
"Inverſis quæ ſub verbis latitantia cernunt:
"Veraque conſtituunt, quæ belle tangere poſſunt
"Aures, & lepido quæ ſunt fucata ſonore."
LUCRETIUS, *Lib.* 1. 640.

deplore the dullneſs of my own apprehenſion, who, notwithſtanding the great authors quoted in Mr. Harris's treatiſe, and the great authors who recommend it, cannot help conſidering this "perfect example of analyſis," as—An improved compilation of almoſt all the errors which Grammarians have been accumulating from the time of Ariſtotle down to our preſent days, of technical and learned affectation*.

B.

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* I muſt however do Mr. Harris and Dr. Lowth the juſtice to acknowledge, that the Hermes of the former has been received with univerſal approbation both at home and abroad; and has been quoted as undeniable authority on the ſubject by the learned of all countries. For which however I can eaſily account; not by ſuppoſing that its doctrine gave any more ſatisfaction to their minds who quoted it than to mine; but becauſe, as Judges ſhelter their knavery by *precedents*, ſo do ſcholars their ignorance by *authority*: and when they cannot reaſon, it is ſafer and leſs diſgraceful to repeat that nonſenſe at ſecond hand, which they would be aſhamed to give originally as their own.

B.

I am afraid, my good friend, you ſtill carry with you your old humour in politics, though your ſubject is now different. You ſpeak too ſharply for Philoſophy. Come, Confeſs the truth. Are not you againſt *Authority*, becauſe Authority is againſt you? And does not your ſpleen to Mr. Harris ariſe principally from his having taken care to fortify his opinions in a manner in which, from your ſingularity, you cannot?

H.

I hope you know my diſpoſition better. And I am perſuaded that I owe your long and ſteady friendſhip to me, to the conviction which an early experience in private life afforded you, that—Neminem libenter nominem, niſi ut laudem; ſed nec peccata reprehenderem, niſi ut aliis prodeſſem.—Indeed you have borne your teſtimony for me in very trying ſituations, where few

beſides yourſelf would have ventured ſo much honeſty. At the ſame time, I confeſs, I ſhould diſdain to handle any uſeful truth daintily, as if I feared leſt it ſhould ſting me; and to employ a philoſophical inquiry as a vehicle for intereſted or cowardly adulation.

I proteſt to you, my notions of Language were formed before I could account etymologically for any one of the words in queſtion, and before I was in the leaſt acquainted with the opinions of others. I addreſſed myſelf to an inquiry into their opinions with all the diffidence of conſcious ignorance; and, ſo far from ſpurning authority, was diſpoſed to admit of half an argument from a great name. So that it is not my fault, if I am forced to carry inſtead of following the lanthorn: but at all events it is better than walking in total darkneſs.

And

And yet, though I believe I differ from all the accounts which have hitherto been given of Language, I am not ſo much without authority as you may imagine. Mr. Harris himſelf and all the Grammarians whom he has, and whom (though uſing their words) he has not quoted, are my authorities. Their own doubts, their difficulties, their diſſatisfaction, their contradictions, their obſcurity on all theſe points are my authorities againſt them *: for their ſyſtem and their difficulties vaniſh together. Indeed unleſs, with Mr. Harris, I had been repeating what others have written, it is impoſſible I ſhould quote any direct authorities for my own manner of expla-

* "Profecto in Grammaticorum prope omnium "commentis, quæ ἀγροικοι immenſium extollunt, pene "ὑδεν ὑγιες: cum paginæ ſingulæ ſæpe plures contineant "errores, quam Sicinius ille Dentatus vulnera toto "habuit corpore."

G. J. VOSSII ARISTARCHUS, Lib. iii. Cap. 2.

explanation. But let us hear Wilkins, whoſe induſtry deſerved to have been better employed, and his perſeverance better rewarded with diſcovery; let us hear what he ſays.

—" According to the true philoſophy " of ſpeech, I cannot conceive this kind " of words" (he ſpeaks of Adverbs and Conjunctions) " to be properly a diſtinct " part of ſpeech, as they are commonly " called. But until they can be diſtribut- " ed into their proper places, I have ſo " far complied with the Grammars of in- " ſtituted languages, as to place them here " together."—And again,

" For the accurate effecting of this [i. e. " a *real character*] it would be neceſſary " that the theory itſelf [i. e. *of language*] " upon which ſuch a deſign were to be " founded, ſhould be exactly ſuited to the " nature of things. But upon ſuppoſal

" that this theory [viz. *of language*] is de-
" fective, either as to the fulness or the
" order of it; this must needs add much
" perplexity to any such attempt, and ren-
" der it imperfect. And that this is the
" case with that common theory already
" received, need not much be doubted."

It appears evidently therefore that Wilkins (to whom Mr. Locke was much indebted) was well convinced that all the accounts hitherto given of Language were erroneous. And in fact, the languages which are commonly used throughout the world, are much more simple and easy, convenient and philosophical than Wilkins's scheme for a *real character*; or than any other scheme that has been at any other time imagined or proposed for the purpose. Mr. Locke's dissatisfaction with all the accounts which he had seen, is too well known to need repetition.

Sanctius

Sanctius rescued QUOD particularly from the number of these mysterious Conjunctions, though he left UT amongst them.

And Servius, Scioppius, G. J. Vossius, Perizonius, and others, have explained and displaced many other supposed Adverbs and Conjunctions.

Skinner (though I knew it not previously) had accounted for IF before me, and in the same manner; which, though so palpable, *Lye* confirms and compliments. Even S. Johnson, though mistakenly, has attempted AND; and would find no difficulty with THEREFORE.

In short, there is not such a thing as a *Conjunction* in *Any* Language, which may not, by a skilful Herald, be traced home to its own family and origin; without having recourse to contradiction and mystery with Mr. Harris: or, with Mr. Locke, cleaving open the head of man, to give it such a

 birth

birth as Minerva's from the brain of Jupiter.

B.

Call you this authority in your favour? When the full ſtream and current ſets the other way, and only ſome little brook or rivulet runs with you? You know very well that all the authorities which you have alleged, except Wilkins, are upon the whole againſt you. For though they have explained the meaning, and traced the derivation of many Adverbs and Conjunctions; yet (except Sanctius in the particular inſtance of QUOD,—whoſe conjunctive uſe in Latin he too ſtrenuouſly denies) they all acknowledge them ſtill to be *Adverbs* or *Conjunctions*. It is true, they diſtinguiſh them by the title of *reperta* or *uſurpata*: But they at the ſame time acknowledge (indeed the very diſtinction itſelf is an acknowledgment) that there are others which are *real*, *primigenia*, *nativa*, *pura*.

H. True.

H.

True. Becauſe there are ſome, of whoſe origin they were totally ignorant. But has any Philoſopher or Grammarian ever yet told us what a *real, original, native, pure* Adverb or Conjunction is? Or which of theſe Conjunctions of Sentences are ſo? Whenever that is done, in *any* language, I may venture to promiſe you that I will ſhew thoſe likewiſe to be *repertas* and *uſurpatas*, as well as the reſt. And till then I ſhall take no more trouble about them. I ſhall only add, that though *Abbreviation and corruption are always buſieſt with the words which are moſt frequently in uſe*; yet the *words moſt frequently uſed are leaſt liable to be totally laid aſide.* And therefore they are often retained,—(I mean that branch of them which is moſt frequently uſed)—when moſt of the other words—(and even the other branches of theſe retained words)—are, by various changes

changes and accidents, quite loſt to a Language. HENCE the difficulty of accounting for them. And HENCE (becauſe only one branch of each of theſe *declinable* words is retained in a language) ariſes the notion of their being *indeclinable*; and a ſeparate ſort of words, or Part of Speech by themſelves. But that they are not *indeclinable*, is ſufficiently evident by what I have already ſaid. For Gif, An, &c. certainly could not be called *indeclinable*, when all the other branches of thoſe *Verbs*, of which they are the regular Imperatives, were likewiſe in uſe. And that the words IF, AN, &c. (which ſtill retain their original ſignification, and are uſed in the very ſame manner and for the ſame purpoſe as formerly) ſhould now be called *indeclinable*, proceeds merely from the ignorance of thoſe who could not account for them; and, who therefore, with Mr. Harris, were driven to ſay that they have neither *mean-*

ing

ing nor *inflection:* whilſt notwithſtanding they were ſtill forced to acknowledge (either directly, or by giving them different titles of *conditional*, *adverſative*, &c.) that they have a " *kind of obſcure* " *meaning*."

How much more candid and ingenuous would it have been, to have owned fairly that they did not underſtand the nature of theſe *Conjunctions*; and, inſtead of wrapping it up in myſtery, to have exhorted and encouraged others to a farther ſearch.

B.

You are not the firſt perſon who has been miſled by a fanciful etymology. Take heed that your derivations be not of the ſame ridiculous caſt with theirs who deduced *Conſtantinople* from *Conſtantine the noble*,—*Breeches* from *bear-riches*,—

Donna

Donna from *Dono*,—and *King Pepin* from ὁσπερ *.

H.

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* "Then this Conſtantyne removed the emperyall ſee
" unto his cytye of *Conſtantyne the noble:* and there for
" the more partye kepte his emperyall honoure; and
" other emperours in lyke wyſe after hym. By reaſon
" whereof the emperours were longe after called em-
" perours of *Conſtantyne noble.*"

Fabian's Chronicle, Chap. LXIX.

" *Hed.* But why *Breeches* now?
" Pha. Breeches, quaſi *bear-riches*; when a gallant
" bears all his riches in his breeches."

Cynthia's Revels, Act 4. Sce. 3.

" Placano i *Doni* il ciel; placan l'inferno.
" E pur non ſon le *Donne*
" Men avare che il cielo,
" Piu crude che l'inferno.
" Il *Don*, credimi, il *Dono*
" Gran miniſtro d' amore, anzi tiranno.
" Egli è, che a ſuo voler impetra e ſpetra.
" Non ſai tu cio ch' Elpino,
" Il ſaggio Elpino dicea?
" Che fin colà nella primiera etade,
" Quand' anco ſemplicetti
" Non ſapean favellare
" Che d' un linguaggio ſol la lingua e 'l core,

H.

If I have been misled, it most certainly is not by Etymology: of which I confess myself to have been shamefully ignorant at the time when these my notions of language were first formed. Though even that previous ignorance is *now* a circumstance which confirms me much in my opinion concerning these Conjunctions: For I knew not even the *character* of the language from which my particular proofs of the *English* conjunctions were to be drawn.

" Allor le amanti *Donne* altra canzona
" Non s' udivan cantar che—*Dona*, *Dona*.
" Quindi l' *enne* addoppiando
" Perchè non basta *un Don*,—DONNA fu detta."
Guidobaldo de' Bonarelli.

" Ὁσπερ—ἠπερ—ὁπερ—Diaper—Napkin—Nipkin—
" Pipkin—Pippin-king—King Pepin."

I forget my merry author of this etymology; but it is altogether as plausible as even *Menage*'s derivation of CHEZ from *Apud*.

drawn. And (notwithſtanding Lord Monboddo's diſcouraging Sneer *,) it was general

* "Now as I am not able from Theory merely, "and *à priori*, to form the idea of a perfect language, "I have been obliged to ſeek for it in the ſtudy of the "Greek.—What men of *ſuperior Genius* may do in "ſuch ſpeculations, I cannot tell; but I know well "that *ordinary* men, without the ſtudy of ſome model "of the kind, would be as unable to conceive the idea "of a perfect language, as to form a high taſte in "other arts, ſuch as ſculpture and painting, without "having ſeen the beſt works of thoſe kinds that are to "be found.—It would be doing injuſtice to *thoſe ſu-* "*perior minds who have in themſelves the ſtandard of* "*perfection in all the Arts*, to judge of them by my-"ſelf; but I am confident that *my idea* of perfection "in language would have been ridiculouſly imperfect, "if I had known no other language than the modern "languages of Europe." Origin and Progreſs of Language. Vol. II. Page 183.

Read this, *Mr. Burgeſs*, and then complain of illiberality to Lord Monboddo: who places himſelf *anſatus in Cathedra*, and thus treats all other men in advance. Whoever, after his lordſhip, ſhall dare to reaſon on this ſubject *à priori*, muſt aſſume then, it ſeems,—to have in his own ſuperior mind the ſtandard of perfection in *All* the Arts!—Do you, Mr. Burgeſs,

ral reaſoning *à priori*, that led me to the particular inſtances; not particular inſtances to the general reaſoning. This Etymology, againſt whoſe faſcination you would have me guard myſelf, did not occur to me till many years after my ſyſtem was ſettled: and it occurred to me ſuddenly, in this manner;——" If my " reaſoning concerning theſe conjunctions " is well founded, there muſt then be in " the original language from which the Engliſh

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acquieſce to this condition? If it were poſſible (which I am very far from believing) that the ſame ſentiments ſhould pervade any conſiderable part of the very learned and reſpectable body to which you belong; I ſhould be ſorrowfully compelled to join in the exclamation,—O! aurita Arcadiæ pecora! qui, *Romæ*, hujus cuculi vocem veluti luſciniolæ melos, in aures admittere ſuſtinetis! And perhaps Mr. Burgeſs himſelf may have reaſon hereafter to regret, that (with all his real or pretended admiration of Lord Monboddo's writings) he neglected to avail himſelf of the only uſeful leſſon to be drawn from them: viz. To be at leaſt as well bred as *Porphyry's partridge*; and to have forborne his noiſe, until he was himſelf ſpoken to.

"Engliſh (and ſo of all other languages) "is derived, literally *ſuch* and *ſuch* words "bearing preciſely *ſuch* and *ſuch* ſignifica- "tions."——I was the more pleaſed with this ſuggeſtion, becauſe I was intirely ignorant even of the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic characters: and the experiment preſented to me a mean, either of diſabuſing myſelf from error (which I greatly feared;) or of obtaining a confirmation ſufficiently ſtrong to encourage me to believe (what every man knowing any thing of human nature will always be very backward in believing of himſelf) that I had really made a diſcovery. For, if upon trial I ſhould find in an unknown language preciſely thoſe very words both in ſound, and ſignification, and application, which in my perfect ignorance I had foretold; what muſt I conclude, but either that ſome Dæmon had maliciouſly inſpired me with the ſpirit of true prophecy in order the more deeply to deceive me; or that my

reaſoning on the nature of language was not fantaſtical. The event was beyond my expectation; for I inſtantly found upon trial, all my predictions verified. This has made me preſumptuous enough to aſſert it univerſally. Beſides that I have ſince traced theſe ſuppoſed unmeaning, indeclinable conjunctions with the ſame ſucceſs in many other languages beſides the Engliſh. And becauſe I know that the generality of minds receive conviction more eaſily from a number of particular inſtances, than from the ſurer but more abſtracted arguments of general proof; if a multiplicity of uncommon avocations and engagements (ariſing from a very peculiar ſituation) had not prevented me, I ſhould long before this have found time enough from my other purſuits and from my enjoyments (amongſt which idleneſs is not the ſmalleſt) to have ſhewn clearly and ſatisfactorily, the origin and preciſe meaning of each of theſe pretended unmeaning,

inde-

indeclinable Conjunctions, at leaſt in all the dead and living languages of Europe.

B.

Men talk very ſafely of what they *may do*, and what they *might have done*. But, though preſent profeſſions uſually outweigh paſt proofs with the people, they have never yet paſſed current with philoſophers. If therefore you would bring me over to your opinion, and embolden me to quit the beaten path with you, you muſt go much beyond the example of Henry Stephens, which was conſidered by Mer. Caſaubon as the ne plus ultra on this ſubject *, and muſt do what Wilkins required,

* " Henricus Stephanus (author immortalis operis, " quod Theſaurus linguæ Græcæ indigitavit) ita omnes orationis particulas (*quarum quanto in omni lingua difficilior, tanto utilior obſervatio*) omnes idiotiſmos excuſſit, eruit, explicavit, ſimilia cum ſimilibus comparavit, ut exemplum quidem in hoc genere aliis ad imitandum reliquerit abſolutiſſimum; ſed quod pauci ſint aſſecuturi." Mer. Caſ. de lingua Saxonica.

before he would venture to differ from the Grammars of inſtituted languages: that is, you muſt diſtribute all our *Engliſh* Conjunctions at leaſt into their proper places. And if it ſhould ſeem unreaſonable in me thus to impoſe upon you a taſk which— "no man, however learned or ſagacious "has yet been able to perform *;"—you muſt thank yourſelf for it, and the peremptory roundneſs of your aſſertion. Beſides, I do really think that after you have profeſſed ſo much of all the languages of Europe, I may fairly expect you to perform a little in your own.

H.

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* "The Particles are, among all nations, applied "with ſo great latitude, that they are not eaſily re-"ducible under any regular ſcheme of explication: "this difficulty is not leſs, nor perhaps greater, in "Engliſh than in other languages. I have la-"boured them with diligence, I hope with ſucceſs: "ſuch at leaſt as can be expected in a taſk, which no "man, however learned or ſagacious, has yet been "able to perform." Preface to S. Johnſon's Dictionary.

H.

If it muſt be ſo, thus then: I ſay that

IF	Are the Imperatives	Lif	Of their reſpective Verbs: Lifan	To give
AN		An	Anan	To grant
UNLESS		Onlef	Onlefan	To diſmiſs
EKE		Eac	Eacan	To add
YET		Let	Letan	To get
STILL		Stell	Stellan	To put
ELSE		Alef	Alefan	To diſmiſs
THO'		Þaf	Þafian	To allow
or		or	or	
THOUGH		Þafig	Þafigan	To allow
BŪT		Bot	Botan	To *Boot*
BŪT		Be-utan	Beon-utan	To be out
WITHOUT		þýnð-utan	þýnðan-utan	To be out
AND		An-ad	Anan-ad	Dare Congeriem

LEST is the paſt participle Lefed of Lefan To diſmiſs

SINCE { Siððan, Sýne, Seanð-es, Siððe, or, Sin-es } is the Participle of Seon } To ſee

THAT is the Article or Pronoun Þat.

These

Theſe I apprehend are the only Conjunctions in our language which can cauſe any difficulty; and it would be impertinent in me to explain ſuch as—*Be-it*. *Albeit*. *Notwithſtanding*. *Nevertheleſs*. SET. *Save*. *Saving*. *Except*. *Excepting*. IF CASE. PUT CASE. *To wit*. *Becauſe*. FORESENE *that*.

"SET this my work full febill be."

G. DOUGLAS.

"Whan he made any ordinary judges, advocates or "proctoures, he cauſed them to be openly named, "requirynge the people and gyvynge them courage, "if there were cauſe to accuſe them, to prove the "cryme by open wytneſſe: FORE SENE if they dyd "not ſufficiently prove it, and that it ſemed to be ma-"licioufe detraction, the accuſour ſhulde forthwith be "beheaded."

Sir T. ELLIOTT, *Image of Governaunce*, Chap. XVII.

"I do not like theſe paper-ſquibs, good maſter, "they may undo your ſtore—I mean of credit, and "fire your arſenall; IF CASE you do not in time make "good thoſe outer works, your pockets."

B. JOHNSON. *Staple of News*, Act I. Sc. 3.

Chaucer alſo uſes IF CACE.

PUT CASE, though now out of faſhion, was frequently uſed by Chillingworth and other good authors.

that. Provided that. Being that, &c. Which are evident at firſt ſight.

B.

Well. Whether you are right or wrong in your conjectures concerning Conjunctions, I acknowledge that this is coming to the point: and is fairer than ſhuffling them over unnoticed; as the greater part of grammarians have done; or than repeating after others, that they are not themſelves any parts of language, but only ſuch *acceſſaries* as *ſalt* is to meat, or *water* to bread; or that they are the mere *edging* or *ſauce* of language; or that they are like the *handles* to cups, or *plumes* to helmets, or *binding* to books, or *harneſs* for horſes; or that they are *pegs* and *nails*, and *nerves* and *joints*, and *ligaments* and *glue*, and *pitch* and *lime*, and *mortar*, and ſo forth *. In which

* " Pour quoy eſt-ce que Platon dit, que l'oraiſon " eſt temperée de *noms* & de *verbes?*—Mais adviſons " que

which kind of pretty ſimilies Philoſophers and Grammarians ſeem to have vied with one

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" que nous ne prenions autrement les paroles de Pla-
" ton que comme il les a dittes : car il a dit que
" l'oraiſon eſtoit temperée *De* ces deux parties, non
" *Par* ces deux parties ; que nous ne façions la faulte
" que feroit celuy qui calomnieroit un autre pour a-
" voir dit, que un oignement feroit compoſé de cire
" & de galbanum, alleguant qu'il auroit obmis à dire
" le feu & le vaſe, ſans leſquels on ne ſçauroit meſler
" leſdites drogues : auſſi ſemblablement ſi nous le re-
" prenions pour autant qu'il auroit obmis à dire les
" conjonctions, les prepoſitions, & autres telles par-
" ties. Car le parler & l'oraiſon n'eſt compoſé *De* ces
" parties là, mais *Par* icelles, & non ſans elles. Car
" comme celuy qui prononceroit *battre*, ou *eſtre battu* ;
" ou d'ailleurs *Socrates* & *Pythagoras*, encore donne-
" roit-il aucunement à entendre & à penſer quelque
" choſe : mais celuy qui profereroit *Car* ou *De* ſimple-
" ment & ſeulement, on ne pourroit imaginer qu'il en-
" tendiſt aucune choſe ny aucun corps, ains s'il n'y a
" quelques autres paroles qui ſoient proferées quant &
" quant, elles reſſembleront à des ſons & des bruits
" vains ſans aucune ſignification ; d'autant que ny à
" par elles ny avec d'autres ſemblables, elles ne peu-
" vent rien ſignifier. Mais à fin que nous conjoignons
" ou meſlions & aſſemblions tout en un, nous y ad-
" jouſtons des prepoſitions, conjonctions, & articles,
" voulans

one another; and have often endeavoured to amuſe their readers and cover their own igno-

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" voulans enfaire un corps de tout.——Comment donc
" pourra dire quelqu'un, ces parties-là ne ſervent-
" elles de rien à l'oraiſon? Quant à moy, je tiens
" qu'elles y ſervent autant comme le *Sel* à la viande,
" & l'*eau* à faire le Pain. Evenus ſouloit dire que le
" *Feu* eſtoit la meilleure *Saulſe* du Monde; auſſi ſont
" ces Parties l'aſſaiſonnement de noſtre langage, ne
" plus ne moins que le feu & le Sel des breuvages &
" viandes, dont nous ne nous ſçaurions paſſer; excepté
" que noſtre parler n'en a pas toujours neceſſairement
" à faire: comme l'on peut dire du langage des Ro-
" mains, duquel aujourd'huy tout le monde preſque
" uſe; car il a oſté preſque toutes les prepoſitions ex-
" cepté bien peu; & quant aux articles que l'on ap-
" pelle, il n'en reçoit pas un tout ſeul, ains uſe de
" noms ſans *bordure*, par maniere de dire; & ne s'en
" fault pas eſmerveiller, attendu qu' Homere, à peu
" de noms prepoſe des articles, comme ſi c'etoient
" *anſes* à des vaſes qui en euſſent beſoign, ou des *pen-*
" *naches* ſur des morions.——Or que les Dialecticiens
" aient plus beſoign de conjonctions, que nuls autres
" hommes de lettres, pour la liaiſon & tiſſure de leurs
" prepoſitions, ou les disjonctions d'icelles, ne plus ne
" moins que les cochers ont beſoign d'*attelages* pour
" atteler de front leur chevaux; ou comme Ulyſſes
" avoit beſoign d'*ozier* en la caverne de Cyclops pour
" lier

ignorance, by very learnedly disputing the propriety of the similie, instead of explaining the nature of the Conjunction.

But

" lier ses moutons ; cela n'argue ni ne preuve pas que
" la conjonction soit autrement partie d'oraison, mais
" bien un outil propre à conjoindre selon qu'elle en
" porte nom, & a contenir & assembler non pas toutes
" choses, ains seulement celles qui ne sont pas simple-
" ment dites : si l'on ne vouloit dire que la *Chorde* ou
" *courroye* dont une balle seroit liée fust partie de la
" balle ; ou la *colle* d'un papier ou d'un livre qui est
" collé ; & les données & distributions des deniers
" partie du gouvernement : comme Demades disoit que
" les deniers que l'on distribuoit manuellement par
" teste à chasque citoyen d'Athenes, pour veoir les
" jeux, estoient la colle du gouvernement de l'estat
" populaire. Et quelle est la conjonction qui façe de
" plusieurs propositions une, en les cousant & liant
" ensemble, comme le marbre fait le fer quand on le
" fond avec lui par le feu ; mais pour cela le marbre
" n'est pas pourtant, ny ne l'appelle lon pas partie de
" fer ; combien que ces choses-là qui entrent en une
" composition & qui sont fondues avec les drogues que
" l'on mesle, ont accoustumé de faire & de souffrir ne
" sçay quoi de commun, composé de tous les ingre-
" diens.——Quant aux prepositions on les peult ac-
" comparer aux *pennaches* ou autres Ornemens que lon

 " met

But, pray, have you any authority for the derivation of theſe words? Are not all former etymologiſts againſt you?

H.

Except in IF, and BUT (in one of its meanings) I believe they are all againſt me. But I am perſuaded that all future etymologiſts, and perhaps ſome philoſophers, will acknowledge their obligation to me. For theſe troubleſome conjunctions, which have hitherto cauſed them ſo much miſtaken and unſatisfactory labour, ſhall ſave them many an error and many a weary ſtep in future. They ſhall no more expoſe themſelves by unnatural forced conceits to derive the Engliſh and all

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" met au deſſus les habillemens de Teſtes, ou bien
" aux *baſes* & *ſoubaſſement* que lon met au deſſoubs des
" Statues; pour ce qu'elles ne ſont pas tant parties
" d'oraiſon, comme alentour des parties."

PLUTARCH, *Platonic Queſtions.*—9th. *Amyot.*

all other languages from the Greek, or the Hebrew; or ſome imaginary primæval tongue. The Particles of every language ſhall teach them whither to direct and where to ſtop their inquiries: for wherever the evident meaning and origin of the Particles of any language can be found, *there* is the certain ſource of the whole.

B.

Without a moment's reflection, every one muſt perceive that this aſſertion is too general and comprehenſive. The mixture which is found in all cultivated languages; the perpetual acceſſion of new words from affectation as well as from improvement, and the introduction of new Arts and Habits, eſpecially in learned nations; and from other circumſtances; forbid the deduction of the *whole* of a language from any one ſingle ſource.

H.

Moſt certainly. And therefore when I ſay the *whole*, I muſt beg to be underſtood with thoſe exceptions. And, that I may not ſeem to contradict myſelf when we ſhall hereafter come to treat of them, I beg you likewiſe to remember, that I by no means include in my aſſertion, the *Abbreviations* of language: for they are always *improvements* ſuperadded by language in its progreſs; and are often borrowed from ſome other more cultivated languages. Whereas the original Mother-tongue is always rude and tedious, without thoſe advantages of *Abbreviation*. And were he once more in being, I ſhould not at all doubt of being able to convince even Junius himſelf (who with many others could ſo far miſtake the courſe and progreſs of ſpeech, as to derive an uncultivated from a cultivated language) that, inſtead of referring the Anglo-ſaxon to his

favourite Greek as its original, he muſt ſeek out (and I ſuppoſe he would eaſily find) a Parent for the latter.

But, I beg pardon, this is rather digreſſing from my purpoſe. I have nothing to do with the learning of mere curioſity: nor am any farther concerned with Etymology, than as it may ſerve to get rid of the falſe philoſophy received concerning language and the human underſtanding. If you pleaſe, therefore, I will return to the Conjunctions I have derived; and, if you think it worth the while, we will examine the conjectures of other perſons concerning them; and ſee whether I have not ſomething better than the authorities you aſk after in my favour.

B.

I ſhould be glad you would do ſo.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. VIII.

Etymology of the Engliſh Conjunctions.

H.

IF and AN may be uſed mutally and indifferently to ſupply each other's place.

Beſides having Skinner's authority for IF, I ſuppoſe that the meaning and derivation of this *principal* ſupporter of the *Tripod of Truth* *, are ſo very clear, ſimple and univerſally

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* See Plutarch Περι του ΕΙ του εν Δελφοις,

Εν δε Διαλεκτικη δη τω μεγιστην εχει δυναμιν ο συναπτικος· ετοσι συνδεσμος, ατε δη το λογικωτατον σχηματιζων αξιωμα.—Το γαρ τεκμηριον

verſally allowed, as to need no farther diſcourſe about them.

Skinner ſays—" IF (in agro Linc. *Gif)* " ab AS. Giſ. *Si.* Hoc a verbo Giſan, " *dare*, q. d. *Dato.*"

Lye, in his edition of Junius, ſays—— " Haud inſcitè Skinnerus, qui deduxit ab " A. S Giſan, *dare*, q. d. *Dato.*"

GIF is to be found not only, as Skinner ſays, in Lincolnſhire, but in all our old writers. G. Douglas almoſt always uſes *Gif:* once or twice only he has uſed *If*; once

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τεκνικον και λογικον, ὡσπερ ειρηται, γνωσις ακολουθιας, την δε προσληψιν ἡ αισθησις τω λογῳ διδωσιν. ὁθεν ει και αισχρον ειπειν, ουκ αποδρεψομαι τελος ειναι τον της αληθειας τριποδα τον λογον, ὁν την τυ λεγοντος προς το προηγουμενον ακολουθιαν θεμενος, ειτα προσλαβων την ὑπαρξιν, επαγει το συμπερασμα της αποδειξεως. Τον ουν Πυθιον ει δη μουσικη τε ηδεται, και κυκνων φωναις και κιθαρας ψοφοις, τι θαυμαστον εστι Διαλεκτικης φιλια τελος ασπαζεσθαι τυ λογυ το μερος και αγαπαν, ὡ μαλιστα και πλειστω προσχρωμενυς ὁρα τυς φιλοσοφυς.

once he uſes *Gewe* and once *Giffis*, and ſometimes *In caſe* and *In cais* for *Gif*.

——" O brother mine Eurilly,
" Quhidder GIF the goddis or ſum ſpretis ſilly
" Movis in our myndis this ardent thochtful fire,
" Or GIF that every mannis ſchrewit deſyre
" Be as his god and genius in that place,
" I wat never how it ſtandis." Book 9.

Chaucer commonly uſes IF; but ſometimes *Yeve*, *Yef*, and *Yf*.

" Lo here the letters ſelid of this thing
" That I mote bere in all the haſte I may;
" YEVE ye woll ought unto your ſonne the king,
" I am your ſervant both by night and day."
Man of Lawes tale.

" IF gold ruſtid, what ſhould iron do?
" For YEF a prieſt be foule, on whom we truſt,
" No wonder is it a lewd man to ruſt."
Prolog. to Cant. Tales.

" She wold wepe YF that ſhe ſaw a mous
" Caught in a trappe." Ibid.

And it is to be obſerved that in Chaucer and in other old writers, the Verb to *Give* ſuffers the ſame variations in the manner of writing and pronouncing it, whether uſed *conjunctively* or otherwiſe. As does alſo the *Noun* derived from it.

" Your vertue is ſo grete in heven above
" That IF the liſt I ſhall well have my love,
" Thy temple ſhall I worſhip evir mo,
" And on thine aulter, where I ryde or go,
" I woll don ſacrifiſe and firis bete;
" And YEF ye woll nat ſo my lady ſwete,
" Then pray I you tomorrow with a ſpere
" That Arcite do me through the herte bere:
" Then reke I not, whan I have loſt my life,
" Though Arcite winnin her to his wife.
" This is th' effect and ende of my prayere
" YEF me my lady, bliſsful lady dere."

Knight's Tale, CAAUCER.

" Well ought a prieſt enſample for to YEVE."
" This gode enſample to his ſhepe he YAFFE."

Prol. to Cant. Tales.

" In the mene tyme, of the nycht wache the cure
" We GIF Meſſapus."

Douglas, Encad. B. 9.

" And

" And ſuffir Tyrianis, and all Liby land
" Be GIF in dowry to thy ſon in hand."
Enead, B. 4.

" A wyſe is goddeſs YEFTE verely,
" All other maner YEFTES hardely,
" As londes, rentes, paſture or commune,
" Or movables, all ben YEFTES of fortune."
Marchauntes Tale.

In Henry the VIIth's will, dated 1509, you will alſo find YEVE uſed where we now employ *Give*.

GIN * is often uſed in our Northern counties and by the Scotch, as we uſe IF or AN: which they do with equal propriety and as little corruption: for GIN is no other than the participle *Given*, *Gi'en*, *Gi'n*. (As they alſo uſe *Gie* for *Give*, and *Gien*

 for

* Ray ſays—" *Gin*, *Gif*, in the old Saxon is *Gif*; " from whence the word *If* is made per aphæreſin li- " teræ G. *Gif*, from the verb *Gifan*, dare; and is " as much as *Dato*."

for *Given*, when they are not uſed *conjunctively*. And *hoc dato* is of equal conjunctive value in a ſentence with *Da hoc*.

> " Then *wi'* his ſpear he turn'd hir owre,
> " O GIN hir face was wan!
> " He turn'd her owre and owre again,
> " O GIN hir ſkin was whyte."
>
> *Percy's Reliques*, Vol. i. *Edom o'Gordon*.

Even our Londoners often pronounce *Give* and *Given* in the ſame manner: As

> " *Gi'* me your hand."
> " I have *Gin* it him well."

So Wycherly, Love in a Wood, Act V.
" If my daughter there ſhould have done
" ſo, I wou'd not have *gi'n* her a groat."

I do not know that AN has been attempted by any one, except S. Johnſon: and, from the judicious diſtinction he has made

made between Junius and Skinner *, I am perſuaded that he will be the firſt perſon to relinquiſh his own conjecture †: eſpecially when he notices his own ſelf-contradiction: for after having (under the article

* "Junius appears to have excelled in extent of "learning, and Skinner in rectitude of underſtanding. "Junius was accurately ſkilled in all the northern lan-"guages; Skinner probably examined the antient and "remoter dialects only by occaſional inſpection into "dictionaries: But the learning of Junius is often of "no other uſe than to ſhew him a track by which he "may deviate from his purpoſe; to which Skinner "always preſſes forward by the ſhorteſt way. Skin-"ner is often ignorant, but never ridiculous: Junius "is always full of knowledge; but his variety diſtracts "his judgment, and his learning is very frequently "diſgraced by his abſurdities."

Preface to Dictionary.

† Immediately after the publication of my letter to Mr. Dunning, I was informed by Mr. S. (an intimate friend of Dr. Johnſon) that I was not miſtaken in this opinion; Dr. Johnſon having declared, that if he lived to give a new edition of his Dictionary, he ſhould certainly adopt all my derivations.

article AN) told us that "AN is a con-
"traction of *And if*;" and given the following instance,

——"Well I know
"The clerk will ne'er wear hair on's face that had it.
——"He will AN'IF he live to be a man."

He very truly (under the article AND) says—"In *And if*, the *And* is *redundant*;
"and is omitted by all later writers. As

——"I pray thee, Launce,
"AN'IF thou seest my boy, bid him make haste."

UNLESS.

Skinner say—"*Unless* nisi, præter, præ-
"terquam, q. d. *One-less*, uno dempto
"seu excepto: vel potius ab Onleran,
"dimittere, liberare, q. d. *Hoc dimisso*."

It is extraordinary, after his judicious derivation of IF, that Skinner should have been

been at a loſs about that of UNLESS; eſpecially as he had it in a manner before him: For Onleſ, *dimitte*, was ſurely more obvious and immediate than Onleſeð, *dimiſſo*.—As for, *One-leſs*, i. e. *Uno dempto* ſeu *excepto*, it is too poor to deſerve notice.

So low down as in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, this conjunction was ſometimes written *Oneles* and *Oneleſſe*. And this way of ſpelling it, which ſhould rather have directed Skinner to its true etymology, might perhaps contribute to miſlead him to the childiſh conjecture of *One leſs*, *Uno dempto*.—But in other places it is written purely ONLES: and ſometimes ONLESSE.

Thus, in the Trial of Sir John Oldcaſtle, An. 1413, "It was not poſſible for "them to make whole Chriſtes cote with-"out ſeme, ONLESSE certeyn great men "were brought out of the way,"

So, in "The Image of Governance" by Sir T. Elliott, 1541, "Men do feare to "approche unto their ſoverayne Lorde, "ONELES they be called."

"This noble empire is lyke to falle in- "to extreme ruyne and perpetuall in- "famye, ONELESSE your moſte excellent "wyſedomes wyll dilygently and conſtant- "ly prepare yourſelfes to the certayne re- "medy."

So in—"A neceſſary doctrine and eru- "dition for any chriſten man, ſet furthe "by the Kynges majeſtie of Englande." 1543.

"ONLES ye beleve, ye ſhall not under- "ſtande."

"No man ſhall be crowned, ONLES he "lawfully fight."

"Neyther

" Neyther is it poſſible for any man,
" ONELESSE this holy ſpirite ſhall firſt il-
" lumine his hart."

" True honour ſhall be gyven to none,
" ONELES he be worthy."

" Who can have true penance, ONLES
" he beleve ſtedfaſtly that God is."

" Who ſo ever doth forſake his lawful
" wyfe, ONELES it be for adultery, com-
" mytteth adulterye in ſo doynge."

" They be bound ſo to do, ONLES they
" ſe reaſonable cauſe to the contrary."

" The ſoule waxeth feble, ONLESSE the
" ſame be cheriſhed."

" In vayne, ONLESSE there were ſome
" facultie."

" It

" It cannot begynne, ONELESSE by the
" grace of God."

So in the " Supplication to King Henry
" VIII." by Barnes.

" I ſhall come to the councell when
" ſoever I bee called, ONLES I be lawful-
" ly let."

So in the " Declaration againſt Joye"
by Gardiner, Biſhop of Wincheſter.

" No man commeth to me, ONLESSE
" my father draweth hym."

" Can any man further replye to this
" carpenter, ONLES a man wolde ſaye,
" that the carpenter was alſo after the
" theſe hymſelfe."

" For

" For ye fondely *improve* * a conclusion
" which myght stande and be true, with
" your fonde paradox of only fayth justi-
" fieth, ONLESSE in teaching ye wyl so
" handel the matter, as, &c."

" We

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* To *improve*. (i. e. to censure, to impeach, to blame, to *reprove*.) A word perpetually used by the authors about Shakespeare's time, and especially in religious controversy. It is taken by us from the French, who used it in the same meaning. It is to be found throughout Bossuet and others. " Elles croient que le " corps & le sang sont vraiment distribués à ceux qui " mangent; & *improuvent* ceux qui enseignent le con- " traire." Des Variat. des Eglises Pro. And I find it so used even at this day in a very recent French publication, (the Memoirs du Baron de Tott.) which though not estimable for its language, is sufficient for the present purpose.—" Je ne pouvois en effet me dis- " simuler qu'en *improuvant* les travaux qu'on venoit " de faire; ceux qui les avoient ordonnés en rejet- " teroient le blame sur les deux architectes." Tom. II. page 123. The expression in Hamlet, (Act II. Sc. 13.) " Of *unimproved* mettle hot and full."—ought not to have given Shakespeare's commentators any trouble: for *unimproved* means *unimpeached*; though Warburton thinks it means " *unrefined*;" Edwards, " *unproved*;" and Johnson, " *not regulated nor guided* " *by knowledge or experience*."

"We cannot love God, ONLES he pre-
" pareth our harte and geve us that grace;
" no more can we beleve God, ONLESSE
" he giveth us the gift of belefe."

