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Sadao, et al

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PERSONS IMPLICATED: Gen. HONJO; Gen. SHIRAKAWA; OKAWA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression--Manchuria

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Resume from his official capacity, of the outbreak of  
the Manchurian Affair and Jap military domination of  
Manchuria thereafter.

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

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Darsey

CHARGE OUT SLIP

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*Original in court*

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADA0, et al

A F F I D A V I T

I, OKADA, Keisuke, make oath and say as follows:

I was born in Fukui Prefecture, Japan, in 1867. I was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1899, after which I was a career man in the Japanese Navy until 1920, having held the following positions during those years:

1904-05	Division Officer on Naniwa; later Captain (Fleet Admiral TOGO in Command)
1908	Captain
1912	Commanding Officer, Kashima
1913	Rear Admiral, Commandant, Sasebo Navy Yard
1917	Vice-Admiral Commander-in-Chief, Sasebo Navy Yard

From 1920 to 1936 I held the following positions in the Japanese Government and Navy:

1920	Vice Minister of Navy
1924	Admiral, Member Supreme War Council
1924 Dec.	Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet
1927	Commander-in-Chief Yokosuka Naval Station
1927	Minister of Navy in TANAKA Cabinet
1929 July	Resigned with Cabinet; Member Supreme Military Council
1932	Minister of Navy in SAITO Cabinet
1933 Jan.	Retired and placed on Navy Reserve List
1934 March 8	Premier
1936	

In the years 1920 to 1936, during which period I served in the capacities of Vice Minister of the Navy, Minister of the Navy in the TANAKA Cabinet, Supreme War Councillor, Minister of Navy in the SAITO Cabinet and Premier of Japan, in order intelligently and effectively to perform the official duties and discharge the responsibilities of those offices, it was my duty to, and I did employ, all available official channels of information to keep myself as fully informed as possible concerning the contemporaneous problems, happenings, issues and events. Such avenues of information included, among others, reports from and conferences with executive and administrative officials and personnel on my respective staffs, conferences with fellow cabinet members, the respective premiers, members of the Diet and other government officials, all of whom likewise had access to similar sources of information concerning such subject matters; cabinet meetings, liaison conferences, meetings of the Supreme War Council and other government agencies; and also official government reports, releases, etc. On the basis of information thus obtained, I endeavored to and did take, with respect to contemporaneous issues and problems, such official action in the discharge of my official duties and responsibilities as under the circumstances appeared to be meet and proper.

During my tenure of office as Minister of Navy in the TANAKA Cabinet, (1927-1929) Japan claimed to have acquired by treaties, agreements, etc. substantial rights and interests in Manchuria. It was the policy of the TANAKA Cabinet, through collaboration with Manchurian authorities to expand and develop such rights and interests to the fullest extent possible. In the administration and application of this policy with respect to Manchuria, the TANAKA Cabinet was considerably more energetic, affirmative and positive than its predecessor cabinet had been.

In connection with this program, TANAKA planned to collaborate with and use Chang Tso-lin, who was then Marshal and defacto ruler of Manchuria. While Chang Tso-lin was opposed to many of the Japanese demands, TANAKA's bargaining and trading power with him lay in the support which Japan might lend to the maintenance of his position of leadership in Manchuria. Japan had lent him considerable support, particularly in connection with the Kuo Sung-lin Mutiny in 1925.

The TANAKA Cabinet felt that it was making substantial progress in expanding Japan's interests in Manchuria through the support of and collaboration with Chang Tso-lin, although TANAKA invariably took the position, and so advised Chang Tso-lin, that he should return to Manchuria and concern himself solely with Manchurian affairs.

In 1928, when the armies of Chang Tso-lin suffered defeat at the hands of the Kuomintang Army, TANAKA again advised him to withdraw his armies into Manchuria before it was too late. The Marshal was obliged to take this advice on this occasion because of his embarrassed military position.

By this time the Japanese army in Manchuria with headquarters in Mukden under General HONJO had become dissatisfied with the policy of the TANAKA Cabinet to collaborate and negotiate with Chang Tso-lin with respect to Japan's interests in Manchuria, did not want to wait on negotiations and were impatient to employ force to occupy Manchuria. A clique or group of officers in this army, which had completely isolated General HONJO and shut him off from communication with the affairs of the army, planned and plotted the murder of Chang Tso-lin upon his return to Manchuria. They arranged on June 4, 1928, that the train on which Chang Tso-lin was traveling from Peiping to Mukden should be wrecked by explosives placed on the track just outside Mukden. Chang Tso-lin was killed in this wreck as planned. This incident plotted and instituted by the clique in the Kwantung Army represented the first overt army move during the TANAKA regime to project itself into the formulation of the policies of the government. The occurrence greatly embarrassed and prejudiced the program of the TANAKA Cabinet with respect to Manchuria and created a crisis which ultimately resulted in its resignation. The Cabinet learned of the occurrence immediately, and was taken completely by surprise and became greatly concerned. Premier

TANAKA expressed great regret and grave concern, and went to the Imperial Palace and made a full report of the occurrence to the Emperor. Upon his return from the palace the Premier (TANAKA) summoned the Minister of War (General SHIRAKAWA) and myself for a conference, at which he announced that the Emperor told him (TANAKA) that he (the Emperor) considered that this was the time to take strong disciplinary action with respect to the army, and that he expected adequate measures to be taken. He (TANAKA) stated that he was determined that appropriate steps should be taken to maintain discipline in the army. The Minister of War (General SHIRAKAWA) and I expressed hearty support of TANAKA's determination. However, when the War Minister took the matter up in the War Ministry, he encountered such strong opposition on the part of the General Staff and other army officers, that he was unable to make any headway or progress whatsoever. The War Minister so reported to TANAKA and myself, and stated that this opposition on the part of the army was based upon the view that to take steps to punish those responsible for this event would be to expose to the public something which the army wished at the time to conceal.

Shortly thereafter TANAKA called me alone for a consultation on the subject, and advised me that he planned to do something about the matter himself. This I also agreed with, but the army opposition to disciplinary action was so strong that TANAKA was unable to accomplish anything either. By this time this issue and the attitude of the army had become a controversial subject in circles outside of the cabinet, even in political parties, and the impotency of the cabinet to control and discipline the army forced its resignation on July 1, 1929.