"In every kynde the female is com-
" monly barren, ONLESSE it conceyveth
" of the male; ſo is concupyſcence barren
" and voyde of ſynne, ONLESSE it con-
" ceyve of man the agreymente of his free
" wyll."

"We maye not properly ſaye we appre-
" hend juſtification by fayth, ONLESSE
" we wolde call the promiſſe of God, &c."

"Such other peviſshe wordes as men be
" encombred to heare, ONLES they wolde
" make Goddes worde the matter of the
" Devylles ſtrife."

" Who

" Who can wake out of ſynne, WITH-
" OUT god call him; and ONLESSE god
" hath given eares to heare this voyce of
" god. How is any man beyng lame with
" ſynne, able to take up his couche and
" walke, ONLESSE god ſayeth, &c."

So in the—" Anſweare to Fekenham
" touchinge the othe of the ſupremacy,"
by Horne, Biſhop of Wincheſter.

" I coulde not chooſe, ONELES I woulde
" ſhawe myſelfe overmuch unkinde unto
" my native countrey, but take penne in
" hande and ſhape him a ful and plaine
" anſweare, without any curioſitie."

" The election of the pope made by the
" clergie and people in thoſe daies, was
" but a vaine thing, ONLES the emperour
" or his lieutenant had confirmed the
" ſame."

" The pope would not consecrate the
" elect bishop, ONLES he had first licence
" therto of the emperour."

" No prince, no not the emperour him-
" selfe should be present in the councell
" with the cleargie, ONLES it were when
" the principall pointes of faith were treat-
" ed of."

" He sweareth the Romaines that they
" shall never after be present at the elec-
" tion of any pope, ONLES they be com-
" pelled thereunto by the emperour."

" Who maketh no mencion of any priest
" there present, as you untruely report,
" ONLES ye will thinke he meant the or-
" der, whan he named the faction of the
" Pharisees."

" So

"So that none ſhould be conſecrate,
"ONLESSE he were commended and in-
"veſtured biſhop of the kinge."

"And further to commaunde the newe
"electe pope to forſake that dignitie un-
"lawfully come by, ONLESSE they woulde
"make a reaſonable ſatisfaction.

"That the pope mighte ſende into his
"dominions no legate, ONLESSE the kinge
"ſhoulde ſende for him."

"What man, ONLESSE he be not well
"in his wittes, will ſay that, &c."

"To exerciſe this kinde of juriſdiction,
"neither kinges nor civill magiſtrates may
"take uppon him, ONLESSE he be law-
"fulled called."

"That from hencefoorth none ſhoulde
"be pope, ONELESSE he were created by
"the conſent of the emperour."

"Ye cannot finde ſo muche as the bare
"title of one of them, ONELESSE it be of
"a biſhoppe."

So in the—"Whetſtone of Witte," by Robert Recorde, 1557.

"I ſee moare menne to acknowledge
"the benefite of nomber, then I can eſpie
"willyng to ſtudie to attaine the benefites
"of it. Many praiſe it, but fewe dooe
"greatly practiſe it; ONLESSE it bee for
"the vulgare practice concernyng Mer-
"chaundes trade."

"Yet is it not accepted as a like flatte,
"ONLES it bee referred to ſome other
"ſquare nomber."

 I be-

I believe that William Tyndall, our immortal and matchleſs tranſlator of the bible, was one of the firſt who wrote this word with an U; and, by the importance and merit of his works, gave courſe to this corruption in the language *.

" The ſcripture was geven, that we may
" applye the medicine of the ſcripture,
" every man to his own ſores, UNLESSE

* Shakeſpeare, in Othello, Act II. Sce. 13. writes,

——————" What's the matter,
" That you *Unlace* your reputation thus
" And ſpend your rich opinion for the name
" Of a night brawler?"

In a note on this paſſage S. Johnſon ſays—" Slacken
" or looſen. Put in danger of dropping; or, per-
" haps, ſtrip of its ornaments." And in his Dictionary, he ſays,—" To make looſe; to put in danger of
" being loſt.—Not in uſe." But he gives no reaſon whatever for this interpretation. I believe that *Unlace* in this paſſage means—" You UNLESS or ONLES your
" reputation," from the ſame verb Onleran.

" then we entend to be idle disputers and
" braulers about vaine wordes, ever gnaw-
" yng upon the bitter barke without, and
" never attaynyng unto the sweete pith
" within, &c." Prol. before the 5 B. of Moses.

I do not know that Onlesr is employed *conjunctively* by the Anglosaxon writers, as we use *Unless*; (though I have no doubt that it was so used in discourse); but instead of it, they frequently employ nymðe or nemðe: (which is evidently the Imperative nym or nem, of nyman or neman, to which is subjoined ðe. i.e. *That* *.) And nymðe—*Take away that*,—may very well supply the place of—Onlesr (ðe expressed or understood)—*Dismiss That*.

LES,

* It is too singular to be left unnoticed, that the antient Romans used *Nemut*, instead of *Nisi*. For which Festus cites Cato *de potestate Trib.* but the passage is lost.

LES, the Imperative of Leran (which has the ſame meaning as Onleran) is likewiſe uſed ſometimes by old writers inſtead of UNLESS.

" And thus I am conſtrenit, als nere as I may,
" To hald his verſe, and go nane uthir way;
" LES ſum hiſtorie, ſubtell worde, or ryme,
" Cauſis me mak degreſſioun ſum tyme."

G. DOUGLAS. *Preface.*

——————— " Gif he
" Commyttis any treſſoun, ſuld he not de;
" LES than his prince of grete humanite
" Perdoun his fault for his long trew ſervice."

G. D. *Prol.* to 10th Book.

" Sterff the behuffis, LES than thou war unkynd
" As for to leif thy brothir deſolate."

G. D. *Æneid.* 10th book.

In the ſame manner it is uſed throughout Ben. Johnſon.

" LESS learn'd Trebatius Cenſure diſagree."

Poetaſter.

" Firſt hear me—Not a ſyllable, LESS you take."

Alchymiſt, Act. III. Scene 5.

"There for ever to remain
"LESS they could the knot unſtrain."

Maſque.

"To tell you true, 'tis too good for you,
"LESS you had grace to follow it."

Barthol. Fair.

"But will not bide there, LESS yourſelf do bring him."

Sad Shepherd *.

You

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* It is this ſame Imperative LES, placed at the end of nouns and coaleſcing with them, which has given to our language ſuch adjectives as *hopeleſs*, *reſtleſs*, *deathleſs*, *motionleſs*, &c. i. e. *Diſmiſs* hope, reſt, death, motion, &c.

The two following lines of Chaucer in the Reve's Tale,

And when the horſe was *loſe*, he gan to gon
"Towarde the fen, there wylde mares rynne."

are thus printed in Mr. Tyrwhit's edition,

"And whan the hors was *laus*, he gan to gon
"Toward the fen, ther wilde mares renne."

I am to ſuppoſe that Mr. Tyrwhit is juſtified for this reading by *ſome* manuſcript; and that it was not alter-

ed

You will pleaſe to obſerve that all the languages which have a correſpondent conjunction to *Unleſs*, as well as the manner in which its place is ſupplied in the languages which have not a conjunction correſpondent

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ed by himſelf merely for the ſake of introducing " *Laus* " *Iſland*, and the *Conſuetud. de Beverley*," into his Gloſſary.

" LAUS (ſays Mr. Tyrwhit) adj. Sax. *Looſe*. 4062. " *Laus Iſland*. Solutus. This is the true original of " that termination of adjectives ſo frequent in our " language, in *les* or *leſs*. Conſuetud. Beverley. MS. " Harl. 560.—Hujus ſacrilegii emenda non erat de- " terminata, ſed dicebatur ab anglis *Botalaus*. i. e. " ſine emenda.—So Chaucer uſes *Boteles*, and other " words of the ſame form; as *Detteles*, *Drinkeles*, " *Gilteles*, &c."

I think, however, there will be very little doubt concerning this derivation; when it is obſerved that we ſay indifferently either *ſleep-leſs* or *without-ſleep*, &c. i. e. *Diſmiſs* ſleep or Be-out ſleep, &c. So, for thoſe words where we have not by habit made the coaleſcence, as the Daniſh Folkelös and Halelös, &c. we ſay in Engliſh *Without* people, *Without* a tail, &c. And it is

respondent to it; all strongly justify my derivation. The Greek Ει μη. The Latin *Nisi.*

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is observable that in all the northern languages, the termination of this adjective in each language varies just as the correspondent verb, whose Imperative it is, varies in that language.

		Termination.		Infin. of the verb.
Goth.	—	ᛚᛁᚾᛊ	—	ᛚᛁᚾᛊᚷᛁᚾ
A. S.	—	Leaſ	—	Leoſan
Dutch	—	Loos	—	Löſſen
German	—	Los	—	Löſen
Daniſh	—	Lös	—	Löſer
Swediſh	—	Lös	—	Löſa

I muſt be permitted here to ſay, that I ſincerely lament the principle on which Mr. Tyrwhit proceeded in his edition of Chaucer's tales. Had he given invariably the text of that manuſcript which he judged to be the oldeſt, and thrown to the bottom the variorum readings with their authority; the obligation of his readers (at leaſt of ſuch as myſelf) would indeed have been very great to him: and his induſtry, care, and fidelity would then have been much more uſeful to inquirers, than any ſkill which he has ſhewn in etymology or the northern languages; were it even much greater than it appears to me to have been.

Nisi. The Italian *Se non.* The Spanish *Sino.* The French *Si non.* All mean *Be it not.* And in the same manner do we sometimes supply its place in English either by *But*, *Without*, *Be it not*, *But if*, &c.

" Without profane tongues thou canst never rise,
" Nor be upholden, *Be it not* with lies."
M. DRAYTON. *Leg. of* R. D. *of Normandy.*

" That never was there garden of such pryse,
" BUT YF it were the very paradyse."
FRANKELEYN'S *Tale.*

" That knighte he is a foul Paynim,
" And large of limb and bone;
" And *But if* heaven may be thy speede,
" Thy life it is but gone."
Sir CAULINE. PERCY'S *Reliques.*

Though it certainly is not worth the while, I am tempted here to observe the gross mistake Mr. Harris has made in the *Force* of this word; which he calls an "*Adequate Preventive.*"

His

His example is—" Troy will be taken, " UNLESS the Palladium be preſerved."— " That is (ſays Mr. Harris) This alone " is ſufficient to preſerve it."—According to the oracle, ſo indeed it might be; but the word UNLESS has no ſuch force.

Let us try another inſtance.

" England will be enſlaved UNLESS the " Houſe of Commons continues a part of " the Legiſlature."

Now, I aſk, is this alone ſufficient to preſerve it? We who live in theſe times, know but too well that this very houſe may be made the inſtrument of a tyranny as odious and (*perhaps*) more laſting than that of the Stuarts. I am afraid Mr. Harris's *adequate Preventive* will not ſave us. For, though it is moſt cruel and unnatural; yet we know by woful experi-

ence

ence that the Kid may be ſeethed in the mother's milk, which providence appointed for its nouriſhment; and the liberties of this country be deſtroyed by that very part of the Legiſlature, which was moſt eſpecially appointed for their ſecurity.

E K E.

Junius ſays,——" *Eak*, etiam. Goth. " ᛦᛁᛗᛕ. A. S. Єac. *Al.auch. D.og. B.ook.* " Viderentur eſſe ex inverſo *και*; ſed rec- " tius petas ex proxime ſequenti ᛦᛁᛗᛕᛦᛁᛗ " (Iſl. *αυξα*) A. S. Єacan. Єcan. ican. *Al.* " auchon. D.oge. B.oecken. Єacan vero, " vel

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An inſtance has been already given where IF is uſed as a prepoſition. In the following paſſage of Dryden, *Unleſs* is alſo uſed as a prepoſition;

" The commendation of Adverſaries is the greateſt " triumph of a writer; becauſe it never comes *Unleſs* " extorted."

" vel auchon, ſunt ab αυξειν vel αεξειν, ad-
" dere, adjicere, augere."

Skinner ſays——" Eke. ab A. s. Ɛac. Ɛeac. *Belg. Oock. Teut. Auch. Fr. Th. Ouch. D.oc.* etiam."

Skinner then proceeds to the verb,

" *To Eke*, ab A. s. Ɛacan. Geican. Iecan.
" augere, adjicere. Fr. Jun. ſuo more,
" deflectit. a Gr. αυξειν. Mallem ab Ɛac,
" iterum, quod vide: quod enim augetur,
" ſecundum partes ſuas quaſi iteratur &
" de novo fit."

In this place Skinner does not ſeem to enjoy his uſual ſuperiority of judgment over Junius. And it is very ſtrange that he ſhould chuſe here to derive the verb Ɛacan from the conjunction Ɛac (that is, from its own Imperative); rather than

the conjunction (that is, the Imperative) from the verb. His judgment was more awake when he derived IF or GIF from Gifan, and not Gifan from Gif; which yet, according to his present method, he should have done.

Perhaps it may be worth remarking, as an additional proof of the nature of this conjuction; that in each language, where this imperative is used conjunctively, the Conjunction varies just as the verb does.

In Danish the Conjunction is *og*, and the verb *öger*.

In Swedish the Conjunction is och, and the verb öka.

In Dutch the Conjunction is ook, from the verb oecken.

In German the Conjunction is auch, from the verb auchon.

In

In Gothic the Conjunction is ΛΠΚ, and the verb ΛΠΚΛΝ.

As in Engliſh the Conjunction is Eke or Eak, from the verb Ɛacan.

YET. STILL.

I put the conjunctions YET and STILL here together; becauſe (like If and An) they may be uſed mutually for each other without any alteration in the meaning of the ſentences: a circumſtance which (though not ſo obviouſly as in theſe inſtances) happens likewiſe to ſome other of the conjunctions; and which is not unworthy of conſideration.

According to my derivation of them both, this mutual interchange will not ſeem at all extraordinary: for YET (which is nothing but the Imperative ȝeꝛ or ȝÿꝛ, of ȝeꝛan or ȝÿꝛan, obtinere) and STILL (which

(which is only the Imperative Stell or Steall, of Stellan or Stealllian *, ponere) may very well ſupply each other's place, and be indifferently uſed for the ſame purpoſe.

But I will repeat to you the derivations which others have given, and leave you to chuſe between us.

Mer. Caſaubon ſays——" ETI, adhuc, " Yet."

Junius ſays——" YET, adhuc. A. S. " ȝyt. Cymrœis etwa, etto, ſignificat, ad- " huc, etiam, iterum; ex ετι vel αυθις."

Q Skin-

* Though this verb is no longer current in Engliſh, except as a Conjunction, yet it keeps its ground in the collateral languages.

In German and Dutch it is		—	*Stellen*
In the Swediſh	—	—	*Stalla*
And in the Daniſh	—	—	*Stiller.*

Skinner ſays—" YET, ab A. S. Ȝet, " Ȝeta, adhuc. modo. Teut. Jetzt, jam, " mox."

Again he ſays—" STILL, aſſidue, inde- " ſinenter, inceſſanter. Neſcio an ab A. S. " till, addito tantum ſibilo; vel a noſtro, " & credo etiam, A. S. As, ut, ſicut, " (licet apud Somnerum non occurrat) & " eodem Til, uſque. q. d. uſque, eodem " modo."

ELSE.

This word ELSE, formerly written *Alles*, *Alys*, *Alyſe*, *Elles*, *Ellus*, *Ellis*, *Ells*, *Els*, and now *Elſe*; is, as I have ſaid, no other than Ælȝ or Ælȳȝ, the Imperative of Ælȝan or Ælȳȝan, dimittere.

Mr. Wharton, in his Hiſtory of Engliſh Poetry, Vol. i. page (without any authority, and in ſpite of the context,

which evidently demands *Else*, and will not admit of *Also*) has explained ALLES in the following passage by *Also*.

" The Soudan ther he satte in halle;
" He sent his messagers faste with alle,
" To hire fader the Kyng.
" And sayde, how so hit ever bi falle,
" That mayde he wolde clothe in palle
" And spousen hire with his ryng.
" And ALLES I swere withouten fayle
" I chull hire winnen in pleye battayle
" With mony an heih lordyng."

The meaning of which is evidently,—" Give me your daughter, ELSE I will " take her by force."

It would have been nonsense to say,—" Give me your daughter, ALSO I will " take her by force."

Junius says—" *Else*, aliter, alias, alio-" qui. A. S. *Elles*. *Al*. *Alles*. D. *Ellers*."

Skinner ſays—" *Elſe*, ab A. s. Ellep, " alias, alioquin. Minſhew & Dr. Tho. " Hickes putant eſſe contractum a Lat. " *alias*, vel. Gr. Αλλως, nec ſine veriſimi- " litudine."

S. Johnſon ſays — " *Elſe*, Pronoun, " (Ellep, Saxon) *other, one beſides.* It is " applied both to perſons and things."

He ſays again—" *Elſe*, Adverb. 1. " Otherwiſe, 2. Beſides; except that men- " tioned."

THOUGH.

THO' THOUGH, THAH * (or, as our country-folks more purely pronounce it, THAF,

* See a ballad written about the year 1264, in the reign of Henry the third;

" Richard THAH thou be ever trichard,
" Trichten ſhalt thou never more."

Percy's Reliques, Vol. ii. p. 2.

See

THAF, THAUF and THOF) is the Imperative Þaþ or Þaþiȝ of the verb Þaþian or Þaþiȝan; to allow, permit, grant, yield, aſſent: And Þaþiȝ becomes *Thah*, *Though*, *Thoug* (and *Thoch*, as G. Douglas and other Scotch authors write it) by a tranſition of the ſame ſort, and at leaſt as eaſy, as that of *Hawk* from þaþuc. And it is remarkable, that as there were originally two ways of writing the verb, either with the guttural G (Þaþiȝan), or without it (Þaþian): ſo there ſtill continues the ſame difference in writing and pronouncing the remaining imperative of this ſame verb, with the guttural G (*Though*), or

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See alſo another ballad written in the year 1307, on the death of Edward the firſt.

" THAH mi tonge were mad of ſtel,
" Ant min herte yzote of bras,
" The godneſs myht y never telle
" That with kyng Edward was."

Percy's Reliques, Vol. ii, p. 10.

without it (*Tho'*). In Engliſh, the difference is only in the characters; but the Scotch retain in their pronunciation, the guttural termination.

I reckon it not a ſmall confirmation of this etymology, that antiently they often uſed *All-be*, *Albeit*, *All had*, *All were*, *All give*, inſtead of *Although* *.

The

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* " But *Al be* that he was a philoſophere
" Yet had he but lytel golde in cofre."
Pro. to Cant. Tales.

" *Albeit* originally the King's Bench be reſtrained by
" this Act to hold plea of any real action, yet by a
" mean it may; as when removed thither, &c.
LORD COKE.

" *All had* he ſey a thyng with both his eyen
" Yet ſhuld we women ſo viſage it hardely."
MARCHAUNTES *Tale.*

" *Al were* it ſo ſhe were of ſmall degree." *Ibid.*

" *Allgyf* England and Fraunce were thorow ſaught."
SKELTON.

The German uſes *Doch*; the Dutch *Doch* and *Dog*; the Daniſh *Dog* and *Endog*; and the Swediſh *Dock*; as we uſe *Though:* all from the ſame root. The Daniſh employs *Skiönt* and *Endſkiöndt*; and the Swediſh Ånſkönt, for *Though:* from the Daniſh verb Skiönner; and the Swediſh verb Skiönja, both of which mean, to *perceive, diſcern, imagine, conceive, ſuppoſe, underſtand.*

As the Latin *ſi* (*if*) means *Be it:* and *Niſi* and *ſine* (*unleſs* and *without*) mean *Be not:* ſo *Etſi* (*although*) means *And be it* *.

* It may not be quite needleſs to obſerve, that our conjunctions IF and THOUGH may very frequently ſupply each other's place, as—" THOUGH an hoſt of men " riſe up againſt me, yet ſhall not my heart be afraid;" or, " IF an hoſt of men, &c." So—" THOUGH all " men ſhould forſake you, yet will not I;" or, " IF " all men ſhould forſake you, &c."

The other Latin Conjunctions which are uſed for *Although*, (as, *Quam-vis*, *Licet*, *Quantum-vis*, Quam-libet) are ſo uncorrupted as to need no explanation.

Skinner barely ſays — " THOUGH, ab " AS Ðeah. Belg. Ðoch. Belg. & Teut. " Ðoch. etſi, quamvis *."

BUT.

It was this word, BUT, which Mr. Locke had chiefly in view, when he ſpoke of

* Though this word is called a conjunction of ſentences, it is conſtantly uſed (eſpecially by children and in low diſcourſe) not only at the beginning, and between, but at the end of ſentences.

" *Pro*. Why do you maintain your poet's quarrel " ſo with velvet and good clothes? We have ſeen " him in indifferent good clothes e're now himſelf.

" *Boy*. And may again. But his clothes ſhall never " be the beſt thing about him, THOUGH. He will " have ſomewhat beſide, either of humane letters or " ſevere honeſty, ſhall ſpeak him a man, though he " went naked."

of Conjunctions as marking ſome "Stands, "Turns, Limitations, and Exceptions of "the mind." And it was the corrupt uſe of this *One* word (BUT) in modern Engliſh, for *Two* words (BOT and BUT) originally (in the Anglo-ſaxon) very different in ſignification, though (by repeated abbreviation and corruption) approaching in ſound, which chiefly miſled him.

"BUT (ſays Mr. Locke) is a Particle, "none more familiar in our language; "and he that ſays it is a *diſcretive* Con-"junction, and that it anſwers SED in "Latin, or MAIS in French *, thinks he "has ſufficiently explained it. But it "ſeems to me to intimate ſeveral Rela-"tions

* It does not anſwer to *Sed* in Latin, or *Mais* in French; except only where it is uſed for *Bot*. Nor will any *one* word in *any* Language anſwer to our Engliſh BUT: becauſe a ſimilar corruption in the ſame inſtance has not happened in any other language.

" tions the mind gives to the ſeveral pro-
" poſitions or parts of them, which it
" joins by this monoſyllable.

" Firſt,———BUT *to ſay no more:*

" Here it intimates a ſtop of the mind,
" in the courſe it was going, before it
" came to the end of it.

" Secondly,——*I ſaw* BUT *two Plants.*

" Here it ſhews, that the mind limits
" the ſenſe to what is expreſſed, with a
" negation of all other.

" Thirdly,—*You pray*; BUT *it is not*
" *that God would bring you to the true re-*
" *ligion:*

" Fourthly,—BUT *that he would confirm*
" *you in your own.*

" The

" The firſt of theſe BUTS intimates a
" ſuppoſition in the mind of ſomething
" otherwiſe than it ſhould be: the latter
" ſhews that the mind makes a direct op-
" poſition between that and what goes
" before it.

Fifthly,—*All animals have ſenſe*, BUT *a*
" *dog is an animal.*

" Here it ſignifies little more, but that
" the latter propoſition is joined to the
" former, as the Minor of a Syllogiſm.

" To theſe, I doubt not, might be added
" a great many other ſignifications of this
" particle, *if it were my buſineſs to examine*
" *it in its full latitude*, and conſider it in
" all the places it is to be found; which
" if one ſhould do, I doubt whether in
" all thoſe manners it is made uſe of, it
" would

" would deſerve the title of DISCRETIVE
" which Grammarians give to it.

" But *I intend not* * *here a full application of this ſort of ſigns.* The inſtances
" I have given in this one, may give occaſion to reflect upon their uſe and
" force in language, and lead us into the
" contemplation of *ſeveral actions of our*
" *minds* in diſcourſing, which it has *found*
" *a way* to intimate to others by *theſe*
" *Particles*, ſome whereof conſtantly, and
" others in certain conſtructions, have the
" ſenſe

* " Eſſentiam finemque conjunctionum ſatis aptè
" explicatum puto: nunc earum originem materiam-
" que videamus. Neque vero *Sigillatim* percurrere
" omnes *in Animo eſt.*"

J. C. SCALIGER.

The conſtant excuſe of them all, whether Grammatiſts, Grammarians or Philoſophers; though they dare not hazard the aſſertion, yet they would all have us underſtand that they can do it; but *non in animo eſt*. And it has never been done.

" ſenſe of a whole ſentence contained in " them."

Now all theſe difficulties are very eaſily to be removed without any effort of the underſtanding: and for that very reaſon I do not much wonder that Mr. Locke miſſed the explanation: for he dug too deep for it. But that the etymologiſts (who only juſt turn up the ſurface) ſhould miſs it, does indeed aſtoniſh me. It ſeems to me impoſſible, that any man who reads only the moſt common of our old Engliſh authors ſhould fail to obſerve it.

Gawin Douglaſs, notwithſtanding he frequently confounds the two words, and uſes them improperly, does yet (without being himſelf aware of the diſtinction, and from the mere force of cuſtomary ſpeech) abound with ſo many inſtances, and ſo contraſted,

contrafted, as to awaken, one ſhould think, the moſt inattentive reader.

" BOT thy werke ſhall endure in laude and glorie,
" BUT ſpot or falt condigne eterne memorie.
Preface.

" BOT gif this ilk ſtatew ſtandis here wrocht,
" War with zour handis into the cietie brocht,
" Than ſhew he that the peopil of Aſia
" BUT ony obſtakill in fell battel ſuld ga. Book 2.
" This chance is not BUT Goddis willis went,
" Nor is it not leful thyng, quod ſche,
" Fra hyne Creuſa thou turs away with the;
" Nor the hie Governoure of the hevin above is
" Will ſuffer it ſo to be, BOT the behuff is
" From hens to wend full fer into exile,
" And over the braid ſey ſayl furth mony a myle,
" Or thou cum to the land Hiſperia
" Quhare with ſoft courſis Tybris of Lidia
" Rynnys throw the riche feildis of pepill ſtout;
" Thare is gret ſubſtance ordenit the BUT dout.
Book 2.
" —— BOT gif the Fatis, BUT pleid,
" At my pleſure ſuffer it me life to leid. Book 4.
" BOT ſen Apollo clepit Gryneus,
" Grete Italie to ſeik commandis us,
" To Italie eik Oraclis of Licia
" Admoniſt us BUT mare delay to ga. Book 4.
" Thou wyth thir harmes overchargit me alſo,
" Quhen I fell firſt into this rage, quod ſche,
" BOT

" BOT ſo to do my teris conſtrenyt the.
" Was it not leful, alace, BUT cumpany,
" To me BUT cryme allane in chalmer to ly. Book 4.
" The tothir anſwered, nouthir for drede nor boiſt
" The luf of wourſchip nor honoure went away is,
" BOT certainly the daiſit blude now on dayis
" Wax is dolf and dull throw myne unweildy age,
" The cald body has mynyſt my curage:
" BOT war I now as umquhile it has bene,
" Zing as zone wantoun woiſtare ſo ſtrang thay wene,
" Ze had I now ſic zoutheid, traiſtis me,
" BUT ony price I ſuld all reddy be. Book 5.
" The prince Eneas than ſeand this dout;
" No langar ſuffer wald ſic wraith procede
" Nor ſeirs Entellus mude thus rage and ſprede;
" BOT of the bargain maid end, BUT delay. Book 5.
" In nowmer war thay BUT ane few menze,
" BOT they war quyk, and valzeant in melle. Book 5.
" Blyn not, blyn not, thou grete Troian Enee,
" Of thy bedis nor prayeris, quod ſche;
" For BOT thou do, thir grete durris, BUT dred,
" And griſlie zettis ſall never warp on bred. Book 6.
" How grete apperance is in him, BUT dout,
" Till be of proues, and ane vailzeant knycht:
" BOT ane blak ſop of myſt als dyrk as nycht
" Wyth drery ſchadow bylappis his hede. Book 6.
" BOT ſen that Virgil ſtandis BUT compare.
Prol. to Book 9.
" Quhidder GIF the Goddis or ſum ſpretis ſilly
" Movis in our myndis this ardent thochtful fire,
" Or GIF that every mannis ſchrewit deſyre
" Be as his God and Genius in that place,

" I wat

" I wat never how it ſtandis, BOT this lang ſpace
" My mynd movis to me, here as I ſtand,
" Batel or ſum grete thyng to tak on hand:
" I knaw not to quhat purpois it is dreſt,
" BOT be na way may I tak eis nor reſt.
" Behaldis thou not ſo ſurelie BUT affray,
" Zone Rutulianis haldis thayme glaid and gay?
Book 9.

" BOT lo, as thay thus wounderit in effray,
" This ilk Niſus, wourthin proud and gay,
" And baldare of his chance ſa with him gone
" Ane uthir takill aſſayit he anone:
" And with ane ſound ſmate Tagus BUT remede.
Book 9.

" ——— BOT the tothir BUT ſere,
" Bure at him mychtely with ane lang ſpere. Book 10.
" BOT the Troiane Baroun unabaſitlie
" Na wourdis preiſis to render him agane;
" BOT at his fa let fle ane dart or flane
" That hit Lucagus, quilk fra he felt the dynt,
" The ſchaft hinging into his ſchield, BUT ſtynt,
" Bad drive his hors and chare al fordwert ſtreicht.
Book 10.

" BOT quhat awailis bargane or ſtrang melle,
" Syne zeild the to thy fa, BUT ony quhy.
Prol. to Book 11.

" Than of his ſpeich ſo wounderit were thay
" Kepit thare ſilence, and wiſt not what to ſay
" BOT athir towart uthir turnis BUT mare
" And can behald his fallow in ane ſtare. Book 11.
" BOT now I ſee that zoung man haiſt BUT fale;
" To mache in feild wyth fatis inequale. Book 12.

" Quhare ſone foregadderit all the Troyane army,
" And thyck about hym flokkand can BUT baid
" BOT nowthir ſcheild nor wappinis down thay laid."
Book 12.

The Gloſſariſt of Douglas contents himſelf with explaining BOT by BUT.

The Gloſſariſt to Urry's Edition of Chaucer ſays,—" BOT for BUT is a form " of ſpeech *frequently* uſed in Chaucer to " denote the greater certainty of a thing." —This is a moſt inexcuſable aſſertion: for I believe the place cited in the Gloſſary is the only inſtance (in this edition of Chaucer) where BOT is uſed; and there is not the ſmalleſt ſhadow of reaſon for forming even a conjecture in favour of this unſatisfactory aſſertion: unſatisfactory, even if the fact had been ſo; becauſe it contains no explanation: for why ſhould BOT denote greater certainty?

And here it may be proper to obſerve, that Gawin Douglaſs's language (where BOT is very frequently found) though written about a century after, muſt yet be eſteemed more ancient than Chaucer's: even as at this day the preſent Engliſh ſpeech in Scotland is, in many reſpects, more ancient than that ſpoken in England ſo far back as the reign of Queen Elizabeth *. So Mr. Caſaubon (de vet. ling. Ang.) ſays of his time—" Scotica lingua " Anglicâ hodiernâ purior."—Where by *purior*, he means nearer to the Anglo-Saxon.

So G. Hickes, in his Anglo-Saxon Grammar, (Chap. 3.) ſays—" Scoti in multis " *Saxonizantes*."

But,

* This will not ſeem at all extraordinary, if you reaſon directly contrary to Lord Monboddo on this ſubject; by doing which you will generally be right, as well in this as in almoſt every thing elſe which he has advanced.

But, to return to Mr. Locke, whom (as B. Johnſon ſays of Shakeſpeare) " I re-" verence on this ſide of idolatry;" in the *five* inſtances which he has given for *five* different meanings of the word BUT, there are indeed only two different meanings *:

 nor

* " You muſt anſwer, that ſhe was brought very " near the fire, and as good as thrown in; or elſe " that ſhe was provoked to it by a divine inſpiration. " BUT, BUT that another divine inſpiration moved " the beholders to believe that ſhe did therein a noble " act, this act of her's might have been calumniated, " &c"

DONNE'S Βιαθανατος, *Part* II. *Diſtinct.* 5. *Sect.* 8.

In the above paſſage, which is exceedingly aukward, BUT is uſed in both it's meanings cloſe to each other: and the impropriety of the corruption appears therefore in it's moſt offenſive point of view. A careful author would avoid this, by placing theſe two BUTS at a diſtance from each other in the ſentence, or by changing one of them for ſome other equivalent word. Whereas had the corruption not taken place, he might without any inelegance (in this reſpect) have kept the conſtruction of the ſentence as it now ſtands: for nothing would have offended us, had it run thus— " BOT, *butan* that another divine inſpiration moved " the beholders, &c."

nor could he, as he imagined he could, have added any other ſignifications of this particle, but what are to be found in BOT and BUT as I have explained them *.

BUT, in the *firſt*, *third*, *fourth*, and *fifth*, inſtances, is corruptly put for BOT, the imperative of Botan:

In the *ſecond* inſtance only it is put for Bute, or Butan, or Be-utan †.

In

* S. Johnſon, in his Dictionary, has numbered up *eighteen* different ſignifications (as he imagines) of BUT: which however are all reducible to BOT and *Be-utan*.

† "I ſaw BUT two plants."

Not or *Ne* is here left out and underſtood, which uſed formerly to be always inſerted, as it frequently is ſtill.

So Chaucer—"I ne uſurpe not to have founden "this werke of my labour or of mine engin. I "n'ame BUT a leude compilatour of the laboure of "old

In the *first* instance,—" *To say no more*," is a mere parenthesis: and Mr. Locke has unwarily

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" old Astrologiens, and have it translated in myn
" Englishe. And with this swerde shall I sleene envy."
Introduction to Conclusions of the Astrolabie.

We should now say—" I am BUT a leude compi-
" latour, &c."

This omission of the negation before BUT, though now very common, is one of the most blameable and corrupt abbreviations of construction which is used in our language; and could never have obtained, but through the utter ignorance of the meaning of the word BUT. " There is not (says Chillingworth) so
" much strength required in the edifice as in the foun-
" dation: and if BUT wise men have the ordering of
" the building, they will make it much a surer thing,
" that the foundation shall not fail the building, than
" that the building shall not fall from the foundation.
" And though the building be to be of brick or stone,
" and perhaps of wood; yet it may be possibly they
" will have a rock for their foundation; whose stabi-
" lity is a much more indubitable thing, than the ad-
" herence of the structure to it."

It should be written—" If *none* but wise men."—
But the error in the construction of this sentence, will

unwarily attributed to BUT, the meaning contained in the parenthesis: for suppose the instance had been this, —" BUT *to* " *proceed*."—Or this,—" BUT, *to go fairly* " *through this matter*."—Or this,—" BUT, " *not to stop*."

Does BUT in any of these instances, intimate a stop of the mind in the course it was going? The truth is, that BUT itself is the fartherst of any word in the language from " *intimating a stop*." On the contrary it always intimates something MORE *, some-

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not excuse the present minister, if he neglects the matter of it. The blessings or execrations of all posterity for ever upon the name of PITT, (pledged as he is) will depend intirely upon his conduct in this particular.

* In the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and several other dead and living languages, the very word MORE is used for this conjunction BUT.

The

ſomething to follow: (as indeed it does in this very inſtance of Mr. Locke's; though

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The French anciently uſed MAIS, not only as they now do for the conjunction MAIS; but alſo as they now uſe *plus* or *d'avantage*.—

Y puis je *Mais?*
Je n'en puis *Mais*,

are ſtill in uſe among the vulgar people; in both which expreſſions it means *more*. So Henry Eſtiene uſes it;

" Sont ſi bien accouſtumez à ceſte ſyncope, ou " plutoſt apocope, qu'ils en font quelquesfois autant " aux diſſyllabes, qui n'en peuvent *mais*."
H. E. *de la precellence du langage Francois*, p. 18.

" *Mais* vient de *magis* (j'entens *mais* pour *d'avan-* " *tage*." Id. p. 131.

In the ſame manner alſo the Spaniſh language employs MAS both for *But* and *More*.

" Es la verdad la que *Mas* importa à los princi- " pes, y la que menos ſe halla en los palacios."
Saavedra. Corona Gothica.

" Obra de *Mas* novedad, y *Mas* eſtudio." Id.

we know not what that ſomething is, becauſe the ſentence is not compleated.) And therefore whenever any one in diſcourſe finiſhes his words with BUT, the queſtion always follows—BUT *what?*

So that Shakeſpeare ſpeaks moſt truly as well as poetically, when he gives an account of BUT, very different from this of Mr. Locke.

" *Meſſ.* Madam, he's well.
" *Cleo.* Well ſaid.
" *Meſſ.* And friends with Cæſar.
" *Cleo.* Thou art an honeſt man.
" *Meſſ.* Cæſar and he are greater friends than ever.
" *Cleo.* Make thee a fortune from me.
" *Meſſ.* BUT—YET—Madam,—
" *Cleo.* I do not like BUT—YET.—It does allay
" The good precedent. Fie upon BUT,—YET.—
" BUT—YET—is as a Jaylour, to bring forth
" Some monſtrous malefactor."

Anthony and Cleopatra, Act II. Sc. 5.

Where you may obſerve that YET (tho' uſed elegantly here, to mark more ſtrongly

the hesitation of the speaker) is merely superfluous to the sense; as it is always when used after BOT: for either BOT or YET alone has the very same effect, and will always be found (especially BOT) to *allay* equally the *Good* or the *Bad* * *precedent*; by something

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* "*Speed.* Item, She hath more hairs than wit, "and more faults than hairs; BUT more wealth than "faults.

"*Laun.* Stop there. She was mine, and not mine, "twice or thrice in that article. Rehearse that once "more.

"*Speed.* Item, she hath more hair than wit.

"*Laun.* What's next?

"*Speed.* And more faults than hairs.

"*Laun.* That's monstrous! Oh that that were "out!

"*Speed.* BUT more wealth than faults.

"*Laun.* Why that word makes the faults gracious."

Here the word BUT allays the *bad* precedent; for which, without any shifting of its own intrinsic signification, it is as well qualified as to allay the *Good*.

thing MORE * that follows. For Botan means—to BOOT †, i. e. to ſuperadd ‡, to ſupply,

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† So Taſſo,——

——— " Am. Oh, che mi dici?
" Silvia m'attende, ignuda, e ſola? *Tir* Sola,
" Se non quanto v'è Dafue, ch' è per noi.
" *Am.* Ignuda ella m'aſpetta? *Tir* Ignuda: MA—
" Am. Oimè, *che* MA? Tu taci tu ~~mi~~ uccidi." *m'*
Aminta, Att. II. Sc. 3.

Where the difference of the conſtruction in the Engliſh and the Italian is worth obſerving; and the reaſon evident, why in the queſtion conſequent to the conjunction, *what* is placed *after* the one, but *before* the other.

Boot what? i. e. *But* what?	What *more?* i. e. Che *ma?*

† S. Johnſon, and others, have miſtaken the expreſſion—*To Boot*—(which ſtill remains in our language) for a ſubſtantive; which is indeed the infinitive of the ſame verb, of which the conjunction is the Imperative. As the Dutch alſo ſtill retain *Boeten* in their language, with the ſame meaning.

‡ " Perhaps it may be thought improper for me to " addreſs you on this ſubject. BUT a moment, my " Lords,

ſupply, to ſubſtitute, to atone for, to compenſate with, to remedy with, to make amends with, to add ſomething MORE in order to make up a deficiency in ſomething elſe.

So likewiſe in the *third* and *fourth* inſtances (taken from Chillingworth) *. Mr. Locke

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" Lords, and it will evidently appear, that you are " equally blameable for an omiſſion of duty here alſo."

This may be ſuppoſed an abbreviation of conſtruction, for " BUT indulge me with a moment, my " Lords, and it will, &c." but there is no occaſion for ſuch a ſuppoſition.

* Knott had ſaid,—" How can it be in us a fundamental error to ſay, the Scripture alone is not judge " of controverſies, SEEING (notwithſtanding this our " belief) we uſe for interpreting of Scripture all the " means which they preſcribe; as *Prayer*, conferring " of Places, conſulting the originals, &c."

To which Chillingworth replies,

" You

Locke has attributed to BUT a meaning which can only be collected from the words which follow it.

But Mr. Locke ſays,—" IF it were his " buſineſs to examine it (BUT) in its full " lati-

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" You pray, BUT it is not that God would bring " you to the true religion, BUT that he would confirm " you in your own. You confer places, BUT it is, " that you may confirm or colour over with plauſible " diſguiſes your erroneous doctrines; not that you may " judge of them and forſake them, if there be reaſon " for it. You conſult the originals, BUT you regard " them not when they make againſt your doctrine or " tranſlation."

In all theſe places, BUT (i. e. BOT, or, as we now pronounce the verb, BOOT) only directs ſomething to be added or ſupplied, in order to make up ſome deficiency in Knott's expreſſions of " *Prayer*, conferring " of places, &c." And ſo far indeed as an omiſſion of ſomething is improper, BUT (by ordering it's inſertion) may be ſaid " to intimate a ſuppoſition in the " mind of the ſpeaker, of ſomething otherwiſe than it " ſhould be." But that intimation is only, as you ſee, by conſequence; and not by the intrinſic ſignification of the word BUT.

" latitude."—And that he " *intends not* " *here* a full explication of this ſort of " ſigns."—And yet he adds, that—" the " inſtances he has given in this one (BUT) " may lead us into the contemplation of " ſeveral *actions of our minds* in diſcourſing, " which it has *found a way* to intimate to " others by theſe particles." And theſe, it muſt be remembered, are *Actions*, or as he before termed them THOUGHTS of our minds, for which he has ſaid, we have " either *none or very deficient names*."

Now if it had been ſo, (which in truth it is not) it was ſurely for that reaſon, moſt eſpecially the buſineſs of an Eſſay on human *underſtanding*, to examine theſe Signs in their *full latitude*: and to give a *full explication* of them. Inſtead of which, neither *Here*, nor *elſewhere*, has Mr. Locke given *Any* explication whatever.

Though

Though I have ſaid much, I ſhall alſo omit much which might be added in ſupport of this double etymology of BUT: nor ſhould I have dwelt ſo long upon it, but in compliment to Mr. Locke; whoſe opinions in any matter are not ſlightly to be rejected, nor can they be modeſtly controverted without very ſtrong arguments.

None of the etymologiſts have been aware of this corrupt uſe of *one* word for *two* *.

Minſhew,

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* Nor have etymologiſts been any more aware of the meaning or true derivation of the words corresponding with BUT in other languages. Voſſius derives the Latin conjunction AT from ἀταρ; and AST from AT, "inſerto s." (But how or why s happens to be inſerted, he does not ſay.) Now to what purpoſe is ſuch ſort of etymology? Suppoſe it was derived from this doubtful word ατας; what intelligence does this give us? Why not as well ſtop at the Latin word AT, as at the Greek word ατας? Is it not ſuch ſort of trifling

Minſhew, keeping only one half of our modern BUT in contemplation, has ſought for its derivation in the Latin imperative *Puta*.

Junius

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trifling etymology (for I will not give even that name to what is ſaid by Scaliger and Nunneſius concerning SED) which has brought all etymological inquiry into diſgrace?

Voſſius is indeed a great authority; but, when he has nothing to juſtify an uſeleſs conjecture but a ſimilarity of ſound, we ought not to be afraid of oppoſing an appearance of Reaſon to him.

It is contrary to the cuſtomary progreſs of corruption in words to derive AST from AT. Words do not gain but loſe letters in their progreſs; nor has unaccountable accident any ſhare in their corruption; there is always a good reaſon to be given for every change they receive: and, by a good reaſon, I do not mean thoſe cabaliſtical words Metatheſis, Epentheſis, &c. by which Etymologiſts work ſuch miracles; but at leaſt a probable or anatomical reaſon for thoſe not arbitrary operations.

Adſit, *Adſt*, *Aſt*, *At*.—This conjecture is not a little ſtrengthened both by the antient method of writing

Junius confines his explanation to the other half; which he calls its "*primariam* "*ſignificationem*."

And Skinner willing to embrace them both, found no better method to reconcile two *contradictory* meanings, than to ſay hardily that the tranſition from one * to the other † was—"LEVI FLEXU!".

Junius

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this conjunction, and by the reaſon which Scaliger gives for it.—"AT fuit AD; *acceſſionem* enim dicit."
De C. L. L. cap. CLXXIII.

I am not at all afraid of being ridiculed for the above derivation, by any one who will give himſelf the trouble to trace the words (correſponding with BUT) of any language to their ſource: though they ſhould not all be quite ſo obvious as the French *Mais*, the Italian *Ma*, the Spaniſh *Mas*, or the Dutch *Maar*.

* Id eſt, a direction to leave out ſomething.

† Id eſt, a direction to ſuperadd ſomething.

Junius ſays—" BUT, Chaucero T. C. V. " 194. bis poſitum pro *ſine*. Primus lo- " cus eſt in ſummo columnæ;—BUT *tem-* " *peraunce in tene*."—Alter eſt in columnæ medio;

—" His golden carte with fiery bemes bright
" Four yoked ſtedes, full different of hew
" BUT baite or tiring through the ſpheres drew."

" ubi, tamen perperam, primo BOUT pro " BUT repoſueram: quod iterum delevi, " cum (ſub finem ejuſdem poematis) in- " cidiſſem in hunc locum;

" BUT mete or drinke ſhe dreſſed her to lie
" In a darke corner of the hous alone."

" Atque adeo exinde quoque obſervare " cœpi frequentiſſimam eſſe hanc parti- " culæ acceptionem. In Æneide quoque " Scoticâ paſſim occurrunt."—" BUT *ſpot* " *or falt*." 3. 58.—BUT *ony indigence*." 4. 20.—" BUT *ſentence or ingyne*." 5. 41.

—*Principal poet* BUT *pere.*" 9. 19.—
" Atque ita porro. BUT videtur dictum
" quasi *Be-ut*, pro quo Angli dicunt WITH-
" OUT: unde quoque, hujus derivationis
" intuitu, præsens hujus Particulæ ac-
" ceptio videbitur ostendere hanc esse *pri-*
" *mariam ejus significationem.*"

The extreme carelessness and ignorance of Junius, in this article is wonderful and beneath a comment.

Skinner says,—" BUT, ut ubi dicimus—
" *None* BUT *he*;"—ab A. S. Bute, Butan,
" *præter*, *nisi*, *sine*; Hinc, " LEVI FLEXU,
" postea cœpit, loco antiqui Anglo-saxo-
" nici AC, *Sed*, designare. Bute autem &
" Butan tandem deflecti possunt à Præp.
" Be, *circa*; vel Beon, *esse*, et ute vel utan,
" *foris.*"

Mr.

Mr. Tyrwhit in his Gloſſary ſays—" BUT. " prep. *Sax. Without.* Gloſſ. Urr.—I can- " not ſay that I have myſelf obſerved this " prepoſition in Chaucer, but I may have " overlooked it. The Saxons uſed it very " frequently; and how long the Scottiſh " writers have laid it aſide I am doubtful. " It occurs repeatedly in Bp. Douglas."

Knowing that no Engliſhman had yet laid this *prepoſition* aſide, I was curious to ſee how many ſentences Mr. Tyrwhit himſelf had written without the uſe of this prepoſition; and I confeſs I was a little diſappointed in not meeting with it till the fourth page of his preface: where he ſays—" Paſſages which have nothing to " recommend them to credit, BUT the ſin- " gle circumſtance of having been often " repeated."

So in Chaucer throughout—" Hys ſtudy " was BUT lytel on the Byble." But Mr. Tyrwhit was not aware that, in all ſuch inſtances, BUT is as much a *prepoſition*, as any in the language.

WITHOUT.

BUT (as diſtinguiſhed from *Bot*) and WITHOUT have both exactly the ſame meaning, that is, in modern Engliſh, neither more nor leſs than—*Be-out*.

And they were both originally uſed indifferently either as *Conjunctions* or *Prepoſitions*. But later writers having adopted the falſe notions and diſtinctions of language maintained by the Greek and Latin Grammarians, have ſucceſſively endeavoured to make the Engliſh Language conform more and more to the ſame rules. Accordingly

WITH-

WITHOUT, in approved modern ſpeech *, is now intirely confined to the Office of a *Prepoſition*; and BUT is generally though not always uſed as a *Conjunction*. In the ſame manner as *Niſi* and *Sine* in Latin are diſtributed; which do both likewiſe mean exactly the ſame, with no other difference than that, in the former the *negation precedes*, and in the other it *follows* the verb.

Skinner only ſays,—" WITHOUT, ab " A. S. wiðutan, *Extra*."

* It is however uſed as a *Conjunction* by Lord Mansfield in Horne's Trial, page 56.

" It cannot be read, WITHOUT the Attorney Ge- " neral conſents to it."

And yet, if this reverend Earl's authority may be ſafely quoted for any thing, it muſt be for *Words*. It is ſo unſound in matter of law, that it is frequently rejected even by himſelf.

S. Johnſon makes it a Prepoſition, an Adverb, and a Conjunction; and under the head of a Conjunction, ſays,—"WITH-"OUT, Conjunct. Unleſs; if not; Ex-"cept—*Not in uſe.*"

Its true derivation and meaning are the ſame as thoſe of BUT (from Butan.)

It is nothing but the Imperative þýþðutan, from the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic Verb þeoþðan, ΥΛΙΚΘΛΝ; which in the Anglo-ſaxon language is incorporated with the Verb Beon eſſe. And this will account to Mr. Tyrwhit for the remark which he has made, viz. that—"*By* and *With* "are often ſynonymous *."

AND.

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* "*Without* and *Within*. Butan and Binnan: ori-"ginally, I ſuppoſe, Bi utan and Bi innan. *By* and "*With* are often ſynonymous." Gloſſary.

AND.

M. Caſaubon ſuppoſes AND to be derived from the Greek εἶτα, poſtea.

Skinner ſays—" Neſcio an a Lat. *Addere* q. d. *Add*; interjectâ per Epentheſin " N, ut in *Render* a reddendo."

Lye ſuppoſes it to be derived from the Greek ἔτι, adhuc, præterea, etiam, quinetiam, inſuper.

I have already given the derivation which, I believe, will alone ſtand examination.

I ſhall only remark here, how eaſily men take upon truſt, how willingly they are ſatisfied with, and how confidently they repeat after others, falſe explanations of what they do not underſtand.—Conjunctions, it ſeems, are to have their denomi-

nation and definition from the uſe to which they are applied: *per accidens, eſſentiam.* Prepoſitions connect word; but—" the " Conjunction connects or joins together " ſentences; ſo as out of two to make one " ſentence. Thus—" *You and I and Pe-* " *ter, rode to London* *," is one ſentence " made up of three, &c."

Well! So far matters ſeem to go on very ſmoothly. It is,

" *You rode, I rode, Peter rode.*"

But let us now change the inſtance, and try ſome others, which are full as common,

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* " *Petrus et Paulus diſputant:* id eſt, *Petrus diſ-* " *putat et Paulus diſputat.*"
Sanctii Minerva, Lib. I. cap. XVIII.

So again, Lib. 3. cap. XIV. " *Cicero & filius valent.* " Figura Syllepſis eſt: ut, *valet Cicero, & valet filius.*" Which Perizonius ſufficiently confutes, by theſe inſtances—" Emi librum X drachmis & IV obolis." " Saulus & Paulus ſunt iidem."

mon, though not altogether ſo convenient.

Two AND *two are four.*
A B *and* B C *and* C A *form a Triangle.*
John AND *Jane are a handſome couple.*

Does A B form a triangle, B C form a triangle? &c.—Is John a couple? Is Jane a couple?—Are two four?

If the definition of a Conjunction is adhered to, I am afraid that AND, in ſuch inſtances, will appear to be no more a Conjunction, (that is a connecter of ſentences) than *Though* in the inſtance I have given under that word: or than *But*, in Mr. Locke's *ſecond* inſtance; or than *Elſe*, when called by S. Johnſon a *Pronoun*; or than *Since*, when uſed for *Sithence* or for *Syne*. In ſhort, I am afraid that the Grammarians will ſcarcely have an entire Conjunction left: for I apprehend that there

is not one of thoſe words which they call Conjunctions, which is not ſometimes uſed (and that very properly) without connecting ſentences.

LEST.

Junius only ſays—" LEST, *leaſt*, mini-
" mus. v. *little*." Under *Leaſt*, he ſays—
" LEAST, *leſt*, minimus. Contractum eſt
" ex ελαχιϛος. v. *little*, parvus." And under *little*, to which he refers us, there is nothing to the purpoſe.

Skinner ſays—" LEST, ab A. s. Læſ,
" *minus*, q. d. *quo minus hoc fiat*."

S. Johnſon ſays,—" LEST, Conj. (from
" the Adjective *Leaſt*) *That not*."

This laſt deduction is a curious one indeed; and it would puzzle as ſagacious a reaſoner

reaſoner as S. Johnſon to ſupply the middle ſteps to his concluſion from *Leaſt* (which always however means *ſome*) to "*That not*" (which means none at all. It ſeems as if, when he wrote this, he had already in his mind a preſſentiment of ſome future occaſion in which ſuch reaſoning would be convenient. As thus,—"The "Mother Country, the Seat of Govern- "ment, muſt neceſſarily enjoy the great- "eſt ſhare of dignity, power, rights, and "privileges: an united or aſſociated King- "dom muſt have in ſome degree a ſmaller "ſhare; and their Colonies the *leaſt* "ſhare;"—That is, (according to S. Johnſon *) *None of any kind.*

It

* Johnſon's merit ought not to be denied to him; but his Dictionary is the moſt imperfect and faulty, and the leaſt valuable of any of his productions; and that ſhare of merit which it poſſeſſes, makes it by ſo much the more hurtful. I rejoice however, that though the leaſt valuable, he found it the moſt profitable: for I could

It has been propoſed by no ſmall authority (Wallis followed by Lowth) to alter the ſpelling of LEST to *Leaſt*; and vice verſa. "Multi," ſays Wallis, "pro *Lèſt* "ſcribunt *Leaſt* (ut diſtinguatur a Con- "junctione

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could never read his preface without ſhedding a tear. And yet it muſt be confeſſed, that his *Grammar* and *Hiſtory* and Dictionary of what *he calls* the Engliſh language, are in all reſpects (except the bulk of the latter) moſt truly contemptible performances; and a reproach to the learning and induſtry of a nation, which could receive them with the ſlighteſt approbation.

Nearly one third of this Dictionary is as much the language of the Hottentots as of the Engliſh; and it would be no difficult matter ſo to tranſlate any one of the plaineſt and moſt popular numbers of the *Spectator* into the language of that Dictionary, that no mere Engliſhman, though well read in his own language, would be able to comprehend one ſentence of it.

It appears to be a work of labour, and yet is in truth one of the moſt idle performances ever offered to the public: compiled by an author who poſſeſſed not one ſingle requiſite for the undertaking, and (being a publication of a ſet of bookſellers) owing its ſucceſs to that very circumſtance which alone muſt make it impoſſible that it ſhould deſerve ſucceſs.

" junctione *Leſt*, *ne*, *ut non*:) Verum omnino contra analogiam Grammaticæ. " Mallem ego Adjectivum *leſt*, Conjunctionem *leaſt* ſcribere."

" The ſuperlative *Leaſt*, ſays Lowth, " ought rather to be written without the " A; as Dr. Wallis hath long ago obſerved. The Conjunction of the ſame " ſound might be written with the A, for " diſtinction."

S. Johnſon judiciouſly diſſents from this propoſal, but for no other reaſon, but becauſe he thinks " the profit is not worth " the change."

Now though they all concur in the ſame Etymology, I will venture to affirm that LEST, for *Leſed* (as *bleſt* for *bleſſed*, &c.) is nothing elſe but the participle paſt of Leran, dimittere; and, with the article

That

That (either expressed or understood) means no more than *hoc dimisso* or *quo dimisso* *.

And, if this explanation and etymology of LEST is right, (of which I have not the smallest doubt) it furnishes one caution more to learned Critics, not to innovate rashly: *Lest*, whilst they attempt to amend a language, as they imagine, in one trifling respect, they mar it in others of more importance; and by their corrupt alterations and amendments, confirm error; and make the truth more difficult to be discovered by those who come after.

Mr.

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* As LES the Imperative of Leran is sometimes used for UNLESS, as has been already shewn under the article *Unless*: so is the same imperative LES sometimes used instead of the participle LEST.

" I knew it was past four houris of day,
" And thocht I wald na langare ly in May;
" LES Phœbus suld me losingere attaynt."
G. Douglas, Prol. to the 12th book of Eneados.

Mr. Locke ſays, and it is agreed on all ſides, that—" it is in the right uſe of " theſe" (*Particles*) " that more particu- " larly conſiſts the clearneſs and beauty " of a good ſtyle:" and that, " theſe words, " which are *not truly by themſelves the names* " *of any ideas*, are of conſtant and indiſ- " penſible uſe in language; and do much " contribute to men's well expreſſing " themſelves."

Now this, I am perſuaded, would never have been ſaid, had theſe Particles been underſtood; for it proceeds from nothing but the difficulty of giving any rule or direction concerning their uſe; and that difficulty ariſes from a miſtaken ſuppoſition that they are not " *by themſelves the names* " *of any ideas:*" and in that caſe indeed I do not ſee how any rational rules concerning their uſe could poſſibly be given. But I flatter myſelf that henceforward, the

true force and nature of theſe words being clearly underſtood, the proper uſe of them will be ſo evident, that any rule concerning their uſe will be totally unneceſſary: as it would be thought abſurd to inform any one that when he means to direct *an addition*, he ſhould not uſe a word which directs *to take away*.

I am induced to mention this in this place, from the very improper manner in which LEST (more than any other conjunction) is often uſed by our beſt authors: thoſe who are moſt converſant with the learned languages being moſt likely to make the miſtake.—" *You make uſe of ſuch* " *indirect and crooked arts as theſe to blaſt* " *my reputation, and to poſſeſs men's minds* " *with diſaffection to my perſon*; LEST *per-* " *adventure, they might with ſome indiffe-* " *rence hear reaſon from me.*"

CILLINGWORTH's Preface to the Author of Charity maintained, &c.

Here

Here LEST is well uſed—" *You make* " *uſe of theſe arts:*"—Why? the reaſon follows,—Lered that i. e. *Hoc dimiſſo*— " *men might hear reaſon from me.*"——— Therefore,—" *you uſe theſe arts.*"

Inſtances of the improper uſe of LEST may be found in almoſt every author that ever wrote in our language; becauſe none of them have been aware of the true meaning of the word; and have been miſled by ſuppoſing it to be perfectly correſpondent to ſome conjunctions in other languages; which it is not.

Thus King Henry the Eighth, in *A neceſſary Doctrine*, &c. *ſixte petition*, ſays,— " *If we ſuffer the fyrſte ſuggeſtion unto ſynne* " *to tarry any whyle in our hartes, it is great* " *peryll* LEST *that conſent and dede wyll* " *folowe ſhortly after.*"

Thus *Aſcham*, in his *Scholemaſter*, ſays, —" *If a yong jentleman will venture him-* " *ſelfe into the companie of ruffians, it is* " *over great a jeopardie*, LEST *their facions,* " *maners, thoughts, taulke, and dedes will* " *verie ſone be over like.*"

Any tolerable judge of Engliſh will immediately perceive ſomething aukward and improper in theſe ſentences; though he cannot tell why. Yet the reaſon will be very plain to him, when he knows the meaning of theſe unmeaning particles (as they have been called:) for he will then ſee at once that LEST has no buſineſs in the ſentences; there being nothing *dimiſſo*, in conſequence of which ſomething elſe would follow: and that if he would employ LEST, the ſentences muſt be arranged otherwiſe.

As,——" *We muſt take heed that the* " *firſt ſuggeſtion unto ſin, tarry not any* " *while in our hearts*, LEST *that*, &c."

" *A*

" *A young gentleman ſhould be careful not* " *to venture himſelf*, &c. LEST, &c."

SINCE.

SINCE is a very corrupt abbreviation; confounding together different words and different combinations of words: and is therefore in modern Engliſh improperly made (like BUT) to ſerve purpoſes which no one word in any other language can anſwer; becauſe the ſame accidental corruptions, ariſing from ſimilarity of ſound, have not happened in the correſpondent words of any other language.

Where we now employ SINCE was formerly (according to its reſpective ſignification) uſed,

Sometimes,

1. Seoððan, Sioððan, Seððan, Siððan, Siððen, Sithen, Sithence, Sithens, Sithnes, Sithns:

Sometimes,

2. Syne, Sine, Sene, Sen, Syn, Sin:

Sometimes,

3. Seand, Seeing, Seeing that, Seeing as, Sens, Senſe, Sence.

Sometimes,

4. Siððe, Sið, Sithe, Sith, Seen that, Seen as, Sens, Senſe, Sence.

Accordingly SINCE in modern Engliſh, is uſed four ways. Two, as a prepoſition; connecting (or rather *affecting*) words: and Two, as a Conjunction; *affecting* ſentences.

When uſed as a prepoſition, it has always the ſignification either of the paſt participle *Seen* joined to *thence*, (that is, *ſeen and thenceforward:*)—or elſe it has the

the ſignification of the paſt Participle *ſeen* only.

When uſed as a Conjunction, it has ſometimes the ſignification of the preſent participle *Seeing*, or *Seeing that*; and ſometimes the ſignification of the paſt participle *Seen*, or *Seen that*.

As a Prepoſition,

1. SINCE (for Siððan, Sithence, or Seen, *and thenceforward*) as,

" *Such a ſyſtem of Government, as the* " *preſent, has not been ventured on by any* " *King* SINCE *the expulſion of James the* " *Second.*"

2. SINCE (for Syne, Sene, or Seen) as,

" *Did George the Third reign before or* " SINCE *that example?*"

As a Conjunction,

3. SINCE (for Seanꝺ, Seeing, Seeing as, or Seeing that:) as,

" *If I ſhould labour for any other ſatis-*
" *faction, but that of my own mind, it*
" *would be an Effect of phrenzy in me, not*
" *of hope*; SINCE *it is not Truth, but Opi-*
" *nion that can travel the world without a*
" *paſſport.*"

4. SINCE (for Siꝺꝺe, Sith, Seen as, or Seen that); as,

" SINCE *Death in the end takes from all,*
" *whatſoever Fortune or Force takes from*
" *any one; it were a fooliſh madneſs in the*
" *ſhipwreck of worldly things, where all*
" *ſinks but the ſorrow, to ſave that.*"

Junius ſays,—" SINCE *that Time*, ex-
" inde. Contractum eſt ex Angl. *Sith*
thence,

" *thence*, q. d. ſerò poſt: ut *Sith* illud
" originem traxerit ex illo ſeiþn, Serò;
" Quod habet Arg. Cod."

Skinner ſays,—" SINCE, a Teut. Sínt
" Belg. Sínd. Poſt, Poſtea, Poſtquam.
" Doct. Th. H. putat deflexum à noſtro
" *Sithence*. Non abſurdum etiam eſſet
" declinare à Lat. *Exhinc*, E & H abjectis,
" & x facillimâ mutatione in s tranſeunte."
Again he ſays,—" SITH ab A. S. Siððan,
" Syððan. Belg. Sedd, Sínt. Poſt, Poſt
" illa, Poſtea."

After the explanation I have given, I ſuppoſe it unneceſſary to point out the particular errors of the above derivations.

Sithence and *Sith*, though now obſolete, continued in good uſe down even to the time of the Stuarts.

Hooker in his writings uſes *Sithence*, *Sith*, *Seeing*, and *Since*. The two former he always properly diſtinguiſhes; uſing *Sithence* for the true import of the Anglo-ſaxon Siððan, and *Sith* for the true import of the Anglo-ſaxon Siðe. Which is the more extraordinary, becauſe authors of the firſt credit had very long before Hooker's time confounded them together; and thereby led the way for the preſent indiſcriminate and corrupt uſe of SINCE in all the four caſes mentioned.

Seeing Hooker uſes ſometimes, perhaps, (for it will admit a doubt) improperly. And SINCE (according to the corrupt cuſtom which has now univerſally prevailed in the language) he uſes indifferently either for *Sithence*, *Seen*, *Seeing*, or *Sith*.

THAT.

THAT.

There is ſomething ſo very ſingular in the uſe of this Conjunction, as it is called, that one ſhould think it would alone, if attended to, have been ſufficient to lead the Grammarians to a knowledge of moſt of the other conjunctions, as well as of itſelf. The uſe I mean is, that the conjunction THAT generally makes a part of, and keeps company with moſt of the other conjunctions.—*If that*, *An that*, *Unleſs that*, *Though that*, *But that*, *Without that*, *Leſt that*, *Since that*, *Save that*, *Except that*, &c. is the conſtruction of moſt of the ſentences where any of thoſe conjunctions are uſed.

Is it not an obvious queſtion then, to aſk, why this conjunction alone ſhould be ſo peculiarly diſtinguiſhed from all the reſt of the ſame family? And why this alone

alone ſhould be able to connect itſelf with, and indeed be uſually neceſſary to almoſt all the others? So neceſſary, that even when it is compounded with another conjunction, and drawn into it ſo as to become one word, (as it is with *ſith* and *ſince*) we are ſtill forced to employ again this neceſſary index, in order to precede, and ſo point out the ſentence which is to be affected by the other Conjunction?

B.

Ðe, in the Anglo-ſaxon, meaning THAT, I can eaſily perceive that SITH (which is no other than the Anglo-ſaxon siððe) includes THAT. But when SINCE is (as you here conſider it) a corruption for *Seeing-as* and *Seen-as*; how does it then include THAT?—In ſhort what is AS? For I can gather no more from the Etymologiſts concerning it, than that it is derived either

either from ὡς or from ALS *: But ſtill this explains nothing: for what ὡς is, or ALS, remains likewiſe a ſecret.

H.

The truth is that AS is alſo an article; and (however and whenever uſed in Engliſh) means the ſame as *It*, or *That*, or *Which*. In the German, where it ſtill *evidently* retains its original ſignification and uſe, (as so † alſo does) it is written —*Es*.

It

* Junius ſays,—" As, *ut*, *ſicut*, Græcis eſt ὡς." Skinner, whom S. Johnſon follows, ſays—" AS a " Teut. *Als*, ſicut; eliſo ſcil. propter euphoniam in- " termedio L."

† The German so and the Engliſh so (though in one language it is called an *Adverb* or *Conjunction*; and in the other, an *Article* or *Pronoun*) are yet both of them derived from the Gothic article SA, SO. And have in *both* languages retained the original meaning, viz. *It*, or *That*.

Mr.

It does not come from *Als*; any more than *Though*, and *Be-it*, and *If* (or *Gif*), &c.

Mr. Tyrwhit indeed (not perceiving that *Al-es* and *Al-so* are different compounds) in a note on the Canterbury Tales, V. 7327. says—" Our AS is the same " with *Als*. Teut. and Sax. It is only a further cor- " ruption of *Also*." But the *etymological* opinions of Mr. Tyrwhit (who derives *For the Nones* from *Pro nunc*) merit not the smallest attention.

Dr. Lowth, amongst *some* false English which he has recommended, and *much* good English which he has reprobated, says—" SO—AS, was used by the " writers of the last century, to express a consequence, " instead of SO—THAT. Swift, I believe, is the last " of our good writers who has frequently used this " manner of expression. It seems *improper*, and is " *deservedly* grown obsolete."

But Dr. Lowth, when he undertook to write his *Introduction*, with the best intention in the world, most assuredly sinned against his better judgment. For he begins most judiciously, thus,—" Universal Grammar " explains the principles which are common to *All* " languages. The Grammar of any particular lan- " guage *applies* those common principles to that par- " ticular language." And yet, with this clear truth before his eyes, he boldly proceeds to give a *particular*

 grammar;

&c. come from *Although*, and *Albeit*, and *Algif*, &c.—For *Als*, in our old English is

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grammar; without being himself possessed of one single principle of *Universal* Grammar. Again, he says,—"The connective parts of sentences are the most important of all, and require the greatest care and attention: for it is by these chiefly that the train of thought, the course of reasoning, and the whole progress of the mind, in continued discourse of all kinds, is laid open; and on the right use of these, the perspicuity, that is the first and greatest beauty of style, principally depends. Relatives and Conjunctions are the instruments of connection in discourse: it may be of use to point out some of the most common inaccuracies that writers are apt to fall into with respect to them; and a few examples of faults may perhaps be more instructive, than any rules of propriety that can be given."

And again,—"I have been the more particular in noting the proper uses of these conjunctions, because they occur very frequently; and, as it was observed before of connective words in general, are of great importance with respect to the clearness and beauty of style. I may add too, because mistakes in the use of them are very common."

After which he proceeds to his examples of the proper and improper use of these connectives;—without having

is a contraction of *Al*, and *es* or *as*: and this *Al* (which in comparisons used to be very properly employed before the first *es* or *as*, but was not employed before the second) we now, in modern English, suppress: As we have also done in numberless other instances; where *All* (though not improper) is not necessary.

Thus,

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having the most distant notion of the *meaning* of the words whose *employment* he undertakes to settle. The consequence was unavoidable: that, (having no *reasonable* rule to go by, and no apparent *signification* to direct him) he was compelled to trust to his own *fanciful* taste (*as in the best it is*), and the uncertain authority of others: and has consequently approved and condemned without truth or reason. "Pourquoi (says "Girard) apres tant de siecles & tant d'ouvrages, les "gens de Lettres ont-ils encore des idées si informes "& des expressions si confuses, sur ce qu'ils font pro-"fession d'etudier & de traiter? Ou s'ils ne veulent "pas prendre la peine d'approfondir la matiere, com-"ment osent-ils en donner des leçons au public? "C'est ce que je ne conçois pas."

Thus,

" She glides away under the foamy ſeas
" As ſwift AS Darts or feather'd arrows fly."

That is,

" She glides away (with) THAT ſwiftneſs, (with)
" WHICH feather'd arrows fly."

When in old Engliſh it is written,

" She———————
" Glidis away under the fomy Seis
" ALS ſwift as Ganze or fedderit arrow fleis."

Then it means,

" With ALL THAT ſwiftneſs *with* WHICH, &c."

After what I have ſaid, you will ſee plainly why ſo many of the conjunctions may be uſed almoſt indifferently (or with a very little turn of expreſſion) for each other. And without my entering into the particular minutiæ in the uſe of each, you

you will eaſily account for the ſlight differences in the turn of expreſſion, ariſing from different cuſtomary abbreviations of *conſtruction*.

I will only give you one inſtance, and leave it with you for your entertainment: from which you will draw a variety of arguments and concluſions.

"And ſoft he ſighed, LEST men might him hear."
And ſoft he ſigh'd, THAT men might NOT him hear.
And ſoft he ſighed, ELSE men might him hear.
UNLESS he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
BUT that he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
WITHOUT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
SAVE that he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
EXCEPT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
OUTCEPT he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
OUT-TAKE he ſighed ſoft, men might him hear.
IF that he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
And AN he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
SET that he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
PUT CASE he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.
BE IT he ſigh'd NOT ſoft, men might him hear.

B.

B.

According to your account then, Lord Monboddo is extremely unfortunate in the particular care he has taken to make an exception from the general rule he lays down, of the Verbs being the *Parent* word of all language, and to caution the *candid* reader from imputing to him an opinion that the *conjunctions* were intended by him to be included in his rule, or have any connexion whatever with *Verbs* *.

H.

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* "This ſo copious derivation from the verb in "Greek, naturally leads one to ſuſpect that it is the "*Parent* word of the whole language: and indeed I "believe that to be the fact: for I do not know that "it can be certainly ſhewn that there is any word that "is undoubtedly a primitive, which is not a *verb*; I "mean a *verb* in the ſtricter ſenſe and common ac-"ceptation of the word. By this the candid reader "will not underſtand that I mean to ſay that *prepoſi-"tions*, *conjunctions*, and ſuch like words, which are "rather the *Pegs* and *Nails* that faſten the ſeveral parts "of the language together than the language itſelf,

H.

In my opinion he is not leſs unfortunate in his *rule* than in his *exception*. They are both equally unfounded: and yet as well founded, as almoſt every other poſition which he has laid down in his two firſt volumes. The whole of which is perfectly worthy of that profound politician and philoſopher, who eſteems that to be the moſt perfect form, and as he calls it— "*the laſt ſtage of civil ſociety* *," where govern-

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" are derived from verbs or are derivatives of any " kind." Vol. II. Part 2. B. 1. Ch. 15.

Court de Gebelin is as poſitive in the contrary opinion,—" Il a fallu neceſſairement," (ſays he,) " que " tous les autres mots vinſſent des noms. Il n'eſt " aucun mot, de quelqu' eſpece que ce ſoit, & " dans quelque langue que ce ſoit, qui ne deſcende " d'un nom."——Hiſt. de la Parole, page 180.

* " But the *private* lives of the ſubjects under thoſe " governments are left as much to the free will of each " individual, and as little ſubjected to rule, as in the " American

government leaves nothing to the free-will of individuals; but interferes with the domeſtic private lives of the citizens, and the education of their children! Such would in truth be the *laſt* ſtage of civil ſociety, in the ſenſe of the lady in the comedy; whoſe lover having offered—" to give her the *laſt* " proof of love and marry her."—She aptly replied, " The *laſt* indeed; for there's " an end of loving."

U 2 B.

" American Governments above mentioned: and every " man in ſuch a ſtate may with impunity educate his " children in the worſt manner poſſible; and may " abuſe his own perſon and fortune as much as he " pleaſes; provided he does no injury to his neigh- " bours, nor attempts any thing againſt the ſtate. " The *laſt* ſtage of civil ſociety, in which the pro- " greſſion ends, is that moſt perfect form of polity " which, to all the advantages of the Governments " laſt mentioned, joins the care of the education of " the youth, and of the private lives of the citizens; " neither of which is left to the will and pleaſure of " each individual; but both are regulated by PUBLIC " WISDOM."——Vol. I. page 243.

B.

But what ſay you to the bitter irony with which Mr. Harris treats the moderns in the concluding note to his doctrine of Conjunctions? Where he ſays,—" It is " ſomewhat ſurpriſing that the politeſt and " moſt elegant of the Attic writers, and " Plato above all the reſt, ſhould have their " works filled with *Particles* of all kinds " and with *Conjunctions* in particular; while " in the modern polite works, as well of " ourſelves as of our neighbours, ſcarce " ſuch a word as a *Particle* or *Conjunction* " is to be found. Is it that where there " is connection in the meaning, there " muſt be words had to connect; but " that where the connection is little or " none, ſuch connectives are of little uſe? " That houſes of cards without *cement* " may well anſwer their end; but not " thoſe houſes where one would chuſe to " dwell? Is this the cauſe? Or have we

" attained

" attained an elegance to the antients un-
" known ?

" *Venimus ad ſummam fortunæ*, &c."

What will you ſay to Lord Monboddo, who holds the ſame opinion with Mr. Harris * ?

H.

I ſay that a little more reflection and a great deal leſs reading, a little more at-

* " This abundance of Conjunctions and Particles," (ſays he, Vol: II. page 179) " is, in my opinion, one " of the greateſt beauties of the Greek language, &c. " For I am ſo far from thinking that that disjointed " compoſition and ſhort cut of ſtyle, which is ſo much " in faſhion at preſent, and of which Tacitus among " the ancients is the great model, is a beauty: that I " am of opinion it is the affectation of a deformity; " nor is there, in my apprehenſion, any thing that more " disfigures a ſtyle, or makes it more offenſive *to a man* " *of true Taſte and Judgement in writing*, &c."

" I ſhall only add at preſent, that one of the greateſt " difficulties of compoſing in Engliſh appears to me to " be the *want* of ſuch connecting particles as the " Greeks have, &c."

tention to common ſenſe *, and leſs blind prejudice for his Greek commentators, would have made Mr. Harris a much better Grammarian, if not perhaps a Philoſopher.—What a ſtrange language is this to come from a man, who at the ſame time ſuppoſes theſe *Particles* and *Conjunctions* to be words *without meaning!* It ſhould ſeem, by this inſolent pleaſantry, that Mr. Harris reckons it the perfection of compoſition and diſcourſe to uſe a great many words *without meaning!*—If ſo, perhaps Maſter Slender's language would meet with this learned Gentleman's approbation.

" I keep *but* three men *and* a boy *yet*,
" *till* my mother be dead; *but what though*
" *yet* I live a poor gentleman born."

Now

* The author would by no means be underſtood to allude to the COMMON SENSE of Doctors Oſwald, Reid, and Beattie; which appears to him to be ſheer nonſenſe.

Now here is *cement* enough in proportion to the building. It is plain, however, that Shakeſpeare (a much better philoſopher by the bye than moſt of thoſe who have writen philoſophical Treatiſes) was of a different opinion in this matter from Mr. Harris. He thought the beſt way to make his Zany talk unconnectedly and nonſenſically was to give him a quantity of theſe elegant words *without meaning* which are ſuch favourites with Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo.

B.

This may be raillery perhaps, but I am ſure it is neither reaſoning nor authority. This inſtance does not affect Mr. Harris: for *All cement* is no more fit to make a firm building than no cement at all. Slender's diſcourſe might have been made equally as unconnected without any particles, as with ſo many particles together. It is the pro-

per mixture of particles and other words which Mr. Harris would recommend; and he only cenſures the moderns for being too ſparing of Particles.

H.

Reaſoning! It diſdains to be employed about ſuch conceited nonſenſe, ſuch affected airs of ſuperiority and pretended *elegance*. Eſpecially when the whole foundation is falſe: for there are not any uſeful connectives in the Greek, which are not to be found in modern languages. But for his opinion concerning their employment, you ſhall have *authority*, if you pleaſe; Mr. Harris's favourite authority: an Antient, a Greek, and one too writing profeſſedly on Plato's opinions, and in defence of Plato; and which if Mr. Harris had not forgotten, I am perſuaded, he would not have contradicted.

Plutarch

Plutarch ſays—" Il n'y a ny Beſte, ny " inſtrument, ny armeure, ny autre choſe " quelle qu'elle ſoit au monde, qui par " ablation ou privation d'une ſiene propre " partie, ſoit plus belle, plus active, ne " plus doulce que paravant elle n'eſtoit; " là où l'oraiſon bien ſouvent, en eſtans " les *conjonctions toutes oſtées*, a une force & " efficace plus affectueuſe, plus active, & " plus eſmouvante. C'eſt pourquoy ceulx " qui eſcrivent des figures de Retorique " louent & priſent grandement celle qu'ils " appellent deliée; là où ceulx qui ſont " trop religieux & qui s' aſſubjettiſſent " trop aux regles de la grammaire, ſans " ozer oſter une ſeule conjonction de la " commune façon de parler, en ſont à " bon droit blaſmez & repris; comme " faiſans un ſtile enervé, ſans aucune " pointe d'affection, & qui laſſe & donne " peine à ouir," &c. *

I will

* Platonic Queſtions. Amyot's Tranſlation.

I will give you another authority, which perhaps Mr. Harris may value more, because I value it much less.