After the murder of Chang Tso-lin, the influence of the army insofar as participation in the formulation of policy on the part of the government with respect to Manchuria was concerned grew progressively stronger. During the period between the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet in July of 1929, and the establishment of the SAITO Cabinet in 1932, I served in the capacity of a member of the Supreme War Council. During this period I often had occasion to discuss with incumbent cabinet members and other statesmen and government officials, who visited me in my home or whom I met on public and social occasions, the serious concern on the part of some in the Japanese government with respect to the philosophy of the army that the Manchurian problems could never be solved short of the use of force to establish a Japanese puppet government there. This disposition on the part of the Japanese army and the inability of the government to control it created a great deal of anxiety on my part. During this period it became apparent to all in Japan who concerned themselves with matters of state that it was only a question of time until the army should undertake the occupation of Manchuria. In the early part of 1931 I received many reports that the army was planning an occurrence which might be made the basis for the occupation of Manchuria. Simultaneously OKAWA, Shumei was conducting a propaganda campaign consisting of public speeches and publications to the end of building up a public sentiment in support of such a movement on the part of the army. I recall my annoyance when it came to my attention that OKAWA had made such a speech at the Naval Academy; it was especially irritating to me that such a man should be allowed to speak before the cadets.

When I came into the SAITO Cabinet as Minister of the Navy in 1932, I learned from reports which I had made to me in order to make myself acquainted with the events of recent months and from conversations and conferences which I held with fellow cabinet members and other government officials, that the occurrence which came to pass on the night of September 18, 1931, was plotted and arranged by the clique in the Kwantung Army, and also that it was not of sufficient gravity to warrant the subsequent action taken by that army in its occupation of Manchuria. The army during these years was completely out of control by the government and no restraint could be placed upon it. This information supplemented and corroborated information which I had obtained from contemporaneous press reports, government releases, contacts with other government officials during the period interim the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet and the establishment of the SAITO Cabinet. As previously stated, it was an assumed fact in government circles in the early part of 1931, that it was only a question of time until the army would make a move to occupy Manchuria by force. I knew that OKAWA, Shumei, a political leader, was definitely identified with this movement on the part of the Kwantung Army at that time. There were many young officers in the Kwantung Army also involved, whose names I do not recall now. The occupation of Manchuria came to pass in the latter part of 1931, with the so-called Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, as its beginning, and did not take any enlightened public official of Japan by any surprise. All of the Japanese armed forces in the area were brought into operation immediately, including the Korean Army, which crossed the border and participated in this occupation without any Imperial sanction. This became known as the "Crossing the Border" Incident, which created quite a profound issue in government circles at that time. While I did not have specific first-hand information as to some of the foregoing facts before or contemporaneously with their occurrence, I learned about each and every one of them through official channels in the immediate period of their occurrence, and they became accepted facts and premises in government circles at the time upon the basis of which official action by government officials was taken.

The SAITO Cabinet which came into office in May of 1932, in which, as previously stated, I was Minister of the Navy, and my cabinet, which came into office in July of 1934, were known in government and army circles as "Navy Cabinets." The army resented both of these cabinets, because it recognized in them navy influence in opposition to the army policy of the use of force in connection with the expansion of Japanese influence in Asia. The army knew that the reason the navy had been asked to form these cabinets was to prevent the military from having their way with respect to the use of force, and throughout their incumbency the army continued its efforts to overthrow the navy influence in the Japanese government. Many occurrences came to pass during the tenures of these cabinets demonstrative of this army resentment, culminating in the attempt at my assassination in February of 1936, which resulted in the assassination of my brother-in-law, Mr. MATSUO, who was mistaken for me. This occurrence was a spontaneous outbreak of resentment on the part of a group of young officers in the army against the incumbent government's lack of sympathy with the ambitions of the military. It constituted an embarrassing situation to the Emperor in that it was somewhat of a public manifestation of the inability of my cabinet to control the military, and ultimately brought about the resignation of my cabinet in March of 1936.

After the occupation of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was the real government there, although a so-called independent government was set up in Manchuria in the early part of 1932, whose independence was supposedly recognized by Japan in September of that year. This government was completely dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army. The government of Japan had no way of learning what the plans and activities of the Kwantung Army were in those years. The army was completely without the control of the Japanese government and remained so up until the Great War in 1941. This was and remains a great pity and shame for the sake of Japan's leadership among nations, and has always caused me untold anxiety and anguish. Japan has been done a most grave injustice.

s/K. Okada

OKADA, Keisuke

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named OKADA, Keisuke, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 29th day of May, 1946

s/Theodore Goulsby Lt. Col., CAV  
Ex. Officer, IPS, GHQ, SCAP

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, TAKAHASHI, Wataru, HEREBY CERTIFY That I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that I, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the above-named OKADA, Keisuke in Japanese, and in so doing, truly and correctly translated the contents thereof from English into Japanese; and that said OKADA, Keisuke stated to me that the contents of said Affidavit were the truth, and that he was willing to sign said Affidavit under oath; and that said OKADA, Keisuke was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 29th day of May, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

s/ W. Takahashi

TAKAHASHI, Wataru

「アメリカ」合衆國其他對荒木貞夫其他訴松事件

供述書

私、岡田啓介ハ宣誓ノ上次ノ通り供述致シマス。  
私ハ一八六七年ハ明治元年ニ日本國福井縣ニ生レ  
マシタ。一八九九年（明治三十二年）ニ海軍兵學  
校ヲ卒業シテ以來一九二〇年（大正九年）ニ至ル  
迄日本海軍軍人トシテ次ノ職ヲ奉ジマシタ。