" Il n'y a rien encore qui donne plus " de mouvement au discours que d'en *ôter* " *les liaisons*. En effet, un discours que " rien ne lie & n'embarasse, marche & " coule de soy-même, & il s'en faut peu " qu'il n'aille quelquefois plus vite que la " pensée même de l'orateur." Longinus then gives three examples, from Xenophon, Homer, and Demosthenes; and concludes—" En egalant & applanissant " toutes choses par le moyen de *liaisons*, " vous verrez que d'un pathetique fort & " violent vous tomberez dans une petite " affeterie de langage qui n'aura ni pointe " ni eguillon; & que toute la force de " votre discours s'eteindra aussi-tost d'elle-" mesme. Et comme il est certain, que si " on lioit le corps d'un homme qui court,

" on lui feroit perdre toute ſa force ; de
" même ſi vous allez embarraſſer une paſ-
" ſion de ces *liaiſons* & de ces *particules in-*
" *utiles*, elle les ſouffre avec peine ; vous
" lui otez la liberté de ſa courſe, & cette
" impetuoſité qui la faiſoit marcher avec
" la meſme violence qu' un trait lancé par
" une machine *."

Take one more authority, better than either of the foregoing on this ſubject.

" Partes orationis ſimiles nexu indigent,
" ut inter ſe uniantur ; & iſte vocatur
" *Conjunctio*, quæ definitur *vocula inde-*
" *clinabilis quæ partes orationis colligit.*
" Alii eam ſubintelligi malint, alii ex-
" preſsè & moleſtè repetunt : illud, qui
" attentiores ſunt rebus ; hoc, qui rigo-
" roſius loquntur. Omittere ferè omnes
" con-

* Boileau's tranſlation.

" conjunctiones Hiſpanorum aut vitium
" aut character eſt. Plurimæ deſiderantur
" in Lucano, plurimæ in Seneca, multæ
" in aliis authoribus. Multas omitto;
" &, ſi meum genium ſequerer, ferè om-
" nes. Qui rem intelligit & argumentum
" penetrat, percipit ſibi ipſis cohærere
" ſententias, nec egere particulis ut con-
" nectantur: quod, ſi interſerantur vo-
" culæ connexivæ, ſcopæ diſſolutæ illæ
" ſunt; nec additis & multiplicatis con-
" junctionibus cohærere poterunt. Hinc
" patet quid debuiſſet reſponderi Caligulæ,
" Senecæ calamum vilipendenti. *Sueto-*
" *nius: Lenius comptiuſque ſcribendi genus*
" *adeò contempſit, ut Senecam, tum maxime*
" *placentem, commiſſiones meras componere,*
" & ARENAM SINE CALCE, *diceret.*"—
" Caligulæ hoc judicium eſt, inquit Lip-
" ſius in judicio de Seneca; nempe illius
" qui cogitavit etiam de Homeri carmi-
" nibus abolendis, itemque Virgilii &

" Titi

" Titi Livii ſcriptis ex omnibus bibliothe-
" cis amovendis. Reſpondeo igitur meum
" Senecam *non vulgo nec plebi ſcripſiſſe,*
" *nec omni viro docto, ſed illi qui attentè*
" *eum legeret. Et addo, ubi Lector mente*
" *Senecam ſequitur, ſenſum adſequi: nec*
" *inter ſententias, ſuo ſe prementes & con-*
" *ſolidantes pondere, conjunctionem majorem*
" *requiri.*"

CARAMUEL, cxlii.

And I hope theſe *authorities* (for I will offer no *argument* to a writer of his caſt) will ſatisfy the " *true taſte and judgment in* " *writing*" of Lord Monboddo; who with equal affectation and vanity has followed Mr. Harris in this particular: and who, though incapable of writing a ſentence of common Engliſh, (*defuerunt enim illi & uſus pro duce & ratio pro ſuaſore*) ſincerely deplores the *decreaſe of learning in England*;

land * ; whilſt he really imagines that there is ſomething captivating in his own ſtyle, and has gratefully informed us to whoſe aſſiſtance we owe the obligation.

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* See Mr. Boſwell's Tour to the Hebrides, p. 473.

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. IX.

Of PREPOSITIONS.

B.

WELL, Sir, what you have hitherto ſaid of the Conjunctions will deſerve to be well conſidered. But we have not yet intirely done with them: for, you know, the Prepoſitions were originally, and for a long time, claſſed with the Conjunctions: and when firſt ſeparated from them, were only diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Prepoſitive Conjunctions*.

H.

Very true, Sir. And these *Prepositive* conjunctions, once separated from the others, soon gave birth to another subdivision*; and Grammarians were not ashamed to have a class of *Postpositive Prepositives*.— "Dantur etiam *Postpositiones* (says Caramuel); quæ *Præpositiones postpositivæ* solent dici, nullâ vocabulorum repugnantiâ: vocantur enim *Præpositiones*, quia sensu saltem præponuntur; & *Postpositivæ*, quia vocaliter postponi debent."

B.

But as Mr. Harris still ranks them with *Connectives*, this, I think, will be the proper place for their investigation. And as the title of *Prepositive* or *Preposition* "*only* "*expresses their place and not their charac-*

"*ter*;

* Buonmattei has still a farther subdivision; and has made a separate part of speech of the *Segnacasi*.

" *ter; their Definition, he ſays, will diſtin-*
" *guiſh them from the former Connectives.*"
He therefore proceeds to give a *compleat* definition of them, viz.

—" *A Prepoſition is a part of ſpeech, de-*
" *void itſelf of ſignification; but ſo formed*
" *as to unite two words that are ſignificant,*
" *and that refuſe to coaleſce or unite of them-*
" *ſelves.*"—Now I am curious to know, whether you will agree with Mr. Harris in his definition of this part of Speech; or whether you are determined to differ from him on every point.

H.

Till he agrees with himſelf, I think you ſhould not diſapprove of my differing from him; becauſe for this at leaſt I have his own reſpectable authority. Having defined a word to be a " *Sound ſignificant;*" he now defines a Prepoſition to be a word

" *devoid of ſignification.*" And a few pages after, he ſays, " *Prepoſitions commonly tranſ-* " *fuſe ſomething of their own meaning into* " *the word with which they are compounded.*"

Now, if I agree with him that words are ſounds *ſignificant*; how can I agree that there are ſorts of words *devoid of ſignification?* And if I could ſuppoſe that Prepoſitions are *devoid of ſignification*; how could I afterwards allow that they transfuſe ſomething of *their own meaning?*

B.

This is the ſame objection repeated, which you made before to his definition of the *firſt* ſort of Connectives. But is it not otherwiſe a compleat definition?

H.

Mr. Harris no doubt intended it as ſuch: for, in a note on this paſſage, he endeavours

vours to juſtify his doctrine by a citation from Apollonius *; which he calls "ra-" ther a deſcriptive ſketch than a complete " definition." But what he gives us in the place of it, as *compleat*, is neither definition nor even deſcription. It contains a *Negation* and an *Accident*; and nothing more. It tells us what the Prepoſition *is not*; and the *purpoſe* for which he ſuppoſes it to be *employed*. It might ſerve as well for a definition of the *Eaſt India Company*, as of a Prepoſition: for of that we may truly ſay—" It is not itſelf any part of the " Government, but ſo formed as to unite " thoſe who would not have coaleſced of

* " Apollonius (ſays Mr. Harris) one of the earli-" eſt and *moſt acute* of the old grammarians."

Hermes, Book 2. *Chap.* 1.

" That *vain Sophiſt* Apollonius (ſays Sir William " Temple) who was *but an Ape* of the antient philo-" ſophers."

Of antient and modern Learning.

" themſelves."—Poor Scaliger (who well knew what a definition ſhould be) from his own melancholy experience exclaimed —" *Nihil infelicius grammatico definitore !*" Mr. Harris's logical ignorance moſt happily deprived him of a ſenſe of his misfortunes. And ſo little, good man, did he dream of the danger of his ſituation; that whilſt all others were acknowledging their ſucceſsleſs though indefatigable labours, and lamenting their inſuperable difficulties, he prefaces his doctrine of *Connectives* with this ſingularly confident introduction; —" What remains of our work is a mat-
" ter of leſs difficulty; it being the ſame
" here as in ſome hiſtorical picture: when
" the principal figures are once formed, it
" is an *eaſy labour* to deſign the reſt *."

B.

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* Such is the language, and ſuch are the definitions of him who, in this very chapter of the prepoſitions, " has modeſtly given us the following note.—" And " here

B.

However contradictory and irregular all this may appear to you, Mr. Harris has advanced nothing more than what the moſt

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" here I cannot but obſerve, that he who pretends to " diſcuſs the ſentiments of any one of theſe philoſo- " phers, or even to cite and tranſlate him (except in " trite and obvious ſentences) without accurately " knowing the Greek tongue in general; the nice " differences of many words apparently ſynonymous; " the peculiar ſtyle of the author whom he preſumes " to handle; the new coined words, and new ſignifi- " cations given to old words uſed by ſuch author and " his ſect; the whole philoſophy of ſuch ſect, together " with the connections and dependencies of its ſeveral " parts, whether *logical*, ethical or phyſical;—He, *I* " *ſay*, that without this previous preparation, attempts " *what I have ſaid*, will ſhoot in the dark; will be " liable to perpetual blunders; will explain and praiſe, " and cenſure merely by chance; and though he may " poſſibly to *fools* appear as a wiſe man, will certainly " among the wiſe ever paſs for a *fool*. Such a man's " intellect comprehends antient philoſophy, as his eye " comprehends a diſtant proſpect. He may ſee, per- " haps, enough to know mountains from plains, and " ſeas from woods; but for an accurate diſcernment " of particulars and their character, this, without far- " ther helps, it is impoſſible to attain."

approved Greek and Latin Grammarians have delivered down to him, and what modern Grammarians and Philoſophers have adopted *.

H.

Yes. Yes. I know the errors are ancient enough, to have been long ago worn out and diſcarded. But I do not think that any excuſe for repeating them. For a much leſs degree of underſtanding is neceſſary to detect the erroneous principles of

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* "Præpoſitio ſeu adnomen, *per ſe non ſignificat*, "niſi addatur nominibus."——Campanella.

"Multas & varias hujus partis orationis definitiones "invenio. Et præ cæteris arridet hæc.—Præpoſitio "eſt vocula: modum quendam nominis *adſignificans*."
Caramuel.

"Ut omittam Particulas minores, cujuſmodi ſunt "Præpoſitiones, Conjunctiones, Interjectiones, quæ "*nullam habent cum nominibus affinitatem*."
J. C. Scaliger. de L. L. Cap. CXCII.

of others, than to guard againſt thoſe which may be ſtarted for the firſt time by our own imagination. In theſe matters it ſhews leſs weakneſs of judgment, becauſe it is more eaſy to deceive ourſelves, than to be deceived by others.

B.

You will do well, Sir, to be particularly mindful of what you ſaid laſt; and to place your ſtrongeſt guard there, where it may be moſt wanted: for you ſeem ſufficiently determined not to be deceived by *others*. And with this caution, I ſhall be glad to hear your account of the Prepoſition. Perhaps I ſhall ſave time, at leaſt I ſhall ſooner ſatisfy myſelf, by aſking you a few queſtions.—Pray how many Prepoſitions are there?

H.

Taking the Philoſophy of language as it now ſtands, your queſtion is a very pro-

per one. And yet you know, that Authors have never hitherto been agreed concerning their number. The ancient Greek Grammarians admitted only eighteen, (ſix monoſyllables and twelve diſſylables). The ancient Latin Grammarians above fifty *. Though the moderns, Sanctius, Scioppius, Perizonius, Voſſius, and others, have endeavoured to leſſen the number without fixing it †.

Our countryman Wilkins thinks that thirty-ſix are ſufficient ‡.

Girard

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* Scotus determines them to be forty-nine.

† Sanctius ſays,——" Ex numero Præpoſitionum, " quas Grammatici pertinaciter aſſerunt; aliquas ſuſ- " tulimus."

‡ " There are thirty-ſix Prepoſitions which may, with " much leſs equivocalneſs than is found in inſtituted " languages, *ſuffice* to expreſs thoſe various reſpects " which are to be ſignified by this kind of Particle."

Part 3. Chap. 3.

Girard ſays, that the French language has done the buſineſs effectually with thirty-two: and that he could not, with the utmoſt attention, diſcover any more *.

But the authors of the Encyclopedie [*Prepoſition*] though they alſo, as well as Girard, admit only *ſimple* Prepoſitions, have found in the ſame language, forty-eight.

And

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* "Quoique les rapports determinatifs qu'on peut "mettre entre les choſes ſoient variés & nombreux; "le langage François a trouvé l'art d'en faire enoncer "la multitude & la diverſité des nuances, par un petit "nombre de mots: car l'examen du detail fait avec "*toute l'attention dont je ſuis capable*, ne m'en offre que "trente deux de cette eſpéce.—Il m'a paru que les "dictionaires confondent quelquefois des Adverbes & "même des Conjonctions avec des Prepoſitions.— "Je ne me ſuis jamais permis de ne rien avancer ſans "avoir fait un *examen profond & rigoreux*; me ſervant "toujours de l'analyſe & des regles de la plus exacte "Logique pour reſoudre mes doutes, & tacher de "prendre la parti le plus vrai. *Je ne diſſimulerai pour-* "*tant pas, que mes ſcrupules ont été frequents:* mais ma "diſcuſſion a été attentive, & mon travail opiniatre."

Vrais Principas, Diſc. XI.

And Buffier gives a liſt of ſeventy-five; and declares that there is a great number beſides, which he has not mentioned.

The greater part of authors have not ventured even to talk of any particular number: and of thoſe who have, (except in the Greek) no two authors have agreed in the ſame language. Nor has any one author attributed the ſame number to any two different languages.

Now this diſcordance has by no means proceeded from any careleſſneſs or want of diligence in Grammatiſts or Lexicographers; but the truth is, that the fault lies with the Philoſophers: for though they have pretended to teach others, they have none of them known themſelves what the nature of a Prepoſition is. And how is it poſſible that Grammarians ſhould agree, what words ought or ought not to be referred

ferred to a claſs which was not itſelf aſcertained. Yet had any of the definitions or accounts yet given of the Prepoſition and of language been juſt, two conſequences would immediately have followed; viz. That all men would have certainly known the preciſe number of Prepoſitions; and (unleſs Things, or the operations of the human mind, were different in different ages and climates) their number in all languages muſt have been always the ſame.

B.

You mean then now at laſt, I ſuppoſe, to fix the number of real Prepoſitions in our own, and therefore in all other languages.

H.

Very far from it. I mean on the contrary to account for their variety. And I will venture to lay it down as a rule, that, of different languages, the leaſt corrupt

rupt will have the feweſt Prepoſitions: and, in the ſame language, the beſt etymologiſts will acknowledge the feweſt. And (if you are not already aware of it) I hope the reaſon of the rule will appear in the ſequel.

There is not, for inſtance, (as far as I am aware) a prepoſition in any language, anſwering directly to the French prepoſition CHEZ *. Yet does it by no means follow,

* In the ſame manner *Temoin* and *Moyennant* are prepoſitions peculiar alſo to the French, but which require no explanation: becauſe the *Subſtantive* Temoin, and the *Participle* Moyennant, are not confined to their *prepoſitive* employment alone (or, as in the Latin it is termed, put *abſolutely*), but are uſed upon all other common occaſions where thoſe denominations are wanted; and their ſignification is therefore evident. MOIENING was antiently uſed in Engliſh.——" At " whoſe inſtigacion and ſtiring I (Robert Copland) " have me applied, *Moiening* the helpe of God, to " reduce and tranſlate it." (See *Percy's Reliques*, Vol. II. p. 273.) Had the uſe of this word continued in

follow, that the modern French do therefore employ any operation of the mind, or put their minds into any poſture different from their anceſtors or from other nations; but only that there happens not to be in any other language a ſimilar corruption of ſome word correſponding preciſely with CHEZ. Which is merely a corruption of the Italian ſubſtantive CASA *: in

in our language, it would certainly have been ranked amongſt the prepoſitions; and we ſhould conſequently have been conſidered as exerting one *operation of the mind* more than we do at preſent.

* Though the bulk of the French language is manifeſtly a corrupt derivation from the Italian, yet, as Scaliger obſerved of the Romans——"Aliqui autem, inter quos Varro, etiam malignè eruerunt omnia è Latinis, Græciſque ſuas origines invidere:" So have the French, in all former times, ſhewn a narrow jealouſy and envy towards Italy, its authors, and language: to which however they originally owe every thing valuable which they poſſeſs. From this ſpirit Henri Eſtiene, *De la precellence du langage François*, (a book of ill-founded vanity, blind prejudice and partiality)

in the ſame manner as *Choſe* is from *Coſa*; or as *Cheval*, *chemiſe*, *chemin*, *chetif*, *chevreuil*,

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partiality) aſſerts that the Italians have taken——" la " bande des mots qu'on appelle *indeclinables*; comme " ſont *Adverbes*, *Conjonctions*, & *autres particules*" from the French: and amongſt others he mentions, *ſe*, *ſe non*, *che*, *ma*, and *Senza*. But I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to ſhew clearly the injuſtice of Henry Eſtiene to the Italian language, when I come to compare the reſpective advantages and diſadvantages of the modern languages of Europe, and whence they flow. In the mean time it may not perhaps be improper to offer a general rule, by which (when applicable) all etymological diſputants ought to be determined, whether ſuch determination be favourable or adverſe to their national vanity and prejudice. Viz. That where different languages uſe the ſame or a ſimilar *particle*, that language ought to be conſidered as its legitimate parent, in which the true meaning of the word can be found, and where its uſe is as common and familiar as that of any other verbs and ſubſtantives.

A more modern author (and therefore leſs excuſable) Bergier, *Elemens primitifs des langues*, having firſt abſurdly imagined what is contradicted by all experience, viz.——" A meſure que les langues ſe ſont eloignées " de leur ſource primitive, les mots ont reçu de " nouveaux accroiſsements: plus elles ont eté cultivées " plus

reuil, *cher*, *chenu*, *chien*, *toucher*, &c. are corrupted from *Cavallo*, *camiſcia*, *camino*, *cattivo*,

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" plus elles ſe ſont allongées. On ne leur a donné " de l'agrément, de la cadence, de l' harmonie qu'aux " depens de leur brieveté:"——Proceeds to this conſequence,——" Les Romains ne nous ont pas com- " muniqué les termes ſimples, les liaiſons du diſcours: " la plupart de ces termes ſont *plus courts* en François " qu'en Latin, & les Gaulois s'en ſervoient avant " que de connoitre l'Italie ou ſes habitants."——And then to ſhew more ſtrongly the ſpirit which animates him (a ſpirit unworthy of letters and hoſtile to the inveſtigation of truth) adds——" Sommes nous ſuffiſa- " ment inſtruits, lorſque nous avons appris de nos " Etymologiſtes, que tel mot François eſt emprunté " du Latin, tel autre du Grec, celui-ci de l'Eſpagnol, " celui-la du Teuton ou de l'Allemand? Mais les " Latins ou les Allemands de qui l'ont ils reçu? Ne " ſemble-*t*-il pas que nos ayeux ne ſubſiſtoient que " des emprunts, tandiſque les autres peuples eſtoient " riches de leur propre fonds? *Je ne puis ſouffrir qu'on* " *nous envoie mendier ailleurs*, tandiſque nous l'avons " chez nous."

Perhaps there was ſomething of this jealouſy in Menage, when (not being able to agree with Sylvius, that CHEZ ſhould be written *Sus* or *Sur*) he aſſerts that——" CHEZ vient de APUD d'ou les Italiens ont " fait

cattivo, *cavriuolo*, *caro*, *canuto*, *cane*, *toccare*, &c.

If

" fait APO, & les Eſpagnols CABE en prepoſant comme " nous un C."

Mr. de Broſſes however, ſuperior to all little prejudices, ſays——" On voit bien que CHEZ eſt une " traduction de l' Italien CASA, & que quand on dit " CHEZ vous, c'eſt comme ſi l'on diſoit CASA VOI " (MAISON de vous). Et encore ce dernier mot eſt " plutot dans notre langue une *adverbe* qu'une *par-* " *ticule*; ainſi que beaucoup d'autres dont l'origine " devient plus facile a reconnoître. Mais quand ce " ſont de *pures Particules*, il eſt mal aisé de retrouver " la premiere cauſe de leur formation; qui ſans doute " a ſouvent été arbitraire & precipitée: comme je " l'ai remarqué en parlant de petites expreſſions *con-* " *jonctives*, qui ne ſervent qu'a former la liaiſon du " diſcours."

Formation mechanique des langues, Tom. II. Chap. 14. Art. 254.

The French Law Term *Chezé*, which has cauſed to that people ſo much litigation, and to their lawyers ſo much controverſy (and which ſome of their authors would have written *Cheſné*, becauſe they ſuppoſed the land to have been formerly meaſured with a *Chain*; and others would have written *choisé* parce-que l'ainé *choiſit*)

If the ingenious Abbè Girard had known what CHEZ really was, he would not have ſaid, (*vrais principes*, Diſc. 11.) " CHEZ a " pour ſon partage particulier une idée " d'habitation, ſoit comme patrie, ſoit " comme ſimple demeure domeſtique." But he would have ſaid CHEZ is merely a corruption of CASA, and has all the ſame meaning in French, which CASA has in Italian *: and that is ſomething more than *patrie* or *demeure domeſtique*; viz.—

Y *Race*,

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choiſit) is derived in like manner from CASA, and means no more than what we in Engliſh call the *Home-ſtead* or *Home-ſtall*, whoſe extent is, of courſe, variable; but ought in reaſon to go with the houſe.

If therefore the French Etymologiſts thus ſtumbled at CHEZE', it is no wonder they knew not what to make of CHEZ, whoſe corruption had proceeded one ſtep farther.

* S. Johnſon (who was converſant with no languages, but Engliſh, Latin, and Greek) under the word AT, ſays hardily, but not truly, that—" CHEZ " means ſometimes *application to*, or *dependance on*."

Race, *Family*, *Nation*, *Sect*, &c. Neither again would he have ſaid—" Il s'agit ici " de la permiſſion que l'uſage a accordée " à quelques prepoſitions d'en regir d'au- " tres en certaines occaſions: c'eſt, à dire, " de les ſouffrir dans les complemens dont " elles indiquent le rapport; comme—*Je* " *viens* DE CHEZ *vous*." He would have ſeen through this grammatical myſtery of one prepoſition's governing another; and would have ſaid, that DE may be prefixed to the *Subſtantive* CHEZ (id eſt, CASA) in the ſame manner as to any other ſubſtantive. For,—" *Je viens De* CHEZ *vous*," is no other than—*Je viens de* CASA *à vous*: or (omitting the *Segnacaſo* *) *de* CASA *vous*; or, *de* CA *vous* †.

But

* That this omiſſion of the *Segnacaſo* is not a ſtrained ſuppoſition of my own, we have the authority of Henri Eſtiene (*De la precell. du lang. Fran.* p. 178.)

" Qui

But thus it is that when Grammar comes at length (for its application is al-

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" Qui la *maiſon ſon voiſin* ardoir voit,
" De la ſienne douter ſe doit.

" Et faut noter—*la maiſon ſon voiſin*—eſtre dict. à " la façon ancienne; au lieu de dire—*la maiſon* DE " *ſon voiſin.*"

So the Diction. della Cruſca—" CASA. Nome " dopo di cui vien laſciato talvolta dagli autori per " proprietà di linguagio, l'*Articolo* e il *ſegnacaſo.*

" *Sen' andarono a caſa i preſtatori.*" BOCCAC.

† " Pourquoy ſi ſouvent de *Diſſylables* font ils (les " Italiens) des *monoſyllables*; de CASA, CA, &c."
H. ESTIENE. *De la precell.*

Diction. della Cruſca.——" CA, ~~accro~~ciato da " CASA."

So Menage.——" Fermato l'uſo di queſto tronca- " mento di CA per CASA, familiare a noſtri antichi. " —*Sarae ſimile all' uomo ſavio, il quale edifica la* CA " *ſua ſopra la pietra.* Vangel di San matteo volgare. " —*Vinegia, ne' quali paeſi ſi dice* CA *in vece di* CASA." Silvano Rozzi. Many other inſtances are alſo given from Dante, Boccacio. Giovan Villani. Franco Sacchetti, &c.

ways late) to be applied to a language; ſome long preceding corruption cauſes a difficulty: ignorance of the corruption gives riſe to ſome ingenious ſyſtem to account for theſe words which are conſidered as original and not corrupted. Succeeding ingenuity and heaps of miſplaced learning increaſe the difficulty, and make the error more obſtinate, if not incurable.

B.

Do you acknowledge the prepoſition to be an indeclinable word?

H.

No.

B.

Do you think it has a meaning of its own?

H.

Yes moſt certainly. And indeed, if prepoſitions had no proper meaning of their own,

own, why ſeveral unmeaning prepoſitions *; when one alone muſt have anſwered the purpoſe equally? The cypher, which has no value of itſelf, and only ſerves (if I may uſe the language of Grammarians) to *connote* and *conſignify*, and to change the value of the figures, is not ſeveral and various, but uniformly one and the ſame.

B.

I gueſſed as much whilſt you were talking of Conjunctions; and ſuppoſed that

* Speaking of Prepoſitions, Cour de Gebelin ſays, Gram. Univerſ. page 238. " Mais comment des " mots pareils qui ſemblent ne rien peindre, *ne rien* " *dire*, dont l'Origine eſt inconnue, & qui ne tien- " nent en apparence a aucune famille, peuvent ils " amener l'harmonie & la clarté dans les tableaux de " la parole & devenir ſi neceſſaires, que ſans eux le " langage n'offriroit que des peintures imparfaites? " Comment ces mots peuvent ils produire de ſi grands " effets & repandre dans le diſcours tant de chaleur, " tant de fineſſe?"

you intended to account for them both in the ſame manner *.

H.

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* In a Letter to Mr. Dunning, publiſhed in the year 1778, I aſſerted in a note (page 23) that—— "There is not, nor is it poſſible there ſhould be, a "word in any language, which has not a compleat "meaning and ſignification even when taken by itſelf. "*Adjectives*, *Prepoſitions*, *Adverbs*, &c. have all com- "pleat, ſeparate meanings, not difficult to be diſ- "covered."

Having in that letter explained the *unmeaning* conjunctions, with which alone I had at that time any *perſonal* concern; and not foreſeeing that the *equally unmeaning* Prepoſitions were afterwards by a ſolemn deciſion (*but without explanation*) to be determined *more certain* than *certainty*; I was contented by that note to ſet other perſons who might be more capable and more at leiſure than myſelf, upon an enquiry into the ſubject: being very indifferent from whoſe hand the explanation might come to the public. I muſt acknowledge myſelf a little diſappointed, that in eight years time, no perſon whatever has purſued the inquiry; although the ſucceſs I had had with the Conjunctions might reaſonably have encouraged, as it much facilitated, the ſearch. But though all men (as far as I can learn) have admitted my particular proofs concerning the Conjunctions, none have been in-

clined

H.

You were not miſtaken, Sir. For though Voſſius and others have concurred with the cenſure which Priſcian paſſes on the Stoics for claſſing Prepoſitions and Conjunctions, &c. together under one head; yet in truth they are both to be acounted for in the ſame way.

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clined (as I wiſhed they might be) to puſh the *principle* of my reaſoning farther, and apply it to the other *Particles*. The ingenious author of *Eſſays Hiſtorical and Moral*, publiſhed in 1785, ſays, (page 125)—" Poſ-" ſibly *Prepoſitions* were, at firſt, ſhort interjectional " words, ſuch as our carters and ſhepherds make uſe " of to their cattle, to denote the relations of place. " Or perhaps a more ſkilful Linguiſt and antiquarian " may be able to trace them from other words, as the " Conjunctions have been traced by the author above " mentioned."—It is therefore manifeſt, that the *principle* of my reaſoning was either not ſufficiently opened by me, or has not taken ſufficient hold of the minds of others; and that it is neceſſary ſtill farther to apply it to the other *Particles*.

The Prepoſitions as well as the Conjunctions are to be found amongſt the other Parts of Speech. The ſame ſort of corruption, from the ſame cauſe, has diſguiſed both: and ignorance of their true origin has betrayed Grammarians and Philoſophers into the myſterious and contradictory language which they have held concerning them. And it is really entertaining, to obſerve the various ſhifts uſed by thoſe who were too ſharp-witted and too ingenuous to repeat the unſatisfactory accounts of theſe Prepoſitions, handed down by others; and yet not ingenuous enough to acknowledge their own total ignorance on the ſubject.

The Grammarian ſays, it is none of his buſineſs; but that it belongs to the philoſopher: and for that reaſon only he omits giving an account of them. Whilſt the Philoſopher avails himſelf of his dignity; and,

and, when he meets with a ſtubborn difficulty which he cannot unravel, (*and only then*), diſdains to be employed about *Words:* although they are the neceſſary channel through which his moſt precious liquors muſt flow.

" Grammatico ſatis eſt, ſays Sanctius, " ſi tres has partes poſteriores (ſcil. *Ad-* " *verbia*, *Præpoſitiones*, *Conjunctiones*, vocet " *Particulas indeclinabiles*; & functus erit " officio perfecti grammatici.—Significa- " tiones enumerare, magis Philoſophi eſt " quam Grammatici: quia grammatici " munus non eſt, teſte Varrone, vocum " ſignificationes indagare, ſed earum uſum. " *Propterea* nos in arte hæc prætermiſſi- " mus."

Mr. Locke complains of the neglect of others in this particular; denies it to be his buſineſs " to examine them in their full

" full latitude:" and declares that he " intends not here, a full explication of " them." Like Scaliger—*Non in animo eſt.*—And this ſerves him as an apology for not examining them at all in any latitude; and for giving no explication of them whatever in *any* place.

The Author of the Port Royal philoſophical grammar, ſaves himſelf by an *Almoſt.* " Ce ſont *preſque* les mêmes rap- " ports dans toutes les langues, qui ſont " marqués par les Prepoſitions." And therefore he will content himſelf to mention ſome of the *principal* French Prepoſitions, without obliging himſelf to fix their exact number. And as Sanctius had his reaſon for turning the buſineſs over to a philoſophical grammar, whilſt he was treating of a *particular* language: ſo this author, who was writing a *general* grammar, had his reaſon for leaving it to thoſe

who

who wrote particular grammars.—" C'eſt " pourquoi je me contenterai de rapporter " ici les *principaux* de ceux qui ſont mar- " qués par les prepoſitions de la Langue " Françoiſe; ſans m'obliger à en faire un " denombrement exact, comme il ſeroit " neceſſaire pour une Grammaire *parti-* " *culiere.*"

M. L'Abbé de Condillac's method is moſt conveniently cavalier, and perfectly adapted to a writer of his deſcription.— " Je me bornerai à vous en donner quel- " ques exemples: car *vous jugez bien,* " Monſeigneur, que je *ne me propoſe pas* " d'analyſer les acceptions de toutes les " prepoſitions." And again, concludes —" En voilà aſſez, Monſeigneur * !"

Even

* In the ſame manner he ſkips over all ſorts of difficulty with the Conjunctions.

" Mais,

Even the learned Preſident de Broſſes, in his excellent treatiſe De la formation mechanique des Langues, is compelled to evade the inquiry. " L'accroiſſement en " tête des mots y amene une quantité fort " variée d'idées acceſſoires. C'eſt un effet " commun des Prepoſitions; qui pourroit " fournir la matiere d'un chapitre tres-phi- " loſophique ſur leurs cauſes, leurs racines, " leur force, leur effet, leurs ſignificati- " ons, leur varietés. Je *ne ferai que tou-* " *cher* cette matiere en fort peu de mots " dans un exemple que je donnerai, & " *ſeulement pour mettre ſur les voies.*"

Tom. II. Chap. 11. Art. 198.

The

" Mais, Monſeigneur, il eſt *inutile* de faire l'enu- " meration de toutes les conjonctions."——" Je ne " crois pas, Monſeigneur, qu'il y ait *rien de plus à* " *remarquer* ſur les conjonctions."

Partie II. Chap. 23.

The laborious and judicious R. Johnſon, includes in one page all that he has to offer on the *Adverb*, *Conjunction*, and *Prepoſition*: and concludes with ſaying—" And here, " if I would ſhew the reader the defec- " tiveneſs of this Grammar (Lilly's) in " the account it gives of the uſe of the " Prepoſitions, it would make a little vo- " lume.

" Sed nos immenſum ſpatio confecimus æquor,
" Et jam tempus Equum fumantia ſolvere colla."

Our countryman Wilkins, who is fairer and more intelligent than any of them, does not deny that it falls properly within his province; but ſaves himſelf by *ſelecting* ſuch as he conceives *ſufficient*. Speaking of Particles, he ſays, (Part 3. Chap. 2.)— " The words of this kind are exceeding " numerous and equivocal in all languages, " and add much to the difficulty of learn- " ing them. It being a very hard matter

" to

" to eſtabliſh the juſt number of ſuch as " in all kinds ~~as~~ are neceſſary *, and to " fix to them their proper ſignifications: " which yet *ought to be done in a philoſo-* " *phical grammar*. I ſhall in this Eſſay " *ſelect* out of inſtituted languages, ſuch " of the ſeveral ſorts as I conceive *ſufficient* " for this purpoſe."

Doctor Wallis ſays—" Adverbia eandem " ſortiuntur naturam apud nos quam apud " Latinos, aliaſque gentes. Conjunctiones " item eundem habent uſum quem apud " Latinos, alioſque. Præpoſitiones etiam " eandem ſortiuntur naturam, quam in " aliis

* No wonder that Wilkins found it ſo hard to fix the number which was neceſſary, ſince their number in every language depends merely upon how many of the moſt common words ſhall become obſolete or corrupted. This being mere matter of particular fact and of accident, can have no place in general or philoſophical grammar.

" aliis linguis. Si quis tamen harum ali-
" quot voces potius adverbia esse dicat;
" aut etiam ex adverbiis aliquot ad con-
" junctionum classem referre malit: non
" tanti est ut hac de re quis contendat;
" cum, & apud Latinos, eadem non raro
" vox nunc pro adverbio, nunc pro con-
" junctione censenda est. Neque aliquod
" grave detrimentum pateremur, si tam
" adverbia quam conjunctiones & inter-
" jectiones, ad eandem classem redigeren-
" tur. *Est quidem nonnihil discriminis, sed*
" *leviusculum.*" Cap. XIII.

Greenwood rashly ventures a little farther than any other person; and upon Mr. Locke's authority, acknowledging it to be his duty to do what other grammarians had neglected, says—

" I am sensible that what I have here
" done"—(and he has done nothing)—

" is ſlight and ſuperficial to what may and " ought to be done; but if this ſhall meet " with any encouragement, I may be ex- " cited to make farther improvements in " theſe matters, by taking more pains to " obſerve nicely the ſeveral *poſtures of the* " *mind* in diſcourſe *."

Now Greenwood's grammar did actually meet with very great and extraordinary encouragement; and went through ſeveral editions ſpeedily during the author's life; but he never fulfilled his promiſe: nor indeed is there any thing about him, to incline us to believe that he was a fit perſon for ſuch an undertaking.

But

* In the ſame manner Greenwood ſlips the Conjunctions. " But this ſhall ſuffice for the Conjunc- " tions, ſince it would be too *tedious* to go through all " the diviſions of them; and *I may ſome other time* ex- " plain them more largely and accurately."

But not to multiply quotations without end (in which you are much better verſed than I am) you know that all philoſophers, philologers and grammarians, who have owned a diſſatisfaction in the accounts already given of the Particles, have yet, for ſome ſhuffling reaſon or other, all deſired to be excuſed from giving a ſatisfactory account themſelves.

B.

But why not concur with M. M. de Port Royal, and the Preſident de Broſſes? They are free from the contradiction and inconſiſtency of Mr. Harris's account of the Prepoſitions. For they acknowledge them to have a ſignification.—" On a eu re-
" cours, ſay the former, dans toutes les
" langues à une autre invention; qui a
" été d'*inventer de petits mots* pour etre mis
" avant les noms; ce qui les a fait ap-
" peller Prepoſitions."

And M. de Broſſes, with great ingenuouſneſs tells us, (Traité de la formation mechanique des langues, Tom. 2. Chap. XI. Art. 198.)—" Chacune des Prepoſi-
" tions a ſon ſens propre, mais qu'on ap-
" plique à beaucoup d'autres ſens par ex-
" tenſion & par approximation. Elles ſont
" des formules abregées, dont l'uſage eſt
" le plus frappant & le plus commode
" dans toutes les langues pour circonſtan-
" cier les idées: elles ſont d'elles-mêmes
" Racines primitives; mais *je n'ai pas*
" *trouvé qu'il fut poſſible d'aſſigner la cauſe*
" *de leur origine:* tellement que j'en crois
" la formation *purement arbitraire.* Je
" penſe de même des Particules, des Ar-
" ticles, des Pronoms, des Relatifs, des
" Conjonctions; en un mot, de tous les
" *monoſyllabes* ſi frequens qu'on emploie
" pour lier les paroles d'un diſcours, en
" former une phraſe conſtruite, & lui don-
" ner un ſens determiné pour ceux qui

" l'entendent. Car ce n'eſt qu'en faveur
" de ceux qui ecoutent qu'on introduit cet
" appareil de tant de conjonctions. Un
" homme ſeul au monde ne parleroit que
" peu ou point. Il n'auroit beſoin d'au-
" cune de ces conjonctions pour former
" ſa phraſe mentale. Les ſeuls termes
" principaux lui ſuffiroient; parcequ'il en
" a dans l'eſprit la perception circonſtan-
" ciée, & qu'il ſçait aſſez ſous quel aſpect
" il les emploie. Il n'en eſt pas de même,
" lorſqu'il faut exprimer la phraſe au de-
" hors. Un tas de mots iſolés ne ſeront
" non plus une phraſe pour l'auditeur,
" qu'un tas de pierres toutes taillées ne
" ſeroient une maiſon, ſi on ne les arran-
" geoit dans leur ordre, & ſi on ne les
" lioit pas du ſable & de la chaux. L'ap-
" prêt de cette eſpece eſt tres-preſſé pour
" un homme qui veut ſe faire entendre.
" Cependant *la nature*, *les images*, l'imi-
" tation, l'onomatopée, *tout lui manque*

" *ici :* car il n'eſt pas queſtion de peindre
" & de nommer *aucun objet reel* ; mais
" ſeulement de donner à entendre *de petites*
" *combinaiſons mentales, abſtraites, & va-*
" *gues.* Alors l'homme aura uſé pour con-
" jonctions des *premiers ſons brefs & vagues*
" qui lui venoient à la bouche. L'habi-
" tude en aura bientôt fait connoitre la
" force & l'emploi. Ces petits ſignes de
" liaſon ſont reſtés en grand nombre dans
" chaque langue, où l'on peut les conſi-
" derer comme ſons radicaux ; & ils y ont
" en effet leurs derivés."

And again (Art. 254.) " J'ai fait voir
" combien il etoit difficile de trouver le
" premier germe radical des *Particules* con-
" jonctives du diſcours. Leur examen
" m'a fait pencher à croire qu'elles etoient
" pour la plupart *arbitraires* ; & que le
" prompt & prodigieux beſoin qu'on en a
" pour

" pour s'enoncer, ayant forcé les hommes
" de chaque pays à prendre le premier
" monoſyllabe ou geſte vocal indeterminé
" qui lui venoit à la bouche dans le beſoin
" preſſant, l'uſage reiteré en avoit déter-
" miné l'habitude ſignificative. Il n'eſt
" guère plus aiſé d'aſſigner la premiere
" origine de *Prepoſitions*, quoiqu'un peu
" plus compoſées que les ſimples particu-
" les conjonctives."