明治卅七年、卅八年 浪速艦分隊長、後ニ同艦艦  
長。

（東郷海軍大將ノ指揮下）

明治四十一年 海軍大佐ニ昇進。

大正二年 鹿島艦長ニ補セラレタル。

大正三年 海軍少將ニ昇進シ、佐世保

鎮守府司令官ニ補セラレル。

大正六年 海軍中將ニ昇進シ佐世保鎮

守府司令官ニ補セラレル。

一九二〇年（大正九年）カラ一九三六年（昭和十  
一年）迄ノ間ニ私ハ日本政府及海軍部内デ次ノ職  
ヲ奉ジマシタ。

大正九年

海軍次官



大正十三年

海軍大將ニ昇進シ、軍事參  
謀官ニ補セラレル。

大正十三年十二月

聯合艦隊司令長官

昭和二年

横須賀鎮守府司令長官

昭和二年

田中内閣ノ海軍大臣

昭和四年七月

内閣ト共ニ併任シ軍事參謀  
官ニ補セラレル。

昭和七年

齋藤内閣ノ海軍大臣

昭和八年一月

同職ヲ併任、豫備役ニ編入  
セラレル。

昭和九年三月

内閣總理大臣

私ハ海軍次官、田中内閣ノ海軍大臣、軍事參謀官、齋藤内閣ノ海軍大臣及内閣總理大臣ノ諸職ヲ奉シター一九二〇年（大正九年）カラー一九三六年（昭和十一年）ノ期間中是等ノ諸職ノ職務ヲ執行シソノ職責ヲ果ス目的ヲ以テ時局問題、出來事、論争點及事件等ニ關シ出來ルダケ精通シテ置ク爲、凡ユル公的情報機關ヲ使用スル義務ヲ持チ、且之ヲ使用シタノデアリマス。斯ル情報ノ徑路ハ就中私ノ各幕僚ノ幹部、行政官及職員カラノ報告及是等ノ人々ノ協議、閣僚トノ協議、是等ノ諸問題ニ關シテ私ト同様ニ同シ情報出所ヲ持ツテ居タ各首相、議會人及其他ノ官吏トノ協議、閣議、聯絡會議、軍事參謀官、其他ノ政府機關ノ會議、並政府ノ公報、發表等ヲ含ンデ居タノデアリマス。

カクシテ得タ情報ニ基キ、私ハソノ職責ヲ果スニ當リ時局問題及論争點ニ關シテハ、ソノ時ノ情況ニ於テ適宜適當ト認メラレタ公的措置ヲ取ラント努力シ各取ツタノデアリマス。

私ガ田中内閣ノ海軍大臣トシテ在任中（自昭和二年至同四年）日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ緊要ナ權益ヲ條約、協定等ニヨリ獲得シタト稱シタノデアリマス。田中内閣ノ政策ハ滿洲ノ官憲トノ協力ニヨツテ是等ノ權益ヲ最大限ニ擴張シテ發展セシメル事デアリマシタ。此ノ政策ハ滿洲ニ對シテ施行及適用スルニ當リ田中内閣ハ前内閣ヨリハ大イニ活發的、肯定的及積極的デアリマシタ。

此ノ目論見ニ關シ田中ハ當時滿洲ノ事實上ノ統治者デアリ元帥デアツタ張作霖ト協力シ且彼ヲ利用セント企テタノデアリマス。張作霖ハ日本ノ諸要求ノ中多クノモノニ反對デアツタケレドモ、田中ハ張作霖ニ對シ彼ガ滿洲ニ於ケル首領トシテノ地位ヲ維持スル爲日本ハ彼ヲ援助スルカモ知レナイト言フ交渉權並取引權ヲ持ツテ居タノデアリマス。日本ハ張作霖ニ對シ、特ニ一九二五年（大正十四年）ノ郭松齡叛亂事件ニ關シテ相當ノ援助ヲ與ヘテ居タノデアリマス。

田中内閣ハ張作霖ニ對スル援助及協力ニヨツテ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ權益擴大ガ相當ニ進歩シテ居ルト考ヘタノデアリマス。充モ田中ハ常ニ張作霖ニ對シ彼ガ滿洲ニ歸還シテ滿洲問題ニ專念スベキデアルト言フ立場ヲ取り、且ソレヲ彼ニ勸告シタノ

デアリマス。

一九二八年（昭和三年）張作霖軍が國民黨ニヨリ敗北ヲ喫シタ時、田中ハ再ビ張ニ對シ手廻レトナラヌ内ニ彼ノ軍隊ヲ滿洲ニ撤退セヨト勸告シマシタ。此ノ際張作霖將軍ハソノ當惑セル軍事的立場ニ鑑ミ己ムヲ得ズ此ノ勸告ヲ受入レマシタ。此ノ時ニ到ツテ奉天ニ司令部ヲ置ク本庄將軍下ノ日本軍ハ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ權益ニ關シ張作霖ト協力シテ交渉スルト言フ田中内閣ノ政策ニ對シテ不満ヲ拘クヤウニナリ且交渉ヲ待タズシテ武力ヲ以テ滿洲ヲ占領セント待チ兼ねテ居マシタ。此ノ軍ノ將校ノ或一派又ハ一團ハ本庄將軍ヲ全く隔離シ、軍務ニ關スル通信カラ遮斷シテ置イテ後、張作霖ガ歸滿スルニ際シ彼ヲ殺害スル陰謀ヲ企テタノデアリマス。彼等ハ一九二八年（昭和三年）六月四日張作霖ガ北京カラ奉天ニ向ツテ旅行シテ居ル列車ヲ奉天外ニテ軌道上ニ仕掛ケテ置イタ爆發物ヲ以テ破壊シヨウト準備シマシタ。此ノ計畫通り張作霖ハ殺害セラレマシタ。關東軍ノ一派ニヨツテ企テラレ、且實行セラレタ此ノ事件ハ田中政權中ニ於ケル政府ノ政策樹立ニ自ラ突出デントスル軍ノ最初ノ歴然タル行爲デアリマシタ。此ノ事件ハ滿洲ニ關スル田中内閣ノ政策ヲ著シク困惑セシメ且不利トナラシメ、遂ニ田

中内閣ノ辭職ヲ余儀ナクシタ危機ヲ生ゼシメタノ  
 デアリマス。内閣ハ直ニ此ノ事件ノ發生ヲ知り、  
 全く不意ヲ打タレテ非常ニ憂慮シマシタ。田中首  
 相ハ之ヲ非常ニ遺憾トシ且容易ナラザルモノトシ  
 テ宮中ニ參内シ陛下ニ詳細ナル報告ヲ上奏シマシ  
 タ。宮中カラ歸邸スルヤ首相(田中)ハ陸軍大臣  
 (白川大將)ト私ヲ協議ニ招キ、陛下ガ彼(田中  
 )ニ今こそ陸軍ニ對シテ強硬ナル懲戒處分ヲ取ル  
 ベキ時デアリ、且陛下モ充分ナル措置ガ取ラレル  
 コトヲ期待スルト仰セラレタト我々ニ告ゲマシタ  
 。彼(田中)ハ陸軍内ノ軍紀ヲ守ル爲ニ適當ナル  
 措置ヲ取ルベク決心シタト述べマシタ。陸軍大臣  
 (白川大將)ト私ハ田中首相ノ決意ニ對シテ滿腔  
 ノ支持ヲ表明シマシタ。併シ乍ラ陸軍大臣ガ此ノ  
 事ヲ陸軍省デ取上ゲタトキ、參謀本部員ヤ他ノ陸  
 軍將校カラ猛烈ナ反對ヲ受ケテソノ結果彼ハ何等  
 ノ進捗ヲナシ得ナカツタトデアリマス。陸軍大臣  
 ハ田中ト私ニカク報告シ且陸軍ノ此ノ反對ハ右事  
 件ニ付實ヲ負フベキ者ニ對シテ處罰措置ヲ取ル事  
 ハ陸軍ガ當時内證ニシテ置キタイ或事ヲ社會ニ曝  
 露スル事ニナルト言フ見解ニ基イテ居ルト述べマ  
 シタ。其後固モナクシテ田中ハ此ノ問題ヲ協議ス  
 ル爲私ダケヲ呼ンデ本事項ニ關シテ何等カノ處置  
 ヲ取ルベク企テントスルト告ゲマシタ。私ハ是ニ

對シテ贊意ヲ表シマシタガ、懲戒處分ニ對スル陸軍ノ反對ハ餘リニモ強硬デアツタ爲、田中モ何モ成シ得ナカツタノデアリマス。此ノ時既ニ此ノ問題及陸軍ノ態度ハ國外ニ於テ又政界ニ於テモ論議セラレルニ到ツテ陸軍ヲ取締リ懲戒シ得ナイ内閣ノ無能力ハ一九二九年（昭和四年）七月一日内閣ノ辭職ヲ餘儀ナクシマシタ。張作霖殺害ノ後、滿洲ニ關スル政府ノ政策樹立ニ參畫スル點ニ關スル限リ、陸軍ノ勢力ハ漸次強化セラレマシタ。一九二九年（昭和四年）七月一日田中内閣ノ瓦解カラ一九三二年（昭和七年）齋藤内閣ノ成立迄ノ期間中、私ハ軍事參議官ヲ奉職シマシタ。此ノ期間中私ハ私ヲ私邸ニ訪シ又ハ公的或ハ社交的集リデ會ツタ在任中ノ大臣其他ノ政治家及官吏ト、武力ニヨツテ滿洲ニ日本ノ傀儡政府ヲ樹立スル以外ニ滿洲問題ハ決シテ解決出來ナイトスル陸軍ノ理念ニ關シ日本政府内ノ或人々ガ持ツ重大關心ヲ協議シタ事ガ屢々アリマシタ。私ハ陸軍ノ新ル傾向トソレヲ取締リ得ナイ政府ノ無力ニ付非常ニ憂慮シマシタ。陸軍ガ滿洲占領ニ取掛ル事ハ單ニ時間ノ問題デアルトハ國事ニ關心ヲ持ツテ居タ凡テノ人々ニハ此ノ期間中ニ明ラカトナツタノデアリマス。一九三一年（昭和六年）ノ初頭ニ私ハ陸軍ガ滿洲國占領ノ基礎トナシ得ベキ事件ヲ企テ居ルト言フ

報告ヲ多數受ケマシタ。ソレト同時ニ大川周明ハ公開演説及出版物ニヨリ、陸軍ノ斯ル行動ヲ支持スル輿論ヲ造リ上、ゲントスル宣傳運動ヲ行ツテ居マシタ。私ハ大川ガ海軍兵學校デ此ノ様ナ講演ヲ爲シタト聞イタ時ノ困惑ヲ想ヒ出シマス。斯ル人ガ生徒ノ前デ話ヲスル事ヲ許サレタト言フ事ハ私ハ特ニ腹立シク思ヒマシタ。一九三二年（昭和七年）齋藤内閣ノ海軍大臣ニ就任致シマシタ時、私ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日發生シタ事件ハ關東軍ノ一派ガ計畫シ用意シタ事。且同事件ハ其後陸軍ガ滿洲占領ニ付採ツタ行動ヲ正當トスル程ノ重大性ヲ持ツテ居ナカツタト言フ事ヲ最近ノ數ヶ月ニ起ツタ事件ニ精通スル爲ニ要求シテ受ケタ報告及閣僚其他ノ官吏トノ會談及會議等ヨリ承知致シマシタ。此ノ期間ノ數年間陸軍ハ政府ノ取締リカラ全然離レ、何等ノ拘束モ受ケナカツタノデアリマス。此ノ情報ハ私ガ田中内閣瓦解カラ齋藤内閣成立迄ノ期間ニ於テ當時ノ新聞報道、政府發表及他ノ官吏トノ接觸等ニヨリ入手シタ情報ニヨツテ補足セラレ確證セラレマシタ。以前ニモ述ベタ通り、陸軍ガ武力ニヨツテ滿洲ヲ占領スル行動ニ出ルノハ單ニ時間ノ問題デアルト言フ事ハ一九三一年（昭和六年）ノ初頭ニ於テ政府筋ハ想定シテ居タ事實デアリマス。私ハ大川周明ガ當時

關東軍ノ此ノ行動ト明ニ關係シテ居ルト知ツテ居マシタ。名ハ思ヒ出シマセンガ關東軍ノ青年將校モ多數之ニ關係シテ居リマシタ。一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日ノ所謂奉天事件ヲ契機トシテ滿洲占領ハ同年ノ後期ニ行ハレマシタガ、日本ノ賢明ナ官公吏ハ之ニヨリ不意ヲ打タレマセンデシタ。ソノ他ニ居タ凡テノ日本軍ハ直チニ行動ニ移リマシタ。此ノ中ニハ勅裁ヲ經ズシテ國境ヲ越エ、占領ニ參加シタ朝鮮軍モ含マレテ居マシタ。之ハ當時政府部内ニ深刻ナ問題トナツタ「越境」事件ト知ラレテ居マス。以上ノ事實ノ中或物ニ關シテハソノ發生以前又ハ同時ニ於テ具體的ニ直接關イタノデハアリマセンガ、是等ノ各事實ニ關シテハ發生シタ即時ノ期間ニ公式ノ經路ヲ通ジテ知リマシタ。