And again (Art. 274.) " On auroit à
" parler auſſi de la cauſe des differentes
" terminaiſons dans les langues, de la ſig-
" nification des prepoſitions, de leur va-
" rieté à cet egard: car les mêmes ont
" pluſieurs ſens très-differents. C'eſt une
" matiere extremement vaſte & très-phi-
" loſophique."

H.

Meſſieurs de Port-Royale and M. de Broſſes deſerve for ever to be mentioned with reſpect and gratitude; but, upon this occaſion, I muſt anſwer them in the words of Mer. Caſaubon (*de lingua Hebraica*)— " Perſuadeant fortaſſe illis; qui de verbis " ſingulis, etiam vulgatiſſimis, à philoſo- " phis, priuſquam imponerentur, itum in " conſilium cedunt. Nos, qui de verbo- " rum origine longe aliter opinamur, planè " pro fabula habemus."

Language, it is true, is an Art, and a glorious one; whoſe influence extends over all the others, and in which finally all ſcience whatever muſt centre. But an art ſpringing from neceſſity, and originally invented by artleſs men; who did not ſit down like philoſophers to invent " *de pe-* " *tits mots pour etre mis avant les noms*;" nor yet did they take for this purpoſe

" *des*

" *des premiers ſons brefs & vagues qui leur* " *venoient à la bouche* * :" but they took ſuch and the ſame (whether great or ſmall, whether monoſyllable or polyſyllable, without diſtinction) as they employed upon other occaſions to mention the ſame *real objects*. For *Prepoſitions* alſo are the names of *real objects*. And theſe *petits mots*, happen in this caſe to be ſo, merely from their

* It will ſeem the more extraordinary that M. de Broſſes ſhould entertain this opinion of the *Particles*, when we remember what he truly ſays of *Proper names*. —" Tous les mots formant les noms propres ou ap- " pellatifs des perſonnes, ont en quelque langage que " ce ſoit, ainſi que les mots formants les noms des " choſes, une origine certaine, une ſignification de- " terminée, une etymologie veritable. Ils n'ont pas, " plus que les autres mots, été impoſés ſans cauſe, " ni fabriqués au haſard, ſeulement pour produire un " bruit vague. Cependant comme la plûpart de ces " mots ne portent à l'oreille de ceux qui les entendent " aucune autre ſignification que de deſigner les per- " ſonnes nommées ; c'eſt ſur tout à leur égard que le " vulgaire eſt porté à croire qu'ils ſont denués de ſens " & d'etymologie."

repeated corruption, owing to their frequent, long-continued, and perpetual uſe.

B.

You aſſert then that what we call *Prepoſitions*, and diſtinguiſh as a ſeparate part of ſpeech, are not a ſpecies of words eſſentially or in any manner different from the other parts: that they are not "*little* "*words invented to put before nouns, and to* "*which all languages have had recourſe:*" but that they are in fact either Nouns or Verbs. And that (like the Conjunctions) Prepoſitions are only words which have been diſguiſed by corruption; and that Etymology will give us in all languages, what Philoſophy has attempted in vain. And yet I cannot but perceive that ſuch words as Prepoſitions, are abſolutely neceſſary to diſcourſe.

H.

H.

I acknowledge them to be undoubtedly neceſſary. For, as the neceſſity of the *Article* (or of ſome equivalent invention) follows from the impoſſibility of having in language a diſtinct name or *particular term* for each particular individual *idea* *; ſo does the neceſſity of the *Prepoſition* (or of ſome equivalent invention) follow from the impoſſibility of having in language a diſtinct *complex term* for each different *collection of ideas* which we may have occaſion to put together in diſcourſe. The addition or ſubtraction of *any one* idea to or from a collection, makes it a different collection: and (if there were degrees of impoſſibility) it is ſtill more impoſſible to uſe in language a different and diſtinct *complex term* for each different and diſtinct *collection of ideas*, than it is to uſe a diſtinct *particular*

* See before, Chap. V.

cular term for each particular and individual idea. To ſupply, therefore, the place of the complex terms which are wanting in a language, is the Prepoſition employed. By whoſe aid *complex* terms are prevented from being infinite or too numerous, and are uſed only for thoſe collections of ideas which we have moſt frequently occaſion to mention in diſcourſe. And this end is obtained in the moſt ſimple manner in the world. For having occaſion in communication to mention a collection of ideas, for which there is no one ſingle *complex* term in the language, we either take that complex term which includes the greateſt number, though not *All*, of the ideas we would communicate; or elſe we take that complex term which includes *All*, and the feweſt ideas *more* than thoſe we would communicate: and then by the help of the Prepoſition, we either make up the deficiency

deficiency in the one caſe, or retrench the ſuperfluity in the other.

For inſtance,

1. " *A Houſe* WITH *a Party-wall.*"
2. " *A Houſe* WITHOUT *a roof.*"

In the firſt inſtance, the complex term is deficient: The Prepoſition directs to add what is wanting. In the ſecond inſtance, the complex term is redundant: The Prepoſition directs to take away what is ſuperfluous.

Now conſidering it only in this, the moſt ſimple light, it is abſolutely neceſſary, in either caſe, that the Prepoſition itſelf ſhould have a meaning of its own: for how could we otherwiſe make known by it our intention, whether of adding to or retrenching

ing from, the deficient or redundant complex term we have employed?

If to one of our modern grammarians, I ſhould ſay — " *A Houſe*, JOIN;" — He would aſk me — " JOIN *what?*" — But he would not contend that JOIN is an indeclinable word, and has no meaning of its own: becauſe he knows that it is the Imperative of the Verb, the other parts of which are ſtill in uſe; and its own meaning is clear to him, though the ſentence is not compleated. If, inſtead of JOIN, I ſhould ſay to him, — " *A Houſe* WITH;" — he would ſtill aſk the ſame queſtion, " WITH *what?*" But if I ſhould diſcourſe with him concerning the word WITH, he would tell me that it was a *Prepoſition*, an *indeclinable* word, and that it had no meaning of its own, but only a *connotation* or *conſignification*. And yet it would be evident by his queſtion, that he felt it had a

meaning of its own; which is indeed the ſame as JOIN *. And the only difference between the two words WITH and JOIN, is, that the other parts of the verb ꝼIþAN, þIðan,

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* WITH is alſo ſometimes the Imperative of þýnðan. *To be.* Mr. Tyrwhit, in his Gloſſary (*Art.* BUT) has obſerved truly, that—" BY and WITH are often " ſynonymous."—They are always ſo, when WITH is the Imperative of þýnðan: for BY is the Imperative of Beon. *To be.*

He has alſo in his Gloſſary (*Art.* WITH) ſaid truly, that—" WITH *meſchance.* WITH *miſaventure.* WITH " *ſorwe.* 5316. 7797. 6916. 4410. 5890. 5922. are " to be conſidered as parenthetical curſes."—For the literal meaning of thoſe phraſes, is (not *God yeve*, but)—BE *miſchance*, BE *miſadventure*, BE *ſorrow*, to him or them concerning whom theſe words are ſpoken. But Mr. Tyrwhit is miſtaken, when he ſuppoſes— " WITH *evil prefe.* 5829. WITH *harde grace.* 7810. " WITH *ſory grace.* 12810."—to have the ſame meaning: for in thoſe three inſtances, WITH is the Imperative of ꝼIþAN; nor is any parenthetical curſe or wiſh contained in either of thoſe inſtances.

As WITH means JOIN, ſo the correſpondent French Prepoſition, AVEC, means—*And Have that*, or, *Have that*

þiðan, *to join* (of which WITH is the imperative) have ceaſed to be employed in the language. So that my inſtances ſtand thus,

1. *A Houſe* JOIN *a Party-wall.*
2. *A Houſe* BE-OUT *a roof.*

And indeed ſo far has always been plainly perceived, that WITH and WITHOUT are

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that alſo. And it was formerly written *Avecque*, i. e. *Avezque.* So Boileau, Satire 1.

" Quittons donc pour jamais une ville importune;
" Où l'honneur eſt en guerre AVECQUE la fortune."

And again, Satire 5.

" Mais qui m'aſſurera, qu'en ce long cercle d'ans,
" A' leurs fameux epoux vos ayeules fidelles
" Aux douceurs des galands furent toujours rebelles?
" Et comment ſçavez-vous, ſi quelqu' audacieux
" N'a point interrompu le cours de vos ayeux?
" Et ſi leur ſang tout pur AVECQUE leur nobleſſe,
" Eſt paſſé juſqu' à vous de Lucrece en Lucrece."

are directly oppoſite and contradictory. Wilkins, without knowing what the words really were, has yet well expreſſed their meaning, where he ſays that WITH is a prepoſition—" relating to the notion of " *ſocial* or circumſtance of *ſociety affirmed*; " and that WITHOUT is a prepoſition " relating to the ſame notion of *ſocial*, or " circumſtance of *ſociety denied*."

And it would puzzle the wiſeſt philoſopher to diſcover oppoſition and contradiction in two words, where neither of them had any ſignification.

B.

According then to your explanation, the Prepoſition WITHOUT, is the very ſame word, and has the very ſame meaning as the Conjunction WITHOUT. Does not this in ſome meaſure contradict what you before aſſerted, concerning the faithfulneſs

of

of words to the ſtandard under which they were originally enliſted? For there does not appear in this caſe to be any melting down of two words into one, by ſuch a corruption as you before noticed in ſome of the Conjunctions. And yet here is one and the ſame word uſed both as a Conjunction and as a Prepoſition.

H.

There is nothing at all extraordinary, much leſs contradictory in this; that one and the ſame word ſhould be applied indifferently either to ſingle *words* or to *ſentences:* (for you muſt obſerve that the apparently *different application* conſtitutes the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepoſitions): For I may very well employ the ſame word of direction, whether it be to add a *word* or to add a *ſentence:* And again, one and the ſame word of direction will ſerve as well to take away a *word* as

to

to take away a *ſentence*. No wonder therefore that our anceſtors (who were ignorant of the falſe diviſions and definitions of Grammar which we have ſince received) ſhould have uſed BUT indifferently to direct the omiſſion either of a *Word*, or of a *Sentence*: and ſhould have uſed WITHOUT alſo indifferently for the omiſſion of a *Sentence* or of a *Word*. But after our authors became more generally and better acquainted with the diviſions and definitions of the Greek and Latin Grammarians, they attempted by degrees to make our language alſo conform to thoſe definitions and diviſions. And after that it was, that BUT ceaſed to be commonly uſed as a *known* Prepoſition; and WITHOUT ceaſed to be *correctly* uſed as a Conjunction.

As the meaning of theſe two words BUT (I mean that part which is corrupted from Butan) and WITHOUT, is exactly the

ſame, our authors would moſt likely have had ſome difficulty to agree amongſt themſelves, which ſhould be the Prepoſition and which the Conjunction; had it not been for the corruption of BOT, which becoming BUT, muſt neceſſarily decide the choice: for though WITHOUT could very well ſupply the place of the *prepoſition* BUT, it could not ſupply the place of the Bot part of the *Conjunction* BUT: whereas BUT could entirely ſupply the place of the *Conjunction* WITHOUT. And this, I take it, is the reaſon why BUT has been retained as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT has been retained as a Prepoſition.

Not however that they have been able ſo to baniſh the old habit of our language, as that BUT ſhould always be uſed as a Conjunction, and WITHOUT always as a Prepoſition. (I mean that BUT ſhould always apparently be applied to *ſentences*, and

WITH-

WITHOUT always to *words*; for that, it muſt be remembered, is the only difference between Conjunctions and Prepoſitions): for BUT is ſtill uſed frequently as a *Prepoſition:* though Grammarians, forgetful or heedleſs of their own Definitions, are pleaſed to call it always a Conjunction;

As thus, "*All* BUT *one.*"

And, though it is not *now* an *approved* uſage, it is very frequent in common ſpeech to hear WITHOUT uſed as a conjunction; where, inſtead of WITHOUT, a correct modern ſpeaker would uſe UNLESS, or ſome other equivalent acknowledged conjunction: and that for no other reaſon, but becauſe it has pleaſed our Grammarians to exclude WITHOUT from the number of conjunctions.

B.

And is not that reaſon ſufficient, when the beſt writers have for a long time paſt conformed to this arrangement?

H.

Undoubtedly. Nor do I mean to cenſure thoſe who follow cuſtom for the propriety of a particular language: I do not even mean to condemn the cuſtom: for in this inſtance it is perfectly harmleſs. But I condemn the falſe philoſophy which cauſed it. I condemn thoſe who wilfully ſhut their eyes, and affect not to perceive the indifferent application of BUT, AND, SINCE, IF, ELSE, &c. both to *words* and to *ſentences*; and ſtill endeavour by their definitions to uphold a diſtinction which they know does not exiſt even in the practice of any language, and which they ought to know cannot exiſt in theory.

To

To the pedagogue indeed, who muſt not trouble children about the corruption of words, the diſtinction of prepoſitions and conjunctions may be uſeful enough (on account of the *caſes* which they govern when applied to *words*; and which they cannot govern when applied to *ſentences*); and for ſome ſuch reaſon perhaps, both this and many other diſtinctions were at firſt introduced. Nor would they have cauſed any miſchief or confuſion, if the *philoſopher* had not adopted theſe diſtinctions; taken them for real differences in *nature*, or in the *operations of the human mind*; and then attempted to account for what he did not underſtand. And thus the *Grammatiſt* has miſled the Grammarian, and both of them the Philoſopher.

B.

" SANS eyes, SANS teeth, SANS taſte, SANS every " thing."

This prepoſition too, which was formerly uſed inſtead of WITHOUT, you mean, I ſuppoſe, to account for in the ſame manner: It can be ſhewn, I ſuppoſe, to be the Imperative of ſome obſolete Saxon verb, having a ſimilar meaning.

H.

SANS, though ſometimes uſed inſtead of WITHOUT, is not an Engliſh but a French Prepoſition, and therefore to be derived from another ſource. Nor is it a *verb*, but a *ſubſtantive:* and it means ſimply *Abſence*. It is one proof, amongſt many others, that Plutarch's half-conjecture was not ill-founded. After all, he thinks it may be worth conſidering, whether the Prepoſitions may not be perhaps little fragments of words, uſed in haſte and for diſpatch, inſtead of the whole words,

words *. SANS is corrupted from the prepoſition *Senza* of the Italians † (by old Italian authors written *Sanza*) who frequently uſe it thus; SENZA *di te*, i. e. ASSENZA *di te*. The French (as we have ſeen in *chez*) omit the *Segnacaſo*, and ſay SANS *toi*. And as from the Italian *Aſſenza* they have their *abſence*; or, as they pro-

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* "Ὁρα δε μη κομμασι και θραυσμασιν ονομαῖων εοικασιν, "ὡσπερ γραμμαῖων σπαραγμασι και κεραιαις οἱ σπευδονλες γρα- "φουσι. &c."

Πλαῖωνικα Ζηνημαῖα. θ.

† "SENZA & SANZA, (ſays Menage) Da *Abſentia*, "per aferesi, lo cava il Cittadini. Viene ſecondo me "da *Sine* (come lo Spagnuolo *Antes* da *Ante*) *Sine*. "*Sines*. *Senes* (onde il franceſe *Sens*, che ſi pronunzia "*Sans*) *Senſe*. *Senſa*. *Senza*."

Again Menage ſays, that SANS *deſſus deſſous*, ſhould be written SENS *deſſus deſſous* "comme on ecrit, *en* "*tout ſens*, *de ce ſens là*, &c. SENS, c'eſt à dire, *face*, "viſage, *ſituation*, poſture, &c." Menage is ſurely wrong: for it means, *without top or bottom*, i. e. a ſituation in which you cannot diſcern the top from the bottom.

nounce it, Abſance or Abſans; ſo have they their Prepoſition SANS from SENZA or SANZA. But I perſuade myſelf that you can have no doubt of the meaning of this Prepoſition SANS, when you find the ſignification of its *correſpondent* words equally clear in other languages.

The Greek prepoſition Χωρις, is the corrupted Imperative of Χωριζειν, to ſever, to disjoin, to ſeparate.

The German prepoſition SONDER, the Imperative of Sondern, which has the ſame meaning as Χωριζειν.

The Dutch prepoſition ZONDER, the Imperative of Zonderen, with the ſame meaning.

The Latin SINE, i. e. *Sit-ne, Be not.*

The

The Spanish *Sin*, from the Latin *Sine*.

The Italian *Fuori* The Spanish *Affuera* (as *Puerta* from *Porta*) The French *Hors* (by their old authors written *Fors*)	From the Latin *Foris*.

Whence *Hormis*, i. e. (*put out*) by the addition of the participle of *mettre*.

B.

If there were no other relations declared by the prepositions, besides those of *adding* or *taking away*, perhaps this explanation might convince me; but there are assuredly Prepositions employed for very different purposes. And instead of selecting such instances as may happen to be suited particularly to your own hypothesis, I should have more satisfaction if you would exemplify in those which Mr. Harris has employed to illustrate his hypothesis.

" From

"From theſe principles" (he ſays, Book II. Chap. 3.) "it follows, that when we "form a ſentence, the ſubſtantive without "difficulty coincides with the verb, from "the natural coincidence of ſubſtance and "energy.—*The Sun warmeth.*—So like-"wiſe the energy with the ſubject on "which it operates.—*Warmeth the earth.* "—So likewiſe both ſubſtance and energy "with their proper attributes.—*The ſplen-"did ſun genially warmeth the fertile earth.* "—But ſuppoſe we were deſirous to add "other ſubſtantives; as for inſtance, *Air*, "or *Beams:* How would theſe coincide, "or under what character could they be "introduced? Not as Nominatives or "Accuſatives, for both thoſe places are "already filled; the Nominative, by the "ſubſtance *Sun*; the Accuſative by the "ſubſtance *Earth.* Not as Attributes to "theſe laſt, or to any other thing: for "attributes by nature, they neither are

nor

" nor can be made. Here then we per-
" ceive the rise and use of *prepositions*.
" By these we connect those substantives
" to sentences, which at the time are
" unable to coalesce of themselves. Let
" us assume for instance a pair of these
" connectives, THRO' and WITH, and
" mark their effect upon the substances
" here mentioned. *The splendid sun* WITH
" *his beams genially warmeth* THRO' *the air*
" *the fertile earth*.—The sentence as be-
" fore remains intire and one; the sub-
" stantives required are both introduced;
" and not a word which was there before,
" is detruded from its proper place."

The first of this pair of his connectives (WITH) you have already explained, and I am willing to admit the explanation. It is,—*The splendid sun* JOIN *his beams*—instead of one single complex term including *Sun* and *beams*.

But

But of what *real object* is THROUGH the name?

H.

Of a very common one indeed *. For as the French peculiar prepoſition CHEZ is no other than the Italian ſubſtantive CASA or CA, ſo is the Engliſh Prepoſition THOROUGH †, *Thourough*, *Thorow*, *Through*, or

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* All *Particles* are in truth, in all languages, the ſigns of the moſt common and familiar ideas, and thoſe which we have moſt frequently occaſion to communicate: they had not otherwiſe become *Particles*. So very much miſtaken was Mr. Locke, when he ſuppoſed them to be the ſigns or marks of certain operations of the mind for which we had either *none or very deficient names*; that the *Particles* are always the words which were the moſt common and familiar in the language from which they came.

† S. Johnſon calls "*Thorough*,—the word *Through* "extended into two ſyllables."—What could poſſibly be expected from ſuch an Etymologiſt as this? He might, with as much veriſimilitude, ſay that ϛλιυλλλ was the word *Soul* extended into three ſyllables, or that Ελεημοσυνη was the word *Alms* extended into ſix.

or *Thro'*, no other than the Gothic *ſubſtantive* ᚦᚢᚱᚢᚹ, or the Teutonic ſubſtantive *Thuruh:* and, like them, means *Door*, *gate*, *paſſage*.

So that Mr. Harris's inſtance (tranſlated into modern Engliſh) ſtands thus,

" *The ſplendid ſun*—JOIN *his beams*—*ge-*
" *nially warmeth*—PASSAGE *the air*—(or, the air being the *paſſage* or *medium*) " *the* " *fertile earth.*" And in the ſame manner may you tranſlate the prepoſition *Through* in every inſtance where *Thro'* is uſed in Engliſh, or its equivalent prepoſition is uſed in any other language *.

After

* So, I ſuppoſe, the Latin and Italian word *Porta* (in Spaniſh *Puerta* and in French *Porte*) has given the Latin and Italian prepoſition *Per*, the French *Par*, and the Spaniſh *Por*.

After having ſeen in what manner the ſubſtantive *Houſe* became a prepoſition in the French, you will not wonder to ſee *Door* become a prepoſition in the Engliſh: and though in the firſt inſtance it was more eaſy for you to perceive the nature of the French prepoſition *Chez*; becauſe, having no prepoſition correſponding to it in Engliſh, there was ſo much prejudice out of your way; yet I am perſuaded you will not charge this to me as a fantaſtical or far-fetched etymology, when I have placed before you, at one view, the words employed to ſignify the ſame idea in thoſe languages to which our own has the neareſt affinity.

Substantive.		*Preposition.*
English Door		Thourough. Thorough. Thorow. Through. Thro.
Anglo-Sax.	Dopa. Dupu Dupe. Đupe	Đupuh. Đuþh. Đpuh. Đop
Goth.	ᏘᏁᏂᏦᏩ. ᏘᏁᏂᏦ	ᏫᏁᏥᏦh
Dutch	Deure. Deur Door. Dore	Deur. Door
German	Thure. Thur. Thor.	Durch
Teuton	Thurah. Thur. Thor. Tura. Dura. Dure.	Thuruh. Thurah. Thur. Duruch. Duruc. Duruh. Durch. Durh.

Though

Though it is not from Asia or its confines, that we are to seek for the origin of this part of our language; yet is it worth noticing here, that the Greek (to which the Gothic has in many particulars a considerable resemblance) employs the word Θυρα for *Door*. And both the Persian (which in many particulars resembles the Teutonic*) and the Chaldean, use THRO for *Door*. You will observe, that the Teutonic uses the same word *Thurah* both for the *substantive*, (*Door*) and for what is called the *Preposition* (*Thorough*). The Dutch, which has a strong antipathy to our *Th*, uses the very word *Door* for both. The Anglo-saxon, from which our language

* "On n'est pas etonné de trouver du rapport entre "l'*Anglois* & le Persan: car on sçait que le fond de la "langue Angloise est Saxon; & qu'il y a une quantité "d'exemples qui montre une affinité marquée entre "l'Allemand & le Persan."

Form. mechan. des langues. Tom. II. Art. 166.

guage immediately deſcends, employs indifferently for *Door* either *Dure* or *Thure*. The modern German (directly contrary to the modern Engliſh) uſes the initial *Th* (*Thur*) for our *ſubſtantive* (*Door*) and the initial D (*Durch*) for our *prepoſition* (*Thorough*): and it is remarkable, that this ſame difference between the German and the Engliſh, prevails in almoſt all caſes, where the two languages employ a word of the ſame origin, having either of thoſe initials. Thus Diſtel und Dorn—in German are—*Thiſtles and Thorns* in Engliſh. So the Engliſh *Dear*, *Dollar*, *Deal*, are in German Theur, Thaler, Theil.

Minſhew and Junius both concur that *Door*, &c. are derived from the Greek Thura: Skinner ſays, *perhaps* they are all from the Greek Thura: and then without any reaſon (or rather as it appears to me againſt all reaſon) chuſes rather uſeleſly to

derive the ſubſtantive *Door* from the Anglo-ſaxon prepoſition *Thor*, *Thruh*, *Thurh*. But I am perſuaded, that *Door* and *Thorough* have one and the ſame Gothic origin ᚦᚢᚱᚹ, mean one and the ſame thing; and are in fact one and the ſame word.

B.

There is an inſuperable objection, which, I fear, you have not conſidered, to this method of accounting for the Prepoſitions: for if they were really and merely, as you imagine, common Nouns and Verbs, and therefore, as you ſay, the names of *real objects*, how could any of them be employed to denote not only *different* (*1) but even contrary relations? Yet this is univerſally

(*1) "Certains mots ſont *Adverbes*, *Prepoſitions*, & "*Conjonctions* en même temps. Et repondent ainſi "en même temps à diverſes parties d'oraiſon, ſelon "que la Grammaire les employe diverſement."

BUFFIER, Art. 150.

univerſally maintained, not only by Mr. Harris, but by Meſſrs. de Port Royal (*[2]) by the preſident de Broſſes, and by all thoſe writers whom you moſt eſteem; and even by Wilkins (*[3]) and Locke.

Now if theſe words have a meaning as you contend, and are conſtantly uſed according

(*[2]) "On n'a ſuivi en aucune langue, ſur le ſujet "des prepoſitions, ce que la raiſon auroit deſiré: qui "eſt, qu'un rapport ne fût marqué que par une pre-"poſition; & qu'une prepoſition ne marquât qu'un "ſeul rapport. Car il arrive au contraire dans toutes "les langues ce que nous avons vu dans ces exemples "pris de la Françoiſe; qu'un même rapport eſt ſigni-"fié par pluſieurs prepoſitions; & qu'une même pre-"poſition marque divers rapports."

M. M. *de Port Royale.*

(†[3]) "Some of theſe prepoſitions are *abſolutely de-"termined* either to *motion* or to *reſt*, or the *Terminus "of Motion*. Others are relatively applicable to *both*. "Concerning which this rule is to be obſerved: that "thoſe which belong to motion cannot ſignify reſt; "but thoſe which belong to reſt may ſignify motion "in the *terminus*." WILKINS. Part III. Chap. 3.

cording to their meaning, which you muſt allow, (becauſe you appeal to the uſe which is made of them as proof of the meaning which you attribute to them): how can they poſſibly be the names of *real and unchangeable objects*, as common nouns and verbs are? I am ſure you muſt ſee the neceſſity of reconciling theſe contradictory appearances.

H.

Moſt ſurely. And I think you will as readily acknowledge the neceſſity of firſt eſtabliſhing the facts, before you call upon me to reconcile them. Where is the Prepoſition to be found which is at any time uſed in contrary or even in different meanings?

B.

Very many inſtances have been given; but none ſtronger than thoſe produced by

Mr.

Mr. Harris of the Prepoſition FROM; which he ſhews to be uſed to denote *three* very different relations, and the two laſt in abſolute contradiction to each other.

" FROM, he ſays, denotes the detached " relation of Body; as when we ſay—— " *Theſe Figs came* FROM *Turkey*.—So as " to *Motion* and *Reſt*, only with this dif- " ference, that *here* the prepoſition *varies* " *its character with the Verb*. Thus if we " ſay—*That lamp hangs* FROM *the cieling* " —the prepoſition FROM aſſumes a cha- " racter of *quieſcence*. But if we ſay— " *That lamp is falling* FROM *the cieling*,— " the prepoſition in ſuch caſe aſſumes a " character of *Motion*."

Now I ſhould be glad you would ſhew me what one Noun or Verb can be found of ſo verſatile a character as this prepoſition: what name of any one real

object or ſign of one idea, or of one collection of ideas, can have been inſtituted to convey theſe different and oppoſite meanings?

H.

Truly, none that I know of. But I take the word FROM (*prepoſition*, if you chuſe to call it ſo)—to have as clear, as preciſe, and at all times as uniform and unequivocal a meaning, as any word in the language. FROM means merely BEGINNING, and nothing elſe. It is ſimply the Anglo-ſaxon and Gothic Noun Fꝛum, FRUM, *Beginning*, *Origin*, *Source*, *fountain*, *author* *. Now then, if you pleaſe, we will apply this meaning to Mr. Harris's for-

* "Ne ꝛæðð ge ꝛe ðe on fꝛumman ꝛonꝛhe. he "ꝛonhte pæpman anð pifman." That is, Annon legiſtis, quod qui eos *in principio*, creavit, creavit eos marem & fœminam. St. Matt. xix. 4.

formidable inſtances, and try whether we cannot make FROM ſpeak clearly for itſelf, without the aſſiſtance of the *interpreting* Verbs; who are ſuppoſed by Mr. Harris, to *vary its character* at will, and make the prepoſition appear as inconſiſtent and contradictory as himſelf.

Figs *came* FROM Turkey.
Lamp *falls* FROM Cieling.
Lamp *hangs* FROM Cieling.

Came is a complex term for one ſpecies of motion.

Falls is a complex term for another ſpecies of motion.

Hangs is a complex term for a ſpecies of attachment.

Have we occaſion to communicate or mention the COMMENCEMENT OF BEGIN-

NING of theſe motions and of this attachment; and the *place* where theſe motions and this attachment commence or begin? It is impoſſible to have complex terms for each occaſion of this ſort. What more natural then, or more ſimple, than to add the ſigns of thoſe ideas, viz. the word BEGINNING (which will remain always the ſame) and the name of the *place* (which will perpetually vary)?

Thus,

" Figs came—BEGINNING Turkey.
" Lamp falls—BEGINNING Cieling.
" Lamp hangs—BEGINNING Cieling."

That is

Turkey the *Place* of BEGINNING to come.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to fall.
Cieling the *Place* of BEGINNING to hang.

B.

You have here ſhewn its meaning when it relates to *place*; but Wilkins tells us, that "FROM refers *primarily* to *place* and "*ſituation*; and *ſecondarily* to *time*." So that you have yet given but half its meaning.

—"FROM morn till night th' eternal Larum rang."—

There is no *place* referred to in this line.

H.

FROM relates to every thing to which BEGINNING relates *, and to nothing elſe: and

* Is it unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that, if the meaning of this word FROM, and of its correſpondent prepoſitions in other languages, had been clearly underſtood; the Greek and Latin Churches would never have differed concerning the *Eternal Proceſſion* of the Holy Ghoſt FROM the Father, or FROM the Father and the Son. And that, if they had been determined to ſeparate, they would at leaſt have choſen ſome ſafer cauſe of ſchiſm? Is it preſumptuous to ſay, that the explanation

and therefore is referable to *Time* as well as to *motion:* without which indeed there can be no *Time*.

"The Larum rang BEGINNING Morning."

i. e. Morning being the *time* of its BEGINNING to ring.

B.

Still I have difficulty to truſt to this explanation. For Dr. S. Johnſon has numbered up *twenty* different meanings of this Prepoſition FROM. He ſays, it denotes,

"1. *Pri-*

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tion of this ſingle prepoſition, would have decided the controverſy more effectually, than all the authorities and all the ſolid arguments produced by the wiſe and honeſt biſhop Procopowicz? And thus have withheld one handle at leaſt of reproach, from thoſe who aſſert —"Que l'on pourroit juſtement definir la theologie— "L'art de compoſer des chimeres en combinant en- "ſemble des qualités impoſſibles à concilier." Syſteme de la Nature, Tom. II. p. 55.

" 1. *Privation.*

" 2. *Reception.*

" 3. *Descent* or *Birth.*

" 4. *Transmission.*

" 5. *Abstraction.*

" 6. *Succession.*

" 7. *Emission.*

" 8. *Progress from premisses to inferences.*

" 9. *Place* or *Person from whom a mes-*
" *sage is brought.*

" 10. *Extraction.*

" 11. *Reason* or *Motive.*

" 12. *Ground* or *Cause.*

" 13. *Distance.*

" 14. *Separation* or *Recession.*

" 15. *Exemption* or *Deliverance.*

" 16. *Absence.*

" 17. *Derivation.*

" 18. *Distance from the past.*

" 19. *Contrary to.*

" 20. *Removal.*"

To

To theſe he adds *twenty-two* other manners of uſing it. And he has accompanied each with inſtances ſufficiently numerous, as proofs *.

H.

And yet in all his inſtances (which, I believe, are above *ſeventy*) FROM continues to

* Greenwood ſays—" FROM ſignifies *Motion* from " a place; and then it is put in oppoſition to TO.
" 2. It is uſed to denote the *Beginning of time*.
" 3. It denotes the *Original of Things*.
" 4. It denotes the *Order of a thing*. (" And in " theſe three laſt ſenſes it is put before *Adverbs*.")
" 5. It ſignifies *Off*."

The caprice of language is worth remarking in the words *Van* (the Dutch *From*) and *Rear*, both of which we have retained in Engliſh as *Subſtantives*, and therefore they are allowed with us to have a meaning. But being only employed as *Prepoſitions* by the Dutch, Italian and French; our philoſophers cannot be perſuaded to allow them any tranſmarine meaning.—*Animam mutant qui trans mare currunt*. And thus *Van* in Holland, *Von* in Germany, *Avanti* in Italy, and *Avant* and *Derriere* in France, are merely *des petits mots inventés pour etre mis* AVANT *les noms*, or, in the VAN of Nouns.

to retain invariably one and the ſame ſingle meaning. Conſult them: and add to them as many more inſtances as you pleaſe; and yet (if I have explained myſelf as clearly as I ought, and as I think I have done) no farther aſſiſtance of mine will be neceſſary to enable you to extract the ſame meaning of the word FROM from all of them. And you will plainly perceive that the "*characters of quieſcence and of motion*," attributed by Mr. Harris to the word FROM, belong indeed to the words *Hang* and *Fall*, uſed in the different ſentences. And by the ſame manner of transferring to the *prepoſition* the meaning of ſome other word in the ſentence, have all Johnſon's and Greenwood's ſuppoſed different meanings ariſen.

B.

You obſerved, ſome time ſince, that the Prepoſitions WITH and WITHOUT were directly

directly oppoſite and contradictory to each other. Now the ſame oppoſition is evident in ſome other of the prepoſitions: And this circumſtance, I ſhould imagine, muſt much facilitate and ſhorten the ſearch of the etymologiſt: For having once diſcovered the meaning of one of the adverſe parties, the meaning of the other, I ſuppoſe, muſt follow of courſe. Thus—Going TO a place;—is directly the contrary of—Going FROM a place.—If then you are right in your explanation of FROM; (and I will not deny that appearances are hitherto in your favour); ſince FROM means *Commencement* or *Beginning*, TO muſt mean *End* or *Termination*. And indeed I perceive that, if we *produce* Mr. Harris's inſtances, and ſay,

"*Theſe figs came from Turkey* TO *England.*
"*The lamp falls from the cieling* TO *the ground.*
"*The lamp hangs from the cieling* TO *the floor*;"

as

as the word FROM denotes the *commencement* of the motion and hanging; ſo does the word TO denote their *termination:* and the places where they end or terminate, are reſpectively *England*, *Ground*, *Floor*.

And ſince we have as frequently occaſion to mention the *termination*, as we have to mention the *commencement* of motion or time; no doubt it was as likely that the word denoting *End* ſhould become a particle or prepoſition, as the word which ſignified *Beginning*. But in the uſe of theſe two words TO and FROM, I obſerve a remarkable difference. FROM ſeems to have *two* oppoſites; which ought therefore to mean the ſame thing: and, if meaning the ſame, to be uſed indifferently at pleaſure. We always uſe FROM (and *From* only) for the *beginning* either of *time* or *motion:* but for the *termination*, we apply ſometimes TO and ſometimes TILL: TO, indifferently either

ther to *place* or *time*; but TILL to *time* only and never to *place*. Thus, we may ſay,

> " *From morn* TO *night th' eternal larum rang.*"
> or, *From morn* TILL *night*, &c.

But we cannot ſay,—*From Turkey* TILL *England.*

H.

The oppoſition of Prepoſitions, as far as it reaches, does undoubtedly aſſiſt us much in the diſcovery of the meaning of each oppoſite. And if, by the total or partial extinction of an original language, there was no root left in the ground for an etymologiſt to dig up, the philoſopher ought no doubt to be ſatisfied with reaſoning from the contrariety. But I fear much, that the inveterate prejudices which I have to encounter, and which for two thouſand years have univerſally paſſed for learning throughout the world, and for deep

deep learning too, would not eaſily give way to any arguments of mine *à priori*. I am therefore compelled to reſort to etymology, and to bring forward the original word as well as its meaning. That ſame etymology will very eaſily account for the peculiarity you have noticed: and the difficulty ſolved, like other enemies ſubdued, will become an uſeful ally and additional ſtrength to the conqueror.

The oppoſition to the prepoſition FROM, reſides ſingly in the prepoſition TO. Which has not *perhaps* (for I am not clear that it has not) preciſely the ſignification of *End* or *Termination*, but of ſomething tantamount or equivalent. The prepoſition TO (in Dutch written TOE and TOT, a little nearer to the original) is the Gothic ſubſtantive TANI or TANHTS, i. e. *Act*, *Effect*, *Reſult*, *Conſummation*. Which Gothic ſubſtantive is indeed itſelf no other than

the paſt participle TANIA or TANIAS, of the verb TANGAN * *agere*. And what is *done*, is *terminated*, *ended*, *finiſhed*.

After this derivation, it will not appear in the leaſt myſterious or wonderful that we ſhould, in a peculiar manner, in Engliſh, prefix this ſame word TO to the infinitive of our verbs. For the verbs, in Engliſh, not being diſtinguiſhed, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being ſometimes impoſſible to diſtinguiſh them by their *place*, when the old termination of the Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word TO (i. e. *Act*) became neceſſary to be prefixed, in order to diſtin-

* In the Teutonic, this verb is written *Tuan* or *Tuon*, whence the modern German *Thun*, and its prepoſition (varying like its verb) *Tu*.

In the Anglo-ſaxon the verb is Teogan, and the prepoſition To.

diſtinguiſh them from NOUNS, and to inveſt them with the *verbal* character: for there is no difference between the NOUN, *Love*, and the VERB, TO *Love*, but what muſt be comprized in the prefix TO.

The infinitive therefore, appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itſelf; pure and uncompounded with the various accidents of *mood*, of *number*, of *gender*, of *perſon*, and (in Engliſh) of *tenſe*; which accidents are, in ſome languages, joined to the verb by variety of *termination*; and in ſome, by an *additional word* ſignifying the *added circumſtance*. And if our *Engliſh* Grammarians and Philoſophers had truſted ſomething leſs to their reading and a little more to their own reflection, I cannot help thinking that the very awkwardneſs and imperfection of our own language, in this particular of the *infinitive*, would have been a great benefit

to them in all their difficulties about the VERB: and would have led them to understand and explain that which the perfection of more artificial and improved languages contributed to conceal from others. For I reckon it a great advantage which an *English* philosopher has over those who are acquainted with such languages only which do this business by *termination*. For though I think I have good reasons to believe, that all these *Terminations* may likewise be traced to their respective origin; and that, however *artificial* they may now appear to us, they were not originally the effect of premeditated and deliberate *art*, but separate words by length of time corrupted and coalescing with the words of which they are now considered as the *Terminations*: Yet this was less likely to be suspected by others. And if it had been suspected, they would have had much farther to travel to their journey's end, and through a road much

much more embarraſſed; as the corruption in thoſe languages is of much longer ſtanding than in ours, and more complex.

And yet, by what fatality I know not, our Grammarians have not only ſlighted, but have even been afraid to touch this friendly clue: for of all the points which they endeavour to ſhuffle over, there is none in which they do it more groſsly than in this of the Infinitive.

Some are contented to call TO, a *mark* of the *infinitive* mood *. But *how*, or *why*, it is ſo, they are totally ſilent.

* Lowth (page 66) ſays — " The *Prepoſition* TO " placed before the Verb makes the *Infinitive Mood*." Now this is manifeſtly not ſo: for TO placed before the *Verb loveth*, will not make the *Infinitive Mood*. He would have ſaid more truly, that TO placed before ſome *Nouns* makes *Verbs*. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter, when I come to treat of the *Verb*.

Others call it a *Prepoſition*.

Others, a *Particle*.

And others † throw it into that common ſink and repoſitory of all heterogeneous unknown corruptions,—the *Adverb*.

And when they have thus given it a *name*, they hope you will be ſatisfied: at leaſt they truſt that they ſhall not be arraigned for this conduct; becauſe thoſe who ſhould arraign them, will need the ſame ſhift for themſelves.