是等ノ事實ハ當時政府部内ニ於テ一般ニ認めラレタ事實及前提トナリ、之ニ基イテ官公吏ハ公式措置ヲトツタノデアリマス。

私ガ海軍大臣トシテ奉職シタ一九三二年（昭和七年）五月成立ノ齋藤内閣ト一九三四年（昭和九年）七月生レタ私ノ内閣ハ政府及陸軍部内ニハ「海軍内閣」ト知ラレテ居マシタ。亞細亞ニ於ケル日本勢力ノ擴大ニ關聯シテ武力ヲ行使セントスル陸軍ノ政策ニ反對スル海軍勢力ヲ此ノ二ツノ内閣ニ

認メルト理由デ陸軍ハ之ヲ怨ンダノデアリマス。海軍ガ是等ノ内閣ヲ組織スル事ヲ頼マレタノハ武力行使ニ關シテ陸軍ノ我儘ヲ阻止センガ爲デアツタ事ヲ陸軍ハ知ツテ居リ、是等ノ内閣ノ存在中陸軍ハ政府内ニ於ケル海軍勢力ヲ打倒スル努力ヲ續ケタノデアリマス。陸軍ノコノ怨ヲ示ス多クノ事件ガ是等ノ内閣ノ存在中發生シ、遂ニ私ニ對スル暗殺未遂ガ一九三六年（昭和十一年）二月行ハレ、ソノ結果私ノ義弟デアル松尾氏ガ私ト間違エラレテ暗殺セラレタノデアリマス。

此ノ事件ハ陸軍ノ野心ニ對スル當時ノ政府ノ同情缺如ニ對シ陸軍ノ青年將校ノ一團ガ抱イテ居タ怨ノ自然的勃發デアリマシタ。之ハ私ガ主宰スル内閣ガ陸軍ヲ取締ルノニ無力デアルト言フ事ヲ幾分か公然ニ表示シタルモノデアアル爲陸下ニトツテハ困惑的情勢デアリマシテ、一九三六年（昭和十一年）三月私ノ主宰スル内閣ハ遂ニ辭職シタノデアリマス。滿洲占領後、一九三二年（昭和七年）ノ初頭ニ所謂獨立政府ガ樹立サレテ、ソノ獨立ハ同年九月日本ニヨツテ想像的ニハ承認セラレタノデアリマスガ、關東軍ガ實質上ノ政府デアリマシタ。此ノ政府ハ關東軍ニヨリ完全ニ支配且操縦セラレテ居マシタ。當時日本政府ハ關東軍ノ計畫及行動ニ關全然知ル道ガナカツタノデアリマス。陸軍



ハ完全ニ日本政府ノ支配外ニアリ、ソシテ此ノ状態ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）ニ大戦勃發迄續イタノデアリマス。此ノ事ハ列國間ニ於ケル日本ノ指導的立場ノ爲ニ遺憾千萬ニシテ恥辱的ナ事デアリ且アツタ。私ハ之ニヨツテ言ヒ盡サレナイ心配ト苦悶ヲ感ジマシタ。日本ハ非常ナ不正ヲ受ケタノデアリマス。

岡田啓介

右岡田啓介ハ一九四六年（昭和二十一年）五月二十九日陸軍省ビル内ニテ本官ノ面前ニテ宣誓ノ上本供述書ニ署名セリ

聯合國軍最高指揮官總司令部  
國際檢察部執行官  
騎兵中佐 テオドア、グールスビ

證明書

予、高橋亘ハ次ノ如ク證明ス。

予ハ日英兩國語ニ通曉シ且本日前記供述書ヲ前記岡田啓介ニ日本語ニテ讀聞カセリ。之ヲ爲スニ當リ予ハ前記供述書ノ内容ヲ英語ヨリ日本語ニ忠實且正確ニ譯セリ。前記岡田ハ該供述書ノ内容ハ眞實ニシテ、彼ハ該供述書ヲ宣誓ノ下ニ喜ビ署名スルト述べタリ。前記岡田ハ予ノ面前ニテ正式ニ宣

誓シ且該供述書ヲ宣誓ノ下ニ予ノ面前ニテ署名セ  
リ。該宣誓ヲ爲シ、且該供述書ニ署名スルニ就イ  
テノ凡テノ手續ハ日本語ヨリ英語ニ、又英語ヨリ  
日本語ニ忠實且正確ニ譯セラレ、該供述者ニヨリ  
充分理解且了解セラレタリ。

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）五月二十九日

日本東京ニ於テ

高 橋 亘

#1749

Translated by  
Mitsuki SADAHARU

予等は合衆國其他對荒木貞夫其他訴訟事件

供述書

松岡田啓介ハ宣誓ノ上テ通リ供述致シタル

一八七七年

明治元年日本國福井縣ニ生レシタノ一八九九年

明治廿二年海軍兵學校ヲ卒業シテ以來大正九年

ニ至ル迄日本海軍ニ人トシテテノ職ヲ奉ジマシタ

明治廿七年一廿八年

浪速艦分隊長 後ニ同艦分隊長  
(東郷海軍大將指揮下)

明治四一年

海軍大佐ニ昇進

大正三年

鹿島艦長ニ補セラレル

大正三年

海軍少將ニ昇進シ佐世保鎮  
守府司令官ニ補セラレル

大正六年

海軍中將昇進し佐母保鎮守府司令長官に補せられた。

一九二〇年

大正九年

一九二六年

大正九年より昭和十一年迄、湖之木八郎

日本政府及海軍部内、職を奉じたり。

大正九年

海軍次官

②

大正十三年

海軍大将に昇進し、軍事参議官に補せられた。

今年十二月

聯合艦隊司令長官に補せられた。

昭和二年

横須賀鎮守府司令長官に補せられた。

今年

田中内閣、海軍大臣

昭和四年七月

内閣に共ニ辞任し、軍事参議官に補せられた。

昭和七年

斎藤内閣、海軍大臣

昭和八年一月 同職ヲ辞任、豫備役ニ编入セリ

昭和九年三月 内閣總理大臣

和八、  
海軍大臣、四年内閣、海軍大臣、軍事

参議官、新藤内閣、海軍大臣及内閣總理

大臣、諸職ヲ奉ジ、  
(一九三〇年) (大正九年) (一九三六年) (昭和十一年)