There

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† S. Johnſon ſays—" To, *adverb* [ꝛo, Saxon; *Te*, " Dutch.]" And then, according to his uſual method, (a very convenient one for making a bulky book without trouble) proceeds to give inſtances of its various ſignifications, viz. " 1. A particle coming be- " tween two verbs, and noting the ſecond as the ob- " ject of the firſt. 2. It notes the *intention*. 3. Af- " ter an adjective it notes its *object*. 4. Noting *Fu-* " *turity*."

There is one miſtake however, from which this Prefix TO ought to have reſcued them: they ſhould not have repeated the error, of inſiſting that the *Infinitive* was a mere *Noun* *: ſince it was found neceſſary in Engliſh to add another word (viz.) TO, merely

* "The words *Actiones* and *Lectiones* (Wilkins "ſays) are but the plural number of *Agere*, *Legere*." However it muſt be acknowledged, that Wilkins endeavours to ſave himſelf by calling the *Infinitive*, not a mere noun, but a *Participle Subſtantive*.—"That which "is called the *Infinitive Mode* ſhould, according to the "true analogy of ſpeech, be ſtyled a *Participle Sub-*"*ſtantive*. There hath been formerly much diſpute "among ſome learned men, *whither* the notion called "the *Infinitive Mode* ought to be reduced according to "the philoſophy of ſpeech. Some would have it to "be the *prime* and *principal* verb; as ſignifying more "directly the notion of action: and then the other "varieties of the verb, ſhould be but the inflexions of "this. Others queſtion whether the Infinitive Mode "be a verb or no, becauſe in the Greek it receives "articles as a noun. Scaliger concludes it to be a "*verb*, but will not admit it to be a *Mode*. Voſſius "adds, that though it be not *Modus in Actu*, yet it is "*Modus in Potentia*. All which difficulties will be

merely to diſtinguiſh the *Infinitive* from the *Noun*, after the *Infinitive* had loſt that diſtinguiſhing *Termination* which it had formerly.

B.

I do not mean haſtily and without farther conſideration abſolutely to diſſent from what you have ſaid, becauſe ſome part of it appears to me plauſible enough. And had you confined yourſelf only to the *Segnacaſo* or *Prepoſition*, I ſhould not ſuddenly have found much to offer in reply. But when inſtead of the *Segnacaſo* (as Buonmattei claſſes it), or the *Prepoſition* (as all others

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" moſt clearly ſtated by aſſerting it to be a *Subſtantive* " *Participle*."

Real Character, Part IV. Chap. 6.

Mr. Harris without any palliation, ſays,—" Theſe " *Infinitives* go farther. They not only lay aſide the " character of *Attributives*, but they alſo aſſume that " of *Subſtantives*."

Hermes, Book I. Chap. 8.

others call it), or the *mark* of the *Infinitive* (as it is peculiarly uſed in Engliſh), you direct me to conſider it as the neceſſary and diſtinguiſhing *ſign* of the VERB, you do yourſelf throw difficulties in my way which it will be incumbent on you to remove. For it is impoſſible not to obſerve, that the *Infinitive* is not the only part of our Engliſh verbs, which does not differ from the noun: and it reſts upon you to explain why this neceſſary *ſign* of the *Verb* ſhould be prefixed only to the *Infinitive*, and not alſo to thoſe other parts of the verb in Engliſh which have no diſtinguiſhing *Termination*.

H.

The fact is undoubtedly as you have ſtated it. There are certainly other parts of the Engliſh verb, undiſtinguiſhed from the noun by termination; but this is to me rather a circumſtance of confirmation

than

than an objection. For the truth is, that to them alſo (*and to thoſe parts only* which have not a diſtinguiſhing termination) as well as to the Infinitive, is this diſtinguiſhing *ſign* equally neceſſary, and equally *prefixed.* Do (the *auxiliary* verb as it has been called *) is derived form the ſame root, and is

* "The verb to DO (ſays Mr. Tyrwhit, Eſſay, "Note 37) is conſidered by Wallis and other later "grammarians, as an *auxiliary* verb. It is ſo uſed, "though very *rarely*, by Chaucer. It muſt be con-"feſſed that the exact power which DO, as an auxi-"liary, now has in our language, is not eaſy to "be defined, and ſtill leſs to be accounted for from "*Analogy*."

In Chaucer's time the diſtinguiſhing terminations of the verb ſtill remained, although not conſtantly employed; and he availed himſelf of that ſituation of the language, either to uſe them or drop them, as beſt ſuited his purpoſe, and ſometimes he uſes both *termination* and *ſign.* Thus, in the Wife of Bathes Tale, he drops the *Infinitive termination*; and uſes TO.

"My liege lady: generally, quod he,
"Women deſyren TO *have* ſoveraynte
"As well over her huſbondes as her love."

And

is indeed the ſame word as TO. The difference between a T and a D is ſo very ſmall,

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And again a few lines after, he uſes the infinitive *termination*, excluding TO.

" In al the court nas there wife ne mayde
" Ne widow, that contraried that he ſaide,
" But ſaid, he was worthy HAN his lyfe."

So alſo,

" I trowe that if Envye iwys
" Knewe the beſt man that is
" On thys ſyde or beyonde the ſee
" Yet ſomwhat LACKEN him wold ſhe."

Romaunt of the Roſe.

The ſame may be ſhewn by innumerable other inſtances throughout Chaucer.

B. Johnſon, in his Grammar, ſays—" The *Perſons* " *plural* keepe the termination of the firſt perſon ſingu- " lar. In former times, till about the reigne of King " Henry the Eighth, they were wont to be formed by " adding *en*. But now (whatſoever is the cauſe) it " hath quite growne out of uſe, and that other ſo ge- " nerally prevailed that I dare not preſume to ſet this " afoot againe." This is the reaſon why Chaucer uſed both TO and DO more rarely than we uſe them at preſent.

ſmall, that an Etymologiſt knows by the *practice* of languages, and an Anatomiſt by the *reaſon* of that practice, that in the derivation of words it is ſcarce worth regarding *. And for the ſame reaſon that TO is put before the Infinitive, DO uſed formerly to be put before ſuch other parts of the VERB which likewiſe were not diſtinguiſhed from the noun by termination. As we ſtill ſay—*I* DO *love*,—inſtead of—*I love*. And *I* DOED or DID *love*—inſtead of *I loved*. But it is worth our while to obſerve, that if a diſtinguiſhing *termination* is uſed, then the diſtinguiſhing DO or DID *muſt* be omitted, the *Termination* fulfilling its office. And therefore we never find—"I DID *loved*;" or "He DOTH *loveth*." But "I DID *love*." "He DOTH *love*."

It is not indeed an approved practice at preſent, to uſe DO before thoſe parts of the *Verb*,

* See the Note, page 130.

Verb, they being now by cuſtom ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed by their *Place:* and therefore the redundancy is now avoided, and DO is conſidered, in that caſe, as unneceſſary and expletive.

However it is ſtill uſed, and is the common practice, and ſhould be uſed, whenever the diſtinguiſhing *Place* is diſturbed by *Interrogation*, or by the *inſertion* of a *negation*, or of ſome other words between the nominative caſe and the verb. As,—

"He DOES not *love* the truth.
"DOES he *love* the truth?
"He DOES at the ſame time *love* the
"truth."

And if we chuſe to avoid the uſe of this *verbal Sign*, DO, we muſt ſupply its place by a diſtinguiſhing termination to the verb. As,—

He

He *loveth* not the truth.

Loveth he the truth?

He at the ſame time *loveth* the truth.

Or where the verb has not a diſtinguiſhing termination (as in plurals)—

They DO not *love* the truth.

Do they *love* the truth?

They DO at the ſame time *love* the truth.

Here, if we wiſh to avoid the *verbal ſign*, we muſt remove the negative, or other intervening word or words from between the nominative caſe and the verb; and ſo reſtore the diſtinguiſhing *Place*. As,—

"They *love* not the truth.

"*Love* they the truth?

"At the ſame time they *love* the truth*."

And

* It is not however uncommon to ſay—"*They*, at "the ſame time, *love* the truth." Where the intervening

And thus we ſee that, though we cannot, as Mr. Tyrwhit truly ſays, account for the uſe of this *verbal ſign* from any *Analogy* to other languages, yet there is no caprice in theſe methods of employing TO and DO, ſo differently from the practice of other languages: but that they ariſe from the peculiar method which the Engliſh language has taken to arrive at the ſame neceſſary end, which other languages attain by diſtinguiſhing *Termination*.

B.

I obſerve, that Junius and Skinner and Johnſon, have not choſen to give the ſlighteſt hint concerning the derivation of TO. Minſhew diſtinguiſhes between the prepoſition TO, and the *ſign* of the Infinitive TO.

Of

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vening words (*at the ſame time*) are conſidered as merely parenthetical, and the mind of the ſpeaker ſtill preſerves the connexion of *place* between the nominative caſe and the verb.

Of the firſt he is ſilent, and of the latter he ſays—" TO, as *to make*, *to walk*, *to do*, " a Græco articulo τὸ; idem eſt ut το ϖοιειν, " το ϖερι ϖατειν, το ϖρατ]ειν." But Dr. Gregory Sharpe is perſuaded, that our language has taken it from the Hebrew. And Voſſius derives the correſpondent Latin Prepoſition AD from the ſame ſource.

H.

Yes. But our Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon anceſtors were not altogether ſo fond of the Hebrew, nor quite ſo well acquainted with it, as Dr. Sharpe and Voſſius were. And if Boerhaave could not conſent, and Voltaire thought it ridiculous, to ſeek a remedy in South America, for a diſeaſe which was prevalent in the North of Europe, how much more would they have reſiſted the etymology of this pretended Jewiſh Prepoſition! For my own part, I am perſuaded that the correſpondent Latin

Prepoſition AD has a more natural origin, and a meaning ſimilar to that of TO. It is merely the paſt participle of *Agere*. (Which paſt participle is likewiſe a Latin *Subſtantive*.)

agitum-agtum	*a*GD*um* —	*a*GD —	AD
	or	or	or
	*a*CT*um* —	*a*CT —	AT.

The moſt ſuperficial reader of Latin verſe knows, how eaſily the Romans dropped their final *um:* for their poets would never have taken that licence, had it not been previouſly juſtified by common pronunciation. And a little conſideration of the organs and practice of ſpeech, will convince him how eaſily *Agd* or *Act*, would become AD or AT *, as indeed this prepoſition

* If the reader keeps in mind the note to page 130, he will eaſily perceive how *actum* became the irregular participle of *agere*, inſtead of *agitum* or *agtum*. For it

position was indifferently written by the antients. By the moderns the *preposition* was written AD with the D only, in order to distinguish it from the other corrupt word called the *Conjunction*, AT; which for the same reason was written with the T only, though that likewise had antiently been written, as the *preposition*, either AD or AT *.

B.

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depended entirely on the employment or omission of the *compression* there noticed. And it is observable, that in *all* languages (for the natural reason is the same) if two of the letters (coupled in that note) come together, in one of which the compression should be employed and in the other omitted, the speaker for his own convenience will either employ the compression in both, or omit it in both; and that without any regard to the written character. Thus (amongst innumerable instances) an Englishman pronounces — *oBZerve* — and a Frenchman — *oPserver*.—In the same manner a Roman would pronounce the word either—*aGDum*, or *aCTum*, that he might not in two letters coming close together, shift so instantly from the *employment* to the *omission* of the compression.

* "AD & AT, non tantum ob significationem, sed "& originem diversam, diversimodè scribere *satius* est."
G. J. Vossius, Etymol. Ling. Lat.

B.

You have not yet accounted for the different employment of TILL and TO.

H.

That TILL ſhould be oppoſed to FROM, only when we are talking of *Time* and upon no other occaſion, is evidently for this reaſon (viz.) that TILL is a word compounded of TO and *While*, i. e. *Time*. And you will obſerve that the coaleſcence of theſe two words, To-hpile, took place in the language long before the preſent wanton and ſuperfluous uſe of the article THE, which by the prevailing cuſtom of modern ſpeech is now interpoſed. So that when we ſay—" *From morn* TILL *night*," —it is no more than if we ſaid—" *From* " *morn* TO TIME *night* *." When we ſay —" *From*

* It is not unuſual with the common people, and ſome antient authors, to uſe *While* alone as a *prepoſition*; that is, to leave out TO, and ſay—*I will ſtay* WHILE *Evening*.

—" *From morn* TO *night*," the word *Time* is omitted as unneceſſary. So we might ſay —" *From Turkey* TO *the* PLACE *called Eng-* " *land*;" or " TO PLACE *England*." But we leave out the mention of *Place*, as ſuperfluous, and ſay only—" TO *England*."

B.

You acknowledge then that the oppoſition of prepoſitions is uſeful, as far as it reaches. But, beſides their *oppoſition* and abſolute *contradiction*, I ſhould imagine that the marked and diſtinguiſhed manner alſo, in which different prepoſitions are ſometimes uſed in the ſame ſentence, muſt very much tend to facilitate the diſcovery of their diſtinct ſignifications.

" *Well!*

Evening. Inſtead of—TILL *Evening*; or, TO WHILE *Evening*. That is—*I will ſtay* TIME *Evening*,—inſtead of—TO TIME *Evening*. Thus—" Sygeberte wyth hys " two bretherne gave backe WHYLE they came to the " ryver of Sigoune."—" He commaunded her to be " bounden to a wylde horſe tayle by the here of her " hedde and ſo to be drawen WHYLE ſhe were dede."

"*Well! 'tis e'en so! I have got the London disease they call Love. I am sick* OF "*my husband, and* FOR *my gallant* *."

Love makes her sick OF, and sick FOR. Here OF and FOR seem almost placed in opposition; at least their effects in the sentence are most evidently different: for, by the help of these two Prepositions alone, and without the assistance of any other words, she expresses the two contrary affections of *Loathing* and *Desire*.

H.

No. Small assistance indeed, if any, can be derived from such instances as this. I rather think they tend to mislead than to direct an inquirer. Love was not here the only disease. This poor lady had a complication of distempers; she had two dis-

* Wycherley's Country Wife.

orders; a ſickneſs OF Loathing — and a ſickneſs OF deſire. She was ſick FOR Diſguſt, and ſick FOR Love.

Sick OF *diſguſt* FOR *her huſband.*
Sick OF *love* FOR *her gallant.*
Sick FOR *diſguſt* OF *her huſband.*
Sick FOR *love* OF *her gallant.*

Her diſguſt was the OFFSPRING of her huſband, *proceeded from* her huſband, was *begotten* upon her *by* her huſband. Her gallant was the *cauſe* of her love.

I think I have clearly expreſſed the meaning of her declaration. And I have been purpoſely tautologous, that by my indifferent application of the two words OF and FOR—both to her diſguſt and to her love, the ſmalleſt appearance of oppoſition between theſe prepoſitions might be done away. Indeed, the difference between them (*thus conſidered*) appears to be ſo ſmall, that the author, if it had pleaſed him, might

might have uſed OF, where he has put FOR. And that he might ſo have done, the following is a proof.

" *Marian. Come, Amie, you'll go with*
" *us.*"

" *Amie. I am not well.*"

" *Lionel. She's ſick* OF *the yong ſhep'ard*
" *that bekiſt her* *."

In the ſame manner we may, with equal propriety, ſay—" *We are ſick* OF *hunger.*" —or, " *We are ſick* FOR *hunger.*" And in both caſes we ſhall have expreſſed preciſely the ſame thing.

B.

'Tis certainly ſo in practice. But is that practice juſtifiable? For the words ſtill ſeem to me to have a very different import. Do you mean to ſay that the words OF and FOR are ſynonymous.

* Sad Shepherd, Act I. Sc. 6.

H.

Very far from it. I believe they differ as widely as CAUSE and CONSEQUENCE. I imagine the word FOR (whether denominated *Prepoſition*, *Conjunction*, or *Adverb*) to be a *Noun*, and to have always one and the ſame ſingle ſignification, viz. CAUSE, and nothing elſe. Though Greenwood attributes to it *eighteen*, and S. Johnſon *forty-ſix* different meanings: for which Greenwood cites above *forty*, and Johnſon above *two hundred* inſtances. But, with a little attention to their inſtances, you will eaſily perceive, that they uſually attribute to the *Prepoſition* the meaning of ſome other words in the ſentence.

Junius (changing P into F, and by metatheſis of the letter R) derives FOR from the Greek *προ*. Skinner from the Latin *Pro*. But I believe it to be no other than the Gothic ſubſtantive FAIKINA, CAUSE.

 I ima-

I imagine alſo that OF (in the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon ᛅᚠ and Af) is a fragment of the Gothic and Anglo-ſaxon ᛅᚠᛅᚴᛅ, poſteritas, &c. Afona, proles, &c. * That it is a noun ſubſtantive, and means always *conſequence*, *offspring*, *ſucceſſor*, *follower*, &c.

And I think it not unworthy of remark, that whilſt the old patronymical termination of our northern anceſtors was SON, the Sclavonic and Ruſſian patronymic was OF. Thus whom the Engliſh and Swedes named *Peterſon*, the Ruſſians called *Peterhof*. And as a polite foreign affectation afterwards induced ſome of our anceſtors

* "OF. A, ab. abs. de. A.S. of. D. aff. B. af. Goth. "ᛅᚠ. Exprimunt Gr. απο, ab. de: præſertim cum "απο ante vocabulum ab adſpiratione incipiens, fiat "αφ'." JUNIUS.

Minſhew and Skinner derive OF from the Latin AB, and that from the Greek απο.

ceſtors to aſſume *Fils* or *Fitz* (i. e. *Fils* or *Filius*) inſtead of SON; ſo the Ruſſian affectation in more modern times changed OF to *Vitch* (i. e. *Fitz*, *Fils*, or *Filius*) and *Peterhof* became *Petrovitch* or *Petrowitz*.

So M. de Broſſes (Tom. 2. p. 295.) obſerves of the Romans—" Remarquons " ſur les noms propres des familles Ro- " maines qu'il n'y en a *pas un ſeul* qui ne " ſoit terminé en *ius*; deſinence fort ſem- " blable à l' υἱος des Grecs, c'eſt à dire " *filius* *."

B.

Stop, Stop, Sir. Not ſo haſty, I beſeech you. Let us leave the Swedes, and the

* " Et quamvis nunc dierum habeant quidem ad " Anglorum imitationem, familiarum nomina; ſunt " tamen ea plerumque merè patronymica: ſunt enim " Price. Powel. Bowel. Bowen. Pugh. Parry. Penry. " Prichard. Probert. Proger. &c. nihil aliud quam *Ap* " Rhys. *Ap*. Howel. *Ap*. Owen. *Ap*. Hugh. *Ap*. Harry. " *Ap*. Henry. *Ap*. Richard. *Ap*. Robert. *Ap*. Roger. " &c. AP, hoc eſt MAB, filius." Wallis, Preface.

the Ruſſians, and the Greeks, and the Romans, out of the queſtion for the preſent; and confine yourſelf, if you pleaſe, as in the beginning you confined my enquiry, to the Engliſh only. Above *two hundred* inſtances, do you ſay, produced by Johnſon as proofs of at leaſt *forty-ſix* different meanings of this one prepoſition FOR, when Harris will not allow one ſingle meaning to all the prepoſitions in the world together! And is it poſſible that one and the ſame author, knowing this, ſhould in the ſame ſhort preface, and in the compaſs of a very few ſhort pages, acknowledge the former to be "*the perſon beſt qualified to give a perfect* "*Grammar* *," and yet compliment the grammar of the latter, as the ſtandard of accuracy, acuteneſs and perfection †!

H.

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* See A Short Introduction to Engliſh Gram. *Preface*, p. 6.

† See id. p. 14.

H.

Oh, my dear Sir, the wiſe men of this world know full well that the family of the *Blandiſhes* * are univerſal favourites. Good breeding and policy direct us to mention the living only with praiſe; and if we do at any time hazard a cenſure, to let it fall only on the dead.

B.

Pray, which of thoſe qualities dictated that remark?

H.

Neither. But a quality which paſſes for brutality and ill-nature: and which, in ſpite of hard blows and heavy burdens, would make me rather chuſe in the ſcale of beings to exiſt a maſtiff or a mule, than

* See the *Heireſs*. (One little morſel of falſe moral excepted) the moſt perfect and meritorious comedy, without exception, of any on our ſtage.

than a monkey or a lapdog. But why have you overlooked my civility to Mr. Harris? Do you not perceive that by contending for only one meaning to the word FOR, I am forty-five times more complaiſant to him than Johnſon is?

B.

He loves every thing that is Greek, and no doubt therefore will owe you many thanks for this *Greek* favour.—*Danaos dona ferentes*.—But confirm it, if you pleaſe; and (if you can) ſtrengthen your doubtful etymology (which I think wants ſtrengthening) by extracting your ſingle meaning of FOR from all Greenwood's and Johnſon's numerous inſtances.

H.

That would be a tedious taſk; and, I truſt, unneceſſary; and for that reaſon only I have not purſued the method you now propoſe,

propoſe, with all the other particles which I have before explained. But as this manner of conſidering the prepoſitions, though many years familiar to me, is novel to you, I may perhaps ſuppoſe it to be eaſier and clearer than it may at firſt ſight appear to others. I will riſque therefore your impatience, whilſt I explain one ſingle inſtance under each ſeparate meaning attributed to FOR.

Greenwood ſays——" The Prepoſition " FOR has a great many ſignifications, " and denotes chiefly for what *purpoſe*, " *end*, or *uſe*, or for whoſe *benefit* or *da-* " *mage* any thing is done; As—*Chriſt died* " FOR *us*." [i. e. *Cauſe* us; or We being the *Cauſe* of his dying.]

" 1. FOR ſerves to denote the *End* or " *Object* which one propoſes in any action; " As—*To fight* FOR *the public good*." [i. e.

CAUSE

CAUSE the public good; or, The public good being the *Cause* of fighting.]

" 2. It serves to mark the *Motive*, the " *Cause*, the *Subject* of any action; As— " *He does all things* FOR *the love of virtue.*" [i. e. The love of virtue being the *Cause*.]

" 3. It is used to mark the use for " which a thing is done; As——*Chelsey* " *Hospital was built* FOR *disabled soldiers.*" [i. e. Disabled Soldiers being the *Cause* of its being built.]

" 4. It is used likewise to denote *Profit*, " *Advantage*, *Interest*; As—*I write* FOR " *your satisfaction.*" [i. e. Your satisfaction being the *cause* of my writing.]

" 5. It is used to denote for what a " thing is *Proper*, or not; As—*It is a* " *good remedy* FOR *the Fever.* In which

" laſt example *to cure* is to be under-
" ſtood." [i. e. Curing the Fever being the *Cauſe* that it is called a *good* remedy.]

" 6. This prepoſition is uſed to denote
" *Agreement* or *Help*; As—*The Soldier*
" *fights* FOR *the King*." [i. e. The King being the *Cauſe* of his fighting.]

" 7. It is uſed to denote the *Convenience*
" or *Inconvenience* of a thing; As—*He is*
" *big enough* FOR *his age*." [i. e. His age being the *Cauſe* that he is big ENOUGH; or that his ſize anſwers our expectation.]

" 8. It is uſed to denote *Exchange* or
" *Trucking*, *Recompence*, *Retribution* or
" *Requital* and *Payment*; As—*He rewarded*
" *him* FOR *his good ſervices*." [i. e. His good ſervices being the *Cauſe* of reward.]

" Hither we may likewiſe refer theſe
" phraſes, *Eye* FOR *Eye*," &c. [i. e. An

eye

eye (deſtroyed by malicious violence) being the *Cauſe* of an eye taken from the convict in puniſhment.]

" 9. It is uſed to denote *Inſtead of*, *in* " *the Place of*; As—*I will grind* FOR *him*." [i. e. He being the *Cauſe* of my grinding.]

" Sometimes it ſerves to denote a *Miſ-* " *take*; As—*He ſpeaks one word* FOR *ano-* " *ther*." [i. e. Another word being the *Cauſe* of his ſpeaking that word which he ſpeaks.]

" 10. It is uſed to denote the *Diſtri-* " *bution* of things by *Proportion* to ſeveral " others; As—*He ſets down twelve Acres* " FOR *every man*." [i. e. Every or each man being the *Cauſe* of his ſetting down *twelve* acres.]

" 11. It denotes the *Condition of Perſons*, " *Things* and *Times*; As—*He was a learned*

" *man* FOR *those times.*" [i. e. The darkness or ignorance of those times being the *Cause* why he may be considered as a *learned* man.]

" 12. It is likewise used to denote *in* " *the quality of*; As—*He suborned him* FOR " *a witness.*" [i. e. FOR that he might be a witness; or, FOR to be a witness.—That he might be a witness; or, to be a witness being the *Cause* of his suborning him.]

" It signifies likewise as much as *Be-* " *cause of, By reason of*; As—*To punish a* " *a man* FOR *his crimes.*" [i. e. His crimes being the *Cause* of punishment.]

" It signifies *As*, or *To be*; As—*He was* " *sent* FOR *a pledge.*" [i. e. That he might be a pledge, or to be a pledge being the *Cause* of his being sent.]

" *During*;

" *During*; to denote the *Future Time*; " As—*He was chosen* [to some office] FOR " *life*." [i. e. To continue in that office FOR life; or, FOR the continuance of his life—The continuance of his life being the *Cause* of the continuance of his office.]

" *Concerning*, *About*; As—*As* FOR *me*." [The sentence here is not compleat; but it shall be explained amongst Johnson's instances.]

" *Notwithstanding*: As, after having " spoke of the faults of a man, we add, " FOR *all that*, *he is an honest man*." [i. e. Though all that has been said may be the *Cause* of thinking otherwise, yet he is an honest man.]

S. Johnson says, " FOR, Preposition.

" 1. *Because of*—*That which we* FOR *our* " *unworthiness* [i. e. our unworthiness the

" *Cauſe*] *are afraid to crave, our prayer is,*
" *that God* FOR *the worthineſs of his Son*
" [i. e. the worthineſs of his Son being
" the *Cauſe*] *would notwithſtanding vouch-*
" *ſafe to grant.*"

" 2. *With reſpect to, with regard to*; As

" *Lo, ſome are vellom, and the reſt as good*
" FOR *all his lordſhip knows, but they are wood.*"

[i. e. As far as all that his lordſhip knows is the *Cauſe* of their being denominated *good* or bad, the reſt are as good.]

" 3. In this ſenſe it has often *As* before
" it; As—*As* FOR *Maramaldus the gene-*
" *ral, they had no juſt cauſe to miſlike him,*
" *being an old captain of great experience.*"
[i. e. As far as Maramaldus the general might be a *Cauſe* of their diſcontent, they had no *juſt* cauſe to miſlike him.]

" 4. In

" 4. In the *Character* of; As—

" *Say, is it fitting in this very field,*
" *This field, where from my youth I've been a carter,*
" *I in this field ſhould die* FOR *a deſerter.*"

[i. e. Being a Deſerter, being the *Cauſe* of my dying.]

" 5. *With reſemblance of*; As—

" *Forward he flew, and pitching on his head,*
" *He quiver'd with his feet, and lay* FOR *dead.*"

[i. e. As if Death, or his being dead, had been the *Cauſe* of his laying; or, He lay in that *manner*, in which death or being dead is the *Cauſe* that perſons ſo lay.]

" 6. *Conſidered as*; *in the place of*; As

" *Read all the Prefaces of Dryden:*
" FOR *thoſe our critics much confide in;*
" *Though merely writ at firſt* FOR *filling,*
" *To raiſe the volume's price a ſhilling.*"

[i. e. Read, &c. the *Cauſe* why you ſhould read them, being, that our critics confide

in them. Though to fill up and to raiſe the volume's price was the *Cauſe* that they were at firſt written.]

" 7. *In advantage of*; *For the ſake of*; " As—

" *Shall I think the world was made* FOR *one,*
" *And men are born* FOR *kings, as beaſts* FOR *men.*"

[i. e. Shall I think that one man was the *Cauſe* why the world was made; that kings are the *Cauſe* why men were born; as men are the *Cauſe* why there are beaſts.]

" 8. *Conducive to*; *Beneficial to*; As— " *It is* FOR *the general good of human ſo-* " *ciety, and conſequently of particular per-* " *ſons, to be true and juſt: and it is* FOR " *men's health to be temperate.*" [i. e. The general good, &c. is the *Cauſe* why it is *fit* or a *duty* to be true and juſt: and men's health is the *Cauſe* why it is *fit* or a *duty* to be temperate.]

" 9.

"9. *With intention of going to a certain* "*place*; As—*We ſailed directly* FOR *Ge-* "*noa.*" [i. e. Genoa, or that we might go to Genoa, being the *Cauſe* of our ſailing.]

"10. *In comparative reſpect*; As—FOR "*Tuſks with Indian elephants he ſtrove.*" [i. e. He contended for a ſuperiority over the elephants; Tuſks, or the claim of a ſuperiority in point of Tuſks, being the *Cauſe* of the ſtriving or contention.]

"11. *In proportion to*; As—*As he could* "*ſee clear*, FOR *thoſe times, through ſuper-* "*ſtition, ſo he would be blinded, now and* "*then, by human policy.*" [i. e. The darkneſs, or ignorance, or bigotry of thoſe times being the *Cauſe*, why even ſuch ſight, as he then had, may be called or reckoned clear.]

" 12. *With appropriation to*; As—*Sha-*
" *dow will ſerve* FOR *ſummer. Prick him:*
" FOR *we have a number of Shadows to fill*
" *up the Muſter-book.*" [i. e. Summer is the *Cauſe* why *Shadow* will *ſerve*, i. e. will do; or will be proper to be taken. Prick him: the *Cauſe* (why I will have him pricked, or ſet down) is, that we have many ſhadows to fill up the Muſter-book.]

" 13. After O, *an expreſſion of Deſire*;
" As—

" *O!* FOR *a Muſe of fire, that would aſcend*
" *The brighteſt heaven of invention.*"

[i. e. O! I wiſh FOR a Muſe of fire, &c. i. e. A Muſe of fire being the *Cauſe* of my wiſhing.]

" 14. *In account of*; *In ſolution of*; As
" —*Thus much* FOR *the beginning and pro-*
" *greſs of the deluge.*" [i. e. The beginning and progreſs of the deluge is the

Cauſe

Cauſe of thus much, or of that which I have written.] N. B. An obſolete and aukward method of ſignifying to the reader, that the ſubject mentioned ſhall not be the *Cauſe* of writing any more. It is a favourite phraſe with Mr. Harris, repeated perpetually with a diſguſting and pedantic affectation, in imitation of the Greek philoſophers; but has certainly paſſed upon ſome perſons, as "*elegance of me-* "*thod*, as *Beauty*, *Taſte*, and *Fine Writing*."

"15. *Inducing to as a motive*; As—— "*There is a natural, immutable, and eternal* "*reaſon* FOR *that which we call virtue*; *and* "*againſt that which we call vice*." [Or, That which we call virtue, we call virtue FOR a natural, eternal, and immutable reaſon, i. e. a natural, eternal, and immutable reaſon being the *Cauſe* of our ſo calling it.—Or, There is a natural, eternal, and

and immutable reaſon the *Cauſe* of that which we call virtue.]

" 16. *In expectation of*; As—*He muſt* " *be back again by one and twenty, to marry* " *and propagate: the father cannot ſtay any* " *longer* FOR *the portion, nor the mother* FOR " *a new ſet of babies to play with.*" [i. e. The Portion being the *Cauſe* why the father cannot ſtay any longer; a new ſet of babies to play with being the *Cauſe* why the mother cannot ſtay longer.]

" 17. Noting *Power* or *Poſſibility*; As " —FOR *a holy perſon to be humble*; FOR " *one, whom all men eſteem a ſaint, to fear* " *leſt himſelf become a devil, is as hard as* " FOR *a prince to ſubmit himſelf to be guided* " *by Tutors.*" [i. e. To be humble is hard or difficult *Becauſe*, or the *Cauſe* being, he is a holy perſon: To fear leſt himſelf become a devil is difficult *Becauſe*, or, the

Cauſe

Cauſe being, he is one whom all men *eſteem a ſaint:* To ſubmit himſelf to be guided by Tutors is difficult *Becauſe*, or, the *Cauſe* being, he is a *Prince*. And all theſe things are equally difficult.]

" 18. Noting *Dependence*; As—*The co-*
" *lours of outward objects, brought into a*
" *darkened room, depend* FOR *their viſibility*
" *upon the dimneſs of the light they are beheld*
" *by*." [i. e. Depend upon the dimneſs of the light as the *Cauſe* of their viſibility.]

" 19. *In Prevention of, for Fear of*; As

" *Corn being had down, any way ye allow,*
" *Should wither as needeth* FOR *burning in Mow*."

[i. e. Burning in Mow, the *Cauſe* why it needeth to wither.]

" *And,* FOR *the time ſhall not ſeem tedious,*
" *I'll tell thee what befell me on a day*."

[i. e. The *Cauſe* of my telling thee, is, that the time may not ſeem tedious.]

" 20. *In Remedy of*; As—*Sometimes hot,* " *ſometimes cold things are good* FOR *the* " *tooth-ach.*" [i. e. Their curing the tooth-ach the *Cauſe* of their being called *good.*]

" 21. *In Exchange for*; As—*He made* " *conſiderable progreſs in the ſtudy of the* " *law, before he quitted that profeſſion* FOR " *this of Poetry.*" [i. e. The profeſſion of Poetry, the *Cauſe* of his quitting the profeſſion of the law.]

" 22. *In the Place of, Inſtead of*; As— " *To make him copious is to alter his cha-* " *racter; and to tranſlate him line* FOR *line* " *is impoſſible.*" [i. e. Line *Cauſe* of line, or, Each line of the original being the *Cauſe* of each line of the tranſlation.]

" 23. *In Supply of, to ſerve in the Place* " *of*; As—*Moſt of our ingenious young men* " *take up ſome cried-up Engliſh poet* FOR

" *their*

" *their model.*" [i. e. To be their model the *Cauſe* of taking him.]

" 24. *Through a certain Duration*; As

" *Since hir'd* FOR *life thy ſervile muſe muſt ſing,*
" *Succeſſive conqueſts and a glorious king.*"

[i. e. The continuance of your life the *Cauſe* of the continuance of your hire.]

" 25. *In Search of, in Queſt of*; As—
" *Some of the philoſophers have run ſo far*
" *back* FOR *arguments of comfort againſt*
" *pain, as to doubt whether there were any*
" *ſuch thing.*" [i. e. Arguments of comfort againſt pain the *Cauſe* of running ſo far back.]

" 26. *According to*; As—*Chymiſts have*
" *not been able,* FOR *aught is vulgarly known,*
" *by fire alone to ſeparate true ſulphur from*
" *antimony.*" [i. e. Any thing which is vulgarly

vulgarly known, being the *Cause* of ability, or of their being supposed to be able.]

" 27. Noting a *State of Fitness or* " *Readiness*; As—*Nay if you be an Under-* " *taker, I am* FOR *you*." [i. e. I am an Undertaker, an Adversary, a Fighter, &c. FOR you; or, I will undertake you; i. e. You the *Cause* of my being an Undertaker, &c.]

" 28. *In Hope of, for the Sake of*, noting " the *final Cause*; As—*Scholars are frugal* " *of their words, and not willing to let any* " *go* FOR *ornament, if they will not serve* " FOR *use*." [i. e. Ornament the *Cause*; Use the *Cause*.]

" 29. *Of Tendency to, Towards*; As— " *It were more* FOR *his honour to raise the* " *siege, than to spend so many good men in* " *the winning of it by force*." [i. e. His honour

honour the *Cauſe* why it were more *expedient*, *fitting*, *proper*, &c. to raiſe the ſiege.

" 30. *In Favour of, on the Part of, on* " *the Side of*; As—*It becomes me not to* " *draw my pen in the defence of a bad cauſe,* " *when I have ſo often drawn it* FOR *a* " *good one.*" [i. e. A good one being the *Cauſe* of drawing it.]

" 31. Noting *Accommodation*, or *Adaptation*: As—*Perſia is commodiouſly ſituated* " FOR *trade both by ſea and land.*" [i. e. Trade the *Cauſe* of its being ſaid to be *commodiouſly* ſituated.]

" 32. *With Intention of*; As—

" *And by that juſtice haſt remov'd the Cauſe*
" *Of thoſe rude tempeſts, which,* FOR *rapine ſent,*
" *Too oft alas involv'd the innocent.*"

[i. e. Rapine the *Cauſe* of their being ſent.]

" 33.

" 33. *Becoming, Belonging to*; As—

" *It were not* FOR *your quiet, nor your good,*
" *Nor* FOR *my manhood, honesty and wisdom,*
" *To let you know my thoughts.*"

[i. e. Your quiet is a *Cause*, your good is a *Cause*, my manhood, my honesty, my wisdom, each is a *Cause*, why it is not *fit* or *proper* to let you know my thoughts.]

" 34. *Notwithstanding*; As—*Probability* " *supposes that a thing may, or may not be* " *so,* FOR *any thing that yet is certainly* " *determined on either side.*" [i. e. Any thing yet determined being the *Cause* of concluding.]

" 35. FOR ALL. *Notwithstanding*; As " —FOR ALL *his exact plot, down was he* " *cast from all his greatness.*" [i. e. His exact plot being, all of it, a *Cause* to expect otherwise; yet he was cast down.]

" 36.

" 36. *To the Use of, to be used in*; As—

" *The Oak* FOR *nothing ill*;
" *The Osier good* FOR *twigs*; *the Poplar* FOR *the Mill.*"

[i. e. Not any thing the *Cause* why the oak should be pronounced bad; Twigs the *Cause* why the osier should be called good; the Mill the *Cause* why the poplar should be esteemed useful.]

" 37. *In consequence of*; As—FOR *love*
" *they force through thickets of the wood.*"
[i. e. Love the *Cause*.]

" 38. *In recompense of*; As—

" *Now* FOR *so many glorious actions done*
" FOR *peace at home, and* FOR *the public wealth,*
" *I mean to crown a bowl to Cæsar's health:*
" *Besides in gratitude* FOR *such high matters,*
" *Know I have vow'd two hundred Gladiators.*"

[i. e. I mean to crown a bowl to Cæsar's health, the *Cause*—so many glorious actions; the *Cause*—peace at home; the *Cause*—the

public weal. Beſides, I have in gratitude vowed two hundred gladiators, ſuch high matters being the *Cauſe* of my gratitude.]

" 39. *In proportion to*; As—*He is not* " *very tall, yet* FOR *his years he's tall.*" [i. e. His years the *Cauſe* why he may be eſteemed tall.]

" 40. *By means of*; *by interpoſition of*; " As—*Moral conſiderations can no way* " *move the ſenſible appetite, were it not* FOR " *the will.*" [i. e. Were not the will the *Cauſe*.]

" 41. *In regard of*; *in preſervation of*; " As—*I cannot* FOR *my life.*" [i. e. My Life being the *Cauſe*; or, To ſave my life being the *Cauſe* why I ſhould do it: i. e. though my life were at ſtake.]

" 42.

" 42. FOR *to*: As—*I come* FOR *to ſee* " *you.*" [i. e. To ſee you being the *Cauſe* of my coming.]

——" *A large poſterity*
" *Up to your happy palaces may mount,*
" *Of bleſſed ſaints* FOR *to increaſe the count.*"

[i. e. To increaſe the number being the *Cauſe* of their mounting.]

FOR. *Conjunction* *; As—

" *Heav'n*

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* So the French correſpondent *Conjunction* CAR (by old French authors written *Quhar*) is no other than *Quâ re*, or, *Que* (i. e. Και) *eâ re*.

" QU and C, (ſays Laurenbergius) communionem ha-
" buere apud antiquos, ut *Arquus*, *oquulus*, pro arcus,
" oculus. Priſc. Viciſſim *anticus*, *eculus*, pro antiquus,
" equulus, antiqui libri. *Cum* & *quum*, *cui* & *qui*.
" Terentius Andriâ: *Qui mihi expurgandus eſt*, pro
" cui: annotat Donatus. *Querquera febris*, Lucilius:
" *Quercera*, Gellius lib. 20. *Cotidie*, non *Quotidie*,
" ſcribunt Quintil. & Victorinus. *Stercilinium*, pro
" ſterquilinio, habent libri veteres Catonis de R. R.
" & Terentius Phormione: *Inſece* & *Inſeque*. Ennius,

 " Livius,

" *Heav'n doth with us as we with torches deal,*
" *Not light them* FOR *themſelves:* FOR *if our virtues*
" *Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike*
" *As if we had them not.*"

[i. e. Themſelves not being the *Cauſe* of lighting them. If our virtues did not go

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" Livius, Cato: ut diſputat Gellius lib. 18. cap. 19.
" *Hujuſce*, & *hujuſque*, promiſcue olim ſcribebant.
" Hinc *Fortuna hujuſce diei*, apud Plinium, lib. 34.
" &, *Fortuna hujuſque diei*, apud Ciceronem, lib. 2.
" de legibus. Et Victor de regionibus urbis: VICUS.
" HUJUSQUE. DIEI. FORT. ÆD. Lex vetus ædificii:
" DIES OPERIS K. NOVEMB. PRIMEIS DIES PEQVVN.
" PARS DIMIDIA DABITUR VBI PRÆDIA SATIS
" SUBSIGNATA ERUNT. ALTERA PARS DIMIDIA
" SOLVETUR OPERE PERFECTO PROBATO QUE."

Of which innumerable other inſtances might alſo be given. And the Latins in cutting off the E at the end of *Que*, only followed the example of the Greeks, who did the ſame by Και (as ſhould have been mentioned before in the note to page 129). Thus in Sappho's ode to Venus,

Ηρε ὁτῖι δ' ην το πεπονθα, κ' ὁτῖι
Δευρο καλοιμι.
Κ' ὁτῖι γ' εμω μαλιςτ' εθελω γινεσθαι.

Αι δε μη φιλει ταχεως φιλησει
Κ' ὁτῖι κελευης.

go forth of us, 'twere all alike as if we had them not: That is the *Cauſe* why heaven doth deal with us, as we deal with torches.]

" 2. *Becauſe*; *on this account that*; As " —*I doubt not but great troops would be* " *ready to run*; *yet* FOR *that the worſt men* " *are moſt ready to move, I would wiſh them* " *choſen by diſcretion of wiſe men.*" [i. e. The worſt men are the moſt ready to move. That is the *Cauſe* why I would wiſh *them* (not the worſt men, but the troops) choſen by diſcretion of wiſe men.

" 3. *For as much. In regard that*; *in* " *conſideration of*; As—FOR *as much as* " *the thirſt is intolerable, the patient may* " *be indulged the free uſe of Spaw water.*" [i. e. As much as the thirſt is intolerable, is the *Cauſe* why the patient may be indulged.]

" 4. FOR WHY. *Becauſe; For this rea-*
" *ſon that*; AS, *Solyman had three hundred*
" *field pieces, that a Camel might well carry*
" *one of them, being taken from the car-*
" *riage:* FOR WHY, *Solyman purpoſing to*
" *draw the emperor unto battle, had brought*
" *no greater pieces of battery with him.*"
[i. e. the *Cauſe*, that.]

B.

FOR, is not yet your own, however hard you have ſtruggled for it: for, beſides Greenwood and S. Johnſon, you have ſtill three others to contend with. Wilkins aſſigns *two* meanings to FOR. He ſays, it denotes—" *the efficient or final cauſe, and* " *adjuvancy or agreement with.*"

Lowth aſſerts that—" FOR, *in its pri-* " *mary ſenſe, is* loco alterius, *in the* ſtead " *or* place *of another.*" And he therefore cenſures Swift for ſaying—" *Accuſed the*

" *miniſters* FOR *betraying the Dutch.*" And Dryden for ſaying—" *You accuſe Ovid* FOR " *luxuriancy of verſe.*" Where, inſtead of " FOR, he ſays OF ſhould be written.

And Mr. Tyrwhit, in his Gloſſary, ſays —" FOR. *Prep. Sax. ſometimes ſignifies* A- " GAINST." Of which he gives three inſtances.

" He didde next his white lere
" Of cloth of lake fin and clere
" A breche and eke a ſherte
" And next his ſhert an haketon
" And over that an habergeon
" FOR percing of his herte."

Mr. Tyrhwitt ſays,—" AGAINST, or to " prevent piercing."

" Therfore FOR ſtealyng of the roſe
" I rede her nat the yate unclofe."

Mr. T. ſays—" *Againſt* ſtealing."

" Some ſhall ſow the ſacke
" FOR ſheding of the wheate."

Mr. T. ſays—" to prevent ſhedding."

H.

As Wilkins has produced no *inſtances*, he has given me nothing to take hold of. And let any ingenuity try whether it can, with any colour of plauſibility, apply Dr. Lowth's meaning of *loco alterius*, or any other *ſingle* meaning (except *Cauſe*) to the inſtances I have already explained. His corrections of Swift and of Dryden, are both miſplaced. For the meaning of theſe paſſages, is,—

" *Betraying the Dutch* }
" *Luxuriancy of verſe* } CAUSE of the accuſation."

So alſo in Mr. Tyrwhit's inſtances, though their conſtruction is aukward and faulty, and now out of uſe, yet is the meaning of FOR equally conſpicuous. The *Cauſe* of putting on the Habergeon, of the advice not to open the gate, of ſowing the ſack—being reſpectively—that the heart might not be pierced, that the roſe might not

not be ſtolen, that the wheat might not be ſhed.

B.

I will trouble you with only one inſtance of my own. How do you account for this ſentence?—" *To the diſgrace of common ſenſe* " *and common honeſty, after a long debate* " *concerning the Rohillas, a new writ was* " *moved* FOR FOR *old Sarum: and every* " *orator was tongue-tied. Although it is as* " *much the duty of the Houſe of Commons to* " *examine the claim of repreſentation, as of* " *the other houſe to examine the claim of* " *peerage.*" Is the repetition of FOR tautologous, or only aukward?

H.

Only aukward. For here are two *Cauſes* mentioned. The *Cauſe* of the writ, and the *Cauſe* of the motion. By a ſmall tranſpoſition of the words you may remove the aukward-

aukwardneſs and perceive the ſignification of the phraſe.—" *A motion was made* FOR " *a new writ* FOR *old Sarum.*" [i. e. A new writ—*Cauſe* of the motion. Old Sarum, or a vacancy at Old Sarum,—*Cauſe* of the writ.] And you will perceive that FOR may be repeated in a ſentence as often as you mean to indicate a *Cauſe*; and never elſe. As, " *A motion was made* FOR *an* " *order* FOR *a writ* FOR *the election of a* " *burgeſs* FOR *to ſerve in parliament* FOR " *the borough of Old Sarum.*"

1. An order—Cauſe of the motion.

2. A writ—Cauſe of the order.

3. Election of a burgeſs—Cauſe of the writ.

4. To ſerve in Parliament—Cauſe of the election.

5. Borough of Old Sarum—Cauſe of the ſervice in Parliament.

B.

But if the words FOR and OF differ ſo widely as you ſay; if the one means *Cauſe* and the other means *Conſequence*; by what etymological legerdemain will you be able to account for that indifferent uſe of them which you juſtified in the inſtances of

" *Sickneſs* OF hunger; and *Sickneſs* FOR hunger."
" *Sickneſs* OF love; and *Sickneſs* FOR love."

H.

Qualified as it is by you, it is fortunate for me that I ſhall not need to reſort to Etymology for the explanation. Between the reſpective terms

" *Sickneſs* —— *Hunger*,
" *Sickneſs* —— *Love*,"

it is certainly indifferent to the ſignification which of the two prepoſitions you may pleaſe to inſert between them, whether OF or FOR: this being the only difference, that

if

if you insert OF, it is put in *apposition* to *Sickness*; and *Sickness* is announced the *Consequence:* if you insert FOR, it is put in apposition to *Hunger* or to *Love*; and *Hunger* or *Love* is announced the *Cause* *.

H. B

I do not well understand how you employ the term *Apposition*. Scaliger, under the head *Appositio*, (Cap. CLXXVII. de causis) says—" Caussa propter quam duo " *sub-*

* The Dutch are supposed to use *Van* in two meanings; because it supplies indifferently the places both of our OF and FROM. Notwithstanding which *Van* has always one and the same single meaning, viz. *Beginning*. And its use both for OF and FROM is to be explained by its different *apposition*. When it supplies the place of FROM, *Van* is put in *apposition* to the same term to which FROM is put in *apposition*. But when it supplies the place of OF, it is *not* put in *apposition* to the same term to which OF is put in *apposition*, but to its *correlative*. And between two *correlative* terms, it is totally indifferent to the meaning which of the two correlations is expressed.

" *ſubſtantiva* non ponuntur ſine copula, è
" philoſophia petenda eſt. Si aliqua ſub-
" ſtantia ejuſmodi eſt, ut ex ea & alia,
" unum intelligi queat; earum duarum
" ſubſtantiarum totidem notæ (id eſt *no-*
" *mina*) in oratione ſine conjunctione co-
" hærere poterunt."

H.

What Scaliger ſays is very true. And this is the caſe with all thoſe *prepoſitions* (as they are called) which are really *ſubſtantives*. Each of theſe—ejuſmodi eſt, ut ex ea & *alia* (to which it is *prefixed*, *poſtfixed*, or by any manner *attached*) unum intelligi queat.

B.

If it be as you ſay, it may not perhaps be ſo impoſſible as Lord Monboddo imagines, to make a Grammar even for the moſt barbarous languages: and the

Savages may poſſibly have as compleat a *ſyntax* as ourſelves. Have you conſidered what he ſays upon that ſubject, Vol. I. Book 3. of his Origin and Progreſs of Language *?

H.

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* "The laſt thing I propoſed to conſider was, the "expreſſion of the *relation* or *connexion* of things, and "of the words expreſſing them: which makes what "we call *Syntax*, and is the principal part of the gram-"matical art."

"Now let ever ſo many words be thrown together "of the moſt clear and determinate meaning, yet if "they are not ſome way connected, they will never "make diſcourſe, nor form ſo much as a ſingle pro-"poſition. This connexion of the parts of ſpeech in "languages of art is either by ſeparate words, ſuch as "prepoſitions and conjunctions, or by caſes, genders, "and numbers, in nouns, &c. But in leſs perfect "languages the moſt of them are denoted by ſeparate "words.

"Now as every kind of relation is a *pure idea of* "*intellect*, *which never can be apprehended by ſenſe*, and "as ſome of thoſe relations, particularly ſuch of them "as are expreſſed by caſes, are very abſtract and me-"taphyſical,

H.

I could ſooner believe with Lord Monboddo, that there are men with tails like cats,

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" taphyſical, it is not to be expected that ſavages ſhould " have any ſeparate and diſtinct idea of thoſe relations. " They will therefore not expreſs them by ſeparate " words, or by the variation of the ſame word, but " will throw them into the lump with the things them- " ſelves. This will make their ſyntax wretchedly im- " perfect.—There are only three barbarous languages, " ſo far as I know, of which we have any particular " account publiſhed that can be depended upon. The " Huron, the Galibi, and the Caribbee; of which we " have Dictionaries and Grammars alſo, *ſo far as it is* " *poſſible to make a Grammar of them.* With reſpect " to ſyntax, the Hurons appear to have *none at all:* " for they have not *prepoſitions* or *conjunctions.* They " have no genders, numbers, or caſes, for their nouns; " nor moods for their verbs. In ſhort they have not, " ſo far as I can diſcover, any way of connecting to- " gether the words of their diſcourſe. Thoſe ſavages " therefore, though they have invented words, uſe " them as our children do when they begin to ſpeak, " without connecting them together: from which we " may infer, that Syntax, which completes the work " of language, comes laſt in the order of invention, " and perhaps is the moſt difficult part of lan- " guage.

cats, as long as his lordſhip pleaſes *; and conclude with him, from the authority of his

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" guage. It would ſeem however, that perſons may " make themſelves underſtood without ſyntax. And " there can be no doubt but that the *poſition* of the " word will commonly determine what other word in " the ſentence it is connected with."

*. As his Lordſhip (Vol. I. page 238) ſeems to wiſh for farther authorities for human tails, eſpecially of any tolerable length, I can help him to a tail of a foot long, if that will be of any ſervice.

" Avant que d'avoir vû cette ile, j'avois ſouvent " oüy dire qu'il y avoit des hommes à longues queües " comme les bêtes; mais je n'avois jamais pu le croire, " & je penſois la choſe ſi éloignée de nôtre nature, que " j'y eus encore de la peine, lorſque mes ſens m'ôte- " rent tout lieu d'en douter par une avanture aſſez " bizarre. Les habitans de FORMOSA etant accou- " tumez à nous voir, nous en uſions enſemble avec " aſſez de confiance pour ne rien craindre de part ni " d'autre; ainſi quoy qu' étrangers nous nous croyons " en ſeureté, & marchions ſouvent ſans eſcorte, lorſ- " que l'experience nous fit connoître que c'etoit trop " nous hazarder. Un jour quelques uns de nos gens " ſe promenant enſemble, un de nos miniſtres, qui " etoit

his *famiſhed* friend, that human fleſh (even to thoſe who are not *famiſhed*) is the ſweeteſt

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" etoit de la compagnie, s'en eloigna d'un jet de pierre " pour quelques beſoins naturels ; les autres cependant " marchoient toûjours fort attentifs à un recit qu'on " leur faiſoit ; quand il fut fini ils ſe ſouvinrent que le " miniſtre ne revenoit point, ils l'attendirent quelque " temps ; apres quoy las d'attendre, ils allerent vers " le lieu ou ils crurent qu'il devoit être : Ils le trouve- " rent mais ſans vie, & le triſte état où il étoit fit bien " connoitre qu'il n'avoit pas langui long-temps. Pen- " dant que les uns le gardoient, les autres allerent de " divers côtez pour decouvrir le meurtrier : ils n'alle- " rent pas loin ſans trouver un homme, qui ſe voyant " ſerré par les notres, ecumoit, hurloit, & faiſoit com- " prendre qu'il feroit repentir le premier qui l'ap- " procheroit. Ses manieres deſeſperées firent d'abord " quelqu' impreſſion ; mais enfin la frayeur ceda, on prit " ce miſerable qui avoüa qu'il avoit tué le miniſtre, mais " on ne put ſçavoir pourquoy. Comme le crime étoit " atroce, & que l'impunité pouvoit avoir de facheuſes " ſuites, on le condamna à être brulé. Il fut attaché " à un poteau où il demeura quelques heures avant " l'execution ; ce fut alors que je vis ce que juſques- " là je n'avois pu croire ; ſa queuë étoit longue de plus " d'un pied toute couverte d'un poil roux, & fort " ſemblable à celle d'un bœuf. Quand il vit que les " ſpectateurs étoient ſurpris de voir en lui ce qu'ils

ſweeteſt of all viands to the human taſte, than admit that " every kind of *relation* is " a *pure idea of intellect*, which *never can* " *be apprehended by ſenſe*; and that thoſe " particularly which are expreſſed by caſes, " are more abſtract and metaphyſical than " the others."

But his lordſhip and his fautors will do well to contend ſtoutly and obſtinately for their doctrine of language, for they are menaced with a greater danger than *they* will at firſt apprehend: for if they give up their doctrine of language, they will not be able to make even a battle for their Metaphyſics: the very term *Metaphyſic* being nonſenſe; and all the ſyſtems of it, and con-

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" n'avoit point, il leur dit que ce defaut, ſi c'en etoit " un, venoit du climat, puiſque tous ceux de la partie " meridionale de cette Ile dont il étoit, en avoient " comme lui."

Voyages de Jean Struys, An. 1650. Tom. I. Chap. x.

controverſies concerning it, that are or have been in the world, being founded on the groſſeſt ignorance of words and of the nature of ſpeech.

As far as relates to *Prepoſitions* and *Conjunctions*, on which (he ſays) *Syntax* depends, the *principal and moſt difficult part* (as he calls it) of the Grammatical art, and which (according to him) is the *laſt in order of invention*, and compleats the work of language: As far as relates to theſe prepoſitions and conjunctions, I hope it is by this time pretty evident that, inſtead of *invention*, the *claſſes* of them ſpring from *corruption*; and that, in this reſpect, the Savage languages are upon an equal footing with the languages (as they are called) of *art*, except that the former are leſs corrupted: and that ſavages have not only as *ſeparate and diſtinct ideas* of thoſe relations as we have, but that they have

this advantage over us (an advantage in point of intelligibility, though it is a disadvantage in point of brevity) that they also *express* them separately and distinctly. For our *Prepositions* and *Conjunctions*, like the language of the Savages, are merely— "so many words of the most clear and de- "terminate meaning thrown together," or, (as he afterwards strangely expresses it)—"*thrown into the lump with the things* "themselves *."

B.

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* What Lord Monboddo has delivered concerning Syntax, he has taken, in his own clumsy way, from the following erroneous article of M. de Brosses.—147. *Fabrique des Syntaxes barbares.*—" Dans son origine, " elle n'a d'abord eu qu'un amas confus de signes " épars appliqués selon le besoin aux objets à mesure " qu'on les découvroit. Peu à peu la nécessité de faire " connoître les circonstances des idées jointes aux cir- " constances des objets, & de les rendre dans l'ordre " où l'esprit les place, a, par une logique naturelle, " commencé de fixer la veritable signification des mots, " leur

B.

Well, Sir, after this tedious inveſtigation of FOR, (one half of which I think might have been ſpared) let us now, if you

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" leur liaiſon, leur régime, leurs dérivations. Par " l'uſage reçu & invétéré, les tournures habituelles " ſont devenues les préceptes de l'art bons ou mauvais, " c'eſt à dire bien ou mal faits ſelon le plus ou le moins " de logique qui y à preſidé; & comme les peuples " barbares n'en ont gueres, auſſi leurs langues ſont " elles ſouvent pauvres & mal conſtruites: mais à " meſure que le peuple ſe police, on voit mieux l'abus " des uſages, & la ſyntaxe s'épure par de meilleures " habitudes qui deviennent de nouveaux preceptes. " Je n'en dis pas davantage ſur l'etabliſſement des ſyn- " taxes; & même ſi j'y reviens dans la ſuite, ce ne " ſera qu'en peu de mots. *C'eſt une matiere immenſe* " dans ſes details, qui demanderoit un livre entier pour " la ſuivre dans toutes les opérations mechaniques du " concept, qui en général la rendent néceſſaire en con- " ſequence de la fabrique du ſens interieur, mais tres " arbitraire dans ſes petits details, par le nombre in- " fini de routes longues ou courtes, droites ou tortues, " bonnes ou mauvaiſes, que l'on peut prendre pour " parvenir au même but. Au ſurplus toutes ces routes " bien ou mal faites ſervent egalement dans l'uſage " lorſqu'elles ſont une fois frayées & connues." This

you pleaſe, pauſe for a moment, and conſider the ground which we have beaten. The Prepoſitions IF, UNLESS, BUT, WITHOUT, SINCE, you had before explained amongſt the *Conjunctions*. To theſe you have now added the prepoſitions WITH, SANS, THROUGH, FROM, TO, WHILE, TILL, OF and FOR. Though we have ſpent much time, we have made but little progreſs, compared with what ſtill remains to be done: at leaſt if our language is as fertile in prepoſitions as Buffier ſuppoſes the French to be.

H.

I rather think we have made great progreſs. And, if you have nothing to object to

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matiere immenſe, as M. de Broſſes imagines it, is in truth a very ſmall and ſimple buſineſs. The whole of cultivated languages, as well as of thoſe we call barbarous, is merely " *un amas de ſignes epars appliqués* " *ſelon le beſoin aux objets.*"

to my derivations and explanations, I muſt conſider the battle as already won. For I am not here writing a dictionary (*which yet ought to be done, and of a very different kind indeed from any thing ever yet attempted any where*), but only laying a foundation for a new theory of language. However, though the remaining prepoſitions are numerous, the greater part require but little, and many of them no explanation.

BY.

BY (in the Anglo-ſaxon written Bi, Be, Biȝ) is the Imperative Býð, of the Anglo-ſaxon verb Beon, *to be*. This prepoſition is frequently, but not always, uſed with an abbreviation of conſtruction. Subauditur, *inſtrument*, *cauſe*, *agent*, &c. Whence the meaning of the omitted word has often been improperly attributed to BY. *With* (when it is the imperative of þýþðan) is

uſed indifferently for *By* * (when it is the imperative of Beon) and with the ſame *ſubauditur* and imputed meaning: As—"*He was ſlain* BY *a ſword*, or, *he was* "*ſlain* WITH *a ſword.*"—"*Kenwalcus was* "*warreyd* WITH *the King of Britons.*" Wallis, confounding together the imperative of wyþðan with the imperative of ÞIÞAN, ſays—"WITH indicat *inſtrumen-* "*tum*,

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* In compound prepoſitions alſo, the Anglo-ſaxon uſes indifferently either þɪð or Be; as,

wɪð-æþtan	Be-æþtan
wɪð-þoþan	Be-þoþan
wɪð-ȝeonðan	Be-ȝeonðan
wɪð-ɪnnan	Be-ɪnnan
wɪð-neoðan	Be-neoðan
wɪð-uþan	Be-uþan
wɪð-utan	Be-utan
wɪð-hɪnðan	Be-hɪnðan

though the modern Engliſh has given the preference to *Be*: having retained only two of the above prepoſitions commencing with þɪð, and dropped only two commencing with *Be*.

" *tum*, ut Latinorum ablativus inſtru-
" menti; atque etiam *concomitantiam*, ut
" Latinorum *cum*."

BY was alſo formerly uſed (and not improperly nor with a different meaning) where we now employ other prepoſitions, ſuch as *For*, *In*, *During*, *Through*. As;—

" Aboute the XVIII yere of the reygne
" of Jue dyed the holy byſhop Aldelme.
" Of him it is written, that when he was
" ſtyryd by his goſtly enymy to the ſynne
" of the fleſh, he to do the more torment
" to himſelfe and of hys body, wolde holde
" within his bedde by hym a fayre mayden
" BY ſo long a tyme as he myght ſay over
" the hole ſauter." Fabian LXXVI.

" The which BY a longe time dwelled
" in warre." XLV.

" To whom the fader had BY hys lyfe
" commytted him." LXXII.

" He

"He made Clement BY his lyfe helper "and ſucceſſour. LV.

"Whom Pepyn BY his lyfe hadde or-"deyned ruler of Guian." LXXXIII.

"Sleynge the people without mercy BY "all the wayes that they paſſyd." LXXVIII.

BETWEEN. BETWIXT.

BETWEEN (formerly written *Twene*, *Atwene*, *Bytwene*) is a *dual* prepoſition, to which the Greek, Latin, Italian, French, &c. have no word correſpondent; and is almoſt peculiar to ourſelves, as ſome languages have a peculiar dual number. It is the Anglo-ſaxion Imperative *Be*, and ꝥpezen or *twain*.

BETWIXT (by Chaucer written *Bytwyt**) is the imperative *Be*, and the Gothic TVAS, or

* "Thy wife and thou mote hange fer atwynne,
"For that *Bytwyt* you ſhall be no ſynne."
Miller's Tale.

or *two:* and was written in the Anglo-ſaxon Betpeohs, Betpeox, Betpux, Betpýx, and Betpyxt.

BEFORE, BEHIND, BELOW, BESIDE, BESIDES.

Theſe Prepoſitions are merely the imperative BE, compounded with the nouns FORE, HIND, LOW, SIDE, which remaining ſtill in conſtant and common uſe in the language; as—The *fore part*, the *hind part*, a *low place*, the *ſide*,—require no explanation.

BENEATH.

BENEATH means the ſame as *Below*. It is the imperative *Be* compounded with the *noun*, *Neath*. Which word *Neath* (for any other uſe but this of the *prepoſition*) having ſlipped away from our language, would perhaps have given ſome trouble, had not the

the *nouns*, *Nether* and *Nethermoſt* (corrupted from Neoðemeſt, Niðemæſt) ſtill continued in common uſe. The word *Nether* is indeed at preſent fallen into great contempt, and is rarely uſed but in ridicule and with ſcorn: and this may poſſibly have ariſen from its former application to the houſe of commons, antiently called "*The* "NETHER *houſe of parliament.*" That the word ſhould thus have fallen into diſgrace is nothing wonderful: for in truth, this *Nether end* of our parliament has for a long time paſt been a mere ſham and mockery of repreſentation, but is now become an impudent and barefaced uſurpation of the rights of the people.

NEATH, Neoðan, Neoðe, (in the Dutch *Neden*, in the Daniſh *Ned*, in the German *Niedere*, and in the Swediſh *Nedre* and *Neder*) is undoubtedly as much a ſubſtantive, and has the ſame meaning as the word

NADIR; which Skinner (and after him S. Johnſon) ſays, we have from the Arabians. This etymology (as the word is now applied only to aſtronomy) I do not diſpute; but the word is much more ancient in the northern languages, than the introduction of that ſcience amongſt them. And therefore it was that the whole ſerpentine claſs was denominated NAAK in the Gothic, and Neoꝼe in the Anglo-ſaxon.

If we ſay in the Engliſh,—" *From the* " TOP *to the* BOTTOM,"—the *nouns* are inſtantly acknowledged: and ſurely they are to the full as evident in the collateral Dutch,—" *Van* BOVEN *tot* BENEDEN.— " BENEDEN *ſtad*, &c."

UNDER.

UNDER (in the Dutch *Onder*) which ſeems by the ſound to have very little connexion with the word *Beneath*, is yet in fact

fact almost the same, and may very well supply its place: for it is nothing but *On-neder*. In the Dutch these prepositions (as we call them) have the degrees of comparison, and they say indifferently either *De benedenste lip*, or, *De Onderste lip*.

BEYOND.

BEYOND (in the Anglo-saxon wiðȝeondan, Biȝeond, Beȝeond) means *be passed*. It is the imperative *Be*, compounded with the past participle ȝeond, ȝeoned, or ȝoned, of the verb Gan, Ganȝan, or Gonȝan, to *go*, or to *pass*. So that—" BEYOND *any* " *place*," means—" *Be passed* that place," —or, *Be* that place *passed*.

WARD.

WARD, in the Anglo-saxon ward or weard, is the imperative of the verb wardian or weardian, *to look at*; or to *direct the*

view. It is the ſame word as the French *garder* *: and ſo Chaucer uſes it, where it is not called a prepoſition.—" Take " REWARDE of thyn owne valewe, that " thou ne be to foule to thy ſelfe." *Parſon's Tale*.

In a figurative or ſecondary ſenſe only, it means to *protect*, to *keep*, to *watch*, to *ward*, or to *guard*. In different places in England, the ſame agent is very properly called either a *Looker*, a *Warden*, an *Overſeer*, or a *Keeper*.

Accordingly this word WARD may with equal propriety be joined to the name of any place or thing to which our view or ſight

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* " Literarum G & W frequentiſſima eſt commu- " tatio, &c."

Wallis's Preface.

" Galli ſemper G utuntur pro Sax. p. id eſt pro W."
Spelman, Gloſſ. (Garantia.)

ſight may be directed. So Chaucer, *Prol. to Cant. Tales*,

> " Full many a draught of wine had he drawe
> " From Burdeux WARD, while the chapmen ſlepe."
> " That eche of you to ſhorten with youre way
> " In this viage ſhall tellen tales tway,
> " To Canterbury WARD, I mene it ſo,
> " And home WARD he ſhal tellen other two."

So we may bid the hearer *look at* or *regard* either the *End* or *Beginning* of any action or motion or time. Hence the compound prepoſitions TOWARD and FROMWARD, and adverbs of this termination without number: in all of which, WARD is always the imperative of the verb, and always retains one ſingle meaning; viz. *Regard*, *Look at*, *See*, *Direct your view*.

Minſhew, Junius, and Skinner, though they are very clear that WARD and GARDER are on all other occaſions the ſame word; (and ſo in *Warden* and *Guardian*, &c.) yet concur

concur that WARD the *Affix* or *postpositive prepoſition*, is the Latin *Verſus:* Skinner, with ſome degree however of doubt, ſaying —" A. S. autem Weaþ, ſi a Lat. *Vertere* " deflecterem, quid ſceleris eſſet?"—Surely none. It would only be an error to be corrected. The French prepoſition *Vers*, from the Italian *Verſo*, from the Latin *Verſus* (which in thoſe languages ſupply the place of the Engliſh WARD, as *Adverſus* alſo does of *To-ward*) do all indeed derive from the Latin verb *vertere*, to *turn*; of which thoſe prepoſitions are the paſt participle, and mean *turned*. And when it is conſidered that in order to *direct our view* to any place named, we muſt *turn* to it; it will not ſeem extraordinary, that the ſame purpoſe ſhould in different languages be indifferently obtained by words of ſuch different meanings, as *to look at*, or, *to turn to*.

ATHWART.

ATHWART (i. e. *Athweort*, or *Athweoried*) *wrested*, *twisted*, *curved*, is the past participle of Þpeopian, to *wrest*, to *twist*; *flexuosum*, *sinuosum*, *curvum* reddere; from the Gothic verb ᚦᛗᛉᛖᚴᚷᚨᚾ. Whence also the Anglo-saxon Þpeop. Þpeoph. the German *Zwerch*. *Zwar*. the Dutch *Dwars*. *Swërven*. the Danish *Tverer*. *Tvert*. *Tver*. the Swedish *Twert*. and *Swarfwa*. and the English *Thwart*, *Swerve* and *Veer* *.

AMONG, AMONGST, YMELL.

Minshew says—" ex Belg. *Gemengt*, i. e. " *mixtus*."

Skinner says—" ab A. s. Gemang, hoc a " verbo Gemengan †."

Junius

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* Junius derives *Swerve* from the Hebrew. And all our Etymologists *Veer* from the French *Virer*.

† In the Dutch *Mingen*, *Mengen*, *Immengen*.
German *Mengen*.
Danish *Mænger*.
Swedish *Menga*.

Junius ſays — " Manifeſte eſt ex A. S. " Mænzan, Menzian, miſcere."

Here all our Etymologiſts are *right*, and *therefore concur* in their etymology. Mr. Tyrwhitt alone ſeems to have no notion of the word. For he ſays—" *I ſuſ-* " *pect* the Saxon Gemang had originally a " termination in *an*." But Mr. Tyrwhitt muſt not be reckoned amongſt Etymologiſts.

Among, *Amongt*, or *Amongſt*, is the paſt participle A. S. Gemænced, or as the Dutch write it *Gemengt*, from the A. S. verb Gemænzan, or Gemenzan, and the Gothic ᚦᚨᛗᚨᛁᚾᚷᚨᚾ *miſcere*.

In the Reve's tale, Chaucer uſes the Prepoſition YMELL inſtead of *among*.

" Herdeſt thou ever ſlike a ſong er now?
" Lo whilke a complin is YMELL hem alle."

But this will give us no trouble, but afford a freſh confirmation to our doctrine: for the Danes uſe *Mellem*, *Imellem*, and *Iblandt*, for this prepoſition *Among*, from their verbs *Megler*, *Melerer*, (in the French *Meſler* or *Mêler*) and *Iblander*, to *mix*, to *blend*; and the Swedes *Ibland*, from their verb *Blanda*, to *blend*.

AGAINST.

AGAINST (in the Anglo-ſaxon Ongegen) is derived by Junius from geonb.

" Dr. Mer. Caſaubon " *mirabiliter* (ſays " Skinner) deflectit a Gr. κατα."

Minſhew derives it from κατεναντι.

I can only ſay that I believe it to be a paſt participle, derived from the ſame verb (whatever it be, for I know it not) from which comes the collateral Dutch verb

Jegenen,

Jegenen, to meet, *rencontrer*, to oppoſe, &c. and may perhaps have been formed ſomething in this manner. Paſt participle *Jegened* (pronounced *yegened*) *jegent*, *jegent-es* (illo oppoſito), *jegents*, and (as Wæpr became *Waſp*) *egenſt*, *againſt*. And I am the more confirmed in this conjecture, becauſe in the room of this prepoſition the Dutch employ *jegens* from *jegenen*: and the Danes *Mod* and *Imod*, from their verb *Möder* of the ſame meaning: and the Swedes *Emot* from their verb *Möta* of the ſame meaning. The Daniſh and Swediſh verbs from the Gothic MΩTGΛN; whence alſo our verb, to *meet*, and the Dutch *Moeten*, *Gemoeten*.

AMID or AMIDST.

Theſe words (by Chaucer and others written Amiddes) ſpeak for themſelves. They are merely the Anglo-ſaxon On-middan, On-middeſ, in medio: and will

the more easily be assented to, because the *nouns Mid, Middle,* (i. e. Mid-dæl) and *Midst,* are still commonly used in our language.

ALONG.

ALONG (in Anglo-saxon On-long) the French supply its place by the *obvious* Noun and article—*Le Long.* In the same manner our ancient authors use *On brede.*

ROUND, AROUND.

Whose place is supplied in the Anglo-saxon by hpeil and On-hpeil. In the Danish and Swedish by *Om-kring.* In Dutch by *Om-ring*; and in Latin by *circum,* a Gr. Κερκος, of which *circulus* is the diminutive.

ASIDE, ABOARD, ACROSS, ASTRIDE, require no explanation.

DURING,

* DURING, is the French participle *Durant*.

PENDING, the French participle *Pendant*.

OPPOSITE, the Latin participle *Oppositus*.

MOIENING, the French participle *Moiennant*.

† SAVE, the Imperative of the verb.

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* The whole verb DURE was ſometime uſed in our language, as—

"That is or ſhall be while the world may DURE."
Knighte's Tale.

"Warre that hath DURED ſo longe."
Fabian's Chronicle.

† This *prepoſitive* manner of uſing the imperative of the verb *to ſave*, afforded Chaucer's Sompnour no bad *equivoque* againſt his adverſary the Friar.

"God *Save* you al, SAVE this curſed Frere."

* OUTCEPT, the Imperative of a miſcoined verb, whimſically compoſed of *out* and *capere* inſtead of *ex* and *capere*.

† OUT-TAKE ſpeaks for itſelf.

NIGH, NEAR, NEXT, are the Anglo-ſaxon Nih or Neah (vicinus) Nihep or Neahep, Nihepc or Neahepc. Mr. Tyrwhitt in his Gloſſary ſays well—" *Hext* " Sax. *higheſt*. *Hegh*, *Hegheſt*. *Hegſt*. *Hext*. " In the ſame manner *Next* is formed from " *Negh*." But he does not well ſay, that —" *Next* generally means the NIGHEST " *following*, but ſometimes the *nigheſt pre-* " *ceding*," for it means ſimply the *nigheſt*, and

* " I'ld play hun 'gaine a knight, or a good ſquire, " or Gentleman of any other countie i' the kingdome " —OUTCEPT Kent: for there they landed all Gentle- " men.—B. Johnſon, *Tale of a Tub*, Act I. Sc. 3.

† " Sir, ſaidin thei, we ben at one
" By even accorde of everiche one
" OUTTAKE richeſſe all onily."
Rom. of the Roſe.

and never implies either *following* or *preceding*. As, " *to ſit* NEXT."

INSTEAD.

INSTEAD from the Anglo-ſaxon In Stەd, i. e. *In place*. In the Latin it is *Vice* and *Loco*. In the Italian *In luogo*. In the Spaniſh *En lugar*. And in French *Au lieu*. In the Dutch it is either *In ſtede* or *In plaats*. In the German *On ſtatt*. In the Daniſh *Iſtæden*, and in the Swediſh (as we uſe either *Home* STEAD or *Home*-STALL) it is *Iſtaellet*. The ſubſtantive STEAD is by no means obſolete, as S. Johnſon calls it; nothing being more common and familiar than—" *You ſhall go in* " *their* STEAD. It is likewiſe not very uncommon in compoſition; as *Homeſtead*, *Bedſtead*, *Steadfaſt*, *Steady*, &c. *

ABOUT.

* One eaſy corruption of this word *Sted* in compoſition has much puzzled all our etymologiſts. Becanus

ABOUT.

Spelman. " ABUTTARE, occurrere, " vergere, ſcopum appetere, finem exerere, " terminare. A Gallico *abutter*, ſeu *abou-* " *ter*;

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nus and Skinner think that Stepmother is *quaſi*, *Stiff-mother*, from *ſtief*, durus; and ſo called becauſe ſhe is commonly *dura*, *ſæva*, *immitis*, *rigida*. Voſſius on the contrary thinks ſhe is ſo called, quaſi *fulciens mater*, as a *ſtiff* and *ſtrong* ſupport of the family, quia fulcit domum cum nova hæreditate. Junius, obſerving that there is not only *Stepmother*, but alſo *Stepchild*, *Stepſon*, *Stepdaughter*, *brother*, *ſiſter*, &c. to all of whom this imputation of ſeverity cannot ſurely belong (neither can they be ſaid *fulcire domum cum nova hereditate*) ſays, *Stepmother* is ſo called, quaſi orphanorum mater: " nam " ꝼrepan Anglo-ſaxonibus & *ſtiufan* Alamannis *viden-* " *tur olim uſurpata* pro orbare." S. Johnſon neither contented with any of the foregoing reaſoning, nor yet with the *videntur olim uſurpata*, determined alſo to try his hand (and a clumſy one, God knows, it is) at an etymology; but inſtead of it produced a pun. *Stepmother*, according to him, is, " a woman who has " *ſtepped* into the place of the true mother." But in the Daniſh collateral language, the compounds remain uncorrupted; and there they are, with a clear and unforced meaning applicable to all,—Stedfader, Stedmoder, Stedbroder, Stedsöſter, Stedbarn, Stedſon, *Steddotter*.

" *ter*; hæc eadem ſignificant.—*La Bout*
" enim *finem*, *terminum*, vel *ſcopum* de-
" ſignat: Inde Angl. *a But* pro meta; &
" ABOUT, pro circa rem vel ſcopum ver-
" ſare. Vox feodalis, & agri menſoribus
" noſtris frequentiſſima, qui prædiorum
" fines (quos ipſi *capita* vocant, Marcul-
" ſus *frontes*, Galli *Bouts*) *abuttare* dicunt
" in adverſam terram; cum ſe illuc adi-
" gant aut protendant. Latera autem
" nunquam aiunt *abuttare* *: ſed terram
" proximam adjacere. La couſtume re-
" formée de Normandie, cap. 556.—" Le
" Serjeant eſt tenu faire lecture des lettres,
" & obligations, & declaration, par *Bouts*
" & coſtes des dites terres ſaiſies."

Junius. " BUT, Scopus. G. *But*. For-
" taſſe deſumptum eſt nomen ab illis
" mon-

* I hardly venture to ſay that I believe, the correct and exact Spelman is here miſtaken.

" monticellis, qui in limitibus agrorum
" ab Agrimenſoribus conſtituebantur, at-
" que ab iis *Bodones* ſive *Botones* nuncupa-
" bantur, & ad quos, artem ſagittandi ex-
" ercentes, tela ſua veluti ad ſcopum di-
" rigebant."