一期百中、  
是等諸職、職務ヲ執行

職責

シノ事勢ヲ果ス目的ヲ以テ、時局問題、出来事

論争及事件等、  
固シキ事ヲテ精通シテ置ク為

凡ソ公的情報機關ヲ使用スル義務ヲ持テ、

且之ヲ使用シテテアリ、  
斯ニ情報ノ経路ハ就中

私、各幕僚、幹部、行政官及職員カラスノ

報告及是等ノ人々トノ協議、閣僚トノ協議

是等ノ諸問題ニ関シテ、閣下ト同務ニ同ジ情報

出所ヲ持ツテ居テ各首相、議會人及其他

ノ官吏トノ協議、閣議、聯絡會議、軍

事會議官、其他、政府機關、會議並

政府、公報、発表等ヲ含メテ居タリテ

③ カクテ得テ情報ニ基キ、物ハソノ職責ヲ

果スニ當リ時局問題及論争点ニ関シテ

ハ、ソノ時ノ情況ニ於テ適宜適當ト認メテ

レタ公的措置ヲ取ラント努力且取ツテ  
ノヲアリマス。

私加田中内閣、海軍大臣トシテ在任中

（自昭和二年至同四年）日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ

<sup>緊要ナ</sup>事ヲ<sup>ナ</sup>權益ヲ條約協定等ニヨリ獲得

ニタト稱シテアリマス。田中内閣ノ政策ハ

滿洲、官憲トノ協力ニヨリテ是等ノ權益

ヲ最大限ニ擴張シテ見セシタル事ナリキ

也。此ノ政策ヲ滿洲ニ對シテ施行及適用

スルニ當リ田中内閣ハ~~其~~前内閣ヨリハ大ニ

強硬的、肯定的及積極的でありませう。

此、目論見の固い田中ハ、当時滿洲

事實上、統治者であり元帥であつた。

張作霖下協力し且彼ヲ利用せんと企てた

ノテありませう。張作霖ハ日本、<sup>諸</sup>要求、中

多<sup>ク</sup>數ノモノニ反対であつたけれどモ、田中

<sup>張作霖ニ對シ</sup>彼<sup>が</sup>滿洲ニ於て首領トシテハ地位ヲ維持ス

ル為日本ハ彼ヲ援助スル<sup>ニ</sup>カモ知レナイ

ト言フ交渉權益取引權ヲ持つて居たり

アリマス。日本ハ~~張作霖~~張作霖ニ對シ~~相~~援助



特ニ五ニ五年(右正十四年) 郭松齡 叛亂

事件ニ関シテ相者ノ援助ヲ與ヘテ居リテ

アリマス。

田中内閣ハ張作霖ニ對スル援助及

加力ニヨリテ滿洲ニ於テ日本ノ權益拡大

ガ相者ニ進捗シテ居ルト考ヘテアリマス。充

田中ハ常ニ張作霖ニ對シ彼が滿洲ニ

帰還 ~~シテ~~ 滿洲問題ニ專念スルヲ望ム

ト言フ立場ヲ取リ且シテ彼ニ警告シタリ

アリマス。

一九二八年(昭和三年) 張作霖軍が國民黨の

ニヨリ敗北ヲ喫シタ時、田中ハ(再)張ニ對シ

手遅レトナラヌ内ニ彼ノ軍隊ヲ滿洲ニ撤退

セシト勸告シタリ(此際)張作霖將軍ハソノ

當惑セル軍事的立場ニ鑑ミ巴リヲ得ヌ

此ノ勸告ヲ受入レタリタリ

此時ニ到リテ奉天ニ司令部ヲ置ク本庄

(將軍)

~~張~~ 麾下ノ日本軍ハ田中内閣、滿洲ニ於ケ

ル日本ノ權益ニ因リ張作霖ト協力交渉スル

ト言フ田中内閣ノ政策ニ對シテ不滿ヲ抱ク

ヤウナリ且交渉ヲ待タズテ武カヲ以テ

滿洲ヲ占領セント待テ兼テ居ヨク。

此ノ軍ハ或一旅又ハ一團<sup>將校ノ</sup>ハ本庄將軍

ヲ全ク隔離シ軍務ニ関スル通信カヲ遮斷

シテ還リテ後張作霖カ歸滿スルニ際シ

彼ヲ殺害スル陰謀ヲ企テタノテ了

リクス、彼等ハ張作霖カ旅行シテ居ル列車

ヲ奉天外ニテ軌道ニニ將<sup>佐掛カク遣イテ</sup>炸裂

物ヲ以テ破壊シコウト準備シタリ。

此ノ計畫通り張作霖ハ殺害セラル。

内閣軍一隊を(得)企てし且実行せられ

此、事件、政府、政策樹立ニ(自)実生(ト)ス

ル軍、最初、歴然、先行為、チアリマシタ。此、

事件ハ、滿洲ニ関スル、田中内閣、政策ヲ

著ク、困感(且)不利ナリシトシ、~~其~~

~~事~~田中内閣、辭職ヲ余儀ナクシテ危

機ヲ生セシメタリテアリマス。内閣ハ直ニ此ノ事

件ノ發生ヲ知り、全ク~~其~~不意ヲ打レテ

非常ニ(復)慮シマシタ。田中首相ハ之ヲ

非常ニ遺憾トシ、(且)容易ナラザルモノトシテ

閣中ニ考内ニ陛下ニ~~御~~詳細ニ報告ヲ

上奏スヨリ。官中カラ帰邸スルヤ首相

(田中)ハ陸軍大臣(白川大將)ト私ヲ協議ニ

招来。陛下ガ彼(田中)ニ~~此~~今ヲ~~陸軍ニ對シテ~~

強硬ナル懲戒處分ヲ取ルベキ時デアリ。

且陛下モ~~彼~~充タル措置ガ取ヲ

~~レニ~~期待スルト仰セラレテ我々ニ告ゲマシヨ。

彼(田中)ハ陸軍内ノ軍紀ヲ守ル爲ニ適

當ナル措置ヲ取ルベク決心シテト述ベマシヨ。

陸軍大臣(白川大將)ト私ハ田中首相ノ決意ニ

対<sup>シテ</sup>滿腔ノ支持ヲ表明<sup>ス</sup>ニ<sup>シテ</sup>併<sup>ニ</sup>今<sup>ノ</sup>陸軍

<sup>大臣が</sup>此ノ事ヲ陸軍省<sup>ニ</sup>取<sup>リ</sup>上<sup>ゲ</sup>タ<sup>ト</sup>キ、考謀本部

員ヤ他ノ陸軍將校<sup>等</sup>ヲ猛烈<sup>ニ</sup>反對<sup>シ</sup>テ

シテ結果<sup>ハ</sup>彼<sup>ハ</sup>何等<sup>ノ</sup>進歩<sup>ヲ</sup>得<sup>ナ</sup>カ<sup>リ</sup>タ<sup>リ</sup>