Skinner. " ABOUT ab A. S. Abuta,
" Ymbutan, circum illud, quantum ad
" priorem ſyllabam a præp. *Ab.* hoc a
" præp. Ymb, quod a præp. loquerali
" Lat. *Am.* Gr. Αμφι ortum ducit, uti,
" ſecundum poſteriorem ſyllabam ab A. S.
" Ute vel utan foris, foras, extremus,
" item extremitas, unde & defluxit Belg.
" *Buyten*, quod idem ſonat; quod enim
" aliud ambit, partes ejus exteriores, i. e.
" extimam ſuperficiem attingit & ob-
" volvit."

" ABUTT, a Fr. *Aboutir.* Vergere,
" confinem eſſe, ubi ſcilicet ager unus in,

" vel verſus, alium protenditur, & ei con-
" terminus eſt: hoc a nom. *Bout*, extre-
" mitas, terminus: quod ſatis manifeſtè
" a præp. Lat. *Ab*. & A. s. ute, Foras,
" Foris, ortum trahit, q. d. quod foras
" protuberat vel extuberat."

" BUT, a Fr. G. *Bout*, Extremitas, Fi-
" nis, Punctum, *Aboutir*, ad finem ten-
" dere, accedere, acuminari. *But* etiam
" in re nautica *Extremitatem* alicujus rei
" ſignat, manifeſte Franco Galliæ ori-
" ginis."

Menage. " *Bute*—*Botto* & *Botontinus*
" ſe trouvent en cette ſignification. Fauſ-
" tus & Valerius dans le receuil des au-
" theurs qui ont eſcrit de *limitibus* agrorum,
" page 312.—" *In limitibus ubi rariores*
" *terminos conſtituimus, monticellos planta-*
" *vimus de terra, quos* BOTONTINOS appel-
" lavimus." Le juriſconſulte Paulus livre

V de ces ſentences titre 22.—" *Qui ter-*
" *minos effodiunt vel exarant arboreſve ter-*
" *minales evertunt, vel qui convellunt* BO-
" DONES, &c." Cujas ſur ce lieu:——
" BODONES, ſic uno exemplari ſcriptum
" legimus, cujus nobis copiam fecit Pi-
" thæus noſter. *Bodones* ſive *Botones* vicem
" terminorum præſtant. Vox eſt Men-
" ſorum, vel eorum qui de agrorum &
" limitum conditionibus ſcripſerunt *."

Spelman, Junius, Skinner and Menage, all reſort to Franco-Gall. for their etymology. As for BOTO and its diminutive BOTONTINUS (which have been quoted) they are evidently the tranſlation of a Gothic

* So, *Vitalis de Limit.* " Hi non ſunt ſemper a ferro
" taxati, & circa *Botontinos* conſervantur." *Innocent. de caſ. litter.* " Alius fontanas ſub ſe habens, ſuper
" ſe montem, in trivio tres *Botontinos*." *Auctor de Agrim.* " Si ſint *Botontini* terræ ex ſuperis prohibeo
" te ſacramentum dare."

Gothic word common to all the northern nations: which word, as it ſtill remains in the Anglo-ſaxon dialect, was by our anceſtors written Boda (whence our Engliſh *To* BODE and many other words) and means the firſt outward extremity or boundary of any thing. Hence Onboda, Onbuta, Abuta, ABOUT.

AFTER.

AFTER (Goth. ᛁᚠᛏᛁᚱ A. S. Æftefn. Dutch *Agter*, *Achter*. Daniſh *Efter*, *Bag*. Swediſh *Efter*, *Åtra*, *Achter*,) is uſed as a noun adjective in Anglo-ſaxon, in Engliſh, and in moſt of the northern languages. I ſuppoſe it to be no other than the comparative of the noun AFT: (A. S. Æft) for the retention of which latter noun in our language we are probably obliged to our ſeamen.

Hind,

Hind, *Aft*, and *Back*, have all originally the ſame meaning. In which aſſertion (although AFT had not remained in our language) I ſhould think myſelf well juſtified by the authority, or rather the ſound judgment, of Mr. de Broſſes; who ſays well—" Quelquefois la ſignification pri-
" mitive nous eſt derobée, faute de monu-
" ments qui l'indiquent en la langue.
" Alors cependant on la retrouve parfois
" en la recherchant dans les langues meres
" ou collateralles." In the Daniſh language they expreſs the ſame meaning by, *For* og *Bag*, which we expreſs by *Fore* and *Aft*, or, *Before* and *Behind*. And in the Anglo-ſaxon they uſe indifferently Behindan, Beæꝼtan, and Onbæc.

DOWN, ADOWN.

From what word preciſely (as the immediate origin in reſpect to the Engliſh) and by what gradations, the prepoſition

DOWN

DOWN has deſcended to our language, *faute des monuments qui l'indiquent en la langue*, I am unable to ſay: nor can I obtain any thing tending toward ſatisfaction from any of our etymologiſts.

Minſhew and Junius derive it from Δυνω, ſubeo. Skinner,—" *ſpecioſe alludit*. Gr. " Δυνω." Lye,—" Non malè referas ad " Arm. *Doun*, profundus." Freret, Falconet, Wachter and De Broſſes, have all laborioufly and learnedly (but I think not happily) conſidered the word *Dun*. From all which it appears to me, that the root (whatever it be) lies deep in antiquity, and its branches have extended very wide.

In the antient Sclavonic *Doluna*, *Dolna*, *Dolun*, is a valley, ditch, or any low place. In the antient Ruſſian bibles (*as I am informed*) *Dolnaa* is uſed both for the ad-

jective *low* and for the adverb *Down, under.* But it is not at present used by the Russians in common discourse, except (*perhaps*) in Servia and Moldavia. But in modern Russian *Dolina* is a valley; and *Dolni* (though seldom) is sometimes used for the adjective *low: Dolu* for *below:* and *Dol* for a *floor*, or any low place.

From this word *Dolna*, *Dolun* (or rather from some correspondent Gothic noun of nearly the same sound and signification) I suppose the Anglo-saxon *Dune*, and our modern DOWN to have proceeded to us. I suppose even the Greek Δυνειν to be not a parent, but a common descendant with a very numerous family of words (which I cannot say are derived from it, but) which have a strong connection and affinity, both in signification and sound, with the Sclavonic Dolun, Dolna; and which

which are to be found in great numbers in all the northern languages *.

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* Goth. ᏁᏅᏅ a cavern, ᏁᏅᏅᏋᏂ valley, ᏁᏅᏅᏩᏕ ditch, ᏁᏅᏅᏅᏫ down, ᏁᏅᏅᏅᏫᏅ lower, &c.

Daniſh. *Dolgning* concealing, *Dolger* to conceal, *Dunſt* an exhalation, *Dunſtig* gloomy, *Dunkel* dark, *Dal* valley, &c.

Swediſh. *Döljande* concealment, *Dölja* to conceal, *Dunkel* dark, *Dal* valley, &c.

German. *Dauliche*, *Daulge* digeſtible, *Dol-kraut* nightſhade, *Dolos* cheat, *Dunſt* exhalation, *Dunckel* dark, *Thon* mud or clay, *Thonichte* clayiſh bottom, clay ground, &c.

Dutch. *Daalen* to deſcend, *Dalen* vallies, *Donker* obſcurity, night, dark, *Dons* a dark, dull colour, &c.

Anglo-ſaxon, Deaȝol obſcure, ſecret, Deaȝollice, Deaȝolnerre, Dahle beon, to lye hid, Deopan Dalo, hell, Diohlu, myſteries, Delpan to dig, Dæne, Denu, Denne, Den, valley, cave, den, or any low place, Dun, a dark colour, &c.

Italian. *Tana*, which Menage abſurdly derives from *Crypta*, " Non ſo donde venga, ſe non forſe da " *crypta* ſignificante *grotta*, *Crypta*, *cryptana*, *Tana*."

Engliſh. *Dale*, *Del*, *Delve*, *Den*, &c. &c.

UP, OVER, BOVE, ABOVE.

Theſe prepoſitions have all one common origin and ſignification. In the Anglo-ſaxon Uþa, Uþeþa, Uþemæſt, are the *nouns* altus, altior, altiſſimus.

Uþa or Uþan altus, (Fr. Th. *Uph.*) Engliſh *Up*. Comp. Uþera, altior (oþeþe or oþeþ) —*Over* or *Upper*. Superl. Uþemæſt, altiſſimus.—*Upmoſt* or *Uppermoſt*. Be-uþan, Buþan, On-buþan.—*Bove*, *Above*.

The uſe of theſe words in Engliſh as Adjectives, is very common; as it is alſo in all the northern languages: for the ſame words are uſed in all of them *. Thus Chaucer

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* Germ.	*Auf. Auber.*
	Oben. Ober. Oberſte.
Dutch.	*op. opper. opperſte.*
	Boven. over. overſte.
Daniſh.	*Oven. Over. Overſte.*
	Ober.
Swediſh.	*Uppe. Öſwer. Öſwerſte.*
	Up. Öfre. Ypperſt.

Chaucer has " Her *over* lyp, his *overeſt* " ſloppe, his *overeſt* courtepy." We ſay —the *Up* lands, the *Above* remark, &c. The Dutch ſay—" De *Boven* blinde," (the top ſail), &c. &c.

It is not neceſſary for my preſent purpoſe, to trace the particles any farther than to ſome *noun* of a determinate ſignification; and therefore I might here ſtop at the Anglo-ſaxon *Noun* Uþeþa, altus. But I believe that UP means the ſame as *Top* or HEAD, and is originally derived from a noun of the latter ſignification. Thus,

" Lowlineſs is young ambition's ladder,
" Whereto the climber *upwards* turns his face,
" But when he hath attained the *Topmoſt* round
" He then unto the ladder turns his back."

Where you may uſe indifferently either *upward*, *topward*, or *headward*; or, *Topmoſt*, *upmoſt* or *headmoſt*. And I mention this the rather becauſe ſome etymologiſts (loſing

ſight of this clue) have choſen to derive the name of that part of our body from ſome noun ſignifying *High* or *Heighth*. As, for inſtance, from the Scythian HA, altus; or the Iſlandic HAD, altitudo; or the Gothic hΛnh, altus: or (with Junius) from Gr. υπαιος or Theot. *Hoh*. or A. S. Heah. I believe on the contrary, that the names of all abſtract relation (as it is called) are taken from common names of objects; and the relations of *place*, more commonly from the names of ſome parts of our body; ſuch as, *Head*, *Toe*, *Breaſt*, *Back*, *Womb*, *Skin*, &c. than any other object. Wilkins ſeems to have felt ſomething of this ſort, when he made his ingenious attempt to explain the local prepoſitions by the help of a man's figure, in the following diagram. But confining his attention to ideas (in which he was followed by Mr. Locke) he overlooked the

etymology

etymology of words, which are their ſigns, and in which the ſecret lay.

" For the clearer explication of theſe " *local* prepoſitions (ſays he) I ſhall refer " to this following Diagram. In which " by the *oval* figures are repreſented the " prepoſitions determined to motion, " wherein the *acuter* part doth point out " the tendency of that motion. The " *Squares* are intended to ſignify reſt or " the term of motion. And by the *round* " figures are repreſented ſuch relative pre- " poſitions, as may indifferently refer either " to motion or reſt."


III To 1
III At 2
III 3 Over
III 1 Upon
III 2 Off
V 2 Above
V Upwards 1
V 3 Before
V 3 After
V Downwards 1
V 3 Behind
V 2 Beyond
V 1 Upon
V 3 About
V 3 Beside
V 1 Near
V 3 Around
V 2 Within
V 2 Without
V 1 Out of

Now I believe that not only the prepositions *Up*, *Op*, *Ob*, *Aub*, *Auf*, Upa, &c. but alſo the names of *Heighth*, *High*, *Heaven*, &c. &c. in all languages are derived from the original name of that part of the body which we now in Engliſh call *Head* *.

You will not expect me to waſte a word on the prepoſitions *touching*, *concerning*, *regarding*, *reſpecting*, *relating to*, *ſaving*, *except*, *excepting*, *according to*, *granting*, *allowing*, *conſidering*, *notwithſtanding*, *neighbouring*, &c. nor yet on the compound pre-

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* Goth. hΛΠΒΙΦS. hΛΠΒΙΦ.
Germ. *Haupt. Haubit. Houbit. Hoiued. Kopf.*
Dan. *Hoffuit. Haupt. Kopp.*
Iſla. *Hoffud.*
Swed. *Hufwud. Kopp.*
Dutch *Hoofd. Kop.*
A. S. heapoð.
Gr. Κεφαλη.
Lat. *Caput.*

prepoſitions *In-to*, *Un-to*, *Un-till*, *Up-on*, *Out-of*, *Through-out*, *From-off*, &c.

B.

I certainly ſhould not, if you had explained all the ſimple terms of which the latter are compounded. I acknowledge that the meaning and etymology of ſome of your prepoſitions are ſufficiently plain and ſatisfactory: and of the others I ſhall not permit myſelf to entertain a decided opinion till after a more mature conſideration. *Pedetentim progredi*, was our old favourite motto and caution, when firſt we began together in our early days to conſider and converſe upon philoſophical ſubjects; and, having no fanciful ſyſtem of my own to miſlead me, *I* am not yet prepared to relinquiſh it. But there ſtill remain five ſimple prepoſitions, of which you have not yet taken the ſmalleſt notice.

How do you account for IN, OUT, ON, OFF, and AT.

H.

Oh! As for theſe, I muſt fairly anſwer you with *Martin Luther*,—" Je les de-
" fendrois aiſément devant le Pape, mais
" je ne ſçais comment les juſtifier devant
" le diable." With the common run of Etymologiſts, I ſhould make no bad figure by repeating what others have ſaid concerning them; but I deſpair of ſatisfying you with any thing they have advanced or I can offer, becauſe I cannot altogether ſatisfy myſelf. The explanation and etymology of theſe words require a degree of knowledge in all the antient northern languages, and a ſkill in the application of that knowledge, which I am very far from aſſuming: and, though I am almoſt perſuaded by ſome of my own conjectures concerning

cerning them *, I am not willing, by an apparently forced and far-fetched derivation, to justify your imputation of etymological legerdemain. Nor do I think any farther inquiry necessary to justify my conclusion concerning the prepositions; having, in my opinion, fully intitled myself to the application of that axiom of M. de Brosses (Art. 215.)—" La preuve connue " d'un grand nombre de mots d'une espece, " doit etablir un precepte generale sur les " autres mots de meme espece, à l'origine " desquels on ne peut plus remonter. On " doit en bonne logique juger des choses " que

* In the Gothic and Anglo-saxon ÏNNA, inna, means *Uterus*, *viscera*, *venter*, *interior pars corporis*. (Inna, inne, is also in a secondary sense used for *Cave*, *Cell*, *Cavern*.) And there are some etymological reasons which make it not improbable that OUT derives from a word originally meaning *Skin*. I am inclined to believe that IN and OUT come originally from two *Nouns* meaning those two parts of the body.

" que l'on ne peut connoitre, par celles de
" même eſpece qui ſont bien connues ; en
" les ramenant à un principe dont l'evi-
" dence ſe fait appercevoir par tout où la
" vue peut s'etendre."

ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ, &c.

CHAP. X.

Of Adverbs.

B.

THE firſt general diviſion of words (and that which has been and ſtill is almoſt univerſally held by Grammarians) is into *Declinable* and *Indeclinable*. All the *Indeclinables* except the *Adverb*, we have already conſidered. And though Mr. Harris has taken away the Adverb from its old ſtation amongſt the other Indeclinables, and has, by a ſingular whim of his own, made it a ſecondary claſs of Attributives,

or,

or (as he calls them) *Attributes of Attributes*; yet neither does he nor any other Grammarian ſeem to have any clear notion of its nature and character.

B. Johnſon * and Wallis and all others, I think, ſeem to confound it with the Prepoſitions, Conjunctions and Interjections. And Servius (to whom learning has great obligations) advances ſomething which almoſt juſtifies you for calling this claſs, what you lately termed it, the common ſink and repoſitory of all heterogeneous, unknown

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* "Prepoſitions are a peculiar kind of *Adverbs*, and "ought to be referred thither."

B. Johnſon's Grammar.

"Interjectio poſſet ad Adverbium reduci; ſed quia "majoribus noſtris placuit illam diſtinguere; non eſt "cur *in re tam tenui* hæreamus." *Caramuel.*

"CHEZ eſt plutôt dans notre langue un *Adverbe*, "qu'une *Particule*." *De Broſſes.*

unknown corruptions. For, he ſays,—"Omnis pars orationis, quando definit "eſſe quod eſt, migrat in Adverbium *."

H.

I think I can tranſlate Servius intelligibly.—Every word, *quando definit eſſe quod eſt*, when a Grammarian knows not what to make of it, *migrat in Adverbium*, he calls an Adverb.

Theſe Adverbs however (which are no more a ſeparate part of ſpeech than the particles we have already conſidered) ſhall give us but little trouble, and ſhall waſte no time: for I need not repeat the reaſoning which I have already uſed with the Conjunctions and Prepoſitions.

All

* "Rectè dictum eſt ex omni adjectivo fieri adver-"bium." *Campanella.*

All Adverbs ending in LY, (the moſt prolific branch of the family) are ſufficiently underſtood: the termination being only the word *Like* corrupted, and the corruption ſo much the more eaſily and certainly diſcovered, as the termination remains more pure and diſtinguiſhable in the other ſiſter languages; in which it is written *lich*, *lyk*, *lig*, *ligen*.

ADRIFT is the paſt particle *Adrifed* of Aðriþan.

AGHAST, AGAST, the paſt participle *Agazed*.

"The French exclaimed—"The Devil was in arms."—
"All the whole army ſtood *Agazed* on him."
Shakeſpeare.

AGO, the paſt participle AGONE or GONE.—So Chaucer,

"I have here with my couſin Palamon
"Had ſtrife and rancour many a day *agon*."

" A man mote ben a fool other yonge or old
" I wot it by myſelf ful yore *Agon*."
" And ſhortly whan his ire is thus *Agon*."
" He made alſo, *Gon* is a great whyle,
" Origines upon the Maudelayne."
" Wimmen have ſwiche ſorwe
" Whan that hir huſbonds ben fro hem *Ago*."
" The vital ſtrength is loſt and all *Ago*."
" A clerk ther was of Oxenforde alſo
" That unto Logike hadde long *Ygo*."

ASUNDER—from A. S. Ꝺſundꝼeꝺ, ſeparated, paſt participle of Ꝺſundꝼian.

This word (in all its varieties) is to be found in all the northern languages, and is originally from *Sond*, i. e. *Sand*.

ASKEW. In the Daniſh, *Skiæv*, is, wry, crooked, oblique. *Skiæver* to twiſt, to wreſt. *Skiævt*, twiſted, wreſted.

ASKANT. ASKANCE. In the Dutch, *Schuin*, wry, oblique. *Schuinen*, to cut wry. *Schuins*, ſloping, wry, not ſtrait.

TO WIT, from pıccan, to know. So *Videlicet*, *Scilicet*, *à ſçavoir*. The old Latin authors uſe the abbreviated *videlicet* for *videre-licet*, when not put (as we call it) adverbially.

NAUGHT, or NOUGHT, is Na hpıc, or No-hpıc.

NEEDS, i. e. *Need is*, (uſed parenthetically.) It was antiently written *Nedes* and *Nedis*.

ANON. Junius is right. It means *In one*, (ſubauditur, *inſtant*, *moment*, *minute*.) So Chaucer,

> " And right *Anon* withouten more abode."
> " *Anon* in all the haſte I can."

All our old authors uſe *Anon* for immediately, inſtantly.

Mr. Tyrwhit, Vol. IV. Note to verſe 381, ſays—" From *Pro nunc*, I ſuppoſe, " came *For the nunc*, and ſo, *For the nonce*. " Juſt as from *Ad nunc* came *Anon*." I agree with Mr. Tyrwhit that the one is *juſt as* likely as the other.

ALONE, ONLY, and antiently ALONELY, i. e. *Al one* and *One-like*. In the Dutch *Een* is one: and *All-een*, alone: and *All-een-lyk*, only.—" *All* him *one*"—was antiently written for—" him *Alone*."

ALIVE, i. e. *On live* or *In life*. So Chaucer has

" Chriſt eterne *On live*."
" For he was yet in memorye and *On lyve*."
" No creature *On lyve*."

ASLEEP, i. e. *On ſleep* or *In ſleep*. So Fabian—" In theſe provynces the fayth of " Chryſte was all quenchyd and *In ſlepe*."

ANEW.

ANEW. Fabian writes it—*Of newe.*

ABOARD. In the Dutch *Aanboord*, i. e. *on board.*

ADIEU, FAREWELL. (Danish *Lev-vel.* German *Lebet-wohl.*) The former from the French, the latter from ꝑaꝑan, to go, or to fare. So it is equally said in English,—How *fares* it, or How *goes* it?

ATWO (Dutch *Intween.* Danish *I tu*) i. e. In two.

ATHREE, i. e. In three. So Chaucer,

> "And cut the throte of Hermegylde *atwo.*"
> "With drie stickes cloven *athree.*"

AUGHT or OUGHT, i. e. A. S. Ā hꝑıꞇ or O hꝑıꞇ. N. B. *O* was formerly written for the article, A, or for the numeral *one.*

AWHILE, (i. e. a time) WHILES and WHILST, (i. e. *Time that.*) *Whilſt* is a corruption. It ſhould be written as formerly *Whiles.* Thus in Shakeſpeare,

" She dy'd, my Lord, but *Whiles* her ſlander liv'd."

i. e. *Whil-es,* time that.

ALOFT, i. e. *On-loft.* So Chaucer,

" And ye, my mother, my ſoveraigne pleſance
" Over al thing, *Out-take* Chriſte ON LOFTE."
" The tonge of man ſo ſwyfte is and ſo wight
" That whan it is reyſed up ON LOFTE .
" Reaſon is ſhewed ſo ſlowly and ſofte."

In the Anglo-ſaxon lyꝼt is the air, or the clouds. In St. Luke " in lyꝼte cum-
" mende—coming in the clouds." In the Daniſh *Luft* is air, and " *At ſpronge i luf-*
" *ten*—to blow up into the air, or *aloft.*" So in the Dutch, *De loef hebben,* to ſail before the wind; *loeven,* to ply to windward; *loef,* the weather gage, &c. From the

the ſame root are our other words. *Loft*, *lofty*, to *luff*. *Lee*, *Leeward*, *lift*, &c.

It would be needleſs to notice ſuch adverbs as, *afoot*, *adays*, *aſhore*, *aſtray*, *aſlope*, *aright*, *abed*, *aback*, *abreaſt*, *afloat*, *aloud*, *aſide*, *afield*, *aground*, *aland*, &c. &c.

BELIKE, uſed in low language for *Perhaps*, i. e. *Be-like*, or *Be chance*. In the Daniſh *Lykke* means a *chance*, *hazard*, *luck*, *fortune*, *adventure*.

ENOUGH, in Dutch *Genoeg* from *Genoegen*, content, ſatisfaction. (S. Johnſon cannot determine whether this word is a Subſtantive, an Adjective, or an Adverb; but he thinks it is all three.)

GADSO, i. e. Cazzo, a common Italian oath (or rather obſcenity) introduced and made familiar in our language by our af-

fected travelled gentlemen in the time of Charles II. See all our comedies about that period.

HALT, Imperative of the Anglo-ſaxon healdan, to hold, or keep (the preſent ſituation) to ſtop, to forbear; our Engliſh verb *to hold* is from the ſame root.

Lo! is the imperative of *Look*. So the common people ſay corruptly—" *Lo!* you " there now."—" La' you there."

> " What LO my cherl, LO yet how ſhrewedly
> " Unto my confeſſour to day he ſpake."
>
> *Chaucer*.

The Dutch correſpondent adverb is *ſiet* from *ſien*, to look or ſee. The German *Siehe* or *Sihe* from *Sehen*, to ſee. The Daniſh *See* from *Seer*, to look or ſee. The Swediſh *Si*, or *Si der* from *Se*, to look.

LIEF,

LIEF, LIEVER. Adj. A. S. Leoꝼ, charus, dilectus, &c. (In Dutch *lief*, *lieve*, *liever*, *lieveſt*.) As,

> " I had as *Lief* not be, as live to be
> " In awe of ſuch a thing as I myſelf."

ONCE, TWICE, THRICE. Antiently written *Anes*, *Ones*, *Twies*, *Thries*. Merely the genitive of *One*, *Two*, *Three*. (The ſubſtantive *time*, *turn*, &c. being omitted.) The Italian and French have no correſpondent adverb. The Dutch have *Eens* for the ſame purpoſe, but often forego the advantage.

RATHER, Goth. Adj. ΚΛΦΙΖΡ facilius. A. S. hꝓæd, hꝓæd, &c. Ræðe, ꝓaðe, ꝓaðuꝓ, ꝓaðeꝼt, promptus, celer, velox. We have this adjective in the poſitive degree in Milton's Lycidas,

> " Bring the *rathe* primroſe that forſaken dies."

Mr. Wharton in a note gives other inſtances of its uſe by ancient poets: adding, that

that—" in the weſt of England there is " an early ſpecies of apple called the *rathe* " ripe."—We have alſo in Engliſh the expreſſion of *rath* fruits, and *rath* eggs.

SELDOM. Adjective.

" Ime rejoyced of my liberte
" That *Selden* time is found in mariage." *Chaucer*.

The Dutch have the adjective *Zelden*, *Selten*. The German *Selten*. The Daniſh *Seldſom*. The Swediſh *Sell ſynt*. Rare, unuſual, uncommon. So we have in old Engliſh *Selcouth* and *Seldſhewn*.

SCARCE (Dutch *Schaars*, rare, unfrequent) ſtill uſed as an adjective in modern Engliſh, but antiently more common; As,

" Loke that no man for SCARCE the hold."
Romaunt of the Roſe.

STARK, A.S. Ꞩtaꞃc, Ꞩteaꞃc. Adj. *Strong*. S. Johnſon ſays, " *Stark*, Adv. is uſed to " intend

" intend or augment the ſignification of " a word; as *Stark* mad, mad in the " higheſt degree. It is now little uſed " but in low language."

In Dutch.	*Sterk. Sterkheid. Sterken.*	ſtrong, ſtrength, to ſtrengthen.
German.	*Starck. Starcke. Starcken.*	
Daniſh.	*Stærk. Styrke. Beſtyrker.*	
Swediſh.	*Stark. Starkhet. Stärka.*	

The greater part of the Adverbs have always been well underſtood, ſuch as Gratis, Alias, Amen, Alamode, Indeed, In fact, Prithee, May be, Perhaps, Perchance, Peradventure, Forſooth, In ſooth, &c.

B.

But I ſuppoſe there are ſome Adverbs, which are cant words, belonging only to the vulgar, and which have therefore no certain origin or preciſe meaning; ſuch as, *Spick and Span*, &c.

H.

SPICK, SPAN.

I will not aſſert that there may not be ſuch; but I know of none of that deſcription. It is true S. Johnſon ſays of *Spick and Span*, that " he ſhould not have ex- " pected to find this word authorized by " a polite writer." " *Span new*," he ſays, " is uſed by Chaucer, and is ſuppoſed to " come from ꝓpannan, to ſtretch, *Sax.* " expandere, *Lat.* whence *ſpan*. *Span new* " is therefore originally uſed of Cloth, " new extended or dreſſed at the clothier's: " and *ſpick* and *ſpan* new, is, newly ex- " tended on the ſpikes or tenters. It is, " however, a *low* word." In *ſpick* and *ſpan* however, there is nothing ſtretched upon ſpikes and tenters but the etymologiſt's ignorance. In Dutch they ſay *Spik-ſpëlder-nieuw*. And *ſpyker* means a warehouſe or magazine. *Spil* or *Spel* means a ſpindle, *ſchiet-ſpoel*, the weaver's ſhuttle; and *ſpoelder* the ſhuttle-thrower. In Dutch, therefore,

therefore, *Spikſpëlder-nieuw* means, new from the warehouſe and the loom.

In German they ſay——*Span-neu* and *Funckel-neu*. *Spange* means any thing ſhining; as *Funckel* means to glitter or ſparkle.

In Daniſh *Funckelnye*.

In Swediſh *Spitt ſpangande ny*.

In Engliſh we ſay *Span-new*, *Fire-new*, *Brand-new*. The two laſt *Brand* and *Fire* ſpeak for themſelves. *Spick* and *Span-new* means *ſhining new from the warehouſe*.

B.

AYE, YEA, YES.

You have omitted the moſt important of all the Adverbs—AYE and NO. Perhaps becauſe you think Greenwood has ſufficiently ſettled theſe points—" *Ay*, he " ſays, ſeems to be a contraction of the " Latin word *Aio*, as *Nay* is of *Nego*.

" For our *Nay, Nay*; *Ay, Ay*; is a plain " imitation of Terence's *Negat quis? Nego.* " *Ait? Aio.*" Though I think he might have found a better citation for his purpose—" An nata eſt ſponſa prægnans? " vel *Ai*, vel *nega.*"

H.

I have avoided AYE and NO, becauſe they are two of the moſt mercenary and miſchievous words in the language, the degraded inſtruments of the meaneſt and dirtieſt traffic in the land. I cannot think they were borrowed from the Romans even in their moſt degenerate ſtate. Indeed the Italian, Spaniſh and French * affirmative adverb,

* The French have another (and their principal) affirmative adverb, *Oui:* which, Menage ſays, ſome derive from the Greek ἔοικε, but which he believes to be derived from the Latin *Hoc eſt*, inſtead of which was pronounced *Hoce*, then *Oe*, then *Oue*, then *Oi*, and

adverb, *Si*, is derived from the Latin, and means *Be it* (as it does when it is called an hypothetical conjunction). But our *Aye*, or *Yea*, is the Imperative of a verb of northern extraction; and means—*Have it, poſſeſs it, enjoy it.* And YES, is, *Ay-es*, Have, poſſeſs, enjoy *that*.

Daniſh, *Ejer*, to poſſeſs, have, enjoy. *Eja*, Aye or yea. *Eje*, poſſeſſion. *Ejer*, poſſeſſour.

Swediſh, *Ega*, to poſſeſs, *ja*, aye, yea. *Egare*, poſſeſſor.

German, *Ja*, aye, yea. *Eigener*, poſſeſſor, owner. *Eigen*, own.

Dutch,

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and finally *Ouy*. But (though rejected by Menage) *Oui* is manifeſtly the paſt participle of *Ouir*, to hear; and is well calculated for the purpoſe of aſſent: for when the proverb ſays—"*ſilence gives conſent*,"—it is always underſtood of the ſilence, not of a deaf or abſent perſon, but of one who has both heard and noticed the requeſt.

Dutch, *Eigenen*, to poſſeſs, *ja*, aye, yea. *Eigenſchap*, *Eigendom*, poſſeſſion, property. *Eigenaar*, owner, proprietor.

Anglo-ſax. Ꝥgen, own. Ꝥgende, proprietor. Ꝥgennyſſe, property.

NOT, NO.

As little do I think, with Greenwood, that NOT, or its abbreviate NO, was borrowed from the Latin; or, with Minſhew, from the Hebrew; or, with Junius, from the Greek. The inhabitants of the North, could not wait for a word expreſſive of diſſent, till the eſtabliſhment of thoſe nations and languages; and it is itſelf a ſurly ſort of word leſs likely to give way and to be changed than any other uſed in ſpeech. Beſides, their derivations do not lead to any meaning, the only object which can juſtify any etymological inquiry. But we need not be any farther inquiſitive, nor, I think, doubtful concerning the origin

and

and ſignification of NOT and NO, ſince we find that in the Daniſh *Nödig*, and in the Swediſh *Nödig*, and in the Dutch *Noode*, *Node*, and *No*, mean, *averſe*, *unwilling* *.

And

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* M. L'Eveque, in his Eſſai ſur les rapports de la langue des Slaves, avec celle des anciens habitans du Latium, (prefixed to his Hiſtory of Ruſſia) has given us a curious etymology of three Latin adverbs; which I cannot forbear tranſcribing in this place, as an additional confirmation of my opinion of the Particles. —" Le changement de l' O en A doit à peine etre re-
" gardé comme une alteration. En effet ces deux
" lettres out en Slavon tant d' affinité, que les Ruſſes
" prononcent en A le tiers au moins des ſyllabes qu'ils
" écrivent par un O."

" Le mot qui ſignifioit auparavant (before *Terra*
" was uſed) la ſurface de la terre. Ce mot en Slavon
" eſt POLE; qui par l'affinité de l'O avec l'A, a pu ſe
" changer en PALE. Ce qui me fait preſumer que ſe
" mot ſe trouvoit auſſi en Latin, c'eſt qu'il reſte un
" verbe qui paroit formé de ce ſubſtantif; c'eſt le
" verbe PALO ou PALARE, errer dans le campagne:
" PALANS, qui erre de coté & d'autre, qui court les
" champs. L'Adverbe PALAM tire ſon origine du
" même mot. Il ſignifie *manifeſtement*, *a decouvert*.
" Or, qu'eſt ce qui ſe fait *a decouvert* pourdes hommes

 " qui

And I hope I may now be permitted to have done with Etymology: for though, like

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" qui habitent des tentes ou des cabannes? C'eſt ce " qui ſe fait en plein champs. Ce mot PALAM ſem- " ble même dans ſa formation avoir plus de rapport à " la langue Slavonne qu' à la Latine. Il ſemble qu'on " diſe PALAM pour POLAMI *par les champs, à travers* " *les champs.* Ce qui me confirme dans cette idée, " c'eſt que je ne me rappelle pas qu'il y ait en Latin " d'autre Adverbe qui ait une formation ſemblable, " ſi ce n'eſt ſon oppoſé, CLAM, qui veut dire *ſecrette-* " *ment, en cachette*; & qui me paroit auſſi Slavon. " CLAM ſe dit pour KOLAMI, & par une contraction " tres conforme au genie de la langue Slavonne, " KLAMI, au milieu des Pieux; c'eſt à dire dans " des cabannes qui etoient formées de *Pieux* revêtus " d'écorces, de peaux, ou de branchages."

" J'oubliois l'Adverbe CORAM, qui veut dire *De-* " *vant, en preſence.*—" Il differe de PALAM (dit Am- " broiſe Calepin) en ce qu'il ſe rapporte ſeulement " à quelques perſonnes, & PALAM ſe rapporte a " toutes: il entraine d'ailleurs avec lui l'idée de prox- " imité."—Il a donc pu marquer autrefois que l'action " ſe paſſoit en preſence de quelqu'un dans un lieu cir- " conſcrit ou fermé. Ainſi on aura dit CORAM pour " KORAMI, ou, *Mejdou Korami*; parceque la cloture " des habitations etoit ſouvent faite d'ecorce, *Kora.*"

I am

like a microſcope, it is ſometimes uſeful to diſcover the minuter parts of language which would otherwiſe eſcape our ſight; yet is it not neceſſary to have it always in our hands, nor proper to apply it to every object.

L l 2 B.

I am the better pleaſed with Mr. L'Eveque's etymology, becauſe he had *no ſyſtem* to defend, and therefore cannot be charged with that partiality and prejudice, of which, after what I have advanced, I may be reaſonably ſuſpected. Nor is it the worſe, becauſe M. L'Eveque appears not to have known the ſtrength of his own cauſe: for CLAM was antiently written in Latin *calim:* (though Feſtus, who tells us this, abſurdly derives *clam* from *clavibus*, " quod his, quæ ce- " lare volumus, claudimus") and *cala* was an old Latin word for wood, or logs, or ſtakes. So Lucilius (quoted by Servius) " Scinde puer, *Calam*, ut caleas." His derivation is alſo ſtill farther analogically fortified by the Daniſh correſpondent adverbs: for in that language *Geheim*, *geheimt*, *I Hemmelighed*, (from *Hiem* home) and *I enrum* (i. e. in a room) ſupply the place of *Clam*, and *Fordagen* (or, in the face of day) ſupplies the place of *Palam*.

B.

If your doctrine of the *Indeclinables* (which I think we have now pretty well exhausted) is true, and if every word in all languages has a separate meaning of its own, why have you left the conjunction THAT undecyphered? Why content yourself with merely saying it is an *Article*, whilst you have left the *Articles* themselves unclassed and unexplained?

H.

I would fain recover my credit with Mr. Burgess, at least upon the score of *liberality*. For the freedom (if he pleases, harshness) of my strictures on my "*predecessors* on "the subject of language." I may perhaps obtain his pardon, when he has learned from Montesquieu that—"*Rien ne recule* "*plus le progrés des connoisances, qu'un* "*mauvais ouvrage d'un auteur celebre:*

"*parcequ' avant d' inſtruire, il faut de-*
"*tromper.*" But Mr. Burgeſs himſelf has undertaken to explain the *Pronouns:* and if I did not leave the field open to him (after his undertaking) he might perhaps accuſe me of illiberality towards my *followers* alſo. I hope the title will not offend him; but I will venture to ſay that, if he does any thing with the pronouns, he muſt be contented to *follow* the etymological path which I have traced out for him. Now the *Articles*, as they are called, trench ſo cloſely on the *Pronouns*, that they ought to be treated of together: and I rather chuſe to leave *one* conjunction unexplained, and my account of the Articles imperfect, than foreſtall in the ſmalleſt degree any part of Mr. Burgeſs's future diſcovery. There is room enough for both of us. The garden of ſcience is overrun with weeds; and whilſt every coxcomb in literature,

literature is anxious to be the importer of ſome new exotic, the more humble, though (at this period of human knowledge eſpecially) more uſeful buſineſs of *ſurculation* (to borrow an exotic from Dr. Johnſon) is miſerably neglected.

B.

If you mean to publiſh the ſubſtance of our converſation, you will probably incur more cenſure for the *ſubject* of your inquiry, than for your manner of purſuing it. It will be ſaid to be υπερ ουϛ σκιας.

H.

I know for what building I am laying the foundation: and am myſelf well ſatisfied of its importance. For thoſe who ſhall think otherwiſe, my defence is ready made:

S.

Se questa materia non è degna,
Per esser piu leggieri,
D'un huom che voglia parer saggio e grave,
Scusatelo con questo; che s'ingegna
Con questi van pensieri
Fare il suo tristo tempo piu suave:
Perche altrove non have
Dove voltare il viso;
Che gli é stato interciso
Mostrar con altre imprese altra virtue.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

E R R A T A.

Page 52.	Line	14.	for *involve*, read *involves*.
76.	note	5.	after *German* insert *Dutch*.
77.		5.	for *prosopeia*, read *prosopopeia*.
91.	note	1.	for *Formont*, read *Fourmont*.
120.		5.	for *Mayl e*, read *May lye*.
145.	At the top of the page insert B.		
221.		9.	for ΛnK, read ΛnK.
221.		11.	for ΛnKΛN, read ΛnKΛN
223.		9.	for *Conjuction*, read *Conjunction*.
224.		1.	for ΛnK, read ΛnK.
224.		2.	for ΛnKΛN, read ΛnKΛN
226.		7.	for As, read AS.
236.		3.	for *Application*, read *Explication*.
242.		10.	for *Mr.* read *Mer*.
250.	note	6.	for *Ni uccidi*, read *m' uccidi*.
264.		3.	for *word*, read *words*.
272.		21.	for CILLINGWORTH'S, read CHILLINGWORTH'S.
301.		5.	for *logeret*, read *legeret*.
323.	note	13.	for *accrociato*, read *accorciato*.
334.		2.	Dele *as*.
374.	note	1.	for ponde, read ponhze.
419.		11.	for *notwitstanding*, read *notwithstanding*.
430.		5.	before *Undertaker* insert *an*.
444.		6.	for H. read B.