テ<sup>アリ</sup>タ<sup>リ</sup>。陸軍大臣<sup>ハ</sup>田中<sup>ト</sup>私<sup>ニ</sup>カ<sup>ク</sup>報告

シ且<sup>ニ</sup>此<sup>ノ</sup>陸軍<sup>ノ</sup>此<sup>ノ</sup>反對<sup>ハ</sup>右<sup>ノ</sup>事件<sup>ニ</sup>付<sup>テ</sup>責<sup>ヲ</sup>負

フ<sup>ヘ</sup>キ者<sup>ノ</sup>處<sup>ニ</sup>罰<sup>ヲ</sup>措<sup>置</sup>テ取<sup>ル</sup>事<sup>ハ</sup>陸軍<sup>ガ</sup>當

時<sup>内</sup>証<sup>ニ</sup>シ<sup>テ</sup>置<sup>キ</sup>タイ<sup>ノ</sup>或<sup>レ</sup>事<sup>ヲ</sup>社会<sup>ニ</sup>曝<sup>露</sup>スル

事<sup>ヲ</sup>ナル<sup>ト</sup>言<sup>フ</sup>見<sup>解</sup>ニ基<sup>キ</sup>テ居<sup>ル</sup>ト述<sup>ベ</sup>タ<sup>リ</sup>

其<sup>レ</sup>後<sup>ノ</sup>間<sup>ニ</sup>モナ<sup>ク</sup>テ田中<sup>ハ</sup>此<sup>ノ</sup>問題<sup>ヲ</sup>

掃蕩スル為に物ヲケテ呼ビテ、本事項ニ對シテ何等ノ

處置ヲ取ルベシヲ企テ思フトスルト告ゲルヲ知ル私ハ

是ニ對シテ<sup>(b)</sup> 贊意ヲ表シマシキガ、陸軍

總式處分ニ對スル陸軍ノ反對ハ餘リニモ

強硬ヲアツタ爲、田中モ成シ得ナカ

ツタフテヤリマス。此ノ時既ニ此ノ問題及陸軍

又政界ニ於テモ

ノ態度ハ~~海~~閣外ニ於テ論議~~課~~ヲ

セラレルニ到リテ、陸軍ヲ取締リ懲戒ニ得ナイ

内閣ノ無能力ハ内閣~~ヲ~~一九二九年(昭和四年)

七月一日内閣ノ辭職ヲ餘儀ナクニヌレタ。

張作霖殺害，後滿洲之國之政府，

政策樹立之考慮盡之其國之限之陸

軍，勢力ハ漸次強化セラル。一九二九年

昭和四年七月一日田中内閣ノ瓦解ナリ

一九三二年(昭和七年)斎藤内閣ノ成立迄ノ

期間中ハ軍事考議官トシ奉職シタル

此期間中ハ和郵ニ訪レ又ハ公的或ハ

私交的集リテ會ツタ在任中ノ大臣其他ノ

政治家及官吏ト。武力ニヨリテ滿洲ニ日本ノ

傀儡政府ヲ樹立スル以外ニ滿洲問題ハ



決して解決出来ナイトスル陸軍ノ理念ニ付

肉ノ日本政府内ノ或人々が持つ重々肉心

ヲ協議ニシテ事か屢々アリマシク。和ハ

陸軍ノ傾向トシテヲ取締リ得ナイ政府ノ

無力ニ付非常ニ憂慮シマシク。陸軍が

滿洲占領ヲ取掛ル事ハ軍ニ時召ノ問題

ヲアソトハ國事ニ肉心ヲ持テ居テ凡テ人々

ニ明カニ此ノ期下中ニ明ラカトナラセテアリ

マス。一九三一年(昭和六年)ノ初頭ニ私ハ陸軍

が滿洲國占領ノ基礎トナシ得ル事事件ヲ

余于居ん卜言ヲ報告ヲ多数ニシテシト

同時ニ大川周明公南演説及出版物ニヨリ

陸軍ノ斯ル行部ヲ支持スル輿論ヲ造リ

上ゲントスル宣傳ヲ行フヲ居ハニシテ私ハ

大川が海軍兵學校テ此ノ格ナ講演ヲ為シ

タト同イタ時ノ困惑ヲ想ヒ生レマス。何トナルボ

斯ル人が生徒ノ前テ話ヲスル事ヲ許サレタ

ト言フ事ハ私ハ特ニ腹立レク思ヒタリト

一九三二年(昭和七年)斎藤内閣ノ海軍大臣

ニ就任致レマシタ時私ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)

九月十八日發生之夕事件ハ閩東軍ノ一派<sup>カ</sup>  
 計畫之用意ニ夕事。且同事件ハ其後陸軍  
 加滿洲占領ニ採<sup>付</sup>ツタ行爲ヲ正當トスル程ノ  
 重大性ヲ持ツテ居ナカワタト言フ事ヲ

最近ノ數ヶ月ニ起<sup>起</sup>ツタ事件ニ精通スル爲ニ  
 要求スル受ケタ報告及關係其他ノ官  
 吏トノ會議及會議等ヨリ承知致シセシメ  
 此ノ期目ノ數年間陸軍ノ政府ノ取締リカラ  
 全<sup>全</sup>離レ、何等ノ拘束モ受ケナカワタノ事  
 アリ。此ノ情報ハ私が當時田中内閣瓦解

カウ新藤内閣~~樹立~~<sup>成</sup>迄、期百ニ~~至~~<sup>於</sup>

當時ノ新聞報道、政府発表及<sup>他</sup>官吏

トノ接觸等ニヨリ入手ノ情報ニ

ヨリテ補足セラル確証セラルコトナリ。此點ニモ

述ベタ通り陸軍が武力ニヨリテ滿洲ヲ

占領スル行動ニ出ル~~ル~~ハ軍ニ時百ノ間

題アリアルト言フ事ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)ノ初

頭<sup>ニ於テ</sup>~~ニ~~政府筋ハ~~想~~<sup>定</sup>ニ~~至~~テ居テ事

實テアリマス。和ハ大川周明が當時内閣軍、

此ノ行動ト明ニ關係ニテ居ント知ツテ居ルヲ知

名ハ思ハ出スセシカ

周東軍、青年將校モ多ク之ニ關係ス

居リマシキ。一九三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日ノ

所謂

奉天ノ事件ヲ契機トシテ滿洲占領ハ同年

ノ後期ニ行ハレマシキガ、其日本ノ賢明ナ

官公吏ハ之ニヨリ不意ヲ打タレマシキヲ以テ

ニ居リ凡テ日本軍ハ直ニ行脚ニ移リマシ

タ。此ノ中ニハ ~~國境~~ 勅裁ヲ經ス

國境ヲ越エ占領ニ參加スル朝鮮軍モ信

スレテ居リタル之ハ當時政府部内ニ深刻

ト問題トナツタ「越境」事件ト知ラレ居ラス

以上ノ事實ノ中、或物ニ因テハソノ發生以前

(具體的ニ)

又ハ同時ニ於テ直接間イタノテハアリセシ

ガ、是等ノ各事實ニ因テハ發生ニ際即時ノ

期日ニ公式ノ経路ヲ通リテ知リコトナリ。

是等ノ事實ハ吾時政府部内ニ於テ一般ニ

認めラレタ事實及前提トナリ、之ニ基キテ

官公使ハ公式措置ヲトワタノテアリヌ。

私ハ海軍大臣トシテ奉職ニタ

一九三三年(昭和七年)五月成立ノ前藤内閣

一九三四年(昭和九年)七月生シタ私ノ内閣

ハ政府及陸軍部内ニハ「海軍内閣」ト

知ラレテ居マシク。亜細亞ニ於ケル日本勢力ノ

拡大ニ因聯シテ武力ヲ行使セントスル陸軍

此ニツ

ノ政策ニ反対スル海軍勢力ヲ軍警ノ

内閣ニ認マルト理由テ陸軍ハ之ヲ怒ニク

ノテアリマス。海軍ガ是等ノ内閣ヲ組織スル

事ヲ頼ミタリハ武力行使ニ因リテ陸軍ノ

我儘ヲ阻止センカ為テアツテ事ヲ陸軍ハ

知ラテ居リ。是等ノ内閣ノ存在中陸軍ハ政

府内ニ於ケル海軍勢力ヲ打倒スル努力

ヲ續ケタリテアリマス。陸軍ノコノ怒ヲ示ス

多クノ事件が是等ノ内閣ノ存在ニ発生

之ノ遂ニ私ニ討スル暗殺（朱遂）一九三六年（昭和十一年）

二月行ハレ、ソノ結果私ノ義弟松尾氏（合アル）カ

私ト同達エラレテ暗殺セラレタリテアリマス

此ノ事件ハ陸軍ノ野心ニ討スル當時ノ政

府ノ同情缺如ニ討スル陸軍之青年將校

ノ一團が抱イテ居タ然心ノ自然的勃発ヲ

アリマス之ハ私ガ主宰スル内閣が陸軍ヲ

取締ルルニ無カシアルト書ク事ヲ幾分か公然

ニ表示シタモノデアル為陸下ニトツテハ困惑



の情勢がテアリマシキ

~~私~~

~~内閣~~ ~~辭職~~ 一九三六年 昭和十一年 三月 ~~辭職~~

私、主筆スル内閣ハ辭職ニシテアリマス

滿洲占領後 一九三二年 昭和七年 〇 和

頭ニ所謂獨立政府が樹立サレテソノ獨

想像的ニハ

五ハ同年九月日本ニヨリテ承認セ

ラタノテアリマスガ 満東軍が實際上政府

テアリマスガ此ノ政府ハ満東軍ニヨリ完全

ニ支配 ~~且~~ 採從セウレテ居マシキ 當時

日本政府ハ満東軍ノ計畫及行動ニ関全然

知ル道がテカツタノヲアリマス。陸軍ハ完全

ニ日本政府ノ支配外ニアリ、ソレテ此ノ状態

ハ五四年(昭和十六年)ニ大戦勃発迄續

イタノテアリマス。此ノ事ハ列國ニ於ケル日本

ノ指導的立場ノ爲ニ遺憾千萬ニシテ

恥辱<sup>的</sup>テアリ且アツタ。私ハ之ニヨツラ言ヒ盡

サレナイ心配ト苦悶ヲ感ジマシタ。日本ハ

非常ナ不正ヲ受ケタノテアリマス。

岡田啓介


右岡田啓介ハ本官ノ前ニテ宣稱元ノ上奏供

一九四六年(昭和廿一年)五月廿九日陸軍省ビル内ニシテ

球書の署名セリ。

聯合國  
聯合軍最高總司令部  
國際檢察部執行官

騎兵中佐  
テオトア  
グールスビー



証明書

予、高橋直ハ珍、如ク証明ス。

予ハ日英兩國語ヲ通曉ニ且本日

前記供述書ヲ前記岡田終今ニ日本語

ニテ讀南カ<sup>セリ</sup>。之ヲ局スニ告リ予ハ

前記供述書ノ内容ヲ英語ヨリ日本語ニ

~~忠~~忠実且正確ニ譯セリ。前記岡田ハ

該供述書ノ内容ハ~~忠実~~ニテ

彼ハ該供述書ヲ宣誓<sup>喜ビ</sup>下ニ署名スルト<sup>喜ビ</sup>求ベタリ。

前記岡田ハ予ノ前ニテ正式ニ宣誓シ且該

予ノ面前ニテ

供述書ヲ宣讀スル下ニ署名セリ。該宣讀

ヲ爲スルニ續且該供述書ヲ

署名スルニ就キテ凡テ手續ハ日本語

又英語ヨリ日本語ニ

ヨリ英語ニ忠實且正確ニ譯セラレ該

供述者ニヨリ充分理解且了解セリ

レタリ。

一九四六年（昭和廿一年）五月廿九日

日本東京ニ於テ

ワタシ

高橋百